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SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA:
PRIORITIES FOR THE 1980'S

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Social Sciences Research in the Middle East and North
Africa: Priorities for the 1980's

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I. INTRODUCTION

This report covers the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, hereafter referred to as MENA. The MENA region consists of all 21 Arab countries, Turkey, and Iran.

While the thrust of the report is to identify major research areas and priorities of research problems as seen by indigenous social scientists, the first part will give the overall setting of such concerns. Thus an overview of major trends and changes in the MENA region is given as a background for the following sections. Supportive data of this overview are presented in tabular form in Appendix A of this report.

In the second part, the report identifies the major research areas as well as specific research problems in the MENA region. This identification is based on data gathered from social scientists in several MENA countries visited by the author (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq). Most of this data was collected through intensive interviews with key social scientists in these countries. In Egypt, the largest in the region, interview data was supplemented by a small-scale survey administered to 60 scholars in the fields of sociology, anthropology, political science, economics and education.

In the third part of the report an attempt is made to assess research capabilities and research obstacles in

the MENA region. Policy recommendations for the IDRC as a funding agency are made.

Throughout the efforts that went into the report, the guiding principle is development related issues. People who were interviewed or surveyed were told that our concerns are development related research needs and priorities. We did not impose a priori any particular definition of "development." We let each social scientist define "development" as he or she preferred and make his responses accordingly.

II. OVERVIEW OF MAJOR TRENDS

A. Undermining of Traditional Society

Most of the present socioeconomic trends in the MENA region are manifestations of one great dialectical process: the erosion of "traditional" structures on the one hand and the attempt to build "new" structures on the other.

No one can pinpoint the moment in which that process started. But most area observers would agree that 1789 was a dramatic turning point in the evolution of the MENA area. Napoleon's ships anchored at Alexandria, along with his soldiers, ideas, technology and scholars. Their initial impression on the people, then marching inland, and then their performance, all made a graphic demonstration of a civilizational confrontation between "modernity" and "tradition." The confrontation has gone on ever since. At times it has looked as if the triumph of modernity is near. Yet every generation in the MENA region witnesses a strong comeback of traditionalism, the latest of which is the so-called Islamic resurgence. The Iranian Revolution and the assassination of President Sadat are cases in point. But such episodes tend to recede in the face of a new wave of societal change triggered by other internal and external forces. Then, traditional structures receive further blows, leading to further erosion.

A few examples will illustrate this steady erosion. The demographic structure of MENA societies, governed for

centuries by the stationary imperatives of a traditional equilibrium of high birth rates and high death rates has been permanently ruptured. Under the impact of Western penetration, and the importation of medical technology, mortality has steadily declined while fertility has remained at more or less its previously high level. This situation, known to specialists as the "stage of demographic transition," is one of rapid population growth. The transition in the MENA region has in fact been a long stable era with no signs of attaining soon the "modern equilibrium," i.e., low birth and death rates.

Rapid population growth meant greater pressure on agricultural land. The latter is scarce to begin with, and its economic mode has traditionally been one of subsistence. Few agrarian enclaves were highly mechanized either by colonial European settlers or indigenous large landowners. Soon a growing rural population could no longer be accommodated in the hinterland. This fact, along with a multitude of other factors, triggered a century-long stream of rural-urban migration.

Pre-industrial cities of the MENA region have thus been subjected to waves of rural newcomers, with their own natural population increase. MENA cities began to double their populations every twenty years (some every ten years). The traditional structure of these cities was ruptured; but the pieces have persisted. Attempts to industrialize and modernize, while substantial, have still been too slow to

incorporate most of the newcomers in modern economic sectors. Thus, triple urban cultural tiers exist everywhere in MENA cities: one traditional, one modern, and one lumpen or parasitic.

Traditional economic structures were likewise undermined. Subsistence agriculture and pastoralism in the hinterland and crafts and guilds in towns were shattered by encroaching market forces of the outside world. Enclave developments, cash crops, and the trappings of modern technology created new modes of production and gave rise to new social formations, as one part after another of the MENA region was penetrated by the West and incorporated in the world capitalist system.

The well-ordered class and political structures of traditional society had persisted with little or no change from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries. It was a world of caliphs, sultans, ulema, soldiers, bazaars, artisans, peasants and herdsmen. This mix of social categories was tied together by a combination of religious beliefs, coercion, fear and the imperatives of survival. Despite its internal tension and elite circulation, the system as a whole appeared to outsiders as quite static or stagnant. Once the upper echelon of the system was defeated or dominated by foreign intruders, i.e., colonial powers, the rest of the system underwent a long, often agonizing transformation.

Traditional family structure, extended and patriarchal, underwent similar if slower transformation. With the diminishing of family-centered crafts in towns and increased

migration from villages, a rising percentage of MENA population has become organized in smaller nuclear family structures. The rest has remained in extended family households but with markedly weakened authority held by the "patre familia." By sheer economic necessity or under the impact of a glowing Western model, a small but growing percentage of women sought work outside their homes.

Traditional formal education, limited to begin with, was religion-centered. Quranic schools trained the children of the well-to-do to read, write, and be well versed in matters of Islam. Some of the few graduates found their way to great centers of higher Islamic learning, e.g. Al Azhar, Zytouna, Mecca, Najaf, or Qam. The Western challenge induced some native reformers (Mohamed Ali in Egypt, Dawood Pasha in Iraq, Khair Eddin in Tunisia) to introduce modern education, and this began to appropriate the best and brightest of MENA children. The graduates were to become the new bureaucrats, technocrats, and professionals--lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers and journalists. They formed the embryonic beginning of what some call the New Middle Class (NMC). From their ranks would spring most of the political leaders in MENA countries in the following decades.

These and other changes undermined traditional structures in MENA societies, but have not completely wiped them out. The social landscape of the region is still full of remnants of these structures, albeit half-standing, some twisted or distorted, and others like scattered blocks or rubble.

On some traditional structures modern ones have been grafted or superimposed. In some cases the traditional and the modern co-exist with varying degrees of tension and conflict. In others, the co-existence has evolved into a creative symbiosis of harmony and cooperation. In some instances, traditional forms facilitated the process of modernity, e.g. traditional kinship ties producing sprouting capitalism. In other instances, modern forms reinforced traditional life-style or belief systems, e.g. the "mechanized nomads," or the use of cassette tapes to disseminate religious sermons. In brief, both "modernity" and "traditionalism" have been unbundled by the men and women of the MENA region. Various groups have picked various items out of each bundle and tried to synthesize them in order to cope with a rapidly changing world around them. The syntheses are neither comfortable nor final. They are in continuous flux. And many people in the region feel trapped, strained, or victimized by their own synthesis. Some pay higher prices than others in the process.

B. Contemporary Social Order in the MENA Region

Social orders reproduce themselves in every new generation. With each reproduction, varying degrees of alteration take place. The undermining of a traditional social order in the MENA region, described above, was caused by four big waves of social change: the colonial experience, introduction of modern science and technology, the national struggle for emancipation, and oil production. Each wave has left its deep and lasting impact on all aspects of life.

The present social order in the MENA region is a product of previous orders intersecting with internal and global events of the last two decades. The symbolic point of its emergence may date back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, to the death of Nasser in 1970, or to the 1973 fourth Arab-Israeli War. But whatever the hypothetical point of its conception, oil has been a decisive factor in the birth and shaping of the present social order. Oil has not only altered global relations between the MENA region and the rest of the world; it has also triggered manifest and latent forces of change in the intra-regional equation, within each country, and inside most men and women of the MENA region. To be sure, oil had been affecting the social landscape in a score of producing countries for the previous three decades. But it is in the last ten years that the oil-induced social changes have been phenomenally accelerated within those countries (Iran, Iraq, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria) and have spilled over dramatically into neighboring countries. The chain of causation may begin in some of the MENA countries but ends up in others, and vice-versa.

It would be an oversimplification to attribute all features of the present social order to oil. But it is not an exaggeration to contend that oil is the most important single factor in giving this order its unique characteristics. In this sense, oil has triggered as many qualitative and quantitative changes as each of the three previous waves--

colonialism, science and technology, and the national struggle for liberation.

The present social order, as always, is in a continuous state of flux. Thus the word "order" should not imply "orderly," "congruency," or "harmony." If anything, early indications point to marked tension, conflict, and socio-economic bottlenecks.

When we assert that oil has been a major determinant of the present social order, it should of course be realized that we are not talking about it simply as a "raw material." It is all the multifacets of this strategic substance, i.e. as energy source, technology, money, manpower and geopolitics. The interaction among these facets on one hand and the existing social structures on the other has produced a host of socio-political-cultural changes which we subsume under the label "social order." It includes the emergence of new social formations, new demographic allocations and dislocations, new values and normative systems, new behavioral patterns, new cleavages and conflicts.

Much of the internal dynamics of the present social order are not fully comprehended by outsiders or the natives themselves. Many of the features of this order as they enhance or obstruct development are yet to be studied systematically. Only the parameters and the gross trends can be sketched out in the discussion that follows.

C. Socio-economic Profiles and Trends of the MENA Region

The MENA region, stretching from Iran to Morocco, has an area of about 14 million square kilometers and a population of about 230 million. The average density for the region as a whole is about 17 persons per square kilometer, though it is as high as 500 in Bahrain and as low as 2 persons per square kilometer in Libya. Similar variance exists among countries of the region in terms of population and territorial size. Turkey, Egypt, and Iran have the largest populations, each with about 42 million in 1980. Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have the smallest populations, each with less than a million in 1980. In terms of territories, Sudan, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia are the largest in size, each more than two million square kilometers. The tiniest is the island sheikhdom of Bahrain with only 600 km², followed by Lebanon and Kuwait.

The MENA region is still going through a demographic revolution. Its overall rate of natural increase is currently around three percent annually. At such a rate, the region could double its population in less than 25 years. In other words, should present rates persist, we may expect about 400 million in the region in the year 2000. This rapid population growth is a function of a steadily declining death rate, which fell from about 40 /1000 annually at the turn of the century to about 15 /1000 in 1980, and persistently high birth rates of about 45 /1000 annually.

The population pyramid of the MENA region is characterized by a broad base and a steep incline. This generally implies a preponderance of children and short life expectancy. The proportion of those under 15 years of age is currently about 45 percent of total MENA population. Those in the 15 to 65 age bracket make up about 50 percent, and those above 65 years are about 5 percent. The implication of this age structure, along with traditions that limit women's access to employment in modern economic sectors, have resulted in an overall low rate of participation in the labor force.

The MENA region is almost entirely situated in the arid zone stretching from the Atlantic to Afghanistan. Being mostly desert, its populations are heavily concentrated in oasis-like patches, in coastal areas, and around river valleys. While the first known cities in history appeared in the MENA region several thousand years ago, the majority of its population has remained rural and nomadic until the mid-20th century. In the last three decades, however, its urban centers have grown rapidly. This trend is caused by the general population increase and by steady streams of rural-urban migration. At present more than 40 percent of MENA's population live in urban centers (some 100 million). Several of its cities have topped the one million mark: Casablanca, Algier, Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus, Tehran, Istanbul. At least one city, Cairo, has reached the ten million mark in the early 1980's. The rural and nomadic

populations are steadily declining in proportion, although still growing in absolute terms.

The major economic resources of the MENA region are agriculture, oil, and minerals. The major economic activities until mid-century were farming, herding, and trading. In the last four decades industrial activities have grown slowly but steadily. Likewise, service activities, especially in state sectors, have markedly increased. Oil revenues have given a strong push to both industry and services in the last two decades. At present, about 60 percent of MENA's manpower (36 million) is engaged in primary activities (agriculture, herding, and related activities), about 10 percent (6 million) in secondary activities (manufacturing and processing), and about 30 percent (18 million) in tertiary activities or services. The MENA population participation rate in the labor force remains generally low, hovering around 25 percent.

In the late 1970's, the GNP for the entire MENA region stood at about \$240 billion. The annual per capita GNP, therefore was slightly above \$1000. Most of this GNP, however, is generated from oil (more than \$200 billion in 1980). There are wide variations in income per capita among MENA countries, since the oil wealth is concentrated in only 10 of the 23 countries of the region. Thus, annual income per capita in a country such as Kuwait is in excess of \$17,000 while in a country like Somalia it is less than \$150.

The economic base of most MENA countries, especially some of the oil rich ones, remains somewhat undiversified.

Either a single crop or a single raw material accounts for a disproportionate share of these countries' GNP.

When natural, financial and human resources are juxtaposed, the region displays marked anomalies. Some countries with rich natural and financial resources have a very small population base and limited capital absorbing capacity (e.g., the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, and Libya). They present one extreme. The other extreme is represented by countries with a large population base but which have limited natural and financial resources and high capital absorbing capacity (e.g., Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen). In between there is a group of countries with moderate to substantial populations, diversified economic base, natural and financial resources, and high capital absorbing capacity (e.g. Iran, Iraq and Algeria). These anomalies have triggered a migratory system of manpower in the MENA region in the last decade, the scale of which is unprecedented since the 8th century with the rise and spread of Islam. The consequences of this large scale migration are multitudinal. Their implications for development have not been adequately researched.

In 1980 it is estimated that as many as 65 percent of MENA adult population were illiterate. The percentage among adult females was even higher, over 80 percent. In this, as in other socioeconomic indicators, there are wide variations. In Lebanon and Kuwait, for example, the percentage of illiterates has been reduced to about 30 percent, while in Saudi Arabia and Yemen it is still about 80 percent.

However, demand for education in all countries has been rising steadily in recent decades. Between 1960 and 1980 MENA children enrolled in primary schools rose from 60 to 85 percent of all eligible age group. Likewise, those enrolled in secondary schools rose from about 15 to 45 percent of the respective age group, and in college level from less than 5 percent to about 10 percent of the respective age group.

But impressive as these indicators may be, it remains true that millions of young MENA population are still without any formal schooling. In 1980, for example, as many as 20 million youngsters of school age were not enrolled. The quality of education in most MENA countries ranges between average and inferior. In the first two levels, primary and secondary, 80 per cent of the schools have no libraries, and pupils rarely participate in science experiments. Despite lip service about relevance of education to development and character-building, learning in the vast majority of MENA schools relies heavily on memorization and the ultimate concern is to pass examinations with high grades, especially at the terminal year of each educational level.

The above pressures and deficiencies reflect on the quantity and quality of higher education in the MENA region. Between 1950 and 1980 enrollment in institutions of higher learning jumped from about 100,000 to over 2,500,000, i.e., 20 times, in three decades. The teaching staff, however, only quadrupled, thus raising the student-faculty ratio from 15:1 to about 50:1 (compared to 15:1 in the West). The great

majority of university students (about 60 percent) major in law, humanities and social sciences. Most MENA countries find it cheaper to respond to increasing demand for higher education by expanding in these fields, rather than expanding in science, engineering and medical sciences, which require much longer planning and preparation of teaching staff, not to mention costly laboratory equipment.

Tables in Appendix A give supportive data on these and other socioeconomic indicators of the MENA countries. The overall conclusion that can be drawn is that growth rates have been quite impressive in recent decades. But they are not consistent among indicators, across countries, or even within each country. These imbalances create gaps and socioeconomic bottlenecks. These in turn have added new troubles to old ones for the political systems of the region, as will be shown in the next section.

D. Political Evolution of the MENA Countries

With the exception of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, all MENA countries had experienced one form or another of Western colonialism: French in Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon and Djibuti; British in Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, the Gulf States, and South Yemen; Italian in Libya and Somalia. The countries' paths to independence ranged from long protracted armed struggles to negotiated agreements, to U.N. supervised settlements. Palestine has remained an exception, where the creation of the settler state of Israel has plunged most of the MENA region into a long conflict with the Jewish State.

At present most of MENA countries are republics: Mauritania, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Djibuti, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, South Yemen, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Eight countries are monarchies: Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait.

Eight of the 14 republics adopted this form of government from the beginning of independent statehood: Mauritania, Algeria, Sudan, Djibuti, Somalia, Syria, Lebanon and South Yemen. The other six started out as monarchies, but later abolished it through coup d'etat or revolution: Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Most of these republics toyed briefly with western-type democracy, but military and/or one-party system rule is now prevalent.

The monarchies are all traditionally based. They derive their legitimacy either from religion (Morocco, Jordan) where the monarch claims to be a descendent of the Prophet Mohamed,

from tribal conquest (all the Gulf States), or a combination of both (Saudi Arabia, where an alliance of a tribe, the Anzah, and a religious movement, the Wahhabis, was forged in the late 18th century).

Like most of the third world, the MENA region suffers from political instability. In the first two decades of independence, military coups d'etat were frequent. Disillusionment with civilian governments which took over after independence, impatience with the slow pace of a distorted Western-type democratic system in problem-solving, and high expectations drummed up during the struggle for emancipation were the main factors behind such coups. However, as military regimes have not displayed a much greater aptness in solving problems or meeting rising expectations, the attraction of this political mode has declined markedly. Thus, while a country such as Syria used to have on the average a coup d'etat once every two years during the 1950's and 1960's, it has not had any during the 1970's. In fact, the regimes in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Somalia have all been in power for over one decade. Attempts to overthrow these regimes are reported periodically but none has succeeded. The problem of a peaceful transfer of power is still acute in these countries. Only Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, and Lebanon among the republics, have developed reasonable mechanisms for peaceful transfer of power. But even the latter two have fallen on hard times in the late 1970's. Lebanon has been torn by a civil war, and Turkey has slipped back to the old pattern of coup d'etat.

Underlying political instability in the MENA region are a host of old and new problems. Among the former are leftover problems resulting from legacies of both colonialism and pre-colonial traditionalism. These include the ethnic and minorities questions, the relationship between religion and modern state, distorted and/or uneven development, modern institution building, and border disputes. The march of socioeconomic events in the last two decades have added new problems of distribution and equity. The fragile and already unstable political systems of the MENA countries are now heavily overloaded. The inability to cope with old and new problems has intensified the question of legitimacy for most political regimes in the region. It is not an exaggeration to assert that at present there is a crisis of legitimacy faced by all regimes.

The crisis manifests itself in more frequent popular flare-ups, e.g., riots and demonstrations. Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and the Sudan witnessed several of these in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Organized opposition parties are still illegal in the vast majority of MENA countries. Dissident groups are harshly dealt with by ruling elites. Yet the number of such groups is on the increase within each country. Dissidents organize themselves either underground or in exile. Some 30 Arabic daily or weekly papers are published in Europe (London, Paris, Cyprus) and find their way back into MENA countries despite stringent efforts at censorship. The most organized among the discontented in recent years are Islamic militant groups. They

are the ones who brought down the Shah's imperial regime (1978), assassinated Egypt's President Sadat (1981), seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca (1979), confronted the Tunisian state in a bloody showdown at Jafsa (1979), and have been waging an urban guerilla war against the regimes of President Assad in Syria and President Hussein in Iraq.

The Islamic militant groups take different names in various MENA countries and they are not organizationally linked to each other across the region. The name of these groups may be Mujaheddin Khalq in Iran, al-Ikhwan in Saudi Arabia, the Moslem Brothers in Syria and Sudan, al-Dawa Party in Iraq, al-Jihad or Repentance and Holy Flight in Egypt. But when analyzed and seen in their "bare bones," the bulk of membership in all these militant groups is from lower-middle class background, well-educated, high achievers, and intensely nationalistic people.

Their proclaimed goal is the establishment of a new Islamic social order. But beneath this vague, though spiritually powerful, appeal lies very earthly socioeconomic grievances. Their real quests are for a greater share in power and wealth, for independence, and for cultural authenticity. Revolutionary Islam of the present generation of the MENA lower middle class is the functional equivalent of secular nationalism a generation ago, and of anticolonial patriotism two generations earlier.

The choice of Islam as a banner for these quests is not accidental. It is a cultural-political shield against

accusations of being "communists" or importers of "foreign ideologies," charges which autocratic rulers in the area have often used to suppress protest movements. Islamic militancy gives the disaffected a cultural legitimacy over and against MENA regimes of various political colors, whether monarchical or republican, so-called "progressive" or "reactionary." Whichever superpower happens to be linked with any of these regimes receives its share of Islamic militants' wrath, whether it is the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

The sociological irony in all this is that the economic growth of the MENA region has made possible the expansion of the ranks of the lower middle class and the lumpen urban proletariat. But this growth has not been accompanied by marked social equity, political democratization, or assertion of cultural authenticity. These very classes are, therefore, increasingly disposed to bring down the present MENA sociopolitical orders.

The sensitivity of MENA's political stability not only derives from its direct bearing on development, but also from the vital importance of the region for the entire world. This importance is both geopolitical and economic. The region is at the geographic center of the world, the intersection of the three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe. Its land mass borders on two oceans (Atlantic and Indian). It contains or controls main passage waterways: Gibraltar, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Suez Canal, and the Strait of Bab Al Mandeb. But it is the oil wealth of the region which has made it acutely vital for the entire world in

the last decade and the next two decades. The lifeline of Western industrial civilization depends in great part on MENA oil. This is all the more reason why MENA's development, political evolution, and stability should be a worldwide concern.

III. RESEARCH AREAS AND PRIORITIES

A. Introduction

Based on interviews with some 86 social scientists from eight MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq), about 450 topics were mentioned as representing what they believed to be social science research priorities in the 1980's.

Those interviewed covered five social science areas: economics (16), education (12), political science (17), psychology (9), and sociology (27). Five directors of research centers in Morocco (1), Tunisia (1), Egypt (2) and Lebanon (1) were also interviewed to supplement individual social scientists' views with those of research institutions. There is no claim that these are representative samples of the fields or the MENA countries. Their selection was based on convenience for the author of this report and on the reputation of these individuals as accomplished or promising social scientists. The information obtained from them gives the author more confidence in his own initial assessment of research priorities in the MENA region.

The topics suggested for research (439) included several identical or similar titles; they were reducible to about one quarter of the initial number. In the short list of about 120 research topics, nearly one half (54) were single country specific. Also, about one-third were of an interdisciplinary nature.

To best present these research priorities, we shall subsume them under the four main headings which the IDRC

Social Sciences Division (SSD) has been channeling its own research activities. These are economics, education, science and technology, and population and development. Research topics which are unclassifiable under the four main areas will be put under a separate heading.

Within each social science area, the order of presenting research priorities will be on the regional, national, urban, and rural levels, when appropriate. Although we have already presented the major trends of the MENA region above, we will preface each set of research priorities with a brief introduction to place the suggested topics in proper perspective.

B. Economics

Although much has been made of the new oil wealth in the MENA region, poverty and underdevelopment are still widespread in most of its countries. The oil wealth is in a few countries containing only about one-third of MENA total population. Among the most populous of these oil countries (Iran, Iraq and Algeria) substantial pockets of rural and urban poverty still exist. Two of these countries, Iran and Iraq, are embroiled in a devastating war with one another. The third, Algeria, is involved in a war by proxy with Morocco, through the Polisario over the Sahara. Some of the oil's most valuable revenues are drained by these conflicts. The less populous oil countries (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Libya) with capital surplus, also have their own problems, both economic and social.

The bulk of the MENA region is still part of the Third World countries with standard economic problems of under

development: shortage of capital, low productivity and low income per capita, imbalance of trade between imports and exports, foreign debt to finance the deficit in the balance of payments, narrow base of industry, fast-growing services sector, low rate of participation in the active labor force, distortion of the structures of manpower, etc. The typical vicious circle of underdevelopment has been compounded in the poor MENA countries by the rising bill of oil imports from their rich neighbors, and by losing to them, temporarily at least, some of their best trained manpower.

The economies of the MENA region on both sides of the wealth divided (created by oil revenues) have displayed other common features during the decade of the 1970's. Agriculture has lagged in its growth behind other sectors, and indeed showed a negative growth rate in a number of countries (Algeria, Bahrain). As a result, the value of agricultural imports have grown for the region as a whole nearly six times in one decade, from slightly over \$2 billion in 1970 to about 12 billion in 1977. In some countries, such as Egypt, the increase in such imports has been ten-fold. Likewise, defense expenditures have increased ten-fold during the same decade. Much of this increase is due to importation of arms and new weapons systems. The integration of MENA economies in the world capitalist system has grown immensely. But it is generally a dependent integration, with a rising percentage of these countries' needs for food, medicine, weapons, technology and managerial know-how being imported from the outside, especially the West.

Many of the research topics suggested below must be viewed in the context of the above features of the MENA region.

1. Inflation

Suggested by nearly every economist (14 of 15) as a research priority, it was also mentioned by several sociologists and political scientists. Its importance derives not only from the fact that the rate of inflation ranges between 30 and 50 percent annually in most MENA countries, but also from its distorting impact on the economy in general and on public spending, in particular for subsidies. The latter question is treated as a research priority below. Inflation as a research concern of economists, however, seeks to go beyond aggregate indicators. The quest is to disaggregate global data in order to monitor inflation by source, sector, and items within each sector, to assess its differential impact on various strata of the population and on the overall performance of national economies. There is a general recognition that much of this inflation is an imported one, due to rising prices of imported goods and services. But a substantial part is also due to increased demand without matching growth in productive economic activities. Similarly, there is a common sense recognition that lower income groups are hardest hit by these inflationary pressures in MENA economies. Research on this topic would aim at sharpening, refining, modifying, and correcting some of these generalizations.

2. Subsidies

Most MENA governments have been subsidizing basic food items (bread, sugar, cooking oil, etc.) as well as non-food items such as gasoline, other oil byproducts, education, health, and public transport. The practice goes back to the early 1960's under the wave of socialism in a score of Arab countries (Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Iraq), but also spread to non-socialist regimes (Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon) and even the oil rich states. The percentage of such subsidies in the early 1960's never amounted to more than 10 percent of state budgets. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, however, subsidizing the same items began to claim a large share of the non-oil states' government budgets. Subsidies are not a serious issue in oil rich countries; both government and individual incomes have grown rapidly to offset whatever rise may have occurred in domestic or world prices of subsidized items. The poorer MENA countries that are in debt are under cross pressure from money lending institutions on the one hand and their own poor and lower-middle classes on the other hand. Typically, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) extends lines of credit to governments of poor MENA countries only if these governments do away with or at least start phasing out the subsidy system. In Egypt (January 1977), Morocco (June 1981) and the Sudan (January-February 1982), such action by the respective governments triggered urban riots so violent that armies had to be called in to restore order. Economists in the region (13 out of 16 interviewed) believe that these subsidies are a

priority research item. Much of the heated debates on the subject lack the requisite fundamental data. There is a recognition that with appropriate systematic analysis, policies could be recommended in order to rationalize subsidies that would neither cause social upheavals nor lead to economic disaster.

3. Taxation System

Many area social scientists (9 economists, 8 sociologists, 7 political scientists) suggested fresh research in the area of taxation. Several among them link the inflation and burdens of subsidies to the present tax systems in a number of MENA countries. Some argued that one cause of inflation is the growing untaxed incomes in the hands of an increasingly minor segment of the population. This adds to an unhealthy growth of demand on a limited pool of goods and services, thus creating further inflationary pressures. Others argue that an efficient and equitable tax system would raise the state revenues so immensely that subsidies would no longer represent an awesome share of government budgets. Whatever the arguments advanced, the socio-political significance adds to the economic urgency of new research in this area.

4. Foreign Trade

Several economists (11 of 16 interviewed) noted the importance of foreign trade as a research priority in a multitude of contexts, e.g. as responsible for balance of payment deficits, foreign debts, inflation, inducing new consumption patterns, dependence, stunting domestic indus-

trial growth, etc. The various aspects of foreign trade as a research topic would include the structure of imports and exports, their direction, their differential impact on domestic economic growth, levels of savings and investments. Some interviewed pointed out the fact that foreign trade in several MENA countries has grown to a sizable percentage of GNP, as high as 100 percent in some cases. Import levels of industrial consumer goods are alarming some area economists especially in countries that had gone a long way in their strategies of "import substitution" in the 1960's (Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Syria). What had promised to be a steady industrial development in these countries is now threatened by the "open door" policies, retreat of socialism and central planning. The needed research would make an overall assessment of industrial strategies as well as import policies.

5. Economics of Technology Transfer

Several economists and sociologists seconded the high research priority of issues related to so-called "technology transfer." The economic aspect of the topic is often mentioned with regard to the quest of some oil rich countries to diversify their economic base. The fact that they suffer from a shortage of native manpower has induced these countries to adopt a strategy of high technology industries which tend to be capital intensive. Examples are petrochemicals, engineering, energy-intensive metallurgy, etc. The multi-billion dollar industrial complexes at Yanbu and Jubail in Saudi Arabia are cases in point. Similar complexes

have been established or are underway in Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq and Algeria. No comparative evaluation of the economic viability of this strategy, much less its social impacts, has been done systematically. The need for modern technology has even been used as an argument to allow the multinational corporations into populous countries with endemic capital shortage (e.g., Egypt, Sudan, Morocco). The economic consequences of these and other aspects of technology transfer would constitute the thrust of research on this topic.

6. The Economic Consequences of Labor Migration

Nearly every social scientist interviewed (63 of 86) has noted the dramatic phenomenon of manpower migration across state borders of the MENA countries in recent years. The movement of labor is from poor to oil rich countries. Its consequences are believed to be profound. The non-economic impact of this large scale migration (about five million persons in 1980) is dealt with later. But the economics, while discussed a great deal, remain understudied. The poor countries seemed quite content in the beginning, as such movement of their people meant substantial remittances, i.e., capital inflow. However, more recently there is a "revisionist" mood among several MENA economists. They would like to undertake more systemic micro as well as macro studies on the economic consequences of manpower exportation. Persistent questions, debates and polemics have raged in the last three years. Many scholars feel that these quarrels are clouded by ideological and/or nationalistic considerations.

Again, hard data and elaborate systematic research, they feel, would clear the air for more rational manpower policies which optimize the cost and benefits for both poor and rich MENA countries.

7. Pan-regional Economic Relations

The question of manpower discussed above is linked conceptually to overall issues of pan-regional relations. There are several configurations or subsystems at work in the MENA region. They intersect, overlap, and occasionally compete. The Arab League and its specialized agencies have set up some institutional mechanisms to enhance economic integration and cooperation among the 21 Arab countries in the region. OPEC, which includes non-Arab countries, and OAPEC which includes only oil exporting Arab countries, have also established similar mechanisms for cooperation and coordination. Some capital-surplus countries, e.g. Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Libya, Kuwait, Iraq, have each unilaterally set up their own "economic fund" to extend aid in the form of grants or loans to needy Arab and Muslim states. More recently (1981) a new subregional body, the Council for Gulf States Cooperation, was set up to coordinate political, economic, military and cultural policies of member states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, U.A.E. and Oman but not Iraq, Iran or Yemen. The economic activities of all these regional and subregional organizations are yet to be assessed and evaluated. Nor has there been much research to evaluate private pan-regional

activities in banking or other joint commercial and industrial ventures. Several economists and political scientists noted a research priority for these pan-regional economic and financial relations. Some have expressed a strong feeling that pan-Arab institutions, both governmental and private, have great implications for the economic future of the entire region.

8. The Economic Role of External Organizations

Several economists and other social scientists noted the lack of research on the role played by international capital in shaping the national economies and societies of the MENA region. Some attributed the neglect of this research area to the funding agencies, who themselves are mostly Western-based. They may be reluctant to reveal the extent and consequences of foreign economic penetration of the MENA countries. Singled out in this regard because of their scale, are the bilateral economic aid programs by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the IMF. Some of the ideologically bent social scientists suggested the possible distorting effects of these aid programs in increasing dependence and in favoring a burgeoning local capitalist class. Similar suggestions were made with regard to the role of the multinational corporations. Much of the talk in this area is ideologically charged, and in the absence of hard systematic research, polemics are likely to continue.

9. Urban Economics

While the above research topics have a national and/or regional dimension, several suggested research topics were subnational, bearing on either urban or rural areas. Those that received most frequent mention are discussed below.

9.a. Economics of Urban Real Estate

Several have noted the skyrocketing of land values in the last decades. This in turn has affected patterns of land use, especially the cost of housing. Economics of real estate has been distorted by heavy speculation and mounting demands for housing. Despite a frantic construction boom in both rich and poor MENA countries, there is a severe housing shortage, estimated at present to be about four million units. Public housing is receding in relative volume compared to that built by private developers. The latter tend to be designed for middle and upper income strata. The bulk of demand, however, is from low income groups. Estimates for urban Egypt suggest that up to 80 percent of the new housing stock is being constructed outside of formal, legal channels. Consequences for sanitation, engineering safety, and loss of agricultural land to this wildcat building are staggering but little understood.

9.b. Economics of Small Enterprises

Because of the global economic changes of the 1970's, much spill-over effect is observed in MENA cities and towns. The phenomenon of multiple job-holding (two or three per capita) to cope with rising costs of living, increase in

women and child labor, rising cost of skilled labor, are all readily observable. But of special note is the mushrooming of small enterprises: boutique shops, small kiosks, taxi owner/operators, pension and furnished apartments, tourism-related small businesses, informal currency trading, small factories, etc. Much of these activities are so small and informal that they escape governmental recording and taxation. They have not figured in aggregate economic analysis of national accounts. Yet many economists concede that they add up to an impressive volume of money, manpower hours, and long-range effects on the national economy. Research is urgently needed in this area. Economists suggest that much of the parasite nature of these activities are due to the lack of more protective institutional channels which could otherwise absorb human energy and investments at the small enterprise level. Of special importance here would be studies of the problems faced by small producers in gaining access to credit. The obstacles to productive investment are often so great that parasitic or quasi-black market operations become the only viable option.

10. Rural Economics

While about 60 percent of total MENA populations live in rural areas, agriculture's share in the GNP has declined steadily in relative terms. This is due in part to the slow rate of growth in agriculture compared to other sectors, and in part to the growing percentage of rural population who are engaged in non-agricultural activities. These and other newly emerging features of MENA rural areas have not

been adequately researched. Some priority issues are discussed below.

10.a. Changing Crop Patterns

In several MENA countries farmers have shifted from traditional food or cash crops to other more lucrative ones. Thus in Yemen, coffee-growing farmers in the highlands have shifted to qat. In Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia they have shifted from grain and cotton, whose prices are state controlled (below world market prices, to subsidize urban demand) to other crops such as fruits, vegetables, flowers, and medicinal herbs. These shifts favor big farmers where economy of scale and marketing skills are essential. Small farmers are often the net losers. They neither benefit from the world price level for their product, nor are able to circumvent state price controls. These observations, often made by agricultural economists, suggest a dire need to study what has really been happening and the consequences with regard to changing crop patterns.

10.b. Agrarian Reform

About 30 years have passed since the first agrarian reform law in the MENA region was enacted in Egypt in September, 1952. Since then, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Algeria, Yemen and Tunisia have enacted similar laws. These agrarian policies invariably implied more than land expropriation from the rich and redistribution to the rural poor. There were also rent controls, new systems of land tenure, and the establishment of agricultural cooperatives. The retreat of

socialism in several MENA countries where agrarian reform was instituted has deflected attention of governments and researchers alike away from this area. There is new interest in the topic among many of the social scientists interviewed for this study. Such interest however has not yet translated itself into new programs of research. Several have noted the need for evaluation research, i.e., agrarian reform "revisited." They believe that much could be learned from the lessons of success and failure in agrarian reform, now that much of the dust has settled.

10.c. Small Rural Enterprises

We have already noted that a growing percentage of rural income is now generated from non-agricultural activities. Some of these are farm support activities such as owning and renting out tractors, water pumps, threshing machines, mechanical plows and the like ("custom" work). Such small scale support enterprises have been made possible and profitable by two factors: first, the large-scale migration of ruralites to both urban centers of their own countries as well as to oil rich countries. This in turn has created permanent or seasonal labor shortages in rural areas which could only be remedied by partial or total mechanization. And second, many of the migrants return with savings which are too small to start any large scale business or major land acquisition, but are big enough to buy farm machinery to use on their own plots with surplus capacity to rent out. The economics of this new development in MENA

rural areas have yet to be fully researched. Likewise, there has been a growing intensification of agriculture. This includes garden farming, poultry, cattle fattening, fisheries, dairy products, etc. Many economists feel that these small scale activities are less parasitic than some of their counterparts in urban areas (see 9.b. above), yet they have substantial redistributive effects in rural and national economies. Much could be learned from systematic comparative research on these new enterprises, along with the fate of old cottage industries in rural areas.

C. Education

Despite impressive growth in school enrollments in all MENA countries, the region as a whole still suffers from widespread illiteracy, an overall low quality of education at all levels, and the missing links of educational relevance to development. Some of these problems have been compounded inside poor countries by the steady rise of teacher migration to oil rich countries where salary scales and work conditions are far better than in their own. Equally responsible is the fact that demand on education (rapid growth of enrollment) has not been matched by a similar rate of growth in teacher training. In some countries the pressure to meet demand has led to hurried programs of teacher training or outright recruitment of unqualified teachers.

Despite problems in all levels of the educational system, most of those interviewed from the field (12 specialists) concentrated on primary and basic education. Their feeling

is that this is where the root of most of the educational problems lie.

1. Drop-outs

All specialists interviewed mentioned "school drop-out" as a serious problem that warrants a research priority in the field of education. Underlying their concern are several factors. For one thing, drop-outs, especially from primary schools, represent a substantial addition to the already large numbers of illiterates in the region. Second, it represents the waste of an already invested resource, and thus an economic burden. Third, it represents a loss of future potential, on the assumption that a literate person is a more valuable manpower element in the developmental processes of a society. Some of the factors related to school leaving may be known. But the steady rise of dropouts (in some countries as high as 40 percent among boys and 60 percent among girls during the six years of primary schooling) points to the necessity of further and more elaborate research. Some specialists suggested that part of such research must be action-oriented, i.e., experimental studies to combat the drop-out phenomenon. Since past research findings in several MENA countries indicated that the phenomenon is "class," "sex," and "parent-occupational" bound, action-oriented research ought to zero in on these respective target groups.

2. Evaluation of Multiple-shift Schools

Some of the poor MENA countries have resorted in recent years to multiple school shifts. The same school building

is used twice or three times a day for successive school shifts of roughly four to five hours each. The first shift may start as early as 6:30 a.m., and the last may end as late as 9:00 p.m. This staggering system is utilized in response to rising demand for schooling and lagging supply of school facilities. Specialists in the field feel that the system is in need of evaluation, especially on the primary level. They point out that with four or five hours of schooling per day, only the cognitive component of education is manageable and takes precedence over the "affective" and "psychomotor" components. The condensed learning process leaves no time for art, music, sports, or any extracurricular activities. Some specialists argue that this is detrimental to children's balanced growth, and may indeed be yet another factor in dropping out. Others argue that the system is still the best poor countries can manage under the circumstances to ensure "distributive justice" for the largest possible pool of eligible children. Whatever the net effect of multiple-shift schools, evaluation research is a priority.

Should such research settle the debate, or suggest improvements in the system, it may be useful to introduce these measures in areas or countries which as yet cannot accommodate all eligible school age children.

3. Private Lessons

In the last ten years the phenomenon of private tutoring for public school children has become widespread in several

MENA countries, and on all levels, from primary to college education. Thus, while public education is theoretically free in nearly all MENA countries, poor and rich, there is tremendous pressure on parents to arrange private lessons for their children in after-school hours to ensure that they will be well prepared to pass the end-of-year examinations. The pressure mounts up in the last year of each educational level in which grade points determine whether or not the child will be admitted to the next level. The private lessons phenomenon represents what may be called an "informal parallel system" of education. It reflects lack of parental confidence in the quality of school instruction and their anxiety over their children's future. It has also become a "big industry" involving the equivalent of a multi-billion dollar operation annually in the MENA region. Private lessons have become a supplemental source of income for thousands of teachers, and for some the main source, with their modest salaries as secondary source. The phenomenon is no doubt linked to deteriorating^r quality of public education, to the multi-shift schools, and possibly to the very Mandarin-like system of examinations. Many of the specialists interviewed mentioned the phenomenon of private tutoring as a research priority.

4. Outreach Education

Given the high percentage of illiteracy among the MENA population, this problem naturally has come up frequently as

a research priority. The inputs in this area revolved around three research issues:

4.a. Population of Remote Areas

It was noted that a substantial part of the population in several MENA countries is either nomadic, live in hinterlands far from administrative centers, or are scattered in hamlets too small to "economically" warrant extension of educational programs. Some countries have experimented with "summer campaigns" for the nomads (Saudi Arabia) during the time of year when large numbers of them gather at water sources. Others have experimented with the "one room school" or mobil "educational caravans." These efforts are primarily directed to school age children although adults may also benefit from them. No systematic evaluation research has been conducted to assess the cost, viability and effectiveness of these programs.

4.b. Recapturing Drop-outs

Given the startling statistics about the dropout rates in several MENA countries, some specialists suggested the need for experimental action oriented research to recapture the dropout youngsters. The idea here is to recognize that some of these youngsters may have dropped out for economic reasons and have entered the unskilled labor pool or apprenticeship. A year or more later they may be disposed to complete their primary or middle education if given the chance and an appropriate modality. Experimental research in this area is viewed as quite promising.

4.c. Adult Literacy

There is recognition that adult literacy programs (ALP) in most MENA countries (some with 50 years history) have failed, yet in a few countries (Democratic Yemen and Somalia) ALP has had a resounding success. Two types of research are suggested in this regard. First, comparative research (across countries) to identify factors of failure and success. Second is curriculum and teacher developmental research for accelerated adult literacy programs. The so-called "functional literacy" programs are much talked about but are yet to be operationalized or implemented on a large scale. Equally promising, but as yet unimplemented on a large scale, is the use of television in ALP.

5. Technical and Vocational Education

Much of the educational expansion in the MENA region in recent years has been in the main academic track programs which culminate in college level education. The middle class aspiration for children is to obtain a college degree. This value fixation has, in turn and over the years, permeated the entire society. As a result, non-college technical and vocational education has suffered: it displays the lowest rate of growth and in some countries has in fact shown negative growth. The startling fact is that shortage of middle level manpower with vocational skills is one of the most serious bottlenecks in development programs in all MENA countries. Recognition of this has led some MENA countries to establish several technical schools and

vocational training centers. But in many cases they remain empty (e.g., in Saudi Arabia); in some countries only unemployed or poorly paid college graduates have enrolled in them. In either case the economic waste and/or "opportunity cost" for the entire society is significant. The socio-cultural stigma attached to vocational training makes it a forced court of last resort. The various aspects of this phenomenon are yet to be systematically researched, especially in view of recent socioeconomic trends triggered by oil and migration.

6. Educational Upgrading

Several MENA social scientists noted the deteriorating quality of education on all levels. They all voice concern over the problem and its consequences for the present and future development of their respective countries. Yet there is no consensus on what ought to be done. Some attribute the deterioration to rapid growth of free public education, with the implication that a solution lies in turning to policies that make education more exclusive or selective. Others attribute the problem to poor planning and/or misplaced national priorities (e.g. versus defense spending). At any rate, all concerned recognize the political constraints in any attempt to reverse the trends as well as the political hazards of government's failure to respond to the increased demands on education. But with this recognition, most specialists still feel that something could and ought to be done about upgrading the educational process. The research topics suggested in the regard pertain to

planning capabilities, physical upgrading of educational institutions, drawing on community and international resources rather than so much on already strained governments, teacher and curricula upgrading. Most of this research would naturally be "action oriented," and would not be a duplication of the UNESCO type of "country reports."

D. Science and Technology Policy

The MENA region as a whole is still quite dependent on imported science and technologies. There are very few scientific research centers. Institutions of higher learning, while having science and engineering faculties that graduate several thousands annually, produce graduates who are ill-trained to become research scientists. Lip service and/or colorful proclamations about the need to develop indigenous science and technologies are yet to be operationalized in concrete, implementable policies. Some countries in the region have established ministries or academies for scientific research, and there have been hopeful signs that these may be able to fill the gap. However, in most cases they either have turned into degree-granting institutions or have become bogged down in bureaucratic paralysis.

Social scientists who have reflected on these issues are quite encouraged, however, by the prospects in this area. Their optimism is based on the pressing socioeconomic problems that are making high level policy-makers more cognizant of the necessity to promote applied research in science and technology. The rising cost of buying, operating, and maintaining imported technology is one factor.

The socioeconomic problems resulting from flashy and often inappropriate foreign technologies is a second factor. The uniqueness and specificity of certain indigenous problems for which there is no readymade importable technology is a third factor.

A number of areas were singled out by MENA social scientists where there are pressing societal needs to concentrate on integrated research in science and technology.

1. Policy-making Mechanisms

Several among those interviewed noted that policy making institutions in the area of science and technology research are either non-existent, or exist but with a limited mandate and/or inadequate budgets. Equally deficient in the MENA region are managerial skills to organize and operate research institutions. Often the case scholarly achievement is confused with abilities to promote science policy or manage research institutions.

2. Water-related Research and Technology

MENA is an arid region with little rainfall and maximum dependence on rivers and underground water. With rising demand on water for irrigation, and for human, animal and industrial use, there has been and will be more scrambling over scarce water resources. Some experts already predict that in the coming decades the MENA region will be dominated by issues of "water politics." These considerations call for science and technology policies to maximize water resources, optimize their use, and rationalize their distribution. Such policies must target research on:

2.a. Water Desalination

2.b. Water Recycling

2.c. Water-saving devices in irrigation, human and industrial use.

2.d. Socio-cultural patterns that impede or enhance all the above concerns.

2.e. Regional agreements on equitable distribution of water and research cooperation on development of appropriate water technologies.

3. Energy-related Research and Technologies

The MENA region as a whole is a major producer of oil. Surprisingly, however, most of the MENA countries are not oil producers and have to import oil from sister states. Actually, most of the poor countries' balance of payments problems are primarily due to rising costs of imported oil to meet their energy needs (e.g., Turkey, Morocco, Sudan, Somalia). Small producers (e.g. Egypt) would be in much better financial condition if most of their oil production were exported to earn foreign currency instead of being consumed at home at subsidized price levels. In either case there is much need for developing alternative energy sources. Research and development of appropriate technologies are believed to be promising with regard to the following:

3.a. Solar energy

3.b. Hydraulic power

3.c. Bio-gas

3.d. Wind power

In these areas, modest beginnings have been initiated. Effective policies and financial support can expand such beginnings to the level of economies of scale. Equally important is research on the socio-cultural factors associated with energy use, diffusion and adoption of new energy-related innovations, etc.

4. Farm Mechanization

One of the stereotypes of MENA agriculture is that it is labor intensive. This may have been the case up to the early 1970's, but with mass migration from rural areas to urban centers and to oil rich countries, complaints have been heard recently of labor shortage in agriculture. Mechanization is thought to be the answer by some but is opposed by others on various grounds including the cost of energy. The debate over farm mechanization tends to be distorted by the issue of technology level. The present practice in farm mechanization relies on importation of heavy and increasingly complicated equipment that tend to be expensive, are energy-hungry, and require high levels of skill to operate and maintain. These factors have made mechanization economical only for large land holders. Since most MENA farmers have small plots, the type of mechanization most appropriate must be of a much smaller scale, inexpensive, fuel efficient, and easy to operate and maintain. The experience of the People's Republic of China in developing this kind of farm mechanization technology is most relevant. There are at present in the MENA region some attempts to follow this way, including some IDRC funded research projects in Egypt.

Further research and development is needed, but equally important is research on dissemination of information among MENA farmers, on socio-cultural correlates of new technology adoption, and on marketing and credit systems for the potential users.

5. Construction-related Technology

There is an acute housing shortage in the MENA region. Present needs are estimated to be in the neighborhood of five million housing units, of which only about half are being constructed. The current gap plus incremental future needs makes housing, especially in urban areas, one of the most explosive socio-political issues in the region. Failure to meet the rising demand is due in part to the construction technologies presently employed. These are either too traditional (for the poor) or ultra-modern and therefore so expensive that only the wealthy can afford to pay for them. The traditional technology that used to be labor intensive and cheap is also quite slow. Recently it has also become more expensive because of labor shortage and restrictions on the use of agricultural soil to make mud or fired bricks for building. A partial answer for the housing question is the development of indigenous construction technologies. These must not only be addressed to methods and techniques of construction but also to the question of building materials and speed of construction. Vested interests (large private contractors), wavering will on the part of some governments, and lack of imagination have

so far impeded the formulation of bold policies of technology development in the area of housing. New research would have to bear on all these issues.

6. Industrial Technology

The development of modern industries in the MENA region has been relatively slow and limited. In 1980, the modern industrial sector (outside oil) accounted for less than 20 percent of total GNP and employed less than 15 percent of the region's manpower. One reason for this modest share of industry in the overall volume of MENA's economic activities is technological. Imported industrial technology is costly, labor-extensive and difficult to repair and maintain. Even in modern and well-established industries which have over 50 years history (e.g. textile industries in Egypt and Syria) the machinery is still imported. The retarded consciousness in developing a technological policy and capability is startling in view of the fact that other Third World countries (e.g. Korea, China, India) that started similar industries years after some MENA countries are now producing and exporting their own technologies. Needed research here has to focus on factors of such retardation and to come up with implementable policy recommendations to rectify the situation.

Another area where research is needed has to do with modernizing traditional industries. By the latter we mean the urban and rural crafts, e.g. leatherwork, woodwork, cooperwork, garments, knitting, weaving and rugmaking, food

preservation, dairy production, etc. There is an inherent cultural and aesthetic argument for protecting and encouraging these traditional industries. Economically, however, they are losing ground; artisans and craftsmen are deserting the crafts to other more rewarding jobs, or are getting old without training a new generation of apprentices. One reason for the decline of traditional industries is technological. What is needed are labor saving devices that raise productivity and reduce production cost. The line between maintaining these crafts' authenticity and injecting supplemental modern technology is admittedly quite a fine one. But the rule of thumb in technology developed for artisans and craftsmen should be one which addresses the arduous repetitive tasks and preserves the creative part of the production process.

E. Population and Development

The general profile of MENA's population has already been sketched in Part II of this report. To recapitulate, the reader is reminded of its size of some 230 million persons unevenly distributed among MENA countries and within each country. It is clustered in oasis-like patches in coastal areas and along river valleys encompassing no more than 15 percent of MENA's total land mass. The rest of the territory is arid desert with no rainfall, few sources of underground water, and scattered nomadic population. The inhabited areas contain 95 percent of total MENA population, with about 40 percent living in urban centers and the rest

in rural areas. The region has been going through a long demographic transition resulting in rapid growth of about 3.0 percent annually. The general characteristics of this population are those of many Third World countries: high fertility, preponderance of young age groups, low rates of economic participation, underdeveloped manpower, and low productivity per capita.

In the last decade, the phenomenal jump in oil prices, the uneven distribution of oil wealth and population, have triggered several effects which added new problems to those that are typical during demographic transition. Much of what MENA social scientists suggested as research priorities in the area of population and development are based on these recent trends.

Surprisingly, some of the standard issues of population growth, control and family planning have not been frequently mentioned as research priorities by social scientists. It looks as if they feel that sufficient research has been conducted already on these topics in the last two decades. Alternatively, some MENA researchers may simply have grown weary of the obstacles to doing much to meet these issues head-on.

1. Migration Research

Nearly all MENA social scientists interviewed (81 of 86) noted the unresearched or under-researched consequences of migration in the region. There is near consensus that this phenomenon is the largest single social event in the region in recent years. The reference to the economic

ramifications and relevant research needed has been discussed (Section III.B above). The non-economic consequences, however, are more important in the view of many social scientists; they are seen and felt everywhere yet have not been systematically investigated. The phenomenon is believed to directly involve about five million workers, and to directly or indirectly involve their families or at least another 20 million (given average family size of five close kin persons). Since this is temporary migration, there is much circulation and replacement. It is estimated that in one decade as many as 50 million MENA population have been directly involved or indirectly affected by oil-migration. In other words, volume alone, if nothing else, makes this a top research priority. In addition, social scientists have noted the impact of such large-scale population movement on family structure, upward social mobility, and class formations in both rural and urban areas, new consumption patterns, migrant's values, norms and frames of reference, and other social-psychological variables. These are often talked about impressionistically but no one knows for sure the extent, direction, and inner dynamics of these impacts. Equally under-researched is the impact of large-scale migration on the host countries' socio-cultural fabric. These host countries until two decades ago had mostly traditional, quasi-tribal social structures. The influx of so many migrants with varied socio-cultural backgrounds, not to mention new technology and windfall oil money, must have affected these countries quite profoundly.

The research agenda on the multitudinal aspects of oil-related migration is staggering. Relevance to development issues are too clear to warrant much elaboration. All MENA countries, rich and poor, are affected.

2. Adjustment of Return Migrants

Related to the previous topic are problems of adjustment of returning migrants. It may be argued that oil-bound migration does not involve very drastic adjustment problems since the cultural area in which people move back and forth is basically one--Middle Eastern and Islamic--but even that argument should be empirically examined. More serious are adjustment problems of MENA migrants returning from Europe, a problem involving several millions from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey. Western and north-western European countries that had hosted these millions in the early post-World War II years have been hit in the late 1970's by "Stagflation." Rising unemployment in these countries, about 10 percent in 1981, hit the MENA workers the hardest. Not only have they been the first to go off their jobs but have also been subjected to increasing incidents of social discrimination and harrassment, and many of them are returning. For those who had lived in Europe for several years along with their families, readjustments in the motherlands are not easy, especially for children who were enrolled in European schools. North African social scientists rank this problem as one of their top research priorities.

3. Rural-urban Migration

The century-long trend of rural-urban migration in the northern tier of MENA countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Iran) is still in motion though it has slowed down somewhat in the 1970's. The high rate of urban growth, about 6 percent annually in the 1950's and 1960's, has leveled off to about 4.5 percent in the last decade; half of that growth is from natural increase, the other half due to rural-urban migration. Countries of the southern tier in the MENA region entered the stage of rapid urbanization only in the last four decades (Iraq, the Gulf States, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the two Yemens, Sudan, and Somalia). The rate of their urban growth is still fairly high, averaging about 6 percent annually for the group as a whole. In the Gulf States urban growth rates have been as high as 12 percent annually, 3.3 percent of which is due to natural increase and the rest to rural-urban and international migrations. The area of migration and urbanization has received substantial research attention in the north tier countries in the past, but not in the southern tier countries. The mixed sources of internal and external migration to their cities make the phenomenon far more complex, especially in the oil rich countries.

4. Urban-rural Migration

The last ten years have witnessed a budding trend of reverse migration from urban to rural areas. The scale is still small and the phenomenon is still limited to a few

MENA countries. Sociologists who first spotted the trend believe that its implications for the future are quite significant. Underlying this new trend are several factors, most important of which is the acute housing problem in urban areas. But no less important is the fact that rural areas in some MENA countries are beginning to have amenities which hitherto were the monopoly of cities... electricity and purified running water. Quite a few white-collar workers, sub-professionals and professionals can now live in villages without hardships or acute feelings of deprivation. Some of them perform their jobs in the village itself (e.g. school teachers, social workers, village doctors, etc.) and live there instead of commuting back to the nearest town; others may actually be working in nearby urban centers and commute to the village as a place of residence. The presence of a growing number of these "townfolks" in MENA villages is bound to have rippling effects. The research needed in this area would aim at assessing the volume of this new trend and monitor its impact on rural socioeconomic structures over time.

5. Patterns of Urban Growth

Much of the previous research on MENA urbanization has been revolving around fixed themes: growth trends, its causes and consequences, newcomers' modes of adjustment, and the dialectics between the old city (the Madina or Casba) and the new (the Ville). Several MENA sociologists expressed the need for fresh research themes which capture

the dynamics of urban growth. The economics and politics of "real estate" as determinants of growth patterns have hardly been investigated. Likewise, the intrusion of regional and international forces have a great deal to do with patterns of urban growth. Yet little or no research has been conducted to assess their dynamics or present and future implications. The emergence of "city-states" in the Gulf countries is a startling case in point. Here, as much as 90 percent of the country's population may be concentrated in a single metropolis. The ethnic character associated with growth patterns in these city-states is readily observed, occasionally talked about, but hardly studied. The encroachment of urban expansion on agricultural land and rural areas nearby has also become phenomenal in some MENA countries in recent decades. The economic and stratificational consequences of this development are yet to be studied.

6. New Towns and Communities

Some MENA countries have been engaged in schemes of population redistribution. This has often entailed creation of new human settlements, i.e., new towns and communities. For some, the overriding reason is to reduce density in urban areas and to create new magnet poles, as in Egypt. For others the reason is to regroup scattered hamlet populations in new communities in order to deliver services with economic efficiency (e.g. Iraq and Morocco). In a few cases (e.g. Egypt and Syria) huge dam construction and land

flooding behind these dams necessitated resettling large numbers of people in new locations. Land reclamation schemes (e.g. Egypt) involve inducing enough people to leave their old communities and resettle in new lands. In one case at least, population was transferred from border areas to new settlements for political and national security considerations (Iraq). MENA social scientists view these examples of large-scale "social engineering" with mixed feelings. Several have suggested that new towns and communities ought to be among the priority research topics in the 1980's

7. Refugees' Problems

Several MENA countries have witnessed varying episodes of armed conflicts internally or externally in the last two decades. Sudan, Iraq, Oman and Lebanon have had protracted civil wars. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco and the two Yemens have been involved in external wars with one or more neighbors. These conflicts have invariably resulted in a refugee problem. Sometimes the refugees spill over to other countries (e.g. the Palestinians, the Eritrians, the Somalis, the Kurds). International agencies often step in with relief assistance. But the human, social, economic and political problems far transcend such relief efforts. During the 1970's some major droughts (e.g., Africa's Sahel area) have added new sources of refugee populations. Sudan and Somalia have had severe refugee problems resulting from both armed conflict and drought. No systematic social research has yet been conducted on these problems.

8. Nomads and Problems of Pre- and Post-settlement Schemes

Nomadic populations have invariably been estimated at constituting anywhere between 10 and 15 percent of MENA's total population. The difficulty of enumerating "wandering nomads" in national censuses is quite understandable. A country like Saudi Arabia officially estimates its nomads as one-quarter of its total population. Observers feel the figure is exaggerated. In any case, countries with sizable nomadic populations have been trying to settle them, in which quest human, political and economic factors are quite intermingled. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Somalia, Sudan and Libya have had various schemes in this regard. Social scientists from these countries especially would like to see the entire issue of nomadism and state intervention to deal with it among the research topics in the next few years. Some, especially in oil rich countries, have noted the importance of approaching the issue in the overall context of manpower development. Their feeling is that all native population should be incorporated in modern socio-economic sectors as part of a strategy to reduce dependence on expatriate labor.

9. Impact of Rural Electrification

Several MENA social scientists have noted that of all the changes in their countries' rural areas none have had as much impact in recent years as a) peasant migration across national borders and b) electrification of an increased number of villages. We have already dealt with migration as

research topics in more than one place in this report. Introducing electricity to MENA countryside is viewed by some as a real silent revolution. It has ended the prevalence of "darkness" and the socio-cultural isolation of rural areas. Availability of electricity means access to an additional array of goods, services, and opportunities, from television to electric-powered water pumps for irrigation. Consciousness raising, exposure to new tastes and life styles are bound to have substantial impact on rural people's attitudes, values and behavior. Students of family planning, for one, are excited about the prospect of altering fertility behavior through the by-products of electricity in MENA villages. Economists and political scientists are anticipating changes of their own. Research on the multiplier effects of electrification of MENA's countryside was ranked as a priority by several.

F. Women and Development

That many social scientists conceive of "women" as a distinct research category in the MENA region is a reflection of two important observations:

First, in the past there has been consistent neglect of the consequences of development processes for the female half of the population. Until very recently, MENA researchers have failed to address such socioeconomic forces as labor migration, farm mechanization, or inflation as they affect women. The research development sectors which did

recognize the importance of sex-related impacts were limited; family planning, health and nutrition and childcare were defined as women's issues, but these were not linked systematically to the structural changes that were transforming MENA societies. Therefore, part of the urgency expressed in connection with research on women reflects the felt need to "catch up."

Secondly, the isolation of past research on women in the MENA region may also be attributed to prevailing cultural ideas of segregation between the concerns and daily lives of men and women. This has encouraged many studies of women as a "special case." Examples are the proliferating country reports on the status of women--in education, law, employment, etc. This kind of research has suffered from two limitations. First, it has a tendency to emphasize tradition and culture as the major impediments to change. Second, because of its isolated conceptual frame, the findings of this kind of research are rarely useful to (or deemed important by) planners and policy makers.

What emerges therefore is something of a dilemma regarding the best approach to research on women's issues. Clearly there is need for a more sensitive and complete data base on how societal changes are affecting women's lives. Yet overemphasis on women-focused research runs the risk of further isolation, rather than integrating the crucial issues into policy dialogues.

Perhaps the most effective strategy is to work toward components in every social research design that highlight

precisely how men and women are differentially affected by the subject under study. Thus, nearly every research priority discussed in this report will become a stronger study if it addresses sex-related influences and outcomes. This will require going beyond correlation type studies: women are such a percentage of men in the labor force; men are X times more likely to favor change, etc. What is needed instead is a careful tracing through of developmental processes in order to understand the unobvious, often unintentional consequences, for women. The following section suggests a few key subject areas where this approach is warranted.

1. Rural Society

Male labor migration is having profound social effects on village life. Remittances may be used to purchase labor saving machinery that reduces women's workloads. On the other hand, the absence of many adult males may increase the responsibilities and tasks which women are expected to perform. When young men migrate, average age at marriage usually rises. This could create a category of young single village women without well defined social roles. The new infusion of cash into village economies is quite likely to undermine traditional forms of production on which women have depended. These socioeconomic consequences of migration have the potential to fundamentally alter women's access to resources and relations between the sexes. These research priorities should be added to more conventional rural studies of

fertility control, female education, and health practices. Applied research on the possibilities of income generating projects for women in processing agricultural products were suggested by some MENA social scientists.

2. Women and Economic Change

More and better research is needed that looks comprehensively at new economic realities in the MENA region. In every country, women are responding by increased entrance into the modern sector labor force. The crucial issues go beyond percentages working and sectoral distributions. Studies are needed of the way young girls are channeled into various types of training and jobs. It may be that structural barriers prevent girls from entering skilled, well paid jobs, while they crowd the ranks of unskilled occupations. Access to training opportunities is a major variable, but systematic studies are lacking for most MENA countries. Studies are also needed of how changes in the labor market are perceived by families. Young boys appear to respond more quickly than girls to shifts in occupational mobility. Thus girls continue to opt for commercial or sewing training in Egypt--both overcrowded and low paid fields--while boys seek industrial training and access to the lucrative building trades.

Female unemployment is a growing but little understood phenomenon. In countries where industrialization has led to the introduction of multinational firms, careful analysis should be done on the hiring practices and impacts of these

practices. Countries that have in the past emphasized or intend to emphasize tourism are in need of impact studies that are sensitive to women's issues, such as prostitution.

Urbanization research has focused recently on "informal sectors" in housing, production, services, and health care delivery. In each of these areas, women's participation is even less well documented than for men. An important research priority should be to develop better concepts and tools for measuring these phenomena. Until the extent of women's informal sector participation is established it is unlikely that government policy will become more sensitive to the urban poor.

To give one example, we do not know what proportion of urban workers and students rely for their daily meals on unlicensed street vendors. The social significance of food vendors, for cheap nutrition as well as income generation, needs to be established. It could be a step toward changing government policy away from eradication and toward upgrading and supervision. The same is true for informal housing, health practitioners such as midwives, etc.

The worldwide trends toward inflation need to be examined from a woman's perspective. Women in the MENA region who used to work only until marriage or the birth of a first child are increasingly likely to stay on the job in inflationary times while children are of preschool age. This produces a multitude of strains on urban families.

Breast-feeding may be cut short, with consequences for infant health. Workers who do not live near female relatives must rely on often inadequate childcare facilities in neighborhoods or at the work place. The double-bind for these women is that they continue working out of conviction that the family's welfare depends on her salary. Men may take second or third jobs as well in response to inflation. This can further strain the family unit. More research is needed into the coping strategies of families and their consequences.

3. Family Formation and Domestic Cycles

Research on marriage patterns and fertility have a well-established tradition in the MENA region. Priorities for future research should build on the existing data base to address recently emerging issues. One important question concerns the apparent rise in female-headed households. This may be a temporary family circumstance brought about by male migration. However, some evidence suggests that widowed and divorced women are now less likely than in the past to receive total support from male kin. This creates a relatively new family form for Arab societies--the household supported by an adult female. Causes and consequences of this trend need to be investigated.

Studies are also required that address the problems of aging. Since women tend to marry older men, and to have longer life expectancies, they will comprise the majority of elderly, often economically dependent, populations in cities. Household dispersion and overcrowding of living units make it increasingly difficult for families to fulfill

traditional obligations toward the elderly. Consequences of these trends need to be more adequately documented and understood.

Finally, the pressure of abundant oil money in some countries, and remittances in others, has profoundly affected the consumption patterns and use of leisure time in households. These changes in family patterns in turn affect the socialization of young children, and not only in regard to material aspirations. One senses that the "oil revolution" has already led to the substitution of new role models and new value systems among Arab youth. These challenges to traditional values are not well understood as yet. A useful point to begin investigation would be at the level of family interaction and the socialization process between parents and children.

G. Socio-political Issues

Much of MENA's development is conditioned by socio-political considerations. Many of the region's social scientists have come to the conclusion that ruling elites play a disproportional role in the developmental process in their countries. This is due to the fragility of national and local institutions, and to the absence of legitimate channels of popular participation. Consequently the state must take the lead in development programs. When the elite's performance in this respect is perceived as inept or inadequate, either social unrest or a coup d'etat is often the result. In either case the process of socio-economic development is interrupted or set back, at least for a while. Even when socio-economic growth is rapid, as has been the case in several MENA countries, certain groups in society may either feel completely left out, or perceive their share in the growth as being too little. Here too, civil strife may flare up, and the developmental process becomes the victim.

For these reasons among others, most of the social scientists interviewed suggested a multitude of socio-political topics as urgent research priorities. The author's knowledge of IDRC's funding orientation and past patterns suggests that such topics may be out of bounds, but for the sake of honest reporting of the data collected from MENA social scientists, we list these topics below without elaboration:

1. Elite formation and circulation
2. Class structure and distribution of wealth and power
3. Political values and civic culture
4. Impediments to political participation
5. Islamic militant movements
6. The role of trade unions
7. Youth problems
8. The relationship between state and religion
9. The role of the military in politics
10. The impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on development of the region
11. The role of foreign aid and the multinational corporations in MENA development
12. Legal systems and development
13. Problems of ethnic minorities
14. Civil strife and civil wars in the MENA region
15. Border disputes in the MENA region
16. The regional arms race and its impact on development
17. Corruption
18. Impact of sudden wealth on work ethics and work values
19. The role of mass media in socio-political control
20. The consequences of the new polarization of rich and poor countries in the MENA region

IV. NOTE ON RESEARCH CAPABILITIES

Given the competing research priorities outlined in Chapter III above, one must take note of existing social research capabilities in the MENA region. The latter consists of qualified researchers, research institutions and available research funds. Unfortunately, there are no quantitative data on these three components for the region as a whole or for its individual countries. The following, therefore, is a rough estimation of these capabilities, pieced together from a variety of sources and educated guessing.

Qualified researchers are those with appropriate academic training and/or some research experience who can carry out individual or team research projects in social science. A partial listing compiled by the Organization for the Promotion of Social Science in the Middle East (OPSSME) and published as the Directory of Social Scientists (Cairo, 1977), gives the name, academic degree, address and publications of some 216 such scientists. The Directory's Introduction states that questionnaires to collect such information were sent to more than 500 social scientists in the region, in the fields of sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Political science, education, and economics were not covered. OPSSME's Directory's entries are nearly exclusively those with PhD's or equivalent and it is our guess that the 500 target population in these fields represents approximately one quarter of the total

PhD pool of MENA social scientists, i.e., some 2000 in the six fields (anthropology, education, economics, political science, psychology and sociology). On the basis of spot checking in three research institutions, in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, we found that there is roughly a ratio of 3 M.A. or B.A. practicing researchers for each PhD. Thus, we may assume a total pool of 6000 social researchers in the MENA region. The largest concentrations are in Egypt and Turkey, followed by Lebanon, Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria, Jordan, and Syria. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Somalia and Mauritania have very few native social researchers--although some of them, especially the oil-rich, have attracted large numbers of expatriate social scientists to man their newly developed institutions. Kuwait is an outstanding case in point.

Social research institutions are relatively new in the MENA region. Some MENA countries have had modern universities for more than half a century. In their academic departments, one form or another of social research used to be conducted sporadically and on an ad hoc basis. This is still largely the case. Most MENA universities are primarily teaching institutions. If they do any research at all in the social fields, it is individually designed and conducted by graduate students for the purpose of obtaining the M.A. or PhD degree.

Government ministries in several MENA countries have research departments or research units of sorts (e.g. ministries of social affairs, labor, education, health, agriculture). These, however, tend to be compilers of basic

aggregate data with little or no research sophistication. Such data, while useful for administrative purposes, hardly give an elaborate or profound understanding of the kind of issues outlined in this paper.

Specialized social research institutions have been introduced in the last three decades. Probably the oldest of these is Egypt's National Center for Sociological and Criminological Research (NCSCR), established in 1957. Since then, some 20 similar research institutions have appeared throughout the MENA region. Most of them are government subsidized but have varying degrees of administrative autonomy. They typically engage in applied and development-oriented social research, including empirical field work. A partial listing of these research institutions is given in Appendix B. From direct observation, as well as that of informants in several of these institutions, an evaluative statement of their performance can be made.

First, the quality of their staffing ranges from average to good, if one looks at the qualifications of individual researchers. Secondly, the volume and quality of their research outputs are inconsistent across sub-fields and over time. The variance across sub-fields seems to be a function of the quality of a single senior researcher who acts as a leader and a catalyst. The variances over time seem to be a function of the role of central planning in the country. The latter has had its ups and downs in several MENA countries (e.g., Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan).

Whenever central planning is in vogue, the state's demand for research inputs tends to invigorate these research centers and gives the researchers a boost in morale and a sense of relevance. Thirdly, the personality of the director in any of these research institutions plays a disproportionate role in its overall vitality more, for instance, than in comparable institutions in the West. The author was struck by the near total paralysis of some research centers in three MENA countries because of this one factor--despite availability of every other capacity for doing the job. Fourthly, there is far less contact or scholarly communication among these research institutions across the region or even within the same country than one usually observes in developed countries. Ironically, if outside communications with other research institutions exists at all it tends to be with those in the West. Fifth, related to the above, is the problem of disseminating research findings. Most of these are written in mimeographed reports that are either shelved or circulated among no more than one hundred people in the research community or the bureaucracy. Some but not all of the MENA research institutions publish periodicals or newsletters. But even these are often irregular in frequency of appearance, poorly printed, or inefficiently circulated.

Research funding comes from a variety of sources. Salaries of the research and administrative staff in MENA research institutions comes mainly from public sources. There is little job insecurity since the members of the staff are virtually tenured public employees. But funds for

research itself (i.e. research budgets) are subject to fluctuations, both political and financial, domestic and external. As pointed out earlier, whenever national planning is on the upswing research funds are generally made available by the governments. Occasionally, however, availability of research funds may be strictly a function of politics in the manipulative sense. In one case for example an institution lost all of its research budget as a punishment of some of its outspoken members who had been critical of the government. External funding of MENA research institutions has varied over the years in terms of source and quantity. Western, UN and regional funding agencies have all contributed to research in one form or another. In the last ten years researchers and research institutions in several MENA countries have been drawn into the oil whirlpool. This often takes the form of lucrative consulting, especially for the more well known researchers and institutions. There is real danger of this development undermining the limited research capabilities in the region.

V. SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The overall socio-economic-political profile of the MENA region, the social research priorities perceived by its own native social scientists, and the available research capabilities suggest a number of policy options for the IDRC. Such options are not necessarily mutually exclusive and some might be pursued simultaneously.

A. Development of Indigenous Research Capabilities

Ideally, one measure of success of any external development agency is its ability to assist in the promotion of indigenous forces toward self reliance. While research on development is the prime concern of IDRC, the local capabilities to do such research on their own, without outside help, must be one of the long range objectives. To achieve this goal, the IDRC might adopt the following measures:

1. Allocation of part of its annual research funds in the form of endowments to local research institutions, the yield of which is to be spent on on-going and future research activities. A legal and organizational modality for this can be worked out on a country by country basis. Likewise, such endowment funds may be earmarked for research periodicals in the region. The idea of endowment funds was once well-known in the region ("awqaf" or "hubus") but has nearly vanished in recent decades. This strategy would in effect allow IDRC to help revive an indigenous practice in a modern form, and ensure continuity of research activities, acting as a buffer for research institutions from some of the

negative effects of MENA's upheavals and uncertainties. The endowed institutions should be encouraged to seek matching or supplemental funds from local sources to increase the size of their respective endowments.

2. Allocation of a percentage of IDRC funds for training indigenous researchers and upgrading research institutions. For individual researchers, periodic workshops and short refresher courses to update their research skills would be appropriate. Other funding agencies (e.g. Ford Foundation) have experimented with this idea in the last two years and the early results are quite promising. For institutions, the upgrading may take the form of refurbishing their libraries, providing them with new statistical packages (e.g. computer software), sponsoring visiting lecturers and inter-institutional exchanges, etc.

3. In some MENA countries where no social research institutions exist, IDRC may initiate (alone or with the help of others) efforts to create such institutions. To avoid unwarranted cost, this may be done in the context of already existing universities or governmental ministries.

B. Research Funding: Institutions vs. Individuals

IDRC has already funded social research in a number of MENA countries. What is to be recommended in this regard is, primarily, the adoption of a flexible strategy along the following lines.

1. The priority of funding should remain institution-oriented. MENA suffers from weak institution-building. It is

therefore important to channel much of the research funds through institutions in order to strengthen their capabilities on the one hand and to induce individual researchers to engage in team work on the other.

2. However, because of the factors described in Chapter IV, there should be a parallel practice of funding individual research outside the institutional framework. Some MENA countries have capable researchers who for a variety of reasons would not or could not carry out their research through an institution. In such cases the bureaucratic hassles are too debilitating to the researcher's energy and patience. And, as noted earlier, in some countries institutions do not exist.

C. Research Networks

We noted, in Chapter IV, that several research institutions in the MENA region hardly communicate with one another. The same applies even more to individual researchers in various countries, and sometimes within the same country, particularly if they are not residing in the national capitol city. Here, we recommend the following to IDRC:

1. Encouraging comparative research on the same topics in as many MENA countries as possible. As noted in several parts of Chapter III, similar problems exist in several countries. Research funding for such problems may be designed to have a built-in feature which calls for regional coordination, at least in research design and exchange of findings. This could be implemented easily through the IDRC's regional office.

2. Helping regional associations in social sciences where they already exist, and help initiate their creation if they do not. IDRC played a commendable role in helping create OPSSME in 1974. However, this organization has all but died, as IDRC and other funding agencies prematurely stopped their financial support. Again, had part of the financial help been in an endowment form, OPSSME or its successor might have thrived.

D. Sensitive Research Topics

In Chapter III we tried to present research priorities as seen by native social scientists. Some of the topics suggested may be politically charged and/or culturally quite sensitive. Such sensitivity did not prevent indigenous scholars from ranking certain topics high on their list of research priority. It is quite possible that precisely because of this sensitivity and lack of governmental support in addressing them seriously, MENA social scientists feel a powerful urge to tackle these topics. This is quite understandable. IDRC however should not feel obligated to fund sensitive research topics, a step that might compromise its official relations in any host country. This cautionary note ought not to preclude the possibility of funding some sensitive research topics if they are clearly development-oriented. What would be required in such cases is unequivocal approval by the host government; and the research should then be carried out by an institution rather than an individual.

APPENDIX A

BASIC STATISTICAL DATA ON MENA COUNTRIES*

*Data compiled from The World Development Report 1981,
issued annually by the World Bank, Washington, D.C.

TABLE 1. BASIC INDICATORS

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u> (Millions mid-1979)	<u>AREA</u> (000 Km ²)	<u>GNP</u> <u>PER CAPITA</u> (\$, 1979)	<u>ADULT</u> <u>LITERACY</u> %	<u>LIFE EX-</u> <u>PECTANCY</u> <u>AT BIRTH, Yrs.</u>
<u>Low-Income</u>					
Somalia	3.8	638	135	60	44
Mauritania	1.6	1031	320	17	43
Sudan	17.9	2506	370	20	47
<u>Middle-Income</u>					
Yemen Arab Rep.	5.7	195	420	13	42
Egypt	38.9	1001	480	44	57
Yemen, PDR	1.9	333	480	27	45
Morocco	19.5	447	740	28	56
Syrian Arab Rep.	8.6	185	1030	58	65
Tunisia	6.2	164	1120	62	58
Jordan	3.1	98	1180	70	61
Lebanon	2.7	10	1200	80	66
Turkey	44.2	781	1330	60	62
Algeria	18.2	2382	1590	35	56
Iran	37.0	1648	2150	50	54
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>					
Bahrain					
Iraq	12.6	435	2410	40	56
Oman					
Saudi Arabia	8.6	2150	7280	30	54
Libya	2.9	1760	8170	50	56
Qatar					
U.A.E.					
Kuwait	1.3	18	17100	60	70
TOTAL					

TABLE 2. Growth of Production

COUNTRY	GDP		AGRICULTURE		INDUSTRY		MANUFACTURING		SERVICES	
	1960-70a	1970-79b	1960-70a	1970-79b	1960-70a	1970-79b	1960-70a	1970-79b	1960-70a	1970-79b
<u>Low-Income</u>										
Somalia	1.0	3.1	-1.5	2.7	3.3	-2.6	14.3	--	2.5	6.8
Mauritania	--	1.8	--	-1.4	--	-0.1	--	1.0	--	7.2
Sudan	1.3	4.3	--	2.7	--	3.3	--	1.5	--	6.9
<u>Middle-Income</u>										
Yemen Arab Rep.	--	8.4	--	4.5	--	13.5	--	12.8	--	11.0
Egypt	4.2	7.6	2.9	2.2	5.3	7.8	4.7	8.2	4.7	11.6
Yemen, PDR	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Morocco	4.2	6.1	4.7	-0.3	4.0	7.3	3.8	6.3	4.0	7.4
Tunisia	4.7	7.6	2.0	5.1	8.2	8.6	7.8	10.6	4.5	8.1
Syrian Arab Rep.	5.7	9.0	4.4	6.4	6.3	10.8	5.6	13.2	6.2	9.1
Jordan										
Lebanon	4.9	--	6.3	--	4.5	--	5.0	--	4.8	--
Turkey	6.0	6.6	2.5	3.7	9.6	7.9	10.9	7.7	6.9	7.5
Algeria	4.6	5.8	0.4	0.6	12.9	6.5	7.7	8.8	-3.0	6.1
Iran	11.3	--	4.4	--	13.4	--	12.0	--	10.0	--
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>										
Bahrain										
Iraq	6.1	10.5	5.7	-1.8	4.7	13.6	5.9	14.4	8.3	10.4
Saudi Arabia	--	11.1	--	4.2	--	11.1	--	5.9	--	11.9
Libya	24.4	1.9	--	11.8	--	-1.7	--	18.9	--	16.4
Qatar										
UAE										
Kuwait	5.7	2.0								
TOTAL										

TABLE 3. STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION

COUNTRY	DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (PERCENT)									
	GDP (Millions \$)		AGRICULTURE		INDUSTRY		MANUFAC.		SERVICES	
	1960b	1979c	1960b	1979c	1960b	1979c	1960b	1979c	1960b	1979c
<u>Low-Income</u>										
Somalia	160	1,030	67	60	13	11	3	7	20	29
Mauritania	70	470	--	27	--	33	--	8	--	40
Sudan	1,470	7,640	58	38	15	13	5	6	27	49
<u>Middle-Income</u>										
Yemen Arab Rep.	--	2,910	--	32	--	--	--	5	--	--
Egypt	3,880	17,050	30	23	24	35	20	28	46	42
Yemen, PDR	--	520	--	13	--	26	--	11	--	61
Morocco	2,040	14,950	23	19	27	32	16	17	50	49
Syrian Arab Rep.	800	9,110	--	16	--	22	--	--	--	62
Tunisia	770	6,070	24	16	18	33	8	12	58	51
Jordan	--	1,870	--	8	--	32	--	16	--	60
Lebanon	830	--	12	--	20	--	13	--	68	--
Turkey	8,820	56,460	41	23	21	29	13	21	38	48
Algeria	2,800	29,810	21	7	33	58	10	11	46	35
Iran	4,120	--	29	--	33	--	11	--	38	--
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>										
Bahrain										
Iraq	1,580	30,710	17	8	52	73	10	6	31	19
Saudi Arabia	--	74,060	--	1	--	74	--	5	--	25
Libya	310	24,570	--	2	--	73	--	3	--	25
Qatar										
UAE										
Kuwait	--	23,300	--	(.)	--	81	--	5	--	19
TOTAL										

TABLE 4. DEMOGRAPHIC AND FERTILITY RELATED INDICATORS

COUNTRY	Crude Birth Rate per 000 Population		Crude Death Rate per 000 Population		% Change in CBR CDR		Total Fertility Rate
	1960	1979	1960	1979	1960-79	1960-79	1979
<u>Low-Income</u>							
Somalia	49	46	29	20	-5.9	-30.0	6.1
Mauritania	51	50	27	22	-0.8	-19.4	6.9
Sudan	45	46	25	18	0.9	-26.2	6.6
<u>Middle-Income</u>							
Yemen Arab Rep.	50	47	29	23	-5.0	-19.5	6.5
Egypt	44	37	19	12	-14.7	-35.1	4.9
Yemen PDR	50	46	29	20	-7.9	-30.1	6.8
Morocco	50	44	21	13	-12.0	-38.5	6.6
Syrian Arab Rep.	47	45	18	8	-4.7	-52.0	7.0
Tunisia	47	31	19	11	-33.5	-43.4	4.4
Jordan	47	45	20	10	-5.5	-50.3	7.0
Lebanon	43	30	14	8	-30.3	-40.4	4.1
Turkey	43	34	16	10	-19.5	-37.4	4.8
Algeria	51	46	20	14	-9.1	-32.8	7.0
Iran	47	43	21	13	-8.1	-36.4	6.1
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>							
Bahrain							
Iraq	49	45	20	12	-8.1	-37.6	6.7
Oman							
Saudi Arabia	49	44	23	14	-10.2	-39.0	7.0
Libya	49	45	19	12	-7.0	-36.5	7.1
Qatar							
UAE							
Kuwait	44	42	10	4	-6.3	-54.2	6.3
TOTAL							

TABLE 4 (cont.)

COUNTRY	Percentage of Women in Reproductive Age Groups 1979	Percentage of Married Women Using Contraception	
		1970	1978
<u>Low-Income</u>			
Somalia	41	--	--
Mauritania	41	--	--
Sudan	42	--	--
<u>Middle-Income</u>			
Yemen Arab Republic	41	--	--
Egypt	44	9	17
Yemen P.D.R.	41	--	--
Morocco	41	1	5
Syrian Arab Republic	40	--	(.)
Tunisia	43	10	21
Jordan	40	--	--
Lebanon	43	14	--
Turkey	43	3	38
Algeria	40	--	--
Iran	42	3	23
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>			
Bahrain			.
Iraq	41	--	23
Oman			
Saudi Arabia	40	--	--
Libya	40	--	--
Qatar			
UAE			
Kuwait	42	--	--
Total			

TABLE 5. LABOR FORCE

COUNTRY	Percentage of Population of Working Age (15-65 yrs)		Percentage of Labor Force in:						Average Annual Growth of Labor Force		
	1960	1979	Agriculture		Industry		Services		1960-70	1970-80	1980-2000
			1960	1979	1960	1979	1960	1979			
<u>Low-Income</u>											
Somalia	54	54	88	84	4	8	8	8	1.7	2.2	2.0
Mauritania	53	52	91	85	3	5	6	10	2.2	2.4	2.8
Sudan	53	53	86	78	6	10	8	12	2.2	2.4	2.7
<u>Middle-Income</u>											
Yemen Arab Rep.	54	54	83	76	7	11	10	13	1.1	0.7	2.7
Egypt	55	57	58	50	12	29	30	21	1.9	2.0	2.5
Yemen PDR	52	54	70	47	15	15	15	38	1.4	1.6	2.9
Morocco	53	50	63	53	14	21	23	26	1.6	3.0	3.5
Syrian Arab Rep.	52	48	54	32	19	31	27	37	2.1	3.3	3.7
Tunisia	53	55	56	35	18	32	26	33	0.7	3.0	2.7
Jordan	52	51	44	21	26	19	30	60	2.8	3.1	3.4
Lebanon	53	55	38	12	23	26	39	62	2.1	1.3	2.8
Turkey	55	56	78	54	11	13	11	33	1.4	2.2	2.4
Iran	51	52	54	40	23	33	23	27	1.0	3.4	3.5
Algeria	52	49	67	32	12	24	21	44	1.0	3.4	3.5
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>											
Bahrain											
Iraq	51	51	53	43	18	26	29	31	2.9	2.9	3.3
Oman											
Saudi Arabia	54	52	71	62	10	14	19	24	3.1	4.5	2.7
Libya	53	51	53	20	17	27	30	53	3.6	3.7	3.1
Qatar											
UAE											
Kuwait	63	52	1	2	34	34	65	64	7.5	4.5	3.1
TOTAL											

TABLE 7. INDICATORS RELATED TO LIFE EXPECTANCY

COUNTRY	Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)		Infant Mortality Rate (0-12 months)		Child Death Rate (1-4 Years)	
	1960	1979	1960	1978	1960	1979
<u>Low-Income</u>						
Somalia	36	44	--	--	43	30
Mauritania	37	43	186	--	41	29
Sudan	39	47	--	--	47	29
<u>Middle-Income</u>						
Yemen Arab Rep.	36	42	--	--	54	41
Egypt	46	57	109	85	32	15
Yemen PDR	36	45	--	--	54	34
Morocco	47	56	--	--	30	16
Syrian Arab Rep.	50	65	--	--	27	7
Tunisia	48	58	148	90	28	13
Jordan	47	61	--	97	30	10
Lebanon	58	66	--	--	13	6
Turkey	51	62	194	--	23	9
Algerie	47	56	--	--	30	16
Iran	46	54	--	--	22	12
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>						
Bahrain						
Iraq	47	56	--	92	30	16
Oman						
Saudi Arabia	43	54	--	--	38	19
Libya	47	56	--	--	30	16
Qatar						
UAE						
Kuwait	60	70	33	39	11	3
TOTAL						

TABLE 8. HEALTH-RELATED INDICATORS

COUNTRY	Population per				Percentage of Population with Access to Safe Water	Daily Per Capital Calorie Supply as:	
	Physician	1970	Nursing Person	1977		Total	% of Requirement
	1960		1960		1975	1977	1977
<u>Low-Income</u>							
Somalia	36,570	--	6,220	--	33	2,033	88
Mauritania	40,400	15,160	7,320	3,430	--	1,976	86
Sudan	33,500	8,690	3,040	1,280	46	2,184	93
<u>Middle-Income</u>							
Yemen Arab Rep.	--	12,460	--	5,660	4	2,192	91
Egypt	2,560	1,050	2,730	1,100	66	2,760	109
Yemen PDR	13,760	7,760	--	1,620	24	1,945	81
Morocco	9,410	11,040	--	1,690	55	2,534	105
Syrian Arab Rep.	4,630	2,570	6,660	3,890	75	2,684	108
Tunisia	10,030	4,800	--	1,070	70	2,674	112
Jordan	5,800	1,960	1,650	820	61	2,107	62
Lebanon	1,210	--	--	--	--	2,495	101
Turkey	3,000	1,770	--	1,460	75	2,907	115
Algeria	5,230	5,330	--	1,480	77	2,372	99
Iran	4,090	--	8,160	--	51	3,138	130
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>							
Bahrain							
Iraq	5,270	2,190	6,680	2,990	62	2,134	89
Saudi Arabia	16,370	1,700	5,850	950	64	2,624	88
Libya	6,580	900	2,390	280	100	2,985	126
Qatar							
UAE							
Kuwait	1,150	790	190	290	89	--	--
TOTAL							

TABLE 9. EDUCATION

COUNTRY	Number Enrolled in Primary School as % of Age Group						Number Enrolled in Secondary School as % of Age Group		Number Enrolled in Higher Education as % of Population		Adult Literacy Rate, Percent	
	Total		Male		Female		1960	1978	1960	1977	1960	1976
	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978						
<u>Low-Income</u>												
Somalia	9	44	13	57	5	32	1	4	(.)	1	2	60
Mauritania	8	26	13	34	3	17	(.)	5	--	(.)	5	17
Sudan	25	50	35	58	14	42	3	16	(.)	2	13	20
<u>Middle-Income</u>												
Yemen Arab Rep.	8	29	14	50	(.)	7	(.)	4	--	1	3	13
Egypt	66	74	80	88	52	58	16	47	5	14	26	44
Yemen PDR	13	72	20	92	5	51	5	28	--	2	--	27
Morocco	47	72	67	90	27	54	5	20	1	4	14	28
Syrian Arab Rep.	65	89	89	105	39	73	16	50	4	14	30	58
Tunisia	66	100	88	116	43	83	12	30	1	5	16	62
Jordan	77	102	94	103	59	101	25	74	1	7	32	70
Lebanon	102	96	105	103	99	89	19	46	6	--	--	--
Turkey	75	105	90	115	58	95	14	41	3	8	38	60
Algeria	46	99	55	114	37	82	8	29	(.)	4	10	35
Iran	41	101	56	121	27	80	12	44	1	5	16	50
<u>Capital-Surplus</u>												
Bahrain												
Iraq	65	117	94	130	36	103	19	50	2	9	18	--
Oman												
Saudi Arabia	12	59	22	74	2	44	2	26	(.)	7	3	--
Libya	59	123	92	128	24	119	9	67	1	7	--	50
Qatar												
UAE												
Kuwait	117	104	131	110	102	98	37	74	--	13	47	60
TOTAL												

Appendix B

Algeria

1. Centre De Recherches Anthropologiques
Prehistoriques Et Ethnographiques
Institut des sciences humaines, Le Bardo,
3, rue Franklin-D. Roosevelt, Alger

Saudi Arabia

1. Centre For Training And Applied Research
In Community Development
Der'ya P.O.Box 558, Riyadh
2. Department of planning & Social Studies
Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs
Ryadh, Saudi Arabia
3. Research Center For the Prevention of Crime
Ministry of Interior
Ryadh, Saudi Arabia

Egypt

1. Cairo Demographic Center
6, Sharia Taha Hussein, Zamalek, Cairo
(Cables: Demografia)
2. Egyptian Society of International Law
16, Sharia Ramses, Cairo
3. Egyptian Society of Political Economy,
Statistics And Legislation
16, Sharia Ramses, P.O. Box 732, Cairo
4. High Council of Arts, Literature
And Social Sciences
9, Sharia Hassan Sabri, Zamalek, Cairo
5. Institute of National Planning
Salah Salem Street, Nasr City, Cairo
(Cables: Insplanning)
6. Institute of Public Administration
14, Sharia Ramses, P.O. Box 1143, Cairo

8. Institute of Statistical Studies And Research
Cairo University, 5, el-Goheiny Street,
Dokki, Cairo
9. National Center For Social And
Criminological Research
Embaba, Giza, Gezira P.O., Cairo
10. National Research Center
American University,
113, Sharia Kasr-el-Aini, Cairo
11. National Institute of Management
Development
7, 26-July Street, Cairo
12. Population & Family Planning Board
P.O.B 1036 Cairo, Egypt
13. Institute For Arab Studies
& Research (Egypt)
14. The Center For Political
& Strategic studies, Cairo
(Egypt)
15. The Middle East Research
Center (Egypt)
16. The National Center For
Educational Research Ministry
of Education Cairo,(Egypt)

Iran

1. College of Social Sciences And
CO-Operative Studies
University of Teheran, Shahresa Avenue
Theran
2. Institute For Economic Research
University of Teheran, Faculty of
Economics, Shaherza Avenue, Teheran
3. Institut D'Etudes Et De Recherches Sociales
Universite de Teheran, Khiabane
Daneshsarah Seraye Jaleh, Theran
4. National Institute Of Psychology
147, Shiraz Avenue, P.O. Box 741,
Teheran (Cables: Ravanshenassie)

Iraq

1. National Centre For Social And Criminological Research
Karradat Mariam, Beghdad
2. The Educational Research Center
Jamal-el-Din, el-Afghany St., Elwaziria,
Baghdad

Jordan

1. Ministerial Committee For Relief Of Displaced persons
Amman, Jordan.

Lebanon

1. Association Libanaise Des Sciences Juridiques
Faculte de droit et des sciences économiques, rue Huvelin, B.P. 293, Beyrouth
2. Centre d'etudes et de Documentation
Economiques, Financieres et Sociales
Gefinor Tower, Block B, Office 500
Clemenceau Street, Beirut
3. Development Studies Association
c/o Hassan Saab, Immeuble Union
Al Sanayeh, Beirut
4. Economic Research Institute
American University of Beirut, Beirut
5. Institut Des Sciences Sociales
Universite Libanaise, Ramlet-el-Baida,
Imm. Victor Haikal, Beyrouth
6. Lebanese Association Of Political Sciences
Association Libanaise Des Sciences Politiques
P.O. Box 3865, Beirut
7. National Institute of Administration And
Development
Rue Verdun, Beirut

8. Center For Educational Research & Development
P.O.B. 9336 Beirut, Lebanon
9. Institute Of Palestine Studies, Lebanon
10. Center For Arab Unity Studies, Lebanon
11. Research center of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Lebanon)

Morocco

1. Centre D'Etude Du Developpement Economique
Et Social
Faculte des sciences juridiques
economiques et sociales
158, avenue F.A.R., Casablanca
2. Higher Institute Of Trade & Business Administration
36, Rue Colbert
Casablanca, Morocco
3. Centre de recherches et d'etudes Demographiques
5, rue Mostaganem
B.P. 178
Rabat, Morocco.

Sudan

1. Institute of African And Asian Studies
Faculty of Arts, University of Khartoum
P.O.Box 321, Khartoum
2. Institute of Public Administration
P.O.Box 1492, Khartoum (Cables: PUBAD)
3. Philosophical Society Of The Sudan
P.O.Box 526, Khartoum

Tunisia

1. Centre D'Etudes Et De Recherches
Economiques Et Sociales
Universite de Tunis
94, boulevard du 9-avril-1938, Tunis
2. Institute Superieur de Gestion
2, rue Ibn Khaldoun
Tunis, Tunisia.

3. C. E. R.C.S
23, rue d' Espagne
Tunis, Tunisia
4. L'Institut National des Sciences de L'education
Tunis, Tunisia
5. L'Institut National de L'Agriculture
Tunis, Tunisia

Turkey

1. İktisadi Gelişme Enstitüsü
Faculte des Sciences Economiques
Istanbul Universitesi, Beyazit, Istanbul
2. Institute Of Population Studies
Hacettepe University, Hacettepe, Ankara
3. Piyasa Etud Ve Arastirma Burosu
Iman Sokak No.1, Beyoglu, Istiklal Caddesi,
Istanbul (Telegr.: Marketing)
4. Turkiye Ekonomi Kurumu
Ankara-Yenişehir, Izmir Caddesi 9/3,
Ankara
5. Turkiye Ve Orta Dogu Anne Idaresi
Enstitusu Genel Mudurlugu
1, Numaralı Cadde. Yucetepe, Ankara
6. Yakın Ve Orta-Dagu Gallisma Enstitusu
Gurtas Ishani, Kat 2, Mithat Pasa Gaddesi
Kizilay, Ankara
7. Public Administration
Institute For Turkey
and Middle East
Yocetep, 1 Cadde, Ankara
Turkey

Somalia

Social Science Division, Somali
National University