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RECONSTRUCTING SIERRA LEONE

BRUCE BAKER and ROY MAY

Sierra Leone's 10-year civil conflict ended in 2001 and was followed by a substantial reconstruction project. This paper considers how far that programme addresses the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict and to what degree signs of genuine reconciliation are emerging. To do so three indicators of reconstruction are examined, namely youth alienation, state corruption and national reconciliation. The article concludes that though there has been successful demobilisation, disarmament and infrastructure building, factors that contributed to the conflict have not been tackled and the signs of reconciliation are still slight. Such a foundation is not sufficient to rebuild the nation or to guarantee its future security.

As Sierra Leone's 10-year conflict ground to a halt in late 2001 (it was formally declared over in January 2002), its five and a half million population, more than a third of whom were displaced or made refugees, were left with the enormous task of reconstructing their individual and collective lives. Many were faced with the multiple challenges of having to rebuild their homes and their livelihoods. In addition, some had to re-establish their relationships with villages that they had fled or with the neighbours and settlers that had engaged in atrocities. Inevitably they questioned whether their lives and country could ever be rebuilt. Likewise donors and aid agencies pondered what would be required to reconstruct the nation, particularly as their first efforts had come to a dramatic halt with a reversion to civil war in 2000. This paper, based on research in March 2003, considers the nature of some of the problems facing the country and how far the external aid programme addresses the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict and is succeeding in promoting a level of peace on which to rebuild social and economic life.

THE WAR-TORN CONDITION JANUARY 2003

No one can imagine the degree of trauma that many still suffer, having experienced or witnessed killings, rape and mutilation and having been forced into being combatants, perpetrators of violence and sex slaves.¹ By every measure of human well-being large numbers were impoverished – whether that was calculated in terms of the availability of security, shelter, employment and access to health, education, sanitation and potable water. There were 500,000 living outside the country and hundreds of thousands had been internally displaced, more than 215,000 women and girls had been subjected to sexual violence² and 72,000 ex-combatants needed reinsertion into civilian life. 300 towns and villages and 340,000 houses had been destroyed, whilst 80 per cent of health posts needed rehabilitation or reconstruction. 50 per cent of teachers

on the payroll were absent from their posts. 85 per cent of livestock had been lost. The country had the lowest Human Development Index in the world. The fighting was over, the devastation was not.

At the level of their communal organisation there was the task of resurrecting the traditional and state political structures. Government services had collapsed at the local level with the loss of personnel and infrastructure. Government employees and paramount chiefs had been forced to abandon their posts, whilst most of the police stations, police barracks, prisons, courts, chiefdom lock-ups, hospitals, clinics and schools had been severely damaged. Yet the people did not want to simply rebuild the infrastructure and return to the pre-war condition, for that was associated with injustice, corruption and authoritarianism. Rather, they saw the end of the conflict as an opportunity for Sierra Leone to reconstruct society after 30 years of social injustice and the abuse of rule.

THE HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME

The scale of the crisis evinced a massive humanitarian and reconstruction programme, led by United Nations' agencies such as UNHCR (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), along with the largest ever UN peace mission, UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, due to depart by December 2004). There were at least 60 aid agencies and NGOs, with the UK aid agency DFID (Department for International Development) particularly prominent. The sum of their efforts came to be termed the 4Rs, namely, repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The challenge of the returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) was not just to take them back to the communities of their choice as districts were secured by UNAMSIL and government troops, but to reintegrate them into those communities. This meant ensuring that at least basic services were present, that reconciliation was facilitated, that employment skills were imparted and that security was maintained. These repatriation and reintegration programmes continue, although rehabilitation rose in importance during 2003, with an emphasis on improving the basic services and promoting community participation and good governance. The progress has been so successful that now reconstruction programmes are emerging that will seek to consolidate the basic services and transfer responsibilities to the government, prior to the scaling down of the aid programme from its present level.³

The transition from emergency relief to development is by no means over, but many feel that the enormous cost (estimated at \$16.4 billion each year for the UN agencies and £100 million each year for the British government) has notched up some remarkable achievements. All 323,000 IDPs and those who have returned from abroad have been resettled and a large number of combatants have been disarmed, demobilised and received reintegration packages. Something like 20,000 houses have been constructed. Security and government authority has been restored over most of the country, although incursions along the border by the Liberian and Guinean armies and rebel troops hinder progress in the southeast. District officers and representatives of line ministries have been deployed in most districts, and elections for both the paramount chiefs and district councils have taken place. The Sierra Leone Police has begun reform and training and has enlarged its numbers so that it is now deployed, albeit thinly, over most of the country.⁴ Similarly, JPs and magistrates have been appointed and trained to at least offer the semblance of a nationwide justice system.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone has begun its work of investigating those most responsible for the war atrocities with a view to prosecuting them. Hundreds of schools and clinics have been rehabilitated, equipped and minimally staffed, whilst amputees have had special housing and training programmes provided for them. Free elections have been successfully organised for both the national parliament and presidency in May 2002 and for the paramount chiefs. A wide degree of freedom of expression for the press and human rights groups and opposition parties is allowed. Finally, agriculture is re-establishing itself, which is vital in a country where 75 per cent of the population are engaged in it. This is an impressive list by any standards.⁵

These achievements represent considerable gains in a very short period of time. However, it is equally clear that they have been driven largely by external funding and expertise, inevitably creating a dependency culture. Certainly many agencies themselves fear that the Sierra Leone government has yet to demonstrate a determined resolve itself to do what it can in passing legislation and developing policies.⁶ Inevitably, therefore, there is anxiety that the momentum for development will rapidly slow as aid agencies scale down their interventions and that the bubble in the economy created by their presence will burst.

THE INDICATORS OF RECONSTRUCTION

How is the success of the whole reconstruction project in Sierra Leone to be measured? The argument of this article is that analysis must take place at the level of the social and political substructure and that there must be an evaluation of the degree to which the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict have or have not been tackled and the degree to which relationships are being restored after the divisions and violence of the war. To accomplish this evaluation we have taken three indicative issues, namely youth alienation, state corruption and reconciliation. The first two have been chosen as indicators of the degree to which the factors predisposing to internal conflict have been addressed and the last has been chosen as an indicator that relationships between victims and perpetrators are being re-established.

International organisations, and non-government organisations have repeatedly emphasised youth alienation and state corruption as crucial to reconstruction because of their association with the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict. Thus Abu Brima of Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) says: 'The war can only really be over when we begin to address some of the root causes. These causes include corruption and mismanagement of the economy, neglect of rural areas and lack of opportunities for young people'.⁷ The UNDP's Governance Programme in Sierra Leone claims: 'It is the task of development to prevent the recurrence of war by addressing its causes. Sierra Leoneans affirm that two fundamental causes of the war are bad governance and marginalisation of youth. Good governance is a fundamental prerequisite for building lasting peace.'⁸ Whilst the Norwegian Refugee Council asserts that: 'Deep-rooted issues that gave rise to the war - a culture of impunity, endemic corruption, weak rule of law, crushing poverty, and the inequitable distribution of the country's vast natural resources - remain largely unaddressed'.⁹

Amongst academics, several explanatory frameworks have been presented for understanding the origins, dynamics and rationale behind the conflict beyond youth alienation and government corruption. Although Michael Brown believes, 'the widely

held view that internal conflicts are often triggered by external “contagion” or “spillover” effects is particularly suspect’, he allows that in the case of the civil war in Sierra Leone spillover from the Liberian conflict was the case.¹⁰ However, since outside forces could only have successfully prosecuted the rebellion if Sierra Leoneans had other reasons for joining in the conflict, spillover cannot be regarded as the most significant factor. An increasingly favoured explanation of the civil conflict has been in terms of economic greed, which in the Sierra Leonean context consists of seeking control of the diamond fields.¹¹ Lans Gberie of Partnership Africa Canada has presented this view to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whilst Sierra Leone’s ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Kamara, has said that the conflict was ‘not about ideology, tribal or regional differences. It had nothing to do with the so-called problem of marginalised youths, or ... an uprising by rural poor against the urban elite. The root of the conflict was and remained diamonds’.¹² Similarly, the former finance minister of Sierra Leone, James Jonah, has described the war as simply about diamonds. Yet, as David Francis observes, although there is no denying that conflict diamonds have fuelled and perpetuated the war,

that does not make them the primary cause. A more plausible explanation is that economic and political exclusion, perceived injustice and fundamental grievances are at the heart of conflict ... if diamonds were the primary reason for the war why did Sierra Leone not degenerate into civil war until 1991, even though diamonds were discovered in the 1930s.¹³

Others have argued that marginalisation in general is the main cause. Catherine Barnes and Tara Polzer speak of the marginalisation of youth, women and those outside of Sierra Leone.¹⁴

However, it is the attitude of youth that has attracted the most attention in analyses of the war. For some this has been portrayed in terms of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) tapping into Sierra Leonean youth culture in the rural areas. For instance, Paul Richards and others speak of young people in the rural areas being denied a means of living and the infrastructure of schools and roads that might open up the opportunity to acquire the material assets they were made aware of through world radio and videos.¹⁵ Richards argues that the RUF was effective in tapping into this youth culture and appealing to them, at least in the early stages of the conflict, in terms of incentives that were material (‘they offered me a choice of shoes and dresses - I have never had decent shoes before’), social (‘education’) and psychological (support and identity). An alternative youth focus has considered what is called the ‘lumpen’ and ‘subaltern’ youth of Freetown, known for their smoking of marijuana, petty theft and violence. The argument is that the marginalisation of urban youth and the absence of structured outlets for youth politics caused rebellious youths to turn to radical, if uncritical, discourses on pan-Africanism and revolution.¹⁶ Neither version explain why in other societies with unemployed or unemployable youth, such events did not take place. In addition, the ‘lumpen’ thesis assumes that youth were the victims of a ‘capitalist transformation’, whereas it seems more credible to see their marginalisation in terms of state predation, that is the manipulation of the economy by the political and economic elite to get more access to resources.¹⁷

Though the focus on youth as a cause of the war has been popular, there are those who see it as only one of a broad range of social and political factors that include state failure and corruption. McIntyre sees the interplay of bad governance and deteriorating economic conditions as the key underlying factors predisposing Sierra

Leone to internal conflict. According to her thesis, youth were attracted to the rebel cause not because of their radicalisation, but because of 'the displacement of communities, the collapse of what little remained of education and health services, social cohesion and the accompanying poverty and hardship'. The RUF 'thrived not because of a generation predisposed to violence, but because constructive social incentives offered to youth were insufficient to guarantee the perpetuation of an already failing state built on a society destabilised by a failing economy'. The RUF offered them a new system of social incentives, 'of a negative, destructive variety, an answer to that which the state and society failed to provide.'¹⁸ Once started, this war only further undermined society's ability to offer youth attractive prospects, leaving them with little alternative but to fight or die. As regards corruption, William Reno agrees that this was widely resented and no one was impressed by the anti-corruption tribunals that President Strasser set up in the early 1990s, since these were careful to focus on low-level or exiled officials and to avoid the big players. However, as he points out, corruption was not an activity confined to the government. Business, political and military figures also diverted profits from the mines and other state assets that might have gone to paying for government services.¹⁹

For all the differences of emphasis, the general consensus is that youth alienation and government corruption were key underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict and thus constitute the basis of the choice of them as markers of whether those factors have been addressed by the current reconstruction project. The third issue dealt with in this article is reconciliation, on the grounds that this is usually taken to mark the end of the conflict cycle. There is no universally agreed definition of the term as applied to nations, indeed some would argue that it must be locally defined.²⁰ In other words, there has to be a locally negotiated reconciliation process where the victims, the perpetrators and the community at large negotiate what is the degree of guilt, the appropriate recompense and the indicators of change required. Since this article is exploring national reconciliation, it prefers to take a broader view of the concept, although at this level there are still widely different views of what it involves.²¹ In nations where protagonists in the conflict have been associated with social identities based on ethnicity, religion or class, reconciliation could well be defined in terms of dissolving any identities that rest on group superiority or alternatively could be defined in terms of mutual co-existence among the distinct and previously hostile groups. In the case of Sierra Leone, however, the conflict was not essentially concerned with inter-communal hostility. What therefore is essential for reconciliation in South Africa, Burundi or Rwanda does not necessarily apply to Sierra Leone in the same way.

A more legalistic definition of reconciliation considers establishing the truth of the past human rights violations and installing an effective rule of law to protect the restored balance. There is no doubt that this touches on important issues, but most recognise that the restoration of formal and legal rights that were lost sight of in the conflict, does not in and of itself bring accommodation and reintegration at the level of individual experience. This is why others prefer to see reconciliation in terms of community building. The war in Sierra Leone could only have happened because large numbers ceased to recognise any common purpose and mutual interdependence between Sierra Leoneans. In this view, only when these elements are established can reconciliation be said to be accomplished. An even fuller definition of reconciliation would add to the need for mutual respect the need for confession, restoration and forgiveness. There is merit when evaluating reconciliation in looking at both the formal processes of establishing the rule of law and the protection of human rights at

the national level, and at the communal and personal responses at the local level. Neither can be left out in an assessment of the degree to which the conflict can be said to be over.

The article will proceed, therefore, to take the three markers of youth alienation, government corruption and reconciliation to reach some conclusions as to the degree to which the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict have been addressed, peace is being established in the communities and the reconstruction project is sustainable.

THE ISSUE OF YOUTH ALIENATION

Since 50 per cent of population of Sierra Leone are under 15, any estimation of the degree to which the conflict is over and there has been genuine societal change has to include them. These are tomorrow's parents, business owners and agricultural workers or tomorrow's fighters. The problems they face are enormous: problems of unemployment, missed and currently inadequate education, the loss of one or both parent, and for at least 10,000, the trauma of having been directly involved with the fighting forces in the war as combatants or sex slaves. Since May 2001, 7,000 former child soldiers have been demobilised, 98 per cent of whom have now been reunified with their families and communities. However, an unknown number of women and girls still remain with their RUF rebel 'husbands'.²² As the government acknowledges:

Disenfranchisement of youth was one of the primary factors that led to the war, creating resentment and a sense of hopelessness in the first place, and ensuring the existence of a willing pool of recruits for the fighting factions. During the war, youth have been exposed to more trauma, responsibility and experience of power than ever before. As a result, they are now more politically aware and carry greater expectations for involvement in decision-making and desire for economic opportunity than ever before.²³

Yet despite these high expectations and despite all the efforts to improve education and welfare services, many young people still do not have access to them or must learn in classrooms in need of repair, re-equipment and more teachers and materials. The same disappointment faces the former child soldiers who were promised at the peace settlement condensed primary school courses or vocational courses. One recent observer noted that:

The education system in the Kambia District is gradually collapsing. Most of the schools destroyed by the fighting forces have not been rehabilitated and the few usable ones have very few teachers most of whom get to school once in a blue moon because of non-payment of salaries. Hand counts in schools revealed the following: Kamba, 454 pupils, 3 teachers; Rokupr (form 3) 615 pupils, 3 teachers; Kamranka, 202 pupils, 2 teachers; Senthai, 524 pupils, 4 teachers. What is more disheartening is that parents are now taxed by school authorities to pay salaries of additional teachers in their schools ... Some of the parents have started removing their children from school ... Some boys and girls who do not have parents to take care of them are in fact becoming street kids, street walking kids and prostitutes.²⁴

Nor are their employment prospects encouraging. Many older ones have been forced to turn to hawking, prostitution, begging and crime on the streets and see little prospect of better jobs or the possibility of being able to finance further education or training. In Kono district, in the east, thousands between 7 and 16 years have turned to diamond mining in conditions that are extremely exploitative. They are often enticed with gifts of trainers and tape recorders and then given non-negotiable fees on an irregular basis.²⁵ The child miners come from various backgrounds, from ex-combatants and street children, to abandoned and separated children. In Koidu town, 15 year old Ibrahim Kaisamba, an ex-combatant, reported: 'I am not happy being in the mines. If I had an option, I would be in school by now ... I still feel too bad about my experience as a combatant and do hope my life changes drastically.' 14-year-old Foday Kanu lost both his parents in the war. He served as a commander of the 'Small Boys Unit' of the RUF. In his words, 'The people who now look after me just can't afford to pay my school fees because they are poor and have been impoverished by the civil war'.²⁶ The lack of full government control in the east makes it unlikely that it can in the short term regularise the mining sector and get young people away from the mine sites. Nor has it the resources to create employment in the main towns, whilst foreign direct investment is still hesitant to risk capital in such a fragile nation with so little infrastructure. But while jobs fail to materialise, unemployed or exploited children are vulnerable and are a ready source of recruitment for potential troublemakers. They are those most likely to resort to violence and anti-social behaviour if their condition is neglected.

Sadly the culture of expectation in terms of education and employment has not been dampened by the government. On the contrary, the government has made promises to the youth concerning employment and education that it knows it cannot fulfil. Recently the National Commission for War-Affected Children has been set up with the objective that concerns of war-affected children will be translated into policy, priority setting and resource allocation. Yet as regards the Ministry of Youth its impact so far has been disappointing. Its National Youth Policy, launched in July 2003, has been accused by the National Youth Coalition and young people generally, of being drawn up without adequate consultation with them and of ignoring issues of information technology training and of psychological help.²⁷ In the absence of serious provision by the state, a vigorous network of civil society organisations works on their behalf. It includes the radio station 'The Voice of the Children', that claims it is run by and for children. More remarkable than these external initiatives has been the ability that youth themselves have shown in organising themselves. In the face of the absence of state provision and the collapse of the armed groups that previously offered some identity and support, the youth have organised youth groups throughout the country, though the term 'youth group' is used fairly loosely. There are 10 major youth groups that have a high percentage of ex-combatants, including MOCKY (Movement of Concerned Kono Youths, which has an estimated 5,000 members) and Kono District Youth League.²⁸

On the positive side, the youth groups not only offer a measure of assistance to young people, but their very strength away from Freetown can be seen as a pressure for governance decentralisation. On the negative side, many of the groups are still dominated by an elite class of privileged young people or are manipulated by local 'strongmen' (politicians and entrepreneurs) for their own ends. As a result, the role of some of the groups is somewhat ambiguous, ranging from support for youths to trade protectionism. The government and UNAMSIL is finding it now needs their co-

operation as much as the paramount chiefs in some areas.²⁹ For instance, in the diamond mining area of Kono some report that it is the youth groups who decide which company sets up in the diamond fields. This may explain why the government is surprisingly ambivalent about them. On the one hand it recognises that in areas where the state is thin on the ground, particularly in terms of security forces, these groups offer some form of policing organisation that can be harnessed for good. On the other hand, the government must surely recognise their dangerous potential. For instance, in December 2001 a dispute over mining in Kono district led to serious clashes between former RUF rebels and youths from MOCKY. During the clashes the youths, supported by policemen and former Civil Defence Force (CDF) militiamen, and allegedly backed by local chiefs and leaders, attacked former RUF combatants and their families. The clashes left at least thirteen, mostly former RUF combatants, dead. During the fighting thousands of civilians, including hundreds of former RUF fighters, fled the area. There were periodic reports of MOCKY members using intimidation to evict non Konos from towns within Kono district in what appeared to be an attempt to consolidate ethnic Kono control over the diamond-mining area.³⁰ As part of MOCKY's campaign to evict all foreigners, in 2002 they abducted a Lebanese trader, holding him hostage until a ransom of US\$1,700 was paid. There is, then, a very real danger that youth groups will obstruct or resist the will of the government and resort to violence, whether it be of a criminal or of a militia nature. At least 5 youth groups have been identified as having the potential to be dangerous and to constitute a destabilising influence, especially those that have replaced the collapsed RUF in its former strongholds.³¹

It should come as no surprise that in the aftermath of the war armed youth groups are seeking an alternative place of belonging and social cohesion within the criminal youth gangs. The gang offers a cohesive alternative sub-culture to the dominant culture which has marginalised them, boasts its own uniform, its own language and, through criminal activity, offers alternative forms of wealth creation. The conditions for ongoing conflict are still very much present. They will continue to play themselves out within families, communities, schools and with traditional authorities. The productive participation of youth, on the other hand, requires constructive social incentives: cohesive communities, accessible education and recognition of the rights of youth to participate in the peace process. The fear is that the transition from the politics of confrontation to the politics of negotiation may not mark the end of violence - but only a subtle slide from political to criminal violence as a direct response to the unaddressed issue of marginalisation.

THE ISSUE OF CORRUPTION

The Sierra Leonean proverbs say that you cannot feed a child and not lick your hand or that you must not smell the mouth of the one who pounds your benni seed. For many, what westerners call 'corruption' is a necessary survival strategy. Hence those working with the Anti-Corruption Commission's education programme report that,

people tell us clearly that the fight will be an uphill task with the present conditions of service for workers. Corruption is being justified by a large percentage of wage earners, on the proviso that their salaries are a pittance compared to the cost of living'.³²

When it comes to the conduct of their political leaders, however, Sierra Leoneans expect arrests and jail. Yet for all the promises of their leaders, the pressure from donors and the creation of institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, corruption remains at the heart of government and deeply embedded in the bureaucracy and criminal justice system. So say senior police concerning politicians and other police officers, and politicians concerning the police and other politicians; and so say NGOs and donors about both.³³ The charges even extend to UNAMSIL and the Anti-Corruption Commission itself.³⁴ The accusations of corruption are of course only anecdotal, but the perception is nevertheless widespread that little has changed since ‘democracy’ came.³⁵ In other words, the sense of injustice that recruited so many people to the RUF - that the then APC (All People’s Congress party) government was thoroughly corrupt - has not dissipated now that the Sierra Leone People’s Party’s (SLPP) government is elected and the constitution a multi-party one. For all the public commissions of the 1990s into state corruption, little has changed. Neither has corruption changed in the clientelist systems that intertwine society at large.³⁶

Clare Short, who until recently was Secretary of State for Development in the British Government, is quite explicit, that alongside Charles Taylor, corruption constitutes one of the greatest threats to Sierra Leone:

Corruption, either grand (the looting of state coffers by those in public trust, the illegal trading in diamonds) or petty (the charge demanded by a low-ranking official for a service that should be free), remains endemic in Sierra Leone. It has become a way of life for many. Society has come to accept, even expect, corruption. As always the poor suffer most, and the poorest of the poor most of all. They are denied access to education, healthcare and medicine because they cannot afford to make the extra payments demanded by corrupt officials. They are denied justice when the legal system is twisted by bribery. And they suffer when corruption diverts scarce resources away from development or deters essential domestic and international investment. The system for prosecuting those found out is itself corrupted by inertia, and the failure to punish those responsible. The temptation therefore remains. Too many of the people entering politics and the civil service in Sierra Leone do so in order to make money. Personal gain, or loyalty to family, tribe or party, is put before national interest. And the consequence of this is that the country is damaged and everyone loses out.³⁷

A great deal of donor money has gone into introducing a number of mechanisms to ensure greater accountability for how public money is spent and tighter accountancy systems have been put in place within the Ministry of Finance. However, although, ‘accounting systems for salaries and budgets have reduced the number of “ghost” employees and decreased the opportunities for padding budgets and siphoning funds ...[nevertheless] government officials continue to try to skim off the top of [development] projects’.³⁸ One donor official admitted that reforms instituted during 2001/2 were a ‘façade’ because of the perpetual tendency of individual politicians and high level civil servants to continually undermine the structures and mechanisms that have been set up to improve transparency and accountability.³⁹ Donor-funded initiatives have included the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC), the Governance Reform Secretariat, the Law Development programme and the published Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys. Then there was a corruption survey in 2000 (to be

extended and followed up in 2003) to collect information about the experience and perceptions of corruption by citizens of Sierra Leone, thus establishing a baseline for future monitoring of change. There have also been some anti-corruption reforms in the police and the military and some media development work to encourage investigative reporting.

Yet all these efforts are still insufficient in and of themselves to tackle the scale of the problem. They are largely institutional measures that require a commitment to implementation that cannot always be assumed. Further, the initiatives are uncoordinated. The country needs a single coherent action programme to reduce corruption and to strengthen financial management and accountability within government (the national anti-corruption strategy that the government agreed to initiate with the Commission in 2000 has largely been left unimplemented). Adequate management systems are required in the civil service, to ensure transparent public procurement and to discourage corruption. Audits are still rare within the government departments, government agencies and quasi-governmental organisations such as the University and state owned enterprises. Many have not been audited for decades. Again, the management of the country's diamond resources still allows a major diversion of the country's resources into private hands. This major area of corruption is likely to continue whilst there is only minimal control of mining and security is inadequate. With this general lack of government control and information on government expenditures, it is difficult to hold the government to account. Further, the local press lacks the capacity to investigate and expose corrupt practices in government. Even when information is available, there are few organisations that can effectively use it to engage with government.

Some of the problems of a top-down institutional approach to tackling corruption are highlighted by the functioning of the Anti-Corruption Commission. It was established in 2000 under pressure from Britain with extensive powers of search and arrest. It not only receives and processes complaints from the public, but is said to have 'collected clear evidence of deep corruption among civil servants and ministers. Working with British intelligence, it has tracked down bank accounts and secret correspondence and gathered information that before would have been well hidden'.⁴⁰ However, with institutionalised patterns of behaviour among the political class little changed, the effects of the discoveries were not surprising. Thus although the Commission found the transport minister with an illegal packet of diamonds worth about £25,000, it appears that 'President Kabbah personally pressured the Commission to drop the case ... At a cabinet meeting in April 2002, ministers claimed that the Anti-Corruption Commission was embarrassing the government and proposed that a more sympathetic lawyer be appointed to handle all prosecutions'.⁴¹ Furthermore, Kabbah's 'political appointees in the Commission are believed to be tipping off key people in government so that when the ACC team raids the office or an account, it finds the evidence removed'.⁴² Since all suspects have to be handed over to the attorney general, who is also Minister of Justice, there is a further opportunity for the government to see that cases proceed through the judicial process slowly or not at all (though this was strongly denied by the Minister in an interview).⁴³

The Anti-Corruption Commission's 2002 report only confirmed its ineffectiveness: no cases brought to trial during 2002, little movement on cases pending in 2001, and even fewer additions. The Anti-Corruption Commissioner Val Collier said that because the Anti-Corruption Act (2000) provided no penalties for failing to cooperate with the Commission, many government ministries and departments simply ignored

the Commission or refused to comply with its requests and recommendations. Collier also expressed frustration over what he said was 'the rather lukewarm attitude of the judiciary, which after two years has yet to take a single matter of adjudication to a final conclusion,' and 'a level of disinterestedness' by Parliament. He claimed that it was inevitable, given inadequate legal staff levels, that cases turned over by the Commission had not been prosecuted.⁴⁴ Nor do the problems end with the Commission. Against the background of suspected political interference in the judicial process, there is the manifest inability or unwillingness of the Public Accounts Committee and other Parliamentary Committees to exercise their authority and to show independence of the government. The concern must be that the political class has little serious interest in tackling corruption from above. Clare Short may well be right: 'Sierra Leone has got to clean up its act fast if it is to remain at peace'.⁴⁵

THE ISSUE OF RECONCILIATION

More than cessation of fighting is required to finish a war where the combatants of both sides live in close proximity. The task is more than reconstructing economies and creating wealth and employment. It is also more than reintroducing free elections for political office, establishing constitutional rights for the citizens and the "normalisation" of government-to-government relations. As Graeme Simpson observes, violent conflict goes beyond the disruption of economics and politics - it damages society:

It causes massive social dislocation, and taints or destroys social relations - from national political relationships to very basic human interactions - whether through racism, violence against women, or destruction of families ... But so much international aid for the recovery or reconstruction process seems almost blind to this social dislocation and to the vital and basic need to rebuild social relationships.⁴⁶

Recognising this, both the national government and the international aid community put considerable emphasis on what they call 'reconciliation programmes'. These are fairly narrowly defined, that is, instead of seeking friendship between former enemies, as is implied by the word reconciliation, they settle for programmes aimed at achieving a renunciation of violence and requiring a willingness by the protagonists to work together for national development (for instance, the Red Cross programmes called Community Animation and Peace Support). Their first attempts, undertaken at the Lome peace agreement of 1999, were even more constrained. Despite the RUF's track record of broken peace agreements (1996), backing a military coup (1997) and uniting with the ousted coup leaders to launch another nearly successful attack on Freetown, they offered a power-sharing arrangement and the dubious concession of amnesty to fighters. In addition, even though the RUF leader Foday Sankoh had been condemned to death for treason in 1998, he was given a full pardon, reinstated as a Sierra Leonean citizen, and offered vice-presidential status plus the chairmanship of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources (in effect, the Minister of diamonds!). In the name of 'national unity' the untrustworthy were trusted unconditionally. Not surprisingly this government fell apart as the RUF returned to insurgency. When that phase of the war came to an end, following the action of ECOMOG (The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group),

UNAMSIL and British troops in 2000, the RUF was not given a second chance of a seat in power. Instead, reconciliation was primarily invested in two formal institutions: The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).⁴⁷ Together these transitional justice mechanisms assumed at the national level the symbolic role of writing the history of the conflict and prosecuting the leading actors behind the atrocities.

The intentions of those who pressed for these institutions are not doubted. They believed that there is no peace without justice,⁴⁸ and hoped that some form of catharsis would follow from the historical narrative and prosecutions. On hindsight, however, the remit and constitutions of the institutions may prove to be ill conceived. Firstly, they will inevitably leave most of the abuses unpunished: the remit is very narrow (the Court is to prosecute those – some 20-30 - who bear the greatest responsibility for the atrocities of the war and that only from November 1996); whilst the time span is brief (the Court has a 3 year mandate, the TRC a 12-18 month one). Indeed some of the prosecution witnesses called before the Special Court are inevitably war criminals themselves.⁴⁹ Secondly, they will leave most of the abuses unrecorded by a public fearful of reprisals. Thirdly, the Court lacks the authority to compel the apprehension of those indicted by the Court, so that President Charles Taylor of Liberia, though indicted in June 2003, cannot be forced to attend. Fourthly, the two institutions may prove to be contradictory as persons will be constrained from giving evidence to the TRC if there is a danger that they may be prosecuted by the Special Court.⁵⁰ Finally the institutions lack universal support in the country. There is evidence that there are distinct regional views about the two institutions: the south largely supporting the Special Court, whilst the north largely supports the TRC.⁵¹ Some had feared that the power of the attorney general, who is also the Minister of Justice, to defer or discontinue any proceedings at his discretion, would protect key political figures in government and smother embarrassing disclosures.⁵² However, the arrest of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sam Hinga Norman, the Kamajors self-styled paramount chief and leading figure in the CDF, on 9 March, (along with the indictment for crimes committed against humanity of: Foday Sankoh, ex-head of the RUF (now deceased); RUF officials Issa Sesay, Alex Brima and Morris Kallon; ex-rebel commander Sam Bockarie (now deceased) and Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the ruling military junta in 1997-1998) dispelled that fear and showed that the Court was not simply aimed at potential political rivals of the government.⁵³ Nevertheless the claim by the special prosecutor that the Court has a role in creating a 'foundation of respect for the law through training, outreach and public awareness that can be sustained after the court has completed its work'⁵⁴ seems exaggerated, given that only 20 or so cases are expected to be processed. As for the TRC's remit not only to create 'an impartial, historical record of the conflict', but to 'address impunity; respond to the needs of victims; promote healing and reconciliation; and prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered', this too looks over-ambitious given its lack of funding and poor organisation. The reality is that both these institutions have more to do with meeting the donor agenda than the calls of the general public.

These two formal and Freetown based institutions exemplify the problems of trying to find a legal framework for a process such as reconciliation, which is essentially something that must take place at the individual and psychological level. The key area for reconciliation is the local one where neighbours have to live with ex-combatants or perhaps even with those who are known to have committed atrocities against family and kin. At this level certain processes have to take place for there to be any meaningful reconciliation. At the very least it requires former protagonists to engage

with one another. Further, whatever comes out at the TRC, at the local level, the misdeeds need to be owned up to and publicly acknowledged for what they are. The alternative is that the truth will seep out drop by drop over the years, poisoning efforts to move on. Collective amnesia is often reported following conflict,⁵⁵ but silence is not the same as reconciliation. In addition to words and as a practical way of adding flesh to apologies, reconciliation is enhanced by the offer of some form of restitution, such as helping to rebuild community property or services. No one can require of another full forgiveness, although this is the ultimate demonstration of reconciliation. Whatever the degree of reconciliation it is costly at the local level and what is more, is beyond governments and national symbolic acts to achieve. It is to be hoped that local organisations and associations can facilitate it, but ultimately it has to come from a will to do it among the individuals, victims and perpetrators.⁵⁶ Penfold argues that many who 'undoubtedly feel that there should be some accounting for these terrible tragedies', nevertheless are prepared to refrain from personal revenge and to leave it to God or Allah to determine retribution.⁵⁷

In Sierra Leone there have been numerous initiatives to facilitate reconciliation at the local level by bringing together former antagonists in joint work programmes, sports competitions, peace and reconciliation concerts and community sensitising meetings. If they are successful then development has a solid societal foundation. But if communities are divided, harbour hatred and engage in ostracism and revenge attacks, then it is very difficult to see how permanent reconstruction can be achieved. Ex-combatants with no employment opportunities, with no community willing to receive them and anxious about their own indictment (and that of their leaders), may well gravitate to their own groups for support and proceed to sustain themselves in the way they know best – by violence. Reconstructing societies requires understanding the dynamic and close relationship between social, political and economic interests. Economic infrastructure can be rebuilt, but political upheaval will destroy it again overnight. Social fabric can be rebuilt and political settlements negotiated, but unless the people's economic needs are met, those agreements have no credibility.

So what has happened to the 24,000 RUF fighters and 37,000 CDF who have handed in their weapons? The pattern, as reported by field officers working with NGOs and donor agencies, is very mixed. There are very different scenarios in different areas. In places the ex-combatants have returned to their homes and have been accepted, elsewhere they have tried and been rebuffed or been subject to attacks, in still other cases they have either been too frightened to return or have permanently settled in new areas. Thus the Registrar of the Special Court reports that their officials are finding as they travel the country, that 'in some areas, perpetrators have already been reintegrated. Elsewhere perpetrators are being attacked by groups who are taking the law into their own hands'.⁵⁸

The mixed responses are confirmed by field officers of the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG). One wrote in 2002 of the Kambia district, on the northern border with Guinea:

The peace and reconciliation expected to be achieved is far from getting its required fruits in Kambia district [because] people most affected by the war living in the villages are not sensitised on what peace and reconciliation is all about. The assignments of sensitising people are given to people who could not even speak the languages understood by the common people ... people worst hit by the war, for example amputees, have been completely abandoned

... Some of these amputees are forced by hunger to go out begging. Would peace and reconciliation be understood by these people?⁵⁹

The same officer wrote in February 2003: 'The relationship between ex-combatants and other civilians is not healthy at all. Civilians, especially victims of the past war still keep ex-combatants at arms length because of the problems they caused their lives'.⁶⁰

Yet in the Tonkolili district, DFID's community reintegration programme reported a more positive picture for the period October-November, 2002:

The identity of ex-combatants is gradually being lost due to the influx of returnees to the district. The process of natural reintegration is taking place and it is becoming very difficult to distinguish between an ex-combatant and an OWAP [other war-affected persons] or any other category of citizen. In fact a lot of ex-combatants do not like being called by that name. Many communities are now facing reality and accepting ex-combatants. The only slight hitch is for ex-combatants who come from some other regions of the country, the Tonkolili communities are still not accepting them and still believe that they should be settled in their regions of origin.⁶¹

Even within districts the situation can be varied over place and time. In Port Loko, both Amnesty International local members and the CGG field officer spoke of reconciliation not being an issue, for there were 'cordial relationships' with returnees, whilst ex-combatants, even though many were from the south east and 'too frightened to return', had been 'reintegrated' through training.⁶² Nevertheless, the DFID account records two football matches at secondary schools in Port Loko and Lunsar which ended with ex-combatants resorting to violence and burning down 2 houses:

Investigation has revealed that the majority of the students from the secondary school that instigated the fighting are ex-combatants (XCs), around 400 in total. A number of factors have contributed to their disruptive behaviour. One is that NCDDR [National Commission for Demobilisation and Disarmament and Reintegration] have delayed with payments of students' allowances, contributing to their frustrations. Another is the apparent lack of discipline and respect that students have for teachers in that particular school. Some of these XCs had attended the Catholic school [where the violence took place] but due to disruptive behaviour they were expelled and, against local advice the other secondary school accepted them onto their register.⁶³

The accounts of revenge attacks are understandably under-reported, but there are many who confirm that they occur.⁶⁴

Also hindering reconciliation is the manner in which the disarmament package (6 months training, a small monthly stipend and a leaving toolkit) for ex-combatants is being handled. Firstly, this is widely perceived as perverse since it 'rewards' the perpetrators of violence whilst the victims or those who remained loyal to the government receive no parallel benefits. Secondly, there have been complaints that former RUF combatants have been given preferential treatment over those of the CDF.⁶⁵ Thirdly, there is even doubt about whether the programme will receive sufficient funding to complete its work.⁶⁶ Certainly the programme has been slow to

take on many ex-combatants (in June 2003 there were still 9,100 waiting to benefit from reintegration projects) and to distribute the toolkits promised to those who have completed the programme.⁶⁷ What the tension over the programme highlights is the need for the reconciliation process to be less combatant focussed and more community focussed.⁶⁸

CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

The indicators that have been used in this article suggest that the aid programme currently being implemented is not effectively addressing the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict. Nor is there convincing evidence that a level of peace on which to rebuild social and economic has been secured. The work undertaken in demobilisation, disarmament and infrastructure building is not to be dismissed, but the reconstruction 'edifice' that rises daily in Sierra Leone has shaky foundations.

In the light of this a number of areas in the reconstruction project might be reconsidered. Firstly, there is uncertainty about whether it has misread the current 'peace' and whether it maybe a mistake to assume that Sierra Leone is a post-conflict society. The cessation of hostilities, the peace agreement, and the rebuilt infrastructure do not prove that conflict has ceased. Even if the armed militias had fully disbanded, which they have not, there is always the danger in fractured societies that conflict and violence, far from disappearing, will, like a rhizome, only grow sideways to re-emerge elsewhere, perhaps as criminal violence, which anyway was often part of the modus operandi of armed rebel groups. In Sierra Leone, as so often happens immediately following hostilities, arms are readily obtained and the state police are still being reorganized and deployed nationwide, leaving an opportunity for banditry and violent crime. This was a feature of Mozambique after the civil war. As demobilised fighters ran out of de-mobilisation pay, many reverted to reliance on their weapon skills and armed robbery and carjacking rose steeply after the war.⁶⁹ Indeed there are already reports in Sierra Leone of an upsurge in armed robbery on a virtually nightly basis in Freetown⁷⁰ and the US State Department reports that, 'Armed robberies and burglaries of residences have occurred more frequently since the lifting of the curfew in early 2002'.⁷¹ Beyond the continuation of violence through crime there is also the harsh reality that brutal conflicts of the sort witnessed in Sierra Leone do not die without trace at the command of formal political or diplomatic settlements and peace agreements. They cannot, as Simpson puts it, be 'negotiated out of existence'. They generate their own histories and residual memories, which in turn can initiate new violent conflicts. The dreadful possibility is that today's victim can become tomorrow's perpetrator as was the case with the Boers and the Hutu. Whether manifested in generational patterns of cyclical violence, or more constrained loops of revenge and retribution, they can, over time, take on a structural character.⁷²

A second uncertainty with the reconstruction process is whether it has misconstrued the confines of the conflict and hence underestimated the scale of the task. The prevalent discourse is one where there is a narrow definition of the victims of the conflict, which in turn leads to a focus only on the direct perpetrators of the conflict. Combined, these two foci restrict the scope of efforts to promote reconciliation. In fact the victims are not just the mutilated, the raped and the displaced, nor were the only perpetrators the armed combatants. There were many who suffered indirectly as a result of the war (in the loss of business, health, social networks, schooling, savings,

important documentation). Further, there were many indirect beneficiaries of the conflict who never picked up a semi-automatic weapon (local 'strongmen', looters, black marketeers, criminal gangs, hoarders of basic necessities, exploiters of people desperate to sell their labour, money lenders – many of whom have retained their wartime gains). This wider circle is largely overlooked in the truth telling before the TRC and the Special Court, or in the work programmes, sports competitions and concerts that bring together former antagonists.⁷³

The third area of uncertainty concerns the danger of underestimating the complexity of bringing about reconciliation. It is salutary to remember Galtung's observation that 'nobody really knows how to successfully achieve reconciliation'.⁷⁴ Indeed there is a remarkable paucity of literature on the subject of operationalising it. In part this absence is because reconciliation is not just an outcome but a process that revolves around relationships rather than issues or interests. In addition there are many levels of the reconciled relationship. At its fullest it involves at least five levels: accepting responsibility; publicly expressing regret; renunciation of the unacceptable behaviour; restitution for wrongs committed; and a mutual commitment not to raise the matter again. The centrality of relationship to reconciliation, as opposed to other conflict handling mechanisms such as peacekeeping does, however, point to the importance of a high level of participation by the conflicting parties in solving the problems in the way that is most relevant to their own particular situation. As Anderson reminds us, 'Each war is unique; each society has its own history, culture personages, values and tensions'.⁷⁵ Lederach's model of reconciliation stressing its four elements of truth, mercy, justice and peace (1999:51-3) is widely quoted.⁷⁶ Yet it is an important insight by Cutter that the weight given to each element needs to vary from conflict to conflict. In Sierra Leone, where there is a widespread sense of shared responsibility for the conflict, forgiveness is to the fore, whereas in Cambodia talk of forgiveness is often dismissed ('How can anyone forgive what happened to us') and in Rwanda the Tutsi can talk of little else than justice and the Hutu of little else but democracy.⁷⁷ Generic approaches promoted by outside professionals are, then, unlikely to succeed.⁷⁸ If reconciliation is more participatory than other conflict handling mechanisms, concerns relationships and has a unique context, then it follows that methods adopted for achieving it must come from the people themselves.⁷⁹ Lederach advocates a model of conflict resolution 'based on building from cultural resources in a given setting' as opposed to a prescriptive model 'based on transferring conflict resolution technology from one setting to another'.⁸⁰ One thing is certain that to turn relationships from ones or resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony needs time and this may not suit the schedules of donor projects

The fourth area of uncertainty concerning the reconstruction process is whether it can be underwritten by economic growth. The government strategy boldly asserts that: 'A growing economy will increase revenue to the state, which in turn will increase services to the people providing greater opportunities for more sustainable livelihoods'.⁸¹ Unfortunately this is more rhetoric than reality since government revenue from diamonds is still minimal, there is little manufacturing, few exports and approximately 60 per cent of the Government's budget comes from foreign assistance. This is hardly an economy geared for success in the global markets. Even if economic growth were to be significant, it would not necessarily be universally beneficial for, as Eboe Hutchful warns, there are hazards. Economic growth and wealth generation, because of the manner in which they inject development resources into impoverished communities, and create winners and losers, may actually reinforce conflict.⁸² Yet it

will be extremely hard to ensure that growth is even between regions and that it does not widen the gap between the rich and the poor, as South Africa has demonstrated.

Fifthly there is uncertainty as to whether the peace settlement might not, ironically, undermine the rule of law. Everyone is delighted that, at least officially, all the land is declared to be safe for settlement. But security is not simply the clearance of rebels, but the assurance in the future of protection of life and property. It is about the rule of law; about the communal principle of self-restraint within the confines of human rights' respecting law. In this respect there must be anxiety that a political settlement that has secured the impunity of the vast majority of the perpetrators of war crimes, and of the beneficiaries of conflict exploitation, might in the long term have serious negative consequences. It may also confirm popular suspicion that the criminal justice system is subject to political interference. A culture of impunity cannot exist alongside a culture of human rights. It is difficult to expect a common criminal to respect the law, if the rebel gets away with rape, mutilation or murder. In particular, for the victims of these abuses it means they are denied access to the information that could be essential to their rehabilitation, let alone any prospect of redress at civil or criminal law. It is not inconceivable therefore that in the absence of any public acknowledgment of wrongdoing, coupled to the impossibility of restitution through the courts, widespread resentment could well manifest itself in informal retribution at both an individual and a collective level.

Finally there is the fear that elements in the government and international community are looking for speedy repairs to the economy and polity, to 'fix' the broken state. One understands the political need for the Sierra Leone government and donors like Britain to 'talk up' the success of the reconstruction programme, but both President Kabbah and Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, speak of reconstruction in terms of a narrow definition of non-conflict and improved economic infrastructure. Following a meeting with President Kabbah in July 2003, Straw said:

The country has enjoyed well over a year of peace, and work to consolidate that peace is well advanced. Sierra Leone has demonstrated that, with the right commitment, peace can be attained even in the bleakest of situations... On 14 July the UN Security Council agreed that the UN peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL, should plan for draw-down to be complete by December 2004. The UK supports this timetable....⁸³

President Kabbah, on the launching of National Social Action Project (successor to the National Commission for Social Action and its predecessor, the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation), September 2003 claimed that:

[All three agencies] have undertaken projects geared towards a rapid transition from post-war relief to economic growth and sustainable development, leading to substantial poverty reduction. These projects ... cover key sub-sectors, reflecting the priority areas of intervention identified in our National Recovery Strategy, namely: Agriculture, Health, Education, Community Infrastructure, Micro-finance Enterprise Promotion, Resettlement

and Rehabilitation, Shelter and Information and Sensitisation... We shall not only rehabilitate and refurbish, but we shall also, where appropriate, rebuild every single structure and every institution in this country that has been damaged by the rebel war by accident or by sheer human neglect.⁸⁴

Such restricted terms to describe reconstruction imply that the process is well on its way. The discourse seems designed to give an opportunity for a 'mission (virtually) accomplished' in the not too distant future. When the peace has lasted a few more years and the welfare facilities and houses have been rebuilt, then donors will be able to scale down aid graciously and the Sierra Leone government will be able to ask for a renewed mandate. However, defined in terms of the youth alienation, state corruption and limited reconciliation that this paper has drawn attention to, there is very much more to rebuilding the nation or to guaranteeing its future security.

NOTES

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1. See the harrowing accounts in, *We'll kill you if you cry: sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict*, Human Rights Watch, 2003, available www.hrw.org.
2. *We'll kill you if you cry*, 26-7.
3. Interviews with UNDP Reintegration Advisor and UNHCR Reintegration programme Officer, Freetown, March 2003.
4. Interview with The Inspector General of Police, March 2003; he is also reported as saying that 'the present number is too small to maintain effective security in the whole country', *Standard Times* (Freetown), 20 July 2003.
5. For more details see 18th UN Secretary General's report to the UN Security Council, 23 June 2003 on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone S/2003/663.
6. Interviews with local agencies, March 2003.
7. Quoted by Christian Aid, www.christian-aid.org.uk/news/features/0301sierra.
8. Available at www.undpsalone.org/files/programmes/GOVpage.
9. Norwegian Refugee Council, www.db.idpproject.org.
10. Michael Brown, *The International Dimensions of International Conflict* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 583.
11. Y. Bangura, 'Understanding the political and cultural dimensions of the Sierra Leone war: A critique of Paul Richards' "Fighting for the rainforest"', *African Development*, 32/3&4 (1997); D. Keen, 'The economic functions of violence in civil wars', *Adelphi Papers* 320 (Oxford: OUP, 1998); D. Keen, *War and Underdevelopment, Vol. 2, Country Experiences* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000); D. Keen, 'Crime. and access to resources', in E. Nafziger, F. Stewart & R. Väyrynen (eds.) *War, Hunger and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies* (Oxford: OUP, 2000); A. Zack-William, 'Sierra Leone: Crisis and Despair', *Review of African Political Economy* 17/49 (1990), 22-33; M. Berdal and D. Malone, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
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13. D. Francis, www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/publicat.
14. Catherine Barnes and Tara Polzer Sierra Leone, 'Peace Process: Learning from the Past to Address Current Challenges, An Expert Seminar Report' (London: Conciliation Resources, 2000), available on www.cr.org/pubs/occ_papers/slsemreport. On the marginalisation of intellectuals, or 'excluded intellectuals', see Paul Richards in, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996).
15. Richards *op cit*.
16. I. Abdullah, 'Bush path to destruction: The origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36/2 (1998), 203-35.
17. W. Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); W. Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
18. Angela McIntyre, Emmanuel Kwesi Aning and Prosper Nii Nortey Addo, 'Politics, War and Youth Culture in Sierra Leone: An Alternative Interpretation', *African Security Review*, 11/3 (2002), available at www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/11No3/McIntyre.
19. W. Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 124-6.
20. For example, Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm, Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid* (Cambridge, Mass.: Collaborative for Development Action, 1996); Kenneth D. Bush, 'Towards a Balanced Approach to Rebuilding War-Torn Societies', *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3/3 (1995), 49-69; Nola Kate Seymoar (ed.), *Creating Common Unity: Models of Self Empowerment: 50 Award Winning Communities*, Friends of the UN, 1997; Thomas G. Weiss, 'Non-Governmental Organizations and Internal Conflict', in Michael Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 435-60.
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23. Government of Sierra Leone, *National Recovery Strategy: Sierra Leone, 2002-2003*, Freetown, 2002.
24. *Governance Issues: Kambia District*, unpublished manuscript, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, November 2002.
25. See Alusine Savage, 'Diamonds and Children in Sierra Leone', *Awoko*, available at www.awoko.com/news/features/Diamonds.
26. Reported, IRIN, 28 February 2003.
27. *Standard Times*, 9 July 2003.
28. Communication, The Centre for Coordination of Youth Activities, April 2003.

29. UNAMSIL Sector 5 Commander, as part of his tour of the Kono, held a series of meetings with the local chiefs, representatives of youth groups including MOCKY and the Kono District Youth League, as well as with local district officials www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/DB/140102.
30. www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa10.
31. Interviews with western embassy officials, Freetown, March 2003.
32. Frederick Bobor James, Principal Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, 'Two years of Anti-Corruption works: perceptions and realities', *Sierra News* (Freetown), 5 March 2003.
33. Speech by Clare Short, Minister of Department of International Development, 27 February 2002, available at DFID website; interviews with chief of police, western embassy officials, and NGOs, March 2003. As an example of the practice of what Sierra Leoneans call the 'evil servants', The Government was required in July 2003 to hand back US\$5.27 of aid because civil servants had used the money 'recklessly', *Concord Times*, 21 July 2003.
34. See, 'UNAMSIL Colonel in Fraud Scandal', Sahr Musa Yamba, *The News* (Freetown), 6 March 2003.
35. See Gibrilla Mansaray, 'Anti-Corruption or Pro-Corruption?', *The African Champion* (Freetown), 7 March 2003.
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37. Speech, Clare Short, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 27 February 2002.
38. International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as Usual*, Freetown/Brussels, ICG, 2002, 16.
39. Interviewed Spring 2002, quoted International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone After Elections*, 16.
40. R. Dowden, 'Sierra Leone Locked in Shackles of Corruption', *Guardian*, 12 October 2002.
41. International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone After Elections*, 17.
42. Dowden, op.cit.
43. Interview, Eke Ahmed Halloway, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, March 2003.
44. IRIN report, August 2003.
45. Speech, Clare Short, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 27 February 2002.
46. Graeme Simpson, 'Reconstruction and Reconciliation: Emerging from transition', *Development in Practice*, 7/4 (1997), 475-478.
47. For details on the legal structure and jurisdiction of the Special Court see: 'A "Special Court" for Sierra Leone?', *Current Developments: Public International Law*, 50/2 (2001), 435-46.
48. See, *Standard Times*, editorial, March 12 2003: 'The only way the victims of the war will be able to come to terms with their situation is when they realise that those responsible for their present circumstances have been brought to justice'.
49. See *Standard Times*, 13 July, 2003.
50. There is confusion over whether evidence brought before the TRC will be made available to the Court: The TRC chairman says 'definitely not', while the Special Court prosecutor says 'only if necessary' (Peter Penfold, 'Will justice help peace in Sierra Leone?', *Observer*, October 20, 2002 available at www.observer.co.uk/worldview).
51. Brundt; Interview with Amnesty International Campaign coordinator and group development officer, Jimmy Momoh, March 2003; Penfold, 2002.

52. International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone After Elections*, 18.
53. Sam Norman, shortly before this arrest, argued that no one should be arrested for defending ones country. Interview, March 2003.
54. Quoted in 'Sierra Leone: Report on Preliminary Review of Justice Sector: Joint DFID/World Bank Visit', by M. Kane et. al., 2002, 22.
55. See Commission for Historical Clarification, *Guatemala: Memory of Silence*, available at <http://shr.aas.org/guatemala/ceh/report>.
56. Peter Storey, 'Reconciliation and Civil Society', paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation conference, *Making Ends Meet: Reconciliation and Reconstruction in South Africa*, World Trade Centre, Johannesburg, 18 August 1994.
57. Penfold, 2002.
58. Robin Vincent, *Sunday Observer*, 3 November, 2002.
59. Governance issues Kambia district, Idrissa Kamara, field officer, Kambia district, unpublished manuscript, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, Sierra Leone, November 2002.
60. CGG, 2003.
61. DFID, 2002, 12.
62. Private interviews, 3 March 2003.
63. DFID, 2002, 14.
64. Interviews with Anglican Bishop Lynch and Violet Kawa, teacher, Freetown, March 2003.
65. *Concord Times*, 5 December 2002, 5 February, 2003.
66. Interview with Sam Norman, March 2003, who claimed that through lack of money the government had been unable to pay the CDF; International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone After Elections*, 13.
67. DFID, 2002; 18th SG Report, 23 June 2003.
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73. B. Hamber, 'Thoughts on the Relationship Between Reconciliation and Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa', Public Lecture at the Annual General Meeting of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London Voluntary Sector Resource Centre, London, 1988, 2-3.
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