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Meta-for

by

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of
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Keene, New Hampshire



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Dedication

In Memoriam

Joseph Vincent Pignatiello, Jr.
26 April 1985–12 February 2012

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Abstract

A clinician is entrusted with the difficult task of organizing, integrating, and formulating a vast amount of information provided by a patient in order to conduct therapy. Typically, a theoretical paradigm is employed in this endeavor. This paper constructs a theory of theoretical paradigms—a meta-theory—to understand better how clinicians organize and understand patient information. The theory of theory posits that theoretical paradigms function as complex metaphors developed within a culture. The argument presented here utilizes research from various areas of psychology—including those focusing on cognitive research, psycholinguistics, and philosophy of theory—to develop the meta-theory. The central thesis of this research is that theoretical paradigms function as metaphors, which were developed within a given historical-cultural context.

Keywords: Meta-theory, theoretical paradigms, metaphor, psycholinguistics

Meta-for

Chapter 1

*Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life,
not just in language but in thought and action*

(Lakoff & Johnson, 2003)

A clinician is entrusted with the difficult task of organizing, integrating, and formulating a vast amount of information provided by a patient in order to conduct therapy. Theoretical paradigms are used in order to inform and accomplish this task. Each paradigm draws on a unique lexicon yet functions similarly at a meta-linguistic level. The present research examines how metaphors function (linguistically and conceptually) and develops a theory of theory. To do this, information from various bodies in the psychological sciences were integrated, including those focusing on cognitive research, psycholinguistics, psychoanalytic thought, and philosophy of theory. As such, the central thesis of this research is that theoretical paradigms function as metaphors, and that the language that comprises each paradigm is metaphoric.

Stemming from this central thesis are the following goals: (a) examine the utility of metaphors and how they functioned, (b) explore how theoretical paradigms served as complex metaphors, (c) develop a theory of theory based on the aforementioned research goals, (d) understand the implications for the application of theory in research and clinical practice, and (e) provide researchers with future directions for scholarly inquiry. By serving as metaphors, theoretical paradigms generate a continuity of ideas and imagery that provide the clinician with flexibility to make sense of a multitude of experiences. The focus of this research includes an elaboration on semiotics (how words convey meaning), metaphor (how linguistic and conceptual comparisons facilitate meaning making), and theory construction (how the linguistic aspects of

theory utilize metaphor to organize and convey vast amounts of information). A review of the literature will expose the reader to how metaphors differ from literal speech. Concepts such as how multiple metaphors interact with one another introduce the reader to intended areas of exploration. The methodology details the processes needed to develop a theory of theoretical paradigms.

Rationale

Clinicians utilize theoretical paradigms as a means to conceptualize clinical information and formulate interventions. Theoretical paradigms also permit one clinician to convey a plethora of data to another in a concise yet informative manner. Functionally, theories serve as metaphors to make conceptualization and information sharing coherent. Here it is proposed that theories are composed of a system of interacting metaphors that not only organize the language of the theory, but also influences how the clinician makes meaning from lived experiences. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) and Punter (2007), for instance, explained that metaphors convey meaning by transferring knowledge about one thing, event, or experience onto another thing, event, or experience that is more nebulous and not as well understood. For example, in understanding how one becomes depressed, a theory (which is proposed to function as a metaphor) transfers one's understanding of conflict or faulty machinery onto the more nebulous construct of depression. A theoretical paradigm does so by relying on multiple interacting metaphors, which provide an organized language to describe *aspects* of the human experience. As such, the theory then becomes a metaphor for how one experiences and views lived experiences.

In order to understand how theoretical paradigms function, the research on consciousness, psycholinguistics, and metaphor formed the structure of this research's central

thesis. What followed was a set of guidelines for the aforementioned argument: For a theory to function as a metaphor, it must (a) transfer meaning from a better known idea or experience onto a lesser known idea or experience in order to create meaning, (b) avoid the use of terms such as *like* and *analogous to* because these explicit terms create relationships known as *similes* and *analogies*, and (c) be organized in a coherent manner so that one can derive meaning from the theory. From this understanding, I utilized a “case example” of psychoanalytic theory to elucidate how theoretical paradigms are composed of, and serve as metaphors. I also explained how the types of metaphors embedded within psychoanalytic writing are linked to their clinical constructs. It should be noted that psychoanalytic theory was neither explained in inordinate detail nor critiqued for strengths and weaknesses. The purpose of this research was ultimately to elucidate the function of theory, how the figurative language of theory evoked meaning, and what were the implications for examining theory in this manner.

One may ask, “Why should theoretical paradigms be examined in this manner?” The importance of this research is multifaceted. First, we are influenced—be it behaviors, feelings, or thoughts—by language. However, there is not a comprehensive understanding of how a theory’s language evokes meaning to guide clinical practice. The language of a theory and its structure influence how the clinician understands human experience, which partially governs how the clinician approaches clinical practice. The evocativeness and figurative aspects of language vary from theory to theory. While a clinician “translates” a presenting problem into different theoretical paradigms, the clinician’s praxis also changed accordingly. This present research served as a useful stepping-stone for future researchers to explore the impact that the *language* of their chosen theory has on their practice—as opposed to how a clinician’s theoretical paradigm

influences her or his *techniques*, such as the use of metaphors, hypnosis, directive teaching, or empathy, in therapy (cf. Cook, Biyanova, Elhia, Schnurr, & Coyne, 2010; Geslo, 1995).

Second, there are pedagogical implications for understanding a theory's language as figurative as opposed to literal; including whether such language is suitable for hypothesis testing or what meaning can be gained by understanding the language as metaphor. Third, by understanding the meaning that is conveyed through the figurative and connotative elements of a theory's language, professionals can develop a greater understanding of the biases inherent in the theory. This is important given the fact that the American Psychological Association (APA) touts that psychologists must be aware of their biases. Understanding one's ethnic and racial biases or the sources of one's countertransference are helpful, yet, the very language that we use to approach our work undoubtedly creates leanings and biases as well. For instance, describing depression as being the result of a personified object is very different than describing it as resulting from a faulty piece of machinery. This inevitably guides how a clinician engages the therapeutic process with the patient, particularly, the language used within the therapy session, within the progress note, or just simply thinking about the case and future directions. This research served as a foundation to understand the figurative elements of various theoretical paradigms.

It seems fitting that the clinician is made aware of the language that is guiding her or his approach to conducting therapy, and this research intended to illuminate the metaphoric structure inherent in the language of theory, which ultimately guides the clinician's practice. This notion goes beyond the idea of a theory merely providing ideas to guide practice. It also extends beyond developing another theoretical paradigm to be placed into clinical efficacy studies. Rather, it is a more nuanced understanding of how Psychology's theoretical paradigms are utilized in

education, research, and practice. Much of the research in psychology has focused on the effectiveness of a theory or process on a given psychological or behavioral construct like depression, psychological growth, or overt behaviors through case studies, quasi-experimental designs, or randomized-controlled trials. This research was aimed at exploring the types of elements that comprised the language of a theory and the implications for understanding these elements as metaphorical, as opposed to literal.

Conceptual Framework

To understand how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors, it is imperative that one understands how language—the medium by which our theoretical paradigms are conveyed—creates reality. For this research the following two ontological assumptions that were made regarding how figurative language evoked meaning in theoretical paradigms: (a) language is a form of agreed communication between two or more individuals, and (b) language is interpreted by an individual based upon his or her lived experiences. These ontological assumptions are rooted in social constructionism and phenomenology, respectively. It was not the purpose of this research to affirm one perspective over another, but to view language as a complex construct that has a significant impact on how one understands the world.

To understand how the social constructionist and phenomenological perspectives guided this research, it was essential to understand what these philosophical underpinnings represented. Both social constructionism and phenomenology have ontological and epistemological assumptions. Meaning, they frame what something is (ontology), and how one comes to know something (epistemology) (Hofweber, 2012; Smith, 2011). Each frame, social constructionism and phenomenology, differs in terms of explicating the bases of ontology and epistemology.

However, the two are complementary and appropriate frames for working with the linguistic devices of theory.

Social constructionism. Gergen (2007) stated that dialog occurs within a relationship, be it a relationship with another, or oneself. He also stated that it is the relationship that provides the context and meaning to the language used to create the dialog. If the reader considers that a relationship can be created not just between individuals, but also with objects or constructs, then one can understand how society impacts the individual. For instance, the term society can be understood through the ecological developmental lens of Bronfenbrenner (1979, 2005), who explained that we engage in bidirectional interactions with the values, language, and beliefs that are disseminated through other ecological systems including the media, schools, parents, and peers. We “know” what is beautiful based on what is portrayed in the media and enacted amongst friends, just as we “know” what is good literature based on what we learn in school or what is popular amongst peers. Our interaction with these aforementioned systems, in turn, influences society to develop a worldview. In essence, there is a relationship formed between the individual and the collective (society) through other individuals, groups, organizations, and systems. What is noteworthy here is that an individual develops based on his or her interaction with others, from which norms and ways of knowing are generated and perpetuated. Gergen postulated that our notions of right and wrong, good and evil, fact and fiction, are constructed based on our interactions with society. Gergen also expressed that writing (in reference to academia) is also a relationship, but one that is formed between the reader and the author, whereby the two, through the writing, develop a shared language and sense of meaning. In psychology and psychiatry, these discursive relationships between reader and author are formed

in an attempt to approximate human experience with a lexicon, which can be dubbed as a theory, model, or hypothesis.

Given the ineffability of the human experience, these theorists utilized the language available within their respective sociohistorical contexts—the language, values, proscriptions, beliefs, and knowledge of a society at a particular time—to develop constructs to guide the process between the analyst/therapist/clinician and the analysand/patient/client.¹ Even with these terms, one can see how groups of individuals within the field of psychology have socially constructed meaning regarding language to describe the same two people within a therapeutic context—the individual conducting therapy and the individual engaging in therapy. Depending on one's training, specific terms are favored over others. Consider the differences in language and approach between those trained in the medical model and those trained in the humanist model of clinical work (cf. Gurman & Messer, 2003). A theorist living in 19th Century Austria would be influenced by a sociohistorical context that is quite different from that of a theorist living in 20th Century America. The ideas and constructs postulated by these respective theorists would represent the language, proscriptions, beliefs, and societal worldview that given point in history. This context is created within the frame of the scholarly work. The figurative use of language, structure of this research, and conclusions drawn, express the sociohistorical context in which this research was conducted. To elucidate, consider the scholarly articles that were written during this research sociohistorical context. The *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association 6th Edition* (American Psychological Association, 2010) outlines the format for the paper (introduction, methodology, results, discussion); encourages authors to

¹ It should be noted here that, for brevity's sake, the terms *clinician* and *patient* will be utilized throughout this manuscript. This is merely a preference to avoid confusion and redundancy. The use of any other terminology will be elucidated within the context of analyzing the language of the theory (i.e., the use of the term *analysand* in psychoanalysis).

utilize clear, precise language that does not rely on poetic and figurative phrasing; and encourages authors to utilize neutral language that is multiculturally sensitive. Contrast that with Freud's (1923/1960) *The Ego and the Id*. The phrase "the ego ideal is the heir to the Oedipus complex" (Freud, 1923/1960, p. 32) is a prime, illustrative example of figurative language. Even if the concepts of ego ideal and the Oedipus complex are understood as literal—these are physical constructs that could be examined—for one to be the heir of another is implausible. Rather, the poetic language may evoke very different images and associations than if it were written as "The ego ideal is the set of beliefs that results from the Oedipus complex." Freud, it will be argued, lived in a sociohistorical context that permitted the use of more evocative language and, thus, influenced how a clinician would understand and approach the practice of therapy.

What is important to understand from the above example is the author's relationship with society and this relationship duly influenced how he viewed the world. As previously mentioned, individuals develop relationships with society through peers, colleagues, media, etc. Gergen (2007) explained how language and dialog influence an individual's perception of the world. Therefore, within a particular society and time period, an individual will develop a psychology that is unique, which includes a vernacular as well as a set of morals, proscriptions, and social norms (cf. Bronfenbrenner, 1979, 2005; Gergen, 2007). This intersection of human development and societal relationships is what yields a sociohistorical context. One's worldview is conveyed in subtle but sometimes obvious ways. The reader of this scholarly work may develop a relationship with the author and his sense of meaning making. Simultaneously, the reader has a worldview based on his or her relationship with society at a particular point in time. Essentially,

both reader and author develop meaning through their relationships with different systems (cf. Bronfenbrenner, 2005).

Within the context of theory development, a theory is created during a particular sociohistorical context and serves as substitute for the non-physical entities of thought, emotion, process, experience, and meaning. It was argued that the development of these constructs relied on what was already known at the time, to convey meaning between the theorist and the reader through language. In particular, these constructs served as metaphors. Thus, social negotiations occurred through discourse to determine what was “real” regarding the human experience and meaning making.

Phenomenology. The second ontological assumption of this research was rooted in phenomenology and focused on the hermeneutic process of reading and interpreting the linguistic elements of theory. The term *hermeneutics* describes the process of understanding and interpreting symbolic forms of communication, whether it is linguistic, or non-linguistic (Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2005). Hermeneutics is a process of individualized interpretation of symbols and language, and it serves as an important aspect of phenomenological inquiry. *Phenomenology* is a philosophy rooted in Husserl’s work and is focused on an individual’s subjective experience (Robson, 2002). One of Husserl’s assumptions, according to Giorgi and Giorgi (2008), is that our world is interpreted through a filter of one’s lived experiences. Within the framework of Bronfenbrenner (2005), over time, an individual interacts with a myriad of individuals and systems. Each interaction is unique and no two individuals will ever have the same sets of experiences. As such, each individual will have different associations, memories, feelings, and experiences, which duly influence how that individual interprets the world.

Consider that when an individual hears, reads, or sees something, that individual may have associations to the stimulus. Given that every individual has a unique set of lived experiences, these associations will impact how an individual will interpret the stimulus. Phenomenology attempts to understand the conscious experience of the individual such as emotions and thoughts, as well as, the import of language and cultural influences/social practices as they relate to perception and interpretation (Smith, 2011).

This research focused on illuminating the evocative and figurative language embedded within theoretical paradigms, which was done by deconstructing the paradigm into its constituent metaphors. Understanding these linguistic tropes at the interface of social influence and personal experience is what underlies phenomenological inquiry. The ontological and epistemological assumptions of phenomenology—the unique way which humans have experiences and how they know what they know—are rooted in describing experience and something that theoretical paradigms attempt to capture. As such, this research was guided by a phenomenological hermeneutic process and, consequently serves as a hermeneutic of theoretical paradigms.

Conceptual framework summary. Psychology's theoretical paradigms, which serve as metaphors, create a dialogic meaning making process about the therapeutic work, as well as, a conceptualization of human experience. This socially constructed language is duly influenced by the manner in which an individual interprets the readings and teachings of the theorists. The phenomenological hermeneutic process results in individuals having different experiences to the language of the theory, which ultimately, influences the meaning that individuals derive from a given experience. What can be seen is that social constructionism and phenomenology comprise different layers of ways of knowing (epistemology) and being (ontology).

Theories are comprised of ideas that are organized and conveyed through language. The linguistic and symbolic elements of a theory, organize and convey ideas that are influenced by an individual's sociohistorical context in which the individual interacts and influences bidirectional. Bronfenbrenner's (2005) bioecological theory posits how one develops within a sociohistorical context and the manner in which one interacts within this context. That is, these interactions occur within nested systems ranging from the individual, to society, and how changes over time. A theoretician, therefore, develops a theory based on his or her interpretation of lived experiences, which are duly influenced by the social constructions generated between the theoretician and society. Subsequently, the theoretician conveys the theory through dialog with others through a language influenced by society and time (sociohistorical context). Meaning about what exists and what is known is illustrated by a theory through this language, which then engages others (e.g., readers) in a dialog.

For instance, psychoanalytic theory ² can be conceptualized as a socially constructed metaphor to explain how a society viewed human experience during the time of Freud. Freud's lived experiences and interactions with society influenced his own epistemology and ontology. When various individuals read Freud's works, differences began to arise because the interpretation of the metaphor (psychoanalytic theory) through the phenomenological hermeneutic process moved across sociohistorical contexts. Stated another way, individuals in different times and societies, interpreted psychoanalysis in ways that reflected their own lived experiences and the cultures. Those metaphors that were resonant with others became dialogic and, again, became a socially constructed concept. Psychoanalysis at the beginning of the 20th Century in Austria is different from psychoanalysis at the beginning of the 21st Century in the

² Note that the use of the terms *psychoanalysis*, *psychoanalytic theory*, and *psychoanalytic thought* are used to denote Freud's understanding of psychoanalytic theory. This distinction is made for the purpose of analyzing the language of the theory itself.

United States. It should be noted that although this would appear to be a linear process with ebb and flow, it is best to understand these as simultaneous processes that result in the ever-evolving language of psychology. As was argued, this process occurred because of the salience of the metaphor and the associations created when forming the metaphor itself.

Overview and Operational Definitions

To lay the foundation for understanding how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphor, it is essential to have an understanding of what metaphors are, what types of metaphors exist in the body of the psycholinguistic literature, and how metaphors are structured. What follows are operational definitions to delineate metaphor from other linguistic tropes. Operational definitions are also provided for how metaphors are linguistically created and socially defined.

Linguistic tropes. A metaphor uses a word or phrase to describe an object or action in terms of another. It is also a linguistic means to create symbolic or representative parallels between two concepts—especially abstract ones (Metaphor, 2009). Etymologically, the origin of the word *metaphor* is from Greek, *meta-* (across) and *-pherein* (to bear or carry), or simply to transfer or carry across (Metaphor, 2009; Metaphor, 2010a; Metaphor, 2010b). The term *metaphor* is in and of itself a metaphor, which may evoke an image of carrying meaning over a chasm and across a bridge from one person to another. Metaphors can serve as intrapersonal, referential devices that link information in the verbal and non-verbal systems (Ellenhorn, 1989). In this sense, metaphor is a linguistic device that links concepts together in ways that convey meaning in a manner that extends beyond literal language. For instance, a literal utterance would be “Margaret is standing next to a rock” while a metaphoric one would be “Margaret is a rock.” In the latter—unless someone has named a rock Margaret—the metaphor conveys a sturdiness of

Margaret's character by developing a relationship with attributes of a rock (e.g., sturdy and supportive).

Given that there are other linguistic tools, such as metonymy, analogy, and simile, the aforementioned definition of metaphor can be expanded and made more precise by indicating what a metaphor is not. A metaphor is not a *metonymy*, which is the process of substituting an attribute of something to serve in the place of that thing (Metonymy, 2009). For example, consider the phrase, "There are discussions with Washington" whereby the city of Washington, DC is substituted for the federal government of the United States. In this case, a relationship between Washington, DC and the Federal government is already established: The three branches of the United States government are headquartered in the federal district of Washington DC, which is commonly referred to as simply Washington.

Additionally, a metaphor is not an *analogy*, which is a comparison between two constructs, usually based on structure, and utilized for clarification (Analogy, 2009). Conceptually, an analogy relies on the notion that the two constructs under comparison share some similar structure. For instance, the chlorophyll found in plants *are analogous to* the photovoltaic cells in solar panels; males and females have analogous, anatomical structures (e.g., penis : clitoris :: scrotum : labia); and books and videos have analogous sections (e.g., table of contents : main menu :: references : end credits). What is important to understand is that to create an analogy, both objects under comparison must have similar conceptual, structural, or functional derivations and this comparison is made explicit through elaboration. This can be accomplished through pictures or language.

Finally, a metaphor is not a simile. A *simile* is a figure of speech that relies on making a comparison more vivid by utilizing conjunctions such as *like* or *as* (Simile, 2009). While similar

to a metaphor in being a figure of speech, the simile makes the comparison more explicit by using conjunctions or adverbs—*like* and *as*, respectively. For instance, “Laura’s eyes are *like* sapphires sparkling in the sun” is a simile while “Laura’s eyes *are* sapphires sparkling in the sun” is a metaphor. As can be seen in this example, the simile draws the comparison to the fore with the word *like* while the metaphor creates what could be construed as a literal or veridical utterance.

Some authors have posed that simile and metonymy are types of metaphors (Punter, 2007). Punter (2007) argued that simile is the simplest type of metaphor because the relationship between the two objects is explicitly labeled with *like* or *as*. As outlined by Glucksberg (2008), metaphors, when compared to similes, tend to elicit more emergent ideas that are functionally and conceptually different. Similarly, distinctions have been made between metonymy and metaphor. To elucidate, Deignan and Potter (2004) examined the corpus of literature on metaphor and metonymy. The authors found that in both English and Italian, there tends to be an interaction between metonymic and metaphoric statements in everyday speech, however, they are in fact distinct constructs. For the purpose of this research, simile, metonymy, and metaphor are understood as distinct linguistic structures given their differences in syntax, structure, and function.

Consider the following example to understand how excitable and energetic someone is: “Michael is a busy bee” (a metaphor). However, one would not say that “Michael’s nose is analogous to a busy bee’s antennae [the olfactory organ]” (an analogy) or that “Michael is *like* a busy bee” (a simile). Suffice to say, metaphor consists of two components, which are linked together to form a relationship that conveys meaning beyond what either component conveys alone. The meaning conveyed through metaphor is implicitly drawn by avoiding linking terms

such as *like* and *analogous to*. Similarly, metaphor does not convey meaning by substituting a word or expression for something else that bears a relationship to the word or expression (i.e., Washington, DC for the Federal government of the United States)—in fact, a metaphor can utilize two starkly different things to form a relationship over a single attribute (i.e., John is a rock.). None of these tropes, however, are literal utterances of speech. To interpret any of these statements as literal merely leads to a confusing understanding at best and a nonsensical understanding at worst (i.e., Margaret is actually a rock; Laura's eyes are actually sapphires; Michael is actually a bee that is busy; Someone is actually speaking to the federal district of Washington, DC). The meaning derived then comes from the extension of the relationship between what is already known, and what is yet known.

Structure of metaphors. Metaphors are linguistic devices that have structure and create and extend meaning by tying two ideas or concepts together. Various terms exist to describe the structure of a metaphor, which tend to differ more on lexical grounds than on pragmatic or functional grounds. While the actual words or symbols utilized to describe the structure of metaphor differ, the concepts that these words represent are quite similar. Although these terms will be described in greater detail, it is important to introduce the reader to the lexical variations in the literature regarding metaphor and its constructions. Different authors describe metaphors as what results from a relationship between two linguistic concepts. For instance, Jaynes (1976), in his book on consciousness and thought, used the terms *metaphrand* and *metaphier*; Kittay (1987) used the terms *vehicle* and *topic*; Black (1962 as cited in Kittay, 1987) used the terms *principle subject* and *subsidiary subject*. What follows is a detailed description of the various components of metaphor. The experience of love (one component of the metaphor) can be placed in a relationship to the experience of a journey (the second component of the metaphor) so that

one is used to provide meaning to the other. This is essential to note because if theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors, and if metaphors require two things, ideas, or experiences to be placed in a relationship with one another, then the reader must be able to decipher *what* is in a relationship with *what else* in terms of a theoretical paradigm. What follows will detail how things, ideas, people, or experiences can be placed into a relationship with one another and, moreover, how constructing metaphors generate meaning.

Metaphrand/Metaphier. Jaynes (1976) explains that a metaphrand is a lesser known construct placed in relation to the metaphier—a known or concretized concept. The metaphier, previously known experiences, has with it associated attributes known as paraphiers, which are displaced onto the metaphrand, creating paraphrands. To describe an individual who has strong work ethic and the capacity to not be overwhelmed, one may say that, “Burt is a workhorse.” The workhorse (the metaphier) is strong, diligent, and capable (the paraphiers). Burt’s personality (the metaphrand) is unknown and abstract but takes on the attributes associated with a workhorse, thus, creating paraphrands. The meaning derived about Burt’s personality comes from the metaphier operating on the metaphrand by, ultimately, displacing attributes of the metaphier (paraphiers) onto the metaphrand (paraphrands).

According to Jaynes (1970), language is one of the three bases of consciousness and relies heavily on metaphors in order to expand one’s understanding of what is *not* known by what is *already* known. It is noted that metaphors are dynamically created and continuously altered. When one metaphor can no longer explain a phenomenon, a new metaphor is created to take its place.

Vehicle/Topic. Kittay (1987) preferred the terms vehicle and topic when understanding the structure of metaphor. The vehicle is the phrase or word utilized to transport the content of an

idea, or the term to be understood metaphorically. The topic is the meaning of the text or the term to be understood literally. Her work builds off of Richard's 1936 work, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, which discusses vehicle and tenor. Black's 1962 work, *Models of Metaphor*, describes the similar constructs as the principle and subsidiary subjects (analogous to vehicle and topic). Given the similarity in structure, these authors will not be discussed but, nonetheless, credited. Kittay favors the term vehicle because of its linguistic similarities to metaphor (both indicating transporting or carrying). Using the earlier example of "Burt is a workhorse," Burt is the topic while workhorse is the vehicle. This may seem quite analogous to metaphrand/metaphier. And indeed, there are strong similarities. Kittay's conceptualization, however, includes that metaphors are the interaction of systems whereby a tension (difference) develops between the vehicle and topic.

Frame. The frame of the metaphor is the context, whether linguistic or contextual, that serves as the minimal unit to establish incongruity (Kittay, 1987). As noted previously, a tension must exist between the vehicle and the topic, and the frame is what produces the necessary tension for the metaphor to occur. Again, using "Burt is a workhorse," the frame is a complex set of clues that provide the necessary tension. Up till this point, the reader may note that Burt was never explicitly stated to be a person. The fact that this research is a doctoral dissertation in clinical psychology and focused on metaphors is what set the frame that Burt is a person; however, if this were a case study on equines as work animals, this statement could be understood as literal (a workhorse named Burt). Thus, there is a contextual frame that creates the metaphor, "Burt is a workhorse."

Consider another example, this time provided by Kittay (1987). *Slum is bloom*. In this case, the author indicates that tension exists between the processing of a flower blooming

(vehicle) and a slum (topic). When described as, “The slum is littered with bloom and ash” and placed in the context the Los Angeles riots, the metaphor disappears because the second, lesser known definition of bloom is unworked metal of puddled iron. As Kittay described, during the riots in Los Angeles, cars were set ablaze resulting in masses of iron (bloom) and ash. A *linguistic frame* is created if the syntax provides the tension needed to create a metaphor. For instance, “The slum *is a* bloom of ash” would provide explicit, lexical cues that *bloom* refers to a flower to serve as the vehicle. This is opposed to the literal utterance, “The slum is littered *with* bloom and ash” which indicated that puddled iron and ash is strewn across a slum.

As indicated in the above example, as well as many others in this research, linguistic and contextual frames are used in synchrony to produce the tension needed to create a metaphor. This is important to note because theoretical paradigms are discussed within a particular frame, however, the frame may not be as explicit as the examples provided thus far and, as such, may lead to misinterpretation.

Summary and integration of metaphoric structure. Metaphors are created when a metaphier and its network of paraphiers, which will cumulatively be known as the vehicle, operate on a lesser known or abstract construct known as a metaphrand. The metaphrand and its network of associations as well as those displaced paraphiers (paraphrands) will cumulatively be known as the topic. All this occurs within a frame, either linguistic or contextual, to indicate that the relationship is to be understood metaphorically. The frame creates a necessary tension so that the utterance is understood as a relationship ultimately resulting in a metaphoric understanding.

The language that is used to create the metaphor and some of the paraphiers are socially constructed to convey a shared meaning between two individuals. The differences in paraphiers and the displacement of specific paraphiers onto the metaphrand (paraphrands) are based on the

individual's lived experiences and may explain the varying degree of salience that a metaphor has with different individuals. Two individuals may generate a common understanding of what the metaphor conveys, yet, each individual's own lived experiences result in nuanced associations, which ultimately influences the metaphor's meaning. Figure 1 depicts a representation of how a metaphier and its associated paraphiers (vehicle) operate on the metaphrand and its paraphiers (topic) (See Appendix A for a glossary of terms).




Figure 1. A metaphor is created when a metaphier with its paraphiers (vehicle) operates on a metaphrand and its paraphrands (topic) by displacing paraphiers. This relationship is formed within a frame to permit the relationship to be understood as metaphorical. The frame can be linguistically or contextually created.

Similarly, what can be seen is that the salience of the metaphor is proportionate to the number of paraphiers that are displaced onto the metaphrand (paraphiers becoming paraphrands). This approximation can be expressed by the formula $N_{Px} \propto S_{\text{Metaphor}}$ where N_{Px} represents the number of displaced paraphiers onto the metaphrand and S_{Metaphor} is the salience of the metaphor.

It should be noted that the salience of a metaphor can change across time and context and, as such, is dynamic rather than static.

Types of metaphors. Now that it has been established that metaphors are created by forming a relationship between a vehicle and topic, it is important to understand the different type of metaphors that exist. Over time, certain types of relationships have been created that have high salience, despite idiosyncratic associations. This means that the number of paraphiers that can be displaced onto the metaphrand (cf. $N_{Px} \square S_{Metaphor}$) is high. Table 1 provides a number of metaphors that have yielded high salience over time. These different metaphors have been named due to the quality of the relationship formed between the metaphier and metaphrand.

Table 1

Types of Metaphors and Their Definitions

Metaphor Type	Description
Container	a metaphor which conveys the notion that an abstract concept resembles a container (e.g., “I am going <i>out of my mind</i> ” or “I need to get <i>into his head</i> ”)
Cross-Modal	a metaphor which utilizes the perception of one medium to describe the perception of another medium (e.g., “This <i>music</i> is <i>sad</i> ”)
Mind-as-Machine	a type of ontological metaphor (see below) that utilizes machinery as a means to understand the components of the mind and (sometimes) the brain (e.g., “My mind is not <i>working</i> today” or “I had a <i>break down</i> last year” or “The brain is <i>programed</i> to respond to stimuli in a certain way”)
Movement–Movement	a metaphor to perceive the movement of one object in terms of the movement of another object (e.g., a <i>spinning top</i> is viewed as a <i>ballerina</i> or vice versa)
Nominal	a metaphor which is structured around two or more distinct nouns to draw similarities from one to be applied to another (e.g., “This <i>job</i> is a <i>prison</i> ”)
Ocular	a visual-spatial metaphor utilized to convey the quality of insight (i.e., “She can <i>clearly see</i> her patterns of behavior”), a conveyance of understanding (i.e., “ <i>I see</i> that you are in pain” [<i>reflection</i>]), or a form of communicating (e.g., “That was a <i>colorful account</i> of the incident”)
Ontological	a metaphor which gives the perception of substance to an abstract, non-substantive object (e.g., “ <i>Inflation makes me sick</i> ” or “We are working towards <i>peace</i> ” or “My mind just isn’t <i>operating</i> today”)
Orientational	a metaphor which relies on directionality to describe one concept in terms of another (e.g., “I am feeling <i>down</i> ” or “My spirits have <i>risen</i> ” or “She is <i>depressed</i> ”)
Perceptual–Affect	a metaphor which utilizes the perception of one object to represent an affect (e.g., the <i>grill</i> of a car is perceived to be <i>smiling</i> , <i>angry</i> , or <i>mean</i> .)

Perceptual–Perceptual	a metaphor which utilizes the stimuli of one object to perceive another object (e.g., a plate of <i>spaghetti</i> is seen as a plate of <i>worms</i>)
Personification	a type of ontological metaphor which relies on utilizing human attributes to describe an abstract, non-substantive object (e.g., “Inflation has <i>destroyed</i> the dollar”)
Predicate	a metaphor which relies on motion verbs to draw similarities from one concept to apply it to another (e.g., “The man <i>fell under her spell</i> ”)
Structural	a metaphor which not only orients the person (as with <i>ontological</i> or <i>orientation metaphors</i>) but also is highly structured on an already clarified concept (e.g., An argument is spoken about in terms of war)

Note. Terms are compiled from various sources including, Chen, Widick, and Chaterjee (2008); Lakoff and Johnson (1980); Schafer, (2003); and Seitz (2005).

Conventional metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explained the conventionality of metaphors within the English linguistic system. A conventional metaphor is any metaphor that is created and utilized by individuals in a way that shapes our worldview, but may not be understood as a metaphor due to repeated use within a culture. Consider the example provided by Lakoff and Johnson, “The solution to my problems.” This conventional metaphor relies on mathematics to elucidate that there is a single answer that can be solved and that, once it is solved, the solution (and process of attaining the solution) is available to that individual. Other conventional metaphors can include the structural metaphor in which strong emotions are viewed as down while rationality is viewed as up. For instance one “Falls in love” but “Rises to reason.” In these examples, the metaphor may not be explicit and, in fact, may be understood as a literal utterance such as “The grass is green.”

Novel metaphors. From Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003) own experience, this same statement (“The solution to my problems”) can be viewed as a novel metaphor when chemistry is substituted for mathematics. That is, the tension between the vehicle and topic is palpable due to

the lack of use of the relationship. A novel metaphor is any metaphor that is created or utilized by an individual yet, due to a lack of repeated use, is understood to be a metaphor. The authors recalled an Iranian student who viewed the phrase “The solution to my problems” in terms of a chemical solution in which problems bubbled and dissipated depending on what was added. This resulted in the worldview that problems never went away but, rather, anything that the individual introduced into the solution should be considered so as not to permit a new problem to bubble up. Another example of a novel metaphor includes “Love is a work of art,” because it requires patience, appreciation for aesthetics, and work. The meaning derived of this is likely different between two teenagers in a relationship and two adults in a relationship.

Conventionality and novelty. As can be seen from the above examples, conventional and novel metaphors may be difficult to disambiguate. Appendix B contains a non-inclusive list of conventional metaphors outlined by Lakoff and Johnson (2003). The metaphors in Appendix B are understood readily; however, they bear little resemblance to what one may consider a metaphor to be. Conventional metaphors develop familiarity within a cultural context and, thus, begin to be viewed less as simple comparisons and more as systems or categories (cf. Glucksberg, 2008). This research understood theoretical paradigms served the clinician-in-training as novel metaphors but, over time, became conventional metaphors as the clinician became better versed in the theory.

Nested metaphors. The term nested metaphors is a term that is proposed by the present author and denotes when multiple types of metaphors are structured together around a core metaphor, often due to increasing complexity of the metaphor. To elucidate, consider the following example in which an individual expresses her or his experience of being caught between two ideas and does not know what to do:

My *mind* just isn't *working* today. There's all this *pressure* from these *opposing ideas*.

The *gears* are just *grinding to a halt*. I am just *stuck*. There's so much *pressure* to make a decision that I may *explode*! ³

In this example, the *core metaphor*, the metaphor that determines the language of other salient metaphors, is that of a mind-as-a-machine metaphor. The mind is a machine (consciousness, focus, attention, and thought) working within a structure that permits the build up of pressure and is built on opposing ideas (gears in orientational placement to one another) that has left the individual indecisive or ambivalent (being stuck; grinding to a halt; experiencing pressure to the point of explosion). To illustrate this, see Figure 2 below.

³ In this example, italics are utilized to emphasize the types of metaphor in use.




Figure 2. The figure provides a visual representation of how metaphors are extended beyond a single phrase, which results in different types of metaphors being utilized, yet, simultaneously maintaining the core metaphor's content.

As can be seen, with such increasing complexity, different types of metaphors are utilized to approximate the experience of being unable to engage in action due to opposing ideas with the potential to lead to an explosion or a meltdown. It should be noted that the length of the sentence or phrase does not necessarily introduce a nested metaphor, rather, it is the size and complexity of the thought attempting to be conveyed that does so.

Semiotics of metaphor use. Given the structure and basic forms that metaphors can take, it is necessary to understand how theoretical paradigms, when serving as metaphors, are utilized and understood by the clinician. Phillips (2000) indicated that the Peirce's triadic sign (the sign-object-interpretant relationship) is essential to meaning making as humans are symbol-based beings. It will be discussed later how the sign-object-interpretant triad permits

theoretical paradigms function as metaphors within clinical practice.

Sign. A sign is, in short, a symbol, utterance, or thing for something else (Phillips, 2000). It indicates to an individual the existence of something. For instance, Atkin (2010) used the example of a molehill. The molehill is a sign not because it is a thing but, rather, that it stands for something: the presence of a mole. This basic example utilizes a physical entity, however, it should be noted that, because we are linguistic and symbolic beings, we rely on the translation of language into meaning (the semiotic process). It is therefore understood that signs can be physical, linguistic, or conceptual.

Object. In the molehill example above, the mole—whether seen by an individual or not—is the object. An object is indicated by the sign and is part of the triadic relationship that facilitates interpretation and meaning making (Atkin, 2010). Like the sign, an object can be physical, conceptual, or linguistic.

Interpretant. The interpretant results from the meaning derived from the sign–object relationship and serves as a translation of the sign (Atkin, 2010). The interpretant has two components, the immediate interpretant (what is readily observed and understood) and the dynamic interpretant (the deeper meaning associated with the sign–object relationship). In the molehill example provided above, the immediate interpretant is that the molehill is composed of earth and has been shaped from the digging process. The understanding that the mole created the molehill as a place to exist, feed, and breed serves as the dynamic interpretant. Overall, the interpretant will become a sign with its associated object and interpretant—the process of which continues ad infinitum (Atkin, 2010).

Summary of semiotics. The utilization of Peircean semiotics is to explain how the metaphor of the theoretical paradigm serves the clinician in practice. This perspective is essential

to the functionality of the theoretical paradigm and is congruent with this research and the existing literature. First, the triadic nature of the sign–object–interpretant relationship is a comparable overlay to the vehicle–topic–metaphor relationship. Second, meaning is derived by placing linguistic components into a relationship with one another. Thus, meaning making is a relational, dynamic process with idiographic influences. Third, the purpose of a theoretical paradigm is not just to understand human experience, but, to apply the theory to effect change within the frame of therapy. This application of theory builds off of the establishment of Peircean semiotics for the interpretation of theory in practice (cf. Muller & Brent, 2000). Finally, this semiotic process maintains the linguistic framework of this research by linking symbols (e.g., physical, linguistic, or experiential) to meaning making.

Chapter Summary

Language can be used flexibly and in a manner that carries meaning through personal and cultural associations. There are numerous instances during which metaphors are utilized without the speaker's or writer's explicit knowledge, and metaphoric speech is no longer heard as metaphoric. Consider such phrases as, "I am filled with hope" which conveys the meaning that hope is a substance and the speaker is a container to be filled with the substance. In this example, it is plausible that many people would not hear this statement as a metaphor, rather, it is just something that is said (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Thus, it is important to examine carefully the language utilized within the theoretical paradigm and how the theoretical paradigm similarly functions.

Based on the information provided, metaphors can be understood to possess the following characteristics:

Metaphors are created through the relationship between a known (or better known) construct (metaphier) and a lesser known construct (metaphrand).

These constructs are composed of systems, the vehicle (metaphier and paraphiers) acting on the topic (metaphrand and paraphrands).

The relationship between the vehicle and the topic facilitates the meaning making process by displacing attributes (e.g., images, concepts, and linguistic expressions) of the better known construct onto the lesser known construct. Meaning, paraphiers are displaced onto the metaphrand, to create paraphrands.

Metaphors require a frame to create tension between the vehicle and topic to indicate that the language is not to be understood literally, but metaphorically.

The salience of the metaphor can be understood in terms of the degree of displacement of the paraphiers as expressed in the equation $N_{Px} \propto S_{\text{Metaphor}}$.

Over time, metaphors become conventional modes of linguistic expression and may not appear as metaphors at all.

Metaphors can be socially constructed and understood through a phenomenological, hermeneutic process.

Metaphors do not function as other linguistic tropes—metonymy, simile, and analogy—in terms of semantic structure, which strengthens the relationship between the vehicle and topic.

It will be argued in the next chapters that theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors and that they function in therapy through a Peircean, semiotic process.

Chapter 2

As can be seen in the area of linguistics, metaphors are generated in order to apply meaning to abstract concepts and ideas (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Theoretical paradigms in psychotherapy are intended to guide the clinician through the therapeutic process and facilitate better psychotherapeutic outcomes (Ambhül & Orlinsky, 1997). Essentially, a theoretical paradigm attempts to approximate a patient's experience or how the patient functions, and this informs the clinician how to engage in the dyadic exchange between them. This chapter details how theoretical paradigms function as metaphors and how their linguistic components are comprised of metaphors. The language of each theoretical paradigm, however, varies in the type and number of metaphors that comprise its linguistic elements. It will be further argued that each theoretical paradigm, itself, serves as a metaphoric guide that the clinician can utilize in practice.

The language of each of the theoretical paradigms, however, has undergone little examination in terms of its linguistic composition and function when compared to its use and efficacy. This chapter details (a) how to understand theoretical paradigms as metaphors at a linguistic level, (b) how theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors, and (c) how the theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors for the clinician (i.e., his or her way of thinking and relating).

The Metaphors that Exist in Psychology

Psychology's roots can be traced back to philosophy and science. Hothersall (1984) described that over the course of history, there has been a search to define what the mind is and how it works. In Ancient Greece, for instance, the mind was understood to consist of matter. Descartes posited dualism, stating that the mind and body were separate, interactional entities. We may view these instances as metaphors to describe and understand consciousness (cf. Jaynes,

1976). This process of conceptualizing consciousness as the Mind and Its processes continues even today with the development of theories in psychology. Sigmund Freud (1915/1957) once wrote regarding psychology as a field:

In psychology, we can only describe things by the help of analogies. There is nothing peculiar about this; it is the case elsewhere as well. But we have constantly to keep changing these analogies, for none of them lasts us long enough. (p. 195)

Leary (1990) posited that dating back to Plato (circa 355 BC), and possibly farther, metaphor has been widely utilized as a guide for a way of thinking and knowing. In fact, Plato (as cited in Leary, 1990) indicated that theories are “likely stories” that people use to understand their world. Leary cites John Locke, “if we could trace them back to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names for things that fall not under our senses to have had their first rise from sensible ideas” and that “sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse signification, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses” (p. 14)

People’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors are prime examples of how humans transform abstract ideas and concepts into something that resembles—and utilizes the language of—the senses. The English words for cognition, emotion, and behavior have been derived from Latin combinations that make a verb, or process, into a noun or thing. Cognition comes from the Latin word *cognitio(n)* which is from the verb *cognoscere*, meaning *to get to know* (Cognition, 2011). Similarly, *behavior* is derived from *be-* (prefix) and *have*, meaning to have in a particular way (Behavior, 2011). *Emotion* comes from the Latin combination of *e-* (variant of *ex-*) and *movere* and means to move out and has been used in the sense of mental agitation and feelings (Emotion, 2011). Again it has been helpful to transform processes, actions, and ways of being

into nouns and things so as to convey substance. By creating a noun from a process, an ontological metaphor is utilized.

Psychology has utilized a number of metaphors to describe discrete phenomena. For example, Hoffman, Cochran, and Nead (1990) described the use of computer schematics and programming as well as Helmholtz's and Descartes' geometrical optics metaphor, which is based on the human visual perception system. Sarbin (1990) detailed how even the term *mental illness*, which means to become infirm of the mind, is in itself a metaphor. He went on to describe how psychopathology (a metaphor) has been utilized to create medical or bodily metaphors for aberrant behavior, including wandering wombs (hysteria), split minds (schizophrenia), and premature dementia (dementia praecox) to provide a few. These psychological phenomena became metaphors by their initial linguistic construction. However, over time, these metaphors became reified and the metaphoric connotation was lost.

Theoretical paradigms work in a similar manner. The theoretician creates metaphors to explain complex, and at times ineffable, human processes such as relational patterns, psychoses, and volatile moods. Theoretical paradigms are constructed of metaphors to understand how to work with these psychological processes and experiences. To elucidate, one can intervene to fix cognitions that are faulty (mind-as-machine metaphor; cognitive-behavioral therapy), explore repressed emotions to let them out (ontological metaphor; psychoanalytic theory), or differentially reinforce behaviors to structurally change one's particular way of being (engineering [ontological] metaphor; behavioral therapy). As a result, theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors arranged in particular ways to understand the human experience, and guide the therapeutic process. Yet, over time, these metaphors can become reified or

conventional metaphors, whereby the frame no longer creates enough tension to decipher the phrase as a metaphor.

The Link between Metaphors and Theoretical Paradigms

It has been explained what metaphors are and how they work. It has also been suggested that theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors. At this point, it is necessary to analyze how theoretical paradigms function as metaphors by first examining the basic tenets for metaphors outlined in the previous chapter. (The tenets are reiterated below for ease of reference for the discussion that follows.)

Metaphors are created through the relationship between a known (or better known) construct (metaphier) and a lesser known construct (metaphrand).

These constructs are composed of systems, the vehicle (metaphier and paraphiers) acting on the topic (metaphrand and paraphrands).

The relationship between the vehicle and the topic facilitates the meaning making process by displacing attributes (e.g., images, concepts, and linguistic expressions) of the better known construct onto the lesser known construct. Meaning paraphiers are displaced onto the metaphrand, to create paraphrands.

Metaphors require a frame to create tension between the vehicle and topic to indicate that the language is not to be understood literally but metaphorically.

The salience of the metaphor can be understood in terms of the degree of displacement of the paraphiers as expressed in the equation $N_{Px} \propto S_{\text{Metaphor}}$.

Over time, metaphors become conventional modes of linguistic expression and may not appear as metaphors at all.

Metaphors can be socially constructed and understood through a phenomenological, hermeneutic process.

Metaphors do not function like other linguistic tropes—metonymy, simile, and analogy—in terms of semantic structure, which strengthens the relationship between the vehicle and topic.

As indicated above in Tenet 1, theoretical paradigms create a relationship between what is a construct, such as depression or personality, and what is better known, such as things, conflicts, or engineering. While many theoretical paradigms draw on esoteric lexica that appear literal (e.g., schema or superego), in fact, the bases of such lexica are grounded in metaphoric language. Concepts may be understood in terms of machinery and engineering (faulty cognitions : faulty mechanics) or human attributes (harsh superego : overbearing mother). In these instances, the lesser known concept of depression with its network of associations (topic) is placed in a relationship to machinery or a human characteristics with its network of associations (vehicle), thus, creating the metaphor of the faulty cognition and schema, or superego. This relationship is created within the frame of academia, clinical practice, and scholarly writings as described in Tenet 4. One cannot see the mind or the processes that govern it, however, one can bear witness to patterns of behaviors that can be conceptualized in terms of something more concrete. As such, a frame has been created whereby tension exists between a human or a piece of machinery (vehicle) and human behavior, emotions, and experiences (topic). This system of lexical relationships satisfies Tenets 2 and 3. Also, with the displacement of associations from the vehicle to the topic, one can understand, explain, and predict (to a reasonable degree) how an individual may engage the world, making them salient to clinical work and research (cf. Tenet 5). Within this scope, the first five characteristics of metaphors are met by theoretical paradigms.

As posited in Tenet 6, metaphors become conventional over time. Theoretical paradigms work similarly whereby the use of the lexicon becomes more conventional and fluid. As identified in Tenet 7, societal influences and individual interpretation—which is based on lived experiences—create metaphors by placing one concept in relation to another. So too is the process for creating Psychology's various theoretical paradigms, which were created during different time periods and in different cultures, such as 19th Century Austria or 20th Century America. These cultures are sociohistorical contexts, which contained significant differences in available knowledge (e.g., engineering, computing, medicine, physics), language, societal mores, and educational focus. One can imagine the societal differences between these two places and time as well as how those societies influenced their theoreticians. In order for a theoretician to make his or her theory salient, that individual would have to develop the theory with a language that is understood within that sociohistorical context. Tenet 7 emphasizes the social construction of language and the process of meaning making. The metaphier utilized to form the metaphor must be able to displace a high number of paraphiers onto the metaphrand. Thus, when creating a metaphor, the metaphier must be salient and known to a society to create a meaningful metaphor. During the creation of the metaphor, it is the social construction of language between the theorist and society that influences what metaphier is chosen.

Simultaneously, during the development of a theory, the theorist is influenced by her or his own images, associations, and thoughts, which are derived from her or his unique lived experiences. The theorist incorporates what she or he already learned from the interpretation. The theorist then attempts to convey those thoughts, conceptualizations, and experiences through theory. This may manifest as a description of what has been helpful when working with patients and the figurative language that the theorist found helpful to understand the patients'

experiences. Essentially, the theorist is interpreting an experience in a clinical setting and attempting to convey it through language so that others can learn from and interpret the theorist's conclusions. The theorist's interpretation of her or his lived, clinical, and personal experiences is a phenomenological hermeneutic process.

Social constructionism and phenomenology are both interfaces of two ontological and epistemological frames. This interface permits both society and the individual a place in the meaning making process. The relationship between the theorist and his or her society, within a particular historical period becomes apparent, whereby the language, worldview, and general knowledge within a society are propagated through discourse. The interpretation of this discourse and other lived experiences influence the meaning derived from the discourse and, in turn, influences future social dialogs. One's interpretation and experiences influence social interaction and dialog. Since influence is bidirectional, social interactions also influence how one interprets experiences. Ultimately, this process manifests in the theorist's lexicon and approach to clinical work, which convey the sociohistorical vernacular, general societal knowledge, cultural mores, as well as the theorist's idiographic associations, experiences, and interpretative processes. These writings are then available for interpretation by the reader in his or her own sociohistorical context.

Individuals interpreting the writings of the theoretician have idiosyncratic associations to the figurative and evocative use of language. Consider that a theoretical paradigm may resonate with one person but not another. Although the language and meaning is understood between student/clinician and the theoretician (a social construction), its utility is constructed at the individual level and can include the student's/clinician's associations and concordance with lived experiences (a phenomenological hermeneutic). Within this scope, the seventh tenet is satisfied

by theoretical paradigms. Last, and possibly most visible, is that theoretical paradigms do not function like other linguistic tropes. To elucidate, a theoretical paradigm does not imply that depression, for instance, is *like* (simile), or *analogous to* (analogy), or *represents part of* (metonymy) a theoretical construct. Although theoretical constructs may appear literal, they are in fact not veridical. Consider that all theoretical constructs merely approximate their respective phenomena, which can be understood based on the number of paraphiers displaced onto the metaphrand. As such, it can be seen that the final characteristic of metaphors is applicable to theoretical paradigms.

Within this purview, it can be seen that theoretical paradigms rely on metaphors to explain human phenomena. However, within it can also be seen that theoretical paradigms serve as a metaphor for how a clinician understands the world. This metaphor is then utilized in therapy to provide coherence and meaning for both patient and clinician. What follows is an understanding of how theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors, how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors, and how these metaphors are utilized within the scope of praxis.

Composition of Theoretical Paradigms

In order to convey meaning, metaphors must describe one abstract concept in terms of another more concrete construct. As noted earlier, metaphors convey meaning by forming a relationship between the vehicle (metaphier and its network of paraphiers) and topic (metaphrand and its network of paraphrands, including displaced paraphiers). Essentially, the meaning and associations linked to a well-known concept (vehicle) are transferred to a lesser known concept (topic). This process is complex when the scope of the metaphor is limited to one aspect of human experience (e.g., love being a journey or debate being a war), however, when a metaphor

is intended to serve as a functional representation of human experience, it must be well structured given the plethora of experiential possibilities.

The philosophy of a theoretical paradigm—how one knows, learns, and views the world—begins with its core metaphor because it sets the basis for the language that is utilized to understand human experiences. For a metaphor to be a core metaphor, its paraphiers must be displaced onto the other metaphors contained within the theory—or at the very least permit congruence between the various metaphors. Consider a theoretical paradigm that makes the ontological and epistemological assumptions in which experience and learning are rooted in the relationships that exist between people. In this instance, the core metaphor is one of personification.

A personification metaphor utilizes a person as the metaphier with people's reactions, interactions, experiences, and other human attributes serving as the paraphiers. This type of metaphor lends itself to be congruent with other metaphors depending on the number of paraphiers that its metaphier can displace onto the other metaphors' metaphrands. For instance, the personification metaphor lends itself to being congruent with other metaphors such as container metaphors, war metaphors, and journey metaphors because the personification metaphor shares paraphiers with these aforementioned metaphors as people can take up space, engage in war, and go on a journey. These commonalities that create congruence between metaphors are similar to the processes that create salience for a metaphor based on the displacement of paraphiers from the metaphier onto the metaphrand. A personification metaphor may not be as congruent with a mind-as-machine metaphor when compared to a container metaphor.

If the mind is a machine, where is the person who would be working on the machine? In what space would that person reside? Would such a space exist outside of the mind and, if so, what would such a space be called? What would ultimately result would be that the person and the machine would be housed in the same place; however, the mind is no longer a machine but a warehouse (or a workshop, mechanic shop, laboratory, etc.). Here, it is important to understand that while a theory could be developed using people and machinery to conceptualize the mind, additional metaphors would need to be utilized to be coherent.

Within the context of a theoretical paradigm, these metaphors—which can convey meaning about depression, grief, anxiety, anger, and behaviors to provide a few—must be congruent or the theory itself would be disjointed. Consider the following example. If a theoretical paradigm utilized the metaphor of a *life is a journey* (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), the lack of coherence would be problematic across different contexts. While a journey may be a salient metaphor for love, the number of paraphiers displaced onto the metaphrand (love) is high, it is less salient for anxiety. The number of paraphiers that a journey can displace on the metaphrand *love* is likely higher than it can displace on *anxiety*.

In this sense, a theoretical paradigm is unique in its construction because its core metaphor, mind-as-a-machine metaphor or personification metaphor for instance, permits congruence with other metaphors. Furthermore, theoretical paradigms are organized more complexly than many conventional metaphors. To elucidate, a theoretical paradigm can explain multiple experiences, such as love, anger, depression, and anxiety. As such, rather than assigning a single metaphor to various emotional and experiential states (i.e., love is a journey), theoretical paradigms utilize nested metaphors to extend the ontological and epistemological assumptions to other metaphors in order to explain a multitude of experiences. For example, the id–ego–

superego triad can be a metaphor for multiple psychological events, such as depression, anxiety, or impulse control (cf. Chapter 3 for a more detailed example). It is this flexibility that is afforded to theoretical paradigms that make them useful in clinical practice. As will be discussed in the following section, these nested metaphors and the theoretical paradigm, which itself serves as a metaphor, ground the clinician's ontology with epistemological certitude.

Theoretical Paradigms Serve as Metaphors

While the theoretical paradigm's evocative language can convey meaning about human behavior, thought, and emotion, the theoretical paradigm itself serves as a metaphor for the clinician. The figurative language of the clinician's theoretical paradigm serves as symbol for his or her epistemological assumptions of what therapy is and how that individual should interact in therapy to effect meaningful change. This is related to the core metaphor of the theory. A personification metaphor conveys that human interaction is at the fore of meaning making and, consequently, guides the clinician to examine the patient's past relationships and current *modus operandi*. This occurs because the coherence of the metaphor guides the clinician's understanding. If a psychological construct, such as depression, is personified, then the clinician understands depression as someone with whom to interact. A clinician may interact with depression directly (i.e., as a person) or indirectly (i.e., as a person born from *in vivo* relationships). Conversely, a mind-as-machine metaphor yields a different understanding. A machine can be fixed by swapping one part for another or by examining to see where the machine malfunctions or breaks down. Rather than focusing on relationship between clinician and patient, the clinician may be viewed as a mechanic of sorts, with tools that can be given to the patient so that, consequently, the patient can maintain the machine in the future.

As can be seen from these two brief examples, a clinician's theoretical orientation serves as a metaphor for how that individual thinks and makes meaning out of lived experiences. This way of thinking and knowing, which is abstract by nature, is concretized by the theoretical paradigm. Moreover, these theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors for conveying the experience of a patient and the process of working with the patient to other mental health professionals. By doing so, other mental health professionals can understand what is being attended to and what is not being attended to in therapy, through a metaphoric shorthand. Rather than explaining each interaction—thus recreating the therapeutic experience—the theory serves as a metaphor for how the clinician tends to respond. Moreover, it yields an understanding of what the quality of the interactions will be like and to what the clinician will, and will not respond. Thus, the clinician can ascertain what is salient in order for therapy to be effective.

Metaphor as the Psychotherapy Object

With the metaphor in hand, the clinician can then utilize the metaphor to effect change. This process, according to Sergio (2011), serves as an object with a particular function that differs from other human relationships and interactions. The function of the psychotherapy object is determined by the metaphor that the clinician utilizes and can be understood through Peircean semiotics. Consider the following example. A patient walks in with a set of symptoms or problems (Sign_1). This set of symptoms or problems symbolizes a particular psychological process as explicated by the clinician's theoretical orientation (Object_1). From the sign-object relationship, the clinician generates meaning regarding deficits, strengths, and ways of interacting (Interpretant_1). The clinician can create this meaning because that individual understood the grammar, syntax, and structure of the writings outlining that theory (Immediate Interpretant), as well as, the implications for what would be considered therapeutic for the patient

(Dynamic Interpretant). By means of the interaction, the patient's set of symptoms or problems shift becoming exacerbated, ameliorated, or neither (remain static). This shift then becomes a new sign (Sign₂), which is then placed in relation to the clinician's theory (Object₂) and further interpreted *ad infinitum*. For a graphical depiction of this process, see Figure 3.




Figure 3. This process continues ad infinitum so that the interpretant becomes the next sign that can be placed in relationship to an aspect of the theory. Sign_{n+1} will share some characteristics with Sign_n.

Now, consider within the context of the aforementioned example how different theoretical paradigms influence the therapeutic process. A theoretical paradigm that utilizes a personification metaphor as its core metaphor will yield different interventions than one that utilizes a mind-as-machine metaphor. That is, beyond the explicit examples provided in a theoretician's work (e.g., "*I then said to the patient....*"), the core metaphor implicates a way of being with an individual. A personification metaphor may implicate dialog, argument, observation, and other human attributes to a psychological process—the processes that cause an individual to feel depressed. As such, the clinician then responds in a way that is different from

these internal psychological processes so as to help effect change. This process is informed by the interpretant, which in itself stems from the sign–object relationship.

Differentiation of the Metaphor and Peircean Triads

One may notice that both metaphors and Peircean semiotics utilize a triadic relationship at the center of meaning making. The vehicle–topic relationship, which yields the metaphor, seems quite analogous, even interchangeable, to the sign–object relationship, which yields the interpretant. The delineation in the language, however, is drawn not along functional lines—as both generate meaning and understanding through a relationship—but, rather, along process lines. Metaphors are created through a relationship of comparisons and displacement, in which two constructs are related based on similarities and differences. Those similarities are displaced onto the more abstract construct (metaphrand) to generate understanding. Conversely, the triadic relationship between the sign, object, and interpretant, is based not on comparison and displacement, but on representation and interpretation. More specifically, the sign serves as a representation for the object, and this relationship then undergoes a hermeneutic process to yield the interpretant. Moreover, the creation of a metaphor is a terminal event that ends with the metaphor’s creation while the Peircean semiotic process is an event that continues *ad infinitum*. Given these contrasts in process, it is important that one not be substituted for the other. It is fitting that Sergio (2011) utilized the phrase “psychotherapy object.” The theoretical paradigm serves as the object within the scope of Peircean semiotics and aligns with the processes described earlier of creating nouns from verbs and ways of being. This is because processes may be understood more readily when they are transformed into objects, which can be structured and built using metaphors.

Chapter Summary

As can be seen, theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors, which make tangible various aspects of the human experience by placing them in relation to some concept, which is already known. The metaphor accomplishes this by displacing attributes on the better known concepts (vehicle) onto aspects of the human experience, which are not as well understood (topic). This process occurs within the field of psychology (frame), with the metaphors changing over time (socially constructed). As time passes, however, these metaphors are viewed as veridical constructs rather than metaphors for human experience and one's way of thinking. These metaphors are interpreted and understood differently from individual to individual. Thus, returning to the eight characteristics of metaphors that were postulated earlier, theoretical paradigms can be explained in the following ways.

Theoretical paradigms are created through the relationship between a known (or better known) construct (metaphier) and a lesser known construct (metaphrand).

These constructs are composed of systems, the vehicle (metaphier and paraphiers) acting on the topic (metaphrand and paraphrands).

The relationship between the vehicle and the topic, ultimately, facilitates the meaning making process by displacing attributes (e.g., images, concepts, and linguistic expressions) of the better known construct onto the lesser known construct. That is, paraphiers are displaced onto the metaphrand to create paraphrands.

Theoretical paradigms require a frame to create tension between the vehicle and topic so as to indicate that the language is not to be understood literally but metaphorically.

The salience of a theoretical paradigm can be understood in terms of the degree of displacement of the paraphiers as expressed in the equation $N_{Px} \square S_{\text{Metaphor}}$.

Over time, theoretical paradigms become conventional modes of linguistic expression and may not appear as metaphors at all.

Theoretical paradigms can be socially constructed and understood through a phenomenological, hermeneutic process.

Theoretical paradigms do not function as other linguistic tropes—metonymy, simile, and analogy—in terms of semantic structure, which strengthens the relationship between the vehicle and topic.

Chapter 3

This chapter elucidates how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors by utilizing a case example. In the case example, the linguistic concepts mentioned heretofore will be applied to psychoanalytic theory and will delineate a process for applying this meta-theory. Once an understanding of how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors, the use of the metaphor in the therapeutic context will be explicated by Peircean semiotics.

Psychoanalysis: An Overview

First, it is important to reiterate that the creation of metaphors occur within a sociohistorical context with their meaning further refined by a phenomenological hermeneutic process. In the case example of psychoanalysis, 19th Century Austria is the sociohistorical context. This sociohistorical context affects the values, language, and the creation of psychoanalysis. Peter Gay's (1989a) book, *Freud: A Life for Our Time* can serve as a more complete reference to the time period of Freud.⁴ The objective of the following section is to create a context in which psychoanalytic theory was developed, providing a foundation for understanding its metaphors.

A condensed history of the development of psychoanalysis. Freud lived in Austria during the late 19th Century and early 20th Century after emigrating from the Czech Republic at the age of 4 (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010). According to Pickren and Rutherford, Freud had a voracious intellectual appetite and had a fondness for history, literature, and philosophy. His interest, spawned from archaeology and ancient heroes, including Moses and Hannibal (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Jones (1953) stated that, being a young Jew in Vienna, Freud had limited options in terms of career and schooling. Essentially, he was limited to business, law, or

⁴ For the purpose of this present research, inordinate historical details will not be provided regarding Freud or psychoanalysis. That is, the present research merely presents detail pertinent to the development of psychoanalysis's language.

medicine. Following gymnasium⁵, Freud chose to pursue a career in medicine at the University of Vienna, which was fraught with anti-Semitism (Jones, 1953). During his studies at the University of Vienna, Freud developed an interest in the writings of Brentano, who was considered the founder of act psychology. It should be noted that act psychology is a discipline of psychology that is focused on the experience of an activity rather than the structure of it (Athabasca University, 2010). As such, Brentano's theory of mental phenomena focused on presentations, judgments, and love and hate (Huemer, 2010). For Freud, this burgeoning interest in the mind would fully surface in the years following his attainment of a medical degree.

Freud graduated medical school with a strong understanding of the brain's structure and function (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Freud's interest ultimately shifted completely from the brain to the mind after he earned a six-month fellowship with Charcot, who would place individuals with glove anesthesia⁶ into hypnotic trances. The authors explain that Freud's intrigue in the domain of thought and motivation became fully evident at this point and that his varied interests (e.g., history, archaeology, war/conflict, and literature) would serve as the foundation for psychoanalysis. Freud's office came to resemble a museum of relics and artifacts from ancient civilizations.

As outlined by Mitchell and Black (1995), as well as Pickner and Rutherford (2010), Freud gradually moved from a topographical theory (unconscious, preconscious, conscious) to a structural theory (id, ego, superego), as a means to explain intrapsychic conflict, mental processes, motivation, and symptom development. These incremental developments in Freud's theory and conceptualizations were wrought over time and based in his own experiences with patients as well as dialog with colleagues and friends (Mitchell & Black, 1995; Pickner &

⁵ *Gymnasium* in many European countries is roughly equivalent to high school in the United States.

⁶ A phenomenon characterized by partial or absent sensation in one's hand—as if wearing a glove—without the presence of neurological damage (Mitchell & Black, 1995).

Rutherford, 2010). Each new development in Freud's theory attempted to capture an understanding of human nature through the use of terms such as *drive*, *instinct*, *energy*, *pressure*, and *conflict*, which were integrated into both the topographical and structural theories (Pickner & Rutherford, 2010). Freud sought to understand the origins of human sexuality and how developmental perceptions influence the experience of sexuality. This, for instance, can be seen in Freud's notion of the *Oedipal complex*, which was based on Sophocles's story *Oedipus Rex* and can be understood as one child's destiny to follow his or her desires, resulting in a passionate drama to possess the parent of the opposite sex while outcompeting the parent of the same sex; childhood sexuality becomes organized during this period and the complex is resolved ultimately through *castration anxiety* leading the child to reidentify with the parent of the same sex (Mitchell & Black, 1995)

Freud developed these ideas, concepts, and theories all while living in Vienna—in fact, Freud refused to leave Vienna even under threat of Nazi occupation (Pickner & Rutherford, 2010). Only in 1938 did Freud leave Vienna for London, where he died approximately one year later from cancer of the jaw (Pickner & Rutherford, 2010). Mitchell and Black (1995) described how Freud attempted to regulate psychoanalysis, which resulted in colleagues isolating him, only to have their language reemerge in Freud's writings later. Overall, the French clinical tradition, philosophy, history, archaeology, neurology, and Freud's own colleagues significantly influenced his thinking.

Psychoanalytic theory: Concepts and formulation. For the purpose of this research, Freud's structural theory was utilized. Mitchell and Black (1995) explained that conflict is at the center of Freud's structural theory. Freud (1923/1960) contested that there are three psychical strata referred to as the (a) conscious, (b) preconscious, and (c) unconscious. He indicated that

the conscious is composed of what one is aware of, the preconscious is composed of what one is not aware of but can become aware of, and the unconscious is that which is latently repressed.

What is important to note is that Freud described the preconscious as unconscious only descriptively but not dynamically, thus, one is not aware of what is in the preconscious or the unconscious; however, that which is in the preconscious is not repressed.

From this, three structures within the psyche are proposed to exist, (a) the id, (b) the ego, and (c) the superego. The id, ego, and superego are in relative contact with one another, with the id being entirely repressed and located inferior to the ego, which enters both the preconscious and unconscious realms, while the superego reaches down into the id and extends up into the conscious (Freud, 1899/2010; 1923/1960). Figure 4 shows Freud's depiction of the id, ego, and superego.




Figure 4. Freud's (1932/2010) depiction of his structural theory in *The Anatomy of the Mental Personality* (recreated by the author of this study). That which is farthest from the perceptual-conscious is farthest from one's level of awareness. As such, the id is farthest from awareness while the ego and superego are closer (or are in) the conscious.

Briefly put, Freud (1923/1960) described the id as that which is comprised of needs and desires, as well as that which communicates the repressed, to the ego. While the id is ruled by passions, the ego is ruled by reason (Freud, 1923/1960). Finally, Freud extrapolated that the superego with its nascent development occurred early in life as the energetic reaction against the id, and its ultimate development being heir to the Oedipus complex.⁷

⁷ Note that, although no direct quotations were utilized from Freud, the author of this study utilizes the language of psychoanalytic theory. This is intentional to convey Freud's evocative language. Moreover, it sets the foundation for the types of metaphors that pervade psychoanalytic theory.

Psychoanalytic Theory and Its Metaphors

The metaphors that constitute psychoanalytic theory are what guide the process of clinical work. For the purpose of this research, the structural model of psychoanalysis was analyzed and its constituent metaphors were highlighted. The analysis commenced with the identification of the core metaphor of psychoanalytic theory and culminated with the identification of the various metaphors and how they nested together. Finally, a description of how the content of the metaphors was influenced by socially constructed and phenomenological processes is provided in particular reference to the vehicle of the metaphor.

The core metaphor: Ontology of the mind. Psychoanalytic theory postulates that the mind exists. Despite Freud's positivist influences in medical school and understanding of physiology and neurology, Peter Gay (1989b) and Mitchell and Black (1995) explained that Freud increasingly utilized psychological language to describe psychological phenomena. For this reason, the implicit metaphor that permits the existence of all other metaphors utilized in psychoanalysis, is the ontological metaphor of the mind. Without it, the conceptualization of the id, ego, superego, conscious, unconscious, preconscious, and instincts (Eros and Thanatos) could not exist. Thus, the ontological metaphor of the mind is the core metaphor in psychoanalytic theory.

Jaynes (1976) explained that dating back to Antiquity the mind has been described metaphorically as an entity. For instance, the word *psyche* is defined as the soul or the word *thumos* is defined as the emotional soul. In both of Jaynes's examples, the mind or one's consciousness has an existence or substance. Regardless of whether a dualist or monist perspective on the mind is taken—the mind and body are separate or that the mind is a function of the brain, respectively—it is conceptually useful to describe the mind as a noun. If the mind is,

indeed, separate from the body, it is an experience that needs to be placed into language. As a result, it is described as something that embodies one's personality, experiences, and memories. If the mind is, indeed, a function of the brain, it is difficult to conceptualize how it interacts with a set of firing neurons. This interaction, thus, must occur with something that is better known or more readily understandable. In either case, a metaphor must be created.

Freud does not depart from this process of conceptualizing a mind. All of Freud's concepts take place within a mind. The unconscious, drives, and structures that pervade psychoanalytic thought do not reside physically within the brain, nor were Freud's works describing exacting experiments to locate personality or other "structures" within the brain itself. As illustrated in Figure 4, Freud's conception of the mind was that of a physical, though indistinguishable entity. If one considers that the mind is now the topic and a physical entity is the vehicle (cf. Chapter 1 for definitions), the associations that one has to something physical can include the mind as something with which to be interacted, something that can be molded, something that can be held, something that can be looked into, something that can change over time, or something that is composed of any combination of the aforementioned. These associations (paraphiers) are displaced onto the *mind*, which makes the concept of the mind tangible. This, when created within the frame of psychological science, presents the mind as *something* that can be studied.

The mind as a container. The personification metaphor is based on Freud's structural theory of the mind, but it relies on its predecessor, the topographical theory of mind. Freud, in his early writings, delineated the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, which are constructed to serve as repositories for thoughts and drives. The id resides primarily within the unconscious, the ego predominately in the conscious, and the superego residing primarily within

the unconscious but also the preconscious (Freud, 1923/1960; Gay, 1989b; Mitchell & Black, 1995). As a result, the personified entities of the id, ego, and superego exist within a space, which requires the use of a container metaphor. Thus, the container is essential for “psychic life” to exist.

As a container, the mind or psyche can receive projections from the patient, introject them, or serve as a holding space. The terms transference, countertransference, and projection each constitute a process by which a personified mind (the unconscious) projects or evokes something *in* the other. The unconscious receives these projections and take up space within the other. As can be seen here, the container metaphor permits for things to be held or contained when there is room, but can be overfilled as well, leading to a lack of containment or holding.

A container, which in this metaphor is the vehicle, is placed in relation to the psyche, in which there is a conscious, unconscious, and preconscious. Containers have volume whereby things can be placed closer to the surface, in plain sight of an individual looking in, or buried at the bottom out of plain sight, and potentially out of complete awareness that something is there at all. Similarly, large containers have less light reaching the bottom than the top of the container. All of these are suitable paraphrased for displacement onto the metaphrand. This works in conjunction with the orientational metaphor of the mind, which is discussed next.

The orientation of the mind. Freud’s use of what Lakoff and Johnson (2003) termed a conventional orientation metaphor of consciousness is readily apparent. That is, consciousness is oriented as up while unconscious is oriented down. Moreover, reason and logic (the role of the ego) are oriented up and emotion and impulse (what drives the id) are oriented down. Freud (1923/1960) describes how the superego dips *down* into the unconscious and that the ego, which is based in reality and associated with judgment and reason are located higher, near the surface.

Even the location of the superego/Über-ich is located above the ego/ich in terms of linguistic usage.⁸

In this case, the mind is oriented in such a way that is coherent with the container metaphor. Finding what has been hidden at the bottom of the container requires one to go down into the depths of the container. The paraphiers of down include dark and hidden, or emotional and irrational within the conventional orientational metaphors. Freud's use of such language permits a high displacement of paraphiers onto the metaphrand. Even those who may disagree with psychoanalysis completely can understand the phrase "Look deep down inside yourself"; maybe in reference to finding something that they wanted to keep from other people. This is in complete accord with the container and orientational metaphors utilized in psychoanalysis to describe the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious as well as moralistic standards and deviant impulses and desires.

Personification of experience. However, within psychoanalytic thought conflict serves as one of the central tenets. Consider how individuals feel conflicted about decisions that they make. Feeling conflicted is unpleasant because one may know what they *want* to do, what they *should* do, and how they actually *could* do it. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) described that the conventional metaphor of argument is war. That is, one *defends* his or her position, *shoots down* other arguments, *take sides* to an argument, and attempts to *destroy* the opposing view. One can even argue (wage war) with oneself, and as such, the individual may feel conflicted or defeated. Yet, conceptually, war is a predominately human development. Things and objects do not wage war and rarely are animals described as engaging in war. From this understanding of conflict and human experience, the meaning can be extended to psychoanalytic theory.

⁸ The terms *ich*, *über-ich*, and (later) *es* are German words that translate into *I*, *above I*, and *it*, which correspond to the Latin translation of *ego*, *superego*, and *id*, respectively.

Freud's development of the id, ego, and superego personify the mental experiences of conflict, which relies on creating human-like conceptions. The id embodies those basic instincts and pleasure-oriented activities; the superego embodies what one "knows" is right and just; and the ego mediates a war on two fronts: between the id and the superego, and between what is happening internally with what is reasonable and possible externally. This is the first step in understanding how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors. The id, ego, and superego are personified metaphors which were described in Freud's (1923/1960) *The Ego and the Id* as *Das Es* (the *it*), *Das Ich* (the *I*), and *Das Über-ich* (the *above I*) and translated later using the Latin words id, ego, and superego, meaning *it*, *I*, and *above I*, respectively.⁹ These entities can engage in humanesque behavior whereby they are the subject of verbs (i.e., "...the ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into action as if it were its own" [Freud, 1923/1960, p. 19]) and can be described as functioning independently of a machine (i.e., the ego is not a program that is run or a reflex that occurs in response to a stimulus).

As such, the id, ego, and superego serve as the vehicle for an individual's psychological processes. However, consider that vehicle is something that is generally well known and can displace paraphernalia onto the metaphor of the vehicle. In this case, it is the evocative language that is utilized by Freud that permits the id, ego, and superego to be vehicles. The rich descriptions of each of these entities provide narratives, thus, creating characters like in a play. These "characters" can then be utilized to help the clinician understand that which is unknown about the patient.

Also, consider the lexical use in Freud's original, untranslated work. There was a clear reference to the self in regards to the *I* and the *above I*; those aspects that are rational (ego) and moral (superego) in the individual, but the impulse-driven, pleasuring-seeking entity of the *it* (id)

⁹ The original German title of Freud's (1923/1960) *The Ego and the Id* was *Das Ich und das Es*.

is a differentiated, vulgar entity. More specifically, the positive aspects are referenced by the word *I*, while the vile attributes are referenced by a non-descriptive thing, the *it*. Thus, during Freud's time, the paraphiers that would be displaced would likely be very different than those in modern America. For individuals who do not know Latin, the initial meaning would be lost in the translation. This exemplifies a shift in the linguistic frame of the metaphor. While, regardless of the translation of Freud's work, the characteristics of the id, ego, and superego are detailed in a poetic and evocative manner. However, the amount of tension that exists may lessen, whereby the metaphor potentially becomes less apparent.

War and the conflict of the mind. This tripartite configuration personifies experiences and urges of an individual. That is, an individual may have the experience of wanting to do something while knowing that it is considered wrong and, ultimately, must negotiate between what may feel right and what is socially proscribed. This internal struggle and the ensuing distress is part of the next discussed metaphor: the structural metaphor of war. As outlined by Mitchell and Black (1995), Freud was interested in anthropology and archaeology, of which war is a part. Consider that the ego must utilize *defenses* to protect against the unconscious onslaught of the id. Freud (1923/1960) stated that the ego must “...*fend them off* [the object-cathexes] by the process of repression” (p. 23). He also indicated the ego must “ [take] on a *hostile* coloring” (p. 27) or that the infantile ego may *fortify* itself. A final example, which clearly makes the link to the war metaphor is actually created by a simile in Freud's writings. Freud (1923/1960) contested,


*The struggle which once raged in the deepest strata of the mind, and was not brought to an end by rapid sublimation and identification, is now continued in a higher region like the Battle of the Huns in Kaulbach's painting. (p. 36)*¹⁰

What should become increasingly evident is that the use of the war metaphor to structure the conflicts between the id and superego, or external and internal worlds, is evocative but metaphorical. (n.b., Freud likened the internal, experienced struggle to that of the Battle of the Huns by way of simile. As outlined by Punter [2007], the use of simile makes the comparison more evident than solely relying on metaphor but is still evocative.)

The experience of internal conflict serves as the topic, while the understanding of war serves as the vehicle. The paraphors that one may see as being displaced are associations to battle, destructions, defenses, and attacking. Moreover, the notion that there can be a victor and a loser, or a stalemate, is a salient paraphor for the experience of internal conflict. Consider that the ego has a war on two fronts (a) the internal world–external world front, and (b) the id–superego front. If the attacks on one, or both, fronts are of such magnitude, the paraphor of exhaustion, fear, or hypervigilance may be displaced from the two-front war to the id–ego–superego conflict.

The nested metaphors of psychoanalysis. Based on what has been discussed heretofore, the primary metaphors utilized in psychoanalytic thought include (a) the ontological metaphor of the mind, (b) the personification metaphor of the structures (id, ego, and superego), (c) the conventional metaphor of debate and conflict as war, (d) the conventional container metaphor of the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and (e) the conventional orientational metaphor of consciousness/reason as up and unconscious/subconscious/emotion as down. This can be illustrated utilizing the structure of nested metaphors, as seen in Figure 5.

¹⁰ Italics added for emphasis by the author of this study.



Note. Uncs. = Unconscious, Pcs. = Preconscious, and Cs. = Conscious

Figure 5. Depicts the nested metaphors of psychoanalytic theory's structural model. The Ontological Metaphor is the core metaphor because it creates a world for the id, ego, superego, conscious, preconscious, and unconscious to exist in.

One may ask, "Why have nested metaphors?" Each metaphor provided above serves a purpose to convey an aspect of human experience or understanding. Without a conceptualization of the mind and its capacity to contain, there can be no id, ego, or superego to reside within it. Similarly, without the orientational metaphor, the *above I* (superego) would be illogical or incongruent with other conceptualizations. Moreover, structures—as in Freud's structural theory—are oriented in at least two directions. It is no coincidence that the emotional, urge driven id is placed below the moral-driven superego.

What is also important is the fact that these nested metaphors are coherent with one another. Rather than using five separate metaphors to describe various aspects of the human experience (e.g., love is a journey, but the mind is a machine), a theory—in this case, psychoanalysis—is comprised of language that permits coherence amongst its metaphors. This is in contrast to simply using a metaphor in therapy (e.g., “Therapy is a journey. What might we find along the way?”), or describing concepts through analogy or simile (e.g., “This part of the brain is analogous to the hard drive on a computer”). The use of language within Freud’s writings set a linguistic frame to interpret the language metaphorically. For instance, it is known that there is no physical part within the body identified as the mind, nor is there a structure known as the superego. It is acknowledged, that certain brain structures (i.e., pineal gland) had previously been considered the interface of the mind and body. However, at the present time, the brain is understood as a complex interaction of systems (Carlson, 2010). What will be described in the next section is how understanding the sociohistorical context of Freud’s time, as well as, Freud’s own lived experiences creates a frame to understand how his theory is comprised of metaphors. Moreover, it will illuminate the actual content of the metaphors utilized within psychoanalysis.

The Use of the Psychotherapeutic Object: Psychoanalysis as a Metaphor

It should be noted here that the term *object* is purposely used in this section to describe Peirce’s semiotic process of interpretation. The reader may recall that the object in Peircean semiotics is something that is represented by a sign or symbol. It is, in essence, the existence of something that is represented by something else (the sign). One must consider, however, that the term *object* also serves as an ontological metaphor. While a molehill may be a sign for the object of a mole and tears may be a sign for the object of depression, the two differ in terms of the

physicality. A mole possesses mass and takes up space. Depression, conversely, is an experience, and experiences do not possess physical mass. And, even though depression can be understood in terms of the physical attributes of neurobiology, chemistry, and physics, it is the product of these interactions rather than the sole existence of them.

As explained by Sergio (2011), psychotherapy is viewed as an object to effect change. Essentially, the process of psychotherapy is also a metaphor. And while this process can be analyzed based on the clinician's interventions or the content of the patient's speech, the process for what causes the change cannot be put to simple language. Rather, the theory is invoked to convey to the clinician and to others what produced change. A patient may, for instance, evidence greater ego capacity, which may be explained by developing insight into the origins of the harsh, internal criticisms of the superego. Based on the presenting issues of the patient, the clinician may choose to intervene in specific ways so that the patient can develop greater ego capacity.

It is at this point of identifying issues and defining relevant interventions that the theory serves *as* a metaphor. This should be differentiated from the theory being *comprised of* metaphors. In the latter, the theory itself is comprised of the nested metaphors that are coherent and convey experience. In the former, the theory is a way of understanding human experience with the nuances that a clinician chooses to engage with the patient, to effect change. As such, a dynamic process emerges whereby the clinician utilizes the theory as a metaphor, to guide the psychotherapeutic process.

This dynamic process can be understood through Peircean semiotics. The clinician engages in a hermeneutic process whereby that individual must interpret the signs and language of the patient to inform how that individual should respond. What guides the intervention is the

response of the patient and the clinician's countertransference. In the latter, the clinician attempts to interpret, and make meaning from his or her associations to the patient's verbal and non-verbal responses. Here, for instance, the metaphor of psychoanalysis permits a personified entity (i.e., the unconscious) to actively move a feeling, image, or otherwise from one person into another. In the former, the clinician interprets the patient's responses and thought processes with the language and meaning of psychoanalysis in mind.

Being guided by the metaphor of psychoanalysis, the clinician understands human existence as a constellation of experiences, of which one is aware of only some. The rest are beyond one's awareness and steeped in morality and impulse, as dictated by the superego and the id. (n.b., That to be *beyond awareness* is congruent with the orientational metaphor.) The theory is, therefore, an object such as a lens, through which the clinician views the world. As an object of ontology and epistemology, psychoanalysis is no longer just composed of metaphors (e.g., ontological metaphor of the mind, mind as container, personification metaphor, war metaphor, and orientational metaphor), but serves as a metaphor for the process of therapy and the experience of the human condition. That is, it is a way of predicting and judging how a clinician is to respond in therapy. It similarly serves as a means to understand the external sociohistorical context in which one lives and the internal phenomenological experiences of being human.

Figure 6 depicts how psychoanalysis serves as a metaphor for the psychotherapeutic process. Note that this may best serve as an oversimplification, but an appropriate approximation of the process of psychotherapy. Consider that this process continues *ad infinitum* and that each sign, object, and interpretant is influenced by those that preceded them. That is, interpretation does not occur in a vacuum.

can be used to conceptualize cases, makes psychoanalysis a thing or object that can be used or something that can effect change. Essentially, this transformation creates an ontological metaphor. This ontological metaphor results from the synergy of its constituent, nested metaphors.

Through a psychoanalytic lens, the human experience is viewed as dynamic where conflict exists and pressures are exerted from opposing forces. The id, ego, and superego can be interacted with as people, which is in contrast to other paradigms that presuppose a different ontological assumption. The language that composes the theory—the vehicles and topics that are placed in relation to one another to create the metaphors—guide how the object (psychoanalysis) is utilized. People are not provided tools so that they can repair their mind (e.g., relaxation techniques, cognitive restructuring techniques, or coping skills), because there is no mind-as-machine metaphor. Rather, people *explore* the *container* of the mind to see what can be *uncovered* (italics added to emphasize the personification, container, and orientational metaphors of psychoanalysis). Thus, when a clinician utilizes psychoanalysis, that individual will understand a patient's problems differently than if that individual utilized another theoretical paradigm. The language that is utilized to create the metaphors governs these processes of meaning making, interpretation, and intervention.

The Language of Psychoanalysis's Metaphors

Now that it has been established that psychoanalysis is comprised of multiple, nested metaphors, and that the theory itself serves as a metaphor for understanding and interpreting the world, it is important to understand the linguistic content of the metaphors. Freud's use of language stemmed from his lived experiences and shared meaning making processes. Both Mitchell and Black (1995) and Pickner and Rutherford (2010) illustrated the various influences

of Freud's thinking and the theory of psychoanalysis. The language and concepts generated during the development of psychoanalysis undoubtedly had a significant effect on how psychoanalysis was applied to praxis. Meaning making and interpretation are at the epicenter of how theories serve as metaphors, whether it is the free associative process that emerged from Freud observing Charcot placing individuals into hypnotic trances, or the understanding of how symptoms manifested from an internal conflict, influencing what a clinician will address. As illuminated by Mitchell and Black, "New language is sometimes invented to convey old ideas, so that differences can be exaggerated in claims to originality. Old language is sometimes stretched to convey new ideas, so that similarities can be exaggerated in claims to continuity" (p. xxi).

The historical context: Europe in the 19th Century. Beginning in the 1850s, there was a political and social resurgence of conservative values dubbed the New Conservatism by Rapport (2005). As described by the author, Europe was in the midst of social and economic change from mid to late 19th century. This period was fraught with conflict as nation states were unified and divided. Moreover, there was internal conflict within nations between liberal and conservative political parties (Rapport, 2005). Rapport explained that much of Europe was battling with identity. The Catholic Church, for instance, wished to spread its influence over Europe while opposition groups espoused secularism and socialism. What was considered moral was in flux, and the freedom of the individual was weighed against the traditions and prosperity of the society.

Within Freud's Czech Republic, there was internal strife between Jews and non-Jews, which may have been one of the reasons that governed his family's emigration from the Czech Republic to Austria (Jones, 1953). Yet, even in Vienna, anti-Semitism reigned and limits were placed on what people of different ancestral heritages could study in school and do for work

(Jones, 1953). Literacy and education were becoming available to the European populace and the emergence of mass politics—the integration of rural communities into national policy—served as a fulcrum for societal change (Rapport, 2005). Moreover, disposable income was increasing in Europe and this provided individuals with more leisure time for reading, joining trade groups, and becoming active in political parties; ultimately creating greater social differentiation amongst societal classes and social interest groups (Rapport, 2005).

Rapport (2005) described that the emerging influence of steam power to propel trains and boats served as a catalyst for Europe's growth, as well as, for its demise (Rapport, 2005). That is, while it facilitated economic expansion and mobility across the continent, so too did it facilitate the development of powerful weapons which would be used in a number of conflicts. In 1914, the Great War began. As described by British Foreign Minister (in Rapport, 2005), the build up of arms prior to the Great War was on account of insecurity—an insecurity that ultimately led to millions of casualties.

Similarly, a paradox emerged with sexuality in Victorian Vienna and elsewhere. While there was some progress being made on account of feminism and more liberal political groups, women in Austria were considered to be different from men and sexuality, despite its visibility, was simultaneously hushed (Luft, 2009). As outlined by Luft (2009), medicine, literature, and theatre tended to serve as the media for discourse on sexuality. Moreover, sexuality served as one of the symbolic fundamental issues in Vienna to debate individual identity, reason, and domination. It was believed that women were expected to be pure and chaste while men were governed by natural urges and permitted to explore their sexual desires with other women (Rapport, 2005).

Nineteenth Century Europe and social constructionism. Victorian Europe was at war both between countries, and within their own borders. Moreover, these internal conflicts were seen in politics, religion, and sexuality. Within psychoanalysis, there is a contention between good and evil that manifests as language becomes steeped in conflict, sexuality, and insecurity. These constructions served to create meaning in the lives of individuals and were suitable metaphors to create metaphors. Similarly, psychoanalysis attempted to provide language to make meaning out of these events. In essence, European policies, literature, and theatre provided a shared language and set of worldviews that contributed to the meaning making processes in psychoanalysis. Freud's contributions in terms of his writings made this process bidirectional, allowing him to influence the societal norms.

Given the prominence of war, conflict, and nation building during Freud's time, it is no surprise that the metaphors of psychoanalysis embody these domains. For instance the conflict between id and superego—which creates the conventional war metaphor—is described in terms of war. One wreaks havoc on the other with the ego available to mediate (cf. the conventional metaphor of argument is war in Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). What was salient at the time was conflict, which served as an apt metaphor because it could displace a higher number of metaphors onto the metaphor, thus creating a salient metaphor so that others could make meaning in their own, personal lives.

Similarly, the discursive exchange between Austrian society, Freud, and other philosophers regarding sexuality formulated a socially constructed understanding of what sex was, how it served individuals and society, and how individuals understood gender roles and sex. The struggles from which societies were attempting to make meaning served to provide the metaphors for psychoanalytic theory. The psychosexual stages of development served as an

interface for the medical community and the larger, Austrian society. These stages served as a tool to make meaning out of the conflicting messages regarding sex. The moral view espoused by the Church and conservatives are seen as embodied within the superego and the urges, and experiences of individuals are seen as embodied within the id (i.e., “What I should do *vs.* what I feel or want to do.”). Freud postulated that the harshness of the superego is governed in part by the Church, one’s teachers, and one’s parents.

Amongst Freud’s colleagues, the discourse around psychoanalysis altered the metaphor. Jung, being from Switzerland, and G. Stanley Hall, being from the United States, polemicized Freud’s views but also altered them to fit their cultures (Gay, 1989a). According to Gay (1989a), Jung broke with Freud because of the focus on sexuality. For Jung, this metaphor lacked salience in that it did not capture his experience or that of his society. It was not just Jung, however, who viewed the emphasis on sexuality as unnecessary. Adler was also critical of the role of sexuality in psychoanalytic theory and proposed that “organ inferiority”—the handicap or disability for which an individual attempts to compensate—and the psychological failure to compensate for this inferiority was the aetiology for a neurosis (Gay, 1989a). Some of this, according to Gay, can be attributed to Adler’s socialist values and interest in social work. Within the context of social constructionism, the dialog around sexuality did not foster meaning and, as such, was rejected by Adler.

Be it Adler, Jung, or any of Freud’s contemporaries, anyone reading Freud’s work becomes engaged in a dialog with Freud. As such, the two (reader and author [Freud]) develop a sense of meaning and understanding of the world through the language of psychoanalysis. Over time, the sociohistorical context changes for the reader and, thus, the language of psychoanalysis is understood differently. While there are countless more examples of how dialog and meaning

making within psychoanalytic circles and other societies led to alterations in psychoanalytic work, the aforementioned examples are intended to elucidate this process. The society and era in which a theory is created influences what metaphors will be utilized. In the case of psychoanalysis, conflict, sexuality, inferiority, and war are most prominent.

Simultaneously, phenomenological processes worked in parallel with those socially constructed processes described above. It is the synergy of these two ontological and epistemological processes that result in alterations to any theory and, more saliently, altered the metaphors of a theory.

Freud's lived experiences. According to Jones (1954), Freud had a voracious interest in literature, language, and anthropology. He read much of the works of Shakespeare and marveled at the power of evocative language and prose. A particularly salient piece of literature was Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, which served as a prominent metaphor in psychoanalysis. Jones also described Freud's fluency in Latin and Greek as well as English, French, Spanish, Italian, and Hebrew. The capacity for language to carry experience was a keen interest of Freud's (*ibid.* Jones, 1954).

When Freud was approximately twelve years of age, Jones (1954) described an incident during which Freud's father had his fur hat knocked off of his head. The perpetrator screamed "Jew!" which symbolized the anti-Semitism at the time. When Freud asked his father, "And what did you do?" Freud's father indicated that he simply picked up his hat and continued on. Jones described how this lack of heroism disillusioned Freud about his father and, moreover, Freud never viewed his father in the same light again.

Another personal account provided by Jones (1954) was that of Freud's first love. Upon returning to his birthplace at the age of 16—the only time that he had done so in his life—Freud

fell in love with a girl name Gisela, a few years his junior. According to Jones, Freud fantasized about being with this girl, despite the fact that he was too shy to express his feelings to her.

Freud desired to have remained in the Czech Republic so that he could have grown up to be a strong and sturdy man, like Gisela's brothers, and would have had the opportunity to marry this girl. On account of this, Freud blamed his father for not affording him such an opportunity. This story, according to Jones, was later associated with another love from childhood, Pauline (in Manchester, England), his half-brother's daughter. She rejected Freud's advances when Freud was 19 years old. Both of these love interests were transformative for Freud (Jones, 1954).

Although there are many more experiences, each of these lived experiences played an important role in Freud's life. Jones (1954) explains that they were instrumental in the development of the Oedipus complex—a hallmark of psychoanalysis. Freud's interpretation and associations to *Oedipus Rex*, his interest in evocative language, his lack of admiration for his father, and his feeling of being silenced and rejected by Gisela and Pauline all informed how Freud viewed human development.

Phenomenology and the language of psychoanalysis. Freud's own lived experiences influenced how he derived meaning from the texts on philosophy and anthropology and then duly influence how he would make meaning from other experiences and texts. As such, the texts and literature that Freud read became something to which he could associate in subsequent experiences and essentially fostered the language that he utilized when thinking and writing about psychoanalytic theory.

Further, Freud's contemporaries had their own phenomenological understanding of Freud's writing based on their own lived experiences. Their associations to Freud's work varied, leading them to develop a language that had more salience when viewed in terms of their lived

experiences. Jung and Adler, for instance, rejected the notion that sexuality formed the foundation of psychological development. Based on their own experiences, there were other factors (e.g., “organ inferiority” in the case of Adler) that seemed more salient to how individuals developed psychologically. Once Freud’s contemporaries created their own lexicon, Freud was able to interpret and associate his work to theirs. Some of Freud’s contemporaries’ language made it into his theory, similar to the language and experiences of anthropology, neurology, history, sex, and war/conflict.

So while a shared sense of meaning making has occurred through socially constructed processes, phenomenological processes led to idiosyncratic associations, spawning new forms of meaning making. For instances, Jung and Adler developed different metaphors to lend greater salience to their metaphors. However, this was partially based on their dialog with Freud (either through his works or in face-to-face conversations). One can see here how social constructionism and phenomenology ebb and flow with one another to generate meaning about the world.

The French tradition, the clinical work in which Freud engaged, fostered his sense of meaning making in the development of his theory. Freud’s clinical work with patients comprised lived experiences to which he could associate. His interpretation of these lived experiences influenced his theory, which in turn influenced his understanding of clinical work. As such, the language of the theory needed to be adapted, to match these novel interpretations. Similarly, Freud’s own experiences and interpretation of them influenced how he approached the clinical encounter, or how he formulated his developing theory. Consider, for example, how Freud’s interest in literature informed how he would create a language to explain the Oedipus complex, which was also guided by his experiences with love and disappointment. The multitude of

experiences that comprise one's existence also implicates just how idiosyncratic a theory's metaphors may be.

Summary

As has been elucidated, Freud's societal context and lived experiences are what molded the psychoanalytic lexicon and may be exemplified by the meaning derived from the story of *Oedipus Rex* by Freud in Victorian Europe to create one of the central tenets of psychoanalysis. This was not the mere substitution of language to describe a concept, nor was it just an idea that influenced Freud's thinking. Rather, it was the meaning of *Oedipus Rex* that was placed into a relationship with an experience of conflicted feelings about a child's parents during adolescence. That is, conflict arises between two separate yet related factions: unbeknownst determination (dubbed as fate in the story of *Oedipus Rex*) and conscious will. Essentially, the meaning that Freud derived from interacting with 19th Century Austria, influenced his understanding of lived experiences (social constructionism), which in turn altered his views of engaging in and interpreting the dialog with his peers and society (phenomenology). Figure 7 is a visual representation that depicts this process.




Figure 7. The top half of the figure depicts the dialog between Freud and society and the influence that his interpretation of lived experiences, and language, has on discourse. Similarly, the bottom half of the figure depicts the influence that the social dialog has on Freud's interpretation of lived experiences and the language that he utilized to understand those experiences. Concisely put, the top half depicts the influence that Freud's phenomenology had on social constructionism, while the bottom half depicts the influence that Freud's social constructions has on his interpretation of lived experiences.

What is important to understand from this process is that the evocative language utilized in psychoanalysis is duly influenced by the sociohistorical context in which Freud lived, as well as, his interpretation of lived experiences. This process is not unique to psychoanalysis, but relevant to all theoretical paradigms within psychology.

Chapter 4

The purpose of this research was to explore how theoretical paradigms function as metaphors. From this thesis, the following goals were addressed: (a) to examine the utility of metaphors and how they function, (b) to explore how theoretical paradigms serve as complex metaphors, (c) to develop a theory of theory based on the aforementioned research goals, (d) to understand the implications for the application of theory in research and clinical practice, and (e) to provide researchers with future directions for scholarly inquiry.

The Utility of a Meta-theory

One may wonder about the utility of having a theory about theoretical paradigms. In essence, the meta-theory is merely its own set of metaphors to describe metaphors. For instance, the use of nested metaphors, metaphiers and paraphiers (vehicle), metaphrands and metaphiers (topic), interpretants, and objects all utilize an ontological metaphor to generate meaning. The vehicle is merely a vehicle for a process of creating associations, which results in the ontological metaphor. This meta-theory provides one way of understanding how clinicians understand and work within the therapeutic context.

By understanding the ontological and epistemological assumptions that clinician's possess regarding their own theoretical orientation, clinicians can engage in more reflective practice, like how they conceptualize their patients' problems. The caveat is that while it is important for a theoretical paradigm to have the capacity to predict how to engage a patient in order to alleviate distress and foster insight into the patient's own actions, to reify a theory is problematic. When reified, the concepts of a theoretical paradigm, the nested metaphors and their resulting interpretants, become viewed as active ingredients that produce therapeutic change. Consequently, the reification of concepts leads to the analogy of psychotherapy as medication.

However, when psychotherapies are compared, common factors and specific “active ingredients” are examined in meta-analyses there are generally no differences in effectiveness. The various theoretical paradigms and the common factors to psychotherapy contributed 11% to 42% of the variance for outcome success (Ahn & Wampold, 2001; Lambert & Barley, 2004; Lambert & Bergin, 1994; Stevens, Hynan, & Allen, 2000; Wampold et al., 1997). This research suggested that the utility of understanding theories as metaphors facilitates the clinician to help the patient make meaning, and allows the techniques or specific “active ingredients” to be governed by the metaphoric language of the theory. Yet it is the experience of the therapeutic relationship that contributes much of the variance in the aforementioned literature. As such, it is important to step away from side-by-side comparisons and examine the experience of the patient to understand what was helpful. Developing predetermined ways of interacting with human beings based on the “active ingredient” of a theory is not only rigid but also fallacious. Rather, a theoretical paradigm’s language likely guides the clinician on how to create new experiences for the patient, with the patient in the service of alleviating and understanding distress.

It is important to understand the parallels of this meta-theory. This meta-theory provides a process to understand how a clinician thinks, feels, and experiences the process of psychotherapy. How the clinician views the world and views psychotherapy undoubtedly influences what the clinician discusses with the patient, how the clinician engages the patient, and what meaning is ultimately generated between the clinician and patient. By examining the metaphors that comprise the theoretical paradigm and by understanding how the theory functions within the therapeutic context, the clinician can develop an awareness of the limitations, strengths, biases, and guiding processes of her or his theoretical paradigm of choice. Moreover, it promotes clinicians to understand the influences that society and culture have on the

development of theoretical paradigms. The biases of a culture can easily manifest in how a theory is intended to function. However, by being immersed in the culture, the clinician can become blinded to those biases.

For example, currently emerging theories may contain biases related to the medical establishment, the reification of research (particularly randomized controlled trials [RCTs]), the use of jargon steeped in computer processing, and the need to save money through the use of time-limited approaches. Consider that Division 12 of the American Psychological Association indicates that “Most therapies described [on the Division’s empirically supported treatments registry] were studied in a particular type of scientific study: a randomized controlled trial. Randomized controlled trials are used routinely in medical research to determine which therapies for a given disorder are beneficial” (Division 12 of the American Psychological Association, 2012, § Scientific Standards For Testing Psychotherapies, para. 2). This follows the logic that (a) medicine uses RCTs and has found beneficial treatments, (b) psychology is searching for beneficial treatments, (c) psychology can use RCTs like those used in medicine, and therefore (d) psychology will find beneficial and non-beneficial treatments.

The problem with this logic is that the fields are not analogous in what they are attempting to research. Psychology cannot create a placebo therapy group because, as Wompold and colleagues (1997) state, psychology researchers examine outcomes as opposed to process; thus, the “active ingredients” are not understood, and the outcomes that are measured are those that best represent the language of the theory. In psychological research, it is unlikely that a primary investigator would utilize a measure of ego strength to assess the effectiveness of a behavioral therapy. Why would this be? The metaphoric language that comprises behavioral therapy does not lend itself to being described in terms of an ego. Conversely, medical

researchers can create placebos because the active ingredient of a medication is substituted with an inert ingredient such as sugar. Despite these large methodological limitations in psychological research, the logic follows that because medicine has found beneficial treatments through this type of research, it then psychology likely found beneficial treatments using the same type of research. Thus, the “winners”—the *bona fide*, empirically supported, or evidence-based treatments—become reified by a process not entirely suited to psychological research.

Wampold et al. (1997) suggested that any intervention that is designed to be therapeutic will be therapeutic, and despite vast differences in the tested treatments, the difference in effect sizes in meta-analytic studies are near 0. These results support the Dodo bird effect, whereby all theories that guide the therapeutic process are found to be effective because they are intended to be effective. It is plausible to suggest that what is therapeutic in psychotherapy is that one individual (the therapist) interacts with another individual (the patient) in an attempt to help that person experience the world differently. The language of the theory is what guides the human interaction between therapist and patient. Thus, a shift must occur in psychology so that at least some research is focused on understanding how the therapeutic process is guided by the clinician's theoretical paradigm.

These previous statements are not to refute the utility of clean research designs or even the potential need to update and change the language and theories in psychology. Rather, the statements are to encourage the exploration of how a theory's language guides its research and practice. By utilizing a meta-theory to explore how culture and language create the metaphors of a theoretical paradigm, the clinician can be better prepared to engage in education, research, and practice. In essence, a meta-theory provides a way of making meaning of Psychology's own

meaning making processes. Or, in reference to the aforementioned paragraphs, what yields the active ingredients within the therapeutic process.

Application to Other Theoretical Paradigms

Psychoanalysis is not the only paradigm that functions as a metaphor, or is comprised of metaphors. The present meta-theory serves as a means to understand the various theoretical paradigms salient in psychology today. This is because there is an underlying assumption of many theories: Given the nature of therapy, there must be a purposive way of interacting with individuals to effect change. Regardless of the conceptual framework of a theory, whether the mind is a function of the brain or separate from it, many theories rely on the ontological metaphor that the mind (or in other cases the psyche or the self) is an entity. This ontological metaphor allows clinicians to interact, to conduct research, or to understand the human experience. Each theory has its language steeped within a sociohistorical context and influenced by an individual or a group of individuals.

Cognitive–Behavior Therapy. Cognitive–Behavior Therapy (CBT) has the core, ontological metaphor that the mind is an entity. That is, the mind or psyche exists regardless of whether it is a function of the brain (monism), or is separate from the brain (dualism). However, the mind is not a container for personified entities to exist but, rather, a machine that can be worked on. As such, the conventional mind-as-machine metaphor is evoked. One may notice the engineering-esque language in CBT such as (1) *restructuring* cognitions, (2) providing *tools* to the patient, or (3) fixing or challenging *faulty cognitions*.

Instead of conflicting with warring, human entities (id, ego, superego), the language of CBT is built around the metaphor of faulty machinery. The patient, then, can receive tools to fix their own faulty machinery and make it run more effectively. This lends itself to another

ontological metaphor in that what the clinician provides is tangible. A strategy, technique, or tool can be utilized by patients outside of therapy when they need it, and “stored” when they do not. The clinician takes an active role in therapy because he or she is an expert of the mind’s machinery and can provide the patient with the necessary tools to fix the machinery.

The metaphors, just like psychoanalysis, are present and nested around a core metaphor of the mind. What differ are the types of metaphors and the manner in which the language is presented. Rachman (1997) described how CBT evolved from the integration of behaviorism and cognitive therapy. Theorists Rachman, Thorndike, Beck, and Ellis were instrumental in developing the framework for CBT. That is, Thorndike first popularized behaviorism while Beck and Ellis promoted variants of cognitive therapy. Each of these individuals lived in 20th century America and, like Freud, was influenced by the sociohistorical context. While there will not be extensive discussion of these individuals’ sociohistorical context and phenomenological associations, it can be appreciated that 20th century America with the growing influence of psychology and its presence in U.S. Military during WWI and WWII as well as the advances in technology and computing (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010) all had a profound influence on the language utilized to create the metaphors of Behaviorism, Cognitive Therapy, and ultimately, CBT.

Implications for The Use of a Meta-theory

The overarching purpose of this research was to change the way in which theoretical paradigms are utilized by Psychology, and this is applicable to pedagogy, research, and practice. Rather than reifying one theory or technique over another, this research suggests that a clinician’s theory is a means to comprehend the nebulous process of psychotherapy. As such, images, stories, linguistic constructions (e.g., *super* + *ego* = above I), and things are placed in a

relationship with psychological phenomena (e.g., depression, anxiety, adjustment problems, and recurring patterns of interpersonal relationships). The result are metaphors that a clinician can utilize to think about her or his role in the therapeutic dyad by having some way to predict where to guide the conversation. These metaphors are taught in graduate programs, researched by practitioners and academicians, and consumed by lay people. However, rather than reifying these metaphors, it may be more useful to explore them.

General implications. The present research acknowledges both the universality and diversity that exist among Psychology's various meta-theories. Each meta-theory possesses core metaphors that are unique to theoretician, time, and culture and around which other metaphors are nested. The differences in core metaphors signify the dynamic nature of language and the continual need to change so as to remain alive and salient. Yet, it also illuminates the universal process of attaching language to the ineffable nature of human experience—a process in and of itself ineffable. In this sense, the present research celebrates the richness of diverse cultural worldviews and individual experiences while it simultaneously reminds us of our common goal in psychology. To some degree, the present research is similar to and different from Psychology's other meta-theories, such as psychoanalysis and CBT. It is important to keep in mind the universality/diversity continuum when considering the pedagogical, research, and practice implications that follow.

Pedagogical implications. While the topic of doctoral students has been explored to some degree in the literature, this research focused on personality traits that are linked to a chosen theoretical paradigm. Boswell, Castonguay, and Pincus (2009) found that individuals who gravitated to the CBT paradigm tended to score lower on the Openness, Anger Hostility, and Impulsivity scales of the NEO-PI-R when compared to those doctoral students who

gravitated more towards the humanistic or psychodynamic traditions. The authors hypothesized that this finding may be attributed to the possibility that those students who were more closed off or unaware of their emotions may have gravitated towards CBT because the theory focuses on emotional control, rather than emotional deepening.

The aforementioned research does not illuminate why doctoral students may gravitate towards a particular theoretical orientation. However, if theoretical paradigms are understood as metaphors, then the question becomes what are the ontological and epistemological assumptions that the doctoral student (or any mental health trainee) possesses. Stated differently, how does the trainee understand the world, the role of therapy, and the process by which therapeutic change occurs? The utilization of a trait model to understand the trainees' proclivities can potentially lead an institution, or a program, to address the trainees' weaknesses, pathologizing and making the ontological assumption that the theoretical paradigms are like options from which trainees choose. Rather, the utilization of the present meta-theory would suggest an alternative pedagogical approach. Given that theoretical paradigms are composed of and serve as metaphors, it may be more useful to explore the trainees' associations to the metaphors by encouraging reflective learning.

Essentially, the trainees are asked to develop a deeper understanding to the paraphiers that are present within a given theory, and to explore what the vehicle is attempting to convey through its relationship with the topic. For instance, in a Personality Theory course, students could be asked to reflect on (a) what their associations are to the id (examining the paraphiers), (b) what psychological phenomena the id is attempting to generate meaning about (examining the relationship between the vehicle and topic), (c) how the trainees understand the psychological phenomena after the reflection on the id (examining the paraphrands and displaced paraphiers),

(d) how the trainees may understand the id in reference to the other concepts evocatively described in psychoanalytic thought (examining how the nested metaphors of psychoanalysis interact with one another), (e) what the function of the mind is (examining the core metaphor of the mind), and (f) how they believe the id would manifest in the therapy room and how they as therapists would respond (examining the Peircean object of psychoanalysis based on what it symbolizes [the manifestation of the id which is the Peircean sign] and what it means in terms of process [the logic behind the responses and where it comes from in the literature which are the Peircean interpretants]).

This process of reflection can take place in the form of both reflection papers and class discussion because it parallels the phenomenological and socially constructed development of the theoretical paradigm. Moreover, discussing the evocative language of a theory can help deepen the trainees' understanding of the theory and shift their thinking from a theory being a tool, to a theory being about meaning making and guiding process. Boswell and colleagues (2009) posited that novice trainees often integrated other paradigmatic techniques into their theory of choice due to the perceived limitations of their theory. The present research may serve as a guide for trainees and clinicians to integrate different theories in a purposive manner based on the chosen theories' lexica. For instance, combining the mind-as-machine metaphor with the anthropomorphism of the id, ego, and superego may feel disjointed or haphazard to clinician and patient alike. While the actual metaphors of the theory may not be utilized, how they inform the process of therapy may be disrupted. Adding homework assignments focused on the present may be discordant to associating freely and discussing past relationships if it is done haphazardly. Professors of Professional Seminar and Case Conference courses may wish to explore (a) why integration is occurring, (b) how the integration is being implemented, and (c) the level of

understanding of the theories being integrated. These types of discussions with trainees may be beneficial to have them think more deeply about their theory or theories as well as more deeply about how and when to integrate.

Similarly, to foster a deeper understanding of the language and ideas conveyed within a theoretical paradigm, it may be helpful to explore the sociohistorical contexts of when the major theories were developed. While it is important to learn important dates and major events in a History of Psychology course, it may also be beneficial to consider using discourse about the sociohistorical contexts that influenced the trainees' theories of choice. One individual's present is another's past. As such, it is important to understand the sociohistorical context in which the trainees' live. By exposing students to context of history and comparing it to the present allows them to develop a greater appreciation for why a theory is structured the way it is, rather than descending to *ad hominem* attacks about the theoretician, or reifying a theory as immutable in terms of language and concept.

Finally, it may also be beneficial to work with students to reflect on how their theories of choice may influence their language, posture, thinking, and behavior in practice. Case Conference and Professional Seminar courses as well as practicum and internship supervision are rife with opportunities to explore these influences. The goal of such an exercise is to help the trainee develop insight into how his or her meaning making processes influence his or her interactions with the patient. If, as therapists, we require our patients to reflect on and examine themselves, why would we not train future clinicians to do the same?

Research implications. There are a multitude of avenues that future researchers may take regarding this meta-theory. It is important for researchers to understand that this research was designed to make meaning from Psychology's meaning making processes. Especially since

theoretical paradigms are understood as meaning making devices rather than veridical, reified constructs, and intended to help clinicians think about how to help patients make meaning out of their lives and experiences. Lambert and Barley (2002) found that nearly 30% of the variance of adult treatment outcomes was due to common process factors. This finding was significant when controlling for therapeutic technique, which accounted for 15% of the treatment outcome variance. Rather than treating theoretical paradigms as if they were medications and conducting research on which paradigm is more effective, researchers should focus on patients' perceptions of what was most helpful in therapy what was most helpful for the clinicians in those same cases.

Researchers have investigated the influences that one's worldview has on choosing a theoretical paradigm. For instance, how a clinician's ontological and epistemological views of psychotherapy—for instance, whether psychotherapy viewed as a medical treatment or existential process—influence her or his choice of theoretical paradigms and how the theory is used as a model of praxis. Norcross and Prochaska (1983) found that clinicians were more satisfied with their theoretical paradigms than researchers. The authors found that 94% of clinicians utilized their theoretical paradigms often or repeatedly. This was based on the fact that clinicians made deliberate choices for their theoretical paradigms based on clinical experience, personal philosophy and values, and graduate training. Further research into these decision-making processes would reflect greater insight into the phenomenological and socially constructed aspects of choosing a theoretical paradigm.

Aside from the usage and selection of theoretical paradigms, researchers could focus on the processing of theoretical paradigms. That is, given the evocative and metaphoric nature of psychology's theories, it may be helpful to understand some of the neurophysiological correlates of their use. Chen, Widick, and Chatterjee (2008), Gioria, Saidel, Soroker, Batori, and Kasher

(2000), Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, and Kircher (2004), Yang, Edens, Simpson, and Kawczyk (2009), and Yoshimura and colleagues (2009) have all found neurophysiological differences between literal speech and various types of metaphoric speech. That is, various parts of the brain such as parts of the left and right hemisphere, the amygdalae, and the inferior and middle temporal gyri have been indicated in terms of processing metaphors. Future researchers may consider investigating if there are differences in how information is processed using a theoretical paradigm versus using literal speech. To elucidate this point, future researchers may present a clinician with phrases such as “John Doe feels depressed” as a (more) literal utterance and “John Doe’s superego is extremely harsh” as a theoretical utterance. Novice and experienced clinicians could be compared to determine changes in processing over time. The findings may shed light on what is elicited at the neurophysiological level. For instance, do theoretical paradigms cause greater activation in parts of the brain associated with emotion? Pending certain advances in technology and neuroimaging, researchers may investigate whether theoretical paradigms are processed differently based on experience and fluency with a particular theoretical paradigm. It should be strongly cautioned that neuroimaging research should not be utilized as a metaphor for the present meta-theory. That is, given the use and desire for utilizing theoretical paradigms (cf. Norcross & Prochaska, 1983), it may be of use to explore the brain’s response to the use of a theory. Neuroimaging studies, however, should neither be utilized as proof to the existence of metaphoric language in a theory, nor utilized to as a proof to the philosophy of the present meta-theory, which may result in confirmatory hypothesis testing and the reification of the present theory. Rather, neuroimaging research in this area would help to better understand one facet of the brain’s response to meaning making processes.

Finally, future investigators could generate more theoretical research to understand why theories exist in psychology, and thus, engage in more constructive discourse about similarities and differences amongst the various paradigms. Rather than reifying a particular theoretical paradigm, more discourse may generate greater understanding about how to interact with patients in a meaningful and meaning-focused manner. By having open discourse about how to make the nebulous process of therapy more concrete and available to clinicians, it is plausible that it will be the patients who ultimately benefit. Rather than determining whether a theory or practice is efficacious as a treatment option, this research was intended to understand how and why theoretical paradigms are processed, utilized, and understood, which is important given the fact that clinicians continue to gravitate towards a model of praxis.

Practice implications. Theoretical paradigms help to organize clinical data into a comprehensive narrative that can guide how the clinician thinks about and interacts with the patient. It provides the clinician with the capacity to predict to varying degrees what may be helpful and what may be harmful to the patient. A theory can guide the clinician to what questions to ask or what to pay attention to during the therapeutic hour. However, when a theory is understood to serve as a metaphor, it serves additional purposes within the therapeutic context.

First, it draws the clinician's attention to the fact that something (vehicle) must be placed into a relationship to something else (topic), in order to form the metaphor. Those unknown constructs, the psychological phenomena that are studied and treated, become more understandable through the metaphors that are created. The metaphors that comprise the theory as well as the theory itself serving as an ontological and epistemological metaphor are what are utilized to connect what is observable with a patient (e.g., behavior, language, patterns) and what is observable at the biological level (e.g., neurophysiology, chemistry, physics). Since the

clinician cannot directly interact with a neuron or system of neurons to effect change, they can only observe what a patient says or does. The metaphors attempt to connect the two with a narrative so as to guide the clinician's interventions. It shifts the focus from the psychological phenomena being a product of biology, the environment, or some combination of the two, to the phenomena being an explanation for something that is yet completely known.

Psychologically, one draws inferences from experiences and, thus, creates meaning when none exists. That is the role of metaphor: To convey meaning by linking two things together when there is an unknown. This can be a significant shift for those who may consider these psychological phenomena to be veridical, static things such as an id, an ego, a superego, a schema, or a reinforcer. These terms, when understood as metaphors, encourages flexibility and exploration with the language rather than reifying it and making the vernacular immutable. This also helps with the understanding that the language utilized within the metaphor was developed within a specific sociohistorical context, which included the theoretician's lived experiences, society's knowledge at the time, and the interface of the two through discourse.

Second, with the understanding that a theoretical paradigm serves as an ontological and epistemological metaphor, the clinician must then explore how this metaphor shapes his or her view of the patient, the treatment, and the potential outcomes. Clinicians must be aware of how their theoretical paradigms create biases either in terms of what can be done, what will be understood as significant, or what will be understood as not significant. Moreover, the metaphor influences the way in which the clinician interacts with the patient. As a contrast, the mind-as-machine metaphor influences the clinician to provide tools and to fix problems while the tripartite, personification metaphor of the id, ego, and superego would indicate a mediation between the three factions.

Third, and similarly, theoretical paradigms serve as a way to provide information about what *is* being considered salient for a case, but they also serve as a means to convey what *is not* being considered salient by the clinician. As a supervisor or consultant, this can lead to a fruitful exploration of what is being missed by the supervisee or consultee. The metaphoric language of the theory, thus, opens and constrains a clinician's capacity to work. By understanding the theory as serving as a metaphor, it permits the supervisor and supervisee to step away from the language of the theory and examine the potential oversights before returning to the theory to reengage in the clinical work. For example, a supervisor and supervisee could explore the use of cognitive or mindfulness strategies as being in service of the ego or explore how countertransference could be a self-schema being elicited in the therapy session. By reifying the concepts or manualizing the treatment, such a conversation may never occur between supervisor and supervisee (or even with oneself).

Finally, according to Boswell and colleagues (2009) and Orlinsky and Rønnestad (2005), there was a shift, both internationally and domestically, towards being integrative or eclectic. Moreover, Ambhül and Olinsky (1997) described how clinicians are reporting similarities and differences in therapeutic goals based on their preferred theoretical orientation. As such, there has been an interest in integrating theories. Understanding that theoretical paradigms comprise of metaphors would indicate that the metaphors being integrated together are congruent with one another. For instance, from a psychoanalytic frame, providing a set of cognitive tools and relaxation strategies to fix a machine (mind-as-machine metaphor) is incongruent if it is not fully integrated into the psychoanalytic language. However, if the cognitive tools are understood as an object being presented, then the focus shifts from fixing something (mind-as-machine metaphor) to providing nurturance for the ego (personification metaphor). This change may seem small, but

consider the implications following the object presentation. What may ensue may be a discussion about the transference of receiving something, or being told to do something. This would be different if it were presented as a homework assignment in more traditional CBT terms.

Conversely, discussing the relationship between the clinician and patient may seem somewhat out of place in a CBT model of praxis. However, when framed in terms of the various schemata and faulty cognitions, it serves as *in vivo* exposure and collaborative work to redress the faulty cognition. Homework may ensue to practice what occurred in therapy rather than, if the clinician were using a personification metaphor, to serve as an exploration of past relationships and transferences.

While it may seem minute to simply ensure that the metaphors are congruent, it extends beyond the actual words and moves into the realm of how these words manifest. Even though the theoretical language may never be disclosed to the patient, incongruence with the metaphor may lead to incongruence in the work. A new assignment (as in the psychodynamic case) or a new topic of discussion (as in the CBT case) may seem disjointed and out of place with the previous *modus operandi*. As such, understanding theory as metaphor requires a purposive and precise integration and a strong understanding of the language of both theories.

Limitations

First, given that this meta-theory is in and of itself a metaphor, it is important to consider that these metaphors should not become reified. However, with the use of ontological metaphors—as in the creation of nested metaphors, objects, vehicles, interpretants, and sign, for instance—there is without a doubt a chance that this present theory, too, will become reified. What was important to glean from this research was that the language that constructed the various theoretical paradigms, and this meta-theory, was flexible. Additionally, in order to

remain salient, the language needs to be adjusted to meet the demands of a future time and place—sociohistorical context.

Second, this present research was theoretical. Thus, it was an integration and extension of known concepts to address a dearth in the literature. Schafer (1981, 2003) described the anthropomorphism and visuospatial metaphors within psychoanalysis. However, his concepts were never examined in the same light as this research. While Schafer detailed the metaphors that existed within psychoanalysis and the need to reduce the jargon of the metaphors, he did not detail the process of the creation of the metaphor. Jaynes (1976) provided the theory about the creation of metaphors, but only tenuously extended the theory into psychology. Schefer, Jaynes, nor this study's author extended the theoretical work to hypothesis testing or qualitative research methodology. As such, it could be argued that a limitation of this research was that it did not go far enough to extend the thoughts of previous authors. Yet, it can be argued that this meta-theory served as the foundation for future research.

Finally, although within the purview of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of this research, one limitation was that there was a phenomenological influence regarding what could be considered a core metaphor for each of the theories. That is, how one interprets the writings of a theory may influence how one interprets the core metaphor around which all other metaphors within the theory envelop. Moreover, even the types of metaphors that are utilized within a theory could be argued persuasively. Yet, this limitation also was a strength of this research in that it encourages discourse, exploration, and reflection regarding any theoretical paradigm to which this meta-theory was applied. This was in accordance with the other ontological and epistemological assumption of this research, which was that discourse and dialog (social constructionism) formed the other half of the reality and knowing. As such, this

meta-theory attempted to promote the processes and assumptions that constructed it. However, each of the limitations that existed served as the foundation to further develop the understanding of Psychology's theoretical paradigms.

Conclusion

This research detailed how theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors, and served as metaphors for clinicians. More specifically, a vehicle (better known construct) and topic (lesser known construct) placed in a relationship to one another within a particular frame. The paraphiers that are displaced onto the metaphrand of the topic helps dictate what type of metaphor is being created. This process occurs multiple times within Psychology's various theoretical paradigms. For many theories, the core metaphor, which dictates the language of the other nested metaphors, is created around the topic of the mind. That is, the mind is a machine, space, or thing which can be fixed, exist in, or manipulated and interacted with. The theory itself, served as a metaphor for the clinician's own ontology and epistemology. The theory, when serving as a metaphor, is governed by Peircean semiotics whereby the metaphor serves as the object in the psychotherapeutic exchange between clinician and patient. The evocative language of a theory is influenced by the theoretician's own associations (based in phenomenology), and the meaning created within a society through discourse and interaction (based on social constructionism).

By understanding theoretical paradigms as metaphors—both being comprised of metaphors and serving as a metaphor—pedagogy, research, and practice can be reconsidered. The implications for this meta-theory challenges educators, researchers, academicians, and clinicians to question what is real in psychology and what guides what we do. Despite this

research's limitations, this meta-theory encourages reflection and discourse to foster a deeper understanding of Psychology's theories by examining the very language that comprises them.

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Appendix A

A glossary of terms is provided for ease of reference. Only those terms that are utilized for the duration of the manuscript are provided (cf. Figure 1 for how each of these terms relate to one another)

Term	Definition
Frame	the context, whether linguistic or contextual, that serves as the minimal unit to establish incongruity (Kittay, 1987).
Metaphier	a known or concretized concept placed in relation to the metaphrand (see below; Jaynes, 1976)
Metaphrand	a lesser known construct placed in relation to the metaphier (see above; Jaynes, 1976)
Paraphier	attributes of the metaphier that can be displaced to varying degree onto the metaphrand (Jaynes, 1976)
Paraphrand	attributes of the metaphier that have become displaced onto the metaphrand, thus, becoming attributes associated with the metaphors (Jaynes, 1976)
Topic	the subject of the text (Kittay, 1987) and, for this research, is comprised the metaphrand and its paraphrands
Vehicle	the phrase or word utilized to transport the content of an idea and is used in relation to the topic (Kittay, 1987) and, for this research, is comprised of the metaphier and its paraphiers

Appendix B

Conventional metaphors tend to have a hidden metaphoric structure and, as such, may not appear to be metaphors at all. However, these metaphors (provided below) are common in colloquial speech and are, nonetheless, metaphors and not literal utterances.

Metaphor	Type of Metaphor	Examples
Arguments are battles and aggression	Argument-is-War Metaphor	Your claims are <i>indefensible</i> . I <i>demolished</i> his argument. Think that you can do better? <i>Shoot!</i>
Theory and arguments are buildings	Building Metaphor	The <i>foundation</i> of his theory is x. Her argument fell apart. What is your conceptual <i>framework</i> ?*
Containers hold abstractions	Container Metaphor	You <i>put in</i> plenty of effort. My argument has <i>holes in it</i> . I am <i>filled</i> with hope.
Journeys orient progress and content	Journey Metaphor	We haven't <i>covered much ground</i> (distance). She is <i>going in circles</i> (directness).
Conscious is up; Unconscious is down	Orientational Metaphor	Wake <i>up</i> /Fall asleep; <i>Under</i> hypnosis; <i>Sank</i> into a coma
Health and life are up; sickness and death are down	Orientational Metaphor	She's at her <i>peak</i> /He's suffering <i>declining</i> health;
Theory is a person	Personification Metaphor	Her theory <i>explained</i> everything; Inflation is <i>destroying</i> the dollar.
Time is a substance and resource	Structural Metaphor	I <i>gave</i> him my time. That <i>took a lot</i> of time to complete.*
Time moves	Time-is-a-Moving-Object Metaphor	As time <i>passes by</i> . Her time <i>will come</i> . The <i>arrival</i> of the Winter Break.*

Time has worth

Time-is-Money Metaphor

We've *spent* enough time
examining this. You'll *save*
time by working on your
dissertation now.*

Note. Examples of conventional metaphors are provided from Lakoff and Johnson's (2003) *Metaphors We Live By*. Those examples denoted with an asterisk (*) are provided by the present author.