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## **Japan's Trade with West Africa in the Inter-War Period: A Study of Japanese Consular Reports**

Katsuhiko Kitagawa\*

Between the two World Wars, half of Japan's exports to Africa consisted of cotton goods, and Anglo-Japanese trade competition occurred over those cotton goods. Between 1930 and 1934, the value of British imports fell 20%, while the value of Japanese imports rose 264%. Great Britain took a variety of measures against Japan in response. Underlying this influx of Japanese products into Africa were the Japanese consuls involved in developing new markets and the private firms carried out detailed market research. From Japan's perspective, the 1930s saw Anglo-Japanese relations, which had been the lynchpin of Japan's foreign policy to date, was marginalized in favor of Japan's relations with Italy. The issue of the new African markets cooled Anglo-Japanese relations, whereas Japan-Italy relations became closer because of compromise over the respective invasions of Manchukuo and Ethiopia. As Britain sought to protect its African markets during the Great Depression, Japan expanded its exports in new markets throughout Africa. Both Africans and others in the colonies preferred cheap Japanese goods rather than goods from Manchester and elsewhere in Britain. During the 1930s, the East and West African markets became the most important African markets for Japan. As prescribed by the terms of Anglo-Japanese relations, Britain sought to insulate the former market, while hindering small Japanese gains in the latter market. Although Japan was not a substantial threat, British policies sought to halt the flow of Japanese goods and, as a result, opened the door to exports from other European countries.

Keywords: Trade, West Africa, Japanese Consular Reports, Inter-War Period

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## 1. Introduction — Purpose of the Study

Japan currently exists in a world where it has multidimensional foreign relations with many countries. The aim of this study is to look back at how Japan developed its relations with various African nations in the past and analyze this history in order to acknowledge both the particulars of present relations and their future. This study forms part of a larger research, based on Japanese Consular Reports, undertaken by the author into “Japan’s Trade with Africa in the Inter-War Period.”<sup>1)</sup>

The most detailed investigation by the Japanese Consul into Japan’s activities in Africa prior to the Second World War can be found in *Africa Keizai Jijo Tenbo* [*General Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa*], compiled in 1932 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Trade Bureau and published by the Japan Industrial Association’s Commercial Institute in Cairo. According to this report, Africa’s markets are divided into four regional groups, with East Africa as Group B and West Africa as Group D. The latter group included Belgian Congo, Portuguese Angola, French Africa (Niger, Senegal, Guinea, Equatorial Africa, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Cameroon, and Togoland) as well as British West Africa (Nigeria, Gambia, Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone). For Japan prior to the Second World War, the obvious priorities on the African continent were Egypt and South Africa, but Groups B and D began to receive more attention during the Great Crash of the late-1920s and early-1930s.

This article will focus on West Africa and consider the following points. Firstly, it shall introduce surveys of economic conditions in inter-war West Africa undertaken by private firms. Secondly, it shall explain how shipping routes to West Africa, which were expected to provide an important role in facilitating trade between Japan and the region, were established. Thirdly, it shall provide an overview of this trade development. Fourthly, it shall examine the disputes that emerged in Japan’s relations with other nations because of Japan’s advances into West Africa.

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1) The author’s work based on consular reports is also found in the following: “Japan’s Trade with South Africa in the Inter-War Period: A Study in the Japanese Consular Reports” in *Japan and South Africa in a Globalizing World: A Distant Mirror*, ed. by Katsumi Hirano and Chris Alden, Ashgate, 2003, pp.25-44, “Japanese Competition in the Congo Basin in the 1930s: A Study of Japanese Consular Reports” in *Intra-Asian Trade and the World Market* ed. by A. J. H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu, London, Routledge, 2006, pp. 135-167.

## 2. Economic Surveys of West Africa by Private Firms — The Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK) and the Yokohama Specie Bank (YSB)

We can utilize the economic surveys of West Africa undertaken by private firms as records to understand the situation in West Africa during the inter-war period.

Firstly, there is *Report on the Economic Situation in West Africa* [*Nishi Africa Keizai Jijo Chosa Hokokusho*] (December 1934) published by the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK hereafter). This report was written based on a survey of West Africa's trade and transport network by OSK's Cape Town representative, Masao Tajima, who on company orders had joined the voyage of the *Arasuka-maru* to West Africa, which left Cape Town on January 13, 1934, and lasted until March 1. The survey included detailed investigations of ports, such as Lagos in Nigeria, Accra in Gold Coast (both British), Dakar in Senegal (French), and Lobito in Angola (Portuguese).

The incentive for this survey was that "our Empire's commercial supremacy already extends to the northern, eastern, and southern areas of the African continent, and our Imperial nation has no little interest in West Africa as the one remaining new market" (p. 1).

Additionally, the extension of Japanese commercial shipping to West Africa would have the following significance:

"Although during the war Japan's regular shipping to Europe was diverted to Dakar via Cape of Good Hope to avoid the ravages of war in the Mediterranean, Japanese vessels have not been seen in the region of West Africa since. The voyage of our *Arasuka-maru* to West Africa aroused great attention and interest in Accra and Lagos, it being the first time a Japanese ship was seen, while we received an enthusiastic welcome in Dakar that recalled the former call at the port by Japanese vessels. Today, when the recent growth of our commercial influence has already drawn East and South Africa into the orbit of our supremacy in commerce and shipping, surely the time has come to establish regular shipping routes between Japan and West Africa." (p. 23)

Furthermore, Tajima outlined the prospects for Japanese trade with West Africa based on his survey:

"If one surveys the current system of trade, relations with the various European nations like Britain, France, Germany, Holland and Belgium are closest on the basis of imports and exports, with the United States next ... trade with the East consists of things like rice from Saigon and Rangoon and sacking from

Calcutta, but the volumes are not large, and while Japanese goods have been making inroads into the West African market in recent years, such trade has occurred via European ports like Liverpool and Marseilles because of the lack of a direct sea route between Japan and West Africa until now. . . . It is obvious that trade between Japan and West Africa has only just begun and there is tremendous scope for future development, with various areas in West Africa offering exceedingly good prospects as new markets for Japanese commodities in particular. . . . I believe that with the establishment of a direct sea route, through the cooperation of the entire nation, and specifically closely regulating and deepening cooperation between traders and exporters, our commercial supremacy can be established in West Africa in the face of European and American competition. . . . These are places in which the buying power of the native consumer is ideal for Japanese imports, which they would warmly welcome, and they would strongly oppose any artificial efforts at their limitation. . . . Moreover, there was great interest in trading Japanese goods shown by European merchants resident in Africa. . . . While Japan must raise trust in its business dealing and the quality of its products in order to maintain cooperation and coordination with those involved in trade in West Africa, it must also urgently plan to develop a smooth reciprocal commerce by closely investigating which of the natural resources from the various areas of West Africa shall serve as raw material for our factories and clear the way to their importation, which will remedy the dangers of one-sided trade." (pp. 7-8)<sup>2)</sup>

Secondly, there is the *Report on Survey of the West African Coast* (Report no. 83, January 1932)[*Africa Seibu Kaigan Shisatsu Hokokuhso*] by the chief investigations officer of the Yokohama Specie Bank (hereafter YSB).

West Africa was unknown, virgin land, and still an undeveloped market for Japanese overseas trade. Japanese goods were already available in northern, eastern, and southern Africa; only the push into West African markets remained. Taking advantage of a three-man inspection party dispatched by the Japan Association for Export Promotion of Cotton Textiles to investigate the cotton market in western Africa, the report's author, Ouchi Hirohito, departed Marseilles for West Africa on November 12, 1931 in order to investigate the economic situation in West Africa with

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2) For background regarding the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK) establishing a West African shipping line and its subsequent development, consult Osaka Shosen Kaisha, *Afurika Koro-shi [History of African Shipping Lines]*, 1956; and the company's *Osaka Shosen Mitsui Senpaku Kabu-shiki Gaisha 80-nenshi [80 years of the Osaka Mercantile Shipping Co. Ltd.]*, 1966.

the inspection team and the Consul of Bombay.

Ouchi went via Casablanca in Morocco, and entered West Africa at Dakar in Senegal. He travelled through Freetown in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Gold Coast, and Slave Coast (around the port of Guinea), and was in Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea in January 1932 before reaching Matadi in Belgian Congo on February 1. He then travelled up the Congo River, south through central Africa, approached the Union of South Africa via Rhodesia and arrived in Cape Town on March 10. On March 21, he arrived in Kobe via Mombasa and Zanzibar on the OSK liner *Chicagomaru*.

Ouchi made the following points in his report. Firstly, the following differences were pointed between East and South Africa, and West Africa: "West Africa means the blacks. Economically, the agricultural production of the blacks is the lifeblood of economic development in these colonies, for the price of these products is reflected in the buying power of the natives, influencing increases or decreases in the demand for imports, and normally demand for imports is in direct proportion to state of the agricultural export trade" (p. 457).

Furthermore, Ouchi was conducting his survey during the Great Crash, which was reflected in the following comment:

"Above all, the current world economic crisis has spread to every part of West Africa, and the slump in prices for those West African commodities produced through the blood and sweat of the natives — of cocoa, palm kernels, palm oil, peanuts, coffee, and rubber — threatens the lifestyle of the native and can only cause feelings of despair for the black man under current conditions. This resentment is visible in the "cocoa hold-up" that recently broke out in Gold Coast, and the general economy is atrophying because as the collapse in native buying power caused by low commodity prices, the volume of imports declines and their stock dramatically rises, doing enormous damage to importers and exporters in West Africa." (p. 476)

Colonial policies in West Africa were the following: "As the main source of revenue for all of the colonial governments was customs revenue, the governments invest their energy in promoting the export trade that is the lifeblood of these colonies, throwing themselves into the development and improvement of agricultural commodities, native education, moral guidance, and welfare advances" (p. 475).

West Africa here largely refers to British and French Africa. What's more, Ouchi points out that West Africa had an enormous demand for textiles, with the level of cotton imports into British and French Africa surpassing the level of imports in the Union of South Africa, British East Africa, the Belgian Congo, Morocco, or any other territory.

Therefore, Ouchi focused on West Africa as a new market for Japanese products and advocated the following:

“The import of our nation’s products into West Africa began several years ago, I believe. However, this was through the offices of European firms, and the amounts are yet trifling, as there are almost no direct transactions between our nation and West Africa. . . . Recession in West Africa provides the ideal opportunity to expand the market for our nation’s cheap commodities in West Africa. . . . it should be thought of as the ideal chance to raise the reputation of Japanese products and open new markets. . . . While flexible approaches tend to be made subservient to plans for the large-scale export of our nation’s mass-produced commodities and it is difficult to envisage such large-scale exports to West Africa, this is not a market which should be discarded by our small and medium manufacturers and export firms, and we in the presently strangled business, trade, and maritime sectors eagerly anticipate the future development of the West African market.” (p. 483)

Ouchi further noted that “in Our Nation’s current situation, the dispatch of travelling merchant, the residence of trade representatives in regions of importance, and the introduction of measures to gain accurate knowledge regarding the other party should all be considered as methods of promoting trade” (p. 485).

### **3. The Establishment of West African Shipping Routes — The Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK)**

The OSK, which had opened new markets for Japanese commodities by establishing a shipping line to East Africa in 1926, continued its surveys of the West African coast. In November 1933, a new trial line was established with the *Arasakamaru* calling at Lagos, Accra, and Dakar via South Africa. The OSK’s *History of African Shipping Lines [Africa Koro Shi]* notes the following:

“While Our Empire’s commercial supremacy already extends to the northern, eastern, and southern areas of the African continent, in spite of the considerable interest of our Imperial nation in West Africa as the one remaining new market, there is currently a great paucity of materials that could be used to learn about the situation on the ground. Therefore, with the aim of contributing to the state of knowledge on West Africa, our employee Mr. Masao Tajima (currently

Executive Director, Sales Manager) was dispatched from Cape Town on this vessel [the *Arasuka-maru* — author] to West Africa to investigate conditions there, where he expended great effort in examining conditions in West Africa.” (p. 179)

Until that period, Japanese exports had been either transshipped through various European ports (Liverpool, Hamburg, Marseilles) or shipped on from New York. Goods were shipped to Europe from Japan on services like the NYK (*Nippon Yusen Kaisha*) Line, Norddeutscher Lloyd, or Messageries Maritimes, and depended upon lines like the Elder Dempster Line, the Woermann Line, the Deutsche Ost-Afrika Line, and the Hamburg-Bremen Afrika Line for the Europe to West African leg. Goods shipped by mail boats to New York from Japan were sent on to West Africa on regular services run by the American West African Line and the Elder Dempster Line. The establishment of a direct West African service by the OSK would inevitably compete with those services.

However, the import and export trade in West Africa was largely in the hands of European firms, in particular the British United Africa Company (UAC) and French Compagnie Française de L’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO). Furthermore, as these firms used their own vessels for trading, and even if the OSK established a direct line to West Africa, booking sufficient cargo would be problematic without the cooperation of these trading firms<sup>3)</sup>. The following can be found in the *History of African Shipping Lines*:

“In truth, West African trade is largely in the hand of these two firms, and the cargos of our nation’s imports are entirely dependent on their mandates. As it is clear that without cooperation between Our Company and these two firms carrying cargo is impractical, our company concluded an FAO in 1936, and sought to organize cargo using this FAO from the dispatch of the *Kofuku-maru* in September of the same year. . . . Cargo taken by CFAO through the FOB costs ten shillings a ton for the first thousand tons and five shillings a ton thereafter. This deal applied for a year beginning from October 1936, under the title of the “Special Address 7 & Inward Freight Commission.” (p. 195)

However, the situation became more favorable from 1935 onward:

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3) For background on the United African Company (UAC), see Yoshio Muroi, *Rengo Afurika Kaisha no Rekishi 1879-1979 — NaijERIA Shakai-keizaishi Josetsu [History of the United Africa Company 1879-1979; an introduction to Nigeria’s socio-economic history]*, Dobunkan, 1992.



“As the direct charters undertaken by the vessels of the two West African firms, UAC and CFAO, are patterned on boosting their results when collecting Our Nation’s goods (at intermediate ports, taking on rice at Rangoon and sacking at Calcutta), this is an opportunity that Our Company cannot let slip. Therefore, tremendous effort was expended on dispatching vessels seven times at two- to three-month intervals, with the Atorasu-maru No. 2 in November of 1935, the Arasuka- maru No. 3 in December of that same year, the Yamashita class Eifukumaru No.4 (actually a charter) in April of 1936, the Arasuka-maru No.5 in July, the International class Kofuku-maru No. 6 in September, and the Kawasaki-class Denmark-maru No.7 in January 1937, establishing this route on secure foundations. “(p. 181)

In this way, assigning the second and third vessels by December 1935 ,OSK had secured this route. However, maritime transport of the period had the following issue:

“Looking at trade occurring between the various nations of the world currently, everywhere there is an adherence to economic nationalism — with the establishment of tariff barriers and quotas, no extreme trade control, the implementation of strict import restrictions, and each nation’s focus on their own vessels and cargos with regard to marine transport. Consequently, there can be no positive outlook for the spread overseas of Our Empire’s commodities, and specifically Our Nation’s products to West Africa, while direct connections remain limited, given the unavoidable burden of the great expense and vast amount of time that results from the detour of the transshipment to Europe…” (p. 184)

Nonetheless, the OSK’s situation improved favorably enough so that “from the beginning of 1935, direct and indirect requests for aid were accepted by the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, and, beginning April 1937, the routes were licensed by a decree of this agency, marking the moment when, after many twists and turns, this route became supported as a regular maritime line” (p. 184). In this way, the West African line was established as a regular route. It ran six times a year and was serviced by the Atorasu-maru, Shunko-maru, and Arasuka-maru under the authority of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation<sup>4)</sup>.

Prior to the OSK operating a direct route to West Africa, the development of Japanese trade with the region, excluding Belgian Congo and Portuguese West

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4) OSK, *[80 years]*, pp. 373-374.

Africa, was hindered by tariff barriers and quotas. However, Africans, with low standards of living and minimal buying power, welcomed high-quality, cheap Japanese commodities, and export trade to West Africa expanded. Nevertheless, from the middle of 1937 onward, the situation changed because of the outbreak of Japanese military invasion into China. As this war of aggression progressed, business discussions were gradually troubled by the introduction of import exchange controls and the rising cost of commodities due to problems with sourcing raw materials, while the buying power of peasants in Nigeria and Gold Coast declined simultaneously, and the closure and bankruptcy of small and medium firms continued apace. Belgian Congo and French West Africa fell into similar straits, and the export trade with West Africa ebbed away.

A survey of Japan's exports to West Africa shows that the goods carried on outward voyages primarily consisted of textiles and cotton goods, rayon (artificial silk), blankets, enamel goods, rubber boots, ceramics, zinc etchings, hats, and canned goods. The main goal of this route was transporting goods to West Africa, but West African cargo might not have been enough to fill the ship's hulls. Therefore, both freighters and regular liners were packed out with cargo for South Africa or, when putting into port at Saigon, were packed out with rice for West Africa there. Subsequently, West African market conditions showed some signs of improvement, but no one expected a fundamental economic recovery. At the end of 1938, a partial recovery was brought about by measures encouraging exports to West Africa, such as establishing a West African trade office and transferring goods formerly transhipped via Europe onto OSK's West African line because of the unstable political situation in Europe. Although 1939 saw steady speculative buying of small and medium firms by those anticipating economic recovery, increasing import restrictions in various West African countries, continuing low prices for agricultural commodities, and the reduced purchasing power of the African population meant that demand remained low. However, in September 1939, with the British and French declaring war on Germany, regular shipping from those countries was terminated, and there were shortages of European goods in West Africa, instantly depleting the stock that had built up since 1937 and raising market prices. Moreover, a shortage of freighter capacity became apparent in rice transports from Saigon to West Africa. Subsequently, however, in July 1940 the voyage of the *Nan'a-maru* terminated Japanese shipping to West Africa due to Japan's accession to the Tripartite Pact<sup>5</sup>.

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5) OSK, *[History of African Shipping Lines]*, pp. 196-198, 203.

#### 4. Japan's Trade with West Africa

During the First World War Japanese goods had shown strong sales at one point, spreading into African markets as substitutes for European goods, but after the war, they had been driven out by European countries resuming economic activity and returning their goods to Africa. The textile and sundry-goods industries that had developed in Japan during the war experienced slowdown or losses. Furthermore, Japanese goods were affected by postwar depression in the world market, strengthened links between metropolises and colonies, and autarchic block economic policies by European states. Capturing new export markets became a pressing need for the Japanese economy.

In such circumstances, new markets that had potential for development were given attention in Africa, Near East, Balkans, and Central and South America, and, particularly in the aftermath of the Great Crash during the early 1930s, interest switched to East and West African market. The abiding theme of the era was the search for a constructive commercial strategy.

Except for a brief period when exports exceeded imports during the First World War, Japanese trade with Africa ran a deficit until 1923, before becoming a surplus due to policy changes. Exports to Africa as a proportion of Japan's total exports increased from 2.5% in the 1920s to around 6-7% in the 1930s. Furthermore, while Africa's proportion of total Japanese imports was 2% in the 1920s, it was 3-5% in the 1930s. Below, based on contemporary surveys and consular reports, Japan's trade with British and French West Africa shall be considered, with a focus on the first half of the 1930s.

##### (1) British West Africa

Information about the economy of British West Africa began to be collected from the mid-1920s. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Trade Bureau published an introductory summary based on parts of the British government's *Colonial Report* in its *Overseas Economic Affairs* [*Kaigai Keizai Jijo*], and an edited translation of an article on that economy in *Times* issued on March 4, 1929 was published as "The Situation in British West Africa [Eiryō Nishi Africa Jijō]." Furthermore, an abbreviated translation of an article on December 8, 1928 from *l'Europe Naval* was published as "The Ports of the West African Coastline [Nishi Africa Engan Shokō]," providing additional information on the West African economic situation.

In addition, on November 22, 1928, the consul general in London, Kikuji Yonezawa, gave a presentation on "The Nigerian Economic Situation [*Nigeria Keizai Jijo*](1928),"

while details of Gold Coast's colonial economy were communicated based on a survey performed and published by the Empire Marketing Board in Great Britain.

However, in 1929, Ouchi of the YSB analyzed colonial markets in British West Africa and recommended which commodities had good prospects in the following manner:

“The primary import into British West Africa is textiles. Such imports run to 6,000,000 pounds annually. This makes up over 20% of total imports. The patterns and colours of cloth demanded differ by region and by the customs and habits of the blacks. Those thought to be desirable include grey bafta, blue bafta, salem pores, cheap shirting, croydon, twill, brocade, prints, domestics, real and imitation madras, and handkerchiefs. Nigeria has the greatest demand, importing 3,500,000 pounds worth annually. As there are many Muslims, the demand for bleached cotton is high. Dyed cloth is about 30% of the total imported cloth, and demand for checked and striped cloth is high. Sales of imitation Madras cloth, which replicates real Indian Madras, are good. There are prospects for printed material. The Yoruba around Lagos like white, ash, slate, brown, green, and blue, while the Hausa in the north prefer red, white, yellow, orange, and green. The people of the Niger River delta in South Nigeria like unpatterned gaudy colours. In Gold Coast, the market for cloth depends upon whether the price of cocoa is low or high, but generally a type of printed material known as wax block prints are popular. African women here use rayon and silk in place of the cotton handkerchiefs found in other places. There is demand for both black and white brocade, and sales of both blue bafta and salem pore are good. In Sierra Leone, there is no obvious demand shown for any particular item, but demand for “fancy cotton” (patterned cloth) is comparatively high, and handkerchiefs and head ties are of silk. Gambia has large population of Muslim and thus receives lots of bleached muslin and white brocade. Seventy-five percent of cotton imports into British West Africa are from Britain, while 90% of bleached cotton and grey bafta are British-made. Elsewhere in the market, the Dutch export raw and bleached cloth, while Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Switzerland all export their particular materials. It is essential for expansion into the West African market that the preferences of Africans regarding colours and materials are investigated. West Africa, and in particular Nigeria and Gold Coast, are markets that Japan should focus on.”<sup>6)</sup>

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6) Yokohama Shokin Ginko Todori-seki Chosaka [Chief Investigations Office of the Yokohama Specie Bank], *Afurika Sei-bu Kaigan Shisatsu Hokoku-sho [Survey of the West African Coast]*, Report no. 83, Shōwa 7-nen

In addition, Ouchi noted the following regarding other sundry goods:

“Currently the focus is on items from Britain, like dress shirts, vests, shirts, underwear, and other items of Western dress. The popularity of canvas and rubber shoes has increased dramatically. African homes generally have two to three items of enamel wear, with the greatest demand in vases, kettles and soup dishes, and we have hopes for these items”<sup>7)</sup>.

However, by the beginning of the 1930s, the Consul Yamazaki in Cape Town was collecting materials for “Business in Nigeria” (In *Overseas Economic Affairs* [*Kaigai Keizai Jijo*] December 13, 1935), with information on that country and its trade provided by Mr. Matsuyama, the commercial chargé d’affaires in London. Particular attention was paid to “packaging and labeling exported textiles” and “custom regimes and tariffs” (*Overseas Economic Affairs* [*Kaigai Keizai Jijo*] April 6, 1934). Additionally, the spread of British fabric in West Africa was noted in detailed surveys, which explored possible openings for Japanese goods. The areas surveyed spread out from Nigeria to Sierra Leone and Gold Coast<sup>8)</sup>. A survey of the various British territories is offered below.

## **Gambia**

It is difficult to learn anything detailed from consular reports. However, YSB’s Ouchi noted the following.

In 1929, 90% of exports consisted of peanuts, with the only other goods being small volumes of palm kernels and hides. Imports were centered on cloth, textiles, rice, kola nuts, yarn, sugar, and flour from Britain and France. Most cloth imports were also from Britain and France, and largely consisted of bleached, yarn-dyed, or patterned fabrics<sup>9)</sup>.

However, Japanese textiles and rubber boots began to make their appearance in Gambia in the early 1930s. In 1932, 4,329,000 square yards of the former and 4,700 pairs of the latter were British-made, while 24,500 square yards and 4,900 pairs came from Japan. By 1933, 5,390,000 square yards and 1,400 pairs were from Britain, while

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(1932), pp. 237-241.

7) YSB, *ibid.*, p. 241.

8) On this see “Naijeria Boeki Jokyo Fu Ippan Kokujo [The Condition of Nigeria’s Trade: with a supplement on the state of the country].” *Kaigai Keizai Jijo* [*Overseas Economic Affairs*], Showa 5-nen (1930), Vol. 24; “Honpo Yushutsu Hosho Seido to Naijeria no Torihiki Jijo [The compensation system for Our Nation’s exports and business conditions in Nigeria],” *Kaigai Keizai Jijo* [*Overseas Economic Affairs*], Showa 5-nen (1930), Vol. 7; and “Sei-A Muke Yushutsu Orimono Hyoki oyobi Hosono ni kansuru Zeikan Kisoku [Concerning the export of textiles to West Africa and customs regulations regarding their packing],” *Kaigai Keizai Jijo* [*Overseas Economic Affairs*], Showa 9-nen (1934), Vol. 30.

9) YSB, *ibid.*, pp. 61-66.

1,271,000 square yards and 12,250 pairs were from Japan. Japanese competition in Gambian market had rapidly become fierce. British authorities were initially skeptical about placing restrictions on Japanese products, but introduced a quota system on June 30, 1934<sup>10)</sup>.

### Sierra Leone

According to Ouchi of the YSB, foreign trade contracted in 1929 because of reductions in import expenditure that accompanied the collapses of export prices and purchasing power of Africans. Sierra Leone's most important exports were palm kernels and kola nuts. The main buyers were Britain and France, and the price of palm kernels was driven by trends in Europe. The primary imports were cloth, textiles, clothing, tobacco, beer, rice, wheat flour, indigo, and lumber. These were primarily imported from Britain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Dyed cloth, bleached cloth, yarn-dyed, and patterned fabrics, in that order, made up the largest amount of cloth imports. Ouchi wrote the following regarding Japan's trade with Sierra Leone<sup>11)</sup>:

"Trade between Sierra Leone and Our Empire remains insignificant, with exports from Sierra Leone to Our Empire essentially at zero, and imports from Our Empire do not exceed the following, according to government statistics:

	1928	1929
Clothing and textiles	166 pounds	535 pounds
Sundry goods	-	69 pounds
Totals	166 pounds	604 pounds

However, it is noteworthy that the volume of Our Nation's commodities traded in West Africa by British, French, and German firms is gradually increasing."<sup>12)</sup>

However, competition of Japanese goods with British goods became fierce in Sierra Leone at the beginning of the 1930s. The volume of imported Japanese textiles increased seven-fold between 1932 and 1933, shocking the British merchant community. Over the same period, imports from Britain fell by 50%<sup>13)</sup>.

10) "Japanese Trade Competition in the Colonies," 22 February 1934, FO 371/18170.

11) YSB, *ibid*, pp. 87-96.

12) YSB, *ibid*, p. 97.

13) "Written Answers, House of Commons," 30 May 1934, FO 371/18179.

## Nigeria

Ouchi of the YSB gave the following presentation on trade with Nigeria in 1929.

Nigerian imported from Britain, Germany, the USA, the Netherlands, and France, in that order, while its exports went to Britain, Germany, the USA, France, and the Netherlands. Its primary exports were palm kernels, palm oil, peanuts, cocoa, raw cotton, and tin, while its primary imports were cloth and textiles. In order, the largest shares of imported cloth were in bleached cotton, dyed cloth, patterned fabrics, grey cloth (unbleached), and yarn-dyed fabric. The largest supplier was Britain, followed by Germany, Italy, France, and the Netherlands<sup>14</sup>.

Ouchi noted the following about trade with Japan:

“According to government statistics on the trade between Nigeria and Our Empire, Nigeria imported 1,931 pounds of goods from Our Nation in 1929, while their exports to Our Empire were negligible. The imports were as follows:

Ceramics and glassware	31 pounds
Glass bottles and lamps	8
Knitted cotton products	1,762
Wooden goods	45
Stationary	39
Others	46
Total	1,931 pounds”

As can be seen, trade with Our Empire is as yet insignificant, as can be imagined when we consider that in the example of knitted products, Our Nation's commodities are initially taken to Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, or France and only then imported into Nigeria from Europe. Direct trade with Our Empire remains a totally undeveloped in this market that Our Empire's traders increasingly desire to advance to.”<sup>15</sup>

However, Tajima of the OSK noted the following about trade between Nigeria and Japan based on trading statistics in 1932.

“Imports from Japan, primarily cloth, rayon, and canvas shoes, totaled 28

14) YSB, *ibid.*, pp.192-203. For clothing and accessories, the largest importers in order were Britain, Germany, and France. Textile products imported into Nigeria included the following: grey bafta, croydons, shirting, domestics, mules, dhooties, twill, brocade, drill, tussore, shantung, damasks, satin, sheets, mosquito nets, muslin, flannel, handkerchiefs, dress shirts, knitwear, silk handkerchiefs, velvet, and velvet goods.

15) YSB, *ibid.*, pp.218-219.

items with a value of 121,678 pounds, and are welcomed for their low prices and good quality. In the absence of artificial barriers, we anticipate high possibilities for further increase. In contrast to the promise demonstrated above for import trade in Japanese goods, exports of Nigeria's natural resources to Japan have not yet been seen and is labeled as nothing in trade statistics, yet the *Arasuka-maru* on the occasion of its West African voyage loaded 700 tons of scrap metal from the government's railway department in Lagos, and perhaps in the future we shall be able to record Nigerian exports to Japan. The bulk of Nigeria's exported natural resources ... include palm kernels, peanuts, palm oil, cocoa, hides, and tin, and I believe that, taking into account recent development of Our Nation's manufacturing sector, research should be undertaken into the utilization of the above commodities as resources, and, in cooperation with manufacturers and traders, an export market with Japan be opened. This is vital for balanced trade between Japan and Nigeria that will clearly aid the development of Our Empire's export market."<sup>16)</sup>

The spread of Japanese commodities in the early 1930s was a threat to the British in Nigeria too. The Nigerian governor proposed adopting more vigorous measures than merely raising tariffs in February 1934. By the end of 1934, British-manufactured textile imports totaled 37,799,409 square yards, but imports of inferior Japanese-manufactured textiles had reached 15,925,075 square yards<sup>17)</sup>.

### **Gold Coast**

Ouchi of the YSB noted the following regarding trade with Gold Coast in 1929. Gold Coast was essentially a mono-crop colony, with its cocoa exported to the United States, Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands making up half of the world's supply and over 80% of exports. Its primary imports were cloth, textiles, foodstuffs, beer, alcohol, and tobacco. Patterned fabric held the largest share of imported cloth, followed by yarn-dyed fabric, dyed cloth, and bleached cotton. The suppliers of this cloth were Britain in the case of bleached cotton, and Britain, Germany, and Belgium for yarn-dyed fabric. Dyed cloth was from Britain, Nigeria, Germany, and Belgium. Grey cloth was from Britain, and patterned fabric was from Britain, Germany, and Sweden<sup>18)</sup>. The following note can be found on Japanese trade with Gold Coast:

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16) OSK, *Nishi-Afurika Keizai Jijo Chosa Hokoku-sho [Report on the economic conditions in West Africa]*, p. 83.

17) "Japanese Trade Competition in the Colonies," 22 February 1934, FO 371/18170.

18) YSB, *ibid.*, pp. 120-129.



“Trade between Our Empire and Gold Coast are, according to the government’s statistics for 1929, as follows:

1929	Exports to Japan	88 pounds
	Imports from Japan	41,361 pounds
	Exports	Cocoa (2 tons) 88 pounds
	Imports	Clothing 7,328 pounds
		Grey Cloth 178
		Other textiles 2,046
		Silk 1,689
		Rayon 418

However, Tajima of the OSK noted the following regarding Japanese cloth:<sup>19</sup>

“It is significant that Our Empire, along with Germany and the Netherlands, is competing to gain a strong position in the market for eleven types of cloth that are dominated by Britain, and it seems that the reason for Our Nation’s weakness in the calicos particularly favored by Gold Coast natives is a lack of market research, which could well be an area with scope for further development.”

“The imports of Our Empire’s commodities, as shown in the trade statistics, had seen a significant increase by the end of 1932, with good reason to think that such an increase will accelerate in 1933. While we can assume that as the government’s statistics are collected on the basis of the country in which the cargo is loaded, in reality the correct figure for Japan’s cotton imports is likely to be higher, although to what degree cannot be established. In spite of this, however, across all of the various cotton goods — sewing cotton, towels, knitted cotton, clothing and so forth — there was an increase in imports in 1932. Across imports of all cotton goods, 1932 displayed an increase over previous years due to decline in prices, reduction in tariffs (which changed from 15% to 12% in 1932) and a depletion of stock towards the end of 1931.”<sup>20</sup>

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19) YSB, *ibid.*, pp. 128-129. In addition, Tajima of the OSK, based on 1932 statistics, noted the following about trade between Japan and Gold Coast. Britain made up 60% of Gold Coast imports, a figure that had recently contracted. Following Britain were countries like the USA, Germany, France, Belgium, and Japan. Although imports from most of these countries were decreasing, imports from Japan were increasing. In addition, to be included in Japanese goods are those items re-exported from Western nations and thus not officially recorded as Japanese commodities. Cotton and textiles constituted the largest volume of goods imported, followed by gasoline, tobacco, rayon, iron and steel, and cloth for sacking (OSK, *ibid.*, p. 121, 122).

20) OSK, *ibid.*, pp. 127-128.

Finally, Tajima summarized trade relations and policies between Japan and Gold Coast in the following terms:

“Imports from Japan consisted of a total of 39 items, primarily various cotton cloths, rayon, clothing, and canvas shoes, and topped 71,131 pounds, and were the other, indirectly imported Japanese commodities not captured in these trade figures recorded, the total amount would not be any smaller, making the Gold Coast second only to Nigeria as the most favorable and important market for Our Nation’s goods. Regarding the increase in imports of Japanese canvas shoes, the following point should be made in the trade statistics. Notwithstanding the fact that the large-scale imports of cheap Japanese canvas shoes shown in the trade figures for this year are unlikely to show the full value of Japanese imports, for the reasons noted above, it is the case that for the years 1928 and 1929, imports of Japanese shoes were zero, in 1930 we see 6,504 pairs and 33,104 pairs in 1931, which increases rapidly to 194,000 pairs in 1932. Were the bulk of these shoes sold at about a shilling a pair, this would be favorable and increase sales. In contrast to this development of imports from Japan outlined above, exports to Japan remain nonexistent, and the need for Our Empire to examine policies that would stimulate Japanese purchases of Gold Coast’s main export of cocoa so that its growth mirrors that in imports must be thought a matter of great importance.”<sup>21)</sup>

Thus in 1932, Japan contributed 1.3% of Gold Coast’s imports, but this figure increased to 3.3% by 1933. Imports of Japanese textiles increased from 0.5% in 1932 to 2.9% in 1933. In Gold Coast, the issue was not these figures as such; rather the issue was that, despite improvements in the quality of Japanese goods, their prices remained 25-40% cheaper in comparison with British goods.

Somewhat before this, on June 7, 1932, commercial counsellor Matsuyama in London had explained and reviewed the spread of British textiles in West African markets in the following manner.

“In British West Africa, textiles from Lancashire overwhelmed those of other countries and had tremendous scope for future growth. Furthermore, because the British had left the gold standard, exchange rates had fallen and the spread of textiles and woolen goods into African markets had become easier. However, while a taste for Lancashire textiles could generally be seen across British West Africa,

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21) OSK, *ibid*, p. 143.

consideration must be taken for different demands and tastes in the various colonies. British merchants had come to consider West Africans as conservative and uninterested in novelty or fashion, but, in truth, arousing demand for new products is a vital task."<sup>22)</sup>

Although it began late, Japanese trade expansion into British West Africa was rapid. In 1932, Japanese textile exports to West Africa were 4,400,000 square yards, whereas Britain's exports were 160,000,000 square yards. Japan's exports to the region showed remarkable progress in the early 1930s, with the Japanese share of the region's imports reaching 11% in 1933. This was the beginning of Britain losing its overwhelming market share. In the British West African market, Japanese exports had reached 21,830,000 yen by 1937, though they were not in a dominant position. This level of penetration into the West African market was clearly a threat to the British.<sup>23)</sup>

Britain was restricted by its treaty obligations to not introduce discriminatory measures regarding foreign commodities in its West African markets. The Anglo-Dutch Gold Coast Treaty of 1871 and the Anglo-French Convention of 1898 both specified this point. However, there was no such treaty binding its actions in Sierra Leone or Gambia, making discriminatory measures against Japanese imports there possible. In 1932, tariffs were applied to Sierra Leone and Gambia, restricting imports of Japanese goods. When the British understood those to be insufficient, they sought to introduce a more effective quota system to halt Japanese imports. In order to counter this, the Japanese sought to diversify its exports to West Africa.<sup>24)</sup>

## (2) French West Africa

We can use Japanese consular reports to determine the situation in French West Africa from the latter half of the 1920s. For example, there are the reports from the extraordinary chargés d'affaires to the French Empire, Hiroyuki Kawai, based on surveys of monthly reports and statistics published by the French government-general undertaken by the Embassy Clerk, Maruo<sup>25)</sup>, and those of the Ambassador

22) See "Eikoku Menpu no Nishi-Afurika Shinshutsu Jokyo [The Spread of British Textiles into West Africa]," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 6-nen (1931), Vol. 30.

23) R. Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism in Africa, 1800-1939." Ph.D. Thesis, Ohio University, 1992, pp.380-381.

24) R. A. Bradshaw, *ibid.*, p. 382.

25) See "Futsuryo Sei-A Boeki Jokyo [The trade situation in French West Africa] — The report of the extraordinary chargés d'affaires to the French Empire Hiroyuki Kawai dated March 13, 1928," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 3-nen (1928), Vol. 4; "Futsuryo Seibu Afurika Boeki Jokyo [The trade situation in French Western Africa] — The report of the extraordinary chargés d'affaires to the French Empire Hiroyuki Kawai dated December 12, 1928," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 3-nen (1928), Vol. 53; and so on.

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the French Empire, Mineichiro Adachi, based on the research of Consular Representative Tomoda of Marseilles<sup>26</sup>). Furthermore, during the Great Crash, Tomoda published reports on the demand for knitted cotton, the Ambassador to France, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, published reports that relied on the investigations of various consuls, and Consul Munemura put together reports on the state of exports to French West Africa<sup>27</sup>). Tomoda noted the following in his report:

“Given that, to date, the minimal trading of Our Empire’s commodities has not been sufficient to find expression in the statistics collected by the customs houses, it is significant that, in 1929, we leapt into third on the list of suppliers of knitted cotton. . . . This advanced position compared to other nations was not the result of superior quality, but the sale of great numbers of goods of not particularly high quality. However, recognizing that these types of Our Empire’s commodities fulfill the demands of many natives in these colonies should allow us to survey our future prospects with satisfaction.” (“Demand for Knitted Cotton (in French West Africa)[Men Meriyasu Juyo Jokyo (Futsu Ryo Seibu Africa)],” Report of Consular Representative Tomoda of Marseilles, August 29, 1930)

Additionally, Tajima of the OSK noted the following about Japan’s trade with French West Africa in 1932.

“There is nothing reported of Japanese commodities in trade statistics because the goods are officially calculated as French or British exports due to being transshipped via Marseilles or Liverpool. Although, in reality, the quantity of Japanese imports such as textiles and canvas goods is increasing, it is difficult to know its quantity or value. As the import tariff on all goods coming into Morocco was set at 12.5% with all countries except the Soviet Union by the Algeiras Conference of 1906, there has been a gradual increase in the import

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26) See “Futsuryo Kamerun Keizai Jokyo [The economy in French Cameroon] — The report of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the French Empire Mineichiro Adachi dated February 7, 1929.” *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 4-nen (1929), Vol. 2: “Futsuryo Seibu Afurika Yunyu Jokyo (1927-nen) [The import situation in French West Africa (1927)] — The report of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the French Empire Mineichiro Adachi dated March 18, 1929.” *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 4-nen (1929), Vol. 6: and so on.

27) “Men Meriyasu Juyo Jokyo (Futsuryo Seibu Afurika) [The demand for knitted cotton (in French West Africa)] — The report of Consular Representative Tomoda of Marseilles dated August 29, 1930.” *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 5-nen (1930), Vol. 44: “Futsuryo Seibu Afurika Gaikoku Boeki (1929-nen) [International trade in French Western Africa (1929)] — The report of French Consul Munemura dated March 31 and April 28, 1931.” *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 6-nen (1931), Vol. 33.

of Japanese commodities into West Africa that have initially been imported into Morocco, where they become eligible for a preferential tariff rate by being shipped onward from there as French cargo. In short, there is no way to separate out Japanese commodities that are recorded as British or French cargo in the trade statistics."<sup>28)</sup>

Tajima noted the following about exports: "Unlike with imports, the recording of exports to Japan as zero is because, in reality, until today there are no indirect exports to Japan either."<sup>29)</sup>

At the beginning of the 1930s, Japanese commodities began to be exported to French West Africa in large quantities. For example, in March 1934, the consul-general of Dakar noted the increase of Japanese exports to French West Africa, showing the rivalry being provided in French West Africa by Japanese goods<sup>30)</sup>. Between 1931 and 1933, textile exports from France to its West African colonies doubled, while British exports also expanded considerably, but textile exports from the "other countries" category, which presumably includes Japan, also doubled. This increase was particularly marked for knitted cotton, rayon, and rubber goods.

In March 1924, import quotas were imposed on various foreign textiles, and in November 1935, this quota system was extended to a number of commodities, including alcohol, knitwear, incense, soap, rayon, clothes, bicycles, cars, and tires. Additionally, beginning on January 1937, foreign-produced cotton cloth was incorporated in French West Africa's quota system<sup>31)</sup>.

During this period, Japanese consular reports on French West Africa had become much more detailed. For example, around the time import quotas were being introduced, the Consulate in Marseilles was dispatching reports on the trade situation and customs revenue in French West Africa, drawn from the likes of *Le Petit Marseillaise*<sup>32)</sup>. Additionally, from 1935 on, there are collections of reports detailing the foreign trade situation in the West African mandates and the trade picture in

28) OSK, *ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

29) OSK, *ibid.*, p. 187.

30) Consul-General Cusden (Dakar) to Secretary of State, 30 May 1934, FO 371/18172.

31) Gaimusho Tsushokiyoku Hensan [Compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Trade Bureau], *Showa 12-nenpan Kakkoku Tsusho no Doko to Nihon* [Trends in trade between Japan and Other Nations — 1937 Edition], Nihon Kokusai Kyokai, 1938, p. 378.

32) Examples include "Futsuryo Sei-A no Kanzei Shunyugaku (1934-nendo) [Customs Revenue in French West Africa (For 1934)] — The report of Imperial Consular Representative of Marseilles Yoshiro Yamashita dated May 7, 1935," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo* [Overseas Economic Affairs], Showa 10-nen (1935), Vol. 14; and "Futsuryo Sei-A Boeki Jokyo (1934-nen) [The trade situation in French West Africa (1934)] — The report of Imperial Consular Representative of Marseilles Yoshiro Yamashita dated September 23, 1935," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo* [Overseas Economic Affairs], Showa 10-nen (1935), Vol. 22.

the various neighbor colonies of French West Africa<sup>33</sup>.

## 5. Japan and Britain in the West African market

Japanese firms that had temporarily entered their commodities in the African market during the First World War had lost that market after the war, with the return of European goods to the African market. The textile and sundry-goods industries that had developed in Japan during the war urgently sought to capture new export markets because of postwar depression, the strengthening of metropole-colonial relations, and autarchic block economic policies pursued by the European states. In such circumstances, the focus shifted to new markets that could be developed in Africa, Near East, Balkans, and Central and South America. In particular, the Great Crash during the 1930s saw a notable increase in interest in the West African market, which rivaled interest in the East African market.

However, how important were these new African markets to Japan? Between 1930 and 1934, Japanese exports to Africa increased by 219.8%, while trade surplus rose by 470%. Africa's share of Japan's total exports rose during the same five-year period, from 3.9% to 8.4%. The primary destination for exports was Egypt, followed by the Union of South Africa, but next came the new markets in East and West Africa. The fact that from 1937 onwards, the value of exports to these new markets had surpassed the value of exports to Egypt and South Africa, is particularly significant<sup>34</sup>.

About half of all Japanese exports to Africa were textiles. In the first half of the 1930s, starting with India and China, low-priced and efficiently sold Japanese textiles had spread throughout Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans, then into Europe, the United Kingdom, and throughout Britain's colonies, inducing trade friction with Britain by capturing new export markets in these regions<sup>35</sup>.

In the 1930s, the two biggest textile exporters were Britain and Japan, who

33) Among many reports, the following should be consulted: "Sei-A Inintochi Chiiki Gaikoku Boeki Jokyo (1935-nen) [The Foreign Trade Situation in the West African Mandate Regions (1935)] — The report of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the French Empire Naotake Sato dated May 11, 1936" *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 11-nen (1936), Vol. 13; "Futsuryo Sei-A Boeki Tokei (1936-nen) [Trade Statistics for French West Africa (1936)] — The report of Imperial Consular Representative of Marseilles Yoshiro Yamashita dated May 18, 1937," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 12-nen (1937), Vol. 14; and "Futsuryo Sei-A Keizai Jijo [The Economic Situation in French West Africa] — The report of the Imperial Consul of Casablanca Naokichi Katsuta dated February 22, 1938," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 13-nen (1938), Vol. 8.

34) R. Bradshaw, *ibid.*, pp. 365-366.

35) Shinya Sugiyama & Ian Brown (eds), *Senkanki Tonan Ajia no Keizai Masatsu — Nihon no Nanshin to Ajia/Obei [Trade friction in Inter-war South-East Asia: The Japanese southern advance and Asia and the West]*, Dobunkan, 1990, p. 89.

together accounted for 60% of the global textile trade. However, Britain's share declined from 33% at the beginning of the 1930s to 27% at the end of the decade, while Japan's share increased from 31% to 38% during that time. Moreover, as already noted, in 1932 Japanese textile exports to British West Africa, at 4,400,000 square yards, accounted for 3% of the region's total, but by 1937, Japanese exports accounted for 11% of the region's total; the 1937 figure was itself only half the level of Japanese textile exports to East Africa. With this spread of Japanese products into the West African market and the retreat of British textile exports, Manchester was seized with fear and a sense of crisis<sup>36</sup>).

In December 1932, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce established the "Special Committee on Japanese Competition," which called for the abrogation of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Commercial Counselor Matsuyama in London reported that the Directors of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce had adopted the following resolution from this movement at the end of November, with the same resolution being adopted by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce at an Extraordinary General Meeting, attended by 400 members, on December 2: "In the face of a situation in which Japanese commodities are seeking to infiltrate the British West African market through outrageously low prices and disturb the proper conduct of trade in this area, we urgently recommend the immediate abrogation of the most-favored nation clause with Japan in order that the British Empire might protect its own market as others have"<sup>37</sup>).

According to a report by Consul Noda of Liverpool in January 1934, the British government proposed in April 1933 to hold a conference of British and Japanese textile manufacturers in London in response to these actions, and announced the repeal of those terms from both the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and the Navigation and Supplementary Treaty of 1925 that applied to British West Africa. At the same time, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce submitted a memorandum to the President of the Board of Trade about the basic framework of Anglo-Japanese textile negotiations. At the negotiations, the Japanese side asked questions about the steps undertaken by the British. According to a report by Consul Noda of Liverpool

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36) R. Bradshaw, *ibid.*, p. 380; Sugiyama & Brown (eds), *ibid.*, p. 88. Kweku Ampiah, "British Commercial Policies against Japanese Expansionism in East and West Africa: 1932-1935" *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1990, pp. 619-641.

37) See "Honpo Menseihin no Eiryō Nishi-Afurika Shijō Shinshutsu to Eikoku Togyōsha no Tokkei Hogo Undo [The spread of Our Empire's textiles into the British West African market and the protectionist movement amongst British merchants] — The report of Commercial Counsellor of Britain Matsuyama dated December 16, 1932," *Kaigai Keizai Jijō [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 8-nen (1933), Vol. 15; and A. Redford, *Manchester Merchant and Foreign Trade*, Vol. 2, Manchester, 1956, pp. 249-262. "Japanese Competition and the British Cotton and Artificial Silk Export Trade," 22 December 1932, Manchester Chamber of Commerce Archives, M 8/5/18.

on February 26, 1936, Conservative MP J. R. Remer spoke about the Anglo-Japanese textile competition issue at a meeting of the House of Commons on January 31, 1934. He pointed out that members of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce included those involved with selling Japanese commodities and questioned their qualifications as representatives at the Anglo-Japanese textile negotiations<sup>38)</sup>.

The Anglo-Japanese textile negotiations were ultimately held in London in February and March of 1934. The negotiations reflected the differing positions of Japan and Britain in the world economy, and were doomed from the start. Following the breakdown in negotiations, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce's "Special Committee on Japanese Competition" recommended that the government introduce a quota system in Britain's colonies. At a meeting on March 19, 1934, the Cabinet organized "the Committee on Japanese Trade Competition," on the advice of the Board of Trade. The committee's members were drawn from the Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Dominion Office, and the Colonial Office, and the President of the Board of Trade chaired it. Its first meeting, on March 27, 1934, considered introducing import quotas. The second meeting, on April 11, explored imposing quotas on Japanese goods in British colonies, introducing an import quota system in West Africa, and, in a move that recognized the importance of the East African market to Britain, investigating the possibility of amending the Treaty of Saint-Germain and either amending or abolishing the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. On May 7, Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, announced that import restrictions on foreign textiles and rayon had been imposed in British colonies and protectorates. However, Runciman announced to the committee on June 6 that the idea that only Japan would be discriminated against in East Africa based on the Treaty of Saint-Germain was dispiriting<sup>39)</sup>.

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38) See "Rankashia Tai Sei-A Shokuminchi Bōeki Fushin to Nihon Kyoso Mondai [Depression in the Lancashire trade with West Africa and the problem of Japanese competition] — The report of Liverpool Consul Noda dated January 13, 1934," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Shōwa 9-nen (1934), Vol. 11; "Eikoku Kain Giin no Manchester Shogisho Kogeki to Sono Hankyo [The Censure by Member of the House of Commons to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and its effects] — The report of Liverpool Consul Noda dated February 2, 1934," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 9-nen (1934), Vol. 12; "Sei-A no Nichi-Ei Tai Kyoso ni Koseinaru Iken [Public Opinion regarding Anglo-Japanese competition in West Africa] — The report of Liverpool Consul Noda dated January 9, 1934," *Kaigai Keizai Jijo [Overseas Economic Affairs]*, Showa 9-nen (1934), Vol. 10; and Joint Committee of Cotton Trade Organization, "Japanese Competition," 12 May 1933m Manchester Chamber of Commerce Archive, M 8/5/18.

39) The *Osaka Asahi Newspaper* provided successive reports on the Anglo-Japanese textile negotiations at the time. See the reports dated February 13, 15, 22, and 28, and March 9, 14, and 15, 1934. In addition, see Cabinet minutes, "Committee on Japanese Trade Competition," 19 March 1934, 27 March 1934, and 11 April 1934, CAB 27/568. British East Africa was the market within which Japanese goods made the largest inroads, after Egypt and South Africa. The peak of this surge occurred in 1937, particularly in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. In 1933, Britain had halted spun cotton exports from Japanese firms into East Africa. However, despite the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1923, the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation remained in effect, and as the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain recognized Japan



In Sierra Leone and Gambia during this time, where Japanese goods had been spreading as fast as British goods had sharply decreased from 1932, import regulations were imposed, and when adjudged insufficient, quota impositions were investigated. Japanese industrialists opposed to this sought to diversify their exports to West Africa. Britain, which had become nervous about inroads made by Japanese commodities, sought to introduce measures against Japanese exports to British West Africa because it was "unfair." Implementing a quota system in British West Africa caused discussion within Britain as well, but as previously noted, quota systems were introduced in Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Nigeria on May 17, 1934 and in Gambia on June 30.

The result was that in Gambia, where the sharp increase in Japanese rubber boot and textile imports had alarmed the British governor, Japanese goods were clearly hit by the quota system's imposition. However, what replaced them were not British goods, but in fact Soviet goods. Furthermore, in Gold Coast, Japan contributed 1.3% of imports in 1932, which had increased to 3.3% by 1933, but the problem was that Japanese prices were 25-40% cheaper relative to their share of the market, which was dealt with by the import quota. While the British situation did improve, Japanese goods were largely replaced by goods from India, Italy, Hong Kong, the USA, and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the efficacy of the quota system introduced into Nigeria remained unclear<sup>40</sup>.

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as a member of the League of Nations, Britain was unable to undertake tough restrictive measures against Japan. In 1934, as Japan pulled out of the League of Nations, Britain explored the possibility of expelling Japan from the East African market, but nothing was done. In West Africa, Britain was unable to take effective measures against Japanese imports because of the Congo Basin Treaties, and consequently lost their market. See R. Bradshaw, *ibid.*, p.379.

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