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Baker, B.

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# **Multi-choice Policing in Uganda**

## **ABSTRACT**

Though increasing diversification of policing away from the state to non-state formal and informal agencies is a widespread pattern, it does not capture the nuances of Uganda's situation. Participative research reveals a fragmented and overlapping pattern of policing, but one that, for historical reasons, is still heavily influenced if not controlled by state institutions. Through its penetration of society by its local council structure, and through a process of militarisation of policing units, the state has maintained a strong influence over most of the diversification. The diversification, therefore, is more one of choice than ownership. It nevertheless yields a surprising degree of choice for Ugandans for protection and/or response to crime and disorder. Such multi-choice policing does, however, demand the construction a law and order policy that is based on incorporating all acceptable policing groups.

**KEY WORDS: POLICING; UGANDA; MULTI-CHOICE POLICING; FRAGMENTATION**

## Multi-choice Policing in Uganda

Most commentators have assumed that increasing diversification of policing away from the state to non-state formal and informal agencies are global trends. Bayley and Shearing argue that there has been a 'worldwide' restructuring of policing that they term 'multilateralization'. 'A host of nongovernmental groups have assumed responsibility for their own protection, and a host of nongovernmental agencies have undertaken to provide security services' (Bayley and Shearing, 2001). Loader notes that 'across the developed and the developing world there is a broad and diverse network of policing that not only works through government but, above, below and beyond government' (Loader, 2000: 328). Similarly, Johnston observes that the broad trend is that 'citizens, rather than being the passive consumers of police services, engage in a variety of productive security activities' (Johnston, 2001: 965). Though this may be a common pattern, it does not capture the nuances of every situation, as this article will demonstrate. Elsewhere I have begun the construction of a typology to understand the variety of policing that exists in Africa (Baker, 2004). Here I attempt to fill in some of the details for one country, the east African state of Uganda. It addresses the questions as to who are the people responsible for authorising and delivering policing?; what do the providers offer and how do they relate to one another?; and how does the public perceive each in terms of competence, accessibility, accountability and respect? And it seeks to consider the implications for the Uganda government. The account is based on research undertaken between February and April 2004.<sup>1</sup>

Individuals and groups are in a unique position to depict and analyse their own experience of policing. Starting from the experience of the citizen, rather than from a governance perspective, the complexity of policing becomes very apparent. In the course of a day individuals may move from the sphere of one policing agency to another or be faced with a choice between state run, informal, and commercial agencies. Policing, as it is experienced, is not just diverse, it is a complex pattern of overlapping policing agencies. This account records the various policing agencies on offer and how men and women in urban and rural settings evaluate them (the conflict areas of the north and north east Uganda were not covered). It reveals a fragmented pattern of policing, but one that, for historical reasons, is still heavily influenced if not controlled by state institutions. There may have been a diversification away from the state Police, but it has not been a straightforward move to non-state formal and informal agencies. Rather, for the most part, the state has maintained a strong influence over most of the diversification. The diversification, therefore, is more one of choice rather than one of ownership. It is for this reason that the process is referred to here as multi-choice policing.

The article will examine three types of police structure: those operated by the Uganda State; those private and community organisations that have state approval; and those that are illegal. A summary of the structures to be examined and their key features is given in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Policing Structures in Uganda

POLICING BODY	AUTHORISER	POWERS	KEY FUNCTION	LINKS WITH OTHER POLICING BODIES.	FUNDING
<b>State structures</b>					
Local Councils Level 1 (LC1)	Central Gov. Locally elected	Local law & order. Courts	Courts; Night patrols	Criminal cases to Uganda Police & magistrate's courts	Local taxes & contributions + volunteers
Uganda Police	Central Gov.	Standard Police powers	Serious crime	Work with LCs CPPs & security Co.s	State
Violent Crime Crack Unit (VCCU)	Military	unclear	Organised violent crime	independent	State
<b>State approved</b>					
Crime Prevention Panels (CPP)	Uganda Police	Citizen	Intelligence to police; peer pressure	Work with Police & LCs	Volunteers
Traders associations	Elected leaders of association	Citizen	Security of trading area	Work with Police & LCs	Members' contributions
Commercial Security	Private companies	Licensed by Police	Guarding	Joint ops with, & inspected by, Police	Commercial
<b>Illegal</b>					
Mob justice			Assaults on alleged criminals	None	

CRIME LEVELS AND INSECURITY

In Uganda's villages most people interviewed in the research reported that what they saw as 'crime' was not a serious issue and that they enjoyed a sense of security. However, although not included in the popular definition of crime, a serious cause of disorder and tension in rural areas is land. In areas where there is pressure for land from an increasing population, where land is being sold to outsiders, and where land has been transferred to commercial farming estates or declared a national park, land has become a contentious issue. Local Councils, magistrates and the Land Tribunal face continuous civil disputes over boundaries, tenants rights, squatting, evictions, inheritance, and the sale of land that was not the vendor's to sell. These frequently spill over into criminal cases of criminal trespass and assault.<sup>2</sup>

As in most developing countries, both fear of crime and victimisation rates are higher in Uganda's towns than in rural areas. Police statistics show increased numbers of reported crime across the country, particularly cases of theft, rape and defilement (sexual intercourse with someone under 18). These rises were particularly associated with urban areas. According to Uganda Police statistics, crime committed in the capital, Kampala, is rising. Some 24 people were shot dead in 2002, compared to 80 in 2003. Also, between 2002 and 2003, defilement cases rose from 649 to 999; aggravated assault cases from 311 to 647; vehicle theft cases from 296 to 319; burglary and theft cases from 454 to 543; robbery cases from 461 to 606; while general theft cases rose from 3,504 to 5,073.<sup>3</sup> My own research showed that of 38 shopkeepers (22 men, 16 women) interviewed in Kampala, 25 felt safe or very safe; seven felt nervous or anxious at times; six felt unsafe. Concerning victimisation rates, it was found that 28 had been a victim of theft in the last 12 months or had known someone who had been. Seven had been a victim of physical assault in the last 12 months or had known someone who had been. Four had been a victim of damage to property in the last 12 months or had known someone who had been.

It is important, however, to disaggregate the reports of crime and disorder on a gender basis. Crime figures very much reflect a male definition of order, but do not always capture the female perspective. As will be shown later, Ugandan women often define law and order as more than the absence of crime. Instead they commonly see it in terms of responsible behaviour, especially by men and youths; or, as an officer of Uganda's largest legal aid NGO put it, 'they want to feel comfortable and secure'.<sup>4</sup> Some of those grievances may be prohibited in the legal code, but that does not necessarily mean that state policing will attend to it. There are those who say that Police officers confronted, for instance, with an accusation of wife beating may not feel it is their business to get involved in another man's 'personal affairs'. And there are, of course, those issues that are not illegal in the formal sense, but are nevertheless unacceptable to women, such as harassment, abusive language, drunkenness and neglect of family responsibilities. This gendered perspective reminds us that for a very large number of citizens the security they are looking for is the provision of care as much as protection. Though legal aid centres handle thousands of cases brought by women each year of domestic violence, inheritance disputes and failure to pay maintenance, there is no knowledge of just how large these problems are.

#### STATE POLICING STRUCTURES: LOCAL COUNCILS

The process by which the Uganda state has configured itself, following the National Resistance Movement (NRM) assumption of power following the civil war in 1986,

has been crucial in determining the nature of justice in the country and the relative absence of informal justice. Perhaps no single institution has been so influential on law and order as the local democratic structure of Local Councils (LCs). All adults automatically become members of their village council and directly elect a nine-person committee to administer the affairs of the village, and indirectly elect parish, sub-county and district levels above that.

As peace was secured, the local government levels of the LC structure (originally known as RCs – Resistance Councils) from village (LC1) through parish (LC2) to sub-county (LC3) were given responsibility, amongst other things, for law and order. Their progressive introduction into the liberated territory during the progress of the civil war ensured that no vacuum was left as the old order of appointed local chiefs was swept away. The subsequent Resistance Committees (Judicial Powers) Bill of 1987, formalised the end of the discredited chiefdom courts. All remaining chiefships were dismantled and the chiefs had their judicial (and legislative and executive) powers handed to the LCs. The restoration of some traditional leaders under the 1995 Constitution was more of a conciliatory gesture; they did not receive any judicial powers or rights to hold customary courts) (Oloka-Onyango, 1989; DANIDA, 1998).

The effect of this speedy introduction of local democracy forestalled what Schärf believes is the common democratisation pattern, at least in Southern Africa, of an initial power vacuum. He anticipates that there will be a time gap between the discrediting and dismantling of old forms of social control and policing, and the introduction of new substitutes. This law-enforcement vacuum, he believes, is likely to be filled by non-state policing agencies that will only disappear when the state develops the capacity to cope with the problems (Schärf, 2003: 14). It was a vacuum that never arose in Uganda.

The duties of the LCs at the local government levels (i.e. LC1-3) include: the mobilisation of the local community in law and order matters; law enforcement through the LC funded Local Administrative Police (LAP); the gathering of criminal data; the service provision not only of courts but of psycho-social care of the victims of crime; the establishment of byelaws that reflect local needs; and LC Courts.<sup>5</sup> It appears that most participants have treated their role as councillors of LCs seriously and have acted effectively.

As a result, LCs have had a remarkable ordering effect on social life and have acted as the first line of protection against disorder and crime and the first point of call when it does occur. It is common to hear people say that they turn first to the LC1 for protection from disorder and crime (often in terms of night patrols, although these are sometimes only activated during periods of insecurity and many question their effectiveness). When surveyed as to where people go to solve a problem 85 per cent said the LC alone or first and when asked 'how has the LC made life better' 35 per cent mentioned 'peace and security' and 22 per cent 'problem solving' (Wunsch and Ottemoeller, 2004: 188). Likewise they turn first to the LC1 in cases of breaches of law and order. Even big plantation managers take fights between their workers to the LC1 first and liaise closely with LC1 chairs 'if a worker is out of order'.<sup>6</sup> Whilst in the LC Courts people have accessible justice when there are issues that cannot be resolved by the family or clan. It is justice in their own language, from a body that respects local traditions and is in turn respected, since leaders have been chosen that

are known, experienced and stand for the new values of the NRM popular revolution (Barya and Oloka-Onyango, 1994). In addition, of course, the LC1 patrols or LC3 home guards, plus the LC courts, offer a framework of justice that is not financially burdensome on the state. It appears that it is the success of the LC system that largely accounts for the relative absence of informal and illegal policing and justice - something so common in the rest of Africa. With a popular and accessible law and order provision, there is little space left for them to emerge.

This is not to say that there are not problems. Justice Professor Kanyeihamba admits that 'records show that the exercise of judicial powers by some of the local councils and councillors and officials has been inadequate, illegal and in some instances, corrupt' (Kanyeihamba, 2002: 262). There are the problems, too, of widespread popular ignorance of the law (e.g. understanding that 'marriage' to and sex with an under 18 is 'defilement'; understanding that begging can be classified as the offence of 'idleness'). LC courts have been accused of exceeding their authority by hearing criminal cases. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the LC courts are at times sources of injustice, due to bribery and male dominance. They are also thought to hand out sentences that are beyond their powers, such as corporal punishment and banishment from the village. One Police inspector commented, perhaps with a certain amount of understandable exaggeration and frustration, that LC Courts 'don't know anything' as regards the law since they lack training. There are also complaints from the LCs that local revenues and LC5 District assistance are insufficient to run the service adequately.<sup>7</sup>

Some of these weaknesses will be eliminated in a proposed new statute (Local Council Courts Bill), but the main point is that the difficulties experienced are primarily ones of implementation, training and resources that can be remedied. The fundamentals of a local law and order system, however, are in place. Uganda is not faced, as many African countries, with a local system of customary courts functioning outside of the state and with different values and procedures that awaits incorporation into the state system.

To examine the effect of the LC1s on law and order in more detail, four have been selected, two rural and two urban.

#### LC Provision of Law and Order in Rural Villages

The fishing village of Busaabala on the edge of Lake Victoria has a diverse mix of ethnic groups. Given that the nearest Police post is 8 km away, they naturally see themselves as the principal law enforcers in the village. The LC1 court is ready to meet immediately for vital cases or on a regular weekly basis for less urgent matters. Typical cases handled include fighting and stealing. It also operates a nightly patrol that is armed with pangas and sticks. The patrol is paid by charging all households Ugandan Shillings (Sh) 500 per month (about 30 US cents). More than 40 of the villagers have been trained by the local District Crime Prevention Panel to be 'crime preventers' (see more below). This has raised awareness of what the law requires and given the 'crime preventers' confidence to contact the Police to receive practical help.<sup>8</sup>

The success, in the eyes of the men of the LC1 leadership, in preserving law and order in the village was evidenced, in their view, by the fact that often there are not enough cases to warrant a meeting of the Court for a month and none could remember a case of mob justice in recent years. There was, however, a qualification from the women, who defined law and order as more than the absence of crime. They defined it positively in terms of responsible behaviour, especially by men and youths. So one of their greatest concerns was husbands that spent the money they earned from fishing on alcohol. This may not be a crime in the legal sense, but for the women it meant that, instead of the men spending time with their families in the day or their money on their families, they were too inclined to disregard their duties. It led, in their view, to 'immoral tendencies' and 'made it a difficult place to raise children'. Another qualification of the women concerned the LC1 directly. Some believed it was 'not functional' for several reasons. First, some perceived that those born in the village dominated the later migrants and got their way more with the LC1. Second, some felt access was difficult because they feared the men might not listen to them and would give more weight to those with money. One even went so far as to accuse the LC1 of being 'cowardly' before those with money and of being 'easily intimidated' by them. Third, the full village council met very infrequently; or rather, it met if there was a serious matter, but did not keep to regular set dates.<sup>9</sup>

The second study was of Mugusu, a village of 640, 9 km south of Fort Portal, in the west. It runs a market every week, which increases its proneness to certain offences. Since the rebel ADF crisis 1998-2002 the area is described as 'safe'; 'we are really sleeping'. The LC1 do not run a patrol (the LC3 run a voluntary 20 strong home guard that covers the villages of the sub-county) and see little of the Police. For the LC1 councillors overall prevalence of law and order was due to their close knowledge of one another. Others, however, reported fairly regular occurrences of petty theft, drunken fights, rape/defilement and domestic violence. Perhaps the fact that many of these were not reported or were related to market visitors explains the fact that the LC1 court had few problems to attend to. For those market traders that were caught stealing, there was a prohibition from returning. None could remember a case of mob justice in the last four years. The overall success in preserving law and order in the village was qualified however. Older persons commonly defined law and order to include morality, particularly sexual morality. They expressed serious concern about young people from their village and those who were attracted to the market and the disco that followed it. They spoke of unemployed school drop outs drinking too much, being promiscuous, taking drugs and resorting to theft and generally saw the youth as a potentially destabilising factor in the village and surrounding sub-counties.<sup>10</sup>

### LC Provision of Law and Order in Urban Zones

It might be anticipated that urbanisation will create mutations from, and additions to the policing systems current in rural areas. The different social problems experienced might be expected to produce different policing structures to address them. (Schärf, 2003: 14). In fact no strong urban-rural contrast was apparent in Uganda. The importance of LC1s in urban zones proved just as significant as in rural areas. Take the example of Luziga Zone, Kampala. This high density area is home for people from a wide variety of ethnic groups from Uganda and from Rwanda and Congo.



Despite the lack of natural homogeneity and long term residence, inhabitants report that it is '98 per cent safe' and has grown much safer over the last few years as pickpocketing by street children has been eradicated. The improvement is largely attributed to the work of the LC1, which itself is multi-ethnic. To tackle crime the LC1 instigated a patrol that arrested pickpockets and others and took them to the LC1 Court or Police. Their pay comes from a contribution from every door of Sh500 per month. The LC1 Court meets twice a week, though they often go 'three weeks without a case'. The cases that do come before them concern domestic violence, fighting and illegal structures. Because they deal effectively with these issues their occurrence has declined and there have been no incidents of mob justice 'in the last few years'. It is also claimed that women are now free or freer to bring issues forward given that 4 of the 10 LC1 councillors are women. The LC1 also encourages others to report matters that individual women might be afraid to report themselves. Though problems with law and order are first taken to the LC1 by the community, there is said now to be a good relationship with the Police (their police post is only 500m away) and they find them co-operative and respectful.<sup>11</sup>

Mbiro Zone, Kampala adjoins Luziga Zone and is similarly diverse ethnically. Residents report that before 1986 there was a high crime rate, including murder, kidnapping of children, rape, defilement and the illegal possession of weapons. Since then, however, crime has been greatly reduced and this is attributed largely to the work of the LC1, although they do not operate a night patrol. 'We have power. As people together we fight the crime'. None could remember when the last incident of mob justice occurred, although it had been common in the 1980s. As with Luziga, the LC1 court doesn't always have a case to try for months on end. Typical cases include domestic violence, theft, simple assaults, land issues and disputes between landlords and tenants. They readily admit that when the court began they were not fully aware of which cases came within their remit and which were the duty of the Police. But following Police training they now feel confident about what their legal powers are. In fact, they sometimes rebuke the Police who come to deal with a case that it is too petty for them and should be left to the LC1. Like the other LC1s, they also report a marked improvement in their relationship with the Police.<sup>12</sup> Thus though it might have been expected that the rural system of collective communal control would break down when it came to transient, mixed ethnic and unfamiliar populations, the supervisory and ordering functions of the LCs persists.

The LC structure at the local government level, both rural and urban, is largely successful in providing law and order in the community (a male-defined order, that is). Beyond that, as the rest of the article will show, it significantly supports other policing structures, such as the Uganda Police, Crime Prevention Panels and Interior Security Organisation (ISO). However, it should not be assumed that there are no matters for concern. Besides the issues raised above, there is always a danger of declining enthusiasm and commitment when a system relies heavily on volunteers. The longer that system continues, the more pressing the question of how LC justice structures can be sustained if they are dependent on voluntary participation. Put differently, once revolutionary fervour has waned and volunteerism subsides in a country, how much will it cost to set up and sustain local participation in policing? (Schärf, 2003). The research found evidence that already full LC1 Meetings are only being attended by activists or those with a pressing crisis and that the meetings themselves are often not held unless there is an emergency. Likewise there was some

evidence of a disinclination by youth to work within its structures. With reported crimes still rising according to Police statistics (even if this is a measure of greater willingness to come forward), there is no place for complacency that the local provision of law and order through LCs will always be adequate. Some inhabitants even in poorer areas have already decided that LC night patrols are not effective and have secured the services of commercial guards.

## STATE POLICING STRUCTURES: UGANDA POLICE & MILITARY UNITS

Under the constitution the Uganda Police have responsibility for life and property. As their Mission Statement says, they are there to: 'secure life and property in partnership with the public in a committed and professional manner in order to promote development'. No one doubts, however, that they are seriously overstretched, with the 13,000 personnel being well below the 40,000 needed to provide their goal of 1 per 600 citizens. Nor do they have adequate transport. The sub-district of Mityana, 70 km north west of Kampala, with over two million people has just 184 police and one motor bike.<sup>13</sup> Fort Portal police in the West have no vehicles or motorbikes to cover the town of 45,000, though the mobile patrol vehicle for Kabarole District was based there.<sup>14</sup>

As an institution they have undergone a number of positive reforms in the last ten years that have enhanced their effectiveness (e.g. the introduction of a Research and Planning Department 1992; a separate Inspectorate 1997 to evaluate performance; A Community Affairs Department 1998; A Legal Department 1989 which in 1999 took on a Human Rights Desk and a Complaints Desk; a Private Security and Police Firearms Department 2001; and a Police Marines Department 2002). Management issues have been addressed (with management units at the level of the directorate, department, region, district and station) and discipline improved (especially following the Ssebutinde independent judicial commission of inquiry into corruption in the Police, 2000).<sup>15</sup> Their role has also been redefined, with their withdrawal from guarding and escort duties in favour of private security companies. The imminent incorporation of LAP into the Uganda Police is also intended to address the problems experienced with this locally controlled force, which in the past has handled crimes too serious for it and has at times been starved of funding by LCs that did not pass on all central government funds allocated to them.<sup>16</sup>

As regards the local community perception, however, the biggest impact has been in the change of relationship between the public and the Police. Until relatively recently the Police were still regarded with suspicion and fear. This is understandable given the abuses under Presidents Amin and Obote prior to the NRM. Yet now, whatever the criticisms concerning their slowness to respond, and persistent claims by the majority of those interviewed of Police bribe seeking (confirmed by the Inspector General of Government's assertion of the Police as the most corrupt institution in the country)<sup>17</sup> the almost universal response was that the Police were now friendly, approachable and showed respect to all citizens. Police may not always be close at hand to many citizens, but generally people would not hesitate to call upon them if there was something that needed their assistance. This is a remarkable turn around, the more so given that across much of Africa the Police are often held in contempt and fear.

Of course there are still hangovers from the past and for all the reforms, the Police are still troubled by charges of human rights abuses, especially excessive force.<sup>18</sup> Likewise they are repeatedly charged with political partisanship in the increasingly heated political atmosphere of emerging multi-partyism. In addition, those Local Defence Units (LDUs) or militias that have become Special Police Constables (SPC) are not held in high regard for their discipline. The general perception is that their knowledge of the law is weak and that sometimes they are trigger-happy and commit human rights abuses. There also appear to be some LDUs that have become neither Special Police Constables nor army personnel: no clear legal framework seems to be guiding them.

One of the issues the government has had to address is the balance between a centralisation that offers the benefits of tighter control and better funding, and local control that offers greater accountability and specific responses to local needs. Centralisation is not only apparent in the bringing of LAP under the Uganda Police, but with the emergence of central military units to address serious crime matters. For instance, the response to armed robbery on an organised scale was the creation of Operation Wembley, later known as the Violent Crime Crack Unit (VCCU), under the Internal Security Organisation (ISO), which itself is part of the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI). With its recruitment of informers, Operation Wembley was very successful in breaking up the criminal gangs or driving them away. Yet the cost was a loss of accountability and inevitably, accusations that criminal elements had corrupted personnel. Further, the military style 'shoot to kill' policy against armed robbers and use of military courts to try suspects clearly weakens judicial procedures. Most people are indeed glad that organised crime has been driven from Kampala (one prosperous Asian business man in Kampala said: 'Operation Wembley had a big impact; it was 100 per cent successful'; a rural LC3 chair said, 'they did a good job, they got seven armed robbers the Police had failed to get, but their method was not good'). However, some traders criticise the VCCU for arrogance, seizing goods with no evidence and 'framing' people.

There are also question marks over the increasing involvement of the VCCU and ISO in investigating what might be termed 'ordinary' crime. Although there is a Police CID, criminal investigation at the sub-county level is increasingly being undertaken by ISO operatives.<sup>19</sup> ISO has recently been exposing 'ghost' payments by the Ministry of Finance for procurements and 'ghost' schools that were taking government money. Said ISO Director-General, Col. Elly Kayanja, upon unearthing 20 'ghost schools': 'anyone who subverts or aids and abets subversion of delivery of quality education to our people is a legitimate security target and we shall move on them with the vigour we moved with on the thugs'.<sup>20</sup> In other words, ISO has developed an investigative capability against serious crimes and fraud that in a civilian government is normally a role for Police CID.<sup>21</sup>

Though the research on which this article is based did not reach to the troubled areas of north and north-east Uganda it is worth noting briefly here that some special policing arrangements exist there which reflect that insecurity. In Karamoja in the north-east, serious and violent stock theft (often cross border) is rampant (Mirzeler and Young, 2000; Hendrickson, Mearns and Armon, 1996). The task of policing this activity is primarily left to a special unit under the army known as the Anti-Stock

Theft Unit. Until 2004 it worked alongside local groups ('vigilantes'), who had been armed by the Ugandan government to enable the population defend itself against the raids. Their abuses, however, led in 2004 to them being formed into a local defence unit under the control of the army.<sup>22</sup>

In areas of LRA rebel conflict, former LDUs and new recruits have been assembled by the army as militias, such as the Frontier Guards in Kitgum, The Elephant Brigade in Gulu, the Amuka in Lango and the Arrow Group in Teso. However ill armed and ill trained militia cannot (by themselves) provide quality security. They have not always been up to the task of defending the IDP camps, hence their failure to withstand the LRA in the massacre of 200 in Barlonyo IDP camp in February 2004. Further, they have even been implicated in armed robberies.<sup>23</sup>

This pattern of centralisation and militarisation of policing in new democracies in the face of rising crime has been noted before: 'The growth of crime itself in transitional societies has in many cases undercut the growth of local forms of policing by ensuring more centralised and militarised responses to disorder' (Shaw, 2000: 11). Unfortunately it works against the very legitimacy that states are trying to create for their forces after years of abuse under authoritarian regimes:

All transitional societies have had to balance the requirement of ensuring local accountability (which remains weak in all cases) with centralised control – the desire to manage change from the centre to ensure both that it occurs uniformly and that local groups (who may oppose the central state) do not obtain control of the police in their area (Shaw, 2000: 11).

## STATE APPROVED POLICING: CRIME PREVENTION PANELS

Given the limitations of size and skills of state Police forces across Africa, governments have had to consider how citizens can be mobilised in an acceptable way to play a role in keeping law and order and in implementing anti-crime strategies. There is a huge potential in mobilising communal self-interest to join in the effort, even if the strategy will inevitably see the emergence of some undesirable elements. The NRM government has never insisted that policing must be a state monopoly. Instead, it has sought security partners who will work within the law and under its supervision. Two types of citizen self-policing have emerged in Uganda; one initiated by the Police themselves and one originating from commercial interests.

The Uganda Police introduced community policing in 1989. The main emphasis has been on education in the law and on crime prevention through the media and schools. Community Liaison Officers (CLOs), located at every police station, have been instrumental in initiating, Neighbourhood Watch schemes and Crime Prevention Panels.<sup>24</sup> The latter are planned for every sub-county or district, though currently they are only successfully operating in a few Districts. They consist of local residents that are trained in crime prevention with a view, not only to empowering people about crime prevention and the requirements of the law, but also that citizens and communities will accept responsibility themselves for law and order in their locality. Two models of Crime Prevention Panels are emerging: one based on the community

at large and one based on employment groups. Their difference of emphasis can be appreciated by examining three successful Panels.

Prior to Katwe Crime Prevention Panel, Kampala, being formed in 1993, the common attitude was that the Police only existed 'to arrest and to torture; they can never be friendly' and few criminals were handed over to them. Reinforcing the gulf was 'an initial resistance from the local Police' to the community policing programme, for fear of empowering the people in the field of their own expertise and of exposing Police corruption. Since the Panel's formation a remarkable 30,000 have been trained as 'crime preventers'. Given that the Katwe Police Division only has 400 officers and a few LAP scattered between 4 police stations and 20 police posts, this is a considerable crime prevention resource.

During the course of 30 2-hour evening sessions, these local volunteers are given training by the Panel and the Police. Topics covered are: the nature of community policing and crime prevention; the differences between criminal and civil cases; the importance of preserving the evidence at the scene of the crime; the institution of criminal proceedings; the LC judicial structure and the cases that they should and should not handle; summons and warrants; road safety; community service; bomb threats; sexual offences; human rights; constitutional rights; domestic violence; laws as they relate to children; marriage and divorce; and mob justice. As each group passes the training it forms a local team or sub-panel. To maintain their motivation, functions and competitions are held each year to see who is the best team. There is also an annual occasion when the 'preventers' meet with the Police to discuss local crime issues and strategy.

Though these 'crime preventers' are separate from the LC structure, they are to a considerable extent under-girded by it, since the elected Crime Prevention Panel executive includes local LC1 and LC2 chairmen and others with experience of civic responsibility. The success of the scheme lies largely in the way people have been mobilised, so that the Crime Prevention Panel is now largely self-sufficient. As far as the Katwe Police are concerned, it has improved the public's perception of the Police and is linked by them to the absence of mob justice in the last 3 years.<sup>25</sup>

The second model is based more on work associations than local panels and in practice is more dependent on Police input for sustainability. It has been used by the Crime Prevention Panel, in the Kawempe Division of Kampala. Because many local leaders 'looked at everything politically' and saw the new scheme as a ruling party project, it proved impossible to secure their interest. The approach, therefore, was to go over their heads to gain a rapport with the people. Beginning in 2000, distinct employment groups were singled out and given a sense of identity through bringing them together in associations. There then began the work of sensitising them regarding crime matters that affected their own interests. Only after that was complete was the offer made of training in crime prevention. Employment groups that were brought together in associations included milk sellers, timber merchants, boda bodas (motor cycle taxis), disco and video halls, teachers, probation officers, special hire companies, bars and brothels, and religious leaders. In the process of meeting with these groups, patterns of crime that particularly affected each one were identified and complaints by the public about any member's activities were directed to these associations. In time, as they began to see their role in policing their own members

and community, association members volunteered to attend the crime preventers course. Upon completing the course they were given direct line phone numbers to the District Police Commander (DPC), CID, Human Rights Desk and others to assure accessibility. Being empowered in terms of knowing what the law required, the local panels of trained crime preventers or the work associations began reporting cases of unlawful activity (including policemen demanding bribes) and making recommendations for curbing crime. Since 2000, 860 have completed the course with a further 500 expected to complete in 2004. Local NGOs have contributed to the success by providing funding for course materials. The partnership with them is of mutual benefit, for the NGOs recognise that working with the Police is an effective way for the NGO to penetrate the local community with their message (e.g. on women's rights, domestic violence, child protection etc.). As in Katwe, groups of trained crime preventers form local panels with an elected leadership.<sup>26</sup>

Crime Prevention Panels are far less common in rural districts, but Matugga Crime Prevention Panel is one such example, lying some 20 km north of Kampala. Its origins go back to 1994 when accusations were made to the LC2 chairman of Police beatings following arrest. The DPC suggested at an ensuing public meeting a training course for local people on crime prevention and legal rights. The Crime Prevention Panel has 300 members and operates throughout the sub-county, where there is just one police post with up to 12 personnel, 3 SPCs and 5 LAP. Its male members gave as their reasons for joining: 'to help the Police to help us and to eliminate crime'; 'in the [civil] war up to 1986 there were many violations of people's rights and this was an opportunity to protect people's rights. It was also an opportunity to learn about the law, of gaining legal advice and of avoiding costs'. Its female members added: 'before there was fighting; now the people are restrained because they know preventers are around; it reduces crime'; 'in the past there were lots of crimes like rape which especially affects us as young people'. Publicity is done through the LC (some 50 per cent of panel executive members are LC members), posters, churches and radio. They see their primary function as assisting the Police and the LCs in crime prevention. However, they are not afraid, if they feel either organisation is ineffective, 'to report to other organs such as Kawempe Police Station, Police HQ or non-Police organs'. Being more rural, they do not have any material assistance from NGOs, but they do hold an annual 'Get Together', where sport, dance, music and drama take place along with a guest speaker (last year it was the Inspector General of Police).

Though the Matugga Panel and LC members attributed much of the order to their own committed work, there were others that placed the success elsewhere. Some shop keepers attributed improvements to the dismantling of the LDUs. Until a few years ago these were said to have been 'bad people', they 'had guns' and 'co-operated with thieves'. Their dismissal and replacement by SPCs was seen as a turning point. Another point of view was that of the ISO. It thought that the Police were 'hopeless' and 'corrupt' and that the crime preventers contributed little other than improving people's knowledge of the law. The real work of addressing serious issues of crime such as cattle thieves and marijuana growers was attributed to their own work.<sup>27</sup> Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between the two. Everyday law and order is maintained by the Police and Crime Preventers working with the LC1, whereas more serious threats are tackled by the ISO on the basis of information from LCs and others.

Why have these particular Panels been successful, whereas similar panels in Kawempe District have only 'taken root' in 4 of the 16 sub-counties? The success is due to both structural and contingent factors. Structurally, as already noted, the support of the LC system through its councillors sitting on the Panel executive has been invaluable. But beyond that, some places have enjoyed high levels of commitment and enthusiasm by volunteers and individual CLOs. And success breeds success.

## STATE APPROVED POLICING: TRADERS' ASSOCIATIONS

The Community Policing Programme with its Crime Prevention Panels represents one type of citizen self-policing - that initiated by the Police themselves. The other originates from private and commercial interests. These are less common but still important amongst traders and services. Two examples can be given, one urban one rural; one large scale, one small. The Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA) was begun in 1986 as a forum for taxi (minibus) drivers and owners to express their views and grievances. The taxi drivers consist of about 60,000 members (30,000 in Kampala) with 10,000 taxis. The drivers themselves elect their management committee. Initially relations with the Police were strained, as there had been a history of taxi drivers facing Police roadblocks and demands for money. Over time, however, dialogue has produced a good working relationship with the Police and a definition of respective roles. Given that taxis are the principal means of public transport, they have considerable leverage on local politics. They have used this to establish themselves as a managing and policing authority of taxis nationwide. They operate a contract with the Kampala City Council to run the taxi parks. Their traffic warden department is 100 strong and, working with the Police, has responsibility for enforcing traffic regulations by taxi drivers and in directing traffic in rush-hour congestion. The department also provides help for children's crossings. A Law Enforcement Department, trained by the Police and LC, arrests thieves and other criminals operating in the taxi park.<sup>28</sup> For the state, allowing this self-policing clearly offers the benefits of increased resources and local knowledge. However, the disadvantage is that it loses some control. There is a political trade off, therefore, between loss of control and yet enhanced provision of policing to the benefit not just of customers, but of voters.

A smaller more rural version of commercially initiated self-policing is Matugga Village market. This busy market on the edge of Matugga is where stallholders sell produce from local farmers, to traders from Kampala. About 120 have stalls, 80 of them women. They have organised themselves into a traders association which has an elected committee. This committee is the policing agency of the market. It acts as arbitrator when there is conflict between stallholders (perhaps over theft of produce) or between stall holders and farmers (perhaps over non-payment). Their sanctions include a fine or exclusion from the market for two days. More serious problems are taken to the LC1 and the Police. They also employ a local man to guard the stalls and produce at night. He is 'not trained, but he is trustworthy'. Through self-organisation, therefore, they have been able to enjoy security levels they call 'fine'. No one knew of any mob justice locally since 2002.<sup>29</sup>

Though this citizen self-policing by taxi drivers and market vendors was initiated by their own commercial considerations, its autonomy is not total. In that respect it does not fully represent that form of diversification that creates policing 'away from' and 'beyond' the state. Like a planet it is still under the gravitational pull of the centre.

## STATE APPROVED POLICING: COMMERCIAL SECURITY GROUPS

There are more than 80 commercial security companies in Uganda, though perhaps half are 'shelf' companies'. Their rapid growth since 1992 has been associated not just with rising crime, but with the strategic withdrawal of the Police from guarding. Though concentrated in the towns they are also found in rural areas guarding quarries and plantations. They are licensed and supervised by the Police under the statutory instrument: The Control of Private Security Organisations Regulations, 1997. Operating licences have to be renewed each year and are subject to satisfactory inspection by the Police of the company, including its armoury and the suitability of its guards. Though the regulations require criminal vetting, training and controls on the use of firearms, they are broad enough to allow wide discretion. For example, only 'appropriate' insurance cover of employees is required; personnel are simply to have 'proper and regular training'; and organisations may be deregistered if companies are 'below the acceptable standard'. Some firms have had their operational licences withdrawn,<sup>30</sup> but elsewhere there have been problems with security guards aiding criminal activity.<sup>31</sup>

There are two ends of the market. First, there are those larger (often foreign-owned) companies that offer a range of security services such as guarding, VIP protection, risk assessment and corporate protection to companies, banks and embassies. The largest two employ some 2,000 guards between them and operate fairly thorough training e.g. in social skills, guarding skills, weapon handling, public relations, personal hygiene. Joint operations with the Police have been undertaken (e.g. following a tip-off of armed robbery being imminent) and exchange of information occurs. Weapons are rented from the Police.<sup>32</sup> Interestingly one of the companies gave applicants a polygraph test to determine their 'honesty' and 'integrity' and use the polygraph test to investigate crimes within companies.

At the other end of the market are smaller local companies that focus on providing guards for individual properties and businesses. Only some of the smaller companies undertake training of guards. They guard both public (e.g. hospitals, government ministries) and private property and offer cash escort. The level of training varies between thorough and basic, but the most striking difference is recruitment policy. Some took recruits only from the army, Police and prison service (it meant training was not necessary); others preferred to recruit from inexperienced candidates ('since the Police are corrupt'). There was also considerable variation on how companies perceived their relationship with the Police. Some companies (particularly one that also undertook private investigation) regretted that there was no co-operation from the Police since they were seen as rivals; another said they offered information to the Police, but information from the Police only came on request; another said that there was an exchange of information both ways. One even said it worked with the Police at public occasions and rallies (this is offered free to the police as a public service).<sup>33</sup>



For those who had use of them, such as traders to protect their stalls at night and shopkeepers in the day and/or at night, most of the comments from interviews were favourable: 'They do a good job at night... they are respectful', 'they show respect', 'they do good'. It was a matter of commercial reality that they did the job they were paid to do and treated clients well and that companies took complaints seriously.

Besides formal commercial security groups there is also some evidence of informal commercial security groups. In the mid 1990s Police CLOs conducted training in crime prevention and detection for the public in central Kampala. Many of those trained were taxi drivers. Though the intention was to educate the public and for information to be disseminated, these 'Crime preventers' took on a life of their own. They assumed an authority in and sometimes outside of their neighbourhoods and began to exploit their knowledge for personal gain. As a result the Police have been trying to 'discourage' their activities, though they admit they have 'failed'.<sup>34</sup>

## ILLEGAL POLICING: MOB JUSTICE

Often motivated by widespread distrust or misunderstanding of the justice system (especially Police bail) and with dissatisfaction with state policing, mob-justice against alleged criminals is still present, if infrequent, in Uganda. Crowds of local people (mainly, though not exclusively, young males) engage in stonings, beatings, machete attacks and burning alive or stripping suspects of their clothes and parading them through the streets. In April 2001 the Inspector General of Police, Major General Wamala, estimated that more than 1,000 persons had been killed by mob violence since 1991 and called for an end to the practice. Likewise the National Political Commissar, Dr. Kiyonga, called mob justice, 'another type of insecurity'. Admitting that it was rampant in many parts of the country, he called for the use of dialogue through elders to resolve conflicts. Where that was beyond their powers, he called for issues to be forwarded to the courts.<sup>35</sup> Despite such appeals, the practice continues across all parts of the country and in both rural and town environments. For example, the press alone reported 11 incidents from January 2003 to March 2004 from every region of the country and many more no doubt went unreported. There were 'lynchings' (i.e. mob murders) for suspected murder, theft, personal injury, defilement and witchcraft.

It is frequently viewed as spontaneous and therefore not strictly policing, but in fact it is often led and organised by an aggrieved person. The BBC's Andrew Harding, caught up in a 'lynch mob' in Lira seeking revenge against Acholis for an LRA massacre, noted that there was a clear ringleader, a woman:

I watched an elegant lady in a beautiful green and yellow dress go to hut after hut, directing the violence. 'Smash this bicycle' she ordered a group of teenaged boys. 'Here, let's throw all this inside that hut. Now stand back – I'm going to set fire to it. OK. Let's go this way'.<sup>36</sup>

One particular concern is that the Uganda Police do not always act to stop it. For instance they did nothing to stop the lynching of an Acholi in an anti-LRA rally in Lira in March 2004, arguing that to interfere in such an angered crowd would only have made matters worse.<sup>37</sup> However the consistent testimony of LCs, the Uganda

Police and the public was that it was on the decrease, sometimes quite dramatically. One senior police officer said that when he took up his post in 2003 ‘mob justice was an almost daily occurrence’. When interviewed he believed it had been reduced ‘by 70 per cent’. He attributed the drop to active pursuit of the culprits and sensitisation of the public in the places where it had occurred.<sup>38</sup>

## MULTIPLE CHOICE POLICING

For more than half a century efforts have been made to establish in Africa Western models of policing, security and criminal justice. That this system has failed to provide justice, particularly for the poor, is largely because the resource assumptions implicit in the model are beyond the means of African countries. In Uganda, as a result of the inevitable gaps in provision by the Uganda Police, other policing agencies have arisen, offering localised protection of different levels of legality, effectiveness, availability, methods and services. Each enforces their own code of conduct and standards. As a consequence of these geographically overlapping policing agencies, Ugandans experience different spheres of policing authorisers and providers or may be in a position to choose as to what body they look to for protection and/or response to crime and disorder (see Figure 2). They are rarely users of either private or public policing, as if these were mutually exclusive categories. As people move about their daily business, or as the time of day changes, so they may move from the sphere of one policing agency to which they would naturally look for protection, to another or be faced at times with a choice of agency to be made in terms of personal experience, preference for mentality (surveillance or punishment), cost or communal status. The extended family may protect the home, but it is the LC1 that sorts out the minor disturbance at the village bar, the vendors committee that mediates a settlement over theft in the market from a fellow trader, the illegal vigilante group or legal militia that pursues the cattle rustlers from a rival tribe in Karamoja, the UTODA marshal that handles the bus station pickpocket, the commercial security guard that secures the entrance to the city shop, the Uganda Police that are called if someone is killed in a traffic accident, and the ISO or VCCU that tackles the sub-county gang that are stealing vanilla seedlings. Policing, as it is experienced in Uganda, therefore, is multi-choice policing.

Although increasing diversification is the reality on the ground in Uganda, for reasons of history it is not a clear-cut diversification away from the state. The new agencies are not predominantly non-state formal and informal agencies. Instead, much of the diversification taking place is still within the boundaries of state initiation or at least state influence and approval. The legacy of the revolution has included a deeply rooted local democracy and a fear of national insecurity recurring. The former has meant that the LC system established by the National Resistance Army during the course of the revolution to provide local law and order, has persisted; the latter has led to a predilection for military solutions to insecurity or the militarisation of policing units. The extent of the provision of law and order by the LC system and the militarised units ensure the state has maintained a strong influence over most of the diversification of policing.

Because the LC structure has always had a law and order function, it has choked the space available for informal organisations to emerge. If organising law and order

structures without its support is difficult, those that have its blessing, whether state initiated (such as Crime Prevention Panels) or commercially initiated (such as market policing) can expect to succeed. Even military style national security bodies such as ISO and VCCU are dependent to a degree on LC supply of intelligence. Likewise because President Museveni has always been doubtful of the loyalty and discipline of the Police, he has kept the police constrained and allowed an array of military-style organisations more directly under his control to flourish at the national level.

Much academic literature on policing constructs the choice as one between accountable public policing and minimally accountable private policing (though see Stenning, 2000). However, for Ugandans their experiences or choices, in as much as they have them, are based on 'what is available', 'what works best' and 'what can I afford', more than issues of who controls the policing body and to whom are they accountable. Indeed familiar security terminology becomes problematic as popular understanding gives different shades of meaning or different applications. Thus 'public' and 'private' do not exist as straightforward terms in popular experience. Public policing not only often fails to serve all equally (Clapham, 1999), but neither is it free. To secure the interest, investigation and prosecution of a criminal case may well necessitate people offering payment to the Uganda Police, as the IGG has confirmed. And yet, 'public' and 'private' may well mean something in terms of the law and communal mores being enforced, despite the evident contradictions and confusions in their formal relationships.

With so many policing agencies operating in Uganda, an important governance issue becomes to what extent security provisions overlap in competitive or co-operative modes? The research detected both an interpenetration of information between groups (e.g. between the Police and guarding companies; between LCs and ISO and VCCU; between CPP and Police; between Police and UTODA) and also relationships of competition more than co-operation (e.g. between Police and private investigation companies; between the ISO and Police). There is a need, therefore, to establish a measure of co-ordination and integration between all acceptable policing groups. Future relationships, however, should not be an issue left to the Uganda police, since they are only one stakeholder. It is a role for national government as it constructs a law and order policy. As Loader and Walker argue:

The state (alone) possesses the knowledge and expertise required to 'steer' the delivery of services among diverse police forms [and] to coordinate the relationship of policing agencies to other governmental authorities ... state action is thus needed if policing is to be delivered efficiently, equitably or (even) at all (2001: 27).

Such a policy will need to first establish both the scale of multi-choice policing and the contribution each group can make both to protection from crime and disorder, and to restorative and punitive responses to abuses. To view plural policing as a potential solution to law and order issues, does not mean a blanket acceptance of all providers. The government has the authority to clearly define the desired relationship between the different policing structures and to set the parameters. It may want to follow the new tendency of regarding law and order issues as an entry-point to development projects. In which case it will want to bring together every local community

organisation, international NGO and government agency concerned with improving the quality of life in the community so that together they can develop a community safety plan, create channels for referral to services provided by one another and share resources.<sup>39</sup> Whatever the details of its overall policy, it will want to avoid policing groups becoming too independent and self-serving. Instead it will want to facilitate them to perform a genuine service to society. It is policy that Schärf calls ‘the celebration of the rich diversity of non-state justice systems’ (2003: 38). A national strategy of law and order that integrates, regulates, mobilises, and empowers all those willing to preserve law and order in an acceptable manner is the best possible response to Uganda’s multi-choice policing context.

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## NOTES

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2. Interviews with Officer in Charge, Mityana Uganda Police Station, 31 March, 2004; Resident District Commissioner, Kabarole District, Ndiwa Chemasuet, 1 April, 2004; Administrative Secretary of Land Tribunal for Kabarole District, Eva Bira Ngeme, 1 April, 2004; LC3 Chairman, Karambi sub-county, Mwiraumubi Eli, 2 April, 2004; LC3 Vice Chairman, Mugusu sub-county, Mbabazi Margaret, 2 April, 2004; Kiko Tea Estate manager, Kiiroya Lameck, 2 April, 2004.
3. *The Monitor* (Kampala), 6 January, 2004.
4. Interview, Keith Kibirango, Head of Information, The Uganda Association of Women Lawyers, 24 March, 2004.
5. Interview, General Secretary, Uganda Local Authorities Association, 26 February, 2004.
6. Interview, Kiko Tea Estate manager, Fort Portal, Kiiroya Lameck, 2 April, 2004.
7. Interviews with LC1 Chairmen.
8. Focus group with LC1 executive members and other village leaders, Busaabala, 10 March, 2004.
9. Focus group with 20 women, Busaabala, 15 March, 2004.
10. Interviews, LC1 Chairman, Mugusu, Sarapio Gafabusa, 1 April, 2004; LC3 Mugusu sub-county, Vice Chair, Mbabazi Margaret, 2 April, 2004; LC3 Karambi sub-county, Chair, Mwiraumubi Eli, 2 April, 2004.
11. Interview, Secretary, LC1, Luziga, 12 March, 2004.
12. Focus group with 5 members of the LC executive committee, Mbiro, 12 March, 2004.
13. Interview, Officer in Charge, Mityana, Uganda Police, 31 March, 2004.
14. Interview, Community Liaison Officer, Fort Portal, Uganda Police, 1 April, 2004.
15. Interview, Julius Odwe, Deputy Inspector General of Police, 3 March, 2004.
16. Interview, David Taitika, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Local Administration Police, 26 February, 2004.
17. *The Monitor*, 22 March, 2004.
18. Even according to reports of the Police's own Human Rights Desk, complaints run into the hundreds each year. And the Uganda Human Rights Commission reports 541 complaints of Police torture 2000-2004.
19. Interview, ISO operative, 16 March, 2004.
20. *The Monitor*, 3 March, 2004.
21. Since the NRM took power there has been a fragmentation of national state bodies charged with the role of internal national security. This is in part due to the persistent internal conflict with armed 'terrorist', 'rebels', 'bandits' and organised crime. Co-ordinating the operations against 'terrorist organisations' is the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JAFT). In the same category is the Internal Security Organisation (ISO). It is part of the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) and under the direct authority of the President. It is primarily an intelligence-gathering body used in fighting terrorist and rebel groups. The Presidential Protection Unit (PPU) also moves outside its natural area of operation. At election times it has been known to intimidate opposition candidates and forcibly disperse 'unauthorised' rallies.
22. IRIN, 24 September, 2001.31; *The Monitor*, 20 February, 2004.
23. *New Vision*, 17 March, 2004.

24. Interview, Simeo Nsubuga, Crime Prevention Officer, Police Headquarters, 25 February, 2004.
25. Interviews with Katwe District Police Commander, Mugisha Bazil; Ali Amote, Community Liaison Officer, Katwe Division; Corporal Kyagulanyi, trainer of 'crime preventers', Katwe Division; Jamil Sebalu, Crime Prevention Panel Chair for Katwe; Hassan Muwamugzi, Crime Prevention Panel Secretary for Katwe, 5 March, 2004.
26. Interview with Ngako Abbey Moiti, Community Liaison Officer, Kawempe Division, 11 March, 2004.
27. Focus group of seven Panel executive and members, Matugga, 11 March, 2004.
28. Interview, Rev Atwiinine, Executive Secretary of UTODA, 27 February, 2004.
29. Focus groups of 35 men and women, Matugga market, 19 March, 2004.
30. *The Monitor*, 19 February, 2004.
31. *New Vision*, 2 March, 2004.
32. Interviews, General Managers, *ArmorGroup Uganda* and *Securicor*, 25 February and 3 March, 2004.
33. Interviews with company managers of, *Home Guard Services*, *Ultimate Security*, *Alert Guards and Security Systems*, and *Elite Security*, 26 February, 18 March and 22 March, 2004.
34. Interview, John Kamyia, Acting Assistant Commissioner of Police, Community Affairs, 25 February, 2004; see also Davis *et al.*, 2003.
35. *New Vision*, 24 December, 2002.
36. BBC, broadcast, 28 February, 2004.
37. *Economist*, 25 February, 2004.
38. Interview, Officer in Charge, Mityana, Uganda Police, 31 March, 2004.
39. An example is South Africa's Community Safety Forums, which went national in October 2002. Each month all justice system structures, all relevant local government structures, education representatives and Community-based organisations meet and identify problems and generate solutions. Schärf, 2000.

Figure 2. Overlapping policing agencies in Uganda

