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The 1997 Winifred E. Weter Faculty Award Lecture

Seattle Pacific University

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LIVINGSTONE, DARWIN, AND TOCQUEVILLE ON GLOBAL FRONTIERS: SOUTHERN AFRICA, ARGENTINA, AND ALGERIA AT THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN

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For Reference

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Weter Faculty Award for Meritorious Scholarship Lecture
Seattle Pacific University
Seattle, Washington
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Dedication:

To Ruth, Jenni, Karin, Marta

The modern world was born about seven generations ago, early in the 19th century. So argues Paul Johnson in his recent world historical narrative, The Birth of the Modern: World Society, 1815-1830.(1) Hayden White informs us that the act of historical narration is itself founded on the historian's subconscious choice of poetic deep structures, tropes, that frame the epistemological, aesthetic, and moral dimensions of the narrative. White identifies four tropes or poetic styles--metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony--that are revealed in the way the historian weaves together these three dimensions.(2) Apart from the impressive epistemological and aesthetic dimensions of Johnson's book, which is to say it is well researched and elegantly presented, we can seek its moral dimension by asking, was the birth of the modern a good thing or not? Johnson reveals his answer early on. After identifying the "cornerstone of the modern, democratic world order, [as] the Special Relationship between the United States and Britain," Johnson's narrative "broadens out not only to take in society as a whole but to embrace all five continents as each, in turn, is harnessed to the accelerating chariot of progress."(3) The chariot of progress. Is it ironic that in the postmodern era, Johnson selects a premodern metaphor to describe the birth of the modern? The point is: the process of global change has been good for all. It has been a win/win chariot ride in which all the continents, and presumably the people living on those continents, have gained as each has been harnessed to the chariot of progress.

Yet, reading only Johnson's chapter entitled "The End of the Wilderness" presents a sharply different metaphor of global change. Focusing on the frontiers of Western and non-Western interaction around the globe, Johnson vividly portrays the chaos, destruction, exploitation, and even extermination of peoples thrown under the chariot wheels of progress. Was this simply the price that had to be paid for progress, the necessary cost of modern civilization? Johnson's debate with himself reflects a debate that is deeply imbedded in contemporary culture. Should we view our contemporary world as a set of improvements (usually lumped together under the term modernization) in the human

condition, the West's gift to the world, or should we view contemporary global structures of inequality between North and South as the legacy of a world-system divided between an exploitative core and an exploited periphery, the West's theft from the world? What, if anything, does a Christian historian have to say in this debate, one side appealing to the Christian virtue of individual freedom and the other side appealing to the Christian virtue of social justice? One's position within this debate influences not only one's perception of the past as it relates to the present, it also shapes one's picture of the present as it relates to the future. My aim is to go beneath the surface of this debate to try to illuminate questions of cultural identity and the forces of social and cultural formation during a transitional age, the age in which the modern world took form.

I locate the birth of the modern slightly later than Paul Johnson does, at least in the three regions on which I am focusing--Algeria, southern Africa, and Argentina. The second quarter of the 19th century was an era of revolutionary transformations in these three regions which, although distant from each other by about five thousand miles, shared enough geographic and historical similarities to make comparison fruitful. In the early nineteenth century these regions were drawn into a European-dominated global market system in which Britain, the world's workshop, and increasingly France, functioned as importers of raw materials and exporters of manufactured products. All three regions from the 1820's to the 1850's were arenas of extreme political turbulence as groups on both sides of shifting frontiers sought to maintain and extend political control. Large numbers of European immigrants established new lives in all three regions; these settlers imported the latest in military and industrial technology from Europe to overcome indigenous resistance. The colonists utilized as well local sources of labor and rich soils to transform these societies into agrarian export economies. (South Africa's mineral revolution began a generation later in the 1860's.) All three regions witnessed Christian missionary efforts whose outcomes varied dramatically from one region to the other.

Three Europeans born between 1805 and 1813 played key roles in shaping the West's sense of self. Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat who lived from 1805 to 1859 is rightly regarded as one of the most astute political philosophers and historians of the 19th century, well known in this country for his classic Democracy in America. Seeking to identify the political, cultural, and economic forces that lay behind the great transformation in his homeland and in the world, Tocqueville insisted that free men elucidate empirically the alternatives facing them and act responsibly in creating a world of stability and opportunity for future generations. Charles Darwin was born into England's cultural and business elite on February 12, 1809 (the day Abraham Lincoln was born) and lived until 1882. Darwin revolutionized the scientific world and challenged the cultural givens of his age with his theories of naturalistic evolution in The Origin of Species in 1859 and The Descent of Man in 1871. David Livingstone was born in Scotland in 1813 and died in East Africa in 1873; his remains lie only a short distance from those of Charles Darwin who is buried next to Isaac Newton at Westminster Abbey, in the heart of London. Livingstone was best known for his travel writings in southern and central Africa and gained widespread respect for bringing Christianity, commerce, and civilization into the heart of an unknown continent.

Less well known are the roles of these three individuals as witnesses to, and participants in, cross-cultural encounters in Algeria, Argentina, and southern Africa, during a foundational era. Each represents a different face of Western culture, Darwin the natural scientist, Tocqueville the social scientist, Livingstone the geographer-explorer, yet all three shared traits widely considered to be modern or Western--an emphasis on rational inquiry, a highly developed sense of individualism, an insatiable curiosity, keen observational skills, disciplined record-keeping habits, and cultural self-confidence. Each helped to etch the image of the West as it defined itself vis-a-vis the "other", the non-West.

The convulsions that rocked Algeria, Argentina, and southern Africa between the 1820's and 1850's can be understood only within the context of the industrial revolution which began in England in the mid-18th century. The foundations of this "great transformation" occurred three centuries earlier at the end of the 15th century when three voyages led to two "great discoveries." The voyages of Bartolomeo Dias in 1487-88, Christopher Columbus in 1492, and Vasco da Gama in 1497-99, knit together and set in motion the modern global system, a system whose economic significance and variable impact was noted by Adam Smith in 1776:

> The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind. . . . By opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which, in the narrow circle of ancient commerce, could never have taken place. . . To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned.(4)

As Europeans set foot in these distant regions, new cultural encounters took place leading to transformations that have profoundly shaped the contemporary world. Two decades after Dias' arrival at the South African Cape, another Iberian power, Spain, conquered parts of western Algeria. And across the Atlantic, the early 16th century also witnessed the arrival of the first Iberians in the region of modern day Argentina. Later in that century the port city of Buenos Aires was founded on the Rio de la Plata.

For three centuries following the arrival of Iberians by sea, old residents and new residents of these widely separated regions interacted with each other, sometimes violently, sometimes peacefully. In southern Africa the establishment of a permanent Dutch settlement at Cape Town in 1652 transformed the sporadic contact between Khoi residents and passing European ships into a continuous struggle between European

settlers and the indigenous peoples over control of land, livestock, and labor. Frontiers were continually contested but in many cases remained relatively stable for centuries. Despite the common perception that the Americas were incorporated into vast empires during the age of mercantilism, the European and Creole presence was often limited to small enclaves along the coast. During the early 19th century, a profound shift in power relations occurred, a shift only comprehensible within the context of the industrial revolution.

This lecture, and the larger research project of which it is a part, is a reflection of my personal voyage of cross-cultural discovery going back to the first years of my life. I was born of European-American parents in an American Spanish-speaking colony, Puerto Rico, an island claimed for Spain during Columbus' second voyage, and claimed by the United States in a war with Spain whose centennial we will commemorate next year. My parents had met there as Christian service workers, my father helping to build the hospital in which my mother, a nurse, labored and went into labor, giving birth to me in 1948. The hospital later became a chicken hatchery.

I grew up on the Great Plains of Kansas, only seven or eight decades after the closing of the Western frontier. Like most Kansans I had little idea that there had been a frontier struggle between settlers and Indians around my home town. Yet ironically, I grew up constantly being reminded that there had been such a frontier; I was simply unable to make the connection between the "Cowboys and Indians" fantasies of Hollywood and the geographical setting in which I was living.

After graduating from Bethel College with a major in history, I intended to pursue a Ph.D. either in European or Latin American history. Instead, my wife Ruth and I accepted an offer to teach English for two years in Algeria, preceded by a year of language study in France. At what point in the phases of cultural transition from a small Kansas farm town to Sidi Bel Abbes, Algeria I crossed the frontier between West and non-West is hard to say. The experience impressed upon me the fluidity and elasticity of culture and

the complexity of cross-cultural interaction. The experience of studying Arabic and living and teaching in a culture so dramatically different from my own awakened an interest in pursuing graduate studies in African and Middle East history. Once I began those studies at Northwestern University, like most graduate students, I became more and more narrowly focused as I staked my claim on a domain of knowledge in which I could claim expertise. My dissertation research took us back to the Algerian Sahara, now with two small children, as I researched the history of a community, the Mizab, comprised of five small cities of Berber Muslim sectarians. After completing my micro-research and receiving my Ph.D., I immediately had to regain a macro-perspective in order to teach cross-disciplinary courses on Africa and the Middle East at George Mason University. I continued to conduct research in the area of my dissertation--there was no lack of material--but the seeds of a broader research agenda had been planted. Maybe it was the early years living in a Latin culture. Or perhaps a lecture entitled "The Feasibility of World History" by William H. McNeill during my college days at Bethel College. Most likely, the fact that I had majored in two graduate fields normally kept distinct, African history and Middle Eastern history, due to my interest in North Africa, cultivated a comparative perspective on global history. George Fredrickson was teaching at Northwestern University when I was there; his research, which culminated in a pioneering work of comparative history, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History, demonstrated how a comparative approach could open new vistas on both American and South African history.(5)

As the sole Africanist at George Mason University in the early 1980's, at a time when the turbulence in South Africa was making continuous headlines, student interest in South Africa prompted me to develop a course on the history of southern Africa. Developing that course and then teaching it half a dozen times made me increasingly aware of the striking similarities between the social powderkegs and tragic histories of apartheid South Africa and "apartheid" Algeria. Simultaneously I was developing a new

course, "History of the Modern Global System" which aimed to cultivate a comparative global and historical perspective in my students. The continuous challenge of teaching through a global lens shaped my research interests in several ways: it made my research reflect the debates that I told my students were an integral part of historical reconstruction, and it made me take seriously the interaction between the West and the World and the shifting frontiers between the two. My long and circuitous intellectual journey, which began in La Plata, Puerto, eventually led me back to the Rio de la Plata in Argentina to a long-term project in comparative global history of which this lecture is a part.

To grasp the geographical picture of my lecture, it may help to construct mentally an almost equilateral triangle whose sides are roughly 5000 miles in length and two of whose corners lie at about 35 degrees latitude south (Buenos Aires and Cape Town) and one of whose corners lies at about 35 degrees north (Algiers). What tied the three regions together historically were their links to a fourth region, Western Europe. The Napoleonic wars during the first decade of the 19th century unleashed ideological and material forces that swept around the globe. British naval forces invaded both the South African Cape and Argentina in 1806. At the Cape the British wrested control of the region from the Dutch and decided, after some initial hesitation, that they had come to stay. In Latin America the British were repulsed militarily, but the invasion helped launch the South American independence struggle from Spain of which Britain, as the chief promoter of free trade, became the main beneficiary. England flexed its growing naval muscle in the Mediterranean as well, bombarding the city of Algiers in 1816, fostering growing French fears of encirclement, culminating in the fateful French decision to send a naval expedition of its own to Algiers in 1830. Following a decade of debate over the costs and benefits of trans-Mediterranean expansion, the French decided, like the British in South Africa, that they had come to stay.

As the Latin American colonies struggled for political independence from Spain in the first quarter of the 19th century, the industrial revolution in Britain and France offered these emerging global superpowers new tools of of economic and political expansion. The spectacular imperial scramble for global dominance at the end of the 19th century has tended to overshadow the unprecedented rates of expansion that had occurred earlier in the century. Between 1800 and 1878, according to a leading historian of imperialism, the average rate of Western imperial expansion (including former European colonies such as the United States) was an estimated 216,000 square miles per year, or 600 square miles per day every day for over three-quarters of a century.(6) This occurred prior to the accelerated push for global empires during the last two decades of the 19th century known as the Scramble which left nearly 85% of the world in European and neo-European hands by World War I.

The industrial revolution and the global revolution in power relations known as imperialism went hand-in-hand. Daniel Headrick's The Tools of Empire may oversimplify the connection between the two by reducing them to six major tools of expansion, but his book is a useful starting point in comprehending the awesome accumulation of power deriving from constantly improving firearms, the railroad, the telegraph, canals (in particular the Suez Canal), steamboats, and quinine.(7) In each of the three regions, we can examine the particular combination of these tools, and others, as they dramatically lowered the costs of penetrating, claiming, and exploiting/developing vast land areas.

The arrogance that derives from power is an ancient theme, recorded time and again in history and in Scripture. That the accumulation of Western power was accompanied by the formation of Western myths explaining and justifying this accumulation of power should be no surprise. One of the clearest expressions of an evolving myth in the 1830's was formulated by MacGregor Laird, whose family constructed the steamboat, a decisive factor in the British victory over China during the Opium War from 1839 to 1842.

> We have the power in our hands, moral, physical, and mechanical; the first, based on the Bible; the second, upon the wonderful adaptation of the Anglo-Saxon race to all climates, situations, and circumstances . . the third, bequeathed to us by the immortal Watt. By his invention every river is laid open to us, time and distance are shortened. . . hundreds of steam-vessels, carrying the glad tidings of "peace and good will toward men" into the dark places of the earth which are now filled with cruelty.(8)

Laird's cultural, racial, and technological arrogance may appear quaint from a late twentieth-century perspective, but his clear and confident vision contained deadly serious implications for peoples scattered around the globe. Laird was at least one-third correct. The mechanical advantages gained by Western powers via the industrial revolution, and in particular James Watt's steam engine, did revolutionize global power relations. The steamboat, Laird's product, was crucial in determining the outcome of the Opium War; the British officers and merchants accurately described it as "worth its weight in gold."(9)

Hearing the news from China about the war with Britain, and anticipating correctly its outcome, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote to an English friend,

> I can only rejoice in the thought of an invasion of the Celestial Empire by a European army. So at last the mobility of Europe has come to grips with Chinese immobility! It is a great event, especially if one thinks that it is only the continuation, the last in a multitude of events of the same nature all of which are pushing the European race out of its home and are successively submitting all of the other races to its empire or its influence. Something more vast, more extraordinary than the establishment of the Roman Empire is growing out of our times, without anyone noticing it; it is the enslavement of four parts of the world by the fifth. Therefore, let us not slander our century and ourselves too much; the men are small, but the events are great.(10)

Does this picture of change correspond to Paul Johnson's image of a world being hitched to the chariot of progress? Tocqueville's metaphor of a world enslaved came to be buried under more comfortable self-images in the West, especially since England and France, ironically, were leading the effort in the 1830's and 1840's to abolish the institution of slavery throughout the world. Did the world have to be enslaved to make it free? Did the world have to be freed to make it enslaved?

The following year, 1841, Tocqueville visited the budding French colony across the Mediterranean for the first time. In the quarter-century following the French conquest of Algiers in 1830, the political, cultural, and economic structures of Turkish Algeria were turned upside-down. Beginning in 1830, Algerians witnessed the French occupation of the capital, the gradual extension of military control over the coastal region, and the growth and eventual defeat of Abd al-Qadir's impressive but short-lived state in western Algeria.

The frontier of French expansion in Algeria was a contested zone where events were pictured in radically different ways, depending on one's vantage point. On one side were editorials such as the following:

> Who knows what changes we are destined to bring about in these famous, but desolate regions, debased for centuries by the tyranny of Muhammad's followers? Who knows if, in a few years, under the protection of our kings, arts and sciences and commerce will not flourish where today barbarity and ignorance rule and where the banner of the false prophet will soon undoubtedly bow before the flag of France and the revered symbol of Christianity?(11)

An Algerian political leader recorded a perspective from the other side of the frontier:

> In short, I ask myself why my country should be shaken to its foundations and all the roots of its vitality attacked? . . I see Greece aided and then firmly established as a state after tearing itself away from the Ottoman Empire . . but when I think

> again of the country of Algiers, I see its unfortunate inhabitants placed in the yoke of arbitrary government, of extermination, and of all the plagues of war. And all these horrors are committed in the name of a free France.(12)

The endemic turbulence of frontier zones influenced enduring historical interpretations. Consider this description by seventeen Algerian leaders sent to the French authorities at Algiers soon after the 1830 conquest:

> [After the initial disruption] commercial relations were re-established and maintained for a while. Then the Bedouins rebelled, intercepted the routes, and fought amongst themselves, some desiring to trade with the French and others in opposition. The latter are the more numerous. We managed to reopen communications only with great difficulty. Then they rebelled again, accusing the French of depriving them of the means of subsistence and of ruining the country. The result of all these troubles has been the utter destruction of means of livelihood and industry. . . If this situation continues . . the battles, the misery, the interruption of communications will end in a massive loss of life. And that will not bring about peace. We have been told that justice and equity reign in France. It is only too true that they do not reign at Algiers. . . we conclude that the province of Algiers will never be tranquil and that only through immense sacrifices in men and money will the French be able to possess it. It would be necessary even to depopulate the country of its original inhabitants and to repopulate it with other men, an impossible option.(13)

These leaders' assumption that settler colonization was unimaginable may seem naive as we look back from a distance of a century and a half to the beginnings of the three-act tragedy of modern Algeria, a tragedy whose first act, settler colonization, produced Albert Camus, whose second act, decolonization, produced Frantz Fanon, and whose third act, independence, is still being written in blood; but what "rational" person in 1831 would have predicted for Algeria the revolutionary transformations that lay ahead?

As state officials looked inland from Algiers, from Cape Town, or from Buenos Aires, they observed an occupied zone under firm state control which appeared relatively peaceful. Beyond the region of "law and order" lay an arc of turbulence, uncertainty, ambiguity, and struggle. Unable to perceive the arc of turbulence as a perimeter of conflict whose turbulence was the political by-product of the shifting frontier, colonial administrators, metropolitan writers, and historical interpreters assumed that conflict was the normal and natural conduct of uncivilized "natives" awaiting the arrival of civilization.

State-sponsored immigration of European settlers, *pieds noirs,* beginning in the 1840's formed a society sharply divided by class and racial caste. Alexis de Tocqueville visited Algeria twice in the 1840's and observed the dynamics of defeat, dispossession, and exploitation. The dispossession of the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria was more chaotic than what he had observed on the American frontier; on the latter he had been impressed by the American preoccupation with legality, commenting sardonically, "It is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws of humanity."(14) Tocqueville, unable to escape the contradictions of liberal imperialism, applauded the civilizing efforts of his countrymen in the Algerian colony, even as he admitted to himself, "We did not bring to Africa our liberal institutions; instead we dispossessed it of the only ones which resembled them."(15) He predicted accurately the tragic fate of this emerging settler colony: "As I listened sadly to all these things, I asked myself what could be the future of a country given over to men of this type, and where would this torrent of violence and injustice end, if not in the revolt of the indigenous people and the ruin of the Europeans."(16)

Nevertheless, by the 1840's it was too late to turn back. For Tocqueville, reversing the momentum of colonization in Algeria would have required too high a price in French national pride: "Any people which gives up without a contest what it has taken by force so that it may retire peacefully to its original borders--any such people proclaims that its age of greatness is over."(17) The age of French greatness was just beginning.

Patriotic sentiment won out in the struggle with conscientious liberalism, or should we call it conscientious Christianity?

Argentine statesman and author of the classic Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento visited Algeria in 1847, just a year after Tocqueville's second visit to the colony.(18) Armed with a letter of introduction from de Lesseps, future builder of the Suez Canal, Sarmiento met Marshal Bugeaud, the French military governor of Algeria and discussed the similarities between the desert campaigns in the two regions. We lack the details of their conversation; however, we do know the nature of Bugeaud's "iron-fist" strategy that began in 1841. Responding to some metropolitan criticism of his policies in the Algerian colony, Bugeaud bluntly admitted that Algeria had to be placed "in a state of war . . in order to dominate it, modify it, and plunder it for the profit of a new people."(19) Journals kept by his officers in Algeria dispassionately described the results. "We arrive at tents abandoned by their owners who, awakened by the approach of our soldiers, have fled in disorder with their flocks. Shots from all sides rain upon these miserable people, surprised and without defense. Men, women, and children are soon surrounded; their flocks are seized. Everything that cannot be carried off is put to the torch."(20)

Charles Darwin witnessed first-hand similar strategies utilized in the desert campaign against the Indians of the Argentine south in the early 1830's as he travelled through the region during his five-year around-the-world voyage on the *Beagle*. Darwin's travels took him to regions which generally had had no contact with the Intercommunicating Zone of Africa-Eurasia prior to the "great discoveries" of the late 15th century. He was struck by the demographic melting away of peoples in the face of the European advance. It was too early for Darwin, or Livingstone, or Tocqueville (in North America) to grasp the central role played by disease in clearing the field for Western expansion outside of the ICZ, since this was prior to the breakthroughs in medical research associated with Joseph Lister, Robert Koch, and Louis Pasteur. Toward the end

of his voyage, Darwin noted, "Wherever the European had trod, death seems to pursue the aboriginal. We may look to the wide extent of the Americas, Polynesia, the Cape of Good Hope, and Australia, and we find the same result."(21) Disease may have been the primary factor in the disappearance of the native peoples of the Argentine south, as it had been throughout the Americas ever since the arrival of Columbus; it was not, however, the only factor, as Darwin himself observed.

Independent Argentina under caudillo Juan Manuel de Rosas, who ruled the Platine federation from 1829 to 1852, may appear at first glance to be a society so different from French-ruled Algeria or British-ruled South Africa as to make comparison meaningless. A closer look reveals similar social dynamics in the creation of this "neo-Europe", as the complex interplay between the urban and rancher elites, frontier gauchos, and Indians of the interior were giving shape to Argentine state and society. Disease paved the way for the thrust into the interior at the expense of the native peoples. For example, a smallpox epidemic swept through the Tehuelche Indians south of the Rio Negro between 1809 and 1812, reducing their population by half according to the French naturalist D'Orbigny.(22) The weakening of indigenous resistance coincided with the strengthening of economic forces for expansion and the increasing availability of technological tools that lowered the cost of expansion in the 1820's and 1830's. Accelerating European demand for hides in the 1820's, just as most of South America had been freed from Spanish control, broke the uneasy balance of forces among the rancher elites, gauchos, and Indians of the interior. Under the leadership of Rosas, who established the enduring pattern of caudillo (strong man) rule, the government conducted campaigns to destroy Indian autonomy, incorporating the remnants as laborers into the pastoral export economy. Rosas gained fame, as had Bugeaud in Algeria and Andrew Jackson in the United States, during his compaigns against the native populations, thereby opening up vast terrorities for cattle and later sheep farming to meet the export demands

from Europe. As he travelled through the Argentine interior in the 1830's, Charles Darwin carefully recorded his observations on the dynamics of a shifting frontier.

> General Rosas's plan is to kill all stragglers, and having driven the remainder to a common point, in the summer, with the assistance of the Chilenos, to attack them in a body. This operation is to be repeated for three successive years. I imagine the summer is chosen as the time for the main attack, because the plains are then without water, and the Indians can only travel in particular directions. The escape of the Indians to the south of the Rio Negro, where in such a vast unknown country they would be safe, is prevented by a treaty with the Tehuelches to this effect; that Rosas pays them so much to slaughter every Indian who passes to the south of the river, but if they fail in so doing, they themselves are to be exterminated. . . The general, like Lord Chesterfield, thinking that his friends may in a future day become his enemies, always places them [his Indian allies] in the front ranks, so that their numbers may be thinned. . . I think there will not, in another half-century, be a wild Indian northward of the Rio Negro. The warfare is too bloody to last; the Christians killing every Indian, and the Indians doing the same by the Christians. It is melancholy to trace how the Indians have given way before the Spanish invaders. . . Not only have whole tribes been wholly exterminated, but the remaining Indians have become more barbarous: instead of living in large villages, and being employed in the arts of fishing, as well as of the chase, they now wander about the open plains, without home or fixed occupation.(23)

Such scenes undoubtedly shaped Darwin's world-view; life is a struggle for survival, among species, among races, among cultures, among individuals, the "fittest" surviving. The epistemological and aesthetic dimensions of Darwin's most influential works, The Origin of Species in 1859 and The Descent of Man on 1871, are impressive. But what about the moral dimension? This question remains hotly debated and deserves a

careful analysis, which is far beyond the limits of this lecture. Was Darwin himself a Social and Racial Darwinian? Did he contribute wittingly to the pseudoscience of race, the ideology of aggressive imperialism, and the abuses of monopoly capitalism during the Gilded Age? Reading closely Darwin's writings, especially his later ones, along with passages such as the following by Donald Worster leads me to the conclusion that Darwin, although passionately devoted to scientific truth, was morally blinded by the arrogance of Western and human power so characteristic of the Gilded Age.

> Although he [Darwin] temporized that this "warfare" between closely related species or individuals was only another metaphor and might not always involve actual physical combat or painful death, he also declared in unmistakably warlike language that inferior beings must be "beaten and supplanted" by their superiors in "dreadful" and savage hostility. . . In 1881, near the end of his life, he was as strongly impressed as ever with the universality of violence in man and nature. Noting that the "Caucasian races have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle for existence," he added that it seemed to be the law of history and progress that an "endless number of lower races" had to be wiped out by "the higher civilized races."(24)

Two intellectual giants, Tocqueville and Darwin. One seemed to place his ultimate faith in nationalism; the other placed his faith, like Marx, in a "scientific law" of historical struggle. As power continued to gravitate into the hands of a handful of European empires in the last decades of the 19th century, so did the corresponding arrogance sow the seeds of unimaginable horrors in a 20th century which dawned with bright hopes. In an age in which Cecil Rhodes was "saddened" by the fact that he could not annex the planets, an age in which H. S. Chamberlain declared "Race lifts a man above himself; it endows him with extraordinary--I might say supernatural--powers", an age in which Nietzsche was writing God's obituary, an age in which the Asante king and queen mother, leaders of the West African kingdom that had defeated a British invading force in the

1820's, kneeled in abject humiliation and submission before the boots of victorious British officers, was it a world liberated or a world enslaved, to return to Tocqueville's metaphor?(25) Was the "burden of empire" a white man's burden or a brown and black man's burden? Or was it, we are just beginning to ask, above all a woman's burden, white, but especially brown and black?

Following the latitudinal parallel eastward from Buenos Aires about five thousand miles takes us to Cape Town as yet another settler society was taking shape during the second quarter of the 19th century. The turbulent frontier between Europeans and Africans to the east and north of the Cape resembled that of Algeria at the same time--the forces of land hunger and the need for labor by Boer farmers and ranchers, the logic of the iron fist in suppressing overt resistance during the "frontier wars" (similar to the strategy of Rosas, Bugeaud, and Andrew Jackson), new state-building initiatives by African leaders, the formulation of myths to explain and justify expansion and forced removal, the advantages in military technology enjoyed by advancing Europeans in their encounter with Africans. Here as well, the period from the 1820's to the 1850's saw a cyclone of forces that buffeted peoples along shifting frontiers. The arrival of British settlers in the eastern Cape during the 1820's failed to provide the pacifying buffer between Africans and Boers that the British government had hoped for. Arising out of the turmoil of shifting frontiers of European-African interaction was an explosive movement of state formation and restructuring,the mfecane, led by Shaka Zulu and his successors, which in turn triggered massive population dislocation and defensive state-building, most notably by Moshoeshoe of the Sotho people. In the aftermath of the mfecane, thousands of Boer farmers, exasperated with British attempts (spearheaded by the missionary John Philip) to raise the legal status of their slaves and servants, slavery formally abolished throughout the British empire beginning in 1834, moved beyond the British political frontier in an attempt to establish their own communities free from British interference. But, whereas the Boer trekkers of the late 1830's wanted freedom from British liberalism,

they needed desperately the guns and powder which were essential in gaining control of the land. Weapons from the Cape played a crucial role in determining the outcome of conflicts with the inhabitants of the interior, and by the early 1850's, two independent Boer republics had taken form northeast of the Cape, two more cornerstones of modern South Africa, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. African state-builder Moshoeshoe, unlike Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, managed to preserve the integrity of his truncated state in the face of Boer encroachment.

Arriving at the Cape in 1841 under the sponsorship of the London Missionary Society, China being off limits due to the disruption of the Opium War, David Livingstone began more than three decades of activity as missionary, medical doctor, explorer, geographer, and political agent along the northern frontier of European settlement. His meticulous records offer us precious glimpses of both the subtle and dramatic changes taking place in southern Africa during this tumultuous epoque. They also provide insights into the birth of the modern world, for Livingstone, more than any other individual, opened the door to the modern age in tropical Africa, from the worst of imperialism and economic exploitation to the best of science and Christianity.

Born in Blantyre, Scotland in 1813, David Livingstone grew up in a deeply religious Congregationalist Calvinist family. He began working in a cotton mill at the age of ten and completed his medical degree at Glasgow for the purpose of Christian service to China. The Opium War between Britain and China ruled that out, so Livingstone accepted an assignment with the London Missionary Society in southern Africa, arriving there in 1841, within a few months of Tocqueville's first visit to Algeria.

Due to Livingstone's commitment to scientific detachment (not always successful), his profound empathy for the inherent dignity of all human beings (limited on occasion), and his disciplined, detailed, and astute records of his experiences, his writings remain a mine of information in studying cultural encounters during the mid-19th century.

Livingstone was the image that the West wished for itself-- rational, empathetic, courageous, generous, and tolerant.

A deeply religious individual, Livingstone was a no-nonsense pragmatist, driven by a single-minded determination to spread the benefits of Christianity, civilization, and commerce throughout Africa. Even his marriage to Mary Moffat seemed more a matter of Christian duty than of personal affection based on the letter he sent to the directors of the LMS:

> Various considerations connected with this new sphere of labour, . . having led me to the conclusion that it was my duty to enter into the marriage relation, I have made the necessary arrangements for the union with Mary, the eldest daughter of Mr Moffat, in the beginning of January 1845. It was not without much serious consideration & earnest prayer I came to the above decision, and if I have not deceived myself I was in some measure guided by a desire that the Divine glory might be promoted in my increased usefulness.(26)

After a couple of unsuccessful attempts to establish a mission station to the north of Kuruman, Livingstone established himself among the Bakwena people in present-day Botswana. In this arid climate, water was the key to survival. Little wonder that the role of the chief, responsible for the harmony and survival of the society, was bound up in rituals associated with cloud control, or rain-making.

Livingstone's writings are especially illuminating because of the author's sustained experience living on the Western frontier. His astute and generally candide accounts provide precious insights into the nature of West and non-West at a time when both concepts were taking shape. The debates that Livingstone, a medical doctor, engaged in with African medical and rain doctors offer revealing glimpses of the intricate webs linking science, religion, and technology during a transitional age. Livingstone was intrigued by the complexity of the debate over cloud control, returning to it frequently in this writings. In probing such cross-cultural encounters, we discover that the identity of who is Western

and who is non-Western may be less obvious that we normally assume, a truth that Livingstone himself found both fascinating and frustrating.

In 1857 Livingstone published a dialogue between a European medical doctor and an African rain doctor.(27) Livingstone had been developing that dialogue in writing for at least a dozen years. The first dialogue elements show up in his writings as early as1845, four years after his arrival in southern Africa.(28) Gradually other dialogue elements and sketches appear in his journal and correspondance over the following years, the "complete" dialogue recorded in his journal on October 12, 1853.(29) Undoubtedly this dialogue was a composite of numerous discussions which Livingstone and other missionaries had with a variety of rain doctors, but probably the central figure was, ironically, his only convert to Christianity, the Bakwena chief Sechele.(30)

Let us go back a century and a half to southern Africa as two doctors seek to explain their world views. Where could one find a clearer confrontation between West and non-West? Who better to describe that encounter than David Livingstone? All-too-common stereotypes, the legacy of 19th century myths, may still picture the outcome of such a debate as entirely predictable. On the one side a "witch-doctor" from the "Dark Continent"--heathen, traditional, primitive, superstitious, closed-minded, non-rational; on the other a scientifically trained medical doctor from the West--Christian, modern, enlightened, open-minded and rational.

The following dialogue is based primarily on the version recorded in Livingstone's journal on October 12, 1853:

Missionary (coming to a rain doctor who has a great number of bulbs, roots, plants, and pots and powders around him). Hail, Father! What are you doing with so many medicines?

Rain Doctor. I thank you my son. I am charming the rain. We are killed by the Sun.

M. You can make rain then.

R.D. We need rain. Without it we have no milk, the cattle having no grass. We cannot get roots in the field either if the stalks are not brought to the surface by rain. Without it the women would hoe the gardens in vain, we should get no corn. We should perish if we had no rain.

M. As to the benefits of the rain you and I are of one mind, but I believe no one can make rain but God.

R.D. You water your garden by means of the river, but we who use no irrigation must make rain or we should get no corn. We have done it from time immemorial, and we know it is better to apply rain to the whole plant, than a little river water applied only to its root. You do according to the customs of your forefathers, and so do we. You don't need rain but we should die without it.

M. As to the benefits & good influences of the rain, and {its} superiority over irrigation, we are perfectly agreed. That which I dispute is that your medicines have any influence on the rain whatever. God alone can make it.

R.D. I know that perfectly. God alone can make rain, my medicines don't make it. But he has given us the knowledge of certain plants and trees by which we pray to him to make rain for us. We charm the clouds, & He makes the rain for us.

M. But God has told us that there is only one way by which we can pray to him acceptably, viz. {that is} by Jesus Christ.

R.D. Truly. And he has told us differently. God has been very good to both white and black. To the white he has given the knowledge of guns, gunpowder, horses, and many other things which we know nothing about. He has given you wisdom too. We see it. To us blacks he has not been so liberal, but he has given us the knowledge of some things too, and the most important is that of certain trees and plants which we use to make rain. We have the knowledge of rain making, you have it not. Now we don't despise those things God has given you, though {since} we are ignorant of them. Nor should you despise what he has given us, though {since} you do not know nor understand them.

M. When did God give you the knowledge of rain making?

R.D. In the beginning, of old. When we first opened our eyes in the world, we found our fathers working with these medicines, they were taught them by their fathers, & so from the beginning, and we now do as they told us to do. We follow in their trail.

M. But God has given us his book, and that gives us correct information as to what he did. Our origin is the same, and in the book which never forgets we have what God revealed to our common ancestors, and he tells us that he has appointed seed time and harvest, summer and winter, and that he gives rain from heaven and fruitful seasons. And this he does to the good and the evil alike, and I think he would give you rain without any medicines. I don't despise your knowledge, I only believe you are mistaken, and should like you to make a trial. God will give us rain if we get if at all.

R.D. No he won't. He might to you white people, but not to us blacks to whom he has given the knowledge of his plants. He has no heart to us.

M. Have you ever tried?

R.D. How could we? We should starve. The town would become scattered. And whoever thought of trying starvation? We cannot buy corn as you do {you who send to Kuruman for supplies}. We must grow it, and it is rain which causes it to spring up and yield.

M. But your medicines so frequently fail. . [You wait till you see the clouds come, then you use your medicines . .]

R.D. Truly. And so it is with all medicines. We administer medicines to sick people and so do you, though people often die. If God does not please to heal, the patient dies. And so it is with the rain. We do not fail, but God refuses to give us rain. . .

M. I think you are wrong about the medicines. We apply them to animate, you to inanimate things. You often make a great smoke, and it never reaches the clouds which you say you are charming.

R.D. We apply medicines to every thing, and if you wish us to throw aside our medicines why do you retain your own?

M. I apply them to living beings, and see and know their effects. You make smoke and cause all the women of the town to pass through it. They feel no effect. You sprinkle all with medicines, no effect is visible, but effects are always visible from my medicines. I can foretell their effects. . .

R.D. There are defects in all medicines, but I see plainly you don't want rain. We do, and cannot do without it. If you make rain for us I shall let it alone.

M. I do wish rain most heartily, and I think your work tends to drive away rain & displease God. He wishes us to feel our dependance on Him alone, and though you say you pray to him all the women in the town believe that you make the rain. They call it your rain, & praise you for it instead of God.

R.D. Well, if you wish rain and pray to God for it, why does it not come? You fail as well as we.

M. We pray for it but do not make it. We leave it to his good pleasure to give or withhold it. You say you pray to him, but you believe you make it independant of him . . . The rain was given by God, & would have fallen had you let your medicines alone.

R.D. Of course, and it is so with all medicines, people get well though they use no medicines. .

[M. Could you make it rain on one spot and not on another?

R.D. I wouldn't think of trying. I like to see the whole country green, and all the people glad; the women clapping their hands, and giving me their ornaments for thankfulness, and lullilooing for joy.]

M. I think you deceive both them and yourself.

R.D. Well, then, there is a pair of us (meaning both are rogues).

M. Remain well, my friend.

R.D. Depart pleasantly, Father.

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Trying to answer the question of who won this debate raises yet more questions. Won in what sense? Clearly European control of African territory continued to expand dramatically over the following decades. By World War I, the entire continent of Africa, except for Liberia and Ethiopia, had been partitioned into European-controlled colonies. Livingstone played a central role in helping bring this about, for the most high-minded of reasons, for he passionately hated the slave trade that continued to ravage eastern and central Africa. Whether or not one views his legacy as spreading the benefits of modern civilization and spiritual and cultural enlightenment or spreading the enslavement of imperialist domination and economic exploitation, Livingstone's remarkable travels over the following years brought to the attention of the Western world the possibilities of Western penetration into the interior of tropical Africa. What made his remarkable journeys possible were not only his extraordinary personal endurance, courage, discipline, and religious faith; without his daily doses of quinine sulphate, an extract from the cinchona tree native to Latin America isolated by French researchers in 1821, it is inconceivable that Livingstone would have survived the recurring fevers of malaria over the following decades.(31)

Although Livingstone was trained as a medical doctor and recorded valuable empirical observations, we should not be misled into thinking that he had a substantially greater scientific understanding of disease than his African counterparts. For years after his arrival in Africa, he continued to apply leeches to treat gastro-enteritis.(32) His medical training preceded the revolutionary breakthroughs of Lister, Koch, and Pasteur. This is not to deny that Livingstone possessed a scientific outlook, as he himself took pride in. Or did he? Let's examine the dialogue he so carefully recorded. Livingstone is pushing a new method of agriculture, one based on irrigation. Both doctors agree that watering the whole plant by rain would be better than just placing moisture on the roots, something which today's arid lands agriculturalists reject. Leaving that aside, Livingstone

helped demonstrate the "superiority" of irrigation in the1840's. Why not rely on a continuous supply of irrigated water rather than unpredictable and variable rainfall? In one experiment, some of the Bakwena people relocated near the river to follow Livingstone's example. Then several years of drought dried up the river, literally leaving them high and dry, and now separated from their previous location to boot.(33) Irrigation is a more productive method of agriculture in certain settings, but its superiority in the Botswana desert was not self-evident as Livingstone assumed.

Which of the two doctors was more philosophical in maintaining a logical consistency in argumentation? Sechele early on affirms that his medicines don't make the rain, but that God alone can make it. Yet toward the end of the dialogue Livingstone says, "you believe you make it independant of him." Was Livingstone aware of the inconsistency of his own position, and if so, why did he leave it in the dialogue? Through most of the dialogue, Livingstone is at pains to convince Sechele that there is nothing he, Sechele, could do to influence the rains, since the clouds are totally under God's control; there is no connection between human activities and rainfall. But then suddenly, Livingstone reverses himself by stating, "I think your work tends to drive away rain & displease God." So human activities can, after all, influence rainfall?

Which of the two doctors is more scientific? Superficially the dialogue makes Livingstone appear scientific; after all, he continually wants Sechele to carry out some experiments to provide empirical evidence to support or refute his rainmaking rituals. Anthropological studies of ritual indicate that social peace and security are enhanced by the collective symbols, rituals, and myths that unite communities. Sechele was not just the rainmaker for his Bakwena people, he was medical therapist, political decision-maker and judge. He carried the responsibility for the survival and cohesion of the entire social group on his shoulders. This involved maintaining a harmony among the living, the spirits of the departed ancestors, and God. The heavens opened with life-giving rainfall when harmony prevailed on earth, his primary obligation. The rituals of rainmaking were an affirmation

of community and of Sechele's responsibilities in maintaining that cohesion. Livingstone ridicules the rituals of having the women of the town pass through the smoke, arguing that no effects are visible. Must all effects be visible to the human eye?

Which of the two doctors was the more cosmopolitan, more tolerant, more open to alternative ways of thinking, more willing to accept cultural pluralism? In an influential essay on African conversion to Christianity, Robin Horton argues that this is what distinguishes traditional societies from Western (scientifically-oriented) societies:

> The key difference is a very simple one. It is that in traditional cultures there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical tenets; whereas in scientifically oriented cultures, such an awareness is highly developed. It is this difference we refer to when we say that traditional cultures are "closed" and scientifically oriented cultures are "open."(34)

Does the dialogue support Horton's thesis? That the dialogue itself could take place shows a measure of mutual respect indicative of a "metaculture" that includes both doctors. The initial and closing greetings are family metaphors: "Hail, Father . . I thank you my son." "Our origin is the same, . . common ancestors." There are points of agreement, for example, the benefits of rain, its superiority over irrigation, and the affirmation that only God can make rain. Sechele makes a continuous effort to include Livingstone within a community of therapists, recognizing that they both believe in God, both have received knowledge from their ancestors, both act to preserve health and wellness, and both acknowledge the inscrutableness of God's interventions in human affairs. Sechele also recognizes the cultural differences between the Europeans and the Africans, showing respect for the knowledge, technology, and wisdom of the former. He continually seeks to make Livingstone see that there is a basic equality between them, since Sechele possesses some knowledge that Livingstone does not have. Livingstone, while treating Sechele as an individual with respect, rejects the validity of Sechele's cultural beliefs and practices, all the while denying that he (Livingstone) despises those

traditions. Livingstone asserts that Sechele is "mistaken", that his book (Livingstone's Bible) alone has "correct information", including when to plant seeds and harvest crops, and that rain falls on the good and evil alike. Livingstone may have the advantage of a global view, whereas Sechele's geographical and cultural horizons may be more localized, but which of the two is truly cosmopolitan? What is cosmopolitanism if not an openness to the validity of other cultural beliefs and the lack of insistence that one's own way of thinking is the only way?

Once again Robin Horton on the differences between traditional cultures and modern Western cultures:

> Since the overriding aim of explanation is to disclose order and regularity underlying apparent chaos, the search for explanatory analogies must tend towards those areas of experience most closely associated with such qualities. Here, I think, we have a basis for indicating why explanations in modern Western culture tend to be couched in an impersonal idiom while explanations in traditional African society tend to be couched in a personal idiom . . . In complex, rapidly changing industrial societies the human scene is in flux. Order, regularity, predictability, simplicity, all these seem lamentably absent. It is in the world of inanimate things that such qualities are most readily seen. This is why many people can find themselves less at home with their fellow men than with things. . .(35)

Is this thesis supported by the dialogue? Livingstone asserts that one of the key differences between his approach to therapy and Sechele's approach to therapy is that Livingstone applies them to living beings or animate things, whereas Sechele applies his medicines to inanimate things. But, as mentioned earlier, Sechele clearly involves his people in his rituals, and they reward him with respect and honor for working hard to assure the harmony and prosperity of their society. Conversely, Livingstone prayed that God would heal his patients, but, as a medical doctor, he had a variety of material instruments, ranging from leeches to a stethoscope, to treat his patients. Yet Livingstone

criticizes Sechele for utilizing material instruments, specifically the burning of a variety of plants, in his treatment of the clouds.

This brings us to the rainmaking rituals which Livingstone clearly saw as purely magical practices. But were they? Livingstone criticizes Sechele for waiting until the clouds collected to build his fires so that the smoke would carry into the clouds. Was Sechele an ignorant "witchdoctor", or was he, after centuries of empirical observation by his ancestors, a century ahead of the scientific community? Here is the title of a Canadian Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Toronto in 1985, "Selected Cases of Precipitation Development in Natural and Seeded Cumulus Clouds in Southern Africa."(36) I believe these modern rainmakers waited, like Sechele, until the clouds appeared before beginning their "incantations"!

Obviously I have only scratched the surface, which is always the case when lecturing on Africa. My immersion in writings by and about David Livingstone have deepened my admiration for him. After all, it was Livingstone who gave us this wonderful dialogue. The fact that the name "Livingstone" is still found on the map of independent Africa, as opposed to the names Rhodes or Stanley which have understandably been erased, reflects the radically different spirit and legacy of this deeply religious and humanitarian person. Livingstone's love for all of God's creatures, his remarkable ability to share the Gospel while conveying respect for cultural diversity, and his conviction that religion and science "are not hostile, but friendly to each other," are ideals as worthy to hold up today as they were a century and a half ago.(37)

I was privileged to witness a watershed event several years ago during the annual meeting of of the African Studies Association in Seattle. Richard Elphick, Professor of History at Wesleyan University whom I have long regarded as one of the premier scholars of the South African past, read a paper entitled "Religion in South African Historiography: A Study in Denial."(38) That paper was the intellectual equivalent of a fresh breeze, urging that the serious study of religion be brought into the mainstream of South African

historiography. Elphick thoughtfully diagnosed the failures of historians to treat religious faith with the respect that it deserves, either neglecting it altogether or reducing it to politics or economics. This is all the more remarkable when one considers that by 1980, an estimated 75% of South Africans were professed Christians, figures which "denote one of the most dramatic cultural transformations in human history. But where can one find an account that describes the process, much less explains it?"(39) Elphick continues:

> We historians need not give the last word to the people of whom we write. But before we write that last word, let us listen carefully, and at length, to what they have to say. Thereby we can combat the intellectual arrogance that disfigures academic enterprise in our time. We can also improve our chances of being read a hundred years from now, when numerous scholarly fads will have come and gone, but when religious people will still surely exist, seeking--and believing themselves found--by the holy and the divine.(40)

When one considers the bleak outlook for the future of South Africa ten years ago, many analysts predicting a bloody Algerian-like revolution that would rid the world of apartheid, the events of the past decade appear nothing short of miraculous. That Nelson Mandela, one of the truly heroic figures of the 20th century, could move from prison to president of a democratic South Africa is astonishing. Try to imagine that largely peaceful transition without the courageous leadership of Desmond Tutu, Beyers Naude, and thousands of other men and women of religious faith, both within and outside South Africa. Try to imagine the extraordinary efforts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to heal a broken society without the leadership of Desmond Tutu and other people of faith. During all of the years I went through high school, college, teaching in Algeria, graduate school, and a decade of university teaching, Nelson Mandela languished in prison, vilified, demonized, and abused, simply because he was demanding rights that I took for granted. How could any human being have the superhuman strength to overcome the natural desire for revenge and retribution after twenty-seven years in prison?

I believe Nelson Mandela revealed part of the answer to that mystery several years ago in a speech at Cape Town when he urged Jews to stay and help build the new South Africa rather than emigrating to Israel-Palestine. I had never considered Mandela to be a "spiritual" or "religious" person. In his speech Mandela made a remarkable, and to me inspiring, revelation: "Mandela said he was brought up in the Wesleyan Christian tradition, a branch of the Methodist Church. During his 27 years in prison, he said, he missed only one Sunday religious service, because of illness."(41)

Sometimes it is appropriate to let others have the last word. Let us listen, truly listen, to the inaugural vision of Nelson Mandela as he opened a new era in South African and perhaps global history on May 10, 1994:

> We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. . . We pledge ourselves to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender, and other discrimination. . . The time for healing of the wounds has come. The moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come. The time to build is upon us.(42)

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APPENDIX

Wind In His Hair:

I do not care for this talk about a white man. Whatever he is, he is not Sioux, and that makes him less. When I hear that more whites are coming, I want to laugh. We took a hundred horses from these people. There was no honor in it. They don't ride well. They don't shoot well. They're dirty. Those soldiers could not even make it through one winter here. And these people are said to flourish? I think they will all be dead soon. I think this fool is probably lost. [laughter]

Kicking Bird:

Wind In His Hair's words are strong and I have heard them. It's true the whites are a poor race and hard to understand. But make no mistake. The whites are coming. Even our enemies agree on this. So when I see one man alone without fear in our country . . . I do not think he is lost. I think he may have medicine. I see someone who might speak for all the white people who are coming. I think this a person with which treaties might be struck.

Wind In His Hair:

Kicking Bird is always looking ahead and that is good. But this man cannot cover our lodges or feed our children. He is nothing to us. I will take some men. We will shoot some arrows into this white man. If he truly has medicine, he will not be hurt. If he has no medicine, he will be dead.

Elder:

No man can tell another what to do. But killing a white man is a delicate matter. If you kill one, more are sure to come.

Senior Elder:

It's easy to become confused by these questions. It's hard to know what to do. We should talk about this some more. That is all I have to say.

Dances With Wolves
Orion Pictures, 1990