Building the "State" without "Peace" or Making "Peace" without the "State"

A Baseline Study on the Paradox of State-building and Peace-building in Sierra Leone

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Introduction

Even for countries with every prospect of perpetual survival, periodic evaluation of how situations have been managed during moments of national emergencies is an appropriate exercise. This becomes all the more profound for nations that have had occasions to reshape the structures of their national constructs after situations of intense peace and security breakdowns that affected intergroup relations. This is where the mutually reinforcing subjects of "Peace-building" and State-building" come into the equation of national politics.[1] What seems to be the crucial issue here is the nature and extent to which the management of the outbreak of conflict facilitates a society's revisiting of the central issues in its statebuilding conversation. Addressing these issues allows for the location of peacebuilding as part of the continuum of statebuilding in which peacebuilding represents an interlude in the state-building process that has now turned violent. The peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone after its bitter civil war from 1991-2002 provides a rich empirical basis for the examination of how the nation used the opportunity of its " second-chance" to address fundamental issues of governance at the heart of its statebuilding conversation and therefore allows us to locate the mutuality between peacebuilding and statebuilding.

This study takes a detailed look at the process of Peace-building and State-building in Sierra Leone after its bitter civil war. Among the crucial questions it raises include:

1. What is Sierra Leone's historical trajectory in relation to the statebuilding conversation that took place before the civil war?

2. What was distinct about the process leading to the settlement? What are distinct features of the settlement and considerations that dictated the settlement?

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[1] Both State-building and Peace-building continue to attract academic attention. Recent studies on both subjects include: Craig Zelizer, *Integrated Peace-building: Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict*, 2013 and Timothy Sisk, *Statebuilding*, Polity Press, 2013.

3. To what extent has the formal agreements reached after conflicts brought credible long-term peace?

4. To what extent has peace-building returned the Sierra Leonean society to the original state-building "conversation" and how have fundamental issues of governance been addressed in the aftermath of the conflict?

5. What identity issues that were part of the statebuilding conversation were taken into consideration in the settlement and post settlement arrangements?

6. Has the gender regimes that predated conflict altered? If so, how? Does this differ from other identity conversations pre- and post conflict?

These questions, often previously asked rhetorically, are the subjects of focus of this research.[2] The central argument advanced in the paper is that four issues are central to the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone. These are:

i. The identity conversation in the quest for nationhood;

ii. The search for a legitimate, and effective national political culture;

iii. The politics (and intrigues) involved in the management of its natural resource endowments; and

iv. The re-engagement of societies and communities at the margins of the state.

This Baseline study also posits that efforts to address these four issues have underlined the state-building conversation in the country and that lasting peace will depend on the extent to which these issues are addressed

This Baseline study attempts five objectives. First, it provides a historical perspective of the politics and intricacies of the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone. Second, it discusses the country's civil conflict, especially the issues that underlined its causes and

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[2] Among the countries that fall into this category are Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Rwanda and Ethiopia. All these countries are parts of the larger focus of this research.

prolongation. Third, it interrogates the process leading up to the settlement and the distinct features of the settlement, including the actors involved and the issues covered or neglected in the search for peace. Fourth, it examines the outcomes of the settlement including the extent of the transformation of the identity markers and extracts the lessons learnt from the peace process. Lastly the study identifies the key propositions to be tested during the proposed field-trip.

The Inevitability Of Instability: Extracting Relevant Historical Trajectories In The Statebuilding Conversation In Sierra Leone

As a former British colony established by freed slaves, Sierra Leone was, until the outbreak of its civil war in 1991, one of West Africa's beacons of admiration.[3] Its tertiary institution, the Fourah Bay College, had trained many of West Africa's early elites,[4] and the relatively stable nature of its democracy, even if not very credible, was sufficient to win it a measure of respect in a region with littered history of civil wars, military coups and acrimonious inter-group relations.[5] However, within this historical evolution lay many issues that were to play redoubtable roles in some of the developments that now characterise the political and economic outlooks of the country. Not long after its independence in April 1961, clear indications began to emerge that the country would be bedevilled with instability, even if the scale of what ultimately came could not have been imagined. This "inevitability of instability" syndrome was rooted mainly in 1) the nature of ethnic relations; 2) the nature of political governance; 3) the management of natural resources; and 4) social exclusion. However these issues cannot be understood in isolation. In order to understand the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone it is therefore crucial to bear in mind the complexity, intertwinement of these issues and their mutually influencing nature.

Identity Conversations and the Quest for Nationhood.

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[3]The country's beaches have historically attracted visitors to the country and the general peace that existed in theneighbouring countries for the period immediately after independence were sources of further attraction.

[4] Fourah Bay College was Black Africa's first University College and its contribution to educational development of the region has recently been captured in the first major book on the University, See, Anthony Karim Kamara, A Concise History of Fourah Bay College 1827 – 2003,

[5] As of this time, Ghana had experienced military coup and Nigeria had experienced both military coups and a bitter civil war.

Identity conversations in Sierra Leone's statebuilding process centre on the control and domination of the state and the political sphere by political elites. They involve the manipulation of the ethnic relations largely among the Krios, Mendes, Temnes and the Limbas for narrow political and elite interests. In the pre-colonial period, these identity conversations were initially and largely between the resettled slaves, the Krios and the indigenous local populations. The indigenous population of Sierra Leone is made up of some 18 ethnic groups. The south and eastern part of the country is dominated by the Mendes, which is the largest ethnic group in the country. Temnes, Limbas, Korankos, Yalunkas, Fullas and few others dominate the northern part of the country with the Krios in the western areas.[6]

The British Colonial administration divided Sierra Leone into two entities: the Colony and the Protectorate. These territorial divisions resulted in the unequal development of the protectorate, mainly inhabited by the indigenous populations, in comparison to the Colony, largely populated by the Krios.[7] These sociological and geo-political divisions resulted in the privileging by the British of the Krios over the indigenous populations and undermined the interdependence and cultural understanding between the two broad groups. As a consequence, the Krios were highly educated and occupied most of the professional positions in the colonial administrations at the expense of the indigenous populations broadly described as illiterate. This subsequently reinforced the air of superiority of the Krios over the indigenous populations. The Krios who were more educated and Christians felt that they had a mission to expose the ingenious populations to " light' and civilisation. The indigenous populations fiercely resisted these perceptions of cultural, religious and racial superiority. These racial and prejudicial distinctions however underlined and structured the legal, administrative, political and social relations between and within the colony and protectorate.[8] The main underlying point of tension at the heart of this identity conversation was the contestation over political equality and control of the state.[9] With increased political mobilization of the Krios against colonial rule, the British established legal policies that increased political and public participation of the Indigenous populations in the

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[6]Christopher Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*. London, 1962.
[7] TRC Final Report, Chapter One p.5-6
[8] Jimmy D. Kandeh 1992 Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone African Studies Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Apr. p.83
[9] Jimmy D. Kandeh 1992.p. 81

governance process.[10] Additionally, the British and the natives realigned their economic and trade relations with the Krios following the arrival of Lebanese immigrants in 1907.[11] This further widened the ethnic rift between the natives and the Krios. As independence approached, the contestations between the numerically larger native populations and the minority Krios centred on the control and domination of the post – independent political project. Remnants of these divisions continue to reverberate throughout the post-independence period.

Following independence, this identity conversation shifted to reflect political contestations predominantly among the Mendes, Temnes and the Limbas elites over the control of the state and its resources. This resulted in the instrumentalization of ethnic identities by the elites for their own narrow interests.[12] As such, political organizations and divisions in the country were formed and historically and contemporaneously mirrored ethnic Identities. The post independent political party, The Sierra Leone's People Party, attracted support predominantly from the Mendes and was stigmatized as a Mende party.[13] Conversely, the All Peoples Congress led by Siaka Stevens was formed as a counterforce to SLPP and the Mendes and drew its support principally from the Temnes, and the Limbas. Stevens' dictatorship for instance ensured that his dominance, reinforced by ethnic favouritism in the security forces, continued until the transfer of power to Joseph Momoh in 1985. The preference for Momoh was predicated on the belief by Steven that only a loyal person from his own ethnic group (the Limba) could protect his interests while he was outside a formal position of political power. When the SLPP won office in 1996 for the first time in nearly 30 years, it was widely perceived as the return to power of the Mendes.[14]The dominance of northerners in the army remained a legacy from Stevens' time. Hence, the military coup of May 1997 also reflected some shift in the ethnic complexion of power.

The emergence and development of Ethno-political identities have played a significant political and developmental role through class formation and domination in the Sierra

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[10] TRC Report *op-cit* pp.9-10
[11] Lansana Gberie, War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection. p.10
[12] REF?
[13] Jimmy D. Kandeh(1998).Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996.African Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Sep.), p.92
[14] *But Kabbah tried to heal ethnic divisions by including representatives of other parties into the government REF?*

Leone statebuilding conversation.[15] As will be shown later, after the conflict, ethnicity became more prominent in the understanding of national politics. For the purpose of our discussion in this project, what is crucial to note is that political elites have wired their interests to ethnicity and they have introduced zero-sum tendencies to national politics. All these were to be crucial factors in the politics of state and peace building due to the degree to which they have undermined the emergence and development of a collective sense of national identity.

The Search for a legitimate and effective national political culture

A central issue in the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone involves the nature and legitimacy of the political governance. An examination of the exercise of political governance in Sierra Leone reveals a distinctive narrative of elite centred governance at the expense of social transformation. This conversation among the elites is distinct in its exclusion of the Sierra Leone society in the negotiation of the terms in which they would be governed and its attendant degenerative social, political and economic impacts. The elites indifference to the larger societal demands was driven by political contestation over the consolidation of power and control of the state and its resources. Three main features of this elite centred sate building conversation are emblematic of the exclusion of the Sierra Leone Society in the governance process and found variant expressions before and after outbreak of the civil war this include repression, authoritarianism and brutality of the Political governance, corruption and the emergence of an alternative radical politics.

Repression, brutality and authoritarianism as components of governance are emblematic of the Sierra Leonean Statebuilding conversation. The restructuring of the chieftaincy system in the protectorate[16] by the British in their expansionist process marked the emergence of political repression and authoritarianism by indigenous political leaders in Sierra Leone.[17] Before this, the chiefs were legitimately elected and responsive to their people and were subjected to inbuilt traditional systems of check and balances that prevented them from becoming abusive or autocratic.[18] The

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[15] Jimmy D. Kandeh (1992.)pp. 81-99 April
[16] The system of chieftaincy was non existent in the Colony
[17] TRC Final Report pp.7-8
[18] Ibid.

consolidation of colonial rule resulted in the erosion of these values and remaking of the chieftaincy system into institutions for forced and brutal taxation and punishments. Additionally the subservience of the chiefs to the colonial authority, their perceived lack of fairness and injustice and corruptible nature further alienated them from the local populations.[19] This legacy was carried over into the post independent period and resulted in the co-option of chiefs by the political elites.

With independence, the politico-elites were ruthless in how they responded to dissent both within the opposition and within their regimes. From 1960, divisive party politics largely between the SLLP and APC grounded on ethnic and regional alliances and weak support bases fragmented the political system in Sierra Leone and with it hopes of a collective national identity. Political mobilization centred on the construction of a multiparty system and a democratic culture. The political dissent by a broad constituent of Sierra Leoneans immediately precipitated the replacement of Sir Milton Magai, following his death, by his Sir Albert Magai. The issue at this point was the qualifications of Sir Albert Magai. Against the background of the oppositions against him, Sir Albert Magai attempted to establish a one party rule. This was widely opposed and resulted in the uncovering of a coup plot against him.[20] Magai desire to consolidate power further entrenched regional and ethnic polarization, cronyism in the public sphere and the narrowing of the political space.

Albert Magai's loss of election in 1967 to Siaka Stevens precipitated three military coups within the space of one-year.[21] Once he assumed office, Steven began the process of arrogating more powers to himself, a process that resulted in the establishment of a one-party-state in 1978. A key feature and development of the Steven administration was the way he dealt with opposition and the consequences this was to have on the country's future. While the Magai brothers were somewhat tolerant of opposition, with Sir Milton Magai even providing money for opposition political parties to organise

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[19] TRC Final Report, pp.11-12

[20] In response to the coup, Sir Albert Magai signed a Defence Pact with Guinea, thus providing a prelude to the complex regional involvement that was later to occur in the country. He ruled until 1967, when he lost election to Siaka Steven's All People's Congress (APC).

[21] The first, led by David Lansana, a Brigadier in the army and a close friend of Albert Magai, who overthrew Stevens few hours after assuming office in April 1967. Another coup led by Andrew Juxton-Smith later removed Lansana in March 1968. This regime too was overthrown the following month by Brigadier John Bangura, who reinstated the constitution and brought Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister.

campaigns, Steven was ruthless in the ways he responded to dissent. For example, in May 1971, a coup attempt by John Bangura, who had earlier handed power to him was uncovered at conception and Bangura and other plotters were hanged.[22] To convince Sierra Leoneans that the plotters had been killed, their bodies were displaced for public view. The killing of Bangura marked the beginning of an unfortunate sequence that was to plague Sierra Leone. From that moment, bloodshed became a part of Sierra Leonean politics and governance. Countrywide student demonstrations in 1977 against the corrupt, and repressive APC regime marked the first attempt at political mobilization against the regime.[23] The APC however responded ruthlessly by closing all schools and colleges, arrest and detained scores of students and dissolved the one-party legislature.[24] The introduction of the one-party constitution in 1978 under the APC narrowed the political space and unmasked ethnic and electoral violence.[25]

In 1986, Stevens retired from politics and specifically chose Joseph Momoh, who had previously been the head of the Sierra Leone Army, to be his successor. There was no major shift in policy towards governance under Momoh. Like Stevens, he too took strong views against coup plot and, in fact, had his Vice President, Francis Minah, hanged in 1989 for one of such alleged coups. Abuse of power continued under Momoh and it was not surprising that it was under him that a civil war that was to redefine the outlook of Sierra Leone occurred. As the 1996 elections demonstrated, the change of government did not lead to the transformation of institutional practices of government.[26]All these political contestations and associated repressions and brutalities created a reduction in the value of human life among Sierra Leoneans, a trend that was to be displayed to its most abysmal level during the civil war.

Military coups are crucial parts in the historical evolution of the Sierra Leone state. Military coups unmasked political contestations among the elites and had redoubtable impacts in the statebuilding conversation. In March 1971 another military coup was organized by soldiers loyal to Bangura. One of those arrested and jailed for this coup

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[22] This was in spite of the impassioned speech in which Bangura recalled his long association with Stevens and the assistance he gave in ensuring that Stevens became the Prime Minister.
[23] Jimmy D. Kandeh(1998). pp. 91-111
[24]Ibid.,p. 93
[25]Ibid., p. 93
[26] Ibid.,p. 93

was Foday Sankoh, a name that was to become the most infamous in the history of Sierra Leone as the head of the Revolutionary United Forces. In fact this turn of events posits the potential impact of discontent with the political elite by excluded groups. It also impacts on the statebuilding process as Sankoh sought to reengage this in some way through the civil war. From here the links between political governance and the antecedents of violent conflict are well established. There was another alleged plot in July 1974, which saw 8 people executed. The 1997 AFRC/RUF coup signalled the failure of democratic renewal in Sierra Leone and the delinking of democracy and development.[27]These contestations of power among the various leaders had considerable impact on statebuilding in at least two ways. First, it created an impression that later became entrenched in the country that control of political power at the centre was to be aspired for with desperation and that holders of political power at the centre can use the control of state resources to intimidate the population. Second, it marked the beginning of the marginalisation of segments of the society, especially youths and minority ethnic groups.

However, far more prominent in explaining the rots that subsequently led to the civil war was the nature and extent of corruption in the country.[28] The governments, especially the Steven's, was notoriously corrupt and it made use extensive patronage that effectively undermined all the principal institutions including the parliament, police, armed forces and civil service. Similar to the APC, and NPRC,the SLLP under Tejan Kabbah remained a unregenerate patronage party which devoured that state.[29] The perceptions of a hegemonic ethnic group in the APC additionally coloured any vestiges of a national identity and contributed to the introduction of nepotism and cronyism in state institutions.[30] Even at this early stage, the management of the country's mineral resources, especially diamonds, had become a key issue and it was the mismanagement and general problems of governance that was to lead to the bitter civil war.[31]

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[27]Ibid., p. 107-109
[28] Ibid
[29] Ibid.p. 107
[30] TRC Report p,20
[31] See, Abiodun Alao: *Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment*: Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2007

The above elite governance process and its associated brutality and repression laid the foundations for the emergence of a radical political alternative. Historically however political mobilization can be traced backed to the emergence of trade and labour unions. This sowed the seeds for student radicalism and for the emergence of RUF. However, the political dissent was distinct in its absence of a political consciousness and a programme of action. This was conspicuously absent within the RUF/SL

Natural Resource Management and the Politics of State-building and Peace-building in Sierra Leone

There is a popular anecdote among Sierra Leoneans that effectively captures the relationship between natural resource endowments and the politics of their management in the country. According to the anecdote:

"When at creation God blessed Sierra Leone with enormous mineral resources, other nations of the world complained at the favourable disposition of God towards the country. In response, God told them: "Wait till you see their leaders".

By regional standards, Sierra Leone's natural resources are significant, if not exceptional. Apart from its land that is fertile for agriculture, the country also has considerable mineral resources, such as Gold, Diamond, Bauxite, Rutile, and Iron Ore and has the third largest mining deposit in the world and the largest in Africa. Of all these, however, diamonds are the most important, and consequently, most controversial. The resource was discovered in Sierra Leone in 1938, and since then, it has dominated the country's economy, accounting for virtually all of Sierra Leone's foreign exchange earnings.[32] The deposits are located in three main fields: Koidu-Yengema (Kono), Tongo and Zimmi. These run south of Zimmi town along the Mano River down to the Liberian border. The deposits are shallow and require minimal exploitation to guarantee returns. The location as a gateway to war-torn Liberia also made it strategic during Liberia's conflict. The same applies to gold, which, after its discovery immediately contributed to the country's national economy. But apart from

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[32] The country's diamond deposit is the highly prized Kimberlite dyke concessions (underground rock-formation deposits) and they are commonly the alluvial variety (water-borne deposits of gravel). Sierra Leone at the Crossroads: Seizing the chance to benefit from mining. Published by National Advocacy Coalition On Extractives (NACE), March 2009 http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/sierra-leone-at-the-crossroads.pdf

gold and diamonds, there is iron ore at Marampa and it was a major foreign-exchange earner until mining there was closed down in the mid-1990s.[33] In terms of the economic benefits accruable from these resources, its relatively small population of about 5 million people should ordinarily have advantaged Sierra Leone. However, the failure to manage these resources efficiently brings the issue of natural resource governance into focus of attention. Indeed, as will be discussed later, it is the mismanagement of these resources that brought diamonds to the focus of attention in the country's civil war.

As with most African countries, the central government manages Sierra Leone's mineral resources. In the case of Sierra Leone, the government was completely irresponsible and irresponsive in the way the management was done. Although structures were established to manage the resources these were again undermined by the government in what looked like self-inflicted sabotage. These further weakened the state. The first attempt to ensure the participation of Sierra Leoneans in the management of diamonds extraction in the country was the establishment in 1976 of the Alluvial Diamonds Mining Scheme (ADMS). Although ostensibly this was to ensure the participation of all Sierra Leoneans in the management, the interest of the resource producing communities was to be at the fore of attention however, was not to be the case, as the introduction of the ADMS later became an opportunity for foreigners, especially Lebanese to become more deeply involved in the affairs of the diamonds business. As a way of going round the activities of the ADMS, many fictitious companies were set up by Sierra Leonean elites and the Lebanese. Consequently, despite the official attempt by the government to ensure the participation of people from the diamonds-producing communities, to these people, diamonds mining was an activity undertaken by "strangers", either "racial" or "ethnic". The controversies of resource control were further made more difficult by break-down in traditional authority and the blurring of ethnic identities of the migrant workers who worked in the diamonds fields. In essence the decentralization and privatization of extraction was expected to assist the redistribution of the proceeds among a broader base of Sierra Leoneans. However the success of this 'broadening' attempt was limited on account of a poor base for involvement on the part of the domestic private sector at the local level due to a history of exclusion on various levels, including access to basic social and physical

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[33]More recently again, bauxites have been discovered in the north.

infrastructure as is highlighted later in the section. Rather it undermined inadvertently the control and power of the state as a construct to manage the mineral resource sector. It also fuelled challenges to the monopoly of the state, not least over the use of force. Arguably it impacted on the state-building process as access to these resources represented stronger voices in power negotiation as evidenced by the main group during the civil war, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

In 1985, the government established the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), the primary responsibility of which was to collect revenue.[34] But while in theory this institution existed, most of Sierra Leone's diamond and gold were still smuggled out of the country. All across the country, artisan miners smuggle diamonds out of the country and the significant role that some of the neighbouring countries were later to play in the affairs of diamond mining and illegal exploitation began during this period.

Contrary to what is often assumed natural resources have been at the roots of controversies before the outbreak of the war in 1991. Indeed, what actually happened during the war was that a particular natural resource, diamonds, gained prominence in the politics of the conflict in the West African nation. While not underestimating the importance of diamonds in the war in Sierra Leone, especially its introduction of multiplicity of actors and brutality into the conflict, the recognition diamonds also attained during the war was because of other on-going wars where the resource was playing important roles, as in the cases of Angola and the DRC.

In looking at how mineral resources underlined state-building and peace-building, five features of the mineral resource governance sector needs to be identified, even if not discussed in any significant details. The first was the role of the level of corruption and elite greed, which permeated all facets of the sector. It was a well-known fact that successive governments have illegally used resources from diamonds for personal enrichment. As would be discussed later, this was to be a major cause in the civil war.

The second was the role of the Lebanese. Indeed, the Lebanese are widely believed to be at the centre of many questionable activities in diamonds and gold exploitation in the

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[34] In 2004, the name of this body was changed to Gold and Diamond Department (GDD).

country. According to the authoritative Partnership Africa Canada, "from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, aspects of Lebanon's civil war were played out in miniature in Sierra Leone, [as] various Lebanese militia sought financial assistance from their compatriots in Sierra Leone, and the country's diamonds became an important informal tax base for one faction or the other" Indeed, the link between Lebanese business interest and the trade in diamond during the war was to become a major factor in explaining the prolongation of the war. It has also been noted by scholars that Sierra Leone diamonds were used to finance part of the civil war in Lebanon. [35] Over the years, they have also developed complex networks of relationship with successive government functionaries at the expense of the state.

Third, were the activities of the "illicit" miners; it is impossible to know the exact number of those who were undertaking this activity before the beginning of the war but a figure going into several thousand will not be an exaggeration. These people who came from all over the world were illegally exploiting the resources at the expense of the local population. Thus, the people of the diamonds producing region were victims of both the official government exploitation and those of the illicit miners. However, of these two actors, the local population felt more comfortable with the illicit miners because they were paid some money for the diamonds they were able to get.

The fourth consideration was the use of the security agencies to monitor the activities in the diamonds producing regions. Right from the time of independence, the government had used the security forces to impose "order" in the diamonds regions. For example, the government of Sir Albert Magai used police and the army. During the period of President Siaka Stevens, the repression became more profound as the government, allegedly through the introduction of Lebanese business men like Jamil Said Mohammed, hired Palestinian fighters to protect diamond fields. Indeed, by the early 1980s, many diamond dealers had transformed their tributors into armed personal bodyguards. The implication of these was that the only official government presence in the diamonds producing region of Sierra Leone was the security and this was mainly to suppress the population.

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[35] Lansana Gberie *War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection*

Fifth and most profound of all was neglect of the diamond-producing region of the country. It was a well-known fact that the diamond producing parts of Sierra Leone are the least developed, with no electricity, pipe-borne water. Indeed, the region has nothing to show for producing the resource that is the life-wire of national economy.[36] This was to be a crucial reason for the bitter civil war.

Re-engaging the "margins"

The Statebuilding conversation in Sierra has also centred on negotiations on the inclusion of communities and societies excluded from these conversations. The concentration of political power, economic activities and social amenities in the centre to the neglect of the rest for the country produced a distinctive narrative of exclusion. This narrative of exclusion found variant forms of expression before and during the civil war. The RUF for instance exploited the narratives of youth marginalization and the neglect of the rural communities to recruit child soldiers and propagate their propaganda. In order to understand this conversation of re-engaging the margins it is important to analyse historically the emergence of social exclusion in Sierra Leone by looking at the marginalization of the youth and the neglect of rural populations and the resource producing areas.

The ethno-regional dynamics of the Civil war can be traced back to the historical neglect of regional areas peripheral to the development of the Sierra Leonean State. The neglect of the rural community had many manifestations. For example, access to safe water and sanitation in urban areas in 1990 was 83 per cent and 59 per cent respectively, compared to 22 per cent and 35 per cent for rural areas.[37] But while there was a general neglect of rural areas, the country's south-east province- Kano district, which is the main diamond producing region, suffered neglect from successive governments, such that the people in the region had little to show for being the residents of the resource-rich land that is the main stay of the national economy. Pujehun district for instance was emblematic of a volatile chieftaincy system, high literacy and lack of social amenities that sow the seeds for resistance and rebellions. Tonkolil, Bo and Moyamba, Kailahun

[36] Lans Gberie, *op-cit*
[37] Abiodun Alao, *op-cit,*

district was replete with political and social disillusionment, lack of basic infrastructure and remoteness from the political centre.[38] Kambia district was characteristic of geographical isolation and the associated poverty and illiteracy, abusive and absolute stranglehold by the chief that created a sense of hopelessness. It was thus not surprising that these regions were to be the starting point of the rebellion, as there had been a disenchanted operation base that could be exploited for violent anti-government operations. The socio-economic and political conditions in these geographically isolated regions provided the basis for re-engagement with the socially indifferent political centre. However this conversation found violent expressions following the outbreak of the civil war.

The Civil War

The Sierra Leone civil war (1991 – 2002) was undoubtedly the most important landmarks in the history of the country. It is also a topic that has attracted its own range of academic attention.[39] The war started when the Revolutionary United Front, (RUF), a hitherto unknown movement took up arms against the government of President Momoh. The force was led by Foday Sankho, a former army photographer who deserted the army after having been court-marshalled for involvement in a coup against Siaka Stevens. The causes of the war are diverse, but they centred around four main factors: (i) the mismanagement of the country's natural resources; (ii) the absence of credible democracy; (iii) the total neglect of the rural community; and (iv) the contagious effects of the war in neighbouring Liberia.

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[38] TRC Final Report. pp.28-35

[39] See, for example, Krijn Peters and Paul Richard, "Why we Fight: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone", *Africa*: *Journal of International African Institute,* Vol. 68, No. 2, 1998; "Sierra Leone Prisoners of War? Children Detained in Barracks and Prisons, Index: London: International Secretariat of Amnesty International; Paul Richards, "Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Crisis of Youth?" In O. Furley (ed.), *Conflict in Africa* London*: I. B. Tauris, 1995 and Ibrahim Abdullahi, "The Lumpen Proletariat and the Sierra Leone Conflict" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, June 1998. These include David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention,* London: IISS Adelphi Paper; 1998, William Shawcross, "In Praise of Sandlines", *The Spectator*, August 1998; Funmi Olonisakin, "Mercenaries Fill the Vacuum", *World Today*, June 1998. Examples of these include Funmi Olonisakin, "Nigeria and the peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1998; Paul Conton, "The Battle for Freetown", *West Africa,* 2 – 15 March 1998; Desmond Davies, "Peacekeeping: African Style", *West Africa* 4 – 17 May, 1998. See, among others, E. Garcia, *A Time of Hope and Transformation: Sierra Leone Peace Process Report and Reflection,* London: International Alert, 1997.

Three characteristics of the war are worthy of note because of their contributions in shaping the future of Sierra Leone. These are: the extent of the brutality; the diversity of the actors that participated; the role of diamonds; and the nature of the final cessation of the conflict. The brutality that manifested in the war was severe and at a stage, the RUF became one of the world's most brutal insurgent movements. On the whole, about 50,000 people died and up to half a million people displaced. Again, in what became its most gruesome signature, the war produced up to 4,000 amputees – including babies as young as three months. It was this brutality that brought the war to the focus of international attention.

On its part, the diversity of actors was a factor that made the war potentially confusing, with ephemeral alliances changing the tides of battle fortunes. It also made the peace process more complicated. At the beginning, it was between the rebel force and the government forces, then loyal to the late President Joseph Mommoh. A civil militia group, known as the *Kamajors* later came into the equation, joining forces with the government against the rebel RUF. In April 1992, another coup sent Momoh into exile and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The NPRC proved equally ineffective in dealing with the RUF and by 1995 the RUF controlled most of the countryside and had arrived at the outskirts of Freetown. To try to retrieve the situation, the NPRC hired several hundred mercenaries from the firm Executive Outcomes. To all these various actors were to be added the (*Sobel*) a sobriquet for those who operate both as rebel and soldier.

The third aspect of the war with long-term implication was the link with diamonds. Indeed the war attained notoriety because of the desperate desire of all the warring sides to have access to diamonds. This was also to explain the multiplicity of external actors that came into the politics of the civil war. The important role of diamonds in explaining the external ramifications of the conflict is evident in the subsequent conviction of former President Charles Taylor of involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war. This now leads to a discussion of the peace process.

Responding To The Conflict: Distinct Features Of The Pre Settlement And Settlement Processes.

The efforts to end the war in Sierra Leone began almost as soon as it started. However, the various truncations it experienced meant that the impacts were often not noticeable. As in all cases, the initial effort was to end the war and create a crude semblance of order around which post-conflict reconstructions can commence. The peace process in Sierra Leone was characterised by a number of events with their associated distinctive features, which had an impact in the prolongation of the conflict, and defined the complexity peacebuilding process and the degree to which it laid basis for lasting peace.

The multiplicity, and shifting alliances of the main protagonists

The process of bringing peace to Sierra Leone was quite complex for at least two reasons. First, there were some actors whose position was not formally recognised for a very long time, even though they were widely recognised as being dominant actors in the conflict. Perhaps the best example here was Charles Taylor, who, because of his role then as a Warlord, could not have been formally invited to come into the negotiation table in some of the early discussions. Consequently, his non-involvement in the process meant that he was not even legally liable to any violation accusation. This was to be a major factor in the prolongation of the conflict.

Second, the patterns of alliances were constantly shifting and the main actors were multiplying accordingly. There were militia groups, mercenaries, rebels, and government soldiers all shifting and re-juggling alliances; at a stage the rebels and the soldiers fought alongside each other against the regional force. In circumstances of this nature, the extent to which enduring peacebuilding could be quickly implemented is severely limited.

The main peacebuilding actors and their varying motivations and interests and cross purposes

To a very large extent, those who intervened to bring peace and restore the statehood of Sierra Leone were dictated by circumstances. With actors already involved in neighbouring Liberia, those who went into Sierra Leone were those somewhat "seconded" from Liberia and these were the regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations. While the intentions of both were the same, the extent of motivation differed. For ECOWAS, the location of the country ruled out indifference as an option to the organisation, while the United Nations felt that another state collapse after Liberia would destabilise the entire Sub-region. Second, the regional organisation that was determined to bring peace to the country, ECOWAS, was again not operating as a united front. Indeed, one of the countries, Cote d'Ivoire was known to be a sympathiser of the rebel force in the country. Other lesser interveners that intervened, albeit on a lesser scale, were UK, the African Union and hired mercenaries. Notwithstanding the prominence of these actors, Sierra Leone was not without an organized civil society, which had clarity about the causes of the war and a preferred path to stable peace.

"Flawed" Peace Agreements: Abidjan, Conakry, and Lome Agreements

Three main Agreements were signed to end the Sierra Leone Civil War. The first was the Abidjan Peace Agreement, signed between the government of President Kabbah and the RUF in November 1996 and terminated following the May 1997 coup. The second was the Conakry Agreement, signed in October 1997, between the military Junta of Johnny Paul Koroma and ECOWAS. This agreement was terminated when ECOMOG removed the AFRC Junta from power before the due date stipulated in the agreement. This was later followed by the Lome Peace Agreement, signed in July 1999 between President Kabbah and the RUF and remained among the most controversial agreements ever signed in the sub-region.[40]

A common feature that underlined the design of these three agreements was the extent to which the agreements sought to appease the main protagonist and therefore end the

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[40] President Kabbah did not want to sign any further agreement with the RUF, but domestic and external pressure forced him to capitulate. Domestically, the rebels controlled the controlled the main diamond mines, which meant that some form of agreement had to be reached. External pressures came from Britain and Nigeria. Britain needed a face-saving agreement after the controversial Sandline Affairs. Sandline Affair, which saw the British Labour government, accused of contravening a UN arms embargo by allowing a private military company to supply arms to the Sierra Leone government and ECOMOG forces. Nigeria on the other hand was finding the human and financial cost of regional peacekeeping difficult to sustain.

conflict at the expense of addressing the structural causes of the conflict that lay at the statebuilding conversation. Tied to this was the erroneous assumption regarding the willingness and commitment of the RUF and the capacity of the government of President of Kabbah to building lasting peace.[41]

The Abidjan Agreement granted a general amnesty to RUF in return for the rebels ending their activities. The main aim of the Conakry Agreement was to allow for the return of the overthrown government of President Kabbah within six months. This baseline study however focuses on the Lome Agreement was as it was central to the peace process for it provided for the entry of the largely externally driven peacebuilding process.

The Lome Agreement was emblematic of a number of omissions and concessions that undermined the sustainability of the peace process. The Lome Agreement granted significant and controversial concessions. The agreement legitimized the RUF and its brutal actions by   granting the rebel group public offices.[42] Article V especially dismayed Sierra Leoneans, for it specifically allocated Cabinet appointments to members of the rebel force[43] Articles III to IV also allowed for power sharing with the government through the transformation of RUF into a political party and the formation of a broad based government of national unity. This provisions belied RUF commitment to peace.

Furthermore, the Agreement ensured the disarming of the RUF by controversially and erroneously pardoning Foday Sonkah for treason and granting him the position of Vice President and chairman of the commission that oversaw Sierra Leone's diamond mines and therefore unreserved control of Sierra Leone's strategic natural resources.[44] By giving Foday Sanko the position of vice president, the agreement made Sankoh answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone. The Lome Agreement as such is also distinct and infamous in the extent to which it individualized the peace agreement around the person of Foday Sankoh. This and the lack of a credible sanction regime to

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[41] Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero *Op-cit p.120*
[42] The movement was allocated four ministerial and four deputy ministerial positions Article IV of Part Two
[43] Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero *Op-cit p.123*
[44] See Article VIII of the Lome Peace Agreement For more discussion on the Lome Peace Agreement, see, Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero: "Cut Short for Taking Shortcuts: The Lome Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone", *Journal of Civil Wars*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn, 2001.

deal with non-compliance with the agreements gave Foday Sonkah and the Rebel group room to manoeuvre and therefore opportunity to delay the peace process.[45]

Additionally, the agreement excluded key actors in the conflict including local militias, Karamajors, and remnants of SLA from the negotiation and implementation of the agreement.[46]Article XI of the agreement also controversially granted RUF 'absolute and free pardon ... in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the Lome agreement[47] and as a result it denied justice to the victims of RUF atrocities.[48] This blanket amnesty resulted in internal and external backlash against the UN and other external parties to the negotiation. The accord however provided for the establishment of a TRC, while reneging of the agreement by RUF following the events of May 2000 forced the UN to rethink the amnesty offer therefore allowing for the set up a special court.[49] The contradictions and defects within the Lome agreement allowed for the compromise of the position of Sierra Leone and demonstrated the limits and dangers of externally imposed peace at the expense of building a sustaining peace process.

Uncoordinated International Response

The international response to the conflict in Sierra Leone represents a model of disengagement. The international community's indifference to the unfolding crisis in Sierra Leone was due to the fact that Sierra Leone represented minimal economic and strategic importance to the West.[50] Indeed, the initial experience of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) instructively demonstrates the inadequate and uncoordinated international response to the civil war. UNAMSIL would however later become a model UN Mission.*[51]*

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[45] Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero *Op-cit p.122-123;127*
[46] Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero *Op-cit p.122-123*
[47] The Lome Accord (Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown, July 1999).
[48] Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero *Op-cit p.124*
[49] UN 'Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone', UN document S/2000/751, 31 July 2000, para. 9. Abidoun Alao and Comfort Ero *Op-cit p.118*
[50] 'Funmi Olonisakin , Peacekeeoing in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008 p.10
[51] Funmi Olonisakin , Peacekeeoing in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008 p.10

The operationalization of the Lome Agreement allowed for the departure of ECOMOG and the entry of a United Nations Team to supervise the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation plans. However, faced with low troop numbers, a weakened mandate and conflicting contingents, UNAMSIL's 500 peacekeepers in May 2000 would find themselves hostage to the obstinate RUF rebels. This eventually led to the collapse of the Lome agreement.

The May 2000 events demonstrated the lack of contingency planning on the part of the Force, the overreliance and erroneous assumption that the peace agreement would work and the single-minded focus on the demobilisation and disarmament tasks.[52] Additionally, the uncoordinated and inadequate deployment of 6000 troops to UNAMSIL reflected the unwillingness of the UN member states to offer any logistical and technical support to UNAMSIL.[53] This apathy sums up the UN's reluctance and inaction to respond decisively throughout the civil war until the events of May 2000.

To further compound UNAMSIL's problems, the UK intervention aimed at evacuation of British and European nationals was merely a show-off of UK military might rather than a genuine attempt to reinforce UNAMSIL.[54] These " over-the-horizon" displays and British unwillingness to commit troops under UN auspices heavily dented UN's already tarnished image, challenged the mission's raison d'etre and explicitly demonstrated the lack of faith in the UN.

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat argues that 'Sierra Leone showed that the political and operational lessons from failed UN missions in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia had not been learned".[55] UNAMSIL's initial experience highlighted the mismatch between mission mandates and the lack of resources and support from UN member states of the UNSC that continued to plaque UN peacekeeping operations. As the Brahimi report articulated UNAMSIL represents the problems of international peacekeeping including lack of greater cohesion and direction, better rules of engagement, resources, well-structured command and control, adequate equipment and political will and support from UN member states.[56]

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[52] Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero *Op-cit*
[53] Funmi Olonisakin , *Op-cit*
[54] Ibid.
[55] C. De Jonge Oudraat, "Humanitarian Intervention: The Lesson Learned", *Current History*, December 2000, p. 420.
[56] August 2000 UN of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations into the state of peacekeeping

Revisiting The Statebuilding Conversation: The Nature Of The Post Settlement Process

The Sierra Leone Truth and Justice Commission and Special Court

A key feature of the external post-conflict peacebuilding programme in Sierra Leone was the promotion of transitional justice through national reconciliation and healing and the prosecution of those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Leonean law committed since November 30 1996. These two agendas were enshrined in the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court respectively and are by products of the Lome Agreement.

Notwithstanding the funding and operational challenges that marred the two processes[57], there were questions regarding the extent to which both institutions achieved their main objectives and therefore set Sierra Leone back to its statebuilding conversations. A major criticism relates to the tensions regarding the overlapping mandates of the two institutions. In particular, the work of the Special Court was undermined by the reluctance by perpetrators to the conflict to appear before the TRC for fear that their testimonies would be used against them in the Special court.[58] Second, the confidence of the special court among Sierra Leoneans was undermined by the failure of the court to try perpetrators who bore the greatest responsibility for the war. With the exception of the trial of Charles Taylor, Issa Sessay and others, the death of key perpetrators of the war without trial including Foday Sankoh, Sam Hinga Norman, Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma undermined the mission of the Special Court. Third, by seeking to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility the court failed to prosecute the actual perpetrators of the atrocities who carried out the orders of their commanders. On the contrarily, the foot solders were integrated in the national armed forces. The Final Report of the TRC also highlighted the lack of focus on the plight of the victims noting that meaningful truth telling cannot occur without adequate reparations for victims of conflict.[59]

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[57] See Sierra Leone's Truth And Reconciliation Commission: A Fresh Start?
[58] Lansana Gberie 2003 The Special Court of Sierra Leone Source: African Affairs, Vol. 102, No. 409 (Oct., 2003), pp. 6448Post War Regimes and State Reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone p.65. See also Sierra Leone's Truth And Reconciliation Commission: A Fresh Start? p.4
[59] See Final Report of the TRC,

Furthermore, the mandated timelines for the two institutions further raise questions regarding the extent to which the two processes revisited the historical statebuilding conversation that lay at the roots of the conflict. The Special court was only mandated to deal with atrocities committed after 30 November 1996. This however fails to capture most of the atrocities that were committed before this date. Additionally, section 6 of the TRC Act of 2000 tasked the commission with the objective of creating a historical record of the violations of human rights from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 until the signing of the Lome Peace agreement.[60] These timelines again cut off the historical period in the Sierra Leone Statebuilding conversation. Furthermore, legislation for the establishment of the TRC provided for a 12-month operational phase. These limited time mandates pale in comparison to the historical period in the statebuilding conversation and therefore puts in doubt the meaningfulness and efficacy of the national reconciliation and rebuilding process.

International institutional capacity building approach.

The post conflict international statebuilding process in Sierra Leone thus followed the tried and tested post conflict institutional reconstruction model. This approach largely focused on rebuilding of state institutional capacity including the reconstruction of courts, prison and police buildings. This institutional statebuilding approach in Sierra Leone with it emphasis on institutional efficiency and technocratic support, microeconomic stability and consolidation of state authority is articulated in the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) of June 2001 and Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy of 2002.[61] However as Christof Kurz argues, donor driven analytical and policy prescriptions influenced by neoclassical economics ideas with their focus on individual decision-making and functionalist formal institutions ignore the historical and sociological process in the Sierra Leone state formation process and elsewhere.[62]

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[60] See Article XXVI of the Lome Agreement and the Final Report of the TRC: Chapter One: Mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission pp.23-25

[61] Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL), 2005. Sierra Leone poverty reduction strategy paper. (SL-PRSP), 2005_/2007, Freetown; Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and European Community, 2007. Country strategy paper and national indicative programme for the period 2008_/2013. Freetown.

[62] Christof P. Kurz (2010) What You See is What You Get: Analytical Lenses and the Limitations of Post-Conflict Statebuilding in Sierra Leone, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 4:2, 205-236

Though his diagnosis of the flawed assumptions inherent in international peace and statebuilding processes are correct his alternative analytical framework of understanding the state formation process in Sierra through clientelism also fails to capture adequately the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone.

Emerged Outcomes

This section of the Baseline study addresses three main issues: how has inter-group relations been since the end of the civil war: how has the management of natural resources been since the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement that ended the war; and how the country fared on the crucial issue of corruption. These three issues have been selected because they are the main issues that accounted for the war and also were the fundamental issues that the peace agreement attempted to address to prevent recourse to war. Since Sierra Leone has not returned to conflict since the signing of the agreement in 2002 (thus breaking a decade possibility of relapse rule) there is the need to investigate whether the agreement was effectively well packaged to address all aspects of the war or whether there were other factors that prevented a relapse.

Continuation of divisive party politics along ethnic lines.

The electoral contestation during the November 2012 elections largely between Enerst Koroma of the APC and Maada Bio of the SLPP re-invoked old rivalry between the two political parties and has further underline the role of ethnicity in national politics with the Mendes supporting the SLPP and Temnes supporting Koroma. Ethnic and sectional fault lines have also galvanized post election tension and violence. The fiercely contested 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections that brought the opposition APC party to power left the country deeply divided along ethnic and regional lines that have the potential to ignite violence upon the slightest provocation and plunge the country once more into chaos. The same could be said of the July 2008 Local government elections. In 2011, political violence first erupted on the national level in July when APC supporters allegedly attacked the SLPP nominee and flag bearer,

Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. In the ensuing violence, one person was reported killed and 20 people suffered injuries. Several buildings were also burnt down, including the local APC party office. The incumbent President Koroma won the election and the impact of ethnicity on politics has continued ever since.

Natural Resource Governance

Since the end of the war, efforts to manage natural resources have been relatively impressive, both because the country needed the money coming from these resources and also because of the realisation that any mismanagement could return back to a bitter conflict. In an attempt to appease the diamonds producing region of the country and also address international condemnation that was coming to the country because of its treatment of the diamond regions, the government later came up with a scheme whereby a percentage of the resources coming from diamonds is used to develop the local community. This initiative was, however, believed to have come too late and it was also considered as being too little. Diamonds have also played an important role in Sierra Leone's post war recovery. The coming into place of the Kimberley Process, the international regulatory mechanism that was established to monitor international trading in illegal diamonds, also assisted in ensuring that diamonds in Sierra Leone was quick to make a reverse from the negative image it had established during the period of the war.

With the increase in diamond production and the end of the war, it then became possible for the government to divert more resources to post-war recovery. However, although increase in diamond revenue has assisted the government, it is also important to point out that the extent of destruction was too much for what this can address and as such the bulk of the money used for post-war reconstruction have been through donor funding. One aspect of post-war recovery's link with diamonds is the gradual increase that seems to be emerging in the social responsibility of some of the foreign diamond businessmen in the country. In some of the diamond producing regions of the country, Lebanese businessmen and local -population are coming together to discuss issues of common concerns, including the provision of security. Although this has not gone round all the regions, it is an initiative that seems to be attracting the interests of the local community.

Sierra Leone natural resources base is also growing with exploration of mining, marine and oil resources. Like many other natural resources, the government is also making plans to come up with a major policy position on the management of marine resources. There are however concerns with the illegal exploitation of these marines resources by foreign vessels and their management.[63] Sierra Leone's economy is now about to be turned around significantly with the discovery of oil.[64] In 2009, the President established a Task Force to develop a new Petroleum Policy. The draft policy reflects concerns regarding good governance and prudent economic management of oil revenues for current and future generations. There can, however, be no doubt that the success will depend on the commitment and capacity to translate policy into action. The government is also trying to set up a National Oil Company. Also since the announcement of the find, a number of donors and NGOs have been involved in Petroleum governance and policy reform. One of the most prominent concerns of stakeholders is that oil might make Sierra Leone to fall victim of what has been described as "The oil-tragedy".

Corruption and Management

Corruption has reduced considerably, even though it is still a major issue in Sierra Leone. The presidency of the late Tejan Kabbah was marred with allegations of corruption against top government officials, although none was proven and nobody was convicted. The current President Koroma also has allegations of corruption on his neck. Although the President is widely considered to be above board on the issue of corruption (he was, in fact the first President to declare his assets) he is surrounded by people believed by people believed to be more controversial on issue of corruption.

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[63] Presently there are over 100 licensed vessels and more than half that number poaching. This is as a result of the fact that Sierra Leone had constantly been unable to supply the resources/logistics to protect its marine resources from unlicensed fishing, resulting in an over exploitation, lack of benefits to the country and an overall damaging effect to the resources eco-system. This has seen a number of attacks on local fishermen and the destruction of their fishing equipment. In some instances, the attacks have led to deaths and capture of citizens from neighbouring countries especially Guinea. There are, however, growing concerns now about the management of marine resources and in August 2012, there was a major protest by irate fishing mongers about the government's policies which they claimed was preventing them from having access to quality fish.

[64] In September 2009, the United States independent oil firm, Anadarko, announced the discovery of a hydrocarbon system off the Sierra Leonean coast. The company operates the Venus B-1 exploration well in its offshore block SL-6/07 on behalf of its partners Woodslide Australia Repsol YPF (Spain) and Tullow (UK/Ireland).

Some of the corruption issues have been to the top of government and President Koromoa's Vice President, Samuel Sumana, faced a major allegation of corruption over logging in Sierra Leone levelled by the Al Jazaara News.

Propositions

Among others, this Baseline study has the following Propositions:

(1) That after a bitter civil conflict, enduring peace and stability can only come after key issues that underlined the original conflict has been addressed.

(2) That the politics surrounding the management of natural resources is central to the establishment of long-term stability after a bitter civil conflict that had occurred partly because of natural-resource mismanagement.

(3) That the identity conversations including gender have not be adequately addressed

(4) That the externally driven peacebuilding process has not anchored the basis for stable peace