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The 1978 Winifred E. Weter Faculty Award Lecture



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Winifred E. Weter Faculty Award Lecture Seattle Pacific University

BECOMING:

A HISTORIAN'S PROSPECTUS FOR INTEGRATED LEARNING

William Woodward, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor of History

Seattle, Washington April 20, 1978

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Higher education in America suffers from a complex and perhaps inherently self-contradictory mission. The college experience has become a rite of passage, a time of vocational preparation, a time of exposure to fragments of the accumulated culture of the ages, a time to reinforce certain traditional American values and discard others.

The conflicting objectives have produced conflicting educational theories, in turn creating the paradox of increasing specialization on the one hand, and the idealization, if not the realization, of broad interdisciplinary learning on the other.

Seattle Pacific College has stressed the ideal of interdisciplinary study. It was routinely addressed in the faculty recruitment process. It was reflected in certain programs that spanned two or more specialized fields. It was an ideal firmly held, if not often satisfactorily achieved.

Now we are in the inaugural year of a new identity as Seattle Pacific University, a name change reflective of the reach, diversity, specialization, and professionalism of our curriculum. For Seattle Pacific University the interdisciplinary concept is inappropriate, unattainable and potentially disruptive and disillusioning.

That the heyday of the pure liberal arts college has apparently passed seems to support this idea. In the megalithic multi-versities, too, liberal studies suffer the same sad fate. Individual disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, history of course among them, report declining enrollments accompanied by declining morale. Rampant vocationalism, reinforced by the provincialism of a presentist, isolationist mind-set and a "romantic idolization of ignorant spontaneity" (to borrow William McNeill's apt phrase), has spurred the trend toward specialized and applied fields.¹ Demographic projections offer the promise of further declines. The advocate of liberal, trans-disciplinary learning increasingly appears anachronistic. So I call today for us consciously and explicitly to abandon the ideal of interdisciplinary studies.

I

Yet I am not suggesting that Seattle Pacific capitulate to the widely heralded malaise of contemporary academe. My intention in fact is quite the opposite. I urge that in joyful defiance of prevailing trends we at Seattle Pacific come together in renewed commitment to wholeness, and begin to define more precisely our unique identity and distinctive mission. Clearly we are no liberal arts college, no small, homogeneous academic enclave. Just as obviously we are no hodge-podge of vaguely educational enterprises linked merely by common name and bureaucratic superstructure. What we are, or rather what we can be, is a genuine *uni*-versity conspicuously integrated in purpose and program, faithful to our common evangelical commitment, hence a vivid contrast to the fragmented purposelessness of contemporary secular higher education. Ours, in short, is the exciting opportunity to invent (or perhaps more accurately re-invent) the Christian University.

With this heady prospect in view, I wish to use this forum to address two concerns. First, I seek to present my understanding of history as a distinctive way of knowing, and to suggest how this understanding contributes to the task of relating the study of history to Christian faith. But this confessedly preliminary personal synthesis should be seen, secondly, as one specific example of a larger prospectus for achieving genuine integration in the Christian University. I want to propose that integrated learning be based upon our common understanding of various ways of knowing, one of which is history; I want your response to clarify that common understanding.

"But wait," I hear you saying. A glaring contradiction seems evident. Within the space of a few introductory paragraphs I have rejected the concept of interdisciplinary study and advocated the ideal of integration. Am I playing silly little semantic games with you?

I don't think so. I believe there is a real and crucial difference between interdisciplinary and integrative learning. I am convinced that interdisciplinary efforts are illusory and counter-productive. Integration, on the other hand, is necessary, fruitful and attainable. My discussion begins, therefore, with this strategic distinction.

My reasoning rests on the psychological, philosophical and utilitarian impact of the two words.

Picture a raucous, crowded barnyard. Animals mill about contentedly, neighing and bleating and snorting and chirping and mooing at each other with a great deal of charm and amiability and, of course, a great deal of noise. Each beast in this pleasant but jumbled scene routinely returns to its own stall to feed in its own trough. But every once in awhile, equine boldness or porcine curiosity induces someone to nose about in the trough of another. To its great and satisfied surprise, there are some appetizing morsels to be had feeding elsewhere. But such adventuresome initiatives soon cease. For a chicken the unfamiliar cuisine is ultimately dissatisfying: goat chow can never be as appealing as good old familiar chicken chow. Goat feed is really just for goats, chicken feed really just for chickens.

Now that's what it means to be interdisciplinary: to masticulate the concepts of another field on occasion, to peek cautiously over the walls of a familiar and well defined intellectual stall in order to see if there is anything interesting or useful in another's domain, to negotiate over disputed territorial claims along a common boundary, perhaps, but eventually to return possessively to the familiar environs of one's own clearly defined habitat and content. The identity and "integrity" of the individual discipline is never compromised; the comfortable habit of traditional academic demarcations never upset.

But the conceptual fallacy of this interdisciplinary idea is precisely that it retains what it professes to transcend. What's going on in that academic barnyard is not chicking or sheeping or pigging (though perhaps some cowing and horsing around), it's *raising livestock*. And that is an integrative observation, not an interdisciplinary one. None of the individual animals, in short, will ever grasp that essential holistic perspective; only the farmer sees it that way. The word "interdisciplinary," I would argue, raises a certain set of images in our consciousness that subtly but materially differ from what we really want to do at a Christian Uni-versity. It may be acceptable for the large secular multi-versity to structure itself with rigid administrative and curricular walls between the disciplines, and thus feel reassuringly daring in speaking of interdisciplinary experiments. But if the Christian University is to be distinctively what it claims to be, the multi-versity understanding of interdisciplinary studies cannot be adequate. Hence we should abandon the term as we reject that understanding.

How then can we properly grasp the distinctive notion of integration? Escape from the barnyard, now, and go in to the city. You are attending the theater tonight. As the performance unfolds, you may become vaguely aware of the unobtrusive but essential role of various kinds of stage lighting devices. Each of those lights has a distinctive character, intensity, shading, focus, and purpose. One brilliant spotlight directs your attention to the main action, while a battery of soft floods quietly shapes your consciousness of the background set. Some lights fix on particularly important places, while others troop across the whole stage.

Each of those lights signifies a particular academic discipline, the play the whole of knowable truth. The existence of each field, by this analogy, is functional, not autonomous. It purposes to examine some aspect of a total reality, but with no pretension to exclusive domination of any compartmentalized aspect of the whole. A discipline may have a very narrowly defined area of coverage which it illumines brightly; another may offer a more panoramic, but less precisely defined, understanding. Exact boundaries are fuzzy; indeed, many fields overlap, and some may fully encompass others. But this results in complementarity, not competition. Most important, the lights are not on stage; they direct attention to what's happening on the stage. Without each light working properly your appreciation for the drama would be poorer. But you watch the play, not the lights--the play's the thing!

That's integration.

So I suggest a first step is to forsake references to "interdisciplinary"² and speak uniformly of integration. I think that simple matter of vocabulary will be psychologically more conducive to the task of transcending our specialties to apprehend the wholeness and unity of truth. I think it, too, more practically conducive to actually doing what our institutional objectives commit us to do. Instead of saying we engage simultaneously in the technical task of being interdisciplinary and the more nebulous and philosophical process of integrating faith and learning, we dissolve the artificial fact-faith dichotomy³ and affirm that the task of integration is one endeavor. This leads, thirdly, to the philosophical rationale for deciding to use the single term. Integration--a making whole or complete, a unifying--seems best to describe what our educational and Christian mission is all about. Our universe, at a Christian University, is no ill-sorted barnyard agglomeration, but a whole, a dynamic whole with a purposeful plot and an omnipotent Author-Director.

Integrated learning, then, ought to be our goal. What is involved in achieving integration? First we must truly and fully grasp the concept. Then we must unreservedly commit ourselves to practice this concept, not just profess it. We then must devise specific ways to perform this commitment.

What does integration mean? How can one apprehend the process of taking in the entire stage, of seeing the entire performance? Consider integration, first, as a progressive centripetal activity, beginning where the interdisciplinary endeavor ends, with programmed interaction between practitioners of specific fields. Interaction swirls into interconnection, then into interpenetration, and finally into unification.

To further clarify the concept, reflect on some linguistic cognates. To achieve unification of thought is to become like an *integer*, a whole number, etymologically speaking "untouched," thus intact, entire, whole. ("Intact" and "entire," incidentally, derive from precisely the same root.) Failing, however, is to face intellectual, social, and institutional *disintegration*, for the objective of wholeness is *integral*, essential to our mission. It must be pursued with *integrity*, an unreserved commitment and honest effort.

And integrity requires, once we understand the concept of integration, an explicit commitment, a commitment to live into the revised motto on the new University seal (Figure 1). This motto must become the mandate--Wholeness in Truth--that we all accept. And let no one misunderstand. Integration must become the very essence of the curriculum. Integration by definition cannot occur as a purely individual effort in a few isolated courses nor as an extra-curricular activity. Classroom prayer, chapel, warm collegial relationships, university position papers articulating Christian perspectives--all are important, but none substitutes for a consciously integrated curriculum. "Wholeness in Truth" must mean wholeness, in truth, indeed--not an abstraction but a new tradition. "Wholeness in Truth" demands an affirmation of the wholeness of truth: all truth is in fact God's truth.4 "Wholeness in Truth" requires wholeness in pursuit of truth, a committed community engaged in integrated instruction and integrated scholarship. Faithfulness is a concomitant expectation, wholeness in holding to the truth, even in extending our service to new audiences. And we are called, finally, to wholeness on behalf of the truth, unhesitating advocacy of the integrity and integration of theoretical and applied knowledge.

But I think most of us stand ready to affirm our commitment to integration. How to achieve it remains the nagging question. It is an awesome challenge, intellectually and administratively. It entails coordination of the various disciplines, discerning their relation to the totality of knowledge. It entails rigorous elaboration of the maxim that all truth is God's truth: how does unified knowledge intersect shared belief? It requires that each scholar grapple with how his own professional specialty and faith commitment interrelate.





The first step toward integrated learning, as I see it, is to begin where we are as individual scholars, visualizing our special perspectives as part of a vague but real integrated universe of knowledge. Indeed, I would contend, to be a good professional sociologist or physicist or historian, let alone a Christian one, one ought to be able to conceptualize how his own field, his own personal spotlight, sheds light on the whole of reality and thus contributes to generalized knowledge.

Once we as individuals lift our sights beyond the narrow confines of the discipline to embrace the wide horizons of knowledge, we can glance sideways at each other to perceive how individual perspectives complement and intertwine with each other. At this point, then, I would like to propose a specific strategy to accomplish this gradual comparative and interacting process, a strategy pointing ultimately to the tough practical questions of curriculum philosophy and design. The rest of the discussion will thus become an effort to illustrate this strategy using my own field of history.

The strategy is simply this. Let us begin formally to explore with each other the distinctives, as we comprehend them, of our respective approaches to knowing or modes of inquiry. Deliberately avoiding the epistemological and psychological foundations of how we know, *I propose*

that our integration begin at the basic level of identifiable ways of knowing.

A classic division in learning is the traditional polarities of the arts and the sciences--the two cultures of C.P. Snow. These then constitute an initial pair of ways of knowing; I will term these two approaches as imagination and empiricism. On the one hand man apprehends through an appeal to sensory response, on the other through a process of reasoning from sensory input. (We can add to these two basic categories, of course. Religious knowing, for instance, as David McKenna has pointed out,⁵ is a third culture on the Christian campus, adding moral content to the discipline of the sciences and the creative expression of the arts. Other distinct approaches will come to mind as well.)

I shall therefore present history as another identifiable way of knowing. I urge that this personalized, preliminary effort initiate the long process of sharing perspectives, refining concepts, and proceeding to the task of building an integrated curriculum. To understand history as one basic approach to knowing is just the beginning.

III

It is no startling new insight to declare that the academic discipline of history faces enormous difficulties. Child of an ahistorical generation, today's student seems suspicious of the patterns of the past, unimpressed by tradition and pattern in human affairs, largely apathetic about--or perhaps just overwhelmed by--great issues of public policy. The stampede away from exposure to cultural diversity and to the complexity and subtlety of rigorous thought carries the aura of an ideological crusade. In consequence, academic historians, like their colleagues in other liberal disciplines, wallow in a debilitating self-pity, immobilized by an often pedantic over-specialization.⁶ Creative synthesis is not only avoided, it is scorned; the exasperating anti-history bias of today's undergraduate thus not only goes unchallenged, it triumphs. Meanwhile, the abandonment of history requirements, once the source of a captive audience for competent professors, has created a philosophically and pedagogically atomized elective system that permits the great majority of students to elect not to take history.

To compound the problem, historians have failed to adjust. While some perceptive history professors offer curricular alternatives⁷ as at least a beginning counterattack, others merely point fingers--not always unjustly-or wearily surrender. For instance, recent reports⁸ belligerently lay the blame for student disenchantment with history on the public schools, where courses in contemporary social problems or an intellectually weak mishmash known vaguely as social studies have supplanted broad history offerings. On the other hand, the distinguished American historian David Donald seems disillusioned to the point of forsaking the field altogether. "If I teach what I believe to be the truth," Donald writes, "I can only share . . . my sense of the irrelevance of history and of the bleakness of the new era we are entering." Morosely capitulating to the myth of the "unprecedented age," he laments that the age of abundance has ended. "The people of plenty have

become the people of paucity." So, he concludes, "the 'lessons' taught by the American past are today not merely irrelevant but dangerous."⁹

Academic historians themselves must shoulder much of the blame for the trauma that brings one of the most brilliant practitioners of their craft to such despondency. Unable to build a convincing case that the study of history contributes to a coherent view of the world, they have forfeited any claim to relevancy in the minds of a presentist, new-narcissist generation. But the reports of history's demise are, like Twain's, greatly exaggerated. Interest in undergraduate history programs can revive, but only if the academic community--and academic historians in particular--fosters the resurgence. How can that occur? First, through a more optimistic appraisal of the existing appeal of history. Second, and more important, through a redefinition of the nature and value of historical study.

Hope for the future is not hard to find. There is a vigor in historical studies that belies the gloomy assessments.10 To be sure, part of the problem has been the narrow, specialized thrust of the profession; yet such concentration has begun to bring forth a host of new information using new types of evidence and new methods of accumulating and analyzing that evidence. Historians must now exploit these materials to construct a new interpretive synthesis.

But the greatest contradiction to the pessimism within the profession is the extraordinary boom in popular interest in history away from campus. But then history, you see, is like liver: it's good for you, but unless it is prepared and served properly, it can be horrible. But if selected carefully, prepared from the right recipe, and dished out in an appetizing portion, it can really be appealing. And that's what's happening beyond the cloisters of academe. In fact, if there is one current phenomenon more galling to history professors than declining enrollments, it is that lots of non-professional historians are making lots of money doing history. (Even other social scientists, professing awakened interest in what they call longitudinal studies, commandeer history and legitimate it by applying a jargonistic label and an esoteric quantitative approach. And *they* qualify for NSF grants!)

Consider the range of evidence for widespread interest in popular history.

Weed through your junk mail! Time-Life books has inaugurated a multivolume subscription series on "The Old West". It is a calculated appeal. Thousands of Americans devote their leisure hours (and surplus dollars) in pursuit of authenticated antiques or a complete and verified genealogical record, or read periodicals that cater to these and other leisure interests, including a genuine leisure interest in narrative history. Booksellers offer a considerable body of recent fiction to a greater or lesser extent based on history.¹¹

Even community activists have discovered the past. Civic-minded Seattleites find themselves bitterly divided over how many old Army buildings at Fort Lawton ought to be designated historic landmarks. Pioneer Square and Port Townsend also illustrate the burgeoning national movement to preserve the built as well as the natural environment. And travelers

flock to historic sites and museums that not only restore old structures but interpret their real-life historical context. Henry Ford, forever remembered--out of context--as the one who said history is bunk, left as his enduring legacy the popular Greenfield Village.¹² The DuPonts have given us the stunning mansion at Winterthur, Delaware; the Rockefellers' millions have made Colonial Williamsburg the center of important scholarship as well as a tourist mecca. Seattle Pacific's own Darwin Kelsey has created a living 19th century New England farm at Old Sturbridge Village, Massachusetts.

To dispel all doubt about the enduring fascination of the past, turn on your television, the unchallenged barometer of American popular taste. The nostalgic appeal of "Happy Days" triumphs in the ratings war. "How the West Was Won" reassures us that if James Arness rides again, the eternal verities of right and wrong must be back in place. More to the point, note the frequency and impact of the historically oriented specials. Television has discovered the lucrative market for the pseudo-historical "docu-dramas" that can convince you in an easy ninety minutes that McCarthy was a Hitlerian villain and King a saintly hero (or, in a decade or two, perhaps the reverse).13 The Afro-American experience, for better or worse, was indelibly outlined in the nation's consciousness by the remarkable weeklong series called "Roots." Switch to the Public Broadcasting System and the quality -dramatic and historical--improves: witness "The Adams Chronicles,"14 "Poldark," "I, Claudius," even "Upstairs, Downstairs." Clearly the market for history--if we do not demand too much accuracy, objectivity, or complexity in portraying human experience--is far from saturated.

The question remains, however, how to channel popular enthusiasm for historically oriented romantic drama of indifferent aesthetic and intellectual merit into serious study of history as an essential component of undergraduate education--and specifically for Seattle Pacific, as part of an integrated, Christian undergraduate education. That concern now prompts the attempt to define the distinctive nature and contribution of historical study in the context of the need for integrated learning at the Christian University.

History can be aptly understood as the collective memory of humankind. More formally, the academic discipline of history can be defined as the interpreted reconstruction of significant processes and sequences of events in the human past, derived from remains and records, and intended to be true. Observe the distinction between the reality--the historical event itself, an absolutely unique, unrepeatable, and unrecoverable phenomenon that the historian can never experience (unless as an original eyewitness, and then subsequently only in memory); the *remain* or *record*--the surviving evidence of the unrecoverable past event that may be a physical artifact or some sort of first-hand account; and the *reconstruction*, the intelligible presentation of the evidence.¹⁵ The definition stresses that history is reconstruction. It further highlights four elements of the character of legitimate history: (1) the <u>derivative</u>, (2) the <u>sequential</u>, (3) the <u>concrete</u>, and the subjective.

History, in short, is a secondhand business, and an evaluative business. It is the historian who selects, inteprets, assigns significance.

If history is collective human memory, it is the historian who determines what is in fact memorable--that is, what is both reconstructable and worth reconstructing. Both can change, of course, from era to era and from historian to historian. But the definition includes, as an essential restraint against total subjectivity and relativism, the addendum that the historian intends the reconstruction to be true. History is thus to be distinguished from myth and legend. And historical interpretations do not change upon mere whim, for historians borrow from--or critique--each other's research and insights in the continuing quest for demonstrable accuracy--a dialectical process shortly to be explored further. Moreover, history by and large is confined, in Jacques Barzun's phrase, to "the particulars of change within time and place." As we shall see, the <u>sequential</u> and <u>concrete</u> aspects of history that Barzun refers to provide additional limits to the subjectivity of the historian's interpretations.¹⁶

With this working distinction in mind, our next task is to examine history as a distinctive approach to knowing, characterized as <u>derivative</u>, <u>sequential</u>, <u>concrete</u> and somewhat <u>subjective</u>. Recall that my proposed strategy for integrated learning rests on just such an analysis of fundamental approaches to knowing, identifiable modes of inquiry or ways of thinking. Let us return to the classic dichotomy of the two cultures, first identifying the obvious distinctions between the approaches to knowing the arts and sciences, then suggesting how history both stands apart from and spans these mainstreams of human thought.

Let me hastily sketch, then, without detouring into a rigorous epistemological analysis, an idealized construct (see Figure 2) differentiating between art as a way of thinking and science as a way of thinking--or approach to knowing. The general approach to knowing of the arts, on the one hand, may be categorized as *imagination*, in contrast to the scientific approach, *empiricism*.¹⁷ More specifically, the arts seek to discern *insights based on* an emotional *response to personal experience*; the sciences seek to describe *findings based on observation* of external phenomena.

Furthermore, in the artistic pursuit of insights the scholar's purview is often *particularist*, that is, concentrated on a particular to express a universal. The process places high value on *originality and creativity* in discerning and expressing that larger principle. And the product will usually be communicated in a fashion that is *evocative and persuasive*. Imagination may be said therefore to operate in the province of the *archetypical*, motivated by a compelling vision of what ultimately is or ought to be, though often expressed in the guise of a particular character or subject or idea.

The purview of science, by contrast, is *reductionist*, limiting variables so as to arrive at a general statement that expresses a carefully circumscribed and narrowly controlled set of particulars. The scientific process depends on the *cumulation* of knowledge that is progressively reinforced by the *replicability* of experiments; scientific findings will in turn therefore be *descriptive and predictive*. Empiricism, lastly, is evidently confined to the province of the *typical*, in its patterned quest for the generalization or models that fit a set of particular observed phenomena.

In sum, the various fields in the arts and humanities are at bottom concerned, in my view, with what the universe is (and often what it ought

ARTS

IMAGINATION

SCIENCES

EMPIRICISM

I. Discern Insights

a Based on EMOTIONAL RESPONSE TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

b. Particularist

c. Originality, Creativity

2. Evocative and Persuasive

pursuit

purview

b. Reductionist

a. Based on

I.Describe Findings

OBSERVATION OF

EXTERNAL PHENOMENA

c. Cumulation, Replicability

product

process

2. Descriptive and Predictive

3.Archetypical (representative particulars) province

3. Typical (inclusive generalizations

WHAT THE UNIVERSE IS AND WHY WHAT THE UNIVERSE DOES AND HOW

Figure 2. Contrasting the arts and sciences.

to be instead)--and why. Disciplines of the natural and social sciences concentrate on what the universe does--and how.

Such an obviously simplified and perhaps artificial construct proves useful at least in defining the contrast between imagination and empiricism as ways of knowing. My purpose, however, is not so much to call attention to the great gulf fixed between the two cultures, but to illustrate the distinctive character of my own discipline, which I modestly submit may be one way to bridge the chasm. For where in this scheme would history fit? Historians have long agonized over this question of their identity. Do we belong with the humanities, where we might more readily indulge our individualistic tastes and preference for the impressionistic instead of the conclusive? Or do we yield to the greater prestige of joining the social sciences, where we can bask in modern civilization's worship of the certainties and rewards of science?¹⁸ This professional schizophrenia often breaks out into open warfare in professional meetings, as the self-assured quantifiers launch a cannonade of numbers and jargon against the literary types huddling bravely but anxiously in bunkers of traditionalism, armed with yellowing documents and an occasional timid value judgment.

For me this is a wrenching question, intensified and personalized whenever a colleague--an English professor, let us say--asks condescendingly why history isn't in the School of Humanities, the day after a compatriot in the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences--a psychologist, for instance--admits to having a difficult time defining the social sciences in a way that would include history. Hence I feel compelled for the sake of my own self-respect to venture an answer, which I hope will be received as irenic rather than arrogant. History, I must reply, belongs to both the humanities and the social sciences, and, therefore, to neither. A return to the chart of distinctions between the arts and sciences demonstrates this assertion (see Figure 3).

Some historians claim simply that they are "scientific in method, and literary in result." It would be more accurate to say that historians enlist science in the pursuit of evidence, and clothe their findings in the garb of literature. But more helpful is to examine history as a crossroads of the arts and sciences. History succeeds in reconstructing the past when it merges *both* imagination and observation so that each becomes a control and stimulus to the other. Empiricism harnesses imagination even as imagination stretches empirical investigation.

The historian engages in a task that may be described as seeking to discover actual instances within the record of human experience of the insights or findings identified in other scholarly disciplines. This endeavor is based, as we have seen, on an empathetic yet critical weighing of surviving evidence of the objective, external historical event. In a very real sense, then, in results as in sources, the historian's work is <u>derivative</u>. It is also eclectic. And this habit of borrowing the jealously guarded content of other fields extends to method, as well: the historian may use the tools of the sociologist to examine past society, or the anthropologist's techniques to interpret past culture, or the analytical and critical devices of the literary scholar to evaluate documentary materials.

ARTS

IMAGINATION

EMOTIONAL RESPONSE

I.Discern Insights

TO PERSONAL

EXPERIENCE

b. Particularist

a. Based on

HISTORY

imagination harnessed by empiricism empiricism stretched by imagination

"DERIVATIVE"

I.Discover Instances (of insights or findings)

a. Based on EMPATHETIC EVALUATION OF SURVIVING EVIDENCE

b. Wholistic

EMPIRICISM

SCIENCES

I. Describe Findings

a. Based on OBSERVATION OF EXTERNAL PHENOMEN

b. Reductionist

c. Originality, Creativity c. Evidentiary, Dialect ical

2. Evocative and Persuasive

"SUBJECTIVE" 2.Narrative or Explanatory Event or Symbol c. Cumulation, Replicability

2. Descriptive and Predictive

3. Archetypical

"CONCRETE" 3. Atypical

3. Typical (inclusive generalizations

(representative particulars)

"SEQUENTIAL"

WHAT THE UNIVERSE IS AND WHY WHAT THE UNIVERSE (OF MAN) HAS BEEN BECOMING - AND WHO, WHEN, WHERE

WHAT THE UNIVERSE DOES AND HOW

Figure 3. *History as a way of knowing*, in contradistinction to imagination and empiricism.

On the other hand, the historian recontextualizes the abstractions of other disciplines, since his purview is <u>holistic</u>, general, encompassing the total range of concrete human experience. Thus the historian, eclectic if not parasitic, deriving his methods and the vocabulary of his generalizations from other disciplines, and his insights and findings from evidence that intervenes between him and the event he wishes to reconstruct, provides the distinctive and essential service of returning the results of scholarship to the complex crucible of real-life time and place.

Not only must the historian's pursuit be <u>derivative</u>, it will also necessarily be <u>subjective</u> to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the topic and the available sources. But historians are not fantasizers. They strive for truth through a process that is *evidentiary and dialectical*. Like a lawyer in a courtroom, the historian marshalls the evidence to make the case for a particular conclusion. The judicial metaphor applies to the whole historiographical tradition. Alternative interpretations of past processes and sequences of events arise as historians unearth new evidence, bring new analytical tools to bear in evaluating the evidence, examine the evidence in the light of some new perspective, or just weigh the relevance and significance of the evidence differently. The dialogue continues indefinitely, with interpretations put forth, challenged, abandoned, and reprised--yet always preeminently tied concretely to the evidence.

To provide an example of current interest, consider our present understanding of the American Revolution. The Anglo-American colonies, "as every schoolboy knows," faced with the tyrannical acts of the British Parliament, heroically revolted to preserve their liberties. Well, not quite. Schoolboys rarely keep current with the state of the interpretive art. Beginning about the turn of the century, a group of historians challenged that simplistic nineteenth century patriotic view by pointing out, after prodigious research, that the British Empire wasn't so repressive after all. Moreover, asserted another group about the same time, the fundamental conflict was really a matter of simple economic self-interest: the well developed aspirations of the colonial merchant elite clashed with imperial interests. Of course, that meant that the great majority of Americans must have been manipulated into revolution by the propaganda and political maneuverings of the merchant class.

Now that view makes more sense, doesn't it? Or does it? It certainly did to the generation between the two world wars: they had witnessed a gradual Anglo-American rapprochement culminating in American intervention in World War I on the side of the historic British enemy paralleling the so-called Progressive Era in the United States when trust-busting, muckraking reformism focused attention on the confrontation of economic interests. Then, too, amid the disillusion and isolationism that followed World War I, Americans resurrected the idea that a conspiracy of financiers and arms manufacturers manipulated the United States into the war. In other words, the prevailing interpretations of the Revolution mirrored the general social perceptions of that generation of Americans. One could say, cynically, that historians weren't writing the history of the Revolution, they were writing contemporary social commentary. But one could as easily say that the historians' social milieu sensitized them to concerns formerly overlooked.

But then came World War II, and a new era of scholarship coincident with a new outlook. Historians began again to take seriously the ideas of the American colonists; ultimately the Revolution once more came to be understood as primarily a political conflict fueled by an ideology of classical republican virtue, and therefore as a conservative movement. Yet no sooner had this view achieved acceptance than younger historians, mobilized by the activist ethos of the sixties, began to argue that the Revolution was indeed revolutionary in social and economic as well as political and ideological categories. The explanatory battle continues to rage.¹⁹


This brief sketch of the ebb and flow of just one historiographical dialectic has hardly done justice to the nuances of interpretive analysis or the immense increase in types and quantities of evidence exploited over the last century of investigation. I trust, however, that it serves to illustrate how the evidentiary process, like an everlasting tennis volley, continues through stroke and counterstroke to come ever closer to a truly accurate reconstruction of the complex times of the 1770s.

But this does not yet exhaust our description of the attributes of historical study, although most historians would probably cite this advocacy process as the primary distinctive of their endeavors. It certainly highlights the way most sophisticated history professors teach their courses, especially at the graduate level. Still, it does not assuage the nagging doubts about the inroads of subjectivity. What is the character of the historian's product?

Here we observe how science and art come together in the field of history. The historian describes what happened in the past by evoking a sense of a bygone era, using retroactive prediction to pose and test hypotheses about the explanation of events. For example, to understand how and why the American Revolution occurred, a historian might postulate what evidence must exist to support (or refute) a proposed explanation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the outbreak of the revolt.²⁰ The ultimate reconstruction, moreover, may be presented as *narration or explanation* (or some intermixture), depending on purpose, sources and subject matter. And it may emphasize the event as objective *event* for its own sake *or* as *symbol*.

Thus the resolution of the subjectivity question finally comes with the intent and mode of presentation. Figure 4 illustrates graphically the continuum that extends from the more objective narration of historical events to the more subjective explanation or analysis of a past understood symbolically. A matrix of hypothetical (in some cases actual²¹) titles for studies of a sequence of events (the coming of the American Revolution) and a process (the westward movement in the United States) demonstrate how narrative, explanation, event, and symbol interact.²²

No matter how symbolic and explanatory the presentation, however, history as reconstruction of a memorable past remains preoccupied with <u>concrete</u> particulars; or, to put it another way, with the *atypical* and the unique. Historians, despite periodic pretensions to uncovering general laws of historical development, return to their distinctive concern for particulars of time, place, and person. Even the masters of computerassisted statistical analyses of population cohorts obtain their raw data



from tax lists, census records, wills, genealogies: each disembodied number, in short, signifies a real and unique individual, living in a certain place at a specified time, never to be replicated. No methodological innovation, no speculative excursus, no literary device can rob the historian of that unshakable bonding to the real, the unique, the concrete.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the historian's ultimate concern is what the universe has been becoming--and who, where, and when. History is a dynamic enterprise, swept along with the flow of human events, confronting the fact and the impact of continuing, unavoidable, inexorable change. But analytically change does not equate to disarray. Change occurs within the unidirectional dimension of time. Hence the discipline of history inevitably orients itself to <u>sequence</u>, and more specifically, to the sequence of change. David Trask aptly labels this as thinking "processionally, that is, in terms of time passing." He properly asserts that this is the "specific service of the historian."²³

History, in short, is *becoming*, and this, I would argue, is the essence of historical knowing. And it is more. It is the unique and indispensable contribution of history to other fields, and a fruitful starting point for integrated learning.

So to summarize thus far: history can be a vital, attractive part of an undergraduate program. Popularized forms of history thrive; their appeal can be brought on campus through a proper understanding of history's contribution as a way of knowing.

But for too long historians have dwelled on their content instead of their distinctive approach to knowing. Only with the realization that to get a job, the history graduate must sell his skills rather than his major have some spokesmen within the profession caught the vast vision of what historical training can provide. Writes one:

History's value is less in what historians know than in how they come to know, less in what they say than in how they see, less in their product than in their process and their understanding of it. The historian's way of seeing is crucial to society, and we should not retreat from spreading that mode of perception.²⁴

Modestly and tentatively on this basis, the historian, whose work admittedly derives from the knowledge and techniques of other fields, can now dare to approach his colleagues with a unique and helpful perspective. To the fine arts and humanities, history presents itself as a branch of literature analogous to photography in art. History is to fiction as the photograph is to painting. History and photography seek to portray objective, concrete reality creatively but truly. The accurate representation in each case is limited by such considerations as subject matter, composition, focus, available light, breadth and depth of field--the very terms become metaphors. History thus offers to the arts concrete context, the uncompromising corrective of objective evidence, a return to the particulars of actual human experience, a sense of development and process--the concept, in short, of *becoming*. Observe that the notion of becoming makes the photographic analogy more specific and apt. For it is not the still photo that images the historian's contribution, but the motion picture.²⁵ One may wish to freeze a frame for detailed analysis, but ultimately the historian's task is to run the film through. And at this point the historian can offer his services to the social scientist. Alfred Kuhn astutely proposes a "unified social science" concerned with three fundamental components: communication, transaction, and organization. The analytical posture, of course, is static; the historian adds the missing ingredient, change.²⁶ Against the tendency toward reducing behavior to elemental components understood as established regularities, the historian offers complexity and the dynamism of change as the film continues to roll.

And such modest contributions point to a bolder achievement. History, merging imagination and empiricism, holds out the promise of a reconciliation, if not a synthesis, of the two cultures. Now I harbor no conceit that history alone bridges the arts and sciences. Integration, not merely history, is the abiding burden of this discussion. Hence my exposition constitutes an invitation for each discipline to make the case for its own distinctive approach to knowing, its own value in fostering integrated learning.

But above all, at the Christian University integrated learning must occur when each of us scrutinizes what we do as scholars in our individual disciplines, understands that our specialized inquiries serve to illumine one part of a totality, and therefore consciously works toward understanding that totality as an integral whole. I suggest beginning by agreeing on the several basic approaches to knowing upon which all our specialized disciplines build. I have listed as a minimum imaginative knowing, empirical knowing, historical knowing, and religious knowing. Most would concede that language can be a distinct approach to knowing; perhaps non-linguistic symbols (numbers, physical expression) can also qualify. However finally defined, these ways of knowing, I submit, ought thus to form the ground of a thoroughly integrated core program in general education,²⁷ required of all students, flexible but not unstructured, buttressed by performance standards, and imbued with a values orientation. Only with such a visible, mandated curricular emphasis could we honestly boast of our commitment to "wholeness in truth."


Nevertheless, the task of integration is only half complete when we accomplish this overhaul of our curriculum. For Seattle Pacific it is not enough to become, uniquely, a Uni-versity. Our identity, as we all know and cherish, goes far deeper. It is for us not enough to share our various perspectives in lighting the stage, nor in grasping the total vision of the performance. Our commitments require us, rather, to come to grips with the meaning of the play, and to get to know the Director so intimately that His ultimate purposes mesh with our specific academic pursuits. Integration at Seattle Pacific is incomplete--indeed, is an outright fraud--if it does not include the integration of learning and the Christian faith. So now confront with me the difficult question of how to enlarge our integrative endeavor to encompass the integration of faith and learning. Actually, it is a twofold task, the specific case of Christian education differing from--but anchored in--Christian scholarship in general. What does it mean, first of all, to build an integrated curriculum permeated by the Christian perspective, incorporating courses--biology courses, art courses, history courses--taught in a manner that is distinctively Christian? And then secondly, what does it mean to be a Christian botanist, sculptor, or historian? Preliminary answers to the first question may well come to mind, but we often feel stymied by the second.

A fruitful way to seek some answers is to analyze possible approaches to integration. I identify four elements of integrated Christian education: the personal, the communal, the substantive, and the applied. Christian scholarship includes three aspects: the methodological, the analogical, and the philosophical. Contributing to both spheres and thus linking the two is a dimension I will designate the functional. Observe from Figure 5 that the logical relationship I have just outlined differs from the chronological order most of us follow as we strive to probe the depths of this vast subject. Note, too, the especially strategic location in both schematics of the functional and analogical aspects. I will explore these two in somewhat greater detail.

First, then, let us review briefly aspects dealing primarily with curriculum building and course instruction. Obvious but sometimes neglected is the personal dimension. To insure an integrated Christian educational experience, each one in the university community must submit to the obligations of personal discipleship, renewing his or her commitment daily, striving to mature in personal wholeness.²⁸ A key virtue to cultivate, since it so easily evaporates in the rarefied stratosphere of professional scholarship, is humility. Just as important is a clear demonstration of the reality of the Christian commitment of faculty members. Sometimes students just aren't sure about the vitality of our faith; we threaten them with our degrees and vocabulary, and often with the way we choose to express our commitment. I remember as a Christian college student I often wished one of my instructors would for once speak forthrightly about his Christian experience in the cliches with which I was comfortable. We as faculty must be models of mature Christian life and thought, to be sure, but we also need to take care to relate to students at the point of their present development, spiritually as well as intellectually.

Secondly, on the Christian campus as in the Christian churches, whole persons must come together in a whole community. This *communal* relationship among learners at the Christian university is another important component of effective integration, and a prerequisite to growth, witness, and service. Open communication, mutual loyalty, caring relationships, and sheer time spent together will facilitate the total interchange that supports a truly integrated learning environment. Let Seattle Pacific University be known as a community knit together by the Master's love.²⁹

The Christian spirit in each individual and in the community at large provides the proper setting for the integration of faith and learning, but



does not automatically begin the actual process of integration. Perhaps the point at which each of us as Christian teachers first ponder the implications of a distinctively Christian perspective is in deciding about the content of our courses. This is the substantive aspect of integration. In the Christian university we should not hesitate to be partisan without being propagandistic. Our courses ought to incorporate concerns and perspectives directly relevant to the Christian community, whether in the literature course that studies the works of C.S. Lewis, or in the political science course that proposes the life of William Wilberforce as evidence of the possibility of Christian statesmanship, or a reference to the New Jerusalem in an urban sociology course, or emphasis to religious developments from the Reformation to the missionary movement in a modern history course. Moreover, students must confront questions of values and belief from an explicitly Christian standpoint in any course. And most broadly, the curriculum should be carefully built upon a unified core cluster of foundational studies providing overall coherence to the entire academic program.

Lastly, the Christian university should relate learning to faith in the *applied* dimension. Integrated education ought to result in integrated service in Christ's name beyond the campus. Graduates as well as the present community ought to be engaged in such service, service understood in terms of vocation, ministry in the local church, missions, civic responsibility, compassionate care for human needs both local and global, and the offering of the human and material resources of the university to church and society. On campus, meanwhile, we must be pooling the resources of our respective specialties to develop a firm theoretical foundation for moral judgment and moral action. As a historian, for example, I might examine how and when justice and mercy have prevailed in human societies, contributing these insights as together we hammer out a fully Biblical rationale--from both Testaments--for an understanding of how Christians can serve as God's agents to press for a just and compassionate world order.

All of these activities can occur, however, without really integrating faith and learning at the most challenging and transforming level. It is when we examine how our faith commitment affects our scholarship that the true uniqueness of the Christian perspective and the process of integration at the Christian university really becomes meaningful.

The first aspect of integration in Christian scholarship is the *methodo-logical*. Not only must the Christian be as rigorous in his scholarship as any professional in the field, but his labors will be distinctively characterized by proper motivation, integrity and a firm commitment to excellence. The geographer or philosopher, for instance, who professes allegiance to the name of Christ will pursue research and reflection as an act of service to God and fellow man, not for personal or institutional prestige or advancement, not for peer recognition nor for professional "one-upsmanship."

In the investigatory process itself the Christian scholar must be a model of integrity, demonstrating profound reverence for God's creation and for the creative work of others, and genuine humility about the ultimate value of his own efforts apart from others' contributions. The Christian, furthermore, will not pursue some line of inquiry simply because the tools exist. Ethical questions about the sanctity of life or the right of privacy may intrude for the geneticist who confronts the moral implications of recombinant DNA research, or for the biographer who gains access to potentially destructive private papers. The Christian, moreover, must retain his unique constellation of values in the midst of a deeply imbedded but often pagan consensus that shapes modern thought. Thus the home economist will not succumb to the materialistic assumptions undergirding much of modern living, nor will the historian ignore past abuses of power that have shaped the contemporary world.

And the Christian cannot be sloppy in his research or presentation. The values of selflessness and service offer no excuse for mediocrity. Excellence for one's own sake, of course, is vanity, and excellence to impress or satisfy the expectations of others is elitist and pretentious. But, as William Peterson recently pointed out in another context, ³⁰ this does not imply that shoddiness is next to godliness. Rather, commitment to the Almighty Lord of Creation mandates excellence for His glory. Students and faculty alike must affirm that even in intellectual pursuits we are instructed to "work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men" (Col. 3:23 NIV).

Most of us will readily allow our faith commitments to shape the methodology of our scholarship. But the philosophical aspects of integration present a far more awesome challenge. Our researches rarely require us to devise an explicit, personal, Christian philosophy of communications or sociology or music or history. Too often the sheer magnitude and daring of such an inquiry discourages any faltering first steps. But the philosophical dimension cannot be ignored. It involves both analytical and critical elements. One must first analyze the often implicit philosophical foundations of the field to identify categories for critical examination.

To use the personal example: historians, I will quickly discern, engage such ultimate concerns as the nature and impact of individual behavior, the grounds for human values and moral judgments, the possibility of objectivity, and the role of Providence or chance in human events. Most historians will never address these issues directly, of course, but their personal "control beliefs" (to borrow Nicholas Wolterstorff's term³¹) will shape their analysis. E.F. Schumacher has pointed out the naturalistic, positivist, and evolutionary orientation of much of modern thought. Others have developed an analysis and critique of these thought-forms from a Christian standpoint; a particularly impressive example is philosopher Stephen Evans' work on the social sciences.³² As a Christian historian I too should expose and criticize the control beliefs underlying contemporary historical analysis. And I need to explore the theoretical and practical implications of the fact that my own work originates from an entirely different set of assumptions. On my own I may be inadequate to this strategic task; in the combined resources of the scholarly community at the Christian university, however, ought to be found a basis for such analysis and criticism.

Wrestling with the deep philosophical questions will remain, then, as a formidable ongoing responsibility of the Christian scholar. Reflection on the *functional* dimension of integration, however, poses a less overwhelming challenge and promises more immediate fruits. Indeed, consideration of the functional component of integration can ease the process of confronting the philosophical issues. "Functional" refers to the mutual service specific fields of learning and Christian commitment can offer each other. After a

careful assessment of the general value derived from study in a discipline, one can then specify how that study will enhance Christian faith, and, conversely, how a Christian perspective can aid the study of that field.

Again the personal case: how can the study of history serve my faith commitment, and how can my faith serve my historical scholarship? Before answering I need to determine what value accrues from studying history. If history is human society's collective memory, then the benefits of memory can, by analogy, point to the value of history. Why do I prize my capacity to remember? Memories often bring pleasure: an agreeable occasion is recalled and relived. More important, memory helps define identity by retaining images of past influences--environmental, circumstantial, and personal. Remembered experiences provide perspectives from the past to guide present action, and also serve an ordering and rationalizing function in coping with new experience. Perhaps most significant of all, memory gives awareness of existence in time, just as the convergence of images from both eyes gives depth perception, or awareness of existence in three-dimensional space.

The study of history yields similar benefits: diversion, cultural identity through an understanding of heritage, background on present events coupled with a sense of responsibility to the community, integration of the many facets of human experience, and perhaps most importantly an awareness of change through time.

How then can history serve faith? By providing perspective on self, on mankind, and on revelation. How can faith serve history? By clarifying such significant areas as the purposefulness of historical study, the process of historical interpretation, and ultimate meaning in the human experience. Let us examine each of these in turn.

History serves faith, first, by providing perspective on self: by aiding self-understanding. A proper awareness of the vast landscape of human experience through the ages enlarges and enhances one's identity. Who am I?-that enduring fundamental question of the human mind can be answered in part through study of the past. I am the product of a distinctive national and cultural heritage. I also belong to the even more ancient heritage of the Christian church, comprising a great company of witnesses, in the imagery of the twelfth chapter of Hebrews. My identity clarifies further when I contrast my own heritage with other cultural traditions past and present, since I escape the temptation to "universalize from one's own time and place," and confront the reality of "change within the framework of continuity."³³ Through both identification and differentiation, in sum, I come to a fuller appreciation of who I am.

But identity is only one part of self-understanding. History helps to clarify not only identity, but also responsibility. Study of the past exposes a panoramic vista of a perennially broken world, a world in which Christ calls us to render to Caesar and to rescue Caesar's victims. "The poor you have with you always," said Jesus. It was a statement not of surrender to the inevitable but of enduring obligation. That the poor remain despite advances in technology and human organization is quite clear to the student of history, who thus comes to better understand the context in which to exercise Christian responsibility. In a world irreparably flawed by sin, human need persists. The story of man becomes an unavoidable plea for the

act of love and the message of peace that are the core of the Christian gospel. History, the all-encompassing record of human experience, provides the most vast and challenging answer to the question "Who is my neighbor?" Historical perspective, therefore, is essential equipment for those whose mandate is the Great Commission.³⁴

Self-understanding--a sense of identity with a sense of responsibility-thus leads to an awareness beyond self; the self-view requires a world view. And history provides not only perspective on self but, secondly, a perspective on man. History serves faith through validating the Biblical understanding of man and society. Civilizations may expect to enjoy some measure of progress, history allows us to say, but violation of certain fundamental principles of human relations can threaten disintegration of the political and social order. And well-intentioned, progressive innovations can inflict unanticipated side effects that become the target for the next wave of reform. Thus an appreciation for the past steers one away from utopianism on the one hand and despair about the human prospect on the other, away from the paralysis of nostalgia and the rootlessness or presentism.³⁵ And a proper understanding of history precludes both cultural arrogance and cultural relativism. Historical understanding fosters acceptance of cultural diversity across time and space without a naive, value-free sentimentalism that lets any cultural form be self-authenticating.

Most broadly, historical awareness permits synthesis in thinking about human existence by integrating the whole range of human life and culture, as we have seen, in developmental inter-relationship. Indeed, history's special contribution to the task of organizing a coherent understanding of the nature of things is to tie one's personal world and life view concretely to actual events.

Thirdly, history serves faith by providing perspective on revelation, the self-disclosure of the Creator. Since all truth is God's truth, truth discovered (in any field) amplifies truth revealed. History becomes particularly relevant since it is the matrix both for God's sovereign acts and for God's self-disclosure. "I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," proclaimed Yahweh. "I am the God who brought you out of Egypt." The eternal, infinite God whose name -- "I am that I am "-- transcended time and space chose to couch his revelation in concrete historical context; history was the revelatory referent for the changeless God of Israel. And the Incarnation, the culmination of God's revelation of himself to man, 36 was itself a historical event, indeed the intersection of history and eternity. Hence it is no surprise that the Apostles rooted their faith in the historicity of the person and work of the Incarnate Son of God.37 Nor is it surprising that Jewish and Christian rituals have a fundamental historical content: the Lord's Supper, like Passover, is a sacrament of commemoration as well as present commitment.

Moreover, since God has chosen to relate to humanity within the bounds of time and space, we can better know Him through knowing historical contexts such as the rise of the Jewish nation, or the character of the first century Roman world, or the development of the Christian church. And certainly when the historical setting is understood, the Scriptural revelation itself becomes more vivid and meaningful, while the authentication of the Biblical narrative by external sources increases our confidence in its message.³⁸ These are some ways in which history serves faith. Now what of the converse: how can faith serve history? In what way will my Christian commitment shape my performance as a professional historian? First, faith gives purposefulness to historical study. The Christian view of man legitimates the joy of human intellectual pursuit in general, and the quest for an understanding of the past in particular. To understand the human creature as imaging the Creator, capable of rational thought (including memory) and aesthetic sensitivity as well as spiritual experience, liberates one from the tyrannizing shackles of present material necessity. Historical study is not a waste of time. Reflecting on the past does not result in futile intellectualizing.

Moreover, if history serves faith by explaining the persistence of human need, faith serves history by demanding a response to that need. The response may take the form of strengthening fellow believers, calling the unbeliever to commitment, or caring for the hurts of another. Whatever the response, it stems from the inescapable fact that God assigns his work in history to us as His ambassadors, charging us to reach out to a desperate world as salt and light--retarding corruption and proclaiming the message of reconciliation.³⁹

More controversially, one's faith will, secondly, shape one's historical interpretation. The historian's personal assumptions about the behavior of man and society will, you will recall, infuse historical reconstruction with a subjective quality. The Christian historian will follow the implications of his beliefs in interpreting the historical evidence, for if truth discovered amplifies truth revealed, the reverse is also true. Faith shapes selection of topic, investigatory approach, evidence and emphasis. Faith also informs inference and judgment. One way in which the Christian has an edge, in fact, is in empathizing with personalities in the past, since he knows the essential character of man: fallen yet redeemable. No evolutionary assumption about the inevitable improvement of human nature or the perfectibility of human society will warp the Christian's critical appraisal of the weaknesses in past human endeavor. The Christian historian can demonstrate the tragic inadequacy of well-intentioned human actions to cope with complex social and political problems, especially in times of crisis.

Faith also instructs the Christian historian that God is in control of events, sovereignly acting as sustainer and judge of the universe. The specific application of this concept of Providence becomes a very delicate matter, however. To what extent can I presume to perceive God's active and direct intervention to alter the course of history? It becomes a meaningless truism to say that God works in every event, but to deny that Providence exists is to repudiate the efficacy of prayer. Yet do I as a scholar dare to decide where God's actions specifically shape human events? I confess I have not resolved this dilemma. But at this point in my thinking I want at least to affirm this: where God's character and God's purpose are evident in the unfolding affairs of humankind, there God is directly and visibly exercising his Providential care. In short, where justice and mercy prevail, God's hand is at work; by implication, where justice and mercy are violated, God will intervene to judge, eventually if not immediately. This view allows for God to harden the heart of Pharaoh, to direct the annihilation of the Canaanites, to raise up Cyrus, and yes, to raise up a Hitler and secure his

downfall, without portraying Him as arbitrary or history as deterministic. Admittedly it is a profoundly difficult problem, one which has been answered in vastly different ways by different Christian historians.⁴⁰

The Christian historian, moreover, will approach his field with the whole sweep of human experience in mind, recognizing that history is teleological, a meaningful whole. This brings us to the third way in which faith serves history: by revealing the ultimate purpose underlying the course of human events.

The Christian view of the world explains that history has an origin and a destiny, with the Incarnation as pivotal event. Thus there is meaning and relevance in human personality. Individual choice is a real possibility, not a mere convention that obscures a basic genetic or environmental determinism. The drama of history unfolds, for the Christian, in an atmosphere of hope.⁴¹ The Christian view of history thus sees history as, yes, *becoming*.

The *functional* aspect of the integration of faith and learning, exploring both how scholarship can serve faith and how faith influences scholarship, has thus brought us--at least in terms of our specific example of the discipline of history--to the *analogical* aspect. The final way to go about relating scholarly work to faith is to delineate some conceptual model or organizing idea, based on a distinctive approach to knowing, that applies epistemologically or functionally to both one's faith and one's scholarship, transferring analogically from one sphere to the other.

Understanding history as a way of knowing not only assists in integrating the disciplines, therefore, it also contributes to the process of integrating faith and learning. I have identified the idea of "becoming" as the essential distinctive of historical knowing, and the most basic contribution of historical awareness to human thought. Let me specifically examine in conclusion how the notion of "becoming" bridges the historian's scholarship and the historian's faith.

History is the story of what has been becoming, I have argued: the study of the flow of change in the particulars of concrete human experience through time. Now I want to assert in addition that the concept of "becoming" is an essential distinctive of the Christian way of looking at things. This concept merits further exploration and elaboration beyond what I will develop here. For now let me identify some implications of "becoming" as a Christian idea. Christian experience, I believe, involves becoming insofar as it is processional, incarnational, teleological, and integrational.

Christian experience is processional. Things change. Time moves forward. The relationship between God and man is never static. Instead, Christians are called to grow, to mature, to *become* more like Christ. Forgetting those things--triumphs or failures--that are behind, I press ahead to the goal, daily renewed and freshly challenged. Christianity is a relationship, and thus ever changing, continuously developing. All of human experience, moreover, must be viewed in the same dynamic perspective. Growth and decay both happen; thus neither the grinding determinism and fatalism of a cyclical view of history nor the evolutionary assumptions of indefinite progress are adequate models for a Christian understanding of human existence. This is true because all of history was altered by the Incarnation. When God became a man in the person of Jesus Christ, time and the timeless became linked together. For the Christian no discontinuity exists between ultimate spiritual reality and concrete historical experience, no hierarchy of being demeans or denies material existence. Christ became a man, so that man could become like Christ, clothed in His righteousness, acceptable to the Father.⁴²

And this process of becoming is not endless, for the Christian experience is teleological. "There is coming a day," the Christian affirms, when all will be fulfilled. History will culminate, the present order of existence will be altered, bringing both final redemption and final judgment. The becoming will conclude when the believer realizes the full possession of what is now held only potentially by virtue of his position in Christ. We shall, in short, *become* what we are: we shall become like Him, for we shall see Him as He is.⁴³

Finally, we not only know that history will end, but toward what goal history is moving. And that goal, appropriately, is integration. The fundamental fact of human existence is alienation: from self, from the rest of the human race, from God. God's business is to reconcile, to make one, to integrate the creation once again. God's intention, Paul reveals (Eph. 1: 9-10), is to unite, to integrate, all things in Christ. That cosmic purpose includes a plan for each one who is "called according to his purpose," that is, to be "conformed to the image of His Son" (Romans 8:29-30), both individually and collectively (Eph. 4:13). History as God sees it, in short, is a process of humanity becoming whole.

Integration in Christian perspective, it may be added, recognizes diversities within the overall coherent unity. In becoming whole, in becoming one, we are not becoming identical. Scripture uses the image of the body-one, with differing parts--to illustrate this fact. And doesn't a unity of diversities seem to be an apt description of the Christian university? Becoming an integrated entity of unified diversities is, in sum, what learning is all about.

And it is what history is all about. And it is what Christianity is all about.

V

Integration, therefore, is not a luxury for the Christian, or for the Christian university. It is not just one option. It is not a noble but unrealizable ideal. The radical task of demonstrating the wholeness of learning within a community of Christians is, I submit, mandatory upon us all.

And so I give you this my vision for integrated learning, my dream for what we can and should become as a Christian *uni*-versity. I have stressed that integration of the specialized disciplines and integration of faith and learning are two facets of the same single, solid goal: integrated integration, if you will. Integrated learning, I contend, views

all knowledge as one. It should be pursued through progressive clarification of the half-dozen or so basic ways of knowing. It must be the primal motivation for Christian scholars as they engage in their professional specialties. And it must be programmed into the curriculum of the Christian university.

To summarize: two different, though not mutually exclusive, readily acknowledged approaches to knowing are imagination and empiricism. History as a way of knowing--both art and science and neither art nor science--can bridge that classic bifurcation. I have contended that the distinctive dimension of historical knowing that facilitates this bridging, and thus the distinctive contribution of historical knowing to the process of integration, is its focus on the processional, or developmental--its emphasis on becoming.⁴⁴ History will therefore be one key component of an integrated curriculum.


What would a curriculum designed for integrated learning, and premised on Christian commitment to wholeness in truth, look like? Figure 6 suggests one way to visualize it. Observe that it must be explicitly tailored to reinforce the centrality of the historic Christian commitment of the institution. All programs would emanate from that source, a pulsating transmitter, beaming outward to the fringes of the university service area.

The integrated Christian curriculum would, in consequence, begin with a common core of foundational studies, giving full-bodied expression to the central commitment and extending to penetrate every university activity. It would build upon the foundational core with an integrated basic program in general studies, flexible but coherent, rooted in understanding of the various approaches to knowing. It would include as part of the general requirements a developmental sequence of learning and living skills, skills in language, analysis and critical reasoning, quantification, civic participation. (We should never discard that historic, fundamental ideal of liberal learning: to be able to discriminate between good and bad, to be able, as Harold MacMillan loved to say, "to detect when a man is talking rot."⁴⁵) The general studies program, moreover, would demand of all students competent awareness of the content of the four broad divisions of the liberal disciplines (humanities, fine arts, social science, and natural science).⁴⁶

Upon this foundation the curriculum would build a wide range of specialized professional programs, permeated by the integrative base yet competent to address the demands of an overspecialized world. Upon this foundation, too, would be constructed extended service programs for diverse audiences. Finally, the curriculum would provide at every step an emphasis on application, commissioning the integrated learner for reconciling service in a broken world.

Such an integrated curriculum must, of course, be supported by rigorous, integrated scholarship and, most important of all, a vibrant, deeply personal, integrated Christian community.

It is admittedly a bold and far reaching challenge to balance these three concerns, but then that has ever been the test of faith. Scripture and history record examples of the epic deeds of faith. Where, the church now asks, "have all the high-risk ventures gone?"⁴⁷ Let it be said of our work here that we took the great risk, to gain the great reward, of integration.



That is my vision for integrated learning at Seattle Pacific University.

So, my colleagues, receive this university year lecture as an affirmation of one colleague's conviction and vision, and yes, as a tribute to a beloved Christian educator, Winifred Weter--but as more: as an invitation. An invitation to become more historically minded, to include historical knowing in your cognitive repertoire. An invitation, too, to teach me about your distinctive mode of inquiry. In short, may we engage each other, first of all, in free and rigorous explication of our respective approaches to knowing, so that we can then, secondly, confront our students with the prospect-indeed the assignment--of truly integrated learning--of wholeness in truth. Then may we proudly in the name of the Christ we serve affirm that we have indeed *become*, and are continuing to *become*, a university in fact as in name--and yes, uniquely a Christian *uni*-versity. ¹ William H. McNeill, "Studying the Sweep of the Human Adventure," <u>Chronicle of Higher Education</u>, January 30, 1978, p. 32. Carl G. Gustavson, "The Historiography of Blue Books," American Historical Association <u>Newsletter</u>, 16 (Jan. 1978), 7-9; "Crisis in the Liberal Arts," <u>Newsweek</u>, Feb. 6, 1978.

² Some might object that discarding the term "interdisciplinary" might imply that individual disciplines retain no separate validity. "Cross-disciplinary" or "trans-disciplinary" have been proposed as alternate labels; neither satisfies me. For those needing reassurance that the identity of particular fields will not be dissolved altogether in my proposal, I offer "metadisciplinary" to describe what ought to be done.

³ The "chief obstacle" to justifying "belief in the possibility of religious knowledge," writes Jerry Gill in his provocative work <u>The Possibility of</u> <u>Religious Knowledge</u> (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), pp. 7, 13, is "the epistemological dualism underlying all modern thought" that posits "an unbridgeable gulf between the domains of fact and value."

⁴ See Arthur Holmes, <u>All Truth is God's Truth</u> (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977).

⁵ David L. McKenna, "The Three Cultures," address at Spring Arbor College, 1968.

⁶ Laments McNeill ("Human Adventure"): "As a result of decades of increasingly arcane specialization, professional historians in the United States are seldom capable of thinking seriously about how best to present their subjects to undergraduates at an introductory level." <u>Newsweek</u> ("Crisis in the Liberal Arts") adds the other side of the coin: "The old requirements for broad study have all but disappeared, replaced by pre-professionalism, specialization, and a general sense that college students should be allowed to study whatever they please."

⁷ See, for example, McNeill, "Human Adventure"; John E. Wills, "History and its Audience: A Course and a Concept," AHA <u>Newsletter</u>, 16 (Feb. 1978), 5-8; or any number of the journal <u>The History Teacher</u>. Perhaps the most promising approach is a full reappraisal of the objectives of undergraduate education, such as Harvard's recently reported proposal: "Harvard Weighs Plan to Reform College Curriculum," <u>Chronicle of Higher Education</u>, March 6, 1978, pp. 1, 15-18.

⁸ Richard Kirkendall, "The Status of History in the Schools," <u>Journal</u> of American History, 62 (Sept. 1975), 557-570.

Notes

⁹ David Donald, "Our Irrelevant History," <u>New York Times</u>, Sept. 8, 1977, reprinted with responses by Edward L. Keenan and Blanche Wissen Cook in AHA <u>Newsletter</u>, 15 (Dec. 1977), 3-5. My objection to social studies is not intended as a general indictment, though I have deep personal reservations, based on limited personal experience, about the way "social studies" is conceptualized and taught. See the brief criticism of Edwin Fenton's <u>The New</u> <u>Social Studies</u> (New York: 1967), in George Q. Flynn, "History and the Social Sciences," <u>The History Teacher</u>, 7 (May 1974), 442; also Lester D. Stephens, "From History to Social Studies," AHA <u>Newsletter</u>, 15 (April 1977), 9-11.

10 Just one source of examples for the range of the "new histories" may be found in a two issue sequence of <u>Daedalus</u>: Winter 1971 (titled "Historical Studies Today") and Spring 1971 (titled "The Historian and the World of the Twentieth Century").

ll For example: <u>American Heritage</u>, <u>Americana</u>, <u>American History Illustrated</u>, among periodicals; two sample novels are James Michener, <u>Centennial</u> (New York: Random House, 1974); and E.L. Doctorow, <u>Ragtime</u> (New York: Random House, 1975).

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12 James J. Flink, <u>The Car Culture</u> (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1975), pp. 72-74, explains the context and significance of Ford's "unwittingly sophisticated" remark. Ford's objection was to the way conventional history was written, as the saga of wars and great political leaders bearing little relevance to contemporary life and issues.

13 Mark Harris has written an incisive critique that somehow got printed in the TV viewer's Bible: "Docudramas Unmasked," <u>TV Guide</u>, March 4, 1978, pp. 6-10.

14 Distinguished historian Richard B. Morris was not gentle in his critique of the highly touted "Adams Chronicles": "The Diplomacy of the American Revolution from the Outside and the Inside," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations <u>Newsletter</u>, 7 (June 1976), 1-8.

15 I am indebted to Earle Cairns for first sorting out my thinking about these distinctions. Cairns adds a fourth category, history as *research*, and links the overall categorization to cognate words in Latin, French, and German. See Earle E. Cairns, "Christian Faith and History," in <u>Christianity and the</u> <u>World of Thought</u>, ed. Hudson T. Armerding (Chicago: Moody Press, 1968), pp. 149-164.

16 Barzun, <u>Clio and the Doctors: History, Psycho-History, Quanto-History</u> (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1974). Barzun singles out narration, chronology, concreteness, and memorability as the distinctives of history.

17 Some might prefer "intuition: or "creative expression" to "imagination." My category of the arts, no matter what label is chosen, includes the disciplines in the fine arts and humanities. Similarly, the sciences include the human or social as well as the natural sciences.

18 "A premium of prestige has been placed upon the technical, the empirical, the specialized, and the saleable." McKenna, "The Three Cultures," p. 1.

19 The literature is vast. A good place to start for interpretations up to the mid-1960s is Jack P. Greene, ed. <u>The Reinterpretation of the American</u> <u>Revolution</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), introduction. See also Greene's "The Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and an Interpretation," <u>Political Science Quarterly</u>, 88 (1973), 1-22. The most recent addition to the debate is Joyce Appleby, "The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology," <u>Journal of American History</u>, 64 (March 1978), 935-958. A good introduction to the views of Bernard Bailyn, focus for much current analysis, is this essay: "The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation," in <u>Essays on the American Revolution</u>, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 3-31.

²⁰ Such a rigorous "scientific" methodology is not always followed explicitly, of course.

21 Ray Allen Billington, <u>Westward Expansion</u> (4th ed.; New York: MacMillan, 1974); Bernard Bailyn, <u>The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution</u> (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1967); Henry Nash Smith, <u>Virgin Land</u>: <u>The American West as Symbol and Myth</u> (New York: Random House, 1950).

²² One might complain that the more subjective use of history as symbol weakens the earlier contention that history is distinguished by its attention to the concrete. Indeed, some historians would agree that when their colleagues indulge in explanatory generalization at the expense of straight-forward narration they are no longer doing history. My present response to this knotty problem simply reiterates that even at the most subjective end of the continuum, historians still strive for truth, and still base their conclusions on hard evidence of concrete events.

²³ Emphasis in original. In contrast to processional thinking, Trask explains, others who look at the post--political scientists, archeologists, demographers--"think structurally, that is, . . . eliminate the time factor" by delineating the structure of politics or populations at a given instant in time. Trask goes on to suggest historians ought to be contributing to policymaking as prophets, i.e., as those who anticipate contingently, since "the very nature of historical thought, concentrating as it does on the analysis of continuity and change, confers upon historians not only unique perspectives on the future but special prophetic abilities." "A Reflection on Historians and Policymakers," The History Teacher, 11 (Feb. 1978), 221-225.

²⁴ Robert H. McKenzie, letter to the editor of AHA <u>Newsletter</u>, 15 (Nov. 1977).

²⁵ Trask, "Historians and Policymakers," p. 222.

²⁶ Kuhn, <u>Unified Social Science: A System Based Introduction</u> (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1975). Kuhn deals with change but seems a bit uncomfortable with it: see esp. pp. 5, 448-464. See also Flynn, "History and the Social Sciences"; Carl Landauer, "Toward a Unified Social Science," <u>Political</u> <u>Science Quarterly</u>, 84 (1971), 563-583. 27 A somewhat similar approach is now under study at Harvard. A task force report calls for a core curriculum to "encourage a critical appreciation of and informed acquaintance with the major approaches to knowledge . . . in other words, to . . . acquire basic literacy in major forms of intellectual discourse." Five areas are identified: Literature and the Arts, History, Social and Philosophical Analysis, Science and Mathematics, and Foreign Languages and Cultures. It is interesting to note that, in addition to getting its own category, historical study is an explicitly recognized component of three of the other four areas. See <u>Chronicle of Higher</u> Education, March 6, 1978, pp. 1, 15-18.

28 In my view, discipleship and personal wholeness are to be understood developmentally, as processes in which the Christian is continually engaged (Phil. 1:6), defined by the obligations to (1) glorify God (Eph. 1:6,12,14; I Cor. 10:31) through (2) becoming conformed to the image of Christ, our model of holiness and servanthood (Rom. 8:29; II Pet. 1:2-8; Eph. 4:12-16), and thus (3) bearing fruit (i.e., reproducing Christlikeness in others) through example, witness, and service (Eph. 2:10; John 15:1-16). I further believe that this growth is to occur in the context of the Christian community, through maturing, mutually accountable relationships (Rom. 15:14; Gal. 6:1-4).

29 And thus as a community of the Master's true disciples (John 13:35).

30 Peterson, "Thinking Big," Eternity, Feb. 1978, pp. 39-40.

31 Nicholas Wolterstorff, <u>Reason Within the Bounds of Religion</u> (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976), 11-13 and passim.

32 E.F. Schumacher, <u>Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 88-89; C. Stephen Evans, "Christian Perspectives on the Sciences of Man," <u>Christian Scholar's Review</u>, 6 (1976), 97-113; Evans, <u>Preserving the Person: A Look at the Human Sciences</u> (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1977); M. Howard Reinstra, "History, Objectivity and the Christian Scholar," <u>Fides et Historia</u>, 10 (Fall 1977), 7-25; Roger C. Sider, "The New Biology in Search of a Soul," <u>Christianity Today</u>, Feb. 10, 1978, pp. 20-24; Rheinnallt Nantlais Williams, <u>Faith</u>, Facts, History, Science, and How They Fit Together (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1973).

33 Gustavson, "Blue Books." George Marsden quotes C.S. Lewis in this regard: "We need," Lewis told a group of students just after the outbreak of World War II, "intimate knowledge of the past . . . because we cannot study the future, and yet need something to set against the present. . . ." One who "has lived in many times . . . is therefore in some degree immune from the great cataract of nonsense that pours from the press and the microphone of his own age." "Learning in Wartime," quoted by Marsden, "A Christian Perspective for the Teaching of History," in <u>A Christian View of</u> <u>History?</u>, ed. Marsden (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), p. 33.

34 Note that Jesus' answer to the challenge ("who is my neighbor") to his edict to love neighbor as self (Luke 10:25-37) was the parable of the Good Samaritan. One's neighbor is someone from an alien race, culture, and religion, in an enemy nation.

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³⁵ "One of the privileges of youth," William McNeill wryly observes, "is to believe that the world began with one's own consciousness of it. . . One of the privileges of age is to know that the world is much older than the young think and that schemes for reform regularly develop unforeseen side effects, with the result that today's solutions generate tomorrow's problems, world without end." McNeill, "Human Adventure." James Flink's The Car Culture illustrates vividly this tendency for unforeseen side effects to develop out of presumed panaceas.

³⁶ The writer to the Hebrews (1:1-4, 2:16-18) forcefully argues the immense significance of Christ come as a man. John in his first epistle makes a belief in that a test of faith.

³⁷ See, for example, II Pet. 1:16-18; I John 1:1-3; and especially Paul's argument in I Cor. 15:1-20.

³⁸ I am not suggesting that apologetics is the sole, or even the main, function of archeology and ancient history, nor am I at this point taking sides in the current inerrancy debate, though my sympathies are firmly with those who claim (following Arthur Holmes' objection to double negatives) that the Scriptures are wholly true and reliable. What is crucial is to observe that the historicity of the origins of Christianity may be tested under the criterion of falsifiability; see, for a fine illustration of my point, Paul L. Maier, The Empty Tomb as History, May 28, 1975, pp. 4-6.

³⁹ II Cor. 5:18-20. And the church is God's demonstration, His showcase exhibit, for all time and all creation, of His wisdom and power, according to Eph. 3:10-11.

⁴⁰ "Providence is that decree whereby God wills in eternity that which comes to pass in time," is the apt and elegant definition offered by John McIntyre in <u>The Christian Doctrine of History</u> (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), p. 35. His view of Providence closely parallels my own, as when he asserts (p. 37) that Providence "exhibits the characteristics of judgment, mercy, and redemptive purpose." The distinguished historian Kenneth Scott Latourette was even bolder, discerning specific cases in history of the evidence of God at work. See especially his AHA Presidential address, "The Christian Understanding of History," <u>American Historical Review</u>, 54 (1949), 259-276. Marsden, introducing <u>A Christian View of History?</u> (p. 11) terms this position one of "overassurance." In the same volume William A. Speck dissects Latourette's position: "Kenneth Scott Latourette's Vocation as Christian Historian," pp. 119-137.

⁴¹ Walter T.K. Nugent, <u>Creative History</u> (2nd ed.; Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1973), ch. 15, exemplifies how weakly someone without an explicit Christian orientation handles the topic of "Historians and Hope."

42 II Cor. 5:21.

43 Rom. 8:21-23; I Pet. 1:3-5; I John 3:1-2.

⁴⁴ For further elaboration of these themes, see Arthur F. Holmes, <u>Faith</u> <u>Seeks Understanding</u> (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1971), esp. pp. 60-84; <u>McIntyre</u>, <u>Christian Doctrine of History</u>; <u>Marsden ed.</u>, A Christian View of History, esp. essays by Marsden, McIntire, MacPhee, E. Vankley, and Rienstra. To study the philosophy of history with respect to the relationship of history to the sciences and humanities, begin with David Donald's review essay of four differing views, "Between Science and Art," <u>American Historical Review</u>, 77 (April 1972), 445-452; and H. Stuart Hughes, <u>History as Art and as Science</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

⁴⁵ MacMillan, also John Duggan, quoted in "Crisis in the Liberal Arts," <u>Newsweek</u>, Feb. 6, 1978.

46 This could be accomplished either through a range of specifically designated courses already in the curriculum, through new courses to be explicitly created as general requirements, or--and this is my preference--through a unified curriculum focusing on broad integrative concerns such as identity, responsibility, environment, behavior, expression.

⁴⁷ Peterson, "Thinking Big," p. 19. Peterson rightly distinguishes between sanctified risk taking as an act of faith and empire-building through slick promotion.

