


University of South Wales



2060273



105 Cathays Terrace, Cardiff CF24 4HU, U.K.

Tel: +44 (0)29 2039 5882

Email: [info@bookbindersuk.com](mailto:info@bookbindersuk.com)

[www.bookbindersuk.com](http://www.bookbindersuk.com)

**SATELLITE BROADCASTING AND YOUNG PEOPLE  
IN SAUDI ARABIA**

By  
Hussain Said Al-Gahtani

**A Ph.D. Thesis  
Submitted in accordance with the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**The University of Glamorgan  
School of Humanities, Law, and Social Sciences**

**May 2004**

## DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed ..... (candidate)      Date .....

## STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

Signed ..... (candidate)      Date .....

## STATEMENT 2

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed ..... (candidate)      Date .....

## **TABLE OF CONTENT**

Declaration	I
Dedication	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
Abstract	iv
Table of content	vii
List of Figures and Tables	xiv

### **CHAPTER ONE: INRODUCTION**

1.1	Prelude	2
1.2	Research Problem	4
1.3	Aims of the Study	7
1.4	Significance of the Study	7
1.5	Research Key Questions	8
1.6	The Context of the Study	9
1.6.1	Globalisation of the Media and Culture, and Cultural Imperialism	10
1.6.2	The Saudi Media and the Study of Satellite Audiences	15
1.7	Structure of the Thesis	17

### **CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

2.1	Introduction	21
2.2	Media / Cultural Imperialism Theory	21
2.2.1	Media Imperialism	21
2.2.2	Cultural Imperialism	24
2.2.3	Major weaknesses of the cultural imperialism and the media imperialism theories	28
2.3.1	UNESCO and the Movement for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)	30
2.3.2	The USA's Response to a NWICO	31
2.4	Globalisation, Media and Culture	32
2.4.1	What is 'Globalisation'?	32
2.4.2	The globalisation of media and culture	35

2.4.3	Local culture and global culture	38
2.5	Uses and Gratifications Theory	48
2.5.1	Nature and definitions	48
2.5.2	Criticisms of uses and gratifications theory	51
2.6	Media Audience Research in Saudi Arabia	52
2.7	Conclusion	61

### **CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY**

3.1	Introduction	63
3.2	Reviewing the Literature	65
3.3	Questionnaire and Focus Group Timetable	66
3.4	Questionnaire Survey	67
3.4.1	Advantages and disadvantages	67
3.4.2	Sample population	70
3.4.3	Permission for the field study	71
3.4.4	Sample size and procedure	72
3.4.5	Questionnaire Preliminary Questions	73
3.4.6	Piloting the questionnaire	74
3.4.7	Analysis and results of the pilot questionnaire	75
3.4.8	Questionnaire modifications and changes	76
3.4.9	The final draft questionnaire	81
3.4.10	Validity of the questionnaire and focus group questions	82
3.5	Focus Group	83
3.5.1	Definition and brief history	83
3.5.2	Combining the focus group and the questionnaire survey	84
3.5.3	Steps in focus group research	86
3.5.4	Piloting focus group questions	86
3.5.5	Sampling and recruitment of groups	88
3.5.6	Designing questions for the focus group	91
3.5.7	Location of focus group interviews	93
3.5.8	The moderator	93
3.5.9	Focus group guidance	94
3.5.10	Recording the data	95

3.5.11	Analysing the focus group data	95
3.6	Data-Collection Difficulties	105
3.7	Ethical and Ethnographical Dilemmas	106
3.8	Summary	110

#### **CHAPTER FOUR: SAUDI ARABIA; Historical and Cultural Background**

4.1	Introduction	113
4.2	Location, Size and Geographical Regions of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	113
4.3	Administrative Regions of Saudi Arabia	114
4.4	Historical Background	115
4.5	Cultural Milieu	116
4.6	Islam	120
4.7	Ulema (Religious Leaders) in Saudi Arabia	121
4.8	The King	122
4.9	The Consultative Council ( <i>Majlis Al-Shoura</i> )	122
4.10	The Council of Ministers	123
4.11	Population	123
4.12	Oil, the Economy and Development Programmes	124
4.13	The Media in Saudi Arabia	126
4.13.1	Print Media	126
4.13.2	Broadcasting in Saudi Arabia	128
4.13.3	Television	130
4.13.4	The Internet	132
4.13.5	Media Regulation in Saudi Arabia	137
4.14	Summary	140

#### **CHAPTER FIVE: SAUDI ARABIA IN THE SATELLITE**

##### **COMMUNICATION ERA**

5.1	Introduction	142
5.2	Global Satellite Development	143
5.3	Satellite Development in the Arab Region	145

5.4	Satellite Channels Available in Saudi Arabia	155
5.5	Top Satellite Channels Watched in Saudi Arabia	162
5.5.1	Satellite channel start-ups	162
5.5.2	Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC)	165
5.5.3	Al-Jazeera	167
5.5.4	The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) and Future TV	169
5.5.5	The Arab Radio and Television Network ART	173
5.5.6	Abu Dhabi Satellite Channel	174
5.6	Official and Social Reactions and Attitudes	175
5.6.1	Official reaction to satellite TV	176
5.6.2	Religious reaction to satellite TV	177
5.6.3	Social reaction to satellite TV	179
5.7	Summary	181

## **CHAPTER SIX: QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS**

6.1	Introduction	183
6.2	Demographic characteristics	184
6.3	Uses of Satellite Channels	188
6.3.1	Satellite channel viewing habits	188
6.3.2	Popular satellite channels	192
6.3.3	Popular satellite programmes	195
6.3.4	Common reasons for watching satellite channels	198
6.3.5	Reasons for watching satellite channels late evening/early morning	201
6.4	Uses of Newspapers, Magazines, Internet, Radio and Terrestrial TV	202
6.4.1	Newspaper readership	202
6.4.2	Magazine readership	203
6.4.3	Usage of the Internet	205
6.4.4	Usage of the Radio	206
6.4.5	Usage of terrestrial (Saudi) TV	208
6.5	Satellite channels uses vs. terrestrial TV uses	211
6.6	Effects of using satellite channels on the usage of other media	213

6.7	Impact of watching satellite channels on the other activities of young adults	215
6.8	Influence of watching satellite television on Saudi young adults' attitudes towards Western culture	217
6.9	Summary	219

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: FOCUS GROUP RESULTS**

7.1	Introduction	222
7.2	Main Focus Group Topics	222
7.3	Analysing of the Focus Group Data	223
7.4	Focus Group Results	224
7.4.1	Favourite satellite channels	224
7.4.2	Favourite satellite channels programmes	229
7.4.3	Most common satellite channels viewing habits	233
7.4.4	Most common terrestrial channels viewing habits	234
7.4.5	Arabian satellite channels used to watch Westernised media and culture	235
7.4.6	Satellite channels used to watch sexually explicit programmes	237
7.4.7	Influence of watching the satellite channels on local culture	242
7.4.7.1	Influence on religion	242
7.4.7.2	Influence on Saudi music	244
7.4.7.3	Influence on dress and hairstyle	246
7.4.8	Influence of watching satellite channels on other media usages	250
7.4.8.1	Influence on print media readership	250
7.4.8.2	Influence on listening to the radio	251
7.4.8.3	Influence on Internet usages	252
7.4.8.4	Influence on the usage of terrestrial (Saudi) TV	253
7.4.9	Terrestrial (Saudi) TV versus satellite channels	256
7.4.9.1	Sports and matches	256
7.4.9.2	Music	258
7.4.9.3	News	260
7.4.9.4	Films and serials	263



7.5	Summary	265
<b>CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION OF STUDY FINDINGS</b>		
8.1	Introduction	269
8.2	Literature Review Findings	269
8.3	Research Question No.1: How do young Saudi adults use satellite channels	272
8.4	Research Question No. 2: Are there any effects of using satellite channels on the usage of other media	278
8.4.1	Use of print media	279
8.4.2	Use of the radio	280
8.4.3	Use of the Internet	281
8.4.4	Use of terrestrial TV, and main differences between satellite channels use and terrestrial TV use	282
8.5	Research question No. 3: What kinds of influence does watching satellite TV have on activities of Saudi young adults and on their attitudes towards Western culture?	286
8.5.1	Influences of watching satellite TV on some everyday activities	286
8.5.2	Influences of watching satellite TV on local culture and the attitudes towards Western culture	288
8.6	Issues Emerged from the Research	291
8.6.1	Ownership Matters	292
8.6.2	Global TV	294
8.6.3	Communication Technology	295
8.6.4	Media Expertise (Media human resources)	296
8.6.5	TV News	297
8.6.6	Pornography, satellite channels and young adults in Saudi Arabia	299
8.7	Summary	301
<b>CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSION</b>		
9.1	Introduction	305
9.2	Summary	306
9.3	Main Findings	309

9.4	Suggestions and Recommendation	324
-----	--------------------------------	-----

	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>331</b>
--	---------------------	------------

## **APPENDICES**

Appendix A:	Questionnaire used in pilot study
Appendix B:	The English version of the questionnaire
Appendix C:	The Arabic version of the questionnaire
Appendix D:	Questionnaire results' tables
Appendix E:	Samples of official letters for field study
Appendix F:	Mass communication policy in Saudi Arabia

## **List of Figures and Tables**

<b>Figure</b>		<b>Page</b>
Figure 3.1	Focus group statistical analysis steps	104

<b>Tables</b>		<b>Page</b>
Table 2.1	Common reasons for media use	49
Table 3.1	Questionnaire and Focus Group Timetable (December 2000 – July 2001)	67
Table 3.2	Strengths and Weaknesses of Self-administered Questionnaires	70
Table 3.3	Focus group participants and their departments	91
Table 3.4	Sample of analysing focus group: Channels/Programmes preferences and viewing habits	100
Table 3.5	Sample of focus group questions analysing: Q1.1 Top favourite satellite channel: Summary of findings	101
Table 4.1	Saudi Arabia's population	124
Table 4.2	Major Saudi daily newspapers	127
Table 4.3	Major Saudi magazines	128
Table 4.4	The estimated number of local Internet users in Saudi Arabia	136
Tables 5.1-5.4	TV and Radio bouquets on ARABSAT satellites	149 -152
Tables 5.5-5.9	Satellite channels available in Saudi Arabia in June 2001 according to their satellites and degree of reception.	156-162
Table 5.10	Satellite channel start-ups	166

Table 5.11	Arab channels advertising revenue received, 1998-1999	172
Table 7.1	Focus group sample	222

### Tables in Chapter 6 (Questionnaire Results)

Table 6.1	Respondents' Gender	184
Table 6.11.1	Watching satellite channels and gender, Crosstabulation count	188
Table 6.11.4	Average hours students spend watching satellite channels	189
Table 6.11.11	Students' Most popular Satellite Channels.	194-195
Table 6.11.12	Satellite Channels Programmes Ranked According to Students' Viewing Choice	197
Table 6.11.13	Ranking of Countries Producing the Programmes Students most preferred to watch.	198
Table 6.18.1	Watching terrestrial (Saudi) TV and gender, Crosstabulation count	208
Table 6.18.2	Average hours spent watching Saudi terrestrial TV	209
Tables 6.19.1 - 6.19.3	Impact of satellite channels on the usage of other media	215-217
Tables 6.19.4 - 6.19.8	Impact of satellite channels on the other activities of young adults	217-219
Tables 6.19.9 - 6.9.12	Impact of satellite channels on Saudi young adults' attitude towards Western culture	218-220

### Tables in Appendix D

Table 6.2	Respondents' Age	1
Table 6.3	Respondents' Colleges	1
Table 6.4	Respondents' Nationalities	1
Table 6.5	Respondents' regional representation	1
Table 6.6	living situation	1
Table 6.7	Family members	1
Table 6.8	Students' families' monthly income	1
Table 6.9	Students' travel to other countries	2
Table 6.10	Students' understanding of other languages	2
Table 6.11.2	Number of satellite TV receivers and / or decoders in respondents' Homes	2
Table 6.11.3	How long have you been watching satellite channels?	2
Table 6.11.5	Type of Satellite Channels	3
Table 6.11.6	If you watch scrambled channels; who pays the cost?	3
Table 6.11.7	Where do you watch satellite channels most?	3
Table 6.11.8	With whom do you like to watch satellite channels most?	3
Table 6.11.9	When do you prefer to watch satellite channel most?	4
Table 6.11.10	What is the prime time period of most of your satellite channel viewing	4
Table 6.12	Reasons for watching satellite channels	5-6

Table 6.13	Reasons for watching satellite channels late evening/early morning	7
Table 6.14.1	Newspaper readership and Gender Crosstabulation Count	8
Table 6.14.2	How often do you read newspapers?	8
Table 5.14.3	Students' three most favourite newspapers	8
Table 6.15.1	Magazine readership and Gender Crosstabulation Count	9
Table 6.15.2	How often do you read magazines?	9
Table 6.16.3a	Students Top favourite magazines	10
Table 6.15.3b	Magazines in alphabetical order according to country of origin	11
Table 6.16.2	How often do you use the Internet?	11
Table 6.16.3	The most frequently visited Internet websites	12
Table 6.17.1	listening to radio and Gender Crosstabulation Count	12
Table 6.17.2	How often you listen to the Radio?	13
Table 6.17.3a	Students' favourite radio stations	14
Table 6.17.3b	Radio stations according to country of origin	15
Table 6.18.3	Number of TV sets in students' homes	15
Table 6.18.4	Places where respondents watch Saudi TV most	15
Table 6.18.5	Students' Preferred Companions	16
Table 6.18.6	Students' Preferred Viewing Period	16
Table 6.18.7	Prime period of students' terrestrial (Saudi) TV viewing	16
Table 6.18.8	Saudi TV programmes ranked according to students' preferred viewing choice	17

**DEDICATION**

**TO**

**MY WIFE AND CHILDREN**

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor John Beynon and Professor Tom O'Malley for their experienced guidance, enthusiasm, continuous support, valuable suggestions, endless encouragement, and patience throughout the period of my study. Without them, this work would not have been possible to achieve. Sincere thanks are also due to all staff members of the School of Humanities, Law, and Social Sciences at the University of Glamorgan for their assistance and co-operation during the research process.

I would also like to thank the Ministry of Information in Saudi Arabia for giving me this valuable opportunity and sponsoring my postgraduate study. I extend my special thanks to the academic and administration staff at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for helping me in the distribution and collection of questionnaires and conducting the focus groups sessions in both pilot and main fieldwork studies. Special thanks are extended to all students who participated in the study, and staff members who checked the focus group and questionnaire questions and responses for data coding and computer entry.

I am deeply indebted to my wife and children for their encouragement, support and patience throughout the course of my study. They have been of great assistance to me during my stay in the UK. I wish to thank my mother, my brothers and sisters whose supplications and warm feelings have always brought comfort to me and my family. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all friends whom I have met in Britain and who have made my stay in the UK so very enjoyable.

## ABSTRACT

Satellite channels were introduced in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s by limited elite-wealthy Saudis. The new communication technologies during the 1990s made it possible for a large number of Saudis to switch to different kinds of direct broadcasting satellite channels using low cost equipment to receive hundreds of uncensored television programmes. Before the spread of satellite dishes throughout the country, Saudis were only able to view two government-controlled TV channels offering limited types of programmes compared to what is offered on satellite.

Satellite channels and programmes contain cultural messages and images from the originating countries that, it may be argued, are incompatible with Saudi Arabia's Islamic cultural values. No qualitative study, to-date, has investigated the satellite channel viewing habits of the Saudi community in general, in spite of the existence of strong concerns about the influence of such habits on Saudi culture. The present research then, is a study of the relationship between audiences and satellite in Saudi Arabia and an analysis of the implications of this relationship for local culture.

The research is placed within the context of current scholarship on satellite audiences and of debates about global media and culture, and media and cultural imperialism. It uses quantitative and qualitative data to answer questions about young Saudi adults' use of satellite TV and their beliefs about its influences, and the effect of viewing satellite television on the usage of other media, particularly the two Saudi local TV channels. The researcher draws upon aspects of the uses and gratifications approach which focuses on the audience as the primary element in understanding the mass communication process. This approach also focuses on how people utilise media content. Whilst there have been a number of studies of TV and satellite audiences, these have neither systematically

examined the qualitative dimensions of satellite usage in relation to quantitative data, nor have they discussed their findings in relation to wider debates about the cultural impact of satellite communications in Saudi Arabia. The present study is therefore useful for providing the basis for further cross-cultural comparisons between the media in Western and Arab worlds.

Two key primary data collecting techniques, a quantitative survey of 438 male and female university students, and a series of eight in-depth focus group sessions involving 51 individuals, were used to obtain information about young adults' uses of the media in general, and satellite TV in particular, in Saudi Arabia . This combination of these quantitative and qualitative methods was relatively new in the field context. Survey and focus group questions were piloted between mid December 2000 and mid February 2001 at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. After slight amendments and modifications, the main fieldwork was undertaken from March 2001 to July 2001.

The study found young Saudi adults watched satellite channels quite extensively, and the most preferred channels they chose to view were Arab channels, whose programmes depend on entertainment that is presented in a Western manner. Research findings indicated that the image of the Saudi media working within the country's borders was low. The extent of the study sample's exposure to satellite channels was greater than their exposure to local Saudi television. Most of the findings support the 'glocalisation' thesis where the global is heavily mediated through Arab versions of the global or Western culture. The study also highlighted possible influences of conflicting cultural messages from external media on the local culture.



## **CHAPTER ONE**

# **INTRODUCTION**

## 1.1 Prelude

The electronic media started in 1949 in Saudi Arabia when a medium wave (AM) radio transmitter and studio were built in Jeddah. In 1965, television transmission started at both the Jeddah and Riyadh stations. Saudi Arabia now has two government-controlled TV channels broadcasting throughout the country in Arabic and English. Many researchers have found programmes on these two channels very limited compared to what is offered on satellite (Al-Amoudi, 1990; Al-Makaty, 1995; Marghalani *et al.* 1998; Alterman, 1998; and Sakr, 2000)

During the 1980s, the spread of satellite dishes was limited. Only elite-wealthy Saudis could afford dishes, however, several technological and economic changes during the 1990s made it possible for a large number of Saudis to own satellite technology (Marghalani, 1998). There is no cable TV service in Saudi Arabia, despite the government promising in 1994 to provide satellite channels throughout the country via cable. The vast diffusion of easy use and low price equipment for receiving a large number of satellite channels has helped to undermine the feasibility of the cable TV project in Saudi Arabia. Al-Rashed, (2000) described the cancellation of the cable TV project in Saudi Arabia as a victory for the new communication technologies over censorship.

Today, satellite dishes are spreading throughout Saudi Arabia as well as the rest of the Arab countries. Although estimates of their exact number are uncertain, close observers maintain that some two-thirds of the population in the Arabian Gulf States have access to satellite television (Alterman, 1998). These satellite channels and programmes

contain cultural messages and images from the originating countries that, it could be argued, are incompatible with Saudi Arabia's Islamic cultural values (Boyd, 2001).

The variety of satellite channel content has generated widespread debate among Saudi society about the potential effects of programmes. Al-Makaty (1995) identified three types of reaction to the launch of direct satellite broadcast in Saudi Arabia: those who tended to be accepting of direct broadcasting satellite (DBS) transmissions; those who regarded DBS as a threat to Saudi society in general; and those who viewed DBS as a serious cultural threat.

Although satellite channel content is not always received positively among audiences and critics in Saudi Arabia, one may argue that satellite TV is not the direct causal factor influencing young adults' behaviours or views in SA as some conservatives claim. Television in general and satellite television in particular can be used both positively and negatively. Because of the lack of social and media research in Saudi Arabia, no qualitative study to-date has investigated the satellite channel viewing habits of the Saudi community in general, in spite of their undoubted influence on Saudi local culture and way of life and thinking. Although the present work is carried out by a researcher who is a Moslem and thinks that some foreign media output threatens or at least has some negative impact on his Islamic country's local cultures and values, nevertheless, he will attempt at all times to be objective and impartial in his views and assessments of the current situation.

This is the context within which the present study examines the relationship between satellite channel viewing and young adults' culture in Saudi Arabia, and the issues

surrounding debates about media and cultural imperialism, and the globalisation of media and culture.

## 1.2 Research Problem

Users of satellite dishes in Saudi Arabia are now able to switch to different kinds of direct broadcasting satellite (DBS) channels using low cost equipment to receive hundreds of uncensored television programmes. Before the spread of satellite dishes throughout the country in the 1990s, Saudis were only able to view two government-controlled TV channels offering limited types of programmes. Until the mid 1990s, the number of satellite channels received in Saudi Arabia was limited. Al-Makaty (1995, pp: 96-97) named 56 channels: 29 satellite television and radio programmes delivered by the ARABSAT, and 27 television channels – some of them not clear - delivered by INTELSAT, Gorizont (a Russian satellite), and ASIASAT.

Nowadays, with antennas that may be as small as 50 centimetres (less than 20 inches) across, and a total cost of less than fifty pounds (300 Saudi Riyals), people in Saudi Arabia are able to watch hundreds of free-to-air and scrambled channels that are not subject to government censorship. In addition, satellites have become more powerful; therefore, there is likely to be a continued increase in their broadcasting capacity as well as a continuing diminution in the size and expense of satellite dishes (Alterman, 1998: 16). In 1998, Marghalani *et al.* concluded from a large-sample survey in Saudi Arabia that (63.8%) of respondents owned and/or had regular access to a satellite dish. The end of the 1990s saw the introduction of digital satellite technology, which

duplicated the number of available channels providing very high quality screen pictures and sound, at a low price. These factors have led to an increasing number of satellite channels users in Saudi Arabia.

Yamani (1984), in an early mention of the new technology, described satellite broadcasting as a new means of domination by the international media over local cultures. He highlighted the prospect of cultural dependency for developing countries faced with this coming technological onslaught. In the 1990s, many scholars, academics, religious teachers and officials in the Arab world commented on the introduction of satellite channels to Saudi Arabia and the Arab world in general. Religious scholars' response to the content of satellite channels has been the most critical. Sakr (2001) states that Saudi Arabia's satellite ban in 1994, which was not enforced, was intended primarily to mollify local religious conservatives. Religious scholars in Saudi Arabia basically regard most satellite channels' content as conflicting with the religious moral values of Islam.

At the same time, during the 1990s, some Saudis decided to become major proponents of what was believed to be a powerful new international communication medium: direct satellite broadcasting. MBC, ART, and Orbit are good examples of Saudi owned satellite channels, however, none of them are based in Saudi Arabia.

The majority of Saudi audiences were ready to welcome the introduction of satellite television. A high number of Saudi young adults were TV watchers. Boyd and Shatzer (1993, cited in Marghalani *et al.* 1998) concluded from a large-sample survey of Saudi university students that 80 per cent of respondents watched television daily, and 92 per

cent of them watched between .5 and 2.5 hours daily. The limited TV and radio stations and programmes, the absence of cinemas, and the lack of theatres and other forms of public entertainment in Saudi Arabia were other factors influencing young adults' wish to view satellite channels. In a newspaper article, Hashim, (2001) stated that more than 80 per cent of viewers engaging in telephone live talk programmes on channels from Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Syria and Qatar were Saudis.

The diversity of satellite channel content has generated widespread debate in Saudi society about the potential effects of programmes. The debate contains three distinct perspectives. The first is that of the basic conservatives who regard television in general, and satellite television in particular, as an instrument of social subversion conveying ideas that contradict Islamic values. The second viewpoint is held by those who consider themselves conservatives but who contend that satellite television is a tool which can be used both positively and negatively to introduce different ideologies. The third group comprises liberals who call for using satellite channels to watch any channel or programme without restrictions (Towaiq, 1996). No qualitative study, to-date, has investigated the satellite channel viewing habits of the Saudi community in general, in spite of the existence of strong beliefs about the influence of such habits on Saudi culture. The present research is a study of the relationship between young adults and satellite in Saudi Arabia and an analysis of the implications of this relationship for Saudi local culture. The research is placed within the context of current scholarship on satellite audiences and of debates about global media, and media and cultural imperialism. It also uses quantitative and qualitative data to answer questions about young Saudi adults' use of satellite TV and their beliefs about its influences, and the

effect of viewing satellite television on the usage of other media, particularly the two Saudi local TV channels.

### **1.3 Aims of the Study**

The main aims of the research are:

- To analyse the literature on the media, culture and satellite usage in Saudi Arabia in the context of wider bodies of literature on global media and cultural imperialism, and the way audiences use satellite channels.
- To determine the ways in which satellite channels are used by young adults in Saudi Arabia.
- To analyse the implications of satellite usage by young adults for culture in Saudi Arabia.

### **1.4 Significance of the Study**

Studying the uses of satellite TV in Saudi Arabia is important because of the paucity of research in general on audience usage of Saudi media and on electronic media audiences in particular (Boyd, 2000). It is therefore essential to provide further systematic information about the spread and use of satellite TV in Saudi Arabia as a relatively new medium.

A high proportion of Saudis, using low cost receivers, are receiving hundreds of uncensored channels with a variety of programmes far exceeding what ordinary, or

state terrestrial television is providing. During the last decade, many academics and authorities in the Arab world and in Saudi Arabia particular, have speculated on the potential negative impact of satellite channels on Islamic local culture. Mohammed Abdoh Yamani, a Saudi scholar and Atif Al-Abd, a public opinion researcher in Oman, referred to satellite television as a direct 'cultural invasion' and not a 'cultural interaction' (cited in Al-Shaqsi, 2000). This study contributes to an understanding of the relationship between satellite TV and these concerns about Saudi culture.

Whilst there have been a number of studies of TV and satellite audiences, these have neither systematically examined the qualitative dimensions of satellite usage in relation to quantitative data, nor have they addressed their findings directly to wider debates about the cultural impact of satellite communications in Saudi Arabia. The present study is therefore useful for providing the basis for further cross-cultural comparisons between the media in the Western and the Arab world.

### **1.5 Key Research Questions**

In order to achieve its aims, this study addresses the following research questions:

#### **RQ1: How do young Saudi adults use satellite channels?**

*Sub questions:*

Q1.1 What types of channels do Saudi young adults watch most?

Q1.2 What types of programmes do young adults in Saudi Arabia expose themselves to on satellite channels?



Q1.3 What are the important common reasons for young adults in Saudi Arabia watching satellite channels.

**RQ2: Are there any effects of using satellite channels on the usage of other media?**

*Sub questions:*

Q2.1 How do young Saudi adults use newspapers, magazines, radio, the Internet, and terrestrial TV?

Q2.2 Are there any differences between satellite channels use and terrestrial TV use amongst Saudi young adults?

**RQ3: What kinds of influence does watching satellite television have on the activities of Saudi young adults and their attitudes towards Western culture?**

*Sub questions:*

Q3.1 Does watching satellite channels impact on any of the other activities of young adults?

Q3.3 Is there any relationship between the watching of satellite channels by young Saudi adults and their attitude towards Western culture and lifestyle?

## **1.6 The Context of the Study**

This study reviews some of the key issues that emerged from a study of the literature relating to globalisation of the media, the attendant theory of cultural imperialism, and research on the media in Saudi Arabia, particularly the use of satellite channels.

### **1.6.1 Globalisation of the media and culture, and cultural imperialism**

International communication is a complex and fast-growing sub-field within the major field of communication and media studies (Mohammadi, 1997). It includes the issues of culture and cultural commodification (the turning of cultural products into commodities), the diffusion of information and news broadcasting by media companies around the world, and the challenges faced by the developing world in the light of these processes (ibid).

In the nineteenth century global communication networks were systematically organised due to the development of new technologies, which enabled communication to be dissociated from physical transportation (Thompson, 1997). While the telegraph was the first medium of communication to successfully exploit the communication potential of electricity, in recent years, satellite communication, direct broadcasting by satellite (DBS), and the Internet have become the latest fast growing media of communication.

It was in the 1970s and the early 1980s that a series of conferences and commissions sponsored by UNESCO generated wide-ranging debate on the 'New World International Information and Communication Order' (NWICO). This movement was a reaction of the developing countries to inequalities in the international flow of information and communication. UNESCO presented a report internationally known as the MacBride report, which sought to support the right of developing countries to sustain their own national and cultural identity in the context of what was argued to be the global domination of communications by Western concerns (Barker, 1997).

Thus, in this context, it is important to examine the global development of international communication, in particular the way in which, under contemporary conditions, relations of power and communication are stretched across the globe, involving compressions of time and space and the re-composition of social relationships (Hamelink, 1994; Stevenson, 1995; Schiller, 1996 and Mohammadi, 1997). Within this area of study, there has been a recurring set of concerns about the 'imperialism' of the Western media in relation to developing countries. This first took the form of debates about media imperialism (Reeves, 1993). However, more recently, writers have argued that cultural imperialism should be analysed as a process different from media imperialism, since the concept of 'media imperialism' is too constrictive, in the sense that it isolates individual media from an overall set of economic and ideological culture relations (*ibid*).

Cultural imperialism has been described as a concept particularly relevant to television. TV, in concert with advertising, is seen as a potent force for cultural imperialism, given its extensive reach and the power of visual imagery in capturing and holding attention (Lee, 1980 and Barker 1995). For Lee, (1980) the international influence of television is characterised by: television programme exports to foreign countries; foreign ownership and control of media outlets; the transfer of metropolitan broadcasting norms and the institutionalisation of media commercialism at the expense of 'public' interest. It also involves the spread of Western values into countries where they threaten the indigenous way of life.

Today, satellite technology has extended television coverage throughout the world. The number of television channels has multiplied with the introduction of advanced cable and satellite, which, together with other new communication technologies, have 'expanded the range of media products, established new niche markets and introduced new sources of competition' (Curran, 2000:130). Blumler and Gurevitch (2000) also state that satellite technology has increased access for many people to non-national sources of entertainment, information, play, sociability and politics. They believe national boundaries no longer define communication systems so distinctly, as the organisation and flow of mass communications are being internationalised. When transmitted by satellite directly to home dishes, digital broadcasting provided several hundred channels round the world in 1997, and may deliver several thousand more channels within a decade (Herman and McChesney 1999).

Due to the development of new technologies and the rapid growth of communication sectors in the Western world, globalisation proceeded very fast during the twentieth century. Since the early 1980s the world has witnessed the fast growth of global media. There are more media products, media consumers, foundations and local and international media corporations. One of the main factors of this growth is the new media technology such as satellite, the Internet and other forms of digital communication which compress time and space (Williams, 2003). Today, people can easily interact with anyone anywhere in the world, not only by physical travel or the movements of goods, but also through using the new media technology.

The word for 'globalisation' in Arabic is 'Awlamah', and is largely used in the Arab world to describe the interrelationship between countries trade, economies and culture. Most people view international trade and technology as a negative phenomenon when linked to globalisation. Al-Ashgar (2002) maintains that the aim of the globalisation is world domination by a single regime or organisation. He claims that the West, under the leadership of the USA, is working to impose its ideology and system of values on non-Western countries.

The global media and global consumer culture are the means adopted to achieve this aim. The giant media corporations' ownership, for example, is concentrated in the hands of a few Western transnationals, such as Rupert Murdoch's corporations. Global brands, such as Coca-Cola and McDonald's, are sold in every market throughout the world. Global culture operated precisely through the multiplication of different products, services and spectacles targeted at specific audiences. Cvetkovich and Kellner (1997) comment '... there are now few corners of the world immune from the viral forces of a global consumer and media culture' (cited in Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000: 17).

There are many dangers at this global culture level, such as the elimination of local cultural differences towards cultural sameness. The local cultural identity is changed with 'symbols from the publicity and image departments of multinational corporations.... Satellites make it possible to overcome all national and class boundaries and to plant the carefully devised glitter of white America in the hearts of people all around the world' (Beck, 2000: 43).

Young Saudi adults are assumed to watch satellite channels quite extensively because of their fascination with this new medium and with cultures different to that in Saudi Arabia. Satellite technology in Saudi Arabia is expected to be used by young adults to watch Arabian satellite channels broadcasting their programmes in a Western style, in addition to non-Arabic channels, mainly American and European channels. Presumably there will be some impacts of watching foreign channels and programmes, therefore, this study endeavours to examine the argument that satellite technology is an unmediated vehicle for the promotion of cultural imperialism and/or a global media and culture phenomenon heavily mediated through Arab versions of the global or Western culture, which Appadurai (1990) called 'mediated globalisation', and Robertson called the 'glocal' in his (1992, 1995) model.

Discovering the most preferred channels and programmes among Saudi young adults, the influence of watching these channels and programmes on their local culture, and the origin and ownership of popular channels will add to the current scholarship debate on issues relating to media and cultural imperialism and the globalisation of media culture, particularly how the local and global culture impacts on each other.

This study will review the debates about whether the globalisation of the West's popular culture is having a homogenising effect or leading to the development of new hybrid culture forms. As part of this world, Saudi Arabia is living within the flow of the global culture and media, and the issue is whether this flow is going to cause the appearance of a third culture in the form of hybrid patterns between the local and global cultures.

### **1.6.2 The Saudi media and the study of satellite audiences.**

In exploring the literature on cultural imperialism, the question of the relationship between audiences and internationally produced media products needs to be addressed. There is literature on this topic in connection with Saudi Arabia, which draws in particular on the tradition of uses and gratifications research.

Uses and gratifications theory focuses on the audience as the primary element in understanding the mass communication process. It focuses on how people utilise media content. In the early 1940s, researchers became interested in why people engaged in different forms of media behaviour, such as radio listening or newspaper reading (Wimmer and Dominic, 1997).

Later, in the 1970s, Blumler and Katz undertook group discussion based research in which subjects' statements were listed and categorised. They listed four broad categories of 'needs' fulfilled by the media for audiences. The first was diversion, which is the capacity of the media to provide escape from everyday pressures. The second was the way the media enhances personal relations, through the companionship of television and the way television encourages social interaction. The third was the ability of the media to stimulate reflections on personal identity through comparison with the lives of other people. The fourth was the way the media fulfils a surveillance role that is keeping an overview on events in the world (cited in O'Sullivan *et al.*, 1998: 130).

In the particular conditions of Saudi Arabia, research into the way audiences relate to the media has been dominated by the uses and gratifications model (Boyd, 2001). The last two decades have seen this method used widely to investigate the mass media, and particularly television, in Saudi Arabia (Abuzinada, 1988; Al-Amoudi, 1990; Al-Attaibi, 1986; Al-Heezan, 1993; Al-Oofy, 1990; Marghalani, 1998; Merdad, 1993; Najai, 1982).

The present study will seek to do full justice to the range of literature focusing on the globalisation of media and culture, and the media and cultural imperialism debates, and relate them to media usage in Saudi Arabia. This work will supplement the literature in its concern with the understandings that audiences bring to their viewing practices. This approach will draw on insights gained from research into the situated audience, which has become a feature of media and cultural studies research in the last two decades (Hansen *et al*, 1998). This has involved designing, piloting and implementing a series of focus groups.

Combining this method in the ways advocated by Morrison (1998) with quantitative data on young adults' viewing choices will provide new data on satellite usage as well as deepen the qualitative dimensions of knowledge in this area. The study will therefore fill the gap identified in the literature on satellite channels in Saudi Arabia, in relation to the way young adults use and understand satellite channels, and thereby further illuminate debates about cultural imperialism in the age of global media and culture.



## **1.7 Structure of the Thesis**

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. This first chapter, the introduction, specifies the issues of the study, the structure of the thesis, and the contents of each chapter. It states the research problem, which largely focuses on the use of satellite channels in Saudi Arabia and aspects of its relationship to young adults' culture. The introductory chapter also discusses the existing literature, states the objectives and significance of the study, and the research approaches it will follow in order to complete this investigation.

The second chapter outlines the theoretical basis of the study. It discusses the literature relating to globalisation of the media, the attendant theory of cultural imperialism, and research on the media in Saudi Arabia, in particular the use of satellite TV.

The third chapter presents the study methodology. It outlines the literature search, used as a secondary method to collect data pertinent to this research. Then it describes in detail the two key primary data collecting techniques, which consist of a quantitative survey of young adults and a series of in-depth focus groups used to obtain information about the uses of the media in general, and satellite TV in particular, amongst young adults in Saudi Arabia.

The fourth chapter provides an historical and cultural background to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, illustrating its uniqueness due to the influence of Islam, which permeates every aspect of its citizens' lives. This chapter also explains the role of the media within this cultural and religious milieu, and governmental control over its operations.

The fifth chapter discusses the development of satellite communication in general and satellite development in Saudi Arabia in particular. It lists the names of all satellite channels available in Saudi Arabia at the time of the field study for this research, which was undertaken from March 2001 to July 2001. This chapter contains detailed information about the top satellite channels watched in Saudi Arabia.

The sixth chapter presents the findings of the survey study. It is divided into four parts. The first part describes the demographic characteristics of the study sample: their gender, age, family's monthly income, number of the family members, place of residence, ability to speak foreign languages, etc. The other three sections of this chapter will be organised according to the three main research questions. These questions are the general headings for sections 2, 3 and 4.

The seventh chapter presents the findings of the focus group research. Firstly, it outlines the topics covered by the questions used in the focus group, such as favourite satellite channels and programmes, satellite and terrestrial channel viewing habits, most Westernised Arabian channels, satellite channels used to watch sexually explicit programmes, and the influence of watching satellite channels on local culture. It then describes the technique used to analyse the data and details the results of the analysis. It finally draws conclusions from the analysis.

The eighth chapter presents an overall discussion of the most distinctive results arising from the study. It is divided into five sections. The first section briefly presents main findings from the review of relevant literature of the research. The subsequent three sections discuss findings in relevant to the three main research questions designed to

achieve the aims of the study. The final section will discuss media and culture issues which have emerged in the course of this research.

Chapter nine, the final chapter, summarises the main conclusions reached in this study, and highlights areas for further study.

**CHAPTER TWO**

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

## **2.1 Introduction:**

The main focus in this study is young Saudi adults and their use of satellite channels in Saudi Arabia. It aims to provide a descriptive and analytical profile of their use of these channels and the kinds of influence watching satellite channels have on the attitudes of Saudi young adults towards Western culture, in the context of debates about cultural imperialism and globalisation of the media. This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study. It will review some key issues that have emerged from a study of the literature relating to globalisation of the media and the attendant theory of cultural imperialism, research into the media in Saudi Arabia, and, in particular, studies of the use of satellite channels in the Kingdom.

## **2.2 Media / Cultural Imperialism Theory**

### **2.2.1 Media Imperialism**

The issue of media and cultural imperialism provided one of the major conceptual thrusts behind the movement for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), involving international organisations such as the United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). At that time, in the 1970s, scholars proposed grouping the various currents of critical research on international communication under the heading "media imperialism." Among them was the British scholar, J. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, who provided an early definition of media imperialism as:

'..the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any country are singly or together subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other country or countries, without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so affected'(1977: 117).

He referred to four dimensions of media imperialism: the first is the technology of the media system where the shape of the communication vehicles refers to the way in which countries, such as the United States, Britain, France and Germany, are in a position of advanced industrialisation to shape the nature and vehicle of mass communications. These vehicles, whether newspapers and magazines, films, radio and television, or records and tapes, have been established not just simply as a result of a series of technological developments, but in relation to specific national markets and processes of capital accumulation and centralisation.

The second dimension of media imperialism is the set of existing industrial arrangements. After World War II, there was a growth in transnational media corporations, especially in the major colonial powers of Britain and France, which exported their industrial-organisational arrangements as well as finance and helped determine the set of industrial arrangements in Asia and Africa. These were overturned or modified very much in accordance with dominant or ruling interests, generally by means of capital aid and advice through the establishment of new communications systems. The main broadcasting organisations in Britain, France, and the United States provided models of operation, or were directly responsible for setting up transmission and supplying equipment and personnel to many 'dependent' countries. The relation of

the media to advertising is considered a key part of the industrial arrangements since it mostly derives from Anglo-American capitalist industrialisation.

The professional values and practices of media staff make up the third dimension of media imperialism, according to Boyd-Barrett, (cited in Reeves, 1993) which refer to notions of professionalism, objectivity and detachment, and appropriate forms of technology developed in advanced capitalist countries. Media content and market penetration are the fourth and most obvious form of media imperialism, which consists of television programmes, films, books, magazines, records and tapes, and other cultural commodities, as well as advertisement (ibid: 53-55).

Whereas Oliver Boyd-Barrett's definition of media imperialism does not name a country or group of countries in the media pressure game, Ogan specifically refers to two main groups within this scenario:

'Media imperialism is often described as a process whereby the United States and Western Europe produce most of the media products, make the first profits from domestic sales, and then marketing the products in Third World countries at costs considerably lower than those the countries would have to bear to produce similar products at home' (1988: 94).

This perspective emphasises the economic effects of media imperialism on Third World countries and pays less attention to its other important effects on culture and international relations.

### **2.2.2 Cultural Imperialism**

Writers have used various phrases in an attempt to define and clarify the nature of "cultural imperialism." An examination of the literature reveals several different terms, such as "media imperialism" (Boyd-Barrett, 1977); "structural imperialism" (Galtung, 1979); "cultural synchronisation" (Hamelink, 1983); "cultural dependency and domination" (Link, 1984 & Mohammadi, 1995); "electronic colonialism" (McPhail, 1987); "communication imperialism" (Sui-Nam Lee, 1995); "ideological imperialism" and "economic imperialism" (Mattelart, 1994). All these different terms relate to the same basic notion of cultural imperialism, and different international scholars who have written on the subject attribute its origins to different sources (White, 2000).

Writers have argued that cultural imperialism should be analysed as a process different from media imperialism (Reeves, 1993). For many writers, the concept of "media imperialism" is too restrictive, in the sense that it isolates individual media from an overall set of economic and ideological culture relations. As distinct from more specific media imperialism, Reeves argues that cultural imperialism theory embraces a much more holistic view of the media by focusing on the relationship between ownership and control of the media and the power structure in society, the ideological signification of meaning in media messages, and its effects in reproducing the class system (ibid: 53).

In spite of the various uses of the term cultural imperialism, it is important, as Tomlinson points out, to distinguish between 'imperialism' and 'globalisation':



‘Globalisation may be distinguished from imperialism in that it is a far less coherent or culturally directed process. The idea of imperialism contains, at least, the notion of purposeful project; the intended spread of a social system from one centre of power across the globe. The idea of globalisation suggests interconnection and interdependency of all global areas which happens in a far less purposeful way. It happens as the result of economic and cultural practices which do not, of themselves, aim at global integration, but which nonetheless produce it. More importantly, the effects of globalisation are to weaken cultural coherence in all individual nation-states, including the economically powerful ones – the imperialist powers of a previous era’ (1991: 175).

Downing, Mohammadi, and Sreberny-Mohammadi (1995) further the discussion by defining the word 'imperialism' as: ‘the conquest and control of one country by a more powerful one’ and then state:

‘Cultural imperialism signifies the dimensions of the process that go beyond economic exploitation or military force. In the history of colonialism, (i.e., the form of imperialism in which the government of a colony is run directly by foreigners), the educational and media systems of many Third World countries have been set up as replicas of those in Britain, France, or the United States, and carry their values. Western advertising has made further inroads, as have architectural and fashion styles. Subtly but powerfully, the message has often been insinuated that Western cultures are superior to the cultures of the Third World’ (p. 482).

Thus, to use ‘imperialism’ in the phrase ‘cultural imperialism’ implies some degree of purposefulness. Mattelart (1994) argues that the term cultural imperialism was first used at the end of the 1960s by Jacques Rigaud, who was alarmed at the loss of French cultural influence in the era of information technologies, and by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who conducted studies on the role of communications in international relations. Roach (1997), however, asserts that the cultural imperialism thesis emerged most prominently

in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s in the work of Antonio Pasquali in 1963, Mario Kaplun in 1973, Luis Ramiro Beltran in 1976, and Fernandes Matta in 1977. She points out that some of the most influential theorists in the field have been Westerners: the Belgian, Armand Mattelart, Herbert Schiller of the USA, and the Canadian, Dallas Smythe.

A number of authors have presented their own interpretations of cultural imperialism; nonetheless, the main approach of the thesis can be identified in the work of Schiller (1976). According to his interpretation, 'cultural imperialism proposes that a society is brought into the modern world system when its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping its social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating centre of the system'. In his 1976 work "Communication and Cultural Domination", Herbert Schiller proposed the use of the term 'cultural imperialism' to describe the way in which large multinational corporations, including the media, of developed countries dominate developing countries. This publication is often cited in studies relating to cultural imperialism.

There has been considerable debate about cultural imperialism (Reeves, 1993). In 1987, McQuail coined the expression 'electronic colonialism' in reference to understanding the nature of cultural imperialism. He defines electronic colonialism as "the dependency relationship established by the importation of communication hardware, and foreign-produced software, along with engineers, technicians and related information protocols, that vicariously establish a set of foreign norms, values, and expectations which, in varying degrees, may alter the domestic cultures and

socialisation processes' (ibid: 18). More expressions and definitions of the concept were raised. For instance, Sui-Nam Lee (1988) defined 'communication imperialism' as opposed to 'cultural imperialism' as follows: 'Communication imperialism can be defined as the process in which the ownership and control of the hardware and software of the mass media as well as other major forms of communication in one country are singly or together subjugated to the domination of another country, with deleterious effects on the indigenous values, norms and culture' (p: 74).

Cultural imperialism has been described as a concept particularly relevant to television. TV, in conjunction with advertising, is seen as a potent force for cultural imperialism, given its extensive reach and the power of visual imagery in capturing and holding attention (Barker, 1997; and Lee, 1980). For Lee, (1980) media, or more specifically television imperialism, is characterised by: television programme exports to foreign countries, foreign ownership and control of media outlets, the transfer of metropolitan broadcasting norms, the institutionalisation of media commercialism at the expense of 'public' interest; the invasion by capitalistic world views, and infringements of the indigenous way of life in recipient nations.

Two decades after Lee published this work, satellite technology had extended television coverage throughout the world. The number of television channels has multiplied with the introduction of advanced cable and satellite. When transmitted by satellite directly to home dishes, digital broadcasting was able to provide several hundred channels in 1997, and may deliver several thousand channels within a decade (Herman & McChesney 1999). New communication technologies, have 'expanded the range of media products, established new niche markets and introduced new sources of

competition' (Curran, 2000:130). Blumer & Gurevitch (2000) also state that satellite technology has increased access for many people to non-national sources of entertainment, information, play, sociability and politics. They believe that national boundaries no longer define communication systems so distinctly, as the organisation and flow of mass communications are being internationalised.

### **2.2.3 Major Weaknesses of the Cultural Imperialism and the Media Imperialism Theories**

Media imperialism theory has been attacked for its failure to provide empirical support for its basic propositions. Fejes suggests that this is a crucial deficiency since:

‘... without theory delineating the pounds of explanation, there is the danger of media imperialism becoming a pseudo-concept, something which can be used to explain everything in general about the media in developing countries and hence nothing in particular’ (cited in Reeves, 1993:54).

Ogan (1988) argues that the cultural imperialism theory lacks explanatory power and needs to be advanced beyond the level of pure description. This is clear in the multiple definitions that have been offered by different critical theorists, including those stated earlier.

Work published in Australia by Sinclair, Jacka, and Cunningham (cited in White, 2000) suggests that the cultural imperialism theory does not hold true in all situations of information exchange between nations. They published a book that presents scholarly writings on the television industries of peripheral nations including India, Brazil, Mexico, Middle Eastern countries, Canada and Australia. The Mexican based Televisa,

which produces 78% of all its programming, and the Brazilian Globo Network, which produces 80%, have managed to secure and dominate their domestic markets to a degree unmatched by any English-speaking market (White, 2000).

Referring to these new patterns in global television, Straubhaar (1991) posits that 'cultural proximity', a concept describing the way "audiences tend to prefer programming which is closest or most proximate to their own culture if it can be supported by the local economy", is responsible for media industries dominating a market and not necessarily "cultural imperialism".

A Brazilian researcher, Omar Oliveira, also referred to the cultural imperialism theory in connection with television programmes as a type of media flow. He pointed out that during the 1970s much cultural imperialism thinking in Latin America derived from the enormous quantities of American television imports. However, by the early 1980s, in view of the evident popularity of Brazilian soap operas over US imports, 'Brazil fought back cultural intrusion and won the battle' (Oliveira, 1993:117, cited in Roach, 1997).

Another weakness that has been identified by some critics is that the cultural theory does not fully acknowledge the concept of the active audience. In his response to this critique, Schiller (1989: 150) claims that one active audience theorist, Tamar Liebes, conducted research to examine how domestic audiences respond to Western media. Liebes studied the impact of the popular TV programme, "Dallas", in Israel. The study included four groups of Israeli viewers: Israeli Arabs, Moroccan Jewish immigrants, kibbutz members, and new Russian immigrants. Liebes found that the message imparted by "Dallas" depended on the viewer's values, and varied according to the

experiences of the particular group to which the viewer belonged. The viewer, therefore, actively produced meaning while consuming the media product or programme.

### **2.3.1 UNESCO and the Movement for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)**

Since the Second World War, the four major news agencies —Reuters, Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI) and France Press Agency (AFP) have preserved their positions of dominance in the international system for the collection and dissemination of news and other information. Many other agencies have been established and have expanded their spheres of operation; and some agencies, such as TASS and the Deutsche Presse Agentur, have acquired, (at least temporarily), a prominent international role. But the four major agencies remain the key actors in the global information order and have also increased their activities, taking advantage of new developments in information and communication technology to emerge as central players in the new global market for data and information (Thompson, 1997).

The dominance of the major news agencies, combined with other inequalities in the international flow of information and communication (television, radio, print media, books, and movie production) from the USA and Europe (developed countries) to countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa (developing, or third world) has led to calls from various quarters for a reorganisation of the global information order. A series of conferences and commissions sponsored by UNESCO in the 1970s and early 1980s

generated wide-ranging debate on the 'New World International Information and Communication Order' (NWICO) (Thompson, 1997).

The UNESCO report "Many Voices, One World: towards a new, more just and more efficient world information and communication order", (1980) internationally known as the MacBride report, sought to support the right of developing countries to sustain their own national and cultural identity in the context of what was argued to be the global domination of communication by Western concerns (Barker, 1997). Thompson (1997) states that the proponents of a NWICO were seeking a more equitable balance in the international flow and content of information, as well as a strengthening of the technological infrastructures and productive capacities of less developed countries in the sphere of communication.

Besides UNESCO, the Non-Aligned Movement, that had initiated the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), also spearheaded the call for the establishment of a NWICO. It stressed from its earliest declarations what is still to this day a major tenet of Third World thinking on global information relations: that economic and cultural domination are inextricably linked (Roach, 1990).

### **2.3.2 The USA's Response to a NWICO**

At consecutive general conferences and specialised meetings of UNESCO, Third World complaints crystallised around several key areas, namely, news flow, television flow, and advertising and communications technology. The UNESCO initiative met

with considerable resistance from certain movements and interest groups in the West. 'The US reaction to the demands for a NWICO was hostile. Although during the early phase of the NWICO movement, there was some slight space for negotiation, a close reading of the history of this period leaves no doubt that the 1970s paved the way for the 1990s. The anti-NWICO coalition of the press, the government, private sector interest groups and academia was already well-established during this period' (Roach, 1997: 284).

In 1984, the United States withdrew from UNESCO, followed by the United Kingdom in 1985. This joint withdrawal deprived UNESCO of around 30 % of its budget and greatly limited the effectiveness of any policy recommendations. Nevertheless, the NWICO debate helped to increase awareness of the issues resulting from the dominance of the major news agencies and, more generally, by the inequalities associated with the globalisation of communication (Thompson, 1997). The US withdrawal from UNESCO ended in 2003 and the first US lady, Laura Bush, led the American delegation to a UNESCO conference.

## **2.4 Globalisation, Media and Culture**

### **2.4.1 What is 'Globalisation'?**

Like many of the key words used in human and social sciences, globalisation is a concept that has been widely discussed and continues to be the subject of considerable debate and disagreement. The origins of globalisation were summarised by Waters (cited in Beynon and Dunkerely, 2000) in three stages as follows:



- that a form of globalisation has been in progress throughout history (for example, the unrecorded, prehistoric movements of people across the planet);
- that it is an outcome of capitalism in the modern period;
- that it is more recently, the product of the 'disorganised capital' of post-industrialism and post-modernity. (p: 4)

By the 1990s 'globalisation' was used by scholars to refer to the way in which, under contemporary conditions, relations of power and communication are stretched across the globe, involving compressions of time and space and a recomposition of social relationships (Mohammadi, 1997). Similarly, Thompson claims:

The reordering of space and time brought about by the development of the media is part of a broader set of processes which have transformed (and are still transforming) the modern world. These processes are commonly described today as 'globalisation' (1997: 149).

He argues that globalisation 'arises only when (a) activities take place in an arena which is global or nearly so (rather than merely regional, for example); (b) activities are organised, planned or coordinated on a global scale; and (c) activities involve some degree of reciprocity and interdependency, such that localised activities situated in different parts of the world are shaped by one another' (1997:150).

Negus and Roman-Velazquez (2000) have divided different commentators on the concept of globalisation into three groups. The first group consists of the enthusiastic advocates of greater international business and trade. For them, the word globalisation is descriptive of real changes occurring in the world, visible and audible on the streets

of major cities and small villages. They see increasing numbers of people, images and things moving across borders, creating new 'markets', breaking down barriers, and disrupting previous routines and distances between different peoples and places. For the second group, globalisation is an idea that should be approached more critically. They view it as an ideology that conceals the continuing dominance of international capital and the endurance of unequal or imperial relations between states. The third group of writers use the term globalisation to refer to processes and practices that clearly cross geographical borders, and to indicate growing 'interconnections' across the planet.

In Arabic, the word for globalisation is 'Awlamah'. It is primarily used when referring to the global economy rather than global culture. It is an expression that is used to describe a new form of colonialism or a conspiracy theory. The global economy and the global culture are expected to impact on local economies and culture to the benefit of West and these are the main reasons behind the pessimistic view of globalisation in the Arab World. For instance, Al-Ashgar (2002) asserts that the aim of globalisation is to control the world by a single regime or organisation. He claims that this regime, whether it is already present or to be created by the USA, seeks to impose its laws, values, and beliefs throughout the world.

While globalisation is a phenomenon that is usually linked to the modern world, some scholars have traced its origins back more than five centuries, in connection with the growth of international trade (Thompson, 1997). The dramatic increase in the nature, volume and geographical extent of trade, especially between the colonial powers of the West and other parts of the world that were under colonial domination, was an example

of globalisation. Another example is that of core countries which imported raw materials from the colonies and exported manufactured goods throughout the world, resulting in the increasing importance of industrial products as a source of economic and political power (ibid).

Globalisation proceeded very fast during the twentieth century due to the development of new technologies and the rapid growth of communication sectors in the Western world. The diffusion of information by the Western media and its power in the international system became obvious in the last century, especially after the Second World War. Mohammadi contends that the reason for the establishment of the United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) was to create a balance between the cultural and intellectual rights of nations. He states that UNESCO's purpose was 'not only to encourage all member states to cooperate in the field of education, science, culture and communication, but also to provide a platform for member states to discuss peacefully how to maintain a reasonable view on cultural and intellectual rights, flow of news and information, and freedom of expression' (1997: 2).

#### **2.4.2 The Globalisation of Media and Culture**

The world has witnessed an extremely fast growth in the global media since the early 1980s. There are now more media products, media consumers, foundations and local and international media corporations than at any time in history. One of the main factors for this growth is the new media technology, such as satellite, the Internet and

other forms of digital communication which compress time and space (Williams, 2003).

Today, people can easily interact with others any where in the world, not only through physical travel or the movement of goods but also through the use of the new media technology. The latter enables them to communicate with other nations and take part in different local or global events through the screens of the Internet and satellite TV.

‘There is no longer the need to be in the same place to share in experiencing major events, whether it is the Olympic Games in Sydney, the trial of former US football star, O.J. Simpson in, Los Angeles or Princess Diana’s funeral in London. The electronic media and the new communications technologies make such events instantly accessible to us wherever we are. They are making the world a smaller place than it has ever been’ (ibid: 213).

The word ‘global’ was linked to this phenomenon because of the new relationship between time, space and nations all over the world. In the late 1960s of the last century, McLuhan coined the term ‘global village’ to describe this phenomenon. He viewed ‘the growth in global media and communications technology as positive and beneficial. He commented, ‘Electronic communications are producing an environment in which people are involved with, and responsible for each other’ (cited in Williams, 2003).

In time, and due to the increasing growth of the Western Media and technology resulting in an unequal distribution of information in both hardware and software between different nations, some disputed McLuhan’s optimism such as Schiller, Hamelink, Mattelart, and Godling (Ibid). Beynon and Dunkerely (2000) indicated the

opinions to its consequences are sharply divided, especially in respect of cultural globalisation:

It is proposed by some as a thoroughly progressive and liberating phenomenon, opening up the potential for greater human connectedness and the spread of human rights, democracy, health care and improved inter-cultural understanding worldwide... Conversely, it is widely attacked as heralding in a new and voracious phase of Western capitalism and the imposition of Americanised culture (in the form of television, videos, pop music, films and adverts and other Western goods) on vulnerable communities unable to protect themselves from the volume and intensity of foreign imports (p: 2).

Referring to the global media, Williams (2003) points to its increasingly global reach and cites a few examples to emphasise its popularity as follows:

Michael Jackson's music can be heard and bought on every continent, while African music is now available to a global audience. In 1995, the music channel MTV was seen in 320 million households in 90 countries across five continents, fulfilling its slogan of 'One Planet, One Music'. The magazine *Reader's Digest* as early as 1980 was published in 39 national editions in 17 languages with a global audience estimated at 28 million readers, and by 1996 its worldwide sales revenue was recorded as US\$3billion. The *International Herald Tribune* is available for purchase in 143 countries and has subscribers in all parts of world. ... Wherever you look, whatever sector you examine, the media have become truly global in their reach (214).

### 2.4.3 Local Culture and Global Culture

The word 'culture' is widely recognised as extremely difficult to define adequately (Beynon and Dunkerely, 2000). Like globalisation, this term or 'way of life' is also fraught with definitional problems (Williams, 2003). It is one of those words which has changed its meaning over time. Williams (1976, cited in Beynon, *et al.* 2001) identifies three usages of the word 'culture': firstly, to refer to the works and practices of intellectuals; secondly, to intellectual and aesthetic development; and thirdly, to particular ways of life of a given group.

Tomlinson (1991) expands the definition to avoid viewing culture just in terms of goods and objects, to include 'the context within which people give meaning to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives' (p.7), as well as the 'resources through which people evaluate narratives of individual and social meaning and purpose.' (p.173)

Two further definitions of culture, among many attempts in the 1990s, were proposed by Hall (1997). The first defined culture as that which is distinctive about the way of life of a community, a social group, a nation or a people (including subcultures that exist within the dominant, hegemonic culture). Hall's second definition emphasises the cultural practices underlying the production and exchange of meanings. Individuals who share the same culture interpret the world in similar ways and express themselves in ways that are readily understood by each other. Accordingly, culture is not only composed of artefacts (whether novels, comics or rock videos), but the cultural practices that underwrite the production and exchange of meanings between members

of a group or society. It is a view that suggests that culture is about feelings and emotions as much as objects and ideas.

In Arabic, the word for culture is 'Thagafah' but its meaning is not the same as in English. The meaning is more complex since there is a difference according to whether the word is part of an infinitive expression or a complex expression. In an infinitive expression, 'Thagafa' means to know a little bit about most subjects or to know something about everything. A person is viewed as cultured if s(he) has a wide knowledge of social, political or economic issues. Thus, the Arabic meaning of the word 'culture' differs from the English one. However, Al-Shaqsi (2000) and Al-Ashgar (2002) argue that when using the Arabic word for culture in a national or social context, its meaning comes closer to that in the English language. Therefore when the culture of society is mentioned, what is meant is the cultural and ideological tradition of that nation in all its theoretical and practical aspects which characterise that nation or society.

With reference to the 'Easy Arabic Encyclopaedia', Gerbal *et al* (1961) comments that the culture of a nation in all its aspects constitutes its way of life. The belief of a nation, its history, its view of life, the ideas and theories of its people and thinkers, which are written in books and study reports, all of these contribute to defining the style of its life and control its path (p. 39).

In the case of Saudi Arabia, any discussion of Saudi society and culture must acknowledge the influence of the religion of Islam. This is because the ideological credo and ethical structure of this society, its values, customs, habits, and contributions

to the arts and sciences, in all cases conform to Islamic teachings inherited through successive generations from the time of the Prophet Mohammad around a thousand and four hundred years ago. The Islamic teachings, in fact, shape the values of the Muslim Nation. This commitment was at its greatest strength, of course, during the first years when this religion appeared.

One of the well known principles among Muslims is that earlier generations were more committed to the religion of Islam than later ones, therefore, observed its customs and upheld its values more zealously than the modern-day generation. Moreover, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, just after the last century when the world witnessed global communication between peoples in a way never previously seen in history, the local culture of Muslims has become less powerful to resist the influx of other cultures – particularly Western cultures - through different examples of cultural globalisation. These include media production, the most important of which is the TV with its wide scale spatial coverage and impact caused by direct broadcast via satellites. This influx of foreign cultures is also enhanced by the widespread consumption of Western products which are present in abundance globally, like Coca-Cola and McDonalds, the presence of Western names and symbols in the form of actors, entertainers, and famous sport stars, and the Internet, tourism, and other means. In spite of this influx, Al-Ashgar (2002) argue that the expected decrease in the resistance of local culture to this globalisation does not mean that Islamic local culture will be viewed as part of history as a result as becoming limited space or time, or will disappear in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, Islam as an original credo is deeply rooted in the society and its culture.



Saudi society, in contrast to many other Muslim societies, is characterised by wealth and the luxurious life of most of its members. Because of their wealth, its members are strongly inclined to buy imported goods, to travel abroad, and to watch satellite channels. Moreover, they are part of the increasing number of people throughout the world who are exposed, more than at any time before, to more than one type of culture due to the fast and effective movement of what Hannerz (1991) called *Global ecumene*. In his view, the entire globe has become one world, not only in political and economic aspects, but also in cultural interaction and exchange. He describes this cultural movement referring to two types of tendency as follows:

- “Situational tendency” in which a peripheral people are pounded from a cultural centre and eventually assimilate the incoming meanings and in time, become indistinguishable from that culture.
- “Maturational tendency” which is the process whereby global cultural forms are absorbed and reproduced in the local culture. They coexist alongside the local culture, and in time, become hybridised (cited in Beynon and Dunkerley 2000, p. 21).

Hannerz focuses on the differential aspect of global cultural influences, with particular references to cultural reproduction in third world. He presented two examples or patterns to compare and illustrate his argument. The first is Japan, which he thinks is culturally self-sufficient and can resist the cultural effects of globalisation. The second example is less advanced or less developed countries, which have been colonised for a long period. Their cultures are weak and their economy is very limited, therefore, they are unlikely to resist the cultural effects of globalisation (ibid).

With reference to Saudi Arabia, it is possible to say that this country should have a great deal of cultural self-satisfaction due to its religious heritage. Also, Saudi Arabia

is a country that has not been occupied like many other neighbouring countries. The production of oil and its reserves enable Saudi Arabia to maintain a good economic status. Therefore, the strength of resistance to the globalising culture will be connected to these factors, the most important of which are: the balance between the interaction with other cultures and the commitment to Islamic teaching, and the continuity of the strength of the economy and using it in a way that may reduce dependence on Western and imported goods.

It is also essential to support development projects and ideas that promote education and local culture to make the latter a prime concern and source of pride for the Saudi citizen.

The headlong rush of any Islamic society towards the coming cultures (specially Western culture), without considering their differing values, habits, and customs, may gradually lead to the erosion or demise of the local culture, and in the process the formation of a new hybrid culture which has no distinct, separate identity, but is similar and identical to other societies. Hamelink cautioned in 1983 that cultural diversity was in endangered at the global level because of the growing tendency towards sameness and similarity. Now, twenty years later, cultural globalisation has been enhanced by the international media, the development of the Internet and information systems, and the increased power of the multinational companies, especially in the media field, to arrive at what Beck (2000) calls the '*single commodity world*'. This change, according to Beck, occurs when the local cultural identity is changed with pervasive symbols from the publicity and image departments of

multinational corporations and satellites make it possible to overcome all national and class boundaries (ibid: 43).

Reactions towards globalisation are varied. There are some who think there is no reason to fear other cultures, even the culture of the superior (i.e. Western culture), since their effects will not de-root the local culture and will not have a permanent strong effect. There are others who believe in the necessity for strong opposition against making the whole world one culture, and others who hold opinions in between these two. Held *et al.* (1999) presented three overall reactions towards cultural globalisation as follows:

Those who forecast cultural homogenisation as an outcome of the impact of western media and consumerism (hyperglobalisation); those who regard the impact of global culture as being relatively superficial (sceptics); and those who predict the emergence of new, exciting global cultural networks and hybrids (transformations). (Cited in Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000: 17).

Locally, there are different reactions from Saudi writers and intellectuals to cultural globalisation. For example, Habib (2001) argues that the widespread culture in the world today is the dominant culture not the global culture, as the former is imposed on the weak countries equally, just as the policies of the strong countries are imposed on the weaker ones. He argues that this dominance will not lead to changing other peoples' and nations' culture but the peoples involved will simply remain under the control of the super states. He concludes by saying that it is impossible for the world to change into one global culture and hence become only one pattern because of the existing cultural differences which are difficult to unify throughout the world, although a certain culture may have a dominant role in the present historical moment.

There is another opinion that considers cultural globalisation a real fact and therefore, the best strategy to do is to find ways of interaction with other human cultures to make use of their positive aspects and stand firmly against their negative ones (Mahfuz, 2000). Mahfuz calls on Saudi society to develop their state of affairs and conditions through programmes of work that positively accommodate the movement of global culture rather than “closing the windows” on the pretext of cultural security (p: 16). He suggests three programmes to achieve this: firstly, developing the administrative, economic, and political infrastructures so they are in harmony with the present time culture changes. Secondly, making use of the opportunities offered by globalisation, especially active participation in the technology of information and communication revolution. Thirdly, reconstructing the learning and educational environment in a way that conforms to the needs of the future.

The current debate about culture in Saudi Arabia is strongly concerned with the impact of the global on the local without talking about the reverse impact, i.e. the local on the global. This may be due to the weakness of the local media and cultural products and hence their inability to have a global impact. It may also be due to increasing fear about the negative impact of cultural and media globalisation on the local culture in spite of the alternating impact of global and local cultures, and the appearance of what is known as *Glocalisation*. Robertson (1995), who coined this term, defined it as:

‘The creation and incorporation of locality processes, which themselves largely shape, in turn, the compression of the world as a whole’ (Cited in Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000: 21).

There are several internationally recorded patterns of *the global impacting upon the local*, for example, American foods like McDonalds, Pizza Hut, Kentucky, Coca Cola, and Pepsi; clothing and shoe products, like Benetton, Nike, Reebok, Addidas and others; American media productions like movies, music, and television and journal products; and, finally, American advertisements that also support the above patterns. On the other hand, there are patterns which may be classified as the *local impacting upon the global*, for example Italian or Indian foods, which are known globally like pizza and curry, or Asian and African clothes which are used by some fashion industries as raw patterns in designing seasonal fashions. Local African and Asian music is also used in a similar way to produce international patterns and styles. But, in general, the impact of the local on the global is far less than the impact of the global on the local. Rather, we see that even this limited impact is reformed by the super states and then re-exported as a global product. For example, a pattern or type of local culture in Africa or Asia, for instance, a certain food or a kind of music, is adopted by giant industrial or media enterprises in the West to be strongly re-exported again in a way that suits the interests of the super societies that export to consuming or weak societies throughout the world in one global form.

The contributions of Robertson (1995) who searched the impacts of the global on the local and vice versa are well known. In his view, the local is sometimes used by the global which he regards as the impact of the local on the global. When local products become global and famous they have their own impact and this is another factor of globalisation. (ibid, pp: 35-37)

Robertson also referred to emergence of new patterns of hybrid culture due to the alternate impact between the local and global. This may support the argument that culture is not constant but variable. Based on this perception it becomes clear that it is not possible to stop the flow of the global culture and media into Saudi Arabia, but its usage by Saudis remains a question of whether it will cause the appearance of a third culture in the form of hybrid patterns between the local and global cultures.

Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia is exposed to a new global culture. This may also lead to the emergence of new patterns of culture, for example, some youths in Saudi Arabia may become inclined to certain types of Western sports and listen to Western music, like pop, and some may wear clothes different from the norm in their societies. But the most important question is to what extent this change in culture will affect their commitment to the religious beliefs and the social traditions and customs, and whether they will be able to endure globalisation and simultaneously observe and preserve these values. Discussing Hybridism leads us to other models of global culture, for example, cultural homogenisation, in which the acceleration and enhancement of globalisation through international media and information system companies erodes local cultures and customs (Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000:23).

According to Beck (2000), cultural homogenisation is causing the world to become a single commodity world. This model, if it succeeds, will destroy the local cultures of people, especially local youth culture, and lead to the dominance of only one culture, which, according to the present reality of the world, is Western culture, in particular, the American culture. However, Appadurai (1990) argues that what is considered a

threat to a certain style of life is not really a threat, but part of the normal change in culture.

He argues that cultures have numerous styles and forms and people have the ability to coexist within a wide range of cultures in the advanced world of today. In his view, cultural globalisation does not mean that the world is becoming more culturally homogeneous. Appadurai's (1990) flow model considers globalisation as a set of highly complex interactions or 'flows', carried out by a variety of agencies and "inflected by the historical, linguistic and political of different sorts of actors – nation states, multinationals, sub-national groups, and religious, political and economic movements, villages, neighbourhoods and families" (cited in Beynon *et al.*, 2001: 34). Appadurai (1990) named five advanced 'flows': *ethnoscapes*, *technoscapes*, *financescapes*, *mediascapes* and *ideoscapes*, and provided some examples of these notions and some expected disjunctures between them. One example he provide is the disjuncture between ideoscapes and mediascapes 'where there is a conflict between television content and what is deemed acceptable or not acceptable locally or nationally (for example, the reception of global television in Islamic countries, or the banning of the Red Hot Dutch pornography channel in the UK)' (ibid: 37).

According to previous theories and opinions, Saudi Arabia as part of the world, is inside the influences of the global culture. Although I mentioned earlier that the local culture of Saudi Arabia may have the strength and purity of origin to resist the influence of global culture, still it is possible that global culture may affect the local, especially the culture of young adults. The growing global cultural impacts all over the world cannot be stopped and Saudi young adults' increasing contact with it cannot be

controlled. However, if Islamic principles and values are instilled in them from a very early age and become deep-rooted, their exposure to the global culture will not erode or diminish them. They will still be an influential force in their lives.

## **2.5 Uses and Gratifications Theory**

### **2.5.1 Nature and definitions**

Uses and gratifications theory highlights the audience as the primary element in understanding the mass communication process. It focuses on how people utilise media content. In the early 1940s, researchers became interested in why people engaged in different forms of media behaviour, such as radio listening or newspaper reading (Wimmer & Dominic, 1997). Some early studies tried to classify the responses of audience members into meaningful categories.

In 1944, Herzog identified three types of gratifications associated with listening to radio soap operas: emotional release, wishful thinking, and obtaining advice (Ibid). Berelson took advantage of a New York newspaper strike in 1949 to ask people why they read the paper. Their responses were placed in five major categories: reading for information, reading for social prestige, reading for escape, reading as a tool for daily living, and reading for a social context (ibid). These two studies together with other subsequent ones conducted in the 1950s were the first development in the three phases of uses and gratification research categorised by Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch (1974). They asserted that the first phase was primarily descriptive, while the second, in the 1960s, was mainly concerned with categorising the needs presumed to mediate



different patterns of media consumption. The third phase includes studies conducted from the mid 1970s to-date which explore the links between gratifications thus detected and the psychological and sociological origins of the needs to be satisfied.

In the 1970s, Blumler and Katz undertook group discussion based research in which subjects' statements were listed and categorised. They listed four broad categories of 'needs' fulfilled by the media for audiences. The first was diversion, defined as the capacity of the media to provide escape from everyday pressures. The second was the way in which the media enhanced personal relations, through the companionship of television and its encouragement of social interaction. The third was the ability of the media to stimulate reflections on personal identity through comparison with the lives of other people. The fourth was the way the media fulfilled a surveillance role by presenting an overview of events in the world (cited in O'Sullivan *et al.*, 1998: 130).

An empirical study in the uses and gratification tradition might typically involve audience members completing a questionnaire about why they watch a particular TV programme. McQuail (1987: 73) provided a typology of common reasons for media use shown in table 2.1 below:

<b>Common reasons for media use</b>		
1-	Information	a) Finding out about relevant events and conditions in the immediate surroundings, society and the world.
		b) Seeking advice on practical matters or opinion and decision choices.
		c) Satisfying curiosity and general interest.
		d) Learning; self-education.
		e) Gaining a sense of security through knowledge.
2-	Personal Identity	a) Finding reinforcement for personal values.
		b) Finding models of behaviour.
		c) Identifying with values of another person (in the media).
		d) Gaining insight into oneself.
3-	Integration and Social Interaction	a) Gaining insight into the circumstances of others; social empathy.
		b) Identifying with others and gaining a sense of belonging.
		c) Finding a basis for conversation and social interaction.
		d) Having a substitute for real-life companionship.
		e) Helping to carry out social roles.
		f) Enabling one to connect with family, friends and society.
4-	Entertainment	a) Escaping, or being diverted, from problems.
		b) Relaxing.
		c) Obtaining intrinsic cultural or aesthetic enjoyment.
		d) Filling time.
		e) Emotional release.
		f) Sexual arousal.

Table 2.1: Common reasons for media use

Source: McQuail (1987: 73).

### 2.5.2 Criticisms of Uses and Gratifications Theory

Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch (1974) stated that up to that point in time most uses and gratifications research was concerned with operationalising issues, such as the social and psychological origins of needs, which generate expectations of the mass media or other sources, subsequently leading to differential patterns of media exposure (or engagement in other activities), resulting in needs gratifications and other consequences, mostly unintended ones. Palmgreen, Wenner, and Rosengren (1985) presented a contemporary view of uses and gratifications that characterised the most important assumptions of the approach as follows: (1) media audiences are active; (2) media use is goal-directed; (3) media uses fulfil a large range of audience needs and gratifications; and (4) the patterns of gratifications or media-related needs obtained can be identified not only by media content but also by media characteristics and through the process of media exposure, including the social situation.

The use of traditional self-reporting to understand how people utilise media content has several limitations. Sometimes viewers may not know why they choose to watch, listen to, or read what they do. If they try to explain and give reasons, sometimes they may express the least important reason or repeat what others have mentioned (O'Sullivan *et al.*, 1998). Uses and gratifications theory as an analytical model, implies that 'audiences comprise individuals whose conscious search for gratification elicits a media response which supplies their needs. This *laissez faire* market concept overlooks the extent to which audience needs are partly a product of media supply (learning to enjoy what is available), and the social context from which the audience originates, e.g. class and ethnic subcultures' (ibid: 131).

Another criticism is that the uses and gratifications approach concentrates solely on why audiences consume the media rather than on enlarging the investigation to discover what meaning and interpretations are produced, and in what circumstances, i.e. how the media are received (ibid).

## **2.6 Media Audience Research in Saudi Arabia**

In the particular conditions of Saudi Arabia, research on the ways in which audiences relate to the media has been dominated by the uses and gratifications model (Boyd, 2001). The last two decades have seen this method used widely to investigate the mass media, particularly television, in Saudi Arabia (Najai, 1982; Al-Attaibi, 1986; Abuzinada, 1988; Al-Saud 1989; Al-Oofy, 1990; Bait Al-Mal 1992; Merdad, 1993; Al-Heezan, 1993; Marghalani, 1998; Al-Muaither, 2001 and Al-Garni, 2000).

The researcher is confident that Najai (1982) was the first Saudi researcher to employ a uses and gratifications approach. He investigated television gratifications among 520 high school students (407 Saudis and 113 non-Saudis) between 15-20 years of age. He adopted 18 motive statements based on his own experience and previous research. Five gratification factors were identified from the analysis: understanding (surveillance), learning, diversion, relaxation, and companionship. Rank ordering showed that Saudi youth regarded television primarily as a means of gratifying cognitive needs, while affective needs came second. Najai found no significant difference between males and females in the amount of time they spent watching television.

The last Saudi study on the uses and gratifications was conducted by Al-Muaither, (2001) who investigated the uses of the print media by young adults in Saudi Arabia. A sample of 600 male and female university students was selected for this study from three different universities in different geographical areas in Saudi Arabia. Al-Muaither used the survey method to collect data during April to July 1999, then utilised an SPSS package for data analysis. The results showed that Saudi young adults were avid print media users, and the main findings indicated that gratifications dimensions used by young people in Saudi Arabia are similar to those utilised by the younger generation in more developed countries.

Al-Muaither's study yielded six gratification factors ranked on a 5-point scale according to their importance. The surveillance factor was ranked first, Entertainment or Escape/Diversion were ranked second, the Tension Release factor was ranked third, the Religious factor ranked fourth, the Social Integration factor was ranked fifth, and the Personal Identity factor was ranked in last place. Al-Muaither reported students' expectations were met by only four gratification factors, that is, the Religious, Tension Release, Social Integration, and Entertainment or Escape/Diversion factors. He concluded that young Saudis get less than what they expect from all types of the print media. Significant differences existed between Gratifications Sought and Gratifications Obtained across almost all gratifications factors. The only gratification factor which seemed to be satisfied was the Religious factor by Saudi Newspapers and Saudi Magazines.

Between the studies of Najai (1982) and Al-Muaither (2001), there were a number of Saudi media studies, most which utilised the uses and gratifications model. In 1986, Al-

Attibi investigated the relationship between interpersonal communication and six other media outlets. A sample of 858 students was asked to rate 25 media-related needs. Al-Attibi found four needs for all media: cognitive (surveillance), tension-release, social, and escape. The mean scores suggested personal communication was more important than the mass media in satisfying 14 out of the 25 needs. Newspapers, television, and radio were the most helpful in satisfying cognitive (surveillance) needs, while affective needs, including entertainment, were perceived to be best gratified by personal communication.

Abuzinada (1988) measured 18 cognitive and affective gratification needs of 226 participants in Jeddah in relation to gratifications sought from: 1. Videocassette recorders, 2. Egyptian television stations, 3. Saudi Arabian Television stations, and 4. Saudi newspapers. Abuzinada used the extended family network rather than a random sampling technique and found that Saudis used VCR programming primarily to gratify entertainment-escape needs, in addition to satisfying information needs and social needs. Entertainment/escape and information were the only two gratifications sought from Saudi newspapers, Saudi television stations, and Egyptian television stations. In addition, more than 59% of the whole sample indicated their dissatisfaction with the programmes on Saudi Television Channel One and stated they spent more hours watching Egyptian television than Saudi channels.

Another media uses and gratifications study was conducted by Al-Saud (1989) who examined Saudi audience activity and involvement with television newscasts. His investigation disclosed that the Saudi news audience was actively involved with newscasts on the Saudi television Channel One.

Al-Heezan (1993) conducted a comparative study of exposure to the Saudi Arabic-language Channel One and to the English-language Channel Two in the Kingdom. He reported three motives for watching Channel One: information, entertainment, and companionship. Entertainment, information, and an alternative to Channel One were the three motivation factors for watching Channel Two. Based on the order of the factors in the analysis, Al-Heezan argued that viewers' motives for watching Saudi TV, Channel One and Channel Two were different. He deduced that Saudis watch Channel One primarily to satisfy information needs, while entertainment was the main need for Channel Two viewers. The study also shed light on whether the Saudi television audience was active or passive. Al-Heezan concluded that since Saudi audiences knew in advance what they wanted to watch, they were more active at the time of pre-exposure to the Arabic channel, Channel One, whereas the audience watching the English Channel, Channel Two was more active during exposure because they reported using the remote control to go back and forth between these two channels.

Using cognitive and affective classifications for gratifications sought from the media, Merdad (1993) studied gratifications sought from watching Saudi programmes in addition to Egyptian and Western programmes. Twenty items were constructed from previous research to measure gratifications from these three types of programmes. Five gratifications were sought from watching Saudi television; the first four were labelled cognitive and the fifth was labelled affective. Factor analysis revealed four gratifications were sought from watching Egyptian programmes and another four from watching Western programmes. Some factors were specifically named to indicate whether they met needs to be informed or to pass the time. Merdad gave one name to

both the first and fourth factors: 'entertainment/diversion', as the type of gratification Saudis most sought from terrestrial television.

Videocassette recorders which were highly used in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s were also investigated with the uses and gratification model. Al-Oofy (1990) examined, using a telephone survey, the use of videocassette recorders among Saudis. His research questionnaire included 12 need statements classified into two broad categories. Cognitive needs comprised four items that were all surveillance statements. Affective needs included eight items: to pass the time, to seek excitement, to be entertained, to overcome loneliness, to have personal opinions, to have something to talk about, to relax, and to escape. Al-Oofy reported that VCRs were more helpful in satisfying affective needs than cognitive needs. He also found females spent more time viewing programmes on videotape than males. Further, females preferred to watch Egyptian taped programmes, whereas males preferred to watch taped programmes from the USA.

In the early 1990s, satellite television was launched in the region and Saudis started to watch limited foreign channels. The first study to investigate this new phenomenon also utilised the uses and gratifications model. Bait Al-Mal (1992) carried out a study in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, among 201 students and university staff belonging to the Department of Mass Communications, King Saud University. The study applied the Uses and Gratifications and Diffusion of Innovation approaches. He found the majority (73%) of respondents watched satellite channels everyday, and the *MBC* channel, *Dubai* and *Egyptian* channels were most frequently watched, especially among high school and university respondents. Females appeared to spend more time watching satellite channels than males. They also watched serials and movies more than males.



Respondents with a higher level of education, i.e. with a Master or doctorate degree, watched English language news channels (CNN & BBC World) more than less educated participants. Respondents watched satellite channels primarily for the news and news programmes, and then cultural and entertainment programmes.

The second study related to satellite channels in Saudi Arabia was conducted in 1995 by Al-Makaty. He studied the status of direct satellite channels (DBS) in the Arab world and its impact in Saudi Arabia. He employed theoretical frameworks to examine global communication, focussing on the New World Communication and Information Order (NWCIO), the cultural/media imperialism theory, and communication and development. There is a lack of media / culture research in Saudi Arabia and the work of Al-Makaty (1995), was the first study to focus solely on the cultural imperialism thesis. He conducted a Q-study with 38 attitude statements during December 1993 to January 1994 to determine Saudi Arabians' perspective on satellite channels, the availability of which were limited at that time. The sample was 50 Saudi males. Al-Makaty identified three types of respondents: those who tended to be accepting of DBS transmissions; those who regarded DBS as a threat to Saudi society in general; and those who viewed DBS as a serious cultural threat.

Subsequent to Al-Makaty work, Marghalani (1997) conducted the third study on the uses of satellite channels in Saudi Arabia. Based on twenty-two gratification statements, the study, which was carried out in Riyadh between December 1995 and January 1996, yielded six gratifications factors. The surveillance factor came out on top, followed by the availability/variety quality factor. The intercultural factor came third while censorship and religious factors came in fourth and fifth place, respectively.

The last factor to motivate people to use satellite TV was sexual curiosity/identification. This study also indicated that additional traditional motives, such as entertainment, relaxation, and social utility, were important in attracting Saudis to satellite TV. Religious and cultural factors were the most compelling reasons for avoiding satellite channels in Saudi Arabia.

Most of the Saudi uses and gratifications media studies mentioned above, applied a quantitative questionnaire method which did not yield in-depth answers, such as why audiences chose to watch what they did, and did not give them the opportunity to explain and give reasons for their viewing habits. Moreover, most in-depth questions as to how and why Saudi people used the media were not answered completely nor in a systematic way. The aforementioned studies were PhD and Master Theses carried out in US universities, which applied the quantitative survey method in their utilisation of the uses and gratifications model, therefore, statistical data only were obtained and findings were thus somewhat superficial.

In contrast, Al-Garni (2000) in a qualitative study carried out in a UK university, examined the reasons for the Saudi media industry's dependence on imported foreign productions. In a departure from traditional dependency theory, which emphasises the role of external factors in the context of the world system, Al-Garni investigated the state of dependency and underdevelopment using a more locally grounded analysis which evaluated the role of Saudi media policies and regulatory functions in perpetuating the dependency status. He applied two methodologies. Firstly, he carried out content analyses of a two-week period of Saudi television programming on Channel One to examine the quantity and quality of both local and imported television fare in

terms of genre and format. Secondly, he conducted interviews with Saudi media officials, media policy makers, and independent local producers to ascertain, from their perspective, what exactly constrains the Saudi media industry and limits its potential, and why the Saudi media is dependent on imported television fare.

The results of the content analyses and interviews revealed political, professional and economic constraints handicap Saudi television's performance. This has led to output which is considered to be irrelevant to the needs and interests of the Saudi viewing population. It has also led to an increase in imported foreign programming and DBS popularity, thus raising concern among culturists and Islamists who object to the content which, they argue, conflicts with the basic principles of the Islamic faith.

Al-Garni concluded his study by maintaining that Saudi television's image is currently at an all time low and the Saudi broadcasting authority has to recognise and admit this image problem. While Al-Garni's study dealt in some parts with issues related to Saudi TV, foreign programmes and local culture, the current study will focus on satellite channels and their usage by Saudi young adults in the context of wider bodies of the media, cultural imperialism, and the globalisation of media and culture. Analysing the literature related to the topic, in addition to the combined use of qualitative and quantitative methods in this study, i.e., a questionnaire and focus group, will contribute in-depth information about the uses of local and foreign media in Saudi Arabia and wider the debate about the impact of the global culture on local culture.

These studies of TV usage point to particular uses made by young people of terrestrial TV and satellite. One group of studies (Najai, 1982; Al-Attibi, 1986; Bait Al-Mal,

1992) indicates that media usage by young people in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and 1990s was stimulated by the desire to gain information about the society and culture, to gain relaxation, to learn about religion, and to feel more integrated into society. The same range of factors was also found in the studies of Abuzinada (1988); Al-Heezan (1993); Al-Oofy (1990); and Marghalani (1997) who studied the use of TV and satellite by Saudi audiences in general.

Thus, findings overall point to four categories as being the recurrent reasons why people watch satellite TV and TV in Saudi Arabia as mentioned earlier by McQuail (1987: 73) who provided a typology of common reasons for media use shown in table 2.1. They are information, personal identity, integration and social interaction, and entertainment. Where differentiating between terrestrial TV and satellite TV use, factors motivating people to use satellite TV rather than terrestrial TV were: lack of surveillance and censorship, the variety of programmes, an interest in other cultures, religious issues, and sexual curiosity (Bait Al-Mal, 1992 and Marghalani, 1997).

Those studies which have examined attitudes to the quality of local TV in Saudi Arabia have found a high level of dissatisfaction amongst viewers with local services before the introduction of satellite channels (Abuzinada, 1988) and after the widespread use of satellite channels (Al-Garni, 2000). The latter study argues that this dissatisfaction has led to the popularity of direct satellite broadcasting in Saudi Arabia. More importantly, the studies of Bait Al-Mal (1992), Al-Makaty (1995), Marghalani (1997) and Al-Garni (2000) have pointed to the widespread use of direct satellite broadcasting in Saudi Arabia amongst both young and old people, and also the widely held view that they having undesirable influence on the local culture.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

This survey of literature has pointed to a number of conceptual and theoretical issues which will be explored further in this dissertation.

Within the literature on cultural imperialism and the processes of globalisation, there is little work on Saudi Arabia specifically examining how direct satellite broadcast usage relates to these processes. This study does this by exploring aspects of DBS uses amongst young Saudi adults. It seeks to clarify the extent to which such usages supports, modifies or undermines the idea that 'local' cultures are being threatened by transnational satellite broadcasting. In so doing, it will make an empirically grounded contribution to the conceptual work on globalisation and the media.

Further, by building on and extending the tradition of research in the Saudi media outlined above using qualitative and quantitative methods, it will explore actual use of satellite, the impact of that use on the usage of other media, and user perceptions of the relationship between their practice and cultural values.

Finally, it will draw on the empirical work to highlight some of the implications of satellite use by young Saudi adults for the culture of Saudi Arabia, whilst acknowledging that such an activity can provide valuable, but not definitive, insights.

**CHAPTER THREE**

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines and discusses the methods employed in this study. It describes the two key primary data collecting techniques, a quantitative survey of young adults and a series of in-depth focus groups, used to obtain information about young adults' uses of the media in general, and satellite TV in particular, in Saudi Arabia. This combination of methods was relatively novel in the field context.

Whilst there have been a number of studies of TV and satellite audiences in Saudi Arabia (Boyd, 1972; Al-Heezan, 1993; Merdad, 1993; Al-Oofy, 1994; Al-Makaty, 1995; Margahlani, *et al.* (1998), these have neither systematically examined the qualitative dimensions of satellite usage in relation to quantitative data, nor addressed their findings directly to the wider debate about the cultural impact of satellite communications in the Kingdom. In addition, several scholars, such as Blumler, Gurevitch, and Katz (1985), have urged researchers to conduct more cultural investigations into media use. The aims of this study are as follows:

- To analyse the literature on the media, culture and satellite usage in Saudi Arabia in the context of wider bodies of literature on global media and cultural imperialism, and the way audiences use satellite channels.
- To determine the ways in which satellite channels are used by young adults in Saudi Arabia.
- To analyse the implications of satellite usage by young adults for culture in Saudi Arabia.

Aim one was addressed through the use of a literature search and review. Aim two was explored using a questionnaire and focus groups. Aim three was addressed through the analysis of the data in relation to the theoretical issues covered in the literature review.

After deciding the area of research and defining the research problem, the researcher reviewed the literature on the research topic. The combination of a questionnaire survey and focus group was decided as the most appropriate research method for the gathering of data. This combination of methods is completely new in Saudi media research. When integrated them to speak as one voice, they will provide - in a systematic way - the needed reliable qualitative and quantitative data about Saudi young peoples' uses of satellite television.

A period of research design followed, in which both the questionnaire survey and focus group questions were tested in order to determine how effectively they answered the main research questions briefly restated below:

- RQ1: How are young Saudi adults using satellite TV?
- RQ2: Are there any effects of using satellite TV on the usage of other media?
- RQ3: What kinds of influence does watching satellite television have on the activities of Saudi young adults and their attitudes towards Western culture?

After the pilot study, extensive field research was undertaken in Saudi Arabia. The result was the accumulation of a substantial data set derived from 438 completed questionnaires and eight focus group sessions involving 51 individuals. This chapter describes the research methods in detail.



### 3.2 Reviewing the Literature

After defining the research problem, the researcher reviewed the literature related to the study subject to become familiar with project topics, gain an overview of the subject area, and obtain a wide range of related materials. Hansen *et al.* (1998) argue that ‘A good literature search not only maps the area of work but establishes the foundations for the whole project’. (p:74).

In the preliminary stage, reviewing the literature enables the researcher to become familiar with previous works in the area and to define what it is the study intends to focus on and what sort of gaps in the literature are apparent. It helps the researcher decide on the most appropriate search method, or combination of methods, for the collecting of data. Hart (2001) identified five good reasons for searching the literature when beginning a research project. He stated that a search of the literature:

1. will help the researcher identify work already done or in progress that is relevant to his work;
2. will prevent him from duplicating what has already been done;
3. will help him avoid some of the pitfalls and errors of previous research;
4. will help him design the methodology for his project by identifying the key issues and data collection techniques best suited to his topic;
5. will enable the researcher to find gaps in existing research, thereby giving him a unique topic. (p:3)

I have planned a comprehensive search of the literature on this topic. I have read around the subject such as previous research into the field, media and culture books and journals, documents, government reports, statements and announcements, policies towards the media in general and satellite TV in particular, related topics in Saudi

magazines and newspapers, and Internet searching. Further, I have informally interviewed some individuals in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia whose understanding of the subject matter might be helpful in interpreting terms and concepts, events, policies, and the like. I set up a physical filing system, files on computer with back-up and sometimes printouts copies to avoid repeating work I have already done, searching and reviewing the literature started from the beginning of this project and continued throughout the research period.

### **3.3 Questionnaire and Focus Group Timetable**

The survey study and focus group questions were piloted between mid December 2000 and mid February 2001 at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. After amendment and modification, the main fieldwork was undertaken from March 2001 to July 2001. Table 3.1 outlines the research timetable from December 2000 – July 2001.

STEPS	PLACE	DATE
Construction of the first draft questionnaire in English and preliminary focus group questions.	UK	10-12- 2000
Completion of the translation of the questionnaire into Arabic	SA	5-1-2001
Piloting the questionnaire	SA	10-1 to 25-1-2001
Revision of focus group questions	SA	3-2 to 7-2-2001
Piloting focus group questions (two groups)	SA	8-2 & 11-2-2001
Reconstruction of the final draft of the questionnaire and modification of the focus group questions	UK	16-2 to 20-3-2001
Distribution of the questionnaire	SA	27-3 to 11-4-2001
Data derived from questionnaires entered into the Windows SPSS programme.	SA	16-4-2001
Final draft of focus group questions	SA	4-5-2001
Conducting focus groups	SA	7-5 to 28-5-2001
Commencing data analysis	SA & UK	July 2001

Table 3.1 Questionnaire and Focus group Timetable (December 2000 – July 2001)

### 3.4 Questionnaire Survey

#### 3.4.1 Advantages and disadvantages

The researcher employed the survey ‘questionnaire’ technique to collect data for the study. This technique was chosen because of its usefulness in gathering information in a relatively short time from a large population. Hansen *et al.* (1998) describe survey research as follows:

Survey research usually seeks to provide empirical data collected from a population of respondents on a whole number of topics or issues. Sometimes, the data is used to lend support to, or to negate, hypotheses or propositions, but

at other times it can simply provide basic information on existing or changing patterns of behaviour. In the 'new media of cable and satellite broadcasting', a survey could identify not only who takes up these media but also why (Hansen et. al. 1998: 225)

Questionnaires are beneficial and valuable tools when seeking information about what people think, and their beliefs or their explanations for their attitudes and individual receptions (Coolican, 1995). They are one of the measurement devices frequently used by researchers who need reliable quantitative data about audiences on a large scale in a systematic way (Gunter, 2000).

Most researchers who have investigated the Saudi mass media have used questionnaires. The majority of them have written media MA theses and Ph.D. dissertations at Western universities, especially in the USA (Boyd, 1972; Najai, 1982; Abuzinada, 1988; Al-Amoudi 1990; Al-Oofy, 1990; Merdad, 1993; Al-Makaty, 1998; Al-Muaither, 2001). Past researchers in Saudi Arabia have found that self-administrated questionnaires provide more effective means of information gathering in the Kingdom for its advantages explained in this section. (Al-Amoudi, 1987; Abuzinada, 1988; Boyd and Asi, 1991). A major advantage of developing questionnaires for this study is they allow respondents privacy. Saudis do not feel happy about sharing in public opinions that may be considered to be against Islam or expressing views that may be unacceptable to the local community. Questionnaires also give students the necessary time to fill in the information needed and are efficient tools for obtaining the necessary data.

The questionnaire was also deemed a suitable method for collecting the data required for this study in view of the sensitivity of some of the issues raised in the questions, which deal with the media in Saudi culture. This methodology was also appropriate for the Saudi cultural milieu which requires the separation of unrelated males and females in one setting. The self-administration method employed here gave respondents the opportunity to express their opinions more freely, especially Saudi females, who cannot have contact with a male researcher.

Anonymity was another very important factor to Saudis because of the sensitivity of the research subject, which deals with satellite television. Talking about satellite television in Saudi Arabia can sometimes generate political debates, or involve the expression of views which oppose government policy, or the admission of watching sexually explicit material which is unacceptable according to the laws and principles of Islam.

However, the survey method has several disadvantages. Hansen *et al.* pointed to two major disadvantages of using the survey method as follows: 'it cannot go deeply into responses given by respondents and it assumes the answers given are, more or less, truthful. In contrast, in-depth interviewing can often pick up on contradictions and play around with responses' (1998: 233). The questionnaire does not usually allow space for an on-going, in-depth investigation of attitudes and opinions. Hansen has concluded that these two methods should not be seen as antagonistic but combined they can be used to good effect (*ibid*).

Berger (2000) argues that one of the disadvantages of self-administered questionnaires is that people may misinterpret questions. He has outlined the advantages and disadvantages of the self-administered questionnaire as shown in table 3.2 below:

### Self-Administered Questionnaires

<i>Advantages</i>	<i>Disadvantages</i>
Inexpensive	People may misinterpret questions
No interviewer bias is involved	Low response rates are the norm
Questions can be on very personal matters.	It is not known who actually filled out the questionnaire.
Questions can be complex and detailed	Sampling errors are frequent

Table 3.2 strengths and weaknesses of self-administered questionnaires

Source: Berger (2000:190)

#### 3.4.2 Sample population

The researcher has chosen young adults in Saudi Arabia as the sample for this study. Young adults and teenagers are those in Saudi Arabia most influenced by different television channels as previous studies have shown (Al-Oofy, 1986; Abuzinada, 1988; Al-Oofy, 1990). They are also a sector of the Saudi community which has access to satellite channels. Also, they are an easy group to reach. They constitute a large social cross section assembled in one area, i.e. university campus.

The sample population was selected from King Abdul-Aziz University (KAU) in Jeddah, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There were many reasons for this choice. First, KAU has students from all the regions of SA. It is the second largest university in the Kingdom, with a population of 25,181 students in 1999/2000 (Ministry of

Information, 2000), thus the researcher had access to young Saudi adults from across the country, in one place. Another reason for this choice of population was that Jeddah is the second largest city in the Kingdom, but, as yet, no studies have investigated the use of satellite television exclusively in this city. The previous studies about satellite television have chosen the whole country or Riyadh, the capital of SA, as the study location (Bait Al-Mal, 1992; Al-Oofy, 1994; Al-Makaty, 1995; Marghalani, 1997).

A third reason for choosing this sample population was that undergraduate students are an accessible and relatively distinct section of the young adult population, and therefore suitable for investigation purposes. Due to cultural factors, as previously stated, access to females for research purposes is difficult in Saudi Arabia. The researcher could gain access to females in this age group more readily in a university setting than elsewhere. Finally, the researcher was able to solicit the help of university staff since they are familiar with data collection for scientific studies and other types of research.

### **3.4.3 Permission for the field study**

In order to gain permission to conduct the study the researcher presented the following items to KAU:

- A letter of introduction and request for assistance from the researcher's study supervisor (See Appendix D)
- An official letter from the Saudi Cultural Office in London. (See Appendix D)

These two letters, which outlined the research topic, enabled the researcher to obtain research data required from other sources, including government and private institutions. At King Abdul-Aziz University, the researcher requested the assistance of

staff involved in teaching to encourage students to fill out the questionnaire during a suitable period within the university timetable.

#### **3.4.4 Sample size and procedure**

A main purpose of this study was to examine the uses of satellite television amongst young adults in SA, therefore, the full study sample for this study was selected randomly from four levels of two types of courses compulsory for all university students. The courses were Arabic language skills (101 and 102) and Islamic studies (101, 102, 103, and 104). These courses draw students from all grades of all colleges and departments and, therefore, provided a fair and representative sample of all the students enrolled at the university.

The researcher was assisted by staff members from the Arabic Language department and the Islamic Studies department in the College of Humanities on the male and female campus. Two classes (one male and one female) were selected from each of the aforementioned courses, making in total 12 male classes and 12 female classes. Twenty students were selected randomly from each class, making a total of 480 students.

To gather data from male students, the researcher sought the help of staff members of each course. Letters from the heads of the Islamic Studies and Arabic language departments were sent to staff members to solicit their assistance in encouraging students to participate in the research. Staff members allowed the researcher to meet the students in each class in order to introduce his project and give instructions for participation in the questionnaire survey. Letters from the head of the female campus



were sent to staff members asking them to give the researcher's wife and niece assistance in collecting data from female students (See Appendix D, for departmental letters to male and female staff members).

Questionnaires were distributed during class time, which usually took about 12 –20 minutes to complete. Male and female students completed a total of 240 questionnaires each (480 in total). However, 42 questionnaires were excluded from the final analysis due to incomplete data, leaving 438 useable surveys.

#### **3.4.5 Questionnaire preliminary questions:**

The researcher with guidance and advice from his supervisor created a wide range of questions for inclusion in the questionnaire. He developed a draft questionnaire to elicit answers to the key research questions. He then submitted the first draft to his supervisor for comments and to two other staff members in the same department. The questions focused on four areas to accomplish the research aims. The first group of questions asked students about their uses of newspapers, magazines, the Internet, radio, and terrestrial television. The second group asked specifically about the use of satellite channels among young adults in Saudi Arabia. This part of the questionnaire included questions about duration of satellite dish ownership, the number of hours respondents spent watching satellite channels, access to satellite channels, the programmes and channels they preferred, and motives for use of satellite channels. The third group of questions was designed to detect any cultural change amongst young Saudi adults who watched foreign channels. Questions explored the influences of watching satellite channels on the way of life in SA, habits and traditions, and also investigated the use of

foreign languages and extent of travel outside SA. The final group of questions provided socio-demographic data such as students' age, annual income, region, place of study, family situation, etc.

### 3.4.6 Piloting the questionnaire

The pilot study helped the researcher discover unforeseen problems in his questionnaire and focus group questions, prior to undertaking the final part of the study. Seal (1998) has commented:

The best way to find out whether a question 'works' is to try it out on a number of people. One of the more common problems that such piloting of a question can then reveal is that it is not answerable, or that its meaning is ambiguous. The respondent may say that he or she doesn't really understand what the question is getting at, or may give a reply that reveals he or she has interpreted it in a very different way from what was intended. Practice in designing questions, trying them out and revising them will improve the researcher's skills in making good questions. (131)

Berger (2000) also indicates that one of the important stages in the development of a survey instrument is to carry out a pilot study: 'a test survey and questionnaire on a small group of people to see what problems arise'. He advises the researcher to consider the following questions when assessing the pilot study:

- Can people easily understand all his questions?
- Do his questions enable him to obtain the information he wants to obtain?
- Are there questions he didn't ask that he should have asked?
- Are there questions he asked that he shouldn't have asked?
- Does his pilot suggest that he should try a different method of data collection? (198)

During the period January and February 2001 the researcher piloted the questionnaire and focus group questions in Saudi Arabia. He returned to the UK to modify the questionnaire and the focus group questions before conducting the final field study during his second visit to Saudi Arabia (see appendix A for questionnaire used in the pilot study). The pilot study took place in Jeddah at King Abdul-Aziz University. The objective here was to distribute the questionnaire to Saudi students and interview several who were capable of providing data about satellite television use by young adults in Saudi Arabia in order to:

- 1) Identify and gain a better understanding of the population under investigation;
- 2) Obtain an early sense of which needs are important among young Saudi adults and to test whether or not the items adopted from the literature are meaningful to them;
- 3) Discover items appropriate for Saudi culture for inclusion in a planned focus group.

The sample for the pilot questionnaire survey was selected randomly from multi-sectional courses compulsory for students at all levels, such as Arabic language skills and Islamic studies. Male and female classes were selected randomly, and 40 students were randomly selected from four classes (two male and two female classes). The piloted respondents suggested some changes and comments, which helped the researcher when he revised the final questions for both questionnaire and focus group.

#### **3.4.7 Analysis and results of the pilot questionnaire**

After collecting the questionnaires, the researcher returned to the UK to meet his supervisor, and with the benefit of his guidance and a discussion of the preliminary

results, he began a full analysis of the whole set of data and reconstruction of the questionnaire. All data was coded into numerical values and fed into a computer using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) in order to generate frequencies and percentages of different types of responses and ascertain correlation between variables. Three questionnaires were excluded from the final pilot analysis due to incomplete data, leaving 37 useable surveys. However, because of the limited number of respondents in the pilot questionnaire the computer was unable to make correlations between different variables.

There were many important advantages of undertaking an analysis of the findings derived from the pilot questionnaire before finalising the questionnaire and conducting the field study. The researcher discovered problems related to coding and the analysis of certain variables. Answers to some questions were found to indicate confusion, requiring the researcher to modify, reduce or expand choices, provide explanation before some questions, transfer others to a scale of choices, and add questions and choices in order to provide some missed information related to the key questions.

#### **3.4.8 Questionnaire modifications and changes**

After collecting the questionnaires completed by students, and to make construction of the final draft easier, the researcher immediately wrote down comments suggested by students. Comments and suggestions were also collected from three staff members at the University of Glamorgan and King Abdul-Aziz University and from colleagues and friends in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. Their comments and suggestions together with the researcher's notes resulted in some changes to the questionnaire. The

questionnaire was revised before being distributed for final application for this study (see appendices A and B). Changes and modifications resulting from the pilot study are detailed below.

- Because of cultural factors, some minor changes were made to the Arabic draft of the questionnaire. These changes did not, however, alter the English meaning of any single word or sentence. For instance, the Arabic form of talking to a female from that used for a male.
- The translation of some words (sex, erotic... etc.) had to be indirect; and some words which have different meanings, or no Arabic synonyms (terrestrial, scrambled .etc), were translated into sentences that explained more accurately the English meaning.
- In questions 1b, 2b and 4c, which asked about type of newspapers, magazines and radio stations, respectively, students read/listened to, there were four options and students were asked to indicate one of them:

- |                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. ( ) Domestic (in Arabic) | 2. ( ) Domestic (in English) |
| 3. ( ) Foreign (Arabic)     | 4. ( ) Foreign (Non Arabic)  |

Each one of these questions was followed by an open-ended question asking students to write down their top five favourite newspapers, magazines, and radio stations, respectively. The researcher found that answers to the second group of questions were virtually a duplication of answers to the first group of questions because the available media in SA is limited. The researcher therefore removed questions 1b, 2b, and 4c and retained the second group of questions.

- In questions 1d, 2d, 4d, which asked students to write down their top five favourite newspapers, magazines, and radio stations, respectively, most students did not write five names of each type of media for the reason given above, that is the limited availability of media in SA. In addition, the incomplete answers to these questions resulted in much of missing information when the data was analysed. Therefore, the researcher modified the questions by asking students to list three, instead of five, top newspapers, magazines and radio stations they preferred in order of use.
- Question 3c, an open ended question, endeavoured to determine the web sites most frequently visited by young adults in SA. Students' answers resulted in a large number of site names and addresses that were very difficult to analyse. Therefore, the researcher changed this question to incorporate a three-point scale: Always, Sometimes and Never, and to request participants to indicate one option for each one of ten following web sites: music, news and events, chat & people, shopping, love & relationships, erotica, computing, games and entertainment, education, and sports. (See appendices A and B).
- Questions 6 asked students which terrestrial channel they watched and question 7 asked how many hours they spent watching it daily. As there are only two available terrestrial channels, Saudi channel 1 and Saudi channel 2, the researcher merged these two questions into one, incorporating a five-point scale to indicate the number of hours students spent watching each channel, ranging from 'never watch it' to 'watch it daily for more than five hours' (See appendices A and B).

- Questions 13a and 32b asked respondents on which days they preferred to watch terrestrial TV and satellite TV. Students found it difficult deciding which days to select out of the seven days listed (Monday to Sunday). The revised question asked them to choose one option only from three: weekdays, weekends, or both. This made it easier for respondents to answer the question and at the same time it was easier for the researcher to analyse the results (See appendices A and B).
- Questions 26 and 27 asked students to write down the ten channels they watched most and the ten channels they preferred, respectively. Although the researcher provided a heading before each of the questions pointing out there was a difference between the channels students watched most and the channels they preferred, students' answers to both questions were almost always the same or they failed to answer the second question. Some, in fact, wrote 'same as above' or 'what is the difference?' To avoid misunderstanding, the researcher combined the two questions into one, asking the study sample to name the satellite channels they most preferred watching in order of preference from 1 to 5. Another observation was that only a small number of students named ten channels; most named between 4 and 7. The revised question therefore asked students to rank five channels. They did this more carefully and without omissions, yielding sufficient data for analysis (See appendices A and B).
- Question 29 asked students from which country/countries the programmes they preferred to watch originated. The original list of categories was reduced from fourteen to seven to make the analysis of results easier (See appendices A and B).

- In question 33 students were asked their age. To make analysis easier, three new categories were introduced: 18-20 years, 21-23 years, and 24 years or over. According to the pilot survey results, since all respondents were students, their ages were mostly between 18 and 25 (See appendices A and B).
- Question 35 asked students what subject they were studying. Pilot survey results showed respondents provided more than twenty different subjects. Although some students were in the same college or departments they were studying different specialities. This question was subsequently changed to ask students to indicate one main college only, making it easier for students to answer and the researcher to analyse findings (See appendices A and B).
- While most students in the pilot study indicated they preferred watching terrestrial television between 06.00 pm and 12.00 pm, an anticipated response, a considerable number of students gave between 12.00 pm to 06.00 am as their preferred time for watching satellite television. This result led the researcher to include a question presenting six possible reasons why sample members wanted to view satellite channels late at night. Students were asked to rate them according to a five-point scale ranging from 1 'strongly agree' to 5 'strongly disagree' (See appendix B).

After the pilot questionnaire results were analysed, it was clear to the researcher that he had not obtained well defined answers to two important aspects: the impact of satellite TV on young adults' other activities and the main reasons for watching satellite television. Therefore, two scaled questions dealing with these two aspects were added (See appendix B).



The questionnaire was finally divided into four separate sections, each one starting with question number 1. Numbering in the piloted questionnaire had been from question number 1 to question number 43 (some with sub questions). However, the ultimate strategy altered students' first impression of a lengthy questionnaire and a possible reluctance to answer it.

Finally, an open question was added at the end of the questionnaire asking respondents to write their comments about satellite channels and programmes.

#### **3.4.9 The final draft questionnaire**

The final questionnaire for this study consisted of four main sections (See appendix B). Section one comprised four main questions dealing with the uses of newspapers, magazines, the Internet, and radio. The second section consisted of eight questions asking students about their uses of terrestrial television. The third section consisted of sixteen questions asking specifically about satellite television uses among young adults in Saudi Arabia and their influence on the local culture. The final section included socio-demographic items, such as gender, age, nationality, family's monthly income, ability to speak other languages, and so on. On the front page of the questionnaire the researcher assured respondents that he would use their answers only for scientific purposes and no individual's identification would be required. He asked respondents to read all the questions carefully and to be open and honest in their opinions.

Different statistical measurements ranging from yes / no answers to a 5 point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, disagree, strongly disagree) were used to investigate each concept in the questionnaire. Most previous Saudi studies related to

this research topic had avoided using open-ended questions, yet the researcher found it necessary to include some, despite the difficulties they caused at the time of data analysis. No previous media study in Saudi Arabia had asked respondents using open-ended questions to name and rank in order of preference their favourite newspapers, magazines, radio stations and satellite channels. This technique resulted in a rich, solid amount of data very beneficial not only for this study, but also for any future study of the media in Saudi society.

#### **3.4.10 Validity of the questionnaire and focus group questions**

To ascertain whether or not the questionnaire survey and focus group questions designed for this study were valid, the following steps were carried out:

Step 1: The pilot, then the final questionnaire and focus group questions were presented to a number of postgraduate colleagues and friends involved in postgraduate studies at the University of Glamorgan and Cardiff University for validation, to seek their comments and suggestions.

Step 2: An Arabian PhD student, studying linguistics in the UK made the translation from English into Arabic, the respondents' native language. He had experience of translation work and teaching English as a Second Language.

Step 3: The translation was double-checked by a Saudi teacher in the Humanities College at King Abdul-Aziz University in Saudi Arabia, a PhD holder, teaching English as a Second Language.

Step 4: The English version was presented to the researcher's study supervisor, and both the English and Arabic versions were shown to Dr. Ali Al-Garni in the Mass Communications Department at King Abdul-Aziz University.

Step 5: The final draft was checked by two statisticians, Dr. Noori and Mr. Ali Solyman at King Abdul-Aziz University, to obtain their suggestions for data coding to ensure computer entry and analysis would be without error.

### **3.5 Focus Group**

#### **3.5.1 Definition and brief history**

The focus group has been defined by Krueger and Casey as 'a special type of group in terms of purpose, size, composition, and procedures' (2000:5). They then specify the purpose of the focus group as listening and gathering information to better understand how people feel or think about an issue, product, or service (ibid). A focus group is a carefully planned series of discussions conducted always with similar types of participants who have been selected because they have certain characteristics in common that relate to the topic. The discussions are then analysed carefully and systematically (ibid).

Focus groups began with Robert Merton in 1941. In one of the first focus group studies, Merton explored morale in the US military and found people revealed sensitive information when they felt they were in a safe, comfortable place with people like themselves (Krueger and Casey, 2000; Morrison, 1998). In his article on the focused interview and focus groups (Merton, 1987) he traced the conception and development of the method back to the early 1940s. He referred to radio audience research at the

University of Colombia with Paul Lazarsfeld at the Colombia office of radio research, and to research on film audiences.

While academics began rediscovering the focus group interview in the 1980s, often learning from market researchers, they nevertheless returned to the work of Merton to learn how the technique was originally used (cited in Krueger and Casey, 2000). The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the increasing use of the survey method for media research, paying particular attention to studying the effects of the media on audiences. Since then the concern in the field has moved gradually to exploring the relationship between audiences and the media (Hansen *et al.* 1998). Researchers have turned away from the traditional concept of influence and effects on audience behaviour and beliefs 'toward concerns with how audiences interpret, make sense of, use, interact with, and create meaning out of media content and media technologies' (ibid: 259). This new movement using different approaches, such as cultivation analysis, agenda setting, and uses and gratifications to gather data, has involved focus group interviews alongside participant observation and the ethnography method. These methods have rejected the traditional quantitative approach to the audience media relationship (ibid).

### **3.5.2 Combining the focus group and the questionnaire survey**

The main objective of conducting focus groups in this study was to facilitate group discussions with Saudi young adults capable of providing a high quality discussion about satellite television use by young adults in Saudi Arabia in order to gain a better understanding of the population under investigation. The purpose was also to incorporate this technique into the research method in order to ask, and explore in

depth, questions that had not been answered adequately in the questionnaire. Morrison states that the focus group, with its ability to explore meaning, helps to reduce the imposition of meaning in questions asked in a survey. He adds that if the survey occurs before the focus group is conducted, the latter will assist in the explanation of findings by revealing what might be going on 'behind' the figures. (1998: 159)

Researchers, such as Hansen *et al.* (1998), emphasise the benefits of combining qualitative and quantitative procedures, resulting in a methodological variety that strengthens the research design. Another advantage of focus group interviews over other research methods, especially individual interviews, is that participants react to one another, as well as to the interviewer. They are likely to relax and interact more naturally. Further, they have the opportunity to "pick up on" and react to one another's comments and responses, creating a rich set of data (Priest, 1995). In relation to quantitative methods, Krueger (1994) comments:

"Focus group interviews can be used before quantitative study, during a quantitative study, after a quantitative study, or independent of other methodological procedures. The decision to use a methodological mix is often made in the planning stages at the beginning of the study" (1994: 30).

In this study, the researcher conducted focus groups after analysing the data obtained from the questionnaire. He avoided repetition of some of the quantitative questions used in the questionnaire earlier which had produced fairly complete and meaningful answers taking on board the point made by Morrison (1998) that focus groups need to be used as a complement to, not a substitute for, survey work in mass communications research. In-depth questions were used in the focus groups, especially when discussing

the relationship between the audience and satellite channels and the relationship between satellite channels and local culture.

### **3.5.3 Steps in focus group research**

There are several steps involved in conducting successful focus group discussions. Hansen *et al.* (1998); Krueger (1994); Krueger and Casey (2000) and Morrison (1998) have identified several steps involved in conducting a focus group. The researcher used these as guidelines in order to successfully plan and conduct the focus groups in this study.

### **3.5.4 Piloting focus group questions**

The focus group interviews in this study were semi structured. Berger (2000) outlines three widely recognised types of focus group research questions i.e. structured, semi structured and unstructured as follows:

1. *Unstructured interviews.* In these interviews, the researcher is focused and is trying to gain information, but he or she exercises relatively little control over the responses of the informant.
2. *Semi structured interviews.* The interviewer usually has a written list of questions to ask the informant but tries, to the extent possible, to maintain the casual quality found in unstructured interviews. Focus groups are considered to be semi structured interviews.
3. *Structured interviews.* The researcher uses an interview schedule- a specific set of instructions that guide those who ask respondents for answers to questions. For example, the instructions might tell what follow-up questions to ask if a question is answered in a certain way. (p.112)

The researcher benefited from the questionnaire answers to construct the preliminary focus group questions. As a result, he used different types of general questions to introduce the topic of the study. For example: What is your favourite newspaper? Why do you prefer it? What is your favourite magazine? Why do you prefer it? What is your favourite radio station? Why do you prefer it? What is your favourite satellite channel? Why do you prefer it? Other questions in the focus group pilot study concentrated on satellite and terrestrial television viewing, such as: where do you prefer to watch satellite television/terrestrial television? What time do you prefer to watch satellite television, terrestrial television and why?

The researcher also employed several questions to determine the influence of watching foreign channels and programmes on satellite television on young Saudi adults in terms of religion, watching and listening to Saudi songs and music, dress and haircut, watching Saudi channels and programmes, etc.

The researcher then interviewed two groups of students separately at KAU in Jeddah. The first group consisted of five students while the second group comprised seven students. The twelve participants were drawn from different levels and colleges of the university. The first focus group lasted 70 minutes while the second lasted approximately 50 minutes. Most of the questions were semi-structured and all participants were asked to explain their usage of different media, and of satellite television in particular. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, then analysed qualitatively. The researcher started by reading through the interview transcripts several times. He then developed categories to classify responses, statements and opinions, coded them, and summarised each statement to find out the major results.

The main changes made to focus group questions were the cancellation of questions which asked about students' favourite newspapers, magazines, radio station, and their use of the Internet. The results of these questions did not add new significant data to the data obtained from questionnaires. Since the time for each group interview was limited, the researcher decided to benefit from the time these questions had occupied to cover more important points related to satellite channels and culture. The questions about influences of watching satellite channels on other media usages remained among the final draft questions.

During the piloting of the focus group, the researcher observed that at the very beginning the majority of the students compared Saudi TV with satellite channels and were critical of the former. The researcher therefore added questions which covered the most important issues that had arisen during the pilot focus groups. Thus, students were asked questions which compared satellite channels and terrestrial (Saudi) TV in respect of sport, music, news, films and serials. The researcher decided to keep these questions to the last part of the focus group, making it clear to students that the final part of the procedure would be used to discuss in more detail the issues they had raised.

### **3.5.5 Sampling and recruitment of groups**

As mentioned above, this study took place in Jeddah at King Abdul-Aziz University. The participants in this study were students selected randomly from groups that watched satellite TV, from different academic courses, and from different levels of study. While collecting questionnaire data, the researcher sought students willing to participate in focus groups, the purpose of which had been explained briefly to them in



most of the classes visited. He made a list of students agreeable to taking part in the focus group, and other students, who had been selected randomly by their teachers, and then agreed to participate. The researcher contacted these students again after arranging the group discussion location and setting the times of each group meeting. The researcher then provided participants with written detailed information about the focus group they were to attend. It contained brief details about the purpose of the focus group, the topic, time, place and anticipated duration. Focus group participants were from across Saudi Arabia.

During his field study in Saudi Arabia, the researcher interviewed eight groups of students between 7 May 2001 and 28 May 2001. Krueger and Casey recommend researchers conduct three or four focus groups with any one type of participant, to determine whether they have reached saturation. They define saturation as 'a term used to describe the point when you have heard the range of ideas and are not getting any new information' (2000: 26). They suggest more groups if the researcher is still obtaining new information after three or four focus groups, or separating the participants into different groups, males and females, for example, so that he can compare and contrast how certain types of people talk about an issue.

Initially, the researcher conducted five focus groups with students from different departments and academic courses. Four groups comprised specific students from particular departments while the fifth focus group included students from different departments. There were two reasons for this. First, some groups were invited to participate in the research with the help of a university member of staff from a specific department; therefore, group members were drawn from a specific department. Second,

the researcher wanted to deliberately avoid mixing the groups to see whether each group's opinions were similar or different according to their major course of study. A comparison between groups was undertaken after conducting the five focus groups. The researcher did not find major differences in opinion between groups according to their field of study. He conducted another three focus groups but he did not obtain information different from that already obtained from the first five focus groups.

The total number of students in all groups was 51, representing different departments. As illustrated in Table 3.3, each focus group consisted of 5-8 students, who all contributed to the discussion and debate. Krueger and Casey (2000) indicate that focus groups are typically composed of five to ten people, but size can range from as few as four to as many as twelve. Hansen *et al.* (1998) suggest that the ideal group size for audience studies is between six and ten.

It must be noted that the participants in focus groups for this study were males only. Female students were not included in this focus group due to cultural restrictions in Saudi Arabia which prohibited the researcher from meeting females who were not immediate family members. Table 3.3 shows focus group participants and their departments.

<b>Group</b>	<b>College or Department</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>
1	Humanities	7
2	Business	6
3	Mixed	8
4	Media (in Humanities)	6
5	Science	5
6	Mixed	6
7	Engineering	7
8	Mixed	6
<b>Total</b>		<b>51 students</b>

Table 3.3: Focus group participants and their departments

### 3.5.6 Designing questions for the focus group

To obtain the best results from the focus group, the researcher used different types of questions. First, he started discussions by asking questions to introduce the topic under investigation. These questions acted as icebreakers between the researcher and participants. Usually they were general questions such as: What is your favourite satellite channel, or the channel you watch most? Why do you prefer it? etc. Although some suggest requesting participants in focus groups to introduce themselves, for instance, revealing their names, occupations, hobbies, etc. (Kruger. 1994), the researcher did not do this because anonymity was very important in the present study since it encouraged the Saudi students to participating in the discussion to express their opinions more openly and freely.

Another type of question used in the focus group was the key questions which are the main research questions and sub questions. Key questions were very important because most of the detailed answers were gained from them. Key questions were divided into three groups: questions about satellite television viewing, questions focussing on terrestrial TV viewing; and questions about the influence of young Saudi adults' viewing habits on local culture.

The third group of questions was used in the last ten minutes of the focus group. These questions reviewed comparisons between satellite channels and terrestrial (Saudi) TV, and asked all focus group participants to express their final opinions on the issues discussed. The following shows the main points covered by the focus group questions:

- Preferred Channels / Programmes and viewing habits
  - Top favourite satellite channel
  - Top favourite programmes categories
  - Satellite channel viewing habits
  - Terrestrial channel viewing habits
  
- Most Westernised Arabian channels
  
- Satellite channels used to watch sexually explicit programmes
  
- Influence of watching satellite channels on local culture
  - Influence on religion
  - Influence on Saudi music
  - Influence on dress and hairstyle
  
- Terrestrial (Saudi) Television vs. satellite channels
  - Sport and matches
  - Music

News

Films and serials

### **3.5.7 Location of focus group interviews**

KA University was the best location choice for gathering students together. The researcher obtained a great deal of help from university staff members in arranging formal rooms in which to conduct the focus group. It was more convenient for students to participate in a group discussion on the university campus than invite them to a location far from their homes which needed to be booked at a time not convenient to all students. Hansen *et al.* (1998) point out that the location chosen for focus groups will differ depending on the purpose of the research, convenience, and practical feasibility. They refer to different examples, such as Liebes and Katz (1990) who held the focus group in people's homes, Gamson (1992) who involved people in discussion in their gardens rather than in a formal setting, and Schlesinger *et al.* (1992) who held the majority of their focus groups in a university setting.

### **3.5.8 The moderator**

The researcher was also the moderator for this study. He was familiar with the research topic that might have been a sensitive issue in Saudi Arabia. The value of this is undisputed. He directed the discussion and controlled its tone to keep the conversation flowing within the domain of each specific topic. The researcher tried hard to ensure all participants took the discussion seriously and strove to make them feel comfortable with the topic under discussion.

The collection of data for scientific research using focus group interviews is a relatively new approach in the Saudi community. The researcher was worried that he might get a weak response from students, either low attendance, inactivity in discussion, or reluctance to express personal opinions. Despite some difficulty experienced in convincing students of the importance of participating in interviews as well as in fixing a place and time suitable for all students, the researcher was agreeably surprised by the immediate positive interaction of those who participated after the start of each group session. With the help of the researcher acting as moderator they willingly expressed their points of view, whether supporting or opposing the argument with openness and confidence. The researcher was pleased by the students' active participation and by the valuable information they contributed to his research.

### **3.5.9 Focus group guidance**

The researcher briefly introduced himself to the participants, explaining the purpose of the group discussion and informing them that their responses were being recorded. Through the early questions the researcher asked introductory questions which usually were general questions to warm participants up, such as the names of satellite TV channels and programmes mostly preferred by each student, and make participants more amenable to discussing more specific matters. He encouraged them to openly express their views on the issues specified.

The researcher used a range of questions (see section 3.5.6, and chapter 7, section 2) from general open questions to specific topics using structured questions. All group sessions ended with final questions that considered the significance of comparisons between satellite TV and terrestrial (Saudi) TV. The researcher summarised the

important points raised during the discussions and gave all participants the opportunity to express their final opinions.

#### **3.5.10 Recording the data**

An audiocassette recorder with sensitive remote microphones was used to collect all the data produced by the focus group discussion. The researcher introduced the recorder at the beginning, and informed all participants that the material was for research use only and by the researcher alone. He asked each participant to introduce himself briefly using the name he had placed in front of him, and giving the name of his college or department to make it easier for the researcher to remember and identify each voice. Also, immediate observational notes were made at the time of the discussions whereas additional notes were written down directly after the end of each focus group session.

#### **3.5.11 Analysing the focus group data**

The recorded interviews were transcribed into written text by the researcher, read several times and then typed up using Word software. Back-up tapes and floppy disks were kept. Hansen *et al.*'s suggestion for analysing focus group data is to 'start by developing a scheme for categorising and labelling the responses, statements, arguments, and exchanges recorded in the interview transcripts' (1998: 279). They recommend that the headings used in focus group guide be the categories for analysis, and they encourage the researcher to read through the interview transcripts several times in order to become familiar with the spread of arguments, topics, and issues covered. The categories, according to Hansen, will vary depending on the purpose and objectives of the research. The researcher transcribed all the tapes from one focus

group before conducting the next and carried out all this work himself. He then supplemented the transcripts with the notes he had taken during the focus group discussions.

The transcription of focus group discussions had many advantages. Firstly, it enabled the researcher to gain feedback early on in the study process. Secondly, it helped him moderate the next group more effectively. Thirdly, it gave him the opportunity to obtain an early sense of each group's results from the beginning. Fourthly, he was able to make good use of the time between groups. Finally, (because interviews always produce an enormous amount of data), the data obtained from the eight groups was not excessive or complicated, since the researcher had familiarised himself with it, step by step from the beginning. He was able, therefore, to readily understand, categorise, and then analyse data without major difficulties (ibid).

The next step following the development of categories is coding and analysing. There are no absolute rules as to how coding is done; a great deal depends on the nature of the material being coded (Berger, 2000). (Creswell, 1994) has developed a general guide to the coding process as follows:

- Read the material over as a whole and gain an overview of it.
- Pick one transcript and examine it carefully, looking for topics covered.
- Do this for several transcripts and make a list of all the topics that were covered.
- Make abbreviations for each topic and go through the transcripts, putting down the appropriate abbreviation beside each example or given topic. If your topic list does not cover all the material, see if you can think up new topics that will help you do the job.



- Turn your topic into categories. Make sure that the categories cover all your transcripts and do not duplicate one another.
- Decide on a final set of abbreviations for your categories and alphabetise them. You now have an alphabetical list of codes for the transcripts.
- Assemble all the material found under each category in one place and analyse it to see what you find.
- See whether you can refine your coding and get fewer and more descriptive categories. (2000: 121)

Hansen *et al.* (1998); Seals (1998); Berger, (2000); and Kruger and Casey (2000) strongly recommend the use of computers to manage data in different ways in focus group analysis. Referring to three kinds of computer usage, Kruger and Casey illuminate the most practical approaches to use after the discussion findings have been transcribed. The first method is simply using a word processor as way of cutting and pasting to record the results of themes, categories and quotes. By developing a coding system the researcher can easily identify each quote by group and/or participant.

The second approach is 'to go beyond the cutting and pasting functions of word-processing programs and begin to quote. A number of researchers have been creative with the use of sorting, coding, and macros. Essentially, they use the capabilities of the software they already use to analyse the results' (ibid: 137). The third approach to analyse focus groups, indicated by Kruger and Casey, is the use of software that is specially designed for qualitative analysis. Although Ethnograph and NUDI\*ST (*Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theory-building*) are the most popular programs in academic settings, neither of these two programs is available in an Arabic software edition.

Although there are many suggested techniques for focus group data analysis, the researcher analysed his data according to a systematic technique recommended by Krueger (1988; 1994), and Krueger and Casey (2000). Since most of Krueger's procedures have been approved by other media researchers, such as Hansen *et al.* (1998); Seal (1998); and Berger (2000) he adopted one of four analysis options recommended by Krueger called Transcript-Based analysis, which is described below:

- Make backup copies of tapes.
- Give the original tapes to the transcriptionist for entry into the computer.
- When the transcriptions return, the moderator or assistant listens to tapes, adds the names of speakers, and completes missing data, if possible.
- File tapes, transcripts, field notes, and the like for future analysis.
- When ready to complete the analysis, gather the transcripts and field notes by categories of focus groups.
- Read transcripts and field notes one category at a time.
- Look for emerging themes (by question and then overall).
- Develop coding categories and code the data.
- Sort the data into coded categories.
- See what data is left out and consider revision.
- Prepare the draft report beginning with the most important questions.

(1994:157)

Considering the study purpose and type the researcher found the following analysis technique the most suitable method for his research. He developed coding categories. The data was coded according to the order used previously in developing the list of points covered by the questions at the time when the interviews were conducted. He then put the first group of students' answers to the first question on a form with the name of the group (i.e. Group No. 1 – Humanities, 7 students) and the answer of every student on it followed by a final summary of the group's answers. This is illustrated in

table 3.4 below which presents participants' answers to model question 1.1 asking them to give the name of their favourite satellite channel and the reasons for their choice:

Table: 3.4 *Channels/Programmes preference and viewing habits*

*Q1.1: What are your top favourite satellite channels?*

**Group No. 1 (Humanities)**

<i>Participant</i>	<i>Channel</i>	<i>Reasons</i>
1	<i>Al-jazeera</i>	Live news and objective programmes unaffected by personal or governmental interests.
2	<i>MBC<sup>1</sup></i>	Varied, including news, movies, serials (drama), quizzes and sport
3	<i>1.MBC 2.LBC<sup>2</sup></i>	1.Varied, including entertainment 2.Entertainment, freedom of thought and expresses different points of view
4	<i>MBC</i>	I have no digital receiver, so it is the best of what is available on Arabsat
5	<i>1. LBC 2. Future</i>	Varied programmes with no censorship
6	<i>1.MBC 2. ART<sup>3</sup></i>	1.Varied programmes 2.I watch them for sports and coverage of Saudi matches
7	<i>1.Kuwait 2. Jordan</i>	Many programmes involve computers and the Internet

**Description**

Four students out of seven preferred the MBC channel for its varied material, entertainment quality, and because it is the best channel in the Arabsat group for those who receive Arabsat channels only. Lebanese channels were the students' second favourite satellite channels. They were liked for their varied and diverse material, entertainment and freedom of thought and expression of different viewpoints. One student chose Aljazeera for its unbiased news and live political programmes unaffected

<sup>1</sup> (Middle East Broadcasting Centre)

<sup>2</sup> (The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation)

<sup>3</sup> (The Arab Radio and Television Network)

by personal or governmental interests. Another student chose Kuwait and Jordan channels because they present many programmes focusing on computers and the Internet. The researcher repeated the procedure for the same question for the other seven groups. Therefore, the researcher ended up with fifty one answers for the first question on eight separate forms (one for each of the eight groups).

From the combined summary of the eight answers, the researcher produced a final brief summary of findings for this question. Then he added notable quotes as shown below in table 3.5:

Table 3.5: *Q1.1 Top favourite satellite channel: Summary of findings*

<i>Channel</i>	<i>Brief summary</i>	<i>Notable quotes</i>
MBC	<p>A large proportion of students preferred this channel.</p> <p><b><u>Reasons:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Its programmes are diverse.</li> <li>• It is suitable for all family members, especially the Saudi family.</li> <li>• The diversity of the programmes may obviate the need to view other specialised channels for news, sports, or movies.</li> <li>• It is the best channel for those who receive Arabsat only.</li> <li>• It is suitable for students who cannot view television for long periods.</li> </ul>	<p>“It is a group of channels in one channel.” “I view most of my favourite programmes on this channel.”</p> <p>“Sometimes it avoids having to watch other specialised channels.”</p> <p>“It respects the cultures of Arab and Moslem communities more than other rival channels like, for example, the Lebanese channels.”</p> <p>“I like its diversity, and suitability for all members of the Saudi family.”</p> <p>“It presents music and a lot of songs and sports programmes as well as Saudi matches.”</p> <p>“I watch it together with my family who think that it is the best channel for the Saudi family.”</p> <p>“We receive only Arabsat channels and, of course, MBC is the best of those available and the most diverse.”</p> <p>“Most of my time is for study and I can’t view many channels, Therefore, MBC is enough as it includes news, movies, sports, songs, quizzes... almost everything.”</p>

The researcher then analysed the rest of the questions, following the procedure used for the first question. The answers to every question in all the focus group sessions were classified according to bases or criteria, such as similar answers, different answers, answers that agreed, answers that disagreed, supporting answers, opposing answers, whether positive or negative, whether effective or ineffective, given names of channels, countries or programmes, either Arabic or Western, etc. In this way it was easy to proceed with statistical analysis of the answers in addition to considering every single answer, whether to a question or just an opinion.

This method facilitated the statistical analysis of answers. The aforementioned steps are summarised in the following illustrative diagram (figure 3.1)




Figure 3.1: Focus group statistical analysis steps

### **3.6 Data-Collection Difficulties**

In order to undertake the pilot trip, carry out the field study, distribute the questionnaire, arrange meetings with students etc., the researcher was sometimes obliged to wait for a long time to receive official approval from interested foundations, such as the Saudi Cultural Bureau in London, the Ministry of Information in Riyadh, or K.A.U. in Jeddah. Saudi society is still not fully responsive to research data-collection. Although the sample for this study was drawn from university students, a large number of students were unwilling to participate in the focus group discussions; this was also the case, but to a lesser extent with the questionnaire. However, the researcher endeavoured to combat this attitude by visiting randomly selected classes and reiterating that participation in the questionnaire survey was anonymous and all data would be used for research purposes only. This proved to be the best way to distribute the questionnaire to a large number of students and increase participation.

Taking into consideration certain cultural factors, some minor changes had to be made to the final Arabic drafts of both the questionnaire and the focus group questions. However, the researcher was ultimately satisfied that all the phrases and expressions used in his questions were fully understandable and acceptable, and had the same meaning before and after translation from English to Arabic.

Another cultural restriction prohibited the researcher from meeting females who were not immediate family members, and necessitated him excluding female students from the focus group sample. He therefore sought the help of his wife and niece, after they had been given instructions on how to collect the questionnaire from female students



with the help of female staff members. In contrast, it was not possible to obtain the assistance of a female to conduct the focus group interviewing of female students for this research. During the limited time for the field study in Saudi Arabia it was difficult to find a female who had had some experience of interviewing people for research purposes or was willing to attend training sessions on how to conduct female focus groups. Further, the research aims and the sensitive topics and issues needed to be covered would not have been as successfully achieved by someone else, since the researcher would use his experience, results obtained from questionnaires and pilot focus groups and data gained from reviewing the literature to conduct focus groups effectively. Hansen *et al* stated that 'in media and communication research it is often the researcher himself or herself who acts as the moderator' (1989: 273).

### **3.7 Ethical and Ethnographical Dilemmas**

As a Saudi Arabian Moslem researcher undertaking his research in a Western university, the researcher faced several ethical dilemmas when conducting his study among Saudi society primarily related to three important issues, namely, gender, pornography and anonymity. Because of religious teachings and cultural restrictions in Saudi Arabia which prohibited the researcher from meeting females who were not immediate family members, the researcher was unable to meet female students. Therefore, the survey method employed in this study enabled the researcher to collect quantitative information from females without personally meeting with them. As previously stated, he sought the help of his wife and niece who were given instructions on how to collect the questionnaire from female students with the help of female staff members. Appendix D includes a copy of the letter from the head of the female campus

to female staff members asking them to give the researcher's wife and niece assistance in collecting data from female students. This ensured the researcher and his assistants were adhered to and complied with the regulations of the country while collecting the data for this research.

Although conducting this study at a Saudi university enabled the researcher to include Saudi females in his study sample, it was impossible for the researcher to personally interview female students to collect quantitative data. The circumstances of data collection were not the only difficulties related to gender. The Arabic form of talking to a female is different from that used for a male, therefore, the correct form of address was taken into consideration when devising the draft questionnaire for female students. Moreover, culturally, it is impolite to talk publicly with people in general and with females in particular about sensitive issues, such as sex or erotica, or even to refer to these subjects using frank terminology. The researcher delicately phrased references to these subjects so as not to cause offence to study participants. For example, "lovmaking" in English would be translated as "physical relationships inside/outside marriage".

Pornography is a sensitive issue in Saudi Arabia and presented another ethical dilemma in this research. Western pornographic media and product are totally antithetical to Saudi culture and the Islamic way of life. Because the current study focused on the foreign media and culture and young adults, it was inevitable that sexual issues would be mentioned in discussions with the study sample. However, as Machin, (2002:82) indicates, people are often unwilling to talk openly about sexual behaviour, personal income, or political matters, particularly when they do not know the

interviewer, or the person who will analyse the questionnaires. Another problem was that discussion of sexual issues in Moslem culture is avoided or restricted whereas in the Western culture there are no issues which are not openly discussed in society or in mixed company. The researcher did his best to make it clear to students that the authorities were aware that pornographic materials were viewed by some people, therefore, they were confirming previously known information. The researcher nevertheless assured students he would not use any information given against them since all data would be used for research purposes only. He made this clear on the front page of the questionnaire (see appendix B) and in the beginning of each focus group session. The researcher also refrained from making any judgemental comments throughout the course of the research. Anonymity was also an important factor which guaranteed this; students were encouraged to talk freely and openly about their viewing of pornographic materials and sexually explicit programmes.

Sensitivity in this study was not confined to sexual issues. Political activity, criticism of media policy, local values, traditions and religious practices are all viewed as sensitive subjects when discussed publicly in the Saudi community. The researcher therefore, used impersonal statements in both questionnaire and focus group surveys to persuade students to answer questions related to these matters. No data was attributed to any specific individual nor the names of study participants disclosed.

Further the study samples were young Saudi adults living in a cultural, social and media age differing from the time when the researcher was a young man. These changes were acknowledged and taken into account when interviewing study participants and commenting on the existing situation.

Moreover, although the researcher sometimes held views which differed from those of students, he did his very best to remain neutral. Studying the media and culture in Saudi Arabia without a biased view or attitude is not easy for a Saudi Moslem researcher in a Western university committed to the retention of Saudi values. Nevertheless, being a member of the community under investigation was an advantage since the researcher was better able to understand the sample's beliefs, attitudes, and the data he had collected from them. Machin (2002) when talking about ethnographic research for media studies argues that 'to understand why a person does something you need to look at it in the context of their lives as a whole' (2002:3). The present study is an ethnographical project as described by Machin:

'A way of doing research into what is going on in the social world. It is, those who use it believe, a powerful method of revealing why people do the things they do. At the heart of the idea of ethnography is the act of observing and listening to people as they go about their everyday lives in order that we can understand the way they behave or think on their own terms'. (ibid)

The researcher's Islamic background unavoidably influenced some views and opinions in this study. However, it may be argued that no research is completely detached from the person who carries it out. Any researcher's underlying moral concepts and values will to some extent influence the way in which he presents his work and comments on his findings. In the present case, the researcher is a Moslem dealing with issues that affect his country and impact on its prevailing customs and traditions. External forces in the form of the media are commonly viewed as threat to the Islamic way of life. Thus, because he regards some media output as having a detrimental impact on his

community's local culture and system of values, it is inevitable the researcher will sometimes be moved to defend his cultural values and beliefs in this study.

Moreover, because the researcher is a Moslem undertaking fieldwork in a very sensitive area, i.e. the way the media from outside his country interjects in the local way of life which he feels is under threat from it, his interpretation of and comments on his findings will unavoidably be coloured by his views to some extent. A Western researcher conducting a study on Western media and culture within a Western community is likely to have a different view of media globalisation and cultural imperialism than one examining the Saudi context. The researcher of this study could not but be apprehensive about the negative impact of cultural globalisation on his community's national and local culture. Nevertheless, he attempted at all times to be objective and impartial in his views and assessments of the present situation. In her work focusing on the relationship between the self and ethnographic fieldwork, Coffey (1999) points out that ethnographers (and others involved in fieldwork research) should be aware of how fieldwork research and textual practice construct, reproduce and implicate selves, relationships and personal identities. She commented, 'it is usual to find a personal dimension in the relating of fieldwork and the analysis of data'. Thus, the researcher is part of the research process, and should discuss, in some form, the nature of field relations and identity management' (ibid: 4).

### **3.8 Summary**

This chapter has outlined and described the primary data collecting methods employed in this study, a questionnaire survey and in-depth focus group of young Saudi adults'

uses of the media in general, and satellite channels in particular. Sample size and recruitment, questionnaire design, analysis and results of the pilot questionnaire survey, subsequent questionnaire modification and changes, and validation of the questionnaire and focus group questions have also been detailed. The next chapter will present a historical and cultural background of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

**CHAPTER FOUR**

**KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA**

Historical and Cultural Background

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides a historical and cultural background to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, stressing the influence of Islam, which permeates every aspect of its citizens' lives. The later part of the chapter explains the role of the media within this cultural and religious milieu, and governmental control over its operations.

#### **4.2 Location, Size and Geographical Regions of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comprises approximately four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula, a landmass constituting a distinct geographical entity, bordered on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the east by the Arabian Gulf. The Kingdom itself, which occupies approximately 2,250,000 square kilometres (868,730 square miles), is bounded on the north by Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait; on the east by the Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates; on the south by the Sultanate of Oman and Yemen; and on the west by the Red Sea. Located between Africa and mainland Asia, with long frontiers bordering the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, and with the Suez Canal near to its north-west border, Saudi Arabia occupies a strategically important position.

Geographically, Saudi Arabia is divided into five major regions. The first is the Central region. At its centre is the royal capital of Riyadh. Second is the Western region, which lies along the Red Sea coast. The study location, the busy seaport of Jeddah, is a thriving commercial central in this region. Of particular interest, the Western Region



contains the holiest cities of Islam, Makkah and Madinah, which are visited annually by some two million Moslems.

The Southern region, in the southern Red Sea-Yemen border area, constitutes the third region. The Southern Region is a relatively fertile area of coastal mountains in the extreme southwest (near Yemen). It has always been relatively densely populated. Fourth, is the Eastern region, the sandy and stormy eastern part of Saudi Arabia, and the richest of all the regions in petroleum. The headquarters of the Saudi oil industry is located in this region, in Dhahran. Finally, the fifth major region is Rub al-Khali (the Empty Quarter). It is a massive, trackless expanse of shifting sand dunes in the south of the Kingdom covering an area of more than 250,000 square miles (650,000 square kilometres) (Ministry of Information, 2000)

### **4.3 Administrative Regions of Saudi Arabia**

For administrative purposes, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is divided into 13 regions. Each of these regions has a Regional Governor having the rank of Minister, who is responsible to the Minister of the Interior. Below is a list of the regions and the cities in which the administrative headquarters of each region are located.

- 1- Riyadh Region: Riyadh City
- 2- Makkah Region: the Holy City of Makkah
- 3- Madinah Region: the Holy City of Madinah
- 4- Qasim Region: Buraidah City
- 5- Eastern Region: Dammam City

- 6- Asir Region: Abha City
- 7- Tabouk Region: Tabouk City
- 8- Hail Region: Hail City
- 9- Northern Border Region: Arar City
- 10- Jizan Region: Jizan City
- 11- Najran Region: Najran City
- 12- Al-Baha Region: Al-Baha City
- 13- Al-Jouf Region: Sikaka City

#### **4.4 Historical Background**

Some knowledge of the history leading to the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and, in particular, of the cultural background, is essential to an understanding of the principles which have guided the Kingdom's development. The Saudi royal family had witnessed many triumphs and setbacks until King Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud), eventually joined together the tribes of most of the Arabian Peninsula to form a single nation within a Kingdom in 1932.

The first ruler of the First House of Saud was Mohammed bin Saud. He started as ruler of Ad-Dar'iyah, where he joined forces with Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab, an eminent religious leader, in what could be called the first alliance. Mohammed bin Saud concluded an agreement with Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab that together they would bring the Arabs of the peninsula back to the faith of the Islamic religion. They confirmed this agreement with an oath in 1744.

From 1744 until 1890 bin Saud family members were governors of Riyadh. In 1891 the then governor, Abdul Rahman bin Saud, was forced to flee to Bahrain with his son, Abdul Aziz, and to live in exile in Kuwait as a result of being defeated in battle by bin Rashid. In 1902, Abdul Aziz bin-Saud retook the city of Riyadh and established his rule over the area. From 1902 through 1926, Ibn-Saud consolidated the unity of most of the Arabian Peninsula. In September 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded and officially acquired its present name.

#### 4.5 Cultural Milieu

The concept of culture is by definition central to cultural studies. It is one of the most complex words in both the English and Arabic languages as Barker (1999: 11) points out:

[...] there is no correct or definitive meaning attached to it. In describing it as ‘one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language’, Williams (1983) indicates the character of cultural studies as an arena of debate and contestation. That is, culture is not ‘out there’ waiting to be correctly described by theorists who keep getting it wrong. Rather, the concept of culture is a tool which is of more or less usefulness to us in understanding human beings as a life form. Consequently, its usage, and therefore meanings, continue to change.

In Arabic, the word equivalent to the English word ‘culture’ is *Thagafa*. It refers to general public knowledge, when used separately, or is used to describe an educated person possessing a great deal of information and knowledge. When *Thagafa* is used to refer to social aspects of human life, such as values, customs and traditions, it should be accompanied by another word like society or nation. The present study uses the word ‘culture’ to refer to the sets of values, traditions, customs and the general way of live of

a particular society (see chapter 2, section 4.3 for more detailed information about culture definitions) .

There are many factors influencing Saudi culture. The two most important factors are Islam and the geography of the Arabian Peninsula. To understand Saudi Arabia's social, political, and economic development, it is essential to recognise that Islam, which permeates every aspect of a Moslem's life, also permeates every aspect of life in Saudi Arabia. Before and after Islam, the people of the Arabian Peninsula have been at the geographic, commercial and cultural crossroads of the world. As early as 3,000 BC, the people of the western region of the Arab peninsula were part of a far-reaching commercial network extending to south Asia, the Mediterranean and Egypt. Trade flourished, with merchants of the peninsula acting as the vital link between India and the Far East on the one side and Byzantium and the Mediterranean states on the other. Interaction with the cultures of both east and west over the centuries enriched the ancient traditions and culture of the people of the peninsula (Ali, 1987).

The introduction of Islam to the Arabian heartland in the seventh century further strengthened the region's cultural heritage. Within a century, Islam spread west to the Atlantic Ocean and to the east as far as the Indian subcontinent and China. Every year for the past fourteen centuries, Moslem pilgrims from around the world have travelled to Islam's holiest sites in Makkah and Madinah, helping to further enrich the culture of the people of the peninsula. With the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the government sustained Islamic traditions and culture. For example, Islam prohibits fornication (sex outside marriage), gambling, and alcohol drinking, and these social activities and behaviours are still forbidden in Saudi Arabia.

Another illustration of the fact that Islam permeates every aspect of Saudi Arabian culture is the position of women in Saudi Arabian society. The stereotype of Moslem women as uneducated, with no rights and no opportunities, is erroneous since the Holy Qur'an gave women economic and social rights from the beginning of Islam. In Saudi Arabia, women are legally entitled to inherit and bequeath property, holding their wealth in their own names even after marriage, without obligation to contribute that wealth to their husband or their family. Under the Islamic law of Saudi Arabia, a woman is enjoined to behave modestly in public and is generally expected to give her full commitment to making a family home. Although women in Saudi Arabia have a pre-eminent role within the family, yet, the role of women in Saudi Arabian society is not only confined to home making. The development of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has brought with it increasing opportunities for women in both education and employment. In 1960, the government introduced a national education programme for girls. By the mid-1970s, about half of all Saudi Arabian girls were attending school. Five years later, education was available to all Saudi girls. (Saudi Arabia Information Resources, 2002)

The family unit in Islam consists of a lawfully wedded man and woman. The family occupies a central place in both individual and social life in Saudi Arabia, and the relationship between every single relative in a family is very important. Society in Saudi Arabia is regarded as conservative. According to Kazan, (1993) Saudi Arabia tends to be the most conservative Gulf Country, followed by Qatar, Oman, the UAE, and Kuwait. Kazan also observed little change in the cultural aspects of Gulf societies, regardless of their adoption of modern technology. Nomads and villagers have moved

to urban areas and receive higher education, the best health care, and use luxurious cars, housewares and electrical sets. Al-shaqsi argues that ‘the culture of the Arab Gulf region has been able to resist unfamiliar cultural influences due to the people’s strong belief in their local cultures’ (2000: 90).

The traditional dress in Saudi Arabia is one of its strongest ties to the past. The practicality of loose, flowing garments in a hot wind-swept climate reinforces the ideals of propriety in dress and conduct. Men wear a *thawb*, a simple, ankle-length shirt of cotton or wool. Traditional headwear includes a *ghutra*, a large diagonally folded cotton square worn over a *kufiyyah* (skullcap) and held in place by an *igal*, a double-coiled cord circlet. Nowadays, a growing number of children, teenagers and youth are wearing Western style dress: trousers and shirts. This trend is one of the cultural issues investigated in this study. In the past, women’s traditional dress displayed regional and tribal motifs and is embellished with coins, sequins, metallic thread or brilliantly coloured fabrics. This traditional dress is hardly worn nowadays. The Saudi woman’s dress market is modern and lively, exhibiting the latest Western fashions. Yet, the classic head-dress, a *shayla*, a scarf of black gauzy fabric wrapped around the head, and an *abaya*, a black outer cloak, is customarily worn over the dress in public.

A unique cultural condition in Saudi Arabia is the separation of unrelated males and females in one setting. In all levels of study, starting from year six in primary schools, each of the genders have their own schools and colleges. As was explained earlier in chapter 3 section 5 the researcher, according to this cultural milieu, was not able to interview females students. Furthermore, his wife and niece, with the help of female

staff helped him to distribute and collect copies of the questionnaire completed by females.

#### **4.6 Islam**

Islam is a religion that informs every part of daily life. The five Pillars of Islam, listed below, constitute the basic religious duties, which every Moslem must perform:

- 1- Al-Shahadah (Testimony)
- 2- Al-Salah (Prayer)
- 3- Al-Siyam (Fasting)
- 4- Al-Zakat (Almsgiving)
- 5- Al Hajj (The Pilgrimage)

The Holy Qur'an in the Islamic faith is the words of God revealed to the Prophet Mohammed, by the Angel Gabriel. There are 114 Suras (chapters) in the Qur'an, which vary in length. The Holy Qur'an, as it is now, was compiled shortly after the Prophet's death. It is the basis for the faith of every Moslem and his/her guide to living. It provides guidance on most aspects of life, covering personal, social, military and legal matters, as well as religion (Ministry of Information, 2002).

For one fifth of the world's population, Islam is a way of life, as well as a religion. Saudi Arabia is regarded as the Holy Land of Islam, charged with guardianship of the two holiest cities, namely, Makkah, which Moslems face five times a day in prayer, and Madinah, which contains the mosque of the prophet Mohammed and his grave.

#### **4.7 Ulema (Religious Leaders) in Saudi Arabia**

Saudi Arabia is an example of an Islamic state governed by the Holy Qur'an. It is therefore inevitable that the Ulema (religious leaders) play a key role within the state. They play an influential part in the following fields of government:

- The judicial system of Saudi Arabia.
- The implementation of the rules of the Islamic Shari'ah.
- Religious Guidance Groups with affiliated offices all over the Kingdom.
- Religious education, that is, Islamic legal education and theology at all levels in Saudi Arabia.
- Religious jurisprudence.
- Preaching and guidance throughout the nation.
- Religious supervision of all Mosques in the Kingdom.
- Continuous scientific and Islamic research.
- Public notaries.
- The handling of legal cases in courts according to Islamic law (Ministry of Information, 2000).

They also play an important role in the media field. For example, most Ulema opposed the installation of the first TV station in Saudi Arabia. They believed that television was a vehicle that could negatively affect the Islamic way of life. This matter was resolved by King Faisal who promised the Ulema that Saudi television would obey Islamic principles and respect local values as well as give priority to religious programming (Al-Makaty, 1995).



#### **4.8 The King**

Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy in which power is extremely centralised. The King is the head of state, the Prime Minister, and the general commander in chief of the army. Assisted by the Consultation Committee and the Council of Ministers, the King is the centre of all political activities. Executive and legislative functions ultimately derive their authority from the King, who also exercises judicial authority when the occasion demands. It is to the King that all foreign representatives are accredited, and it is the King who appoints ambassadors and other envoys sent abroad. He names all Consultation Committee members, all ministers, other senior government officials, principals, governors of provinces, and also selects all military officers above the rank of colonel. All legislation or decree law is either by royal decree or by ministerial decree sanctioned by the King.

The King is the highest court of appeal and has the power of pardon. Public opposition to the King's policy is not allowed. There is no system of political parties or independent interest groups, and no elected representatives (Ministry of Information, 2002).

#### **4.9 The Consultative Council (*Majlis Al-Shoura*)**

The Consultative Council, or *Majlis Al-Shoura*, marked a significant move towards the formalisation of the participatory nature of government in Saudi Arabia. The primary function of the *Majlis Al-Shura* is to advise the King on issues of importance to the nation. Its members, appointed by the King for a four-year renewable term, represent the spectrum of Saudi society. The first session of the new Council was inaugurated in

1993. This Council consisted of 60 members in addition to the chairman. On 1997, King Fahd decreed an increase in membership, to consist of a chairman and 90 members, 64% of whom were PhD holders. In 2001, the membership of the Consultative Council was increased once more to 120 members (<http://www.shura.gov.sa/ArabicSite>, 2002; Ministry of Information, 2002).

#### **4.10 The Council of Ministers**

The Council of Ministers was established as the natural political outcome of King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud's final consolidation of power and unity over the Kingdom. Under the bylaws promulgated in September 1993 by King Fahd, the Council has responsibility for drafting and overseeing the implementation of internal, external, financial, economic, educational, and defence policies, and general affairs of state. The Council meets weekly, and is presided over by the King or his deputy. The king names all ministers for a period of four years. He has the power to drop any minister or to extend his job. In addition to the King and Crown Prince, five other members of the royal family have become recent members of the Council of Ministers.

#### **4.11 Population**

According to the 1974 census, the Kingdom's population was just over 7 million. Since then, by all accounts, the population has grown dramatically. Another estimate by the World Bank in 1987 gave a figure of above 11 million. The official estimate in 1987 was 13.6 million. The 1992 census suggested a total population of 16.9 million, of

which 12.3 million were Saudi nationals. Most recent estimates (1999) put the population of the Kingdom at 21.4 million (<http://www.planning.gov.sa/>, 2002). Of the Saudi national population, 50.4% were males and 49.6% females (ibid). The approximation for the Saudi population is due to the absence of a current official census. This has also led to inexact figures and percentages given by different sources. For instance, the 1995 Saudi statistical Yearbook stated that 53% of the population were aged between 20 and 29 years. In 2002, the Ministry of Information estimated that more than half of the Saudi population was under 20. In all circumstances, it is generally accepted that children and youths make up the largest percentage of the Saudi population. Table 4.1 below, adapted from The Consultative Council (*Majlis Al-Shoura*), presents recent statistics for Saudi Arabia's population.

POPULATION	
Total Population	21.4 million (2000)
Annual Growth Rate	3.5 %
Life Expectancy	Males 70 years; Females 74 (1998)
Infant Mortality Rate	22 (1998)
Urban population	85%
Age structure	0-14 43% 15-64 54% Over 65 3%
Ethnic Groups	Arabs: 90% Afro-Asians: 10%:

Table 4.1: Saudi Arabia's Population

Source: <http://www.shura.gov.sa>, 2002.

#### 4.12 Oil, the Economy and Development Programmes

According to the latest oil estimates (1999), the Kingdom's recoverable reserves now stand at 263.5 billion barrels. This means Saudi Arabia has roughly 25% of the world's proven oil reserves. As techniques for extraction improve and new reserves are found,

it is estimated that the oil reserves of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will last for some 90 years (S.A Information Resources, 2003). Before this main source of income was exploited in the 1950s, Saudi Arabia had been dependent on imports, which had strained the transport and communication system. Since then, the country has become wealthy and new government ministries and government and privately owned corporations have been established to deal with increased revenue flows from oil. An improved modern economic infrastructure has therefore begun to take shape.

The Five-Year Development Plan was the model chosen for economic development in Saudi Arabia supported by oil derived income. In 1970, King Faisal announced the First Five-Year Development Plan in Saudi Arabia (Al-Farsy, 1980:118).

The recent Seventh Development Plan 2000-2005 adopts a set of economic policies that fit into a long-term perspective designed to develop human resources, raise the efficiency of manpower, and increase employment through both the generation of new jobs and replacement of non-Saudi manpower. The long-term perspective also involves qualitative improvements in state-provided services, such as education, health, social, and municipal services, as well as expansion in the provision of water, electricity, transportation, and telecommunication services with a view to keeping pace with increasing demand (<http://www.planning.gov.sa/>, 2002).

### **4.13 The Media in Saudi Arabia**

#### **4.13.1 Print Media**

The mass media in Saudi Arabia are the product of the cultural and political environments of Saudi society. The press was, and still is, influenced and shaped by the basic social values and economic and political conditions which construct Saudi society in a unique way.

In facing the challenges of modernisation and development, the press in Saudi Arabia plays a rather conservative and subordinate role. Al-Muaither (2001) argues that two main factors contribute to this media situation: the first is the tight control the government has over the media. This control puts the media under a variety of pressures to comply with government policies and to follow and act upon government initiatives. The second factor is that the media suffer internally from a number of problems and shortcomings.

The most serious of all is the shortage of qualified and skilled journalists, broadcasters and other media personnel. These problems hinder the media from becoming a more effective and forceful element in the development process in Saudi Arabia (ibid: 109-110). Development plans in the 1960s and 1970s were mostly concerned with structural changes in transport and industry. Very little attention was given to the development of the print media until the 1980s (Al-Garni, 2000). One of the aims of the 1982 first written policy regarding information in the country was to balance the freedom of the press especially on people opinions and news coverage, defining its responsibilities towards both the government and the public, and to supply information and uphold

religious and traditional values.

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the main daily newspapers and magazines in Saudi Arabia at the time of the fieldwork for the present study in 2001. Although these newspapers and magazines are owned by joint stock companies, with an administrative board for each, nevertheless, the designation of any editor-in-chief has to be with government approval, namely that of the Minister of Information.

	<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Circulation</b>
1-	Al-Bilad	Jeddah	40,000
2-	Al-Nadwah	Makkah	35,000
3-	Al-Madinah	Jeddah	90,000
4-	Okaz	Jeddah	150,000
5-	Al-Riyadh	Riyadh	140,000
6-	Al-Jazirah	Riyadh	110,000
7-	Al-Youm	Dammam	50,000
8-	Arab News (in English)	Jeddah	25,000
9-	Saudi Gazette (in English)	Jeddah	40,000
10-	Riyadh Daily (in English)	Riyadh	20,000
11-	Al-Watan	Abha	(new in the market)

Table 4.2: Major Saudi Daily Newspapers

Source: Al-Watania Distribution Company, April. 2001.

	<b>Magazine</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Circulation</b>
1-	Al-Yamamah	Riyadh	60,000
2-	Al-Da'wa	Riyadh	30,000
3-	Iqra	Jeddah	35,000
4-	Al-Sharq	Dammam	15,000
5-	Al-Arab	Riyadh	12,000
6-	Al-Majallh Al-Arabiah	Riyadh	50,000
7-	Al-Faisal	Riyadh	50,000

Table 4.3: Major Saudi Magazines

Source: Al-Watania Distribution Company, April. 2001.

#### 4.13.2 Broadcasting in Saudi Arabia

In 1932, King Abdul Aziz set up his own private radio network in the Kingdom, primarily to enable him and his officials to be kept informed of events. In the full sense of public broadcasting, transmissions began in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1948 from a small station in Jeddah (Kerayem, 1982). This was followed three years later by a station in the Holy City of Makkah. These two stations, which were on the air for no more than 14 hours a week, broadcast recitations from the Holy Qur'an, the sayings of the Prophet, news and cultural programmes and some music. From these relatively modest beginnings, the Saudi Radio Broadcasting Service emerged. In 1964 the Riyadh broadcasting station and the Call of Islam station (based in the Holy City of Makkah) began transmissions (ibid).

The expansion of radio services in Saudi Arabia was inescapable due to local changes in the economy, an improved standard of living, and an outside media offensive, mainly from Egypt. In the late 1950s, Egyptian radio (Voice of Arabs) starting attacking the Saudi government on account of the two countries very different political agendas.

Saudi Arabia had neither the transmitters nor the programming talent to defend itself at that time. Marghlani *et al.* (1998: 289) argue that Egyptian radio services' hostility toward the Saudi government during the 1960s was the main factor responsible for the rapid transmitter and programming expansion during that period in Saudi Arabia. Hostile radio programming was probably also the single most important motivation for building a national television system.

Another factor is Saudi Arabia's role as guardian of the Holy Places and centre of the Islamic world, which necessitated the Kingdom employ radio to strengthen Islam within and outside Saudi Arabia. In 1973, the Kingdom began short wave and high frequency broadcasting in Bembari, Bengali, English, French, Indonesian, Pharsi, Somali, Swahili, Turkestan, Turkish and Urdu (Al-Harithy, 1998). In 1979, radio broadcasts from various stations were unified into the General Service (*ibid*). The programming policy governing the General Service is based on the following principles: 1) The essential emphasis must be on religious, social and cultural programmes; 2) Particular attention should be given to news and political programmes; 3) Outstanding thinkers should be encouraged to give talks on important topics; 4) Provision should be made for educational programmes for the enlightenment of listeners; 5) There should be special programmes catering for the family, for childcare and for health education; and 6) Eminent people of letters should be encouraged to write religious, cultural and social dramas for broadcast as serials (Ministry of Information, 2002).



In addition to the General Service, by 2002 there were a number of other radio channels:

- The Second Programme Service, which broadcasts folkloric, dramatic, recreational, literary and scientific programmes.
- Foreign Language Broadcasting, which focuses on Islamic programmes.
- The Call of Islam Broadcasting Station, which transmits the message of Islam.
- The Holy Qur'an Broadcasting Service.
- The European Languages Station, which broadcasts religious and informational programmes in English and French (Al-Harithy, 1998).

All radios mentioned above are state owned stations and administrated by the Ministry of Information. There is no Saudi private radio station broadcasting within the border of the Kingdom.

#### **4.13.3 Television**

In 1964, the late King Faisal commissioned the American National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) to construct a national television network. The first test television transmissions in the Kingdom took place in 1965 from stations in Riyadh and Jeddah. The government had several motives for introducing television. First, it sought to provide citizens with information, news, and entertainment. Second, it wanted to minimise the possible negative effects of hostile radio propaganda, especially from Egypt. Third, it wished to promote a sense of national unity among Saudis. Finally, it wanted to use television as a means of improving health and literacy (Boyd, 1982, cited in: Al-Makaty, 1995: 62).

In 2002, there were two government-controlled television channels broadcasting throughout the country: one in Arabic, the other in English. Programming is a balanced blend of religious and cultural programmes, entertainment and music, Arabic drama programmes, non-Arabic films and serials, children's programmes, and news and current affairs programmes. Special programming is produced for all the major events in the Islamic calendar, especially for Ramadan and for the period of the Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to the Holy Places.

Programming on these government channels is very limited compared to what is offered on satellite channels (Marghalani *et al.* 1998: 299). Al-Amoudi (1990) found programmes on Saudi channel 1 and Saudi channel 2 consisted of religious fare (25%), Arabic drama and children's programmes (30%), variety and musicals (22%), non-Arabic films (8%), and sports and news (15%). The government, because of Islamic and traditional culture, and for political reasons as well, censors imported programmes from Western countries and from other Arab countries. In the 1970s, the Saudi government authorised the Ministry of Information to censor all programmes for Saudi television based on guidelines that prohibit:

- Scenes that arouse sexual excitement.
- Women appearing indecently dressed, in dance scenes or engaged in lovemaking.
- Woman appearing in athletic games or sport.
- Alcoholic beverages or anything connected with alcoholic drinking.
- Derogatory references to any of the Islamic practices.
- Other countries treated with praise, satire, or contempt; references to Zionism.

- Material meant to criticise the monarchy.
- All immoral scenes.
- References to betting or gambling; and
- Excessive violence (Shobaili, 1971, pp: 272-273).

In 1982, an information policy, which also dealt with television, was formulated (Al-Harithy, 1998). This policy aims to prohibit items, which may cause friction within Saudi society from the social, moral, religious and political points of view. Television in Saudi Arabia is thus subject to prior censorship and programmes are screened, censored, and sometimes edited in advance (Al-Garni, 2000: 155). Although there has been a softening on Saudi television censorship, nevertheless, it is still operated by the Ministry of Information, and the above guidelines are still applied and followed when dealing with televised materials.

#### **4.13.4 The Internet**

In 1999, the Internet service became available in the Kingdom, with all the connections routed through a state server (Internet Service Provider), sited at the King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST). The Saudi Telecom Company (STC), directed by the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephones, provides the external means to access the Internet and the service is available for research establishments, academicians and both public and private companies. KACST established the Internet Services Unit (ISU) which undertook all the operations essential to the service's insertion into the Kingdom. The ISU is also responsible for establishing all the regulations and polices required to provide the service (Ministry of Information, 2002).

The Internet service in the Kingdom is organised into three main levels. At the first level are ISPs, commercial companies that provide Internet access to the general public, government and private sector through dialup and leased lines. ISPs are connected to the National Backbone and to the International link at the ISU. The second level is the National Backbone, the Saudi Telecomm Company (STC), which developed the network, connecting most parts of the Kingdom together. The ISU and all ISPs are connected to the National Backbone, which carries Internet traffic inside the Kingdom, and to the International Link. The third level is the International Link, which connects the National Backbone to the International Internet. The International link is operated by the ISU and all International traffic to the Kingdom passes through this link (Internet Service Unit at KACST: <http://www.isu.net.sa/2002>).

**Parties Responsible for Internet Services:**

- Internet Services Unit (ISU) at King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST)
- Saudi Telecom Company (STC).
- Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
- The Internet's Permanent Security Committee

**Internet Services Unit (ISU)**

- Qualifying and Licensing ISPs.
- Connecting ISPs to the Internet.
- Connecting Local Universities to the Internet.
- Domain name Registration.
- Content Filtering.

- Providing Technical Support for ISPs and Universities.
- Connectivity to the ISU

#### **Saudi Telecom Company (STC)**

- Providing the basic Telecom Infrastructure.
- Providing the National IP backbone.
- Providing International Connectivity to the ISU.
- Providing ISU Connectivity to ISPs.
- Providing ISP Connectivity to subscribers.

#### **Internet Service Providers (ISPs)**

- Provide Internet Connectivity.
- For Governmental Institutions.
- For Companies and Organisations.
- For Individuals.
- Providing value-added services like Web hosting

#### **The Internet's Permanent Security Committee**

- Internet Rules, Policies and Regulations.
- Content Filtering.
- Co-ordination between Governmental entities and KACST (ibid)

The expense of the Internet in Saudi Arabia is much higher than in other countries, for example, the UK, and logging on the W.W. web through the Saudi telephone network is very slow due to technical reasons. Associated with this is the censorship imposed by the government to limit access to prohibited sites. This is thought to be a main factor

for the lack of data transmission to the W.W. web (Matawaa, 2002). These three disadvantages are continuously criticised by newspapers and magazines writers and frequently by subscribers. The Saudi Telecom Company has promised to improve its service and to gradually cut down the cost of using the Internet. KACST involvement in Internet censorship is called 'Content Filtering. Its opinion with regard to Internet censorship can be understood from the followed statement:

'Pursuant to the Council of Ministers' decree concerning the regulation of use of the Internet in Saudi Arabia, all sites that contain content in violation of Islamic tradition or national regulations shall be blocked. A security committee chaired by the Ministry of Interior has been formulated. One of the tasks assigned to this committee is the selection of sites to be blocked and the oversight of this process. However, due to the widespread and diverse nature of pornographic sites, KACST was commissioned to directly block these types of sites. Other non-pornographic sites are only blocked based upon direct requests from the security bodies within the government. KACST has no authority in the selection of such sites and its role is limited to carrying out the directions of these securities bodies (Internet Service Unit at KACST: <http://www.isu.net.sa/2002>).

The ISU argues that types of materials directed to block are few, most noteworthy among them are pornographic web pages, which consist of 95% of all blocked web pages. As for other categories, they consist mainly of pages related to drugs, bombs, alcohol, gambling and pages insulting the Islamic religion or Saudi laws and regulations. The ISU (2002) cites some articles supporting its filtration policy such as a study by Cass Sunstein in the *Duke Law Journal* (undated). According to the ISU, this study found that countries, which impose strict laws relating to the prevention of pornography, enjoy a reduction in the rate of rape and murder and vice versa. Further, in a study conducted by the Attorney General's Commission (undated) on pornography

and another conducted by the University of New Hampshire (undated) it was found that those states trafficking most heavily in pornography saw a similar increase in the rate of rape. Specifically, Alaska and Nevada were the two states with the highest rates of pornographic materials (five times that of other states), accompanied by a similar increase in rape activity (eight times that of other states) (ibid.)

The number of Internet users wide world has increased in recent years (Alterman, 1998). It grew by 84% through 1997, and by more than 50% wide world in the first six months of 1998 (ibid.). Alterman estimated the growth of the Internet in the Gulf region as follows:

[...] growth in some of the Gulf markets, like Kuwait and Bahrain, seems to lag a bit. The computer market overall in the Arab world is growing at an annual rate of 20 per cent, and in some countries, like Lebanon, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, it is growing at 50 % to 60 % per year. Some sort of Internet service is available in every Arab country but Iraq. Saudi Arabia will soon offer full Internet access to its residents, which will no doubt boost Arab numbers significantly (ibid: 36).

Access to the Internet via home, public computers in Internet cafes, or semi-public ones at universities and research organisations, could make it difficult to divine the total numbers of users, gender, age, etc. The Internet Service Unit at KACST is one of very few limited sources able to estimate the number of Internet users in Saudi Arabia. Table 4.4 below shows the growing number of Internet users in Saudi Arabia between April 2001 and December 2002 in randomly selected months.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Estimated number of users</b>
April 2001	690,000 users
Dec 2001	900,000 users
July 2002	1,110,000 users
Dec 2002	1 453 000 users

Table 4.4: The estimated number of local Internet users in Saudi Arabia  
Source: <http://www.isu.net.sa/>, February, 2003

#### **4.13.5 Media regulation in Saudi Arabia**

The first Saudi Information Policy was issued by Royal Decree by King Abdul-Aziz, following the proposed introduction of radio broadcasts to the Kingdom in 1949 for the first time. In essence, the policy prescribed general directions as to the manner in which this new medium should be operated. It stated:

‘... foreign news should avoid bias, insults and defamation of anyone  
... the local news should broadcast facts and the viewpoint of the Saudi Government, while remaining silent on issues not usually made public’ (Shobaili, 1971:188).

Radio output at that time - the early 1950s - consisted of religious programmes whose content was based on readings from the Holy Qur’an and talks about Islamic and Arab history. Such programmes helped to alleviate the concerns of the religious elements in society and absorbed their objections to the new medium. However, once King Saud succeeded his father, in order to clarify certain clauses, he issued a Royal Decree in 1955 to dissolve the aforementioned policy (Alamoudi, 1984).



The introduction of television in 1965, and the opposition it encountered from certain religious groups in the country, dictated the need for modifications appropriate to the nature of the new medium. These modifications and the addition of new clauses were designed to control the appearance of women on televised programmes. As a result, women's appearances were confined to certain roles and certain types of programmes, for example, as hosts or guests in children's or women's shows. Women appearing in these programmes were required to observe the strict Moslem dress code; they had to cover their hair and wear loose clothing to ensure their bodies were fully covered down to the wrists and ankles in order to prevent their exposure to viewers (Zamakshari, 1994).

TV Censorship Department screens and censor the content of foreign made programmes. Its responsibilities included and still include the screening and editing of scenes and language in imported and locally made programmes to ensure their suitability and consistency with the Islamic norms of Saudi society (Al-Garni, 2000). The television policy was changed, and the imported television productions were decreased after the siege of the Holy Mosque in Makkah, in November 1979 by a group of 225 well-armed Saudis. They took over Islam's most holy place and it took several weeks to dislodge the mosque occupants (Boyd, 1999). The Saudi Ministry of Information at first said nothing about the incident, which left people listening to the reports of other foreign Arabic stations and their comments on what they believed to be happening (ibid). Before this event, Saudi Arabia did not have an aggressive information philosophy, and so the 'silence' policy, which prevailed at the time, was conducive to the spread of rumours and speculation about the siege, at national and

international levels. The treatment of this incident by the Saudi media and their hesitation in reaching a decision regarding the announcement of the development of the event led to the re-formulation of a media policy (Al-Garni, 2000). Soon after this, the Saudi authorities implemented a ban on Western films and television serials or series on Saudi Channel 1. This ban is still in force and non-Arabic productions have been restricted to Channel 2 (ibid.) The Supreme Council of Mass Communication, established in 1981 by Royal Decree, finally formulated a media policy which was approved by Royal Decree in May 1983 (See appendix F).

The legislation concerning television is part of the current Saudi information policy, as formulated in 1982 by the Supreme Council of Mass Communication, a task force committee consisting of academics and top officials at the Ministry of Information, chaired by the Interior Minister, Prince Naif. The policy refers to the principles, goals and objectives of print and broadcast media in Saudi Arabia. Emanating from Islam and based on its laws and beliefs, the policy aims at establishing belief in Allah, and raising the intellectual, cultural and moral levels of Saudi citizens. The policy also prescribes broad guidelines by which its objectives and aims are to be achieved, and covers areas such as news, education, public awareness, entertainment and cultural programmes.

Currently in effect, this policy provides general guidelines and frameworks for media operations. In addition, the policy contains articles that assert the need for harnessing the media to numerous goals, such as preserving the country's cultural identity and protecting the primary interests of its citizens. It also gives the family, children, women and teenagers the importance they deserve, and directs the media, especially broadcasting, to respond to their needs and concerns through specially made

programmes. Given the fact that illiteracy rates are high in the country, the policy confirms the need to eradicate this problem. The policy has stated that the media should seek to be objective in presenting the facts and should avoid exaggerations while guaranteeing freedom of expression to all.

What is significant about this media policy is that it is the first written policy to describe how the Saudi media should be used. Previous policies were merely prohibitive ones, that is, they stated what the media should not do rather than spell out their responsibilities (Alharithi, 1985).

#### **4.14 Summary**

This chapter has presented detailed information about Saudi Arabia's historical and cultural milieu, indicating its far reaching influence on Saudi citizens' everyday lives. Vast oil revenues have also contributed to the Kingdom's improved standard of living. The government's control over the media was extensive up until the 1990s. However, as the next chapter will show the presence of new technologies, for example, satellite communication, has begun to loosen the government's control over the nation's viewing habits. These new viewing habits will inevitably have an impact on local culture, as the research will clearly reveal in the study fieldwork presented in chapters 6 and 7.

**CHAPTER FIVE**

**SAUDI ARABIA IN THE SATELLITE  
COMMUNICATION ERA**

## 5.1 Introduction

Communication satellites have facilitated the transmission of television signals to different parts of the world, starting with television news coverage in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, the transmission of television programmes by satellite direct to homes started in many Western countries but was available only to elite, wealthy Saudis who could afford dishes and the mandatory electronic equipment needed to decode incoming signals (Margahlani *et al.* 1998). Several technological and economic changes during the 1990s made it possible for a large number in the Arab world to own satellite technology.

The introduction of satellite television to the Middle East coincided with the introduction of state and privately owned Arabic satellite channels. Although the exact number of satellite dishes in the Middle East in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular, is not known, close observers of the satellite scene estimated that by the late 1990s some two-thirds of the population in the Arab Gulf had access to satellite television (Alterman, 1998).

This chapter will explain the beginnings and growth of satellite communication technology, internationally and regionally, and its outstanding role in the creation of new television channels, especially in the Middle East. This is the first study of the media in Saudi Arabia, probably in the Arab region, to present detailed material about satellites of different generations and geographical orbits, TV channels and radio stations broadcasting via each satellite, and detailed information about the most preferred satellite channels in Saudi Arabia at the time of the study fieldwork. It is,

therefore, an important reference for subsequent media studies in general and satellite channels research in particular.

## **5.2 Global Satellite Development**

Television broadcasting has changed enormously across the world in the last three decades with the development of satellite technology. The idea of satellite communications was first put forward by Arthur C. Clarke, a British engineer, in 1945. He envisaged a system of “extra terrestrial relays,” or repeaters, in space. Clarke predicted that an object put into orbit 22,300 miles above the earth would circle the globe in 24 hours, the same time it takes for the earth to rotate once. He indicated that three such repeaters located 120 degrees apart above the equator would cover the entire planet. Clarke’s idea of a geostationary satellite led to the existing system of satellite communications. (A geostationary or geosynchronous orbit is one where a satellite maintains a constant position relative to the earth. It is sometimes referred to as the ‘Clark Orbit’). In 1957, the Soviet Sputnik satellite showed the world for the first time that communication using space satellites was possible. This event provoked U.S. scientists and engineers to develop more sophisticated satellites for commercial use (Al-Makaty, 1995).

The first communications satellite capable of relaying messages immediately was launched in 1962, called Telstar. It orbited the earth every 157 minutes and was capable of relaying signals across the Atlantic for 18 minutes of each orbit. Telstar was able to connect ground stations in the USA and UK for about half an hour each day.

The next development was the placing of satellites in geosynchronous orbit, which improved both the quality and immediacy of satellite broadcasting. The first satellite to be established in a geosynchronous orbit was Intelsat1 launched by the International Telecommunication Satellite Organisation on 6 April 1965. It was the world's first commercial communication satellite for television, voice and facsimile, and was known as Early Bird. The 1960s saw a series of American satellites built. Those of the 1960s and 1970s were small and relatively weak in power but costly. By the 1980s satellites and launchers had become big and powerful. High-powered earth stations transmitting and receiving signals to and from them were large. However direct broadcast satellites reduced the size and cost of the television sets needed to receive their signals, making direct reception of satellite television more attractive to final consumers than before (Collins, 1992:13-16).

Communication satellites have three uses. First, fixed satellite systems (FSS) deliver telephone, data, and radio signals from one point to another, or to many other stations (multipoint). Second, broadcast satellite systems (BSS) transmit radio and television signals from producing broadcasters to other terrestrial broadcast or cable transmitters. Third, direct broadcast satellites (DBSs) beam radio and television programme signals from stations directly to homes via high-powered satellite transmitters. A DBS has been defined by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as a 'radio communication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general public'. DBSs enable audiences within the coverage area of the satellite's broadcast signals to receive programming through

their own umbrella-sized dish antenna directly from the satellite transmitter, rather than through the terrestrial transmission of a local station (Ibid).

The technology of a high-powered transmitter aboard the satellite makes DBS reception possible through a small parabolic dish antenna only 18 inches in diameter that can transfer high-quality programme signals to every home within its footprint (a satellite's footprint is the geographical area on the surface of the earth where signals transmitted from the satellite can be received) (Howell, 1986, cited in Al-Makaty, 1995: 81).

### **5.3 Satellite Development in the Arab Region**

The early use of satellite for television transmission in the Arabian Gulf occurred in Saudi Arabia and Oman in 1978, when the two countries signed a contract with INTELSAT to transmit their TV signals throughout their territories. In May 1981, ARABSAT (the Arab Satellite Communications Organisation) signed a contract with the French AEROSPATIAL satellite manufacturer and launcher to manufacture an Arab communication satellite. In February 1985, the Arab states launched their first satellite for use in regional telecommunication. ARABSAT was described as a regional satellite system providing telecommunications and direct broadcasting television to the countries in its coverage area. It reduced the Arab states' technological dependency on INTELSAT by providing domestic and regional services (Al-Saadon, 1990:14-15). However, the technology remained under-utilised until 1990, when due to the availability and diffusion of satellite dishes, especially in the Gulf Arab states, ARABSAT allowed the commercial use of its facilities (ibid).



The first generation ARABSAT satellites included 1A, 1B & 1C. The first two were launched in 1985 at a total cost of US\$150 million. Both satellites were off service in 1993. In 1992, the third Arab satellite of the first generation (1C) was launched and remained in operation until 2002. In November 1997, ARABSAT sold 1C to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The first generation ARABSAT transmitted signals on S and C bands. The C band covered a wide area spanning the whole Arab world, southern Europe and some parts of south and central Africa. (ARABSAT, 2002)

To keep up with the growing demands for quantity and quality in telecommunication services, ARABSAT in April 1993 signed another contract with AEROSPATIAL to manufacture a pair of satellites, ARABSAT 2A and 2B. Both satellites were launched in 1996. Both ARABSAT 2A and 2B are expected to remain in service until 2012. The second-generation satellites of ARABSAT transmit signals on C band which covers the Arab world, most of Europe, Western Asia and Central Africa. An 80cm diameter dish can receive television signals beamed from these satellites (ARABSAT, 2002).

The Arab world entered the digital age of TV transmission by launching a third generation of ARABSAT satellites in February 1999. ARABSAT 3A, with a lifetime of more than 15 years, is more advanced and covers wider areas than the previous generation of ARABSAT satellites. With 20 transponders in the KU band, each capable of carrying up to 8 digital channels, the third generation of ARABSAT satellites cover all of the Arab world, most of Europe, and some parts of Asia and Africa. This ultimately has increased the number of television channels received at home. ARABSAT has two control centres, to control the satellite during launch phase

and in orbit. The Primary Control Facility (PCF) is located in Dirab, near Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, and the Secondary Control Facility is located in Tunis, Tunisia. Both centres are capable of controlling all the traffic (TV, telephone, data, etc.) relayed by the ARABSAT satellite (ibid.)

The main goals of ARABSAT satellites are to exchange news and public affairs between Arab state-owned national television stations, to facilitate cultural and social integration among member states, and to disseminate Arab culture to the rest of the world. Al-Saadon (1990) found a lack of use of ARABSAT for TV programme exchanges as a result of political, social and economic differences among Arab states. Nevertheless he argued that Arab countries with closer economic and diplomatic relationships were more likely to exchange news between each other using ARABSAT than other countries.

As stated above, one of ARABSAT's goals is to disseminate Arab culture within and outside the Arab World. Al-Shaqsi (2000) indicates that its members minimally used ARABSAT in its early period as a mechanism for educational and cultural exchange, with the exception of transmitting sport events. Abdul-Malik (1989) pointed out that during the experimental period of news exchange via ARABSAT only 70 news stories out of 1348 were about cultural and arts events.

It was only when ARABSAT allowed the individual and commercial use of its facilities that Arab viewers were brought close to the lifestyles and traditions of each other, and only then was the gap of cultural understanding abridged. Thus, Al-Shaqsi (2000) argues, it was not the administration of ARABSAT which made this crossover happen but rather Arab national television channels starting to beam signals to home

TV satellite dishes using ARABSAT. He adds that the use of ARABSAT for disseminating Arab culture is only a partially fulfilled mission and its failure can be solely attributed to the absence of common consensus among Arab countries as to the way Arab culture should be presented.

The commercial Use of ARABSAT was a main goal in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1990, the ARABSAT General Assembly adopted a supplementary modification to the main goals of the organisation (ARABSAT, 2002). A main result of that modification was the emerge of many privately owned and run satellite channels using the ARABSAT facilities, the first three of which were the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), Arab Radio and Television (ART), and Orbit, all owned by Saudi Arabian businessmen. This was followed by tens of state and privately owned Arabian satellite channels.

Tables 5.1 to 5.4 list the TV and Radio Bouquets (packages) on ARABSAT Satellites.

Table 5.1: Digital TV &amp; Radio bouquets (packages) on ARABSAT satellite

SATELLITE	TV CHANNELS	FREQ. KHZ	RADIO CHANNELS
ARABSAT 2-D at 26° East	<b>Kuwait Sport, Sharja, TV 5, Channel-2, Saudi-2, Euro News (English &amp; French), Qatar ARABSAT Info, Thane-SAC, Morocco</b>	11585	Saudi-2, Qatar, Sharjah
ARABSAT 2-D at 26° East	<b>Dubai EDTV, Dubai Sport, Dubai Business, Palestine, Al- Jazeera, Al-Alam, Jordan, Al Mustakillah, Syria, ANN.</b>	11661	MBC FM, Syria, Al-Alam, Jordan, Al-Jazeera, VOA Sawa, VOA Farda
ARABSAT 2-D at 26° East	<b>Djibouti, Al Emirate, Yemen, Algeria, ESC, Tunis, DW,BBC world</b>	11623	UN Radio, Tunis, Yemen, Mauritania, Al-Emirates, Algeria
ARABSAT 3-A at 26° East	<b>Bahrain, Saudi-1, Libya, Kuwait, Sudan, AL Majad, Saudi-2, Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Oman</b>	11746	Oman, Saudi-2, Kuwait, Bahrain, Sudan, Saudi-1, Abu Dhabi
ARABSAT 3-A at 26° East	<b>AL Manar, Future, LBCI, NBN, New TV, MBC, Nagham, Tele Liban, ALArabia Channel- 2,</b>	11785	<b>(Vacant)</b>
ARABSAT 3-A at 26° East	<b>Algeria, Jordan, Tunis, Yemen, Dubai EDTV, Morocco, AL- Jazeera, Sharjah, Mauritania, Al Mushtakillah</b>	11938	Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, VOA Sawa, VOA Farda, Mauritania, Sharjah, Tunis

Source: Arabsat, Riyadh 2002

Table 5.2: Analogue TV Channels on ARABSAT 2nd Generation Satellites

Satellites	Band	Channels	TXP	Freq. KHz
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	(Vacant)	1	12521.00
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	KUWAIT	2	12536.00
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	ART	3	12562.77
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	(Vacant)	4	12577.77
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	ART	5	12604.50
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	(Vacant)	6	12619.50
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	ART	7	12646.30
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	(Vacant)	8	12661.30
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	(Vacant)	9	12685.06
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	LIBYA	10	12700.06
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	(Vacant)	11	12720.00
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Ku-Band	(Vacant)	12	12735.00
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	SHARJAH	1	3720.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	LBC	2	3740.75
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	EGYPT	3	3761.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	ART	4	3781.75
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	NILE TV	5	3802.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	CHANNEL2	6	3822.75
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	CNN	7	3843.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	FUTURE	8	3863.75
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	ORBIT	9	3884.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	SUDAN	10	3904.75
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	SAUDI 1	11	3925.25
ARABSAT 2A	Medium	TV 5	12	3945.75

at 26° East	C-Band			
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	<b>SAUDI 2</b>	13	3966.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	Medium C-Band	<b>EMIRATES MEDIA</b>	14	3985.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	High C-Band	<b>ABU DHABI</b>	15	4039.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	High C-Band	<b>DUBAI</b>	16	4062.00
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	High C-Band	<b>AI- ARABIYA</b>	17	4080.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	High C-Band	<b>MBC</b>	18	4096.25
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	High C-Band	<b>AL- JAZEERA</b>	19	4122.75
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	High C-Band	<b>OMAN</b>	20	4139.50
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	High C-Band	<b>KUWAIT</b>	21	4166.75
ARABSAT 2A at 26° East	High C-Band	<b>YEMEN</b>	22	4180.50
ARABSAT 2B at 30.5° East	Medium C-Band	<b>MOROCCO</b>	9	3883.75
ARABSAT 2D	Ku-	<b>QATAR TV</b>	123	10971.00

Source: Arabsat, Riyadh 2002

Table 5.3: ARABSAT 3A TV List

<b>ARABSAT-3A AT 26° EAST, KU-BAND</b>			
<b>TV Channels</b>	<b>TXP</b>	<b>Freq. KHz</b>	<b>Polarisation</b>
<b>ORBIT</b>	1	11727.48	HORIZONTAL
<b>ARABSAT BOUQUET</b>	2	11746.66	VERTICAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	3	11765.84	HORIZONTAL
<b>ARABSAT BOUQUET</b>	4	11785.02	VERTICAL
<b>ORBIT</b>	5	11804.20	HORIZONTAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	6	11823.38	VERTICAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	7	11839.50	HORIZONTAL
<b>ABU DHABI TV</b>	8	11861.74	VERTICAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	9	11880.92	HORIZONTAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	10	11900.10	VERTICAL
<b>ORBIT</b>	11	11919.28	HORIZONTAL
<b>ARABSAT BOUQUET</b>	12	11938.46	VERTICAL
<b>ORBIT</b>	13	11957.64	HORIZONTAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	14	11976.82	VERTICAL
<b>ORBIT</b>	15	11996.00	HORIZONTAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	16	12015.18	VERTICAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	17	12034.36	HORIZONTAL
<b>(Vacant)</b>	18	12053.54	VERTICAL
<b>ORBIT</b>	19	12072.72	HORIZONTAL

Source: Arabsat, Riyadh 2002

Table 5.4: ARABSAT European Bouquet (package)

<b>SATELLITE</b>	<b>TV CHANNEL</b>	<b>FREQUENCY MHZ</b>	<b>POLARISATION</b>	<b>RADIO CHANNEL</b>
HOTBIRD-4 at 13° East	Sharjah, Qatar, Saudi 1, Kuwait, Libya, Sudan, Oman, Iraq, Esc (Eygpt), Al Manar	12654	Horizontal	Sharjah FM, ESC, Qatar, Kuwait, Baghdad, Saudi, Sudan, Oman, Al Nour

Source: Arabsat, Riyadh 2002

During the 1980s, the spread of satellite dishes was limited; only elite, wealthy Arabs could afford dishes. However, several political, technological and economic changes made it possible for most Arab governments to have a satellite-delivered television service. These changes led to the rise of satellite television in the 1990s, both in terms of channels produced in Arab countries (most are state channels) and channels transmitted to the region from other countries via different satellites. A larger number of Arabs, especially in the Gulf, owned satellite technology (Marghalani *et al.* 1998).

Alterman (1998: 16-17) points to three developments in the Arab world which led to the rise of satellite television in the 1990s. The first was the multilateral response to Saddam Hussain's invasion of Kuwait. He argues that Operation Desert Storm and its preceding events in 1990—1991 made wonderful television viewing and created highly impressive images. Although the allies carefully controlled information for news broadcasts, the result was a feeling of immediacy and a steady stream of information for television viewers.

Another crucial development for the sudden emergence of Arab satellite television, according to Alterman, was the launch of a new generation of satellites which duplicated the number of available channels providing very high quality screen pictures and sound, at a low price. He refers to the ARABSAT launch in 1985 as the main factor for this development. The third important development was the emergence of a substantial class of Arab professionals who had studied and sometimes worked in the West before returning to their countries of origin. 'Those from the Gulf countries especially benefited from sharp increases in levels of education, literacy, and prosperity following the oil boom of the 1970s. They were also products of the jet age,



when a trip to Paris or London was a voyage of merely a few hours. Some 200,000 Saudis have studied in the United States since the early 1960s, and tens of thousands of others have studied in Europe. Other Saudis have lived in Western countries for extended periods for other reasons. Saudi Arabia is not alone. The growing numbers of Arabs who have lived overseas are more consumer-oriented than their parents and their wealth has given them many options for consumption' (ibid: 17).

Users of satellite dishes in Saudi Arabia are now able to switch to different kinds of DBS channels using low cost receivers to receive uncensored television programmes. Until the mid 1990s, the number of satellite channels received in Saudi Arabia was limited and countable. Al-Makaty (1995, pp: 96-97) named 56 channels: 17 satellite television and Radio programmes delivered by the ARABSAT satellite at 31 degrees east, 12 television channels delivered by the ARABSAT satellite at 20 degrees east, and 27 television channels – some of them not clear- delivered by Intelsat, Gorizont (a Russian satellite), and Asiasat.

Today's antennas may be as small as 50 centimetres (less than 20 inches) across. In addition, satellites have become more powerful, therefore, there is likely to be a continued increase in broadcasting capacity as well as a continuing diminution in the size and expense of satellite dishes (Alterman, 1998: 16). Although estimating satellite dishes' exact numbers is a perilous science, close observers of the satellite scene estimate that some two-thirds of the population in the Arab Gulf have access to satellite television (ibid.). Marghlani (1998: 304) concluded from a large-sample survey in Saudi Arabia that (63.8%) of respondents owned and/or had regular access to a satellite dish.

#### **5.4 Satellite Channels Available in Saudi Arabia**

At the time of the field study for this research in Saudi Arabia during the period mid December 2000 to mid June 2001, the researcher investigated the available satellite channels in the Kingdom and found more than 300 channels, listed in the following Tables, 5.5 to 5. 9, according to their satellites and degree of reception.

Table 5.5: Satellite Channels through NILESAT 101 7° WEST

No.	Channel's Name	Status	No.	Channel's Name	Status
1.	Educ-1	Free-to-Air	39.	Nile drama	Free
2.	Educ-2	Free	40.	Nile sport	Free
3.	Educ-3	Free	41.	Nile culture	Free
4.	Educ-4	Free	42.	Channel-5	Free
5.	Educ-5	Free	43.	M-net	S
6.	Educ-6	Free	44.	TV-5	Free
7.	Univ-1	Free	45.	TMC	Irdeto
8.	Univ-2	Free	46.	N/P	Irdeto
9.	Most-T	Free	47.	TVL	Irdeto
10.	Ajman	Free	48.	MTV	Irdeto
11.	Hor-1	Free	49.	VH-1	Irdeto
12.	Hor-2	Free	50.	BTV	Irdeto
13.	Channel-1	Free	51.	TCM	Irdeto
14.	Channel-2	Free	52.	FUT	Irdeto
15.	ESC-2	Free	53.	STY	Irdeto
16.	Test-2	Free	54.	DISC	Irdeto
17.	Nile-TV	Free	55.	SET	Irdeto
18.	ESC-1	Free	56.	TCN	Irdeto
19.	Channel-3	Free	57.	CNN	Irdeto
20.	V-Cairo	Free	58.	Shownet	Irdeto
21.	Line-1	Free	59.	Shownet	Irdeto
22.	Line-2	Free	60.	Shownet	Irdeto
23.	Promo	Free	61.	Shownet	Irdeto
24.	BBCW	Free	62.	Hall-2	Irdeto
25.	Dubai business	Free	63.	ART	Irdeto
26.	Dubai	Free	64.	ART	Irdeto
27.	PSC	Free	65.	ART	Irdeto
28.	ANN	Free	66.	ART	Irdeto
29.	MBC	Free	67.	ART	Irdeto
30.	Oman	Free	68.	ART	Free
31.	Bahrain	Free	69.	IQRA	Free

32.	Kuwait	Free	70.	TNT	Irdeto
33.	Andalus	Free	71.	ART	Irdeto
34.	Dubai drama	Scrambled	72.	ART	Free
35.	Channle-8	Free	73.	Euronews	Free
36.	Nile news	Free	74.	Dubai sport	Free
37.	Nile family	Free	75.	PSC	Free
38.	Nile variety	Free	End of the Table		

Source: Eurostar Communications' promotional materials, 2001

Table 5.6: Satellite Channels through HOTBIRD 2,3,4 &amp; 5 13° EAST

No.	Channel's Name	Status	No.	Channel's Name	Status
1.	Polsat	S	136.	R8	Irdeto
2.	Polsat 2	S	137.	Film-sat	Irdeto
3.	Nasza	S	138.	Cartoon	Irdeto
4.	Ivn	S	139.	Promo	Irdeto
5.	Eurosport	S	140.	NET	Free
6.	Planete	S	141.	MAD TV.	Free
7.	3ABN	Free	142.	ET-1	Irdeto
8.	HB4/20	Free	143.	Channel one	PowerVu
9.	HB4/30	Free	144.	UD	PowerVu
10.	MTA	Free	145.	CFI peco pro	Viaccess
11.	10.722-H	Free	146.	MCM Europe	Viaccess
12.	For kids rom	Free	147.	Fashion	Free
13.	Infosport	Viaccess	148.	Muzzik	Viaccess
14.	Rgions	Viaccess	149.	Tomil tv	Free
15.	Mezzo	Viaccess	150.	Serte test	Free
16.	Festival	Viaccess	151.	Deutsche ban	PowerVu
17.	Historie	Viaccess	152.	Deutsche ban	PowerVu
18.	Titoon	Viaccess	153.	STAG/T11	PowerVu
19.	Odysse	Viaccess	154.	DTAG 50/T1	PowerVu
20.	Canal+	Mediaguard	155.	Wuerth KG/	PowerVu
21.	Canal+ ty	Mediaguard	156.	Gerting/T2	PowerVu
22.	TMT	Free	157.	BT1/T31	PowerVu
23.	Ale kinol	Mediaguard	158.	NTV unscram	PowerVu
24.	Minimax	Mediaguard	159.	Sounderkand	PowerVu
25.	TVP-1	Mediaguard	160.	SLO-TV1	Free
26.	TVP-2	Mediaguard	161.	SLO-TV2	Viaccess
27.	Canal+ niebi	Mediaguard	162.	Polonia	Free
28.	EPG	Mediaguard	163.	Super 1	Free
29.	Quantum-Q24	Free	164.	MINI-BVN	Viaccess
30.	Venus	Free	165.	TVP1-1	Mediaguard
31.	J-channel	Free	166.	TVP-2	Mediaguard
32.	Euro shope	Free	167.	Polsat-1	Mediaguard
33.	Vox	Free	168.	Polsat-2	Mediaguard
34.	Sat.1A	Free	169.	Nasza	Mediaguard
35.	RTL2-Austria	Free	170.	Wot	Mediaguard
36.	CNN	Scrambled	171.	Kuwait	Free
37.	NBC	Free	172.	Oa 1 HB3	Free
38.	ZDF	Free	173.	Tele 24 swiss	Free
39.	K-TV	Free	174.	Abudhabi TV	Free
40.	RTL-Television	Free	175.	Equidia inter	Free
41.	BBC-prime	Viaccess	176.	RTV monte	Free
42.	DW-tv	Free	177.	Eros/LCA	S/F
43.	Sat-1 ch.	Free	178.	SF-2	Viaccess
44.	Channel one	Viaccess	179.	SF-1	Viaccess
45.	Channel-two	Viaccess	180.	TSR-1	Viaccess
46.	Channel-three	Viaccess	181.	TSI-1	Viaccess
47.	Channel-four	Free	182.	TSR-2	Viaccess

48.	Channel-five	Free	183.	TSI-2	Viaccess
49.	ABI	Viaccess	184.	SRG SSR Sat	Free
50.	AB-moteurs	Viaccess	185.	EBS	Free
51.	Animuox	Viaccess	186.	MOU.2	Free
52.	Chasse et pe	Viaccess	187.	Mizik tropic	Free
53.	XXL	Viaccess	188.	Pink puls	Free
54.	Musique class	Viaccess	189.	TLI	Free
55.	Escales	Viaccess	190.	HRT-TV-1	Free
56.	FIT/chane/HI	Viaccess	191.	HRT-TV-2	Viaccess
57.	RFM-TV	Viaccess	192.	HRT-TV-3	Viaccess
58.	Feed K	Viaccess	193.	Sicilia inter	Free
59.	RAI-1	Free	194.	HRT-national	Viaccess
60.	RAI-2	Free	195.	Frotel	Viaccess
61.	RAI-3	Free	196.	Sardegna uno	Viaccess
62.	RAIwidesareen	Free	197.	Hot-bird ch.	Free
63.	Test-2 RAI	Free	198.	www.travel	Free
64.	Test-2 RAI	Free	199.	Eutelsat-ch	Free
65.	Raimosaico	Free	200.	Mantecorlo sat.	Free
66.	Rainews	Free	201.	Bulgaria TV	Free
67.	Camera	Free	220.	Ralch 4	S
68.	Telepace	Free	221.	Ralch 5	S
69.	Raisport	Free	222.	MBC	Free
70.	Rainet TunoSA	Free	223.	Service-2	Free
71.	Raieducation	Free	224.	Service-3	Free
72.	RainettunoSA	Free	225.	Service-4	Free
73.	SaAT-200	Free	226.	CNNI	Free
74.	R1	Irdeto	227.	Euronews	Free
75.	R2	Irdeto	228.	Canal rural	Free
76.	R3	Irdeto	229.	Sharja	Free
77.	R4	Irdeto	230.	Qatar	Free
78.	GREEK	Irdeto	231.	Saudi-1	Free
79.	R5	Free	232.	Kuwait	Free
80.	R6	Irdeto	233.	Libya	Free
81.	R7	Irdeto	234.	Sudan	Free
82.	ERT SAT	Free	235.	Oman	Free
83.	Film net	Irdeto	236.	Jordan	Free
84.	SsporK-TV	Irdeto	237.	Dubai sport	Free
85.	Mego	Irdeto	238.	Dubai business	Free
86.	ANT-1	Irdeto	239.	Evision	Free
87.	Star	Irdeto	240.	Hot-bird ch.	Free
88.	Alter-5	Irdeto	241.	Thai TV-5	Free
89.	New	Irdeto	242.	Digitaly	Free
90.	Mediaset-1	Free	243.	Studio Europe	Free
91.	Mediaset-5	Free	244.	Video	Free
92.	Mediaset-4	Free	245.	Telemarket	Free
93.	Test	Free	246.	Game network	Free
94.	ART variety	Viaccess	247.	Passions	Free
95.	ART children	Viaccess	248.	Onyx	Free
96.	ART movies	Viaccess	249.	Mangas	Scrambled

97.	ART music	Viaccess	250.	Encyclopaedia	Scrambled
98.	ART Europe	Free	251.	Polar	Scrambled
99.	LBC Europe	Viaccess	252.	Cin palace	Scrambled
100.	Egypt sat-c	Free	253.	Romance	Scrambled
101.	ART sport	Viaccess	254.	Rire	Scrambled
102.	IQRA	Free	255.	Action	Scrambled
106.	Puma	Free	256.	AB sat promo	Free
107.	Cmilagro	Free	257.	DCTV-English.	PowerVu
108.	Satisfaction	Free	258.	DCTV-Italy	PowerVu
109.	Telesierra	Free	259.	DCTV-Arabic	PowerVu
110.	Vtv	Free	260.	DCTV-German	PowerVu
111.	TVE inter	Free	261.	DCTV-Spanish	PowerVu
112.	TV golicia	Free	262.	DCTV-French	PowerVu
113.	Cibernos	Free	263.	DCTV-Portuguese	PowerVu
114.	NTVi	Free	264.	PGM2-German	PowerVu
115.	AIT	Free	265.	PGM3-German	PowerVu
116.	Armenia tv	Free	266.	TVN	Free
117.	Al jazeera	Free	267.	Net	Free
118.	Tirrenosat	Free	268.	ET-1	Scrambled
119.	Radio rock	Free	269.	ET-3	Scrambled
120.	ARS-TV	Free	270.	AIOEC	Scrambled
121.	Coming soon	Free	271.	ALPHA	Scrambled
122.	Test telecom	Free	272.	Seven	Scrambled
123.	Gold channel	Free	273.	OTE Promo	Free
124.	Polonia-1	Free	274.	ESPN	Scrambled
125.	Super	Free	275.	MCM	Scrambled
126.	AH-EDP3	Free	276.	Ote plus	Scrambled
127.	VIVA-test-1	Free	277.	Euros port	Scrambled
128.	VIVA-test-2	Free	278.	Ert sat	Free
129.	TV polonia	Free	279.	Star	Scrambled
130.	Discovery	Irdeto	280.	Muzzik	Scrambled
131.	R9	Irdeto	281.	Fashion TV 1SP	Scrambled
132.	BBC world	Irdeto	282.	IPE-U	Scrambled
133.	CNN	Irdeto	283.	IPE-M	Scrambled
134.	CCTV	Free	284	APTNI	Free
135.	R10	Free			

Source: Eurostar Communications' promotional materials, 2001

Table 5.7: Satellite Channels through ARABSAT 2 A 26° EAST

No.	Channel's Name	Status	No.	Channel's Name	Status
1.	ALGERIA	Free	30.	ART	Irdeto
2.	FUTURE	Free	31.	ART	Irdeto
3.	ALJAZEERA	Free	32.	ART	Free
4.	LBC	Free	33.	IQRA	Free
5.	YEMEN	Free	34.	ART	Irdeto
6.	BAHRAIN	Free	35.	TNT	Irdeto
7.	SYRIA	Free	36.	ART	Irdeto
8.	ABUDHABI	Free	37.	ART	Free
9.	IQRA	Free	38.	CNN	Free
10.	MOROCCO	Free	39.	AJMAN	Free
11.	RTT	Free	40.	MBC	Free
12.	LBC	Irdeto	41.	ESC	Free
13.	ART	Irdeto	42.	ABUDHABI	Free
14.	ART	Irdeto	43.	SAUDI-2	Free
15.	ART	Free	44.	TV-5	Free
16.	TFC	Irdeto	45.	MAURITANIA	Free
17.	B-4-U	Free	46.	QATAR	Free
18.	SHARJAH	Free	47.	TUNIS-A	Free
19.	SUADI-1	Free	48.	DUBAI EDTY	Free
20.	KUWAIT	Free	49.	DUBAI-S	Free
21.	LIBYA	Free	50.	DUBAI-B	Free
22.	SUDAN	Free	51.	AJMAN	Free
23.	OMAN	Free	52.	EURONEWS-E	Free
24.	JORDAN	Free	53.	EURONEWS-F	Free
25.	ANN	Free	54.	ORBIT PROMOT	Free
26.	PALESTINE	Free	55.	MOSTAKLA	Free
27.	ART	Irdeto	56.	CH-9	Free
28.	ART	Irdeto	57.	CH-10	Free
29.	ART	Irdeto	58.	CH-11	Free

Source: Eurostar Communications' promotional materials, 2001



Table 5.8: Satellite Channels through ARABSAT 2 A 26° EAST

No	Channel's Name	Status			
1.	P1 CCTV 4	FREE	30.	PREMIUM	Pay Channel
2.	P2 CCTV 3	FREE	31.	RHEM	Pay Channel
3.	P3 CCTV 9	FREE	32.	CARL	Pay Channel
4.	P4 CCTV TEST	FREE	33.	TRAVEL	Pay Channel
5.	P5 CCTT TEST	FREE	34.	SKY	Pay Channel
6.	SPTK	Pay Channel	35.	SS 1	Pay Channel
7.	CHO	FREE	36.	SERIE	Pay Channel
8.	FUTUR	Pay Channel	37.	CCTV	Pay Channel
9.	C+H	Pay Channel	38.	FUTUR	Pay Channel
10.	RTP	Pay Channel	39.	AFRIC	Pay Channel
11.	SS 2	Pay Channel	40.	BLOOM	Pay Channel
12.	CNN	Pay Channel	41.	EVENT	Pay Channel
13.	TV 5	Pay Channel	42.	IA 1	Pay Channel
14.	ZEE	Pay Channel	43.	IA 2	Pay Channel
15.	ERT	Pay Channel	44.	FUTUR	Pay Channel
16.	MNE	Pay Channel	45.	DISC	Pay Channel
17.	MNW	Pay Channel	46.	VH 1	Pay Channel
18.	TMMC	Pay Channel	47.	CART	Pay Channel
19.	SS	Pay Channel	48.	TNT	Pay Channel
20.	KTV	Pay Channel	49.	HALL	Pay Channel
21.	RAI	Pay Channel	50.	BBC	Pay Channel
22.	PRIME	Pay Channel	51.	ESPN	Pay Channel
23.	BBC PASA	Pay Channel	52.	FUTUR	Pay Channel
24.	UN KNOWN	Pay Channel	53.	FUTUR	Pay Channel
25.	NTSC JAPANESE	FREE	54.	DD NEWS	FREE
26.	NTC ENGLISH	FREE	55.	DD SPORTS	FREE
27.	PAL JAPANESE	FREE	56.	DD INTERNAL	FREE
28.	PAL ENGLISH	FREE	57.	DD 1	FREE
29.	AUDIO FOR RADIO	Pay Channel			

Source: Eurostar Communications' promotional materials, 2001

Table 5.9: Satellite Channels through ARABSAT 2 A 26° EAST

No.	Channels' Name	Status	No.	Channels Name	Status
1.	Henan	FREE	21.	Channel One	FREE
2.	Jx Sat TV	FREE	22.	Jilin Satellite TV	FREE
3.	Hei Long Jiang	FREE	23.	EMTV	Pay Channel
4.	Hubei 1	FREE	24.	Radio Channel 1	Pay Channel
5.	Hubei 2	FREE	25.	EMTV & Radio	Pay Channel
6.	Fujian 1	FREE	26.	RTV WNS+44171	FREE
7.	Fujian 2	FREE	27.	Saudi CH 1	FREE
8.	Guangdong	FREE	28.	DWTV	FREE
9.	Guangdong	FREE	29.	MCM	FREE
10.	Hunan 1	FREE	30.	Rai International	FREE
11.	Hunan 2	FREE	31.	TVE	FREE
12.	Hubei 1	FREE	32.	TV5-Asia	FREE
13.	Hubei 2	FREE	33.	APTN 01+44171	FREE
14.	Shaan Xi 1	FREE	34.	Sat link Israel	FREE
15.	Shaan Xi 2	FREE	35.	Digital Video	FREE
16.	LNTV	FREE	36.	JSES 1	FREE
17.	NMCHTV	FREE	37.	Sky 1 Racing	FREE
18.	NMTV	FREE	38.	Sky Racing	FREE
19.	GXTV	FREE	39.	Sky 2 Racing	FREE
20.	Anhui TV	FREE			

Source: Eurostar Communications' promotional materials, 2001

Tables 5.5 – 5.9 show that available satellite channels in Saudi Arabia have a variety of geographical origins. Many are Arab, British, American, Asian and European. This variety of sources poses problem for those people concerned about the impact of globalisation on Saudi culture.

## 5.5 Top Satellite Channels Watched in Saudi Arabia

### 5.5.1 Satellite channel start-ups

All satellite channels in the Middle East started as free-to-air satellite television services. Amin (2000) indicated that satellite broadcasting came first to the region in December 1990, when the Egyptian Satellite Channel started transmission. Nile TV International was the second Egyptian satellite channel. It commenced experimental

broadcasting in October 1993 in English and French. The main objective of this network, according to Amin, is to promote the image of Egypt in Europe and to attract tourism.

In September 1991, one year after the introduction of the Egyptian Satellite Channel, two Saudi businessmen, Walid bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim (a young Saudi investor whose holdings also included United Press International) and Saleh Kamel (who pulled out of MBC in 1993) launched the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) (Sakr, 2001). Kuwait found it necessary to start its own network after the Gulf War, and the Kuwaiti Space Network commenced in December 1991. Emirates Dubai Television (EDTV) began its satellite channel a year later, in October 1992 (Boyd-Barrett, 2000).

The Jordanian Radio and Television Corporation started broadcasting on the Jordanian Arab Space Channel in February 1993. In 1994, Morocco's national television was put onto satellite followed by two other North African countries, Algeria and Tunisia. The main reason for satellite transmission of the service was to develop bridges to improve communication between expatriate workers in Europe and their home countries. North African countries have a different Arabic dialect that is not well understood by the rest of the Arab nations, and this may be why their satellite services mainly address North Africa (Amin, 2000).

The Gulf States were among the first nations to utilise satellite broadcasting since they did not have problems financing these projects. Bahrain and Qatar placed their main channels on Arabsat for direct broadcast transmission to the Arab world. Dubai's satellite channel was the first to reach the United States, via Galaxy. There are many

projects that will play an important role in promoting telematics and informatics in the region, like the development of new specialised channels, such as the Dubai Business Channel and the Dubai Sports Channel, as well as Dubai's Internet City (*ibid.*) In 1995, Qatar introduced Al-Jazeera, the first Arab all-news and public affairs satellite channel. Two private Lebanese satellite channels started broadcasting in 1996, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC, founded as a Christian militia station in the 1980s), and Future TV, a private station part-owned by the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Al-Hariri (Sakr, 2001).

The Middle East has four competing digital television platforms: ART/1st Net, Orbit, Star Select, and Gulf DTH/Showtime. ART developed from a single free-to-air analogue DTH channel to a full service of many popular channels. In addition to transmission to the Middle East on ARABSAT 3A and NILESAT 101, the company also broadcasts to Europe, North America, South America, Asia, and Australia. ART launched Iqra, the first Arab Islamic satellite channel as an outlet for cultural expression with a specific mission of safeguarding indigenous Arab-Islamic cultural values and forms. It features talk shows and interviews on religious and cultural issues with live audience participation (Amin, 2000).

It is noted that most Arab states have tried to jump into the satellite television race for viewers, but most of the popular stations are privately owned and independent of state control, however, Saudi capital plays a pre-eminent role in financing the private stations (Alterman, 1998: 32). Table 5.10 lists several satellite channels which started

up between 1990-1998, then presents brief details of the channels most frequently viewed by the study sample (see chapters 6&7).

Table 5.10: **Satellite channel start-ups, 1990-98**

Start-up	Name	Country link	Ownership
1990	ESC	Egypt	State
1991	MBC	Saudi Arabia	Private
1992	EDTV	Dubai, UAE	State
1993	JSC	Jordan	State
1994	ART	Saudi Arabia	Private
1994	Orbit	Saudi Arabia	Private
1994	RTM	Morocco	State
1995	STV	Syria	State
1996	LBCsat	Lebanon	Private
1996	Future International	Lebanon	Private
1996	Al-Jazeera	Qatar	Independent
1997	ANN	Syria	Private
1998	Nile Thematic Channels	Egypt	State

Source: Press reports; company promotional material cited in Saker, 2001: 15

### 5.5.2 Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC)

This channel was established in London in September 1991, just months after the Gulf war and a few weeks before the multilateral Middle East peace talks opened in Madrid. The MBC project absorbed vast funds. Legal and social constraints inside Saudi Arabia necessitated locating the company abroad, but there was never any doubt that MBC programming was directed primarily at those audiences in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf who had tuned in so readily to CNN. From the outset, MBC managers put the

stress on news output, calling on early editorial recruits to produce “CNN in Arabic” (Amin and Boyd 1994: 46). Since that time, MBC has sought to maintain superior production and high quality TV journalism, covering stories in the Arab world with correspondents directing camera crews and writing scripts for their own finished news reports. Ayish (2002) pointed out that MBC was a great success in the early 1990s among those who owned dishes, a far smaller number than those owning them today. At the same time MBC gave Saudis and other Arabs the chance to watch a new type of news coverage and presentation that was totally different from what they were used to watching on national channels. MBC paved the way for other channels such as Al-Jazeera and ANN.

In 1998, a third of MBC’s staff was made redundant after a change in management. Its evening schedules afterwards revealed a decisive shift in favour of entertainment at the expense of news in order to attract more adolescent viewers in Saudi Arabia who had turned to the Lebanese channels for their entertainment; hence MBC lost part of its Saudi advertisement market. Sakr noted that news on MBC always tries to avoid reporting on and interpreting sensitive political issues in the Gulf region (1999: 98).

In April 2002, MBC moved to Media City in Dubai. Al-Hedeithy, the Director General of MBC, in an interview with TBS Publisher’s Senior Editor, indicated there were many reasons for the move. One reason it had gone to London originally was the fact there were no facilities in the Middle East back in 1991 to accommodate a pan-Arab channel, neither the necessary technical nor political environment. Over time there have been many changes, and now in Dubai MBC enjoys the same freedom and technical provision it had enjoyed in London. The second reason is it is more

economical to be in Dubai than London. Third, the channel wanted to get closer to its audience. It is considered healthy to have interaction between the people who produce the programmes and the people who view the programmes. By this is meant being able to meet at least a significant segment of its audience in restaurants, cafés, or in universities. In London, there was little or no interaction with the viewers (TBS, 2000).

### **5.5.3 Al-Jazeera**

In 1995, Qatar introduced the first Arab all-news and public affairs satellite channel. Amin (2000) notes that the Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel astonished Arab governments and audiences by showing free-ranging political debates, including interactive ~~debates~~ with live phone-ins, which formed a new forum for freedom of expression in the region. Its uncensored political coverage was quite different from any Arabic-language television programming previously seen because of the unusual background of its founding staff (Sakr, 2001). These were journalists fresh from the BBC Arabic television news service, which had been set up in 1994 to supply the Saudi-owned pay-TV operator Orbit, who had had their contracts terminated because of disagreements over editorial content in 1996. Al-Jazeera did not have to look far for a ready-made team of professionals representing many different nationalities (ibid.)

The political differences between Arab countries, the absence of independent and professional journalists, the lack of a collective strategy and of an effective use of information technology are reasons that have prevented successful news exchange among Arab countries. It was only in the mid 1990s that Arab news coverage

improved as a result of the establishment of independent, or partly independent channels, the foremost being Al-Jazeera. This channel's professional correspondents are in many Arab countries and the rest of the world.

Alterman (1999: 1) refers to Al-Jazeera as follows:

Al-Jazeera has invariably stepped on many toes, which are particularly sensitive in authoritarian political cultures where anyone in authority rarely has his toes stepped upon. The price it has paid has been periodic closure of its bureaus in many Arab countries, and a relative lack of advertising. But Al-Jazeera's popularity throughout the region is extraordinary, and the degree of satellite dish penetration of the markets has been so extensive in recent years that Al-Jazeera now has a bigger market share than any one national channel at nearly any given time.

It was not surprising when the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU), the body in charge of ARABSAT, gave Al-Jazeera a six months grace period in which to conform to the "Arab media code of honour," in other words to "promote brotherhood between Arab nations" (Anderson and Eickelman, 1999). Officials in many Arab countries still regard Al-Jazeera as provocative. However, the channel is widely popular among Arab viewers, among them Saudi young adults, as this study will show (see chapters 6 and 7). According to Alterman (1998: 22):

'Al-Jazeera revels in presenting unusual views and political debates. Its two flagship programmes, *al-Ittijah al-Mu 'akas* (The Opposite Direction) and *al-Ray alAkhar* (The Other Opinion) are debate programmes, and heated ones at that. Taking their cue from American programmes like the *McLaughlin Group* and *Crossfire*, Al-Jazeera's debates often present diametrically opposed perspectives on issues that matter to Arab viewers:



religion and politics, relations with Israel, regional unity, and others. In addition, the station is closely tied to the Qatari government’.

According to Time (2004), with an estimated 35 million viewers, the network is being imitated across the region. Moreover, Al-Jazeera has angered Arab governments by giving airtime to rebel movements and freedom advocates and tackling taboo topics like polygamy and apostasy. Further, nothing has made Al-Jazeera so famous as the journalistic hospitality it has extended to Osama bin Laden through the Al-Quaeda leader’s interviews and doomsday warnings. The company’s executives consider bin Laden’s words as genuine scoops defending their professionalism. However, skeptics sneer that the Emir of Qatar has used Al-Jazeera to put his tiny country on the map. He insists that the channel reflects a wind of change blowing through the Middle East (ibid).

#### **5.5.4 The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) and Future TV**

In 1996, two Lebanese stations, LBC and Future, developed satellite delivery to the Middle East shortly after the government’s Audiovisual Media Law made Lebanon the first Arab state to authorise private radio and television stations to operate within its borders (Sakr, 2001). The socially and politically unique situation of this country of just 4 million people is reflected in its media. Besides the state broadcaster Tele-Liban, Maronite Christians are supposed to content themselves with LBC, Sunni Muslims with Future TV, the Christian Orthodox with Murr TV, and Shia Muslims with NBN and Al-Manar TV, run by Hizbollah, the Lebanese Shia political group dedicated to resisting Israel’s occupation of the south (ibid).

With their relaxed and informal approach, and LBC's uninhibited game shows, these channels – especially LBC and Future TV- have had an instant impact on viewing patterns in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia (Amin, 2000). Al-Shaqsi (2000) noted that the Lebanese channels, especially LBC and Future, are more like those of culturally liberal and Western-oriented countries. Although Arabs share a common language, historical background, geographical borders and to a great extent the same religion, there are some cultural differences and diverse political ideologies between them, for these reasons, while some countries tend to be more sensitive to traditional Islamic values, others such as Lebanon are tolerant (ibid.)

Excluding news and politics, entertainment is a predominant feature of all Future TV and LBC TV programmes. It is viewed as a normal expression of the Lebanese way of life and such programmes are deliberately designed to catch the attention of viewers, especially in the Gulf region, in order to increase income from advertising, investment, and tourism. Future TV president, Nadim Munla, said in 1998:

We are proud to be a channel that promotes Lebanon. We are very keen to portray its real image to other Arab countries. This will make Lebanon stronger and give incentives to people to invest, by telling them that life is back, Lebanon is healthy, there's fun and entertainment, and it's beautiful (Sakr, 2001: 76).

Examining 1998-1999 pan-Arab television advertising revenue, one can see how these two Lebanese channels in the early stage had the highest average revenue in the region (see Table 5.11).

Table 5.11: Advertising revenue received, 1998-1999

(\$ Million; at 'rate card', i.e. excluding discounts)

Channel's Name	1998	1999
LBC Sat	93.3	166.5
Future International	88.0	114.2
MBC	76.9	91.5
Egyptian Space Channel	26.7	36.4
Emirates' Dubai TV	20.8	22.3
ART	26.5	21.4
Al-Jazeera	3.2	8.0
Syria Satellite TV	1.8	1.9
Jordan Satellite Channel	0.7	0.6

Source: Pan-Arab Research Centre, Dubai (cited in Sakr, 2001: 116)

(LBC) was launched over the airwaves of Lebanon in 1985 as the first private TV station in the country. This was during the time of the ten year civil war. Lebanon was characterised by political unrest, military conflagration, and public despair. LBC faced a difficult challenge in 1989 and 1990 when the chaos in Lebanon took a turn for the worse and LBC offices were targeted by direct hits. Nowadays, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts LBC International, LBCSAT, a free satellite channel broadcasting 22 hours a day, LBC Europe, broadcasting 16 hours a day, and LBC America and LBC Australia which broadcast around the clock (LBC, Internet, 2002).

Future is another Lebanese owned and operated company founded in 1993. It started, in October 1994, its trial satellite broadcasting over the footprint of ARABSAT 1D. Shortly after, it launched Future International on ARABSAT 2A to broadcast 18 hours a day. The Future channel is a fast growing channel facing strong competition in the Lebanese TV market, especially from LBC.

### **5.5.5 The Arab Radio and Television Network (ART)**

ART was founded in October 1993 as a private network by Saleh Kamel, a Saudi businessman who sold his 37.5 per cent stake in MBC for a reported \$60 million, in partnership with another leading Saudi entrepreneur, Prince Al-Walid bin Talal. It was developed as a pay-TV venture with administrative headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; technical headquarters in Amman, Jordan, and production facilities spanning the entire Middle East (Alterman, 1998). It began by broadcasting five channels to Europe and the Middle East via ARABSAT in 1993 from transmission facilities in Italy, then gradually introduced further commercial and niche television channels. ART currently maintains one free-to-air “promotional” channel, but overall the company relies on subscription fees for the bulk of its revenues. Although Kamel has said on more than one occasion that he views the revenues accruing through pay-TV as a better means of funding good television than relying on advertising, Sakr (1999) points out that ‘it is clear from the limited number of subscribers to the ART package that ART subscription revenues have a long way to go to match the outlays of the company’s owners, who have paid for expensive production and relay facilities in Avezzano, Italy, as well as in several Arab cities’ (p: 98).

ART has invested heavily in the new Media Production City being erected outside Cairo to produce new shows that can both fill ART’s considerable airtime and convince the viewing audience that ART is worth the premium charged. It produces over 6000 live and recorded shows every year, including family dramas, serials, plays, sports programmes, music videos and documentaries. The network has the largest Arabic movie library in the Middle East and has been associated with leading film

production houses in the Arab world. ART has remained focused on providing the Arab world with a diverse and exciting spectrum of family entertainment while maintaining a commitment to providing quality viewing services and preserving the integral traditional values of Arab culture (ART, Internet, 2002).

When Kamel founded ART, its offices were in Italy. Within a few years, however, they began to migrate to Cairo, which brought them closer to their audiences and also to production facilities. Costs in Cairo are also a fraction of the costs of operating from Rome, which no doubt entered into the investors' calculations (Alterman, 1998).

International Network Distribution, (IND) licenses the majority of premium pay television services to major platform operators and cable service providers on a global level. The ART/IND reach currently spans North America, South America, South Africa and Australia, providing both cable and direct-to-home (DTH) services. In contrast to its competitors, ART's regional broadcasts do not put a heavy emphasis on news. In addition to its promotional channel, ART broadcasts five channels (variety, kids, sports, movies, and music) that feature mostly Arabic-language programming (ibid).

#### **5.5.6 Abu Dhabi satellite channel**

The Abu Dhabi satellite channel is considered to be an extension of the UAE Television from Abu Dhabi, which began its transmission, in black and white, in August 1969 and in colour in December 1974. In January 2000, it was launched under

its present name and in its current format concentrates on comprehensive news services and programmes.

In addition to its news service, the Abu Dhabi channel produces nearly 90% of the programmes that it broadcasts. These include political and current affairs programmes, as well as cultural, social, entertainment, drama series and documentaries. It covers the Middle East, Europe, and North America, and will soon reach South America and Australia (<http://www.emi.co.ae>, 2002). Emirates Media Incorporated (EMI), reincorporated under this name in 1999, is a large and diversified media corporation which provides different media, including print, radio, television, Internet, publishing and distribution, and one of its main sections is Abu Dhabi satellite channel.

### **5.6 Official and Social Reactions and Attitude**

There is no doubt that new information and communication technologies that took off during the 1990s, such as satellite channels and the Internet, were main factors contributing to the dramatic changes in Saudi society in the economic, social, and political spheres within that time period. It was the first time in the history of broadcasting in the region that audiences had the ability to select channels, programmes and news from a menu of Arabic and non Arabic networks in near or far regions on the earth. The absence of cinemas, and the lack of theatres, and other forms of public entertainment in Saudi Arabia put an emphasis on entertainment in the home, a practice that often involves watching television (Alterman, 1998). Boyd and Shatzer (1993, cited in Marghalani *et al.* 1998) concluded from a large-sample survey of Saudi

university students that 80 per cent of respondents watched television daily, and 92 per cent of these watched between .5 and 2.5 hours daily. Thus, a large number of audiences were ready to welcome the introduction of satellite television. According to a survey of 495 Saudi adults conducted in December 1995 and January 1996, 63.8 per cent had access to a satellite dish and spent an average of 21 hours per week watching television (Marghalani *et al.* 1998). In his daily column, Hashim (2001) guesstimate that more than 80 per cent of viewers engaging in telephone live talk programmes on channels from Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Syria and Qatar were Saudis.

#### **5.6.1 Official reaction to satellite TV**

The major official reaction to the new media came in March 1994, when the use, manufacture or import of satellites dishes and receivers were banned in the Kingdom by the decree of the Saudi Ministers' Council (Marghalani *et al.* 1998: 297). Sakr states that 'Saudi Arabia's satellite ban was intended primarily to appease local religious conservatives' (2001: 20). Viewers of satellite channels were promised they would have access via a wireless cable network. The decree legitimatised the establishment of the cable TV service in Saudi Arabia under the supervision of the Ministry of Information. It was clear that the aim of this proposed project was to supply people in the country with selected channels and programmes.

While SARAvision Company, its name was later changed to Al-Rowwad, was designing its cable network system, this project that seemed an attractive option between 1995-96, looked much less tempting just two years later. By that time dish

ownership had spread to over 58 per cent of households with television in Saudi Arabia and it was clear that most people preferred direct satellite broadcasting in order to receive an unlimited number of channels without censorship (Sakr, 2001).

By the end of the 1990s, the project was officially cancelled. Al-Rashed (2000), editor-in-chief of the *Asharqalawsat* daily newspaper, ridiculed the design and commented it was too late in Saudi Arabia to launch a national TV cable network since house roofs around the country were full of satellite dishes and people watching unlimited channels without censorship. He argued that while it was possible for any government to utilise the 'gatekeeper media theory' to monitor the local media, it was, however, unrealistic to monitor transnational media such as satellite television.

### **5.6.2 Religious reaction to satellite TV**

Religious scholars in Saudi Arabia basically view most satellite channels' content as conflicting with the teachings of Islam. They assert satellite channels have a bad effect on the commitment of people in general, and youth in particular, to religious teachings. Social mixing between the two sexes, sex before or outside marriage, songs and music, dancing, the appearance of naked or partly naked women, gambling, alcohol, etc., are - from their point of view- activities prohibited by Islam, and should be prohibited on TV. Religious belief is the main reason why some Saudis avoid watching satellite channels. When discussing the motives for Saudis' non-use of direct broadcasting satellites (DBS) Marghalani *et al.* (1998) stated:



[...] But there also are perceived disadvantages associated with DBS that may motivate some potential audience members, particularly religious conservatives, to avoid exposure to this new medium. Certainly the most potent of these disincentives is the fact that most DBS channels available to Saudis have a strong Western flavour and thus project values, beliefs, and practices that clash with the tenets of Islam. [...] Not surprisingly, the religious beliefs avoidance factor was moderately correlated with the avoidance of sexual and violent content on DBS channels, content obviously at variance with conservative Islamic values (p: 311).

Religious scholars are not the only people in Saudi Arabia wary of satellite channels and their unpleasant effect on the commitment of youth to religious teachings. A large number of writers, educationalists and officials repeat this viewpoint occasionally. For instance, Prince Naif Bin Abdul Aziz, Minister of the Interior, in a long interview with girl college students in Riyadh, commenting on the negative impact of satellite television stations, said: 'Since it is difficult for parents to prevent members of their family from watching what is aired by foreign transmitters, why not make ourselves immune by refusing to watch or listen to something that is contradictory to our beliefs or culture'. He advised the girls who were in dialogue with him through closed-circuit television to adhere to Islamic teachings, pointing out that Islam does not bar anything of benefit to women. 'All taboo matters are detrimental to mankind' he was quoted as saying (Riyadh Daily, April 27, 2000).

When Arabs started to watch satellite television in the early 1990s, most channels were delivered through ARABSAT which has control facility centres in Saudi Arabia and Tunis. Both centres are capable of controlling all the traffic (TV, telephone, data, etc.) relayed by the ARABSAT satellite. For example, in 1997, the ARABSTA control

centre's Primary Control Facility (PCF), located in Saudi Arabia blocked out the French channel CFI after it has broadcast an X-rated movie. The channel was banned from using ARABSAT and was replaced by another French channel, TV5. Nowadays, ARABSAT is only one of several available satellites received in the region carrying hundreds of channels (see Tables 5.5 to 5. 9).

### **5.6.3 Social reaction to satellite TV**

The diversity of satellite channel content has generated widespread debate among Saudi society about the potential effects of programmes. The discussions have made this new type of broadcasting a target of daily attacks in mosques, daily newspapers, community living, TV and radio seminars and interviews, etc. It has become evident that satellite channel content is not always received positively among audiences and critics in Saudi Arabia. Al-Makaty (1995) identified three types of respondents to the launch of direct satellite broadcast in Saudi Arabia: those who tended to be accepting of DBS transmissions; those who regarded DBS as a threat to Saudi society in general; and those who viewed DBS as a serious cultural threat.

According to the researcher's observations, during the last ten years, public reaction to satellite channels in Saudi Arabia can be grouped into three distinct perspectives. The first is that of basic conservatives who regard television in general, and satellite television in particular, as an instrument of social subversion conveying ideas that contradict Islamic values. Most in this group are religious people, amongst them parents who still do not allow a television set in their homes.

The second viewpoint is held by those who consider themselves conservatives but who contend that satellite television is a tool which can be used both positively and negatively. One can argue that most satellite channels viewers in Saudi Arabia belong to this group because they maintain they benefit from this media which enables them to watch news, religious programmes, Arabic serials, quiz shows, sports and chat programmes, etc. which do not conflict with religious or local cultural values. They delete the channels they do not wish to receive or scramble them to support their 'halfway' attitude.

The third group comprises viewers who use their remote controls to freely watch any channel or programme without restrictions. While most in this group are expected to be single youths, it is an open secret that some Saudi families access satellite channels that others would consider 'out of bounds'. Because of the lack of social and media research in Saudi Arabia, no qualitative study to-date has investigated the satellite channel viewing habits of the Saudi community in general, in spite of their influences on Saudi local culture and way of life and thinking.

### **5.7 Summary**

It is obvious that communication technology has introduced direct satellite broadcasting not only as a new type of media but also as a new facet of globalisation. Although Egypt was the first country to utilise satellite distribution in the Arab world, with the hope that those with home satellite dishes would pick up the signals, Saudi

businessmen pioneered not only a service designed to be seen free-to-air directly by home viewers but were also the first to do so on an advertising-supported basis. Enormous Arabic satellite channel dishes began to dot the landscape, but the emergence of high-powered satellites in the early 1990s drove dish size down to 50 centimetres (20 inches) across or smaller.

Today, in Saudi Arabia, and despite a ban on satellite receiver ownership, which has not been enforced, a high proportion of Saudis, using low cost receivers, are receiving hundreds of uncensored channels with a variety of programmes far exceeding what ordinary, or state terrestrial television is providing. The next two chapters, chapter six and chapter seven, will present quantitative and qualitative data to show how young adults in Saudi Arabia use these satellite channels.

**CHAPTER SIX**

**QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS**

## 6.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the results of the survey study conducted at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, during March and April 2001. The number of questionnaires completed by members of the sample study was 438. Questionnaire data were analysed using SPSS (Statistical Packages for Social Science) in order to evaluate the research findings.

The main concern of this study is Saudi young adults' usage of the media in general and satellite channels' usage in particular. This study was therefore, designed to find answers to the following research main questions:

RQ1: How are young Saudi adults using satellite channels?

RQ2: Are there any effects of using satellite channels on the usage of other media?

RQ3: What kinds of influence does watching satellite television have on activities of Saudi young adults and on their attitudes towards Western culture?

This chapter includes four main sections. The first section presents the demographic characteristics of the study sample, i.e. gender, age, monthly income, number of family members, place of residence, ability to speak foreign languages etc. The other three sections of this chapter will be organised according to the three main research questions. These questions provide the general headings for sections 2, 3 and 4. Finally, some detailed tables related to this chapter are to be found in Appendix E to avoid increasing the length of data presentation in this chapter,

## 6.2. Demographic Characteristics:

As mentioned before, the total number of the sample study was 438 students. Table 6.1 shows that 236 (53.9%) were males, while females numbered 201 (45.9%).

Gender	Frequency	%
Male	236	53.9
Female	201	45.9
Missing*	1	.2
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.1: Respondents' Gender

The ages of the respondents in this study varied between 18 and 24+, which as shown in Table 6.2 (see Appendix E), were split into three age groups: 18 – 20, 21 – 23, and over 24 years. The number of students, whose ages were between 18 and 23 years, was 370 (84.4%). This high percentage was to be expected since the sample comprised university students who had joined university after finishing a study period of 12 years, starting at age 6.

Table 6.3 (see Appendix E) shows the different colleges to which members of the study sample belonged. It is clear the study sample included students from all colleges. However, the highest percentage of students (42.5%) came from the Humanities College, the largest college in the university, with eight departments. Female students are separated from male students in Saudi Arabia. They have their own teaching blocks. At King Abdul Aziz University female students do not study environmental, or maritime studies or engineering.

.....  
\* Missing: Number of Cases (Aggregate Function)

The number of cases in the group that have missing data for the source variable.

Four hundred and twenty seven of the study sample (97.5%) were Saudis and only ten (2.3%) were non-Saudis (see table 6.4 in Appendix E). This finding is due to the Saudi government's decision several years ago to increase the number of Saudi students in Saudi Universities since a growing number had been unable to find a place in universities in the Kingdom. The government does not allow acceptance of non-Saudi students, with rare exceptions, by Universities, which are government funded and free.

Saudi Arabia comprises thirteen administrative districts. To ascertain the regions to which the students in the study sample belonged, the administrative districts were grouped into five regions. The first, the Western region, comprises the district of Makkah (Jeddah is one of its cities), and the district of Al-Madinah. The majority of students in the study were from this region because it was the study location. There were 198 (45.2%) students from this region in the study sample.

The second region, the East of the Kingdom, includes the Eastern district only. It is about one thousand miles from Jeddah and there are two universities in this region. Only 25 (5.7%) students from this region participated in the study. The third region, the Middle of the Kingdom, consists of Riyadh district, the capital of the Kingdom in which there are two large universities, and the district of Al-Qaseem in which there are many branches of these two universities. There were 41 students from this region (9.4%) in the study sample.

The fourth region, the South of the Kingdom, comprises the four districts of Najran, Asir, Jizan, and Al-Baha; the latter three are near Jeddah. There is only one university in this region, which may explain why the second largest percentage (26.4%) of



students (116 in number) in the study sample came from the south of the Kingdom. The fifth region, the North of the Kingdom, comprises the four districts of Tabouk, Hail, Al-Jouf and the Northern Border. These districts are between 500 to 1000 miles away from Jeddah and there are no universities in this region. There were 45 (10.3%) of students from this region in the study sample (see table 6.5 in Appendix E).

Table 6.6 (see Appendix E) shows that 356 student (81.3%) in the study sample lived with their families. One reason for this high proportion may be Saudi universities' closure of free student residential accommodation as a result of the government's decision to privatise this type of residence which has subsequently become rented accommodation, let out by private companies which pay a proportion of their income to the government. The student residence of King Abdul-Aziz University had been closed for several years but, at the time of the fieldwork, was undergoing refurbishment for student occupation at a later date.

Table 6.7 (see Appendix E) shows that a high percentage of students' families (67.2%) had between 4 and 10 family members. It is normal in Saudi Arabia to find 6 or 7 children in a family, and there may even be more than ten. The percentage of families having more than ten children was 12.8%.

To assess the monthly income of the families with which students lived, members of the study sample were asked to select one of five monthly income groups as follows:

- Group 1: Below 3000 Saudi Riyals \* (equivalent to £500, a low income)

- Group 2: From 3000 SR to 6000 SR (equivalent to between £500 and £1000, a low to moderate income)
- Group 3: From 6001 SR to 9000 SR (equivalent to between £1000 and £1500, a moderate income)
- Group 4: From 9001 SR to 12000 SR (equivalent to between £1500 and £2000, a moderate to high income)
- Group 5: More than 12000 SR (equivalent to £2000, a high income)

The results show that 141 (32.2%) of families that students lived with had a monthly income of between 3001-6000 SR, a low to moderate income. Eighty families (18.3%) had a moderate income (between 6001-9000 SR) and an almost equivalent number, 79 (18.0%) had a high income (more than 12000 SR). Sixty-nine (15.8%) families had a low income (below 3000 SR) and 59 families (13.5%) had a moderate to high income (from 9001 SR to 12000 SR) (see table 6.8 in Appendix E).

Students in the sample were asked if they had visited other Arab countries; Europe or North America; Non-Arab Asian Countries; and Non Arab African countries. Table 5.9 shows that 182 (41.6%) of students had travelled to one or more Arab countries whereas only 72 (16.4%) had travelled to a country in Europe or North America. A similar number, 65 (14.8%), had travelled to one or more non-Arab Asian countries, but only 16 (3.7%) had travelled to one or more non-Arab African countries (see table 6.9 in Appendix E).

.....  
\* £ 1 Stirling was equivalent to 6.00 Saudi Riyals at the time of the study

Regarding foreign languages, a large number of the sample said they understood the English language (64.8%) or spoke English fluently (16.0%). A very small number spoke foreign languages other than English (see table 6.10 in Appendix E).

### 6.3 Uses of Satellite Channels

#### 6.3.1 Satellite channel viewing habits

##### RQ1: How are young Saudi adults using satellite channels?

Tables 6.11.1 – 6.11.12 show the study sample's usage of satellite channels available in Saudi Arabia. As shown in Table 5.16.1, 346 (79%) out of 438 students viewed satellite channels; 207 (47.2%) were males and 139 (31.8%) were females. However, 85 (19.4%) students did not view satellite channels. Of these, 28 (6.4%) were males and 57 (13%) were females. It is clear from this that the number of viewers of satellite channels was almost equal to the number of Saudi TV viewers (347 students), and the male to female proportion was also similar.

Watching satellite channels	Respondents' Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
<b>Yes</b>	207 47.2%	139 31.8%	346 79%
<b>No</b>	28 6.4%	57 13%	85 19.4%
<b>Missing</b>	2 0.5%	5 1.1%	7 1.6%
<b>Total</b>	237 54.1	201 45.9%	438 100%

Table 6.11.1 Watching satellite channels and gender  
Crosstabulation count

Only 25 students of the 346 of the satellite channels viewers had no satellite channels receivers or decoders, whereas 170 students had one receiver and 152 students more

than one. The drop in the prices of these systems year after year, and the constant updating of technologies may possibly have contributed to the increase in the number of these systems and their diversity (see table 6.11.2 in Appendix E).

As mentioned in chapter 5, the early 1990s saw the start of the spread of satellite channels in Arab countries, especially in Saudi Arabia. As to when they first watched satellite channels, students were asked to choose one of four options, ranging from less than one year to more than five years. The results in table 6.11.3 (see Appendix E) show that 154 students had been viewing Satellite channels for more than five years, 90 students for between 3 to 5 years, 67 students between 1 to 3 years, and 36 for less than a year. In other words, 244 students from the study sample (55.7%) had been viewing satellite channels for more than 3 years.

Table 6.11.4 shows the average hours students spent viewing satellite channels. It is clear from the results that the largest proportion of the study sample (133: 30.4%) viewed satellite channels daily for between 1 to 3 hours, 97 (22.1%) for more than 5 hours, and 31 (7.1%) viewed them for less than 1 hour a day. Thus almost half of the sample (49.6%) viewed satellite channels daily for between 1 to 5 hours.

Daily viewing of Satellite channels	Freq.	Percent
Less than one hour	31	7.1
1-3 hours	133	30.4
3-5 hours	84	19.2
More than 5 hours	97	22.1
Missing	93	21.2
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.11.4 On average, how many hours do you spend watching satellite channels?

Satellite television broadcasting is divided into two types, depending on the type of broadcasting and receiving. These two types are open-to-air channels and scrambled (coded) channels. The first type enables viewers to receive channels without subscription while the second type is only accessible with subscription and payment of viewing fees. Table 6.11.5 (in Appendix E) shows that 179 of the 346 satellite channels viewers watched open-to-air channels only, 10 students watched coded channels only, whereas 151 viewed both types of channels.

Table 6.11.6 shows that 70 students of the 179 who viewed coded channels only did not pay viewing fees because they accessed the channels illegally without subscription cards or PIN numbers. The same table shows that 20 students paid the cost of viewing by themselves, 47 students' parents paid their viewing fees, 32 viewed them with others who paid the fees, lived in residential apartments where the fees for the service were already paid, or watched in cafes.

When asked where they watched satellite channels most often, a large proportion of students (346: 64.2%) viewed satellite channels in their home, while 42 (9.6%) viewed them in the homes of friends, 22 (5.0%) in other places like cafes, and 3 (.7%) viewed them in student residential accommodation. The latter very low number was likely due to the reason previously given, i.e. very few students lived in private, rented accommodation. The majority of students lived at home with their families (see table .6.11.7 in Appendix E).

Table 6.11.8 (see Appendix E) shows the conditions or situations in which the sample liked to view satellite channels. It is clear that 91 (20.8%) preferred to view them with

friends, 87 (19.9%) preferred to view them in different social settings, like cafes, 84 (19.2%) liked to view them alone, 63 (14.4%) with all family members, and just 18 (4.1%) with family members of the same sex.

Regarding the times of viewing satellite channels, the results show that 191 students (43.6%) of the study sample preferred to watch satellite channels both on weekdays and weekends, 113 (25.8%) preferred to watch them at the weekend, and 41 (9.4%) preferred to view them on weekdays only. The latter low percentage was likely due to the fact that members of the sample were students and therefore were studying during weekdays (see table 6.11.9 in Appendix E).

Students were asked what time of day they watched satellite channels most often and were given four options: 6 am – 12 noon; 12 noon – 6 pm; 6 pm – 12 pm; and 12 pm – 6 am. The largest proportion of students (212: 48.4%) indicated their prime viewing time was between 6 pm – 12 pm whereas the second largest group of students (104: 23.7%) selected the period between 12 pm – 6 am (see table 6.11.10 in Appendix E).

A low percentage of the sample viewed in the morning and in the afternoon, 0.9% and 6.6%, respectively. The results of the pilot study carried out prior to the main questionnaire had pointed to students' late night and early morning viewing of satellite channels. Therefore, a question was added to the main survey to ascertain reasons for students' late evening/early morning viewing habits (see table 6.13 in Appendix E for results)

### 6.3.2 Popular Satellite Channels

#### RQ1.1 What types of channels do Saudi young adults watch most?

Table 6.11.11 shows the names of the satellite channels the participants in the study sample most preferred watching. In an open-ended question, the researcher asked students to name their five favourites in order of preference from 1 to 5. The immediate results of this questioning are shown in table 6.9.11 where 51 channels are listed as the most popular satellite channels watched by the students sampled.

It is clear from this table that the *MBC* channel was the favourite satellite channel among students. Of the 346 satellite channel viewers, 168 (38.4%) ranked it their favourite, 64 (14.6%) ranked it their second favourite, and 50 (11.4%) ranked it as their third. This channel was always ranked in either first, second or third place by students.

*Al-Jazeera* was the favourite of 34 (7.8%) of students, *LBC* was the favourite of 18 (4.1%), *Future* was the favourite of 13 (3.0%), closely followed by *UAE*, the preferred choice of 12 (2.7%) of students.

Turning to students' second favourite channels, *LBC* was the preferred second choice of 42 (9.6%), *Future* by 29 (6.6%), *UAE* by 18 (4.1%) and *ART* variety by 16 (3.7%). When asked to write the name of their third choice of satellite channels, 41 (9.4%), 34 (7.8%), 25 (5.7%), and 24 (5.5%) of students referred to *Future*, *LBC*, *Abu Dhabi*, and *ART* variety, respectively.

As table 6.11.11 clearly shows, *MBC* was the students' outstanding favourite satellite channel, it was selected by 168 students compared to its nearest rival *Al-Jazeera*, chosen by only 34 of the study sample. Students' preferred choice between *Al-Jazeera*, *LBC*, *Future*, *UAE*, *ART* variety and *Abu Dhabi* were far less pronounced.

All the channels ranked 1 to 5 in order of preference were Arabic channels providing a miscellany of programmes, except *Al-Jazeera* which is a news channel.



Top Favourite Satellite Channel			Second Top Favourite Satellite Channel			Third Top Favourite Satellite Channel		
	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>		<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>		<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>
MBC	168	38.4	MBC	64	14.6	MBC	50	11.4
Al-Jazeera	34	7.8	LBC	42	9.6	Future	41	9.4
LBC	18	4.1	Future	29	6.6	LBC	34	7.8
Future	13	3.0	UAE	18	4.1	Abu Dhabi	25	5.7
UAE	12	2.7	ART variety	16	3.7	ART variety	24	5.5
ART variety	9	2.1	Orbit	16	3.7	UAE	22	5.0
Movie Channel	8	1.8	Kuwait	16	3.7	Egypt	20	4.6
ART music	7	1.6	Abu Dhabi	15	3.4	Al-Jazeera	18	4.1
Showtime	7	1.6	Al-Jazeera	13	3.0	Kuwait	14	3.2
Orbit	6	1.4	Egypt	12	2.7	Orbit	10	2.3
Egypt	5	1.1	ART music	10	2.3	Nile	9	2.1
Nile	5	1.1	MTV	9	2.1	ART music	7	1.6
Abu Dhabi sport	4	.9	Syria	8	1.8	MTV	6	1.4
Abu Dhabi	4	.9	Dubai sport	7	1.6	ART movies	5	1.1
Kuwait	4	.9	Movie Channel	7	1.6	Discovery	5	1.1
TV Land	4	.9	Nile	6	1.4	Dubai sport	4	.9
ART teens	3	.7	ART sport	4	.9	Bahrain	4	.9
VOX	3	.7	ART movies	4	.9	Showtime	4	.9
MTV	3	.7	ART Iqra	3	.7	XXL	4	.9
Ultra Blue	3	.7	Bahrain	3	.7	RTL	3	.7
Super Movies	3	.7	Italiano	3	.7	Super Movies	3	.7
Cartoon	3	.7	TV Land	3	.7	Style	3	.7
ART sport	2	.5	Sharja	2	.5	ART Iqra	2	.5
ART Iqra	2	.5	CNN	2	.5	Syria	2	.5
Sharja	2	.5	VOX	2	.5	Nile drama	2	.5
Action	2	.5	Showtime	2	.5	Movie Channel	2	.5
Dubai sport	1	.2	Super Movies	2	.5	Cartoon	2	.5
Bahrain	1	.2	69x	2	.5	Iraq	1	.2
Qatar	1	.2	Movie 2	2	.5	Countdown	1	.2
Sudan	1	.2	ZDF	2	.5	Star Plus	1	.2
Syria	1	.2	Sony (India)	2	.5	Film net	1	.2
Animal Planet	1	.2	Abu Dhabi sport	1	.2	ANN	1	.2
ANN	1	.2	FTV	1	.2			
			Disney	1	.2			
			Style	1	.2			
			Satisfaction	1	.2			
			Music Now	1	.2			
Missing	97	22.1	Missing	106	24.2	Missing	108	24.7
Total	438	100.0	Total	438	100.0	Total	438	100.0

Table 6.11.11: Students' Most popular Satellite Channels.

Fourth Top Favourite Satellite Channel			Fifth Top Favourite Satellite Channel		
	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>		<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>
<b>LBC</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>6.8</b>
<b>Future</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>Future</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>6.6</b>
<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>UAE</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5.9</b>
<b>Abu Dhabi</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>LBC</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>5.3</b>
<b>Al-Jazeera</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>Al-Jazeera</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>5.3</b>

(Continued) Table 6.11.11: Students' Most popular Satellite Channels.

### 6.3.3 Popular satellite programmes

**RQ1.2 What types of programmes do young adults in Saudi Arabia expose themselves to on satellite channels?**

Table 6.11.12 shows ten different types of satellite channels programmes which students were asked to rank in order of preferred viewing choice from 1 to 10, with 1 signifying top favourite and 10 indicating least favourite. A similar type of question had been presented to the study sample regarding their viewing of eight types of (Saudi) TV programmes. In the present investigation, two further types of programmes, not aired on Saudi TV, were added to the list, namely, fashion and erotica.

It is clear from table 6.11.12 that music was students' preferred type of programme. In this table, 204 (46.6%) ranked music as their first, second and third favourite type of programme. In contrast, 23 (5.2%) of the sample ranked it as their eighth, ninth and tenth least preferred type of programme.

Sports were ranked first, second and third by 147 students (33.5%). In contrast, 84 (19.1%) of the sample ranked it as their eighth, ninth and tenth least preferred type of programme. Noticeably, sport programmes were preferred more than Western movies and drama. The latter was the preferred first, second and third choice of 169 (38.5%) students. Seventy-two (16.4%) of students preferred sports to 47 (10.7) who preferred Western movies and drama presented through the satellite channels. Only 25 (5.7%) students ranked Western movies and drama as their eighth, ninth, and tenth least preferred type of programme. Only 29 (6.7%) of students preferred Arabic movies and drama, a much lower percentage than the 38.5% preferring Western movies and drama.

Table 6.11.12 also reveals that a reasonable proportion of students preferred religious programmes. Of the 438 students sampled, 78 students (17.8 %) ranked this type of programme as their first, second and third preferred choice. The proportion of students preferring erotica programmes was higher than the researcher had anticipated, 62 students (11.8% of the sample), ranked this type of programme as their first, second and third preferred choice. Almost a quarter of students (148: 33.8%) ranked it as their least preferred type of programme.

Satellite Channel Programmes		Ranking											Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	
Sport	Freq.	72	39	36	31	23	16	17	28	44	12	120	438
	%	16.4	8.9	8.2	7.1	5.3	3.7	3.9	6.4	10.0	2.7	27.4	100.0
News and Politics	Freq.	35	33	44	31	34	36	39	33	26	22	105	438
	%	8.0	7.5	10.0	7.1	7.8	8.2	8.9	7.5	5.9	5.0	24.0	100.0
Music	Freq.	70	75	59	39	28	20	18	12	11	0	106	438
	%	16.0	17.1	13.5	8.9	6.4	4.6	4.1	2.7	2.5	0	24.2	100.0
Instructional	Freq.	11	16	28	17	40	46	53	39	46	31	111	438
	%	2.5	3.7	6.4	3.9	9.1	10.5	12.1	8.9	10.5	7.1	25.3	100.0
Religious	Freq.	29	26	23	38	46	35	43	34	33	23	108	438
	%	6.6	5.9	5.3	8.7	10.5	8.0	9.8	7.8	7.5	5.3	24.7	100.0
Arabic Movies & Drama	Freq.	2	11	16	20	35	49	46	63	43	31	122	438
	%	.5	2.5	3.7	4.6	8.0	11.2	10.5	14.4	9.8	7.1	27.9	100.0
Western Movies & Drama	Freq.	47	64	58	45	47	34	19	21	4	0	99	438
	%	10.7	14.6	13.2	10.3	10.7	7.8	4.3	4.8	.9	0	22.6	100.0
Advertising	Freq.	46	41	33	60	38	38	33	30	11	0	108	438
	%	10.5	9.4	7.5	13.7	8.7	8.7	7.5	6.8	2.5	0	24.7	100.0
Erotica	Freq.	19	7	26	26	17	25	29	20	30	98	141	100.0
	%	4.3	1.6	5.9	5.9	3.9	5.7	6.6	4.6	6.8	22.4	32.2	100.0
Fashion	Freq.	15	29	27	42	26	23	27	23	46	53	127	438
	%	3.4	6.6	6.2	9.6	5.9	5.3	6.2	5.3	10.5	12.1	29.0	100.0

Table 6.11.12: Satellite Channels Programmes Ranked According to Students' Viewing Choice

The researcher designed a question to find out which countries produced the programmes students most preferred to watch on satellite channels. The question included seven options: *Saudi Arabia*; *Arab Gulf States*; *Other Arab Countries*; *USA*; *Asia*; *Europe*; and *Latin America*. Students were asked to rank them from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the country/group of countries producing programmes students most enjoyed viewing, to 7 representing the country/group of countries transmitting the programmes they least enjoyed watching. As shown in Table 6.11.13, the *Arab Gulf States* produced the programmes 101 students (23.1%) most preferred watching. The *other Arab Countries*, the *USA*, *Saudi Arabia* and *Europe* produced the programmes (100: 22.8%), (52: 11.9%), (45: 10.3%), (43: 9.8%) students most preferred watching, respectively.

R A N K I N G	Saudi Arabia		Arab Gulf States		Rest of Arab Countries		USA		Asia		Europe		Latin America	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
1	45	10.3	101	23.1	100	22.8	52	11.9	2	.5	43	9.8	8	1.8
2	28	6.4	107	24.4	85	19.4	37	8.4	16	3.7	38	8.7	10	2.3
3	40	9.1	40	9.1	79	18.0	69	15.8	28	6.4	34	7.8	27	6.2
4	29	6.6	34	7.8	25	5.7	54	12.3	76	17.4	61	13.9	17	3.9
5	20	4.6	31	7.1	22	5.0	44	10.0	63	14.4	76	17.4	33	7.5
6	45	10.3	17	3.9	14	3.2	32	7.3	72	16.4	48	11.0	57	13.0
7	90	20.5	4	.9	4	.9	11	2.5	30	6.8	4	.9	129	29.5
M I S S I N G	141	32.2	104	23.7	109	24.9	139	31.7	151	34.5	134	30.6	157	35.8
T O T A L	438	100.	438	100.0	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.0	438	100.

Table 6.11.13 Ranking of Countries Producing the Programmes Students most preferred to watch.

#### 6.3.4 Common reasons for watching satellite channels

##### RQ1.3 What are the important common reasons for young adults in Saudi Arabia watching satellite channels.

Table 6.12 (see Appendix E) shows the reasons why students viewed satellite channels. The study sample was presented with twelve possible reasons as follows: to find out how people outside Saudi Arabia live; to gain more knowledge about different cultures; to know what is going on internationally; to enjoy a wide variety of programmes; to

watch uncensored programme; to watch uncensored news; to find issues to discuss with others; to keep up with current issues and events; to relax; to watch sexually explicit scenes; to watch more matches and other sport programmes; and because it is the only means of entertainment. They were asked to indicate to what extent these reasons influenced their viewing habits on a five point scale, ranging from 1 representing strongly agree to 5 reflecting disagree.

Table 6.12, section 1, shows 248 (56.6%) students agreed or strongly agreed they watched satellite channels *to find out how people outside Saudi Arabia live*, 76 (17.4%) students said they somewhat agreed with this reason, while 25 (5.7%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed with the reason given.

Section 2 shows 228 (52.1%) students agreed or strongly agreed they viewed satellite channels *to gain more knowledge about different cultures*, 95 (21.7%) students somewhat agreed, and only 23 students (5.2%) disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Section 3 shows 287 (65.6%) students agreed or strongly agreed they view satellite channels *to know what is going on internationally*, 53 (12.1%) students somewhat agreed, while only 9 (2.0%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Section 4 indicates 240 (55.7%) students agreed or strongly agreed that they viewed satellite channels *to enjoy a wide variety of programmes*, 87 (19.9%) students somewhat agreed, while 17 (3.8%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Section 5 shows 169 (38.5%) students agreed or strongly agreed they viewed satellite channels *to watch uncensored programmes*, 59 (13.5%) students somewhat agreed, whereas 119 (27.2%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Section 6 indicates 210 (47.9%) students agreed or strongly agreed they viewed satellite channels *to watch uncensored news*, 63 (14.4%) students somewhat agreed with this reason, whereas 74 (16.9%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Section 7 reveals 198 (45.3%) students agreed or strongly agreed that one of the reasons they viewed satellite channels was *to find issues to discuss with others*, 103 (23.5%) students somewhat agreed with this, whereas 48 (10.9%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Section 8 discloses 286 (65.3%) students agreed or strongly agreed they watched satellite channels *to keep up with current issues and events*, while 57 (13.0%) students somewhat agreed, and only one student strongly disagreed.

Section 9 shows 223 (50.9%) students agreed or strongly agreed that they the watched satellite channels *to relax*, 86 (19.6%) students somewhat agreed, and 35 (8.0%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Section 10 shows that 106 (24.1%) students agreed or strongly agreed they watched satellite channels *to watch sexually explicit scenes*, 75 (17.1%) students said that somewhat agreed, while 163 (37.3%) students chose to disagree or to strongly disagree with this reason.

Section 11 indicates 176 (40.2%) students agreed or strongly agreed they viewed satellite channels *to watch more matches and often sports programmes*, 65 (14.8%) said they somewhat agreed with this reason, whereas 103 (23.5%) disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Finally, section 12 shows 193 (44.0%) students agreed or strongly agreed they viewed satellite channels *because it is the only means of entertainment*, 111 (25.3%) students somewhat agreed with this reason, and only 43 (9.9%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

### **6.3.5 Reasons for watching satellite channels late evening/early morning**

Tables 6.13 (see Appendix E) shows six possible reasons why members of the sample wanted to view satellite channels late at night. Students were presented with these reasons and asked to rate them on a five point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Results from the questionnaire survey revealed the main reason students wanted to view satellite channels late at night was because: *Western movies are broadcast late*. One hundred and thirty four students (30.6%) strongly agreed and agreed that this was the reason for their late night viewing of satellite channels.

The second and third main reasons given by the students were: *more Arabic movies are broadcast late* and: *to kill time when I can't sleep* respectively. One hundred and twelve (25.5%) and one hundred and two (23.3%) students strongly agreed and agreed that these were the main reasons for their late night viewing of satellite channels.



Fourth and fifth main reasons were: *to watch matches and other sports programmes* and: *to watch sexually explicit programmes* respectively. Eighty three (19.0%) and 77 (17.6%) of students agreed these were the main reasons for their late night viewing of satellite channels. The final main reason was: *to watch more news and political programmes*. Fifty three (12.1%) selected this reason for their late night viewing of satellite channels. This latter choice may have been due to students' general lack of interest in news and politics.

#### **6.4 Uses of Newspapers, Magazines, Internet, Radio and Terrestrial TV.**

##### **RQ2.1 How do young Saudi adults use newspapers, magazines, radio, the Internet, and terrestrial TV?**

###### **6.4.1 Newspaper readership**

The three tables 6.14.1 – 6.14.3 (see Appendix E) show the usage of newspapers by the study sample. They show that 389 (89%) of students (50.5% males and 38.5% females) read newspapers whereas 44 (13 males, 31 females) did not. Two hundred and twenty-five (51.4%) students read newspapers daily, 128 (29.2) read them weekly, while 34 (7.8%) read newspapers monthly. The tables also show the names of the most popular newspapers read by the study sample. Students were asked in an open question to name their top three favourite newspapers and rank them in order of preference. This procedure differed from that of many former media studies in Saudi Arabia, the most recent of which conducted by Al-Moaither (2001) presented eight newspapers titles and asked students to rank them in order of preference.

The results in table 6.14.3 show that the *Okaz* newspaper, published in Jeddah (the study location) was the students' favourite newspaper with 46.8%, 20.3%, and 9.8% of students ranking it their first, second and third most favourite newspaper, respectively. The *Al-Madinah* newspaper, also published in Jeddah, was students' second most favourite newspaper, with 10%, 23.7%, and 13.5% ranking it their first, second and third most favourite newspaper, respectively. Finally, the *Al-reyadeyah* newspaper, again issued in Jeddah and focusing on sports, was students' third most favourite newspaper, with 15%, 7.1% and 13% ranking it their first, second and third most favourite newspaper, respectively.

This table also shows the names of newspapers proffered by the students, which include Arabic newspapers issued in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and London, together with two English newspapers, the *Saudi Gazette*, issued in Jeddah, and *Arab news* issued in London. The newspapers are:

1) *Alam Alriadh*, 2) *Al-Belad*, 3) *Al-Ektisadeyah*, 4) *Al-hadaf (Kuwait)*, 5) *Al-Hayat (London)*, 6) *Al-Jazeera*, 7) *Al-Madinah*, 8) *Al-Nadwah*, 9) *Al-reyadeyah*, 10) *Al-Riyadh*, 11) *Asharqalawsat (London)*, 12) *Al-Watan*, 13) *Arab News*, 14) *Okaz*, and 15) *Saudi Gazette*.

#### 6.4.2 Magazine readership

The tables 6.15.1 - 6.15.3 (see Appendix E) illustrate the readership of magazines by the study sample. They show that 321 (73.3%) of students from the sample read magazines. A comparison of magazine readership according to gender indicated that

162 of the 201 females sampled read magazines compared to 159 of the 236 males sampled. This result reflects the cultural situation in the Saudi community where males are more involved in outdoor activities than females, for example, driving cars and going to sports clubs and cafes, whereas females use part of their free time reading magazines.

These tables show that 180 (41.1) of the 322 students read magazines monthly, 127 (29%) read them weekly, and only 15 (3.4%) read them daily. To elicit the names of the most popular magazines read by the study sample, the researcher again asked students to name their three top favourite magazines, in order of preference. The results are presented below:

*Sayedaty*, an Arabic magazine, specialising in women's interests and published in London, was the favourite, with 21.7%, 8.2, and 7.1% of students rating it first, second, and third.

*Fawasil*, focusing on youth, was the students' second favourite magazine, with 11.2%, 7.3%, and 3.4% rating it first, second and third. It was followed in ranking, with minor differences, by a number of similar magazines focussing on youth issues of interest to both genders. These were *Al-Jamilah*, *Al-Jadidah*, and *Al-Mukhtalif*. They focus on news about entertainers, fashion, beauty, poetry, short stories, and sports.

The names of the magazines offered by students, which included forty-eight magazines from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, other Arab countries, Britain and the USA, are presented in table 6.15.3b (see appendix E). These magazines are in alphabetical order and grouped according to the country of origin. Some of these magazines are concerned with Islam, like *Al-Dawah* and *Al-Mujtama'a* magazines; others are focus

on sports, like *Al-Malaib* and *Reyadahwashabab*; others concentrate on finance and economics, like *Mal wa Egtessad*, while others are concerned with cars and computers. There is also one American magazine, *PlayBoy*, chosen by two students as their favourite magazine, despite the fact that the government does not allow it in Saudi Arabia. Overall, the findings indicate that the majority of students' favourite magazines are issued outside Saudi Arabia. (See tables 6.15.3a and 6.15.3b in Appendix E)

### **6.4.3 Usage of the Internet**

Tables 6.16.1 and 6.16.2 (see Appendix E) show students' usage of the Internet. They indicate that 168 (38.3%) of the 438 students sampled used the Internet, about 70% of whom were males. One reason for the much lower number of female students using the Internet is that most Internet users go to Internet cafes and most of these are accessible to males only. Only 60 (13.7%) students used the Internet daily. The low frequency of daily use of the Internet may be due to several factors. The universities do not provide this service for students in general, only those in the computer department are likely to use the Internet on a daily basis, and only for a limited time. Use of the Internet at home is also limited due to the expense, it is more expensive than in other countries, for example, the UK.

A third reason may be due to the fact that logging onto the W.W. web through the Saudi telephone network is very slow due to technical reasons. A fourth reason is the censorship imposed by the government to limit access to prohibited sites, such as those showing indecent material, for example, pornography.

To ascertain the kind of web sites visited most frequently by young adults in the Kingdom, the researcher named ten different web sites and asked participants to indicate how frequently they visited each web site using a three point scale: Always, Sometimes, Never. Findings concurred with those derived from the pilot study for each of the focus groups and the questionnaire.

As the results show, the Internet was used mostly to visit music web sites. One hundred and forty-seven (33.7%) students visited these 'always' and 'sometimes'. Sites for news and current affairs were visited 'always' and 'sometimes' by 135 (30.8%) students, while chat and people sites were visited 'always' and 'sometimes' by 121 (27.6%) students. The shopping and love & relationship sites were the least visited. Ninety eight (22.4%) of students never visited shopping sites and 97 students (22.6) never visited love and relationship sites.

#### **6.4.4 Usage of the Radio**

This part examines students' usage of the radio. Tables 6.17 show that 368 (84%) of students from a total of 438, listened to the radio; 216 (49.3%) of them were males and 152 (34.7%) were females. Males drive cars, which usually have radios, whereas females do not drive cars in Saudi Arabia. Two hundred and seventy eight students (63.5%) listened to the radio daily, sixty students (15.1%) listened to it weekly, and twenty three students (5.3%) listened to it monthly.

An open question was used to ascertain students' usage of the radio. The researcher requested students to write the names of three radio stations they preferred listening to more than others, in order of preference.

The results presented in Table 6.17.3a show that the *MBC FM* station occupied first place. Two hundred and ninety students (66.2 %) from the sample chose this station as their top favourite while 28 (6.4%) chose it as their second preferred choice, and 15 (3.4%) as their third. This station's headquarter was in London until late 2002 then moved to Dubai. It broadcasts in Arabic and its programmes largely include songs and music.

*The Qu'ran station* occupied second place, chosen by 51 (11.6%) students as their first favourite, 26 (5.9%) students as their second favourite, and by 5 (1.1%) students as their third. This station broadcasts from Riyadh and is under the authority of the Saudi Ministry of Information. It broadcasts Holy Qur'an recitations and Islamic programmes. *Riyadh Radio* occupied third place in the list of students' preferred radio stations. This is the main radio station in Saudi Arabia and is under the authority of the Ministry of Information. It has varied programmes that cover most interests, for example, news, songs and music, religious issues, poems, live debates, and so on. Nine students (2.1%) chose it as their favourite station, 36 (8.2%) students as their second, and 19 (4.3%) as their third.

Noticeably, *Radio Jeddah (Second Programme)* which broadcasts from Jeddah (the study location) did not succeed in attracting a large number of listeners despite its varied programmes that cover most interests, similar to Riyadh Radio. It was also

noticed that students' choice included 16 different Arabic and Western radio stations all broadcasting in Arabic. Presented in table 6.17.3b are the Radio stations, listened to by students according to country of origin.

**6.4.5 Usage of Terrestrial (Saudi) TV**

Tables 6.18.1 – 6.18.8 illustrate the usage of terrestrial (Saudi) television, which has two channels. The First Channel broadcasts in Arabic and the Second Channel in English.

As shown in Table 6.18.1, 347 (79.2 %) students of the 438 sampled watched Saudi TV; 203 (46.3%) were males and 144 (32.9%) were females. Of the 85 (19.4%) students that did not watch it, 54 (12.3%) were females and 31 (7.1%) males.

Watching terrestrial TV	Respondents' Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
<b>Yes</b>	203	144	347
<b>%</b>	46.3%	32.9%	79.2%
<b>No</b>	31	54	85
<b>%</b>	7.1%	12.3%	19.4%
<b>Missing</b>	4	2	6
<b>%</b>	0.9%	0.5%	1.4%
<b>Total</b>	238	200	438
<b>%</b>	54.3%	45.7%	100%

Table 6.18.1 Watching terrestrial (Saudi) TV and gender Crosstabulation count

Table 6.18.2 shows that 25 (5.7%) of the sample did not view the First Channel while 94 (21.5%) did not view the Second Channel. As shown in the table, a large proportion of the viewers of the First channel, 27.9%, viewed it for 1 to 3 hours daily, 20.5% viewed it between 3 to 5 hours daily, 18.5% viewed this channel for less than one hour

a day while 8.2% viewed it for more than 5 hours daily. Table 5.12.2 also shows that a large proportion of the viewers of the Second Channel, 25.1%, viewed it for less than one hour a day, 7.5% viewed it between 3 to 5 hours daily, and 3.2% viewed it for more than 5 hours a day.

Hours Spent Watching TV	Channel One		Channel two	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
<b>Never watch it</b>	25	5.7	94	21.5
<b>Less than one hour</b>	81	18.5	110	25.1
<b>1-3 hours</b>	122	27.9	103	23.5
<b>3-5 hours</b>	90	20.5	33	7.5
<b>More than 5 hours</b>	36	8.2	14	3.2
<b>Missing</b>	84	19.2	84	19.2
<b>Total</b>	438	100.0	438	100.0

Table 6.18.2 Average hours spent watching Saudi TV

Tables 6.18.3 and 6.18.4 (see Appendix E) show that 263 (60%) of the students sampled had more than one TV set in their homes. Three hundred and seven (70%) of the sample viewed Saudi TV in their own homes, while 39 (9%) viewed it in student accommodation, friends' homes or other places.

Regarding the place and time the sample liked to view Saudi TV, it was clear that 63 (14.4%) preferred to view it alone, 137 (31.3%) preferred to view it with all family members present, 27 (6.2%) with friends, 21 (4.8%) with family members of the same sex, and 94 (21.5%) in other places or groups. The results also show that 137 students (31.3%) preferred to view Saudi TV at the weekends, 73 (16.7%) preferred to view it during weekdays, while 136 (31.1%) viewed it throughout the week (weekdays + weekends). Students' favourite time for viewing Saudi TV was between 6 p.m and 12 midnight as 272 (62.1%) recorded this period. This is reasonable since students should



be busy studying in the mornings and the afternoons (see tables 6.18.5, 6.18.6 and 6.18.7 in Appendix E).

Table 6.18.8 (see Appendix E) shows eight different types of TV programmes. Students were asked to rank these from 1 to 8 in order of preferred viewing choice. As this table shows students preferred watching sports programmes. This is probably because Saudi league matches are shown on Saudi TV and include interviews with players and coaches and debates among those involved with sports.

Islamic programmes were the second preferred viewing choice of students. This is to be expected considering the status of Islam and its impact on social and formal activities, including the media.

Western movies and drama were students' third preferred choice of programmes. This may have been due to the impact of the Second Channel, which presents foreign films and broadcasts in English. Students' least preferred programmes were advertisements, news and politics, and Arabic movies and drama. Seventy-two (16.4 %) 57 (13.1%) and 56 (12.8 %) ranked these eighth in order of preferred choice of programme respectively. Main reasons for the latter finding were likely due to the limited content of Saudi news and political programmes which focus primarily on central and local government affairs. Arabic movies and drama are heavily censored.

## 6.5 Satellite Channels Uses VS. Terrestrial TV Uses.

### **RQ2.2 Are there any differences between satellite channels use and terrestrial TV use amongst Saudi young adults?**

The results of satellite channels use and terrestrial (local) TV use in this chapter show many differences regarding the use of these two types of media by Saudi young adults.

The main differences are as follows:

The average hours students spent viewing satellite channels were more than the average hours they spent watching terrestrial TV. Whereas 97 (22.1%) of students watched satellite channels for more than 5 hours daily, only 36 students (8.2%) and 14 students (3.2%) viewed Saudi First and Second terrestrial TV channels respectively more than five hours daily. More students viewed First and Second terrestrial channels for less than one hour a day (81: 18.5% and 110: 25.11% respectively) than viewed satellite channels for less than one hour daily (31: 7.1%).

Regarding the places where respondents watched satellite channels and Saudi TV most often, 42 (9.6%) of students viewed satellite channels in the homes of friends, compared to just 6 students (1.4%) who viewed Saudi TV in friends' homes. This finding matched the conditions or situations in which the sample liked to view satellite channels and terrestrial TV. Results indicated 91 (20.8%) preferred to view satellite channels with friends in contrast to only 27 (6.2%) who preferred to view Saudi TV with friends. Further, 137 (31.3%) of the sample preferred to view Saudi TV with all family members, whereas only 63 (14.4%) preferred to view satellite channels with all family members.

Concerning the times of viewing satellite channels, the results show 191 students (43.6%) preferred to watch satellite channels on weekdays and weekends, 113 (25.8%) preferred to watch them at the weekend, and 41 (9.4%) preferred to view them on weekdays only. The results also indicated 137 students (31.3%) preferred to view Saudi TV at the weekends, 73 (16.7%) preferred to view it during weekdays, while 136 (31.1%) viewed it throughout the week (weekdays + weekends).

When students were asked what time of day they watched satellite channels and terrestrial TV most often, students' favourite time for viewing Saudi TV was between 6 p.m. and 12 midnight, as 272 (62.1%) recorded this period. Students' satellite channel prime viewing time was also between 6 p.m. and 12 p.m. but the proportion was lower (212: 48.4%). A low percentage of the sample, 13 (3.0%), viewed Saudi TV between 12 midnight and 6 a.m, whereas a larger group of students (104: 23.7%) selected this period of time as the prime time period for most of their satellite channel viewing.

Finally, types of programmes students preferred to view resulted in some differences in respect of their use of these two types of media. Sport programmes were one of the main differences. Although they were students' most preferred type of programme, however, they were more preferred in the terrestrial TV than satellite channels. One hundred and twenty five students (28.5%) ranked sports programmes as their most preferred type of programme on terrestrial TV, whereas 72 (16.4%) of students ranked them as their most preferred programme on satellite channels. Music programmes were more preferred on satellite channels than terrestrial TV: 70 (16%) and 34 (7.8%) of students ranked them as their first preferred type of programme on satellite channels and terrestrial TV, respectively.

Religious programmes were found to have the highest recorded differences in terms of preferred programme type for students' usage of these two media. For seventy-seven (17.6%) of the students religious programmes were their first preferred type of programme on terrestrial TV, whereas only 29 (6.6%) of students ranked this type of programmes as their first on satellite channels. In contrast, Western movies and drama were only slightly more preferred on terrestrial channels TV than satellite channels, by 53 (12.1%) and 47 students (10.7%) of student, respectively. Students' viewing of Saudi TV and satellite channels were further examined in eight focus group discussions, which analysed in greater depth students' usage of these two media. Findings will be presented in chapter seven, section 7.4.9

### **6.6 Effects of Using Satellite Channels on the Usage of Other Media.**

**RQ2: Are there any effects of using satellite channels on the usage of other media?**

Tables 6.19.1 to 6.19.12 show some possible effects of viewing satellite channels on the usage of other media by students and on some of their everyday activities. A five-degree scale was again used to measure the extent of these possible effects

Table 6.19.1 shows that a large number of students (280: 64.0%) agreed and strongly agreed that viewing satellite channels: *Reduced time spent watching Saudi TV*, 34 (7.7%) students disagreed and strongly disagreed that this was the case, while 43 (7.8%) students somewhat agreed that it did.

<b>1. Reduces the time I spend watching Saudi TV</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	193	44.1
Agree	87	19.9
Somewhat Agree	34	7.7
Disagree	21	4.8
Strongly Disagree	13	3.0
Missing	90	20.5
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.1: Impact of satellite channels on the usage of other media

Table 6.19.2 shows that 188 (42.9%) students agreed and strongly agreed that viewing satellite channels: *Reduced time spent listening to radio*, whereas 66 (15.1%) students either disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 94 (21.5%) students somewhat agreed that this happened.

<b>2. Reduces the time I spend listening to the radio</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	90	20.5
Agree	98	22.4
Somewhat Agree	94	21.5
Disagree	49	11.2
Strongly Disagree	17	3.9
Missing	90	20.5
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.2: Impact of satellite channels on the usage of other media

Table 6.19.3 shows that 98 (22.4%) students agreed and strongly agreed that viewing satellite channels: *lessened their interest in reading newspapers and magazines*, while 102 (23.2%) students somewhat agreed that it did. In contrast 147 (33.6%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.

<b>3. Lessens my interest in reading newspapers and magazines</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	45	10.3
Agree	53	12.1
Somewhat Agree	102	23.2
Disagree	94	21.5
Strongly Disagree	53	12.1
Missing	91	20.8
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.3: Impact of satellite channels on the usage of other media

## 6.7 Impact of Watching Satellite Channels on the other Activities of Young Adults.

### RQ1.3 Does watching satellite channels impact on any of the other activities of young adults?

Regarding whether satellite channels distracted students from studying at home, table 6.19.4 shows that 100 (22.8%) students agreed or strongly agreed that: *they were distracted from studying because of viewing satellite channels*, 93 (21.2%) somewhat agreed, while 152 (34.8%) students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

<b>4. Distracts me from studying</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	53	12.1
Agree	47	10.7
Somewhat Agree	93	21.2
Disagree	79	18.1
Strongly Disagree	73	16.7
Missing	93	21.2
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.4: Impact of satellite channels on the other activities of young adults

Offering prayers is obligatory for every Muslim five times a day at specific times during the day and night and males should pray in the mosque. As to whether viewing satellite channels *negatively affected students' performance of prayers*, Table 6.19.5 in shows that most students (197: 45.0%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that it did, whereas 47 (10.8%) students agreed or strongly agreed, and 103 (23.4) students somewhat agreed.

<b>5. Distracts me from saying my daily prayers on time</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	31	7.1
Agree	16	3.7
Somewhat Agree	103	23.4
Disagree	69	15.8
Strongly Disagree	128	29.2
Missing	91	20.8
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.5: Impact of satellite channels on the other activities of young adults

Turning to table 6.19.6, as to whether viewing satellite channels *encouraged students to stay at home for a longer time*, 181 (51.3%) students agreed or strongly agreed, 84 (19.2) somewhat agreed, and 84 (19.2%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that their stay at home was increased due to viewing satellite channels.

<b>6. Encourages me to stay at home for a long time</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	81	18.5
Agree	100	22.8
Somewhat Agree	84	19.2
Disagree	53	12.1
Strongly Disagree	31	7.1
Missing	89	20.3
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.6: Impact of satellite channels on the other activities of young adults

When asked whether viewing satellite channels, in general, *reduced the time spent viewing Arabian satellite channels*, especially since the users of this technology were able to view many non-Arabic channels, whether open-to-air or scrambled, table 6.19.7 indicates that 104 (23.7%) students agreed or strongly agreed, 112 (25.6%) students somewhat agreed, and 127 (29.0%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that satellite channels in general distracted them from watching Arabic satellite channels.

<b>7. Reduces the time I spend watching Arabian channels</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	29	6.6
Agree	75	17.1
Somewhat Agree	112	25.6
Disagree	89	20.3
Strongly Disagree	38	8.7
Missing	95	21.7
Total	438	100.0

Table 5.19.7: Impact of satellite channels on the other activities of young adults

As to whether satellite channel viewing *reduced the time students spent watching Arabian programmes*, 109 (24.9%) agreed or strongly agreed, 87 (19.9%) somewhat agreed, and 145 (33.1%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that it did.

<b>8. Reduces the time I spend watching Arabian programmes</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	45	10.3
Agree	64	14.6
Somewhat Agree	87	19.9
Disagree	106	24.2
Strongly Disagree	39	8.9
Missing	97	22.1
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.8: Impact of satellite channels on the other activities of young adults

### 6.8 Influence of Watching Satellite Television on Saudi Young Adults' Attitudes towards Western Culture

**RQ3: What kinds of influence does watching satellite television have on the attitudes of Saudi young adults towards Western culture?**

Students were asked whether their viewing of satellite channels *reduced the time they spent watching Western channels*. Table 6.19.9 shows that of those sampled, 95 (21.7%) strongly agreed and agreed that it did, and 105 (24.0%) somewhat agreed, whereas 140 (31.9%) disagreed and strongly disagreed.

<b>9. Reduces the time I spent watching Western channels</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	31	7.1
Agree	64	14.6
Somewhat Agree	105	24.0
Disagree	100	22.8
Strongly Disagree	40	9.1
Missing	98	22.4
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.9: Impact of satellite channels on Saudi young adults' attitude towards Western culture

Examining satellite channels' impact on the *time students spent watching Western programmes*, 99 (22.6%) strongly agreed and agreed that it did *reduce the time they*



spent watching these programmes, 95 (21.7%) somewhat agreed, whereas 149 (34.0%) disagreed and strongly disagreed (see table 6.19.10).

<b>10. Reduces the time I spent watching Western programmes</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	29	6.6
Agree	70	16.0
Somewhat Agree	95	21.7
Disagree	100	22.8
Strongly Disagree	49	11.2
Missing	95	21.7
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.10: Impact of satellite channels on Saudi young adults' attitude towards Western culture

Students were asked whether viewing satellite channels stimulated a desire to travel abroad. They were first asked whether viewing satellite channels *encouraged them to travel to Arab countries*. One hundred and fifty-three (34.9%) students agreed and strongly agreed, 81 (18.5%) students somewhat agreed, whereas 112 (25.6%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that it did (see table 6.19.11).

<b>11. Stimulates me to travel to Arab countries</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	75	17.1
Agree	78	17.8
Somewhat Agree	81	18.5
Disagree	63	14.4
Strongly Disagree	49	11.2
Missing	92	21.0
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.19.11: Impact of satellite channels on Saudi young adults' attitude towards Western culture

The final question asked whether viewing satellite channels *encouraged them to travel to Western countries*. Of those sampled, table 6.19.12 shows 139 (31.8%), 85 (19.3%) and 112 (27.9%) of students agreed and strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, and disagreed or strongly disagreed, respectively, that their satellite channel viewing encouraged them to visit Western countries.

A comparison of the latter two results suggests that viewing satellite channels stimulated a slightly stronger desire in students to travel to Arab countries than Western countries. Programmes on satellite channels marketing tourism to Arab countries neighbouring Saudi Arabia may have a role in stimulating this desire, as well as the low cost of travelling to neighbouring countries as well as a common language, i.e. Arabic, and a shared culture.

<b>12. Stimulates me to travel to Western countries</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	84	19.2
Agree	55	12.6
Somewhat Agree	85	19.3
Disagree	60	13.7
Strongly Disagree	62	14.2
Missing	92	21.0
Total	438	100.0

Tables 6.19.12: Impact of satellite channels on Saudi young adults' attitude towards Western culture

## 6.9 Summary

The data shows young adults in Saudi Arabia are able to view hundreds of satellite television channels without censorship, and the channels they most prefer to view are Arab channels, such as *MBC*, *LBC*, *Future*, which provide entertainment programmes. Music, sports, Western movies and drama were students' most preferred satellite channel programmes. To keep up with current issues and events, and to know more about what was going on internationally, were main reasons for young Saudi adults watching satellite channels. A main difference between satellite channel and terrestrial TV use was the average hours students spent viewing satellite channels were more than

the average hours they spent watching terrestrial TV. A large proportion of students viewed satellite channels with friends, whereas a very small number viewed Saudi TV in friends' homes. They liked to view terrestrial TV more with family members than satellite channels.

It has been shown in this chapter that the study's sample preferred *Okaz* newspaper, published in Jeddah, and *Sayedaty* magazine published in London. They preferred the *MBC FM* radio station broadcasting from London (recently moved to Dubai) to Saudi broadcasting stations. Only a third of the sample used the Internet, most of whom were males. Of all Internet users, only about one-sixth used it daily. Another important result was that only 79% of the entire sample watched Saudi television. A quarter of them watched it less than an hour daily. The next chapter, focus group results, will provide more in-depth data to answer research questions.

**CHAPTER SEVEN**

**FOCUS GROUP RESULTS**

## 7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the focus group data and analysis. Firstly, it outlines the topics covered by the questions used in the focus group. It then describes, briefly, the technique used to analyse the data and details the results of the analysis. It finally draws conclusions from the analysis.

During his fieldwork in Saudi Arabia, the researcher interviewed eight groups of male students. Cultural restriction prohibited him from meeting females, and necessitated him excluding female students from the focus group sample (see chapter 3, sections 6 and 7 for more details) The total number of students in all groups was fifty-one, representing different academic courses or departments, as shown in table 7.1 below:

<b>Group No.</b>	<b>College</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>
1	Humanities	7
2	Business	6
3	Mixed	8
4	Humanities, Media	6
5	Science	5
6	Mixed	6
7	Engineering	7
8	Mixed	6
<b>Total</b>		<b>51 students</b>

Table 7.1: Focus group sample

## 7.2 Main Focus Group Topics

The researcher used the findings from the test interview of two groups of students, conducted during his pilot study, as well as the outcome of the analysis of the questionnaire data derived from both the test and final stages, to establish the final

questions and themes for the focus group sessions. The following shows the topics explored in the course of the group discussion:

**1. Preferred Channels / Programmes and viewing habits**

- 1.1 Favourite satellite channel
- 1.2 Favourite programmes' category
- 1.3 Satellite channel viewing habits
- 1.4 Terrestrial channel viewing habits

**2. Arabian satellite channels used to watch Western media and culture**

**3. Satellite Channels used to watch sexually explicit programmes**

**4. Influence of watching satellite channels on local culture**

- 4.1 Influence on religion
- 4.2 Influence on Saudi music
- 4.3 Influence on dress and hairstyle

**5. Terrestrial (Saudi) television vs. satellite channels**

- 5.1 Sports and matches
- 5.2 Music
- 5.3 News
- 5.4 Films and serials

**7.3 Analysis of the Focus Group Data**

The recorded discussions were transcribed into written text, which the researcher read several times and typed using Word software. Although there are many suggested techniques for focus group data analysis, the researcher analysed his data according to a

systematic technique recommended by Krueger (1988; 1994), and Krueger and Casey (2000). According to their suggestions, the main topics explored in the focus group sessions (mentioned above) are used as category headings for analysing focus group data. A detailed description of this method has been presented in chapter 3, section 5.11. The findings in this chapter will be combined with the findings derived from the survey method in chapter six and presented analytically in chapter 8, according to the research main questions.

## **7.4 Focus Group Results**

### **7.4.1 Top favourite satellite channels**

The **favourite** satellite channel was *MBC*. A large proportion of the students preferred this channel. The reasons they claimed were: the diversity of programmes; suitable for all family members, especially the Saudi family; no need to view specialised channels, such as news, sports or movies channels; the best channel available for those who receive Arabsat channels only, and the best channel for students who cannot watch television for long periods, since there is no need for other channels because of the diversity of MBC programmes.

#### **Students' notable quotes included the following:**

“It is a group of channels in one channel” a participant from group 1 said. Another student (group 2) connected his preference for this channel to the preference to types of programmes he preferred. He commented, “*I view most of my favourite programmes on this channel.*” Some people may watch more than one channel to find different programmes they like, but if one channel can provide varied assortment of the

programmes they like, then they will prefer to watch that channel only as one student from group 5 indicated when he commented, *“For me, MBC is enough; I don’t need to watch specialist channels, such as sport channel, to watch sports programmes, or music one to listen to songs, or news channel. MBC presents them all.”* Another student from group 7 preferred MBC for a similar reason. Referring to MBC he remarked, *“It presents music and a lot of songs as well as sports programmes and Saudi football matches.”* MBC was also preferred by a student from group 8. Because his time was limited due to study requirements he didn’t have time to watch a lot of channels therefore MBC was just right for him *“as it contains news, movies, sports, songs and quizzes... almost everything.”*

Besides the diversity of its programmes, MBC was mostly preferred by the study sample because it considers the special condition of the Saudi family. The Islamic circumstance in the country may direct television viewing for some Saudis. The channels or programmes watched by family members should not contain materials which conflict with Islamic teaching. A student from group 7 watched the MBC channel because his family chose to watch it. He said, *“I watch it with my family who think it is the best channel for the Saudi family”*. From the same group another student linked the diversity and suitability of this channel and the Saudi family condition as follows: *“It’s diverse and suitable for all family members, especially the Saudi family.”* A student from group 5 emphasised this viewpoint more strongly when he declared that he watch MBC channel most because: *“It considers, with respect, the culture of Muslim and Arab communities more than competing channels like the Lebanese channels.”*



All Arabian satellite channels air their signals through the Arabsat satellite which is easily received by all types of dishes in Saudi Arabia. A student from group 4 called attention to the limited number of alternative channels for those who only receive Arabsat. It was clear he watched MBC not because, in his view it was the best channel, but because it was the best available one at his home. He said, "*We receive channels through the Arabsat satellite only, and MBC is the best available and the most diverse.*"

The **second** top favourite satellite channels were *LBC* and *Future*, both Lebanese channels. Most students mentioned these two channels together referring to them as 'the Lebanese channels' or 'LBC and Future' rather than mentioning them singly. They liked these channels because they presented a lot of Western material, contained a lot of entertainment, students enjoyed the freedom of thought and expression in the live discussion of opinions and points of view and, finally, the programmes or movies presented were not censored.

Most students' notable quotes focused on the presentation of Western programmes without censorship as a main reason for watching Lebanese satellite channels. A student from group 3 said, "*They openly show to other cultures, especially the Western one.*" Another student from group 5 commented, "*I watch Western movies on the Lebanese channels because they don't edit out anything.*" The same view was expressed by a student from group 1, "*The Lebanese channels present Western movies and series without monitoring or editing.*" "I can watch the movies in full on these channels without censoring or editing", a student from group 2 added.

The boldness of LBC and Future in broadcasting uncensored materials not only applies to entertainment but serious programmes also. One student, from group 8, stated that these two Lebanese channels “*discuss public affairs without restriction or reservation and they help in suggesting solutions to problems.*” The variety of their programmes, especially music and dance was another reason for students preferring to watch these two channels. Students from groups 4 and 6 said: “*They present a lot of concerts and dance sequences*”; “*They are not restricted by formalities... and there is a good variety of programmes*”; and “*Their programmes are varied*”

The **third** top favourite satellite channel was *Al-Jazeera*:

A considerable proportion of students preferred this channel because they liked to watch news and political programmes. This channel presented live programmes, including unedited questions and arguments; the students appreciated the channel’s ability to deliver live coverage of any event in different parts of the world and, finally, the lack of censorship of this channel’s programmes.

The following are quotes from students who watched this channel because of its particular focus on news. A student from group 3 said, “*Its news programmes are inclusive, even the sports news. Its coverage is not limited to the local or regional news only.*” A student from group 5 claimed, “*It has live coverage of events all over the world It is also not limited to politics.*” “*It presents excellent scientific, documentary and political programmes*”, student from group 2 commented. Another from group 7 expressed the same opinion and also referred to the censorship issue as follows, “*It presents not only news but also live programmes that include hot debates and the discussion of religious, political and economic affairs, without editing or censoring.*”

The absence of censorship seemed to be a common reason for watching this channel. Students from groups 1, 4 and 8 gave the same reason as follows: *“It presents live news and political programmes without editing or censorship.”* A student from group 3 considered the Al-Jazeera channel to be neutral and objective. He said, *“It does not take notice of personal or individual governments’ interests”*

MBC, LBC, Future and Al-Jazeera were also questionnaire survey respondents’ most preferred channels.

Regarding the **fourth** top favourite satellite channel, ***Orbit, Dubai Sport, ART Sport*** and ***Abu Dhabi Sport*** all came in fourth position overall. Two focus group students referred to each of these channels as their top favourite. The common feature of all of these channels is their concern with sport and this seemed to be the reason why they were popular among students.

One student in group 3 said he liked viewing Orbit in order to follow international sports and *“the clear commentary on the matches.”* Another, from group 8 said he watched Dubai Sport channel in order to *“follow football competitions in the Gulf, Europe and Latin America.”* A third from group 2 commented that he watched ART sport *“to view sport programmes and more football matches.”* A fourth student from group 6 said he watched Abu Dhabi Sport to *“follow football competitions in the Gulf and Europe.”* Sport is therefore an activity that extends beyond national boundaries and young adults in Saudi Arabia are among of consumers of the global sport media.

Students' **fifth** favourite satellite channels were *Kuwait, Syria, the Movie Channel* and *channels showing sexually explicit material*. Each channel was chosen as a top favourite channel by one student for the following reasons: Arabic songs on the Kuwaiti channel, Arabic serials on the Syrian channel, American movies on the movie channel, and adult programmes on channels showing sexually explicit scenes. Students' comments on these issues will be presented later in different parts of this chapter.

#### 7.4.2 Top favourite satellite channel programmes

Students' top favourite satellite channel programmes were sports programmes. Of several Arab sports channels, the most popular were: (1) *ART Sport*, (2) *Dubai Sport*, (3) *Orbit*, (4) *Abu Dhabi Sport*, and (5) *MBC*.

The majority of students preferred sports programmes, especially football. A student from group 3 commented, "*I like sports programmes more than any other programmes and I am sure most students are the same.*" A Student from group1 said "*I watch sport more than anything else; I rarely view movies or follow serials.*" Students viewed Arab channels specialising in sports, in addition to MBC, because they covered the important Saudi matches. A student in group 6 remarked, "*The best match coverage and the best sport programmes are on the sport channels. They specialised in sport.*" When talking about MBC channel, a student from group 7 said "*It presents music and a lot of songs as well as sports programmes and Saudi football matches.*" Students did not follow Saudi sport on Saudi terrestrial television if it was covered at the same time by other channels. They primarily followed Saudi sports, then Gulf sports, European football

and, finally, Arab sports. Although some showed an interest in European football and International sports, they watched Western channels very rarely due to the cost of connection and the language barrier.

It was not surprising these young adults preferred sports programmes because sporting fixtures are popular everywhere in the world. A student from group 6 commented accordingly, *“Like most young men, I like sport more than anything else, especially football.”* Another one from group 2 remarked, *“I like a variety of programmes, but I watch them only if there is no football match or a good sports programme.”* A student from group 3 stated, *“Sport takes up most of my time watching television. I spend a lot of time studying, and when I am home relaxing, I look for matches first. If I can’t find a good one, then I look for an Arabic or Western movie.”* More comments made by students regarding sport channels and programmes will be presented later in this chapter.

When students were asked what their **second** favourite type of satellite channels programme was, the majority referred to **Arabic movies and serials** viewed on various Arabic channels, the most popular of which were: (1) **MBC**, (2) **LBC**, (3) **Future**, (4) **Dubai**, and (5) **Syria**. Students’ favourite Arabic movies were Egyptian. Students from group 3 and 8 commented as follows: *“I always look for comedy, which I find in the Arabic serials and plays or Egyptian movies”*; *“My favourite serials are Syrian and the Kuwaiti”*; *“I follow the serials closely. In recent years the Syrian serials have been outstanding and beaten their competitors, even the Egyptian productions which were dominant before the satellite channels came into being.”* Students preferred viewing

Arabic movies on MBC than watching them on LBC and Future, and viewing Arabic serials more on the Syrian satellite channel, MBC channel, and Dubai channel.

Lack of Saudi TV production was the reason for the much lower popularity of local movies and serials. A student from group 2 said, *“I prefer the Saudi serials, but unfortunately there are very few of them.”* A student from group 5 commented at length on viewing Arabic TV production in the Arabic channels,

*“I have noticed that my friends are favourably disposed to Arabic productions and the Arabic channels. I think this is natural, because the language, religion and social situations and problems are similar, and we share common political issues. Although production content may vary from that presented by Saudi television, it is still nearer to our situation than that in Western productions”.*

Section 7.4.9.4 in this chapter, focussing on films and serials on both satellite channels and terrestrial (Saudi) TV will contain further notable comments from students.

Students' **third** choice in the favourite satellite channel programme category was **Western movies**, viewed on various Arabic and Western channels, the most popular of which were LBC, Future, MBC, and the Movie channel. A student from group 2 said *“I watch Western movies more than others. I view them on MBC and the two Lebanese channels.”* Several comments made by students indicated why they liked watching Western movies on these satellite channels. A group 5 student remarked, *“I watch Western movies on the Lebanese channels because they don't edit out anything.”*

Another student from group 1 commented, *“The Lebanese channels present Western movies and series without monitoring or editing”*.

American movies were the first choice of those who viewed Western movies. A student from group 7 said, *“I watch different Arabic movies and serials, as well as some Western ones, especially American ones; as you know they are well known worldwide”*.

While some students preferred to watch Western movies on a Western channel, as a student from group 3 indicated when he said, *“I prefer to watch Western movies on Western channels like the Movie channel,”* the origin of the production or understanding of foreign language in which the film or series was produced played a main role in the choice of channel. A student from group 8 said, *“Regarding Western productions, I watch the South American serials because they are dubbed in Arabic so I can understand everything.”* Another student from group 7 said: *“The language barrier does not enable us to watch Western programmes, except when there is translation or dubbing”*.

Students' **fourth** favourite satellite channels programme category was (1) News and political programmes; (2) Songs and music; (3) and live debates and discussion programmes which were viewed on various Arab channels.

A considerable proportion of students equally favoured these three types of programme. They preferred to view the news and political programmes on the Al-Jazeera channel. Religious programmes were viewed on the Saudi channel, Sharja and Iqra. Quiz programmes were viewed primarily on MBC, then on the Abu Dhabi

Channel. Sexually explicit programmes were viewed on XXL, Blue Sat and Satisfaction, and then the two Lebanese channels for uncensored shots.

#### 7.4.3 Most common satellite channel viewing habits

Most students watched the satellite channels with family members. The rest, in equal proportion, either viewed the satellite channels alone or with friends. Most students in the first group indicated they viewed the satellite channels with their families because they lived in a house where only one receiver or decoder was available and was used commonly by everybody.

Students commented as follows: *“I view satellite channels with the family because only one receiver is available at our home”* (student from group 1) and *“I have no choice but to watch these channels with the family because there is only one receiver in our house - but this does not bother me”* (student from group 3).

Almost a quarter of the fifty-one students liked viewing satellite channels alone. Their responses revealed that all of them lived with their families, and most had one or more receivers in their own room. A student from group 7 said he viewed the satellite channels late at night when the family was asleep or when they were out. Reasons for viewing these channels alone indicated individual differences. One student in group 2 said he viewed subjects *“not suitable for the rest of the family.”* Another in group 4 said he had younger brothers and sisters so left the monitoring of the programmes they could watch to the parents while he concentrated on watching the programmes he liked



without interruption or distractions. He added, *“I pay a special subscription to sports, movies and sex channels, which no one also in the family can decode in order to view them.”* A student from group 5 remarked: *“I am one of those who likes viewing programmes that depend on live interviews and debates. I don’t like anyone to distract my attention when I’m watching them or changing the channel when I’m concentrating on following a live of debate”*.

There was only a slight difference between students’ reasons for their most usual satellite channel viewing with friends. First, students lived with their friends, which enabled them to watch satellite channels and discuss what they viewed. By using a decoder they could watch all satellite channels, which were not censored. The second reason was they liked sports programmes and matches, which were ever *“more enjoyable when viewed with friends”* student from group 2 said. Two students in group 7 also indicated they watched satellite channels with their friends away from home *“in order to view channels or programmes that are not available at home”*.

#### **7.4.4 Most common terrestrial channel viewing habits**

A large proportion of students said they viewed Saudi television with their families. They mentioned different reasons, for example, their families watched the Saudi channel and they watched it with them, or there was only one receiver and they had no option but to watch the channel with their families.

A small proportion viewed Saudi television with friends only when matches were covered solely by Saudi television. Of those who viewed Saudi television not one in the focus group viewed it alone. Only three students never watched Saudi television.

#### **7.4.5 Arabian satellite channels used to watch Western media and culture**

The majority of students stated that of all the Arabian channels, the Lebanese channels in general, and LBC and Future in particular, were the most similar to Western channels. In their view, these channels represented Western culture more than other Arabian channels. Three students thought all the Arabian satellite channels directly or indirectly served Western culture. They *“served Western culture either intentionally or without intention through the intensive use of Western music, presenters appearing in Western fashion, and their dependence on Western movies and serials, using with translation or dubbing, in addition to advertising goods manufactured by Western companies.”*, a student from group 5 commented. Another student from group 2 referred to the domination of Western media production and said:

*“...most of the good movies and productions on television are from the West and most of the dominant companies in media production and advertising are Western. This definitely influences Arabian satellite channels”.*

Two students thought MBC came closest to the Lebanese channels in its concern with Western culture and style. A student from group 7 commented, *“MBC is trying to compete with and follow the style of the Lebanese channels.”* One student in group 3

thought the Egyptian channel, the Nile, was the most Westernised Arab channel since it produces its programmes in foreign languages (mostly *English*) “*and most of its material and programmes are Western.*” One student thought the Dubai satellite channel came closest to the Lebanese channels, concern with Western culture and style, and tried to follow their style, whereas another thought the Orbit channel came a close second.

Students’ comments on the Lebanese channels, indicate why they considered these the most Westernised Arabian channels. For example, a student from group 1 said, “*Had they not presented in Arabic, I would have thought they were Western channels.*” Similarly, a student from group 4 stated that he watched the Lebanese channel as if he was viewing Western channels because of “*the style of clothing, talking, and thinking, and presentation of songs and movies, and the freedom with which they discuss any subject.*” A student from group 2 thought the Lebanese channels were trying to be like West channels. He commented, “*They tend to imitate Western TV channels in their style of photography, presentation, and talking, using lots of Western terms and portraying Western habits and culture more than Arabian culture.*” Some students’ opinions on Lebanese channels focused on their entire content. A student from group 4 said, “*There may be some programmes on the other channels that portray and reflect Western culture but not to the extent the Lebanese channels do.*” A student from group 7 similarly commented, “*If the other channels convey Western culture through some programme of Western songs or movies, or by covering a certain event in the West, the Lebanese channels totally adopt the Western style in all their programmes.*”

Some students expressed concern about Arabian TV channels copying Western channels to the extent of disregarding the local culture. A student from group 1 commented, *“The Lebanese channels mimic the Western channels in everything, and don’t consider the religion or social situation of the Arab viewer.”* Another student from group 4 provided an example of this describing the content of a Lebanese channel programme as follows: *“They have no reservations about anything. I saw on one live discussion programme a number of homosexuals who talked openly about their lives and situations as if they were in a Western country and in front of a Western audience.”* A comment by a student from the same group linked the situation on these channels to the Lebanese people’s character and way of life which, in his view, is similar to the West. He argued *“... even the Arabian channels that are not Lebanese tend to Westernisation if there are Lebanese presenters and actors on them”*.

#### **7.4.6 Satellite channels utilised to watch sexually explicit programmes**

A large number of students in the focus group said their viewing of sexually explicit programmes or scenes that stimulated their sexual desires had increased greatly as a result of watching satellite channels. One student in group 3 remarked,

*“...everybody is able to receive programmes specialising or concentrating on sex, which is easy through open or coded satellite channels. For example, I subscribe to a movie channel or a sports channel which provides a number of free channels, some of these may include programmes concerned with scenes of asexual nature and anybody may be*

*incited to view them. Channels like these may be easily decoded and viewed without paying fees”.*

Viewing pornographic material does not need special equipment as a student from group 8 indicated. He said, *“We can view sexually explicit materials at any time with the normal satellite dish.”* A student from group 1 added, *“It used to be difficult to access sex channels without a special dish and receiver. It was costly as well. But today it is easy and sometimes free. These channels present very stimulating programmes, not only for youth, but for all sections of the community”.*

A small proportion of students said they watched these programmes sometimes, but they were not among their favourite programmes. Three students said they preferred sex channels and programmes to other programmes. They claimed that many young adults viewed these channels but did not admit to doing so. One of them in group 8 openly admitted, *“I view sex channels all the time and this is a fact I do not deny as a lot of youths do.”* Another of the three said: *“A large number of youths, for sure, view sex channels and programmes, but feelings of guilt may stop them from admitting to others they do. We are still aware of the rules and standards of behaviour expected in our community.”* The third student who was in group 3, said,

*“The channels I view most are sex channels like Satisfaction, Ultra Blue and XXL, and then music channels and miscellaneous materials which show sexually explicit scenes or beautiful girls. This is my personal interest, one which is shared by a lot of youths who are not willing to frankly confess it is an interest of theirs or reveal they watch these channels.”*

Those students who regularly viewed sex channels said they lived with friends of the similar age away from their families. Others in group 1 revealed they sometimes viewed these channels in their rooms using their own receivers, or “... *when the family was out, or late at night, or with friends.*” The descriptions of these channels given by students were similar to a large extent, and sometimes identical. One in group 3 commented

*“There are some coded channels and other open ones that present only sex programmes. The coded channels are mostly specialised channels that present movies for only limited hours. They show all the body parts of the participants and their functions without any reservation, and the camera will focus on the ‘sensitive’ parts. We do not know the exact place or source of the broadcasting of some of these channels, but believe they are Russian or European and broadcast between certain times. As for the open-to-air channels, some of them are similar to the coded ones, but they present sex to a lesser extent than the coded channels.”*

Another student in group 3 remarked: *“The open channels are the advertising channels for the coded ones to attract as many subscribers to the coded channels as possible. I believe their sources of finance are through advertisements and phone numbers for sexual chat or contact. As for the coded channels, I believe their main source of income is from subscribers as well as advertisements which is less than the open ones earn.”*

The opinions of students differed regarding the aims of these channels. One student from group 8 stated *“These channels make massive profits and a very high income*

*through both subscriptions and advertisements, because production costs are not high. The material presented is just sexual intercourse between people, filmed in a certain place. The whole process is like a video tape broadcast to a very large number of people".* Another student from the same group said,

*"I think some of these channels have aims other than financial, although they are available in some European and American countries in the same way they are available in Islamic countries. For example, they may be trying to undermine the ideological and cultural values of the young and their thinking, especially in this country. We have suddenly moved from many prohibited unacceptable behaviours to a more relaxed attitude to certain behaviours without gradual transition in thought or attitude. Every nation has enemies. The enemies of Muslim nations may have the support of certain parties that are able to use these satellite channels to destroy the values and beliefs of our Islamic way of life."*

Another student in group 8 remarked,

*"Monetary income is never unimportant. Even if we assume profit is the main aim, it is better for any party that seeks to cause cultural damage to do so and make a profit at the same time. If some enemy parties want to use the satellite channels for both profit and cultural damage it is easy for them to do so, and not just through the specialised sex channels that broadcast opposing thoughts and beliefs."*

Expanding this argument further, a student in the same group commented on the times the sexually explicit programmes were broadcast

*“These channels are broadcast from both the East and West, and there are time differences in these locations. Their night times do not coincide with ours. But what we see is most movies and sexually explicit programmes and foreign channels being broadcast late at night our time. Therefore, in my view, they are broadcasting specific material, movies and programmes especially for the Middle East.”*

Enlarging on this theme participant in group 5 further commented,

*“There are certain channels whose mission is to make misbehaviour, fornication, and adultery look attractive to young people, and these channels are well known to them. Their programmes focus on sex and arouse sexual desire and base instincts that destroy the mentality, behaviour and morals of the youth, leading them to depression and sometimes to drugs, because what they show is totally different from the reality. Sexual promiscuity can lead to unwanted pregnancies and terrible diseases like syphilis and HIV/Aids.”*

A discussion about the pornography issue with Saudi young adults elicited conflicting views more than for other areas discussed in the course of focus group sessions. For example, a student from group 4 contended that watching sex channels and programmes will lead Saudis to *“...end up confused and leading double lives, because outwardly they will try to be respectable and morally upright but often their behaviour will be promiscuous, leaving behind them a trail of misery. We should not watch these*



*channels. They are against our religion and I think only a small number of people watch them.”* In contrast, a participant from the same group pointed out, *“..for a large proportion of people, sex movies and programmes are popular, otherwise they would not be produced on such a large scale”*.

#### **7.4.7 Influence of watching the satellite channels on local culture**

##### **7.4.7.1 Influence on religion**

The majority of students thought watching satellite channels had a bad or negative effect on Islamic belief and practice and cited many examples of this. A considerable proportion of students thought that watching satellite channels had neither a negative nor a positive effect on youth. A student from group 2 said, *“It is up to each person and the extent of their religious commitment. It is difficult to attribute the neglect of religion or performing prayers to watching satellite channels or to any other cause.”*

One student in group 1 commented, *“Using other media, travelling abroad and spending time in the company of friends who don’t care what is lawful or unlawful in Islam are influences that we can’t separate from the non-Islamic influences on satellite channels.”* In similar view, a student in group 8 said, *“There are a lot of young people who watch things that are against Islamic principles and teachings, but this does not affect their religious commitment nor their behaviour in a way that contradicts Islam.”* In reply, a student from the same group stated, *“There are other factors that negatively affect the commitment of youth to Islamic teachings... but their effect is not so immediately powerful like that of the satellite channels.”* Reiterating his view and

emphasising the negative effects of using satellite channels in Saudi Arabia, a student from group 3 indicated that “... *most writers, religious scholars, and educationalists repeatedly say the satellite channels have a bad effect on the commitment of youth to religious teachings.*” On the other hand, one student from group 5 thought viewing satellite channels had had a positive effect on him. He said “*I became a viewer of more religious programmes than before on channels other than the Saudi one after watching satellite channels.*”

When describing the negative effects of watching satellite channels on religious practice, some students drew a connection between performing prayers on time and watching satellite channels. A student from group 1 remarked, “*The great number of matches and interesting movies stop us from performing prayers on time and going to the mosque when we should.*” But a student from group 2 gave the attitude of viewers as a main reason for the negative impact of satellite channels on religious duties. He said, “*Watching these channels may prevent us from performing prayers at the mosque or at the proper time, but it is our responsibility to stop our work at the time of prayer.*” Another student in group 7 thought the content of these channels opposed Islamic belief and practice. He remarked, “*Most satellite channels’ programmes go against Islamic belief and practice, but are presented as normal and acceptable.*” Satellite channels content differed from what people were accustomed to watch on the local TV as a student from group 2 pointed out, “*Since we’ve started watching satellite channels, we’ve become used to viewing a lot of sex, crime, and drug-taking movies... Islam does not allow these things... and they must have a negative effect on youth*”.

To support their views students gave many examples. A student from group 6 commented, *“The satellite channels spread new ideologies and the youth find them attractive and want to imitate them, although nearly all conflict with the religion of Islam, for example, social mixing between the sexes, sex before or outside marriage, and the call to enjoy life regardless of religion.”* A student from group 1 remarked, *“because of the frequent viewing of other religions’ activities on satellite channels, I think some young Moslems are becoming more interested in Western religious festivities than Islamic ones”*.

#### **7.4.7.2 Influence on Saudi music**

A large number of students thought satellite channels had a negative effect on local music and song, because they helped spread both Arabian and Western music and songs in Saudi Arabia, making them popular with a large proportion of youth at the expense of traditional Saudi songs.

However, a small proportion of students said satellite channels had a positive impact on Saudi music and song because they presented Saudi songs, which had not been presented on Saudi television, using dance sequences. A student in group 3 stated,

*“Song production is different now in most countries and there should be music, group dancing and girls, but Saudi television does not show video clips or women who sing, the only people presented are male entertainers not women, therefore, we watch songs and music from Saudi Arabia and other countries on other channels”*.

Several students were critical of Saudi television's presentation of music. A student in group 2 stated,

*"I like Saudi songs on other channels... we even watch concerts recorded in Saudi Arabia on other channels in spite of the availability of Saudi television. The photography and production sometimes differ and we believe Saudi television lags behind them in this regard. The songs presented are very limited and most of them are old. There are new Saudi entertainers that we have seen on the satellite channels but not on (Saudi) television".*

Another student in group 4 said *"Saudi television does not allocate much time to presenting songs. For example, there is only one programme that presents songs once a week; it's very short and it does not present modern songs. Therefore, we watch good Arabic and Western songs on the satellite channels".*

There was a small proportion of students who said they tended to listen to songs on radio and tapes more than on the television; in fact, they rarely listened to songs on television, and therefore, felt they could not really comment on the influence of satellite channels on Saudi songs or music. Nevertheless, several students commented on the effects of satellite channels on Saudi music and songs in relation to other Arabic and Western music. *"We are watching more Arabic and Western music on satellite channels"* (group4). *"Satellite channels have increased the tendency among the young to (listen to) Western music and songs"* (group 1). Another student in group 5 indicated that *"...before satellite channels we tended not to listen frequently to Western songs*

*and music”* One of the students in group 8 explained why he watched songs being performed on satellite channels and not on the local Saudi channel, *“There are no songs with video clips on Saudi TV. I think the photography in the video clips as well as the songs on the satellite channels are very attractive to people.”* Another student from group 2 described the attractiveness of the video clips when he said, *“ ... some people are more interested in the dance sequences that accompany the songs and music, than in the words and tunes, and like watching the shots of beautiful girls. This can never happen on Saudi television”*.

A group 3 student expressed his enjoyment of Western music as follows, *“There is a programme on MBC that presents Western music and songs and generates great interest among the youth. This programme plays the top ten popular Western songs every week.”* However, a student in group 6 gave a very different reason for Saudi young adults watching the performance of Western songs. He stated *“Some of them like watching and listening to Western songs and music even though they don’t understand what the words mean. They like others to think they live a Western lifestyle, enjoy Western arts and freely copy them”*.

#### **7.4.7.3 Influence on dress and hairstyle**

Most students said imitation of Western fashions was increasing among Saudi young adults in several ways. They focused on two particular aspects which they thought were the most prominent, namely, style of dress and haircut. They agreed satellite channels were responsible for this increased Westernisation. One student in group 5

said: *“Yes, satellite channels do have a great influence on dress and hairstyle. For example, in the streets and markets of Jeddah you see many young people imitating Westerners in their dress, hairstyle, and the kinds of music they listen to.”* Another student from group 2 commented:

*“From their appearance generally, particularly their dress and haircut, and also in their way of thinking and acting, many young people show they are fond of the Western lifestyle and are attracted to the Western way of life. They know a lot about the West and imitate Western manners and attitudes, sometimes blindly. They like others to think they have travelled to the West or watch Western channels frequently”.*

A large proportion of students thought satellite channels played a major role in encouraging Saudi young adults to imitate Westerners. One student from group 7 remarked, *“I believe satellite channels play a major role because many people say there has been a profound change in the culture and behaviour of the young since the spread of satellite channels.”* A student in group 8 echoed this view, stating,

*“Most of the outwardly Western features like hairstyle, wearing trousers, listening to Western songs, and using a lot of Western language or slang, were not so obvious and widespread several years ago. My older brothers say that ten years ago, the behaviour of the young was quite different from now; and all the factors are the same except for the widespread viewing of satellite channels. Therefore, I*

*think it is they that have affected the young adults, especially with regard to their imitation of Western culture”.*

A student from group 3 remarked: *“Satellite channels have definitely contributed to the tendency of the youth to adopt the Western style of dress. Some even put on clothes with Western words on them that they don’t understand! Others listen to songs in English and don’t understand the words. Some young people even put on shorts on cold days because they love to imitate Westerners’ fashion – yet most of them have never travelled outside Saudi Arabia”.*

Another student from group 4 referred to the influence of Lebanese channels on young people’s dress, hairstyle, and the songs preferred by them. He said:

*“The source of the spread of Western fashions and ideas among the youth of our country may be traced to the Lebanese channels. For example, there is a programme on one of the Lebanese channels that presents the latest hair fashions for boys and girls in the West, which are very different to those considered acceptable in our society. There are aspects of people’s lives that take a long time to change, but it doesn’t take long for the youth to imitate clothes and hairstyles and follow music trends in the West”.*

Another student from group 6 argued that satellite channels’ impact reached every place in the kingdom. He commented,

*“In my view satellite channels have had a negative impact on traditional styles of clothing, appearance and song. We see now many youths dressed in Western dress with pictures of Western stars and broadcasters on their*

*chests. That this is happening cannot be denied. I've seen this phenomenon not only in large cities, but also in remote areas where Saudi television may not reach. The young have been quickly affected, because of what they watch on the satellite channels".*

Almost a third of participants agreed that imitating Westerners in many ways, for example, styles of dress and hairstyle, was actually increasing among the Saudi youth, but satellite channels were not the prime cause of this. One student from group 2 said: *"I believe there is a sector of Saudi youth influenced by Western thinking and culture but it is not necessarily through the television and satellite channels. Some have travelled abroad and others may have parents or relatives who are not Saudis and these factors may also influence their behaviour and attitude."* He concluded by saying: *"...young adults' attraction to Western culture may be due to collective factors not only to watching satellite channels".*

A student from group 8 took this argument further, saying: *"Why should we regard changes in dress as an imitation of the West? The reason may simply be that it is more comfortable to put on trousers and a shirt. I think these are more practical and comfortable than the Thawb (local dress)."* Another student in the same group added, *"Definitely television affects the behaviour and thinking of people. But I may like something I have seen in the street or in a shop not necessarily because of the television or the satellite channels."* Another student from group 1 expressed the same view and said,

*"It is rare to find people who imitate what they see on television, especially with regard to dress. The fashion industry draws young people's attention to*



*new fashions through advertisements and encourages them to buy them.*

*More is shown in the shops than on the television, and young males have started to become more interested in fashion than young females”.*

#### **7.4.8 Influence of watching satellite channels on other media usages**

##### **7.4.8.1 Influence on print media readership**

The majority of students felt watching satellite channels did not negatively affect their reading of newspapers and magazines in terms of both the time allocated for reading and the types of print media they read. Two of the students drew attention to the fact they were not regular readers of newspapers and magazines before watching the satellite channels nor after. One of them in group 3 said: *“Before I joined the university, I rarely read newspapers and magazines, and I am still the same up to now.”* The other one in group 7 commented, *“I rarely read newspapers or magazines. I may sometimes buy a magazine if I am interested in a particular subject. Thus was the case before I used to watch satellite channels and remains the case now.”* There was a very small proportion who said they did not read newspapers or magazines or both. One student from group 2 said, *“My free time is very short because of study and this time is mostly at night, the time when lots of my favourite programmes are shown. Therefore, I spend this time watching the TV.”* However, a student in group 5 commented, *“Perhaps if there were no satellite channels and entertainment programmes, I would spend more time reading some magazines.”*

Among the majority of students who thought watching satellite channels did not affect their reading of the printed media, one in group 7 stated, *“I do not think watching satellite channels affects the time I spend reading newspapers or magazines as the time I spend doing this has not changed.”* A student in group 4, like the majority of students, also confirmed satellite channel viewing had not influenced his reading of the printed media. He stated, *“The time I read a newspaper is usually during the day when I don’t watch much television anyway, and this pattern hasn’t changed.”* In contrast, a student from group 1 pointed to a slight impact of satellite channel viewing on his readership of newspapers and magazines. He said, *“My viewing of satellite channels may have had a small effect and increased my readership of some magazines that list the satellite channel programmes or publish interviews with celebrities whom we learn about through the satellite channels. But, as I said previously, this impact is small. As for newspapers, I quickly read the front pages and this is what I used to do before”*.

#### **7.4.8.2 Influence of watching satellite channels on listening to the radio**

Most participants, who were male, always listened to the radio while driving, hence there was no need to compare their listening to the radio before and after satellite channels. A student from group 2 said, *“I listen to the radio in the car for songs and news; I can’t remember whether I listen to it more now than before. However, watching satellite channels doesn’t influence the time I spend listening to the radio.”* Several students did not listen to the radio, except on rare occasions, and only when driving. They had never regularly listened to the radio and this listening pattern had not changed over time.

However, a small number indicated watching satellite channels had influenced the amount of time they spent listening to the radio. For example, a student in group 1 commented, *“I used to hurry to listen to the radio for important news events to follow developments. I wanted to know the details rather than wait until the next day to read all about them in the newspapers. But now the TV channels transmit everything that happens in sound and image which is far better than listening to the radio.”* A student from group 2 similarly commented, *“People used to talk in detail about news events they had heard through the BBC, Voice of America, or Mont Carlo, but now they say we watched the news on Al-Jazeera channel or CNN. Of course, satellite channel viewing has reduced the time I spend listening to news on the radio, as it has most people’s.”* In contrast, one student in group 6 thought satellites had positively affected the time he spent listening to the media. He said, *“I listen to MBC FM which broadcasts via satellite. If there isn’t a good programme on the TV, I may switch to this radio. Sometimes, I may be busy with something at home or doing revision so I prefer to listen to the MBC FM via satellite.”*

#### **7.4.8.3 Influence of watching satellite channels on Internet usage**

The number of Internet users among the interviewees was not large. As mentioned in chapter 6 section 4.3, generally, the proportion of Internet users was low (38.3%), and only 13.7% of them used the Internet daily. This may explain the weakness of their answers when asked about the effect of watching satellite channels on Internet usage. Most answered watching satellite channels had no effect on their usage of the Internet, either because did not use the Internet or because they used it but were not aware of any

influence on its use by their satellite channel viewing habits or vice versa. A student in group 3 commented as follows: *“I watch satellite channels and use the Internet but do not know whether one of them positively or negatively affects the other. Each has its own particular attraction for me and advantages.”* Among the few who referred to the influence of satellite channel viewing on Internet usage, a student in group 8 said, *“For me, use of the Internet would be greater if there were no satellite channels.”* A student in group 4 similarly commented, *“I use the Internet at home while watching the TV. On some channels there may be something that distracts me from the Internet or vice versa. Sometimes I may spend all my time on the Internet and forget about viewing the TV”.*

#### **7. 4.8.4 Influences of watching satellite channels on the usage of Saudi TV**

As mentioned previously, all participants in focus groups were satellite channel viewers. The results of the questionnaire survey (see chapter 6, section 4.5) had revealed 20% of the study sample did not watch Saudi TV. When asked about the influence of satellite channels viewing on local TV viewing most students agreed the influence was negative, since satellite channels viewing shortened the time they spent watching the First and the Second Saudi terrestrial channels. Moreover, a small number revealed they no longer watched Saudi channels at all as the result of watching satellite channels.

In the course of focus group sessions, the researcher became aware of the following. First, from the very beginning of the session, the majority of students critically compared Saudi TV with satellite channels. Their comments about Saudi TV were

generally disparaging. The researcher had to continually make it clear to students that a part of the session had been set aside for discussing this issue, therefore they should not go beyond the limits of the questions being asked. All points would be discussed, not just one issue. Also from the beginning of the focus group sessions, the researcher expected students to answer “Saudi TV” when asked the following question: “During group viewing of all family members, which channel is likely to be watched by all?” As anticipated, most students gave one quick answer, ‘the Saudi channel’ or ‘the Saudi TV’. Most of those who gave this answer were those who strongly criticised Saudi TV. Immediately after their answers, the researcher asked why Saudi TV? Answers included the following: many students from groups 3,4,5,7 and 8 similarly said “*It does not need censoring.*” A student in group 2 commented,

*“All that is presented has been edited. Saudi TV will not broadcast something that is controversial, that will flout the values and beliefs of Islam, offend cultural traditions, or cause embarrassment to any family member by showing something that is unsuitable for all family members, no matter what their age”.*

A student from group 8 said, “*Its programmes are suitable for all family members, whereas on other channels I view, there are a lot of programmes which are not suitable for young children or the adolescents.*” A student in group 6 stated,

*“When I view satellite channels with my family, the remote control is always held in the hand of one of the grown ups so the channel can be changed immediately if there are scenes or words unsuitable for all the viewers sitting around. However, if we were watching Saudi TV, there*

*will be no need to change the channel as all the material presented has been edited and well censored beforehand”.*

As regards the answers students gave when asked whether watching satellite channels affected watching Saudi TV, several commented as follows. A student from group 1 said, *“Yes, it has affected the time I spend watching Saudi TV. I only watch it now when there is a live football match not covered by other channels.”* Another student in the same group stated, *“When I moved from my city to Jeddah, I settled in a house with other students where there is a satellite dish. I no longer watch Saudi TV”.*

A student from group 3 no longer found programmes exciting on terrestrial TV. He remarked, *“When I finish scanning the channel’s contents I never find anything I want to watch on the Saudi channel.”* Another student in group 7 indicated he spent very little time watching TV because of his studies, but wouldn’t spend it watching Saudi TV *“while there are better options”.*

Students provided various comments and answers when asked about the influence of watching satellite channels on their viewing of Saudi TV. They are included in the next part of this chapter which present a comparison of terrestrial Saudi TV and satellite channels usage.

## 7.4.9 Terrestrial Saudi television vs. satellite channels

### 7.4.9.1 Sports and matches

As was clear from a former question (see section 7.4.2), students' most favourite programmes were sports and football matches, particularly on the Arabian sports channels, and also on MBC because it covers important Saudi matches. All students in the focus group, who were males, agreed that sports in general, especially football matches, were their main reason for viewing Saudi television, especially when there were matches on it not covered by the other channels. One student from group 1 said: *"I only watch football matches on Saudi television."* Another in group 2 stated, *"I hardly watch Saudi television unless there are football matches because my viewing time is limited."* A third student from group 3 commented: *"Saudi television can't compete with the other channels and I do not watch it unless there is a local football match that other channels don't cover."*

Only one student from group 6 indicated Saudi television satisfied his desired coverage of Saudi sport. He commented, *"I follow sport on Saudi television, since there is now a new programme on it called 'All Sport' that satisfies most of what I actually need concerning Saudi sport, and its coverage is much better than before."* Most students, however, agreed Saudi television did not satisfy most of their viewing needs regarding sports programmes and matches. A student in group 7 commented,

*"I look for Saudi sport on channels other than Saudi ones because Saudi television does not satisfy the different needs of young people as well as other channels. What is needed is an increase in the variety of material*

*and greater attention paid to providing the kinds of programmes young people actually want, for example, sports programmes of a higher standard and showing more national and international sporting events”.*

Students were then asked if the same match was presented live on a local Saudi channel or a non-Saudi satellite channel which channel would they watch it on. Three students in group 2 said it would depend on the commentator. Another in group 2 said: *“I watch a match with a good commentator I like.”* Other students in group 4 indicated they would watch it on channels other than Saudi ones because *“the commentator presents comments during the match and interval, analyses the shots, different players, and performance to a degree and level of excellence not found on Saudi television.”* Another student in group 4 agreed with this comment, further adding:

*“... the style of commentary, the production, and follow- up of events add flavour to the match that I don't find on Saudi television. Even the technical coverage of sports is not good on terrestrial TV. The quality of commentary, photography and production of sports programmes on Saudi television is much lower than on other television channels”.*

Another student from group 8 revealed he watched sports programmes on the ART sport and Orbit channels *“because their coverage is better.”* He added, *“Most young people do. The comments, analysis, guests, and technical aspects like production are better, especially on the sport-specialising channels like Orbit, Dubai Sport and ART Sport”.*



#### 7.4.9.2 Music (terrestrial Saudi television versus satellite channels)

All the students, except one, thought the satellite channels presented Saudi music and songs much better than Saudi TV. One student differed and thought Saudi TV was better presenting Saudi music and songs. The following comments express the majority view, beginning with a student from group 2, who said: *“It’s unbelievable but we get the best Saudi songs on other channels. We even watch concerts held in Saudi Arabia on other channels, even though Saudi TV covers them, because the style of photography and technical aspects are better. Saudi TV lags behind in these aspects”*. Another student in group 3 commented,

*“I like Saudi TV, but the songs it presents are very limited and old. There are new Saudi entertainers but we get to know about them not through Saudi TV but actually through the satellite channels. There is a weekly programme on MBC that presents Western music and songs that is viewed by many Saudi youth. This programme presents the top ten popular Western songs each week. Saudi TV is not widely used for broadcasting songs, for example, there is only one programme that presents old songs once a week and for a very short time”*.

Another student from group 7 suggested satellite channels had helped to spread Western songs and music in Saudi Arabia and make them popular among young people since *“before satellite channels we hardly heard any Western music and songs”*.

When asked the reasons for the popularity of satellite channels students gave similar answers, which centred on one major cause. One student in group1 commented, *“Saudi*

*TV is concerned with religious matters. For example, Saudi TV will not present programmes or songs including dancing or female singers, therefore, whoever wants to watch these songs has to find them on other Arabic channels.*” Another participant in group 8 similarly commented,

*“The photography accompanying most songs is in the form of video clips, which show outdoor scenes in which girls are dancing. These scenes are not allowed to be broadcast on Saudi TV. Some people are more interested in the visual effects than the words of songs and music. They like to watch the dancing and the beautiful girls. They would never see these on Saudi TV”.*

Another student, also from group 8 corroborated his view, saying,

*“There is a programme of Western songs on the MBC channel which carries news stories of male and female entertainers and is very popular. The Arabian lady presenting the programme filmed one of its scenes in her bedroom. It would be impossible for a female Arab presenter to film such scenes for Saudi TV in her bedclothes in her bedroom”.*

A further comment was made by student from group 3 on the presentation of music and songs on Saudi TV as follows: *“Saudi TV has far less interesting entertainers than the satellite channels, Saudi TV does not show video clips, females singing nor have female presenters. Saudi TV music programmes are presented by male entertainers only”.*

#### 7.4.9.3 News (terrestrial Saudi television versus satellite channels)

Students showed great concern about the issue of news. Most said they followed the news on several channels, the most prominent of which was Al-Jazeera, since they were currently dissatisfied with Saudi television's presentation of news. Nevertheless, some indicated they thought a slow change was taking place and they expected Saudi television to improve and develop in this aspect. One student from group 4 commented, *"I think the satellite channels will induce the Saudi channels to change their style of newscasts. In the past we used to watch very few programmes on Saudi television. I believe it has started to become aware of its poor image and reputation since it has begun to present more varied and diverse programmes. Even in news casting there has been an evident change"* He supported his view with the following example:

*"... a few days ago we saw the hijacking of a Saudi plane and how Saudi television covered it. The style of photography had lots of live sequences. This could not have happened if the satellite channels had not appeared. I think the diffusion of satellite channels into Saudi society has been a shock to Saudi television, forcing it to change in several respects".*

Just under half of participants in focus group sessions expressed the view that Saudi local TV newscast focus on matters important to a small group of people rather than society in general. A student from group 2 stated,

*"Saudi TV tends to focus extensively on reception protocol and long news reports, which are very monotonous to watch. The great escape from this monotony is watching satellite channels which shows Saudi television is not providing the kind of news material we find interesting. We prefer the*

*wide variety of choice available on satellite channels to the lack of variety on Saudi television”.*

Regarding the presentation of facts without exaggeration or bias, one student in group 6 said, *“I don’t think there is any channel taking a middle position between the two channels, Al-Jazeera and MBC, when covering Saudi news. Al-Jazeera may report incorrect or exaggerated news, while the MBC bulletins may be overcautious and consequently hide some facts.”* Students made several comments on the issue of news on Saudi television. Discussing **modernisation**, one student in group 1 said he could not see any renewal or development going on in Saudi television’s coverage of the news. Several students criticised the **prolonged newscasts**, one from group 5 commenting, *“Sometimes they change the internal decor of the news studio but keep the same presenters and the same style of presenting the news as well as long newscasts.”* Another in group 8 said:

*“While other channels produce a summary of not more than two minutes of each important news item, Saudi television may spend more than an hour on local news, providing details that are of little interest to the majority of viewers, for example, reception formalities, talks and speeches during ceremonies and official occasions, and the valediction at the end”.*

**Lack of specialist news presenters** was another issue. One participant from group 3 while criticising the prolonged newscasts extending to one or two hours that can be read in the newspapers the following day, also referred to a lack of specialist news presenters, and said, *“We see the same presenter reading the news, covering football matches or presenting a miscellany of programmes.”* Other students criticised **the**

**delays in reporting** important events, one from group 7 stating “*Sometimes the events may be in Saudi Arabia but you hear about them and their details on other channels*”.

Saudi television’s emphasis on local news and its failure to interrupt its programmes for important national or international news were also criticised. One participant in group 5 commented,

*“Saudi television concentrates on local news and rarely interrupts the programmes for important or urgent news because the presenters have to keep to a time schedule. World news is presented on Saudi television but later than on other channels so, local news, which I may call ‘special news’ since it focuses on only local people and events, is, in fact always under all circumstances given priority”.*

Research participants also criticised Saudi television’s **lack of live coverage of events and its lack of concern with people’s reactions to news events**. A student from group 1 remarked: “*Saudi television presents the news but not in close detail. Its reporters never visit news locations, never interview officials or those involved in the events, nor elicit people’s reactions the news events as we see other channels do*”.

A large number of students said they felt they had no choice but to view the news on other channels, although some of these channels were not always neutral and sometimes exaggerated news reports, or even presented inaccurate information. A student from group 3 commented: “*Of course Al-Jazeera is not totally neutral nor always credible, but it is better than other Arabic channels. It quickly reports in a coherent, logical way, and mostly from the location of an event, but this does not mean*

*its news bulletins are always reliable and accurate*". Another student in the same group agreed with this comment, stating, *"I watch the news on Al-Jazeera more than on other channels but with a degree of caution, as what they say is not always true. Sometimes I feel reporters are after excitement and bent on provoking confrontation between the Arab parties under the spotlight, and because of these factors, news reportage may not always be absolutely credible."* A student from group 8 said: *"On more than one occasion some channels have reported events in Saudi Arabia and provided details which have later been found to be untrue. It became evident that these channels were not entirely honest at that time but exaggerated or altered some of the facts"*.

#### **7.4.9.4 Films and serials (terrestrial Saudi television versus satellite channels)**

A very small proportion said they watched films and serials on Saudi television. One student from group 5 said: *"The Saudi First channel presents Arabic serials only; there are no films. The second channel presents American films, but I do not watch them regularly. I subscribe to a movie channel to view the best movies."* A student in group 6 commented: *"I think the Gulf channels are the best for serials while the Lebanese channels, ART, and MBC are the best for movies"*.

A small proportion of students, as mentioned earlier, did not watch Saudi television, however, all participants in the focus group discussions watched the satellite channels. In group 8, one student's reason for not watching Saudi TV was as follows: *"Basically, I don't watch Saudi television because what is presented is not up to our economic and cultural standards. Presentation should be better, that's why I watch other channels."*

Some of the students thought the paucity of Saudi movies and the poor production quality of Saudi serials encouraged young people to watch satellite channels. One participant from group 2 said: *“I like the Saudi serials, although there aren’t many of them, and I watch them on Saudi television or any other channel. I prefer them to the Egyptian or Syrian ones; however, if there is no Saudi material I may watch something else. Sadly there are very few Saudi productions”*.

A student from group 3 added, *“Most of the movies and serials presented on Saudi television are not Saudi, therefore, it’s not necessary to watch them on a Saudi channel.”* In contrast, a small proportion of students preferred to view movies and serials on Saudi television, but associated viewing these programmes with family viewing. A student also from group 3 said: *“Most of what my family watches is on the Saudi channel and sometimes on other channels. I watch the movies and serials that don’t include any sexually explicit scenes with my family”*.

A participant in group 7 indicated that censorship played an important role in families’ choice of Saudi television for family viewing since *“... parents and the older generation can be confident that what they and their families watch strictly conforms to our traditional and cultural values.”* However, several students thought paying strict attention to religious and cultural values and demands was the main reason why Saudi television did not present a wide variety of movies and serials. A student from group 6 revealed this was the reason he liked watching movies and serials on Lebanese channels. He said,

*“On Lebanese channels I can see a serial or movie without it being censored or edited. The story will be presented in its entirety and not*

*abridged. This is not the case on the Saudi channel. All of the serials or movies I watch on the Lebanese channels would simply not be presented on Saudi TV, and if they were, much of their contents would be omitted.”*

A student from group 5 said he watched dubbed serials, which he thought were originally Mexican or Venezuelan, that were understandable as they had Arabic dubbing. In addition, he viewed “ ...these films in translation, not on the Saudi channel, because their content would be considered unacceptable by the Saudi community for religious and social reasons”.

### **7.5 Summary**

It has been shown in this chapter that MBC, LBC, Future, and Al-Jazeera channels were successively the most popular satellite channels for the sample of students investigated, followed by a number of sports channels. Hence, it is possible to conclude that entertainment, sports, and news programmes are the primary viewing needs satisfied by using Arabic channels in general, and these channels in particular, since the first three channels presents entertainment, sports and news programmes. Although students' top favourite satellite channels were Arabic channels, the first three channels, namely, MBC, LBC and Future, presented translated Western programmes as well as Western music and songs.



Lack of watching Western channels does not mean students did not watch Western films and programmes. They occupied a high level of preferred choice, and students indicated they preferred to view them translated into Arabic on Arabian satellite channels. This means satellite channels are main factors in transmitting Western media and culture to young adults in Saudi Arabia. The sample regarded Lebanese channels, particularly LBC and Future, as the channels which were the most similar to Western channels among all Arabic channels. Also, they suggested these channels served Western culture more than the other Arabic channels, followed by MBC. As was mentioned above, these channels occupied the first level of preference.

Students participating in focus groups in this study, who were males only, revealed their favourite programmes were sport, followed by Arabic serials, Western films, then news and political programmes. The lack of censorship of any of the programmes or movies presented was a main reason students watched them on satellite channels since it was evident this form of media was utilised by Saudi young adults to watch sexually explicit programmes. A large number of students said that the viewing of sexually explicit programmes had increased greatly as a result of watching satellite channels. Pornography is one of the important issues to have emerged in this study and will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

Finally, the results confirmed that the time spent viewing Saudi TV was very low compared to viewing satellite channels. The researcher selected four categories of programmes and presented them to participants in order to ascertain whether they preferred viewing them on Saudi TV, both the First and Second channels, or on satellite channels. The results indicated a high proportion of group participants preferred to

watch these programmes on satellite channels. Therefore, it is clear Saudi TV is failing to meet the needs of Saudi young adults where programmes focusing on sports and matches, music, news, and films and serials are concerned.

It is also clear Saudi young adults are more exposed to foreign channels and TV programmes than to the local TV media, hence, the satellite channels viewed in Saudi Arabia can be regarded as a type of global media transferring different forms of foreign cultures to the local culture.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **DISCUSSION OF STUDY FINDINGS**

## **8.1 Introduction**

The data results in chapters six and seven together, with the literature examined in the course of this study, reveal many aspects of the impact of satellite channels on local media and cultural conditions in Saudi Arabia. It is young adults and their use of satellite channels in the kingdom that is the main purpose of this investigation. To assist this purpose, the researcher has drawn on aspects of the uses and gratifications approach to facilitate better understanding of young Saudis' use of satellite channels. This chapter presents an overall analysis of the most distinctive results arising from the study. It is divided into five sections. The first section will briefly present main findings from the review of literature relevant to the research. The subsequent three sections will discuss findings relevant to the three main research questions designed to achieve the aims of the study. The final section will discuss media and cultural issues which have emerged in the course of this research, for example, satellite communication technology and its impact on channels' ownership; TV expertise and programmes production; news on satellite channels and the information flow debate; and the study sample's viewing of pornographic material on satellite channels.

## **8.2 Literature Review Findings**

Communications technology has developed rapidly during the past few decades until it has reached a stage where Saudi residents are able to use instruments and small sized technologies, which are cheap and easy to make and maintain, to assist their viewing of hundreds of television satellite channels. This technology has also changed people's

attitude to the media in Saudi Arabia. Previously, they had only been able to watch two heavily censored government run channels and thus received television which was an instrument of government policy. Nowadays, censorship is reduced insomuch as viewers can watch television materials not subject to government approval. A viewer in Saudi Arabia is able to follow events at source, and is exposed to numerous differing opinions and news which may conflict with official government policy, religious values, or local cultural values. The viewer can freely watch what s(he) chooses.

The ownership of television channels in Arab countries was originally limited to governments only, but the emergence of direct satellite broadcasting has led to new owners in the arena. With regard to the Arab world, Saudi businessmen were the pioneers in the field (Alterman, 1998; Amin, 2000; Boyd-Barrat, 2000 and Sakr, 2000). The second Arab channel broadcast via satellite after the Egypt Satellite Channel, was MBC, owned by two Saudi businessmen. One established channels specific to him under the name of ART. Then the Orbit channels emerged, also owned by Saudi businessmen. There were other Arab satellite channels owned by individuals or companies. Further, there were government channels that were of a business and profit-making nature. There were also channels promoting the beliefs of religious parties in addition to official government channels which benefited from direct satellite broadcasting technology (ibid). Thus, terrestrial channels penetrated the furthest corners of a country, while satellite broadcasting reached countries in different parts of the world.

In light of the increased number of Arabian satellite channels, and since most have been able to attract Arab viewers away from their local stations, Arab countries have

hurriedly sought to carry out developmental changes in their local television stations, and broadcast them through one or more satellites. Among such channels is Saudi television which is trying to improve programme presentation and content in the light of religious, political and social circumstances (Al-Garni, 2000). Numerous Saudis have started to refer to the improvement in Saudi television presentation. However, a number of them, and some among the study sample, regard it as a small, almost imperceptible development, and want faster, more noticeable change.

Moreover, despite the widespread and growing influence of the media, especially in the last decade, data from this study indicates that Saudi media policy has not kept abreast of the worldwide changes. The local media, in terms of quantity and quality before the spread of satellite television and the Internet, and after, has remained virtually the same. Because of this, the organisations that control the media have become an obstacle to improving their quality and content and have contributed to the growing interest in the external media aimed at Saudis. Further, despite increased coverage, and the large increase in the population in the last decade and the beginning of this decade, there has been only one new daily newspaper. New local radio station has not been established. There are still only two local television channels, Channel One and Channel Two. Lately, time has been allocated on Channel Two for sports coverage, and a plan to establish a news channel has been announced by the Ministry of Information. Undoubtedly, the failure to curb interest in the external media and to promote internal media growth and development increases consumption and utilisation of external media as well as the absorption of external culture at the expense of the local media and culture.

Studies related to media studies generally and satellite channels specifically in Saudi Arabia are sparse. There is also a lack of social studies generally and research on local culture and its relation to the media in particular. Most of such studies are carried out in American and British universities to gain a Master or Doctoral qualification. Despite the importance of satellite channels and increasing international academic interest in the subjects of globalisation and cultural imperialism, Saudi studies focusing on these aspects are few. This is why the researcher's study adds to the literature on media and culture in Saudi Arabia, and provides a basis for other studies to examine further topics in this field not previously explored.

### **8.3 Research Question No.1: How do young Saudi adults use satellite channels?**

We pointed previously to the spread of satellite channels in Saudi Arabia and the ability to watch them on a daily basis, 24 hours a day. There is extensive competition between Arabian channels to win over new viewers, especially from Saudi Arabia, which offer a large market for advertising purposes for which many Arabian satellite channels compete. Thus, it is natural that each channel seeks to extend its share in this market because of the increasing number of Saudi viewers of satellite channels and their accompanying dissatisfaction with the local media.

Before the introduction of satellite TV to the country, viewers on the west coast (the location of the current study) were able to watch Egyptian terrestrial TV channel most of the year especially when humidity was high and terrestrial signals was strong. At that time, Abuzinada's (1988) study found 59% of the sample of 226 extended families

members in Jeddah dissatisfied with Saudi television programmes. Further, they watched Egyptian TV more than Saudi TV. After the appearance of satellite TV, studies showed the popularity of this new media among Saudis from the very beginning. In his study, Bait Al-Mal (1992) reported that the majority (73%) of respondents from among university students and staff watched satellite channels everyday. Marghalani *et al.* (1988) concluded from a large-sample survey in Saudi Arabia that (63.8%) of respondents owned and/or had regular access to a satellite dish and viewers spent more hours watching satellite channels than the two local government channels. The present study support previous findings. Questionnaire and focus group results revealed 346 out of 438 students (78.9%) viewed satellite channels, 207 of whom (47.2%) were males and 139 (31.7%) were females.

The study also indicated 244 students from the study sample (55.7%) had been viewing satellite channels for more than 3 years, and almost half the sample (49.6%) viewed satellite channels daily from between 1 to 5 hours. Depending on the type of channels broadcast and received, 179 satellite channel viewers (51.7%) watched open-to-air channels only, and 10 students (.029%) watched coded channels only, whereas 151 (43.6%) viewed both types of channels.

Regarding the locations where members of the sample liked to view both Saudi TV and satellite channels, findings revealed (31.3%) liked to view Saudi TV with other members of their family whereas only (14.4%) liked to view satellite channels with family members; and (14.4%) preferred to view Saudi TV alone whereas (19.2%) preferred to view satellite channels alone. Students participating in focus groups referred to different reasons for watching Saudi television with their families, for



example, their families only watched Saudi channels and they watched these with them. Saudi television programmes were suitable for all family members to watch without supervision, or there was only one receiver and no other option but to watch Saudi channels when their families wanted to view them.

Previous studies ( Najai, 1982; Al-Attibi, 1986; Abuzinada, 1988; Al-Heezan 1993; Merdad 1993; Al-Oofy 1990) found Saudi people mostly used the media in general and TV in particular for information, interculturalism, entertainment and diversion. Bait Al-Mal (1992) and Marghalani (1997) found the availability and variety of quality programmes, information, and entertainment were the most gratifications sought from watching satellite TV by Saudis. The present study findings found the study sample used satellite mostly to obtain information, learn about other cultures, and enjoy the availability and variety of quality programmes. According to questionnaire results, the primary reason for viewing satellite channels was: *To keep up with current issues and events* (information), followed by: *To know what is going on internationally* (information), then: *To find out how people outside Saudi Arabia live* (Interculturalism), and: *To find a wide variety of programmes* (Availability and Variety). Thus, this study tends to generally confirm the findings of previous studies. There is a slight difference in the order of main reasons for viewing satellite TV between this study and Marghalani's (1997) results. Information came first in the present study and availability and variety came third, whereas availability and variety came first and information came third in Marghalani's study. Interestingly, sexual curiosity was the last reason given by the study sample in both studies. The issue of watching

sexual explicit scenes will be explored in detail in the section discussing the pornographic materials young Saudi adults watch on satellite channels.

The researcher employed open questions in the questionnaire to obtain the names of the satellite channels the participants in the study sample most preferred watching. The researcher asked students to name their five favourite ones in order of preference from 1 to 5. This procedure differed from that in former studies by Bait Al-Mal (1992), Al-Makaty (1995) and Marghlani (1998) since these authors provided a ready-made list of satellite channels available at the time of their studies and asked students to choose from those listed. This illustrates the importance of the present study, which used open-ended questions to elicit the satellite channel favourites of young adults in Saudi Arabia. Questions in focus group were also posed sessions to elicit the names of the channels participants watched. Foremost was the MBC channel, followed by the two Lebanese channels, LBC and Future, then the Qatari Aljazeera channel, and after that, several sports channels. MBC was also the most preferred satellite channel viewed by Saudis in previous satellite TV studies (Bait Al-Mal, 1992; Al-Makaty, 1995; and Marghlani, 1998). It was selected by students in the present study as their top favourite on account of the diversity of its programmes and suitability for all Saudi family members as was mentioned in the previous chapter, in section 7.4.1.

The two Lebanese channels came second because they presented a lot of entertainment programmes in a Western style. Students enjoyed the freedom and lack of censorship on these two channels. They watched news and political programmes on the Aljazeera channel. The presentation of live programmes, including unedited questions and

arguments, live coverage of different parts of the world, and lack of censorship were the main reasons students liked this channel.

All the channels most preferred by the sample are Arab channels, which suggests young adults in Saudi Arabia are using satellite television not to watch Western channels, mainly American, as some might expect, but because they are interested in viewing regional Arab channels. This is an important result in relation to the debate about the globalisation and imperialism of media and culture, which raises such questions as: does usage of satellite channels increase the use of Western channels? Does it increase the viewing of Western programmes? Does it transfer and circulate the global Western culture?

Although young Saudi adults watched satellite channels quite extensively, they generally watched Arabic speaking channels. However, the three most popular among the study sample (MBC, LBC, and Future) are channels that provide programmes primarily based on entertainment and a huge number of programmes which present songs and music of a Western nature. Thus, although young adults preferred Arab channels, they very much enjoyed watching the Western programmes on these channels. For example, Western movies were highly preferred by young Saudi adults. Many in the focus groups said Lebanese channels were most similar to Western channels, and also presented more programmes reflecting Western culture than the other Arabian channels. For this reason, in the next chapter the researcher will look beyond the sample's preferred channels to the preferred content of these channels and discuss the relationship between the local and the global, especially what Appadurai (1990) termed 'mediated globalisation'. In this regard, he points to the capacity to

produce and disseminate both information and images at speed throughout the world via different types of media. He states that the hardware is continually increasing in variety and capabilities in that personal computers can now be networked via phone lines, or camcorders linked to satellite broadcasting transmitters. He defined this interconnectedness as repertoires of print, celluloid and electronic screens that are being increasingly, disseminated globally.

Another finding related to students' viewing of Western programmes is that from eight different types of TV programmes, Western movies and drama were students' third preferred choice of terrestrial TV programmes. This may be due to the impact of the Saudi Second Channel which presents foreign films and broadcasts in English, whereas the Saudi First Channel does not present Western programmes. Yet, even though they were not extensively watching Western channels, young Saudi adults preferred Western media productions and watched them on the Arabian TV channels. This finding corroborates results exported in previous studies by Al-Heezan (1993), Merdad, (1993) and Al-Oofy (1990) which indicated that Saudis liked to watch Western programmes on terrestrial channels (Saudi and Egyptian) and video recorders.

Watching Western movies was also the reason some students watched satellite channels late at night. One important pilot study result for this research was the considerable number of students who said between 12.00 pm to 06.00 am was their preferred time for watching satellite channels. This result guided the researcher to add a scale question asking respondents to give their reason/reasons for watching late-night satellite channels. The final results revealed the main first reason was: *Because more Western*

*movies are broadcast late, followed by the reason: because more Arabic movies are broadcast late.*

Although the present study was carried out in Saudi Arabia on a study sample of whom 97.5% were Saudi students, regarding their most preferred programmes, those programmes coming from Saudi Arabia occupied fifth place out of the seven groups of countries presented. The Gulf States occupied first place, followed by the Rest of the Arab Countries, then the USA, Europe was fourth, and Asia and Latin America were sixth and seventh, respectively. In the focus groups, students referred to the poor quality of Saudi TV production as the reason for the low popularity of local movies and serials. Before satellite channels, Egyptian terrestrial TV channels were most preferred by Saudis who were able to view them in the 1980s (Al-Oofy, 1990).

The average hours students spent viewing satellite channels, their viewing habits, and types of preferred programmes, will be presented later in section 8.4.4 when discussing the main differences between satellite channel and terrestrial TV usage.

#### **8.4 Research Question No.2: Are there any effects of using satellite channels on the usage of other media?**

In order to answer the questions relating to the use of different media, particularly satellite channels, by young adults in Saudi Arabia, two methodologies were employed to gather information from the study sample. The results of the two methodologies, a questionnaire and focus group sessions, were presented in detail in chapters six and

seven. The following sections highlights the most important findings derived from the research data.

#### **8.4.1 Use of print media**

The newspaper readership of the sample indicated that young Saudi adults read newspapers in a high proportion, and preferred local Saudi newspapers, especially those published in the city of Jeddah, the study location. There was no significant difference between the newspaper readership of males and females. Both males and females also read magazines in a high proportion. However, they preferred magazines published outside Saudi Arabia. The proportion of females reading magazines was slightly higher than that of males.

This study through employing the technique of open-ended questions managed to elicit the names of newspapers and magazines that Saudi undergraduate students read during the period of the study's implementation. This study was the first to use open-ended questions for this purpose. Previous studies had relied on close-ended questions, suggesting the names of local newspapers and magazines presented in a list respondents had to choose from. Thus, this study's methodology facilitates a future link between it and other studies focussing on the Saudi media. It opens the door to more in-depth studies of issues related to the media, and political, social, or cultural changes in Saudi Arabia.

In the focus groups, the majority of students thought their viewing of satellite channels did not negatively affect their reading of newspapers and magazines, both in terms of the time allocated for reading and the types of print media they read. A small number of students said they had not been regular readers of newspapers and magazines before watching satellite channels therefore could not assess whether viewing them had influenced their reading of the print media. A very small proportion did not read either newspapers or magazines.

#### **8.4.2 Use of the radio**

Here again, open-ended questions were used. It soon became apparent that students in the study sample listened frequently to the radio, especially males when driving cars. The MBC FM radio station, whose residency is outside Saudi Arabia, had the highest proportion of listeners. Despite its ownership by Saudis, its programmes' contents differ totally from those of local broadcasting stations, since they resemble to a large extent programmes on the stations Western youths enjoy listening to, concentrating on singing, music and live chat. This radio station was much preferred by the student sample interviewed. Moreover, since advertisements are not allowed on Saudi local broadcasting stations, the MBC FM radio station allows Saudi listeners access to radio advertising and therefore has sole admittance to this very lucrative market. It should be noted here that Saudi land and space is almost free of private local electronic media (not owned by government) transmitted from inside Saudi borders as a result of recent media policy. Another research finding revealed local broadcasting station (The Second

Programme) transmitting from the city of Jeddah aiming at a youth audience was not highly valued by the sample.

Focus group participants, who were all males, thought watching satellite channels did not negatively affect their listening to the radio since they mostly listened to it while driving. A small number, however, thought their viewing of satellite channels had reduced the time they spent listening to important news and following developments on the radio. For example, they used to listen to the radio, particularly foreign stations such as the BBC, Voice of America, Monte Carlo, etc. when there was an important news event, but now, because satellite channels present live coverage of events, listening to the radio is considered less exciting for keeping up-to-date with breaking news stories.

#### **8.4.3 Use of the Internet**

This study showed 38.3% of the sample used the Internet; about two-thirds of whom were males. However, of these, only 13.7% used the Internet or entered the World Wide Web daily. The Internet service in Saudi Arabia, at the time of field study trip, was experiencing many obstacles, primarily, as indicated in the literature review, due to high costs, a slow communication system, and censorship, or in official terms, 'a filtered system'. The researcher expects the number of Internet users to rise rapidly once permission is officially granted to use uncensored broadband service or satellite to access the Internet. This view is supported by the increase in recent years of those accessing TV channels through satellite. If permission is granted for this Internet usage,



especially through satellite, the government will have neither power nor control over this service. Lack of supervision will lead to the widespread use of a practical information communication service by Saudi society that has been shown to quickly grow accustomed to using communication and information technologies when available.

#### **8.4.4 Use of terrestrial (Saudi) television, and main differences between satellite channel and terrestrial TV usage.**

One most important result revealed that a significant percentage of the sample did not watch Saudi television at all, since the questionnaire results indicated that 79.2 % of the entire sample watched Saudi television. Of these, a quarter watched it less than an hour daily. Likewise, focus group results revealed that most of those watching Saudi television watched it only when it broadcast live local football matches that no other channel was broadcasting at the same time.

One of the main aims in employing focus group methodology was to gather more in-depth answers to some of the responses from the questionnaire. The researcher deliberately chose four types of programmes he noticed young Saudi adults were attracted to and preferred more than other programmes, i.e. sports, music, news, films and serials. He posed questions about these to students, comparing their presentation on Saudi television and satellite channels. The results suggested that Saudi television was failing to meet young Saudi adults' needs where these types of programmes were concerned. While many of the study sample indicated their understanding and respect

for the religious and social circumstances that prevent the showing of films, serials and songs in which there is dancing, kissing, semi-naked scenes, and pictures or ideas that Islamic belief prohibits, they strongly criticised Saudi television's lack of ability to present good sports and news programmes they considered interesting enough to watch. They said they viewed these types of programmes mostly on satellite channels and not the Saudi channel. Many individuals confirmed they preferred watching Saudi sports on non-local channels, they learned about Saudi and world news from non-local sources, and they searched for entertainment programmes on satellite channels as a result of Saudi television failing to strengthen their link with the local society.

There were other differences between satellite channel and terrestrial TV usage amongst Saudi young adults. The average hours students spent viewing satellite channels were more than their average terrestrial TV viewing hours. The number of respondents who watched satellite channels with friends and in their friends' homes was more than those who watched Saudi TV with friends and in their friends' homes. Further, the sample preferred to watch Saudi terrestrial TV rather than satellite channels with all family members.

Regarding the times of viewing, the proportion of students who preferred to watch satellite channels on weekdays, weekends, and throughout the week (weekdays + weekends) was slightly more than those who viewed local terrestrial TV. Students' preferred time for viewing both satellite channels and terrestrial TV was between 6 pm and 12 midnight. However, more students watched terrestrial TV at this time (62.1%) than watched satellite channels (48.4%). A much lower percentage of the sample

viewed Saudi TV between 12 midnight and 6 am (3.0%) compared to (23.7%) who viewed satellite channels at this time.

The study also highlighted differences regarding types of programmes students preferred to view on these two types of media. According to questionnaire findings, sport programmes were students' most preferred type of programme, and more preferred to view sports on terrestrial TV than satellite channels (28.5% and 16.4%, respectively). However, according to focus group findings, the majority of students preferred watching sports programmes, especially football on satellite channels. When they were asked the reasons for their favourite satellite channels, good presentation of sports and matches was a main reason.

Focus group students criticised terrestrial television's lack of ability to present good sports coverage and programmes, some revealing they watched local Saudi channels only if there was a local football match not covered by the other channels. It should be noted that most local matches are covered by Saudi terrestrial channels exclusively. On satellite channels, students followed Saudi sports, then Gulf sports, European football and, finally, Arab sports. Focus group results thus indicated that some students showed an interest in international sports. In this regard respondents were reflecting the fact that sport is a global phenomenon and youth in Saudi Arabia are similar to other youths around the world who are interested in international sports, famous teams and players.

The time spent watching programmes focussing on religion on the two types of media also differed. More students ranked it as their first preferred programme type on terrestrial channels than on satellite channels. This result was to be expected because of

the strong emphasis on this type of programme in all Saudi local media. Al-Amoudi (1990) found that 25% of the programmes on Saudi Channel 1 and Saudi Channel 2 were religious programmes.

An unexpected result was students' slightly stronger preference for watching Western movies and drama programmes on terrestrial channels than satellite channels (12.1%, 10.7%, respectively).

Finally, students preferred watching music programmes on satellite channels rather than terrestrial TV. Focus group participants indicated that because Saudi television does not show video clips or shots of women singing or dancing they preferred watching music programmes on satellite channels. The questionnaire results revealed 47% of students ranked music as their first, second and third favourite type of programme and most preferred to watch this type of programme on satellite channels because they presented music and songs in a far more entertaining way than Saudi TV. Moreover, satellite channel presentation of songs includes video clips and far better photographic effects and technical aspects than Saudi TV which does not present programmes or songs accompanied by female singers or dancers.

Students mostly preferred to view news programmes on satellite channels rather than on Saudi TV. Just under half of the sample (210: 47.9%) agreed or strongly agreed they viewed satellite channels to watch uncensored news in contrast to 74 (17.1%) who disagreed or strongly disagreed this was the reason for watching news programmes on satellite channels. Most students preferred to watch the news on satellite channels rather than terrestrial TV, the most prominent of which was Aljazeera, because they

were dissatisfied with Saudi television's presentation of news. Students participating in focus group sessions criticised Saudi local TV newscasts for focusing on matters relating to a small minority of people rather than the society in general. The lack of modernisation and specialist news presenters, reporting delays, lack of live coverage, and prolonged newscasts were issues of most concern to students when discussing news matters on terrestrial Saudi TV (see chapter 7, section 4.9.3).

In their view, the lack of Saudi movies and the poor production quality of Saudi serials encouraged young people to watch satellite channels. Most students liked to watch Arabic and Western movies and serials on satellite channels too. Lack of censorship of these programmes on satellite channels was another reason students preferred to watch them on this type of media.

### **8.5 Research Question No.3: What kinds of influence does watching satellite television have on the activities of Saudi young adults and their attitudes towards Western culture?**

#### **8.5.1 Influences of watching satellite television on some everyday activities of students**

This research endeavoured to ascertain possible effects of viewing satellite channels on students' everyday activities. The majority of students thought watching satellite channels had a bad or negative effect on their religious practices but less effect on religious beliefs. Many Saudis, among them students in this study sample, feel the contents of most satellite channels' programmes conflict with Islamic values and beliefs. They claim these channels show material and practices that Islam does not

allow, such as sexually explicit scenes, nudity, consumption of alcoholic, and drug-taking. Further, some students argued that these channels spread new ideologies and attitudes which in opposition to their religious values such as the toleration of pornography, social mixing between the two sexes, sex outside marriage, and the call to enjoy life regardless of the consequences.

A five-point scale question focusing on the relationship between performing prayers and the viewing of satellite channels was included in the questionnaire. Offering prayers is obligatory for every Muslim five times a day at specific times during the day and night; males should pray in the mosque. The results showed that 45% of students disagreed and strongly disagreed that viewing satellite channels negatively affected their performance of prayers, in contrast to 10.8% who agreed and strongly agreed that it did.

When asked whether viewing satellite channels affected their performance of prayers in mosques or at specified times, focus group participants' responses were similar to questionnaire results. Interestingly, a student from group 1 made the following comment, *"because of their frequent viewing of other religions' activities on satellite channels, I think some young Moslems are becoming more interested in Western religious festivities than Islamic ones"*. In general, students indicated satellite channel viewing had some influence on religious practice but not on underlying religious belief.

Since the research sample comprised students, studying was another activity examined in the questionnaire, to see whether satellite channels distracted students from studying at home. Just under a quarter (22.8%) of students agreed and strongly agreed they were distracted from studying because of viewing satellite channels whereas just over a third

(34.8%) disagreed or strongly disagreed this was the case. However, overall findings indicated that watching satellite channels to some extent impacted on students' studying since 21.2% of students 'Somewhat Agreed' this was the case. The majority of the study sample also thought viewing satellite channels encouraged them to stay within the home setting for a longer period. Satellite viewing and its impacts on the usage of other types of media have been discussed earlier in this chapter.

Regarding students' views of satellite channels' impact on some local cultural activities, a large number thought satellite channels had a negative effect on local music and song, because they helped spread both Arabian and Western music and songs in Saudi Arabia, making them popular with a large proportion of youth at the expense of traditional Saudi songs. Finally, most students said that imitation of Western fashions was increasing among Saudi youth in several ways, such as style of dress and haircut. They also thought satellite channels were responsible for increased Westernisation.

### **8.5.2 Influence of watching satellite channels on students' behaviour and their attitudes towards Western culture**

The questionnaire and focus group findings indicated that satellite channels were believed to play a role in changing young viewers' behaviour, ranging from young Saudi adults' gradual acquaintance with other cultures, becoming increasingly attracted to them, and imitating them occasionally. It is difficult to negate or support the repeated claim made in Saudi Arabia that satellite channels are a main cause of new types of behaviour appearing in youths during the years the service has been in operation, such

as the increase in the number of youths taking drugs, drinking spirits, committing crime; or imitating all that is Western, for example, in respect of dress or haircut, and preferring to listen to Western music and songs rather than traditional Saudi music. Such behaviour is difficult to separate from other influences in youths' lives, such as their exposure to other types of media other than satellite channels, and familiarity with other cultures through travel, reading, merchandise, and the logos that saturate the market.

Moreover, during the time satellite channels have been in existence and spread, Saudi society has experienced profound economic and social changes, particularly since the Gulf War. These are among several factors influencing youths' behaviour, either positively or negatively. Finally, social studies investigating the effect of the media on young Saudi adults before the advent of the satellite channels service are lacking. Because such studies are absent, any comparison between the effects of the media prior to and after the spread of satellite channels on young Saudi adults would be based upon conjecture and assumptions rather than empirical and scientific evidence. Taking this into consideration, the study therefore focused on the present situation and the study samples in the questionnaire and focus group sessions where therefore asked their opinions on the influence watching satellite television had on their behaviour and attitude to Western culture.

In the questionnaire, students were presented with twelve possible reasons why they viewed satellite channels. The results showed that 56.6% of them agreed or strongly agreed they watched satellite channels to find out how people outside Saudi Arabia live, and 52.1% agreed or strongly agreed they viewed satellite channels to gain more



knowledge about different cultures. These results suggest satellite channels are medium that provides information for viewers about people and cultures in other nations. Another result indicated viewing satellite channels stimulated a desire to travel abroad, but stimulated a slightly stronger desire in students to travel to Arab countries rather than Western countries.

Students were also asked whether their viewing of satellite channels reduced the time they spent watching Western channels and Western programmes since they were able to view many open-to-air Arabian channels. Only 21.7% and 22.6% of students strongly agreed and agreed that it reduced the time they spent watching Western channels and Western programmes, respectively. This result was similar to that derived from responses to the question asking students if viewing satellite channels reduced the time they spent watching Arabian channels and Arabian programmes.

Students in focus groups also discussed the time they spent listening to Western songs and music, and the extent to which they imitated the Western styles of dress and haircut as a result of watching satellite channels. Students thought satellite channels had helped spread Western music and songs in Saudi Arabia, making them popular with a large proportion of youth. Some indicated that before satellite channels they had tended not to listen frequently to Western songs and music.

The popular channels in this study, such as MBC, LBC, and Future, recognise the great interest in Western music among youths and have responded to this fact. Students often mentioned these channels when talking about Western music. They referred to the Western music programmes on these Arabian channels, such as those playing the top

ten Western songs every week. One reason given by some students for watching Western songs was to show “*they live a Western lifestyle, and enjoy Western arts and freely copy them.*” Some, according to a student from group 6, liked watching and listening to Western songs and music even though they did not understand what the words meant.

While a large proportion of participants in focus groups thought satellite channels were responsible for the growth in the popularity of Western music, a large proportion also considered satellite channels played a major role in influencing Saudi young adults’ imitation of Western fashions, for example, hairstyle, dress (i.e. the wearing of trousers), listening to Western songs, and using Western phrases or slang. This imitation had not been so obvious and widespread several years ago. A third agreed that the imitation of Western styles of dress and hairstyle was actually increasing among Saudi youths, but satellite channels were not the prime cause of this. Young adults’ attraction to Western culture was due to a range of social and economic factors, not only to watching satellite channels, some students commented.

### **8.6 Issues Emerging from the Research**

Satellite technology and advances in information technology, international computer networks, and television broadcasting services through cable have enabled media organisations to operate on a global scale by assisting the process of internal organisational communication and facilitating media products’ distribution across the world (Barker, 1999: 51). In the light of this globalisation, culture no longer remains

restricted to a specific time or place. Television has contributed through satellite to its spread and dispersal. Studying and analysing what is occurring today in Saudi Arabia as a result of the wide usage of this technology adds to the existing and ongoing debate about cultural and media imperialism and globalisation.

Reeves (1993) argues that the media content of television programmes, films, books, magazines, records and tapes, and other cultural commodities, as well as advertisements in developing countries, generally reflect the influences of the prevailing Western culture, primarily that of the USA. In the age of satellite channels, television has become more important as a medium for transferring Western media and culture globally according to media and cultural imperialism supporters. However, some findings in this study suggest that satellite TV has exposed young people to a range of styles and content not catered for by Saudi TV, but much of it Arab in origin. Further, the most popular channels are owned by Arab businessmen or Arab governments and most preferred programmes are presented in Arabic.

These findings, which are clearly evident in questionnaire and focus group results and briefly summarised below, do not support all media and cultural imperialism theory. Rather, they lend weight to the glocalisation thesis, i.e that the global is heavily mediated through Arab versions of the global or Western culture. The findings supports the view of those theorists (Appadurai, 1990; Robertson, 1992) who suggest that globalisation is not a simple one way process; that in many ways the global becomes transformed through the local culture by way of language and style to become (glocal).

### **8.6.1 Ownership Matters**

Television viewers in Saudi Arabia presently receive through satellite hundreds of channels, and, as this study's results have shown, most students in the sample preferred Arab channels owned by Arabian businessmen or Arab governments. Producing satellites and owning them has become common among French, British, American, Russian, and Arab individuals, etc. and is no longer limited to a state or specific group of countries. The same can be said of television channels. Murdock (1990) distinguishes three basic kinds of conglomerates operating in the global communication field: industrial, service, and communications.

The present study investigated the ownership of satellite channels preferred by the study sample, and found none belonged to the giant owners of media production and those controlling it in the United States and Europe, for example, Time–Warner, Bertelsmann, Walt Disney, Robert Murdoch's Corporation. This does not mean that such names have not invested in reaching the Saudi viewer. They have attempted to reach this viewer market through other internationally known channels and through materials such as programmes and news which Arab channels buy from the giant media companies and other international production companies (Ayish, 2000). However, what can be confirmed is that such companies do not participate in ownership of the channels most preferred by young Saudi adult viewers. This suggests that satellite channels in Saudi Arabia are vehicles for influences that are 'regional' (Arabic), and 'global' (India, Russia etc.) not just Western.

### **8.6.2 Global TV**

This study has revealed that young Saudi adults' exposure to satellite channels is very great. Moreover, since Western content in channels and programmes was clearly preferred by a large proportion of this study's sample, it can be deduced that satellite channels' transmissions penetrate national borders and barriers, impacting on the culture and language of many different societies. In view of this impact, it is important to mention here that Arab satellite channels have increased the provision of programmes targeted at Arab audiences. This, in turn, means a decrease in the number of programmes bought from the West. This increased provision continues to increase year after year. According to Kandil (1985), between 40 and 60 per cent of TV programmes aired on Arab television channels in the 1970s and early 1980s were imported from the United States, the UK, France and Germany. Data released by the Arab States' Broadcasting Union (cited in Ayish, 2002) indicate some television services have achieved a 100% local production level (Egyptian and Syrian services) whereas other channels have not exceeded a 30% level. Data on in-house programme production by Arab World Television Services in 2000 showed that Egypt had the highest level of self-sufficiency in the region stemming from its historical primacy in television and cinematic productions. Other television broadcasters had achieved high levels of local production, such as the Jordan Satellite Channel (80%), Abu Dhabi Satellite Channel (70%), Tunisia's 7 Satellite Channel (70%), Algerian Satellite TV (75%), Sudan Satellite TV (79%), and the Syrian Satellite Channel (100%) (ibid).

Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that what Arab television channels produce is viewed mostly by Arabs, and sometimes watched in specific countries or a single

country or region. Although this suggests the failure of the Arab media to reach non-Arab viewers, it is, however, a sign of resistance to outside media influences and attempts to try to fulfil local viewers' needs for entertainment, news, and sports, supported by local companies' advertisements. Further, these endeavours lessen dependence and reliance upon the Western media generally, specifically that which is American. To overcome the language barrier and the high cost of importing famous Western TV programmes, some local channels have begun to produce similar programmes in Arabic, with names differing from the original ones.

Private Arabian satellite channels have also started to produce Arabic versions of well-known Western programmes, such as *Who Wants to be a Millionaire*, and *Big Brother* on the MBC channel (MBC, Internet, 2003). The latter was stopped early in March 2004 due to protests from the public in Bahrain, where it was being produced, and Islamic spiritual leaders who opposed the mixing of unmarried males and females in the same setting (Al-Madina, 2004). Although these programmes are presented in Arabic, with Arabian presenters and participants, nevertheless, they are produced based on the same Western ideas and values. The existing literature does not refer to any study solely analysing satellite channels' content. Discussion of content is generally descriptive and non-detailed.

### **8.6.3 Communication Technology**

As mentioned earlier, communication technology, which has benefited many areas of the media, continues to develop at an astounding pace, making communication,

production, and media broadcasting methods easier by the day. Given the number and variety of sources of production of this technology, it is difficult for a specific country or a certain group of countries to monopolise this technology. However, the production and development of such technology in Arab countries lags behind that in other countries. Further, there is competition producing it in Asia, Europe, and America. Selling technology, and providing services related to it, benefit both the investor and the country in which s(he) resides. Development and improvement of the media through high quality technology is possible everywhere at reasonable costs. It is no longer the case that countries alone are able to establish TV channels. Nowadays, investors use the technology not only to establish their own channels but also to operate their own private satellites. The difference is clear if we remember the way in which television started in some third world countries. This was through help from the countries that had colonised them, since being relatively undeveloped, these third world countries were unable to bear alone the huge costs of providing and using the technologies involved. Thus, it was difficult for such countries to operate this new media technology completely independently, and they found themselves having to rely on assistance provided by their former colonised masters

#### **8.6.4 Media Expertise (Media human resources)**

Satellite channels have opened a wide door in the Arab world through which to develop media workers' abilities as a result of experience gained through work in more advanced media-wise foreign countries. This is how the two channels MBC and Aljazeera developed and became successful. Both were launched from London and

benefited from British experience and from Arabs who used to work in the British media, namely, the BBC. Later, these two channels provided training programmes for people from different Arab countries. Further, satellite channels facilitate access to external channels, some of which are internationally known, and thus Arabs have the opportunity to view hundreds of channels and benefit from what is new and good in the different television specialities. Finally, development has also resulted from ongoing competition between Arab channels, each one wishing to present the best, most up-to-date material.

Even though American media and film production remains ahead of its rivals, and it is difficult to keep up with it due to both experience and abilities, encouraging developments have been witnessed in Arab television production with the spread of satellite channels in numerous areas, such as Syrian, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti serials; news on channels like Aljazeera and Abu Dhabi; entertainment on Lebanese channels and the MBC channel; and competitions, sport, discussions, and live interviews on many Arabian satellite channels. Most of these programmes draw their production and expertise, actors, presenters, directors, cameramen, technicians, and reporters from Arab resources whose proficiencies have noticeably developed in the last ten years.

#### **8.6.5 TV News**

News is regarded as the most distinguished media. However, much debate focuses on the non-equivalence between the advanced countries and developing countries in terms of the international flow of information and communication. Numerous countries have



complained about the monopoly and control of international press agencies and news television networks in this area (Thompson, 1997). Also, there are concerns about the objectivity of the party presenting the news; the preciseness of what it presents as information; the underlying motives behind what it chooses to reveal about a matter or event; the manner of wording or comment; and service presenters' hidden agenda and underlying motives for revealing certain factual information. Further, despite the fact that the Arab region is an important source of news that influences daily lives throughout the world, for example, the unique political circumstances of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraqi War, OPEC decisions, etc. its own media are unable to present this vital news in as professional a manner as the Western media.

Nevertheless, the changes that Arab channels have contributed to the area of news dissemination need to be acknowledged. Arab viewers have acquired television channels presenting news from many sites, not just in the Arab region, but also from various areas in the world, especially important capitals and areas of current events. Some of these channels specialise only in news, for example, Aljazeera, Alarabiya, and ANN. Some are general channels but present bulletins and competing news programmes of a high quality of proficiency and specialisation, for example, the Abu Dhabi channel and MBC. With respect to numerous events and occasions, some of these channels, especially Aljazeera and Abu Dhabi, are not only providers of news to Arab viewers, but often the only source of news items that press agencies and international television channels take from them. The Arab language that such channels use, the spread of their offices and reporters, and the non-orthodox manner in which they work, have helped to establish a news service presented specifically for the

Arab viewer which looks forward to being on a par with famous Western channels, like CNN, the BBC, Fox, and others. Here one may also argue that satellite channels are changing situations that have prevailed for many years relating to the control of the news market, information spread, and secrecy in the spheres of politics and war.

#### **8.6.6 Pornography, satellite channels and young adults in Saudi Arabia**

Satellite channels have made access to pornographic materials easier than before. Students claimed that accessing pornographic materials does not need special equipment. It is not costly as well and sometimes may be easily decoded and viewed without paying fees. As outlined in the literature review, McQuail (1987) classified sexual arousal under the entertainment motive for common reasons for media use. Marghalani (1997) found that sexual curiosity/ identification was the last factor to motivate Saudis to use satellite TV. Although Marghalani's study is the first and only available study mentioning the viewing of pornographic material on satellite TV by Saudis, nevertheless, it does not provide details of audience numbers, viewing hours, or names of channels.

In the present study, results revealed the sample were watching and accessing this type of material and programmes on a regular basis. The proportion of students preferring erotic programmes was higher than the researcher had anticipated. The questionnaire findings indicated that 106 students (24.1%) agreed or strongly agreed that the reason they viewed satellite channels was to watch sexually explicit scenes, 75 students (17.1%) said they somewhat agreed this was the reason, in contrast to 163 students (23.5%) who disagreed or strongly disagreed this was the reason. From ten different

types of satellite channel programmes students were asked to rank in order of preferred viewing, 62 students (11.8%) in the sample ranked this type of programme as their first, second and third preferred choice. Almost a quarter of students (148: 33.8%) ranked it as their least preferred type of programme. Responses to another question designed for the 197 members of the sample who watched satellite channels late evening/early morning indicated that 77 students agreed or strongly agreed that the main reason for their late night viewing was to watch sexually explicit programmes, 45 students somewhat agreed while 65 students disagreed and strongly disagreed this was the reason.

Although pornography conflicts with the teachings of Islam and the Muslim way of life, nevertheless, some male students in the focus groups talked frankly about their use of satellite channels to watch pornography. In general, most students in the focus group said their viewing of sexually explicit programmes or scenes had increased greatly as a result of watching satellite channels. Those male students who regularly viewed sex channels said that many young adults viewed these channels but feelings of guilt stopped them from admitting to others they did so. Pornographic channels, such as Satisfaction, Ultra Blue and XXL, were mentioned by some students when they were asked about their favourite channels and programmes.

Discussion about pornography with young Saudi male adults elicited a varied range of responses among the study sample. They discussed the origins of the adult channels as well as their aims and sources of finance. The increasing portrayal of nudity and the viewing of pornographic material are not limited to a particular nation, it occurring in all nations. This type of material reaches Saudis via different means, but the

populations growing accessibility to satellite dishes has greatly contributed to its increased viewing in the country. In the early days of satellite channels in Saudi Arabia some people refused to view them because their content conflicted with Islamic values. Nudity and sexually explicit programmes are not acceptable according to Islamic teachings. The influence of pornography accessed via satellite channels targeting Saudi air space on Saudi cultural and family life has not yet been researched. The researcher will refer again to this issue in the following chapter.

### **8.7 Summary**

As has become clear from the study sample, young Saudi adults are able to view hundreds of television channels without censorship. The most preferred channels they choose to view are Arab channels, whose programmes depend on entertainment that is presented in a Western manner, at the expense of the prevailing local media and culture. The contents of satellite channels' programmes differ from those of local TV and sometimes conflict with official government policy, religious values, or local cultural values. The study data suggests satellite television poses a challenge to the content of Saudi TV, and to the regime of religious and political control, but this can be dealt with by timely reform within Saudi Arabia by improving the local state media in many ways such as increasing the number of TV and radio stations, launching and expanding more media training programmes and allowing more Saudi private media to work from inside the country.

The data shows that the cultural imperialist thesis is only partly applicable and the global perspective is a more relevant approach to understand the complex relationship between Saudi young adults and their use of satellite television. The study findings pointed to the significant presence of Western influences on the satellite and youth environments. Saudi young adults are more interested in Saudi sport, Saudi and Arab songs, and Arab affairs and watch Arab channels more than Western channels. Here, it is clear that the global and the local (glocalisation) come together. Western styles and format are made accessible to Saudi young adults through the Arabic language and the popular Arabian channels, such as MBC, LBC, Future and ART.

Other issues, for example, the extended ownership of satellite channels, improved news presentation on them, increased use of communication technology and an increase in the number of experienced workers employed on Arab satellite channels are additional factors which, the researcher argues, will enhance the media situation in the Arab world.

Regarding the use of local and foreign types of media, it is important to note that the extent of the study sample's exposure to satellite channels was greater than their exposure to local Saudi television. Further, the study sample preferred a radio station broadcasting from outside Saudi Arabia to Saudi broadcasting stations. In addition, students read more magazines issued outside the Kingdom than Saudi magazines. While the viewing of satellite channels did not negatively affect Saudi young adults' reading of newspapers and magazines, listening to the radio, and use of the Internet, the majority of the study sample thought watching satellite channels had reduced the time

they spent watching local terrestrial TV. It also impacted on some of their everyday activities.

Viewing satellite channels had some influence on the study sample's religious practice, but not on their underlying religious belief. They claimed it distracted them from studying while at home. They thought satellite channels had helped spread both Arabian and Western music and songs in Saudi Arabia and made them popular. Imitation of Western fashions was increasing among Saudi young adults in several ways the study sample revealed, but they did not think this was due only to satellite channels. The aforementioned findings lead the researcher to suggest those responsible for the media in Saudi Arabia must improve media content and quality in order to provide viable alternatives to outside media sources. These suggestions and recommendations will be presented in more detail in the following and final chapter concluding this study.

**CHAPTER NINE**

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

## **9.1 Introduction**

The main purpose of this research has been to study the relationship between young adults and satellite channels in Saudi Arabia and to analyse the implications of this relationship for the culture of Saudi Arabia. The study placed the research within the context of current scholarship on satellite channels, audiences, and debates about media globalisation and cultural imperialism.

Very few studies have presented descriptive information about satellite channels in Saudi Arabia, or their usage. Those that have done so have adopted the uses and gratifications approach. However, none has conducted an in-depth investigation providing a descriptive and analytical profile of young adults' usage of these channels and its influence on local culture in the context of debates about cultural imperialism and media globalisation. A significant aim of this study was to serve as an exploratory base for future studies of the media in Saudi Arabia in general and satellite channels in particular, and of media audience research.

At the end of this work, the researcher believes it is not possible to understand what is happening nowadays in Saudi Arabia in terms of media and cultural changes without considering the global perspective in terms of both the global media and cultural globalisation. The usage of satellite channels by Saudi young adults is part of a global phenomenon. Globalisation impacts differently at different points and places throughout the world. As lived it is a far more complicated experience than the theorists would indicate. Because people take on board, respond to, and integrate its various impacts on their daily lives in many different ways, the theories of globalisation and



media imperialism are somewhat inadequate. My own research findings demonstrate the realities are far more complex than the theorists would suggest.

This chapter will draw together and summarise the study's main themes and present overall conclusions drawn from the research findings. It will also include suggestions for future research and propose recommendations to those responsible for the media in Saudi Arabia.

## **9.2 Summary**

This study has undertaken a review of the literature on the media in Saudi Arabia, on satellite channels in particular, and provided detailed information about Saudi Arabia's historical and cultural milieu. It has illustrated the Kingdom's uniqueness due to the influence of Islam, which permeates every aspect of its citizens' lives. An examination of the role of the media within this cultural and religious milieu, and governmental control over its operations, which was explained in detail, indicated that the presence of new technologies, for example, satellite communication, is loosening the government's control over the nation's viewing habits.

In the 1990s it became possible for large numbers in Saudi Arabia to own satellite technology and to watch hundreds of different satellite channels, especially after the emergence of high-powered satellites. During the field study for the research in Saudi Arabia, the researcher investigated available satellite channels in the Kingdom and found more than 300 channels (most free-to-air), as listed in chapter five, section four.

It is clear that direct satellite broadcasting is not only a new type of media but also a new facet of mediated globalisation which Appadurai (1990) called a mediascape. He points to the capacity to produce and disseminate at speed both information and images throughout the world via newspapers, television, films or the Internet. A mediascape refers not only to the technology as hardware, but also to the interests and motives of the global media barons who own and control the global means of production and transmission (ibid).

The study's theoretical framework explored debates about globalisation of the media and the attendant theory of cultural imperialism. It reviewed the development of the new technology that has enabled communication to become dissociated from physical transportation through to the introduction of direct broadcasting by satellite leading to advancements in media globalisation. In the age of satellite channels, television has become an important vehicle for the global spread of different cultures. Several scholars (Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch 1974, 1985; McQuail, 1987; Mohammadi, 1997; Thompson, 1997 and Herman & McChesney 1999) have pointed to the need to conduct more studies on media use and its cultural impact.

The researcher adopted aspects of the uses and gratifications approach which focuses on the audience as the primary element in understanding the mass communication process. This approach also focuses on how people utilise media content, therefore, the researcher sought to determine the ways in which satellite channels were used by young adults in Saudi Arabia. He employed two key primary data collecting techniques, a quantitative survey of young adults and a series of in-depth focus groups, to obtain information about young adults' uses of the media in general, and satellite TV in

particular. This combination of methods was completely new in Saudi media research. This was the first media study to use the focus group method and the first to combine it with the survey method.

Every effort has been made to integrate these two methods to speak as one voice. Both the questionnaire survey and focus group questions were tested in order to determine how effectively they answered the main research questions. They were piloted between mid December 2000 and mid February 2001 at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. After amendments and modifications, the main fieldwork was undertaken from March 2001 to July 2001. The result was a substantial data set derived from 438 completed questionnaires and eight focus group sessions involving 51 individuals. A literature review, plus the analysis of the data collected by questionnaire and focus group methods have provided an original contribution to knowledge in the area of young adults' use of satellite channels, particularly in Saudi Arabia.

However, studying the media and culture in Saudi Arabia without a biased view or attitude is not easy for a Saudi Moslem researcher committed to the retention of Saudi values working in a Western university. Any researcher's underlying moral concepts and values will inevitably influence to some extent the way in which he presents his work and comments on his findings. Some of the researcher's views and opinions in this study were unavoidably influenced by his Islamic background. A Western researcher conducting a study on Western media and culture within a Western community will likely have a different view of media globalisation and cultural imperialism than a Saudi researcher examining the Saudi context. The researcher of this study could not but be apprehensive about the negative impact of cultural globalisation

on his community's national and local culture. Nevertheless, he attempted at all times to be objective and impartial in his views and assessments of the present situation. The study sample comprised Saudi young adults living in a cultural, social and media milieu very different from the one the researcher experienced as a young adult. These changes were acknowledged and taken into account when interviewing study participants and commenting on the existing situation. To examine and provide a balanced, unbiased account of the study context was challenging but the researcher's patient and persistent efforts resulted in an extension of his knowledge and experience in the research field.

### **9.3 Main Findings**

In this research, the author: **a)** analysed the existing literature on media, culture and satellite usage in Saudi Arabia, **b)** ascertained the ways in which the media in general, and satellite channels in particular were used by young adults in Saudi Arabia, and **c)** analysed the implications of satellite usage by young adults for culture in Saudi Arabia. The main findings were as follows:

#### **a) The media, culture and general satellite usage in Saudi Arabia**

Satellite technology has spread transnational television by broadcasting TV signals directly to homes. There are no longer boundaries restraining people from receiving channels and programmes broadcast from different places in the world. This research

was proposed to analyse this phenomenon from several perspectives offered by the theories of media and cultural imperialism, and globalisation of the media and culture.

Although young Saudi adults watched satellite channels quite extensively, their most preferred channels were Arabian channels, not Western channels, for example, the BBC, CNN, or MTV, but generally Arabic speaking channels. It might be assumed that satellite channels would be watched by young Saudi adults because of their fascination with cultures strange and different to that in Saudi Arabia, but a major study finding was that satellite technology in Saudi Arabia is used mainly among young adults to watch different forms of Arab culture. If young people are watching Arabian satellite channels most of the time then the impact of watching Western channels will be significantly reduced. Thus, the evidence presented in this thesis shows that the channels preferred by Saudi young adults do not support the argument that satellite technology is an unmediated vehicle for the promotion of cultural imperialism. However, another study finding revealed that the kinds of programmes young adults watched were often modelled on Western values and forms. Therefore, looking beyond the types of preferred channels to the preferred content of these channels would seem to support what Appadurai (1990) called 'mediated globalisation'.

The study findings indicated the global is heavily mediated through Arab versions of the global or Western culture. Most of the study sample liked the Arab channels because they could understand the language, and they are not censored in the way that Saudi terrestrial TV is. They also thought satellite channels influenced young adults' dress and hairstyle and had some influence on their religious practice, but not on their underlying belief in the value of Islamic principles. They referred to a Westernisation

of Arab culture presented through Arabic satellite channels. In my view, this is an example of how satellite TV influence can be viewed as mediated globalisation rather than media imperialism. The data revealed satellite TV had alerted young people to a range of styles and content not catered for by Saudi TV, but much of it Arab in origin. Secondly, it was clear that the most popular channels were owned by Arab business people or governments. The data, therefore, supported those theorists who suggest that globalisation is not a simple one way process. Moreover, the global will not retain its appeal unless it becomes local, that is, unless it is transformed through the local culture by way of language and style to become glocal. Thus, the 'glocal' is very complex. It cannot be expressed by a neat diagram because it is dynamic, constantly changing, and can mean many different things to different people.

Examining the theory, Robertson's (1992, 1995) model is schematic, presenting a division between the local, global, and glocal. He regards the 'glocal' as the result of the global impacting on the local, and thus a hybrid between the local and the global. Appadurai's (1990) model is far more complex. It explains globalisation as if it were a group of molecules moving around in a dynamic mix of different things, media, technology, finance, etc. The mix is constantly being made and is shifting. Although Appadurai's model has been criticised (Waters, 1995) for being too amorphous, yet it seems closest to the reality. Because we don't know where things are heading, we don't really know what the glocal is. It varies, shifts and moves in different directions. Glocalisation is a snapshot of a particular place at a particular time, where the global and the local conflate in complex ways.

To examine the cultural imperialism concept further and possible processes of media imperialism, the researcher investigated the ownership of satellite channels, the news presented on them, the use of communication technology, and the increase in the number of experienced workers employed by Arab satellite channels. He found none of the satellite channels preferred by the study sample belonged to the giant owners of media production and those controlling it in the West. The leading private Arab satellite channels were founded by Arabian businessmen, and some channels were established in Western countries, such as MBC, ART and ANN, due to more restrictive local media policies in some Arab countries than in the West, and the removal of barriers to private investment by the foreign media in some European countries (Saker, 2000). Among the most preferred channels were the two private Lebanese channels, LBC and Future, whose operations are based inside Lebanon. Another preferred channel was the Qatari channel, Al-Jazeera, sustained by Qatari officials and broadcasting its programmes from inside the Gulf state of Qatar. The other preferred Arabian satellite channels were those controlled by Arab governments.

Satellite channels' technology enables media organisations to operate on a global scale, thus, culture no longer remains restricted to a specific time or place, and it is difficult for a specific country or a certain group of countries to monopolise this technology. Nowadays, investors from developing countries use this technology not only to establish their own channels but also to operate their own private satellites as was mentioned previously in chapter 4.

Regarding TV programmes, Arab satellite channels have increased the provision of programmes targeted at Arab audiences year after year (see chapter 8, section 4.2), which may be a positive sign of resistance to outside media influence and a movement away from importing programmes towards producing them. The ongoing competition between Arab channels to present the best material as well as the continuing growth of new satellite channels have developed the quality of production and workers' abilities as discussed in chapter 8, section 4.4. Concerning news coverage, some Arab channels have significantly contributed to the area of news dissemination, for example, Aljazeera, Al-Arabia and Abu Dhabi, have become sources of important news item for press agencies and international television channels.

Moving to the global culture themes discussed in this study, there is no doubt that satellite television has forced cultural interaction and exchange between viewers and outside nations. People nowadays are subject to several types of culture and the Western style is the most powerful. As regards the Saudi Arabia situation, this movement of culture it could be argued is unidirectional, from the global to the local.

The medium under consideration, satellite channels, is still not professionally provided by the Saudi community; for the most part the local community are media receivers rather than producers, or partial producers. Local production is far too inadequate to meet all the needs of Saudi viewers or to attract outside viewers, thus the study sample preferred to watch satellite channels and programmes more than the local TV. Although they preferred to watch Arab channels, such as MBC, LBC, Future, ART etc., as table 6.11.11 in chapter six shows, most of these channels' programmes are heavily mediated by the local conditions. Further, the origins of the available free-to-air satellite channels



in Saudi Arabia, as tables 5.5 - 5.9 in chapter five pointed out, reflect a variety of sources. They are from different parts of the world, thus, Saudis are inside the global media and culture vehicle and the issue, therefore, is: to what extent does the global influence the local Saudi culture?

Turning to Robertson's (1992, 1995) model of the global local and the local global, and the notion of 'glocalisation', the claim is that exportation of local culture via the media from a developing country like Saudi Arabia is very weak compared to the Western culture that Saudis receive through satellite channels. It is a mighty one-way exchange of culture, the Western 'global' to the Saudi local. Indeed, the qualitative and quantitative results of the study revealed the sample's exposure to satellite channels was greater than their exposure to local Saudi television and the most preferred programmes they chose to view were programmes dependent on entertainment mostly presented in a Western style as mentioned earlier.

But what is the outcome of this culture movement? In general it is unclear, as Robertson (1995) indicated: 'global culture is the product of a continuous interplay between its universalistic aspects and its particularistic reproduction, but the outcome is always uncertain'. There is a clear mixing of global and local culture on the satellite channels viewed by Saudi young adults, but the Saudi community seems able to adapt to this situation, live with globalisation and yet retain its basic moral and religious values and behavioural codes. The global, which often presents a glocal face, will inevitably influence the local, but this does not necessarily mean that Saudi local culture will disappear. The existing state of affairs is far more complex than some media imperialist theorists' arguments allow for, since they maintain that when the

global arrives the local will disappear. Saudis have a solid cultural background that enables them to step into the global while still remaining in the local. Wheeler (2000) comments that the growth and spread of new media such as satellite television and Internet is often seen as part of the globalisation of culture, but in fact local cultural traditions are often adapted to the new media. She suggests that despite the availability of numerous sources of information, Kuwait national identity remains strong and Kuwaitis adapted the new media to the expression of their own cultural traditions and vice versa.

Although the study sample were, to a large extent, satellite channels viewers, some nevertheless believed these channels were negatively impacting on their local culture. According to Appadurai's (1990) model, culture is more diverse than we sometimes realise since people have the capacity to live within and alongside many different cultures in our postmodern world. He described globalisation going on in a number of different ways as a mediascape, technoscape, ethnoscape, ideoscape and financescape to illustrate how rapid, complex, and contradictory globalisation is. His flow model shows the different fluids or elements mixing together. He referred to the reception of global television in Islamic countries and the banning of the Red Hot Dutch pornography channel in the UK as examples of the disjuncture between ideoscapes and mediascapes when there is a conflict between television and what is deemed acceptable or not acceptable locally or nationally (ibid).

There is some influence on Saudi local culture from the way in which satellite TV globalises cultural form (i.e. programme type) and cultural style (music and fashion) but local factors, for example, religion, language, cultural affiliation, regional cultures,

dilute or modify this influence. Saudi society is not being Westernised on the inside even if it may appear increasingly Western on the outside. Globalisation is not having the extensive impact on people's subjectivities as first thought. Mediated globalisation can be lived with and does not necessarily erode local cultures.

What students said and what appears to be the result of watching satellite channels would seem to be a threat to the way of life traditionally led by Saudi young adults. However, this could also be viewed as part of normal cultural change which allows people to assimilate a number of cultures simultaneously. The content of satellite channels will inevitably influence those young adults who watch them to differing extents and this influence is difficult to prevent because we live in a global age. But outward signs of a tendency to adopt Western styles and patterns of behaviour do not necessarily mean the wholesale adoption of the Western way of life or its underlying social and moral values.

One issue which is problematic from the Islamic point of view is the ready access to pornographic materials on satellite channels. The study results revealed that almost a quarter (24.1%) of young Saudi adults were watching and accessing this type of material. Marghalani (1997), in the first and only previous study referring to the viewing of pornographic material on satellite TV by Saudis, found that sexual curiosity/identification was the last factor to motivate Saudis to use satellite TV. However, he did not provide details of audience numbers, viewing hours, or names of channels. Pornography conflicts with the teachings of Islam and the Muslim way of life as well as the moral values of citizens in general in other nations or in any civilised society. The global spread of the explicit description or exhibition of sexual activity and the viewing

of pornographic material is not limited to a particular nation nor to a single type of media, such as satellite channels. Pornography is a global issue. Its spread is not limited by national boundaries; it reached Saudis via smuggled magazines and videotapes long before the age of satellite dishes, although it is now far more easily accessible and available than at any time due to the proliferation of satellite channels. This is the argument raised by most people who are against the use of satellite channels in Saudi Arabia.

The pornography phenomenon raises many concerns and questions in the Kingdom, such as what is the actual number of both genders watching pornographic material on satellite channels? What is the impact of viewing this kind of material on the Saudi way of life? Does it contribute to broken families? To what extent does it influence changes in the relationship between non married males and females? Does it promote homosexuality? The researcher suggests studies to investigate the influence of pornography accessed on satellite channels on Saudi culture and family life, if only because of the many questions that remain unanswered.

Gender and gender differentiation in Saudi Arabia is another theme that requires further exploration in the area of media and cultural studies. While the researcher indirectly collected valuable quantitative data from female students, he was not able to personally conduct focus groups with females to gain qualitative data for a better understanding of the population under investigation, due to the Saudi cultural milieu that requires the separation of unrelated males and females in one setting, as explained in chapter three sections 3 and 6. A detailed comparison of male and female study results was not always possible or lacked sufficient depth. Where possible using the SPSS programme,

the researcher examined some quantitative queries by crosstabulating gender for selected variables to ascertain if there were significant differences between results. In general, he found no significant differences between the viewing habits of male and female students or their attitudes towards the use of satellite channels.

**b) Uses of the media in general and satellite channels in particular by young adults in Saudi Arabia**

A questionnaire survey and focus group were conducted to analyse the ways in which the media were used by Saudi young adults. Research findings indicated that:

- A high proportion of young Saudi adults read newspapers, and preferred local Saudi newspapers, especially those published in the city of Jeddah, the study location. *Okaz* was the most widely read newspaper by the study sample. They preferred magazines published outside Saudi Arabia, the top favourite was *Sayedaty*. The proportion of females reading magazines was slightly higher than that of males. The majority of the study sample did not think watching satellite channels negatively affected their reading of newspapers and magazines, both in terms of the time allocated for reading and the types of print media they read. Although it would have been useful to compare the results of the present study with those of previous studies, the sole previous print media readership research study in Saudi Arabia by Al-Muither (2001) had examined the use of Saudi print media only. He found that *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* was the most widely read Saudi daily newspaper and *Al-Yamamah* the most widely read

magazine. Both Al-Muither's (2001) findings and the present study's findings indicated that young Saudis are more likely to read newspapers and magazines published in their regions.

- The study sample listened frequently to radio, especially males when driving cars. The MBC FM radio station, whose residency is outside Saudi Arabia, had the highest proportion of listeners. The sample's viewing of satellite channels slightly reduced the time they spent listening to the radio, as was shown in the satellite impact section in chapter 6. No previous media has study examined the role or use of the radio among Saudi society, despite its early importance as the only media form reach large parts of the extensive kingdom of Saudi Arabia for decades before the arrival of terrestrial TV transmission then the appearance of satellite channels.
- There was low Internet usage among the sample. The influence of the sample's viewing of satellite channels on Internet usage was also very low because the Internet was new in Saudi Arabia at the time of the field study and data collection for this work.
- Some of the sample did not watch Saudi television at all since questionnaire results indicated that just over three quarters (79.2 %) of the sample watched Saudi television. A large number of students also agreed that viewing satellite channels reduced the time they spent watching Saudi TV, and reduced the time they spent listening to the radio. Most young adults, who watched Saudi television, watched it only when it broadcast live local football matches that no

other channel was broadcasting at the same time. This finding shows the importance of the local in people's life in a globalising environment.

- While the percentage of the sample who watched satellite channels was almost similar to those who watched terrestrial TV (79%), however, the average hours they spent watching satellite channels was more than the average hours they spent watching terrestrial (local) TV (see tables 6.11.4 and 6.18.2 in chapter 6). This result supported the findings of previous studies conducted before and after the appearance of satellite channels, which revealed local television was less preferred when other external channels were available. The Egyptian terrestrial TV channels were most preferred by Saudis who were able to view them in the 1980s (Abuzinada, 1988). In the early 1990s, satellite channels' receiving equipment in Saudi Arabia was very expensive, nevertheless, from the very beginning of this service, Bait Al-Mal (1992) reported that the majority (73%) of Saudi participants in his study watched satellite channels everyday. Further, Marghalani *et al.* stated that (63.8%) of a large-sample survey in Saudi Arabia 'owned and/or had regular access to a satellite dish and viewers spent more hours watching satellite channels than the two local government channels' (1988: 304).
- Focus group results indicated that Saudi television was failing to meet the needs of young Saudi adults especially in the case of programmes focusing on sports, music, songs, news, films and serials, the sample's most preferred programmes. Abuzinada (1988) reported that 59% of his study sample were dissatisfied with Saudi television. Twelve years later, Al-Garni (2000) stated that Saudi

television's image was at an all time low and the Saudi broadcasting authority had to recognise and admit this image problem.

- The sample's primary reasons for viewing satellite channels were: 1- *To keep up with current issues and events*, 2- *To know what is going on internationally*, and 3- *To find out how people outside Saudi Arabia live*. The least common reason was: *To watch sexually explicit scenes*. Previous studies ( Najai, 1982; Al-Attibi, 1986; Abuzinada, 1988; Al-Heezan 1993; Merdad 1993; Al-Oofy 1990) found Saudi people mostly used the media in general, and TV in particular, for information, interculturalism, entertainment and diversion. Bait Al-Mal (1992) and Marghalani (1997) found the availability and variety of quality programmes, information, and entertainment were the gratifications most sought from watching satellite TV by Saudis. The present study findings found the study sample viewed satellite channels mostly to obtain information, learn about other cultures, and enjoy the availability and variety of quality programmes. Thus, this study tends to generally confirm the findings of previous studies (see chapter 8, section 3, for more details).
- The MBC channel was the top favourite channel among Saudi young adults, followed by the Lebanese LBC and Future channels, the Qatari Aljazeera channel, and several sports channels. MBC was also the most preferred channel in previous satellite TV studies in Saudi Arabia (Bait Al-Mal, 1992; Al-Makaty, 1995; and Marghalani,1997). All these channels are Arab channels, however, the three most popular watched by the study sample were channels mostly



providing entertainment programmes whose content includes a huge number of programmes, songs, and music of Western origin and style.

**c) Implications of satellite usage by young adults for culture in Saudi Arabia**

- The majority of the sample thought there might be some influence on their religious practice, but not on their religious belief, as a result of watching satellite channels, such as missing prayers in the mosque and celebrating Western religious festivities rather than Islamic ones. Many Saudis, among them students in this study sample, feel the contents of most satellite channels' programmes conflict with Islamic values and beliefs. Marghalani (1997) stated that religious and cultural factors were the most compelling reasons for avoiding satellite channels in Saudi Arabia. Al-Garni (2000) reported that the increase in imported foreign programmes and DBS popularity was generating concern among culturists and Islamists who object to the content which, they argue, conflicts with the basic principles of the Islamic faith.
- A large number of students thought satellite channels had a negative effect on local music and song, because they helped spread both Arabian and Western music and songs throughout Saudi Arabia, making them popular with a large proportion of youth at the expense of traditional Saudi songs (see chapter 7, sections 4.5 and 4.7.2). They like to watch Saudi songs more than other Arabic and Western songs, and criticised local terrestrial TV for not presenting them frequently and as attractively as satellite channels. The latter present Saudi

songs with dance sequences and video clips not allowed on the local terrestrial TV.

- Most students expressed a similar opinion that imitation of Western fashions was increasing among Saudi youth in several ways, such as style of dress and haircut. They also thought satellite channels were responsible for increased Westernisation. According to the cultural plurality model these changes may be viewed as signs of emerging new cultural hybrids and homogenisation. This supports, to some extent, the liberal argument in the media and cultural debate that cultural changes always happen, culture never stays still, and changes must be embraced because it is impossible to stop them. Although cultural changes are clearly taking place in the Kingdom, there should be a limit as to how far the Western media is allowed to change Saudis' Islamic way of life. As a Moslem researcher, I personally disagree with the argument that we in Saudi Arabia must embrace global culture changes because not every global cultural change is inevitable and beneficial. The foreign media and their products undoubtedly have a place in Saudi society and members of the Saudi community will use them but hopefully in their own way, thus retaining their unique identity as Moslem people.
- While (31.3%) of the sample liked to view Saudi TV with other members of their family, only (14.4%) liked to view satellite channels with family members. Students participating in the focus groups referred to different reasons for this, which mostly centred on content differentiation between the local 'terrestrial' TV and satellite channels. Some satellite channel programmes were considered

unsuitable for some family members (particularly children and females). Another result revealed that a considerable number of students preferred to watch satellite channels between 12.00 pm and 06.00 am. Satellite channel usage had therefore influenced cultural behaviour to some extent.

- As mentioned earlier, the present and previous research findings indicated that the image of the Saudi media working within the country's border is at an all time low. The extent of the current study sample's exposure to satellite channels was greater than their exposure to local Saudi television. Further, the study sample preferred a radio station broadcasting from outside Saudi Arabia to ones broadcasting within the kingdom. In addition, students read more magazines issued outside the Kingdom than Saudi magazines. These findings together with observations of the media and cultural situation in the Kingdom lead the researcher to propose the following suggestions to those responsible for the media in Saudi Arabia in order to improve media content and quality and thereby provide viable alternatives to outside media sources.

#### **9.4 Suggestions and Recommendations**

In the light of the rapid changes in, and intensification of, global mass media communications and international economic and political relations which link distant localities in such a way that local incidents are shaped by events occurring many miles away, this study urges Saudi policy makers to modify and amend Saudi media policy so that the contents of the internal media become more attractive to Saudi audiences.

Licensing policies regulating media ownership should be changed to include new owners of different types of media, and media codes of practice should be simplified.

The burden of direct censorship of state owned media outlets should be removed or, at least, eased. Policy makers are also advised to give independent and private media enterprises more autonomy over new productions in the Saudi local market. Businessmen should also be encouraged to establish new newspapers, magazines, and radio and television stations. This particular recommendation is related to one of the major findings of this research that, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Saudi government established many regional TV stations in regions such as Jeddah, Qassim, Abha and Damman, to cover regional events and provide local programmes (in a BBC regional service style).

The initial objective of media planners at the time was to link local communities through local media coverage separately serving local communities. All necessary financial and technical facilities were provided and the regional stations came into being for a short period of time. The initial objective was not fully implemented because of a change in policy. Local channels were not allowed to transmit because the government later decided that two channels, one in Arabic and one in English, would be sufficient to cover the whole Kingdom. In practice, the regional TV stations were used as transmitters of the two main Channels' programmes rather than allowed to operate as independent broadcasters. Their staff had very little to do. Logically, local stations should be allowed to transmit their own local TV channels.

Further, Saudi television should pay close attention to its provision of youth programmes. Policy makers are recommended to set up more national TV channels specialising in sport, education, and local and international news, and improve the quality of these types of programmes. Finally, in order to achieve successful media structure and performance, policy makers need to conduct systematic and regular public opinion surveys and research on Saudi audiences' attitudes towards the broadcasting service in the country. This should be a priority since it will enable planners to measure the overall impact of media policy and services in the kingdom.

One distinct feature of the present situation is the emergence of private Saudi external media which play increasingly influential and competitive roles within and outside Saudi borders. The local Saudi media, which is directly run or controlled by the Saudi authorities, is more localised and less influential. It is recommended to carry out a comparative analysis of these two sections of the Saudi media, focusing on the effects of ownership on media content and orientation. This should be followed with an in-depth analysis of the effects of the two media sections on Saudi audiences.

The present study identified the most popular satellite channels in Saudi Arabia, however, the description of these channels and their contents were presented based on hearsay rather than systematic analysis. Therefore, the researcher recommends further studies analysing the content of the most popular satellite channels mentioned in this study.

There has been no previous research on the effects of satellite channels on culture in Saudi Arabia. The present study has provided a useful foundation for future work,

possibly longitudinal studies, on attitudes to the relationship between TV, satellite and culture in Saudi society. In addition, research might wish to probe what people exactly mean when they say something is 'Westernised'. Is a satellite dish 'westernised' and therefore 'bad'? Why do some people describe some Arab channels, such as LBC and MBC, as 'Westernised', and what does this mean to a Saudi viewer?

This is the first media and culture study to employ the focus group technique in Saudi Arabia, however, the researcher, due to the prevailing Saudi cultural milieu was unable to conduct focus groups with females. This study has provided data which could be developed further by a female researcher carrying out a focus group study on the same subject.

### **A Personal Note**

This research project has been a very interesting, constructive and beneficial work in many aspects to me personally and to my success as an academic researcher at the University of Glamorgan. This work has offered me not only the opportunity to learn more about my home country's culture, but also the wonderful chance to know another nations' cultures at first hand, i.e. that of the country where I have studied, the United Kingdom.

To live outside my country for several years, to acclimatise myself with to a new culture, values and way of live and, at the same time, study, watch and evaluate my local culture from outside Saudi Arabia has been a very valuable experience. It has enhanced by conducting study examining the use of a new influential type of media, and how the local and global culture impact on the other. At the same time, the experience has deeply enriched and extended my academic knowledge and personal life experiences. For instance, my English language and academic writing style have improved. I have read a lot of books, journals, papers and dissertations, especially those focusing on media and culture studies. I have met many experts and academics in the field. In the UK, I have met British and foreign people and made new friendships, and attended conferences, seminars and workshops. I have benefited from the use of modern and excellent university research facilities and, again, the valuable consequences of the entire above are uncountable.

I believe that the final design of the project undertaken is strong and the research is a useful contribution to the field of study. This, of course, would not have been achieved without the help and guidance of my supervisors who

provided me with continuous guidance and encouragement throughout the course of the research. I have completed this work in a way that I confidently feel balances the PhD research requirements, academic ethical considerations, and the need to remain objective and impartial when studying the media and culture in Saudi Arabia and to present the research without a biased view or attitudes. If I were to do this work again I would do it similarly, using the same research methods and design, and review any new literature in the field.

**Hussain Al-Gahtani**

P.O Box 35194  
Jeddah, 21488  
Saudi Arabia

Email: [algahtanihs@hotmail.com](mailto:algahtanihs@hotmail.com)

[hussainwales@yahoo.uk.com](mailto:hussainwales@yahoo.uk.com)



## **APPENDICES**

## **Questionnaire**

Dear Students,

I am a doctoral student. I am studying the role of satellite television in Saudi Arabia, in particular the ways in which young adults use and understand satellite television. These questions are designed to help me develop a picture of satellite usage amongst young adults and to give me some indication of the preferences expressed by viewers.

This study will also examine briefly the usage of other media such as newspapers, magazines, radio, the Internet and terrestrial television.

The researcher will only use your answers only for scientific purpose, therefore, you don't have to write your name but if you do, no names will be included in any reports. I will be more than happy to provide you later on with the results of my research if required.

Hussain Al-Gahtani

Group [        ]      Place [            ]      Date [            ]

Notes:

Appendix A, Questionnaire used in the pilot study

**1. Do you read newspapers?**

a) Yes [ ] If yes, go to (b) No [ ] If no please go to question 2

b) What type of newspapers do you read?

Domestic newspapers (in Arabic) [ ] Domestic (in English) [ ]

Foreign (Arabic) [ ] Foreign (Non Arabic) [ ]

c) How often you read newspapers?

Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ]

d) What are the names of newspapers you read most often in order of use?

1- 2- 3- 4- 5-

**2. Do you read magazines?**

a) Yes [ ] If yes, go to (b) No [ ] If no please go to question 3

b) What type of magazines you read?

Domestic (in Arabic) [ ] Domestic (in English) [ ]

Foreign (Arabic) [ ] Foreign (Non Arabic) [ ]

c) How often do you read magazines?

Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ]

d) What are the names of magazines you read most often in order of use?

1- 2- 3- 4- 5-

**3. Do you use the Internet?**

a) Yes [ ] If yes, go to (b) No [ ] If no please go to question 4

b) How often you use the internet?

Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ]

c) Do you use the internet for:

Domestic sites and searching [ ] Internationally [ ] Both [ ]

d) What are the five main websites you visit in order of use?

1-  
2-  
3-  
4-  
5-

Appendix A, Questionnaire used in the pilot study

**4. Do you listen to the Radio?**

a) Yes [ ] If yes, go to (b) No [ ] If no please go to question 5

b) How often you listen to the Radio:

Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ]

c) What type of stations you listen to?

Domestic stations [ ] Non domestic stations [ ] Both [ ]

d) What are the names of radio stations you listen to most often: in order of use?

1- 2- 3- 4- 5-

**5. How many television sets do have in your home?**

One [ ] Two [ ] Three [ ] More than three [ ] None [ ]

**6. On average, how many hours a day do you spend watching television?**

Less than one hour [ ] 1-2 hours [ ] 2-3 hours [ ]

3-4 hours [ ] 4-5 hours [ ] More than 5 hours [ ]

**7. Please rank in order channels you watch often without using satellite.**

Start with the channel you prefer to watch most.

1]

2]

3]

4]

5]

**8. Do you usually watch terrestrial television at:**

Home [ ] Student's accommodation [ ]

Friend's home [ ] Other places (cafés for example)[ ]

**9. Does the place of viewing terrestrial television:**

a) Have no effect on what is watched [ ]

b) Have a limited effect on what is watched [ ]

c) Have a major effect on what is watched [ ]

**10. Do you usually watch terrestrial television:**

Appendix A, Questionnaire used in the pilot study

On your own [ ] With a friend [ ]

With friends [ ] With your family [ ]

If with your family, please tick one of the following types:

With parents [ ] With brothers [ ] With sisters [ ]

With brothers and sisters [ ] All [ ]

**11. Does the situation of viewing terrestrial television:**

a) Have no effect on what is watched [ ]

b) Have a limited effect on what is watched [ ]

c) Have a major effect on what is watched [ ]

**12. Please rank in order the following terrestrial television programme categories**

according to your preference. Start with '1' to indicate the type of programme you prefer to watch most and go down to '7' for the one you watch least of all.

Religious [ ] Sport [ ] Music [ ]

Instructional [ ] News and Politics [ ]

Arabic movies & drama [ ] Western movies & drama [ ]

**13. When do you prefer to watch television?** (You can give more than one answer)

a) Days: Saturday [ ] Sunday [ ] Monday [ ] Tuesday [ ]

Wednesday [ ] Thursday [ ] Friday [ ]

b) Times: 6 am – 12 [ ] 12 – 6 pm [ ]

6 pm – 12 [ ] 12 – 6 am [ ]

**14 How many satellite TV decoders/ receivers in your home?**

One [ ] Two [ ] Three [ ] More than 3 [ ] None [ ]

**15. Do you watch satellite channels? Yes [ ] No [ ]**

If yes, please answer question 16. If no please go to question 32

**16. How long have you been watching satellite channels?**

Less than one year [ ] 1-2 years [ ] 2-3 years [ ]

3-4 years [ ] 4-5 years [ ] More than 5 years [ ]

Appendix A, Questionnaire used in the pilot study

17. On average, how many hours a day do you spend watching satellite?

- Less than one hour [ ]      1-2 hours [ ]      2-3 hours [ ]  
3-4 hours [ ]      4-5 hours [ ]      More than 5 hours [ ]

18. Do you watch:      *Open-to-air channels* [ ]

*Scrambled (coded channels)* [ ]

*Both* [ ]

19. Your decoder/ receiver can receive large number of channels. Therefore:

- a) All these channels are available all the time on your TV [ ]  
b) Some of these channels are available and others have been deleted [ ]

20. Who pays for your satellite use of scrambled channels?

(You can give more than one answer)

- Your self [ ]      father [ ]      mother [ ]  
Others [ ]      I can use it free [ ]      I don't use it [ ]

21. Does the cost of scrambled channels:

- a) Have no effect on your channel choice [ ]  
b) Have a limited effect on your channel choice [ ]  
c) Have a major effect on your channel choice [ ]

22. Do you watch satellite television at: (You can give more than one answer)

- Home [ ]      Student's accommodation [ ]  
Friend's home [ ]      Other places (cafés for example)[ ]

23. Does the place of viewing

- a) Have no effect on what is watched [ ]  
b) Have a limited effect on what is watched [ ]  
c) Have a major effect on what is watched [ ]

24. Do you watch satellite channels: (You can give more than one answer)

- On your own [ ]      With a friend [ ]      With friends [ ]      With your family[ ]

If with your family, please tick one of the following types:

Appendix A, Questionnaire used in the pilot study

With parents [ ]      With brothers [ ]      With sisters [ ]

With brothers and sisters [ ]      All [ ]

**25. Does the situation of viewing**

- a) Have no effect on what is watched [ ]
- b) Have a limited effect on what is watched [ ]
- c) Have a major effect on what is watched [ ]

**26. Please rank in order the ten satellite channels you watch most often.**

Start with '1' to indicate channel you watch most often:

- 1-
  - 2-
  - 3-
  - 4-
  - 5-
  - 6-
  - 7-
  - 8-
  - 9-
  - 10-
- Cancelled*

**27. Please rank the top ten satellite channels in your order of preference.**

Start with '1' to indicate channel you prefer to watch most, and go down to 10 for the one you prefer least of all:

- 1-
- 2-
- 3-
- 4-
- 5-
- 6-
- 7-
- 8-
- 9-
- 10-

**28. Please rank in order the following satellite programme categories according to your preference. Start with '1' to indicate the type of satellite programme you prefer to watch most and go down to '8 for the one you watch least of all.**

News and Politics [ ]      Religious [ ]      Sport [ ]  
Instructional [ ]      Music [ ]      Erotic [ ]  
Arabic movies & drama [ ]      Western movies & drama [ ]

**29. From which countries do the programmes you prefer to watch originate?**

**Please number in order of preference:**

Egypt [ ]      Lebanon [ ]      Syria [ ]      Saudi Arabia [ ]  
Arab Gulf States [ ]      Rest of Arab states [ ]      USA [ ]  
India [ ]      Rest of Asia [ ]      England [ ]      France [ ]

Appendix A, Questionnaire used in the pilot study

Rest of Europe[ ] Israel [ ] Latin American Countries[ ]

30. Do you watch MBC Channel? a) Yes [ ] No [ ]

If no, please go to question 16

If yes, please go to (b)

b) How often do you watch it?

Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ]

c) For how long have you watched it?

Less than one year [ ] 1-2 years [ ] 2-3 years [ ]  
3-4 years [ ] 4-5 years [ ] More than 5 years [ ]

d) How do you think MBC channel deals with the following?

Subjects	Poorly	Fairly	Well	Very well	Excellent
Saudi Music					
Western Music					
Saudi Fashions					
Western Fashions					
Saudi attitudes to religion					
Western attitudes to religion					
Saudi attitudes to money					
Western attitudes to money					
Portrayal of Saudi youth					
Portrayal of Western youth					
Saudi Politics					
Western Politics					

31. Why do you watch MBC channel? (You can give more than one answer)

- a) To find out how people outside Saudi Arabia live. [ ]
- b) To gain more knowledge about different cultures. [ ]
- c) To know what is going on internationally. [ ]
- d) To understand other cultures, values and habits. [ ]
- e) To see females and not just males. [ ]
- f) To watch more Western programmes. [ ]
- g) To watch more Saudi programmes. [ ]
- h) To see more Arabic programmes. [ ]



Appendix A, Questionnaire used in the pilot study

i) Because it is not controlled by religious people. [ ]

j) Because it is not controlled by government. [ ]

**32- When do you prefer to watch satellite TV? (You can give more than one answer)**

a) Days: Saturday [ ] Sunday [ ] Monday [ ] Tuesday [ ]  
Wednesday [ ] Thursday [ ] Friday [ ]

b) Times: 6 am – 12 [ ] 12 – 6 pm [ ]  
6 pm – 12 [ ] 12 – 6 am [ ]

33. Your age .....

34. Sex

Male [ ]

Female [ ]

Cancelled

35. Study subject .....

36. Number of your family .....

37. Career you wish to pursue .....

38. Your father job .....

If he doesn't work please tick here [ ]

39. Your mother job .....

If she doesn't work please tick here [ ]

40. Your nationality Saudi [ ] Other [ ]

If Other, are you : Arab [ ] which state? [ ]

Non Arab [ ] which state? [ ]

If Saudi, Which region you came from?

West [ ] East [ ] Central [ ] South [ ] North [ ]

41. Do you live:

Alone [ ]

With your family [ ]

With others [ ]

*Appendix A, Questionnaire used in the pilot study*

**42. Is your family's annual income:**

*Less than 3000 SR* [ ]      *3000-6000 SR* [ ]      *6001-9000 SR* [ ]  
*9001-12000 SR* [ ]      *More than 12000 SR* [ ]

**43. Have you travelled to:**

a) *Europe:*      *Yes* [ ]      *No* [ ]

If yes, which countries?

.....

b) *USA:*      *Yes* [ ]      *No* [ ]

*Cancelled*

**44. Satellite TV has been described as a new technology that has some advantages and disadvantages. Do you think that:**

*It has more advantages than disadvantages* [ ] *or*

*More disadvantages than advantages* [ ]

---

Dear respondent,

Thanks again for your help. As I mentioned above, this is an anonymous questionnaire, but it is **optional** if you could write your name and address. No names will be included in any reports.

Name: .....

Tel: .....

Email: .....

Address: .....

## **Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire**

--	--	--

### **Uses of Satellite Television among Young Adults in Saudi Arabia**

Dear Respondents,

I am a postgraduate student. I am studying the role of satellite television in Saudi Arabia, in particular the ways in which young adults use and understand satellite television. These questions are designed to help me develop a picture of satellite usage amongst young adults and to give me some indication of the preferences expressed by viewers.

This questionnaire has four groups of questions. The first group is about newspapers and magazines readership and uses of Internet and radio. The second group asks questions about terrestrial TV. The Third group of questions is focussing on the satellite television viewing while the last section will ask you some questions about social background and demographic status.

The researcher will use your answers only for scientific purpose; therefore, no single sort of identification is required.

Thank you for helping the researcher conduct this study.

#### **NOTE:**

- \* Please read all questions carefully.
- \* Put the appropriate mark in the right place when answering.
- \* Be free and honest about your opinion.

**Hussain Al-Gahtani**

**University of Glamorgan  
United Kingdom**

## Appendix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

### SECTION ONE

#### 1- Do you read newspapers?

- a)  Yes    If yes, go to (b)  
 No    If no, please go to question 2

#### b) How often you read newspapers?

1.  Daily                      2.  Weekly                      3.  Monthly

#### c) What are the names of newspapers you read most often in order of use?

- 1-                                      2-                                      3-

#### 2- Do you read magazines?

- a)  Yes    If yes, go to (b)  
 No    If no, please go to question 3

#### b) How often do you read magazines?

1.  Daily                      2.  Weekly                      3.  Monthly

#### c) What are the names of magazines you read most often in order of use?

- 1-                                      2-                                      3-

#### 3- Do you use the Internet?

- a)  Yes    If yes, go to (b)  
 No    If no, please go to question 4

#### b) How often you use the Internet?

1.  Daily                      2.  Weekly                      3.  Monthly

## Appendix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

c) How often do you visit these websites categories?

Type	Always	Sometimes	Never
1. Education			
2. News and events			
3. Sports			
4. Chat and People			
5. Games and Entertainment			
6. Erotic			
7. Shopping			
8. Computing			
9. Love and relationships			
10. Music			

**4- Do you listen to the Radio?**

- a)     Yes    If yes, go to **(b)**  
       No     If no, please go to section

**b) How often you listen to the Radio?**

1.  Daily        2.  Weekly        3.  Monthly

**c) What are the names of radio stations you listen to most often: in order of use?**

- 1-  
2-  
3-

End of section one

## Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

### SECTION TWO

#### 1- Do you watch terrestrial (Saudi) television?

Yes    If yes, please answer question number 2

No    If no, please go to section 3 in page 6

#### 2- How many television sets do you have in your home?

1.  One

2.  Two

3.  Three

4.  More than three

5.  None

#### 3- On average, how many hours a day do you spend watching Saudi TV?

TV Channel	Never watch it	Less than One hour	1-3 hours	3-5 hours	More than 5 hours
Channel One					
Channel Two					

#### 4- Where do you watch terrestrial television most?    *Please mark one option only*

1.  At home

2.  Student's accommodation

3.  Friend's home

4.  Other places (cafés for example)

#### 5- With whom do you like to watch terrestrial TV most?

*Please mark one option only*

1.  Alone

2.  With friends

3.  With family members of the same sex

4.  With all family members

5.  In different social setting

## Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

**6- Please ranks in order the following terrestrial TV programmes categories according to your preference. Start with 1 to indicate the type of programme you prefer to watch most and go down to 8 for the one you watch least of all.**

*If there is any program category you don't watch, please leave it without number.*

- Sport       News and Politics       Music       Instructional  
 Religious       Arabic movies & drama       Western movies & drama  
 Advertising

**7- When do you prefer to watch terrestrial TV most?**

1.  Weekdays      2.  Weekends      3.  Both

**8- What is the prime time period of most of your terrestrial TV viewing?**

*(Please select one option only)*

1.  From 6:00am – 12 noon  
2.  From 12 noon – 6:pm  
3.  From 6:00pm – 12pm  
4.  From 12: 00pm – 6:00am

End of section two

## Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

### SECTION THREE

#### 1- Do you watch satellite channels?

- Yes If yes, please answer question 2  
 No If no, please go to section 4 page 10

#### 2- How many satellite TV decoders/ receivers in your home?

1.  One                      2.  Two                      3.  Three  
4.  More than three                      5.  None

#### 3- How long have you been watching satellite channels?

1.  Less than one year                      2.  1-3years  
3.  3-5 years                      4.  More than 5 years

#### 4- On average, how many hours a day do you spend watching satellite TV?

1.  Less than one hour                      2.  1-3 hours  
3.  3-5 hours                      4.  more than 5 hours

#### 5- Do you watch:

1.  Open-to-air channels, or  
2.  Scrambled (coded channels),or  
3.  Both

#### 6- If you watch scrambled channels, who pays the cost?

1.  Yourself                      2.  Parents  
3.  Others                      4.  You can decode it free

#### 7- Where do you watch satellite television most?

*Please mark one option only*

1.  At home                      2.  Student's accommodation  
3.  Friend's home                      4.  Other places (cafés for example)



## Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

### 8- With whom do you like to watch satellite television most?

*Please mark one option only*

1. ( ) Alone
2. ( ) With friends
3. ( ) With family members of the same sex
4. ( ) With all family members
5. ( ) In different social setting

### 9- Please name and rank in order the five satellite channels you prefer and watch most.

*Start with 1 to the most watched and 5 to the least watched in your favourite list.*

- 1- -----
- 2- -----
- 3- -----
- 4- -----
- 5- -----

### 10- Please ranks in order the following satellite programme categories according to your preference.

**Start with 1 to indicate the type of satellite programme you prefer to watch most and go down to 10 for the one you watch least of all.**

*If there is any program category you don't watch, please leave it without number.*

- ( ) Sport            ( ) News and Politics            ( ) Music  
( ) Instructional            ( ) Religious            ( ) Arabic movies & drama  
( ) Western movies & drama            ( ) Advertising            ( ) Erotic  
( ) Fashion

### 11- From which country/countries do the programmes you prefer to watch originate? Please number in order of preference? Start with one to the most watched and 7 to the least watched.

*If there is any country's programm you don't watch, please leave it without number.*

- ( ) Saudi Arabia    ( ) Arab Gulf States    ( ) Rest of Arab countries  
( ) USA            ( ) Asia            ( ) Europe            ( ) Latin American Countries

## Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

**12- When do you prefer to watch satellite TV most?**

1. ( ) Weekdays                      2. ( ) Weekends                      3. ( ) Both

**13- What is the prime time period of most of your satellite TV viewing?**

*(Please select one option only)*

1. ( ) From 6:00am – 12 noon                      2. ( ) From 12 noon – 6:pm  
 3. ( ) From 6:00pm – 12pm                      4. ( ) From 12: 00pm – 6:00am

**14- If you watch satellite TV late in the evening (after midnight), why do you watch it late?**

*Please indicate by ticking the choices opposite to each statement.*

Statements	Strong Agree	Agree	Some-what Agree	Dis-agree	Strong Disagree
1. To kill time when I cant sleep					
2. To watch more news and politics programs					
3. To watch matches and other sport programs					
4. To watch more expected sexually appealing scenes and programs					
5. Because more Arabic movies are broadcast late					
6. Because more Western movies are broadcast late					
7. Other: <i>please specify:</i>					

## Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

### 15- How does watching satellite TV impact on other activities?

*Please indicate by ticking the choices opposite to each statement.*

Statements	Strong agree	Agree	Some- what agree	Dis- agree	Strong Dis- agree
1) Reduced time I spent watching Saudi TV					
2) Reduced time I spent listening to radio					
3) Lessened my interest in reading newspapers & magazines					
4) Distracted me from studying					
5) Distracted me from saying my daily prayers on time					
6) Encouraged me to stay at home for a long time					
7) Reduced the time I spend watching Arabian channels					
8) Reduced the time I spend watching Arabian programs					
9) Reduced the time I spend watching Western channels					
10) Reduced the time I spend watching Western program					
11) Stimulate me to travel to Arab countries					
12) Stimulate me to travel to Western countries					

## Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

### 16- What are the reasons for watching satellite TV.

*Please indicate your answer by ticking one of the choices opposite to each statement.*

Reasons	Strong agree	Agree	Some- what Agree	Dis- agree	Strong Dis- agree
1. To find out how people outside Saudi Arabia live					
2. To gain more knowledge about different cultures					
3. To know what is going on internationally					
4. To understand other cultures, values and habits					
5. To find a wide variety of programs					
6. To watch uncensored programs					
7. To watch uncensored news					
8. To find issues to discuss with others					
9. To keep up with current issues and events					
10. To relax					
11. To watch sexually attractive scenes					
12. To watch more matches and other sport programs					
13. Because it is the only means of entertainment					

End of section three

## Appedix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

### SECTION FOUR

- 1- Gender:**
1. ( ) Male
  2. ( ) Female

- 2- Age:**
1. ( ) 18-20 years
  2. ( ) 21-23 years
  3. ( ) 24 and more

- 3- College:**
- |                    |                 |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| 1. ( ) Humanities  | 2. ( ) Business |
| 3. ( ) Science     | 4. ( ) Medicine |
| 5. ( ) Environment | 6. ( ) Maritime |
| 7. ( ) Engineering |                 |

- 4- Your nationality:**
1. ( ) Saudi
  2. ( ) Non-Saudi

**If Saudi, Which region you came from?**

1. ( ) West    2. ( ) East    3. ( ) Central    4. ( ) South    5. ( ) North

**Do you live:**

1. ( ) Alone    2. ( ) With your family    3. ( ) With others

**If you live with your family, how many members are you?**

1. ( ) Less than Four    2. ( ) Four – Seven  
3. ( ) Eight – Ten    4. ( ) More than Ten

**6- What is your family's monthly annual income?**

1. ( ) Less than 3000 SR    2. ( ) 3000-6000 SR    3. ( ) 6001-9000 SR  
4. ( ) 9001-12000 SR    5. ( ) More than 12000 SR

## Appendix B, The English Version of the Questionnaire

7- Have you travelled to the following countries?

Countries Categories	Yes	No
1. Arab countries		
2. Europe or North America		
3. Asian non-Arab		
4. African non-Arab		

8. Do you speak other language?

Language	Fluent	Understand	Don't know
1. English			
2. Other European			
3. Any Asian			
4. Any African			

Would you like to add any comments regarding the satellite channels or programmes you watch?

-----  
-----  
-----

Thank you for helping the researcher conducting this study



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

عزيزي الطالب / عزيزتي الطالبة :

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

شكرا لمساهمتكم في تعبئة هذه الاستبانة المعدة من قبل / حسين سعيد القحطاني .. المتبعث من وزارة الإعلام للدراسات العليا في بريطانيا .

إن الباحث يدرس استخدام الشباب في المملكة العربية السعودية لوسائل الإعلام بصفة عامة واستخدامهم للقنوات الفضائية التليفزيونية بشكل خاص لذا فقد تم تصميم هذه الاستبانة لتحتوي على أربع مجموعات من الأسئلة : المجموعة الأولى تتعلق باستخدامات الصحف ، المجلات ، الإنترنت والراديو ، فيما تتعلق المجموعة الثانية بالتليفزيون المحلي ، والمجموعة الثالثة بالقنوات الفضائية وستكون أسئلة الجزء الأخير أسئلة عامة مثل العمر ، التخصص الدراسي المنطقة .. الخ .

سوف يقوم الباحث باستخدام إجابات هذه الاستبانة لغرض البحث العلمي فقط ، لذلك فإن كتابة اسمك ليست ضرورية .

شكرا لمساعدتك على تنفيذ هذه الدراسة ، وأرجو ملاحظة ما يلي :

- قراءة جميع الأسئلة بعناية .
- وضع علامة ( √ ) في المكان الصحيح عند اختيار الإجابة
- أن تعكس إجابتك وجهة نظرك بكل حرية وأمانة

والله الموفق

الباحث / حسين سعيد القحطاني

## الجزء الأول

فضلاً ضع علامة / أمام واحدة فقط من الإجابات المتاحة

١- هل تقرأ جرائد؟

- أ ) نعم [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة نعم ، فضلاً أجب على ( ب، ج )  
لا [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة لا ، فضلاً انتقل إلى السؤال رقم ( ٢ )

ب - هل تقرأ الجرائد :

- يوميًا [ ] أسبوعياً [ ] شهرياً [ ]

ج - أذكر بالترتيب أسماء الجرائد المفضلة لديك والتي تقرأها أكثر من غيرها  
فضلاً ابدأ بالرقم ١ كأفضل جريدة ثم ٢ .. وهكذا :

- (١) (٢) (٣)

٢- هل تقرأ مجلات؟

- أ ) نعم [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة نعم ، فضلاً أجب على ( ب، ج )  
لا [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة لا ، فضلاً انتقل إلى السؤال رقم ( ٣ )

ب - هل تقرأ المجلات :

- يوميًا [ ] أسبوعياً [ ] شهرياً [ ]

ج - أذكر بالترتيب أسماء المجلات المفضلة لديك والتي تقرأها أكثر من غيرها  
فضلاً ابدأ بالرقم ١ كأفضل مجلة ثم ٢ .. وهكذا :

- ١ -٢ -٣

٣- هل تستخدم الإنترنت؟

- أ - نعم [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة نعم ، فضلاً أجب على ( ب، ج )  
لا [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة لا ، فضلاً انتقل إلى السؤال رقم ( ٤ )



Appendix C<sub>4</sub> The Arabic Version of the Questionnaire

ب - هل تستخدم الإنترنت :

يوميةً [ ] أسبوعياً [ ] شهرياً [ ]

ج - هل تزور المواقع التالية عبر الإنترنت ؟

لا أزورها	أحياناً	دائماً	نوع الموقع
			تعليمي -١
			أخبار وأحداث -٢
			رياضة -٣
			محادثة Chat -٤
			ألعاب وتسلية -٥
			مواقع مثيرة للغرائز -٦
			تسوق وشراء عبر الإنترنت -٧
			كمبيوتر -٨
			علاقات غرامية -٩
			الموسيقى والطرب -١٠

٤ - هل تستمع إلى الراديو؟

أ - نعم [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة نعم ، فضلاً أجب على الفقرات ( ب، ج )  
لا [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة لا ، فضلاً انتقل إلى السؤال رقم ( ٥ )

ب - هل تستمع إلى الراديو :

يوميةً [ ] أسبوعياً [ ] شهرياً [ ]

ج - أذكر بالترتيب أسماء محطات الراديو التي تستمع إليها أكثر من غيرها

فضلاً ابدأ بالرقم ١ كأفضل محطة لديك ثم رقم ٢ .. وهكذا :

-٣

-٢

-١

## الجزء الثاني

١- هل تشاهد التلفزيون المحلي؟

نعم [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة نعم ، فضلاً انتقل إلى السؤال ٢

لا [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة لا ، فضلاً انتقل إلى أسئلة الجزء الثالث في الصفحة رقم ٦

٢- كم عدد أجهزة التلفزيون التي في منزلك؟

واحد [ ] اثنان [ ] ثلاثة [ ]

أكثر من ثلاثة [ ] لا يوجد [ ]

٣- ما هو معدل عدد الساعات التي تقضيها يوميا في مشاهدة التلفزيون السعودي؟

اسم القناة	لا أشاهدها	أقل من ساعة واحدة يوميا	من ساعة إلى ثلاث ساعات	من ثلاث إلى خمس ساعات	أكثر من خمس ساعات
الأولى					
الثانية					

٤- في أي مكان مما يلي تشاهد غالباً التلفزيون المحلي؟ (الرجاء اختيار إجابة واحدة فقط)

(١) في المنزل [ ] (٢) في سكن الطلاب [ ]

(٣) في منزل صديق [ ] (٤) في أماكن أخرى [ ]

٥- هل تشاهد التلفزيون المحلي غالباً وأنت :

(١) وحيد [ ] (٢) مع جميع أفراد العائلة [ ]

(٣) مع أصدقاء [ ] (٤) مع أفراد من العائلة (ذكور فقط أو إناث فقط) [ ]

(٥) في حالات اجتماعية متنوعة [ ]

٦- فضلا رتب قائمة البرامج التلفزيونية التالية ( التي تشاهدها في التلفزيون السعودي ) وذلك حسب أفضليتها لديك .

ضع رقم ١ أمام أفضل البرامج لديك ثم الأرقام متتابعة بحيث يمثل الرقم ٨ أقل البرامج تفضيلا لديك:

- |     |                            |     |                            |
|-----|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------|
| [ ] | الرياضية                   | [ ] | الأخبار والبرامج السياسية  |
| [ ] | الموسيقى والغناء           | [ ] | التعليمية                  |
| [ ] | الدينية                    | [ ] | الإعلانات                  |
| [ ] | الأفلام والمسلسلات العربية | [ ] | الأفلام والمسلسلات الغربية |

٧- ما هي الأيام التي تفضل غالبا مشاهدة التلفزيون المحلي خلالها ؟

- (١) أيام الأسبوع الأولى ( من السبت إلى الأربعاء ) [ ]
- (٢) نهاية الأسبوع [ ]
- (٣) جميع أيام الأسبوع [ ]

٨- ما هي الأوقات التي تفضل غالبا مشاهدة التلفزيون المحلي خلالها ؟

- (١) من ٦ صباحا - ١٢ ظهرا [ ]
- (٢) من ١٢ ظهرا - ٦ مساء [ ]
- (٣) من ٦ مساء - ١٢ ليلا [ ]
- (٤) من ١٢ ليلا - ٦ صباحا [ ]

### الجزء الثالث

- ١- هل تشاهد القنوات الفضائية؟  
نعم [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة نعم ، فضلا انتقل إلى السؤال التالي (رقم ٢)  
لا [ ] إذا كانت الإجابة لا ، فضلا انتقل إلى أسئلة الجزء الرابع في الصفحة رقم ١١
- ٢- كم عدد أجهزة استقبال القنوات الفضائية (ريسيفر و ديكودر) الموجودة في منزلك؟  
واحد [ ] اثنان [ ] ثلاثة [ ]  
أكثر من ثلاثة [ ] لا يوجد [ ]
- ٣- منذ متى وأنت تشاهد القنوات الفضائية؟  
(١) منذ أقل من عام [ ] (٢) من عام إلى ثلاثة أعوام [ ]  
(٣) من ثلاثة أعوام إلى خمسة [ ] (٤) منذ أكثر من خمسة أعوام [ ]
- ٤- ما هو معدل عدد الساعات التي تقضيها يوميا في مشاهدة القنوات الفضائية؟  
(١) أقل من ساعة [ ] (٢) من ساعة إلى ثلاث [ ]  
(٣) من ثلاث إلى خمس ساعات [ ] (٤) أكثر من خمس ساعات [ ]
- ٥- هل تشاهد :  
(١) قنوات مفتوحة ( يتم مشاهدتها بدون بطاقة أو اشتراك ) [ ]  
(٢) قنوات مشفرة ( يتم مشاهدتها باستخدام بطاقة أو اشتراك ) [ ]  
(٣) قنوات مفتوحة ومشفرة [ ]
- ٦- إذا كنت تشاهد قنوات مشفرة ، من الذي يدفع قيمة الاشتراك ؟  
(١) أنت [ ] (٢) الوالد أو الوالدة [ ]  
(٣) آخرون [ ] (٤) تستطيع فك التشفير و مشاهدتها دون مقابل [ ]
- ٧- في أي مكان مما يلي تشاهد غالبا القنوات الفضائية؟ (الرجاء اختيار إجابة واحدة فقط)  
(١) في المنزل [ ] (٢) في سكن الطلاب [ ]  
(٣) في منزل صديق [ ] (٤) في أماكن أخرى [ ]

- ٨- ما هي الحالة التي تشاهد غالباً القنوات الفضائية خلالها : الرجاء اختيار إجابة واحدة فقط
- (١) وحيد [ ] (٢) مع جميع أفراد العائلة [ ]
- (٣) مع أصدقاء [ ] (٤) مع أفراد من العائلة (ذكور فقط أو إناث فقط) [ ]
- (٥) في حالات اجتماعية متنوعة [ ]

- ٩- فضلاً اذكر بالترتيب أسماء خمس قنوات فضائية تفضلها وتشاهدها غالباً أكثر من غيرها .  
ابدأ برقم ١ كأكثر قناة تشاهدها ثم القناة التي تليها تنازلياً بالرقم ٢ ثم ٣ .. وهكذا :

-١  
-٢  
-٣  
-٤  
-٥

- ١٠- فضلاً رتب قائمة البرامج التلفزيونية التالية ( التي تشاهدها في القنوات الفضائية )  
وذلك حسب أفضليتها لديك . ضع رقم ١ أمام أفضل البرامج لديك ثم الأرقام ٢، ٣ .. حتى تصل  
إلى .. ٩، ١٠ بحيث تكون أقل البرامج تفضيلاً لديك أو التي لا تشاهدها :

- |                                      |                                |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| [ ] الرياضية                         | [ ] الأخبار والبرامج السياسية  |
| [ ] الموسيقى والغناء                 | [ ] التعليمية                  |
| [ ] الدينية                          | [ ] الإعلانات                  |
| [ ] الأفلام والمسلسلات العربية       | [ ] الأفلام والمسلسلات الغربية |
| [ ] البرامج والأفلام المثيرة للفرائز | [ ] الموضة والأزياء            |

- ١١- ما هي البلدان التي تفضل مشاهدة البرامج الصادرة منها ؟ فضلاً رتب القائمة التالية حسب

الأفضلية لديك وابدأ بالرقم ١ كأفضل بلد تشاهد البرامج المصدرة منه ثم ٢ ، ٣ .. وهكذا :

- |  |                                |
|--|--------------------------------|
| [ ] السعودية   | [ ] دول الخليج                 |
| [ ] الدول العربية الأخرى   | [ ] الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية |
| [ ] الدول الآسيوية   | [ ] الدول الأوروبية            |
| [ ] دول أمريكا اللاتينية ( المكسيك ، فنزويلا ، البرازيل .. الخ ) | [ ]                            |

١٢- ما هي الأيام التي تفضل غالباً مشاهدة القنوات الفضائية خلالها ؟

(١) أيام الأسبوع الأولى ( من السبت إلى الأربعاء ) [ ]

(٢) نهاية الأسبوع [ ]

(٣) جميع أيام الأسبوع [ ]

١٣- ما هي الأوقات التي تفضل غالباً مشاهدة القنوات الفضائية خلالها ؟

(١) من ٦ صباحاً - ١٢ ظهراً [ ] (٥) من ١٢ ظهراً - ٦ مساءً [ ]

(٢) من ٦ مساءً - ١٢ ليلاً [ ] (٤) من ١٢ ليلاً - ٦ صباحاً [ ]

١٤- إذا كنت تشاهد القنوات الفضائية في أوقات متأخرة ( من ١٢ ليلاً - ٦ صباحاً )

فضلاً أكمل الجدول بوضع علامة √ في مربع واحد فقط أمام كل حالة

أسباب المشاهدة المتأخرة	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	لا أوافق	لا أوافق بشدة
١- عدم القدرة على النوم					
٢- لمشاهدة المزيد من الأخبار والبرامج السياسية					
٣- لمشاهدة المزيد من المباريات والبرامج الرياضية					
٤- لمشاهدة اللقطات و البرامج المثيرة للفرائز					
٥- لوجود المزيد من الأفلام العربية آخر الليل					
٦- لوجود المزيد من الأفلام الغربية آخر الليل					
هل يوجد أسباب أخرى ؟ : فضلاً أذكرها ثم ضع علامة / تحت الخيار المناسب :					
					-٧
					-٨

Appendix C, The Arabic Version of the Questionnaire

١٥- ما هو تأثير مشاهدتك للقنوات الفضائية على الحالات التالية :  
فضلا أكمل الجدول بوضع علامة √ في مربع واحد فقط أمام كل حالة

الحالة	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	لا أوافق	لا أوافق بشدة
١- انخفض وقتك المخصص لمشاهدة التلفزيون السعودي					
٢- انخفض وقتك المخصص للاستماع إلى الراديو					
٣- انخفضت رغبتك في قراءة الصحف والمجلات					
٤- لا تذاكر دروسك بانتظام					
٥- لا تؤدي الصلوات أو بعضها في وقتها المحدد					
٦- أصبحت تجلس في المنزل (أو مكان المشاهدة) وقتاً أطول					
٧- انخفض الوقت الذي تمضيه في مشاهدة القنوات العربية على حساب غيرها من القنوات					
٨- انخفض الوقت الذي تمضيه في مشاهدة القنوات الغربية على حساب غيرها من القنوات					
٩- انخفض الوقت الذي تمضيه في مشاهدة الأفلام والبرامج العربية					
١٠- انخفض الوقت الذي تمضيه في مشاهدة الأفلام والبرامج الغربية					
١١- القنوات الفضائية حفزتك على السفر إلى الدول العربية					
١٢- القنوات الفضائية حفزتك على السفر إلى الدول الغربية					

Appendix C, The Arabic Version of the Questionnaire

١٦- ما هي الأسباب التي تجعلك تشاهد القنوات الفضائية ؟  
فضلا أكمل الجدول بوضع علامة √ في مربع واحد فقط أمام كل سبب

السبب	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	لا أوافق	لا أوافق بشدة
١- لاكتشاف طريقة حياة الناس ومعيشتهم في الدول الأخرى					
٢- لمعرفة ثقافات وقيم وعادات المجتمعات الأخرى					
٣- لمعرفة ماذا يدور في أنحاء العالم					
٤- للوصول إلى خيارات كثيرة ومتنوعة من البرامج					
٥- لمشاهدة برامج ليست خاضعة للرقابة الرسمية					
٦- لمشاهدة أخبار ليست خاضعة للرقابة الرسمية					
٧- متابعة موضوعات يمكنني مشاركة الآخرين إذا تمت مناقشتها					
٨- لكي أكون على علم بآخر الأحداث الجارية والموضوعات الجديدة					
٩- للراحة والاسترخاء					
١٠- لمشاهدة البرامج أو اللقطات المثيرة للفرائز					
١١- لمشاهدة المزيد من المباريات والبرامج الرياضية					
١٢- لأنها الوسيلة الوحيدة للترفيه والتسلية					



### الجزء الرابع

١- الجنس : ١- ذكر [ ] ٢- أنثى [ ]

٢- العمر : ١- من ١٨ - ٢٠ [ ]

٢- من ٢١ - ٢٣ [ ]

٣- ٢٤ سنة أو أكثر [ ]

٣- الكلية : ١- الآداب [ ]

٢- الاقتصاد والإدارة [ ]

٣- العلوم [ ]

٤- الطب [ ]

٥- الأرصاد وعلوم البيئة [ ]

٦- علوم البحار [ ]

٧- الهندسة [ ]

٨- علوم الأرض [ ]

٩- طب الأسنان [ ]

٤- الجنسية : ١- سعودي [ ] ٢- غير سعودي [ ]

إذا كانت الإجابة سعودي .. ما هي المنطقة التي تنتمي إليها أسرته :

١- الغربية [ ]

٢- الشرقية [ ]

٣- الوسطى [ ]

٤- الجنوبية [ ]

٥- الشمالية [ ]

٥- أ) هل تعيش : ١- وحيدا [ ] ٢- مع الأسرة [ ] ٣- مع آخرين [ ]

ب) إذا كنت تعيش مع أسرتك .. كم عدد أفرادها ؟

- ١- أقل من ٤ أفراد [ ]      ٢- من ٤ إلى ٧ أفراد [ ]  
 ٣- من ٨ إلى ١٠ أفراد [ ]      ٤- أكثر من ١٠ أفراد [ ]

٦- ما هو المتوسط الشهري لدخل أسرتك :

- ١- أقل من ٣٠٠٠ ريال [ ]  
 ٢- من ٣٠٠٠ - ٦٠٠٠ ريال [ ]  
 ٣- من ٦٠٠١ - ٩٠٠٠ ريال [ ]  
 ٤- من ٩٠٠١ - ١٢٠٠٠ ريال [ ]  
 ٥- أكثر من ١٢٠٠٠ ريال [ ]

٧- هل سافرت إلى أي دولة من مجموعة الدول التالية :

لا	نعم	قائمة الدول
		١- الدول العربية
		٢- أوروبا أو أمريكا
		٣- آسيا ( دول غير عربية )
		٤- أفريقيا ( دول غير عربية )

٨- هل تتحدث لغة أجنبية من اللغات التالية :

لا أفهمها	أستطيع فهمها	أتمتعها بطلاقة	اللغة
			١- الإنجليزية
			٢- أي لغة أوروبية أخرى
			٣- أي لغة آسيوية
			٤- أي لغة أفريقية

هل ترغب في إضافة رأي أو ملاحظة حول القنوات الفضائية أو البرامج التي تشاهدها ؟

-----  
 -----

**شكرا لمساهمته القيمة في تنفيذ هذه الدراسة**



Mr Al – Gahtani  
2 Barnfield Close  
Pontprennau  
Cardiff  
CF23 8LN

**School of Humanities  
and Social Sciences**  
Pontypridd CF37 1DL  
Head of School  
Professor MEH Connolly  
Telephone 01443 482353  
Fax 01443 482138


Wednesday 29<sup>th</sup> November 2000

To whom it may concern

I am writing to confirm the Mr Al – Gahtani, of the above address is a full – time research student with the school of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Glamorgan and is currently carrying out research into the role of Satellite Television in Saudi Arabia and in particular the ways in which young adults use and understand it.

Mr Al – Gahtani’s research involves the use of questionnaires and group interviews designed to develop a picture of satellite television use and viewing preference amongst a sample of students (chosen as representative of the population of young Saudi adults) and it would prove most useful if you could aid him in the administration of said questionnaires and interviews.

Yours sincerely

  
Dr T O' Malley  
School of Humanities and Social Sciences



Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia  
Cultural Bureau  
London/UK



المملكة العربية السعودية  
وزارة التعليم العالي  
مكتب الملحق الثقافي في بريطانيا

الأكاديمية رقم الملف: IN4

## إفادَة

يفيد المكتب الثقافي السعودي في بريطانيا بأن السيد / حسين سعيد القحطاني  
مبتعث للدراسات العليا من قبل وزارة الإعلام في مجال الدراسات الإعلامية  
بجامعة جلا مورغن ، وهو الآن بصدد القيام برحلة علمية للملكة العربية  
السعودية بغرض جمع بعض المعلومات المتعلقة ببحثه.

وقد صدرت هذه الإفادَة بناءً على طلبه لتقديمها إلى من يهّمه الأمر.

والله ولي التوفيق ،،،

الملحق الثقافي في بريطانيا  
عبد الله بن محمد الناصر

اص اسز



Ref. No. ....  
Date .....  
Encl. ....

الرقم .....  
التاريخ .....  
المرفقات .....

سعادة عميده كلية الاداب

الموقره  
جامعة الملك عبدالعزيز بجده

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته ،

نأمل التكرم بالتعاون مع الزميل حسين بن سعيد  
القحطاني المبتعث للدراسات العليا في بريطانيا من قبل وزارة  
الاعلام والذي يقوم حاليا بتوزيع استبيانات علي طلاب وطالبات  
الجامعات اثناء رحلته العلمية .

شاكرين لكم حسن اهتمامكم ،

مدير عام اذاعة جده

بكر محمد باخيفر

١٥ / ٢ / ١٤٤٢

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA  
Ministry of Higher Education  
KING ABDULAZIZ UNIVERSITY  
Women's Campus

Dean's Office مكتب العميدة

المملكة العربية السعودية  
وزارة التعليم العالي  
جامعة الملك عبد العزيز  
قسم الطالبات

Ref. : .....

Date : .....

Encl. : .....

الرقم : ٦٦٩ / ٤٤

التاريخ : ٤٤ / ٤٤

المرفقات : .....

الموضوع: الاستبيان .

معادة مدير عام جامعة جدة

الأستاذ/بكر محمد باخيزر

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

حفظه الله

إشارة إلى خطاب سعادتك المتضمن التعاون مع المبتعث من قبل وزارة الإعلام للدراسات العليا الأستاذ/حسين بن سعيد القحطاني، وتوزيع الاستبيان على طالبات الجامعة .

نرفق لسعادتك الاستبيانات بعد تعبئتها من قبل الطالبات .

مع خالص التحية...

٢/٤٨  
عميدة قسم الطالبات  
د. رفيقة بنت حسين خاشقجي

٠١-السيد/٤٤/ع.باداود - ١٤٢٢/٢/٢٧ هـ



## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Age	Frequency	Percent
18-20 years	174	39.7
21-23 years	196	44.7
24 and more	66	15.1
Missing	2	.5
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.2: Respondents' Age

Colleges	Humanities	Business	Sciences	Medicine	Environment	Maritime Studies	Engineering	Missing	Total
Frequency	186	92	75	8	13	17	45	2	438
Percentage	42.5	21.0	17.1	1.7	3.0	3.9	10.3	.5	100.0

Table 6.3: Respondents' Colleges

Nationality	Frequency	%
Saudi	427	97.5
Non Saudi	10	2.3
Missing	1	.2
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.4: Respondents' Nationalities

Region	Frequency	%
West	198	45.2
East	25	5.7
Central	41	9.4
South	116	26.4
North	45	10.3
Missing	13	3.0
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.5: respondents' regional representation

Live	Freq.	%
Alone	39	8.9
With family	356	81.3
With others	43	9.8
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.6: living situation

Family Members	Freq.	%
Less than 4	43	9.8
4 to 7	172	39.3
8 to 10	122	27.9
More than 10	56	12.8
Missing	45	10.2
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.7: Family members

Income	Freq.	%
Less than 3000 SR*	69	15.8
3000-6000	141	32.2
6000-9000	80	18.3
9000-12000	59	13.5
More than 12000 SR	79	18.0
Missing	10	2.2
Total	438	100.0



## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Table 6.8: Students' families' monthly income

	Other Arab Countries		Europe or North America		Non-Arab Asian Countries		Non-Arab African Countries	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
<b>Yes</b>	182	41.6	72	16.4	65	14.8	16	3.7
<b>No</b>	256	58.4	366	83.6	373	85.2	422	96.3
Missing								
<b>Total</b>	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0

Table 6.9: Students' travel to other countries

	English		Other European language		African language		Asian language	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
<b>Fluent</b>	70	16.0	2	.5	6	1.4	4	.9
<b>Understand</b>	284	64.8	44	10.0	21	4.8	24	5.5
<b>Not Spoken</b>	68	15.5	299	68.3	316	72.1	312	71.2
Missing	16	3.7	93	21.2	95	21.7	98	22.4
<b>Total</b>	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0

Table 6.10: Students' understanding of other languages

Number of receivers/decoders	Freq.	Percent
One	170	38.8
Two	77	17.6
Three	49	11.2
More than three	27	6.2
None	25	5.7
Missing	90	20.5
<b>Total</b>	438	100.0

Table 6.11.2: Number of satellite TV receivers and / or decoders in respondents' homes

Satellite channels viewing	Freq.	Percent
Less than one year	36	8.2
1-3 years	67	15.3
3-5 years	90	20.5
More than 5 years	154	35.2
Missing	91	20.8
<b>Total</b>	438	100.0

Table 6.11.3: How long have you been watching satellite channels?

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

<b>Type of Satellite Channel</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Open –to-air channel	179	40.9
Scrambled (coded channels)	10	2.3
Both	151	34.5
Missing	98	22.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6.11.5 Type of Satellite Channels

<b>Scrambled Channel Fee Payer</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yourself	20	4.6
Parents	47	10.7
Others	32	7.3
You can decode it free	70	16.0
Missing	269	61.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6.11.6 If you watch scrambled channels; who pays the cost?

<b>Most Frequent Satellite Channel Viewing location</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
At home	281	64.2
Student's accommodation	3	.7
Friend's home	42	9.6
Other places (e.g. cafes)	22	5.0
Missing	90	20.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6.11.7 Where do you watch satellite channels most?

<b>Most Preferred Satellite Viewing Sitting</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Alone	84	19.2
With all family members	63	14.4
With friends	91	20.8
All the family with the same sex	18	4.1
In different social settings	87	19.9
Missing	95	21.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6.11.8 With whom do you like to watch satellite channels most?

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

<b>Preferred Time Period for Satellite Channel Viewing</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Weekdays	41	9.4
Weekends	113	25.8
Both	191	43.6
Missing	93	21.2
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.11.9 When do you prefer to watch satellite channel most?

<b>Prime Time period for most satellite channel viewing</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
From 6:00am – 12 noon	4	.9
From 12 noon – 6:pm	29	6.6
From 6:00pm – 12pm	212	48.4
From 12:00pm – 6:00am	104	23.7
Missing	89	20.3
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.11.10 What is the prime time period of most of your satellite channel viewing

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

**Table 6.12 Reasons for watching satellite channels**

<b>1. To find out how people outside Saudi Arabia live</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	95	21.7
Agree	153	34.9
Somewhat Agree	76	17.4
Disagree	18	4.1
Strongly Disagree	7	1.6
Missing	89	20.3
Total	438	100.0
<b>2. To gain more knowledge about different cultures</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	91	20.8
Agree	137	31.3
Somewhat Agree	95	21.7
Disagree	19	4.3
Strongly Disagree	4	.9
Missing	92	21.0
Total	438	100.0
<b>3. To know what is going on internationally</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	161	36.8
Agree	126	28.8
Somewhat Agree	53	12.1
Disagree	5	1.1
Strongly Disagree	4	.9
Missing	89	20.3
Total	438	100.0
<b>4. To find a wide variety of programmes</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	114	26.1
Agree	130	29.7
Somewhat Agree	87	19.9
Disagree	12	2.7
Strongly Disagree	5	1.1
Missing	90	20.5
Total	438	100.0
<b>5. To watch uncensored programmes</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	90	20.5
Agree	79	18.0
Somewhat Agree	59	13.5
Disagree	77	17.6
Strongly Disagree	42	9.6
Missing	91	20.8
Total	438	100.0
<b>6. To watch uncensored news</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	123	28.1
Agree	87	19.8
Somewhat Agree	63	14.4
Disagree	50	11.4
Strongly Disagree	24	5.5
Missing	91	20.8
Total	438	100.0

Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Continued; Table 6.12: Reasons for watching satellite channels

<b>7. To find issues to discuss with others</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	81	18.5
Agree	117	26.8
Somewhat Agree	103	23.5
Disagree	37	8.4
Strongly Disagree	11	2.5
Missing	89	20.3
Total	438	100.0
<b>8. To keep up with current issues and events</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	155	35.4
Agree	131	29.9
Somewhat Agree	57	13.0
Disagree	2	.5
Strongly Disagree	1	.2
Missing	92	21.0
Total	438	100.0
<b>9. To relax</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	119	27.2
Agree	104	23.7
Somewhat Agree	86	19.6
Disagree	24	5.5
Strongly Disagree	11	2.5
Missing	94	21.5
Total	438	100.0
<b>10. To watch sexually explicit scenes</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	60	13.6
Agree	46	10.5
Somewhat Agree	75	17.1
Disagree	62	14.2
Strongly Disagree	101	23.1
Missing	94	21.5
Total	438	100.0
<b>11. To watch more matches and other sports programmes</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	126	28.8
Agree	50	11.4
Somewhat Agree	65	14.8
Disagree	45	10.3
Strongly Disagree	58	13.2
Missing	94	21.5
Total	438	100.0
<b>12. Because it is the only means of entertainment</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	125	28.5
Agree	68	15.5
Somewhat Agree	111	25.3
Disagree	23	5.3
Strongly Disagree	20	4.6
Missing	91	20.8
Total	438	100.0

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Tables 6.13 Reasons for watching satellite channels late evening/early morning

<b>1. Because more Western movies are broadcast late</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	84	19.2
Agree	50	11.4
Somewhat Agree	39	8.9
Disagree	18	4.1
Strongly Disagree	8	1.8
Missing	239	54.6
Total	438	100.0

<b>4. To watch matches and other sport programmes</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	41	9.4
Agree	42	9.6
Somewhat Agree	35	8.0
Disagree	34	7.8
Strongly Disagree	42	9.6
Missing	244	55.7
Total	438	100.0

<b>2. Because more Arabic movies are broadcast late</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	58	13.2
Agree	54	12.3
Somewhat Agree	42	9.6
Disagree	26	5.9
Strongly Disagree	18	4.1
Missing	240	54.8
Total	438	100.0

<b>5. To watch sexually explicit programmes</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	41	9.4
Agree	36	8.2
Somewhat Agree	45	10.3
Disagree	28	6.4
Strongly Disagree	47	10.7
Missing	241	55.0
Total	438	100.0

<b>3. To kill time when I can't sleep</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	54	12.3
Agree	48	11.0
Somewhat Agree	70	16.0
Disagree	20	4.6
Strongly Disagree	13	3.0
Missing	233	53.2
Total	438	100.0

<b>6. To watch more news and politics programmes</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Strongly Agree	10	2.3
Agree	43	9.8
Somewhat Agree	53	12.1
Disagree	47	10.7
Strongly Disagree	43	9.8
Missing	242	55.3
Total	438	100.0

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Newspaper readership	Respondents' Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
<b>Yes</b>	221	168	389
<b>%</b>	50.5%	38.5%	89%
<b>No</b>	13	31	44
<b>%</b>	3%	7%	10%
<b>Missing</b>	2	3	5
<b>%</b>	0.4	0.6%	1%
<b>Total</b>	236	202	438
<b>%</b>	53.9%	46.1%	100%

Table 6.14.1 Newspaper readership and Gender Crosstabulation Count

Time	Frequency	%
<b>Daily</b>	225	51.4
<b>Weekly</b>	128	29.2
<b>Monthly</b>	34	7.8
<b>Missing</b>	51	11.6
<b>Total</b>	438	100.0

Table 6.14.2 How often do you read newspapers?

Top Favourite Newspaper	2 <sup>nd</sup> Top Favourite Newspaper		3 <sup>rd</sup> Top Favourite Newspaper					
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%				
<b>Okaz</b>	205	46.8	<b>Al-Madinah</b>	104	23.7	<b>Al-Madinah</b>	59	13.5
<b>Al-reyadeyah</b>	67	15.3	<b>Okaz</b>	89	20.3	<b>Al-reyadeyah</b>	57	13.0
<b>Al-Madinah</b>	44	10.0	<b>Al-Watan</b>	39	8.9	<b>Okaz</b>	43	9.8
<b>Asharqalawsat</b>	20	4.6	<b>Asharqalawsat</b>	33	7.5	<b>Al-Ektisadeyah</b>	40	9.1
<b>Al-Hayat</b>	14	3.2	<b>Al-reyadeyah</b>	31	7.1	<b>Asharqalawsat</b>	36	8.2
<b>Al-Watan</b>	12	2.7	<b>Alam Alriadh</b>	27	6.2	<b>Al-Watan</b>	29	6.6
<b>Al-Ektisadeyah</b>	10	2.3	<b>Al-Belad</b>	14	3.2	<b>Al-Belad</b>	20	4.6
<b>Alam Alriadh</b>	7	1.6	<b>Al-Riyadh</b>	8	1.8	<b>Al-hadaf, Kuwait</b>	15	3.4
<b>Al-hadaf, Kuwait</b>	4	.9	<b>Al-Ektisadeyah</b>	7	1.6	<b>Alam Alriadh</b>	11	2.5
<b>Al-Riyadh</b>	3	.7	<b>Al-Nadwah</b>	7	1.6	<b>Al-Riyadh</b>	6	1.4
<b>Al-Jazirah</b>	2	.5	<b>Al-hadaf, Kuwait</b>	4	.9	<b>Al-Jazirah</b>	3	.7
<b>Saudi Gazette</b>	2	.5	<b>Al-Hayat</b>	3	.7	<b>Al-Nadwah</b>	3	.7
			<b>Al-Jazirah</b>	3	.7	<b>Al-Hayat</b>	2	.5
			<b>Arab News</b>	2	.5			
			<b>Al-Yom</b>	1	.2			
<b>Missing</b>	48	10.9	<b>Missing</b>	66	15.1	<b>Missing</b>	114	26.0
<b>Total</b>	438	100.0	<b>Total</b>	438	100.0	<b>Total</b>	438	100.0

Table 5.14.3 Students' three most favourite newspapers

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Magazines Readership	Respondents' Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
<b>Yes</b> %	159 36.3%	162 37%	321 73.3%
<b>No</b> %	71 16.3%	36 8.2%	107 24.5%
<b>Missing</b> %	6 1.3%	4 0.9%	10 2.2%
<b>Total</b> %	236 53.9%	202 46.1%	438 100%

Table 6.15.1 Magazine readership and Gender Crosstabulation Count

Magazine Readership	Frequency	%
<b>Daily</b>	15	3.4
<b>Weekly</b>	127	29.0
<b>Monthly</b>	180	41.1
<b>Total</b>	322	73.5
<b>Missing</b>	116	26.5
<b>Total</b>	438	100.0

Table 6.15.2 how often do you read magazines?



## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

1 <sup>st</sup> Top favourite magazine			2 <sup>nd</sup> Top favourite magazine			3 <sup>rd</sup> Top favourite magazine		
	Freq.	%		Freq.	%		Freq.	%
Sayedaty	95	21.7	Sayedaty	36	8.2	Sayedaty	31	7.1
Fawasil	49	11.2	Fawasil	32	7.3	Al-Osrah	15	3.4
Al-Jadidah	16	3.7	Al-Jamilah	23	5.3	Fawasil	15	3.4
Al-Moktalif	15	3.4	Al-Yakazah	19	4.3	Kotoof	14	3.2
Al-Nadi	10	2.3	Al-Moktalif	17	3.9	Reyadah washabab	13	3.0
Al-Yakazah	9	2.1	Reyadah washabab	14	3.2	Al-Moktalif	12	2.7
Al-Osrah	8	1.8	Al-Osrah	12	2.7	Al-Yakazah	11	2.5
Reyadah washabab	8	1.8	Kol Al-nas	12	2.7	Al-Nadi	11	2.5
Al-Nahda	7	1.6	Al-Nadi	10	2.3	Asdaf	10	2.3
PC	6	1.4	Zahrat Khaleej	8	1.8	Laha	9	2.1
Kotoof	6	1.4	Al-Jadidah	8	1.8	Heya (She)	9	2.1
Al-Rajl	6	1.4	12/21	7	1.6	Kol Al-nas	8	1.8
Asdaf	6	1.4	Ekraa	7	1.6	Al-Jadidah	8	1.8
12/21	5	1.1	Al-Farha	6	1.4	Al-Farha	6	1.4
Zahrat Khaleej	5	1.1	Taht El-eshreen	6	1.4	Zahrat Al-Khaleej	6	1.4
That El-eshreen	5	1.1	Heya (She)	6	1.4	Al-Jamilah	6	1.4
Al-Jamilah	5	1.1	Laha	5	1.1	Al-Faisal	4	.9
Al-Majallah	4	.9	Al-Malaep	5	1.1	Al-Malaep	3	.7
Al-Farha	4	.9	Asdaf	5	1.1	Al-Ghafelah	3	.7
Kol Al-nas	4	.9	Al-Nahda	4	.9	Aldaawah	2	.5
Almojtamaa	4	.9	Satellite	4	.9	Al-OM & Baby	2	.5
Aldaawah	4	.9	PC	3	.7	Al-Rajl	2	.5
Laha	4	.9	Masaa	3	.7	Sayyarat	2	.5
Windows	4	.9	Sayyarat	3	.7	Satellite	2	.5
Al-Manhal	3	.7	Al-Majallah	2	.5	12/21	1	.2
Al-OM & Baby	3	.7	Aldaawah	2	.5	Almojtamaa	1	.2
Satellite	3	.7	Kotoof	2	.5	Al-Nahda	1	.2
Heya (She)	3	.7	Laylat Khamees	2	.5	Ekraa	1	.2
Masaa	2	.5	Nadwah Alameyah	2	.5	Windows	1	.2
Al-Malaep	2	.5	Windows	2	.5	Al-Majaless	1	.2
Sayyarat	2	.5	Al-Ghafelah	2	.5	Rose Al-Yousef	1	.2
Al-Majaless	2	.5	Al-Shabab	2	.5			
Playboy	2	.5	Basem	2	.5			
Al-Bayan	1	.2	Almojtamaa	1	.2			
Basem	1	.2	Al-Gowat Al-Musallaha	1	.2			
Mal & Egtessad	1	.2	Al-Bayan	1	.2			
Al-Sager	1	.2	Internet	1	.2			
Al-Maarefah	1	.2	Mal & Egtessad	1	.2			
Missing	122	27.9	Missing	160	36.5	Missing	227	51.8
Total	438	100.0	Total	438	100.0	Total	438	100.0

Table 6.16.3a Students Top favourite magazines

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Country	Saudi Arabia	Arab Gulf States	Other Arab Countries	UK	USA
M A G A Z I N E S	Al-Faisal Aldaawah Al-Ghafelah Al-Gowatal- Musallaha Al-Maarefah Al-Malaep Al-Manhal Al-Nadi Al-Shabab Basem Ekraa Reyadah- washabab	Al-Bayan Al-Farha Al-Jadiedah Al-Jameelah Al-Majaless Al-Mojtamaa Al-Moktalef Al-Nahda Al-Osrah Al-Sager Al-Yakazah Asdaf Fawasl Heya (She) Kol Al-nas Kotoof Laha LaylatKhamees Mal wa Egtessad Masaa Nadwahalameyah Zahratal-Khaleej	12/21 Al-OM&Baby Internet Satellite Sayyarat RoseAlyousef Tahtelehreen	Al- Majallah Al-Rajl Sayedaty	PC Playboy Windows

Table 6.15.3b Magazines in alphabetical order according to country of origin

Use of the Internet	Frequency	Percent
Daily	60	13.7
Weekly	48	11.0
Monthly	59	13.5
Missing	271	61.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6.16.2 how often do you use the Internet?

Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

	Internet for Education		Internet for News & Events		Internet for Sports		Internet for Chat and People		Internet for Games and Entertainment		Internet for Erotic		Internet for Shopping		Internet for Computing		Internet for Love and relationship		Internet for Music	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
<b>Always</b>	25	5.7	58	13.2	49	11.2	75	17.1	38	8.7	28	6.4	7	1.6	58	13.2	29	6.6	83	18.9
<b>Some-times</b>	84	19.2	77	17.6	51	11.6	46	10.5	65	14.8	56	12.8	52	11.9	54	12.3	34	7.8	64	14.6
<b>Never</b>	50	11.4	29	6.6	61	13.9	47	10.7	56	12.8	81	18.5	98	22.4	46	10.5	97	22.1	22	5.0
<b>Missing</b>	279	63.7	274	62.6	277	63.2	270	61.6	279	63.7	273	62.3	281	64.2	280	63.9	278	63.5	269	61.4
<b>Total</b>	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.	438	100.

Table 6.16.3 The most frequently visited Internet websites

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Listening to Radio	Respondents' Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
<b>Yes</b> %	216 49.3%	152 34.7%	368 84%
<b>No</b> %	20 4.6%	47 10.7%	67 15.3%
<b>Missing</b> %	1 0.23%	2 0.47%	3 0.7%
<b>Total</b> %	237 54.1%	201 45.9%	438 100%

Table 6.17.1 listening to radio and Gender Crosstabulation Count

Listening to Radio	Freq.	Percent
Daily	278	63.5
Weekly	66	15.1
Monthly	23	5.2
Missing	71	16.2
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.17.2 How often you listen to the Radio?

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Top Favourite Radio Station			Second Favourite Radio Station			Third Favourite Radio Station		
	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>		<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>		<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>
MBC	290	66.2	Riyadh	36	8.2	Kuwait	26	5.9
Qur'an	51	11.6	MBC	28	6.4	Riyadh	19	4.3
Riyadh	9	2.1	Kuwait	28	6.4	MBC	15	3.4
Jeddah, Second Programme	7	1.6	Jeddah, Second Programme	26	5.9	Mont Carlo, France	14	3.2
BBC	4	.9	Qur'an	26	5.9	Jeddah, Second Programme	13	3.0
Kuwait	3	.7	Mont Carlo France	14	3.2	Abu Dhabi	10	2.3
Nedaa Al-Islam	1	.2	Nedaa Al-Islam	8	1.8	Dubai	9	2.1
Abu Dhabi	1	.2	Dubai	6	1.4	Qur'an	5	1.1
European Programme	1	.2	Abu Dhabi	6	1.4	Voice of Arabs	2	.5
			European Programme	6	1.4	BBC	1	.2
			BBC	5	1.1	Bahrain	1	.2
			Voice of Arabs	4	.9	European Programme	1	.2
			Voice of America	3	.7			
			Bahrain	2	.5			
			Israel	2	.5			
			Yemen	1	.2			
Missing	71	16.2	Missing	237	54.1	Missing	322	73.5
Total	438	100.0	Total	438	100.0	Total	438	100.0

Table 6.17.3a Students' favourite radio stations

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Country	Saudi Arabia	Arab Gulf States	Other Arab Countries	Europe	USA	Israel
<b>R A D I O  S T A T I O N S</b>	European Programme (in English and French)  Jeddah (Second Programme)  Nedaa Al-Islam  Qur'an  Riyadh	Abu Dhabi  Bahrain  Dubai  Kuwait	Voice of Arabs (Egypt)  Yemen	BBC (in Arabic)  MBC  Mont Carlo (in Arabic)	Voice of America (in Arabic)	Voice of Israel

Table 6.17.3b Radio stations according to country of origin

Number of TV sets	Freq.	Percent
One	86	19.6
Two	137	31.3
Three	72	16.4
More than three	54	12.3
Missing	89	20.4
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.18.3 Number of TV sets in students' homes

Viewing Location	Freq.	Percent
At home	307	70.1
Student's accommodation	9	2.1
Friend's home	6	1.4
Other places	24	5.5
Missing	92	20.9
Total	438	100.0

Table 6.18.4: Places where respondents watch Saudi TV most

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Viewing Companions	Freq.	%
Alone	63	14.4
With all family members	137	31.3
With friends	27	6.2
With family members of the same sex	21	4.8
In different social settings	94	21.5
Missing	96	21.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6.18.5 Students' Preferred Companions

Preferred Viewing Period	Freq.	%
Weekdays	73	16.7
Weekends	137	31.3
Both	136	31.1
Missing	92	20.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6.18.6 Students' Preferred Viewing Period

Time for viewing terrestrial TV	Frequency	%
From 6:00am - 12noon	7	1.6
From 12 noon - 6:pm	44	10.0
<b>From 6:00pm - 12pm</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>62.1</b>
From 12:00pm - 6:00am	13	3.0
Missing	102	23.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6.18.7 Prime period of students' terrestrial (Saudi) TV viewing

## Appendix E, Questionnaire Results' Tables

Rank	Sport		News & Politics		Music		Instructional		Religious		Arabic Movies & Drama		Western Movies & Drama		Advertisements	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
1	125	28.5	20	4.6	34	7.8	5	1.1	77	17.6	7	1.6	53	12.1	31	7.1
2	32	7.3	54	12.3	60	13.7	28	6.4	54	12.3	20	4.6	72	16.4	15	3.4
3	30	6.8	38	8.7	48	11.0	43	9.8	35	8.0	23	5.3	57	13.0	52	11.9
4	19	4.3	41	9.4	37	8.4	46	10.5	40	9.1	46	10.5	57	13.0	32	7.3
5	22	5.0	40	9.1	23	5.3	54	12.3	53	12.1	53	12.1	34	7.8	24	5.5
6	11	2.5	40	9.1	43	9.8	50	11.4	33	7.5	47	10.7	28	6.4	42	9.6
7	45	10.3	29	6.6	31	7.1	61	13.9	11	2.5	60	13.7	17	3.9	42	9.6
8	38	8.7	57	13.0	35	8.0	25	5.7	16	3.7	56	12.8	7	1.6	72	16.4
Missing	116	26.5	119	27.2	127	29.0	126	28.8	119	27.2	126	28.8	113	25.8	128	29.2
Total	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0	438	100.0

Table 6.18.8 Saudi TV programmes ranked according to students' preferred viewing choice



## **MASS COMMUNICATION POLICY IN SAUDI ARABIA\***

### **INTRODUCTION**

The information policy refers to the principles and goals, which constitute the foundations and requirements of information in Saudi Arabia. This policy emanates from Islam, in doctrine and law, which is the national religion. It aims at establishing belief in God, raising the intellectual, cultural, and perceptual level in the citizens, and dealing with social problems. It seeks to stress the concept of obedience to God, His Prophet, and the legal guardian. It urges to respect the law and to carry it out continuously. It includes the broad outlines which govern the Saudi information; thus accomplishing the goals by means of education, guidance, and recreation. This policy is considered a part of the country's general policy, and is specified in the following articles:

Article 1: Saudi information has its obligation to Islam exclusively. It seeks to keep the tradition of this nation, and to exclude all that contradicts God's laws which He gave to the people.

Article 2: The Saudi mass communication will oppose all destructive currents, atheistic inclinations, materialistic philosophies, and all attempts to distract the Moslems from their beliefs. It will further expose their falsehood and dangers to the individuals and societies, and will stand up to every challenge, which does not agree with the general policy of the country.

---

\* Source: S. Al—Harithi, *The Mass Media in Saudi Arabia: Present Concept, Functions, Barriers and Selected strategy for an effective use in Nation-Building and social awareness.* PhD. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1983.

## *Appendix F, Mass Communication Policy in Saudi Arabia*

Article 3: All the information media seek to serve society by consolidating its precious Islamic values; firmly fixing its honoured Arabic traditions; keeping its gracious inherited customs; and stand in opposition to everything that spoils its purity and harmony.

Article 4: All mass communication will seek to serve the existing policy of the kingdom, protecting the primary interests of the citizens first, then the Moslems and Arabs in general. This will be done by the adoption of this policy and its presentation with full documentation, supported by precedence and facts.

Article 5: All the mass communication will seek to present the unique and distinctive characteristics of Saudi Arabia on the national and international levels, emphasising its stability and safety, and progress in various domains by embracing Islam as the constitution of the government and the law of life, placing upon her shoulders the responsibility to serve the Islamic sacred places.

Article 6: All the mass communication will seek to strengthen the bond among the citizens by informing them of the numerous parts of their country and the significant aspects pertaining to them, thus demonstrating the complementary nature of these regions.

Article 7: All the mass communication will seek to enhance the loyalty to the country bringing to light the capabilities and potential bestowed upon it, and reminding them of the greatness of its past and present. As the citizen is made aware of his responsibility to his country, he will be urged to contribute to its progress advancement and protection.

Article 15: The Saudi mass communication will seek to promote and encourage scholarship in all fields of specialisation. This can be accomplished at a high level of religion, science, awareness, and dedication, having all conditions favourable.

Article 16: Realising its significant role, the Saudi mass communication will deal directly and effectively to abolish illiteracy by adopting educational and scientific principles, dedicating educational programs that meet the needs of every age and mentality.

Article 17: The mass communications in Saudi Arabia are certain that standard Arabic is the vehicle of Islam and the reservoir of its education. Consequently, the following points are emphasised:

1. The authors and writers of programs will be directed to follow closely the rules of grammar and syntax, as well as care for correct expression and pronunciation.
2. The newscasters, program directors, and club sponsors will be directed to use standard Arabic, to avoid making mistakes in pronunciation, and conform to the rules of proper execution.
3. To be highly selective, and avoid all that is derogatory or downgrading of standard Arabic.
4. To raise the level of the programs that use colloquial Arabic gradually, and replace it with simplified standard Arabic.
5. To actively support all programs, plays, and series which utilise the standard Arabic to make it desirable to the public.
6. To engage in teaching standard Arabic to the non-Arabic speakers in the Islamic countries, utilising the most advanced methods and technology.

Article 18: The Saudi mass media currently support educational and scientific movements by the following ways:

## *Appendix F, Mass Communication Policy in Saudi Arabia*

1. Encouraging researchers, scientists and intellectuals in every way possible which includes the publishing of their scholarly works, and giving them opportunities to express their views.
2. Guiding young talents and encouraging them, and sponsoring them until they reach the desired level.
3. Holding scholarly discussions, literary and scientific conferences among the educated in the kingdom, as well as with others outside; thus, presenting the educational and scientific capabilities of the kingdom.
4. Encouraging specialised periodicals which are published in Saudi Arabia and the Arab world.
5. Supporting national publishing houses that they may publish serious Saudi writings, and sponsoring book exhibits; thus demonstrating the rank which Saudi Arabia has attained in the scientific and educational world.

Article 19: The Saudi information media stresses the significance of tradition and the need to revive it. It carries out its part by accomplishing the following:

1. Encouraging the preservation of tradition materially and morally by:
  - a. Preparing programs, identifying its books and their locations.
  - b. Publishing it at the expense of the government and making it available to everyone.
  - c. Facilitating the availability of these books to the parties concerned.
2. Resisting every effort which seeks to destroy tradition or scorn it.
3. Encouraging programs which draw on books of tradition, especially in the areas of study, play series and literary biographies.
4. Exhibition masterpieces of tradition, introducing the public to the forefathers'/ ancestors' efforts and accomplishments in many fields of knowledge, and inviting them to bridge the gap between the past and the present of this nation.

Article 20: The Saudi information media will seek to bring closer all the Moslems by

means of introducing the Islamic peoples, their countries, potentials and capabilities; and to instigate co-operation among these countries.

Article 21: The Saudi Information media seeks:

1. Unity and co-operation among all Arabs, avoiding all antagonistic tendencies.
2. Defences of their cases especially the ones dealing with their destinies, urging them to stand up for Islam at every opportunity that avails itself.

Article 22: The Saudi information media affirms the standing invitation to God among Moslems and others until God inherits the whole earth. Thus the Saudi means of communication participates in this obligation in all wisdom and advice, seeking to communicate with intellect while respecting the privacy of others.

Article 23: The Saudi information media, in co-operation with their counterparts in the Islamic world in general, and the Arab world in particular, will seek to adopt a unified program which serves the religious and secular interests of all Moslems, and will attempt to represent their cultural and intellectual unity.

Article 24: The Saudi information media affirms its respect of the rights of everyone individually and collectively. Simultaneously, it seeks to create an atmosphere of harmony, unity, and co-operation among all, informing everyone of his direct responsibility for the whole society.

Article 25: The Saudi information media seeks to be objective in presenting the facts, avoiding exaggerations, valuing the honour of an individual's word and the need to protect it and raise it above every suspicion.

Article 26: The Saudi information media desires that freedom of expression be guaranteed within the national goals and values of Islam.

*Appendix F, Mass Communication Policy in Saudi Arabia*

Article 27: The Saudi information media advocates respect for the dignity of man; to exercise freedom in his land; to disapprove of every act of violence on individuals or peoples; to fight all expansive intentions; to stand by right, justice and peace; and to rise against injustice and racism.

Article 28: The Saudi information media affirms the import of human expert resources which is capable of accomplishing the goals of the Saudi means of communication; and entrusting these resources with training and making necessary adjustments.

Article 29: The Saudi information media encourages local production of materials which are in accordance with its policy.

Article 30: The Saudi information media shall comply with this policy and the execution of all its rules and regulations.