

# Women's Security After War: Protection and Punishment in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

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# Abstract

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Does violence against women increase in the aftermath of war? If so, why? Scholars and policy-makers have begun to ask questions about violence against women in the post-conflict space, yet complexities in measurement and a focus on outcomes (rather than mechanisms) leave essential questions unanswered. This dissertation refines and scopes these questions to learn about whether, how, and why the social context that supports violence against women changes as a result of war.

The central argument of this dissertation is that armed conflict fosters protective masculine norms that, in turn, affect how communities socially sanction or punish local crimes, including violence against women. Drawing insights from feminist theory, economics, social psychology and political science, the theory of protective masculine norms describes a process by which the gendered nature of protection and exigencies of community security lead communities to choose more severe punishment for public crimes deemed to threaten their communities. Protection tradeoffs, however, also lead people to choose less severe punishment for other “private” crimes.

I derive and examine the observable implications of this theory in the context of eastern DR Congo, a place where there are high levels of violence against women that has also been exposed to high levels of insecurity associated with armed violence in the distant and recent past. **Chapter 1** lays the framework for the dissertation; describing the social nature of violence against women, processes of norm change, the research approach, and the derivation of protective masculine norms theory. Then, because protective masculine norms are broadly shared across societies, **Chapter 2** investigates the nature of war, law, and punishment processes in eastern DR Congo to understand how the theory and findings travel to other

contexts.

**Chapter 3** motivates the theory of protective masculine norms by providing the empirical foundation for differentiating between forms of violence against women and placing them in a framework with other crimes. Contrary to prominent theories about empowerment, backlash and violent masculinities; armed conflict fails to affect preferences for punishing rape and domestic violence in a unidirectional way. Armed conflict increases how severely people prefer to punish rape and stealing, but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic violence. The qualitative evidence underscores the relevance of disaggregating crimes against women in terms of public community threats and private crimes.

**Chapter 4** explicates the theory of protective masculine norms, grounding it in the literature and in the case. I examine the quantitative and descriptive evidence related to alternative hypotheses that may account for armed conflict's effects: exposure to wartime crimes, security structures and demographic change. Finding little support for alternative theories, I describe the design of and results from qualitative work probing central propositions within protective masculine norms theory: Protection is gendered, people have shared memories of conflict incidents, this affects their subsequent behaviors, and internal crimes are related to perceived provision of protection.

Since sanctioning is a public act subject to group dynamics and norms, **Chapter 5** examines the implications of protective masculine norms and the findings about preference change for how groups choose to punish crimes. Armed conflict may affect how groups choose to punish crimes by changing individual-level preferences, by changing group dynamics, neither, or both. I find that armed conflict affects group preferences primarily through individual-level preference change, underscoring the relevance of preference change for social sanctioning in the aftermath of war. The data also show that group dynamics make people's preferences more extreme, suggesting the importance of norms to shaping preferences - a central tenet of the theory.

**Chapter 6** discusses the emerging research agenda of protective masculine norms and

its contributions. Questions remain about levels of violence against women after war. But, already protective masculine norms has begun to unify a formerly disparate set of findings emerging about armed conflict, domestic violence, and social and legal change.

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Introduction

### 1.1.1 Research Question

In 2010, the United Nations Secretary General created a new position, appointing Margot Wallstrom Special Representative for sexual violence in armed conflict. Her appointment marked the pinnacle of a widespread understanding among both scholars and policy-makers that rape is used by armed groups during armed conflict as a tool of war. UN Security Council Resolution 1820 and its sister resolutions all aim to end impunity for this form of wartime violence that women disproportionately experience; and, in doing so, further embed women's security within the security agenda of states.

Yet, time and time again, research reveals that women's insecurity extends far beyond the context of war. In 2006, a compilation of cross-country surveys by the World Health Organization estimated that that between 15 and 71 percent of women in a broad set of study countries had experienced physical or sexual violence in their lifetimes (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2006).<sup>1</sup> Such pervasive levels of violence against women can both galvanize advocacy efforts against violence against women and foster disbelief in the possibility of change.

Conflict's aftermath, however, is thought of as a critical juncture - a moment in time when both domestic and international actors work together to rebuild, redesign and create more stable and equitable societies, including for women. It is also a space where women may be subject to increased levels of harm due to violent masculinities, decay of legal institutions and infrastructural damage. As security concerns have broadened to include peace-building and post-conflict stability operations, new questions have arisen about women's security in the post-conflict space. But, because political science research has focused on violence that armed groups perpetrate as part of the armed conflict, relatively little is known about war's

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<sup>1</sup>Study countries include Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Japan, Namibia, Peru, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Thailand, and the United Republic of Tanzania.

effects on the violence against women that follows war. This dissertation moves beyond the war context to examine women's security in the post-conflict space.

Does violence against women increase in the aftermath of war? If so, why? How can this violence be addressed? Even while scholars have begun to consider questions about violence in the post-conflict space, complexities in measurement and a focus on outcomes (rather than mechanisms) leave essential questions unanswered. This dissertation refines and scopes these questions to learn about whether, how, and why the *social context* that supports violence against women changes as a result of war.

The social context is a set of reactions to violence against women, reactions which are normatively important because they reflect tolerance for violence of this kind. An exploration of the social context asks how people think about and engage with one another in their community surrounding issues of violence against women. To what extent is violence against women accepted, supported or even lauded? How do people treat fellow community members that perpetrate violence against women? Do they prefer to punish perpetrators when acting as individuals? As groups?

Not only is the social context normatively important, but it yields insights into the broad and elusive repertoires of violence that women face in their day-to-day lives. The social context reflects violence that might not be captured by surveys designed to estimate the sheer magnitude of specific forms. Reactions to violence shape and constrain the ability of the legal system to function. Finally, the social context can play a role in encouraging or deterring perpetrators of violent crimes.

Political theorists have long theorized about armed conflict as a locus of change (e.g. Fanon, Marx, Engels). It is a point in time in which new regimes and ideas emerge (or at least the time that they jump onto the world stage) and old regimes die. Canonically, Tilly (1990) argued that war was at the heart of the emergence of the modern state system due to the strong state bureaucracies that emerged hand-in-hand with waging modern war. In the same vein, this study suggests that the widely-felt and widely-shared shock of armed conflict will

have implications for the social dynamics that follow.

The effect of armed conflict on violence against women in the post-conflict space is under-theorized and underexamined given its relevance to international advocacy work, postconflict peacebuilding efforts, and women’s empowerment programming. In this dissertation, I examine the effects of war on the social context of violence against women in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, a place where there is intense interest in advocacy work to improve the lives of women in the wake of armed conflict, and a focal point of scholarly research on the sources, motives, and measures to address rape (Alison 2007; Baaz and Stern 2009; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010; Johnson et al. 2010; Kelly et al. 2012; Meger 2010).

More broadly, this research area speaks to fundamental questions that emerge from historical institutionalist scholarship about attitudes, institutions and the potential for change. Besley and Reynal-Querol’s (2014) study of the role of past conflict on present conflict; Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) study of the effects of the slave trade on modern social trust; and Alesina et al. (2016) study how historical plow agriculture affects gender roles today. This scholarship points to specific events or technologies that resonate and have large and persistent effects over time. A focus on how armed conflict changes social dynamics addresses fundamental theoretical questions of whether and how attitudes and norms, often thought to be “sticky” features of society, change (Chandra 2006).

### **1.1.2 Summary of Main Argument**

The central argument of this dissertation is that armed conflict fosters protective masculine norms that, in turn, affect how communities socially punish local crimes, including violence against women. Drawing insights from feminist theory, economics, social psychology and political science, the theory of protective masculine norms describes a process by which the gendered nature of protection and exigencies of community security in the aftermath of war lead people to choose more severe punishment for public crimes deemed to threaten their communities. Protection tradeoffs, however, also lead people to choose less severe punishment

for other “private” crimes.

The theory of protective masculine norms calls attention to an undertheorized and paradoxical aspect of male protection and violence, describing how protected populations can be simultaneously protected and harmed by their protectors. As a result of war, men want to contribute to protecting their communities, making them more likely to root out crimes such as public rape. But communities also give these men more leeway to perpetrate violence against women in their homes in the name of protection. In this way, protective masculine norms theory pushes academic and policy communities towards thinking in a more nuanced way about masculinities that emerge from the circumstance of war.

The theory and findings challenge prominent frameworks for thinking about violence against women after war. One strain of literature suggests that armed conflict allows women to take on new roles in society, improving their positions and treatment (Wood 2008; Tripp 2015; Mageza-Barthel 2015). Another strain of literature suggests that war fosters harmful gender attitudes and practices when male groups organize, bond, and engage in war (Cohen 2016; Morris 1996; Zurbriggen 2010). Such harmful masculinities can undermine the post-war security environment for women by unhinging social norms and sanctions that keep violent behaviors perpetrated against women at bay.

While these alternative theories suggest that that the gendered nature of war leads to unidirectional outcomes on violence against women, I find that war’s effects are multidimensional and dependent on how people perceive the violent crime. As described in the theory of protective masculine norms, good things don’t always move together and bad things don’t always move together. Protection and violence are intertwined.

### **1.1.3 Theory Generation Process**

The theory of protective masculine norms is developed through a multi-stage research process that draws from both inductive and deductive approaches in the specific case of eastern DR Congo. The theory and findings are grounded in 6 months of my own fieldwork as well as

longer spans of inquiry, data collection, coding and reporting by local research teams. This work could not have been completed without the involvement and expertise of Research Initiatives for Social Development, whose members have helped to question, refine and implement (and thus define) this project in multiple phases since 2015.

I integrate quantitative and qualitative approaches throughout this research to evaluate effects, trace processes, and embed the theory in the local context. The research project uses original quantitative and qualitative data from 80 focus groups held across 20 villages, 40 randomly sampled interviews across 4 villages, and 48 elite interviews held between 2016 and 2018. I also integrate data from original survey measures from 2015.

Given the uncharted nature of this area of research, I draw several theories from the prominent literature about armed conflict's effects and derive the implications of those theories for the social context of violence against women in the aftermath of war. When the quantitative evidence of armed conflict's effects fail to align with expectations, I build on the quantitative findings and qualitative insights to develop the theory of protective masculine norms that can explain the findings. At the same time, I derive and assess the applicability of several additional theories that might explain the same effects. Finding little support for the alternative theories in further analyses - but continuing to find support for the theory of protective masculine norms - I conduct additional fieldwork in the same communities to trace the logic and refine the theory.

This dissertation integrates a rich literature on conflict, power and violence against women from non-positivist, feminist tradition to inspire questions and inform expectations about trends in the world. Yet, I examine quantitative and qualitative evidence for described theories fully in the positivist tradition with the goal of establishing evidence for causal effects. As part of a different ontological tradition, critical feminist theories are integrated but not "tested" by the the findings that emerge.

#### 1.1.4 The case of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Sexual violence, war, armed groups, foreign actors, mines, international advocacy, peacekeeping - these frames of reference for Democratic Republic of Congo are strong and widely shared among scholars, policy-makers and media consumers across the world. Chapter 2 delves into these histories and frames in order to inform the generalizability of the research findings. But prior to this discussion, a few words should be said about the context, my motivations for choosing DR Congo, and the ethics of undertaking research in this case. I also introduce several scope conditions for the theory.

My decision to study armed conflict's effects on the social context of violence against women in eastern DR Congo is motivated by theoretical, normative, and empirical considerations. Armed conflict has ebbed and flowed in DR Congo's eastern regions at various levels and intensities involving numerous armed actors over the past 20 years. Rape and other forms of violence by armed groups occurs at very high levels, but domestic violence - violence by intimate partners - is also notably high.

At the outset of this research, the violence in DR Congo was described in both the scholarly and policy arenas as a rational way to wage war and, at the same time, as indicative of a violent and barbaric culture. But how are "norms" and "culture" shaped by the situation of armed violence that has been gripping Congo's eastern regions for the past 20 years? Questions about armed conflict's effects on the social context provide insights into norm emergence and change that can challenge cultural stereotypes.

Yet, this study navigates carefully in this normative endeavour. Focusing on violence against women in DR Congo can feed into exceptionalizing it in this case. However, and as I will discuss further, violence against women is a widely shared phenomenon across societies - as is war. Recognizing this shared harm and drawing from the broad feminist literature on patriarchy and violence suggests the generalizability of the findings even as they grow out of this specific context.

This study examines variation in community exposure to violence within the single context

of DR Congo to learn about armed conflict's effects. This follows the approach taken in many studies on the microdynamics of violence and is better able to control and account for specificities of the conflict that might be driving differences if comparisons were made across contexts.

In taking this approach, however, DR Congo presents a hard case for finding effects. All communities in my area of study experienced higher levels of violence in the distant as compared to the recent past. Thus, observed differences between communities that have and have not been recently exposed to armed conflict are the result of additional exposure to armed conflict rather than exposure *per se*.<sup>2</sup> The effects of armed conflict may be even larger in communities without such a shared history of conflict exposure.

As will become clear, the key component of the micro-theory of protective masculine norms developed in this dissertation is that communities act to protect themselves in the wake of exposure to armed conflict. This community-level reaction is contingent on community members' beliefs that they need to provide their own security. This means that the theory describes processes that will occur in the aftermath of armed conflict in places where communities feel that they cannot rely on the state to ensure their security from repeated episodes. Thus, the theory of protective masculine norms and the findings of this dissertation are most directly applicable to weak states confronting armed conflict.

While this dissertation develops a micro-theory of protective masculine norms in relation to eastern DR Congo, it also sheds light on protective masculine norms as a general phenomenon. Despite clear scope conditions for the theory that I describe, protective masculine norms as a general phenomenon are potentially relevant in a broad range of contexts - but may manifest differently. I provide an example extension of the theory of protective masculine norms in the final chapter with an application to the Croatian context.

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<sup>2</sup>This becomes apparent in the process tracing exercise I undertake in Chapter 4.



### 1.1.5 Summary of Introductory Chapter

This section has introduced my question and research approach. It has also introduced and motivated the case. In the remaining sections of this introductory chapter, I provide a theoretical discussion of violence against women and a framework for thinking about its relationship with social sanctioning of this violence. I argue for placing primacy on understanding social sanctioning of violence against women to learn about dynamics of violence.

I then turn to a discussion of armed conflict and lay the foundation for studying its effects. Drawing insights from the social sanctioning framework, I describe questions that emerge from existing studies of armed conflict's effects on violence against women, arguing that social sanctioning provides a new lens through which to study armed conflict's effects.

Finally, how does social sanctioning change? I provide an overview of norm change, describing several broad hypotheses about the effects of armed conflict on social sanctioning. I situate the remaining chapters of the dissertation in relation to these hypotheses.

## 1.2 Violence against Women

### 1.2.1 Definitions

According to the United Nations definition, violence against women is “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” (UN General Assembly 1993). The key component linking these forms of violence is the motivation: Violence against women is perpetrated against women specifically because they are women.

Since motivations for attacks are difficult to establish, the term violence against women is used to refer to forms of violence that *primarily* target women such as sexual violence, human trafficking, female genital mutilation, intimate partner violence and domestic violence

(Women 2013). This slippage is made explicit within the definition of gender-based violence given by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which defines gender-based violence as “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately” (Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1992).<sup>3</sup>

Feminist scholars have uncovered multitudinous arenas in which women experience violence associated with unequal and patriarchal gender hierarchies (Brownmiller 2013; Hunnicutt 2009; Tickner 1995; True 2012). Ann Tickner (1995) and Jacqui True (2012, 5) have argued that, because of the relationship between violence and underlying disparities, much violence against women is, at root, gender-based. In common parlance, the term gender-based violence is often used to refer to violence against women to the exclusion of violence against men, reflecting the widespread, systemic and gender-based nature of the violence that women face (2012, 4–5). I use the term violence against women for definitional precision to reflect that this study is about violence directed against women.

The term *violence* is socially constructed and can be defined in broad or narrow ways (Muehlenhard and Kimes 1999). Organizations such as UN Women and the European Institute for Gender Equality highlight the importance of examining broad forms of violence including physical, sexual, psychological, and economic forms of violence or abuse. Such broad definitions are useful for understanding how violence may manifest differently across genders.

This study, however, defines violence more narrowly to focus on physical forms of violence against women. Physical forms of violence can be more consistently measured and assessed across contexts (Jewkes 2002). I focus on two forms of physical violence that disproportionately affect women across the globe - rape and domestic violence - to understand armed conflict's effects on violence against women. While men can be targets of rape and domestic violence,

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<sup>3</sup>CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (11th session, 1992). The term gender-based violence is broader than women, encompassing violence against men because they are men. Because of CEDAW's clear focus on women, this reference to gender-based violence is specific to women.

it is clear that women tend to be disproportionately affected (Human Security Report Project 2005; Leiby 2009; Hunnicutt 2009).

I define rape according to the ICC's definition which includes two components: "(i) The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. (ii) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent" (United Nations 1998).

By domestic violence, I refer to physical violence by a current or former intimate partner. This can be any act of physical violence against women, including but not limited to the operational definition within standard Demographic Health Survey questionnaires for domestic violence: beating, hair-pulling, slapping, punching, shoving, stabbing with a knife or other object, threatening to cause bodily harm with a weapon, or forcing a woman to engage in sexual intercourse or another sexual act when she does not want to (Kishor and Johnson 2004; Garcia-Moreno et al. 2005).

My focus on rape and domestic violence raises an initially perplexing question about intimate partner rape. After all, much of the physical violence that women experience by their intimate partners is, by definition, rape. At the intersection, these two phenomena are the same form of violence against women.

However, local accounts and understandings of what counts as rape are central to this study and agreement across contexts on the point varies widely. For example in the United States, women could not pursue husbands for perpetrating spousal rape in all 50 states until 1977 (Whatley 1993). In eastern DR Congo, spousal rape or intimate partner sexual violence is not considered a crime in the legal code.

To embed this study in the local context and maintain definitions that are widely applicable,




Figure 1.1: Rape and Domestic Violence

I place intimate partner rape aside to study rape by non-intimate partners and physical, non-sexual forms of domestic violence. I will return to the discussion of how intimate partner rape enters into the theoretical framework in the concluding chapter.

### **1.2.2 Ethics and Measurement**

Understanding what brings about change in violence against women requires measuring and learning about violence against women that takes place. As with other sensitive subjects, ethics associated with research on violence against women must attend to respect for autonomy of persons, protection of vulnerable persons and beneficence. But specificities of the subject matter also give researchers pause and warrant reflection both by those that conduct research and consumers of the information gleaned from their studies (Boesten 2017; Boesten 2018).

First, taking part in a study about violence against women can communicate information about one's experience to other members of society, including husbands that may respond by perpetrating more abuse towards participating wives. This precaution undergirds an important standard on violence against women research: not to interview men and women from the same household on the subject of violence against women, particularly domestic violence. In some cases, where the population is small and participants know one another it may not be appropriate to interview both men and women on this subject within the same community. Yet the privacy of the subject matter must be weighed in relation to accurately

informing participants of the research goals and what the process will entail.

Discussion of one's own experiences of violence has the potential to be cathartic, and scholars have found that many participants voluntarily choose to discuss their histories of rape (Cohen 2010). Viewed in this light, research about violence becomes analogous to an intervention in which the individual's voice and pain is *heard* (Ellsberg and Heise 2005, 43). Yet, engaging in discussions about violence also has the potential to re-traumatize victims or impose further shame on victims and their families (Fujii 2010; Olujic 1995).

A growing evidence-base suggests a need for a precautionary approach to research on violence against women. Cohen (2010) provides an account of findings from a group of researchers studying domestic violence in Ethiopia. In a follow-up study, they found that twenty percent of participants had been beaten because of their involvement in the survey (Parcesepe, Stark, and Roberts 2008).<sup>4</sup> Wary scholars have cancelled studies that ask questions about violence against women both in Mexico due to violent backlash from husbands of participants that took part (Ellsberg and Heise 2002) and in Sri Lanka, due to the recognition that local stigma for taking part in the study was too great to offset any potential benefit to participants (Swiss and Jennings 2006).

There are some conditions under which it is necessary to ask questions about exposure to rape or domestic violence. However, researchers must be confident that the questions and study design contribute new knowledge - numbers that inspire more confidence than questions - while minimizing risk.

In my own research, as described in following chapters, I choose not to ask direct questions about violence against women - but instead to engage with communities and individuals within them to better understand the social context. I understand the measures of social context (preferences for punishment, perceptions of how others will react, discussions with community members, descriptions of local processes) as concrete and subject to fewer questions and less measurement error than measures of violence against women. I expound on this point in

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<sup>4</sup>This study was described in Cohen (2010, pg.63).

## 1.3 Social Sanctioning Framework

### 1.3.1 Factors Influencing Perpetration

There are a multitude of frameworks for understanding the determinants of violence against women with an eye to reducing this violence. The study of violence against women has roots in public health, law, sociology, anthropology, economics, and, increasingly, political science. Over time, scholars across disciplines have come to recognize the utility of multifaceted approaches that recognize both individual and social determinants of violence against women as well as their interrelationship.

For example, it is important to ask both why the issue of violence against women is more systemic on some societies than in others and why only some men within every society perpetrate violence against women? Heise (1998) offered a unified ecological framework describing individual and social determinants of violence against women as mutually reinforcing and mutually constituted. The model served to bring together two camps of scholars studying violence against women: Feminist scholars focusing on the structural causes of violence against women and public health scholars focusing on individual-level factors. Since this time, scholars have increasingly accepted that individual-level and social-level factors both contribute to violence against women - with the understanding that a focus on social factors does not negate individual responsibility and culpability for engaging in harmful acts.

To explicate the interrelationship, at the individual level, a person's attitude towards women and attitude towards acts of violence against women affect whether an individual perpetrates.<sup>5</sup> At the social level, factors such as social or legal punishment and social norms can serve to reduce or amplify the likelihood that an individual will perpetrate

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<sup>5</sup>An attitude is an individual's preference or feeling about someone or something. For a review the literature on the observational relationship between attitudes towards rape and perpetration, see Polaschek and Ward (2002)

given some initial predilection to perpetrate. The idea is that perceived social and legal factors will influence an individual's behavior *at a given point in time* independently of that individual's attitude. But, one must also recognize that an individual's attitude is not formed independently - but *influenced* by the environment in which an individual lives.

I emphasize influence, because social factors and individual attitudes are related but remain distinct. This is true even in contexts such as in DR Congo - where scholars have questioned whether individual preferences (rather than community preferences) are a useful subject of inquiry (Johnson and Van de Vijver 2003). Chapter 5 will present data showing that people's private preferences are influenced by the social sphere but also continue to remain distinct.<sup>6</sup> The difference between individual attitudes and other social factors is key to processes of norm, attitude and behavior change.

Attitudes are socially-influenced individual preferences about how one should behave. Norms are beliefs or ideas about how other people in a community behave or think one should behave. People may rely on their perceptions of how others behave as an indicator for how they think one should behave, which is referred to as a descriptive norm. Or people may draw from their perceptions of how others think they should behave, which is referred to as a prescriptive norm (Tankard and Paluck 2016).<sup>7</sup> Note that descriptive and prescriptive norms may at times conflict. For example, as in the case of DR Congo, domestic violence may be perpetrated widely, but not considered ideal behavior. Both descriptive and prescriptive norms likely weigh into an individual's decision to perpetrate, but the key point is that - in norms theories - social factors (behaviors and ideals of others and/or expectations about the behaviors or ideals of others) influence an individual's behavior given that individual's attitude at a particular point in time.

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<sup>6</sup>The data examine how changes in preferences for punishment (not perpetration) vary in the private and public spheres.

<sup>7</sup>This difference is essential for norms change interventions. Tankard and Paluck (2016) describe how, when norms are out of line with the norm one seeks to propagate, providing information about the descriptive norm can have detrimental consequences. This is relevant for revealing estimates of violence against women where statistical estimates tend to be high.

### 1.3.2 Crimes and Deterrence

Legal reforms across the world have been driven by the idea that authorities can deter violence against women to some extent through increasing the potential disincentives as compared to the incentives for engaging in an illegal behavior (Mayerfeld 2006). The criminological framework undergirds international efforts to bring accountability to perpetrators of sexual violence in wartime in UN Security Council Resolution 1820 and following sister resolutions 1888, 1960, and 2106. Individual attitudes, assessments of positive social sanctions, assessments of negative social sanctions, and the likelihood of legal punishment all weigh into a varied and complex calculation that potential perpetrators of violence against women make.

Authorities seek to regulate violence against women by categorizing it (in its many forms) as a crime, defining punishments and imposing those punishments.<sup>8</sup> Becker (1968) provides a foundational model that establishes criminals as rational agents who respond to incentives and disincentives for engaging in crime. His model demonstrates that crime can be deterred through increasing the costs of engaging in illegal behavior - but only to a certain threshold, because it would be irrational for the state to take on all of the costs necessary to reduce crime to zero (Becker 1968). Within every society, different people accept different levels of risk; some will continue to perpetrate crime in the face of extreme punishments.<sup>9</sup> Irrational individuals fall outside of the scope of the deterrence model, but the assumption is that the majority of individuals respond to perceived costs.<sup>10</sup>

Becker's model is derived to address crimes, broadly construed, and has been critiqued for the primacy it gives to costs and benefits for crimes that may be considered heinous and reprehensible (Stern 1978).<sup>11</sup> Normatively, violence against women is a moral issue that

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<sup>8</sup>A crime is defined as act of action or omission that is punishable by a legal authority. A crime, by this definition, can be classified as criminal or civil.

<sup>9</sup>This is the same assumption presented in the Granoveter's threshold model for joining a riot or undertaking other risky group activities (Granovetter 1978).

<sup>10</sup>Taking stock of the evidence base for rational behavior in the area of criminology, Paternoster (2010) finds strong support for the claim that criminals behave rationally.

<sup>11</sup>Stern critiques Becker's model for weighing social costs and benefits rather than addressing moral



authorities should punish irrelevant of costs. But how extensive are states rights to pursue all necessary costs to reduce violence against women to zero? And, then, what capacity do states have if given extensive rights to pursue and punish? Even while violence against women is a clear moral issue, the deterrence model remains central to understanding its regulation.

Evidence also suggests that costs matter when people think about engaging in perpetrating acts of violence against women. In lab research with college males, Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward (1992) find that the perceived likelihood of formal punishment is an important determinant of people's projections of whether they would perpetrate a hypothetical crime of sexual violence.<sup>12</sup> The effect of perceived legal punishment is, however, heterogeneous; expectations of punishment have no effect when a respondent is morally opposed to the hypothetical act.<sup>13</sup> This heterogeneous finding elucidates the interaction between attitudes and potential punishment. The deterrence framework is useful only given an individual has an attitudinal predilection to perpetrate and is weighing costs and benefits at a particular point in time.

Attention to impunity, the permissive factors that allow violence against women to continue, has inspired and helped to coordinate a host of efforts to address violence against women; but the frame also leads scholars and policy-makers to the conclusion that violence is a problem to be solved from the top down, by criminal law (Houge and Lohne 2017). However, impunity is not only legal, but social in nature. The legal and social realms are interrelated and impact one another. The likelihood that an act will be punished depends not only on what the law says but how it is implemented by society members more broadly.

Legal impunity occurs when breaking the law fails to elicit legal punishment. Social impunity occurs when social punishment for engaging in a proscribed behavior (or not

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concerns. For a summary see Sandmo (1993, 14–16).

<sup>12</sup>Six dimensions of five scenarios were randomly varied for each of 94 respondents.

<sup>13</sup>Those that are morally opposed to an act of violence against women will not be affected by varying the costs of engaging in such violence - much as irrational individuals will not be influenced by such calculations. However, and as will be discussed later, individuals that are morally opposed may respond to incentives or potential benefits.

engaging in a prescribed behavior) is absent or compromised. Individuals within communities socially punish one another when they judge, stigmatize, or punish others for what they consider to be deviant, unappealing, or dangerous behavior.<sup>14</sup>

The behaviors that the social realm seeks to regulate is broader than those of the legal realm. Socially regulated behaviors may range from social niceties such as not covering one's mouth when coughing or cutting into a line, to social order regulation such as using social or economic status to do something that others without that status would not be able to get away with, to societal dangers such as pedophilia, incest, and rape. Social punishment might be carried out in the form of a disapproving facial expression, a rumor mill that damages one's reputation, or complete ostracization. Levels of social punishment will vary across types of behavior, across social groups, and over time.

Changes in the law may redefine what people view as socially desirable or permissible over time. But at any moment in time, enforcement of the law remains constrained by the social sphere. For example, social impunity will contribute to legal impunity when friends and neighbors fail to alert authorities about crimes.

Social impunity differs from legal impunity in other important ways. It is limited by the scope of what constitutes a set of society members that can sanction one another. As such, it requires that group members envision themselves as part (or potentially part) of that society. While sanctioning can occur over a long distance, its effects are stronger in closer proximity.

The legal realm relies mainly on negative punishments to deter behavior.<sup>15</sup> When considering the social realm, however, it is important to consider not only social costs, but also social benefits or incentives that might accrue from engaging in an illegal behavior.

In an inquiry into the logic behind sexually aggressive behavior, Bouffard and Bouffard (2011) asked 129 U.S. college men whether they would perpetrate a hypothetical scenario of

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<sup>14</sup>Note that by behavior, I am including absence of an expected behavior - where the absence is considered deviant, unappealing or dangerous.

<sup>15</sup>The law can define benefits to encourage behaviors (e.g. marriage) but this is less applicable to criminal acts which are the focus of this study.

date rape. They then asked the respondents to describe the potential costs and benefits of undertaking the act. The men that said they would commit the date rape described both the legal consequences and individual benefits (e.g. potential relationship with the woman) of engaging in date rape. This underscores the need to account for perceived benefits in addition to costs when considering the perpetration of violence against women.

Studies of rape on college campuses in the United States exemplify how men can accrue social benefits through engaging in violence against women. Sanday's (1992) landmark study of rape culture on college campuses in the United States describes a campus environment where young men become subjects of their fraternity group and then pursue sexual activity with women that conforms with the standard of masculinity that the group has propagated. By converging with the behaviors expected by the group, the members gain friends and status, forming cohesive bonds with fellow group members that remain unchallenged by men or women external to the group.<sup>16</sup>

Rather than impunity, a term that captures both the positive and negative incentives inherent to understanding the perpetration of violence against women is *social sanctioning*. Through a focus on social sanctioning, my approach emphasizes the importance of social costs and benefits while acknowledging the interconnectivity between social and legal sanctioning. Given an individual's attitude, the perceived potential for social sanctioning will affect the behaviors of rational individuals.

### 1.3.3 Bias in Violence Measures

The focus on the social sanctioning of violence against women in this study underscores the need for wariness in interpreting statistical findings about violence against women. If a variable affects the social sanctioning environment it also affects when, why and to whom individuals within populations of research report incidents of violence - even in surveys.

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<sup>16</sup>This idea of cohesion and bonding was usefully developed by Dara Kay Cohen (Cohen 2016) to explain why armed groups with low social cohesion perpetrate gang rape during wartime.

Biases in reporting can lead experimental evaluations to overstate an intervention's effects on violence. Respondents may report less violence against women after being "treated" with a norms or informational intervention to reduce violence against women not because there is actually less violence but because they learn that it is socially desirable not to experience (and thus less often disclose) such violence. This social desirability - viewed as a confounder in many studies - is indicative of an environment or an emerging environment that is less tolerant of this violence.

I understand changes in social sanctioning and social desirability bias as important outcomes in themselves. In the short run, social sanctioning may serve to deter or encourage violent behavior. In the long run, social factors will affect attitudes and individual predilections to perpetrating violence against women (Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011).

The need for numbers in order to understand and predict violence against women is apparent, but the need to understand the social context - which gives insights for how practitioners might address violence against women and to better understand the numbers that exist is, in my view, more urgent. This study gives primacy to the empirical examination of the social context of violence against women while drawing out theoretical implications for violence against women.

#### **1.3.4 Social Sanctioning**

When someone chooses to socially sanction a perpetrator of a crime, he or she can choose to encourage that perpetrator through positive social interactions such as invitations for dinner, walking places with the perpetrator, or making explicit positive references to the crime in conversation. Someone can also choose to do nothing, continuing to interact with the perpetrator without reference to the crime in the way he or she has in the past. Or, finally, someone can choose to negatively sanction that perpetrator, through counsel, gossip, social ostracization, reporting to authorities, or even forms of extrajudicial punishment such as beating. It is possible that someone may choose a mix of these behaviors over time. Each

time that someone interacts with others in society about the perpetrator or crime (including the perpetrator himself), a person makes a decision about how to socially sanction.

It is not surprising that social sanctioning is social. As described in the discussion of individual and social factors that lead people to perpetrate violence (or not), people undertake decisions about how they engage in social sanctioning by weighing the alternatives (costs and benefits) in relation to the social context.

First, as part of this cost/benefit analysis, an individual's attitude will influence how they treat perpetrators of crimes. Attitudes or preferences are part of the social sanctioning environment. Second, through social interaction, people learn about the attitudes and expectations of others. Each time community members engage with one another about the crime and/or perpetrator, they may update their attitude or preference for socially sanctioning that person and/or that crime. Relating this back to violence against women and the discussion about decisions to perpetrate based on descriptive and prescriptive norms, social sanctioning - interactions with others in society about the perpetrator and about the crime - is an important arena where these descriptive and prescriptive norms are communicated.

Norms are shown to be both a source of stability and a vehicle of fast and dynamic change. Unlike attitudes, norms are perception-based. Paluck and Ball (2010) and Tankard and Paluck (2016) describe how differences between attitudes and norms (perceptions of others expectations or attitudes) are essential to theories of norm change (e.g. to discourage littering or to increase individual contributions to environmental protection). People may be wrong about the attitudes and beliefs of others. This discordance, known as pluralistic ignorance, is a suboptimal social equilibrium where community members behave as if they prefer one thing, but actually prefer another (Bjerring, Hansen, and Pedersen 2014). While attitude and preference change is thought to happen only slowly, behaviors can change very quickly under conditions of pluralistic ignorance - because behaviors can change without any accompanying attitude or preference change (Mackie 1996; Kuran 1997; Mackie et al. 2015). When people's true attitudes or preferences are revealed, people are able to act in accordance with their

own attitudes rather than against them. The expression of true preferences and the ability to coordinate is the foundation for the idea that norms can change quickly when attitudes and norms are out of sync.

The central theory of this dissertation - the theory of protective masculine norms - describes how norm change associated with armed conflict can be the font of broad and dynamic changes to preferences for social sanctioning. The theory describes a process of preference change through the mechanism of norms. When communities are exposed to armed conflict, exposure increases the demand for protective behavior on the part of men in the community. When people in communities express a need and desire for protection by men and communicate expectations that men act protectively, men adapt their preferences for sanctioning. As a result, men *prefer* to punish crimes that they perceive pose a harm more severely. In this way, the theory of protective masculine norms draws on norms theories to explain how preference change occurs. In response to war, attitudes and norms move briefly out of line with one another, but preferences for protection - and thus social sanctioning of crimes - catch up.

However, as described, norms theories also posit that norm change can lead directly to behavior change without changing people's preferences. This dissertation explores such an alternative pathway by examining theories of group dynamics. Armed conflict may affect group dynamics directly, changing factors such as whose norms matter or whether norms are more or less powerful. While consistent with theories of preference change, these theories do not require preference change to occur. Group dynamics can be either norm specific (e.g. specific only to violence against women), or relevant to social sanctioning more broadly.<sup>17</sup>

However, the direct effects of armed conflict on group dynamics are limited and weak. I thus conclude that armed conflict affects social sanctioning through changes in preferences for social sanctioning rather than through group dynamics. This preference change is theorized

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<sup>17</sup>Analysis from Bauer et al (2016) shows that armed conflict affects social engagement consistently across a number of studies. Increased social engagement could be due to changes in preferences for such engagement or due to changes in group dynamics, but the studies do not weigh or explore these mechanisms.

to occur because of protective masculine norms.

## 1.4 Armed Conflict

Thus far, I have referred to armed conflict in a very general way. In this section, I define armed conflict - the independent variable in this study and review the literature on its theorized effects on violence against women. How do scholars and policy-makers think about armed conflict's effects on violence against women? What evidence supports their claims? This section demonstrates that there is significant room for advancements in this literature in terms of theory and empirics, further motivating the outcome of social sanctioning in relation to my approach to theorizing about and measuring armed conflict.

### 1.4.1 Theorized effects on Violence against Women

Scholars have made great strides in recognizing and explaining variation in violence perpetrated against women during armed conflict, with a focus on armed group perpetration of sexual violence (Cohen 2013a; Cohen 2016; Wood 2006; Wood 2009; Cohen and Nordås 2014; Skjelsbaek 2001). But theories about how and why armed groups perpetrate violence against women during war have begun to shape the way scholars and policy-makers approach violence against women in the post-conflict space.

Zurbriggen (2010) describes how “we cannot get rid of rape until we get rid of war” because of the violent masculinities that undergird both rape and militarization. Does armed conflict militarize *society* and foster shared violent masculinities that have implications for the conduct of violence after war as scholars suggest (Enloe 2000; True 2012, 137)? The mechanisms that transmit these theorized effects to society remain macro-level and largely unspecified.

Boesten (2010) suggests that the justice system can contribute to the proliferation of rape in the aftermath of war. Her qualitative and interpretive work in Peru describes a justice system that continues to view violence against women as legitimate and tolerable in the

aftermath of war. Patterns of violence during the war are thus reflected in the patterns of rape that follow. Her argument comes closer to identifying a specific institutional mechanism by which armed conflict can transmit effects.

Ostby, Leiby and Nordas (2019) describe individual-level mechanisms by which armed conflict affects violence in the post-conflict space. They describe how domestic violence can increase in the aftermath of war when soldiers return home due to widespread post traumatic stress disorder. Such individual-level arguments remain closely linked to theories about armed group perpetration of violence, suggesting that armed conflict will affect domestic violence in households of excombatants but will not have wider and broader societal effects (at least in the short term).

Other scholars and policy-makers emphasize how armed conflict affects the structural conditions that lend themselves to violence against women. Based on an overview of armed conflicts worldwide, Bastick, Grimm and Kunz (2007, 10) summarize the state of knowledge about the legacies of armed conflict:

“Armed conflict often has consequences in terms of sexual and gender-based violence after the shooting has stopped. A number of countries emerging from armed conflict report a very high and/or increasing incidence of criminal and family violence. Impunity for acts of sexual violence committed during the conflict, post-conflict poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities and the weakened rule of law, may combine to foster increased inter-personal and sexual violence, and to make women and girls particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and trafficking.”

Bastick’s summary highlights the structural drivers of women’s insecurity that results from armed conflict. The argument is that women are subject to greater vulnerability in contexts of internal displacement, infrastructural damage, and weak law enforcement.<sup>18</sup> Women may

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<sup>18</sup>For other examples of this approach, see Haglund and Richards (2017); Sigsworth (2008, 21); Hudson (2006).



also become more vulnerable when they are pushed into the informal economy where they can be subject to violence and trafficking (Chinkin 2008).<sup>19</sup>

A focus on the social context, however, presents an important first order question for theories about structure. What are the forces that lead people to perpetrate or not to perpetrate in the face of infrastructural damage? The social context can provide insights into when and why the informal economy poses greater potential for harm.

#### 1.4.2 Evidence of Armed Conflict’s Effects

Does armed conflict have implications for how societies rather than armed group members, treat women as posited by institutional, individual, and structural theories? If so, why? Empirical research is emerging that lends some credence to the claim that women face greater insecurity, including rape and domestic violence, in the aftermath of armed conflict.

In “Violence begets violence”, Østby (2016) combines Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data and geospatial conflict data across Africa to show that intimate partner violence tends to be greater in places where armed conflict has occurred. In Colombia, Noe and Rieckmann (2013) show that individuals in areas that were exposed to higher magnitudes of conflict are more likely to experience intimate partner violence and display attitudes conducive to it. In Peru, Gallegos and Gutierrez (2010) show that intimate partner violence is higher in areas that have been more greatly exposed to armed conflict.<sup>20</sup> Østby, Leiby, and Nordas (2019) provide the most comprehensive statistical examination of armed conflict’s effects on intimate partner violence in Peru, drawing from DHS data on intimate partner violence and a

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<sup>19</sup>Related statistical analyses suggest that armed conflict has important gendered repercussions. While more men die during armed conflict, women’s life-expectancy and maternal health outcomes are significantly and negatively affected in the long run (Plümper and Neumayer 2006; Li and Wen 2005; Urdal and Che 2013).

<sup>20</sup>The authors describe the transmission of violence during armed conflict through the space of the home by applying Pollak’s (2004) model of intergenerational transmission of intimate partner violence. In this model, a husband will be more violent if he grew up in a violent home; a wife will remain with a violent husband if she grew up in a violent home; and these individuals from violent homes will tend to marry one another. While proposing this framework, the authors do not design their study to trace the proposed process of change.

spatial estimate of wartime violence collected by a commission geared towards learning about its distribution. The authors find that armed conflict has small but statistically significant effects.

However, gender inequality is a strong predictor of war onset (Caprioli 2005; Cockburn 2010). Armed groups may target places with greater gender inequality and higher pre-existing levels of domestic violence. The design of these studies cannot account for pre-conflict characteristics that may affect both exposure to armed conflict and post-conflict violence against women. Jhumka Gupta et al (2009) use a regression discontinuity design to help account for potential selection. Based on a convenience sample of immigrant men in Boston, the authors find that exposure to armed conflict, measured as migration just after the point that armed conflict began, increases the likelihood of perpetrating intimate partner violence in the past year and holding attitudes conducive to perpetration. The findings lend support that armed conflict has causal effects on intimate partner violence and suggest that exposure to conflict can lead to long-term effects on individuals that are not disrupted by subsequent changes in locality.

While evidence is beginning to mount that levels of intimate partner violence increase after armed conflict (Gupta et al. 2009; Noe and Rieckmann 2013; Gallegos and Guitierrez 2010; Østby and others 2016; Østby, Leiby, and Nordås 2019); questions remain about how violence translates from the battlefield into the home. The findings are also subject to questions about survey reporting. The results show that men are more likely to *report* their perpetration or women to *report* their experience of intimate partner violence as a result of armed conflict in a survey. Actual levels may or may not be affected. For example, households may report more domestic violence in the aftermath of armed conflict, because interventions geared towards improving gender equality provide more security or encouragement for respondents to report. In this way, more reporting of domestic violence could be a sign that violence is better recognized and addressed as a result of the war.<sup>21</sup> Conversely, if people are not secure

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<sup>21</sup>For an explanation of this common problem in understanding the magnitude in human rights violations,

enough to report, the threat of social sanctioning could underestimate war's effect. The framework of social sanctioning highlights variation in when and why people disclose violence and suggests that studies of violence should be accompanied with accounts of attitudinal, social and legal change.

The focus on the social sanctioning of violence against women in this study underscores the need for wariness in interpreting statistical findings about violence against women. If a variable affects the social sanctioning environment it also affects when, why and to whom individuals within populations of research report incidents of violence - even in surveys.

The majority of empirical research on violence against women relies on questions about domestic violence found in Demographic Health Surveys, which have been conducted across many countries over time. But questions remain about how findings from the many studies using this measure translate to other forms of violence against women such as non-intimate partner rape. Yet, as datasets on rape have emerged to fill gaps in data availability, so have empirical studies of rape in the post conflict space.

Haglund and Richards (Haglund and Richards 2017) examine the relationship between armed conflict intensity and rape prevalence using aggregated state-level rape data from WomanStats (a measure that aims to account for the context of reporting) in the post conflict period. They find that levels of rape vary with the intensity of the previous armed conflict. They also find that law enforcement helps to reduce levels of rape. Their findings fit the picture that scholars and policy-makers have painted about impunity in the aftermath of war, but leave questions about mechanisms and whether the observed effects are attributable to armed conflict.

Overall, the evidence base paints a picture of worsening violence against women in the aftermath of war. However, this evidence comes with few theoretical insights that describe micro-level processes in a cohesive way. Few of these studies set out to look for improvements in violence against women - and reporting more violence against women can actually indicate

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see Clark and Sikink (2013).



Figure 1.2: Rape, Domestic Violence and Stealing

an improvement in norms. While some disparate findings exist, larger theorizing with focus on mechanisms will inspire more confidence in the measures and the models on which the findings are based to make a broader contribution.

### 1.4.3 Method

In research on violence against women, scholars have focused on armed conflict's effects on one form of violence or category of crime to make generalizations about violence against women. But what does one category of violence tell us about violence against women more broadly? Or about violence more broadly? If increases in rape and domestic violence occur along with increases in other crimes, the findings may have less to do with gender than scholars suggest. Findings from existing studies may be specific to the particular form of violence against women, to violence against women broadly, or to violent crimes. In this dissertation, I move away from this single outcome model to examine armed conflict's effects on two forms of violence against women and a third general crime, stealing, for comparison. By examining armed conflict's effects on several outcomes, this study can better assess both the arguments and the mechanisms.

There is also a need to account for pre and post conflict determinants of violence against women to reduce omitted variable bias that may drive the statistical relationships that the models reveal. In this dissertation, I use a matched pair design to better evaluate and causally

identify the effects of armed conflict along with integrated qualitative work and follow up process tracing. My definition of armed conflict is geared towards tracing armed conflict's micro-level effects.

#### 1.4.4 Definition

Conflict is essentially a difference in preferences. It means to be in opposition or to clash. Armed conflict occurs when a difference in preferences takes the form of two or more competing organized groups engaging in armed violence over a political or territorial goal.<sup>22</sup>

Definitions of armed conflict tend to be built around coding definitions for datasets, requiring a minimum threshold of battle-related deaths for inclusion. By this definition, war is said to end - not when violence ends - but when it dwindles or changes forms (Sambanis 2004). By other definitions, war is said to end when a peace deal is made or elections are held (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Both definitions, however, miss important continuities between war and peace as exemplified in the case of eastern DR Congo. Peace was declared in 2003 when a peace deal was made and levels of violence subsequently subsided, but violence by armed groups has continued in DR Congo's eastern regions at different levels and intensities in the midst of this "peace".

These definitions of war and peace lend themselves to distinct and sometimes arbitrary units of analysis that can miss continuities and discontinuities in violence categorized as part of war and as part of peace (Sambanis 2004). This has led some scholars to begin asking questions about levels of violence in wartime and in the post-conflict peace (Suhrke and Berdal 2013). At the local level, large-scale political violence and violent crime can manifest in similar ways (Schuld 2013).

Studies are also emerging that highlight many of the calm moments and informal arrangements within the spaces of larger conflict environments or wars (Staniland 2012). These

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<sup>22</sup>The Peace Research Institute Oslo defines it as "a contested compatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).

moments in-between local episodes of violence are the same as those studied by counterinsurgency scholars interested in the effects of local violence or hearts and minds campaigns in winning or changing the course of an overarching conflict (Eli Berman and Shapiro 2018).

This study moves beyond dichotomous definitions of war and peace to examine specific incidents of insecurity associated with armed conflict and how those incidents or moments of war affect local dynamics in its aftermath. When armed groups wage violence within a particular community, that community has been exposed to armed conflict or war, terms that I use interchangeably.

This approach relies on a local, spatial definition of armed conflict, but differs in an important way from studies that identify conflict exposure based on an aggregation or count of individuals that have been exposed. Rather than placing primacy on individual exposure to violence, it considers communities as a whole to be treated with war exposure. The key driver is not firsthand exposure but existing knowledge that a violent incident of armed conflict affected their own household or other households in their community. This harm can include pillage of households by armed groups when its inhabitants have fled, as they often do in eastern DR Congo.

The definition of armed conflict as a shared community event is inspired by work on social memory, suggesting that how people remember armed conflict matters for social outcomes. Memories are shared, commemorated and remembered through social interaction with other members of the community.<sup>23</sup> Part of conflict's effects stem from how people remember, think about, and talk about incidents of armed conflict within their communities. Shared knowledge and memory of local exposure to armed conflict can beget shared fears among community members as well as shared changes in behaviors.

Through this definition and approach, this dissertation contributes both to literature on the micro dynamics of war as well as the literature on post-conflict peace. It examines

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<sup>23</sup>Rather than individual attributes, some psychologist and politic scientists emphasize that memories are social - social and commemorated through oral histories and social practices. See for example Middleton and Edwards (1990) and Bernhard and Kubik (2016).

the microdynamics of armed conflict by examining what happens in the aftermath of local violence. But, in the aggregate, it describes broadly shared social dynamics in the post-conflict period where many communities have been exposed to incidents of armed violence.

While the local definition of armed conflict described here moves away from battle death thresholds for defining what constitutes war, the findings from this dissertation are most relevant to wars conventionally defined as internal or civil wars, both internationalized and non-internationalized in nature. Civil wars tend to be fought within the territory of the state and entail substantively different and often more intertwined interactions between armed groups and local communities. Civil wars are accompanied by a looming local threat associated with commitment problems and fears of recurrence even after the conflict ends (Walter 2002).

The applicability of the theory to international wars, however, will vary since the location of fighting may occur completely outside a state or set of states at war. Then, in communities where fighting occurs, there may be different and/or fewer interactions between armed actors and local communities. The state may also differ in how it seeks to protect communities against an external threat in international as compared to civil wars. Even so, given the focus on local exposure in this study, the findings are likely relevant to geographic locations or contested zones where international wars continually recur and populations are left unprotected by their states.

While this study begins unbundling armed conflict (as a treatment) by looking specifically at local conflict exposure, examining different forms of armed violence remains beyond the scope of this study. This decision is, in part, due to the single context in which the study takes place. Armed groups in eastern DR Congo (particularly in the area of my study) share many of the same repertoires of violence. This means that many of the areas will be subject to a similar “treatment” of local violence. Yet, local exposure to violence that departs substantially from the violence in this case may yield different findings from this study.

Additional implications follow from my focus on this case. People within all communities

in this study live in a state of insecurity, subject to everyday, often violent crime. Thus, claims made throughout this dissertation are in reference to episodes of armed conflict as distinct from general insecurity associated with day-to-day crime. However, this differentiation between general insecurity and an episode of local armed conflict is not meant to suggest the inapplicability of the findings to other large-scale forms of violence that share similar features, such as community exposure to gang warfare and terrorism.

## 1.5 Broad hypotheses about armed conflict

There are many claims in the scholarly and policy literature about armed conflict's effects on violence against women. While potential trajectories of change are numerous, mechanisms about how and why armed conflict has effects tend to remain either untheorized or untested. In addition, the causal identification of armed conflict is weak, again making it unclear what components of war might bring about changed levels of violence against women.

This introductory chapter shifts the focus from violence against women to the social sanctioning of this violence in the aftermath of war. Social sanctioning reflects how people think about crimes and treat the perpetrators in their day-to-day lives. Social sanctioning is normatively important, but also constrains the legal realm as ordinary people and law enforcement decide whether and how to punish crimes.

Thinking about how armed conflict continues to affect violence against women in its wake requires broader thinking about how armed conflict transmits effects. How might armed conflict change preferences of ordinary people that are not directly associated with armed groups?

To this end, I have introduced theories of norm and preference change and situated them in relation to violence against women and the social sanctioning of this violence. I have presented several broad processes, all based on theories of norm change, about how armed conflict can affect social sanctioning of violence against women in the aftermath of war.

First, armed conflict may change individual *preferences* related to social sanctioning of






Figure 1.3: Logic Chart

violence against women. As described in this chapter, and as I will argue further, changes to preferences can occur because of changes in norms. But in my exploration of the mechanisms that lead to preference change, I also examine the potential relationships between preferences and institutional and demographic change.

Second, armed conflict may change *group dynamics* that affect sanctioning of violence against women. Group dynamics describe how preferences aggregate in a social environment - where social sanctioning actually takes place. This pathway is important to explore, because group dynamics could render changes in preferences inconsequential for social sanctioning, could have no effects, or could magnify the effects of preference change.

Finally, armed conflict may affect social sanctioning of violence against women in other ways. I provide some evaluation of these alternative trajectories, but do not rule out changes in social sanctioning that are not relevant to changes in attitudes towards that sanctioning or to changes in group dynamics. In other words, structural explanations and institutional explanations are set aside except as they relate to preference and norm change.

For example, armed conflict may directly affect *violence against women* which, in turn, may affect social sanctioning of violence against women. This may be because exposure to violence against women leads communities to learn about the attitudes and beliefs of others as they engage in social sanctioning. Because of its relationship with attitudes and norms, I explore this trajectory. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, there is little evidence for this theory.

This chapter has defined armed conflict as a local experience that can continue to affect behaviors, attitudes and norms in its wake. How does community exposure to armed conflict affect social sanctioning of violence against women in eastern DR Congo? How do effects vary in comparison to other crimes?

This dissertation examines the effects of armed conflict on social sanctioning of two locally perpetrated crimes against women: rape and domestic violence. As detailed in later chapters, both crimes refer to crimes perpetrated by community insiders. Then, for comparison, I examine armed conflict's effects on a third local crime: stealing by a community insider. The entire study is based on research in South Kivu, eastern DR Congo.

### 1.5.1 Chapter Outline

The central argument of this dissertation is the theory of protective masculine norms - a theory about how social sanctioning changes when men are driven to protect as a result of war. The theory of protective masculine norms is developed over the course of this dissertation in several stages.

Because protective masculine norms are broadly shared across societies, but examined in the context of eastern DR Congo, **Chapter 2** investigates the nature of war, criminal and family law, authorities, and punishment processes in eastern DR Congo to understand how the theory and findings travel to other contexts.

**Chapter 3** motivates the theory of protective masculine norms by providing the empirical foundation for differentiating between forms of violence against women and placing them in a

framework with other crimes. Contrary to prominent theories about empowerment, backlash and violent masculinities; armed conflict fails to affect preferences for punishing rape and domestic violence in a unidirectional way. Armed conflict increases how severely people prefer to punish rape and stealing, but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic violence. The qualitative evidence underscores the relevance of disaggregating crimes against women in terms of public community threats and private crimes.

**Chapter 4** explicates the theory of protective masculine norms, grounding it in the literature and in the case. I examine the quantitative and descriptive evidence related to alternative hypotheses that may account for armed conflict's effects: exposure to wartime crimes, security structures and demographic change. Finding little support for alternative theories, I describe the design of and results from qualitative work probing central propositions within protective masculine norms theory: Protection is gendered; people have shared memories of conflict incidents; this affects their subsequent behaviors; and internal crimes are related to perceived provision of protection.

Since sanctioning is a public act subject to group dynamics and norms, **Chapter 5** examines the implications of protective masculine norms and the findings about preference change for how groups choose to punish crimes. Armed conflict may affect how groups choose to punish crimes by changing individual-level preferences, by changing group dynamics, neither, or both. I find that armed conflict affects group preferences primarily through individual-level preference change, underscoring the relevance of preference change for social sanctioning in the aftermath of war. The data also show that group dynamics make people's preferences more extreme, suggesting the importance of norms to shaping preferences - a central tenet of the theory.

**Chapter 6** discusses the emerging research agenda of protective masculine norms and its contributions. Questions remain about levels of violence against women after war. But, already protective masculine norms has begun to unify a formerly disparate set of findings emerging about armed conflict, domestic violence, and social and legal change.

# Chapter 2: The Case of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

## 2.1 Introduction

This dissertation examines the effects of armed conflict on social sanctioning of crimes in eastern DR Congo, arguing that conflict affects community norms, preferences for, and sanctioning of violence against women. The previous chapter introduced the case of eastern DR Congo, developed the concept of social sanctioning, and described how I have chosen to define armed conflict to study its effects in this case. However, attention to the specificities of the case can yield insights into the extent to which the theory of protective masculine norms and the findings related to social sanctioning travel beyond this case.

What are the sources of armed group violence and theories of why violence has developed and continues in this way? What do the social and legal spheres of sanctioning rape, domestic violence, and stealing - the outcomes of focus throughout this dissertation - look like in this case? This chapter provides an overview of the armed conflict, violence against women, law, and social practice surrounding these issues.

My account of the history and development of armed conflict in eastern DR Congo draws from my reading of secondary sources. I choose to rely on secondary sources to integrate insights from scholars focused solely on explaining this vast and complex war. Less is known about the social context of violence against women such as local processes of punishment and preferences for punishing local crimes against women in eastern DR Congo. To provide this social context, I incorporate data from elite interviews in 20 villages and original survey research across 700 villages in this context.

These insights provide a framework for understanding the methods and findings in the empirical chapters that follow (Chapters 3-5) and establish the centrality of social sanctioning for the treatment of crime perpetrators in eastern DR Congo.

## 2.2 Background

Much has been written about war, armed conflict, and violence against women, particularly sexual violence in DR Congo. And, there are many frameworks for understanding the complexities of violence that have taken place and the violence that continues (Prunier 2008; Lemarchand 2012; Autesserre 2010; Turner 2007; Stearns 2012).

DR Congo (known as Zaire between 1971 and 1997) emerged as an independent state in 1960, after many years of repressive and extractive rule by Belgian colonizers. DR Congo is a large vast land estimated to be the size of Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway combined. Decolonized during the wave of ideological struggle against communism, a coup left DR Congo securely in the pro-Western hands of Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, who was later “elected” into power.

During Mobutu’s reign, the economy plummeted from \$377 per capita in 1958 in the hands of the colonizers to \$117 in 1993 (Van Acker and Vlassenroot 2000; as cited in Autesserre 2010). As the anti-communist struggle subsided, Western support for the dictator dried up. The regime used corruption, violence and divide-and-rule tactics to maintain rule; at one point Mobutu is estimated to have owned 95% of the country’s wealth (Reno 1999, 152–54). Not only is DR Congo vast, but it is also ethnically diverse with over 200 identified ethnic groups. Three of the four largest ethnic groups are Bantu, with the four major ethnic groups comprising 45 percent of the population (Agency 2016).

With his rule threatened, particularly in the east, Mobutu sought to maintain power by fomenting divisions between ethnic groups - divisions which set the grounds for the ethnic character of the wars that were to follow. Importantly, “nonindigenous” “Banyanmulenge” populations from Rwanda were increasingly excluded from society.<sup>24</sup> Land and political rights were expropriated (Autesserre 2010, 115:130–42). The military was allowed to pay themselves by preying on these excluded populations (Autesserre 2010, 115:56–57).

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<sup>24</sup>This “nonindigenous”, “Banyanmulenge” population had settled in the eastern regions either forcefully during the colonization period or in response waves of ethnic conflict in their country of origin.

Thus, when the Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994 and Hutu extremists and other new “nonindigenous” “Bayanmelege” fled over the border, the stage was set for armed conflict to erupt. The new Tutsi regime that took power in Rwanda after the Rwandan genocide became concerned about the treatment of their ethnic kin just over the Rwandan border in eastern DR Congo. In addition, the fledgling Rwandan government recovering from genocide now had a security issue just over the border as Hutu extremists fed off the refugee/aid camps to refuel with the ostensible aim to liberate Rwanda from Tutsi rule.

## **2.3 Wars in DR Congo**

Between 1994 and 2003, DR Congo experienced large scale war, a war that was actually two wars waged in a consecutive series. The situation became so complex that its second war is referred to it as Africa’s World War. An estimated 5.3 million lives are estimated to have been lost in this war largely due to indirect deaths such as disease and starvation.

In the First Congo War, Rwanda along with other neighboring African states intervened to overthrow Mobutu Ses Seko through the AFDL rebel group. Despite foreign actors seeking to negotiate a settlement, the AFDL was able to achieve military victory and install President Laurent Kabila who was loyal to the Rwandan regime. However, when the legitimacy of his rule was questioned by internal forces, Kabila turned on his foreign backers and sent foreign military advisors and others out of the country. In response, Rwanda along with several other African leaders fomented a second rebellion to overthrow the newly installed president. This time, support for Kabila’s overthrow did not receive as widespread of support and was actively opposed by several neighboring countries (Autesserre 2010, 115:48; Group and others 2000). Without a preponderance of force, the result was a military stalemate during which many outside actors were fomenting and backing rebel groups, rebel groups were splintering, and wartime economies structured around mines had the opportunity to consolidate. The international community worked to establish a peace agreement, installing a transitional government in 2003 that ultimately reflected the distribution of power among

armed groups.<sup>25</sup> Finally, elections were held in 2006 and “peace” declared.

But to what extent can eastern DR Congo be characterized as “post-conflict” at all? Despite peace agreements, two elections, and repeated references to DR Congo as a post-conflict country, ongoing violence has continued in the eastern regions at various levels and intensities throughout and since the transition and elections. By some accounts, in 2017, over 120 armed groups were estimated to be operating in eastern DR Congo alone - a proliferation from an estimated 70 armed groups in 2015 from the same source (Stearns and Vogel 2017).<sup>26</sup>

Autesserre (2010) has shown just how inapplicable the “post-conflict” framework is to the case of eastern DR Congo and described how the post-conflict frame has impeded international efforts to address the sources of the continued armed conflict. In my references to post-conflict throughout this dissertation, I refer to the immediate wake of exposure to violence by armed groups at the community level. But, I do not consider DR Congo to be a country experiencing peace in the aftermath of war. My study explores variation in exposure to armed conflict, comparing the social context of armed conflict in communities recently exposed to war and communities that have not been recently exposed. This study thus remains about violence at the micro-level and does not address macro-framings of Congo as Congo at peace or Congo at war.

Through this approach and in line with existing scholarship on DR Congo, this study will highlight how armed violence continues to shape people’s everyday experiences and everyday actions *in-between* local episodes of armed violence. By exploring variation in micro-level exposure to armed conflict violence this study seeks to understand micro-level changes that aggregate up to macro level change. To clarify, I do suggest that community level changes will aggregate to affect the social environment in the peace that follows war. Thus, the findings that emerge from examining local-level variation in conflict exposure will be relevant in war’s

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<sup>25</sup>Prior to the transitional government, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001. He was killed by a body guard. His son, Joseph took power following his demise.

<sup>26</sup>These estimates have been provided by the Congo Research Group based on local research of affiliates located in North and South Kivu. These numbers include very small, splinter armed groups that appear to operate with reasonable levels of independence.

aftermath when exposure to violence across communities is broadly shared, but will be more localized when exposure to armed conflict is not widely shared across locations.

Other specifics about armed violence in DR Congo are also important to consider. For example, the conflict has both an international and a domestic character, which has contributed to the complexity in determining the motivations for continued violence in the war. Up to fourteen state actors are identified to have fought on the ground as part of Congo's Second War (Autesserre 2010, 115:49) after the ceasefire during the transition period (1999 to 2003) alone. Over the past 20 years, states have engaged in the armed conflict by initiating, supporting, or aligning with rebel groups inside and outside DR Congo's territory.<sup>27</sup> In addition, there is an extremely high proliferation of armed groups. As armed groups begin to interact with local conflict dynamics, new splinter groups continue to emerge with different loyalties and agendas depending on location (Autesserre 2010, 115:144).<sup>28</sup>

Two other actors bear specific mention in relation to the context. First, underscoring the internationalized nature of the war, there has been a United Nations peacekeeping mission (known as MONUC from 1999-2010, now MONUSCO) deployed in eastern DR Congo since 1999. Its long standing and robust presence leads it to be considered a relevant actor in the conflict.

Second is the Armed Forces of of DR Congo (FARDC). The FARDC, often underequipped, underpaid, and accused of human rights abuses, have aligned with different rebel groups (or Mai Mai) to undertake operations over time. The FARDC has also absorbed many armed groups. During campaigns to establish control in the east and gain a monopoly of violence, the FARDC has incorporated members of many of these groups at different points in time. In this process, there has been infiltration of norms from these independent group within the FARDC. The loyalties of subunits are often questioned (Baaz and Verweijen 2013).

While there are many relatively autonomous armed groups operating in eastern DR

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<sup>27</sup>Some armed groups are backed by Rwanda; some Uganda; fewer by Burundi

<sup>28</sup>The splintering of armed groups is also facilitated by the low availability and high cost of communication and travel from area to area.



Congo, there are also reasons to think of the violence that armed groups and the military perpetrate as related. All parties in DR Congo (peacekeepers sometimes included) have been characterized as behaving violently towards the Congolese population. In interviews in my sample of villages in eastern DR Congo in 2016 and 2018 that asked about past notable events that occurred in those villages, the main groups that people tended to differentiate in the areas of my research in South Kivu were Rwandaese or Bayanumelege, the Mai Mai, the military, or more specifically the FNL (the group for the liberation of the Hutu people).

Another important consideration is the the extreme brutality of armed groups towards the DR Congo population.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, over the course of the war, armed groups, including the military, have extracted from, raped and abused the population. Most of the violence associated with the armed conflict in DR Congo takes the form of armed group on civilian violence rather than armed group on armed group violence.

As with the history and origins of the war, there are many accounts of why armed groups perpetrate such brutal violence against the population. Focus group accounts suggest that this practice emerged in response to perpetration of violence by Rwandaese residents and refugees in DR Congo (Kelly et al. 2012). However, allegations that violence was imported by Rwandan genocidaires and then replicated by other groups sit all-too-comfortably with dominant modes of ethnic othering of “non-indigenous” populations that emerged over the course of colonial rule and in the Mobutu era (1965-1997). Beginning in this era, the government was unable to pay the military members adequately and allowed for pillage and plunder as part of this pursuit, a practice that seems to continue today (Gordon 2016, Chapter 2). In seeking to gain dwindling control over the eastern regions of DR Congo in the face of a shrinking economy, then-President Mobutu facilitated the expropriation of non-indigenous ethnic communities, Rwandaese (Bayanmunelege) in particular - often

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<sup>29</sup>I won't recount the horrific stories easily found in media accounts, but I do note that stories of extreme brutality of armed group violence is reflected even in randomly sampled interviews in my interview populations - strongly suggesting that stories of extreme brutality are not outliers or cherry picked by advocacy organizations seeking to improve victim services.

allowing or encouraging the military to take what they need by preying on these unwelcome ethnic groups (Reno 1999, Chapter 5; Autesserre 2010, 115:56).

In Weinstein's (2006) framework for thinking about civilian abuse, brutal violence against populations becomes more probable when armed groups are not dependent on the population for support. The eastern regions of DR Congo are indeed resource rich, with reserves such as gold, diamonds, cobalt, and columbo-tantalite (used in electronic equipment) and foreign sources systematically contribute to the rise and sustenance of armed groups. Perhaps the centrality of resources to the armed conflict supports an atmosphere conducive to brutal violence against civilians. However, resource-driven conflicts are not unique to eastern DR Congo. And in many cases, extraction here is dependent on civilian assistance, with the civilian population being abducted as porters to help move goods. This does not align with the characterization of an armed group devoid of reliance on the population (Baaz and Stern 2013, 68–71). The focus on extraction also seems to feed into the dominant characterization of armed conflict in eastern DR Congo as criminal rather than a political exercise.<sup>30</sup>

What creeps into conversations time and time again about the nature of violence in DR Congo is essentialism about a pre-existing or emergent culture of violence. The image of savagery told in tales such as Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* shapes how people perceive norms of violence in Congo today.<sup>31</sup> The common understanding among Western societies (or the Global North) is that violence in DR Congo has been normalized due to repeated exposure to brutal violence throughout the colonial era, the Mobutu era, and then experiences of two large-scale armed conflicts.

Autesserre recounts a conversation with a Western diplomat about the normalization of violence: "It's a human tragedy... but... it is a country that has been through, certainly since 1996, a decade of pretty serious ongoing violence, and people become somewhat numb to that..." (2010, 115:75). Despite this widespread assumption, research continually fails

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<sup>30</sup>In addition, considering eastern DR Congo as a "post-conflict" context facilitates the interpretation of armed groups as criminal and devoid of political goals or grievances (Autesserre 2010, 115:72–74).

<sup>31</sup>See, for example, Dunn (2003).

to show that violence has been normalized in Congolese society. Autesserre (2010, pg. 79) describes:

All of my eastern Congolese interviewees regarded the ongoing bloodshed as being, without question, out of the norm. Their reactions to incidents of torture, fighting, and massacres clearly showed that they were far from habituated or “numb” to such events. Even perpetrators did not consider the violence that they committed as “normal” or “natural.”

Research that seeks to understand perpetration of violence from the eyes of the perpetrators also finds little evidence that violence is perceived as normal by the perpetrators. Baaz and Stern describe how FARDC members have come to see the state and higher-ups as cheating them and not giving them their due. They remain unpaid, hungry, and distrustful of their authorities. They perceive that the population also fails to treat them with respect (Baaz and Stern 2008, 81–82). They respond to abuse with abuse.<sup>32</sup> Empirical work by Gordon (2016, Chapter 2) suggests that, indeed, the perpetration of violence by FARDC members is associated with failed receipt of pay.

Armed group members may be barred from achieving what society expects of them (and what they aspire to) and perpetrate violence in response. Rather than violence becoming normative, a sense of failed masculinities may account for the brutal nature of violence - borne of suffering with the intent to cause suffering - on the part of armed groups (including armed group members).

In line with this scholarship, this dissertation fails to find evidence that violence has been normalized. People continue to be outraged by most violence. Rather than normalizing violence, my interviews suggest that the alternative, peacemaking, is highly revered.

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<sup>32</sup>For another example of the failed masculinities argument in the case of DR Congo, see Lwambo (2013).

## 2.4 Violence against Women

Research on the war in DR Congo - and particularly research on its effects on violence against women - cannot take place without attention to the widespread and brutal nature of sexual violence perpetrated as part of the armed conflict. Armed groups including the military have perpetrated sexual violence against members of the population. Studies have sought to examine the motivations for rape. Based on narrative analyses of interviews with soldiers that have perpetrated rape, Baaz and Stern (2009) describe how some rape is characterized as “evil” rape representing active aberration with societal norms. But, another type of rape that soldiers describe is “lust” rape, which is of a different character.

Irrespective of perpetrator motivations, it is evident that sexual violence is perpetrated by many armed groups in this context. A quantitative account of armed groups perpetration from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset provides an systematically collected overview of the nature of this violence (Cohen and Nordås 2014). This dataset draws from reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. State Department to estimate sexual violence by armed groups in terms of 4 categories: Massive, Several/Many, Some, and None reported.

The Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset codes this information for conflict actors in PRIO’s conflict actors dataset.<sup>33</sup> It then continues to code mentions of armed group perpetration in the 5 years following armed conflict.<sup>34</sup>

Figure 2.1 describes the distribution of armed groups accounted for in the SVAC dataset. Table 2.1 presents the actor-specific levels of perpetration across the three different sources for the same time period. The reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department describe 10 of the 21 identified actors as perpetrating sexual violence - half of which are identified to perpetrate on a massive scale. All sources suggest

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<sup>33</sup>For a description of armed conflict definitions and coding schemes see (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

<sup>34</sup>Because the time period after 2010 does not fit either of these criteria, the data only provide a historical account of armed groups operating in DR Congo and accounts of their perpetration of sexual violence prior to 2010.




Figure 2.1: Actors (State and Non-State) in SVAC Dataset by year

that the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo perpetrate sexual violence at the highest level.

In the media, DR Congo is described as the quintessential case of sexual violence during conflict.<sup>35</sup> The influx of international aid and programming associated with this particular form of violence presents important challenges to studying violence against women in eastern DR Congo. First, when discussing violence against women, people assume that the focus of my research is on sexual violence by armed groups, in line with the dominant frame. My research agenda, however, seeks to consider violence perpetrated against women that is not sexual in nature and to consider violence not solely perpetrated by armed groups. Each conversation requires explicit effort to direct the discussion to the topic at hand.

Second, scholars have raised ethical concerns about the “fetishization” of studying sexually violent acts such as rape, both in the context of armed conflict and eastern DR Congo (Meger 2016; Autesserre 2012; Baaz and Stern 2013). This dissertation confronts the ethical issue of

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<sup>35</sup>Autesserre (2012) describes the trajectory of how international attention began to shift to the issue of sexual violence and addressing it in eastern DR Congo. In 2002, Human Rights Watch drew attention to this feature of the war and its brutality.

Table 2.1: Armed Group Perpetration of Sexual Violence in Dataset

Actor	Years Party to Conflict	Max SV (US State)	Max SV (Amnesty)	Max SV (HRW)
AFDL	7	0	0	0
ALiR (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda)	10	0	0	0
Angola	10	0	0	0
BDK	3	0	0	0
Chad	7	0	0	0
Civil Guard	7	0	0	0
CNDP	4	1	3	1
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	17	3	3	3
FDD (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)	11	0	0	1
FDLR	12	2	1	3
FNL (National Liberation Forces)	11	2	0	2
Mai Mai (Mayi Mayi)	12	2	2	2
MLC	9	2	3	2
Namibia	9	0	0	0
RCD	9	3	2	2
RCD-ML	7	0	0	1
Rwanda	11	2	1	2
Special Presidential Division	2	0	0	0
Uganda	10	2	0	0
White Legion	6	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	9	0	0	0

further “fetishizing” rape in war narratives in three ways: by (1) shifting attention away from perpetration by armed groups (2) asking about positive aspects of how societies choose to punish this violence and (3) seeking to understand people’s preferences for punishing violent crimes including crimes against women rather than superimposing norms about how people should prefer to punish crimes.<sup>36</sup>

Given the potential for research and policy inundation in the area of violence against women, I ask participants in 79 focus groups (which will be described in more detail later in this study) about which crimes (if any) under discussion (rape, domestic violence and stealing) the state should be more active. Sixty-one percent suggested that the state should more

<sup>36</sup>Congolese researchers that I worked closely with often commented offhand that asking people’s preferences on this matter was a surprising and different approach.

actively address rape.<sup>37</sup> While there are many components to tease apart in this question (e.g. potential beliefs about associations with aid combined with perceptions that the state might learn their responses), the responses - at minimum - suggest that people are not averse to programming on this issue. Rather, it seems that the influx of programming on rape is encouraged by communities that have been repeatedly receiving such programming (all cases in this sample of 20 villages).

Even while shifting the frame, this study continues to address violence against women and, in doing so, highlights women's insecurity and vulnerability in DR Congo. Indeed, violence against women is a large issue that warrants attention. But it is also a large issue elsewhere in the world.

The 2013-14 Demographic Health Survey found that 52 percent of women across DR Congo had experienced physical or sexual abuse by their intimate partners in their lifetimes, with 71.5 percent of women reporting that they were afraid of their partner most of the time. Estimated levels of rape or sexual violence in South Kivu, where my study takes place, were estimated at 48 percent in their lifetimes and 24 percent in the past 12 months (Ministère du Plan et Suivi de la Mise oeuvre de la Révolution de la Modernité and International 2014, p 20-21).<sup>38</sup> As described in the introductory paragraphs of Chapter 1, these estimates are not much different than reported in other countries (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2006). In my focus on DR Congo, I make no claims of exceptionality in this regard.

Some have suggested that the perpetration of sexual violence by armed groups has further harmed the status of women in this society (CEDAW 2011, pg. 24), but this remains an empirical questions in need of study - something that I examine indirectly in Chapter 3. While DR Congo is a member of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination of Women, women continue to be unequal members of society as evidenced in the roles that

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<sup>37</sup>Eighty-seven percent of focus groups described wanting more state intervention in terms of stealing. In contrast, only fifteen percent of focus groups suggested that the government should play more of a role in addressing domestic violence.

<sup>38</sup>Citation for 71.5 percent was calculated using Demographic Health Survey Data (International 2012).

Table 2.2: Example Developments in Family Law

	1970 Family Law	2018 Family Law
Article 444	The husband is the head of household. He must protect his wife; she must obey her husband	Remains unchanged
Article 448	The wife must obtain the permission of her husband on all legal acts which require her to provide a service that must be given in person	Any legal act requiring the performance of an obligation may be undertaken only with the agreement of both spouses
Article 454	The wife is obliged to live with her husband and follow him wherever he sees fit to reside the husband is obliged to accommodate her	The spouses undertake to live together wherever they choose to reside in the interest of the marriage

women play in the home. Women do all of the housework, care for the children, and are responsible for meal preparation (Department 2018; Pierotti, Lake, and Lewis 2018; Sleg, Barker, and Levtov 2014; Windt, Humphreys, and Sierra 2018). At the same time, women’s labor outside the home is visible to anyone that visits eastern DR Congo; women can be seen walking on the roadside transporting heavy sacks of grain and other goods on their backs to the nearest market or city.<sup>39</sup> These are the more fortunate women also; the less well off do not have goods to sell.

## 2.5 Legal Codes

The Family Code of 1970 provides the basis for contemporary family law in DR Congo, both reflecting and enshrining the gender inequality that I have described (Htun and Weldon 2015). Table 2.2 provides an example of three laws from the Family Code of 1970 and how the laws have been amended in the past 10 years.

Article 444 in Table 2.2 enshrines men as head of the household and stipulates that wives must obey. To my knowledge, this article is still part of the body of law regulating marriage. The state’s official explanation for keeping this law (in response to international investigation)

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<sup>39</sup>Estimates suggests that women produce 75 percent of food in rural areas in addition to their labor in the household (CEDAW 2011, pg. 18)



is that “all ethnic groups share the differentiated perception of male and female roles. Family relations between men and women are built on an underlying inequality between man, the husband and father who is head of the family, and woman, the wife and mother who manages the household”(CEDAW 2011).<sup>40</sup>.

The wording of Article 444, the centerpoint of family law, even uses the term protection to describe the relationship between men and women. This gives initial credence to the claim that I make throughout this dissertation - that there is a widespread belief that men should act as *protectors* of women which I will develop further in Chapter 4.

Despite inequalities, domestic violence is defined as a crime under Congolese law. However, it does not outline a specific penalty for domestic violence and it does *not* consider intimate partner rape to be such a crime (Department 2018).<sup>41</sup>

Sexual violence (by non-intimate partners; presumably by armed groups) is treated very differently under Congolese law. Since conflict’s onset in 1994, DR Congo has strengthened its laws punishing rape and improved the legal system, even prescribing appropriate punishment. An act of rape is punishable by up to 20 years in prison, with a minimum sentence of 5 years (Department 2018, Section 6). Scholars of international human rights have written that the legal system and domestic trial proceedings produce “frequent and high-quality judicial decisions” (Lake 2014b, pg. 515).<sup>42</sup> While imperfectly applied and underreported, rape sentences prescribed by law are frequently imposed (Lake 2014a; Lake, Muthaka, and Walker 2016).

International investigators have recognized the gap between law and practice for punishing domestic violence, suggesting that legal reforms have been undertaken but not implemented

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<sup>40</sup>However, this is unclear. The CEDAW report DR Congo said that it was updating this portion of the Family Code. In a series of investigations in relation to DR Congo’s CEDAW membership, investigators have repeatedly raised questions about Article 444. DR Congo’s official response has been in support of keeping Article 444 (CEDAW 2011; CEDAW 2012, 5)

<sup>41</sup>In such a case, they rely on “ordinary criminal code.”

<sup>42</sup>Lake argues that the puzzle of DR Congo’s high-quality judicial rulings can be attributed to the weak nature of the Congolese state and the sizeable active presence of international actors that have worked to install these developments without state obstruction (Lake 2014a).

in DR Congo. The investigation committee of Committee for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women demanded a response about domestic violence in DR Congo (CEDAW 2018, pg. 3):

“Please also indicate what actions have been taken, in line with the Convention, to educate and inform the public, including traditional leaders, teachers, judges, defence and law enforcement forces, political figures and boys and men in particular, about the social impact and consequences of domestic violence in order to make such violence an unacceptable violation of human rights.”

Such gaps between law and practice reflect the need to look beyond the legal system to examine conflict’s effects on everyday punishment practices and norms, which might intervene in top-down measures to address violence against women in eastern DR Congo.

## **2.6 Processes in Practice**

How do communities manage local crimes in eastern DR Congo? What are the processes involved in punishing people that perpetrate crimes? In order to understand how armed conflict affects social sanctioning, it is necessary to understand the practices for punishing rape, domestic violence, and stealing in communities in eastern DR Congo. Based on original interviews with village leaders (Chiefs) across 20 villages held in 2016 and 8 elite interviews with villagers that aid the chief in local conflict resolution held in 2018 (Elders/Sages); I describe local processes, highlighting areas where law and practice fail to converge.

In villages in eastern DR Congo, traditional village chiefs and chiefs of the groupement (one administrative level higher) are tasked with resolving inter-personal conflict within the village. Both leaders can mete out punishment, with the chief of the groupement becoming involved more often when issues are large or cannot be resolved by the village chief.

Chiefs play a quasi-state, quasi-traditional role. The organization of rural areas draws

both from traditional structure and adapts them to the state's needs.<sup>43</sup> The village chiefs and groupement chiefs are powerful authorities, particularly because they determine who can stay in the village and who can obtain land (Autesserre 2010, 115:130–31).

The law prohibits extrajudicial settlements for crimes of rape, clearly defining prison sentences as the appropriate form of punishment for this crime. Yet while outside the scope of the law, extrajudicial punishments are commonplace in all of the villages that I studied in eastern DR Congo.

There are cases in which extrajudicial punishment occurs from the bottom up. When asked what would likely happen if villagers caught a thief, chiefs from the majority of 20 villages describe how it is almost unimaginable that the thief would be brought to their doorstep without first being badly beaten. Villages chiefs tended to view part of their role as keeping crime perpetrators out of the angry hands of villagers.

However, extrajudicial justice is not only carried out by villagers, but meted out by village chiefs themselves. For example, when the chief demands that the perpetrator of a crime make a payment to the family of a rape victim, this engagement falls outside the scope of what is prescribed by law. In cases where a young unmarried woman is raped by a man from the village, law prescribes a jail sentence for the perpetrator. Yet, forced marriage and fines paid by the perpetrator to the family of the victim are commonplace (Department 2018, Section 3). In discussions with village chiefs, an overwhelming majority report that such a crime is and should be handled locally through fines and marriage. Authorities describe how marriage would bring responsibility to the male perpetrator and would make it such that he did not perpetrate again.<sup>44</sup>

Part of the breakdown between law and practice seems to manifest (or at least legitimate itself) through definitions. When asking village chiefs about whether rape was perpetrated by

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<sup>43</sup>For example, the successions of Groupement chiefs do not go uncontested. In fact, some of the main violence reported during the past 5 years within one of the territories that I worked in was in relation to a groupement chief succession dispute.

<sup>44</sup>Note that here, marriage is described more in terms of a social punishment as opposed to a social reward.

villagers in the village, the first answer tended to be, “no”. Yet, this “no” was often followed by a statement about this “other” related category that they considered to be early marriage which also fit the account of rape described in our discussion. By defining rape within their village as something else, chiefs are able to circumvent dissonance between law and practice. For perpetrators of “real” rape, traditional leaders expressed that there was nothing that they could do to protect a perpetrator from a jail sentence.

The village chief is advised or assisted by a group of elders (also known as sages) comprised of around 4 men and 4 women to aid with conflict resolution. These elders attend the meetings during which the chief renders judgement.<sup>45</sup>

I asked elders within each village to describe the typical local processes for handling inter-personal conflicts.<sup>46</sup> Villagers begin by taking issues to the chief. If the chief and elders together are unable to resolve the conflict, then the issue goes to the chief of the groupement (one level of jurisdiction higher and still within the traditional structure of rule). Following that, villagers will take issues to the police - with the potential that perpetrators may at that point be taken to jail.

While there is some role differentiation between the state police and local traditional authorities, the elders tend to describe the interaction as an ordered process related to severity. The police mainly use fines and jail as a form of punishment. The village chief can dictate counsel, payments between parties, and expulsion from the village. The chief can also contact the police in cases where a crime warrants jail. Thirty-five percent (248 of 709) village chiefs interviewed in 2015 had worked with the police or a tribunal in the past 6 months alone.<sup>47</sup> In cases where the police take a villager into custody, the chief can also attempt to intervene to support a wrongfully accused individual.<sup>48</sup> Unofficially through action or inaction, the

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<sup>45</sup>Male elders also aid the chief of the groupement. Some female elders indicated that they help the chief to resolve issues related to women but not other issues. It is unclear if men’s roles are delineated in such a way.

<sup>46</sup>In terms of conflict-resolution, a crime is conflict between the aggrieved party and the perpetrator

<sup>47</sup>This is based on a survey of 709 largely rural villages that were part of an evaluation by the International Rescue Committee in 2015. For more details see (Laudati, Mvukiyehe, and Van der Windt 2016).

<sup>48</sup>My interviews with villagers conducted in 2018 describe accounts of Chiefs intervening on behalf of

village chief can also choose to allow villagers to undertake direct vigilante justice against crime perpetrators. Thus, the village chief is truly at the center of choices about punishment, even if he must work with or through the police for outcomes such as jail.

However, villagers do have the option to go directly to the police. In interviews and focus groups, villagers describe how calling the police is costly and fails to resolve conflict. Both chiefs and elders consistently reveal a preference to handle problems locally if at all possible and not to get police involved. Chiefs (and villagers) view the police as corrupt, external and predatory towards the population.

“For a question that would require 2000 Congolese Francs at the level of the village chief, the same question can require 100000 Congolese Francs [when brought to the police]... When a question is handled by the police it always generates a clash. Thus the conflict is aggravated and creates other conflicts (vengeance, settling of accounts, etc.).” (Male elder Village 4)

If a villager brings an issue to the village chief, it costs that villager a round of beer. Fines imposed by the police are much larger and, in the minds of the chiefs and others in the village, fail to actually resolve conflicts between villagers.

“The problem is between the people of the community and is managed within the community. It is how we say here”the dirty laundry is washed by the family.” The man did not pay us the money, he had just given a small case of Primus [beer] which costs less than 10 dollars.“” (Male elder Village 1)

In a similar vein, one female elder describes the utility of counsel offered during meetings with elders and traditional authorities for assuaging conflict.

“Resolving the conflict locally can avoid dispensing a lot of money to the state... and people often give counsel to those persons in conflict.” (Female elder Village 3)

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individuals. This randomly selected interview sample will be described in Chapter 4.

It is potentially not surprising that elders, so close in proximity to the chief, see benefits of the very local conflict resolution process that they are involved in. However, it is also important to note that elder advisory roles in the conflict resolution process are not their “day” jobs. Most are agricultural workers along with their spouses, slightly more educated than the majority of the population, but still relatively poor.

## 2.7 Social Sanctioning

The above description has provided an overview of how local processes of punishment take place. Social sanctioning related to violence against women and other local crime, as described in the previous chapter, also includes less formal behaviors, such as how people engage with perpetrators socially and whether people will tell authorities about crimes that have been perpetrated to begin with. What other positive and negative sanctions might perpetrators consider when deciding whether to perpetrate crime?

In order to learn about norms of social sanctioning related to rape, I asked residents across 700 villages in three provinces in eastern DR Congo about how they perceive social sanctioning in their village. In particular, I asked for an estimation of the proportion of men or male youths in the village that would engage in a range of sanctioning behaviors - both positive and negative in nature.

The questions were asked in the context of a survey related to the evaluation of a large-scale community driven development program in eastern DR Congo. The survey was implemented in 2015 and allows for systematic observation of a wide range of villages that were randomly selected from a large set of sites.<sup>49</sup> Five randomly sampled respondents were surveyed in each village in 2015.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>These sites were mainly ‘off the beaten path’ of most aid work and surveys (other than the DHS). The sample was determined in 2007 prior to the initiation of the community driven development program. For a full description of the program and the evaluation in 2011 see Humphreys, van der Windt, and de la Sierra (Forthcoming).

<sup>50</sup>Because this survey was a follow-up to a survey implemented in 2010-11, the randomly sampled respondents were selected and surveyed in 2011 and surveyed again in 2015. Where respondents from 2011

My questions that were included in the survey asked whether, in the hypothetical case that someone from the village raped an unmarried woman from the village, what proportion of villagers would take the following actions? To assess perceived social encouragement, I asked about the proportion of men or male youths that would encourage someone to repeat the behavior or laugh in response to learning about the crime. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is 0% of the population (“almost no one”) and 5 is 100% (“almost everyone”) of the population, the mean estimated proportion of villagers that would laugh falls just below almost half (1.8). The mean estimated proportion of villagers that would encourage the perpetrator to repeat the action is similar but closer to no one (1.3). Thus, people perceive little support in their village for perpetrating rape.

Other punitive social behaviors that I asked about include beating the perpetrator (fight), sending the perpetrator away from the village, telling the perpetrator not to repeat the action, and making the perpetrator pay the family of the victim. Means for these questions all fall between half of the population (3) and more than half of the population (4). Overall, people expect that others in their communities disapprove acts of rape and will socially sanction perpetrators in these ways.

Another form of social sanctioning linked closely with punishment processes is reporting the perpetrator or event to traditional authorities or the police. On average, respondents estimate that more than half of male or youth villagers would signal the incident to traditional authorities or the police if they know about it. Overall, respondents believe that it is very likely (but not certain) that the traditional authorities and police will punish the perpetrator. People have confidence in both the traditional authorities and the police to punish rape. They expect that the community is supportive of punishment.

Likely because the questions ask about estimations of men and male youths (rather than personal attitudes), there are few differences between men’s estimates and women’s estimates of proportions that would socially sanction. However, women believe that there is a slightly

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could not be reached, replacement respondents were again randomly sampled from the village population.

Table 2.3: Social Sanctioning Norms in eastern DR Congo

	MIN	MAX	N	MEAN	SD	N.F.	MEAN.F.	SD.F.	N.M.	MEAN.M.	SD.M.	P.DIFF.	ICC
<b>Prop. Social Reward</b>													
Laugh	1	5	3149	1.77	1.14	1558	1.74	1.11	1590	1.79	1.17	0.231	0.002
Say to repeat	1	5	3233	1.25	0.77	1602	1.23	0.73	1630	1.27	0.80	0.163	0.151
<b>Prop. Social Punishment</b>													
Fight	1	5	3072	3.16	1.45	1514	3.21	1.45	1557	3.11	1.45	0.054	0.006
Leave Village	1	5	3064	3.46	1.39	1513	3.48	1.39	1550	3.43	1.38	0.356	0.040
Pay Victim Family	1	5	3039	3.76	1.26	1496	3.79	1.24	1542	3.73	1.27	0.215	0.083
Say Not to Repeat	1	5	3214	4.01	1.36	1588	4.00	1.38	1625	4.01	1.34	0.709	0.053
Not Speak to Him	1	5	3069	3.16	1.39	1519	3.16	1.39	1549	3.16	1.39	0.971	-0.030
Marry Victim	1	5	2907	3.02	1.43	1433	3.05	1.44	1473	2.99	1.41	0.217	0.153
<b>Prop. Sociolegal Punishment</b>													
Signal to Authorities	1	5	3216	4.11	1.10	1595	4.12	1.11	1620	4.11	1.10	0.887	-0.129
Signal to the Police	1	5	3197	3.98	1.22	1586	3.98	1.21	1610	3.97	1.22	0.733	-0.127
<b>Punishment Likelihood</b>													
Authorities will Punish	1	5	3244	3.89	1.13	1607	3.96	1.12	1636	3.83	1.15	0.002	0.192
Police will Punish	1	5	3213	3.77	1.13	1594	3.82	1.12	1618	3.73	1.14	0.031	0.046

greater likelihood of punishment by traditional authorities and police than men.

The intracluster correlation coefficients for the proportion of people that would make the perpetrator leave the village, and the proportion that would laugh are all very low, less than 0.1. This suggests that people make different estimations of how their communities treat perpetrators of these crimes. Estimations could instead depend strongly on an individual's reference group of friends or an individual's own personal attitudes. There is a moderate level of intracluster correlation within villages for signaling to authorities suggesting that signaling is more of a shared quality at the village level than some other measures. As one would expect, since referring to similar authorities, the intracluster correlation (ICC) for the likelihood traditional authorities would punish is high, above .2.

## 2.8 Intra-village Crime

Do instances of within-village rape - rape perpetrated by villagers against villagers - *happen* here? To what extent do people's responses to hypothetical questions about rape by fellow villagers and punishment of fellow villagers have basis in reality?

First, I ask about the last time a rape incident like this happened in the respondent's village. Across the 700 villages in the sample, randomly sampled villagers within 60 percent of the villages report such an incident has occurred in their village and the reports are






Figure 2.2: Most recent episode of local rape in village

concentrated in the 5 years prior to the survey. Sixty-five percent of 413 villages reporting such an incident also report that it occurred between 2010 and 2015. Figure 2.2 describes the number of villages with the most recent episode of local rape in that year as derived from villager accounts.

I followed up with a question about whether and how village authorities (either the police or traditional leaders) punished the crime that respondents recalled. Enumerators coded the villager accounts of punishment in terms of several categories. Figure 2.3 describes villager accounts of punishment for crimes that occurred in the past.

Most villagers providing accounts of past punishment recall authorities implementing a prison sentence, but the second category is a much lighter reaction: a reprimand. People also recall perpetrators of rape being hurt by authorities, being expelled by authorities, death at the hands of authorities, and receiving no punishment. There is large variation to be explained, variation which will be explored in later chapters.

In order to further motivate my focus on intra-village crime (again, with the focus in this survey being on rape), I asked another hypothetical question to learn about who people think




Figure 2.3: Proportion of Respondents Reporting Punishments by Traditional Authorities

Table 2.4: Likely Perpetrator of Rape in Village by Group-type

	MIN	MAX	N	MEAN	SD	N.F.	MEAN.F.	SD.F.	N.M.	MEAN.M.	SD.M.	P.DIFF.	ICC
By Villager	1	4	3014	1.85	0.91	1498	1.83	0.91	1515	1.87	0.91	0.209	0.245
By Outsider	1	4	3002	2.16	0.97	1484	2.15	0.98	1518	2.16	0.97	0.797	-0.005
By Armed Group	1	4	2895	2.32	1.05	1421	2.31	1.06	1473	2.33	1.05	0.654	0.036
By Excombatant	1	4	2879	2.36	1.06	1416	2.37	1.07	1462	2.34	1.05	0.499	0.000

perpetrate rape. If someone were a victim of rape in your village, what is the probability that the person that committed the rape was a man from the village, from outside of the village, an armed group or military member, or a former armed group or military member. Table 2.4 describes the mean likelihood estimation for each perpetrator type.

Table 2.4 reveals that the probability that the perpetrator is an outsider, an armed group member, or an excombatant (asked as non-exclusive categories) is indeed higher than the probability that the perpetrator of the rape is by a village insider. However, the difference is not as large as one would expect. The ICC for this response is also quite high, with a value of .245. This means that people in particular villages are reporting reasonably consistent responses about fellow villagers.

## 2.9 Conclusion

Progress for women at the state level often fails to translate into improvements in the daily lives of women (Berry 2015). This dissertation brings a focus to local crime and social processes in order to examine how armed conflict continues to shape the everyday lives of women. The local punishment processes described here highlight potential pathways by which perpetrators might be punished. Individual preferences for punishment held among villagers also influence whether and how perpetrators will be punished. These processes and preferences describe the social context of violence against women, the focus of this study.

Social sanctioning is also relevant outside of DR Congo and to crimes more broadly. Understanding the nuances of the context allows for its components - such as understandings of punishment in terms of severity - to be developed in later chapters in a way that allows for generalizable theory.

Armed conflict, as defined here, also takes on a distinctly local dimension. This chapter has described the shared nature of violence that communities experience at the hands of armed groups. While the nature of violence in DR Congo may be unique and is certainly discussed as such in existing literature, exposure to this violence at the micro-level is largely comparable within this case.

## Chapter 3: Preferences for Punishment

### 3.1 Introduction

How does armed conflict shape the security environment for women? One stream of literature suggests that women are empowered to better defend themselves and provide their own security after armed conflict (Tripp 2015; Mageza-Barthel 2015). Another stream of literature suggests that women are disempowered during conflict and subject to increased threats in its aftermath (Haglund and Richards 2017). One way that armed conflict may affect women's security is by affecting preferences for punishing crimes against them. This chapter derives and assesses theories from established literatures by looking at the effects of armed conflict on preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing in eastern DR Congo.

While social sanctioning inevitably includes both positive and negative sanctioning behaviors, this chapter examines preferences for social sanctioning of crimes through the focus on *preferences for punishment*. People may also hold preferences to respond to perpetrators with social rewards. I set aside such preferences for social rewards to limit the scope of the study and learn about armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishment.

Because preferences for punishment denote levels of disapproval for harmful acts, they reflect the broad, elusive repertoires of violence and discrimination that women experience in their day-to-day lives. Preferences for punishing violence against women are, essentially, attitudes. These attitudes enter into the social sanctioning framework for understanding violence against women in two ways. First, attitudes represent an individual's predilection to perpetrate at a given point in time. One is not likely to prefer to punish a crime that one would also prefer to engage in. Thus the distribution of preferences for punishing violence against women are likely related to levels of violence against women.

Second, preferences for punishment are the first step in the social sanctioning process. For an individual to engage in social sanctioning, that individual must first believe that the particular crime deserves punishment. Only given a preference in favor of social punishment

will people begin to weigh the social costs and benefits (e.g. group dynamics explored in Chapter 5) of engaging in that punishment. In this way, preferences for punishment indicate an individual's willingness to either punish a crime themselves or to facilitate punishment by reporting the crime to others such that they might carry out punishment.

Studies of criminal law and its effectiveness for deterring violent crime describe two important dimensions of punishment: certainty and severity (Gibbs 1968; Gray and Martin 1969). Certainty reflects whether the prescribed punishment will be carried out. Severity reflects the extent to which a punishment brings about inconvenience, suffering or harm to a perpetrator's life.<sup>51</sup> Yet, in the social sanctioning framework, these dimensions are intertwined. How severely people prefer to punish crimes influences whether and how punishment occurs.

In this study, I examine preferences for punishment in terms of severity. How severely should rape, domestic violence, and stealing be punished? How much harm is reasonable to impose on a perpetrator for harms caused? By examining punishments that are commonly applied in the context of eastern DR Congo in terms of severity, this study can better speak to armed conflict's effects on punishment across different legal and social contexts.

This chapter derives three broad hypotheses from the prominent literature relevant to the social context of violence against women in the aftermath of war. I describe the empirical implications of theories about women's empowerment, backlash, and violent masculinities for how severely people prefer to punish rape, domestic violence and stealing. I then examine the implications of these theories of armed conflict's effects using both quantitative and qualitative methods.

The quantitative analysis uses a matched pair design to help causally identify armed conflict's effects and improve upon its measurement in previous studies. This chapter also presents the original protocols that I have developed for measuring people's preferences for punishing local crimes using hypothetical narratives in the context of focus groups. This

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<sup>51</sup>My focus on severity in terms of harm does not mean that punishment serves the goal of bringing harm. It may instead be undertaken to foster community security.

method allows for the close integration of quantitative and qualitative data.

Analyses of these original data from 80 focus groups held across 20 villages in eastern DR Congo alongside interviews with village chiefs in each village reveal no support for prominent theories about women's empowerment, backlash or violent masculinities. As a result, I use the integrated, mixed-method nature of the study to probe the data for insights into armed conflict's effects. The insights from this analysis motivate the theory of protective masculine norms that I present in the following chapter.

## **3.2 Literature and Theory**

Scholars often theorize about rape and domestic violence together - as forms of violence against women affected by similar determinants such as gender attitudes and the acceptability of violence. Despite this, few studies examine data related to non-intimate partner rape and domestic violence together.

At the same time, scholars often consider crimes against women such as rape and domestic violence as distinct from crimes that are not targeted at women because of their gender. For example, while domestic violence is thought of as "a concrete manifestation of inequality between the sexes" (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2005), stealing is not thought about in the same way. This conception leads scholars to specialize in violence against women research without attention to other crimes.

But, a singular focus on violence against women inhibits learning about what uniquely affects violence against women versus what affects violence against women similarly to other crimes. This has important implications for theory. If armed conflict affects violence against women similarly to other crimes, then the gender-specific nature of existing hypotheses needs to be reassessed.

To address this limitation in the literature, I derive hypotheses for how armed conflict may affect rape and domestic violence as forms of violence against women and stealing as a third comparative crime. The comparison with stealing examines similarity and difference

between a more gender-specific and less gender-specific crime in terms of who is directly harmed. Stealing, particularly as measured in this study, directly harms both men and women. Stealing also offers a comparison with non-violent crime - even though people often perceive it as such.

I outline implications of several theories from the prominent literature: theories about what happens when women are empowered after war, how society reacts to their empowerment and the repercussions of violent masculinities developed over the course of the war.

### **3.2.1 Women's Empowerment**

Scholars have described the gendered social processes of civil war and suggested that - counterintuitively - women may be more empowered after armed conflict than they were before (Wood 2008; Tripp 2015; Hughes 2009). Empowerment arguments are based on the idea that armed conflict generates a structural change that, in turn, leads to a change in norms. Men tend to hold dominant positions across most societies and to engage in most of the fighting associated with war. When men go off to war, women step in to fill gaps, taking on new positions previously afforded only to men.<sup>52</sup>

The perspective that war brings opportunities to women emerged from the historical literature describing World War II as a pivotal event that increased United States female labor force participation (Goldin 1991; Schweitzer 1980; Clark and Summers 1982). While centering less on the formal economy, a similar logic appears in descriptions of women's roles in contemporary wars. Conflict scholars describe how women are given more freedom of movement than their male counterparts during wartime due to assumptions that women are civilians while men play combatant roles (Carpenter 2005).<sup>53</sup> The greater space and demand for women's contributions outside the home leads women to take on more daily tasks external to the household that can persist in the aftermath of war.

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<sup>52</sup>Men also die at higher rates than women during war so may not return to refill social or economic positions (Hughes 2009).

<sup>53</sup>This widespread assumption can give women tactical advantages as well (Bloom 2012).

Women not only contribute on the homefront, but also join armed groups and contribute directly to fighting (Wood and Thomas 2017; Cohen 2013b). Their wartime involvement challenges gendered assumptions about women's ability to contribute to political and military spheres (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). In doing so, it disrupts patriarchy and can inspire an emergent feminist agenda and lead women to participate in civil society (Cockburn 2010; Tripp 2015).

Whether contributing to their societies at home or through direct involvement in war fighting - during war - women have new and different opportunities. And, through their newfound positions, women can garner respect for their actions and contributions.<sup>54</sup>

As people begin to hold women in more esteem and as women become better placed in society, both men and women will better regulate the violence perpetrated against women. This logic has roots in the literature relating inequality to violence - where people are more likely to consider and accept violence against others when those others are lesser or less human (MacKinnon 2007). When women are held in higher esteem, their claims of violence will be heard and prosecuted more seriously. For example, when women report violence that they experience to the police, the police will be more likely to file a report. When women are better placed in society, women will have more power to identify, punish, and ultimately deter perpetrators. This is one logic driving arguments for increased women's security force participation. Taken together, after war - when women are better placed and better esteemed - women should find themselves in a community that increasingly chooses to punish crimes against women such as rape and domestic violence.

Most of the scholarship on women's empowerment after armed conflict has examined women's political descriptive representation (Hughes and Tripp 2015; Mageza-Barthel 2015; Tripp 2015). This research shows substantial political gains for women in the wake of armed

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<sup>54</sup>Women's performance during wartime may transcend their return to work at home in the aftermath of war. From a norms-based framework, new understandings of women's abilities may lead them to be more highly regarded and better treated based on their past rather than present contributions. Norms of employment may not have changed in the long-run, but esteem of women may change independently.



conflict across Africa, but it remains unclear whether descriptive representation reflects (or translates to) women's empowerment (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007).

Empirical studies are beginning to examine empowerment beyond descriptive representation. Garcia-Ponce (2017) uses a difference-in-difference design to show that municipalities exposed to insurgency in Peru have more female participation after the imposition of a national gender quota. Lazarev (2018) shows that women in communities exposed to conflict in Chechnya bring more cases to legal institutions that favor women, suggesting that this happens because male elder networks were destroyed by war. These studies show that armed conflict shapes women's engagement with the state apparatus, but cannot disentangle war's effects on local institutions from empowerment outcomes.

Two new studies examine women's empowerment more explicitly. Analysis of wars between 1900 and 2015 by Webster et al (2019) demonstrates empirical support for the hypothesis that armed conflict empowers women by changing their social roles. During and after war, a compiled measure of women's political power, social influence, and civil liberties is higher than in other periods. Emerging work by Huber (2019) examines gender equitable attitudes in Uganda and suggests that conflict's effects are conditional on aid and gender. Men in areas exposed to conflict hold more gender equitable attitudes if they have also been exposed to international aid. Women, however, hold more gender equitable views with or without the presence of international aid.

Thus, there is an emerging evidence base for the idea that armed conflict can empower women. But, whether armed conflict empowers women in its wake may depend on features of the conflict. For example, if women become systematic targets of violence such as rape during armed conflict, they may be further sheltered and removed from the public sphere rather than afforded new opportunities. If women remain sidelined on the home front as well as within armed groups during war, then they will not be presented with the same opportunities to bring about the improved positions and community respect that are integral to empowerment (Karim and Beardsley 2017).

In sum, empowerment arguments suggest that people will punish violence against women more in the wake of armed conflict because of the new roles and esteem afforded to women by community members. As forms of violence largely targeted at women, rape and domestic violence will thus be punished more in places exposed to recent armed conflict.

Yet, the same prediction will not apply to other crimes, because punishment preferences for crimes such as stealing are not related to women's esteem in the same way. Therefore, armed conflict should have a unique effect on preferences for punishing crimes against women.

*H1: Armed conflict increases the severity of punishment preferences for crimes against women (rape and domestic violence), but not other crimes (stealing).*

### **3.2.2 Backlash**

The empowerment hypothesis is grounded in the idea that violence against women is a consequence of women's subordination; the theory describes how increased equality between men and women leads to less violence against women (Whaley and Messner 2002). Backlash theory builds on women's empowerment, but emphasizes that violence against women is a means that men use to enforce women's subordination (Brownmiller 2013). If violence against women is a means to subordinate women rather than a consequence of their subordination, women's empowerment will lead to more violence against women as community members react against the closing gender gap. The relevance of empowerment or backlash to explaining the effects of armed conflict ultimately depends on the purposes of violence in gender relations.

In large, backlash theory suggests that men and women will be differently affected by changes to women's status and esteem associated with war. For women, the implications are consistent with empowerment theory. When their positions are improved, women will have less tolerance for the violence perpetrated against them and will prefer to punish rape and domestic violence more severely. Men, however, perceive women's improved status as a threat. As a result, they will accept more violence against women and punish perpetrators less severely. As in empowerment theory, backlash has no implications for crimes that are

not linked to women's status and esteem.

*H2: Armed conflict increases the severity of punishment preferences among women and decreases the severity of punishment preferences among men for crimes against women (rape and domestic violence), but not other crimes (stealing).*

The centerpiece of backlash theory is about men's responses and how they tend to differ from women's. There may be some variation, however, in how women respond to empowerment in the framework of backlash. As part of the social structure, some women may support behaviors that contribute to their subordination. If a subset of women react to empowerment by tolerating more violence against women as men do, the study may find null effects among women for rape and domestic violence as is predicted for stealing.

### **3.2.3 Violent Masculinities**

Feminist scholars argue that masculinities associated with preparing for and engaging in war militarizes the lives of ordinary people and creates normative conditions for rape (Zurbriggen 2010; Enloe 1989; Enloe 2000).<sup>55</sup> Harmful masculinities that emerge in relation to conflict processes include idealizing violent warrior-like behavior and devaluing women and feminine qualities such as emotions (Morris 1996; Zurbriggen 2010; Goldstein 2003; Whitworth 2004).<sup>56</sup>

Behind a theory of violent masculinities is the assumption that women are innately peaceful caregivers who are averse to violence (or are socially constructed to this role and aversion). However, men are not wholly violent either. As argued by scholars such as Grossman (2014) and Hoover-Green (2016), men must be encouraged to overcome a human aversion to violence in order to facilitate their engagement in warfighting and effectiveness on the battlefield. In order to facilitate war fighting, societies thus encourage people that engage

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<sup>55</sup>I define "masculinities", which I use interchangeably with the term "masculine norms", as ideas about how people in a community believe a man should behave.

<sup>56</sup>Note that this set of theories directly contradicts the framework of empowerment. For example, under threat of war citizens will see female leaders as less capable, with negative effects on female representation (Schroeder 2017).

or might engage in war to accept - even revere - violence (or particular forms of violence) towards outgroups.

At the same time, societies discourage qualities - feminine qualities - that may impede the conduct of this violence. Research has shown that the process of bonding and preparing for war among male groups leads its members to denigrate feminine qualities and refer to outgroups in feminine terms (Morris 1996).

When women and feminine qualities are devalued, this can lead crimes against women to be tolerated or ignored. At the same time, revering violent male qualities can lend support for men's perpetration of what people deem to be masculine crimes such as rape and domestic violence. This leads to a more permissive and even encouraging environment for violence against women. Thus, there will be less punishment for crimes against women in communities exposed to armed conflict.

The literature on harmful masculinities and war is concerned with masculinities that emerge in preparation for and during war; whereas, the concern of this study is war's aftermath. Yet, wartime theories are relevant, because wartime changes in attitudes and norms can extend into the post conflict space. Empirical research has shown that discriminatory attitudes increase after exposure to armed combat (Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015); and community trust is higher after war (Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014).

In sum, theories of violent masculine norms are intimately tied with how highly women are valued and what forms of violent masculinities are revered. Because harmful masculinities devalue women and feminine qualities while encouraging violent behavior among men, armed conflict will decrease sanctioning of crimes against women in its aftermath. However, theories of harmful masculinities have no predictions for sanctioning of other crimes.

*H3: Armed conflict decreases the severity of punishment preferences for crimes against women (rape and domestic violence), but not other crimes (stealing).*

Table 3.1: Summary of Three Hypotheses

1. Women’s Empowerment

	Rape	Domestic Violence	Stealing
Men	+	+	no effect
Women	+	+	no effect

2. Backlash

	Rape	Domestic Violence	Stealing
Men	-	-	no effect
Women	+	+	no effect

3. Violent Masculine Norms

	Rape	Domestic Violence	Stealing
Men	-	-	no effect
Women	-	-	no effect

There are also channels by which armed conflict may increase or decrease sanctioning for crimes more broadly (e.g. rape, domestic violence and stealing). For example, exposure to armed conflict may lead to normalization and greater tolerance of rape and stealing as individuals continue to mimic and tolerate behaviors that took place (and were not punished) during the war (Boesten 2010). In this example, preferences for punishment change as a result of armed conflict but are not specific to crimes against women since not explicitly tied to women’s value.

Other theories have implications for sanctioning, but less relevance to changes in *preferences* for sanctioning. For example, armed conflict may lead to institutional breakdown and decreased potential for individuals to sanction or report perpetrators (Haglund and Richards 2017). This might decrease the ability to punish, but not because of preference change. Such theories are, therefore, not the focus here.

In sum, as depicted in Table 3.1, each hypothesis derived from the established literatures suggests that armed conflict will affect preferences for punishing rape and domestic violence in the same direction: either increasing or decreasing together. In addition, armed conflict should not have similar effects on preferences for punishing stealing.

I examine the evidence for each of the three theories in eastern DR Congo, a central case for understanding the nature of armed conflict and its effects on women. Findings

that empowerment, backlash or violent norms fails to explain armed conflict's effects in this context at this point in time will not have implications for the theories' applications beyond eastern DR Congo. However, failure of prominent theories to account for the findings will demonstrate a need to build a new theory to explain this pivotal case while raising questions for future empirical studies in both DR Congo and beyond.

### **3.3 Armed Conflict (Independent Variable)**

To find out about how armed conflict affects preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence, and stealing, I designed and implemented a data collection effort in South Kivu, DR Congo. In this section, I describe the measurement of my independent variable and the survey on which it is based. I then turn to my identification strategy which draws upon unique data from a large-scale panel survey implemented in 2011 and 2015.<sup>57</sup>

#### **3.3.1 Measurement**

Armed conflict is a highly bundled treatment. It can be defined by location, by community involvement, or by its looming threat. Reflecting my focus on community experiences and community effects, I examine how recent village exposure to armed conflict impacts preferences for punishing crimes by comparing villages that have and have not been recently exposed. By this definition, armed conflict is the space in between episodes of local violence perpetrated by armed groups.

A local definition of armed conflict facilitates not only learning about the immediate aftermath of local violence, but also causally identifying the effects of armed conflict through a matched pair design. In the experimental framework, my treatment is the effect of an additional episode of armed violence within a community within the past 5 years.

I code community armed conflict exposure based on a survey administered to village

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<sup>57</sup>The accounts of two waves of the survey are described in full in Humphreys, Wan der Windt, and de la Sierra (Forthcoming) and Laudati, Mvukiyehe, and Van der Windt (2016).

leaders in 2015. Village leaders were asked the year that the last episode of armed conflict occurred in their village. If the leader notes a year of 2011 or after, the village is considered to have been exposed to armed conflict. This measure takes local understandings of what constitutes armed conflict at face value and removes error from imposing exposure based on proximity to a reported event.

I validate this survey measure of armed conflict by conducting interviews with chiefs from the villages in my final sample. When asked to describe recent events in their villages, chiefs of villages that were exposed to armed conflict tended to describe recent events in their village as pillage by armed groups, burning of houses by armed groups, and displacement of the population. They speak of activity by armed groups and the military. Meanwhile, chiefs from non-conflict villages tend to talk about more general insecurity, for example from ongoing theft or murders by people that have arms (but not “armed groups” per se). Thus the qualitative data confirms that conflict villages have been exposed to episodes distinct from non-conflict villages - ultimately validating the survey measure.

Not only does the village chief recount the event on his own terms, but within four focus groups conducted in each of the 20 villages (that I will describe in Chapter 4), participants also recount the episode described by the village chief. The measure thus captures the collective experience and collective memory of armed conflict and facilitates the interpretation of the survey measure in context.

### **3.3.2 Strategy of Causal Inference**

The effects of armed conflict are difficult to causally identify because so many factors can be both the cause and consequence of exposure (Blattman and Miguel 2010). For example, armed groups may choose to undertake operations where there is already little security, little community cohesion or few weapons. Conversely, armed groups may target wealthy villages when their goal is to amass goods. Factors that predict why armed conflict happens in a village may lead researchers to attribute statistical differences between conflict and

non-conflict villages to the effects of armed conflict when they are, in fact, due to the drivers of armed conflict itself.

To account for such dissimilarities between conflict and nonconflict villages, I use a matched pair design, creating a set of matched pairs of villages that were most alike based on data collected in 2011 - prior to recent exposure to armed conflict. I then compare like villages (matched pairs) to estimate the effect of armed conflict in order to better attribute statistical findings to armed conflict.

Within two territories of South Kivu, DR Congo,<sup>58</sup> I pair each village that has been exposed to recent armed conflict with a similar village that has not been exposed to recent armed conflict using a matching algorithm. The matching algorithm specifies a set of characteristics relevant to both armed conflict and punishment preferences for violence against women.

These measures draw from household surveys and leader surveys administered in 2011 as part of one of the largest community development programs in eastern DR Congo, notable for its breadth and inclusion of hard to reach villages. Since research efforts (particularly focus groups) tend to cluster near a few large cities, this study comes closer to the actual distribution of villages in DR Congo.<sup>59</sup>

The following characteristics are summarized at the village level and employed in the matching specification. Several village-level variables relate to the treatment of women: attitudes towards women's equality, attitudes towards mistreatment of women, and levels of domestic and sexual violence (as measured in list experiments). These measures help to account for how gender inequality and gender-related violence might predict armed conflict exposure as well as social sanctioning.<sup>60</sup> Community trust and ethnic fractionalization may indicate pre-existing divisions within communities that increase the likelihood of war

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<sup>58</sup>See Appendix A.2.1 for details on selecting Walungu and Uvira, territories with higher levels of recent armed conflict.

<sup>59</sup>Detailed information on this survey and the sample can be found in Humphreys et al. (Forthcoming).

<sup>60</sup>Empirical analyses have suggested that gender inequality and conflict exposure are statistically related (Caprioli 2005).



exposure and decrease the potential for social sanctioning. I construct local measures of ethnic fractionalization based on local demographic data from the 2011 survey, a local measure based on the extent to which community members trust coethnics, and a comparison measure of trust in non-coethnics. International development programming, widespread in eastern DR Congo, may affect both whether a community is targeted and how communities prefer to punish crimes.<sup>61</sup> I include an indicator for whether the village did or did not receive the IRC's (randomly implemented) community driven development program in the matching algorithm. Finally, I incorporate a set of variables that the literature establishes as important predictors of armed conflict such as a locally relevant measures of wealth, security perceptions, exposure to previous war, and proximity to conflict-relevant geography such as mines, forests and mountains.<sup>62</sup>

Covariate balance is achieved or substantively improved along many important dimensions: in terms of violence against women, attitudes towards women, community trust, and several geographic variables. I retain all variables in the original matching algorithm for transparency. Detailed description of the algorithm specification and balance on the full sample are included in Appendix A.2.3.

After forming the full set of matched pairs, I randomly select 5 pairs (equivalent to 10 villages) from each territory to implement the measurement of my outcome variable. I use this subset in all subsequent analyses.<sup>63</sup> This random selection allows me to generalize my findings to all conflict villages and their pairs in the larger survey sample within the two territories.

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<sup>61</sup>For example, if armed groups know the IRC is working in a village, more repercussions may result from harmful attacks.

<sup>62</sup>See Appendix A.2.2 for further details on the matching procedure.

<sup>63</sup>One village was replaced in the final sample due to security conditions. Appendix A.2.4 includes details and Appendix A.5.3 includes analyses that account for attrition.

### 3.4 Private Preferences for Punishment (Dependent Variable)

Data on the outcome variable, preferences for punishing crimes, are drawn from a series of 80 focus groups conducted in August 2016.<sup>64</sup> Four focus groups took place in each of the 20 selected village: 2 focus groups with women and 2 with men.<sup>65</sup> In total, this research component involved over 960 focus group participants.

I use focus groups to measure preferences for punishing crimes for two reasons. First, the focus group setting allows for the close integration of my quantitative measures of preferences with qualitative data informed by the social context. This qualitative data becomes central to the development of the theory of protective masculine norms.<sup>66</sup> Second, as will be described in detail in Chapter 5, I use the same focus group context to assess alternative pathways by which armed conflict may affect social sanctioning.

#### 3.4.1 Participants

Between 11 and 16 participants attended each focus group. Focus group leaders worked with village chiefs to create highly inclusive lists of potential participants drawing from lower and upper strata of society.<sup>67</sup> Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present summary statistics on characteristics of the participants.<sup>68</sup>

An average female participant is 34 years old with 1 year of schooling,<sup>69</sup> has lived in the

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<sup>64</sup>While 80 focus groups were planned, one focus group did not take place since many men were working outside of the village on the day that research took place.

<sup>65</sup>Male and female focus groups were held separately to reflect ethical standards for research on violence against women, with male enumerators leading male focus groups and female enumerators leading female focus groups.

<sup>66</sup>Importantly, the quantitative measures of preferences for punishment are taken in private with minimal influence from the social setting of the focus group.

<sup>67</sup>Participants were not recruited randomly from the population. One threat to causal inference stems from the potential that chiefs in conflict and non-conflict communities selected different types of participants because of armed conflict. See Appendix A.3 for details on recruitment and Appendix A.3.4 for balance in participant characteristics across conflict and non-conflict villages. I use models with individual-level control variables to account for nonrandom selection.

<sup>68</sup>See Appendix A.3.3 for data pooling men and women.

<sup>69</sup>Education is coded based on the French education system levels 1-3 (differentiated by 1, 1.1, 1.2 . . . 1.6

Table 3.2: Summary Characteristics of Female Participants

	MIN	MAX	N	MEAN	SD	ICC
Age	18	90	537	34	13.61	0.10
Education	0	3	537	1	0.97	0.10
Years in Village (Categorical)	1	4	537	3	0.93	0.12
Frequency Meeting Others	1	4	537	3	0.97	0.27
Homogeneous Subgroup	0	1	537	1	0.48	0.04
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever)	0	1	537	1	0.31	0.09
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs)	0	1	537	0	0.50	0.40

Table 3.3: Summary Characteristics of Female Participants

	MIN	MAX	N	MEAN	SD	ICC
Age	18	100	458	40	17.01	0.10
Education	0	3	457	2	0.96	0.09
Years in Village (Categorical)	1	4	458	4	0.74	0.16
Frequency Meeting Others	2	4	458	4	0.62	0.46
Homogeneous Subgroup	0	1	458	1	0.50	-0.01
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever)	0	1	458	0	0.50	0.24
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs)	0	1	458	0	0.39	0.23

village around 10 years,<sup>70</sup> and meets with others in the community most days of the week.<sup>71</sup> Eighty-nine percent of women report having ever seen violence by armed groups in their village while 50 percent report seeing violence in their village in the past 5 years.<sup>72</sup> Male focus group participants have a slightly higher mean age of 40 years. Men also have higher levels of education, meet others slightly more frequently, and have lived in villages much longer than women (averaging almost 20 years). Fifty percent of male participants report ever having seen violence in their village while 19 percent report seeing violence in their

etc), with 0 indicating no education.

<sup>70</sup>Years in village is coded categorically, where 1=less than 5 years, 2=between 5 and 10 years, 3=between 10 and 20 years, and 4=more than 20 years or born here.

<sup>71</sup>Frequency of meeting others is coded as 4=each day, 3=several days per week, 2=several days per month, 1=less.

<sup>72</sup>Individual measures of violence are not used in analyses.

village in the past 5 years.<sup>73</sup>

Both male and female focus group participants are mostly farmers. Some, however, identify as traders, teachers, nurses, students, and drivers. Around 20 men and 20 women self-identify as being out of work.

### 3.4.2 Measurement Design

To learn about preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing, I build focus groups around hypothetical crime narratives that closely match the context. The hypothetical approach helps to ensure the safety and well-being of subjects by mitigating potential for trauma or stigma associated with recounting real events.<sup>74</sup> The design directed conversation away from the event described in the narrative itself and towards ways people prefer to punish other community members for engaging in these crimes, emphasizing agency rather than victimization. The hypothetical approach also provides two methodological advantages: (a) holding variation in definitions and scenarios as constant as possible across villages and (b) capturing preferences for sanctioning in non-event cases.

One crime narrative is about rape, another about domestic violence, and another about stealing.<sup>75</sup> Each is an example of actual crime under Congolese law.

**Rape:** A married man from the village was driven by his sentiments towards a young woman. One day he is overcome by his passion, takes the young woman from the field, and rapes her. She is hurt and has to go to the hospital. Her mother and father are upset.


**Domestic Violence:** A man from the village returns after being away for his job. Now, this man hits her often. Yesterday, she left the house without telling

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<sup>73</sup>Appendix A.3.3 includes statistical tests of differences between women and men.

<sup>74</sup>Ethical protocols are summarized in Appendix A.3.1.

<sup>75</sup>In the few focus groups that enumerators presented the crimes in an order other than the randomization, the order that was actually implemented is coded.



Stealing

Rape

Domestic Violence

Figure 3.1: Crimes

him and he hurt her very badly when he found out. She is in the hospital. Her mother and father are upset about her treatment.

**Stealing:** A man had two goats that he had been saving to give as a gift for his son’s marriage. But, a man from the village steals the two goats. The man who steals the goats uses one goat to feed his family and the other to pay a debt that he owes to another man. The goats are now gone. The family that lost the goats is upset.

I commissioned a local artist of Bukavu, South Kivu to create the illustrations based on the narratives. The illustrations were presented along with each crime to further concentrate the discussion and decrease definitional variation (Figure 3.1).

There are several motivations for the narrative designs. First, perpetrators are always men from the village, because this study means to capture how armed conflict affects preferences for punishing *everyday* crime rather than crimes perpetrated by armed groups as part of the conflict. This component of the study is key to learning about how armed group violence - violence by outsiders - affects internal community dynamics. This means that any effects that I find are not due to insider-outsider distinctions. The focus on married male perpetrators also mitigates the possibility that populations would excuse this behavior as coming from a misdirected and disadvantaged youth.

Second, the crimes of rape and stealing are aligned to be comparable in local monetary value. For stealing, two goats is a low, but sometimes accepted, bride price to give to a groom's parents. Two goats is also a low amount that parents might demand if their daughter has been raped. A crime that results in the loss of two goats and a crime that results in the loss of a daughter (to rape) can lead to similar compensations.

Finally, the injured women in the rape and domestic violence narratives both end up in the hospital; and, the mother and father bring forward the complaints. The parallel outcomes and complainants make the narratives on violence against women comparable.

Focus group leaders describe five punishment options: (1) counseled by a fellow villager, (2) told to pay a sum to the victim by the chief of the village, (3) expelled from the village, (4) sentenced to prison for 20 years, or (5) physically beaten to near death. Participants circle their preferred punishment (Figure 3.2) for each of the three crimes.<sup>76</sup>

The five punishment options serve as examples of true punishments available in this context. As described in the previous chapter, randomly sampled respondents to a large scale survey report that these punishments have been implemented in their communities. In interviews within these communities, chiefs and elders also describe many of these punishment

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<sup>76</sup>Participants choose their single most ideal choice. To ensure privacy, participants are asked to fold their response card and not to show their responses to other members of the focus group or to the enumerator. The illustrations, drawn by the same artist in Bukavu, South Kivu, also helped to facilitate the inclusion of illiterate populations in the study.




Figure 3.2: Punishments

processes in detail.

The punishment options are constructed and ordered to reflect punishment severity. Changes to severity of preferences rather than a focus on specifics about punishment enhances the generalizability of these findings to other contexts.<sup>77</sup> Yet, because of the importance of the ordinal severity scale, I also wanted to validate this ordering as part of the study.

To this end, I asked focus group participants to rank the severity of the punishments in a group exercise following the quantitative measurements. Figure 3.3 summarizes the mean responses given in the 80 focus groups, with lines indicating standard errors of the means.<sup>78</sup>

Figure 3.3 shows that, on average, women believe that prison is a slightly more severe punishment than beating. Men, however, believe that prison and beating are equally severe.<sup>79</sup> In order to reflect perceived severity across the sample population, I collapse the outcome measure to fall on a scale of 1 to 4 for all analyses, where the 4th level of the scale is equivalent to choosing prison or beating until near death.

<sup>77</sup>See Appendix A.5.5 for analyses of dichotomized outcomes.

<sup>78</sup>The mean is calculated as the percent of 80 focus groups.

<sup>79</sup>Appendix A.4.2 further describes the ranking data.




Figure 3.3: Mean Severity Rankings in 80 Focus Groups




Figure 3.4: Distribution of Private Punishment Preferences

### 3.4.3 Descriptive Sanctioning Data

Figure 3.4 depicts the distribution of preferences for punishing the three crimes in eastern DR Congo, a set of preferences given scant attention and previously unknown to researchers.<sup>80</sup>

Across all participants, the modal categories for rape and stealing are the same. Most participants select (4) prison or beating, the most severe punishment option, as their preferred punishment. Domestic violence looks different with the least severe punishment, (1) counsel

<sup>80</sup>Distributions of raw responses are provided in Appendix A.4.1.



by a fellow villager, as the modal level of punishment.<sup>81</sup> This distribution is already suggestive that people are thinking about the crimes of rape and stealing as being more similar than rape and domestic violence.

Figure 3.4 shows consistency but not uniformity in preferences among both men and women across the measures. For both domestic violence and stealing, mean punishment preferences are statistically higher in severity among men. But there is no difference in preferences between men and women when it comes to punishing rape.<sup>82</sup> This convergence could be due to ceiling effects and the widespread advocacy efforts in eastern DR Congo that have been working to develop a more punitive environment for rape.

## 3.5 Results

How does community exposure to recent armed conflict affect preferences for sanctioning rape, domestic violence, and stealing in eastern DR Congo? I use quantitative evidence to establish armed conflict's effects, describe how the results speak to the theoretical frameworks, and then harness qualitative evidence to provide contextual support.

### 3.5.1 Quantitative Evidence

I estimate two fixed effects OLS regression models to examine the effects of armed conflict on punishment preferences for each of the three separate crimes.<sup>83</sup> I pool data from men and women.<sup>84</sup> The first model is a basic model that includes a control for whether or not a respondent is female. The second is an interacted model that adds an interaction term to test for whether armed conflict affects male and female preferences for punishing crimes

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<sup>81</sup>Some villagers do not consider counsel by a fellow villager to be a form of punishment. But, this underscores what the severity scale aims to capture: a range from very low or non-punishment to very severe punishment.

<sup>82</sup>See Appendix A.4.3 for statistical tests of difference.

<sup>83</sup>I present OLS regressions for ease of interpretation. An ordered logit model is included in Appendix A.5.4.

<sup>84</sup>Models disaggregated by gender are included in Appendix A.5.1.

differently.

All models include individual level control variables.<sup>85</sup> Education level proxies for an individual's wealth and social status. A categorical variable of the years an individual has lived in the village controls for an individual's integration within the community. I also include a measure of the frequency that individuals engage with others to proxy for social knowledge and social power. Finally, a homogeneity variable accounts for a design component not analyzed in this study, which is whether an individual's subgroup is homogeneous in terms of education.<sup>86</sup> I also include the order of the crime narrative associated with each outcome (e.g. whether the narrative of rape was presented 1st, 2nd, or 3rd for preferences on sanctioning rape etc.). To account for clustering within villages, standard errors are clustered at the village level. I use pair fixed effects to implement the matched pair design.

Table 3.4 (Model 2) shows that community exposure to recent armed conflict increases how severely men prefer to punish other men from their communities for perpetrating rape (.448). Using OLS estimation, exposure to armed conflict is estimated to increase the severity level of punishment from a mean of 2.4 to a mean of 2.8 among men. On a 4-point ordinal scale, this is substantive and could translate into a 1-point change in severity.

Model 2 also reveals that armed conflict affects men's and women's preferences for punishing rape differently. The interacted model for sanctioning rape (Model 2) shows that armed conflict has a precisely estimated zero effect on women's preferences (.448-.450=.002), an effect which differs significantly and substantively from the estimated effect for men. Failing to account for the gender difference leads to null results about the effects of armed conflict in the basic model (Model 1).

Armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishing stealing look similar to armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishing rape. Model 6 in Table 3.4 shows that armed

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<sup>85</sup>I emphasize models with controls to help account for the nonrandom recruitment of focus group participants. Fixed effects models without controls are consistent and provided in Appendix A.5.2.

<sup>86</sup>When dividing participants of a focus group into subgroups, enumerators formed some heterogeneous and some homogeneous subgroups based on education level.

Table 3.4: Private Preferences for Punishment (Pooled Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.205 (0.131)	0.448*** (0.133)	-0.230** (0.111)	-0.191 (0.215)	0.209 (0.177)	0.356** (0.176)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.450* (0.272)		-0.067 (0.249)		-0.260 (0.276)
Female	0.173 (0.146)	0.407** (0.206)	-0.321*** (0.120)	-0.285* (0.172)	-0.199 (0.139)	-0.059 (0.239)
Education	0.174*** (0.055)	0.171*** (0.055)	-0.058 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.040)	0.101** (0.048)	0.099** (0.047)
Frequency Meeting Others	-0.014 (0.072)	-0.011 (0.078)	-0.015 (0.066)	-0.012 (0.064)	-0.091 (0.087)	-0.086 (0.087)
Homogeneous Subgroup	0.070 (0.120)	0.081 (0.123)	-0.018 (0.093)	-0.016 (0.092)	-0.068 (0.139)	-0.065 (0.140)
Years in Village	-0.019 (0.030)	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.029 (0.041)	-0.028 (0.042)	-0.043 (0.044)	-0.039 (0.045)
Narrative Order: Rape	0.177** (0.069)	0.186*** (0.069)				
Narrative Order: DV			0.124 (0.102)	0.132 (0.112)		
Narrative Order: Stealing					0.169** (0.085)	0.141 (0.087)
Constant	2.472*** (0.455)	2.291*** (0.409)	2.688*** (0.269)	2.646*** (0.311)	3.270*** (0.405)	3.224*** (0.415)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.112	0.121	0.069	0.069	0.057	0.059
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.098	0.105	0.053	0.053	0.042	0.043

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

conflict increases how severely men prefer to punish stealing (0.356). The estimated effect on preferences among women is substantively less than the effect among men, though not statistically different. However, alongside the basic model (Model 5), the interacted model (Model 6) shows that it is important to account for male and female differences when estimating armed conflict's effects.<sup>87</sup>

In sum, the findings on rape and stealing outcomes are similar. Men prefer to punish rape and stealing more when their communities have been exposed to armed conflict. Women's preferences for punishing rape and stealing are either less affected or not affected at all by community exposure.

But the findings of armed conflict's effect on preferences for punishing domestic violence look very different than its effects on rape and stealing. Model 3 shows that armed conflict decreases how severely both men and women prefer to punish domestic violence (-.230), so conflict affects preferences for punishing domestic violence in the opposite direction from rape and stealing. Model 4 shows that this effect does not vary by respondent gender.

Both men and women want to punish domestic violence less severely in communities recently exposed to armed conflict. While men are given less free reign to perpetrate rape or stealing against other community members in the aftermath of war, they are given even more free reign to abuse their wives.

Returning to the four norms-based theoretical frameworks outlined in this paper, how do the findings adjudicate between the theories in the case of eastern DR Congo?

Empowerment theories (H1) suggest that armed conflict should increase how severely people prefer to punish rape and domestic violence, because these crimes are linked to women's status and esteem. If empowerment were well describing the effects of armed conflict in DR Congo, the effects of armed conflict on rape would *not* be gendered. But armed conflict increases how severely men prefer to punish rape while, for women, there are zero effects. In

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<sup>87</sup>These pooled regression models do not account for how control variables might be functioning in gender-specific ways. Results are largely consistent when disaggregating data by gender in Appendix A.5.1.

addition, armed conflict has opposite effects on preferences for punishing domestic violence than suggested by empowerment theory.

Backlash theories (H2) have a similar prediction to empowerment theories, but suggest that men will respond negatively rather than positively to women's improved status. Because they feel threatened by the diminished gender gap, men will prefer to punish crimes against women *less* in communities exposed to armed conflict. But, men prefer to punish rape *more* in communities exposed to armed conflict - contrary to the theorized direction. I also find similar effects for stealing, which should remain unaffected if backlash associated with women's increased status were driving the findings. Lastly, backlash theory fails to account for why women prefer to punish domestic violence less after armed conflict. On each account, backlash theory does not map onto the findings in this study.

Violent masculine norms theory (H3) suggests that armed conflict decreases how severely people prefer to punish violence against women, because male violence becomes more greatly revered while women and feminine qualities are devalued. But, like the previous theories, violent masculine norms theory is not supported by the data. Instead of *decreasing* how severely men and women prefer to punish rape and domestic violence, armed conflict *increases* how severely men prefer to punish rape - opposite the direction suggested by the theory. A theory of violent norms also fails to explain armed conflict's effects on stealing. However, violent masculinities theory is consistent with the findings on domestic violence.

DR Congo is also a case where many women have been subject to rape as part of the armed conflict and where women have been minimally involved in fighting within armed groups. As such, the conflict context makes DR Congo a less likely case where we would see women become more empowered as a result of the war, so the findings against empowerment theory are potentially less surprising in this case.

Yet, an important contribution that emerges from the empirics is that shocks such as armed conflict can affect preferences for punishing rape and domestic violence in opposite ways - even though they are both crimes against women. All good things do not always move

together. Addressing rape in the aftermath of armed conflict will not necessarily translate into reducing other forms of violence against women such as domestic violence.

### **3.5.2 Quantitative Insights**

Theories of women's empowerment also suggest that gender attitudes should improve in the aftermath of war. The theory of women's empowerment describes a process by which women become more highly valued and esteemed as a result of their empowerment. The theory that I derived extends this argument to describe implications for preferences for punishing crimes against women. However, gender attitudes may or may not be related to preferences for punishing crimes. If men choose to punish rape but continue to conceive of women as their property, then empowerment has probably not occurred (Huber 2019, footnote 6). Does armed conflict improve gender equitable attitudes in my sample of 20 villages in eastern DR Congo?

Analyses of armed conflict's effects on gender attitudes in the 20 matched pairs in this study show that armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishment are not the result of women's empowerment. My analysis draws from survey data gathered in the same 20 villages as part of a survey in the World Bank's evaluation of a program by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The survey draws from a random sample of 4 or 5 residents in each village. The small sample of survey respondents within these 20 villages makes the power of the models weak in comparison to my analyses of the focus group data.

First, correlations between gender attitudes and the proportion of the villagers that accept wife-beating as an appropriate response to the standard range of DHS questions show that acceptance of wife-beating and gender attitudes are positively correlated among men (.45) with a p-value of .06, which approaches statistical significance in this small sample. This means that villages with men that are more accepting of domestic violence also have men with more gender equitable attitudes, which is not an expected relationship. Among women, the village-level correlation is estimated in the negative direction, which is more

consistent with expectations that more equitable gender attitudes lead to decreased tolerance of violence (-.28), however the relationship is statistically insignificant with a p-value of .24. Both directional relationships hold at the individual-levels as well.<sup>88</sup>

While there are many questions that these correlations raise about gender attitudes and their relationship to violence, it is clear that gender attitudes, as measured here in this sample, is not a strong proxy for the acceptability of violence.<sup>89</sup>

Second, as depicted in Table 3.5, regressions of gender attitudes on armed conflict, respondent gender and their interaction (using the same matched pair design clustering standard errors at the village level) fail to yield statistically significant results.

Table 3.5: Effects of armed conflict on gender attitudes

	Gender Attitudes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Armed Conflict	0.146 (0.173)	0.150 (0.173)	0.202 (0.252)
Female		-0.206 (0.129)	-0.154 (0.154)
Armed Conflict * Female			-0.106 (0.325)
Constant	2.427*** (0.089)	2.507*** (0.101)	2.482*** (0.120)
Observations	96	96	96
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.002	-0.010

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Pair Fixed Effects (10 Pairs); SEs clustered at village level

Given the low power of the models, it is important to consider the magnitude of the

<sup>88</sup>However, women's individual-level estimates approach statistical significance while men's do not.

<sup>89</sup>Respondents were asked if they disagree, have no opinion, or agree with a statement that women should have the same rights and responsibilities as men in society. The mean response of the entire sample was 2.23 on the scale from 1 to 3, thus there is a moderate level of gender equitable attitudes in eastern DR Congo as measured in the survey.

coefficients despite the null finding of statistical significance. The direction and magnitude of the coefficients suggest that conflict, if anything, might improve gender attitudes among men which is inconsistent with theories of backlash. At the same time, armed conflict has indeterminate effects on gender attitudes among women, but could range from being less positive (than the effects estimated for men) to worsening women's gender equitable attitudes. Taken together, the data fail to show clear support for backlash or empowerment.

The effects of armed conflict on gender attitudes, if anything, seem to be independent of the effect of armed conflict on punishing these forms of violence against women - bolstering the findings here that the empowerment and backlash channels are not driving the effects. These findings also suggest a need to turn to specificities of punishment in the aftermath of war rather than considering gender attitudes as a useful proxy.

### **3.5.3 Qualitative Evidence**

The quantitative evidence fails to support theories of empowerment, backlash or violent masculinities; but to what extent does the qualitative evidence converge with the findings? I draw from closely integrated qualitative evidence collected from the same 20 villages. This work includes focus group discussions that followed the quantitative measures as well as semi-structured interviews with each village chief and a social worker from each village.<sup>90</sup> The analysis seeks to gauge the theoretical plausibility of protective masculine norms by exploring how people perceive each crime.

In this examination of how people perceive rape, domestic violence and stealing, I make no claim about the source of these perceptions or that these perceptions are, at root, local. Working in a post-colonial (or decolonizing) context with very high levels of advocacy around the issue of violence against women, people's understandings of rape and domestic violence are undoubtedly shaped by outside actors.

An important empirical question for my analysis is whether outside actors are shaping

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<sup>90</sup>The same crime narratives and illustrations focus and relate the responses.



perceptions differently in conflict and non-conflict communities. In interviews, local female advocacy workers from each of the 20 villages report between two and three advocacy organizations working in each community - and within Walungu and within Uvira the active organizations are reportedly the same. The widespread nature of advocacy across my sample suggests that changes in perceptions from advocacy initiatives alone are not driving empirical differences in preferences between conflict and non-conflict communities.

Do people describe rape, domestic violence, and stealing in ways consistent with empowerment, backlash or violent masculinities? Then, do discussions shed light on alternative theories? I take the existence of the perceptions themselves, rather than their origins, as relevant to understanding how armed conflict will shape punishment of rape, domestic violence and stealing.

### **Perceptions of Domestic Violence**

Domestic violence is a widespread behavior in eastern DR Congo and is considered a legitimate tool by which men discipline or educate their wives. In the 20 villages where I conducted focus groups, there is a 70 percent acceptance rate of wife beating.<sup>91</sup> When asked whether rape, domestic violence or stealing were least likely to be punished in their village, 95 percent of focus groups listed domestic violence.

Domestic violence is considered a private matter best dealt with by the couple and their families. When village chiefs hear about domestic violence, it tends to be in their capacity as fellow villagers rather than in an official capacity. In the rare event that a complaint is brought to the chief, he will speak with the family, preferring to handle disagreements between villagers locally rather than call upon a higher outside authority.

Villagers are unlikely to socially punish perpetrators of domestic violence, also viewing

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<sup>91</sup>This statistic is drawn from the 2015 survey associated with the IRC evaluation and is calculated as the unweighted mean of the village means. A respondent is coded as accepting domestic violence if he/she agrees that it is acceptable for a man to hit his wife if she leaves without telling him, refuses sex, neglects the children, burns the food, contradicts him, has relations with another man, takes contraception without his knowledge, or drinks alcohol.

it as a private matter. When female focus group participants were asked how they would respond if their friend perpetrated domestic violence, one woman explained, “It is not our business, I must continue to act as a friend because he is not my husband. It is his wife that must handle this” (V1, FG1). Another woman described: “Here, we are not interested in this, our husbands can hit us without worry” (V1, FG1). Still other women suggested that there should be no punishment of domestic violence since the root cause of the incident could not be known (V13, FG1).

Men also consider domestic violence to be a non-issue. Most said that they would continue their friendship with someone that perpetrated domestic violence (V21, FG3). Some men consider domestic violence an “accident”, so not something that warrants punishment. Others suggest that domestic violence is caused by the actions of the wives that are being beaten, rendering it inappropriate to punish the man for his action.

Some men, however, note a strategic dimension, noting that there is a risk to ending friendships with perpetrators of domestic violence: “If not, we risk having no friends in the village, because everyone perpetrates domestic violence in their households” (V1, FG4). Men think about their relationships with other men in the community when considering punishment. Thus there seems to be a strategic element to preferences for punishing domestic violence that are not emphasized by theories of empowerment or violent masculine norms theories. And, the theory of backlash suggests a different strategic logic - centered on keeping women in subservient positions rather than thinking about men’s relationship with other men.

Women also think strategically about punishing perpetrators of domestic violence. Women note their dependence on others when thinking about punishing perpetrators of domestic violence. One woman explained, “I cannot go to complain because if they take him to prison, I will be left alone suffering with the children. I must forgive him” (V1, FG1). To punish a perpetrator of domestic violence severely was to put an end to the family (V8, FG3). One woman stated, “Even if my husband hit me each day, I would not bring it [to authorities] as

a crime, because we are alone responsible for our acts. Even if he is at fault, I will forgive him always because we are united for better or for worse” (V13, FG1). Informal discussions also suggest that women have nowhere to turn if their husbands are taken away and that a fine on one of them damages the lives of the entire family.

Interviews with female social workers from the village suggest that women see domestic violence as part of their culture – passed down through many generations. People that I interviewed were unwary when describing their own experiences of domestic violence (even though no direct questions were asked). Domestic violence is repeatedly described as a shameless custom in focus groups as well. When asked about whether domestic violence happens in the village, men from one village laughed in unison, saying that “this habit rages here” (V1, FG3).

Despite its widespread acceptance, perpetration of domestic violence does not elicit social approval either - as one might expect from a theory of violent masculine norms or backlash. Women said that eventually, a perpetrator of domestic violence risked losing the respect of each of the women in the community (V21, FG1). Some suggested that women must consider someone that perpetrates domestic violence to be a dangerous person. They would hope their husbands would not befriend such a man for fear that their husbands would copy his behavior (V21, FG1). The fact that domestic violence does not foster widespread respect, gives less credence to theories such as violent masculine norms, which suggest that people herald men that perpetrate violent masculine crimes like domestic violence and rape.

Focus group discussions suggested that neither men nor women consider domestic violence to be a crime to guard against. In cases where participants describe domestic violence as a problem, it is one relevant to the family but irrelevant to the community as a whole. It is a private matter to be dealt with by the family.

Participants often stated explicitly that it should not be grouped with rape and stealing. Those that did view domestic violence as an incident that should elicit a community response viewed counsel as the only appropriate response: “This is the punishment” (V1, FG1). If

there were any community intervention, one aid worker said that 100% of the male population would support the man. Others suggested that villagers tried not to take sides, but instead would advise the man to think about the needs of his wife and advise the woman to remember that a woman can never be equal to a man.

This latter statement suggests that women's empowerment and backlash theories could be relevant in cases where women become empowered from war: people do think about domestic disputes as stemming from uncharacteristic female behavior or women overstepping their bounds. However, in the case of DR Congo, women's status has not substantively improved as a result of the war. Women are considered wholly unequal and often instigators of the domestic violence against them.

### **Perceptions of Rape**

Rape, however, is on the other end of the spectrum in terms of its severity as a crime and its deserved punishment. While domestic violence is cited as least likely to be punished in 95 percent of focus groups, rape is listed as the most likely to be punished in 73 percent of focus groups.<sup>92</sup>

Focus group participants describe rape as the most severe crime, completely destroying the victim. Rape generates concern among villagers for several reasons. It could spread disease; it fosters social stigma against the women; and it can leave women infertile or pregnant. In line with other research in this same context, rape essentially lowers women's value and reduces their future life prospects (Kelly et al. 2011).

Participants described their responses to rape very differently from domestic violence, mainly noting the danger that rape presents to themselves and other community members. One female participant stated that it is important to send a rapist to prison, because "he could do the same thing to me in the future" (V6, FG1). Women suggest, "We cannot pardon him, because he is a criminal and a bad person. He may also turn against another

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<sup>92</sup>Some of these focus groups cited both rape and stealing as the most likely to be punished.

person“ (V1, FG1). Another participant noted the importance of resolving the issue only if the perpetrator presented danger: “If the rapist is a neighbor and a friend, I could pardon and counsel him, but I can take him to justice when he becomes dangerous” (V1, FG1). This latter statement reveals that women understand the new legal channels available to them to help resolve issues of rape, which again is very different from their beliefs or willingness to use the legal system to address domestic violence, despite that option being available.

While 70 percent of people accept domestic violence within the 20 villages in my study, only 3 percent of people will allow a former rapist to move to their village, underscoring the difference in how these crimes are viewed.<sup>93</sup> Men openly admit to the common practice of domestic violence, but do not admit to engaging in rape. Instead, men make efforts to frame stories of rape in their communities as fiction: “Rape does not exist here. This is only a new method that girls use here. When a girl notices that you have money, she falls in love with you because of your money. Once pregnant, she will say that she has been raped. This is not true.” (V1, FG3). Beliefs that rape stories tend to be false accusations also becomes apparent in interviews with village chiefs.

Women, however, say that men do perpetrate rape within their villages, but at the same time emphasize that soldiers *also* perpetrate rape: “For young girls 10-17 years of age, men often damage their lives, but so do the soldiers” (V6, FG1). Some chiefs and social workers acknowledge the occurrence of rape in their villages – however, rape is presented as becoming a problem mainly when local conflict resolution cannot address the situation (e.g. through marriage between the perpetrator and victim). When chiefs from the village are asked about rape, they say that there is no rape in the village - but then add that there is this “other” category of early marriage.

Overall, people suggest that if the state does not punish a perpetrator of rape, they would punish the rapist themselves or at minimum denounce the rapist (V6, FG3). In interviews,

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<sup>93</sup>As in the statistic for accepting domestic violence, this is an unweighted analysis of village level means associated with the 2015 IRC evaluation within these 20 villages. The question asks whether respondents would accept that a man who perpetrated rape could live in their village.

village chiefs made it clear that villagers often take punishment into their own hands, beating a criminal before being brought before them.

What stands out in discussions is that men are not proud of rape in their villages or about perpetrating it. At most, men are flippant about rape, indicated by laughter in some of the male focus groups about the scenario presented in the rape narrative. Men's reticence to discuss rape and haste to deny rape directly diverges from discussions of domestic violence, which both men and women openly describe as a custom and as a form of violence that women deserve because of their behavior. This occurs even though they can be brought to the police and prosecuted for both rape and domestic violence in this context. If people heralded violent masculine norms, one would expect to find more evidence of support for (or nonchalance about) rape among villagers and particularly among male villagers. If men became more tolerant of violence against women in order to help preserve or re-establish the gender hierarchy upset by war (as in backlash theory), one would expect men to tolerate more rape because women step out of line. But rape was consistently and vehemently opposed.

### **Perceptions of Stealing**

While respondents characterize rape and domestic violence in opposite ways, they characterize rape and stealing similarly. In both male and female focus groups, participants often cannot decide whether stealing or rape warrants the greatest punishment of the three crimes – even while it is a clear consensus that domestic violence warrants the least punishment.

Participants associate the risks of both rape and stealing. One female focus group member explains that she is afraid of stealing and thinks it is most important to address because her husband had been killed in her home by thieves (V6, FG1). Participants speak about how stealing “can destroy the whole village” (V16, FG1). When a thief steals, “his father and the whole population from here misses out on peace. . . . He is a person who impoverishes the family and risks our children starving and becoming street children” (V19, FG3). People view stealing as damaging to the village economy hurting the community and its development as a

whole.

When asked to rank order the severity of the three crimes and to talk about appropriate punishments, women and men point out that rape often occurs in the context of stealing; A thief “is capable of killing, stealing, and raping at the same time” (V16, FG1). In discussions about which crimes participants hoped that the government would work to address, participants who suggested that the government focus on stealing also said that, if you punish one of these crimes, you punish both. While these crimes often occur in the same context, there is also a close link between how rape and stealing are perceived. When women are conceived as a form of male property, rape becomes akin to stealing from men and from communities.

Men also expressed the opinion that current methods for punishing stealing were not severe enough: “Because of democracy, we refuse to kill the thieves; this is why theft increases here in our country” (V1, FG2). As I will expound in later chapters, follow-up work demonstrates that people believe that the state is completely ineffective in punishing perpetrators of stealing - but quite effective in punishing rape. Thus, even while rape and stealing are perceived similarly and armed conflict has similar effects, both male and female evaluations of state effectiveness at punishing these two crimes run in opposite directions.

Men are also more likely to describe their personal ability to take action against thieves. For example, they could chase thieves from the village so that thieves were no longer able to steal from them (V2, FG3). While some men impart that if the state finds a perpetrator not guilty that he is not culpable and should be set free, most men in male focus groups suggested to kill or to expel a perpetrator of rape or theft (V6, FG4). Others suggested that if the state did not punish a perpetrator of rape, their role as villagers was to denounce the rapist, which is a form of social sanctioning (V6, FG3). In interviews, village chiefs made it clear that villagers often take punishment into their own hands, beating a criminal before being brought to them.

There seems to be a gendered dimension to punishment, however. Women in focus groups

were more likely than men to state that they would not punish a perpetrator of domestic violence because it was not their role. Instead, it was the role of the leaders (V8, FG1). When women made statements about punishments during the discussions, they would present their statements as “if I had the power, I would do X” suggesting that they did not really see a role for themselves in sanctioning.

Women also express more hesitance than men to take an active role in punishment. When asked how they would respond if authorities did not punish a thief, their response suggests a standpoint of disempowerment, a group one female participant responded: “I cannot live with him as a friend because he is a thief. [And] I cannot complain to authorities because my neighbor pardoned him from punishment - even though I am afraid of him.” (V1, FG1). In reference to a crime of domestic violence, a woman hesitates whether it is her place to counsel or punish: “I can only stay friends with him if we were friends before. Maybe I can force myself to advise him not to do this again” (V1, FG3). Another group also expressed deference to authorities for sanctioning: “We will follow up with authorities to understand why they did not punish, if not [in agreement] we will make peace with the perpetrator” (V16, FG1).

Thus, discussions about participant perceptions of stealing reveals not only that people think about rape and stealing as threats to their communities, but also that punishment may have an important gendered dimension. The gendered dimension of punishment might be accounted for by the theory of violent masculinities, because men might be driven to *punish* in more violent ways. However, violent masculinities cannot account for why this is not the case for domestic violence.

The gendered dimension also raises questions for theories of empowerment and backlash, which do not account for *punishment* as being gendered. Instead, empowerment and backlash consider the gendered nature of the *crime*. An understanding of the quantitative results will need to account for why armed conflict has greater effects on men’s preferences for punishing rape and stealing than on women’s and consider the gendered nature of punishment rather



than the gendered nature of the crime.

### 3.5.4 Qualitative Insights

Counter to theories that link rape and domestic violence theoretically, the qualitative evidence highlights key differences in how people perceive domestic violence and rape. Domestic violence is a common, everyday, wide-spread and private crime that does not warrant punishment and does not impact communities. As a private crime, neither the crime nor its repetition is perceived to impact others in the community.

At the same time, the data show similarities between how people perceive rape and how people perceive stealing. Rape and stealing are harmful to communities, damaging to property, perpetrated by bad or untrustworthy people, and warranting punishment by communities. As a public crime, the crime and its repetition are perceived to impact others in the community.

*Insight 1. A context-informed theory should differentiate between crimes that are perceived as private and unthreatening to communities and crimes that are perceived to be public community threats.*

Second, focus group discussions bring important dynamics of punishment into the purview. People think strategically about whether they will socially punish perpetrators of crimes. Men will continue friendships with perpetrators of domestic violence or, as they say, risk having no friends in the village. Women describe their and their family's reliance on men that perpetrate domestic abuse.

*Insight 2. A context-informed theory should integrate strategic tradeoffs that people face when punishing perpetrators of crimes.*

Third, the discussions revise theories of empowerment, backlash and violent masculinities by moving away from the focus on the gendered nature of crimes to highlight the gendered

nature of punishment processes. Women express more reticence than men to engage in sanctioning acts themselves, so armed conflict may not affect their sanctioning in the same way.

*Insight 3. A context-informed theory should account for the perceived dominant role that men play in punishment.*

Depictions of community harm, strategic tradeoffs and the gendered nature of punishment provide insights into *why* the quantitative findings fail to support existing theories (H1-3). Together, these findings and insights motivate a new theory of protective masculine norms that will be presented in the following chapter.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

This chapter assesses one avenue by which armed conflict can continue to affect women's security: through changes in preferences for punishing crimes. I begin with theoretical implications from the prominent literature on violence against women, describing how armed conflict is theorized to affect preferences for punishing crimes against women in terms of empowerment, backlash, and violent masculinities. The chapter then uses a matched pair design and novel data on private preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence, and stealing to examine the relevance of these theories in eastern DR Congo.

The findings show that armed conflict increases how severely men prefer to punish rape and stealing while decreasing how severely both men and women prefer to punish domestic violence. The findings challenge conventional wisdom on gendered norms, which suggests that women become either empowered or disempowered as norms improve or worsen after war. Most theories link rape and domestic violence theoretically as forms of violence against women and suggest that improvement in one will lead to improvement in the other. But I find no such link: people within my focus groups do not think about rape and domestic violence in the same way. And, armed conflict affects these outcomes differently. Women's

security is far more nuanced than the literature portrays.

The quantitative approach demonstrates the utility of looking across sets of outcome variables when assessing the applicability of theories. If, for example, this study had focused solely on preferences for punishing domestic violence, the conclusion may have been that armed conflict had further engrained violent masculine norms; but this is inconsistent with the findings on preferences for punishing rape. This study serves as a call for researchers to consider broadening approaches to theory rather than narrowing.

Finally, this chapter motivates the theory of protective masculine norms through the integration of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. After demonstrating armed conflict's effects quantitatively, I draw upon data gathered in the same focus groups to assess the qualitative evidence base for these theories and gather insights from which to generate a new theory. Evidence from the focus group discussions about each of the crimes reveal three central insights that will contribute to a contextually-informed theory of protective masculine norms in the following chapter.

## Chapter 4: Protective Masculine Norms

### 4.1 Introduction

In the wake of local exposure to armed conflict, people in eastern DR Congo prefer to punish rape and stealing more severely, but domestic violence less severely. Given that the theories derived from the prominent literature - empowerment, backlash and violent masculinities - are irreconcilable with the findings, can other compelling theories account for the effects?

This chapter advances a new argument, a theory of protective masculine norms, to explain the observed effects of armed conflict on communities in eastern DR Congo. The theory generating process was informed by the three qualitative insights described in Chapter 3, so is context-specific in derivation. Rape and stealing are perceived as threatening crimes to communities while domestic violence is considered a private and unthreatening crime. Punishment is described as a gendered and strategic process.

While informed by the context, the theory draws on a wealth of literature that reveals broadly shared phenomena across societies related to norms of male protection. Feminist scholars have described how problems and social attitudes are shared even while their “manifestations” vary (Bunch 2012, 30; Richards and Haglund 2015, 2–4). Embeddedness in this literature suggests the relevance of the *concept* of protective masculine norms in many situations and contexts. I derive the specific theory of protective masculine norms as one manifestation of this concept: Explaining armed conflict’s effects on communities in weak states that are struggling to provide local security.

Following the theory’s explication, I review several alternative explanations and the evidence for those theories. Finding little support for alternative explanations, I describe a qualitative research design to probe essential elements of protective masculine norms theory in the context of eastern DR Congo. Combined with the empirical findings of armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing, the qualitative evidence gathered from 4 villages lend weight to and further develop the theory of protective

masculine norms.

## 4.2 Protective Masculine Norms

### 4.2.1 Literature on Masculine Protection

Protective masculine norms are related to the concept of chivalry that upholds men as protectors of vulnerable populations, particularly women and children (Chinkin and Kaldor 2013). The idea that men are expected to protect women seems antithetical to theories about violence against women, which suggest that women are targeted with particular forms of violence precisely because they are women. Are women protected because they are women? Or do women face more violence because they are women?

This conundrum is one reason that masculine protection has received scant attention within the literature (Chafetz and Dworkin 1987; Hunnicutt 2009). The fact that patriarchal ideology can both encourage harming women and protecting them is what Hunnicutt (2009) refers to as the *paradox of protection*. Patriarchy, she explicates, can simultaneously encourage both protection and vulnerability:

Chivalry renders women powerless because accepting protection implies neediness and vulnerability; meanwhile the threat of being victimized requires acquiescence to the protection that men offer. (Hunnicutt 2009, 565)

Armed conflict can accentuate the gendered dimension of protection and vulnerability. During armed conflict, men are perceived as protectors with power and agency and women as vulnerable and in need of protection (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Goldstein 2003; Chinkin and Kaldor 2013; Hunnicutt 2009; Carpenter 2005). This has implications for women's status and security after war. Chinkin and Kaldor describe:

During conflict soldiers are deemed “heroes,” and this gives rise to a dichotomy between the images of “protector” (men) and “protected” (women)... The

terms “protected” and “victim” used to describe women imply weakness and subordination, which, in turn, perpetuate women’s lack of empowerment in peacetime situations and mask the reality of women’s experience of violence and insecurity. (Chinkin and Kaldor 2013, 168)

Women’s subordination, victimhood and described need for protection in war reflects their widespread and shared subordinate role in peacetime contexts (Pateman 2016). War highlights differences in men’s and women’s status in society as men are called to the service of the state in the name of protection.

While conflict and security scholars have explored associations between the warrior image, militarized masculinity and war (Morris 1996; Goldstein 2003; Zurbriggen 2010; Duncanson 2013), very few have integrated the concept of masculine protection and none focus on it alone.

Karim and Beardsley (2017) draw upon the norm of masculine protection to help explain why security institutions fail to integrate women into their forces. When women are thought of as individuals to be protected (rather than as protectors), female security force members are rarely put on the front lines and thus devalued within security institutions. Goldstein (2003) argues that men are motivated to fight, in part, to protect women who represent the home and normalcy. Carpenter (2003) describes how the concepts of protection and vulnerability in war affect the international community’s approach to evacuating warzones. By defining women and children as victims and men as warriors or defenders, international evacuation protocol leaves men behind to be slaughtered even in situations where men are most vulnerable.

This literature describes broad systemic processes where gender roles and war are mutually constituted. Research on norms and war rarely move from the macro to the micro level to outline and test specific micro processes.<sup>94</sup> I propose a testable micro-level theory that brings

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<sup>94</sup>An exception is Karim and Beardsley (Karim and Beardsley 2017).

the concept of male protection to the forefront.<sup>95</sup>

#### 4.2.2 Micro-level Theory of Masculine Protection

As Enloe (1989) once described, “men are expected to be protectors of the world.” In armed conflict, men tend to be tasked with the role of protector. Men make up the majority of defense group members, armed group members, state military, and heads of household across most contexts. Protection can involve violence, but may entail other actions such as overseeing evacuation, emergency work, and guarding agricultural or household property. Whether the goal is to protect one’s property, one’s family, one’s community, or one’s armed group, protection provision tends to fall on men.<sup>96</sup>

Whether or not men actually provide protection to their property, families, and communities (which may comprise other armed group members) when faced with armed conflict, people sense a greater need for protection. The collective experience of armed conflict reveals the dependence that community members have on one another for protection and demonstrates the reality of outside threats.<sup>97</sup> Because men are perceived protectors in war, protection is expected to come from men in the community. As a result, demand for *male* protection grows in the aftermath of war.

With increased demand for male protection in the wake of armed conflict, people calculate new tradeoffs when deciding whether to punish male community members for engaging in crimes. This idea draws upon *Insight 2* from the qualitative work presented in the previous chapter: *A context-informed theory should integrate strategic tradeoffs that people face when punishing perpetrators of crimes.*

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<sup>95</sup>While male protection inevitably coexists with male violence in armed conflict, this theory is explicated to isolate the protective norms logic.

<sup>96</sup>While chivalry has positive connotations, protection is not always altruistic in intent. Men may be motivated to protect their wives for multitudinous reasons, including because they view wives as a form of property.

<sup>97</sup>Even if individuals themselves did not experience violence firsthand (for example, if they were away from the village), the experience is part of the collective village memory and relevant to individuals.

Community members want to preserve the supply of male protection within their communities to prepare for conflict recurrence. This forward-thinking calculation means that men, as perceived protectors, are given greater license to perpetrate crimes, as long as those crimes are of a private nature and not perceived to harm the community. In this way, conflict - an interaction between a community and outsiders - changes internal punishment dynamics within communities.

But, this tradeoff is contingent on the nature of the threat a criminal poses. As demand for male protection increases in the wake of armed conflict, protection becomes a more highly revered masculine quality that all community members more greatly value and esteem. Men, wanting to live up to masculine ideals heralded within their communities, will prefer to act in a more protective way - preferring to root out crimes that pose a public threat to a greater degree than before.<sup>98</sup> After exposure to armed conflict, men will thus prefer more severe punishments for crimes perceived to harm their communities.

Norms driving men to behave more protectively and punish more after war introduce a gendered dimension to punishment in the aftermath of war, drawing from *Insight 3* in the previous chapter: *A context-informed theory should account for the perceived dominant role that men play in punishment.*

Women may actively seek and encourage protective behavior on the part of men. Like men, they may prefer to punish crimes that threaten their communities more after armed conflict. But, because of gender role differentiation common in war, conflict's effects may be gendered. Women will not be subject to the same normative pressures as men to provide protection to their communities. As a result, armed conflict may not affect women's preferences for punishing internal community threats to the same extent as it affects men's. Some women may prefer to accept the risk that male criminals from their communities pose in order to maintain access to protection by insiders from outsiders. In the face of perceived vulnerability,

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<sup>98</sup>This logic parallels insights from evolutionary models and simulations, which show that contributions to public goods games increase when games are structured to include in-group punishment alongside out-group competition (Sääksvuori, Mappes, and Puurtinen 2011; Abbink et al. 2010).



the devil that women know may always be better than the devil that they don't know - even when insiders themselves pose a community threat.

In this micro-level theory of protective masculine norms, I have explicated how armed conflict brings about increased supply of and demand for protective behavior by men. The logic suggests that, in the wake of armed conflict, community members will be less likely to punish men that perpetrate crimes because they want to safeguard men in their midst to serve as future protection providers. But men will also prefer to act more protectively in accordance with masculine ideals after war and will want to punish men whose crimes threaten their communities.

But what crimes are considered public community threats? How do these theoretical claims map onto preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence, and stealing? The theoretical implications are tied to how people perceive these crimes in context.

### **4.2.3 Context-specific Implications**

The described dynamics of intra-community punishment should generalize to other conflict contexts as communities react to bolster protection in the wake of war. From context to context, however, precisely how these dynamics map onto preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing will vary. This is because communities may have different perceptions about whether these crimes constitute public community harms to protect against. The crime-specific theoretical implications outlined here are thus specific to eastern DR Congo.

This section describes a typology of crimes suggested by *Insight 1* in the previous chapter: *A context-informed theory should differentiate between crimes that are perceived as private and unthreatening to communities and crimes that are perceived to be public community threats.*

As described in the previous chapter, rape and stealing are considered public threats that harm communities. A crime of rape negatively impacts the victim, her husband and her family. If the crime is repeated, it will harm another woman, her husband and her family.

Table 4.1: Typology of Crimes

Unthreatening Crimes to Communities	Threatening Crimes to Communities
- Private in nature - Repetition of the crime does not impact others in the community	- Public in nature - Repetition of the crime will impact others in the community
Ex. Domestic Violence, Intimate Partner Rape, Beating One's Children	Ex. Rape, Stealing, Assault, Manslaughter

The crime of rape is perceived to threaten the public; it is a public crime. Other crimes in the same category include stealing, assault and manslaughter. Each of these crimes impact (a) people outside the home and (b) both men and women.

Domestic violence, however, is considered a private matter, widely accepted as a form of education and discipline for wives. The crime of domestic violence and its repetition impacts the victimized woman, but generally stops there. It does not threaten women in other households or men in other households in that community. The closest evidence to spillover effects from domestic violence is that women in eastern DR Congo consider the possibility that men that perpetrate domestic violence may influence their friends to do the same. Thus, women prefer that their husbands do not associate with men known to perpetrate. Thus the crime of domestic violence (a) usually remains within the households and (b) threatens only women - never men.

This raises important questions about who is considered a citizen or community member. Whose harm is relevant to communities? Social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Kant describe the foundation of government from a hypothetical state of nature, describing how people rationally give up some freedoms to government and, in turn, rely on that government to protect their interests. Yet, as explicated by Pateman (2016), women appear as citizens in social contract theories only through marriage and familial relations with men. Each social contract is thus tied up with a “sexual contract” whereby men govern women in the context of the patriarchal modern state.

The “sexual contract” relegates women to be less-than-full members of the community and, in this structure, women’s harm remains secondary. In this framework, women’s harm is not community harm per se. Thus, there seems to be a gendered logic behind the distinction between private crimes that fail to impact communities and public crimes that do.

However, the theory of protective masculine norms does not ask about the origin of the distinction between private crimes and public crimes, but takes local understandings and this typology as given in order to understand armed conflict’s varied effects on crimes.

Because domestic violence is not considered harmful to communities, people in communities recently exposed to armed conflict will prefer to safeguard future male protection that domestic violence perpetrators in their communities can provide. They will thus prefer to punish domestic violence, notably widespread among men in their communities, less after their communities are exposed. Women, even if the perpetrators are their husbands and they themselves are being victimized, will want protectors to escape punishment so that they can and will provide protection.

*H4a: Armed conflict will decrease the severity of punishment preferences for domestic violence.*

Because rape and stealing are perceived as harmful crimes to the community, people in communities recently exposed to armed conflict - particularly men that are expected to engage in protective behavior - will prefer to punish rape and stealing more severely.

Women, perceived primarily as protection seekers rather than protection providers in conflict, are not subject to the same normative dynamic as men. Women may thus respond to these perceived community threats no differently.

*H4b: Armed conflict will increase the severity of punishment preferences for rape and stealing, particularly among men.*

Table 4.2: Summary of Theoretical Implications

1. Women’s Empowerment

	Rape	Domestic Violence	Stealing
Men	+	+	no effect
Women	+	+	no effect

2. Backlash

	Rape	Domestic Violence	Stealing
Men	-	-	no effect
Women	+	+	no effect

3. Violent Masculine Norms

	Rape	Domestic Violence	Stealing
Men	-	-	no effect
Women	-	-	no effect

4. Protective Masculine Norms

	Rape	Domestic Violence	Stealing
Men	+	-	+
Women	+	-	+

Table 4.2 summarizes the theoretical implications. Unlike theories of empowerment (H1), backlash (H2) and violent masculinities (H3), the theory of protective masculine norms (H4) can account for the findings of the quantitative research project. Protective masculine norms theory implies that rape and domestic violence will be differently affected by armed conflict because what matters about crimes is not whether they are crimes against women but whether the criminal is perceived to pose a public threat to communities. Because it increases the value of community protection, armed conflict will increase how severely people prefer to punish rape and stealing - crimes that threaten communities (and this will be particularly true for men since men are subject to normative pressure to engage in community protection). But armed conflict will decrease how severely people prefer to punish domestic violence, because of the lesser, private harm and the potential protection that community perpetrators of domestic violence can provide.

Specific features of the armed conflict in DR Congo may make it a likely case to find evidence of protective masculine norms. As elucidated by Baaz and Stern (2009), men in DR Congo sense that they have failed in achieving what communities expect of them - for

example, by failing to provide protection during a recent conflict episode, by failing to provide means for their families, by failing to find gainful employment and by failing to marry.<sup>99</sup> Men want to live up to ideals heralded in their communities. A sense of failed masculinity associated with recent armed conflict can lead men to act in more hyper-masculine ways; thus, men compensate for perceived failures by preferring to behave more protectively.

Yet much of the framing around violence against women and backlash in DR Congo suggests that this reactive process leads to violent masculinities and backlash against women - neither which finds support in the data. Protective masculine norms provides a corrective interpretation of male behavior that can better explain the findings of the previous chapter.

Again, the theoretical implications of protective masculine norms for rape, domestic violence and stealing will differ from context to context depending on how people view these crimes. The scope conditions for the theory's generalizability refer to armed conflict's effects on punishing crimes, with the theorized direction of change depending on how those crimes are perceived to threaten (or fail to threaten) communities in that context. This means that, in communities where domestic violence *is* perceived as a public community threat (unlike in eastern DR Congo), the theory of protective masculine norms remains relevant for understanding armed conflict's effects, but suggests that armed conflict will increase (rather than decrease) how severely people will prefer to punish domestic violence as it does for rape. In communities where domestic violence is *not* perceived as a public community threat (as in eastern DR Congo), the theoretical implications for the effects of armed conflict on domestic violence will be the same as those outlined here.

Given this framework, there are two central scope conditions to consider: First, communities feel the need to provide protection for themselves because of the shared experience and, second, there is a male bias in understandings of who should provide this protection. Male protection may be pertinent to non-conflict events such as gang warfare and terrorism. The

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<sup>99</sup>In part as a result of war and the destabilization of the economy, men in DR Congo find it difficult to pay the bride price that would allow them to marry.

theory will be relevant in the aftermath of such events where communities feel the need to provide their own security against repeated episodes and believe that security should come from men.

Contrary to the claim that war-related protection is a predominantly male activity, recent literature has highlighted the substantive role that women play in waging and responding to war (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007; Cohen 2013b). Initially, this may suggest that responses to armed conflict are not gendered in the way described. However, despite their role in fighting and protecting communities in response to war, female contributions may fail to overturn engrained conceptions about their roles. And it is engrained conceptions of these roles that drive the dynamics theorized in protective masculine norms. Short of overturning this engrained bias towards prizing men's protective role, the dynamics outlined in the theory of protective masculine norms will hold.

### **4.3 Alternative theories**

What other explanations can account for the finding that armed conflict increases how severely people prefer to punish rape and stealing but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic violence? While no parsimonious theories can explain observed changes in punishment preferences for all three crimes, it is important to consider that different factors account for armed conflict's effects on domestic violence, rape and stealing.

Perhaps places exposed to recent armed conflict are less secure and subject to more crime from outsiders (rape and stealing) and thus people want to punish rape and stealing (even when perpetrated by insiders) more because these are the *crimes* that they experience everyday. The *continued insecurity* argument is not inconsistent with the theory of protective masculine norms. The continued insecurity argument, however, begs two important questions. First, why do people want to punish rape and stealing when they are more greatly exposed? Second, why are armed conflict's effects more relevant for men's preferences than women's? The theory of protective masculine norms helps to fill these gaps. People want to punish

rape and stealing because they face insecurity and desire more security or protection. Men's preferences are more affected by armed conflict because they are perceived as (and perceive themselves as) providers of this protection and are compelled to react to this insecurity.

Despite theoretical weaknesses, the continued insecurity argument raises important questions about the relationship between levels of rape and preferences for punishing rape, between levels of stealing and preferences for punishing stealing, and between levels of domestic violence and preferences for punishing domestic violence. This will be further examined in the conclusion of this dissertation when asking about the implications of protective masculine norms theory for deterring violent crime. However, there is no statistical evidence from these communities that levels of rape are higher in communities recently exposed to armed conflict in this sample of 20 villages. In fact, theories about deterrence would suggest lower rather than higher levels of rape and stealing since there is more support for punishment.

The review of the literature on domestic violence after armed conflict (provided in the introductory chapter) also suggests that domestic violence increases in the aftermath of war (Østby, Leiby, and Nordås 2019). If the continued insecurity argument is just about increased levels of a crime and domestic violence increases as does rape and stealing, then communities should respond by punishing all of these crimes more. Yet, people prefer to punish domestic violence less. The raw magnitude of a crime does not explain the observed variation in preferences for punishment.

Another variant of this reasoning is about *conflict-related crime*. If people experience rape and stealing as a part of their exposure to armed conflict - as something that happened to them or their communities in the past, but is no different from non-conflict villages in the present - then they may react more severely to rape and stealing because this is part of their past experience. By this logic, men are simply more fed up with rape and stealing and want to punish these crimes more because of their past conflict-related effects on communities. But, as in the continued insecurity argument, the logic of previous conflict-related community exposure alone cannot account for the gendered nature of the findings for rape and stealing.

The findings on domestic violence are less problematic for a theory about conflict-related crime. Domestic violence is not experienced as or perceived as a conflict-related crime, so the effects of armed conflict on preferences for punishing domestic violence are not due to perceived associations with past conflict.<sup>100</sup> While not conflicting, the theory about conflict-related crime, cannot explain the findings.

However, as described in the previous chapter, my qualitative work suggests that people think about rape and stealing as harmful in both conflict and non-conflict communities. Exposure to armed conflict does not seem to affect the extent to which communities perceive rape and stealing as a threat or a problem. Rather than understandings of the harm, it is the preferred punishment of the crime that changes as a result of armed conflict.

There is suggestive evidence that little difference exists between conflict and non-conflict villages in how they define community problems. In the 80 focus groups that took place across 20 villages in 2016, participants were asked which of the three crimes that they would like to see more government intervention to help with the crime. While related to the quality of interventions by the government, focus group responses to this question provide insights into whether respondents in conflict and non-conflict villages view rape, stealing and domestic violence as problems in the first place. Figure 4.1 describes the proportion of focus groups that mentioned stealing only, rape only, domestic violence only and then combinations of these crimes as problems that warrant further intervention.

The data show that groups from both conflict and non-conflict villages indicate that rape and stealing are problems in their community and at roughly similar levels. In non-conflict villages, a higher proportion of focus groups suggest that rape and stealing are the only problems that warrant further government intervention. But focus groups in non-conflict villages tend to mention only stealing or include domestic violence slightly more often. Overall, the figure fails to reveal systematic differences between conflict and non-conflict villages in

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<sup>100</sup>Even if domestic violence occurs during an armed conflict and is conflict-related (e.g. as a result of PTSD), people do not perceive it that way because it is not perpetrated by outsiders as part of the conflict.






Figure 4.1: Preferences for More Intervention by Issue Area

perceptions of rape and stealing as problematic.

While the focus group discussions were narrowed to discussions of rape, domestic violence and stealing, participants could easily choose no response, only one area, or all areas as warranting further interventions. Even while, the ethical procedures associated with the study indicated that the study was not linked to receipt of aid, it is possible that respondents might say that they want more from their government in every dimension because there is no cost to doing so. Yet, focus groups participants rarely choose all three crimes and often say there is no role for the state in addressing domestic violence.

Can *state effectiveness* in addressing crimes explain armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishing rape and stealing or domestic violence? A theory of state effectiveness suggests that village-level conflict exposure changes the effectiveness of state interventions or aid in addressing crime in those villages. People will prefer more punishment by the state for crimes that the state is effective at punishing. This is related to a vast literature on state building; where states are effective people will gain confidence and give more authority to the state

(Lake 2010; Levi 1997). Perhaps villages exposed to armed conflict prefer more punishment of rape and stealing because the state proves its effectiveness in handling these crimes in the aftermath of local exposure to war.

There are two sources of evidence that run against a theory of state effectiveness. First, when dichotomizing the outcome variable from the last chapter (severity of preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing) and examining armed conflict's effects on prison and beating separately, one can see that armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishing rape are largely driven by preferences for prison while the effects of armed conflict on preferences for punishing stealing are driven by preference for beating to near death by community members.<sup>101</sup> It is thus unlikely that the findings of armed conflict's effects on rape and stealing are linked to the effectiveness of the state.

Second, as part of the follow-up study described in the next section, I convened focus groups with elites in 4 villages to help interpret and understand the quantitative findings from the 2016 study. Participants were recruited on the basis of their involvement in local conflict resolution. In these focus groups, participants almost uniformly described the state as very effective in punishing rape but completely ineffective in punishing stealing. If people turn over thieves to the police, they will be out again in a matter of days. Conversely, elites understood the state as holding perpetrators of rape to account - and keeping them in jail. Because these differences in the perceived effectiveness of the state in punishing rape and stealing, an argument about state effectiveness would suggest opposite effects of armed conflict on these crimes. But, armed conflict affects rape and stealing similarly, suggesting that state effectiveness can't well explain the findings.

Finally, an argument about *demographic change* suggests that people that died or left the village as a result of community exposure to armed conflict tended to prefer less punishment of rape and stealing than those that stayed behind - or, relatedly, that people that tended to

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<sup>101</sup>Again these categories were collapsed into one point of the scale to reflect how participants viewed punishment severity.

prefer more punishment of domestic violence died or left the village. Does armed conflict change the distribution of characteristics in a society in a way that affects preferences for punishing local crimes?

Analysis of balance between treatment and control villages in the previous chapter already shows reasonable balance on respondent characteristics of age, education, years living in the village, and ever being exposed to armed violence at the individual level. This suggests that neither demographics nor the recruitment process for focus group participants in the 2016 study were affected by armed conflict. The claim is that armed conflict did not fundamentally affect the participant recruitment process is further bolstered by data from the follow-up study that will be described in the next section as well. The distribution of respondent characteristics among randomly sampled respondents are not very different from the focus group participant characteristics described in the previous chapter.

## **4.4 Design of follow-up study**

Given the weaknesses in alternative theories and the potential contributions of the theory of protective masculine norms, I designed a qualitative study that took place within four villages of eastern DR Congo. The study investigates the plausibility of masculine protective norms theory and seeks to discover more about its processes in the context of eastern DR Congo.

### **4.4.1 Questions**

Focus group discussions from the previous study provide the foundation for the theory of protective masculine norms by revealing how people perceive rape, domestic violence and stealing in terms of threatening and unthreatening crimes. Empirically the data also show that armed conflict affects how severely people prefer to punish rape and domestic violence in opposite ways - contrary to existing theories. But the 2016 study did not ask about protection during armed conflict or trace community responses to armed conflict exposure. So, I needed

to return to these communities to ask questions about protection, community protection and processes of change.

I design this 2018 study as a plausibility probe or “illustrative case” in order to contribute to developing the theory of protective masculine norms and to assess its applicability in this case (Eckstein 1992, 148–52; Levy 2008; Beach 2017). This study probes the existence of necessary conditions for armed conflict to have the effects proposed by protective masculine norms theory:

1. Protection is gendered.
2. Armed conflict increases local demand for protection.
3. People consider security tradeoffs when deciding about punishing local crimes.

Using hypothetical questions about punishment and protection networks alongside people’s accounts of their experiences and behaviors, this component of the project explores the relationship between crime, protection and community security in eastern DR Congo - elements not explored prior to this component of the study. It also uses process tracing to learn how communities have responded to incidents of insecurity, a different approach than the comparison between conflict and non-conflict villages in the preceding chapter.

#### **4.4.2 Sample**

The qualitative data draw from interviews with a random sample of the population in 4 of the 20 villages as well as elite interviews with one man and one woman that engage in conflict resolution from each of the four villages. By randomly sampling respondents within four village populations, the design is able to incorporate diverse perspectives from each community. Through the inclusion of elite interviews, the design elicits detailed insights into crime and sanctioning decisions in each community.

The set of 20 villages described in the last chapter were selected by matching all villages exposed to armed conflict with a village not exposed to armed conflict and then randomly

selecting 10 pairs of villages (20 villages). Security conditions impacted the selection of the 4 of these 20 villages as sites where in-depth qualitative research would take place. Many of the 20 villages were not secure enough for teams to travel to due to heightened tensions associated with the upcoming 2018/19 elections. Thus, the sample of 4 villages in this component of the study are less remote and more secure than some of the other villages in my potential sample.

Of the four villages in the qualitative sample, only one was categorized as a village recently exposed to armed conflict during the 2016 study. Its matched pair, Village 3 is also included in the sample of villages for this study. New conflict-related incidents were recounted in interviews in Village 1 and 3, revealing the necessity in analyzing processes rather than relying on a comparison across villages. I use process tracing rather than a comparison on conflict and non-conflict villages to better account for conflict incidents that occurred between the 2016 study and the 2018 study.

The 4 villages are heterogenous in terms of population, with Villages 1 and 3 having a larger population of 2,000 and 3,000 respectively; and Villages 2 and 4 having smaller populations of 400 and 500 respectively. These villages are also heterogeneous in terms of their main source of external protection or security. In one village (V1), the majority of respondents refer to the FARDC or Bukavu officials as the main source of protection. In Village 2, however, the main source of outside protection cited is the church and NGOs. Community members in Village 3 refer to a self-defense group, the Mai Mai, as their source of external protection. In Village 4, community members describe only one another (if anything) as a source of security or protection for their community. One man from Village 4 attributes the current security of his village to a man that helped to keep the population from joining the Mai Mai - demonstrating that in this matched pair, Mai Mai were actively operating in both villages but not as dominant in Village 4 after this man's intervention (M3; Q6b). This variation in the perceived source of external security provision provides greater weight to findings about internal protection that hold across all four villages and suggests generalizability beyond these four villages to other villages in South Kivu, eastern DR Congo.




Figure 4.2: Respondent Characteristics

#### 4.4.3 Respondent Characteristics

Figure 4.2 describes the mean age, education level and years living in the village of male and female respondents across the four villages. As a random sample of the population, the respondent characteristics are representative. Across all villages, the mean education level is 3.6 years among women and 6.25 years among men, reflecting a substantial and known gender gap in education. The mean age among men and women is similar, with a mean age of 41 years for women and 44 years for men. Women, on average, have lived in the village around 20 years, spending around half of their lives in the village. As expected for patrilineal structured households, men have lived in the village for a longer amount of time, on average 33 years.

Agriculture is the predominant form of work, with 18/20 female respondents and 13/20 male respondents describing their current work in agriculture. When asked to describe the work of their spouse, 17/20 women describe their husbands as being in agriculture and 14/20 describe their wives as being in agriculture. Consistent with a random sample, the male and female accounts of work and spousal work reflect one another well. Other work includes brick layer, carpenter, teacher, motorbike or tractor driver, trader, selling palm oil, and selling corn. Household size ranges from 4 to 10.

Respondent characteristics do not differ substantially from the previous study (where focus group participants were not selected randomly). The similarity among the population samples give greater confidence that the focus group sampling procedure in the previous study was inclusive, drawing on broad samples of the population.

## **4.5 Evidence from Qualitative Interviews**

This section presents the interview evidence in the logical progression indicated by protective masculine norms theory. First, protection is a gendered process. Second, armed conflict has effects on behaviors and norms because of these gendered dynamics. Finally, there are security tradeoffs for punishing community members for their crimes.

I approach the analysis of the quantitative data with an eye to its representative nature. This also offers greater transparency in the extent of support for theorized mechanisms (Beach 2016). Quantitative examination of the qualitative data was facilitated by the use of coding schemes within NVivo 12.

### **4.5.1 Protection is gendered**

#### **Nature of protection**

The theory of protective masculine norms begins with the assumption that the nature of protection is gendered, with men being perceived protectors of communities and individuals within it. The gendered nature of protection is widespread across the world and shared even among animal populations (Drews 1993). But what does protection look like in eastern DR Congo? Is it, as protective norms theory would expect, clearly gendered?

Randomly sampled interviews of four villages populations provide insights into the gendered nature of protection in these areas. I asked men and women about the gender distribution of their ideal network of community protection. Most men and women (70%) choose a security network mainly comprised of men.

Specifically, the interview question asked, of 5 individuals, who would you choose to




Figure 4.3: Gender Distribution of Security Networks

protect your village. Figure 4.3 describes the gender distribution of responses. Responses below the forty-five degree line are biased towards men. There are some outliers where respondents chose more or less than five individuals, their responses are also included in the distributions.<sup>102</sup>

Across the four villages, only two female respondents and one male respondent chose a protection network solely comprised of men. All suggested that they chose men, because women were “not capable” of assuring security in the village (L210). A woman from Village

<sup>102</sup>While outlier responses tend to come from female respondents, this could be due to enumerator differences in implementation rather than characteristics or background of the respondents.



1 explains that “it is men that are capable of assuring the security of the community because of their physical force” (K8).

A man from Village 3 goes beyond physical capacity to explain:

“Women are not made for security. They always have fear. And further, they do not keep secrets; they tell all that they see.” (L32)

The 4 respondents choosing 1 woman and 4 men describe a similar logic, pointing out that women could counsel the men - who were created or ordained to provide security (K3, L22, M1, K1). A man from Village 4 describes:

“It is men who assure security. The Bible is clear. A woman is created feeble in comparison to the man. Even in the home, in bed the man sleeps in front and the woman behind, so that if there is danger the man will be the first to defend.” (K3)

Some add that while men are built for the “real work of security”, women play a role by providing counsel and encouragement (L22, K1). Others described how, in addition to differences in terms of physical capabilities, women are too easily deceived to depend on for security (M1 and K1).

Nearly half of all respondents (19/40), however, would comprise their ideal security network with three men and two women. By design, the interview question enforces inequality in the gender distribution of one’s security network by asking about a hypothetical network of five individuals. To what extent does this numerical distribution indicate that protection is gendered?

The reasoning that respondents provide for choosing this modal outcome reveals a gendered nature of protection that extends further than raw numbers. Table 4.3 describes several categories of respondent reasoning and provides the frequency distribution of respondents providing that reasoning.

Table 4.3: Categories of Logic for including Women in Modal Reponse

Topic	Frequency
Supportive	6
Equality	4
Women’s Security	3
No response	6
Total	19

Six of these 19 respondents do not provide a reasoning for their choice (L24, L25, L310, L35, L35, M10). But, of the 13 accounts given, 6 respondents explicitly describe women as serving a supportive, counseling or encouraging role to men in security provision (K2, K4, L21, L28, L31, M2). A woman from Village 2 describes:

“Men are more courageous and flexible in matters of security, women are only there to accompany them.” (L28)

A man from Village 4 provides a similar account of women’s role:

“Men are naturally made to secure women and the entire family. Women can also do this but mostly in the case of surveillance.” (M2)

Among respondents that describe women as doing a better job in the arena of security than men, women’s role is still described as merely supportive. Two men from Village 4 describe.

“Each time a man will direct and a woman will assist. A woman makes fewer mistakes and people can count on her to advise the men. A woman brings more security than men. She observes, analyzes and and knows quickly how to approach an enemy. An organization where one finds women also directly inspires trust” (K2).

“Women help while men work. Women keep secrets, are calm and help men make plans” (K4).

One man from Village 2 openly rejects the sex distinction presented in the question, saying that “securing a place is not about sex” and that “women do this better in comparison to men” (L21). Even so, the respondent favors men in his security network.

In these discussions about security networks, several men also point to broader ideals for why they included women: equality (M4, L34) or acknowledging women’s capabilities and the need for working together (L33, L23). This logic resonates with many efforts by outside actors in the region to improve women’s roles outside the home. Women, however, tend to provide a concrete security logic to including women, emphasizing their role in ensuring the security of women (M8, K6, M6). As described by a woman from Village 4 and a woman from Village 1, respectively:

“Men will assure the safety of the community while women will ensure the security of women.” (M8)

“... women should be represented because the two respected women will respect the rights of other women.” (K6)

The prevailing logic described by the respondents support the starting assumption in protective masculine norms theory that community protection is a gendered. But there are also five respondents that chose to include more women in their security network than men. Does their logic conflict with this assumption? The logic described by these outlier respondents is not dissimilar, but reflects previous discussions about women’s inclusion being key to women’s security (K10) or women having distinct capabilities, such as being less corrupt or having better bargaining skills (L37, M5, M3).

In 6 cases, female respondents chose a protection network that included fewer than 5 people.<sup>103</sup> Four of these 6 respondents chose an equitable distribution, perhaps making a statement about equity that goes beyond the respondents that chose a 3:2 ratio. Potentially

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<sup>103</sup>Unlike the few that chose more than 5 people, the interview question allowed for this possibility.

some respondents prefer a smaller and tighter network of security. One woman laments her disbelief in achieving security (L39).

“I choose one man and one woman, only because I am obligated to choose. I do not know a person that can assure the security of the community here” (L39).

The disbelief that this woman communicates suggests that - despite efforts to achieve security - people might not think that achieving community security is a real possibility or rely on security networks. While it is important to ask about hypotheticals to understand abstract internal biases (Finch 1987; Mitchell et al. 2006), the biases in hypotheticals only become relevant if and when they express themselves in real behavior.

### **Protective behaviors**

In order to examine whether and how the gendered nature of protection manifests in behavior and to learn about how protection happens, respondents were asked to recount stories of protecting others and being protected.<sup>104</sup>

The interview questions about protection ask about times when respondents have helped to protect someone from danger or someone has helped them in a dangerous situation. This has two implications for analysis. First, not all responses are relevant to armed conflict. Many feature discussions of monetary help or sustenance in times of famine. Second, respondents are not explicitly asked to think about protection at the community level. Thus, descriptions of protective acts provide an overview of the types of protective behaviors that men and women engage in, but does not confine the discussion to acts relevant to community security. This approach leaves the conversation open to learn about the circumstances under which protection happens in terms of individual experiences, rather than pre-defining protection in terms of its relationship with armed conflict.

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<sup>104</sup>Note that this question was asked prior to the questions about hypotheticals to avoid biasing responses towards expressed norms.

Of 40 responses to these questions, 25 stories of protection could reasonably be related to a conflict incident such as stealing, rape, kidnapping, and armed violence by someone that was not explicitly from the community. Descriptions of these protective acts include informing others of threats, informing authorities of threats and negotiating or arranging the release of neighbors or friends held captive by armed groups in the forest. People also tell stories of how fellow villagers have pleaded on their behalf when wrongfully accused of armed group membership or formed patrols to guard their homes when threatened individually.

The experiences that people recount aligns with how respondents characterize women's role in hypothetical security networks, supporting the proposition that protection is gendered in practice.

Of these 25 conflict-relevant stories, only three respondents described a woman helping them to avoid a dangerous incident. A man from Village 1 described how a woman from his village warned him of suspected danger along a route. Heeding her warning, he remained where he was rather than traveling further. Moments later, shots rang out from the location the woman had described (K5). Another woman described a similar story about women's role in information sharing to avoid dangerous conflict situations. A female neighbor came to her house to warn her of impending pillage by the FNL. This gave her time to gather some goods and flee (K7). Another woman describes how she avoided a potential incident of rape based on information a woman that returned from the fields shared with her (L27).

To probe further about the gendered nature of protection, there were also explicit questions about whether there were examples of women protecting others in the village. Thirty-six respondents answered this question, with one-third of respondents reporting either that women do not protect (7 respondents) or could think of no examples (5 respondents).

When probed, respondents tended to describe incidents in a similar logic to that given when discussing hypothetical security networks. Women play an important role in helping and protecting other women. Eight of the 36 respondents described examples of women intervening in cases of domestic violence (M10, K2, L23, K3, L34, M5, L36, L27). These

responses come from both men and women across villages. Three of the 36 respondents, two women and one man across 3 villages, described situations where women intervened in cases of rape (L28, L31, M8). Two additional stories described protecting other women or resolving conflicts with other women (L37, M4, L21). The perception that women primarily serve as protectors of other women rather than communities carries over to the experiences and stories that people recount.

Of the 36 responses to the explicit question about women's protective behaviors, there are only 4 examples of women providing security not only for other women but for other households (L25, K5, L37). One man described how women took part in security rounds or patrols (L25) while another described how women provide information about armed groups from their travels to and from work in their fields (K5). Finally, respondents recounted stories about women intervening to help keep the homes of others safe from fire (L32) or from bandits (L37).

The interviews also entailed questions about what people did personally to help protect others in their community. Both male and female respondents tend to describe instances in which they made noise to scare thieves from neighboring homes. They often achieved this by hitting their cows so that the noise scares the thieves away. Respondents also describe their interventions in situations of domestic violence. But, importantly, this is framed in terms of helping neighbors individually rather than in terms of providing community protection.

These descriptions reinforce the idea presented in the previous section that both women and men see women as integral players in ensuring the safety of women; however, women are perceived to play less of a role in community security more broadly. Even in the strongest example of women providing community security, the male respondent underscores that they do this alongside men.

“Yes, women protect also. Certain women from this village participate in the patrol. *They do this with the men*, but all intervene to protect the population.”

[L25, emphasis mine]

#### **4.5.2 Armed conflict increases demand for protection**

Having established the gendered nature of community protection, I now turn to the evidence of armed conflict's effects. If armed conflict affects demand for male protection in the way proposed by the theory of protective masculine norms, (1) people will remember or know about an incident of armed conflict in their communities (2) people will react or express a desire for protection in response to such an incident and (3) people will highly revere men that have engaged in protective behaviors towards their communities.

#### **Armed conflict and perceived insecurity**

In an environment of ongoing insecurity and general crime, how important is an incident of armed conflict to communities? An open-ended question at the beginning of all interviews asked respondents to list situations that they view as dangerous. More than half of all respondents (22/40) refer to armed conflict directly when describing situations that they view as dangerous. Five additional respondents refer to violence more generally, amounting to almost 70 percent of respondents referring to violence in their communities as a dangerous situation. Armed conflict is second only to sickness in terms of the number of respondents that mention it as a dangerous situation or event. Other widely-shared categories include death, famine, rape, poverty, and sorcery.

Evidence suggests that people remember and respond to episodes of armed conflict. In 2016, the village chief in each of 20 villages recounted notable events that occurred within the village during the past 10 years. Following each chief interview, participants in 4 focus groups were asked to describe the notable events that the chief had mentioned, including events of armed conflict. In all 80 focus groups, participants easily recounted the notable events. Two years later, interview respondents recount the same events. Because questions were asked in an interview context (rather than a focus group context), this follow-up study also shows that people recount these events individually (rather than as groups). Respondents that did not live in the village at the time of the event were also able to recall the event, underscoring

the relevance of community level exposure.

During recent incidents of armed conflict, almost all respondents report having fled the village to the forest, another village, or another country for days, weeks, months or years. Prayer was considered the central source of protection during such a dangerous incident. People's story about protection during episodes of armed conflict was a story of "every man for himself (or family for itself)." When asked whether respondents were assisted by fellow villagers, their answer tends to be a strong and repeated "no, no one helped" or "only God could help me, I prayed."

So, if people do not protect one another during incidents of armed conflict, when and how does community protection take place?

Protective behavior that respondents report tends to happen in-between episodes of armed conflict. Armed conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is not a context where people stay at home to defend themselves and others in their village against incoming armed groups. However, there is some evidence, even in this data, that some respondents have joined armed groups in response to insecurity. For example, one respondent in my sample describes joining the Mai Mai, a group originally formed as a self-defense group (that is often now considered a party to the conflict) in response to an incident of insecurity.

Generally, these communities do not have the means (or guns) to defend themselves. People are concerned about protection from armed conflict (avoiding or escaping it) rather than protection during episodes. Thus, local protective behavior tends to take the form of information provision, patrols, and forming relationships with outside security actors to avoid armed conflict episodes. With timely information, people can flee and/or inform the appropriate authorities to help stop such an incident when their lives are threatened.

When asked about villagers helping one another, the response is a resounding "no." However, respondents continually underscore that family, very close friends, and church members do help one another. When asked about why someone has helped them in the past, most respondents say that this person was part of their family, a friend, or a fellow church



member.

This reliance on networks means that, during times when people expect repeated incidents of insecurity, people may seek to further embed themselves in (or at least not alienate) their social networks. For example, in this context standing up against an act of domestic violence may damage one's network, but engaging in socially-approved protective behavior such as punishing a thief or a rapist may solidify one's network and enhance one's security network. Such social networks can serve as an important source of protection from armed conflict.

### **Armed conflict and behavior change**

In order to trace processes of how people respond to incidents of armed conflict, and to better understand if and how demand for protection increases in the aftermath of armed conflict, I asked respondents whether they were prepared for the first incident of insecurity, how they prepared for any second incident of insecurity as well as how they prepared today.

Almost all respondents suggested, initially, that they were not prepared and could not be prepared for an incident of armed conflict. Because one cannot know when and where such incidents would happen, one cannot prepare for them. One woman summarized that such an incident was “pufu” (K2), which in the local language means unpredictable and surprising (K7). All respondents suggested they were not prepared for the first incident of armed conflict. For example, a male respondent said, “I was thinking that me and my goods were totally secure” (K2).

People describe how they were fearful in the aftermath of an incident of armed conflict and suggested that they adjusted their behaviors accordingly.

After the war, there was misery among the population and we were afraid of another war. Here at home I no longer raised cattle because I was afraid that we would be looted. We spent two months with our clothes packed. . . because we were fearful of another war. Our preparation had to be different because now we had the experience of war. (M2)

This respondent goes on to describe the uncertainty of the environment and the importance of war memory for security.

Today, we have already forgotten the experience of the war. We only have fear of thieves and the current regime. If Kabila does not let go of power, I have fear that more people are going to die. (M2)

While the respondent from Village 2 describes “forgetting” about the war, the war is clearly on the forefront of his mind - informing the fear of what will happen in the future. A respondent in Village 3 echoes this fear of the future, underscoring the importance of conflict memory and its tale of caution.

In 2004, war was a surprise. No one was prepared. Life begins to resume shyly despite the fact that the Kabila regime risks plunging us back into war (L32).

Both respondents frame war remembrance in a positive light as a note of wariness as people protest the regime.<sup>105</sup>

In the progression from talking about the first incident of insecurity associated with armed conflict to how people prepared for future incidents in its wake and in the present day, respondents began to reveal how they as individuals and as communities have responded to incidents of armed conflict. Figure 4.4 shows the number of respondents that describe preparation for recurrence of armed conflict in terms of several categories. These coding categories were revealed through conversations and were not asked about directly.

It is clear that people think about and prepare for future incidents of insecurity. They do so in several ways: preparing to flee, joining information networks, and collaborating with security forces. Only 1/4 of respondents say that they do not prepare in any way.

Many respondents preparing to flee described how their past experience fleeing the village informs what they plan to bring with them when they flee again. A recurrent theme was

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<sup>105</sup>While there was a large amount of insecurity associated with the elections, at the time of writing, elections and a relatively peaceful transfer of power seems to be in process.




Figure 4.4: Responses to incidents of insecurity

that people prepare to flee from incidents of armed conflict, which occurs often in eastern DR Congo, by selling their goods. If they leave their goods behind, the goods will only be pillaged and they are not able to bring many heavy goods with them during their escape.<sup>106</sup>

Whether or not people prepare to flee depends largely on means and family context. A woman from Village 4 described that, because she did not have enough money to flee and already had many children, she prepared by gathering enough goods for her family for sustenance during a future incident of insecurity (M8). An older man also said that he would not prepare to flee but to stay because he was now too old and without means to flee.

Whether preparing to flee or preparing to stay, the discussions about preparation underscore that people respond to past episodes of armed conflict by making preparations for the future. These preparations are inextricably linked with community exposure to armed conflict. People describe how their experiences inform their fears and behaviors. It is reasonable to conclude that demand for protection from armed conflict grows.

What forms of protection do people demand? Respondents describe the key to protection

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<sup>106</sup>This contrasts with how they discuss their preparation for incidents of insecurity such as famine where they prefer to keep their goods so that they can have nourishment during the difficult time.

as avoiding an incident of armed conflict - an incident where no one can help them. This requires having the information to respond before the event presents itself.

In the face of insecurity, people rely on information; but this information is given and received under risky circumstances. Respondents often ask themselves what motivated people to risk their lives in order to offer the information that saved them from harm. Information provision is protective, because it gives people time to notify external security forces or to flee. When one individual heard that he would be directly targeted, networks of men circled around his home to deter the violence.

In several villages (Village 1, Village 2, and Village 3) communities have responded to the increased demand for protection by formalizing nightly patrols. These patrols allow people to have the information that they need to protect themselves and warn their communities of danger. One man from Village 1 describes:

We started to be vigilant. People go around at night to get information on suspicious movements during the day. Before these FNL soldiers come here, there is at least one person who will see unknown people here. . . this information allows us to flee to save our lives. (K5)

However, respondents also note that because these patrols are formed of civilians, the people within them are not well armed and it is difficult for them to protect themselves from armed groups and armed thieves (L25). In the case of this village a higher level authority (Chef de Groupement) had implemented or required the patrols in the villages it oversaw and the respondent expressed some discontent with this requirement without provision of equipment.

Again, members of these communities do not have the means to protect themselves, so protection takes the form of information gathering and collaborating with external security forces in between episodes of armed conflict. Notably, villagers described either how they had reinforced their collaboration with external security forces (which security force depended on the village loyalties) in response to armed conflict incidents while a man from another

village described how such an incident led him to join a group engaging in security provision personally.

The foregoing discussion suggests that armed conflict affects communities and leads people within them to take on new behaviors to prepare for future episodes of insecurity. Sometimes it leads them to prepare to flee, with close attention to information provision that would be useful for making such a decision. To aid with information, three of the four communities have formally implemented a system of patrols, which also changes dynamics of security provision in the community. These patrols can also reinforce bifurcated gender roles in the provision of security. As described by one woman in Village 1 in her discussion of the hypothetical security network, women could not take part in night patrols because of the demands women face at home (K6).

Perceived and real differences between genders in contributions to community security become more greatly felt in the wake of community exposure to armed conflict when people are fearful of future conflict recurrence and are preparing for its recurrence.

### **Armed conflict and masculine norms**

Norms are beliefs about how men in a community should ideally behave. How does increased demand for protection in the wake of armed conflict affect masculine norms? Because women, like men, hold ideas about how men in a community should behave, both men and women uphold and propagate masculine norms.

In order to assess the claim posited by protective masculine norms theory - that armed conflict has implications for how people think men in a community should behave - I included an open-ended interview question about the characteristics of an ideal man. I coded all responses to this question as providing help, access to information, or security.

Table 4.4 shows that about half of all men and slightly less than half of all women describe ideal masculine qualities as inclusive of access to help, information provision or security more generally. A man from Village 2 provides a concrete example:

Table 4.4: Respondent Descriptions of Masculine Qualities

	Men	Women	Total
Help, Information, or Security	10	8	18
No Help, Information, or Security	10	12	22
Total Respondents	20	20	40

I will give you the example of the head of the groupement (upper level authority). This is a wise man with solidarity towards the population. He has means, money, a vehicle, fields, and cows. When there is a problem with stealing... he always looks for a good solution. He is the one that organized the patrols at night. During incidents of insecurity, he collaborates with the police and military and knows how to do this even if the police are abusive towards the population. This is a man that does not have fear. (L23)

This man is influential and collaborates with the authorities in Kinshasa... in a case of insecurity, he knows in advance what will happen and asks us to begin to prepare to flee or asks us not to panic and stay calm in our homes. (L23)

A woman described a man in her village that “resolves conflicts, and gives counsel... this ideal man assures security against the thieves at night...” (L38) Another woman from the same village describes a man that is “wise, kind with all of the people in the community, that helps the others and has a good heart” (L39).

After describing the qualities of an ideal man, respondents were asked explicitly how this individual (or the described characteristics) would aid in their protection in a time of insecurity and whether or not the individual that they envisioned would change. Table 4.5 depicts whether and how people chose to update the individual or the individual’s ideal qualities.

Very few respondents said that they would change the characteristics or identity of an ideal man under conditions of insecurity. Those that did choose to change made a practical argument for it; for example, in cases where a respondent was referring to an ideal man that

Table 4.5: Respondents Changing Qualities under Conditions of Insecurity

	Men	Women	Total
Yes, different	3	4	7
No, but adds characteristics	11	10	21
No, no different	5	2	7
No answer	1	3	4
Total Respondents	20	20	40

lived outside of the village or that had passed away, the respondent would choose someone nearby. It also became evident from this question, however, that many women felt constrained in their responses, indicating that they do not feel comfortable talking about men that were not their husbands. Because of this dimension, I focus mainly on men’s responses to this question.

Most men describe how the person that they had been considering in their ideal description would help them during an event of insecurity. These descriptions included how this ideal person would give information to the local authorities, the military and other villagers about the incident. Others emphasize how such an individual must be “influential” (L32) or “listened to by the population” (M3).

Importantly, this discussions of ideal men and how ideal men in a community behave provides no evidence of violent masculine norms. A theory of violent masculine norms suggests that people become conditioned to or even revere violence as a result of war. This is inconsistent with the findings from the previous chapter, as well as the qualitative evidence here. Both male and female respondents describe how ideal men avoid conflict and help others in the community. The majority of respondents cite peaceful relations between husband and wife in the home as an ideal quality. These findings run counter to claims in the literature about the normalization of violence in the home (Kelly et al. 2018).

The discussion about ideal men also provides insights into the importance of a man’s role or contributions to the community, suggesting that ideal men act not only for themselves but for the community. They give good counsel and “advocate for the entirety of the village not

for his private interests” (K3). Another man from Village 1 describes: “This [ideal] man lives with his family without problems and has love towards his community... (K4)

In sum, not only do people revere nonviolent men - men that work to mitigate conflict through counsel - but also men that contribute to their communities. In the aftermath of war, one key contribution is towards community security. A substantial number of respondents mention security contributions in their descriptions of ideal men without priming. Others are quick to describe how ideal men aid in community security when primed. People highly revere men that have helped their communities and that have helped to protect them personally. Taken together, this paints a picture consistent with the theory of protective masculine norms. Both men and women, in the wake of exposure to armed conflict, expect men to behave protectively towards their communities as demand for male protection grows.

#### **4.5.3 People consider security tradeoffs when punishing crimes**

Thus far, the qualitative evidence suggests that people demand more community protection in the aftermath of war. This demand is plausibly related to masculine norms, e.g. how ideal men behave towards their communities. However, a key component of this theory of protective masculine norms is that external threats, realized through exposure to armed conflict, changes how community members choose to punish one another for crimes.

The theory of protective masculine norms suggests that people consider security tradeoffs when deciding whether to punish male community members for their crimes.

Having established people’s perceptions of particular crimes as threatening or unthreatening in nature in the previous chapter and in the exposition of the theory, this section turns to an examination of how the security tradeoffs differ for threatening and non-threatening community crimes.

#### **Tradeoffs between punishment and protection**

Protective masculine norms theory is underpinned by the assumption that when considering






Figure 4.5: Proportion adding crime perpetrators to security network

whether and how to punish local male perpetrators of crimes, people also think about the perpetrator’s potential contributions towards community protection. It is because of the theorized relationship between punishment of internal crimes and tradeoffs to protection that exposure to armed conflict affects how communities choose to punish crimes.

Consistent with the theory of protective masculine norms, do people consider security tradeoffs for punishing crimes? Do people perceive increased security costs for punishing perpetrators of domestic violence as compared to rape and stealing?

To learn about how people perceive the relationship between intra-community crime perpetration and community security, I asked respondents whether they would add a male perpetrator of rape, domestic violence, and stealing (in turn) to their security network of 5 community members. Respondents then provided the reasoning behind their decision.

Figure 4.5 describes the security network data. Only 5% of respondents would add a perpetrator of rape, but 53% would add a perpetrator of domestic violence and 17% would add a perpetrator of stealing. Men are even more likely than women to add a perpetrator of domestic violence to their security network with 80 percent of male respondents choosing to add this perpetrator in most (3/4) of the villages but only twenty or forty percent of female respondents choosing to add the perpetrator of domestic violence.

Both men and women that choose to include a perpetrator of domestic violence suggest

that its perpetration does not bear on an individual's capability to contribute to community protection. There are many reasons that men may hit their wives, such as being drunk and women's mistakes at home. Some men even suggest that perpetrators of domestic violence may provide better community security than others (K5, L3, L5).

He may have good ideas to plan how to secure the community (K5)

A man that hits his wife is not a model for everyone, but since he commits this infraction inside his home, this does not exclude that he will be able to render service to the community in times of insecurity. For example, a man in this village beats his wife, but one day armed thieves came in the village and it was him that took the lead for chasing them and mobilizing the youth. (L3)

Yes, I can add him, since beating his wife takes place in his home, but protecting against armed groups is in the community and for the community. He can be a bad man at home but be useful for all the village. He can participate in patrols, he can inform the Chief of the Groupment if he sees movements of insecurity in the village. (L5)

The set of respondents that chose not to add a perpetrator of domestic violence suggested that a perpetrator of domestic violence would not protect women's security or would not be good at establishing peace. Others emphasized that "one charged with security should be an artisan of peace even in his home" (M1).

Conversely, almost all respondents refer to perpetrators of rape as people that cannot be trusted for community security, with many describing how their inclusion in community security networks will negatively impact the security of their community.<sup>107</sup> A perpetrator of rape may hurt the person and community that they are tasked to protect. They are considered "dangerous" people.

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<sup>107</sup>The two respondents that indicated they would add a rapist to their security network also commented on capability, concluding that rape did not impact the ability of someone to contribute to the protection of their community (L24, M8).

Impossible to add him. This is an un desirable person. He will not work for the community (K4).

He is a very bad person and can reinforce insecurity rather than fighting against it. The same spirit behind this act can lead him to associate with armed groups and rape our women and children (L35)

There is resounding agreement on this point: A rapist is “a dangerous man for all of the society” (L21) who can “take advantage of [his role in] security to rape more” (M1).

While not referred to as “dangerous” people as in the case of rape perpetrators, perpetrators of stealing are judged in relation to whether respondents believe an individual that steals can be reformed. All 7 respondents that include a perpetrator of stealing suggest that this is conditional on counsel and reform such that the perpetrator no longer steals. For respondents that believe a thief is always a thief, they are not included in protection networks (L25, M3).

He is one with a heart of a thief and will always stay a thief and an element of insecurity for the population (L23).

The thief will stay a thief all of the time. Armed groups provide him an opportunity to even better practice stealing. (L35).

I think this is contrary to security - this thief. I cannot count on him. (M3)

Women are less steadfast in their belief that people that steal cannot be reformed. Many respondents describe how they might add thieves to their security network if this is the first time to steal or depending on the scale of the crime.<sup>108</sup>

There is also evidence that people consider the tradeoffs between punishing perpetrators of domestic violence due to the sheer number of men that perpetrate domestic violence within

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<sup>108</sup>Men in elite focus groups within the four villages suggested that women punish thieves less because they have a soft heart and their sons might be the thieves being punished. Men believe that women are more likely to shelter thieves.

their communities (K6, L210, M8). When speaking about how an ideal or respected man would react to a situation of domestic violence, a woman from Village 1 said:

Counsel the man who beats his wife, because most men beat their wives and if people put all of them in prison, there would be very few men in this village. (K6)

In the same vein, a woman from Village 2 suggested to counsel a perpetrator of domestic violence “because many men do this and we cannot imprison all of them” (L210).

In conversations about including perpetrators of rape and stealing in security networks, respondents draw upon what they have learned from seeing the devolution of armed group behavior in their own backyard - that recruiting people that behave badly can backfire, with negative effects on safety and protection to individuals and communities. In one community, an early experience of local violence during the era of Mobutu responded to this experience by helping to build the Mai Mai group as a local self-defense group. This group, even while its origin was to protect this very community, continues to prey upon the population.

The qualitative evidence from these discussions of hypothetical security networks and whether people would include crime perpetrators reveal tradeoffs between punishing community perpetrators of crimes and the protection that crime perpetrators might be able to provide. But how do discussions of hypotheticals translate into the everyday connections and power structures within communities? To what extent do hypotheticals carry over into reality?

Respondents were asked how they would respond if a specific individual that had aided them in the past were accused of each of these crimes. When people think about punishing people that have helped them in the past for hypothetical crimes the same logic prevails: they are most lenient for domestic violence, slightly less lenient for stealing, and steadfast against excusing people that have aided them for rape. Perpetrators of rape must go to jail; but respondents will visit their former benefactors there. The data suggest that personal connections do not override decisions to exclude perpetrators of rape and stealing from security networks.

Consistent with the theory of protective masculine norms, people consider tradeoffs to community security when deciding about how to punish internal community crimes. Because people do not want to include rapists and thieves in their security network, the cost to community security for punishing perpetrators of rape and stealing is low or non-existent. However, because people do want to include perpetrators of domestic violence in their security network, the cost to community security for punishing perpetrators of domestic violence is high.

## 4.6 Conclusion

The previous chapter presented evidence that armed conflict increased how severely people prefer to punish rape and stealing but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic violence - but these findings were unexpected and remained unexplained by theories posited ex-ante. This chapter responds to the quantitative findings and qualitative insights with the presentation of a new theory of protective masculine norms as well as several alternative explanations.

Combining context-informed insights with a broad feminist literature on masculinities, I build a theory of protective masculine norms in eastern DR Congo with an eye to its future generalizability. When a community is exposed to armed conflict, people demand more community protection, a form of protection generally supplied by men. Wanting to safeguard male protectors in their communities, people prefer to punish perpetrators of common, private crimes (such as domestic violence) less. Wanting to guard their communities from harm, people - particularly men - prefer to punish criminals that pose a public community threat (such as rape) more. In this way, the gendered nature of conflict and protection has gendered repercussions, fostering a less permissive environment for rape but a more permissive environment for domestic violence.

My previous work, however, had not asked about protection. To further develop the theory and assess the theory's applicability in eastern DR Congo, I needed to learn more

about protection, armed conflict and strategic security considerations associated with crimes. Interviews from follow-up fieldwork in a sample of four villages confirm the basic tenets of the theory

1. Protection is gendered.
2. Armed conflict increases local demand for protection.
3. People consider security tradeoffs when deciding about punishing local crimes.

Beyond adding to the theory's plausibility by confirming these points, this follow-up research provided an opportunity to trace processes of insecurity and protection more explicitly. This work revised my understanding of when protection happens. I had expected that people would talk about protective incidents *during* armed group attacks. But, people described an "every man for himself" logic during incidents of local insecurity.

Protection happens in the space in-between incidents of armed conflict. It happens day-to-day through the formation of security networks and information sharing within communities. Instead of preserving the supply of protection for communities to use *during* armed conflict incidents, activity is geared directly towards daily protection *from* armed conflict incidents where no one can or will help. The centrality of protective behaviors to daily life in the aftermath of armed conflict is even stronger than originally described.

Having established how preferences for punishing local crime change in the aftermath of armed conflict and having provided an account of why, the next question is about the implications of this preference change. To what extent do these changes in preferences shape the decisions communities make about punishing crimes?

# Chapter 5: Group Dynamics

## 5.1 Introduction

Armed conflict affects preferences for punishing local crimes. But, do these changes in preferences have implications for how community members choose to punish perpetrators of rape, domestic violence, and stealing? Does armed conflict's demonstrated effects on preferences *matter* for how perpetrators are treated in the public sphere?

There are many ways in which preferences influence the punishment of crimes against women. Police are more likely to file a report of rape if they hold more gender equitable attitudes and do not believe that the victim is to blame for her victimization. People are also more likely to tell authorities about a crime if they believe that a perpetrator should be punished for his or her crime. These examples show that punishment is inevitably a social process; each involves someone revealing their preference for punishment to someone else in the community. Even in cases where someone chooses to ostracize a perpetrator by not inviting him to his or her home, he or she is revealing a preference - at minimum - to the perpetrator.

While the social nature of punishment has informed my focus on preferences for punishment in the previous chapters, this chapter brings the investigation of the social nature of punishment one step further by examining the relationship between private and public preferences and then examining the effects of armed conflict on preferences for punishment in the public sphere. To this end, I delineate three types of preferences - private, public, and group preferences - and measure them in the context of focus groups.

Focus groups aim to overcome the bias towards the private sphere in survey research and learn directly from social processes by engaging with people as groups. Focus group leaders can note who is silent, who contributes, who overpowers others and who makes whom uncomfortable - and then ask "why" (Fujii 2017). Yet, focus groups do not directly disclose how people's private views on the same subject may differ from those that they express.

Inattentiveness to this private dimension leaves important ethical questions about the effects of focus groups on the private sphere unanswered - and unanswerable.

Drawing upon data collected within the same 80 focus groups described in Chapter 3, I examine how armed conflict affects each type of preference, exploring whether armed conflict affects group dynamics directly, through individual preferences, neither or both. My analysis shows that public and group preferences are measurably distinct from private preferences and often more extreme. The evidence supports the argument that armed conflict affects public and group preferences for punishment through its effects on private preferences. This shows that armed conflict can have effects on the treatment of perpetrators in the public sphere - suggesting the relevance of protective masculine norms to actual social punishment.

The findings in this chapter also provide insight into the social nature of preferences, a key tenet of the theory of protective masculine norms. I demonstrate, using a within subject experiment, that people update their private beliefs to be closer to expressed group norms.

While I fail to find support for theories that armed conflict affects group dynamics directly, there is some evidence that armed conflict affects the extent to which community members, particularly male community members, internalize group norms. Among men, armed conflict increases convergence with expressed group norms for punishing domestic violence but decreases convergence for stealing. The effects among women are statistically significant but substantively approximate zero. In sum, armed conflict's negative effects on preferences for punishing domestic violence may perpetuate through interactions with others in the public sphere, particularly for men.

## **5.2 A Model of Preferences in Public and Private Spheres**

Researchers often take the average preference derived from private survey questions with individuals to reflect a population's preference, noting some standard deviation. Yet, we also know that the average preference does not necessarily reflect a *community's* preferences, because averaging is only one of a multitude of ways in which preferences may aggregate






Figure 5.1: Process Model

when people act as groups (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998). Studies of deliberation show that – far from coming to moderate, average preferences – group decisions or preferences can be highly polarized aggregations of their component parts (Roux and Sobel 2015).

In order to learn about the nature of preferences for punishment and consider how armed conflict shapes not only the private but the social sphere, I categorize preferences in terms of three types: private, public, and group preferences. This section introduces a 3-step process model grounded in the rich literature describing how and why public and private preferences may differ.

As described in Figure 5.1, the process model begins with an individual’s private “true” preference. It then asks how that original preference adapts to the social world by describing how it is related to the preference that an individual is willing to share with others. This is the first arrow in the model (Private to Public). Then, the process moves from public expression of a preference to a group decision that reflects shared preferences (Public to Group). Finally, the model examines how group norms, as expressed in the group decision, affects private “true” preferences, coming full circle (Group to Post-discussion Private).<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>109</sup>There are additional pathways relevant to this model that are not fully explored here. It may be the public expression of preferences (Step 2) that drives private preference change rather than the expression of group preferences (Step 3). For example, an influential person within a group may be more pivotal to driving private preference change (Step 1) than a larger group consensus (Step 3). Additionally, private preferences may influence group preferences (Step 3) directly rather through the public preference channel (Step 2). The process model, however, provides a framework for thinking about how these preferences not only differ but change. However, the circular process does not capture all potential pathways of how the private sphere

### 5.2.1 Private Preferences

It is the contention of this dissertation that no measure of preference is completely private or asocial. Once a preference is disclosed, some element of it becomes social. Despite this understanding, researchers seek to approximate private preferences in their research to the fullest extent possible because understanding them is essential to tracing the process of preference change.

By implementing a survey experiment in Kenya, Cloward (2016) shows that, even in private surveys, the preferences that people reveal can be highly dependent on who respondents believe will receive the information. If respondents believe that an international aid donor will receive the information, their responses are more likely to conform to international donor expectations; whereas, if respondents believe that their local community will receive the data, their responses will be more likely to conform to local expectations. This shows that even responses to private survey questions are not viewed as private, but are informed by a respondent's understanding of the audience.

Beliefs about the privacy of one's responses to survey questions has also been shown to affect the responses that one gives. In a study that varies levels of privacy to elicit sensitive information, Scacco (2010) finds that respondents disclose more engagement in sensitive behaviors simply by erecting a physical barrier between enumerators and respondents. Another method for imparting greater privacy is to ask respondents to record their responses on a slip of paper only later to be examined by the enumerator (Humphreys, Khan, and Lindsey 2015). List experiments are also widely used in order to get closer to the truth without individuals having to reveal sensitive information to researchers (Corstange 2009; Aronow et al. 2015). In research particular to violence against women, women are often coupled with female enumerators – with the understanding that shared characteristics among enumerator and respondent will generate an environment of comfortability and better approximate an individual's private or true preference (Organization and others 2001).

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affects the social sphere and vice versa.

In sum, existing research demonstrates that levels of privacy and understandings about the intended audience have implications for what information a survey respondent reveals in surveys. The more privacy assured to respondents and the less that respondents know about the preferences of the audience, the closer the revealed preferences will be to “true” private preferences. As such, private preferences are distinct and potentially differentiable from the preferences that people will express in the public sphere.

### **5.2.2 Public Preferences**

In the process model that I explicate here, the first step in any group discussion is bringing preferences from the private sphere into the public sphere. In a focus group setting, this means sharing one’s preference with the focus group leader and all other participants in the session. In shifting to the public sphere, people may choose to reveal a different preference than their “true” private preference, a process which Timur Kuran (1997) refers to as dissimulation.

The divergence between an individual’s private belief and the belief that the individual is willing to express in public is an important subject in the social norms literature (Tankard and Paluck 2016; Miller and Prentice 2016). Kuran (1997) outlines three factors that determine whether an individual will express his or her real private preference in public: individual benefits, reputational benefits, and expressive benefits. Because similarity is often highly prized among groups, individuals thinking about their reputations may choose to hide their true preferences and characterize them as similar to those of respected individuals in the public sphere. But an individual will also weigh this reputational concern against the value that he or she expects to gain from revealing his or her true preference (such as moving a group decision towards this true preference) or the value that he or she expects to gain directly from self expression.

When many people dissimulate their true preferences in the public sphere, a suboptimal social equilibrium can emerge where community members are largely behaving as if they prefer one thing, but actually prefer another. This discordance is known as pluralistic ignorance

(Bjerring, Hansen, and Pedersen 2014). In a setting of two potential preferences under pluralistic ignorance, most people (or everyone) prefer option A, but believe others prefer option B. Because their beliefs about others' preferences are incorrect, people act as if they prefer option B even while they prefer option A. This behavior confirms people's incorrect beliefs, generating a remarkably stable suboptimal equilibrium.

Even while stable, theories of norm change suggest that behavior can change very quickly when a community's true underlying preference for option A is revealed, because people begin to act in accordance with their true preferences. In some cases, such as the eradication of foot binding in China, communities were able to move away from the behavior fairly quickly, by pledging alongside other families that they would not engage in foot binding or allow their sons to marry women whose feet had been bound. By changing incentives posed by the marriage market, people were able to act on their true preferences within a generation (Mackie 1996).

Thus, social norms theories suggest that people will attempt to predict the preferences of others in their community and will adapt their own preference accordingly when interacting with others. Thus, if members of a focus group expect the preferences of powerful members of their group to be more extreme, they will adapt their preferences to be more extreme. If they expect the preferences of other powerful members of their group to be more moderate they will adapt their preferences to be more moderate. Where there is uncertainty about the preferences of others, people will have difficulty making predictions and will likely adapt their preference less when expressing their preference in public.

Yet, even while the norms framework suggests that people will reveal a different preference in public than in private, other frameworks suggest otherwise. Some scholars contend that people do not hold private preferences as distinct from public preferences. One reason is that respondents often believe that researchers are asking about what happens in a community rather than about personal preferences or what they believe *should* happen in a community (Schuler and Islam 2008, Ellsberg et al. (2001)). In many societies, respondents do not think

in the same individualistic way as researchers often assume, so respondents may not believe that individual preferences are (or should be) distinct from community preferences (Smith 2004). Additionally, a large psychological literature suggests that people tend to believe others think like them (Ross, Greene, and House 1977).<sup>110</sup> In this case, the difference between public preferences and private preferences given by the same individual should be minimal.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the first step in understanding the social nature of preferences in focus groups is accounting for how individuals portray their beliefs to others. There are many reasons why an individual's private and public preferences may differ – as well as reasons why they may not. By empirically assessing whether or not people hold private beliefs that are distinct from the beliefs that they express to others, researchers can refine their approach to interpreting silences within focus groups.

### **5.2.3 Group Preferences**

Group preferences are important because groups, rather than individuals acting alone, determine the social context in which decisions are made. In focus group settings, it is common to ask people to work together to make decisions as a group. For example, focus group leaders may ask participants to rank the importance of different issue areas while noting how the discussion ensues to give context and social meaning to the final ranking. If the first step in the social nature of preferences is sharing preferences with others in the focus group, the next step is making decisions with others in the focus group.

Several theories provide insights into dynamics of focus groups. As described in the previous section, social norms theories highlight how, within groups, individuals often feel subvert or overt pressure to conform to the opinions of others in their groups, ultimately decreasing the diversity of opinions for group members to consider. People with social power sway decisions to their preference, sometimes achieving this by doing no more than voicing their preference. Social power can also be wielded in more direct ways, such as through a

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<sup>110</sup>This theory is known as the false consensus effect.

glance of disapproval or a reminder about a participant's relative status (e.g., mocking fellow participants for speaking in a language associated with lower social strata). In sum, social norms theories suggest that group decisions can be driven by a few dominant individuals.

Group polarization occurs when group discussions lead to more extreme rather than more moderate preferences (Myers and Lamm 1976). If the dominant group members hold more extreme preferences, group preferences may become more polarized as others conform or adopt those more extreme preferences. There may also be diffusion of responsibility for decisions among groups, leading people to take more extreme decisions than they would take individually (Kogan and Wallach 1967).

The key component of group polarization as defined in social psychology is that there is movement towards an "already preferred pole" (Myers and Lamm 1976, pg. 603-604). In this usage, polarization stands in contrast to "extremization" which describes how people, when acting as groups, become less neutral. Thus, polarization as used here suggests movement in the same direction, but beyond the average preferences of individuals.<sup>111</sup>

Group composition can also affect the nature of group decisions (Kroon, Van Kreveld, and Rabbie 1992). More heterogeneous groups may begin with more diversity of opinion, but – at the same time – this diversity may be offset as people conform to perceived social pressures imposed by more dominant group members. Group composition is one area where research on the effects of gender composition has been particularly important – showing that inserting one woman into an otherwise all male group has no effects. Instead, women's preferences are only heard and accounted for in group decisions when a critical threshold of female participants is met (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).

In sum, research shows that group preferences are not simply the mean preference held by individuals within a group. The social sphere leaves ample space for social norms to affect preference expression within focus groups. The same set of underlying private preferences may yield different outcomes in different social settings according to group composition. Norms

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<sup>111</sup>Thus polarization is not necessarily describing a cleavage inducing process (Lamm and Myers 1978).

theories posit channels by which public and group preferences will become more extreme.

#### **5.2.4 Post-Discussion Private Preferences**

The next step in the social preference process is how the public sphere, in turn, shapes the private sphere. When others' preferences and arguments become known and a group preference is voiced in the context of a focus group, how does that knowledge, in turn, affect "true" private preferences that individuals hold? This step in the process describes a channel by which social norms, as expressed within focus groups, affect preferences that people return home with after the focus group concludes.

The constructivist literature on norms recognizes that the social sphere and the private sphere are mutually constituted. In Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) model of international norms cascades, people internalize international norms as a third and final step of norm consolidation. When norms are internalized, people follow the norm unthinkingly and this leads to more consistency between preferences in the private and public sphere.

However, the process of internalization can be a long road and social norms are not always internalized. When people do not align their private preferences with those of their social group, a gap will remain between public and group preferences on the one hand and post-discussion private preferences on the other. Take for example the case of religion. When a group expresses a norm against religion within a focus groups discussion, this may lead people to change (a) the religious preference that they reveal to others, (b) their underlying religious preference, (c) neither, or (d) both. Less explored is the possibility of norm defiers. Bicchieri (2006) highlights that preferences can change with or against expressed norms. Norm compliers will want to adapt their preferences to those expressed by their group, but norm defiers will want to act contrary to preferences expressed by their group. However, while aptly capturing the behavior of a few, norm defiance is unlikely to describe the behavior of a broad population.

Thus, there are two main channels by which focus groups may affect people's private

preferences: (1) Public and group preferences expressed in focus groups may have no effect on an individual's original preference, which suggests that private preferences are fairly stable in the face of social norms. Or (2), public and group preferences in focus groups may shift an individual's preference towards the expressed group norm or decision, which suggests that social norms become internalized. If there are changes in private preferences due to social interactions in focus groups, this underscores the model's depiction of all preferences as innately social.

## 5.3 Theory and Hypotheses

### 5.3.1 Hypotheses of difference and polarization

Based on the process described above, I propose two families of hypotheses. First, I examine **hypotheses of difference** to establish that there are statistical differences between preferences that people express in private and what they express in public, as groups, and again in private (after discussions have taken place). If private, public and group preferences differ, the findings will establish the relevance of considering the social sphere when considering armed conflict's effects on social punishment.

Then, I ask how private preferences change as they move from the private to the public spheres and back again. I propose **hypotheses of polarization**; along the trajectory from private to group preferences, norms theories suggest that preferences will move unidirectionally (in the direction of dominant preferences) to greater extremes. But, I also examine how interactions in the public sphere shape the private preferences that people hold. Norms theories suggest that people will update their private preferences towards group norms after engaging in group discussions. Thus, post-discussion private preferences will be more extreme than pre-discussion private preferences, but potentially not as extreme as group preferences themselves as people shift in line with expressed norms.

Protective masculine norms theory suggests that preferences change because of the increased value of protection that men can offer - because of norms. Through examining how



group dynamics influence the private preferences that people hold, this research provides insights into the norms-based impetus to preference change - a key tenet of protective masculine norms theory. In addition, examining how the social sphere interacts with private preferences reveals insights into how changes in preferences for punishment, demonstrated empirically, might perpetuate in post-conflict societies.

### 5.3.2 Hypotheses of aggregation and group dynamics

Having established armed conflict's effects on the preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing, two central questions remain: First, does preference change have implications for social punishment? Second and relatedly, does armed conflict have independent effects on social dynamics?

In sum, armed conflict may affect public preferences for punishment because (a) preferences in the public sphere may be affected because of changes in private preferences, (b) the public sphere may be affected independently of private preferences<sup>112</sup>, (c) both, or (d) neither.

The first and most apparent hypothesis is that the effects of armed conflict on preferences for punishment aggregate up to also affect the preferences that people express in public. In turn, publically expressed preferences should affect group preferences and group decisions for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing.

**Hypotheses of aggregation** suggest that, when armed conflict increases how severely people privately prefer to punish rape and stealing, they will also prefer to punish rape and stealing more as groups. In this environment, perpetrators will be more likely to be socially punished because of underlying "true" changes to the distribution of punishment preferences in a community.

The opposite is true for domestic violence, since armed conflict decreases how severely people prefer to punish this crime. However, because domestic violence is considered a more

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<sup>112</sup>Effects on preferences in the public sphere could run in the opposite or the same direction as private preference change.

private crime, aggregation may be different - thus it is important to examine pathways of change to social punishment specific to each crime.

Yet, the three step process model outlined in the theory section suggest several **hypotheses of group dynamics**. Social dynamics could drive public and group preferences directly in many ways. Armed conflict may add uncertainty about others' preferences so individuals do not know (could not well predict) the punishment preferences of others. If so, people in conflict communities will not be able to adjust either their publicly expressed preferences as effectively as places not exposed to recent armed conflict. This would lead to less of a difference in private preferences as compared to publicly expressed and, potentially, group preferences.

Another pathway by which armed conflict might have direct effects is by empowering different individuals that hold more extreme views. As a result, empowered individuals drive public and group preferences differently from their counterparts in other communities. This is consistent with the framework of protective masculine norms where men that protect become more empowered or revered.<sup>113</sup> Alternatively, armed conflict may simply foster a discussion environment that favors more extreme views rather than changing how power holders drive group preferences.

Finally and more generally, armed conflict may affect people's private preferences (as shown in Chapter 3), but people may continue to reveal an unchanged preference to others. If individuals choose to dissimulate their changed private beliefs after armed conflict, public and group behavior may remain unchanged even though people's underlying "true" preferences are different. Kuran (1997) outlines preference expression as being dependent on individual calculation of individual benefits, reputational benefits, and expressive benefits. If armed

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<sup>113</sup>A study of how protective masculine norms affect group dynamics directly might examine changes in dynamics of male/female decision-making power on punishment within a combined gender group. While I chose not to do so here for ethical reasons, a differently formulated study could examine this dimension in the future. Another method would be to identify and trace the role of power holders in decision-making within groups in conflict and non-conflict communities. This would be possible to some extent in future analyses of the existing data. However, prior to tracing these mechanisms, it is important to establish the relationship empirically.

conflict changes any of these factors, it may lead to differences in preferences that people express in public and, in turn, differences in how groups punish crimes in the wake of armed conflict.

Hypotheses of aggregation and hypotheses of group dynamics, however, are not mutually exclusive. Changes to social punishment may occur because of private preference change in the community *and* because of changes to group dynamics directly. Where co-existing, the effects could also reinforce one another or cancel one another out.

## **5.4 Research Design**

I design and implement a study within the same communities in eastern DR Congo to investigate the relationship between private preferences, public preferences and armed conflict. The form of the study uses a focus group setting to learn about private, publicly expressed and group preferences for punishing crimes in both conflict and non-conflict villages.

Focus groups harness the form and content of conversations among participants of a group discussion to reveal socially informed truths. Despite viewing and analyzing silences, hesitations, and dominance in focus group conversations, questions still remain about how the public nature of focus groups impacts what researchers learn. Even less explored are the ways by which group discussions affect people's preferences themselves, which have important ethical implications for researchers that use focus groups worldwide.

### **5.4.1 Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo**

The context of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is germane to research on preferences for punishing crimes against women for several reasons. First, there have been a substantial number of focus groups highlighting the importance of social norms and social stigma around violence against women in this context (Kelly et al. 2012, Kelly et al. (2011)). Is social sanctioning important? Or might the public nature of research (in the form of focus groups)

on this topic lead directly to the social nature of the results?<sup>114</sup>

Rape and wife-beating are sensitive subjects of research in DR Congo as they are anywhere in the world. Because of its sensitive nature, participants in one-on-one surveys as well as focus groups that discuss violence against women will be particularly cognizant of how they report and frame their attitudes and experiences. Research on violence against women is thus a very likely area where the public and private dimensions of preferences may be differentiated.

Second, in a context inundated by research and efforts to address violence against women through social engagement, there is an urgent need for researchers and advocacy organizers alike to better understand how even their unintended interventions might affect peoples lives on these important issues. If preferences become more extreme as a result of engaging in focus group conversations, then there needs to be increased oversight and efforts to mitigate potential harmful effects.

Third and finally, the study of local everyday social sanctioning behavior in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has been largely overlooked in the face of the dominant focus on addressing rape perpetrated by armed groups as a tool of war (Autesserre 2012, Lake (2014b)). Parsing apart the private and public dimensions associated with punishing everyday local crime can inform efforts to decrease impunity and improve local security.

#### **5.4.2 Design**

Chapter 3 describes my measure of private preferences for punishing crimes against women in eastern DR Congo. I held 80 focus groups across 20 villages - some villages that had and some that had not experienced armed conflict events in the recent past. I chose to measure these private preferences in the context of focus groups to integrate qualitative data that

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<sup>114</sup>In a working paper with Koos (Koos and Lindsey 2019), we demonstrate the relevance of stigma - a form of social sanctioning - to both individuals and communities in a representative sample outside of the focus group context. The connection to this dissertation is interesting. When thinking about stigma, Koos and I consider the social sanctioning of victims; when thinking about sanctioning in this dissertation, I consider the social sanctioning of perpetrators.

would help me to interpret the findings.

In addition to providing the opportunity to integrate qualitative work, the focus group provided a context to measure how people change their preferences when moving from the private to the public sphere.

Each focus group begins with a focus group leader verbally collecting basic background data from participants. Following the receipt of these basic data, focus group facilitators divide participants (ranging from 11 to 16 members in size) into subgroups of 3-4 members as outlined in a detailed protocol. Dividing into subgroups facilitates the quantitative portion of the research by augmenting the number of (sub)group level observations where I can observe how the public dimension shapes the private sphere.<sup>115</sup> The protocol yields approximately 230 subgroups from the sample of 80 focus groups and 960 participants.

To record the quantitative measurements, each participant is given a response card to note their ideal response to the three hypothetical crimes. As depicted in Figure 3.2, the card provides illustrations to represent different potential punishment options (also described by the focus group leader) that can be characterized on a scale from less to more severe. This approach aims to create a meaningful, contextual study for participants to engage in by asking about actual punishment options rather than an abstract scale.

As described in the protocol outlined in Chapter 3, each focus group began with the measure of private preferences that involved a description of hypothetical crime narratives of rape, domestic violence and stealing. Crimes were presented in a randomized order and participants circled their preferred punishment option for each crime on a card. The focus group leader then collected folded pictorial cards of all three responses from each participant. The participant's indication of their preference on the folded card serves as the measure of private preferences.<sup>116</sup>

After all response cards were collected, the focus group leaders asked about publicly

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<sup>115</sup>While not analyzed here, subgroups are assigned to achieve a balanced number of both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups in terms of education. This variable appears as a control in regression analyses.

<sup>116</sup>A description of the punishment options and a validation of the severity scale is detailed in Chapter 3.




Figure 5.2: Order of Measurement

expressed preferences for each crime, in the same randomized order; then group preferences for each crime in the same randomized order; and finally post-discussion private preferences for each crime in the same randomized order. The order is summarized in Figure 5.2.

**Private preference:** First, participants circle their preferred punishment on the pictorial card for all three crimes in private. The focus group leaders emphasize that their response will not be shared with anyone. After all crime narratives are read, participants fold the response card and return it to the focus group leader. Respondents thus do not feel that they are being observed by focus group leaders or by other participants of the focus group, approximating “true” private preferences.

**Public preference:** Second, new cards are distributed. Participants repeat the same task for all three crimes, but enumerators emphasize that each participant will be asked to share his or her response card with his or her small subgroup of 3-4 participants. Once everyone has circled their public preference for each crime, participants then share their response card with other subgroup members.

**Group preference:** Third, focus group leaders ask participants to discuss the punishment options with their subgroup to decide which option is the subgroup’s most preferred punishment. Focus group leaders then verbally ask each subgroup about their choice and record the group’s preferred punishment accordingly. In the background, focus group leaders also take note of important subgroup dynamics and note if and when there are any cross subgroup dynamics at play.

**Post-discussion private preference:** Finally, a third set of response cards are distributed. Participants circle their preferred punishment on the pictorial card for all three crimes in private. The focus group leaders emphasize that these responses will not be shared with anyone. After all crime narratives are reviewed, participants fold the response card and return it to the focus group leader in order to best approximate participant privacy.

To facilitate repeated discussions of the same crime narrative as well as to focus the minds of participants on a shared story, focus group leaders presented the illustrations drawn by a local artist presented in Chapter 3 each time the crime was referenced. Focus group leaders also reviewed the narrative each time.

Because the crime ordering is randomized, the randomization breaks the link between the crime-specific findings and ordering effects. However, the order in which I measured preferences is the same in every focus group to reflect the described process model. Therefore, there are potential ordering effects between private preferences, publicly expressed preferences, group preferences and post-discussion private preferences.<sup>117</sup>

To summarize, the design yields four sets of outcome variables relevant to this study: private preferences, publicly expressed preferences, group preferences, and a second measure of private preferences (post-discussion private preferences).

The structure takes the form of a within-subject experiment, where participants are “treated” at each stage of measurement. For example, the design well translates into a comparison between private and post-discussion private preferences, where the difference between an individual’s response is attributable to the public and group measurement components of the focus group discussion. However, the design does have limitations. It is not possible to tease apart whether a focus group’s effects on post-discussion private preferences

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<sup>117</sup>The design cannot address the question of whether, in an experimental study, a focus group that measures only publicly expressed preferences would be different from a focus group that measures only private preferences. However question can be explored in future research in a larger sample to build on the findings here.

Table 5.1: Mean and Difference from Private Punishment Preference

	Mean	SD	Diff from Private 1	P-value of Diff
<b>Rape</b>				
Private	3.175	1.216		
Publicly Expressed	3.283	1.159	0.108	0.002
Group Choice	3.554	0.972	0.379	0.000
Post Discussion Private	3.334	1.145	0.159	0.000
<b>Domestic Violence</b>				
Private	1.905	1.228		
Publicly Expressed	1.935	1.248	0.029	0.416
Group Choice	1.733	1.149	-0.172	0.000
Post Discussion Private	1.852	1.229	-0.053	0.187
<b>Stealing</b>				
Private	2.923	1.239		
Publicly Expressed	2.945	1.235	0.021	0.553
Group Choice	3.088	1.158	0.164	0.000
Post Discussion Private	2.994	1.215	0.070	0.056

are attributable to expressing a preference in public or to the process of forming a group preference. For some comparisons, it remains a bundled treatment.

The measurement procedure contributes a new method to the empirical measurement of preferences that also accounts for group norms. The method is feasible to apply in almost any focus group setting, including focus groups with unlettered populations as in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. It provides an additional avenue to checking our assumptions about private preferences in focus groups and learning why and how they change.

## 5.5 Evidence

### 5.5.1 Relationship between private, public and group preferences

To begin the analysis, I calculate the individual-level means, take the difference, and conduct paired t-tests on the difference between public, group and post-discussion private preferences and original “true” private preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing. This analysis pools responses from both male and female focus group participants.



As suggested by hypotheses of difference, the naive difference in means analyses depicted in Table 5.1 points to statistically significant differences between private preferences for punishing rape and preferences influenced by the social sphere. There are also statistically significant differences between private preferences for punishing stealing and group preference as well as post-discussion private preferences. Finally, there are statistically significant differences between group preferences for punishing domestic violence and private preferences.

Given the context, people may have less knowledge about others' preferences on punishing domestic violence and stealing as compared to rape, which is widely discussed. Without information about what the "right" response is people cannot account for the expected preferences of others when expressing their preference in public. This may explain observed differences in whether people adapt their "true" private preferences when expressing them to their groups.

Another relevant question related to hypotheses of difference, however, is whether publicly expressed, group, and post-discussion private preferences are different from one another. Table 5.2 reveals the statistical significance of the differences across all private and public measures of preferences for each crime. For interpreting the direction of difference across measures, note that the column variable mean is subtracted from the row variable mean. P-values are denoted by asteriks using standard significance thresholds.

While there is some variation across crimes, it is clear that social measures are also statistically different from one another. For rape, domestic violence, and stealing; the difference between publicly expressed and group preferences is statistically significant, suggesting that it is not only the preference that is revealed driving preference aggregation but also group dynamics. For all three crimes, there is also a statistically significant difference between group measures and the private preferences that people report after group discussions. Thus, even while Table 5.1 suggests participants change their preferences, participants do not fully conform with the preferences of their groups.

As suggested by hypotheses of polarization, preferences for punishing rape and stealing,

Table 5.2: Difference across all Punishment Preferences

	X = Private	X = Public	X = Group
<b>Rape</b>			
Diff: Public - X	0.11**		
Diff: Group - X	0.38***	0.27***	
Diff: PostDisc Private - X	0.16***	0.05	-0.22***
<b>Domestic Violence</b>			
Diff: Public - X	0.03		
Diff: Group - X	-0.17***	-0.2***	
Diff: PostDisc Private - X	-0.05	-0.08*	0.12***
<b>Stealing</b>			
Diff: Public - X	0.02		
Diff: Group - X	0.16***	0.14***	
Diff: PostDisc Private - X	0.07	0.05	-0.09**

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that when moving from the private to the public sphere, people exhibit punishment preferences for rape and stealing that are both statistically different and more severe.

The public sphere operates a bit differently when it comes to preferences for punishing domestic violence. Unlike rape and stealing, preferences for punishing domestic violence become less (rather than more) severe when people act as groups. But this finding continues to support hypotheses of polarization. The outcome variable, preferences for punishment, is measured on a scale from 1 to 4, so the center point between 1 and 4 is 2.5. The mean private preference for domestic violence falls below this central threshold - meaning a move towards extreme is downward rather than upward in severity. Thus, as in the case of punishing rape and stealing, the shift between private preferences and group preferences is moving towards an extreme - but a low extreme rather than a high one.

Hypotheses of polarization also suggest that people's post-discussion preferences are more extreme than original or "true" private preferences, but - potentially - not as extreme as group preferences (since influenced by but no longer in the public sphere). This is also borne out in the data, because preferences move unidirectionally through the public sphere towards extremes, but then moderate when they re-enter the private sphere.

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that post-discussion private preferences are more extreme after the discussion than original private preferences for punishing rape and stealing.<sup>118</sup> While there is not a statistical difference between private and post-discussion private preferences for punishing domestic violence the estimated difference also runs in the expected (and opposite direction). The trajectory of change from private to public spheres and back again becomes most clear in Table 5.2, where the estimated differences between group preferences and post-discussion private preferences all flip signs as preferences move back into the private sphere.

There are other interesting differences to consider across the crimes that warrant future study. For example, there is a positive and statistically significant difference between private preferences and publicly expressed preferences only in the case of rape. Why is this not the case for stealing? Adapting one's preference prior to revealing that preference requires some level of information about the preferences of others within one's subgroup. Figure 3.4 and Appendix A.4.1 show that even though the modal response is the same for rape and stealing, there is more variation in responses for stealing than for rape. Focus group discussions with elites in four villages about the findings also revealed that people thought the government was ineffective in punishing stealing, but was effective in punishing rape. There may be variation in people's willingness to express a preference out of line with government policy as in the case of stealing. People may be less clear about what the socially appropriate action is and thus are less likely to update their preference before revealing that preference to others.

Taken together, the data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide initial support for **hypotheses of difference** and **hypotheses of polarization**. Public, private and group preferences are statistically differentiable from people's original private preferences - with some variation in statistical significance - and social preferences tend to move towards extremes in the sample pooling men's and women's responses.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup>For stealing, the estimated difference in means just misses the statistical threshold (as depicted in Table 5.1) but runs in the expected direction.

<sup>119</sup>Again, polarization is defined here in terms of the definition from social psychology which describes how




Figure 5.3: Men and Women's preferences

But, there are reasons to expect differences in group dynamics according to gender. And one might expect such differences to be particularly true for preferences around gender-based violence such as rape and domestic abuse. To what extent do hypotheses of difference and polarization hold when dividing the data between men and women? Figure 5.3 presents plots of the means for all respondents and then disaggregates the results by gender. Error bars indicate standard errors of the means.

The plots reveal descriptively how preferences for punishing rape follow similar trajectories for men and women as they engage with others in the social sphere. In line with the hypotheses of difference and the hypotheses of polarization, both men and women hold clearly differentiable private, public, group and post-discussion private preferences, particularly in the case of rape. However, there is little need to disaggregate men's and women's preferences for punishing rape, because they are so closely related.

Men and women's preferences for punishing domestic violence also move in the same direction for punishing domestic violence. However, the trends suggest that women's preferences might be even more affected by group dynamics than men's. For stealing, however, the opposite is true. There are few observed differences between the public and private spheres

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preferences among groups are more extreme than the average of individual preferences with movement in the direction of the preferred pole (Myers and Lamm 1976; Lamm and Myers 1978).

for women's preferences; instead, observed changes in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3 seem to be driven by changes in men's preferences for punishing stealing rather than women's.

To test more rigorously for differences between men and women and to account for the group nature in which the data was collected, I conduct an additional analysis where I combine (or stack) data from all outcomes and run one regression with several dichotomous indicators for whether the outcome is a private, a publicly expressed, a group, or a post discussion private preference. As currently structured, the base term for each coefficient is private preferences. When an interaction term is statistically significant, this means that it is statistically different from private preferences. Preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence, and stealing are depicted in Tables 5.3-5.5. In each table, Model 1 includes individual-level fixed effects, Model 2 adds a control variable for the gender of the respondent, Model 3 adds an interaction term between the preference type and gender, and Model 4 adds individual-level fixed effects to Model 3.

The models in Table 5.3 confirm what was presented descriptively in Figure 5.3. Publicly expressed, group choice and post discussion preferences for punishment are statistically different and more extreme than private preferences for punishing rape. Whether or not a respondent is male or female is not driving differences in how the public sphere affects private preferences for punishing rape.

Table 5.4 confirms that group preferences for punishing domestic violence are statistically more extreme (less severe) than private preferences for punishing domestic violence. Models 2-4 in Table 5.4 show that female respondents prefer less punishment for domestic violence across the board, but effects of the public sphere on preference are not heterogeneous by gender. Both men and women prefer to punish domestic violence less as groups.

Focus group participants in elite focus groups suggest that the observed difference between men's group and private preferences for punishing domestic violence were most likely affected by the knowledge about the behaviors of other men in their groups. When men know that other men in their groups have perpetrated domestic violence, they will be unlikely

Table 5.3: Private versus Group Outcomes: Rape

	Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences			
	Ind.FEs	Stacked Outcomes		All
		Female.Ctrl	Female.Het	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public (base=Private)	0.108** (0.050)	0.108** (0.043)	0.180*** (0.056)	0.180*** (0.065)
Group (base=Private)	0.379*** (0.098)	0.379*** (0.085)	0.425*** (0.106)	0.425*** (0.122)
PostDisc Private (base=Private)	0.159*** (0.057)	0.159*** (0.049)	0.175*** (0.067)	0.175** (0.078)
Female		0.014 (0.148)	0.077 (0.154)	-0.188*** (0.061)
Female x Public (base=Private)			-0.133 (0.091)	-0.133 (0.105)
Female x Group (base=Private)			-0.087 (0.113)	-0.087 (0.131)
Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private)			-0.030 (0.096)	-0.030 (0.111)
Constant	3.589*** (0.041)	3.168*** (0.106)	3.134*** (0.109)	3.805*** (0.046)
Indiv. Fixed Effects?	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,972	3,972	3,972	3,972
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.495	0.014	0.014	0.495

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table 5.4: Private versus Group Outcomes: Domestic Violence

	Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences			
	Ind.FEs	Stacked Outcomes		All
		Female.Ctrl	Female.Het	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public (base=Private)	0.029 (0.041)	0.029 (0.035)	0.053 (0.047)	0.053 (0.054)
Group (base=Private)	-0.172** (0.080)	-0.172** (0.069)	-0.101 (0.099)	-0.101 (0.114)
PostDisc Private (base=Private)	-0.053 (0.069)	-0.053 (0.060)	0.011 (0.064)	0.011 (0.073)
Female		-0.326*** (0.123)	-0.252** (0.123)	-2.926*** (0.068)
Female x Public (base=Private)			-0.043 (0.074)	-0.043 (0.086)
Female x Group (base=Private)			-0.132 (0.121)	-0.132 (0.140)
Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private)			-0.119 (0.097)	-0.119 (0.112)
Constant	1.049*** (0.043)	2.081*** (0.124)	2.042*** (0.119)	4.009*** (0.049)
Indiv. Fixed Effects?	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,972	3,972	3,972	3,972
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.504	0.021	0.021	0.505

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table 5.5: Private versus Group Outcomes: Stealing

	Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences			
	Ind.FEs	Stacked Outcomes		All
		Female.Ctrl	Female.Het	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public (base=Private)	0.021 (0.034)	0.021 (0.029)	0.022 (0.060)	0.022 (0.069)
Group (base=Private)	0.164** (0.083)	0.164** (0.072)	0.298*** (0.067)	0.298*** (0.078)
PostDisc Private (base=Private)	0.070 (0.055)	0.070 (0.047)	0.125** (0.051)	0.125** (0.058)
Female		-0.282** (0.144)	-0.194 (0.135)	-0.662*** (0.069)
Female x Public (base=Private)			-0.001 (0.102)	-0.001 (0.117)
Female x Group (base=Private)			-0.248** (0.109)	-0.248** (0.126)
Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private)			-0.101 (0.070)	-0.101 (0.080)
Constant	3.186*** (0.035)	3.076*** (0.091)	3.029*** (0.095)	3.889*** (0.041)
Indiv. Fixed Effects?	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,972	3,972	3,972	3,972
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.533	0.015	0.016	0.535

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)



to condemn this behavior as groups. Thus qualitative accounts suggest that descriptive norms led more men to choose the lowest possible level of punishment when acting as groups. Women also expressed knowledge that women preferred domestic problems to remain in their homes - thus descriptive norms may be affecting women's behavior in groups as well.<sup>120</sup>

Table 5.5 confirms the visual depiction presented in Figure 5.3. Group preferences are statistically different and more severe than private preferences for punishment in Models 1 and 2 which do not account for gender. The effect of a group discussion within a focus group has different effects depending on whether men or women are acting as groups. When acting as groups, men prefer *more* punishment for stealing than they do privately. Women, however, prefer *less* punishment (but roughly equivalent to zero difference) than they do privately. Men also seem to be more influenced by expressed group norms in the private sphere, since post-discussion private preferences are positively and significantly related to the severity of men's preferences for punishing stealing (.125).

To summarize, the findings suggest that preferences get more extreme in nature as they move through the public sphere. Preferences for punishing rape and stealing, which on average elicit a higher severity of punishment, become even more severe when people act as groups. Preferences for punishing domestic violence, which elicits a much lower severity of punishment on average, become even less severe when people act as groups. In the case of stealing, the focus group discussion leaves men with more extreme views on punishment than they had prior to the group discussion.

The update to men's private preference for punishing stealing is plausibly related to protective masculine norms theory, which suggests that men are encouraged to act protectively towards their communities by rooting out harmful crimes such as rape and stealing. This means that men's private preferences are driven by a normative dynamic encouraging men to engage in protective behavior against this crime.

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<sup>120</sup>Yet, these descriptive accounts fail to account for why people still feel free to express their private condemnation of the act in their publicly expressed preference.

### 5.5.2 Normative nature of preference change

The question of whether and how focus group discussions change people's preference highlights important ethical considerations related to focus group research - a widespread form of research undertaken worldwide. If engaging in discussions has the power to change people's private preferences, then researchers need to take measures to mitigate potential harm to participants or others that may emerge from preference change.

To further investigate the effects of focus group discussions and gain insights into the normative nature of preference change, I examine the extent to which group preferences drive post-discussion private preference change using a within-subject experimental design. To do so, I regress post-discussion preferences, preferences which have been "treated" with the social influence of an expressed group preference, on group preferences. The models control for a respondent's original "true" private preference, examines the effect of group preference or "treatment" (=1, 2, 3, or 4), and the interaction between them to account for the fact that an individual's preference helped to determine each group's preference. I present the coefficient estimates from the linear regression models in Figure 5.4.<sup>121</sup>

All models include fixed effects at the focus group level and the same individual-level characteristics and design-based controls described in Chapter 3. The first Model, "All" in Figure 5.4, includes a control variable for whether or not a respondent is female. The Men's model (Model 2) drops the female control and examines only the men's data. The Women's model (Model 3) accordingly examines only the women's data. Tables that include more details about these models are provided in Tables B.6- B.8 in the Appendix.<sup>122</sup>

Across all three crimes, the coefficients reveal that both an individual's private preference and a group's expressed preference are positively and significantly related to an individual's post-discussion private preference. The more severely an individual prefers to punish a

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<sup>121</sup>Full models are included in the Appendix Tables B.1-B.2

<sup>122</sup>Since more highly powered, I also ran models with a triple interaction term between private preferences, the group choice, and gender. The triple interaction term was insignificant in all models.




Figure 5.4: Coefficient Estimates of Variables Identifying Group Effects on Post-FG Private Preferences

criminal the more he or she want to punish him after the discussion. The more severely an individual's group prefers to punish a criminal the more he or she want to punish him after the discussion. The interaction term between an individual's original private preference and an individual's group preferences is included to account for how his or her original preference influences the group's decision. Interaction terms are substantively small across all crimes and do not substantively change point estimates.

In the within-subject experimental framework, exposing individuals to the "treatment" of a group preference, affects the severity of people's preferences for punishment. This treatment involves public expression of preferences, a group decision about preferences and a multitude of group dynamics that remain unaccounted for. Yet, this "treatment" models many norms interventions as well as research-oriented focus group discussions designed either to change or learn about people's local perceptions. However, researchers often fail to consider how these discussions - on their own, even without an explicit normative agenda - express norms and thus contain the potential to beget preference change. This has positive implications for well designed norm change interventions that seek to change preferences by engaging in discussions about preferences and norms. However, these findings have surprising and harmful implications for any discussion of norms that may beget harm.

This study has examined preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing through hypothetical crime narratives. This removes the discussion, to some extent, from the specific instances of crimes. However, take for example the many focus groups being held throughout eastern DR Congo on community stigmatization of rape victims (Kelly et al. 2011; Kelly et al. 2012). Does engaging in such discussions beget further stigmatization? Does talking about the pervasiveness of domestic violence in one's community encourage more acceptance of domestic violence? This study provides empirical support for cautionary tales suggested by theories of norm change. Talking about the pervasiveness of a descriptive norm can yield greater tolerance for that behavior (Tankard and Paluck 2016). While described in the literature, this possibility is rarely accounted for by researchers in their work.

In sum, the models presented thus far provide support for the two sets of hypotheses suggested by social norms theories and the three-step process model that I have outlined in this chapter. Overall preferences are distinct depending on whether they are measured in the private or the public sphere. They also tend to be more extreme in the public sphere, particularly when people act as groups.

This section adds to this discussion by demonstrating in yet another way, the normative nature of preference change. Individuals change or update their private preferences as a result of engaging in discussions with their groups. And, as shown, these preferences become more extreme. Thus any effect that armed conflict has on preferences for punishing crimes, can be reinforced and further polarized in the social sphere over time. The next section turns to the effects of armed conflict.

### **5.5.3 Effects of armed conflict**

Findings from Chapter 3 showed that armed conflict increases how severely men preferred to punish rape and stealing and decreases how severely both men and women preferred to punish domestic violence. Given the process model, measurement method and established statistical difference between private, public, group and post-discussion preferences described here, it remains to be seen whether and how these effects on private preference influence punishment in the social sphere.

Hypotheses of aggregation suggest that armed conflict's effects on private preferences will also be evident when measuring preferences in the social sphere. To examine armed conflict's effects across public and private dimensions, I run 4 linear regression models, estimating armed conflict's effects on public, group and post-discussion private preferences for punishing each crime alongside armed conflict's effect on private preferences. I use the models and matched pair design presented in Chapter 3 to identify armed conflict's effects and include the same range of control variables. Tables B.3-B.5 in the Appendix include the relevant tables from which these coefficient estimates are drawn.

Figure 5.5 presents the estimated effect of armed conflict on each outcome variable (labeled along the x axis) in each of the 4 models associated with each crime. The first column of figures, “All”, reflect the “Basic” models from Chapter 3, where the gender of the respondent is included only as a control. The second and third column draw from an “Interacted” model to examine heterogeneous effects of armed conflict and the gender of the respondent. Again, the theory of protective masculine norms suggests heterogeneous effects of armed conflict by gender for both rape and stealing, but pooled effects of armed conflict for domestic violence. For comparison sake, the first reported effect of armed conflict, “Private”, in each subfigure re-reports the findings from Chapter 3.

With some minor variation, Figure 5.5 shows that the effects of armed conflict on private preferences are remarkably consistent between the private and public spheres.

Men privately prefer to punish rape and stealing more severely as a result of armed conflict; and this finding holds for publicly expressed preferences for punishing rape as well as for post-discussion private preferences. The estimate of armed conflict on preferences for punishing rape loses statistical significance for group preferences, likely because the intracluster correlation coefficient for group preferences will inevitably be high for the group measures - weakening the statistical power of the group models. However, the group preference estimate gains statistical significance in the pooled model examining armed conflict’s effects on punishing rape.

Also consistent with findings from Chapter 3, men both privately, publicly and as groups prefer to punish stealing more severely as a result of armed conflict. The findings among women approximate zero in the public sphere as they did in the private sphere.

Armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishing domestic violence deviate when they enter the public sphere to some extent. Armed conflict’s effects on group preferences are strongly negative in the pooled models and for men in the heterogeneous models. Armed conflict’s effects on group preferences also gain statistical significance among women in heterogeneous models. Armed conflict is affecting both men and women similarly even when




Figure 5.5: Effects of Armed Conflict on Private and Public Outcomes

accounting for group dynamics by measuring the preferences of groups. Note also, that although the coefficient plot shows a negative effect of armed conflict on private preferences for punishing domestic violence, the interaction term remains statistically insignificant (as depicted in the Chapter 3 model).

Overall the estimates of armed conflict's effects across private, public, and group preferences suggest that armed conflict affects all outcomes in the same direction and with roughly similar significance levels as for private preferences. In this way, the analyses in Figure 5.5 provide support to hypotheses of aggregation. Armed conflict's effects on private preferences translate to the public sphere. Group dynamics do not interfere with these effects even while there is suggestive evidence that group dynamics may also be at work.

In several cases, the effects of armed conflict appear to be substantively larger on publicly expressed, group, and post discussion private preferences than on private preferences. However, more formal tests are needed to examine whether the effects of armed conflict are statistically different from one another across models.

To statistically test for differences, I run linear regression models on the stacked data to see whether the interaction between the type of outcome (whether a preference measurement is private, public, group or post-discussion private) and armed conflict is statistically significant for explaining the severity of punishment preferences for the three crimes in my study. These models also employ matched pair fixed effects to better identify the effect of armed conflict.<sup>123</sup>

Table 5.6 shows that armed conflict does not have significantly different effects on publicly expressed preferences, group preferences, or post discussion private preferences as compared to private preferences. The interacted models show that this is also true when accounting for heterogeneous effects by gender. Even though the magnitude of the effect of armed conflict is estimated to be larger for group preferences than for private preferences in Figure 5.5, the effect size is not statistically different.

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<sup>123</sup>Tables B.6-B.8 in the Appendix provide additional analyses to check for possible heterogeneous effects by gender with a triple interaction term. Estimated effects of armed conflict do not substantively differ.



Table 5.6: Heterogeneous effects of outcome type with armed conflict

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.198 (0.138)	0.378*** (0.137)	-0.224** (0.106)	-0.234 (0.166)	0.215 (0.177)	0.414** (0.179)
Female	0.090 (0.131)	0.263 (0.202)	-0.399*** (0.099)	-0.408** (0.159)	-0.284** (0.137)	-0.094 (0.229)
Public	0.043 (0.050)	0.043 (0.050)	0.035 (0.058)	0.035 (0.058)	0.008 (0.033)	0.008 (0.033)
Group	0.342*** (0.088)	0.342*** (0.088)	-0.100 (0.086)	-0.100 (0.086)	0.145 (0.089)	0.145 (0.089)
PostDisc Private	0.088* (0.051)	0.088* (0.051)	-0.051 (0.083)	-0.051 (0.083)	0.057 (0.063)	0.057 (0.063)
Armed Conflict x Female		-0.334 (0.257)		0.017 (0.203)		-0.352 (0.293)
Armed Conflict x Public	0.122 (0.082)	0.122 (0.082)	-0.011 (0.071)	-0.011 (0.071)	0.026 (0.058)	0.026 (0.058)
Armed Conflict x Group	0.072 (0.168)	0.072 (0.168)	-0.142 (0.134)	-0.142 (0.134)	0.037 (0.144)	0.037 (0.144)
Armed Conflict x PostDisc Private	0.134 (0.095)	0.134 (0.095)	-0.004 (0.120)	-0.004 (0.120)	0.026 (0.095)	0.026 (0.095)
Constant	2.690*** (0.388)	2.555*** (0.334)	2.468*** (0.278)	2.478*** (0.314)	3.241*** (0.342)	3.178*** (0.361)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,968	3,968	3,968	3,968	3,968	3,968
R <sup>2</sup>	0.125	0.131	0.081	0.081	0.066	0.071
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.121	0.126	0.076	0.076	0.061	0.066

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

The estimated effect of armed conflict on private, public and group measures of preferences are consistent. Armed conflict likely affects the severity of preferences for punishment due to changes in private preferences rather than due to its effects on group dynamics alone. The consistency of this finding of armed conflict's effects on in private, public and group dimensions gives greater weight to the claim that private preference change has implications for how people actually treat perpetrators of local crimes in the social sphere.

Hypotheses suggesting that private preferences aggregate to affect behavior in the public sphere and hypotheses suggesting that armed conflict affects group dynamics directly are not mutually exclusive. Support for hypotheses of aggregation only suggests that group dynamics do not interfere with armed conflict's effects on the private sphere. It remains possible that group dynamics may mitigate or amplify the observed effects.

Does armed conflict affect group dynamics directly and in what direction? In order to assess the potential that armed conflict may affect group dynamics directly alongside preference change itself, I examine armed conflict's effects on preference convergence and preference difference. If armed conflict affects convergence, this means that it affects how powerful norms are - the extent to which people change their preferences to be in line with the social sphere. Armed conflict may make it more likely that people want to converge or conform with the preferences of others in their community. Convergence is a measure of absolute value or distance across private and public dimensions.

Figure 5.6 largely reveals null results for convergence and fails to provide support for hypotheses of group dynamics. Associated tables are included in Tables B.9-B.12 in the Appendix. Armed conflict is not impacting convergence towards a norm in a way apparent across the data. The single statistically significant finding (which might be random due to the sheer number of analyses presented) is that armed conflict increases convergence between men's post-discussion private preferences and the preferences of their groups for punishing domestic violence but decreases this convergence for punishing stealing. Both findings describe how men's preferences are uniquely shaped by the social sphere. However,




Figure 5.6: Effects of Armed Conflict on Convergence across stages of process model

it is shaping internalization in a crime-specific way.

Analysis of the effects of armed conflict on women's preferences for punishing stealing (estimated in models that include an interaction term with the sex of the respondent) approaches statistical significance, such that armed conflict may also be directly impacting a specific group dynamic related to this crime.

Given few and disparate findings on theories of convergence and strong support for hypotheses of polarization in the previous section, armed conflict may not change convergence; instead it may directly influence group dynamics by shifting public, group and post-discussion preferences towards extremes. Therefore, I examine armed conflict's effects on the difference (rather than the absolute value of the difference) to check for armed conflict's effects on group dynamics of polarization.

Figure 5.7 reveals starkly different results. Associated tables are included in Tables B.13-B.16 in the Appendix. For rape, armed conflict increases the difference between the preference that both men and women (in pooled models) express in public and the preference that they hold in private. In Kuran's terminology, people in conflict-affected communities are more likely to "dissimulate" their true preference up front (reporting a more severe preference than their true preference for punishment) - but this is only true for the crime of rape. People's post-discussion private preferences are also more greatly changed, increasing in severity from their original private preference in communities that have been recently exposed to armed conflict. This effect is mainly driven by the female sample and again is only relevant for the crime of rape.

Armed conflict also has limited direct effects on group dynamics related to domestic violence. Group preferences become more extreme (less severe in terms of punishment) as compared publicly expressed preferences, where these findings are mainly driven by the male sample. There are no estimated effects of armed conflict on group dynamics of polarization for the crime of stealing.

In sum, armed conflict's direct effects on group dynamics are weak and inconclusive with




Figure 5.7: Effects of Armed Conflict on Difference across stages of the process model

no clear trends that emerge from the multiple analyses. At most, armed conflict has some limited direct effects on convergence and polarization - but this is crime specific, gender specific and outcome specific. The findings, however, echo a useful word of caution against extrapolating findings about social dynamics related to one crime to another crime.

While armed conflict does not appear to have any overarching direct effects on group dynamics, the evidence strongly support theories of aggregation. Armed conflict's effects on private preference for punishment translate from the private sphere, to the public sphere and back again. This provides insights into the relevance of the theory of protective masculine norms and the associated preference change for how people treat perpetrators of these crimes in the social sphere. It also provides insights into how preference change associated with armed conflict may persist through engagements with others on these issues in the social sphere.

## **5.6 Discussion**

The theory of protective masculine norms describes how and why armed conflict affects preferences for punishing crimes against women. Armed conflict increases how severely men prefer to punish rape and stealing but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic violence. This chapter bolsters the relevance of the findings and support the theory in three ways.

First, it demonstrates the relevance of armed conflict's effects on private preferences (revealed in Chapter 3) by showing that private preferences aggregate to affect preferences for punishing crimes in the public sphere. By showing the relevance of private preferences in a social context, this examination brings the outcome from Chapter 3 one step closer to actual social punishment. When armed conflict affects people's private preferences for punishing local crimes, this preference change translates into the social sphere unimpeded by social factors and group dynamics. The effects of armed conflict also translate back again, evidenced by consistent effects on private preferences measured after group discussions take

place.

In the same vein, this chapter presents hypotheses about how group dynamics might be directly affected by armed conflict. The observed effects of armed conflict are disparate and crime specific, but provide insights into the myriad of ways that norms may shape private preferences when they enter the public sphere. Importantly for this study, observed group dynamics are not strong enough or consistent enough to offset the relevance of armed conflict's effects on private preferences.

Second, the theory of protective masculine norms suggests that norms (what people think others want them to do or think) drive preference change. In the wake of war, demand for protective male behavior changes, protective masculinity becomes more highly prized, and this leads to changed preferences for punishing local crimes. This chapter delves into the social nature of preferences and preference change for punishing local crimes.

Findings from 80 focus group discussions (divided into 230 subgroups) reveal statistical *differences* between private, public, group and post-discussion private preferences. In terms of methods, this underscores the importance of treating private, public, group and post-discussion private preferences as distinct outcomes.

The data also suggest that preferences become more *extreme* when moving from stage to stage. This underscores the social nature of preferences, because it shows how preferences change through interactions in the social sphere. The social nature of preference change is a central tenet of protective masculine norms theory. As evidenced by the effects of group discussions on post-discussion private preferences, social interaction can foster changes even to private preferences.

There are important ethical implications of this finding. The analyses shows that preferences for punishing crimes become more extreme as a result of the focus group discussions. This suggests less tolerance for rape and stealing but more tolerance for domestic violence *because* of discussions. Researchers must be more aware that engaging in discussions of this kind can alter people's preferences and must clearly and transparently address these

ethical considerations prior to facilitating discussions. At minimum, protocols for engaging in focus groups should involve communicating the potential effects to participants prior to and debriefing after engaging in discussions of this kind.

While supporting the theory of protective masculine norms by revealing the social nature of preferences and showing that preferences do change, the findings from this chapter also raise new questions. If changing preferences is as simple as discussing preferences, then are protective masculine norms driving the results? Is conversation about rape, domestic violence and stealing another mechanism that can explain war's effects?

One reason to doubt that it is not solely conversation about these issues that are driving results is that models in Chapters 3 include control variables for individual measures of social engagement with others in the community. Despite this control, armed conflict continues to have effects on preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing. Second, how people engage with one another in discussion (e.g. absolute or directional convergence) does not change as a result of armed conflict. If people conversed more about rape, domestic violence and stealing as a result of armed conflict (a conversation mechanism), then one would have expected that communities exposed to armed conflict would have already experienced more convergence towards norms (as a result of the relative increase in discussions). However convergence as a result of group discussions is not substantively or statistically different in conflict and non-conflict communities.

In sum, this chapter demonstrates that expressions of norms in focus groups fosters preference change. Preferences change because of social factors as suggested by protective masculine norms theory. The conversation mechanism highlighted by the structure of this study also poses an interesting avenue for future research; it demonstrates a channel by which advocacy organizations with well designed norm change interventions may effectively affect preferences towards punishing these forms of violence. Future research should examine how harmful norm change brought about by armed conflict might be effectively mitigated through efforts to change preferences through group discussions.



# Chapter 6: Conclusion

## 6.1 Introduction

### 6.1.1 Summary

In the aftermath of war, how does armed conflict continue to affect women's security? Does armed conflict transmit effects beyond armed groups to change societies?

This dissertation has explored these questions by examining the effects of local exposure to armed conflict on the social context of violence against women in eastern DR Congo. The social context of violence against women reflects tolerance for violence of this kind and how women are treated in their day-to-day lives. My framework for thinking about the social context, described in Chapter 1, emphasizes social sanctioning as normatively important, measurable, and relevant to deterring violent crime. Chapter 2 further motivates the centrality of social sanctioning for punishing crimes against women in the case of eastern DR Congo by highlighting systematic gaps between legal codes and processes for punishing local crime.

The quantitative analysis of armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishing crimes (presented in Chapter 3) reveals a social context in which both men and women prefer to punish domestic violence less severely in the aftermath of war. At the same time, men, but not women, prefer to punish rape more severely as a result of war. This presents a puzzling set of findings for theories of violence against women, because it suggests an environment more tolerant of some forms of violence against women but less tolerant of others. This raises questions about whether the determinants of one form of violence against women are relevant to other forms. Discussions held across 80 focus groups reveal no relationship between rape and domestic violence in the minds of participants.

In addition, armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishing rape are consistent with armed conflict's effects on preferences for punishing stealing - a general crime as closely tied to gender. Such similar effects lead to questions about the question. Is violence against

women a crime to be understood and analyzed separately from other crimes? Or does violence against women share important dimensions with other crimes?

The qualitative insights from data gathered in connection with the initial quantitative study in 20 villages begin to reveal a new dimension for characterizing rape, domestic violence and stealing as crimes. People think about rape and stealing as public matters that present, pose a harm, or threaten their communities. Dissimilarly, people think about domestic violence as a private matter that does not impact the community.<sup>124</sup> Based on this differentiation, I build a theory of protective masculine norms - a new theory that describes what happens when men are driven to protect as a result of community exposure to war.

The centerpiece of this dissertation is the theory of protective masculine norms, explicated in Chapter 4. The theory explains how armed conflict exposure changes people's security calculations such that they demand more community protection in the wake of war. Since men are thought of as protection providers, communities demand more *male* protection after exposure. I argue that this change in demand leads to a change in norms. People begin to revere male protective behavior more than previously.

#### Step 1: **Demand -> Norms**

In support of the assumptions within the theory of protective masculine norms, I show that community protection is understood as a male enterprise and people make different security tradeoffs when considering how to punish perpetrators of rape, domestic violence, and stealing. Of crime perpetrators, only perpetrators of domestic violence are considered apt contributors to community security that warrant inclusion in security networks. Process tracing of when and how people prepare for armed conflict reveals that people respond to incidents of insecurity in eastern DR Congo; they often do so by giving and receiving security information and preparing to flee. The evidence suggests that community security

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<sup>124</sup>Indeed, gender remains an important component here. Whose harm is considered a public threat is related to the relative status of women to begin with.

and expectations that men contribute to community security are important social dynamics in the aftermath of armed conflict that can drive norm change.

### Step 2: **Norms -> Preferences**

The next component of protective masculine norms theory is that this norm change that I have described leads to preference change.<sup>125</sup> A comparison of people's preferences before and after people's engagement with their communities about social punishment (in Chapter 5) shows that preferences for punishing crimes are innately social and affected by social interaction with others in their community. This finding adds plausibility to the claim that armed conflict's effects on masculine norms has implications for preference change.

### Step 3: **Preferences -> Sanctioning**

Chapter 5's focus on social sanctioning in the public sphere also demonstrates the relevance of changed preferences for punishing crime to real world social settings where social punishment ultimately takes place. Armed conflict does not appear to affect group dynamics directly in a consistent way. Instead, armed conflict's effects on norms and preferences translate into social sanctioning behaviors of groups.

To summarize, this dissertation has described a trajectory of change that begins with a community's exposure to armed conflict. This exposure fosters demand for protection and then protective masculinities, which, in turn affect preferences for social sanctioning and social sanctioning behaviors themselves. The causal chain that I describe is, indeed, multi-step; but each step that I have described is supported both by original data analysis and broader theory. In describing this causal chain, this work engages in a much needed discussion of the micro-level processes by which armed conflict may transmit effects into the postconflict space (Østby, Leiby, and Nordås 2019).

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<sup>125</sup>Indeed, the findings from Chapter 3 show that armed conflict affects people's *preferences* for punishing crimes. But are people's preferences affected by expressions of norms as protective masculine norms theory suggests?

As a scope condition of this research, I have focused on factors that may influence social sanctioning of violence against women through the social context: preferences, norms, and group dynamics. Because of this focus, the effects that this research finds have the potential to persist even when institutions are rebuilt and armed groups leave. In addition, the analysis of focus group discussions in Chapter 5 provide suggestive evidence that the effects of armed conflict on preferences for punishment will persist as they are reinforced through discussions in the social sphere.

The alternative hypotheses that I have explored have de-emphasized structural arguments that may foster women's insecurity without changing preferences or norms. In Chapter 3, I examined whether women's empowerment, backlash and violent masculinities would affect preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing - finding effects that contradicted each of these alternative hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I weighed additional alternative arguments such as the continued insecurity associated with conflict exposure, reactions to conflict-related crime, and state capacity - all which might affect social sanctioning through preferences. Yet, I do not find support for alternative theories.

## **6.2 Levels of Violence against Women**

Social sanctioning is also relevant because of its potential deterrent effect on violence against women. While I have focused on preferences for punishment among individuals and groups throughout this dissertation, I have also described a theoretical relationship between social sanctioning of violence against women and deterrence.

The relationship between violence against women and social sanctioning of it is the fourth step suggested by the chain of logic that I have presented. Does the threat of social punishment serve to deter rape? How does tolerance for the perpetration of domestic violence relate to levels of domestic violence?

Step 4: **Sanctioning -> Violence**

The relationship between violence against women and the social sanctioning of violence against women is important to address for two reasons. First, measuring violence against women is the focus of the majority of the literature on armed conflict's effects on violence against women. Establishing this relationship helps to speak to this literature more broadly.

Second, there is an additional pathway by which armed conflict may affect social sanctioning of violence against women through changes in preferences and norms. Armed conflict may directly affect violence against women and - only then - the preferences and norms related to sanctioning it.

### **6.2.1 Empirical challenges**

The ability to answer questions about deterrence confronts empirical challenges. To focus on social sanctioning outcomes, I reserved discussion of deterrence for this final chapter. The day-to-day violence that women experience is broad, elusive and difficult to measure, precisely because of the social context, which is the subject of this study. As explicated in Chapter 5, reporting rape and domestic violence to researchers or authorities is a social process where respondents must reveal their acts or experiences in order for their acts or experiences to be known. Because the social context determines how sensitive it is to reveal an act or experience of violence, the threat of social punishment may affect whether respondents report violence, may deter violence, or both. Since increased reporting is a normatively positive outcome, it becomes difficult to interpret statistical associations.

### **6.2.2 Evidence of Deterrence**

I examine observational evidence for the deterrent effect of social sanctioning and its relationship with war by constructing several regression models to observe statistical relationships and discuss potential associations. The sanctioning measures draw from a composite measure of social punishment variables presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3). Social sanctioning is measured as the average of the perceived proportion of men and male youth in communities

that male respondents believe would socially punish someone for perpetrating rape. I use men's perception of social sanctioning in the village, because this is the population for which deterrence is theorized to operate. In deterrence models, it is *perceived* potential for punishment rather than actual potential for punishment that deters. To reflect deterrence, the measures of sanctioning for this analysis focus on perceptions.<sup>126</sup>

The measures of sexual violence incorporate data as reported in a survey by both men and women about household exposure within the past 6 months. It includes sexual violence perpetrated by insiders as well as outsiders, which is not the focus of this study.<sup>127</sup> This measure of sexual violence also yields low estimates, which means that analyses will be caveated to consider underreporting.<sup>128</sup>

Because deterrence happens not at the individual level, but at the village level, I estimate the relationship between armed conflict, social sanctioning, and violence measures by taking the maximum (=1) of all responses at the village level (men's and women's). There are a total of 679 villages in the sample. The models are presented in Table 1.<sup>129</sup>

Table 1 shows that, even with the caveat of underreporting, social punishment is negatively related to sexual violence in the expected direction of deterrence theories. However, the estimate is not statistically significant. Model 2 suggests that armed conflict increases levels of sexual violence in line with the existing literature, although the relationship is also not statistically significant.

Only when armed conflict and social punishment are interacted in Table 1 Model 4 is armed conflict a significant factor influencing sexual violence. Sexual violence does not

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<sup>126</sup>The measures differ from those in previous chapters, which focused on actual potential for punishment: preferences for punishment both among individuals and groups.

<sup>127</sup>This means that some part of the statistical relationship between armed conflict and sexual violence will be driven by perpetration by armed groups. But, because the measure asks about the past 6 months rather than past 5 years, it is not only capturing sexual violence by armed groups.

<sup>128</sup>The data draw from a large representative survey of IRC program villages in eastern DR Congo (described in Chapter 2). The direct questions on sexual violence were asked in the context of a long survey and were not the survey's focus. This likely explains low levels of reporting.

<sup>129</sup>Models are all ordinary least squares regression models.

Table 6.1: Social Punishment, Armed Conflict and Sexual Violence

	Dependent Variable			
	Sexual Violence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Punishment	-0.010 (0.013)		-0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)
Armed Conflict		0.021 (0.025)	0.019 (0.025)	0.274** (0.131)
Armed Conflict x Social Punishment				-0.072** (0.036)
Constant	0.059 (0.048)	0.020 (0.015)	0.053 (0.052)	0.010 (0.056)
Province Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	703	679	674	674
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.011	0.012	0.018
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.010

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure 6.1: Conditional Effect of Armed Conflict Given Social Sanctioning

increase as much with conflict when people perceive there there will be social sanctioning against it. Thus, in the presence of social punishment, the harmful effects of armed conflict on sexual violence seem to be mitigated.

To further interpret the data, Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the mean level of social sanctioning across villages. The figure also plots Model 4’s estimates of armed conflict’s effects for those values of social punishment. Armed conflict is estimated to increase sexual violence when men perceive that between *almost no one* and *half* of men would socially punish rape. Where men estimate that between *half* and *more than half* of men would socially punish rape, armed conflict has roughly zero and nonsignificant effects on sexual violence. Social sanctioning does seem to deter sexual violence in the wake of armed conflict. While Figure 6.1 suggests that perceived social sanctioning moderates but does not reverse the harmful effect of armed conflict, moderation is difficult establish since men’s perceptions



of social punishment are measured after armed conflict takes place and simultaneously with measures of sexual violence.

This study's exploration of the social context provides a unique opportunity to consider how it influences violence against women with attention to how it may also affect standard measures of this violence. Whether people report sexual violence in surveys, particularly sexual violence by insiders, may be contingent on beliefs about social punishment for themselves or for fellow villagers that may have perpetrated it. As suggested in Chapter 5, if villagers underreport sexual violence in places where more social punishment is expected, the results could be driven by social desirability bias as well.

Despite potential for biases in measurement, the relationship between sexual violence and armed conflict are consistent with existing research on sexual violence after war. The finding that perceived sanctioning can moderate the harmful effects of armed conflict on sexual violence also underscores the relevance of social punishment for dynamics of violence. The analyses here provide insights into the deterrence framework and how researchers might consider perceptions of *potential* sanctioning alongside sanctioning itself.

### **6.3 Methodological Contributions**

The theory of protective masculine norms has been developed over the course of this dissertation in an iterative process. What begins as a deductive exploration of theories and empirical tests of those theories in the case of eastern DR Congo develops into an inductive exercise in theory building with further exploration and testing in the same case. My quantitative study of matched (similar) pairs of villages in eastern DR Congo closely integrated complementary qualitative work. These qualitative data provided the bridge from quantitative null findings for existing theories in Chapter 3 to a new theory and research agenda on protection and violence in Chapter 4. In terms of methods, the research process highlights the value of pursuing the interpretation of unexpected results in a rigorous and ethical way.

The project also demonstrates what can be gleaned from considering several outcome

variables together. Because examining many outcomes can lead to random findings of statistical significance, scholars often choose to narrow their focus to a single outcome or domain. However, combining expectations about several outcome variables provides important insights into theory. The interpretation of the findings and the role of gender in Chapter 3 would have been different had I not looked at the combined outcomes of rape, domestic violence and stealing in one research setting. Essentially, the project contributes to the empirical study of violence against women by looking at outcomes beyond violence against women.

My approach to measuring social sanctioning outcomes uses short narratives and images for each crime that have been formulated in partnership with Congolese researchers to speak to the local context. This allows me to examine rape by insiders even when people tend to think about rape by outside actors such as armed group members. Using real local punishments to represent a severity scale also serves to further embed and interpret the results with respect to the context. Such strategies are time intensive but push research to engage with local meanings. At the same time, the scale allows consideration of how armed conflict might affect the severity of punishment elsewhere.

The delineation of private, publicly expressed and group preferences in Chapter 5 inspire questions about measurement of a broad range of outcomes. Certainly, there are some scenarios in which private preferences are relevant for behavior, such as voting in secret ballots (as long as people truly believe that these ballots are secret). However, in studies that seek to understand how people behave in public and as groups, researchers should consider asking questions in those arenas.

Finally, the methods that I employ in this study draw upon common practices in research: focus groups and interviews. But what happens when we begin to look at a participant's engagement in research as a treatment? Combined with norms theories, my findings that focus group discussions change preferences suggest that researchers need to begin thinking about how focus groups or even their own survey questions can influence the preferences that

people hold.

## 6.4 Generalizability

Given the widespread nature of violence against women, patriarchy, and armed conflict, protective masculine norms are likely relevant to understanding a wide range of cases and even other situations. The specific theory of protective masculine norms advanced here, however, describes and examines the evidence for how armed conflict affects preferences for punishing publicly threatening (and publicly non-threatening) crimes in eastern DR Congo. To what extent can the theory describe armed conflict's effects on community dynamics of punishment in other contexts?

Several scope conditions have been introduced throughout this dissertation. First, the findings may be dependent on particular forms of violence that communities experience during war. Villages in eastern DR Congo have been exposed to brutal forms of violence at the hands of armed groups. The theory may be less relevant to other types of wars where civilians are not targeted and people do not sense a need for community protection from future episodes of violence. Civil wars - where fighting occurs within the borders of states, where populations are likely to interact with armed groups, and where there are often lingering issues of insecurity left unaddressed (or unaddressable) by states - is where the theory of protective masculine norms will be most directly applicable. However, the theory may be relevant to explaining post-conflict dynamics in internationally contested zones where international war repeatedly occurs and states do not respond by providing security for their populations.

As described, the theory of protective masculine norms specifies different theoretical implications (or predictions) for how armed conflict affects preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing. But, the crime-specific implications were derived in terms of how people in DR Congo perceive them - either as public threats or as private crimes. Thus, questions about armed conflict's effects in other contexts must begin with a question about

how people in those communities perceive local crimes.

In the introduction, I described why I chose to place intimate partner rape aside during this study of armed conflict's effects in DR Congo. In DR Congo, intimate partner rape neither is nor is perceived as a crime. However, in contexts where intimate partner rape is a crime, it is often perceived of as a private matter much akin to how domestic violence has been described in this study. While this perception would need to be investigated within any context prior to deriving the implications of the theory for punishing crimes, commonly shared understandings suggest that armed conflict will decrease social sanctioning of (and increase tolerance of) intimate partner rape.

Another condition for armed conflict's effects is that people should have a memory of the conflict event and consider the possibility of its recurrence when punishing local crimes. Thus the relevance of the theory is dependent on both a community's actual and perceived security from repeated episodes of war. Thus there remain questions about how the effects of armed conflict carry over in the long term, particularly in post-war contexts where security has been reestablished. Future research should explore how collective memory shapes people's protective behavior over time.

#### **6.4.1 Croatia**

To begin considering the theory's application in another context, I assess its plausibility in Croatia using original research gathered prior to my work in DR Congo. In 2015, I spent one month in Vukovar and Osijek, Croatia - two border communities with Bosnia and a site of widespread violence during its wars following the fall of Yugoslavia in 1991. During this time, I spoke with 12 human rights and NGO workers in the area, individuals that were often from these communities that had also been working in their advocacy roles since the aftermath of the war.

I held conversations about violence against women in their societies, its sources, and how women's positions have changed in the aftermath of war. Several points that stand out in

these conversations suggest the relevance of protective masculine norms in this very different context. Interview participants pointed out that women were empowered during armed conflict. Women were able to move around more than men during the war and took on new responsibilities. There was a female Croatian president at the time of my interviews. However, the effects of armed conflict on women's roles are also complex because of accompanying changes to the national religious structure. Participants identify religion as counteracting some advancements, relegating (or revering) women's contributions within the home.<sup>130</sup>

Most tellingly, even while interview participants recognized that armed conflict empowered women in some ways, they also emphasized men's perpetration of domestic violence in the aftermath of war and the problem that this continued to pose within their society. They also described the empowerment of men and male groups because of their contributions to war. Men are revered because of their engagement in war fighting and male groups, particularly veterans organizations, feel entitled to behave as they please. Taken together, the discussions suggest that while women were empowered during war, men were also empowered during war because of their wartime contributions.<sup>131</sup>

In terms of the theory of protective masculine norms, men in these societies may be given more leeway to perpetrate domestic violence because of their contributions to fighting in war. However, it is unclear how armed conflict shapes sexual violence or the social sanctioning of it in the contemporary period. As in DR Congo, many advocacy groups and researchers have highlighted sexual violence as it is associated with war in the former Yugoslavia. Because this study was not designed specifically to shift the focus away from wartime sexual violence (which was top on people's concerns) to the focus on sexual violence after war, this remains a question for future research on protective norms in this case.

While Croatia is a very secure state, threats of ethnic violence associated with language

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<sup>130</sup>This suggests one of the large complications involved in studying armed conflict in the aggregate rather than focusing in micro-level subnational effects.

<sup>131</sup>Women's empowerment theories often miss the potential role for men's empowerment and how people might revere their waging of violence in the past.

differences took place around the time of this research. These threats may have invoked memories associated with the war. Thus, the Croatian case speaks to the potential longevity of armed conflict's effects with interesting avenues of research into collective memory of violence.

## **6.5 Theoretical Contributions**

### **6.5.1 New Questions**

This dissertation has opened a new research agenda on social sanctioning of violence against women and other crimes by asking about war's effects on the post conflict space. But how do factors other than war affect protective masculine norms? To what extent are the results that I find in this dissertation contingent on the context of this war? What other crimes and social phenomena do protective masculine norms affect?

Despite the compelling logic of the theory of protective masculine norms, it is explored only very tangentially in the literature, because protection and violence appear contradictory. Thus, many questions remain about the nature of protective masculine norms as well as factors that affect and are affected by them.

**Other Contexts:** First are questions about the context specific nature of armed conflict's effects on protective masculine norms and social sanctioning in eastern DR Congo. While preliminary empirical work in Croatia and the breath of critical feminist literature on patriarchy suggest that armed conflict will have similar effects in other contexts, examining different types of armed conflict as well as different forms of community exposure to violence is essential to establishing the breadth of the theory's application. In communities that have experienced war in the more distant past, an important element will be variation in the nature of collective memory.

**Other Shocks:** Second, future research should explore how other shocks such as natural disasters influence micro-level protective behaviors in its wake. To what extent do other incidents of insecurity affect protective behaviors differently? Exploring similarities and

differences between armed conflict and other shocks will yield insights into micro-level factors that drive changes in protective masculine norms. Other types of shocks such as natural disasters may or may not be accompanied by beliefs in the primacy of men's protection, which is central to the theory. Gang warfare and terrorism are more likely to lend themselves to similar community responses as armed conflict. Yet, such potential applications of the theory remain to be explored. Another shock that warrants future research is advocacy geared towards changing norms. While my research suggests that norms interventions can be effective in changing attitudes and norms of social sanctioning, a field experiment implemented with protective masculine norms in mind is the next step towards establishing this claim.

**Other Outcomes:** Third, this research has addressed the relationship between protective masculine norms and rape, domestic violence and stealing. In future research in DR Congo and beyond, it would be useful to consider other crimes in terms of public-private dimensions such as illicit drug use and tax evasion, which could be perceived as private or public crimes. Another central outcome to explore is the extent to which the findings of increased tolerance for domestic violence in the aftermath of war affect women's engagement with their communities - either socially or politically. An increased focus on protection and safety can translate into decreased mobility for women and negatively affect the inclusiveness of the society in which they live.

**Other Groups:** Finally, protective masculine norms theory calls attention to an undertheorized and paradoxical aspect of male protection and violence in war. It describes protection and dependence on one another for protection within communities. This dissertation establishes gender as one important dimension for considering who contributes to community protection, but perhaps there are additional dimensions of power and vulnerability to be explored. For example, men from particular ethnic groups may be thought of as ideal protectors and given more leeway to dominate other groups and perpetrate intra-community violence. Vulnerable groups may, in turn, be more acceptant of this violence when faced with threats by outsiders.

### **6.5.2 Unifying Disparate Findings**

While inspiring future questions, the theory of protective masculine norms already seems to unify a set of disparate findings in the literature, such as findings that domestic violence increases after war (Østby, Leiby, and Nordås 2019); that enforcement of rape law improves after war (Haglund and Richards 2017); and that people become more prosocial, involving themselves more in their community as a result of war (Bauer et al. 2016; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Koos 2018).

If people value community protection more in the wake of armed conflict because of insecurity, villagers may become more prosocial and involve themselves in their communities after war in order to augment protection. Bauer et al's meta-analysis (2016) of armed conflict's prosocial effects suggests that people do become more prosocial as a result of war, but also draws upon studies with a dominance of men in the sample. Thus it may be men, rather than villagers more widely, engaging more in their communities after war - and this engagement may be related to protection. This explanation, however, diverges from those described (but not tested) in this literature.

Similarly, when people are concerned about maintaining access to male protection in their communities, they will choose to punish domestic violence less. According to the theory of protective masculine norms, the level of domestic violence in the wake of armed conflict is due to community dependence on domestic violence perpetrators for security and an unwillingness to punish.

Finally, enforcement of rape laws may improve in the wake of war, because communities themselves seek to root out behaviors that threaten those communities. Change may emerge through bottom-up social sanctioning processes rather than top-down legal channels alone.

## **6.6 Policy Implications**

Legal reforms across the world have been geared towards reducing violence against women by ending impunity for crimes. However, violence against women takes places in a social context



that can bear little relationship to law. This research has examined armed conflict's effects on social sanctioning - commonly held individual and group preferences for punishment - that can both impede (in the case of domestic violence) and complement (in the case of rape) intended effects of legal reform.

The social nature of violence against women suggests that policy aimed to reduce this violence may benefit from considering bottom-up social approaches alongside top-down legal reform. My research shows that armed conflict changes preferences for punishment through its impact on norms. Under certain conditions, both norms and attitudes can change relatively quickly. This is in contraposition to the widespread understandings of attitudes and norms as inhibiting rather than facilitating change (Alesina, Brioschi, and Ferrara 2016). Thus, one avenue by which advocacy organizations may change attitudes related to punishment is by implementing interventions that target norms.

Yet, in their engagements with the community, advocacy organizations also face challenges. The analysis in Chapter 5 shows that engagement with communities *about* preferences *changes* preferences. This has positive implications for well designed norms change interventions but also highlights potential harms that may emerge from discussing harmful norms. Researchers and advocacy groups must reflect on the potential repercussions of engaging with people both as groups and as individuals to address these crimes.

This dissertation provides a nuanced understanding of the social context in which violence against women takes place in eastern DR Congo. Many interventions seek to address rape alone or rape and domestic violence together; but, the findings suggest that interventions should address social impunity for each crime independently. Addressing rape in the aftermath of armed conflict will not necessarily translate into reducing domestic violence, where armed conflict seems to have the most harmful effects. One approach that advocacy organizations may take is to frame domestic violence as a public crime that harms communities. However, policy implications will differ depending on the perceptions of these crimes in other contexts.

## 6.7 Women's Security

This dissertation, entitled “Women’s Security After War”, has investigated women’s security after war by looking at the effects of armed conflict on the social sanctioning of violence against women. What has this trajectory of research, culminating in the theory of protective masculine norms, discovered about *women’s security*?

Indeed, armed conflict has gendered effects on security. The empirical findings in Chapters 3 and 5 show that people are less willing to punish crimes of domestic violence in the aftermath of war, which creates a conducive environment for violence of this kind. But, at the same time, men are driven to protect their communities, preferring more punishment for other harmful crimes. Recognizing tradeoffs between community protection and private violent crime provides a multidimensional, nuanced account of women’s security.

But, at the same time, this dissertation questions the very idea of women’s security as a standalone feature of society. In its response to questions about women’s security, this research turns the concept on its head. Community exposure to armed conflict and collective behaviors to avoid armed conflict affect the behaviors and security of entire communities. Women’s security is not women’s security per se; preferences for punishing violence against women are intertwined with the security of communities and of men.

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## Appendix to Chapter 3

### A.1 Ethical Standards

As in any research involving vulnerable populations and particularly on a subject of violence against women, it is important to take precautions to protect human subjects at each stage of the research process. All protocols in this research have been approved by Columbia University's Institutional Review Board.<sup>132</sup> In addition to standard IRB protocols for participant recruitment and informed consent, my research procedures were built around the following ethical guidelines.

Participants in my study were never asked direct questions about experiences of rape or domestic violence. If discussion of ongoings in the community came up, people were encouraged to leave the discussion anonymous. All questions about crimes were based on hypothetical rather than real scenarios, formulated to reflect the context.

In accordance with ethical guidelines for research on violence against women, I also chose not to hold focus groups with men and women together. A male enumerator led all discussions with men and a female enumerator led all discussions with women.

Finally, I made efforts to be highly inclusive in the procedure for recruiting participants. First, I designed the study to include illiterate populations. Second, village chiefs were specifically tasked with identifying individuals from lower and upper strata of society to be included as potential participants.

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<sup>132</sup>Protocol AAAQ5105 is associated with the analyses of data from the IRC evaluation (Chapter 2 and matching procedure in 3). Protocol AAAQ9306 is associated with the several rounds of focus group and interview research gathered in eastern DR Congo (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Protocol AAAP8451 is associated with scoping interview work with advocacy workers in the area of gender-based violence in Croatia (Chapter 6).

## A.2 Selection

### A.2.1 Province and Territory Selection

I use a matched pair design within two territories in South Kivu: Walungu and Uvira. South Kivu is also one of three provinces in which two panel surveys of a large community driven development program took place. The first survey occurred in 2011 and the second in 2015. These surveys are relevant to the hypothesis tests and generalizability of this study because I use them to select the villages in my final sample. This has two implications.

First, the villages in my sample are villages that were defined by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) as places where they could potentially implement their community driven development program. This sample is broad and unique as it goes well beyond the well-beaten path of advocacy work, which tends to cluster near cities. The complete IRC sample is associated with one of the largest community development programs in the area.<sup>133</sup> The figure below provides an overview of the villages populations in my final sample of 20 villages; it shows that village size is varied and well distributed.<sup>134</sup>

Second, the two surveys allow me to identify armed conflict statistically using a matching procedure based on the datasets related to the surveys. In this project, I use data from the 2015 survey in order to identify whether armed conflict occurred in South Kivu villages within the past 5 years. I combine this with data from the 2011 survey to match villages based on like characteristics prior to these recent episodes of armed conflict.

My village selection method proceeds as follows. First, I select two territories in South Kivu where there were enough episodes of armed conflict in the past 5 years to match on armed conflict within the territory. It is important to match within territories rather than across territories to hold political and administrative boundary characteristics constant. Across all territories of IRC operations in South Kivu, the distribution of armed conflict

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<sup>133</sup>For a full description of the IRC sample, see Humphreys et al. (Forthcoming).

<sup>134</sup>Population data was collected in my qualitative interviews with village chiefs. The final sample of villages excludes the attrited village and includes its replacement.




Figure A.1: Distribution of Village Populations (Final Sample of 20 Villages)

within the past 5 years as measured in the 2015 survey is as follows: Kalehe=5/43 villages, Mwenga=6/44 villages, Uvira=18/61 villages, Walungu=9/110 villages. I select the territories of Walungu and Uvira, because they have higher amounts of recent community armed conflict exposure and a higher number of villages in the IRC sample.

### A.2.2 Matching Procedure

Within Walungu and Uvira territories of South Kivu, I pair each village exposed to armed conflict in the past 5 years with a village that has not been exposed to armed conflict in the past 5 years using a nearest neighbor matching algorithm.

Matching was conducted based on a question in a survey which I helped to implement during several months of fieldwork in eastern DR Congo. This 2015 survey was part of a long-run evaluation of the same community driven development program (Laudati, Mvukiyehe, and Van der Windt 2016).

The following characteristics are summarized at the village level and employed in the matching specification: gender attitudes, attitudes towards mistreatment of women, domestic violence as measured by a list experiment, sexual violence as measured in a list experiment,

having earned no income in the past week, level of trust in coethnic villagers, trusting coethnics more than noncoethnic villagers, likelihood a bike would be stolen if left outside, three principle components for household goods to indicate household wealth, exposure to war between 1996 and 2011, the IRC’s community driven development treatment (which was randomized), proximity to mine, proximity to forest, proximity to mountains, and an ethnic fractionalization index. Again, all matching variables were based on a survey implemented within these villages in 2011.

The matching procedure was implemented in R using MatchIt.<sup>135</sup> The figure displays propensity scores before and after nearest neighbor matching, showing improvement in overall propensity scores. Note that this analysis is related to the matching procedure itself and the full set of matched pairs (only a subset of which were selected for this study).






Figure A.2: Matched and Unmatched Propensity Score Distributions

<sup>135</sup>Daniel E. Ho, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, Elizabeth A. Stuart (2011). MatchIt: Nonparametric Preprocessing for Parametric Causal Inference. *Journal of Statistical Software*, Vol. 42, No. 8, pp. 1-28. URL <http://www.jstatsoft.org/v42/i08/>




(a) Before Matching




(b) After Matching

Figure A.3: Propensity Score Histograms in Uvira



(a) Before Matching



(b) After Matching

Figure A.4: Propensity Score Histograms in Walungu

### A.2.3 Village Covariate Balance achieved through Matching

The following figure, created using the cobalt package in R,<sup>136</sup> demonstrates the covariate balance achieved through the specified matching algorithm.

Again, this analysis is related to the matching procedure itself and the full set of matched pairs (only a subset of which were selected for this study).




Figure A.5: Village Level Covariate Balance

Overall, covariate balance is achieved for many of the important variables in the matching model specification. In Uvira, Domestic Violence, No Income, Coethnic Trust are balanced. The randomized community development program by the IRC, whether there was a Mine Nearby, and whether there was a Forest nearby are also balanced. Villages exposed to armed conflict in Uvira between 2011 and 2015 are virtually indistinguishable in these dimensions along geographic dimensions. While balance is not achieved, the matching procedure improves balance on gender attitudes, attitudes towards the mistreatment of women, incidence of sexual violence, and whether villagers trust coethnics more than non-coethnics. However, there

<sup>136</sup>Noah Greifer (2019). cobalt: Covariate Balance Tables and Plots. R package version 3.7.0. <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=cobalt>

are some tradeoffs. Matching creates additional imbalance in perceived security (whether a bicycle left outside overnight will be there the following morning) and one dimension of wealth (PCA 2).

In Walungu, covariate balance is achieved for attitudes towards mistreating women, domestic violence, sexual violence, coethnic trust, prior war exposure (between 1996 and 2011), and whether or not a forest is nearby the village. The matching procedure substantively improves balance in gender attitudes, though balance is not fully achieved. The matching procedure also improves whether people trust coethnics more than noncoethnics, one wealth component (PCA 3). Like in Uvira, however, the matching procedure creates more imbalance on perceived security in the village as well as some components of the wealth measure (PCA 1). It also increases imbalance on ethnic fractionalization.

In sum, covariate balance is achieved or substantively improved along many dimensions: in terms of violence against women, in terms of attitudes towards women, in terms of community trust, and in terms of some conflict relevant geographic variables. Improvement along these dimensions comes with some additional imbalance in perceived insecurity and wealth or income measures. It is the author's contention that the balance achieved is a substantial improvement along the most important dimensions. Keeping the full set of the variables in the matching algorithm allows for more transparency in balance and imbalanced characteristics.



#### **A.2.4 Final Village Selection and Sample**

After pairing each village exposed to armed conflict with a control village in its territory, I randomly select 5 matched pairs from each territory such that there are 10 villages in Walungu and 10 villages in Uvira, resulting in a total of 20 villages for the study.

Due to security conditions, one village was replaced from the first nonconflict village in list of randomized replacement village pairs. The village that was matched with the attrited village had already been surveyed, so the replacement village joins the pair-mate of the attrited village to form one “unmatched” pair. In a robustness check detailed later in the appendix, I show that the findings hold when dropping the “unmatched pair” where there was one attrited village.

## **A.3 Participants**

### **A.3.1 Recruitment of Focus Group Participants**

The village chief identified potential participants and the research team followed up by inviting the identified persons to attend a focus group on that same day. In eastern DR Congo, there is no census to draw a truly random selection from. Lists from which “random samples” tend to be drawn are provided by the village chief, which not only fails to eliminate the potential for bias but also presents a tradeoff in terms of time. Creating village lists and running focus groups with randomly selected participants would require multiple days in each village.

Rather than staying multiple days in a village, teams arrived and conducted all focus groups on the same day. Spending a single day in each village decreases the potential for chiefs to organize handpicked participants and keeps the subject matter from circulating the community prior to the focus group discussions. To even further mitigate bias, enumerators asked village chiefs to include individuals from both higher and lower echelons of society.

### A.3.2 Pooled Descriptive Statistics of Participants

Table A.1: Summary Characteristics of All Participants (Pooling Men and Women)

	MIN	MAX	N	MEAN	SD	ICC
Age	18	100.0	995	36.67	15.60	0.079
Education	0	3.3	994	1.24	1.01	0.076
Years in Village (Categorical)	1	4.0	995	3.24	0.93	0.067
Frequency Meeting Others	1	4.0	995	3.49	0.84	0.229
Homogeneous Subgroup	0	1.0	995	0.60	0.49	0.008
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever)	0	1.0	995	0.71	0.45	0.041
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs)	0	1.0	995	0.35	0.48	0.151

### A.3.3 Gender Differences in Characteristics of Participants

Table A.2: Gender Difference in Participant Characteristics

	MEAN(M)-MEAN(F)	P(DIFF)
Age	6.52	0.000
Education	0.55	0.000
Years in Village (Categorical)	0.77	0.000
Frequency Meeting Others	0.28	0.000
Homogeneous Subgroup	-0.11	0.001
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever)	-0.39	0.000
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs)	-0.31	0.000

#### **A.3.4 Balance on Participant Characteristics in Conflict and Non-Conflict Villages**

The primary concern of this nonrandom sample of focus group participants from each village is that chiefs in villages recently exposed to armed conflict may select people differently than those in villages that have not been recently exposed. To mitigate this bias, all chiefs were asked not to exclude people whose lives had been greatly affected by armed conflict.

The tables below present additional descriptive characteristics of participants not detailed in the main text. Note that these analyses are the final set of villages (thus include the replacement village and exclude the attrited village in the sample). The tables are followed by graphic representations of differences at the individual level and then across pairs at the village level.

Table A.3: Participant Characteristics by Recent Village Conflict Exposure (Pooling Men and Women)

	N(C)	MEAN(C)	SD(C)	N(NC)	MEAN(NC)	SD(NC)	PVALUE(C-NC)
Age	504	37.81	15.39	491	35.51	15.75	0.02
Education	504	1.20	0.99	490	1.28	1.02	0.25
Years in Village (Categorical)	504	3.31	0.89	491	3.17	0.97	0.02
Frequency Meeting Others	504	3.46	0.86	491	3.51	0.82	0.30
Homogeneous Subgroup	504	0.60	0.49	491	0.60	0.49	0.89
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever)	504	0.71	0.45	491	0.71	0.45	0.82
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs)	504	0.39	0.49	491	0.32	0.47	0.02

Table A.4: Participant Characteristics by Recent Village Conflict Exposure (among Women)

	N(C)	MEAN(C)	SD(C)	N(NC)	MEAN(NC)	SD(NC)	PVALUE(C-NC)
Age	263	34.52	14.20	274	32.86	13.00	0.16
Education	263	0.92	0.95	274	1.05	0.99	0.15
Years in Village (Categorical)	263	2.99	0.89	274	2.79	0.96	0.01
Frequency Meeting Others	263	3.33	1.00	274	3.38	0.95	0.62
Homogeneous Subgroup	263	0.67	0.47	274	0.62	0.49	0.20
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever)	263	0.87	0.33	274	0.91	0.29	0.26
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs)	263	0.55	0.50	274	0.45	0.50	0.01

Table A.5: Participant Characteristics by Recent Village Conflict Exposure (among Men)

	N(C)	MEAN(C)	SD(C)	N(NC)	MEAN(NC)	SD(NC)	PVALUE(C-NC)
Age	241	41.40	15.86	217	38.85	18.14	0.11
Education	241	1.51	0.95	216	1.57	0.98	0.49
Years in Village (Categorical)	241	3.66	0.76	217	3.66	0.73	0.96
Frequency Meeting Others	241	3.59	0.65	217	3.69	0.59	0.11
Homogeneous Subgroup	241	0.52	0.50	217	0.57	0.50	0.35
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever)	241	0.53	0.50	217	0.47	0.50	0.26
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs)	241	0.22	0.41	217	0.16	0.36	0.10




Figure A.6: Participant Covariate Balance across Conflict and Non-Conflict Villages



Figure A.7: Participant Covariates Summarized at the Village Level across Conflict and Non-Conflict Villages



## A.4 Outcome Variable

### A.4.1 Raw Distributions of Outcome Variables




Figure A.8: Punishment Preferences by Conflict




Figure A.9: Punishment Preferences among Men by Conflict




Figure A.10: Punishment Preferences among Women by Conflict

#### A.4.2 Validation of Severity Scale

Table A.6: Mean Severity Rankings from focus group discussions

	Counsel	Payment	Expulsion	Prison	Beating
Women (Means)	1	2.345	3.436	4.345	3.891
Women (SD)	0	0.775	0.877	0.865	0.832
Men (Means)	1	2.043	3.174	4.708	4.130
Men (SD)	0	0.209	0.576	0.550	0.626

<sup>a</sup> Calculated at the focus group level (80 focus groups)

### A.4.3 Gender Differences in Punishment Preferences

Table A.7: Gender Difference in Outcome Data on Preferences for Punishment

	N	MEAN	SD	N(F)	MEAN(F)	SD(F)	N(M)	MEAN(M)	SD(M)	P(DIFF)
Rape	993	3.18	1.22	537	3.21	1.23	456	3.13	1.20	0.322
DV	993	1.91	1.23	537	1.79	1.21	456	2.04	1.24	0.001
Stealing	993	2.92	1.24	537	2.83	1.28	456	3.03	1.19	0.013

## **A.5 Models**

### **A.5.1 Models disaggregated by Participant Gender**

Because of differences between men and women for both covariates and for outcomes, I also conduct analyses using the divided data. While these models do not test for differences in the effects of armed conflict on men and women, models using the gender disaggregated samples do allow covariates to be estimated for each group separately.

Table A.8: Private Preferences for Punishment (Divided Data with Covariates)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.454*** (0.113)	-0.015 (0.219)	-0.156 (0.219)	-0.264*** (0.093)	0.384** (0.150)	0.103 (0.257)
Education	0.162** (0.075)	0.163** (0.066)	-0.184*** (0.069)	0.020 (0.061)	0.040 (0.069)	0.163** (0.080)
Frequency Meeting Others	-0.011 (0.122)	-0.011 (0.090)	-0.041 (0.136)	-0.018 (0.099)	0.071 (0.182)	-0.130 (0.109)
Homogeneous Subgroup	-0.044 (0.145)	0.218 (0.215)	0.025 (0.139)	-0.014 (0.134)	-0.046 (0.174)	-0.054 (0.160)
Years in Village	0.014 (0.061)	-0.006 (0.036)	-0.118 (0.083)	-0.006 (0.057)	0.009 (0.053)	-0.034 (0.052)
Narrative Order: Rape	0.241** (0.097)	0.170 (0.115)				
Narrative Order: DV			0.138 (0.189)	0.057 (0.133)		
Narrative Order: Stealing					0.144* (0.081)	0.163 (0.175)
Constant	2.327*** (0.649)	2.484*** (0.542)	3.132*** (0.849)	2.408*** (0.288)	2.514*** (0.719)	3.186*** (0.590)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	455	537	455	537	455	537
R <sup>2</sup>	0.145	0.133	0.106	0.073	0.083	0.058
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.116	0.108	0.075	0.047	0.052	0.030

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

## A.5.2 Models without Covariates

Table A.9: Private Preferences for Punishment (Pooled Data without Covariates)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.211 (0.141)	0.445*** (0.150)	-0.268** (0.105)	-0.299 (0.187)	0.234 (0.164)	0.471*** (0.151)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.431 (0.293)		0.056 (0.225)		-0.437* (0.263)
Female	0.104 (0.148)	0.325 (0.246)	-0.286** (0.117)	-0.315** (0.155)	-0.181 (0.132)	0.043 (0.208)
Constant	3.099*** (0.260)	2.982*** (0.245)	2.635*** (0.164)	2.650*** (0.173)	3.273*** (0.125)	3.154*** (0.131)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	993	993	993	993	993	993
R <sup>2</sup>	0.080	0.087	0.061	0.061	0.036	0.044
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.069	0.076	0.051	0.050	0.025	0.032

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.10: Private Preferences for Punishment (Divided Data without Covariates)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.464*** (0.133)	0.008 (0.232)	-0.266 (0.173)	-0.262*** (0.093)	0.479*** (0.139)	0.029** (0.176)
Constant	3.190*** (0.084)	3.126*** (0.435)	2.551*** (0.438)	2.417*** (0.144)	3.031*** (0.092)	3.301*** (0.415)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	456	537	456	537	456	537
R <sup>2</sup>	0.115	0.090	0.077	0.071	0.073	0.034
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.095	0.073	0.056	0.054	0.053	0.015

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

### A.5.3 Attrition Analysis

Because of security conditions, one village attrited from the sample. The following models assess robustness of findings to attrition by dropping the “unmatched” pair, where one of the villages in the matched was replaced with a randomly ordered village from an “unselected” matched pair.

Table A.11: Private Preferences for Punishment dropping one matched pair due to attrition (Pooled Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.311** (0.122)	0.523*** (0.143)	-0.249* (0.138)	-0.291 (0.242)	0.309* (0.182)	0.322 (0.211)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.397 (0.307)		0.071 (0.249)		-0.023 (0.269)
Female	0.161 (0.158)	0.370 (0.241)	-0.298** (0.124)	-0.337* (0.186)	-0.210 (0.142)	-0.198 (0.254)
Constant	2.569*** (0.420)	2.387*** (0.382)	2.656*** (0.276)	2.705*** (0.319)	3.104*** (0.374)	3.100*** (0.398)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	884	884	884	884	884	884
R <sup>2</sup>	0.113	0.120	0.073	0.073	0.074	0.074
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.098	0.103	0.057	0.056	0.058	0.057

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (18 villages)



Table A.12: Private Preferences for Punishment dropping one matched pair due to attrition (Divided Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.517*** (0.121)	0.123 (0.229)	-0.326 (0.268)	-0.247** (0.109)	0.428*** (0.162)	0.338 (0.230)
Constant	2.398*** (0.650)	2.621*** (0.478)	3.424*** (0.907)	2.250*** (0.285)	2.449*** (0.735)	2.780*** (0.476)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	409	475	409	475	409	475
R <sup>2</sup>	0.158	0.130	0.105	0.086	0.093	0.080
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.128	0.103	0.074	0.058	0.061	0.052

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (18 villages)

### A.5.4 Models for Ordinal Outcome

Table A.13: Odds Ratios: Effects accounting for 4-point Ordinal Outcome

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	1.450*** (0.138)	2.197*** (0.198)	0.676*** (0.132)	0.721* (0.192)	1.393*** (0.124)	1.819*** (0.192)
Armed Conflict * Female		0.442*** (0.276)		0.885 (0.268)		0.623* (0.260)
Female	1.521*** (0.161)	2.285*** (0.212)	0.546*** (0.154)	0.581*** (0.205)	0.759* (0.143)	0.969 (0.196)
Education	1.407*** (0.074)	1.402*** (0.074)	0.942 (0.069)	0.941 (0.069)	1.188*** (0.065)	1.181** (0.066)
Frequency Meeting Others	0.987 (0.097)	0.988 (0.096)	0.921 (0.089)	0.924 (0.089)	0.867* (0.084)	0.876 (0.084)
Homogeneous Subgroup	1.245 (0.138)	1.268* (0.139)	0.957 (0.132)	0.960 (0.132)	0.887 (0.127)	0.889 (0.127)
Years in Village	0.980 (0.086)	0.994 (0.087)	0.964 (0.078)	0.966 (0.078)	0.938 (0.073)	0.945 (0.074)
Narrative Order: Rape	1.366*** (0.087)	1.401*** (0.088)				
Narrative Order: DV			1.274*** (0.093)	1.290*** (0.097)		
Narrative Order: Stealing					1.320*** (0.078)	1.255*** (0.083)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors NOT clustered at the village level in this analysis

### A.5.5 Models with Dichotomized Outcomes

Table A.14: Private Preferences for Counsel by a Fellow Villager (Pooled Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	-0.064 (0.044)	-0.138*** (0.048)	0.098** (0.047)	0.116 (0.096)	-0.036 (0.058)	-0.089 (0.066)
Armed Conflict * Female		0.139 (0.099)		-0.031 (0.115)		0.095 (0.090)
Female	-0.004 (0.050)	-0.076 (0.076)	0.160*** (0.056)	0.177*** (0.059)	0.092* (0.048)	0.041 (0.070)
Constant	0.283** (0.138)	0.338*** (0.128)	0.288** (0.133)	0.269* (0.147)	0.040 (0.176)	0.057 (0.175)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.077	0.085	0.077	0.077	0.053	0.056
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.062	0.069	0.062	0.061	0.038	0.040

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.15: Private Preferences for Chief Demands Payment to the Aggrieved Party(Pooled Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.026)	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.072 (0.054)	-0.058** (0.023)	-0.031 (0.047)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.0001 (0.043)		0.088 (0.088)		-0.048 (0.068)
Female	-0.058*** (0.021)	-0.058 (0.039)	-0.063 (0.042)	-0.110** (0.055)	-0.011 (0.029)	0.014 (0.045)
Constant	0.265*** (0.065)	0.265*** (0.069)	0.168** (0.085)	0.222** (0.099)	0.180 (0.127)	0.171 (0.123)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.040	0.040	0.032	0.036	0.028	0.029
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.023	0.016	0.019	0.012	0.012

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.16: Private Preferences for Expulsion from the Community (Pooled Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.001 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.034)	-0.022* (0.013)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.014 (0.027)	-0.025 (0.045)
Armed Conflict * Female		0.034 (0.046)		-0.015 (0.032)		0.070 (0.055)
Female	-0.046* (0.025)	-0.064** (0.030)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.026 (0.023)	-0.054* (0.032)	-0.092*** (0.031)
Constant	0.149* (0.083)	0.163* (0.086)	0.112** (0.054)	0.103 (0.063)	0.248*** (0.095)	0.261*** (0.094)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.027	0.026	0.026	0.018	0.021
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.002	0.004

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.17: Private Preferences for Twenty Years in Prison (Pooled Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.069 (0.044)	0.125** (0.063)	-0.057** (0.027)	-0.042 (0.058)	0.029 (0.062)	0.080 (0.072)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.104 (0.106)		-0.027 (0.075)		-0.089 (0.102)
Female	0.052 (0.062)	0.106 (0.093)	-0.092*** (0.033)	-0.077 (0.060)	-0.024 (0.057)	0.024 (0.089)
Constant	0.165 (0.193)	0.124 (0.187)	0.388*** (0.077)	0.371*** (0.102)	0.376** (0.147)	0.360** (0.158)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.079	0.082	0.034	0.034	0.037	0.038
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.064	0.066	0.018	0.017	0.021	0.022

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.18: Private Preferences for Beating to Near Death (Pooled Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.001 (0.018)	0.038* (0.023)	0.002 (0.014)	0.011 (0.013)	0.050 (0.036)	0.066** (0.031)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.069 (0.049)		-0.015 (0.029)		-0.028 (0.059)
Female	0.056 (0.037)	0.092* (0.053)	0.028 (0.018)	0.036 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.023)	0.013 (0.038)
Constant	0.137* (0.078)	0.110 (0.089)	0.045 (0.053)	0.035 (0.057)	0.155 (0.097)	0.150 (0.095)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.041	0.045	0.047	0.047	0.053	0.053
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.028	0.031	0.030	0.037	0.036

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

## Appendix to Chapter 5

Table B.1: Determinants of Post Discussion Private Preferences

	Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences		
	Rape (1)	DV (2)	Stealing (3)
Rape: Private	0.466*** (0.163)		
Rape: Group	0.479*** (0.132)		
DV: Private		0.149** (0.069)	
DV: Group		0.271** (0.105)	
Steal: Private			0.242* (0.131)
Steal: Group			0.375*** (0.088)
Rape: Private x Group	-0.050 (0.049)		
DV: Private x Group		0.053** (0.026)	
Steal: Private x Group			0.015 (0.034)
Focus Group Fixed Effects? (N=79)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.528	0.478	0.554
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.484	0.429	0.513

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the Village level (20)



Table B.2: Determinants of Post Discussion Private Preferences (Divided Data)

	Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences					
	Rape		DV		Stealing	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Private	0.598*** (0.180)	0.386* (0.226)				
Group	0.584*** (0.114)	0.449** (0.178)				
DV: Private			0.332*** (0.120)	0.036 (0.072)		
DV: Group			0.392** (0.154)	0.201* (0.108)		
Steal: Private					0.466** (0.190)	0.155 (0.153)
Steal: Group					0.468*** (0.154)	0.385*** (0.135)
Rape: Private x Group	-0.069 (0.049)	-0.046 (0.064)				
DV: Private x Group			-0.011 (0.041)	0.095*** (0.036)		
Steal: Private x Group					-0.025 (0.052)	0.016 (0.046)
Focus Group Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	455	537	455	537	455	537
R <sup>2</sup>	0.512	0.551	0.519	0.430	0.559	0.552
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.458	0.509	0.467	0.377	0.511	0.510

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the Village level (20)

Table B.3: Preferences for Punishing Rape

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime							
	Private		Public		Group		PostDisc	Private
	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Armed Conflict	0.205 (0.131)	0.448*** (0.133)	0.307*** (0.092)	0.569*** (0.121)	0.270** (0.135)	0.331 (0.208)	0.337*** (0.126)	0.493*** (0.143)
Armed Conflict x Female		-0.450* (0.272)		-0.486* (0.280)		-0.112 (0.307)		-0.290 (0.307)
Female	0.173 (0.146)	0.407** (0.206)	0.023 (0.158)	0.275 (0.214)	0.083 (0.134)	0.142 (0.241)	0.079 (0.164)	0.230 (0.224)
Constant	2.472*** (0.455)	2.291*** (0.409)	2.709*** (0.407)	2.514*** (0.365)	3.218*** (0.410)	3.173*** (0.387)	2.834*** (0.397)	2.717*** (0.334)
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992	992	992
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.098	0.105	0.112	0.122	0.130	0.130	0.126	0.129

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Pair Fixed Effects (10 Pairs); SEs clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.4: Preferences for Punishing Domestic Violence

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime							
	Private		Public		Group		PostDisc	Private
	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Armed Conflict	-0.230** (0.111)	-0.191 (0.215)	-0.215* (0.110)	-0.096 (0.195)	-0.388*** (0.126)	-0.479** (0.187)	-0.221* (0.133)	-0.326* (0.193)
Armed Conflict x Female		-0.067 (0.249)		-0.206 (0.242)		0.157 (0.238)		0.182 (0.233)
Female	-0.321*** (0.120)	-0.285* (0.172)	-0.339*** (0.112)	-0.228 (0.186)	-0.510*** (0.149)	-0.595*** (0.210)	-0.426*** (0.108)	-0.524*** (0.156)
Constant	2.688*** (0.269)	2.646*** (0.311)	2.534*** (0.276)	2.408*** (0.316)	2.351*** (0.451)	2.448*** (0.462)	2.181*** (0.342)	2.293*** (0.398)
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992	992	992
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.053	0.071	0.072	0.097	0.097	0.073	0.073

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Pair Fixed Effects (10 Pairs); SEs clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.5: Preferences for Punishing Stealing

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime							
	Private		Public		Group		PostDisc	Private
	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact	Basic	Interact
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Armed Conflict	0.209 (0.177)	0.356** (0.176)	0.229 (0.148)	0.484*** (0.126)	0.264* (0.142)	0.484*** (0.182)	0.248 (0.159)	0.419** (0.167)
Armed Conflict x Female		-0.260 (0.276)		-0.454 (0.283)		-0.391 (0.348)		-0.302 (0.335)
Female	-0.199 (0.139)	-0.059 (0.239)	-0.178 (0.135)	0.066 (0.190)	-0.426** (0.180)	-0.215 (0.299)	-0.332** (0.147)	-0.169 (0.244)
Constant	3.270*** (0.405)	3.224*** (0.415)	2.573*** (0.316)	2.492*** (0.335)	3.974*** (0.489)	3.904*** (0.529)	3.357*** (0.380)	3.303*** (0.384)
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992	992	992
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.042	0.043	0.056	0.063	0.120	0.126	0.051	0.053

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
 Pair Fixed Effects (10 Pairs); SEs clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.6: Heterogeneous effects of outcome type with armed conflict for rape

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Preference for Punishment		
	Basic	Interact	TripleInt
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Armed Conflict	0.198	0.378***	0.426***
	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.139)
Female	0.090	0.263	0.363*
	(0.131)	(0.202)	(0.202)
Public	0.043	0.043	0.098
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.086)
Group	0.342***	0.342***	0.458***
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.124)
PostFG Private	0.088*	0.088*	0.140**
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.069)
Armed Conflict x Female		-0.334	-0.418
		(0.257)	(0.268)
Armed Conflict x Public	0.122	0.122	0.143
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.106)
Armed Conflict x Group	0.072	0.072	-0.060
	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.208)
Armed Conflict x PostFG Private	0.134	0.134	0.055
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.132)
Female x Public			-0.098
			(0.125)
Female x Group			-0.206
			(0.136)
Female x PostFG Private			-0.093
			(0.114)
A.Conflict x Female x Public			-0.047
			(0.179)
A.Conflict x Female x Group			0.237
			(0.219)
A.Conflict x Female x PostFG Private			0.145
			(0.182)
Constant	2.690***	2.555***	2.500***
	(0.388)	(0.334)	(0.338)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,968	3,968	3,968
R <sup>2</sup>	0.125	0.131	0.132
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.121	0.126	0.125

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.7: Heterogeneous effects of outcome type with armed conflict for dom. violence

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Basic	Preference for Punishment	
		Interact	TripleInt
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Armed Conflict	-0.224** (0.106)	-0.234 (0.166)	-0.183 (0.178)
Female	-0.399*** (0.099)	-0.408** (0.159)	-0.287* (0.147)
Public	0.035 (0.058)	0.035 (0.058)	0.047 (0.075)
Group	-0.100 (0.086)	-0.100 (0.086)	0.028 (0.120)
PostFG Private	-0.051 (0.083)	-0.051 (0.083)	0.079 (0.080)
Armed Conflict x Female		0.017 (0.203)	-0.072 (0.218)
Armed Conflict x Public	-0.011 (0.071)	-0.011 (0.071)	0.011 (0.095)
Armed Conflict x Group	-0.142 (0.134)	-0.142 (0.134)	-0.244 (0.187)
Armed Conflict x PostFG Private	-0.004 (0.120)	-0.004 (0.120)	-0.129 (0.122)
Female x Public			-0.021 (0.102)
Female x Group			-0.229 (0.151)
Female x PostFG Private			-0.233** (0.110)
A.Conflict x Female x Public			-0.045 (0.149)
A.Conflict x Female x Group			0.178 (0.235)
A.Conflict x Female x PostFG Private			0.222 (0.185)
Constant	2.468*** (0.278)	2.478*** (0.314)	2.410*** (0.316)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,968	3,968	3,968
R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.081	0.082
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.076	0.076	0.076

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.8: Heterogeneous effects of outcome type with armed conflict for stealing

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Preference for Punishment		
	Basic	Interact	TripleInt
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Armed Conflict	0.215 (0.177)	0.414** (0.179)	0.391** (0.186)
Female	-0.284** (0.137)	-0.094 (0.229)	-0.032 (0.231)
Public	0.008 (0.033)	0.008 (0.033)	-0.051 (0.092)
Group	0.145 (0.089)	0.145 (0.089)	0.280*** (0.106)
PostFG Private	0.057 (0.063)	0.057 (0.063)	0.121** (0.049)
Armed Conflict x Female		-0.352 (0.293)	-0.303 (0.276)
Armed Conflict x Public	0.026 (0.058)	0.026 (0.058)	0.139 (0.116)
Armed Conflict x Group	0.037 (0.144)	0.037 (0.144)	0.035 (0.136)
Armed Conflict x PostFG Private	0.026 (0.095)	0.026 (0.095)	0.007 (0.099)
Female x Public			0.106 (0.156)
Female x Group			-0.240** (0.098)
Female x PostFG Private			-0.114 (0.084)
A.Conflict x Female x Public			-0.208 (0.199)
A.Conflict x Female x Group			-0.014 (0.221)
A.Conflict x Female x PostFG Private			0.027 (0.137)
Constant	3.241*** (0.342)	3.178*** (0.361)	3.143*** (0.372)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,968	3,968	3,968
R <sup>2</sup>	0.066	0.071	0.073
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.061	0.066	0.066

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.9: Convergence between Private and Publicly Expressed Preference

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.044 (0.062)	0.023 (0.093)	-0.067 (0.055)	-0.077 (0.089)	-0.105 (0.078)	-0.069 (0.117)
Armed Conflict * Female		0.040 (0.186)		0.017 (0.139)		-0.064 (0.176)
Female	-0.035 (0.091)	-0.055 (0.136)	0.050 (0.086)	0.041 (0.112)	0.120 (0.077)	0.155 (0.133)
Constant	1.128*** (0.260)	1.144*** (0.250)	1.436*** (0.180)	1.446*** (0.201)	0.770*** (0.269)	0.759*** (0.272)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.060	0.060	0.045	0.045	0.021	0.022
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.044	0.043	0.030	0.029	0.005	0.005

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.10: Convergence between Publicly Expressed and Group Preference

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	-0.086 (0.072)	-0.250* (0.137)	-0.041 (0.074)	0.042 (0.149)	-0.023 (0.056)	-0.136 (0.085)
Armed Conflict * Female		0.305 (0.227)		-0.143 (0.208)		0.200 (0.154)
Female	-0.163 (0.128)	-0.321** (0.147)	-0.130 (0.111)	-0.053 (0.164)	0.022 (0.084)	-0.086 (0.118)
Constant	0.906*** (0.321)	1.028*** (0.318)	1.174*** (0.237)	1.086*** (0.291)	1.487*** (0.340)	1.522*** (0.343)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.065	0.071	0.037	0.038	0.041	0.043
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.050	0.054	0.021	0.021	0.025	0.026

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)



Table B.11: Convergence between Group and Post-FG Private Preference

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.011 (0.071)	0.014 (0.144)	0.078 (0.074)	0.262** (0.119)	0.010 (0.039)	-0.128** (0.063)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.006 (0.233)		-0.318** (0.158)		0.245** (0.109)
Female	-0.161 (0.131)	-0.158 (0.116)	-0.216** (0.086)	-0.045 (0.132)	-0.069 (0.068)	-0.201*** (0.075)
Constant	0.454 (0.292)	0.452 (0.306)	0.634** (0.252)	0.438 (0.272)	1.258*** (0.190)	1.302*** (0.182)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.087	0.087	0.058	0.064	0.050	0.054
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.072	0.071	0.043	0.048	0.035	0.038

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.12: Convergence between Private and Post-FG Private Preference

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.063 (0.079)	0.105 (0.097)	-0.030 (0.087)	-0.010 (0.121)	-0.106 (0.079)	-0.040 (0.095)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.078 (0.141)		-0.035 (0.154)		-0.117 (0.132)
Female	0.565*** (0.071)	0.605*** (0.098)	0.119 (0.095)	0.138 (0.116)	0.478*** (0.068)	0.542*** (0.091)
Constant	0.385 (0.276)	0.354 (0.283)	1.500*** (0.309)	1.479*** (0.313)	1.089*** (0.283)	1.068*** (0.287)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.123	0.124	0.037	0.037	0.092	0.093
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.109	0.108	0.022	0.021	0.077	0.077

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.13: Difference between Private and Publicly Expressed Preference

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.102* (0.053)	0.121 (0.096)	0.015 (0.070)	0.095 (0.127)	0.019 (0.058)	0.129 (0.122)
Armed Conflict * Female		-0.036 (0.178)		-0.139 (0.168)		-0.193 (0.186)
Female	-0.151 (0.102)	-0.132 (0.147)	-0.018 (0.095)	0.056 (0.123)	0.020 (0.110)	0.125 (0.169)
Constant	0.237 (0.228)	0.223 (0.247)	-0.153 (0.283)	-0.239 (0.300)	-0.697** (0.332)	-0.732** (0.360)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.026	0.012	0.013	0.021	0.023
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.009	-0.004	-0.004	0.005	0.006

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.14: Difference between Publicly Expressed and Group Preference

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	-0.036 (0.097)	-0.238 (0.207)	-0.173*** (0.061)	-0.383** (0.149)	0.035 (0.075)	-0.0004 (0.131)
Armed Conflict * Female		0.374 (0.283)		0.363 (0.245)		0.062 (0.199)
Female	0.061 (0.154)	-0.134 (0.182)	-0.171 (0.155)	-0.367** (0.169)	-0.247* (0.135)	-0.281 (0.198)
Constant	0.509 (0.320)	0.659* (0.339)	-0.183 (0.402)	0.040 (0.392)	1.401*** (0.410)	1.412*** (0.424)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.070	0.076	0.037	0.041	0.079	0.079
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.054	0.060	0.021	0.025	0.064	0.063

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.15: Difference between Group and Post-FG Private Preference

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	-0.066 (0.095)	-0.163 (0.189)	-0.167*** (0.062)	-0.153 (0.154)	0.015 (0.070)	0.065 (0.110)
Armed Conflict * Female		0.179 (0.280)		-0.025 (0.217)		-0.089 (0.147)
Female	0.005 (0.150)	-0.088 (0.145)	-0.085 (0.132)	-0.071 (0.165)	-0.094 (0.092)	-0.046 (0.102)
Constant	0.384 (0.296)	0.456 (0.324)	0.170 (0.256)	0.154 (0.264)	0.617* (0.334)	0.601* (0.340)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.074	0.075	0.026	0.026	0.047	0.047
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.058	0.059	0.010	0.009	0.031	0.031

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table B.16: Difference between Private and Post-FG Private Preference

	Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime					
	Rape		Domestic Violence		Stealing	
	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted	Basic	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armed Conflict	0.131** (0.062)	0.046 (0.103)	0.009 (0.097)	-0.135 (0.122)	0.039 (0.057)	0.063 (0.090)
Armed Conflict * Female		0.159 (0.175)		0.249 (0.191)		-0.042 (0.125)
Female	-0.095 (0.087)	-0.177 (0.115)	-0.105 (0.094)	-0.239** (0.113)	-0.133** (0.067)	-0.111 (0.085)
Constant	0.362* (0.190)	0.426** (0.192)	-0.507* (0.294)	-0.353 (0.307)	0.087 (0.249)	0.079 (0.254)
PAIR Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	992	992	992	992	992	992
R <sup>2</sup>	0.023	0.024	0.028	0.031	0.035	0.035
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.007	0.012	0.014	0.019	0.018

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)