WHERE ARE THE REVOLVING DOORS IN BRUSSELS? SECTOR SWITCHING AND CAREER PROGRESSION IN EU BUSINESS -GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS.

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Abstract

By applying event history analysis to a unique large sample of more than 300 government affairs managers working for companies active in the European Union, this article investigates whether managers with work experience in the public or non-profit sector are more likely to progress in their career in their current company and whether career progression depends on when that experience takes place. The findings suggest that managers with experience in the public and non-profit sector are less likely to progress in their careers. This effect becomes stronger when the stage of the career at which the manager had experience in the public sector is taken into consideration. These findings are contrary to the expectations from the public and private management literature and suggest that we should see less revolving door activity in Brussels. We propose that these findings are driven by the distinct European Union public policy process and the variance in individual and organizational incentives in the EU public sector.

Keywords: career, government affairs, European Union, lobbying

Introduction

The literature on public management pays great attention to sector switching (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009; Su & Bozeman, 2009) and its effects on career progression (Bozeman &

Ponomariov, 2009). By building on the assumption that only highly qualified and motivated individuals switch sectors (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009; Feeney & Boardman, 2011), recent research shows that public managers with work experience in the private sector are more likely to advance in their careers and receive more responsibility. In other words, a private sector premium is in place in the public sector (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009). The public management literature also finds that this private sector premium is stronger when the work experience in the private sector is in the earlier stages of the manager's career. The reason is that time is needed in order for the manager to adapt his/her skills to the public sector (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009). For its part, the private management literature looks more generally at job mobility, finding that external mobility, namely having work experience outside the current company, positively affects managers' careers in private companies (Lam, Ng, & Feldman, 2012). Close in spirit to the public management strand, Lam et al. (2012) also find that mobility has positive effects only when it takes place at early career stages.

By applying event history analysis to a sample of more than 300 government affairs managers working for companies active in the European Union, this article investigates whether managers with work experience in the public or non-profit sector are more likely to progress in their career in their current company and whether career progression depends on when that experience takes place. Not only does this sample allow us to control for factors such as the type of job (as the analysis focuses on individuals with similar roles), but it also represents a particularly interesting case to study the interaction between the public and the private sector. Indeed, government affairs managers represent a 'most likely case' in which to test the public sector premium hypothesis: if work experience in the public sector does not have positive career consequences for government affairs managers, who work in the intersection between the public and the private sector, it is

unlikely that a public sector premium can be found for other jobs. Moreover, the European Union itself is an interesting case from a public and private management perspective..

The findings show that work experience in the public and non-profit sector has negative effects on the career progression of managers – these managers tend to progress less in the company -and that these effects become stronger when sector switching is recent. As such, this article partially disconfirms the expectations of the private and public management literatures. The analysis shows that sector switching at earlier stages is better than (or more specifically, not as bad as) at later stages. Nonetheless, overall, sector switching has negative effects on career progression. Managers with work experience in other sectors tend to progress less in the current company. This in turn suggests that we should see less revolving doors in Brussels than Washington. We put forward a tentative explanation for these findings, which look at how specific business and government relations affect the private and organizational incentives for career switching in place in the EU business and government relations

Sector Switching in Public and Private Management

An emerging body of work in public management has recently shifted attention to sector switching, in order to gain insight on the interaction between the public and the private sectors. The so-called sector switcher research agenda (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009) studies those individuals who switch from the private to the public sector and how their careers progress.

This research agenda finds that public managers with work experience in the private sector progress more in their careers than those with none. In other words, there is a private sector premium in place in the public sector (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009). The logic behind this dynamic is mainly that sector switching is usually pursued by talented and motivated individuals,

with highly transferrable skills (Boardman, Bozeman, & Ponomariov, 2010; Feeney & Boardman, 2011). Furthermore, the public management literature also finds that this private sector premium is stronger when the work experience in the private sector is at the earlier stages of the manager's career. The reason is that individuals need time to adapt their skills to the public sector (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009).

The literature on private management started to focus on job mobility in the 1980s, as a consequence of the organizational reforms business underwent in those years and the emergence of so-called boundaryless careers (Arthur, Khapova, & Wilderom, 2005; Arthur & Rousseau, 2001; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). In the 1980s, two main phenomena concerned white-collar workers in companies around the world: downsizing and delayering, respectively the reduction of the workforce and the flattening of hierarchies (Hassard, Morris, & McCann, 2012). One of the major consequences was a drastic change in career patterns. Since the 1980s, traditional career ladders inside companies started to be replaced by more flexible career patterns, characterised by high job mobility (Sullivan, 1999; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006).

The private management literature has recently moved the attention to the consequences of this increasing mobility (Arthur et al., 2005; Brett & Stroh, 1997; Dreher & Cox, 2000). By building on the boundaryless career theory, some work posits that those individuals who experience high mobility have greater career opportunities (Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). Moreover, by building on traditional sociological theories, such as the human (Becker, 2009) and social capital theories (Burt, 1997; Granovetter, 1973), Lam et al. (2012) suggest that individuals who experience external mobility, namely who have work experience in different environments, tend to have highly transferrable skills and hence are appealing to companies.

Close in spirit to the public management strand, the private management literature also focuses on the timing of job mobility and its career consequences. Lam et al. (2012) find that external mobility (i.e. a phenomenon which refers generally to mobility outside a firm, regardless of whether in the same sector or not) at the beginning of the career is associated with higher salary than at later stages (Lam et al., 2012). In so doing, they rely on traditional career theories, such as the career stage (Super, 1980), the career timetable (Lawrence, 1988) and the anchor theories (Schein, 1974, 1996). More specifically, they build on the notion that individuals go through several career stages, such as the early stages, where the individual explores and experiments different jobs, and the later stages, where the individual maintains his/her position (Super, 1980). In turn, this rests on social norms regarding career behaviours (Lawrence, 1988), such as that early-career workers are expected to show more mobility than late-career workers. This is also supported by the anchor theory (Schein, 1990), which argues that the worker becomes increasingly anchored to his/her work environment and hence, mobility comes at greater costs at later stages of the career.

In conclusion, public and private management scholars find that sector switching, and job mobility in general, pays off in some ways. Yet, they find that only sector switching in the early stages of the individual's career pays off.

Sector Switching and Career Progression in Brussels

In this work we test the public sector premium hypothesis, which is derived primarily from the US, in the context of the EU. In so doing, we implicitly draw a comparison between these two polities. Although there are some similarities, such as the presence of a strong supranational level drawing actors to the center, in this work we seek to test whether different political institutions and in turn different business and government dynamics (Coen & Vannoni, 2018) lead to different dynamics for sector switching and career progression.

US scholars posit that switching take place because business and government relations are driven by the importance of personal contacts (Bertrand, Bombardini, & Trebbi, 2011; Blanes i Vidal, Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012; Cain & Drutman, 2014; LaPira & Thomas, 2014; Lazarus, McKay, & Herbel, 2016; Lazarus & McKay, 2012). As such, companies hire individuals with experience in the public sector because they can provide access to government, thanks to their personal contacts. More recent work suggests that work experience in government provides the manager with inside knowledge of how the government works (LaPira & Thomas, 2017). In an increasingly uncertain and polarized political environment, these managers are a valuable resource for the firm (LaPira & Thomas, 2017). Moreover, the difference in salary and career prospects between the private and the public sector strongly affect the individual incentives to join the private sector (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Cain & Drutman, 2014). In conclusion, in the US business and government relations individual and organizational incentives encourage managers to switch from the public to the private sector and companies to reward them. This is at the very core of the concept of revolving doors.

Business and government relations in the European Union are rather different and lead to different individual and organizational incentives with respect to sector switching. As for the organizational incentives, in the European Union companies provide the public authority with technical expertise, in exchange of access to policy-making (Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Coen, 2007; Coen & Vannoni, 2016, 2018). Moreover, the political environment is less polarized and competitive than the American one (LaPira & Thomas, 2017; Mahoney, 2008). As such, companies need managers with technical knowledge of the core competences of the sector and hence tend to hire individuals with work experience in the private sector.

As for the individual incentives, European Union officials have permanent contracts, with good benefits, which make employment in the public sector as attractive as that in the private sector.[1] In the context of the EU, we note that the European institutions officials have less incentive to switch than their counterparts in Washington, as they are not politically appointed on fixed term contracts. Rather, they are career civil servants who have opted for a career in the EU, as many as 55 per cent actually switching from the private sector (Connolly & Kassim, 2016), who are well paid, have strong public sector motivations (Hooghe, 1999; Kassim et al., 2013). Moreover, there is limited mobility within the EU institutions with officials remaining for long periods in specific Director Generals (DGs) and that they often have high degrees of discretion as to who consult with along the policy cycle (Bauer, 2009; Kassim et al., 2013). Finally, while we see some mobility between the national and the EU institutions civil service, that may create interesting tension between different national management cultures and the European, it has limited impact the EU public/private career progression (Trondel, Murdoch and Geys 2015).

In conclusion, the literature on the EU suggests that in Brussels individuals are not incentivised to move from the public to the private sector and companies are not incentivised to reward sector switching. Below we put to the test these claims, but looking at whether sector switching leads to career progression in government affairs in Brussels.

Research Design

This article tests whether sector switching has positive career consequences for government affairs managers working in private companies politically active in the European Union. As government

[1] Job mobility and sector switching in particular might still be attractive to some individuals. For instance, the private sector has a more flexible occupational structure, which might be attractive to some. Yet, we argue that overall, incentives at individual and organizational level go against switching.

affairs managers work in the intersection between different sectors, the public and the private ones, they represent a particularly interesting case to study sector switching and by extension public and private management. Indeed, if, in the words of Bozeman and Ponomariov (2009) (p.77-78), 'the "sector switcher" is the drosophila or the Arabidopsis of the management research world — the peculiar species that has just the robust "genetic makeup" we need to understand the phenomena we study', then government affairs are the 'drosophila' or 'Arabidopsis' of sector switching.

The analysis relies on a unique dataset which contains information on the government affairs managers (or in-house lobbyists), namely those individuals in charge of influencing the public policy, working in companies politically active in the European Union in the past ten years. The first step in the construction of this dataset was the identification of a sample of companies politically active in Brussels. For this purpose, throughout 2014 and 2015, observations were gathered from public and private directories (CEC, 2014; DODs, 2014; EA, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b), as well as other authors' datasets (Wonka, Baumgartner, Mahoney, & Berkhout, 2010). The resulting sample consists of 512 public and private companies, based in 32 countries and 13 sectors, which range from a few to hundreds of thousands of employees in size. Then, information was gathered on the government affairs managers working for those companies, using the public and private directories mentioned above (CEC, 2014; DODs, 2014), professional social networks, such as LinkedIn, corporate websites and public affairs/business websites. For instance, in the EU Joint Transparency Register we gathered this information from the section 'Person in charge of EU Relations'. Information was gathered on their current role and their previous occupations. The final dataset contains 325 government affairs managers.

This dataset represents a 'snapshot' of the managers politically representing companies in Brussels at the time of data gathering. As such, this sample includes individuals who have just become in

charge of EU relations and others who have been in that position for a longer period. As discussed below, in the type of analysis used in this work this aspect is very important. Also, it should be noted that, as the sample is composed of individuals in similar job positions and with similar profiles, the analysis partially controls for other factors which might affect switching behaviours, but for which information is unavailable, such as managers' age.

The dependent variable is 'career progression', measured by looking at whether the manager moves from the first job in the current company to the second job, always in the same company, and the timing of this transition, namely the time spent in the first job. We measure progression as job mobility inside the company. First, we focus on job mobility inside the company because inter-firm mobility is affected by complex dynamics at individual level which are not easily captured in an empirical analysis. For instance, an individual might opt for moving to another company at a lower occupation level and/or a lower wage, if the probability of future progression and/or a good salary is higher (Sicherman & Galor, 1990).

Second, we measure career progression by looking at the title of the job. Although this measure is common in the literature (Ransom & Oaxaca, 2005), it does not include a series of other benefits, such as an increase in wage or a broadening of the task portfolio, which are important, but for which information is not available. In other words, we measure career progression with a change in occupation, more specifically job title, within the same firm. This is an imperfect measure of career progression (or 'promotion'). Indeed, it might be that a change in job title is a horizontal movement, or even a downward movement. In their theoretical model of career mobility, Sicherman and Galor (1990) find that the probability of promotion from occupation A to occupation B is a function of the level of human capital obtained in school, that obtained in occupation A and ability. In turn, the level of human capital obtained in occupation A is an

increasing function of education, ability and time spent in the occupation A. Although ability is a latent variable, in the dataset used in this work we have information on the time spent in the first position in a company and the level of education of the managers. If we find that these two factors are positively associated with the likelihood of changing job title, this suggests that our measure is a valid proxy of career progression. Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, which are discussed below, provide evidence for this positive relation.

Third, we look at the first instance of career progression, which is arguably the most likely to be affected by previous work experience. Also, the dynamics behind the first 'promotion' are more straightforward, as the longer the career path in the company is and the higher is the discount factor for the individual. In other words, there are firm-specific investments which makes intra-firm mobility more likely than inter-firm mobility over time (Sicherman & Galor, 1990).

Finally, we rely on self-reported information, which might be problematic. The literature on private management acknowledges the interaction between subjective and objective career success (Arthur & Rousseau, 2001; Feldman & Ng, 2007; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). A review of the studies of career success shows that these two notions are both equally used in the private management literature, as they are theoretically and empirically entangled (Arthur et al., 2005). In other words, the individual's evaluation of his/her own career and more objective indicators, such as task attributes, responsibilities and job level, are highly correlated. The main source of information on career progression in this study, namely LinkedIn, relies on self-reported information, which can be associated with a subjective conception of career progression. Yet, in comparison to surveys, which are common practice in the public management literature, the information provided through professional social networks, such as LinkedIn, is publicly available and subject to the scrutiny of hundreds of people, such as colleagues. It might be argued that when

individuals provide information on their career progression through professional social networks, they also take into consideration their colleagues' perceptions on career progression. As such, information drawn from these sources arguably combines both the objective and subjective career notions. Information on the time passed between when the manager entered the company and his/her first career move or the time spent in the current position in the case of censored observations is available for 309 managers.[2]

The work experience of the manager before entering his/her current company is coded into public, private and nonprofit sectors. The category 'public sector' includes jobs in European institutions, other international (governmental) organizations, national and sub-national authorities. 'Private sector' and 'nonprofit sector' refer respectively to work experience in other companies and in research centres, universities and (national and international) non-governmental organizations.[3] Moreover, in order to test whether the timing of sector switching is relevant, different codes are used for whether the manager has work experience in the public sector (also) in later stages of his/her careers or he/she has work experience in the public sector (only) in earlier stages. Information on managers' professional background (outside the current company) is available for 250 observations.

Finally, managers' individual characteristics, such as gender and education, and factors at company level, such as size, industry and country, gathered from the dataset Amadeus (BureauVanDijk, 2014), are included in the analysis. [4] These factors might be relevant, as both the public and the private management strands of literature emphasise the difference in the workforce

[2] Censoring is discussed in detail below.
[3] For instance, LinkedIn provides information for up to six previous occupations.
[4] The tables in the appendix provide information on the source and operationalization of variables, along with descriptive statistics.

composition between the public and the private sectors and how this affects sector switching (Su & Bozeman, 2009). For instance, great attention is paid to how gender affects career progression (Birgit, 2007; Linehan, Scullion, & Walsh, 2001). Moreover, these two strands suggest that different management cultures are present across different industries and countries (Barron, 2011; Baysinger, Keim, & Zeithaml, 1985; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hofstede, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Nigro & Meier, 1975).

The method used to analyse the data is event history analysis. This method is used to analyse data where the outcome is whether an event occurs, in this case career progression, and the time until the occurrence. It should be noted that survival analysis, how event history analysis is called in natural sciences, was first used to study the effects of medical treatments on patients. The event under study in traditional studies using this method is usually death or illness relapse. Hence, the terminology associated with this method is rather negative in tone, with terms like 'risk' and 'hazard'.

Although several other methods are present to analyse career data (Vannoni & John, 2018), event history analysis is the most suitable to study the likelihood that the individual will transition to a career stage. This method has already been used both in public and private management (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Iverson & Pullman, 2000; Su & Bozeman, 2009; Thom, 2013). For instance, Su and Bozeman (2009) study the likelihood of switching sectors using this approach.

Here, we use the Cox proportional hazards model to determine the association between individual and company level factors and the 'risk' of career progression. We use this model because it is the most flexible one in terms of assumptions. In calculating the risk of an event to happen, the Cox model takes into consideration the occurrence and the duration of that event (Allison, 1984; Box-

Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004), in this case whether the manager progresses in his/her career and how long it takes. The model is the following:

$$h(t|x_j) = h_0(t)\, e^{(x_j\beta)}$$

First, $h(t|x_j)$ is the hazard rate of career progression at time t given the combination of the covariates used in the model, which is x_j. Second, $h_0(t)$ represents the baseline hazard function when the covariates equal zero. Third, β is the effect of the covariates on the dependent variable. The interpretation of the coefficient β for the covariates of interest, namely work experience in the public or nonprofit sector, is the following. If the coefficient β is negative, a negative association is present between work experience in the public or nonprofit sector and the risk of career progression. As for the substantive interpretation, managers with experience in public or nonprofit sector have a hazard rate that is $(1 - e^{(\beta)})$ smaller than the hazard rate of those without. Conversely, if the coefficient β is positive, then a positive association is present between experience in the public or nonprofit sector and the likelihood of career progression. As for the substantive interpretation, managers with experience in the public or nonprofit sector have a hazard rate that is $(e^{(\beta)} - 1)$ greater than the hazard rate of those without.

It should be noted that there are observations for which the managers have not progressed in the company at the time of measurement, namely those managers who jumped directly from a job elsewhere to government affairs managers in the current company. This is called censoring. In this case, the observation is coded as zero and the time is coded as the time spent in the current position until the measurement takes place. In event history analysis, censoring is rather common and it is

not problematic, as long as it is non-informative (Allison, 1984). In the case under analysis, this means that the probability of a manager to be considered censored should not be related to the risk of career progression of this manager. In this analysis, censoring depends exclusively on the data collection process: only those managers who have not progressed when the information is collected are considered censored. It might be argued that those managers who are less likely to progress are also more likely to be measured as censored. This would be true if managers were observed over the same period of time, namely if the sample were balanced. Yet, in this study some managers are observed when they have just started working for the current company and others when they have been working there already for a long time. As such, it is reasonable to assume that censoring is unrelated to the likelihood of being promoted.

The Cox model has a second key assumption: proportional hazards (Allison, 1984; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). This means that the relationship between the risk of an event occurring and time needs to be similar across different strata. In the specific case under analysis, this condition would be violated if female managers were more likely to progress in their careers over time and the opposite were true for male managers, for instance. Although this is an unlikely scenario, especially when the dependent variable is a phenomenon like career progression, which overall tends to be positively associated with time, this condition is tested below. Finally, it should be noted that factors at company level are plugged into the model as control variables, as the use of fixed effects in event history analysis is considered problematic (Allison, 2009; Allison & Christakis, 2006).

Results

Before showing the results of the Cox model, this section provides some descriptive statistics. Roughly 45 per cent of managers experience the event, namely career progression. Moreover, the

mean time for career progression is approximately six years. As for the independent variable of interest, namely managers' work experience, 28 per cent of the managers have experience in the public sector, whereas 23 per cent have experience in the nonprofit sector. Only eight per cent have work experience both in the public and the nonprofit sector. These preliminary findings suggest that sector switching is not a common phenomenon, at least in comparison with the US revolving doors.

The survival functions for those managers with work experience in the public sector and those without are shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1 time (in years in this case) is on the horizontal axis and the proportion of 'surviving' managers – those managers who have not progressed yet at a particular point in time – is on the vertical axis. The fact that both survival functions are negatively sloped means that in both cases the proportion of 'surviving' managers decreases over time. In other words, an increasing number of managers in the sample progress in their career over time. Yet, it should be noted that the proportion of surviving managers with experience in the public sector decreases less over time than the proportion of surviving managers without such experience, which means that fewer managers with public experience progress over time, with respect to those without such experience. This difference is statistically significant, with significance $p < 0.05$.

[Figure 1 about here]

In a similar vein, Figure 2 shows the survival functions for those managers with experience in the nonprofit sector and those without such experience. The results are very similar to those in Figure 1: fewer managers with experience in the nonprofit sector progress in their career over time, with respect to those which do not experience sector switching. These preliminary findings already suggest that having work experience in the public or nonprofit sector might have negative career

consequences in the private sector, but other factors need to be controlled for in the analysis, before drawing conclusions.

[Figure 2 about here]

Also, these findings suggest that the likelihood of career progression, as measured in this work with the first change in occupation (job title) in the current company, increases with time. This suggests that, as discussed above, this measure is a good proxy for career progression. Moreover, Figure 2 shows the survival functions for those managers with postgraduate education and those without. We find that education is positively correlated with our measure of career progression. As mentioned above, this suggests that our proxy is valid.

Table 1 shows the results of the Cox proportional hazards model. As mentioned above, the sign of the coefficient reveals the direction of the association: a negative sign indicates a negative relationship between the covariate and the risk of career progression. Furthermore, in order to interpret coefficients, they need to be exponentiated. The results suggest a negative relationship between work experience in the public sector and the risk of progressing, with significance $p<0.05$, even when controlling for work experience in the nonprofit sector (Model 2), individual level factors (Model 3) and company level factors (Model 4 and Model 5). By looking at the coefficient in Model 5, it can be concluded that managers with work experience in the public sector are 42 per cent less at risk of progressing. Results also suggest a negative relationship between work experience in the nonprofit sector and the risk of career progression, with significance $p<0.01$, in the full model (Model 5). Moreover, managers with postgraduate education are more at risk of progressing in their career, whereas this relationship is negative for those managers working in

small companies. Interestingly, this study shows no significant effect of country and industry on career progression.

[Table 1 about here]

Table 2 shows the results of the Cox model which takes the timing of sector switching as main independent variable. Results show that there is a negative relationship between having experience in the public sector at later stages of the career and the risk of career progression with significance $p<0.01$. In this analysis, early experience in the public sector is taken as a reference category. This allows comparing the effect of late work experience in the public sector with the effect of early work experience. The analysis with no work experience in the public sector as reference category can be found in the Appendix. Also, no significant difference is present between having early experience in the public sector and having none. By looking at the coefficient in Model 5, it can be concluded that managers with recent work experience in the public sector are 74 per cent less at risk of career progression than those with early experience. Work experience in the nonprofit sector remains statistically significant, with significance $p<0.01$, when individual and company factors are controlled for (Model 4 and Model 5). Differently from Table 1, the education of the manager and the size of the company are not statistically significant.

[Table 2 about here]

Finally, Table 3 shows the results of the Cox model which takes the stage at which the manager had work experience in the nonprofit sector as main independent variable. The results show a negative relationship between work experience in the nonprofit sector in the later stages of career and career progression, also when controlling for variables at individual and company level, even though the statistical significance is borderline in Model 5. As above, earlier work experience is

taken as reference category. The analysis with no work experience in the nonprofit sector as reference category can be found in the Appendix. As in the case of work experience in the public sector, having early experience does not have any statistical effect. Work experience in the public sector remains statistically significant with significance $p<0.05$. Results for control variables are similar to those in Table 2. Individual factors, other than work experience, are not statistically associated with career progression.

[Table 3 about here]

Before discussing the results, this section tests the proportionality of hazards, which represents a central assumption in the Cox proportional hazard model, as discussed above. First of all, it should be noted that the two functions in Figure 1 evolve similarly over time. This suggests that the predictor measuring work experience in the public sector satisfies the proportional hazard assumption. A formal test based on the Schoenfeld residuals, as it is common practice in Cox models, shows that the assumption holds for all the predictors.

In conclusion, the results show a negative relationship between work experience in the public or nonprofit sectors and career progression in the private. Unsurprisingly, managers with postgraduate education are more likely to proceed in their careers in firms. Moreover, those in smaller firms will progress less. The negative relationship between work experience in the public and nonprofit sector and career progression becomes stronger when the stage at which that work experience occurred is taken into consideration. In fact, recent experience in the public and nonprofit sector has strong negative effects on career progression, whereas early experience does not have any significant effect. Finally, no variation is found across countries or industries and,

when the stage of the career is taken into consideration, also individual and company level covariates are not significant.

To corroborate our findings, we provide a final piece of evidence showing that no public sector premium is present in our case and that, rather, having work experience in the public sector has negative effects on the career of the manager. We gather information on the position the manager currently holds in the company (at the time of analysis). More specifically, we measure whether the manager has an executive position or not. Executive positions are senior positions, such as (deputy managing, executive or senior) director and (senior) vice president, important for the management of the whole company and just below the president or the managing director. Table 4 shows the results of a logistic regression with whether the manager holds an executive position as dependent variable and whether the manager has experience in the public sector before joining the company. As done for the other analyses, we control for a series of factors at individual, firm, industry and country level, which may affect careers in a company. It is reasonable to assume that the level of education of the individual, his/her gender, the size of the company, the industry in which the company operates and the country of origin might affect career dynamics. Results suggest that those managers with work experience in the public sector prior to joining the current company are less likely to hold an executive position. These results supports our findings above that no public sector premium is present in our case.

Discussion

The findings suggest that for European Union government affairs work experience in the public or non-profit sector has negative career consequences, and these negative career consequences become stronger when the work experience is in the later stages of the manager's career. Furthermore, no difference is present across countries and industries. These findings provide

interesting puzzles for the literature. This suggests the presence of distinct dynamics in place, which calls for future research in the study of sector switching and, by extension, the interaction between the public and the private sector.

A tentative explanation for this puzzling finding might lie in the individual and organizational incentives, determined by the specific business and government relations where the company acts. The individual incentives which drive managers to switch from the public to the private sector and the organizational incentives which drive business and government to hire these managers can explain the lack of a public sector premium found above.

The European Union business and government relations in which companies act and the relative individual and organizational incentives might explain why switching from the public to the private sector does not pay off for government affairs, in terms of career progression. Yet, potential alternative explanations might also explain this finding. It might be argued, indeed, that individuals with a public sector background (particularly those who stayed in the public sector for long) might have a preference for less job mobility in first instance, as they have been socialized into job stability. Overall, mobility is higher in the private sector than in the public sector. It is reasonable to assume that also what the individual wants affect the dynamics studied above. Future research should look also at this aspect. Yet, if it is found that similar dynamics are in place for sector switching from the public sector and sector switching from the nonprofit sector, where job stability is as low as (if not lower than) in the private sector, it is reasonable to conclude that individual preferences for job mobility, which result from the work background of the individuals, matter less in the particular case under analysis.

Also, comparing individuals with recent work experience in the public sector with those with late experience allows controlling for another alternative explanation. It might be argued that high quality individuals are attracted to the private sector with a big promotion. Hence, the following promotion would take longer to arrive. In other words, it might be argued that the premium is in the promotion the manager gets as first job in the private sector. This mechanism might explain why although companies in the European Union value managers with experience in the public sector these managers progress less once they are in the private sector. This alternative explanation is difficult to disprove from an empirical perspective. Yet, in the analysis above we find a strong differential effect between those with recent and late work experience in the public. This finding is inconsistent with the alternative explanation discussed above.

The alternative explanations based on how career progression may be influenced by individual preferences for job mobility, in turn dependent on past work experience, and by the level of the entry position in a company, related to past work experience as well, cannot explain the results in Table 4. The latter suggest that those managers with experience in the public sector prior to joining the current company are less likely to currently hold senior positions in the company. Although individual preferences for mobility and the level of the entry position in the company might affect career progression as we measure it above, namely with intra-firm mobility, it is unlikely that they affect the current job level of the managers. In conclusion, these two alternative explanations can be discarded.

Another puzzling finding for the public management literature (and also for the private management strand) is the lack of variation in the association between sector switching and career progression across countries and industries. In fact, the public management literature suggests that sector switching is more common in certain sectors, such as highly regulated industries (Nigro &

Meier, 1975). Furthermore, even though the private management literature does not study specifically sector switching across industries, some work emphasises the importance of different management cultures and how this might affect the career of managers. Management cultures, as bodies of ideas, norms and beliefs socially transmitted (Hofstede, 1984), differ in several respects and one of these is the relationship with the public authority (Baysinger et al., 1985; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Different ways to interact with the public sector, as embodied in different management cultures, have effects also at the individual level (Barron, 2011; Leung, Rabi, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005). As such, it is reasonable to assume that sector switching might be seen more positively in certain cases than others.

The European Union represents an interesting case from the public management perspective, since European Union institutions, such as the European Commission, combine different national public management cultures, sometimes in strong opposition one another and with an emerging common public management culture at European level (Trondal, Murdoch, & Geys, 2015). The public management literature studies the establishment of an independent administration as a necessary condition for the autonomy of international organizations such as the EU (Olsen, 2010; Trondal & Peters, 2013). Recent work finds that a good portion of EU civil servants are seconded from national administrations and maintain strong links with the administration of origin (Trondal et al., 2015). [5] Hence, from our perspective, we would expect variation in the career dynamics across different firms from different countries.

The same holds true for the private management literature, as companies in the European Union maintain their national management cultures (Barron, 2011; Coen, 1997, 1998), but they are also

[5] This is known as the 'dependency problem' in the public management of international organization (Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012).

subject to strong pressures to standardize their attitudes and behaviours, a phenomenon called Europeanization (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Coen & Dannreuther, 2003; Vannoni, 2015). The lack of variation in career progression dynamics across industries and firms' countries of origins found above seems to suggest that the European private and public management dynamics prevail over the national ones.

Conclusion

This article presents an interesting case study for European public management studies by looking at the effects of sector switching on the career progression of government affairs managers in companies politically active in the Brussels. Findings suggest that sector switching does not pay off. In fact, moving from the public or the non-profit sector to the private has negative effects on career progression, especially if sector switching occurs at later career stages. This suggests a rather different scenario from the one depicted by the US public management and calls for more comparative research which looks at the role of individual and organizational incentives in different business and government environments.

Moreover, the findings support the need for international public administration and international organization scholars to develop studies of business-government relations that take account of new behavioral logics based on different civil service motivations, career incentives and increasing bureaucratic authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Knill & Bauer, 2016) . Significantly, our study contributes to this research agenda by showing the robustness of the EU public policy and business government relationships to internationalization, as our findings show little variation is present across countries origin and/or industries, suggesting that the European management culture prevails over the multinational culture and national origin.

The findings above elicit important implications for the study of revolving doors, central to political science and political economy. In the EU we have seen the emergence of a distinct business government arrangement, where influence is less about money, PACs, political contacts, party and presidential access (LaPira, & Thomas 2017), but rather an informational exchange based on technical expertise, credibility and long run reputation building (Coen 1997, 1999). Under these unique conditions specific business political capabilities have emerged (Coen and Vannoni 2018). In this paper, we find that there are organizational and individual incentives in government affairs in Brussels which prevent managers from switching sectors. This in turn suggest that we should see less revolving doors in the EU, in line with recent research in the field (Coen and Vannoni 2016). Future research should further develop this comparative research agenda and test the revolving doors argument in other contexts and especially in international organizations, such as the international financial institutions.

Figures and Tables

Figure 1 Survival Functions for Managers with Work Experience in the Public Sector and those with No Experience.



Figure 2 Survival Functions for Managers with Work Experience in the Nonprofit Sector and those with No Experience.



Figure 3 Survival Functions for Managers with Postgraduate Education and those with No Postgraduate Education.



Table 1 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and Sector Switching

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Public Experience	-0.47**	-0.48**	-0.45**	-0.52**	-0.54**
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
No-profit Experience		-0.41*	-0.52**	-0.57**	-0.63***
		(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Gender - Male			-0.18	-0.15	-0.17
			(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Education - Postgraduate			0.43**	0.39*	0.44**
			(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Firm Size - Small				-0.54*	-0.64*
				(0.32)	(0.33)
Industry - Information				0.18	0.14
				(0.48)	(0.49)
Industry - Manufacturing				0.17	0.10
				(0.34)	(0.34)
Industry - Other				0.40	0.35
				(0.34)	(0.35)
Industry - Professional				0.04	-0.10
				(0.38)	(0.39)
Industry - Wholesale				0.19	0.13
				(0.46)	(0.46)
Country - Continental					-0.15
					(0.27)
Country - Mediterranean					-0.36
					(0.41)
Country - non-European					-0.05
					(0.34)
Country - Scandinavian					0.61
					(0.41)
AIC	975.95	974.61	973.91	958.23	940.26
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.09
Max. R^2	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Num. events	99	99	99	97	95
Num. obs.	241	241	241	235	232
Missings	84	84	84	90	93
PH test	0.79	0.89	0.86	0.36	0.08

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table 2 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and the Time of Switching from the Public Sector

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Public Experience - None	-0.36	-0.40	-0.45	-0.37	-0.38
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Public Experience - Late	-1.25***	-1.32***	-1.33***	-1.30***	-1.33***
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.41)
No-profit Experience		-0.47**	-0.59**	-0.63***	-0.70***
		(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Gender - Male			-0.27	-0.28	-0.29
			(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Education - Postgraduate			0.39*	0.38*	0.41*
			(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Firm Size - Small				-0.47	-0.54
				(0.32)	(0.34)
Industry - Information				0.20	0.19
				(0.48)	(0.49)
Industry - Manufacturing				0.04	-0.02
				(0.34)	(0.35)
Industry - Other				0.37	0.33
				(0.34)	(0.35)
Industry - Professional				0.03	-0.09
				(0.38)	(0.39)
Industry - Wholesale				0.18	0.12
				(0.46)	(0.46)
Country - Continental					-0.03
					(0.27)
Country - Mediterranean					-0.29
					(0.42)
Country - non-European					0.08
					(0.34)
Country - Scandinavian					0.73*
					(0.42)
AIC	968.25	965.86	965.17	950.34	932.11
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.13
Max. R^2	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Num. events	99	99	99	97	95
Num. obs.	241	241	241	235	232
Missings	84	84	84	90	93
PH test	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.43	0.11

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table 3 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and the Time of Switching from the Nonprofit Sector

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
No-profit Experience - None	-0.41	-0.34	-0.25	-0.17	-0.01
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.43)
No-profit Experience - Late	-1.00**	-0.94**	-0.96**	-0.93**	-0.80*
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.46)
Public Experience		-0.46**	-0.43*	-0.49**	-0.51**
		(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Gender - Male			-0.18	-0.15	-0.16
			(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Education - Postgraduate			0.43**	0.39*	0.43*
			(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Firm Size - Small				-0.55*	-0.61*
				(0.32)	(0.33)
Industry - Information				0.19	0.14
				(0.48)	(0.49)
Industry - Manufacturing				0.17	0.10
				(0.34)	(0.34)
Industry - Other				0.36	0.30
				(0.35)	(0.35)
Industry - Professional				0.02	-0.15
				(0.38)	(0.39)
Industry - Wholesale				0.21	0.13
				(0.46)	(0.46)
Country - Continental					-0.13
					(0.27)
Country - Mediterranean					-0.30
					(0.42)
Country - non-European					-0.03
					(0.34)
Country - Scandinavian					0.52
					(0.42)
AIC	975.22	972.86	971.95	956.53	939.63
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.10
Max. R^2	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Num. events	99	99	99	97	95
Num. obs.	241	241	241	235	232
Missings	84	84	84	90	93
PH test	0.66	0.86	0.85	0.39	0.11

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table 4 Logistic Regression: Executive Position and Switching from the Public Sector

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Constant	0.35**	0.11	-0.75*	-0.79
	(0.16)	(0.28)	(0.45)	(0.52)
Public Experience	-0.49*	-0.52*	-0.52*	-0.49*
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Gender - Male		0.60**	0.68**	0.60*
		(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Education - Postgraduate		-0.29	-0.39	-0.38
		(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Firm Size - Small			0.41	0.48
			(0.40)	(0.41)
Industry - Information			-0.42	-0.27
			(0.63)	(0.64)
Industry - Manufacturing			1.14**	1.23***
			(0.45)	(0.46)
Industry - Other			0.70	0.77*
			(0.45)	(0.47)
Industry - Professional			1.16**	1.27***
			(0.46)	(0.48)
Industry - Wholesale			1.25**	1.32**
			(0.61)	(0.62)
Country - Continental				-0.02
				(0.34)
Country - Mediterranean				-0.33
				(0.55)
Country - non-European				0.18
				(0.44)
Country - Scandinavian				-0.57
				(0.63)
AIC	345.25	343.32	331.10	334.12
BIC	352.29	357.40	366.07	382.91
Log Likelihood	-170.62	-167.66	-155.55	-153.06
Deviance	341.25	335.32	311.10	306.12
Num. obs.	250	250	244	241

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Logistic Regression - Senior Position

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Appendix

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Numerical Variables

	Time	Progression	Public Experience	No-profit Experience	Gender	Education	Firm Size	Executive
Values	309	325	250	250	325	325	320	325
Zero values	0	179	160	174	94	172	9	154
NAs	16	0	75	75	0	0	5	0
Min	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Max	30	1	1	1	1	1	3	1
Range	29	1	1	1	1	1	3	1
Sum	1782	146	90	76	231	153	881	171
Median	4	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
Mean	5.766 99	0.44923 1	0.36	0.304	0.7107 69	0.470769	2.753 125	0.526 154
SE	0.255 795	0.02763 4	0.030419	0.02915	0.0251 89	0.02773	0.037 493	0.027 74
CI	0.503 327	0.05436 5	0.059911	0.057412	0.0495 55	0.054554	0.073 765	0.054 573
Variance	20.21 826	0.24818 6	0.231325	0.212434	0.2062 11	0.249915	0.449 833	0.250 085
SD	4.496 472	0.49818 3	0.480963	0.460905	0.4541 04	0.499915	0.670 696	0.500 085
Coefficient of variation	0.779 691	1.10896 9	1.336008	1.516136	0.6388 92	1.06191	0.243 613	0.950 455

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables

Industry	Frequency
Financial	45
Information	27
Manufacturing	88
Other	64
Professional	73
Wholesale	24
NA	4

Country	Frequency
Anglo-Saxon	78
Continental	135
Mediterranean	26
non-European	63
Scandinavian	19
NA	4

Public Experience Time	Frequency
0	160
Early	22
Late	68
NA	75

No-profit Experience Time	Frequency
0	174
Early	11
Late	65
NA	75

Table 3 Source and Operationalization of Variables

	Source	Operationalization
Time	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Time spent by the manager in the first job in the current company. If no progression, time spent by the manager in the current job at the time of measurement
Progression	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Whether the manager moves from the first job in the current company to another job, always in the same company
Executive	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Whether at the time of the analysis the manager holds an executive position, such as (deputy managing, executive or senior) director and (senior) vice president.
Public Experience	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Whether the manager worked in European institutions, other international organizations, national and sub-national authorities (before joining the current company)
No-profit Experience	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Whether the manager worked in research centres, universities and non-governmental organizations (before joining the current company)
Gender	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Whether the manager is male or female
Education	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Whether the manager attended a post-graduate programme
Firm Size	Amadeus Bureau van Dijk	Categories from the dataset
Industry	Amadeus Bureau van Dijk	Categories from the dataset
Country	Amadeus Bureau van Dijk	Non-European: Azerbaijan, China, Emirates, Japan, South Korea, US;

		Scandinavian: Norway, Finland; Continental: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland; Anglo-Saxon: UK, Ireland; Mediterranean: Italy, Spain, Greece
Public Experience Time	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Whether the manager worked in the public sector also in the three jobs immediately before joining the current company (Late) or only in the previous ones (Early)
No-profit Experience Time	Professional social networks (e.g. LinkedIn), corporate websites and public affairs/business websites	Whether the manager worked in the no-profit sector also in the three jobs immediately before joining the current company (Late) or only in the previous ones (Early)

Table 4 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and the Time of Switching from the Public Sector (No Public Experience as Reference Category)

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Public Experience - Early	0.36	0.40	0.45	0.37	0.38
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Public Experience - Late	-0.89***	-0.92***	-0.88***	-0.93***	-0.96***
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)
No-profit Experience		-0.47**	-0.59**	-0.63***	-0.70***
		(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Gender - Male			-0.27	-0.28	-0.29
			(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Education - Postgraduate			0.39*	0.38*	0.41*
			(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Firm Size - Small				-0.47	-0.54
				(0.32)	(0.34)
Industry - Information				0.20	0.19
				(0.48)	(0.49)
Industry - Manufacturing				0.04	-0.02
				(0.34)	(0.35)
Industry - Other				0.37	0.33
				(0.34)	(0.35)
Industry - Professional				0.03	-0.09
				(0.38)	(0.39)
Industry - Wholesale				0.18	0.12
				(0.46)	(0.46)
Country - Continental					-0.03
					(0.27)
Country - Mediterranean					-0.29
					(0.42)
Country - non-European					0.08
					(0.34)
Country - Scandinavian					0.73*
					(0.42)
AIC	968.25	965.86	965.17	950.34	932.11
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.13
Max. R^2	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Num. events	99	99	99	97	95
Num. obs.	241	241	241	235	232
Missings	84	84	84	90	93
PH test	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.43	0.11

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table 5 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and the Time of Switching from the Nonprofit Sector (No Nonprofit Experience as Reference Category)

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
No-profit Experience - Early	0.41	0.34	0.25	0.17	0.01
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.43)
No-profit Experience - Late	-0.59**	-0.60**	-0.71***	-0.76***	-0.79***
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Public Experience		-0.46**	-0.43*	-0.49**	-0.51**
		(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Gender - Male			-0.18	-0.15	-0.16
			(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Education - Postgraduate			0.43**	0.39*	0.43*
			(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Firm Size - Small				-0.55*	-0.61*
				(0.32)	(0.33)
Industry - Information				0.19	0.14
				(0.48)	(0.49)
Industry - Manufacturing				0.17	0.10
				(0.34)	(0.34)
Industry - Other				0.36	0.30
				(0.35)	(0.35)
Industry - Professional				0.02	-0.15
				(0.38)	(0.39)
Industry - Wholesale				0.21	0.13
				(0.46)	(0.46)
Country - Continental					-0.13
					(0.27)
Country - Mediterranean					-0.30
					(0.42)
Country - non-European					-0.03
					(0.34)
Country - Scandinavian					0.52
					(0.42)
AIC	975.22	972.86	971.95	956.53	939.63
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.10
Max. R^2	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Num. events	99	99	99	97	95
Num. obs.	241	241	241	235	232
Missings	84	84	84	90	93
PH test	0.66	0.86	0.85	0.39	0.11

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1