

Turkey in Somalia: Challenging North/Western interventionism?

Thiessen, C. & Ozerdem, A.

Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University's Repository

Original citation & hyperlink:

Thiessen, C & Ozerdem, A 2019, 'Turkey in Somalia: Challenging North/Western interventionism?', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 40, no. 11, pp. 1976-1995.

<https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1619074>

DOI 10.1080/01436597.2019.1619074

ISSN 0143-6597

ESSN 1360-2241

Publisher: Taylor and Francis

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Third World Quarterly, on 25.05/2019, available

online: <http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/01436597.2019.1619074>

Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

This document is the author's post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from it.

Turkey in Somalia: Challenging North/Western interventionism?

Chuck Thiessen, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, UK¹

Alpaslan Özerdem, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, UK

Abstract

Turkey's humanitarian and development intervention in Somalia is unusually illuminating as a case study to investigate the relations between emerging and conventional interveners in conflict zones since, in this case, Turkey's intervention carries adequate impetus to resist assimilation with conventional North/Western counterparts. Our starting point is the observation that Turkish and conventional humanitarian and development interveners have struggled to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia. This article investigates what this uncooperative and uncoordinated organisational behaviour means, and we root our investigation in 21 face-to-face interviews with officials working inside the Turkish and conventional intervention in Mogadishu and Nairobi to inquire about how they understand and theorise this discordant behaviour. We use a parsimonious analytical framework of trustworthiness that questions the 'ability' and 'integrity' of counterpart organisations to explore the intentions behind organisational behaviours. Our analysis of interview narratives evidences challenges to conventional methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and the protection of the same by North/Western organisations. Our concluding discussion interprets these findings in relation to consequences for the status quo hierarchy of global governance and its promotion of liberal intervention norms, and for the utilisation of securitised and remote-control intervention methodologies in conflict zones such as Somalia.

Keywords

Turkey, Somalia, intervention, cooperation, trust, rising powers

Introduction

We contextualise this article's analysis with a short vignette:

(c. 2015) A Turkish NGO aid worker openly working in a field outside Mogadishu together with local farmers looks up to see a plane descending into the heavily defended Mogadishu International Airport. The plane carries a United Nations official from her headquarters in Nairobi for a 1020 km journey to meet with Somali project managers inside a secured airport meeting room before flying back to Nairobi. After finishing his work, the Turkish worker drives himself back to his rented home where he lives with his spouse and children.

The contradictory modes of engagement by these two expatriate workers point to the reality of divergent approaches to humanitarian and development intervention as practiced by Turkish and conventional North/Western organisations in Somalia.

Since 2011 Turkish organisations have intervened with significant institutional and resource weight in Somalia and have effectively introduced innovative approaches to humanitarian and development service provision that are outpacing efforts by conventional interveners including the UN, North/Western state donors and their governmental and non-

¹ Contact Chuck Thiessen: chuck.thiessen@coventry.ac.uk; chuck.thiessen@gmail.com; Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, Cheetah Road, Coventry CV1 2TL, UK.

governmental representatives.¹ Our starting point is an observation that the dominant conventional international community and emerging Turkish intervention actors are struggling to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia.² While the conventional intervention is multi-lateral in nature and is coordinated from Nairobi, the Turkish intervention community is based in Mogadishu and has been perceived as isolationist as it circumvents most conventional coordination structures, features bilateral aid relationships with Somali counterparts, and funds Turkish organisations with Turkish aid money.³

This article explores how and why conventional and Turkish intervention paths have diverged in Somalia. This exploration contributes more broadly to understanding the proliferation of non-conventional but influential interveners such as Turkey in conflict zones across the globe as a pivotal development for international relations and the status quo of global governance.⁴ However, existing empirical literature has not yet considered how this important evolution in international intervention plays out inside intervening organizations and, thus, cannot predict what uncooperative and uncoordinated organizational behaviour actually means in this case. This paucity of research is sharply out of sync with the rapidly expanding roles played by non-conventional interveners inside international interventions in conflict zones.⁵ In response, this article makes two thematic inquiries. First, we inquire whether the struggle to coordinate and cooperate indicates the contention of conventional methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and, second, whether this struggle also indicates the protection of conventional methods by North/Western organisations in the face of a perceived challenges by emerging actors.⁶

These overarching avenues of inquiry are important and original in the context of existing literature, analytical frameworks and methods of research on international intervention. A literature review shows that, to date, dissonant relationships between conventional and emerging non-conventional humanitarian and development organizations have not been explored at the field-level in conflict zones. Analytically, this is the first research on humanitarian and development intervention in conflict zones to utilize a framework of trustworthiness⁷ to assess relations inside the international community. More specifically, we explore dissonant organizational behaviours by considering perceptions of two antecedent factors to trustworthiness - 'ability' and 'integrity' - to investigate the intentions behind organisational behaviours. Utilizing a framework of trustworthiness helped us uncover the meanings ascribed to organizational behaviours that, once identified, contribute to the scholarly understanding of emerging intervention actors in conflict zones. Methodologically, there has not been any substantive scholarly research that approaches those closest to the action - 21 officials working for Turkish, UN, US, and EU humanitarian and development organisations in Mogadishu and Nairobi - to inquire about how they understand and theorise a lack of cooperation and coordination.

This introduction section has stated our goal of deciphering the underlying meanings ascribed to uncoordinated and uncooperative behaviour by Turkish and conventional intervening organizations. We now proceed by outlining our theoretical background before we describe our analytical framework of organisational trustworthiness⁸ and methods. Findings are presented next, which feature a discussion of the meanings given to Turkish and non-Turkish intervention behaviours. The final discussion and conclusion sections interpret these findings in relation to the status quo hierarchy of global governance and its promotion of liberal intervention norms, along with consequences for the predominant politics of securitised and remote-control intervention methodologies in Somalia and elsewhere.

Context – International intervention in Somalia

Turkey has entered a complex conflict zone that is defined by colonial interference, splintering clan and regional politics, civil warring, famine and natural disasters, and repeated

international and regional military and aid interventions. The severe food crisis across Somalia and Somaliland during the 2011 East African drought set the scene for Turkey's foray into the country, launched by the August 2011 visit of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan along with a large entourage of family, politicians, business people, aid organisation representatives and celebrities. Erdoğan would also make a strong appeal at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2011, passionately advocating for famine relief for Somalis. Erdoğan's visit to Somalia foreshadowed the reopening of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu, the return of attention by many conventional international donors, Turkish facilitated peace talks between Somalia and Somaliland, and the intervention of numerous Turkish aid and development organisations funded by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) - the Turkish bilateral development agency.⁹ The Turkish intervention in Somalia is situated within a wider and more active engagement in international affairs by Turkey which has solidified its status as an influential rising power intervener.¹⁰ The Somalia intervention is emblematic of Turkish notions of 'humanitarian diplomacy', as strategically proposed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009-2014), that emphasized humanitarian aid and development as fundamental components to expanding diplomatic ventures and ensuring foreign policy interests across the developing world.¹¹

During the initial push of the intervention, Turkey evolved into the fourth largest aid donor globally in 2012, and the largest donor among non-OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries in Somalia. Turkish actors have headquartered their activities in Mogadishu and are viewed as somewhat isolationist because of resistance to coordination with conventional multi-lateral donors and their reliance on Turkish aid money. Turkish organisations work alongside a complex multi-lateral aid environment in Somalia and Kenya that features numerous multi-lateral North/Western coordination arrangements. Over 20 coordination arrangements exist, and are dominated by OECD-DAC member states (e.g. the US, EU, UK, Japan, and others) and the UN – especially the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).¹² Multi-lateral complexity in Somalia is exaggerated by remote control management of intervention activities – virtually all international embassies, donor offices, and NGOs have chosen to be based in the relative safety of Nairobi after the withdrawal of US troops in 1994 and UNOSOM in 1995.

A brief clarification of what we mean by 'international intervention' is also necessary. Nuancing the 'international' by differentiating between conventional North/Western (broadly congruent to the OECD-DAC list of countries) and non-conventional Turkish activities is essential for the argument of this article. While the bifurcation of these two geographical categories imprecisely represents a differentiated set of intervening staff and organisations,¹³ our data indicates that representatives of Turkish humanitarian and development organisations believe they have travelled an alternative path to/in Somalia compared to conventional counterparts. These categories serve our purposes by clarifying distinctions at the level of abstraction required to generate broader conclusions in other contexts. We reduce the homogenisation of rather different international actors by targeting officials within the humanitarian and development sectors who are associated with funding from the UN, EU, UK Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and TIKA. And last, we have chosen to utilise the expansive and ambiguous term 'intervention', which refers to the basket of internationally sponsored and interconnected activities committed in the name of humanitarianism, development and peacebuilding in Somalia.

Theoretical background

Our theoretical background explores the intervention space in which Turkish and conventional interveners interact by critically surveying two potential areas of ideological contention, before it discusses the expanding roles of Turkey and other non-conventional interveners in conflict zones.

The self-interested normative discourses of North/Western interventionism

In order to comprehend the intervention milieu in which Turkish and non-Turkish organisations interact it is necessary to consider the self-interests of the North/West to intervene in the conflict-affected developing world as they side-line the restraints of national sovereignty and intervene on humanitarian grounds. The conventional intervention community in Somalia is primarily commissioned by democracies in the North/West and is, as such, underpinned by liberalism, which is vitally interested in the spread of liberal democracy and free-market economics in service to the democratic peace theory. As examples, dominant normative powers in global politics such as the EU promote, in conjunction with the UN system, the principles of democracy, universal human rights, rule of law, equality, freedom, and good governance.¹⁴

But the dissemination of liberal norms and values has not been a self-propelling ‘hands-off’ venture. Dissemination has required aggressive modes of transmission that restrict differences in opinion and target non-liberal populations to expand the liberal sphere.¹⁵ Aggressive modes of transmission are evident in the profusion of ‘humanitarian wars’ in contexts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, and Somalia. In this way, ‘humanitarian war’, as embodied by the War on Terror, counter-terrorism action, and more recently projects to counter violent extremism,¹⁶ has evolved into an essential instrument to advance the goals of liberal global governance.¹⁷

Expanding the liberal sphere of ‘secure’ space has required liberal governments to conceive of humanitarian and development intervention assistance as essentially political in nature.¹⁸ Politics and aid delivery intersect at multiple points and levels (international, regional, local), which has created divisions within the conventional intervention community between organisations who insist they are insulated from political interference and those who aim to transform the politics and dynamics of local conflict without concern for neutrality.¹⁹ The politicisation of intervention serves the liberal system of global governance since the technologies of intervention utilised are calibrated to regulate the behaviours and attitudes of ‘dangerous’ populations and transform the society, economics and politics therein.²⁰

Self-interested intervention practices have been legitimated by a belief in the universality and moral superiority of Western liberal norms, resembling the colonial *mission civilisatrice* rationale for intervention.²¹ Conceived thus, the perceived benefits for the intervener shape the intervention in fundamental ways - interveners promulgate globalised norms and discourses that ultimately strengthen the liberal sphere while reducing opposition in periphery conflict zones. For example, North/Western interventionists have curtailed accusations of neo-colonialism and imperialism and masked underlying political motivations by invoking the human security discourse.²² But the human security discourse needs to be problematised²³ - there is growing evidence that the human security discourse along with its offspring Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine²⁴ are being employed for far more than addressing the insecurity of local conflict-affected populations, and serve the self-interests of liberal nations themselves by morally legitimating more direct forms of intervention in conflict zones.²⁵

The human security and R2P discourses also provide liberal interventionists with a legitimate framework for setting the conditions and parameters that either embrace or exclude non-conventional interveners in conflict zones. This permission to discriminate between who can and cannot ‘legitimately’ intervene has required the North/West to retain careful control

over international interventions. Control is ensured through incentives – especially donor resources, beneficial policies, and access to networks²⁶ – that ensure intervention methodologies contribute to enlarging the North/West's sphere of influence. In response, this research asks whether the self-interested normative discourses of liberal interventionism such as the human security and R2P discourses are being utilised as points of contention by emerging interveners themselves to revise the status quo of global governance.

The securitisation of intervention and the politics of perceptual and physical remoteness

The politicisation of humanitarian and development intervention reveals its motivations – humanitarian and development activities increasingly serve the international security agenda of the North/West.²⁷ By projecting local needs as security issues, external interveners shift attention away from the local experience of peace and development towards the self-interests of conventional interveners, which is facilitated by an intervention logic of perceptual and physical remoteness.

Autesserre argues that perceptual remoteness is based upon the valorisation of external technical expertise over local knowledge, creating a knowledge hierarchy that ultimately serves to segregate interveners from local counterparts and populations.²⁸ As interveners allow technical assistance and credentialed knowledge to override traditional local knowledge, 'differential social capacities' and power differentials are generated.²⁹ Likewise, a relatively small group of North/Western interveners control emerging interveners and their intervention methodologies, which reinforces the boundaries of a certified and professional class of interveners who move from crisis to crisis with specialist knowledge and 'industry talk', as differentiated from both local and emerging international counterparts.³⁰

The securitisation of international intervention has also required physical remoteness, which is embodied by pervasive security policies and routines that profoundly configure interactions between interveners and their counterparts. Remote practices have been driven by perceptions of increased risk for foreign personnel working for agencies that are not viewed as impartial by local belligerents.³¹ Physical remoteness is experienced at multiple levels and shapes the daily 'security' routines of intervening staff as well as overarching intervention structures and processes.³² For example, daily routines such as security briefings, curfews, uninterrupted communication infrastructures and protocols, carefully monitored and vetted travel plans, and stricter precautions for female expatriate staff are common across most conflict zones.³³

Securitisation transform the space in which intervention occurs. Smirl inspects the securitised and 'liminal' space of intervention – the SUV, luxury hotel, and aid compound – and argues that each space enables intervening outsiders to distantiate local populations.³⁴ Air-conditioned four-by-four SUVs with tinted windows visually and symbolically create miniature mobile outposts of security as they rove amongst local populations who are restricted to second-class form of transport such as walking, bicycles, crowded public vehicles, or animals.³⁵ Similarly, Smirl observes that 'every conflict has its hotel', typically large fortified luxurious spaces where external interveners can vet local counterparts through the approval of meeting invitations.³⁶

But perhaps the most poignant symbolic expression of North/Western withdrawal and physical remoteness is the walled aid compound.³⁷ As powerful metaphors for the securitised delineation between 'internationals' and the objects of intervention, these separate spaces manifest processes of 'bunkerisation', or the retreat of interveners away from direct contact with local populations and into safe spaces³⁸. Examples include UN and NGO compounds in most active conflict zones including Baghdad's Green Zone, Kabul's Green Village or even situating headquarters in cities in neighbouring countries (e.g. Nairobi for Somalia and Amman for Iraq and Syria). This retreat has fostered a 'fly-in/fly-out' mind-set, whereby

security protocols require foreigners to restrict their travel to between walled compounds and residences and, in the case of Somalia, fly into the Mogadishu airport to meet with local implementing counterparts onsite. This retreat also transfers both responsibility and risk to local implementing partners³⁹ and relies on forms of remote management,⁴⁰ whereby interveners work at arm's length, relinquish the ability to monitor their zones of influence and risk the control of these 'demonitored spaces' to alternative (possibly ill-disposed) actors.⁴¹

The challenge of and pushback against emerging interveners in conflict zones

The current empirical literature scarcely considers whether the promulgation of self-interested normative discourses and the securitised remoteness of international intervention in conflict zones serve as points of contention through which emerging interveners leverage change in global governance. Emerging non-conventional interveners are exploiting an increasingly permissive international environment and forcing the re-adjustment of intervention architecture and manners, which is provoking pushback from OECD-DAC member states, their donor arms, and the international implementing partners they support. Sezgin and Dijkzeul describe how the spectrum of intervention actors responding to humanitarian crises is expanding to include for-profit organisations, private security companies, faith groups, diaspora groups and a variety of regional organisations.⁴² Further, new donors that include several Gulf states, China, India and Turkey are asserting themselves and operate, along with a variety of private foundations, outside of global aid tracking mechanisms and channel funding through host countries as opposed to multi-lateral frameworks.

The stature of emerging state interveners inside current forums of global governance is contested in the existing literature. Do these emerging actors simply represent facile differences in terms of the practicalities of different intervention approaches or do they represent fundamentally non-conventional approaches and model dissonant modalities of intervention as a critique of conventional approaches? Call and de Coning argue that Turkey and other rising power interveners do carry with them divergent worldviews and theories of change compared to conventional donors – focusing heavily on basic socio-economic and governance capacities as well as physical infrastructure, often preferring government partners to civil society, conceptualizing politics, development, and stability as closely interlinked, and being reticent to monitor and evaluate humanitarian and development inputs.⁴³ But in terms of actual impact, competing viewpoints exist. Some scholars attribute significant agency to emerging state-directed actors in eroding North/Western-approved norms of intervention,⁴⁴ arguing that these actors are committed to reforming the global architecture of conventional intervention and are eroding progressive norms of intervention, particularly in the area of human rights.⁴⁵ Competing viewpoints grant little agency to southern emergents and propose that despite desires to redistribute power in the global political economy⁴⁶ emergents have been tentative and reluctant to assume global leadership roles⁴⁷ and prefer to contest from within and remain integrated into the existing governance order and North/Western liberal structures.⁴⁸

Either way, there are deep contradictions and ambiguities in the stance of emerging state interveners – emerging interveners are often, at once, products of Western colonial influence, 'developing' countries in their own right, and acting as development partners to less fortunate countries – creating a complex and ambiguous positionality in relation to North/Western counterparts and local conflict-affected populations.⁴⁹ Emerging state interveners such as Turkey strategically utilise their various identities to service their foreign policy and economic interests.

Two factors shape the complex and ambiguous identity of Turkey as an intervener. First, Turkey's interventionism carries the historical baggage of the Ottoman empire, which

influences both its relations with the North/West and political discourses inside Turkey regarding its foreign policy in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.⁵⁰ Turkey has positioned and nominated itself as an influential geo-political actor and as a meeting place of civilisations. This outward-looking foreign policy breaks with Atatürk's inward-focused 'Peace at home, peace in the world' approach with a more self-confident stance in the developing world. Self-confidence has allowed Turkey to challenge its traditional subordination to the global governance status quo and increasingly project its self-interests onto the foreign stage.⁵¹

Second, Turkey is most certainly intervening in service to distinct self-interests in Africa. Turkish initiatives in Somalia ensure visibility and support the state's legitimacy across the African continent and its geopolitical goals. Economic interests include providing a market for Turkish goods and business ventures, ensuring access to Somalia's untapped natural resources, as well as strategically positioning itself to access regional markets in the Horn of Africa.⁵² Turkish interests are backed up by expanding infrastructure – since 2017 it has opened its largest military base outside of Turkey near Mogadishu, agreed to open a massive Red Sea port in north-eastern Sudan, and been invited to open a military base in Djibouti.⁵³ Turkish self-interests shine through its strategic and multi-track 'humanitarian diplomacy' foreign policy,⁵⁴ which attempts to balance conscience with national interests by providing humanitarian aid in crises to secure power, influence, and prestige.

It is important to consider the challenge of non-conventional interveners to the conventional intervention enterprise. The intervention space is inherently a site of contention,⁵⁵ and emerging configurations of actors shape the intervention space in ways that are difficult to predict.⁵⁶ Uncertainty is compounded by scant research and theorizing regarding the push-back by conventional North-Western interveners to the challenge of non-conventional interveners in these spaces. The very nature of Western liberalism requires its international representatives in conflict-affected contexts to make clear who is 'in' and 'out' of the Western enterprise and confront difference to maintain its internal coherence.⁵⁷ It is unclear whether and how conventional actors enforce their dominance and reproduce this coherence. This article explores how coordination and cooperation between conventional and emerging actors can serve this dominance and coherence as emerging actors are integrated into or side-lined from conventional intervention structures.

Analytical framework and methodology

This research utilises a single-case study grounded theory design to investigate an unusually illuminating case of humanitarian and development intervention. Unlike most cases of 'emerging power' intervention, Turkey has, in this case, entered Somalia with adequate impetus to resist assimilation with conventional North/Western actors and determine the terms of its engagement with conventional actors. Our research utilises a framework for organisational trustworthiness as outlined by the seminal work of Mayer, Davis and Schoorman⁵⁸ to analyse perceptions of underlying intentions behind observable Turkish and conventional organisational behaviours. Perceptions of trustworthiness inform decisions by one organisation to trust another, and encapsulate a set of beliefs that a trustor holds regarding another organisation and their joint relationship.⁵⁹ Mayer et al. conceive of trust as being multi-faceted in nature, and proposed that the theme of trustworthiness can be explored indirectly through a set of antecedent factors – including 'ability' and 'integrity'.⁶⁰ They argue that these factors explain a majority portion of the perceived trustworthiness of organisations, and provide a 'parsimonious foundation for the empirical study of trust for another party'. Ability refers to 'that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain'.⁶¹ In other words, does the trustee perform as the trustor sees fitting in the situation? Perceptions of integrity also indicate trustworthiness and involves the 'trustor's perception that the trustee adheres to a set

of principles that the trustor finds acceptable'.⁶² Feeding these perceptions of integrity are judgements of value and moral congruence, the credibility of the other's communication, the other's sense of justice and fairness, the alignment of their actions with their words, and whether they are perceived to be self-serving in nature.⁶³

Our data was gathered through a series of 21 face-to-face interviews in 2015 with senior or mid-level officials from Turkish, US, and EU government, international NGO, and donor humanitarian and development organisations as well as the UN in Mogadishu and Nairobi. Sampling was purposive to ensure a cross section of viewpoints were gathered, as defined by key inclusion criteria: the location of international headquarters (US, EU, or Turkey) and regional coordination offices (Mogadishu or Nairobi), the type of organisation, and experience of international cooperation in Somalia. Sampling was also theoretical – some participants were approached to elaborate on gaps in the research. Interviews were conducted in Turkish or English and most were audio recorded. Data analysis was steered by a hybrid constructivist approach to grounded theory⁶⁴ and identified core explanatory categories through open coding, which were clustered under the themes of 'ability' and 'integrity'. Subsequent selective coding fleshed out core categories.

Findings – Perceptions of trustworthiness

Our findings explore whether the struggle to cooperate and coordinate in Somalia can be interpreted as a challenge to conventional ways of intervention by Turkish organisations and/or the protection of the same by non-Turkish counterparts. We have divided our findings according to perceptions of ability and integrity by both Turkish and North/Western respondents, as illustrated in the four quadrants of Figure 1:

Figure 1: Structure of findings

	Turkey	North/West
(In)ability	Turkish perceptions of North/Western (in)ability	North/Western perceptions of Turkish (in)ability
Integrity	Turkish perceptions of North/Western integrity	North/Western perceptions of Turkish integrity

Turkish perceptions of North/Western (in)ability

We begin with the top-left quadrant of Figure 1. Turkish interview narratives featured the perceived inability of counterpart conventional organisations. Several respondents argued that non-Turkish intervention action was remote from local populations since headquarters were abroad in Nairobi and meetings were often held behind fortified walls at the Mogadishu airport. One Turkish government respondent commented on 'bunkerised' strategies: 'The UN itself is like a black box. They organise meetings at the airport, they accommodate there. They have no contact with the people.' A Turkish NGO leader used an oppositional lens to argue:

They have a closed structure. It is hard for the local to get in touch with them. We are on the streets every day. We never see these organisations in touch with the people. Maintaining a distance with people is meaningless. ... The problem would be solved if they leave their ivory towers and unite with the people.

Some respondents talked about how conventional projects were inappropriately risk-averse and banned international staff from local project sites. As a result, these projects have been shaped by the inconveniences of remote and bunkerised approaches to intervention with local populations struggling to comprehend implementation processes. Other Turkish respondents

critiqued through contrast and believed the proximity of Turkish organizations to local populations gave them distinct advantages in local credibility, effectiveness, and acceptance, which secured greater protection for projects and personnel.

Turkish interview narratives also revealed that Western intervention strategies are perceived to be inefficient and disoriented. For example, Turkish NGO officials argued that UN projects struggle to ensure accountability from a distance, and that project costs are massively inflated because of fraudulent local procurement processes. Consequently, North/Western credibility has declined, which also affects counterpart Turkish organisations. A Turkish donor official stated that his organisation avoided working with Western counterparts since association created danger for his staff and blamed the targeting of Turkish personnel by Al-Shabaab on previous cooperation with North/Western organizations. Another Turkish aid official stated: 'From a humanitarian perspective, it is out of question for us to work with a group which has a dark background.' He believed that the segregation of Turkish initiatives was justified since local populations reacted differently to North/Western organisations.

However, not all comments were critical - Turkish respondents also talked about structural abilities, especially the networked nature and internal coherence to conventional North/Western strategies and methodologies due to careful multi-lateral coordination. These respondents recognised that multi-lateral coherence magnified the scale and reach of the conventional intervention, allowing it to extend far beyond the capital Mogadishu through regional partnerships and offices across most central government-controlled areas of Somalia.

North/Western perceptions of Turkish (in)ability

We now move to the top-right quadrant of Figure 1 - perceptions of Turkish (in)ability. North/Western respondents acknowledged that Turkey's robust humanitarian and development intervention including Erdoğan's symbolic visit and servicing Mogadishu with Turkish Airlines flights had effectively legitimated and normalised support for the Somali project across the globe. Conventional respondents also respected the timely, direct and visible impact intervention approaches of Turkish organisations. A foreign donor official surmised, 'They act quickly, are visible.' Flexible action is enabled by prioritised resource support from the Turkish government (e.g. TIKA) and direct action is facilitated by placing Turkish expatriate staff in local areas to interact openly with project recipients. An international NGO leader viewed this localised presence as a direct rebuff to conventional remote practices and stated, '[They] have taken a step closer to the Somalis'. He noted that some Turkish workers resided with their families in Mogadishu. Many respondents believed highly visible infrastructure projects (e.g. hospitals, schools, mosques, roads, street lighting, an orphanage, airport and seaport) enhanced Turkey's image.

But North/Western respondents also shared perceptions of Turkish inability - especially Turkish inability to operate according to internationally approved standards when delivering aid. A Western donor official asserted:

Turkish organisations can learn from good 'donorship' ideals - these ideals have not come from nowhere but are based on established principles from extensive experience in a vast number of countries over a long period.

Further, the Turkish intervention was perceived by some as careless, lacking an overall agenda and, worse, damaging and causing unnecessary local conflict by disrupting local society, commerce and politics.

Conventional respondents also found fault with direct Turkish approaches to aid delivery, especially a deficiency in local ownership. Direct approaches side-line local Somali implementing partners in favour of Turkish NGOs themselves. Relatedly, respondents critiqued Turkey's Mogadishu-centric focus and avoidance of peripheral areas. One

respondent believed this centralised approach was ignorant of Somali clan politics wherein Mogadishu is not consistently recognised as the State capital.

Other critiques focused on Turkey's international relations and the scope of its global and regional influence. Some respondents questioned whether Turkey could effectively engage with regional powers Ethiopia and Kenya. Finally, respondents conditioned the viability of ongoing intervention in Somalia on political stability inside Turkey. Several respondents believed Turkish organisations were prone to unexpected withdrawal from Somalia if political changes occurred at home.

Turkish perceptions of North/Western integrity

Next, we turn to Turkish perceptions of integrity in the bottom-left quadrant of Figure 1. There was virtually no recognition of integrity or shared principles by either side, even when provided with opportunities during interviews. However, respondents regularly criticised the integrity of counterpart organisations. Turkish government respondents believed that Western motivations for intervention were not rooted in Somali poverty but in their home-country's security interests. Several others highlighted the pervasive 'agenda' and insincerity of Western interveners by contrasting with altruistic Turkish humanitarian action. For example, Turkish respondents noted conventional fixations upon security threats and protocols. A Turkish NGO representative opined:

I do not have a bodyguard; we are together with the people on the streets. We do not regard them as source of illness or danger. Since our main motive while coming here was humanitarian, we make everyone feel that to its last degree... The Western organisations have different agendas - coming here with hundreds of body guards and showing love to children as the cameras record do not help.

Relatedly, another Turkish NGO leader argued that humanitarian and development aid's cohabitation with the ongoing AMISON military mission is problematic and viewed Western interventionism as an extension of Europe's historical colonial interference in Somalia.

Another critique of North/Western integrity pointed out the apparent dissonance between local expectations and conventional intervention structures and processes. For example, Turkish respondents were concerned about Western conceptions of statebuilding and democratisation. Government respondents argued that Western statebuilding is unnecessarily fascinated with and constrained by narrow conceptions of democracy-building and human rights promotion. A few respondents noted that Western fixation upon 'soft' issues such as gender rights was diverting resources and attention from more 'important' issues such as economic and infrastructure development. This perceived incongruence is exaggerated by cultural differences, contrasting religious beliefs, and remote approaches to project management that prevent trust-building through face-time with local populations.

North/Western perceptions of Turkish integrity

Last, conventional respondents critiqued the underlying motivations for Turkish assistance and illustrated several areas of dissonance with 'acceptable' intervention norms (bottom-right quadrant of Figure 1). Several respondents viewed Turkish intervention in Somalia as an important component to the global expansion of self-interested Turkish foreign influence. Several respondents including a donor official believed humanitarian assistance allowed the Turkish government and business community to penetrate more deeply into Somalia to satisfy commercial interests such as exploiting gas and oil resources, and support investments in the Mogadishu airport and seaport.

Conventional respondents also argued that Turkish organisations transgressed 'globally' accepted principles of humanitarian intervention. For example, a UN official shared that her organisation endured reduced legitimacy, latitude and security through

association with Turkish organisations since, in some cases, Turkish aid was delivered under provocative armed government escorts. In a related example, an NGO official argued that Turkish economic development was comparatively inattentive to liberal statebuilding goals. Underneath this critique is the perception that Turkish intervention is politicised and ambivalent to government corruption. A donor official shared:

If we are sending strong messages, trying to address a lack of transparency and corruption in government, for example, we will insist that it has to be addressed before we can provide more aid. It is undermined by Turkish approaches when they go in and fund despite what the government is doing.

Some respondents believed this negligence has allowed Turkey to reduce the conditionality of its aid, which limits its leverage to coerce desired political reforms and undermines conventional efforts towards the same.

As a final critique of integrity, Turkish humanitarian and development decisions were perceived to be partially based upon cultural and religious affinities with local populations - in contrast to North/Western actors. An NGO official reasoned, 'Turkey is predominantly a Muslim country, and this is an advantage for Turkey.' Another humanitarian leader claimed that religious affinity allowed and required Turkish actors to expand their influence beyond the conventional - funding the restoration of mosques, facilitating imam exchanges to Turkey, and working closely with Turkey's Ministry of Islamic Affairs to issue scholarships for Somali students to study religion in Turkey.⁶⁵

Discussion - Two arenas of contestation in Somalia

We now explore our original lines of inquiry according to two thematic arenas of contestation in our presentation of findings: the status quo hierarchy of global governance and the prevailing politics of securitization in Somalia.

Contending and protecting the hierarchy of global governance

Our findings reveal a first arena of contestation – respondents perceived Turkish organisations to be challenging the status quo hierarchy of global governance and promotion of global intervention norms as experienced inside the intervention in Somalia. We need to temper this claim somewhat - it is inaccurate to claim a comprehensive rejection of conventional North/Western intervention methodologies by Turkish organisations since modes of Turkish intervention sometimes look quite similar. However, prevailing North/Western approaches are, perhaps, facing an important, albeit limited, challenge from Turkish organizations. We initiated this research with unclarity about whether Turkish organisations recognise this challenge. Given our Turkish respondents' explicit structural critiques regarding the ability of conventional intervention actors we believe they are at least, superficially, aware of their challenge. For example, Turkish respondents regularly reflected upon the networked multi-lateral clout and reach of conventional counterparts and, more importantly, perceived Turkish organisations to sit outside of this influential network. These reflections indicate the perceived exclusiveness of a club of nations who authorise membership to some organisations while excluding discordant aspirants such as Turkey. Moreover, Turkish critiques of integrity reveal suspicions that the conventional club aspires to expand its influence in East Africa in service to homeland self-interests.

Turkish interveners also contended the perceived projection of political, social, and moral superiority through the implanting of globalised and universalist norms by the conventional community.⁶⁶ Turkish respondents questioned Western integrity and its self-imposed mission to reform local and national politics and promote human rights along with the 'soft' transformations it engenders such as gender equality and religious tolerance. Turkish scepticism was amplified by their promotion of 'hard' economic alternatives -

commercial and infrastructure development. But these critiques may be somewhat duplicitous – Turkish organisations are also prescriptive as they bypass local structures and viewpoints and exploit local commercial opportunities. Similar to other rising powers, Turkey aligns its economic investments to its humanitarian and development initiatives, and Turkey has consistently insisted that trade is superior to aid for national development.⁶⁷

Conversely, conventional actors are protecting the status quo of global governance inside Somalia from challenges. Our findings do evidence that conventional representatives of the liberal order do feel responsible to monitor emerging actors and do, in fact, distinguish between states and organisations who do and do not have the right to intervene, and in what manner. Conventional respondents expressed unease about the enticement of Somali politics, economics and society towards Turkey, whereby Turkish humanitarian aid serves as an entry point for commercial development, resource exploitation, and more profound social influence. The protection of global governance was also evident in the way conventional interveners downgraded Turkish government influence inside the hierarchy of regional actors and their interests in East Africa. Conventional respondents were sceptical of Turkish clout and authority, particularly with Ethiopia and Kenya, who contribute numerous troops to the ongoing AMISOM mission and are influential actors in political and security reform. This concern illustrates how regional relations can overtake local concerns in Somalia to preserve global hierarchies and North/Western power.

Last, conventional interveners were explicitly protective of liberal intervention norms – respondents affirmed the moral legitimacy of their mission and utilised the discourse of democratisation and human rights to contrast their work with emerging actors.⁶⁸ For example, reflections upon ‘ability’ contained numerous concerns about Turkish transgression of liberal standards. Conventional respondents believed coordination processes were essential for differentiating between and governing acceptable and non-acceptable intervention practices according to ‘universal’ authorised humanitarian principles.⁶⁹

Contending and protecting the securitisation and remote control of intervention

A second arena of contestation is defined by Turkish critiques of the politics of securitisation, whereby remote-control humanitarian and development intervention methodologies compel expatriate and senior national staff into retreat to secure spaces and behind restricting security protocols. Turkish objections centred on the way security risks shaped the design of intervention initiatives and the way international project staff avoided local project sites. Contention was channelled in two directions. First, Turkish respondents reacted to the logic of remote knowledge creation and concomitant decision-making processes that prefer outside technical expertise to insider knowledge, which serve to distantiate intervening organisations from the priorities of Somalis. Second, respondents described the detrimental effects of physical remoteness that has manifestly configured interactions between external interveners and local counterparts and populations. Basing operations in Nairobi and parachuting into the Mogadishu airport or fortified hotels for meetings have starkly evidenced the conventional stance towards a context judged too dangerous for unprotected personal engagement. Further, physical remoteness symbolised North/Western agendas, whereby security concerns are prioritised despite consequences for humanitarian work, which motivated ideological contention by Turkish organisations, who regularly pointed out their everyday proximity to project activities.

Conversely, conventional interveners were unapologetic and somewhat ambivalent regarding whether and how their securitised methods might be revised in Somalia. These respondents did not admit that alternative manners of intervention are being seriously considered even as they recognised the benefits of proximate intervention approaches by Turkish organisations.

Conclusions

The bottom line to our research is as follows. Uncooperative and uncoordinated behaviour indicates a challenge to North/Western interventionism by Turkish organisations, who appear to be (at least minimally) dissonant with the principles and intervention methodologies of the conventional humanitarian and development community and are concretizing alternative stances with local populations. Concurrently, this struggle indicates the ideological protection of 'approved' intervention norms by North/Western respondents as they affirmed what they perceived to be the boundaries of the conventional intervention project and highlighted Turkish transgressions. An original contribution of this research is its problematisation of the assumed constructive nature of cooperation and coordination between conventional and emerging interveners in conflict zones and suggestion that coordination processes can be viewed as sites of co-optation and/or resistance. The struggle to cooperate is not trivial in this case but is born of the resistant agency of a challenger to the status quo of intervention decision-making.

Illuminating contestation and protection in the relationship between conventional and emerging interveners is significant in two ways. First, our results make new contributions by providing empirical support for existing theories of international intervention and global governance. What we learn is that the global governance of conflict-zone intervention is not impenetrable to challenges from emerging actors and, in response, conventional interveners are reflecting upon how coordination processes might coercively guide the dissonant agendas of newcomers toward 'acceptable' positions. In this case, Turkey has used the good fortune of weighty resources and institutional support from the Turkish government to expose the conventional project's efforts to maintain its advantage⁷⁰ even as they, too, continue to operate in service to self-interests. The resulting friction between Turkish contestation and conventional defensiveness reveals the potential of and limits to revising the status quo hierarchy of global governance and the promotion of less securitised and more proximate intervention methodologies. Overall, the empirical illumination of this research is not limited to the Somalia case - our insights contribute to a growing understanding of evolving global governance with the arrival of new interveners in other conflict-affected humanitarian crises across the globe.⁷¹

Our exploration of the potential and limits of inter-organizational coordination and cooperation points to a second area of significance. Our lines of inquiry critically inform the practices and policies of humanitarian and development organizations by contributing to the existing knowledge base that shapes their decision-making. Specifically, our findings feature the insight that emerging interveners can apply adequate institutional and resource weight to introduce innovative approaches to service-provision despite the coercive influence of more powerful partners and their coordination structures. But staying the course with innovative methods in the presence of conventional interveners will provoke inter-organizational conflict – i.e. the push and pull of contestation and protection. However, the effects of this conflict depend on how it is conceptualised. If viewed as transformational in nature,⁷² dynamics of contestation and protection can lead to negotiation, compromise, cross-organizational learning and perhaps even some semblance of mutual accountability for meeting the direct needs of local populations, civil society and government.

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful for the generous contributions of their respondents in Mogadishu and Nairobi. This article benefited from critical feedback by the anonymous reviewers from *Third World Quarterly*.

Funding

Field research for this article was enabled by funding from the Allan & Nesta Ferguson Charitable Trust.

Notes on Contributors

Chuck Thiessen is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University. Dr Thiessen is a multi-disciplinary mixed-methods scholar and practitioner with significant professional experience in research, consulting, training, advising, and project design, management and evaluation. His research has focused on the ethics of international intervention in conflict zones.

Alpaslan Özerdem is Professor of Peacebuilding and Associate Pro-Vice Chancellor Research at Coventry University. He has over 20 years field research experience in the politics of humanitarian interventions, conflict prevention, disaster response, security sector reform, reintegration of former combatants and post-conflict state-building.

Notes

1. Özerdem, "Turkey as a rising power", 64; Tank, "Turkey's new humanitarian approach".
2. Sazak et al., "Turkey and Somalia"; Özerdem, "Turkey as a rising power".
3. Akpınar, "Turkey's peacebuilding in Somalia"; Ali, "Turkey's foray into Africa", 65; Sazak et al., "Breaking with convention", 98.
4. Amar, "Global South"; De Carvalho & de Coning, "Rising powers"; Sezgin & Dijkzeul, "Introduction".
5. Sezgin & Dijkzeul, "Introduction".
6. Cagaptay, "Defining Turkish power".
7. Mayer et al., "An integrative model", 717-719.
8. Ibid., "An integrative model".
9. Özerdem, "Turkey as a rising power".
10. Oğuzlu & Dal, "Decoding Turkey's rise".
11. Akpınar, "Turkey's peacebuilding in Somalia"; Davutoğlu, "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy".
12. Schmidt, "Coordinating development", 61.
13. Cagaptay, "Defining Turkish power".
14. Donini, "The far side"; Paris, "Saving liberal peacebuilding".
15. Duffield, *Development, security*.
16. Beyer, *Counterterrorism and international power*.
17. Pugh et al., *Whose peace?*; United Nations, "A more secure world".
18. Duffield, "Social reconstruction", 1049; Rieff, *A bed for the night*; Weiss, "Principles, politics".
19. Weiss, "Principles, politics".
20. Duffield, "Social reconstruction", 1067; Rieff, *A bed for the night*.
21. Paris, "International peacebuilding", 637.
22. Davidson, "Humanitarian intervention", 146; Rieff, *A bed for the night*.
23. Bellamy, "Motives, outcomes"; Finnemore, *The purpose of intervention*; Peterson, "Creating space", 320.
24. ICISS, "The Responsibility to Protect".
25. De Larrinaga & Doucet, "Sovereign power", 530; Donini, "The far side", S228.
26. Kim & Lightfoot, "Does 'DAC-ability' really matter?".

27. Tschirgi, "Securitization and peacebuilding", 198.
28. Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 69.
29. Barnett, "International paternalism", 295.
30. Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 81-84; Thiessen, *Local ownership of peacebuilding*, 77-78.
31. Van Brabant, "Cool ground", 110.
32. Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 218-219.
33. Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 2014: 218-219; Egeland et al. "To stay and deliver", 31-32.
34. Smirl, *Spaces of aid*; Smirl, "Not welcome".
35. Ibid., *Spaces of aid*, 95.
36. Smirl, "Not welcome", 32.
37. Fisher, "Reproducing remoteness", 1.
38. Smirl, *Spaces of aid*, 69; Sandstrom, "Remoteness and 'demonitored space'".
39. Fisher, "Reproducing remoteness", 5.
40. Stoddard, *Providing aid*.
41. Sandstrom, "Remoteness and 'demonitored space'".
42. Sezgin & Dijkzeul, "Introduction".
43. Call et al., "Conclusion", 253-255.
44. De Carvalho & de Coning, "Rising powers"; Amar, "Global South".
45. Castañeda, "Not ready"; Jacob et al. "Will rising powers undermine".
46. Nel, "Redistribution and recognition".
47. Breslin, "China and the global order".
48. Kahler, "Rising powers"; Stephen, "Rising powers", 912.
49. Six, "The rise of postcolonial".
50. Aras, "Turkey's rise"; Bayer & Keyman, "Turkey"; Davutoğlu, "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy", 865-870.
51. Ibid., "Turkey's rise", 30.
52. Akpınar, "Turkey's peacebuilding in Somalia", 748.
53. Kabandula, "Rising powers", 10-11.
54. Davutoğlu, "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy".
55. Richmond, "Resistance", 685; Wolff & Zimmermann, "Between Banyans".
56. Sezgin et al., *The new humanitarians*.
57. Davidson, "Humanitarian intervention", 144.
58. Mayer et al., "An integrative model of organizational trust".
59. Dirks & Ferrin, "The role of trust".
60. Mayer et al., "An integrative model", 717.
61. Ibid., "An integrative model", 717.
62. Ibid., "An integrative model", 719.
63. Ibid., "An integrative model", 719.
64. Charmaz. *Constructing grounded theory*.
65. Compare with Harte, "Turkey shocks Africa".
66. See also Paris, "International peacebuilding", 637.
67. Sazak et al., "Breaking with convention", 98.
68. Compare with Donini, "The far side"; Davidson, "Humanitarian intervention".
69. See also Sezgin, "Introduction"; Wolff et al., "Between Banyans".
70. Compare with Duffield, "Social reconstruction".
71. Compare with Kim et al., "Does 'DAC-ability' really matter?"; Six, "The rise of postcolonial"; Sezgin et al., "Introduction".

72. Peterson, "Creating space"; Woolpert et al., "Transformational politics".

Bibliography

Akpınar, Pinar, "Turkey's peacebuilding in Somalia: The limits of humanitarian diplomacy." *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 4 (2013): 735-57.

Ali, Abdirahman, "Turkey's foray into Africa: A new humanitarian power?" *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 4 (2011).

Amar, Paul, "Global South to the rescue: Emerging humanitarian superpowers and globalizing rescue industries." *Globalizations* 9, no. 1 (2012): 1-13.

Aras, Bülent, "Turkey's rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-building in the periphery." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 11, no. 1 (2009): 29-41.

Autesserre, Séverine. *Peaceland: Conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Barnett, Michael, "International paternalism and humanitarian governance." *Global Constitutionalism* 1, no. 3 (2012): 485-521.

Bayer, Reşat and E. Fuat Keyman, "Turkey: An emerging hub of globalization and internationalist humanitarian actor?." *Globalizations* 9, no. 1 (2012): 73-90.

Bellamy, Alex, "Motives, outcomes, intent and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention." *Journal of Military Ethics* 3, no. 3 (2004): 216-32.

Beyer, Anna Cornelia. *Counterterrorism and international power relations: The EU, ASEAN and hegemonic global governance*. London: I.B.Tauris, 2010.

Breslin, Shaun, "China and the global order: Signalling threat or friendship?" *International Affairs* 89, no. 3 (2013): 615-34.

Cagaptay, Soner, "Defining Turkish power: Turkey as a rising power embedded in the Western international system." *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 4 (2013): 797-811.

Call, Charles and Cedric de Coning, "Conclusion: Are rising powers breaking the peacebuilding mold?" In *Rising powers and peacebuilding*, edited by Call, Charles and Cedric de Coning. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017: 243-272.

Castañeda, Jorge, "Not ready for prime time: Why including emerging powers at the helm would hurt global governance." *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 5 (2010): 109-22.

Charmaz, Kathy. *Constructing grounded theory*. London: SAGE Publications, 2014.

Davidson, Joanna, "Humanitarian intervention as liberal imperialism: A force for good." *POLIS Journal* 7 (2012): 128-64.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: Objectives, challenges and prospects." *Nationalities Papers* 41, no. 6 (2013): 865-70.

De Carvalho, Benjamin and Cedric de Coning, *Rising powers and the future of peacekeeping and peacebuilding*. Oslo: NOREF - Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2013.

De Larrinaga, Miguel and Marc Doucet, "Sovereign power and the biopolitics of human security." *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 5 (2008): 517-37.

Dirks, Kurt and Donald Ferrin, "The role of trust in organizational settings." *Organization Science* 12, no. 4 (2001): 450-67.

Donini, Antonio, "The far side: The meta functions of humanitarianism in a globalised world." *Disasters* 34, no. s2 (2010): S220-S37.

Duffield, Mark. *Development, security and unending war: Governing the world of peoples*. Malden, MA: Polity, 2007.

Duffield, Mark, "The liberal way of development and the development-security impasse: Exploring the global life-chance divide." *Security Dialogue* 41 (2010): 53-76.

Duffield, Mark, "Social reconstruction and the radicalization of development: Aid as a relation of global liberal governance." *Development & Change* 33, no. 5 (2002): 1049.

Egeland, Jan, Adele Harmer, and Abby Stoddard, *To stay and deliver: Good practice for humanitarianism in complex security environments* (New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2011).

Finnemore, Martha. *The purpose of intervention: Changing beliefs about the use of force*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.

Fisher, Jonathan, "Reproducing remoteness? States, internationals and the co-constitution of aid 'bunkerization' in the East African periphery." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* (2016): 1-22.

Harte, Julia, "Turkey shocks Africa." *World Policy Journal* 29, no. 4 (2012): 27-38.
ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, 2001.

Jacob, Suraj, John Scherpereel, and Melinda Adams, "Will rising powers undermine global norms? The case of gender-balanced decision-making." *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 4 (2017): 780-808.

Kahler, Miles, "Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo." *International Affairs* 89, no. 3 (2013): 711-29.

Kabandula, Abigail and Timothy Shaw, "Rising powers and the horn of Africa: Conflicting regionalisms." *Third World Quarterly* 39, no. 12 (2018): 2315-2333.

Kim, Soyeun and Simon Lightfoot, "Does 'DAC-ability' really matter? The emergence of non-DAC Donors: Introduction to policy arena." *Journal of International Development* 23, no. 5 (2011): 711-21.

Mac Ginty, Roger, "Routine peace: Technocracy and peacebuilding." *Cooperation and Conflict* 47, no. 3 (2012): 287-308.

Mayer, Roger, James Davis, and David Schoorman, "An integrative model of organizational trust." *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 709-34.

Nel, Philip, "Redistribution and recognition: What emerging regional powers want." *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 4 (2010): 951-74.

Oğuzlu, Tarik and Emel Parlar Dal, "Decoding Turkey's rise: An introduction." *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 4 (2013): 617-36.

Özerdem, Alpaslan, "Turkey as a rising power: An emerging global humanitarian actor," In *The new humanitarians in international practice: Emerging actors and contested principles*, edited by Sezgin, Z. and D. Dijkzeul. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.

Paris, Roland, "International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'." *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 04 (2002): 637-56.

Paris, Roland, "Saving liberal peacebuilding." *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 337-65.

Peterson, Jenny H., "Creating space for emancipatory human security: Liberal obstructions and the potential of agonism." *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 2 (2013): 318-28.

Pugh, Michael, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner. *Whose peace? Critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Richmond, Oliver, "Resistance and the post-liberal Peace." *Millennium* 38, no. 3 (2010): 665-92.

Rieff, David. *A bed for the night: Humanitarianism in crisis*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

Sandstrom, Karl, "Remoteness and 'demonitored space' in Afghanistan." *Peacebuilding* 2, no. 3 (2014): 286-302, doi:10.1080/21647259.2014.887619.

Sazak, Onur, and Auveen Elizabeth Woods "Breaking with convention: Turkey's new approach to peacebuilding." In *Rising powers and peacebuilding*, edited by Call, Charles and Cedric de Coning. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017: 93-106.

Schmidt, Anna, "Coordinating development in conflict states: Donor networks in Somalia." *IDS Bulletin* 44, no. 1 (2013): 53-71.

Sezgin, Zeynep and Dennis Dijkzeul, "Introduction: New humanitarians getting old?," In *The new humanitarians in international practice: Emerging actors and contested principles*, edited by Sezgin, Z. and D. Dijkzeul. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.

Sezgin, Zeynep and Dennis Dijkzeul, eds., *The new humanitarians in international practice: Emerging actors and contested principles* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

Six, Clemens, "The rise of postcolonial states as donors: A challenge to the development paradigm?." *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 6 (2009): 1103-21.

Smirl, Lisa, "'Not welcome at the Holiday Inn': How a Sarajevo hotel influenced geopolitics." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 10, no. 1 (2016): 32-55.

Smirl, Lisa. *Spaces of aid: How cars, compounds and hotels shape humanitarianism*. London: Zed Books, 2015.

Stephen, Matthew, "Rising powers, global capitalism and liberal global governance: A historical materialist account of the BRICs challenge." *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (2014): 912-38.

Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harmer, and Victoria DiDomenico, *Providing aid in insecure environments: Trends in policy and operations* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006).

Tank, Pinar, "Turkey's new humanitarian approach in Somalia." *NOREF Report* (2013).
Tschirgi, Necla, "Securitization and peacebuilding," In *Routledge handbook of peacebuilding*, edited by Mac Ginty, R., 197-210. London: Routledge, 2013.

Thiessen, Chuck, *Local ownership of peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering responsibility for sustainable peace and development* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014).

United Nations, *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility: Report of the high-level panel on threats, challenges, and change*. New York: United Nations - Department of Public Information, 2004.

Van Brabant, Koenraad. "Cool ground for aid providers: Towards better security management in aid agencies." *Disasters* 22, no. 2 (1998): 109-125.

Weiss, Thomas, "Principles, politics, and humanitarian action." *Ethics & International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1999): 1-22.

Wolff, Jonas and Lisbeth Zimmermann, "Between Banyans and battle scenes: Liberal norms, contestation, and the limits of critique." *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 3 (2015): 513-34.

Woolpert, Stephen, Christa Daryl Slaton, and Edward W. Schwerin, eds., *Transformational politics: Theory, study, and practice* (New York: SUNY Press, 1998).