

# Impact of Corporate Governance on Bank Financial Performance

**Oino, I. & Itan, M.**

Published PDF deposited in Coventry University's Repository

**Original citation:**

Oino, I & Itan, M 2018, 'Impact of Corporate Governance on Bank Financial Performance' Journal of Business Management and Economics, vol. 6, no. 8.  
<https://dx.doi.org/10.15520/jbme.v6i08.2262>.

DOI 10.15520/jbme.v6i08.2262.

ISSN 2347-5471

**This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.**

**Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.**

 <p>INNOVATIVE JOURNAL ЮНКВУТ</p>	<p>Contents lists available at <a href="http://www.innovativejournal.in">www.innovativejournal.in</a></p> <p><b>JOURNAL OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS</b></p> <p>Home page: <a href="http://innovativejournal.in/index.php/jbme">http://innovativejournal.in/index.php/jbme</a></p>	 <p><b>JBME</b> ISSN: 2347-5471</p>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

## Impact of Corporate Governance on Banks Financial Performance

<sup>1</sup> Isaiah Oino, <sup>2</sup> Mohamad Itan

<sup>1,2</sup> United Kingdom

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15520/jbme.v6i08.2262>

**Abstract: Purpose:** The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance on the financial performance of financial institutions in London city with emphasis on board role and composition, transparency and disclosure, audit and compliance and the risk management as indicators of corporate governance and profitability, liquidity and loan portfolio taken as proxies for financial performance.

**Design/methodology/approach:** A sample of 20 financial institutions was selected and from each selected, 10 respondents were selected giving a total sample size of 200. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA), with inbuilt ability to check for composite reliability, was used to obtain composite indices for governance indicators as well as the indicators of financial performance, based on the set of questions framed for each of them. **Findings:** The results revealed that all indicators of corporate governance positively influence the financial performance of financial institutions. However, whereas the effect of auditing and compliance, transparency, disclosure and risk management were found to be significant in their influence on financial performance, board role and composition turns out to be insignificant. As such, policy prescriptions are proposed towards redefining the role of board members while enforcing accountability and transparency. **Practical implications:** This paper demonstrates the importance of transparency and disclosure in the managerial affairs, the financial performance of financial institutions through loan portfolio, liquidity and profitability increases by 0.4 with such effect being statistically relevant at 1%. **Originality/value:** The use of primary data in assessing the impact of corporate governance rather than just using secondary data forms the novelty of this study. In addition, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to assess the weight of various parameters.

**Keywords:** Corporate governance, financial performance, Principal Component Analysis, Financial institutions.

### INTRODUCTION

The wave of corporate scandals which swept across renowned companies in Europe and the USA (e.g. Societe General, the LEHMAN BROTHERS etc.), have raised questions as to what composition of the board can best monitor and control the activities of management in an organization. The management of these companies was involved in dubious, questionable and fraudulent accounting practices and their boards could not detect them on time. Fraud, mismanagement and poor monitoring of agents' activities resulted to lack of transparency and accountability making these top companies vulnerable to failures. This led to the creation of regulatory corporate governance reports and codes; these were introduced to set regulations that could ensure effective governance and to improve on the financial performance of these firms. Wilson (2006) noted that poor corporate governance can lead market to lose confidence in the inability of a bank to properly manage its assets and liability, including deposits which could in turn trigger a bank liquidity crisis. The strength of the corporate governance mechanism in a financial establishment determines the system's vulnerability to uncertainties and eventual risks; the reason why some institutions fail, and others succeed. However, Drobotz et al. (2003)'s study shows that good corporate governance lead to increased valuation, higher profit, higher sales growth and lower capital expenditure. The basic building blocks of corporate governance structures include, Directors, Accountability and Audit, Directors' Remuneration, Shareholders and the AGM. Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) identified the need for greater transparency and accountability in areas such as board structure and operation, directors' contracts and the establishment of board monitoring committees. In addition, they all stressed

the importance of the non-executive directors' monitoring role. Our work follows the research conducted by Njekangand Afuge (2017) in Camerron analysing the impact of CG credit unions financial performance.

The interaction between good practices of CG and CSR disclosure, as a transparency mechanism, has not been extensively analysed, and neither the effect of this specific mechanism on financial performance has been studied in depth (Jain and Jamali, 2016). Baumann and Neir (2006) identified that higher disclosure results in higher capital buffers. Hirtle (2007) finds that greater disclosure produces lower risk and higher risk-adjusted returns. These are important aspects in the current banking environment post global financial crisis.

#### Research Objectives

The main objective of this study is to determine the effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of financial institutions. Specifically, it seeks to:

- Assess the effect of board role and composition on the financial performance of financial institutions in London.
- Examine the role of transparency and disclosure on the financial performance of financial institutions.
- Evaluate the effect of auditing and compliance, and risk management on the financial performance of financial institutions.

#### Research Hypotheses

This study seeks to test the null hypotheses that:

- $H_1$ : Board role and composition have no effect on the financial performance of financial institutions in London.

- ii. H<sub>2</sub>: Transparency and disclosure do not affect the financial performance of financial institutions.
- iii. H<sub>3</sub>: Auditing and compliance have no effect on the financial performance of financial institutions.
- iv. H<sub>4</sub>: Risk management has no effect on the financial performance of financial institutions.

## REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Governance in banking dramatically changed in the 1990s because of significant changes of ownership which emanated from mergers and acquisitions (Arouri et al., 2011). The recent financial crisis that affected most of the developed countries originated from America before spreading to other countries. This was because of the financial interconnectivities of financial institutions. The chief cause of the subprime mortgages that lead to the financial crisis was because of excessive risk taking. Excessive risk-taking hinges on agency problem. Agency theory posits that a large board can be less efficient than a small board due to a rise in agency conflicts because of inefficient communication and cooperation costs (Jensen, 1993). However, Pfeffer (1972) noted that board size is positively linked to the performance of large firms. This is because large firms have a greater need of more board members who may bring different experience and expertise especially when the board is well diversified.

Pathan and Faff (2013) study the impact of the board size on the performance of US BHCs for the 1997-2011 period. The study indicated a negative relationship between the board size and performance as estimated by Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and pre-tax operating income (POI) ratios. On the contrary, when Adams and Mehran (2012) analysed 35 BHCs over the 1965-1999 periods, they concluded that board size is positively related to bank performance as estimated by Tobin's Q and ROA ratio.

A diversified board requires both executive and non-executive directors. (Busta, 2007) analysed the influence of non-executive directors in decision making process. The results indicated that there is a positive association between non-executive directors and performance, in terms of return on invested capital and market-to-book values, for a sample of European banks. Moreover, Tanna et al. (2011) examined the impact of the board independence on the performance, as estimated by various efficiency measures, of seventeen banking institutions in the UK. They conclude that there exists a positive and significant relationship between the board independence and bank efficiency over the period 2001-2006. On the contrary, according to the 'stewardship' theory (Donaldson, 1990) there is no conflict between the interests of shareholders and managers.

A wider study by Tandelilin et al. (2007) examined the correlation among corporate governance, risk management and bank performance using a sample of 51 Indonesian banks for the period 1999 – 2004. This study revealed that bank ownership affects both the relationship of corporate governance and bank performance and corporate governance and risk management. Risk management refers to the process by which an organization identifies and analyses threats, examines alternatives, and accepts or

mitigates those threats even before they begins to impede the activities of the organization. Similarly, Culp (2008) opined that risk management is viewed today as one of the key characteristics of successful companies which enable firms to view all risks facing them through some form of pre-planned activities. Kittipat and Nopadol (2014) analysed the relationship between risk management system, a performance measurement system and the financial performance of Thai listed companies. The study was done by collecting data from persons directly involved with these two systems with a total of 101 respondents. The results of the study indicate that success of the enterprise risk management system and performance measurement system have a weak positive correlation with the financial performance of an organization as measured by return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and earnings per share (EPS).

### *Transparency and Disclosure on financial performance:*

Transparency and disclosure of information are considered to be an essential element of corporate governance (Henry, 2008). Disclosure include many aspects such as board and management structure disclosure, ownership structure disclosure and financial transparency and information disclosure. Zaman et al., (2014) considered voluntarily disclosure as one of corporate governance mechanism that enhances performance. Toksal (2004) noted that corporate governance disclosures reduces the cost of capital. On contrary, Habib (2008) did not find any correlation between economic profit and corporate governance. Bushman and Smith (2001), Hassan (2012) and Fung (2014) identified a positive relationship of the stakeholders through CSR disclosure on both the decision-making processes and the company's market value, and consequently, its financial performance. Fuertes-Callen et, al.(2014) find the same positive relationship between CSR disclosure, as proxy of transparency, and financial performance.

Sen (2011) analysed 50 listed companies in order to determine the extent of corporate governance disclosure. He developed an index consisting of 67 parameters in accordance with the clause 49 of the listing agreement. ROE and ROA were used as profitability indicators. The paper concluded that there is a considerable scope for improvement in the corporate governance disclosure practices practiced by the firms as the difference between the quality and quantum of disclosures made by the companies was significant. It was also found that the size of the company is a significant determinant of corporate governance disclosures. Larger companies showed better extent of disclosure as compared to smaller ones.

Kamal (2012) examined 95 UAE listed corporations to measure the extent of corporate governance disclosures made by these firms. The results found that the extent of disclosure is similar in almost all economic sectors (Industries, Banking, Insurance and Services) in UAE. The highest disclosure was found in management structure and transparency and the lowest disclosure in external auditing and non-audit services. The transparency and management structure disclosures were found significantly different across different sectors.

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY/APPROACH**

The study adopted the cross-sectional survey research design. This design is exploratory on the one hand and causal on the other because it examines the relationships amongst variables and the effects of the corporate governance indicators on financial performance.

Principally, primary source of data was used with well structured questionnaires as the research instrument administered to the respondents. These respondents were made up of board members, committee members, staff and enlightened members of the financial institutions and corporate governance. That is, all respondents came from financial background. Though not a time series study, secondary data was collected from the annual reports of the financial institutions on the indicators of performance.

The study population comprised of 20 financial institutions which were selected using the purposive sampling techniques in London city which are registered under the Ministry of Finance. From the financial institutions selected, a total of 10 respondents involving management (board and staff) and members were sampled making a total sample size of  $10 \times 20 = 200$ . All respondents were purposively selected to ensure they are from the same background and have experience and knowledge on corporate governance in order to achieve a sort of common view. We chose banks from the UK (in similar legislation i.e. same country) in order to limit the issue of heterogeneity. In other words, firms or banks in same country are not likely to be different from those in countries. That is, the cross-sectional effects are not significant.

**Model Specification**

The model used for this study is multiple regression analysis to assess the performance of the different indicators on corporate governance. These indicators include: Board role and composition (BRC), transparency and disclosure (TD), auditing and compliance (AC) and risk (R). Financial performance as the main dependent variable is denoted by (FP) with indicators being Profitability (P), Loan Portfolio (LP) and Liquidity (L) as illustrated by Njekangand Afuge (2017)

**a) Profitability and Governance Equation**

This being our base model, the objective is to understand the need of corporate governance in enhancing performance. Large banks are likely to be dominated by large board of directors compared with small banks. Large board of

directors are likely to be drawn from a diverse background including gender, age, experience and qualification. Whist small banks are likely to have a lean board of directors who might not be diversified.

$$P = f(A^{\alpha_0}, BRC^{\alpha_1}, TD^{\alpha_2}, AC^{\alpha_3}, R^{\alpha_4}, e^{\mu})$$

$$Profit_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln BRC_i + \alpha_2 \ln TD_i + \alpha_3 \ln AC_i + \alpha_4 \ln R_i + \mu \quad (1)$$

**b) Loan Portfolio and Governance Equation**

In this case, our task was to assess whether CG determines bank's loan portfolio. The idea is that strong and well diversified board of directors are likely to evaluate the banking's lending behaviour and determine the pattern.

$$LP = f(A^{\beta_0}, BRC^{\beta_1}, TD^{\beta_2}, AC^{\beta_3}, R^{\beta_4}, e^{\mu})$$

$$LP_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln BRC_i + \beta_2 \ln TD_i + \beta_3 \ln AC_i + \beta_4 \ln R_i + e \quad (2)$$

**c) Liquidity and Governance Equation**

$$L = f(A^{\lambda_0}, BRC^{\lambda_1}, TD^{\lambda_2}, AC^{\lambda_3}, R^{\lambda_4}, e^{\mu})$$

$$L_i = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 \ln BRC_i + \lambda_2 \ln TD_i + \lambda_3 \ln AC_i + \lambda_4 \ln R_i + \psi \quad (3)$$

These three functions have been summarized in one function showing the effect of Corporate Governance on Financial Performance in the following Governance-Financial Performance function.

$$FP = f(A^{\pi_0}, BRC^{\pi_1}, TD^{\pi_2}, AC^{\pi_3}, R^{\pi_4}, e^{\mu})$$

Where BRC is Board role and composition, TD is transparency and disclosure, AC is auditing and compliance and R risk management in equations (1) to (3). A priori, it is expected that all the parameter estimates should not be zero.

**FINDINGS**

Our data is fairly distributed in terms of gender and position in the company. However most (52%) of our respondents were between 44-50 years old. The reason to ensure fairly distributed data was to avoid any skewness.

Examining the relationship that exists amongst the different indicators of corporate governance in this study is fundamental in explaining the impact of one concept to the other. It is worth reiterating here that the four indicators of corporate governance and the three indicators of financial performance were used for this study. These retained questions are those that explain the different components of both corporate governance and financial performance. These results are presented following the PCA rankings of the components of corporate governance and financial performance as shown in table 1 below;

**Table 1: Pair-Wise Correlation (Risk Management and Transparency and Disclosure)**

Variable	RSPE	RLPB	RDCC	RLRF	RBI	TDPI	TIDP
RSPE	1.0000						
RLPB	0.5231	1.0000					
RDCC	0.6110	0.5780	1.0000				
RLRF	0.6102	0.5980	0.6003	1.0000			
RBI	0.6812	0.5901	0.6419	0.6108	1.0000		
TDPI	.05092	0.4409	0.4187	0.3765	0.4107	1.0000	
TIDP	0.5987	0.5875	0.6100	0.4880	0.5401	0.6319	1.0000

(RSPE: Regular staff performance evaluation, RLPB: Risk management, RDCC: Regular Defined Cash Ceiling, RLRF: Loan recovery task force, RBI: inter-bank reconciliation, TDPI: Transparency and declaration of personal interest, TIDP: Transparency and information disclosure policy)

One of the diagnostic tests conducted on the variables is to assess the presence of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is where the correlation is above 0.75. The need for staff

performance evaluation and its relationship to the firm's performance is well documented in the literature (Kilduff et al., 2000; Higgs, 2005). Our results demonstrate strong

positive relationship between RSPE and RDCC (0.6110) implies that if staff is evaluated regularly and present credible guarantors in their files, then the risk of poor cash management and unauthorized withdrawals by cheque will reduce greatly, thus improving on cash management. Equally, if the staff are trained and evaluated regularly (RSPE), inter branch reconciliation will be optimized (RBI),

thus minimizing fraud and errors that may arise. This explains the strong positive relationship between RSPE and RBI. The explanation goes same for all the values presented amongst the different relationships in the table 1 above. This strong positive relationship is an indication that risk management is a fundamental indicator of corporate governance that influences financial performance.

**Table 2: Pair-Wise Correlation (Transparency and Disclosure, Auditing and Compliance and Board Role and Composition)**

Variable	TMUR	TAAP	AABC	AMR	AIEB	BIR	BMG
TMUR	1.0000						
TAAP	0.5008	1.0000					
AABC	0.2109	0.2613	1.0000				
AMR	0.5109	0.5366	0.1413	1.0000			
AIEB	0.5041	0.5003	0.2418	0.6100	1.0000		
BIR	0.1813	0.1006	0.2100	0.1690	0.1413	1.0000	
BMG	0.3200	0.3711	0.2001	0.3210	0.3910	0.1519	1.0000

(TMUR: Timely up to date report, TAAP: Asset acquisition procedures, AABC: Audit on activities of board and committee, AMR: Audit monthly report, AIEB: Auditing, internal and external by-laws, BIR: Board interpretation of reports, BMG: Board mastery of guidelines)

Table 2 presents the relationships that exist amongst the variables of the three different components cited above. It is worth noting that following PCA components rankings, the strength of the relationship decreases as we move from one component to the other. The strength of the relationship for instance has dropped as we move from risk management to transparency and disclosure. The relationship between TMUR and TAAP is a strong positive relationship (0.5008) implying that regular reporting is required (TMUR) for the members to closely monitor the procedure and quality of assets acquired (TAAP). There is also a strong positive relationship (0.5109) between the regular presentation of financial reports (TMUR) and the ability to interpret these reports by the auditors (AMR), otherwise these reports will not make any useful contributions to the union's performance. According to the results, reporting (TMUR) is worthless if there is no regular monitoring by the auditors to compare reports with actual results from the field. This explains the strong positive relationship (0.5041) between (TMUR) and (AIEB). Moreover, the presentation of monthly reports and regular monitoring by the auditors (AMR and AIEB) are strongly correlated to the evaluation of the value and quality of assets acquired (TAAP). This implies that without regular monitoring and reporting, poor quality assets could be acquired at exorbitant prices with the aim of meeting self-interests. Above all, regular monitoring (AMR) without regular reporting is worthless. This is confirmed by the strong positive relationship that links monitoring with reporting.

**Table 3: Pair-Wise Correlation (Board Role and Composition)**

Variable	BCSF	BMR	BEMS
BCSF	1.0000		
BMR	0.2901	1.0000	
BEMS	0.5613	0.2978	1.0000

(BCSF: Board committee, and staff functions, BMR: Board mastery of reports, BEMS: Board evaluation of management staff)

Table 3 reveals that there exists a positive relationship between separation of functions (BCSF) and board mastery of reports and staff evaluation (BMR and BEMS). Staff evaluation can easily be captured from the report of activities carried out by the staff. This conforms to the positive relationship between BMR and BEMS.

**Techniques of Estimation:**

This study will make use of the multiple regression analysis technique assuming that the institutions could have some differences which might not be time variant. The effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of financial institutions in London will be captured by examining the effects of the various indicators of corporate governance on the dependent variable.

The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) will then be conducted on these questions to examine which questions better captures the various indicators. PCA is a variable reduction procedure. It is used when we obtain data from a large number of variables (questions) and believe that there is redundancy in the variables (questions). Redundancy means that some of the variables are correlated with one another possibly because they are measuring the same construct. In performing a PCA, scores will be calculated for each subject or indicator. The scores from the questions will then be weighted optimally and summed to compute the scores on a given component or variable.

**The Principal component Analysis (PCA) results:**

Table 4 below shows the four components and their respective eigen values and proportion of the total variance that have been retained as principals.

**Table 4: Retained Components for Governance Indicators and their Eigen values**

Component	Eigenvalue	Proportion (%)	Cumulative Proportion (%)
Component 1	9.9130	20.01	27.10
Component 2	4.5127	9.41	36.51
Component 3	2.1802	7.45	43.96
Component 4	2.1007	3.92	47.88

Component 1 is risk management, components 2 is transparency and disclosure, component 3 is on auditing and compliance and component 4 is board role and composition.

Table 4 above shows that risk management accounts for 20.01% of the total variance, transparency and disclosure accounts for 9.41, auditing and compliance for 7.45% and board role and composition about 3.92% of the total variance. We then move to the next step where we arrange the factor in a hierarchical as shown in table 5 below.

**Table 5: Loadings (Eigenvectors) of Retained Components of Governance Measures**

Component 1 is risk management, components 2 is transparency and disclosure, component 3 is on auditing and compliance and component 4 is board role and composition.

Component 1		Component 2		Component 3		Component 4	
Variable	Eigen Vector	Variable	Eigen-vector	Variable	Eigen-vector	Variable	Eigen-vector
RSPE	0.4912	TDPI	-0.5129	AABC	0.3196	BIR	0.1920
RLPB	0.5219	TIDP	-0.5120	AMR	-0.2932	BMG	0.5619
RDCC	0.4871	TMUR	-0.5194	AIEB	-0.3100	BCSF	0.4331
RLRF	0.5912	TAAP	-0.4100	-	-	BMR	0.5611
RBI	0.5129	-	-	-	-	BEMS	0.4190

(**RSPE**: Regular staff performance evaluation, **RLPB**: Risk management, **RDCC**: Regular Defined Cash Ceiling, **RLRF**: Loan recovery task force, **RBI**: inter-bank reconciliation, **TDPI**: Transparency and declaration of personal interest, **TIDP**: Transparency and information disclosure policy, **TMUR**: Timely up to date report, **TAAP**: Asset acquisition procedures, **AABC**: Audit on activities of board and committee, **AMR**: Audit monthly report, **AIEB**: Auditing internal and external by-laws, **BIR**: Board interpretation of reports, **BMG**: Board mastery of guidelines, **BCSF**: Board committee, and staff functions, **BMR**: Board mastery of reports, **BEMS**: Board evaluation of management staff)

In this we assess the board of directors from a number of fronts. That is, the need for the directors to declare their interests (TDPI), information disclosure (TIDP), availability of monthly reports (TMUR) and procedures that evaluate the quality and value of assets (TAAP). This is in order to analyse the impact of transparency and disclosure. As part of CG requirements, it is very important that the board of directors disclose material interest in any undertaking. Disclosing information about a corporation's governance is also important to potential investors and shareholders and a critical component of transparency.

On their part, the non-interference of the board in the presentation of audit reports (AABC), the actual monthly presentation of audit accounts (AMR) and the plan of auditing (AIEB) are on their part elements of auditing and compliance that load heavily in component 3. The importance of compliance has been identified by Tariq and Abbas (2013) who noted that there is a positive association between compliance and firm performance.

Compliance with the regulatory requirements will entail a detailed interpretation of regulatory framework and reports. The ability of board and committee members to interpret reports (BIR), mastery of guidelines of supervising management activities (BMG), functions clarity and non-interference of board (BCSF), the availability of reports prior to board meetings (BMR) and the existence of performance evaluation for staff and management

succession (BEMS) are the key ingredients of board role and composition.

**PCA on Performance:**

The number of components retained for subsequent analysis is subject to attaining Kaiser Criterion that only components with eigen value greater than 1 are retained. The PCA results show that up to five components are capable of being retained. However, the first three components have high eigen values and capture more variables of interest than the last two. As such, only the first three components are extracted with the relative proportion of variance accounted for displayed on table 6 below.

**Table 6: Retained Components for Performance measures and their Eigenvalues**

Component	Eigen value	Proportion (%)	Cumulative Proportion (%)
Component 1	9.2331	50.12	50.12
Component 2	4.009	10.11	60.23
Component 3	2.1900	7.10	67.33

The eigenvalues indicate that component 1 accounts for 50.12% of the total variation in performance of financial institutions, component 2 accounts for 10.11% while component 3 accounts for 7.10% of that variation. Cumulatively, these three components jointly account for 67.33% of the variation in the performance of financial institutions in London.

**Table 7: Loadings (Eigenvectors) of Retained Components of Performance Measures**

Component 1 is loan portfolios, component 2 is liquidity and component 3 is profitability

Component 1		Component 2		Component 3	
Variable	Eigenvector	Variable	Eigenvector	Variable	Eigenvector
LPCR	0.3910	LDAD	0.5104	PICR	0.3916
LPFC	0.4100	LRAD	0.3012	PMSO	-0.4103
LPLP	0.3901	LMDP	0.4012	PRSM	-0.4108
LPLR	0.4108	LUIA	-0.1004	PCSF	0.3912
LPDL	0.4375	-	-	PDOI	-0.4957
LPLD	0.5612	-	-	-	-
LPWO	0.5781	-	-	-	-

(**LPCR**: Loan portfolio, interest collection rate, **LPFC**: Loan portfolio, fake collateral,

**LPLP**: Loan portfolio, quality of loan policy, **LPLR**: Loan portfolio, low cost of loan recovery, **LPDL**: Loan portfolio, delinquency of loan, **LPWO**: Loan portfolio, written-off **LDAD**: Liquidity, demand deposits)

The eigen values for each of the components reveal that the variability in the performance of financial institutions is determined in order of merit (as indicated by eigen values)

by the loan portfolio policy, liquidity policy and the profitability aim of the institutions.

Going by their eigen vectors, it can be observed that the interest collection rates (LPCR), non-existence of fake collateral documents in bank's loan files (LPFC), an up-to-date loan policy for recovery of bad debts (LPLP), the low cost of loan recovery for the bank (LPLR), low rate of loan delinquency (LPDL), decreasing rate of loan delinquency (LPLD) and the writing off of loans above a year old (LPWO) exert much influence on loan portfolio management index; the availability of deposits on demand (LDAD), bank reserve availability (LRAD), ease of meeting

cash demands (LMDP) and the existence of an investment account for saving excess liquidity (LUIA) are the major determinants of liquidity preferences while prompt payment of interest (PICR), meeting social obligations (PMSO), meeting reserve requirement is as a result of profitability (PRSM), cheap sources of funding relative to interest generated (PCSF) and the increasing rate of dividends paid (PDOI) are the major factors accounting for the variability in the profitability of financial institutions in London.

**Table 8: The results of the multiple regression analysis results are presented in the table below**

	Loan Portfolio	Liquidity	Profitability	Financial Performance
	Coefficient (LSE)	Coefficient (LSE)	Coefficient (LSE)	Coefficient (LSE)
BRC	0.3460 *** (0.2001)	0.1923 (0.0930)	0.7100** (0.2190)	0.1730 (0.1331)
TD	0.1091 *** (0.1003)	0.8710*** (0.0751)	0.1410 (0.1010)	0.3046*** (0.4100)
AC	0.2902 ** (0.0160)	0.9120*** (0.0071)	0.1296 (0.8230)	0.3309** (0.0031)
RM	0.2953*** (0.1200)	0.89518** (0.1740)	0.1290** (0.1201)	0.6230 *** (0.1006)
_CONS	0.2975 (0.1007)	0.1096* (0.2306)	0.1201 (0.036)	0.7100 (0.3001)
R-squared	0.8001	0.4230	0.6701	0.6950
Adjusted R-squared	0.7812	0.4035	0.6396	0.6899
Fstat	65.90	30.12	56.09	60.79
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

The results indicate, board role and composition, transparency and disclosure, auditing and compliance as well as risk management within financial institutions in London governance indicators that significantly influence the financial performance of the financial institutions as indicated by their test statistical values, magnitude and signs. Therefore, we reject the stated null hypotheses except for the role and composition of board members which is insignificant.

The regression results on column five of table 8 above show that transparency and disclosure has a positive and significant effect on the financial performance of financial institutions in London. In fact, as the level of transparency and disclosure in the managerial affairs increases, the financial performance of financial institutions through loan portfolio, liquidity and profitability increases by 0.3046 with such effect being statistically relevant at 1%.

Similar implications can be drawn from the sign and magnitude of the coefficient of auditing and compliance. Its magnitude and sign show that as the level of auditing of accounts in financial institutions and compliance with banking regulations increases, the financial performance of these institutions has the propensity of increasing by 0.3309. This effect is found to be statistically significant at 5% level of significance, is in line with backing a priori expectations. On its part, the coefficient of risk management is positive and significant at 1%. Precisely, as the level of risk mitigation and management increases amongst financial institutions, there is a tendency for financial performance to significantly increase by 0.6230 the effect of which is significant at 1% level of significance, through the effect on loan portfolio, liquidity decisions and profitability.

The results on column five of table 8 further indicate that the joint variation in board role and composition, transparency and disclosure of accounts, auditing and compliance with banking regulations and risk management account for approximately 69% of the total variation in the performance of financial institutions in London city. Approximately 31% of the overall financial performance of these financial institutions is, therefore, accounted for by the error term that is, other factors not modelled in the financial performance model such as membership and other specific characteristics of the financial institutions. This assertion and the prescriptive power of the effect of this joint is ascertained plausible by the significance level of the Fisher F-ratio whose probability shows a 99% confidence in predictions made based on such results.

## REFERENCES

- [1]. Adams, R. B. & Mehran, H.(2012). "Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies," *Journal of Financial Intermediation*, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pp. 243-267.
- [2]. Arouri, M. E. H. (2011). Does crude oil move stock markets in Europe? A sector investigation. *Economic Modelling*, vol. 28, pp.1716-1725.
- [3]. Ashid et als. (2010). "Board Composition and Firm Performance" *Australian Accounting Business and Finance Journal*, vol. 4, pp. 77, 78.
- [4]. Baumann, U. and Nier, E. (2004, September). Disclosure, volatility, and transparency: An empirical investigation into the value of bank disclosure. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review, 31-45.
- [5]. Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. *Journal of*

- Accounting and Economics, 32(1–3), 237–333. doi:10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00027-1
- [6]. Busta, I. (2007), Board effectiveness and the impact of the legal family in the European banking industry. *FMA European Conference*, Barcelona–Spain.
- [7]. Cadbury, A. (1992). *Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance*. London: Gee.
- [8]. Culp, A. (2008) “Voluntary financial disclosure by Mexican corporations”, *The Accounting Review*, vol. 62 (3): 533-541
- [9]. Duhfort, A. M., Lampenius, N., & Christian, K. (2008). “Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Governance Revisited: A Critical Review.” *Corporate Ownership & Control*, 6(2), pp.1- 3.
- [10]. Donaldson, L. (1990). The ethereal hand – organizational economics and management theory. *Acad. Management Rev.* vo.15, pp. 369-381.
- [11]. Drobetz, W., Schillhofer, A. and Zimmermann, H. (2003) Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany. (ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 11/2003. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=379102> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.379102>
- [12]. Fuertes-Callén, Y., Cuellar-Fernández, B., & Pelayo-Velázquez, M. (2014). Determinants of online corporate reporting in three Latin American markets: The role of web presence development. *Online Information Review*, 38(6), 806–831. doi:10.1108/OIR-10-2013-0240
- [13]. Fung, B. (2014). The demand and need for transparency and disclosure in corporate governance. *Universal Journal of Management*, 2(2), 72–80. 10.13189/ujm.2014.020203
- [14]. Greenbury, R. (1995). *The Greenbury report*. [London]: William M. Mercer.
- [15]. Habib, A. (2008). Corporate transparency, financial development and the allocation of capital // *Abacus*, 2008, 44 (1), 1-21.
- [16]. Hampel, R. (1998). *Final report*. London: Gee.
- [17]. Hassan, M. K. (2012). A disclosure index to measure the extent of corporate governance reporting by UAE listed corporations. *Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting*, 10(1), 4–33. doi:10.1108/19852511211237426
- [18]. Henry, D. (2008). Corporate governance structure and the valuation of Australian firms: Is there value in ticking the boxes?., *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, 35, 912-942.
- [19]. Hirtle, B. (2007). Public disclosure, risk and performance at bank holding companies. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 293.
- [20]. Higgs, M. (2005), “Inuence of team composition and task complexity on team performance”, *Team Performance Management*, Vol. 11 (7/8), pp. 227-250.
- [21]. Jain, T. and Jamali, D. (2016). Looking inside the black box: The effect of corporate governance on corporate social responsibility. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 24(3), 253– 273. doi:10.1111/corg.12154
- [22]. Jensen, M. C. (1993) The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems, *Journal of Finance*, 48, 831-880.
- [23]. Kamal, H. M. (2012). A disclosure index to measure the extent of corporate governance reporting by UAE listed corporations. *Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting*, 10(1), 4-33.
- [24]. Kilduff, M., Angelmar, R. and Mehra, A. (2000), “Top management team diversity and firm performance: examining the role of cognitions”, *Organization Science*, Vol. 11 (1), pp. 21-34.
- [25]. Kittipat, D. D & Nopadol, Z.A. (2014) “Evaluation of credit risk management policies and practices in a vietnamese Joint-Stock commercial banks transaction office”, *Business Economics and Tourism*, vol. 4(2): 556-566
- [26]. Njekang, D.N. and Afuge, J.A. (2017) The impact of corporate governance on financial performance of credit unions: The case study of CamCCUL network. *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development*. Vol.4(6), pp.233-243.
- [27]. Pathan, S. and Faff, R. (2013). “Does board structure in banks really affect their performance?.” *Journal of Banking and Finance*, vol.37:5, pp.1573-1589.
- [28]. Pfeffer, J. (1972) *Administrative Science Quarterly* Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1972), pp. 218-228.
- [29]. Sen, A. (2011) Corporate Governance in India: Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement. *JM International Journal of Management Research*, 1, 162-172.
- [30]. Tandililin, E., Kaaro, H., Mahadwartha, P. A., & Supriyatna. (2007). Corporate governance, risk management and bank performance: Does Type of Ownership matter? EADN Working Paper No. 34.
- [31]. Tariq, Y., and Abbas, Z. (2013). Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance. *Economic Modelling*, vol.35, pp.565-575.
- [32]. Tanna, S., F. Pasiouras, and M. Nnadi. 2011. “The effect of board size and composition on the efficiency of UK banks.” *International Journal of the Economics of Business*. vol.18:3: pp.441-462.
- [33]. Toksal, A. (2004). *The impact of corporate governance on shareholder value*, Cologne, University of Cologne.
- [34]. Wilson, I. (2006). Regulatory and institutional challenges of corporate governance in Nigeria post banking consolidation. *Nigerian Economic Summit Group Economic Indicators*, 12(2): 1-10.
- [35]. Zaman R., Arslan M., Sidiqi M.A. (2015), Corporate governance and firm performance: The role of transparency and disclosure in the Banking sector of Pakistan, *International letters of social and humanistic sciences*, 2 (2), 152-166.



**1 Appendixes**

**QUESTIONNAIRE**

**Section A: General Information:**

- 1) Position in the financial institution: a) Member  b) Committee  c) Board  d) Staff   
 2) Sex: a) Male  b) Female  c). Others   
 3) Age: a) 20 – 25  b) 26 – 31  c) 32 – 37  d) 38 – 43  e) 44 – 50 .  f) 50+

**Section B: Corporate Governance Issues:**

**Instructions:** Each question has five options and you are expected to mark a tick ( ✓ ) in the box that corresponds to the best response.

**SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, I=Indifferent, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree**

No	1. Board Role and Composition	SA	A	I	D	SD
1.	Board members have a series of reports that must be available before a board meeting holds.					
2.	Board has a performance evaluation technique and management succession plan for the staff.					
3.	Board and committee members are capable of interpreting all financial reports from staff.					
2. Transparency and Disclosure		SA	A	I	D	SD
1.	Regular monthly and up to standard reports are made available to members.					
2.	The supervisory board reports its activities directly to the members; no board interference.					
3.	All financial reports are true and fare, no hidden or modified accounts.					
4.	There is a project committee which ensures all projects fall within objectives and budget of the union.					

No	3. Auditing and Compliance	SA	A	I	D	SD
1.	There is an independent audit committee (internal and external) that sits monthly.					
2.	The audit process meets the standards put in place by the Ministry of Finance and the software has an audit trail.					
3.	There is an internal policy guiding the activities and reporting channels of the internal controller.					
4.	There is a reputable external supervisory body which presents monthly reports about the union.					
5.	Monthly audit reports are presented by the internal and external auditors.					

No	4. Risk Management	SA	A	I	D	SD
1.	The financial institution has an up to date risk management policy.					
2.	There is a loan recovery task force with a detailed loan recovery schedule and procedure.					
3.	There is a defined cash ceiling and signatories to bank account sign just one cheque leaf at a time.					
4.	All staff files have performance evaluation, guarantor and observation forms which are updated regularly.					
5.	The financial institutions have access to all members quoted in the blacklist of all supervisory bodies.					
6.	All collaterals (landed property) are verified monthly at the level of the lands office.					
7.	All loan files are accompanied by business plans in the case of business loans or a detailed project.					

**Section C: Financial Performance Indicators:**

No	1. Profitability	SA	A	I	D	SD
1.	Dividends paid in the union are on the increase (Latest dividends paid fall between 5% to 7%).					
2.	Service cost (loan interest, transfer and deposit charges) is reduced thanks to high profits.					
3.	All the reserve requirements (education, building, risk management) are met thanks to the profit level.					
4.	The institution is capable of recruiting and paying qualified personnel.					
5.	The financial institution meets all its social obligations through the profits made.					
6.	The profit of the financial institution is on a steady increase reflected by the reduction in transaction cost.					
7.	The sources of funds are relatively cheaper compared to the interest generated from loans.					
8.	Loan interest is paid on time and the actual is always equal to or above the expected amounts.					

9.	Profits are on the increase thanks to income generating assets like buildings.					
10.	All bills, payables, remunerations and others are paid on time.					
No	<b>2. Liquidity</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>SD</b>
1.	All members' deposits are available on demand and timely.					
2.	There is a bank reserve account to meet prompt credit demands and savings withdrawals.					
3.	The institution targets and meets cash demands at peak periods without stress.					
4.	The institution lends out up to only 70% of her savings while the rest and shares are kept as reserves in the union's reserve accounts.					
5.	There is a cash ceiling (maximum safe amount) in all the union's branches.					
6.	There is a day-to-day liquidity follow up to ensure that liquidity and profitability are at equilibrium.					
7.	There is an investment account different from bank current accounts in which excess liquidity is deposited.					
8.	When demands for loans increase, investments in landed property are stopped till when there is excess liquidity in the union.					
9.	The institution ventures in external funding (loans and term deposits) only when loan demand is more than 70% savings.					
10.	There is an investment committee which puts all excess liquidity into profitable ventures.					
No	<b>3. Loan Portfolio</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>SD</b>
1.	The number of delinquent loans and their amounts in the institution are on a decrease over time.					
2.	The loan interest collection rate in the institution is at least 90% or more.					
3.	There is an up to date loan policy which has considerably reduced bad debts.					
4.	The cost of loan recovery is far lower than the benefits from the loan.					
5.	The loan delinquency rate falls below the 5% regulation rate.					
6.	The loan recovery team has been very successful in collecting delinquent loans.					
7.	All delinquent loans above 1 year are written off from the balance sheet.					
8.	All loan application files have duly registered mortgages.					
9.	All board, committee and staff loans are always current; no delinquency.					
10.	There are no fake collateral documents in the institution's loan files.					

**SECTION D: Ranking Financial Performance Indicators:**

Rank the following in order of importance in your financial institution by marking a tick

(✓) on the appropriate answer

NO.	Indicators	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
1.	Profitability			
2.	Liquidity			
3.	Loan portfolio			