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### **Territorial management contracts as a tool to enhance the sustainability of sloping and mountainous olive orchards: evidence from a case study in southern Spain**

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1 **Territorial Management Contracts as a tool to enhance the sustainability of**  
2 **sloping and mountainous olive orchards. Evidence from a case study in**  
3 **Southern Spain.**

4  
5 **Keywords:** organic farming, collective management, territorial management contracts,  
6 Sloping and Mountainous Olive Production Systems (SMOPS), Common Agricultural Policy  
7 (CAP).

8 **Abstract**

9 The continuity of farming in traditional sloping and mountainous olive production systems  
10 (SMOPS) is at risk, especially in marginally productive areas. The abandonment of olive  
11 production on sloping lands would have adverse economic, social, environmental and cultural  
12 effects. To tackle this risk of abandonment and to improve the sustainability of traditional  
13 SMOPS, we propose the Territorial Management Contracts of Rural Areas (TMC). The  
14 potential of this instrument to be specifically applied to organic olive production systems on  
15 sloping lands is assessed. The paper then summarises the results of a survey conducted with  
16 Andalusian farmers aimed at identifying key characteristics of this instrument to enhance  
17 uptake by farming communities. Results show that farmers are well-disposed toward TMC,  
18 and that issues such as flexibility and external advice need to be considered for its successful  
19 implementation. From a policy perspective, the instrument is well aligned with the objectives  
20 of the last reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy.

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## 29 **1 Introduction**

30 Agricultural abandonment is a complex multi-dimensional process driven by different economic,  
31 environmental and social factors (Verburg and Overmars, 2009; Renwick *et al.*, 2013). Agricultural  
32 land abandonment poses severe threats to predominantly agricultural areas in the Mediterranean  
33 Region and is thus of high political interest (Weissterner *et al.*, 2011). Amongst other effects,  
34 agricultural land abandonment leads to a loss of income for farmers, impacts on the amenity value of  
35 agricultural landscapes, increases wildfire risk and contributes to migration from rural villages to  
36 cities. These effects in turn impact on tourism and recreation potentials of these areas, contributing to a  
37 reduction in the general economic viability of communities in agriculturally dominated areas.  
38 Mountainous agricultural systems are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of land abandonment,  
39 because they often entail high environmental value in areas where agriculture is at the heart of  
40 economic activity. According to García-Ruiz *et al.* (2011), farmland abandonment in Europe affects  
41 thousands of square kilometres<sup>1</sup>, and is particularly concentrated in mountainous areas, where  
42 depopulation and difficulties with the mechanisation of agricultural production already resulted in the  
43 abandonment of fields on steep slopes. Abandonment can follow different patterns in response to  
44 policy drivers. For example, the various degrees of farmland abandonment characterized by DLG and  
45 EC-LNV (2005), Pointereau (2008) and Keenleyside and Tucker (2010), -“semi-abandonment”  
46 “partial abandonment” or “cessation of productive farming”- describe situations, in which the land is  
47 not formally abandoned and is subject to some form of management. One such form of management  
48 that stands out is minimum maintenance of the orchards necessary to meet Cross-Compliance  
49 requirements (i.e.: certain environmental conditions that must be met), so that the single farm payment  
50 and other Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments can be claimed. This intermediate level of  
51 abandonment, however, can be seen as one step towards complete abandonment driven by factors such  
52 as ageing population and associated lack of successors, and competition with producers in more  
53 favourable locations.

54 Traditional olive orchards on sloping terrain in the Mediterranean basin constitute a  
55 regionally important agricultural system that is particularly at risk of abandonment, because it is rarely  
56 economically sustainable (Duarte *et al.*, 2008). The OLIVERO project investigated the environmental  
57 and socio-economic sustainability of Sloping and Mountainous Olive Production Systems (SMOPS) to  
58 assess, whether there is a future for olive production on sloping land, and identified actions that  
59 farmers and policy-makers could take (Fleskens and De Graaff, 2008). SMOPS generally encompass  
60 disadvantaged or marginal types of olive grove, in contrast to groves on flat terrain that usually are of  
61 greater productivity and economic viability (Beaufoy, 2008). Olive groves on sloping land tend to

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<sup>1</sup> The ambiguity of this affirmation is due to the lack of consistent measurement across the EU to ascertain the current extent of abandonment (Pointereau *et al.*, 2008).

62 have relatively low productivity, lack successors to ensure continued cultivation, suffer from soil  
63 erosion and wildfire risk and have limitations in access to markets (De Graaff *et al.*, 2008). These  
64 characteristics are important determinants of abandonment, which, according to De Graaff *et al.*  
65 (2008), may affect almost 15 % of SMOPS in the medium term. However, heterogeneity also exists  
66 between SMOPS, which comprise traditional orchards, semi-intensive orchards, intensive orchards  
67 and/or organic systems (De Graaff *et al.*, 2008). This heterogeneity implies that the different types of  
68 SMOPS face different pathways for future development. For example, some SMOPS may likely be  
69 subject to abandonment, while others may be further intensified or may give way to other production  
70 systems such as organic farming (Stroosnijder *et al.*, 2008). Therefore, appropriate management  
71 strategies to prevent increasing abandonment need to consider both SMOPS' distinctive features and  
72 heterogeneity.

73           The Southern Spanish Region of Andalusia is a typical example of an area in which olive  
74 cultivation plays a major role in agricultural production, and where SMOPS are a characteristic part of  
75 the land use mosaic shaping territorial identity. Olive production is the main source of agrarian  
76 employment and constitutes the main economic activity of more than 300 municipalities (i.e. in the 39  
77 % of the region's municipalities). In this research we focus on traditional, non-mechanised and rainfed  
78 SMOPS, which constitute the most vulnerable category among SMOPS in terms of abandonment risk.  
79 Andalusian traditional olive orchards occupy two thirds of the Region's olive area (Cubero and Penco,  
80 2012), and 24 % of the orchards are located on mountainous land (with slope greater than 20 %). In  
81 addition to the economic and social role, traditional SMOPS in Andalusia also have a significant  
82 environmental dimension by overlapping considerably with Nature 2000 and High Nature Value  
83 Farmland (HNVF) (CAP, 2003).

84           According to Arriaza *et al.* (2002), in the South of Spain land abandonment is expected to  
85 affect more than one third of SMOPS in the next decades. Duarte *et al.* (2008) affirmed that the  
86 abandonment of traditional SMOPS would have negative environmental consequences such as a  
87 decrease in biodiversity, increase in soil erosion and major changes to the traditional Mediterranean  
88 landscape. It would also increase the fire risk associated with abandoned land (Moravek and  
89 Zemechis, 2007). In social terms, De Graaff and Eppink (1999) highlighted the historical role of olive  
90 trees in the development of rural communities in the Mediterranean's poor rainfed areas.

91           Previous research has specifically proved the existence of social demand for ecosystem  
92 services provided by SMOPS. For example, Arriaza *et al.* (2008) found that social demand for non-  
93 commodity outputs from mountain olive groves in Andalusia exists, and discussed the implications  
94 that its consideration could have in the design of future agricultural policies. Colombo *et al.* (2005)  
95 identified a considerable social demand to alleviate the negative off-site effects of soil erosion on  
96 pollution of water resources and conservation of biodiversity obtained by appropriate management of  
97 SMOPS. The authors also found that Andalusian citizens not only cared about the environmental

98 dimension of soil erosion (surface and ground water quality, landscape desertification and flora and  
99 fauna), but also for the viability of rural communities, specifically in terms of rural employment.  
100 Finally, Kallas *et al.* (2007) observed that mountainous olive groves help to keep rural areas  
101 populated, and contribute to erosion prevention and the amenity value of landscapes.

102 Agri-environmental schemes are presumably nowadays a suitable policy instrument to  
103 tackle the problem of sustainability of SMOPS and, at the same time, to respond to the social demand  
104 for the ecosystem services provided by this system. However, previous policy responses have been  
105 proven to be inadequate to ensure sustainable SMOPS (Beaufoy, 2008). In this context, the lack of  
106 geographical targeting, which leads to the dispersion of contracts over large areas, emerges as an  
107 important feature (Hanley *et al.*, 1999; ECA, 2011; Kuhfuss *et al.*, 2013). This is because the  
108 environmental state does not improve significantly as long as the global environmental effort has not  
109 reached a minimum level of intensity, or has not been applied on a sufficient area in the zone of  
110 interest (Dupraz *et al.*, 2009). Clearly, a jeopardised application of agri-environmental measures  
111 represents an impediment to the achievement of a minimum level of intensity in a specific area.  
112 Additionally, present agri-environmental schemes are often overly complex and include a very large  
113 number of objectives, complicating the measurement and corroboration of results (ECA, 2011).

114 The evidence of a current trend of SMOPS abandonment, together with the social demand  
115 for the services supplied by them and the low efficiency of the current agri-environmental schemes,  
116 motivate the development of novel institutional arrangements to tackle SMOPS abandonment and its  
117 associated negative impacts. This paper focuses on Territorial Management Contracts (TMC) in Rural  
118 Areas as a policy instrument, which has been previously coined in the Andalusian Act 5/2011  
119 governing olive growing, but not yet operationalised in SMOPS. TMC are contracts between a group  
120 of farmers and the public administration, which require farmers to meet a number of commitments to  
121 improve both production-related conditions and ecological, cultural and socio-economic aspects of  
122 their farms. To the best of our knowledge, the use of collective arrangements in SMOPS has not  
123 previously been investigated in the literature, despite being an important topic in discussions regarding  
124 the CAP post 2013. Indeed, issues such as cooperation or the creation of producers' associations are  
125 considered throughout the design of regional RDPs and are endowed with higher co-financing rates  
126 (European Commission, 2011). Furthermore, in the new CAP policy framework, measures requiring  
127 cooperation have been significantly reinforced and extended to support a wide range of types of  
128 cooperation. This includes joint contracts as an additional element of the agri-environmental measures  
129 that explicitly also cover pilot projects (European Commission, 2013).

130 The first of objective of this paper is therefore to develop a conceptual framework for TMC  
131 associated with a switch to organic farming in the context of SMOPS<sup>2</sup>, as an effective tool to increase  
132 the profitability of farming and, as a consequence, reduce the risk of abandonment. We then use data  
133 from a survey of olive farmers in Andalusian SMOPS areas to achieve our second objective: to  
134 identify likely facilitating factors and barriers to the adoption and proliferation of TMC associated  
135 with organic farming. Given the voluntary nature of TMC, participation of farmers is central to  
136 achieve policy objectives (Ruto and Garrod, 2009); therefore, a better understanding of farmers' views  
137 and preferences regarding TMC and its implementation in SMOPS is important to support its  
138 successful and effective implementation. Finally, we would like to emphasize that the focus of this  
139 paper is not to determine ways to achieve best practice in environmental management of SMOPS,  
140 which obviously depends on a wide range of specific on-farm conditions. Rather, the paper aims to  
141 shape TMC as a policy instrument that addresses the social, economic and environmental issues that  
142 threaten the sustainability of SMOPS.

143 The paper is structured as follows; in the next section, the main characteristics of TMC are  
144 described and it is outlined why they can be an effective tool to increase the profitability of SMOPS,  
145 particularly if implemented in association with organic farming. Section 3 introduces the case study  
146 and the questionnaire used to collect information on farmers and their views regarding TMC as  
147 proposed. Results are then discussed along with their policy implications in Section 4. Finally, Section  
148 5 presents the main conclusions of the study.

## 149 **2 Territorial Management Contracts in Rural Areas associated to organic farming: a new** 150 **tool for the SMOPS' management**

### 151 **2.1 The structure of TMC**

152 The first attempt to implement a TMC type arrangement was implemented in France, by means of the  
153 “*contrats d'aménagement du territoire*” (CTE)<sup>3</sup>. CTE were proposed as development tools in a  
154 territorial strategy of agri-rural development (Velasco and Moyano, 2007). The results achieved by  
155 these contracts with farmers were mixed. The great number of large farms which enrolled in CTE and  
156 the resulting increase in associated financial requirements hampered the accomplishment of the initial  
157 CTE's objectives, consolidating the interests of the existing production systems and models rather than  
158 promoting territorial development dynamics (Chia and Dulcire 2008; Viladomiu *et al.*, 2007). Dulcire

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<sup>2</sup> It should be clarified that the implementation of TMC does not have to be necessarily restrained to organic olive farming in SMOPS. Indeed, collective approaches have been suggested in the last reform of the CAP irrespective of the crop or the area considered as a tool to enhance a better performance of agri-environmental measures. However, in the current research we have confined its application to organic SMOPS because of several inherent characteristics of this system such as its high risk of abandonment, its cost structure and the relevance to small-scale farming.

<sup>3</sup> This concept was introduced in the French Act of July the 9<sup>th</sup> 1999, governing Agricultural Orientation.

159 *et al.* (2006) stated that CTE have rarely served to promote the participation of farmers in the  
160 sustainable and integrated management of the territory or to initiate new projects. Additionally, the  
161 long list of management actions that could be included in the CTE led to patchy outcomes that were  
162 barely visible at a territorial level. However, Arroyo (2008) affirms that, despite the lack of a  
163 successful implementation of CTE in France<sup>4</sup>, the institutional framework and its legal basis could  
164 easily be transferred to other countries to integrate the concept of multifunctionality into farm  
165 management. This is what we believe applies to SMOPS.

166 The concept of TMC for SMOPS proposed here differs substantially from the CTE originally  
167 implemented in France and avoids their main barriers to success. Main differences are the collective  
168 character of the contracts, and the intrinsically small area of the farms in SMOPS. Collective  
169 approaches to agri-environmental schemes have also been implemented in the United Kingdom, the  
170 Netherlands or Finland. In the Netherlands, collective approaches have been successfully implemented  
171 over the past 15 years by agrarian nature associations, demonstrating that the delivery of agri-  
172 environmental measures by farmers' associations can be more effective than by individual farmers  
173 (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, 2011). One of the key factors to  
174 achieve this success has been to ground the associations on a coherent and integrated local programme  
175 defined by local farmers themselves (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and  
176 Innovation, 2011). In the UK context, Davies *et al.* (2004) report various small scale projects for  
177 collective action in Scotland, which have demonstrated a potential for achieving environmental gains  
178 and improving the linkages among farmers and between farmers and other stakeholders. However,  
179 according to the authors, significant changes are needed in both farmers' attitudes and the incentive  
180 structures offered to them to achieve a successful implementation of collective action at a larger scale.

181 From a more general perspective, difficulties of finding support and advice, the eligibility of  
182 costs, the ownership of the land, the lack of trust in associative entities, the considerable administrative  
183 burden and the lack of clear environmental focus were found to be obstacles to TMC implementation  
184 (European Network for Rural Development, 2011). These aspects should, therefore, be taken into  
185 account in the design stage. Despite the existence of potential issues outlined below, the collective  
186 character of TMC supports territorial development objectives, avoids problems of dispersed uptake,  
187 and facilitates the monitoring and verification of outcomes. Likewise, focusing the implementation of  
188 TMC on small farms will avoid allocating a considerable budget to only a small set of beneficiaries,  
189 therefore contributing to distributional equity and enhancing the social legitimacy of the measure  
190 (Rocamora-Montiel *et al.*, 2014).

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<sup>4</sup> This author asserts that the implementation was determined by many external controversies, which reduced their efficiency.

191 In TMC, a group of farmers agree to meet a number of commitments, which are described in  
192 an action plan and serve as a benchmark for verification of expected outcomes by the contracting  
193 parties (administration and the group of farmers). The action plan will also serve as a means to cope  
194 with the inherent heterogeneity of SMOPS, since it will enable the alignment of the general TMC  
195 requirements and goals to the specific characteristics of the area of implementation. Figure 1 illustrates  
196 the basic structure of TMC.

197 *Source: Own elaboration*

198 **FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**

199 **Figure 1: Diagram of the TMC's structure**

200 Two aspects are crucial and distinctive characteristics of TMC for SMOPS: the collective  
201 character of the contracts, and the consideration of spatial connectivity. SMOPS are typically farmed  
202 on a small plot scale. For example, the average olive farm size in Andalusia is less than 5 hectares  
203 (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011). As such, individual micro-management of SMOPS creates a  
204 mixture of agricultural patches with different characteristics and environmental outcomes, where  
205 positive synergies arise only accidentally. Goldman *et al.* (2007) affirm that the potential of  
206 agricultural landscapes to provide ecosystem services often depends on the joint management<sup>5</sup> of  
207 farms. Collective and spatially connected management improves habitat connectivity through the  
208 creation of boundary features, which increase habitat edge effects, thus being beneficial for  
209 biodiversity, an issue of particular importance to high value environmental areas (Franks and  
210 McGloin, 2007).

211 Along the same line, the European Commission (2011) asserts that the synergies resulting  
212 from commitments undertaken jointly by a group of farmers multiply the environmental and climate  
213 benefits of agri-environmental payments. Collective approaches to agri-environmental contracts are  
214 considered to yield greater environmental benefits than separate actions of individual farmers. At the  
215 same time, collective management can improve cost-effectiveness and efficiency through targeted  
216 investments (European Network for Rural Development, 2011). From an economic perspective,  
217 collective management of small farms creates economies of scale, reducing production costs (Ruz,  
218 2012). Likewise, it favours the centralization of supply, which facilitates commercialization and  
219 reduces the cost of distribution of the products (PAAE, 2007). In the case of olive orchards, Ruz  
220 (2012) suggests that collective management of about 50 perfectly connected hectares can achieve  
221 significant economic gains. Of course, the achievement of an 'optimal' degree of spatial connectivity  
222 may not be feasible in practice. However, suboptimal connections of SMOPS can still provide a

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<sup>5</sup> *Joint management* and other terms such as *collective management* do refer to the same concept that aims to be achieved by TMC.



223 considerable improvement over the *status quo* with respect to the economic and environmental  
224 outcomes, and can be feasible to be achieved. For example, Colombo and Camacho-Castillo (2014)  
225 identified several areas in the study region where it would be possible to implement TMC involving 50  
226 hectares of SMOPS out of 100 hectares of land.

227 According to Ciani *et al.* (2012), TMC give greater functionality to the role of the  
228 agricultural sector, improve liquidity of farm businesses and stimulate the use and dissemination of  
229 information and communication technologies for monitoring and control activities. From a social  
230 perspective, Ruz (2012) points out that TMC are an important instrument to tackle the problem of  
231 generational renewal, which is a common issue in a considerable proportion of SMOPS. In this case,  
232 the farmers' association created *ad hoc* for the implementation of the contracts could assume the  
233 management of those farms with owners who are not willing to continue with their farming activity.  
234 Finally, the European Commission (2011) predicts that support for small operators to organise joint  
235 work processes and share facilities and resources should help them to become economically viable,  
236 despite their small scale.

237 A third characteristic of the proposed TMC in SMOPS is the conversion to organic farming.  
238 That is, the collective and spatially connected SMOPS formed under a TMC should be organically  
239 farmed<sup>6</sup>. The transformation to organic farming represents an opportunity to strengthen the  
240 sustainability of traditional mountainous olive production systems (De Graaff *et al.*, 2008), because of  
241 the higher financial profitability of organic olive oil compared to conventionally produced oil, the  
242 enhanced supply of ecosystem services and the similar production costs<sup>7</sup>. The benefits of organic  
243 farming in traditional mountainous olive production systems have been previously analysed by several  
244 authors. Rocamora-Montiel *et al.* (2013) found that organic farming in Andalusian traditional SMOPS  
245 delivers a wider set of environmental and social goods and services than conventional farming, on top  
246 of the implementation of Cross Compliance in CAP, which has led to an overall decrease in the  
247 negative environmental impact of conventional farming. De Graaff *et al.* (2008) observed that even  
248 after considering the reduced productivity and the higher risk of pests and diseases, organic farming  
249 offers opportunities to SMOPS due to the higher price of the products, the development of eco-tourism

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<sup>6</sup> It is important to recognize that this requirement is not compulsory. In this paper we consider the conversion to organic farming, because on average the conversion to organic farming of SMOPS is expected to bring positive environmental, social and economic effects. However, TMC can be implemented in integrated and conventional agriculture where, under some specific conditions, they may even deliver larger benefits relative to the ones obtained through organic farming.

<sup>7</sup> The gap between the production costs of organic and traditional olive orchards narrowed considerably in the past decade due to the improvement of organic management of the orchards, the availability of more efficient inputs and the implementation of Cross Compliance. For example, De Graaff *et al.* (2011) observed that the latter increased the average cost of SMOPS' farming with between 1 % and 10 % (10% applying for traditional SMOPS and 1 % for the most intensive ones). Guzmán *et al.* (2010) found that on average the production costs of organic olive orchards are 1.4 % higher than in conventional systems, with an interval which goes from - 23 % to + 19 % .

250 activities and the availability of specific subsidies. Sanz and García (2013) affirm that the  
251 implementation of organic management in traditional SMOPS balances out the disadvantages that this  
252 system suffers in terms of productivity and costs. Moreover, according to the same authors, organic  
253 production in SMOPS generates a significantly higher profitability compared to conventional  
254 management due to the higher market prices for organic oil both in retail and wholesale markets.  
255 However, despite the above mentioned advantages, organic farming has been adopted on a relatively  
256 low share of the Andalusian olive growing area. According to Colombo and Sayadi (2010), this can be  
257 attributed to difficulties faced by producers to process organic products (e.g., the absence of organic  
258 oil mills); the lack of distribution channels and access to markets; and the insufficient information and  
259 knowledge regarding the management of organic production. Therefore, organic farming in traditional  
260 SMOPS is still controversial. According to the findings of Gómez *et al.* (2008), there is a large degree  
261 of heterogeneity in the outcomes of organic farming, which depend on a set of local environmental  
262 and structural conditions. However, the adoption of organic farming should be interpreted only as one  
263 basis for the implementation of TMC. The improved environmental performance of SMOPS fostered  
264 by TMC should go beyond organic farming commitments. For example, as pointed out by Gomez *et*  
265 *al.* (2008), financial support in SMOPS could be linked to specific additional soil and water  
266 conservation measures that go beyond organic management and that can be important to attain the  
267 environmental sustainability of these systems.

## 268 2.2 TMC and the agricultural policy

269 From a policy makers' perspective, it is essential to understand how TMC associated with organic  
270 farming can be embedded in the agricultural policy framework. Agri-environmental payments are  
271 typically used to encourage uptake of farming practices that enhance the environmental performance  
272 of farms. TMC associated with organic farming may qualify as an additional agri-environmental  
273 measure. In the forthcoming policy framework, collective agri-environmental schemes are likely to be  
274 adopted, providing the institutional basis for such implementation. However, given the large degree of  
275 heterogeneity of areas including SMOPS in terms of environmental and social conditions, the positive  
276 externalities generated by TMC are not expected to be generated homogeneously throughout the  
277 regions. Therefore, the expected outcomes and payments of TMC should be defined on the basis of the  
278 specific characteristics of the area they refer to (Ciani *et al.* 2012).

279 Such an approach would likely lead to an increase in transaction and verification costs for  
280 both private and public bodies. However, tailoring agri-environmental payments to local conditions  
281 (as, for example, in the case of TMC) may contribute to improving the effectiveness of the instruments  
282 in achieving environmental outcomes. This is supported by the mixed success of agri-environmental  
283 measures in achieving environmental conservation objectives (Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003; Kleijn *et*  
284 *al.*, 2006; Batary *et al.*, 2011). Additionally, recent research suggests that it may be worth bearing the  
285 additional costs avoided by policy simplification. Armsworth *et al.* (2012) find that it is likely to be

286 worth to pursue a more complicated policy that involves spatial targeting, even if the additional  
287 implementation costs of doing so would constitute a substantial proportion of the overall budget.  
288 Similarly Pannell *et al.* (2013) find that the additional transaction costs borne by the public  
289 administration in the process of applying more complex incentive designs would be easily outweighed  
290 by the additional environmental benefits generated.

291 Further, the spatial connectivity of SMOPS under TMC emerges as an important  
292 opportunity to reduce the costs associated with the verification of environmental outcomes. The public  
293 body no longer needs to inspect each single parcel, but can optimise the process of verification of  
294 outcomes on a larger scale. Therefore, a general increase in program efficiency is expected for the  
295 collective and spatially connected management of SMOPS: farmers receive payments that are  
296 proportional to outcomes provided, which differ between SMOPS areas, while the number of eligible  
297 projects is lower and the costs of monitoring and verification of the expected results are reduced  
298 through collective management.

299 Currently, all SMOPS receive some kind of public support in terms of single farm payment,  
300 or through rural development measures such as ‘Less Favoured Areas’ (LFA), or agri-environmental  
301 payments. Due to the collective structure of TMC, all of these support mechanisms may be joined into  
302 an overall support to the contracting farmers’ association. Private landowners would face a trade-off  
303 between the extra costs incurred by being a member of the association (mainly transaction costs) and  
304 the benefits gained due to utilising economies of scale. In this context, the new CAP policy framework  
305 allows member states to pay a surplus of 30 % to support agri-environmental schemes that are  
306 collectively managed to compensate for the additional transaction costs.

### 307 **3 Farmers’ views on TMC**

#### 308 **3.1 Survey design and study area**

309 To gather information on farmers’ attitudes towards the proposed TMC and organic farming, a sample  
310 of farmers<sup>8</sup> was interviewed between September 2011 and March 2012 in face-to-face interviews  
311 using a structured questionnaire. Two slightly different versions of questionnaires<sup>9</sup> were administered  
312 to organic and to conventional farmers. Both versions had four parts. In the first part, information  
313 about farmers’ characteristics was gathered. The second part aimed at collecting information about the  
314 current management of the farms by inquiring farmers on aspects related to the farm’s profitability,  
315 their views on the future of SMOPS, the importance of external advisers, and about the importance of  
316 several key factors in guiding farming decisions, including environmental concerns. In the third part

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<sup>8</sup> The interviewees were selected considering whether they had the authority to take decisions concerning the management of the farms, regardless of whether they were full-time farmers or not.

<sup>9</sup> Translated versions of both questionnaires are available as supplementary material

317 farmers were firstly informed and then asked about their position towards a proposed TMC. An  
318 information package was used to describe the structure and functioning of TMC associated with  
319 organic management of SMOPS to farmers. They were informed that the hypothetical TMC required  
320 each of the members of the newly *ad hoc* formed association for collective management to follow the  
321 rules established by its steering panel. It was clearly explained that the association involved in the  
322 TMC has to create a management plan that details all the proposed actions that maintain or improve  
323 the productive, economic, social, environmental and cultural assets of the enrolled areas. Depending  
324 on the achieved outcomes related to these actions, the public administration would offer a certain  
325 payment. Several examples were provided to farmers to explain which actions may be covered, and  
326 how payments are tied to outcomes. We also summarised the advantages and drawbacks of a  
327 collective management of the olive orchards. Farmers were subsequently asked about their willingness  
328 to take part in a hypothetical TMC. If the response was positive, they were asked to rate a set of  
329 characteristics, which described the TMC's functioning. This information is useful for identifying  
330 features that could increase the likelihood of farmers' enrolment. Those farmers who agreed on taking  
331 part in the hypothetical TMC were further inquired about their willingness to pay for its establishment.  
332 Those who rejected the idea of participating were asked about their reasons and were subsequently  
333 asked to state their willingness to accept compensation to take part in the TMC. The questionnaire  
334 ends by asking respondents about their socio-demographic characteristics.

335           The survey was conducted in the municipalities Constantina and Cazalla de la Sierra, both  
336 belonging to the Province of Seville (Andalusia, Spain), as shown in Figure 2. Both municipalities are  
337 located in the North of the Province of Seville and belong to the "Sierra Norte" district. The selection  
338 of these municipalities is based on the findings of Colombo and Camacho-Castillo (2011), who  
339 applied a set of territorial and environmental indexes to determine the suitability of all municipalities  
340 of Andalusia to implement TMC in SMOPS. Based on this analysis, they conclude that these  
341 municipalities exhibit favourable conditions for an efficient implementation of TMC. The agricultural  
342 sector is the main economic sector in terms of employment in Constantina (61 % of employment). In  
343 addition, it represents the main activity for 47 % of the enterprises in the municipality. In Cazalla, 40  
344 % of employment and 32 % of the enterprises are directly related to the agricultural sector (Caja  
345 España-Caja Duero, 2011).

346           The "Sierra Norte" district is an example of a typical mixture of Mediterranean mountainous  
347 and agricultural areas, where olive orchards coexist with forestry, pasture, holm and cork oaks. In the  
348 chosen municipalities, almost all of the SMOPS lie in Natura 2000 designated areas, underscoring the  
349 importance of organic management. The population of the area has been decreasing since the middle  
350 of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Currently, this trend appears to have stabilised. The average yearly change in the  
351 population rate in Constantina and Cazalla has been -0.55 % between 2003 and 2010 (Caja España-  
352 Caja Duero, 2011). The farmers' population is aging. 70 % of farmers in Cazalla and 64 % in

353 Constantina are older than 55 years. This may constitute a threat to the future of SMOPS, especially if  
354 the generational renewal of the farmers is limited.

355 *Source: Own elaboration*

356 **FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**

357 Figure 2: Situation of the studied area

## 358 **3.2 Sample features**

359 Farmers to be interviewed were selected from the list of farmers who belong to the main commercial  
360 local cooperatives, which comprise most of the olive production of the area. In the sampling procedure  
361 we considered representativeness in terms of gender and age. It was not possible to consider  
362 representativeness with respect to other socioeconomic aspects (such educational level), because the  
363 agrarian population data are not disaggregated for other variables at municipal level. The final sample  
364 includes 187 farmers, amongst which 100 use conventional and 87 organic production systems. The  
365 main socio-demographic characteristics are described in Table 1. The majority has a low education  
366 level and has been working as a farmer for the last 30 years. The mean age is almost 60 years,  
367 reflecting the ageing of the farming population in the area. The sample is representative of the  
368 population of farmers in terms of the age ( $\chi^2_4=4.7$ ,  $P = 0.31$ ), but differs in terms of gender ( $\chi^2_1= 13.1$ ,  
369  $P=0.00$ ) with a higher proportion of male farmers in the sample.

370 **TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE**

371 Table 1: Sample features

## 372 **3.3 Survey results**

### 373 **3.3.1 Opinions about the farm's management**

374 An important element associated with effective collective management of SMOPS is the sharing of  
375 knowledge and information between farmers, and the consultation of agricultural extension services.  
376 Parra-López *et al.* (2007) observed that the transmission of knowledge amongst organic farmers in  
377 SMOPS is an effective tool for the diffusion and adoption of organic farming, where often the  
378 producers need advice on their management from either the government's agricultural service or, if  
379 unavailable, from other (organic) farmers. The questionnaire inquired farmers about the frequency of  
380 contacting their neighbours or the technicians of the agricultural extension service to resolve problems  
381 related to farming (questions 2.7 and 2.8). Results indicate that farmers barely take advice from the  
382 agricultural extension service and even less so from other farmers. Only 17.6 % of the interviewees  
383 make use of the extension service at least twice a year, while 63 % of the sample stated to have never  
384 contacted a neighbour to solve doubts regarding farming-related issues. To scrutinize whether the



416 farmers state the small surface of their farms as one of the main impediments for the transformation to  
417 organic. This is particularly interesting in the case of collective management, because this constraint  
418 would not apply anymore. Finally, the remaining 5 % stated that they were farming organically in the  
419 past, but had abandoned it.

### 420 **3.3.2 Profitability and future of the exploitations**

421 The sampled farmers' views regarding profitability, production costs and perceived risk of organic  
422 olive cultivation in SMOPS are reported in Table 3 for organic and conventional farmers (questions  
423 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16 and 2.18).

424 **TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE**

425 Table 3: Organic vs. conventional farmers' views concerning the economic profitability of organic farming.

426 Overall, a majority of both organic and conventional farmers agreed that organic farming is  
427 the most profitable system in this area. Both groups asserted that this is due to the agri-environmental  
428 subsidies paid to organic farms and the higher market price of organic olive oil relative to  
429 conventionally produced oil. However, at the same time, more organic farmers than conventional ones  
430 (21.8 % vs. 9.0 %) declared that the organic system is less profitable than the conventional one,  
431 indicating that there is a large heterogeneity in the farmers' expectation about the profitability of  
432 organic farming. Almost a fifth of the conventional farmers were unable to state an opinion about the  
433 relative profitability, production costs and risks associated with organic farming. The majority of  
434 farmers agreed that both systems have similar production costs, which likely reflects the fact that costs  
435 are mainly determined by the inherent characteristics of SMOPS rather than by the production system  
436 itself. This is also confirmed by Guzmán *et al.* (2010) and Rocamora-Montiel *et al.* (2013), who report  
437 similar production costs for the two production systems. Finally, both groups concurred with each  
438 other that production risks do not differ much between conventional and organic farming. The most  
439 noteworthy observation, despite the observed heterogeneity, is that conventional farmers tend to  
440 consider organic farming in SMOPS the more profitable production system, a fact that should  
441 facilitate the conversion of their farms to organic production within the TMC.

### 442 **3.3.3 Attitudes and preferences toward TMC**

443 After introducing the TMC concept, farmers were asked about their willingness to take part in a  
444 producers' association linked to TMC implementation (question 3.1). 18 % of farmers were willing to  
445 take part in the association unconditionally, whilst 77 % declared to be interested in participating  
446 depending on the commitments required. The rest of the sample (5 %) was not interested to  
447 participate. We found a large correlation between the general willingness to take part in a TMC and  
448 farmers' income. All the farmers whose income relies principally or entirely on agriculture declared to

449 be interested in participating<sup>11</sup>. On the contrary, the 5 % of the sample not willing to participate are  
450 farmers for whom agriculture only represents a marginal share of their total income.

451 Table 4 summarises the farmers' views regarding a set of defining characteristics of the  
452 TMC (questions 3.2.a and 3.2.b). The feature rated highest by both organic and conventional farmers  
453 is the possibility of leaving the association without being penalised, which clearly indicates a need for  
454 a "flexible" design of TMC. Of course, it would not be practical to implement TMC at a large scale, if  
455 participants can leave the agreement without any penalty. However, to include a penalty for leaving  
456 the TMC would drastically reduce the willingness of farmers to participate. As such, the  
457 implementation of the instrument should be tested in the field at local scale first to identify the  
458 minimum requirements to guarantee the functioning of the TMC. Such field tests could be set-up  
459 experimentally, i.e. by varying the contracting requirements, to assess the implications for  
460 participation and performance of the TMC. The second most important characteristic was the  
461 bureaucracy and paperwork to be administered by the association involved in the TMC. This  
462 illustrates the difficulties faced by farmers to cope with the increasing administrative burden  
463 associated with farming, and advocates for a design of a TMC which eases this burden to farmers as  
464 much as possible.

465 The presence of a technician is also rated highly. Here, a statistical difference<sup>12</sup> is observed  
466 between organic and conventional farmers ( $t=2.43$ ,  $p=0.016$ ), revealing that organic farmers consider  
467 the presence of an external adviser more important. This may be expected given that organic  
468 management is a relatively "new" concept, where erroneous management decisions can have serious  
469 implications on the profitability of the farm. The commercialization of the olives or the olive oil  
470 follows in the order of importance. Organic and conventional farmers differ statistically significantly  
471 in their response to all questions regarding the role of the association in the harvest and the  
472 commercialization of the olive oil (characteristics 4, 6 and 7 in Table 4); organic farmers assign  
473 greater importance to the fact that the association supports the harvest of olives and, subsequently, acts  
474 as seller of the organic olive oil, preferably using its own brand. This reflects the concerns of organic  
475 farmers to not be able to trade all the oil as organic and, as such, to not benefit from the added value  
476 associated with organic oil. Conventional farmers assign less importance to this aspect of the  
477 association, whilst they place greater importance on the freedom of managing the farm in a self-  
478 determined way. Statistical tests reveal that, compared to conventional farmers, organic farmers show  
479 a greater willingness to forgo the freedom of managing the farm in a self-determined way, and as a  
480 consequence, to follow the association's directives. Both groups consider it very important to have a

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<sup>11</sup> On average, producers whose incomes rely entirely or principally on agriculture hold larger SMOPS areas compared to the rest of producers, for whom agriculture is not their main economic activity. Therefore, their willingness to participate in the association would ease the achievement of the minimum area required to obtain the expected benefits from collective management.

<sup>12</sup> t-tests were used in the analysis.



481 certain degree of flexibility in the management of the orchards regarding the working dates imposed  
482 by the association. Concretely, a time window of two weeks was indicated as suitable for initiating the  
483 soil preparation, applying weeding and entering the harvesting stage.

#### 484 TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

485 Table 4: TMC's characteristics valued by respondents.

486 Those farmers who accepted to take part in the TMC either unconditionally or conditionally  
487 were subsequently inquired about their willingness to transfer the entire management of their SMOPS  
488 to the association (question 3.5). A transfer of management responsibilities to the association can help  
489 to address the problem of ageing farmers and the lack of generational renewal. Ruz (2012) points out  
490 that the association can constitute a "professional farmer" and thus optimise the collective  
491 management of the orchards. It was explained that farmers who subscribe to a complete transfer of  
492 management to the association will in return receive either a previously determined payment, or a  
493 payment that depends on the financial profit made by the association.

494 The majority of farmers refused the proposal of an integral management of orchards by the  
495 association. However, 19 % stated that the possibility of transferring management responsibilities to  
496 the association is a good idea. Of these farmers, 61 % declared that they required a minimum payment  
497 of 550 €/per hectare to transfer management of their orchards to the association<sup>13</sup>, whilst the remaining  
498 farmers were willing to accept a payment proportional to the financial results of the association.

499 Finally, those farmers who accepted to participate in the TMC were asked about the sum of  
500 money they are prepared to pay to have the association created (questions 3.6 and 3.7). 32 % of  
501 respondents were willing to pay an average sum of 22.6 €/ha (std. deviation= 2.0). The remaining 68  
502 % reported that they cannot afford a payment, although they are generally interested in participating.  
503 Those farmers who were not willing to join to the association were asked about their willingness to  
504 accept compensation in return for enrolling their farms into the association (question 3.8). Paying a  
505 compensation for participation may be justified, because a "minimum" level of spatial connectivity is  
506 required to maximise the environmental benefits resulting from the association. Amongst the group of  
507 farmers not interested in joining the association, 75 % rejected to be paid for including their farms in  
508 it. The average compensation demanded by the remaining 25 % is 341 €/per hectare.

## 509 **4 Discussion and policy implications**

510 The new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) emerges as a decisive benchmark for the analysis of the  
511 results of this study, since the definitive agreement post 2013 is going to significantly influence both

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<sup>13</sup> In the studied area, farmers are currently receiving an average of 250 €/ha through the Single Farm Payment Scheme. The agri-environmental subsidy for organic farms sums up to 370 €/ha.

512 the future of SMOPS and the evolution of TMC. Therefore, it is useful to link the results of this study  
513 to key issues of the new CAP, which is going to affect the public financial support for SMOPS. This  
514 joint analysis will shed light on suitable ways to define promising instruments that can be used to  
515 enhance the sustainability of SMOPS.

516 The European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council have reached a  
517 political agreement concerning the definitive CAP post 2013. However several points are left to be set  
518 at national level and are still pending agreement. In the Commission's initial Legal Proposals  
519 published in October 2011, the main changes were clearly taking shape: the forthcoming policy was  
520 likely to contain a greener and more equitably distributed first pillar and a second pillar focusing more  
521 on competitiveness, climate change and the environment. In these proposals, various references were  
522 made to the importance of LFA and of HNMF, where SMOPS could be positioned. The definitive  
523 agreement has maintained these early proposals, but several changes and specifications have been  
524 introduced. In the first pillar, the definition of the Greening Payment, which will represent 30 % of the  
525 national envelope, will finally not affect permanent crops (Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y  
526 Alimentación, 2014). Also, the schemes regarding LFA and Small Farmers (both optional for Member  
527 States), emerge as key issues for SMOPS. In the second pillar, the possibility of designing thematic  
528 sub-programmes that could be awarded with higher rates of support was included for thematic areas  
529 such as small farms, mountain areas, climate change mitigation / adaptation or biodiversity.  
530 Collaboration between farmers is considered in several instruments, for example in the measure  
531 termed "co-operation", which offers possibilities to support technological, environmental and  
532 commercial cooperation; in the measure "producer groups / organisations offering support for setting  
533 up groups / organisations of small and medium-sized enterprises on the basis of a business plan"; or in  
534 the "agri-environment - climate payments", where joint contracts are likely to play an important role.  
535 The importance of organic farming is reinforced. It has been separated from the "agri-environment -  
536 climate payments" in order to achieve greater visibility (European Commission, 2013).

537 At national level, the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y  
538 Alimentación, 2013) has stressed that the conversion to organic farming in some mountainous areas  
539 will bring important benefits to the environment and aid in the maintenance of a viable population in  
540 these areas. The SMOPS sector published a manifesto in December 2012 (Olivar de Sierra, 2012),  
541 which highlights the importance of olive farming in mountainous areas and provides evidence that  
542 achieving a sound rural development in Andalusia is not possible without the recognition of SMOPS  
543 in development programmes. In the manifesto, specific support is demanded for TMC, greening  
544 measures and for a specific scheme for HNMF. The sector also demands the inclusion of a special  
545 programme for SMOPS in the Rural Development Policy that would sit alongside Natura 2000 areas,  
546 organic farming and the HNMF. They also called for the establishment of new criteria for a fairer

547 budget distribution, with additional payments made based on the environmental and social services  
548 provided.

549 From a social perspective, it was expected that the CAP post 2013 would have moved from  
550 an action-oriented policy to a target-oriented scheme (Rutz and Schramek, 2013), recognising that  
551 actions do not always guarantee the desired results (Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003; Whittingham, 2007).  
552 Although the current reform has not performed a categorical shift toward this target-oriented approach,  
553 the inclusion of alternative instruments promoting cooperation, the spatial concentration of the farms  
554 and the collective management in search of a better performance of agri-environmental payments have  
555 to be considered as the beginning of a new path toward the paradigm change expected for the future  
556 CAP post 2020.

557 Within this policy context, TMC associated with the conversion to organic farming are well  
558 aligned with the main elements of the CAP reform and the observed needs at European, national and  
559 regional level. The proposed instrument is expected to improve the sustainability of SMOPS by  
560 increasing their economic, social and environmental performance. Under the CAP structure, the most  
561 likely way to put TMC into practise would be through the Region's RDPr, and especially through agri-  
562 environmental schemes and measures aimed at promoting cooperation. The RDPr's measures should  
563 provide the general framework, where the definitive instruments (action plan of the association and  
564 resulting TMC) have to be designed. For example, the RDPr's measures could define which actions  
565 are compulsory (e.g., adoption of organic farming, minimum area of joint management of X hectares,  
566 minimum number of members, etc.), and which are left to for the association to decide (e.g., which  
567 management or trading scheme to follow). Following this approach, the inherent characteristics of the  
568 territory where TMC are rolled out can be taken into account through the actions and measures that the  
569 association is free to decide upon. Indeed, according to Espinosa-Goded *et al.* (2010), a regional  
570 approach to the design of agri-environmental measures is appropriate both from the perspective of  
571 potential savings that can be achieved and based on cost-effectiveness. As such, it is possible that  
572 TMC lead to different final implementations in terms of management and organisation, depending on  
573 the characteristics of the areas where they are performed.

574 Importantly, and different to the current "action-oriented" agri-environmental schemes, the  
575 payments will be proportional to the benefits generated. As such, it is necessary that the parties  
576 involved in TMC (the public administration and the farmers' associations) agree on the *status quo*  
577 conditions and on the approach to verification of the results. These conditions can be met by involving  
578 currently active certification agencies for organic agriculture, which have the best knowledge and  
579 technology required for verifying the environmental impacts from agriculture. For example, for  
580 measures focused on the maintenance of the ecological value of SMOPS landscape, the payment could  
581 be based on the accumulation of bonus points for specific actions and outcomes carried out in the  
582 different farm habitats (Niederösterreichischer Oekopunkte Verein, 2011). The measurement of these

583 outcomes requires the development of effective indicators (Burton and Schwarz, 2013), that, among  
584 other requirements, have to necessarily be clearly attributable to specific management actions (Zabel  
585 and Roe, 2009). For example, for those measures aimed at improving biodiversity, the indicator list  
586 should contain a number of species groups (Roth *et al.*, 2008) that should be spatially comparable for  
587 any given agricultural unit (Matzdorf *et al.*, 2008) and represent the variety of habitats in the  
588 programme area (Wittig *et al.*, 2006; Haaren and Bathke, 2008). The public administrator could set up  
589 a stepwise payment system with tranches proportional to the achievement of the anticipated results.  
590 This payment should cover the costs borne by farmers to implement the required measures, including  
591 transaction costs, and include a surplus to incentivise the farmers' enrolment in TMC<sup>14</sup>. The final  
592 value should be proportional to the social demand for the provision of the environmental and social  
593 services generated by SMOPS. Future research may identify the maximum amount of payment that is  
594 socially legitimised by quantifying the citizens' maximum willingness to pay for the provision of these  
595 externalities by SMOPS.

596           The collective character of TMC reduces the costs associated with the monitoring and  
597 verification of outcomes. As pointed out by Schwarz *et al.* (2008), the lack of economies of scale is  
598 considered as a key aspect of the high administration and transaction costs of both the current action-  
599 based agri-environmental schemes and alternative result-based approaches. Under TMC, the public  
600 body no longer needs to inspect each single parcel, and optimises the process of verification of  
601 outcomes on a larger scale. By means of an adequate experimental design, it will be possible to outline  
602 a representative sampling that would allow reducing the number of farms needed to be inspected  
603 within a TMC.

604           The survey results point to aspects that are important for a successful design and  
605 implementation of TMC in the SMOPS. First, TMC must be set up in a way that allows dissatisfied  
606 farmers to abandon the contract without penalties, and in a way that reduces administration efforts.  
607 The positive influence of contract termination possibilities on farmers' willingness to enrol in a  
608 scheme is corroborated by several studies (Christensen *et al.*, 2011; Espinosa-Goded *et al.*, 2010;  
609 Broch and Vedel, 2012; Wilson and Hart, 2001). For example, Broch and Vedel (2012) found that the  
610 introduction of an option to cancel an agri-environmental contract within a limited period of time can  
611 greatly improve farmers' willingness to accept contracts at lower cost for society. In the specific case  
612 of TMC, this may be achieved by incorporating payments in tranches according to the achieved  
613 results. In case a farmer leaves the association before the end of the contract term, s/he will not be  
614 penalised, but s/he will not receive the full payment established in the contract. Farmers would also  
615 reject any new instrument that would increase the administrative burden. As such, TMC should be  
616 administered by a representative of the farmers' association, and farmers would directly interact with

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<sup>14</sup> It is worth to note that the forthcoming policy, in the context of collective agri-environmental measures, increased the share of the payments used to cover transaction costs from 20 % to 30 % of the total payments.

617 this representative and thus avoid any extra administrative work. The reduction of administrative  
618 burden, and hence farmers' transaction costs, has been observed crucial for the success of TMC in  
619 previous cases (European Network for Rural Development, 2011).

620           Second, TMC should incentivise the presence of an adviser, who serves as a reference for all  
621 members to address the farmers' potential lack of confidence in the organic and collective  
622 management of olive orchards. In this context, according the current Regulation on Rural  
623 Development, the association could benefit from the measure termed *Advisory services, farm*  
624 *management and farm relief services*. This measure seeks the improvement of the sustainable  
625 management and overall performance of the farms. Support can be claimed by individual farmers,  
626 groups and small and medium-sized enterprises, as long as it is focused on attaining clearly  
627 determined objectives, which include: climate change mitigation and adaptation, improvements of  
628 biodiversity, the protection of water, the development of short supply chains or organic farming. These  
629 objectives are clearly in line with those of the proposed TMC in SMOPS. Therefore, this measure  
630 seems quite appropriate to prevent that the costs associated with advisory services act as a barrier  
631 (European Network for Rural Development, 2011) for joining collective management approaches.

632           TMC promote the collective management of the harvest, transport and commercialization of  
633 the product. Harvests can be carried out by hiring a squad of professional workers. The subsidies  
634 included in the RDP<sub>r</sub> paid for cooperation can be used to buy machinery to be used by farmers  
635 enrolled in TMC. This may enhance the efficiency of the collectively managed farming operation.  
636 New financial instruments such as credits with low interest rates are also considered in the new  
637 European Strategic Framework; these credits could also be used for acquiring the necessary  
638 machinery, or to support the infrastructure required to improve the marketing of the oil as a high  
639 quality product.

640           The Thematic Working Group of the European Network for Rural Development (2011)  
641 analysed collective approaches to agri-environmental contracts. It identified that the existence of a  
642 legal entity, the existence of a clear action plan, the involvement of local authorities, the clear  
643 definition of control functions or the existence of an adequate advisory service are pre-conditions for  
644 the successful realisation of collective contracts. The relevance of all of these aspects is confirmed by  
645 this study. However, it should be underscored that our empirical findings have to be interpreted within  
646 their specific context before being generalised. In particular, we did not consider the application of  
647 TMC in alternative farming systems, for example in integrated production systems. Our results  
648 therefore apply only to SMOPS areas where organic farming is proved to be more beneficial relative  
649 to other systems, and the transfer of results to such systems should be made with caution.

650           Future research is needed to identify the most efficient way in cost-benefit terms to  
651 implement the instrument. Building upon the results of this study, and focusing on a pilot case, future

652 research should investigate the impacts of different ways of implementing TMC, and aim at  
653 determining the characteristics of the area of implementation that play a key role in the functioning of  
654 TMC. The effect of, for example, the allocation of association memberships (directly or via public  
655 auctions), the impact of different spatial structures of the land that belongs to an association, the  
656 importance of the area's physical (soil, climate, etc.) and social (ageing population, level of  
657 abandonment, etc.) characteristics, the effects of penalties, the effects of an integral management of  
658 the plots, or the resulting economies of scale could be subject of further analysis. The possibility of  
659 funding pilot studies under the Pillar II budget of the forthcoming CAP undoubtedly represents a good  
660 opportunity in this regard.

## 661 **5 Conclusions**

662 SMOPS are under a high risk of abandonment, which threatens the supply of a variety of ecosystem  
663 and social services highly valued by society. It is therefore important to develop alternative strategies  
664 aimed at preventing abandonment and its associated consequences. The conservation and enhancement  
665 of the sustainability of farming operations in less productive or disadvantaged areas, where many  
666 SMOPS are located, is also a priority in the forthcoming RDPr. In this study we analyse these two  
667 interlinked issues and propose the use of TMC associated with organic farming as an alternative  
668 management system to transform SMOPS into a more profitable and sustainable production system,  
669 with the goal of reducing land abandonment. The information generated can be used to design specific  
670 measures under the forthcoming regional RDPr to promote the cooperation between farmers to  
671 increase the profitability of their farms.

672 According to the opinions of a sample of 187 farmers based in a characteristic Andalusian  
673 SMOPS area, almost the entire sample considers the instrument of TMC associated with organic  
674 farming a useful tool to increase the sustainability of SMOPS and would be willing to take part in an  
675 organic producers' association aimed at implementing TMC in their area. However, 77 % of the  
676 farmers made the participation conditional on the commitments required by the association.

677 The agreement reached at European level for the CAP 2013-2020 has retained the  
678 importance of collective contracts and the collaboration between farmers; indeed, cooperation and the  
679 creation of producers' associations are considered cross-cutting aspects in the design of future RDPr,  
680 and joint contracts are considered one of the main elements of future "agri-environment - climate  
681 payments". In the design of future agri-environmental policy instruments, specific attention should be  
682 given to flexibility of the agreements, the reduction of administrative burden and access to advisory  
683 services.

684 Considering both the results of the paper and the current political framework, TMC may be  
685 introduced under the Rural Development Policy and, particularly, through the agri-environmental  
686 schemes. The characteristics that are likely to influence the successful implementation of TMC include

687 the existence of a legal entity (producers' association), the existence of a clear action plan, the  
688 involvement of local authorities, the clear definition of control functions and the existence of an  
689 adequate advisory service. A territorial approach is indispensable, and should be introduced through  
690 the action plan, which has to be designed based on the locally specific characteristics of the territory  
691 and the farmers.

692 Future research is needed to identify of the most efficient way to implement the proposed  
693 instruments. In this context, the use of procurement auctions in a pilot study setting to establish the  
694 most efficient way to create the spatial agglomeration of farmers should be considered.

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