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The Necessity of Moral Reasoning

A certain form of empirical argument has been advanced recently by several prominent moral psychologists who argue that conscious, deliberative reasoning is not necessary to moral judgment.¹ There are some minor differences among these arguments, but the general form is the same: empirical testing of people's moral judgments in response to specific vignettes in various manipulated contexts reveals that emotions play a significant causal role in moral judgment. Moreover, in many cases it appears that reason has no causal role in moral judgment, and that emotions alone are a necessary, and often sufficient cause of moral judgment. Thus, reasoning is not necessary to moral judgment. But the argument does not stop here, because this result is thought to have significant bearing on the philosophical project of moral justification and moral theorizing more generally. Indeed, the larger aim of these empirical moral psychologists is to show that the psychological findings with respect to moral judgment undermine a certain philosophical picture of morality as rationally grounded. If philosophical theories of moral justification and the project of moral theorizing all depend upon the rational grounding of reason, but ordinary moral judgments do not, then there is a serious and deep disconnect between the empirical psychological realities of moral judgment and the philosophical assumptions related to what reasoning can and does accomplish with respect to our own moral judgments. Insofar as the entire philosophical project of moral justification requires reason to play a necessary role in moral justification, and reason is not necessary to moral judgment, then, the conclusion goes, moral judgments cannot be justified in the way that philosophers typically assume. At best, morality is arational. Prinz puts the point rather starkly when he argues that if moral judgment operates according to his view, "then our moral convictions lack a rational foundation."²

These debunking arguments have already received quite a bit of attention, and a fair amount of criticism from philosophers, where the general focus is on arguing that the empirical data are insufficient to show that reasoning is not necessary to moral judgment.³ The basic idea is that if it can be shown that reasoning is necessary to moral judgment, then these debunking arguments do not go through. This basic idea seems right, and the aim of this paper is similarly to show that moral reasoning is necessary to moral judgment with the purpose of undermining these debunking arguments. But, this paper will take a different approach, and focus on the nature of the necessity claim being made in these debunking arguments. More specifically, this paper will address what the claim that moral reasoning is not necessary is supposed to amount to in the context of moral judgment, and what kind of evidence would be needed to support this claim. This is important, because, as I shall argue, there are at least three distinct ways of understanding what it means to claim that reasoning is necessary to moral judgment, and each way of understanding the claim requires different kinds of evidence for support. Ultimately, I will conclude that there is adequate evidence to conclude that moral reasoning is necessary in at least one of these three ways, and that therefore these debunking arguments fail.

1. Distinguishing Necessity Claims

There are at least three distinct ways of understanding the claim that reasoning is necessary to moral judgment. The first is that moral reasoning is directly causally necessary to every moral judgment. That is, for every instance of moral judgment, reasoning is necessarily directly causally implicated in bringing that particular judgment about; no moral judgment is brought about that is not brought about through some direct causal episode of moral reasoning. In terms of evidence, all that is needed to show that reasoning is not necessary in this way is to show that

there is at least one moral judgment where reasoning is not directly causally responsible for bringing it about.

The second way to understand the necessity claim is that moral reasoning is causally necessary to the ordinary development of the mature capacity for moral judgment, but is not directly causally implicated in every particular instance of moral judgment. On this necessity claim, a particular moral judgment may be brought about without any direct causally efficacious episode of moral reasoning, though the mature capacity for moral judgment itself depends upon some past episodes of moral reasoning in development. This necessity claim is defended by both Nichols, and Horgan and Timmons, where they argue that at least some moral judgments are the result of internalized moral reasoning.⁴ Moral judgments are caused by a set of internalized moral rules, perhaps attached to emotions, that are the result of prior episodes of moral reasoning. There are other ways to defend this necessity claim, but the important feature is that there is some necessary connection between the mature state of the capacity for moral judgment and prior instances of moral reasoning. A mature state of the capacity, in this context, simply means that it is fully developed and capable of operating in those contexts in which moral judgments may be called for—that is, capable of producing a moral judgment in the relevant contexts. Of course, that does not mean that it will always produce a moral judgment in relevant contexts. One could be overly tired, or inattentive, or otherwise indisposed, and so fail to produce a moral judgment even in relevant contexts. In terms of evidence, to show that this necessity claim is false, one would need to show that there is no such necessary connection between the mature capacity for moral judgment and prior episodes of moral reasoning.

The third way of understanding the necessity claim is that moral reasoning is necessary to a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment, where “well-ordered” means that the capacity is both

mature *and* functioning according to some normative criteria of appropriateness. The notion of a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment has not been previously explored or developed with much precision, and one major aim of this paper to do so in later sections. For now, what is important is understanding the kind of necessity claim involved here, and in that regard an analogy may be helpful as a first approximation. The necessity involved here is analogous to the claim that oil changes are necessary to having a well-ordered engine, or that cilia are necessary to having a well-ordered capacity to breathe. Cilia are not necessary to explain the causal mechanisms of breathing, or even the mature capacity for breathing, but should the cilia be absent, the ability to breath will be greatly reduced, perhaps even leading to death, because mucus and foreign bodies cannot be cleared from the lungs. Similarly, an engine can run fine for some time without an oil change, but should it not be changed, the ability of the oil to reduce friction is greatly decreased, eventually leading to overheating and the seizing up of vital engine parts. In this way, cilia are necessary to the well-ordered capacity to breath and oil changes are necessary to the well-ordered running of engines. This is a kind of practical necessity; to achieve some well-ordered end or state of functioning, some action or activity is a necessary means to it.

It is important to point out that the specified end state or functioning that is being aimed for, and which constitutes being well-ordered, is going to involve some substantive claims that go beyond merely describing the workings of the typical mature capacity. That is, whether some capacity is well-ordered is going to involve more than a merely descriptive account of how the mature capacity typically works; it will also involve substantive judgments about what it means for the capacity to be operating well according to some normative criteria. These ideas will be developed in more detail later in the paper, but the basic idea here is that we can, and often do, distinguish among capacities that are fully developed and those that are well-ordered. For

example, a person who gets incredibly angry at receiving incorrect change back from a clerk has a fully developed and mature capacity for anger, though we may judge the person as having a less-than-well-ordered capacity for anger given the degree and object of their anger.

In the case of moral judgment, the claim that reasoning is necessary to a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment means that reasoning need not be directly causally implicated in the production of moral judgments (the mature capacity), though it will be directly causally implicated in having a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment, whatever that turns out to be. In terms of evidence, to show that this necessity claim is false, one would need to show that it is possible to have a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment in the total absence of conscious, deliberative moral reflection.

With these distinctions laid out, it is now possible to ask the following two questions: with respect to the larger project of showing that the empirical data undermines the rationality of moral judgments and morality more generally, which of these necessity claims needs to be shown to be false; and which of these necessity claims, if any, can the empirical literature actually be used to undermine? The empirical evidence typically brought to bear on the question of the necessity of moral reasoning to moral judgment can most clearly be used to undermine the first necessity claim—that moral reasoning is directly causally necessary for every instance of moral judgment (though, again, some argue it does not even do that). Indeed, when most moral psychologists argue that reasoning is not necessary to moral judgment, they seem only to have the first kind of necessity claim in mind because of the kind of evidence typically brought to bear to support it.

For example, both Prinz and Haidt argue that reason is not necessary to moral judgment because it is possible for people to produce moral judgments without going through any steps of

conscious reasoning.⁵ Of course they allow that sometimes people engage in some forms of reasoning. Prinz argues that people can reason about whether a particular action falls under a concept, such as the concept “STEALING,” but that such determinations then lead directly to an emotional response, which is the moral judgment. Haidt allows that people often engage in forms of social reasoning, usually through analogies, in ways that emotionally reframe the object of evaluation that can lead to a different moral judgment. For example, someone might say that abortion is like slavery, and by providing such an analogy, they reframe the emotionally salient aspects of abortion, possibly leading another person to a new moral judgment. Importantly for both Prinz and Haidt is that while reasoning can sometimes play these causal roles in moral judgment, they are not necessary to moral judgment, and moreover, that these forms of reasoning are entirely insufficient to provide moral justification.

However, the evidence they provide does not really address the other two ways in which reasoning could be necessary to moral judgment. This is a significant omission, as I shall argue, and a serious blow to the larger project of showing that moral judgments and morality more generally are not rational in the right sort of way. For the sake of argument, let us stipulate that current empirical research does indicate that reasoning is not necessary to moral judgment in the first sense; that is, that moral reasoning is not directly causally implicated in every episode of moral judgment. I shall argue that this is still insufficient to show that moral judgments and morality more generally are not rational, and given that it is insufficient, it is not the case that the empirical literature supports any sort of widespread skepticism with respect to the prospect of moral justification or moral theorizing.

2. Reasoning in Moral Development

To develop this conclusion, we must investigate the other two necessity claims, and determine whether moral reasoning is necessary in those ways and what implications that has for the larger skeptical project. Starting with the second necessity claim, there are several arguments that moral reasoning is necessary to moral development. Nichols, for example, argues that reasoning is necessary to moral development in order for children to learn the moral rules of their community, and also to learn how to apply them correctly to new and novel situations.⁶ Leaving these particular views aside, it is clear that many of the emotions implicated in the mature capacity for moral judgment require fairly sophisticated conceptual resources that are developed through reasoning. For example, guilt is a heavily cognitive emotion, involving rather sophisticated notions of desert and responsibility.⁷ Insofar as such emotions are part of the ordinary mature capacity for moral judgment, then reasoning is necessary to the development of that capacity. Emotion regulation research also indicates that ordinary adults develop fairly sophisticated cognitive mechanisms for regulating emotional responses in ways that conform to their social or personal goals, and that the typical emotional responses of adults are heavily cognitively mediated.⁸ In this way, the ordinary emotional responses implicated in the mature capacity for moral judgment require at least some past (and continuing) reasoning.

There may yet still be other ways in which reasoning is necessary to the development of the mature capacity for moral judgment, but the preceding ways are sufficient to show that reasoning is necessary, and so there is at least one sense in which reasoning is necessary to moral judgment. The next question to address is whether this kind of necessity undermines the larger skeptical project of showing that moral judgments and morality more generally are not rational. At the very least, this is an open question, given the current state of evidence. The currently

understood ways in which reasoning is necessary to develop the capacity for moral judgment simply do not undermine the larger skeptical project, because these uses of reasoning are perfectly compatible with the claim that what children are learning are nothing more than culturally sanctioned ways of acting that have no further basis in reasoning and no rational merit. Indeed, these claims about the role of reasoning in moral education are going to be a common theme of just about any empiricist account of moral development.

The fact that reasoning is necessary to moral development is alone insufficient to undermine the skeptical conclusion that morality is not rational, at least given the current state of evidence. However, there could be a way in which reasoning is necessary to the development of the capacity for moral judgment that could undermine the skeptical conclusion, but it would have to show more than that reason is used to learn and fine-tune the capacity for moral judgment in culturally acceptable ways. What would be needed is to show that reason is necessary to the development of the capacity for moral judgment in a more normative sense—that is, that reasoning is necessary to the development and maintenance of a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment.

3. Well-Ordered Capacity

To begin, we must provide a sufficient characterization of what a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment is, or rather, what it means to call a capacity for moral judgment well-ordered. With this done, it will then be possible to determine what, if anything, is necessary to explain it. To avoid begging the question here, the characterization of a well-ordered moral capacity can be developed from common moral practice and experience. As an initial gloss, a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment is one that provides for a moral point of view that makes sense both

to oneself and to others. This is not meant to be a terribly high standard of the sort that all moral judgments must hang together in a completely rationally defensible sort of way. Rather, the idea is that the person has a relatively consistent set of moral judgments, attitudes, commitments, and intentions that forms a more-or-less coherent moral point of view from which that person engages the world. And the standard is just this kind of more-or-less sort—that it hangs together well enough, though less than perfectly, in order for that point of view to make sense to oneself and others. In some ways this standard does not differ from the notion of having a well-ordered set of desires.

To say that a capacity for moral judgment is well-ordered is to make some claim about its current state—that as things currently stand, one's moral capacity provides something like a more-or-less sensible moral picture of the world. A well-ordered capacity is not so much an end-state, or even a steady state, because it is quite possible for someone to have a well-ordered moral capacity that, at some later time, is no longer well-ordered. Severe dementia, for example, is an obvious sort of case where a person's previously well-ordered capacity for moral judgment may become compromised to the point that it is no longer considered well-ordered. In a less obvious, but more important case, coming to learn of different moral points of view, or contrary moral arguments, or even new kinds of empirical facts that one fails to integrate in the right sort of way into one's moral point of view may make it such that one's moral point of view no longer makes sense. For example, a person who has strongly held anti-abortion views may come to learn of good arguments against her position, and good arguments in favor of another position, but who nevertheless studiously ignores them in her own thinking so as to maintain a moral position that conforms to those in her religious community. This sort of practiced neglect can

cause a well-ordered moral capacity to become not well-ordered over time if such neglect leads to it no longer more-or-less making sense as a moral point of view.

It may be thought that even this somewhat minimal notion of a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment is too idealized; that perhaps this is just a philosopher's way of trying to sneak back into the discussion some elements of rational consistency that have been sufficiently undercut by the empirical literature on moral judgment. But this dismissal is too quick, for there are good reasons for thinking that people do seek to make sense of their own moral judgments, and those of others. One way of getting at this is to start with the two most widely used variations of the now classic trolley cases, bystander and fat man, used in much of the empirical literature on moral judgment. In the bystander case, a trolley is out of control and careening down the track where it will kill five people, unless a bystander throws a switch that will divert the trolley onto another track. There is one person on that track who will be killed if the trolley is diverted. In the fat man case, a trolley is out of control and careening down the track where it will kill five people, unless a fat person is pushed in front of the trolley (usually from a footbridge). Pushing the fat man in front of the trolley will result in his death, but save the other five. Many different studies have recorded how people respond to these individual cases—most approve of throwing the switch, while most disapprove of pushing the fat man—but strangely absent from these studies is a discussion with participants regarding what they think about their own pattern of judgments. For example, do most people view their own pattern of judgments as being problematic in some way? Do most people see their judgments as being in conflict, but are unconcerned? Or do most people see them as being in apparent conflict, but then attempt to provide reasons that explain their different judgments?

Anecdotally, in using these examples in class, most people take the view that their own judgments in these cases are at least in apparent conflict. Many then seek to provide some reasons that explain their different judgments to show that they are not really in conflict, while others change their view about one of the cases in order to render the judgments consistent. The point here is not whether their initial explanations are good, or well-reasoned, or reasoned at all, just that they are attempted, because this demonstrates a recognition on their part of needing to come to some settled view of how to think of these cases, and that their current set of judgments and beliefs simply will not do—that they do not make sense. This is just anecdotal, but it is also consistent with the claim made by many moral psychologists that people will offer *post hoc* rationalizations of their moral judgments in order to make sense of them to others. However, it is not at all clear that this is always problematic, or that the motivation is simply to “win” the argument, as Haidt argues.⁹ In some cases, students are able to provide quite consistent and compelling moral reasons for their own pattern of judgments. And in many other cases, they simply revise one of their judgments so that their own pattern of judgments is apparently consistent. This is important, because it means that they take the initial outputs of their capacity for moral judgment to be fallible, and subject to revision when sufficient reasons exist to revise them. Of course, the context of being in a college classroom discussing morality primes them to this task, but repeatedly students report being personally invested in figuring out for themselves what they think about these cases and how to reconcile it in their own minds. In short, they want their own moral judgments to make sense to themselves.

There may be many motivations for students and others to want their own moral judgments to make sense to themselves. Haidt argues that people engage in this sense-making task in order to signal to others that we are trustworthy social allies. Not mentioned by Haidt is why people

would consider those whose judgments fail to make sense are untrustworthy social allies. This is easy to fill in, however. We typically treat people whose moral judgments fail to make sense as untrustworthy because there seems to be no underlying set of concerns, commitments, or reasons that constitutes what we might consider that person's moral identity, or moral point of view. They take their judgments at face value to be simply the way things are, without a thought as to how their judgments might go awry in various situations, and without any other set of moral commitments, concerns, or reasons to serve as an internal check. Such a person is untrustworthy precisely because there is no way to appeal to such a person should we think that they have gotten some moral question wrong—that their own initial judgments may be fallible. From a prudential point of view, then, there is good reason not to trust someone who cannot make sense of their own moral judgments.

It is useful to fill in this story of untrustworthiness to further distinguish various forms of untrustworthiness that can help us make sense of a well-ordered moral capacity. We can imagine two different politicians running for office, for example, both of whom are prone to making moral claims that fail to make sense in the right sort of way. To one group the politicians say one thing, and to another, the politicians say another. There seems to be no real consistency to any of the moral statements that the politicians make. To many people, the inconsistencies are readily apparent and they take the politicians to be untrustworthy, morally speaking, because of it. However, the politicians' moral pronouncements by themselves allow for two different possible explanations that lead to different accounts of their untrustworthiness. Politician A, for example, simply says whatever he or she judges will win votes. Politician A is deeply cynical and calculating, and is untrustworthy simply because we are in no position to make a determination with respect to what politician A really thinks. Politician B, on the other hand, simply has no

consistent moral views whatsoever. In some situations, things seem to Politician B one way, and in other situations, Politician B sees things in some inconsistent way, and he or she never stops a moment to consider the ways in which his or her moral positions and judgments are inconsistent. This leads to a different kind of untrustworthiness. The untrustworthiness here is that Politician B seems to have no moral point of view at all—no set of considered judgments, principles, or the like that might inform the politician’s moral thinking. Politician B simply takes however things morally appear to him or her at that time at face value, never reflecting or thinking that his or her own judgments could be wrong.

It would be tempting to think that both kinds of untrustworthiness are equally bad given that the politicians’ moral pronouncements do not provide evidence for how the politician will act once in office and thus make it hard to gain social allies, but that elides an important difference. In the first case, Politician A is a liar, and that provides evidence that part of Politician A’s moral point of view includes the determination that it is permissible to lie in order to win. The politician’s moral pronouncements, then, do in fact tell us something about Politician A’s actual moral point of view, namely, that the politician thinks lying is permissible for attaining power. This is what leads us to conclude that the politician’s moral pronouncements should not be trusted. In the second case, Politician B is morally unwise and unreflective in a way that makes clear that the politician has made no real moral determinations at all, and lacks the drive or ability to do so. In this case, Politician B cannot take up the moral point of view of others, or consider reasons and arguments against his or her current moral position. Politician B cannot even take up his or her own moral position, because they do not seem to have one at all. In the second case, it is this feature—of not having a moral point of view—that leads us to conclude that Politician B’s moral pronouncements should not be trusted because they are prone to change

in unexpected ways. It may be hard to determine which of these two kinds of untrustworthiness is worse, but it is clear enough that we sometimes make determinations about whether someone is trustworthy on the basis of how well their moral views make sense.

But there also seems to be a deeper reason why people seek to make sense of their own moral judgments that goes beyond the prudential consideration of gaining social allies. People also want to make sense of their own moral judgments because they want to avoid thinking, feeling, and acting in ways for which there might be good reasons not to, or they want to avoid special pleading, or they want to ensure that if something is a reason to do something in one case, it is also a reason to do the same thing in relevantly similar cases, or if they take something to be a genuine moral concern, it is taken into account in all situations in which arises. For example, think of a person who sincerely holds that all people, regardless of class, creed, or ethnicity are morally equal, but who also tends to make moral judgments in ways that favor his or her own ethnicity over others. One way of understanding this person is simply to say that this person is a moral hypocrite—he or she espouses equality, but does not really hold it personally as a moral ideal. This is the way Prinz deals with such cases.¹⁰ However, another interpretation is that this person simply fails to realize the inconsistency in his or her own moral point of view—that is, fails to see that this collection of judgments does not make sense. If this person is morally serious, though, once he or she comes to see this inconsistency (perhaps by it being pointed out by others), he or she will either be forced to modify his or her moral judgments, or his or her endorsement of the moral equality of persons in order for these judgments to make sense to themselves. And again, on the assumption the person is morally serious, he or she will want these judgments to make sense. He or she may be pained to learn that they have thought, felt, and acted in ways that they consider odious given their other moral commitments. This process is

simply part of what it means to develop a moral point of view—a more-or-less consistent set of commitments, concerns, reasons, and judgments that makes sense to the person. To that extent, developing a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment may also be a moral imperative—at least for those who take morality seriously—because those who fail to do so risk feeling, thinking, and acting in ways that they themselves would consider morally wrong.

Moreover, there is now at least some initial empirical support for the claim that people do develop more-or-less consistent and durable moral points of view.¹¹ In one set of studies, participants were asked to make moral judgments in a range of dilemmatic cases over an extended period of time, and where elements of the dilemmatic contexts were altered in ways that have been shown to negatively influence people's preferences for the so-called utilitarian solution (e.g., direct contact and intentional harm). That is, the cases were designed in ways that typically reduce the likelihood of people choosing the utilitarian solution. However, the researchers found that those who were disposed to utilitarian judgments continued to make utilitarian judgments, even in those contexts. As the authors write:

Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near-perfect consistency.¹²

This is not all that surprising if it is the case that, over time, people develop a more-or-less consistent moral point of view. One more point on this score. Our moral judgments are not just things that happen to us, they are things that we feel belong to us in a certain kind of way; that they are things we somehow author. They are an important part of our identity. This does not

mean that in new and novel cases people do not make snap judgments with little or no conscious reflection—of course that happens. But, for people to endorse those judgments as properly theirs, to act, think and feel consistently with them, to add them to their overall set of concerns, commitments, and attitudes, they should seem to that person to make sense from their own moral point of view. Along these lines, perhaps the basis of many complaints related to contemporary empirical models of moral judgment is precisely the fact that they neglect important features of what it is to have a moral point of view at all. On these models, moral judgments are simply things that ostensibly land in conscious experience, pushing and pulling us in rather direct ways without any regard for how we ourselves might view these judgments. On these models, moral judgment is a function we possess, not something that we do. This picture misses a great deal of how we see ourselves as moral agents, and why we think morality matters in the first place. Of course, it is possible that we are not moral agents, and we are mistaken about why morality matters to us, but this is not a claim that the empirical literature so far supports, and there is not yet sufficient empirical reason to deny that our internal experiences with the moral provide some insight into moral psychology.

The idea of a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment goes beyond the merely descriptive sort of view of moral judgment that seems to be on offer from empirical moral psychologists by containing some substantive content. A merely descriptive view of moral judgment only considers whether the person has the capacity to make moral judgments in many different sorts of cases, including highly abstract and novel ones presented in many of the moral vignettes used in moral psychological experiments. This is the sense of a mature moral capacity developed in Section 1. In this sense, a person has a mature capacity for moral judgment if he or she can make judgments regarding the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness of actions, persons, or

states-of-affairs in a variety of cases and situations. Having a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment, on the other hand, involves having a more-or-less coherent moral picture of the world where these moral judgments make sense to the person making them.

Moreover, as suggested above, a well-ordered moral capacity is also likely going to require some commitment to substantive moral claims in order to make sense to others in the right kind of way. To see why this is important we only need to consider the possibility of someone having a more-or-less consistent moral point of view that nonetheless strikes us as completely odious. For example, we can imagine a person who has a more-or-less consistent moral point of view that is thoroughly sexist, or racist, or both. In situations involving members of a different sex or race, this person makes completely consistent judgments that such persons do not morally matter, and yet there is something about this person's capacity that strikes us as less than well-ordered. The central issue in this sort of case is that the person's moral point of view fails to make sense to others because it neglects reasons and considerations that the person should be taking into account in his or her moral point of view. That is, what makes the person's capacity for moral judgment less than well-ordered is not some sort of internal inconsistency or incoherence, but the way that it fails to align with substantive moral commitments that the person should have. For a person's moral position to make sense to others in the right sort of way it will need to take into account the right sorts of reasons for its judgments. It is will be too much for the aims of this paper to attempt a satisfying account of what those rights sorts of reasons are; the point here is simply to show that the notion of a well-ordered capacity involves more than just internal consistency, but also some substantive moral commitments.

It should be clear by now that the first two necessity claims really involve a conception of the capacity for moral judgment that is meant to be purely descriptive, which may raise the

following sort of objection: a picture of the well-ordered capacity for moral judgment that understands the capacity in terms of substantive (that is, not merely descriptive) criteria involves bootstrapping of some kind, insofar as it uses a normative conception of the capacity for moral judgment to criticize what are intended as a merely descriptive accounts. Such descriptive accounts are not intended to capture a normative conception of the capacity for moral judgment, and so using such a normative conception to undermine descriptive accounts is to miss the mark.

There are two responses to this objection. The first is that it is always necessary to make some substantive assumptions or claims with respect to the moral in order to study the capacity for moral judgment in the first place. If we are interested in providing an account of the psychological mechanisms of moral judgment, it is first necessary to be able to identify the sorts of judgments that count as specifically moral ones. This task is complicated by the fact that moral judgments are often considered a species of social judgments, and that moral and social judgments are typically expressed using the same kind of language. It makes just as much sense to us when someone says, “you shouldn’t stand in the middle of the escalator,” and “you shouldn’t murder people for fun,” or, if you like, “it’s wrong to stand in the middle of the escalator,” and “it’s wrong to murder people for fun.” The issue here is that there is no straightforward and merely descriptive set of criteria that can carve out moral judgments from other social judgments. This does not stop people from offering such apparently descriptive criteria. Turiel, for example, attempts to draw the moral-conventional distinction in purely descriptive ways.¹³ Similarly, Greene attempts to draw a purely descriptive distinction between personal moral transgressions and impersonal moral transgressions in a way that is supposed to allow us to carve up different types of moral judgments.¹⁴ The problem, however, is that these attempts to distinguish moral judgments from other social judgments (or different types of moral

judgments from each other) all rely on some substantive assumptions about the moral. They may be good assumptions, or they may be bad. That is not the point here, though. The point simply is that investigation into moral judgment already begins with us, as investigators, occupying a moral point of view. We already approach the subject matter with some assumptions with respect to the sorts of things that matter from a moral point of view; the sorts of concerns that fall squarely within its purview, and those that do not. There is, in effect, an inescapable sort of circularity here, but not a vicious one.

Second, distinguishing between well-ordered and less-than-well-ordered capacities for moral judgment is necessary to understanding the merely descriptive psychological mechanisms of moral judgment. This may be easier to see by considering some extreme forms of less-than-well-ordered moral capacities. Summers and Sinnott-Armstrong provide some detailed cases of what can be thought of as being a kind of obsessive compulsive disorder with respect to the moral.¹⁵ They call such people “scrupulous agents,” where people seem to form moral judgments (and perform actions) in a repetitive and compulsive way. In one example they cite, a waiter repeatedly judges that she ought to check the cleaning solvents at the restaurant to ensure that none had made it into the patrons’ food, though she herself recognizes that there is no good reason to do so because there is no possible way the cleaning agents could have gotten into the customers’ food. She nevertheless repeatedly checks the solvents for fear that she could possibly be poisoning her customers, and takes it to be a moral imperative to prevent this from happening. This seems to be a clear case of a less-than-well-ordered capacity for moral judgment, in part because the agent sees herself as occupying a moral point of view that she sees as having good reason to reject—so much so that it fails to make sense even to her as a moral point view. It is important to note that all morally serious people probably make judgments that they themselves

see as having reason to reject, and that the difference between the ordinary case and the case of the morally scrupulous is one of degree. Her own moral judgments seem somehow alien to her, being detached from her other moral attitudes, commitments, intentions, and beliefs in a way that goes beyond the ordinary case. There is a very real sense in which morally scrupulous people are so alienated from their own moral judgments that they do not have a moral point of view that makes sense to themselves or others.

This is an extreme example of a less-than-well-ordered capacity for moral judgment, but importantly this is a recognized psychological disorder, and so it highlights the way in which we already draw substantive distinctions between well-ordered and less than well-ordered capacities for moral judgment. The moral domain is one in which we evaluate the degree to which people's moral points of view hang together, and severe deviations are marked out as especially problematic. Moreover, I take it that this is more than a merely statistical notion—that the well-ordered capacity for moral judgment is more than just whatever most ordinary mature people possess. We can imagine a situation such that it becomes the case that scrupulous agents come to dominate in the population. It would not seem to us that their inordinate scrupulosity now counts as well-ordered—there would seem to us something still not quite right about this capacity for moral judgment.

4. The Necessity of Moral Reasoning

What these two responses to the bootstrapping objection reveal is that it is not at all that question-begging to think of the capacity for moral judgment in terms that are not merely descriptive. The notion of a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment is a substantive one, but not a problematic one. So now it is possible to ask what sorts of capacities or psychological

processes are needed to explain how one's capacity for moral judgment becomes well-ordered. There are a few possible hypotheses that need to be considered. The first is that a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment can be fully explained by a perceptual account of moral judgment. On this account, the capacity for moral judgment is one that perceives moral truths, and since truth is consistent and coherent with itself, one's moral judgments will be consistent and coherent in the right sort of way to count as having a well-ordered moral capacity. The central problem with this view is that it is empirically false that people's initial judgments of particular cases are consistent and coherent in the right kind of way in a wide range of cases. As discussed above in Section 3, people make all sorts of judgments that seem, even to them, not to be coherent and consistent in the right sort of way, which gives many people reason enough to think that their own moral judgments are fallible. And this is not too surprising at all given that we typically think that our own perceptual experiences are fallible. A pencil that is put into a clear glass of water will appear bent, even though it is not. Even more interesting these days is the phenomenon of so-called phantom vibration syndrome with cellphones, where one truly believes that one's phone has just vibrated in one's pocket, though it has not.¹⁶ The general fallibility of human perceptual equipment should make us skeptical that the correct account of a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment is to be explained on a perceptual model of moral judgment.

A second hypothesis is that reasoning is necessary to the development of a well-ordered moral capacity. There is plenty of empirical support for this claim. One strand of support comes from emotion regulation research, which again indicates the emotional responses in adults are heavily cognitively mediated, and in some instances, by conscious reflection on one's own social and personal goals, including making sense to oneself and to others. It should also be noted that this research indicates that this is true of adults, but it is also interesting for what it implies about

teenagers and children. Experience gives us reason to think that teenagers and children do not heavily regulate or cognize their own emotional responses, which is why it is not all that shocking to see children or teenagers have emotional outbursts that would seem quite out of place for an adult. In part this is a function of brain development, but it also shows that there is some difference in just being able to do something (have an emotional response), and to do it well, that is, in a manner that makes sense to oneself and others. This is just another indication of the difference between a mature capacity and a well-ordered capacity.

Another important line of evidence is more qualitative in nature, drawing on the experiences of ordinary moral agents. Qualitative data involve asking participants to report their own feelings and mental states, whereas quantitative data are drawn from the third-person perspective—the sort of manipulations that can be done and recorded in the lab. Qualitative data are often used to supplement quantitative data, especially when the research involves people’s attitudes and actions. For our purposes, we may consider people’s personal experiences with the moral as part of our qualitative data. In approaching morality more qualitatively, it is appropriate to focus on how people, over the course of their own lives, interact with moral questions that confront them in the ordinary warp and woof of life.

Most people have to reckon with some moral choices in their own lives, by which I mean not merely choices of whether one ought to do something one sees as wrong, but what sort of person one should be. What would it mean to be a friend to this person, under these circumstances, at this time? Should I value family over fidelity? These are the ordinary moral choices that people make. Of course, it is quite possible to make a decision here relying simply on how one feels at the time. Perhaps one merely acts according to that which has a stronger pull on them at the moment. Of course, that's possible, and possibly common. However common, though, we

recognize that such an approach is not only morally unserious, but also morally unwise. It is here, in moments of choice where much of the hard thinking about morality goes on. Not about whether to throw the switch or kill the fat man, but in whether my friendship with this person requires choices of this sort that conflict with my notions of honor, fidelity, and trust. Life is full of such choices, and over time, the way we make such choices forms what we may consider our own moral point of view. And attaining such a moral point of view that makes sense is just what it means to have a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment.

Episodes of moral decision-making that bubble up from our own experiences in life cannot be easily quantified or studied in the lab or online, but they are no less real. This is a kind of qualitative data that are available only through interacting with people, and attempting to understand ourselves and others as moral agents attempting to navigate our own moral commitments. It is important to add these sorts of episodes to the data when considering whether reasoning is necessary to moral judgment.¹⁷

To proceed, let us address two distinct questions. First, do ordinary episodes of moral decision-making that make up part of the warp and woof of ordinary moral experience require reasoning to resolve? Second, does this show that reasoning is necessary to a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment? The answer to the first question is sometimes. As said before, it is possible to come to decisions in particular moral cases in one's own life without necessarily reasoning about those questions, at least not in the sense of involving conscious deliberation. For example, one can, in some situations, merely go with the option that is easiest to perform, or the one less likely to ruffle feathers. One can simply go with whatever seems to them to have the greatest pull, without giving any further consideration to the questions that present themselves for evaluation. Again, this is all possible, but it is not the mark of a morally serious person, or a

person of moral wisdom to rely on such methods exclusively. This is someone who is pulled and pushed along by his or her moral and social judgments, and for whom how things appear to him or her simply is how things are.

On the other hand, to navigate one's own moral decisions well, to come to decisions that one sees as hanging together in the right sort of way—that make sense in the right sort of way—requires conscious deliberation on the range of reasons, commitments, principles, attitudes, and the like that provide a more-or-less unified picture of how to proceed in this case and others like it. Lest this sound too philosophical, let us take as an example one fairly well-studied phenomenon of people's changing attitudes with respect to same-sex marriage. Because of the rapid change in social attitudes with respect to same-sex marriage, many social scientists are interested in understanding how individuals came to change their own minds with respect to the permissibility of same-sex marriage. And importantly, the data support the claim that social level changes in attitudes towards same-sex marriage cannot simply be ascribed to demographic changes in the US; that in fact, about two-thirds of the people in the US who now believe same-sex marriage is permissible do so because they changed their minds, having previously held that it was impermissible.¹⁸ That is a significant population-level change brought about by individual changes in attitude, which is what has drawn so much attention by social scientists. Among the things they found was that conscious moral deliberation accounts for how many individuals came to change their minds. Stepp and Thompson report that when asked why they changed their minds about same-sex marriage, 25% say that they thought about it more, and another 8% explicitly link it to considerations of equal rights. Thus, in this limited sample, 33% of people who changed their minds regarding the permissibility of same-sex marriage attribute it to their thinking more about it, in one way or another. A similar proportion of respondents (32%)

attributed personal contact with someone who is homosexual as the reason why they changed their minds, which could also involve episodes of conscious reflection, such as, “if this person is pretty decent, then it can’t really be that homosexuality makes a person a bad person.”

These are interesting findings, and they are important in the way in which they support the view that ordinary people can reason about moral issues in light of their own commitments, principles, and attitudes. Of course it is possible for people to come to these views without doing any reasoning of the relevant sort, but what’s striking is how these findings suggest that many people are actually considering the question of same-sex marriage by reasoning through a range of public arguments and considering them in light of moral reasons, commitments, and attitudes that they already accept, and with a desire that their own judgment in this case should make sense against the backdrop of these other reasons, commitments, and attitudes. One very interesting way of seeing this most clearly might be in cases where people did not change their minds. Gaines and Garand found that not changing one’s mind with respect to same-sex marriage is highly correlated with a cluster of attitudes that includes biblical literalism, positive attitudes towards the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, and belief in traditional gender roles.¹⁹ It would seem that for many people who hold this cluster of attitudes, reasoning about same-sex marriage leads them to reject it because it does not make sense against these background reasons, commitments, and attitudes. Indeed, it would seem that supporting same-sex marriage would require rejecting at least one of these other attitudes, which would be quite difficult if a person views them as central to his or her own identity.

Some may object to the use of these self-reported data as being unreliable, especially when compared to the findings in more controlled laboratory settings. But this is simply to favor one kind of data derived from highly abstract and novel moral vignettes over people’s qualitative

reports of how they have navigated a personal moral issue over time. There are no good empirical reasons, however, for discounting such self-reports as having some evidentiary value in understanding moral judgment.

Another objection that might be put forward by someone like Haidt, for example, is that these episodes of moral thinking involve only analogic reasoning, and thus does not qualify as moral reasoning in the right sort of way. Haidt and Bjorklund allow that analogic reasoning is an important causal pathway for moral judgment, but what they deny is that such reasoning has the right features for either rationally grounding those judgments, or justifying them.²⁰ This is because they see analogic reasoning as only ever operating as a means of reframing emotional features of situations that can lead to new emotional responses, and that these analogies are not based in reasons of any sort. For example, if a person argues against abortion by claiming it is just like slavery, this emotionally reframes the issue by making salient other features that may cause different emotional reactions to abortion. Importantly for their view, there are no better or worse ways, in terms of reasons, for framing issues in these ways. To put it in stronger terms, there is no fact of the matter about whether abortion is like slavery in any relevant respect, on this view of analogic reasoning. But there is no good reason for accepting this view of analogic reasoning. Haidt and Bjorklund assume that all analogic reasoning fails to be good reasoning, but there is no theoretical support for this claim. There is bad analogic reasoning, to be sure, but there is also good analogic reasoning. Good analogic reasoning works when one can see that two cases are relevantly similarly, and one is committed to the view that like cases should be treated alike. Analogic reasoning in these cases can help make clear inconsistencies, when they are there, and provide some structure as to what sort of account would be needed to explain them away in a way that makes sense. They can also help make clear that no such account is in the

offing, and so one must revise one's view in order to have a consistent moral point of view. Analogic reasoning of this sort is good reasoning in that it can provide appropriate rational support and sense-making to one's own moral judgments. As I said at the outset, I will take an expansive view of what capacities and processes are included under the notion of reasoning, and analogic reasoning seems to be a very important tool for human reasoning in general, and should also be one in the moral case as well, so long as it is used well.

The foregoing argument helps to undercut what I take to be an obvious objection to this claim that moral reasoning is necessary to a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment; namely, that it requires an overly intellectual picture of moral reasoning that most people do not engage in or are not capable of engaging in. The basic thrust of arguments against the necessity of moral reasoning is that reasoning turns out to be the sort of thing that only extraordinary people, willing and able to spend years of their lives dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge in formal academic settings are really capable of accomplishing. Haidt and Bjorklund are quite explicit about this. They argue that moral reasoning, to really count as reasoning of the right sort, must be based in the "sheer force of logic."²¹ To put it another way: of course philosophers tend to think that moral reasoning plays an important causal role in moral judgment, because they have spent years "training in unnatural modes of human thought."²² However, once we go into the lab and see how ordinary people think through moral problems, the intellectualist picture that philosophers tend to promote is nowhere to be found. People do not reason themselves to moral judgments from first principles of ethics; instead they form judgments and then use various forms of analogic reasoning, perspective taking, consistency considerations, appeals to widely shared moral principles, and similar to show that their moral judgments make sense.

This objection actually gets quite a bit right. When we look at the sort of reasoning people actually engage in, it does involve for the most part analogic reasoning, perspective taking, consistency considerations, appeal to widely shared moral principles, and the like. We do not need an overly intellectual picture to show that moral reasoning is necessary to moral judgment—these tools of thinking and reflecting on moral questions are sufficient for developing a moral point of view, a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment. At no point did the account being offered here appeal to deduction from first principles or the like, nor should it. Reasoning, in humans, is an expansive capacity, taking many different forms to address questions that get presented. There is no reason to prefer calling only one of these forms of thinking “reasoning.”²³ The same holds in the moral case as well.

This response, however correct, is also a little quick, because there is a deeper issue involved here that is easy to overlook. This deeper problem that Haidt and others point to is not the methods by which people reason, but the hidden motivation for why people reason with respect to their moral judgments. As Haidt argues, reason is a tool for winning arguments, not for discovering truth, and thus the real motivation for thinking through moral judgments is not to develop a moral point of view, but simply to win arguments with others. As he writes, “Under...more realistic circumstances, moral reasoning is not let free to search for truth but is likely to be hired out like a lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek confirmation of preordained conclusions.”²⁴ Put this way, the overly intellectual objection is not about methods at all, but about the perspective from which reasoning takes place. Philosophers may imagine reasoning as taking place from a detached point of view, where the ultimate prize is the contemplation of truth, or sense-making; whereas, in reality, reasoning takes place from a very personal point of view, where the ultimate prize is social vindication.

This is a very different kind of objection, but when laid out like this, it also seems to miss the mark for two reasons. First, it fails to distinguish good reasoning from bad reasoning. Motivation, by itself, does not tell us much about whether the reasoning someone engages in is good or bad reasoning. Debaters are often, perhaps only, motivated to win, but they can still put forward good arguments—ones that make sense of the set of judgments and claims being defended. Similarly, someone, perhaps a philosopher, may be engaged in the pursuit of truth, but nonetheless engage in rather poor reasoning. The purposes for which someone engages in reasoning does not tell us much about the quality of that reasoning—there are independent standards here that someone can fail to meet for a variety of reasons. For example, as stated above, there is good analogic reasoning, which generally involves a close similarity between one domain and another, just as much as there is bad analogic reasoning, which generally involves over-reliance on specious similarities that do not hold up under scrutiny. It is an open question whether sincere reasoning is more likely to result in the former, and socially motivated reasoning to result in the latter, but the point is that motivation for someone to reason does not, of itself, tell us much of anything about the quality of reasoning that person engages in.

Second, the objection generalizes from situations and contexts that are almost ideal for eliciting both bad and poorly motivated reasoning (which may contribute to the assumption that these are the same thing). There is no doubt that empirical researchers have discovered people engaging in rather poor reasoning when put on the spot to defend judgments involving highly abstract and novel cases, such as the bystander case or the fat man case. Put on the spot by a researcher, in a known experimental environment, to defend a snap judgment in a highly artificial case answered under time constraints would seem an ideal scenario for not eliciting meaningful or good reflection. In such a situation, where the personal stakes are incredibly low,

but the perceived social stakes much higher, is it any wonder that people do not stop to really think through their responses, but instead engage in poor reasoning with the aim of coming off well to the researcher? Of course not; this is precisely what we should expect. But really, this points to the limitations of quantitative experimental designs in studying moral reasoning and moral judgment, and the need to gather and consider qualitative data in developing a fuller picture of moral reasoning and moral judgment. When that qualitative element is added back in, the force of this objection is seriously diminished. When we consider how people think through caring for a sick parent at the possible expense of caring for their own children, or how they should think about same-sex marriage now that they know same-sex couples, it is far less likely that the correct story for those instances of moral reasoning is that people do it just so they can win an argument, especially when the argument is with themselves. It hardly seems an overly intellectual picture of moral reasoning to think that people engaged in such personally important questions, where the personal stakes are high—ones that will affect the course of their own lives, their view of themselves as people, and how they relate to other people important in their own lives—would pause for a moment to consider a range of reasons, perspectives, judgments, beliefs, and other elements from their own moral point of view to arrive at an answer that makes sense to them. Winning the argument may seem like the point in the lab or other adversarial interactions, but it hardly seems to be the point in life.

The argument of this section so far has attempted to show that reasoning best explains how the capacity for moral judgment becomes and stays well-ordered, and the conclusion might well be that reasoning is therefore necessary to the well-ordered capacity for moral judgment. However, there is one final hypothesis to consider in how the well-ordered capacity for moral judgment comes about, and that is that it basically comes about through some set of sub-personal

processes. As Arpaly has argued, the mere fact that something has the appearance of rationality to it does not warrant concluding that reasoning had any role in bringing it about, because it is quite possible that it came about through some set of sub-personal processes.²⁵

It is true that these sorts of scenarios are possible, and moreover, if they are possible, then it is possible to have a well-ordered moral capacity without reasoning. And, if so, then reasoning is not necessary to a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment. That is correct, and should be accepted. There are possible cases where one can have such a well-ordered capacity without moral reasoning, and accepting this possibility helps to clarify in what way moral reasoning is necessary to the development of the well-ordered capacity for moral judgment, which is that it is necessary in the sense of being practically necessary; that is, necessary from the practical point of view. If one desires to have a moral capacity that makes sense to oneself and others, as a practical necessity, one ought to engage in reasoning with respect to moral questions, because in the absence of such reasoning, one cannot ever really be sure that one's capacity for moral reasoning really is well-ordered, especially if we have good reason for thinking that our own moral judgments can be fallible in some cases. If that is our actual practical situation, then it becomes necessary to reason about moral questions in order to have a well-ordered moral capacity. That is all that the necessity claim amounts to here, and I shall now argue, that is all we need to undermine empirical moral debunking arguments.

5. The Rationality of Morality

If reasoning is necessary to a well-ordered capacity for moral reasoning, would this kind of necessity be sufficient to undercut the skeptical conclusion that moral judgments and morality more generally are not rational? One thing is clear: the role of reasoning to a well-ordered

capacity for moral judgment touches upon our notions of moral justification. It does not say anything about what the nature of moral justification looks like—whether it be reflective equilibrium or something more robust, such as support from first principles of morality. The point, however, is that the notion of a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment is what raises for people normative questions in the first place. They recognize within themselves the need for their moral views to make sense to themselves.²⁶ Questions about the nature of normativity and justification are philosophical in nature, and perhaps go beyond the ways in which ordinary people think about moral questions, but it is clear enough that people engage in moral reasoning, in part, because they want to feel justified in holding the moral views that they do.

However, that also means that it is an open question whether the sort of reasoning being discussed here is sufficient for the project of moral justification. That is, it is an open question whether this sort of reasoning puts moral judgments on solid rational footing. That will depend, in part, on the sort of justificatory standards we think necessary to justify moral judgments. Take, as an example, those who hear the best arguments for same-sex marriage, and yet do not change their minds. Does the sort of moral reasoning described here as necessary to moral judgment give us a way of determining who is right?

The sort of reasoning process laid out here is more limited than that. Likely, the person who continues to hold that same-sex marriage is wrong after hearing the arguments does so because that position makes sense to them. This is at least suggested by the high correlation between holding that same-sex marriage is wrong and a strong belief in the bible. For those who take their moral positions to answer to the bible, and who believe the bible should be interpreted a certain way (or, more likely they believe that the bible says directly that same-sex marriage is wrong), it makes sense to maintain the view that same-sex marriage is wrong. This is not to say that it will

make sense to others who do not share similar starting points of moral reflection. A person who rejects the authority of the bible will likely find this sort of position baffling.

If the standard for moral justification is something like wide reflective equilibrium, where justification is a matter of the back-and-forth consideration and modification of one's considered moral judgments, moral principles, and the best moral arguments, then the kind of reasoning that is necessary for a well-ordered moral capacity will also be sufficient for moral justification. If, however, we take the standard for moral justification to be deduction from a priori or self-evident first principles, or as Haidt might say, "pure logic," then the reasoning described here will not be sufficient for justification. There is not room in this paper to address this debate, so I will just say that wide reflective equilibrium seems right to me, in part because the process accurately describes what it is like for creatures like us to attempt to get our moral bearings. There is a nice match between what we can do and what is required by the normative theory, so it is consistent with the dictum "ought implies can." But secondly, I think it is right because it detaches the conditions of moral justification from the conditions for having moral knowledge. Wide reflective equilibrium allows us to be justified, without also claiming that we have objective moral knowledge. This is a much humbler position, and reminds us that no matter how much thought we have put into some moral question, we could still be wrong. It invites us to listen, to reflect, and do the best we can within our own limited perspective. That seems to me, the best we could hope for, and all we really need to undermine the skeptical conclusion.²⁷

Notes

1. See, Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” *Psychological Review* 108 (2001): 814–834; see, Jonathan Haidt and Frederik Bjorklund, “Social Intuitionist Answer Six Questions,” in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), *Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 181–218.; see, Jesse Prinz, *The Emotional Construction of Morals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
2. Prinz, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
3. See Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine, *op. cit.*; see Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 10 (2007): 279–295; see Valerie Tiberius, “Does the New Wave Moral Psychology Sink Kant?,” Kelly James Clark (ed.) *The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 336-350.
4. See Shaun Nichols, *Sentimental Rules* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); see Horgan and Timmons, *op. cit.*
5. See Haidt, *op. cit.*; see Haidt and Bjorklund, *op. cit.*; see Prinz, *op. cit.*
6. See Nichols, *op. cit.*; See Shaun Nichols, Shikhar Kumar, and Theresa Lopez, “Rational Learners and Moral Rules,” *Mind & Language* 31 (2016): 530-544.
7. See Susanne A. Denham, *Emotional Development in Young Children* (London: The Guilford Press, 1998).
8. See James J. Gross, “Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences,” *Psychophysiology* 39 (2002): 281–291; see Gaurav Suri, Gal Sheppes, and James J. Gross, “Emotion Regulation and Cognition,” in Michael D. Robinson, Edward R.

- Watkins, and Eddie Harmon-Jones (eds.), *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion* (London: The Guilford Press, 2013): 195–209.
9. See Haidt, *op. cit.*
 10. See Prinz, *op. cit.*
 11. See Erik G. Helzer, William Fleeson, R. Michael Furr, Peter Meindl, and Maxwell Barranti, “Once a Utilitarian, Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment Via the Robustness of Individual Differences,” *Journal of Personality* (2016).
 12. *Ibid.*, p 1.
 13. See Elliot Turiel, *The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality & Convention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
 14. See Joshua Greene, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen, “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” *Science* 293 (2001): 2105–2108.
 15. See Jesse S. Summers, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Scrupulous Agents,” *Philosophical Psychology* 28 (2015): 947–966.
 16. See Robert Rosenberger, “An Experiential Account of Phantom Vibration Syndrome,” *Computers in Human Behavior* 52 (2015): 124–131.
 17. See *Ibid.*
 18. See Kyla Stepp and Robert E. Thompson, “Change in Attitudes: What Causes People to Change Their Minds’ about Same-Sex Marriage?,” presented at *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting* (2013).

19. See N. Susan Gaines and James C. Garand, “Morality, Equality, or Locality: Analyzing the Determinants of Support for Same-sex Marriage,” *Political Research Quarterly* 63 (2010): 553–567.
20. See Haidt and Bjorklund, *op. cit.*
21. *Ibid*, p. 193
22. *Ibid*, p. 193
23. See Leland F. Saunders, “What is Moral Reasoning?,” *Philosophical Psychology* 28 (2015): 1–20.
24. Haidt, *op. cit.*, p. 822.
25. Nomy Arpaly, *Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
26. Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
27. I want to thank Jesse Summers for very helpful comments.