

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE
METROPOLITAN PLANNING MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS:
WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS UPON GOVERNANCE

PhD Thesis

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Abstract

This thesis examines Chinese metropolitan planning management system taking lessons from its past as well as current development and involving recommendations for its future improvement. It investigates the historical and current developments in the metropolitan planning management systems and also makes recommendations about how to improve the future systems. It aims to find potential ways which can make the Chinese metropolitan planning management system work well and move the metropolitan planning management to good governance.

This thesis also constructs a theoretical framework from the perspective of decentralization, focusing upon the change of relationships between the Chinese government, market and society, to gain an in-depth insight of changes in the development of Chinese planning management system since 1978. It considers a case study approach to analyze the current situation of the metropolitan planning management system. It employs a qualitative research methodology that comprises of questionnaire and interviews with governmental officials, planners and experts, to study the behaviors of different actors involved in the core operations of planning management system, and investigate relationships between the government, market and society in order to examine the fundamental institutional factors producing the problems. In the end, on basis of the global public management paradigm transformation and in view of the overall trend of the governance transition, it makes recommendations regarding an improved metropolitan planning management system in China.

It identifies factors influencing the Chinese metropolitan planning management system. It argues that the planning management system changes with the administrative system. The administrative management system reform has become the most direct and fundamental motive for promoting the transition of planning management system.

It scrutinizes the problems in metropolitan planning management system. It argues that inadequate modern bureaucracy is the primary characteristic of current planning management systems, which is inducing problems in the metropolitan planning management system.

It argues that the focus of Chinese metropolitan planning management system reform is the allocation of power and responsibility among different interest groups. It argues that reform of the metropolitan planning management system needs continuous improvement and has to surpass the bureaucracy moderately. The essence of metropolitan planning management system reform is rationalizing relationships between different levels of governments as well as relationships between the government, market and society. It insists that improved metropolitan planning management system in China needs support from other governance tools.

KEY WORDS: the metropolitan planning management system; metropolitan planning; governance; regional cooperation; government; China

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I dedicate my dissertation to my family, for their unconditional love all throughout my life.

Yong Wang

List of nomenclatures and abbreviations

CPC	the Communist Party of China
e.g.	exempli gratia = for instance
ed.	Edition
ESDP	the European Spatial Development Perspective
et al.	et alii = and others
EU	European Union
HCD	the Housing and Construction Department
MA(s)	Metropolitan area(s)
MLR	the Ministry of Land and Resources
MOHURD	the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development
MP	Metropolitan planning
MP&M	metropolitan planning management
MP&M system	Metropolitan planning management system
MPO(s)	Metropolitan Planning and its Organization(s)
Mu	Chinese unit of land area. 1 mu equals to 667 square meters.
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NGO(s)	Nongovernmental Organization(s)
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDRC	the Provincial Development and Reform Commission
PM	Public Management
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRD	the Pearl River Delta
RDA	Regional Development Agencies
SGWR	the State Government Work Report
SWC MA	Su-Xi-Chang metropolitan area

LIST OF NOMENCLATURES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Three Compliance	sān guī hé yī,(in Chinese). Which refers to a comprehensive plan that integrates economic development, urban and rural areas, and overall land use planning
UK	the United Kingdom
UNDP	the United Nations Development Programme
UPSC	the Urban Planning Society of China
Yamen	the office of a public official in imperial China.
YRD	the Yangtze River Delta

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Chapter 1

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Research background

With a background of rapid globalization and regional reconstruction, the development of metropolitan areas has become one of the main features of the Chinese regional economy and this section tends to introduce the background of research so that the reader can understand the theory behind this research.

1.1.1 Reorganization of regional spatial structure

Since the 1980s, with the influence of informatization and modern technology, economic globalization has consistently extended in space and over time. In addition, regional integration has experienced unprecedented acceleration (Brenner, 1999; Ludema and Wooton, 2000). Such capitalist globalization has inspired a process of territorial reconfiguration (Perkmann, 2007). The scale of which has been defined by a nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing sizes, e.g. local, regional, national and global (Delaney and Leitner 1997, p. 93; Brenner, 1999; for a critique, see Howitt 2003). New space types, such as the global city, city region, and metropolitan areas, have emerged in large numbers. Moreover, these multiple scales and space types are often mutually tangled and connected (Jessop, 2005) and have formed a new cognitive map of world economics and politics (Swyngedouw, 1997; Scott, 2001).

1.1.2 Rapid development of Chinese metropolitan areas

In 1978, China abandoned its traditional governance model of a planned economy and opened the door to a comprehensive change in its administrative system. Under the multiple actions of globalization, marketization, and decentralization, regional urbanization and urban regionalization became the main features of a booming economy in Chinese regional economic development (Zhang, 2004). In this development process, a regional economic pattern has strongly reconstructed. In addition, metropolitan areas have been rapidly emerging and have become vital and core areas in the Chinese economy. As a new brand of China, metropolitan areas are participating in the global competition and international division of labor. This is evident through the fact that by the end of 2010, there were 23 metropolitan areas in China (Fang, *et al*, 2011). Please see Figure 1.1.




Figure 1-1: The development of Metropolitan Areas in China

Source: Compiled from Fang C. L., Yao S. M. and Liu S. H. (2011). *China's urban agglomeration development report in 2010*. Science Press. P179-225.

Figure 1-1 shows that the number of metropolitan areas has increased at a much faster rate, especially in the last 10 years. We do not know how long this will continue, but it is certain that metropolitan areas will grow with rapid speed in the future. According to a report from the National Development and Reform Commission of China during the third meeting of the 12th National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPC Standing Committee), July 2013, 10 regional metropolitan areas will soon be coming out. This report focuses upon the forthcoming core issues for the new type of urbanization (*Xin Xing Cheng Zhen Hua*) (Wang S.S., 2013). It shows that the construction of metropolitan areas have become the main economic development strategy at national as well as local level. This means that the number of metropolitan areas will mount quickly and the rapid development of metropolitan areas will become the most important feature of regional spatial structure in China.

1.2 Problem statement

Compared to Western countries, research on Chinese metropolitan governance started more recently. With a background of rapid globalization and regional reconstruction, the development and construction of metropolitan areas requires new governance to solve cross-boundary public problems. In such a context, as a tool of metropolitan governance, there is a need for research into the proper development of metropolitan planning management systems.

1.2.1 The dilemma of Chinese regional development

In the process of transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy in China, the state policies and governance have downscaled to the urban level (Wu and Zhang, 2010). Economic decentralization and urban entrepreneurialism enhances regional development capacity in regional economic activities. For this reason a large number of local governments have become significant decision-making bodies as a function of their own revenue (He and Wu, 2005; He, Li, and Wu, 2006; Wu, Xu, and Yeh, 2007). Individual local governments have also been involved in competitive games in pursuit of self-interest maximization (Chien, 2007; Chien and Gordon, 2008). With rapid regional economy growth, regional cutthroat competitions have emerged and lead to a "prisoner dilemma" of regional communication and cooperation (Luo and Shen, 2005). Further development at regional level is facing serious challenges, such as local

protectionism, convergence of industrial structure, unnecessary repetition of infrastructure, cross boundary pollution and disorderly competitions (Zhou and Gao, 2006; Zou, et, al., 2011).

To decrease regional conflicts, an inter-city cooperation and coordinated regional development was called for (Ji, Yu, and Luo, 2006; Tao, 2007; Zong, 2008). Increasing number of local governments were involving in the promotion of coordinated regional harmonious and sustainable development (Fan, 2006).

1.2.2 Weak influence of metropolitan planning in regional governance

With respect to the allocation of spatial resources, metropolitan planning was presumed to have four impacts. Firstly, there would be an arrangement for future “spatial order” of metropolitan areas. Secondly, the agreements would benefit all parties. Thirdly, the program of collective action would promote the overall coordination of regional sustainable development. Finally, an important tool would be used to promote regional governance (Filion, 1996; Bromley, 2001; Wilkinson, et, al., 2010). Multi-levelled governments placed their hope on new spatial planning to effectively supply regional public goods and services based on cooperation rather than competition.

In the face of vast boundary-crossing public problems, metropolitan planning was deemed a tool that could be used to achieve the goal of cross-boundary governance. As a new type of spatial planning, metropolitan planning has emerged in China since 2000. There are plenty of metropolitan planning programming projects that have been carried out all over the country in recent years. However, the functions of such plans in cross-boundary governance were far below the expectations. It is difficult to make the blueprint of metropolitan planning come true. The blueprint of future metropolitan planning exists, but the outcome of planning practice is still out of sight. Along with the rapid growth of global economic integration and regionalization, competition among regions and metropolitan areas intensified. In this rapid regional development, metropolitan planning does not work well.

1.2.3 Metropolitan planning administration needs a new system

In the Chinese spatial planning system, metropolitan planning is not a statutory planning instrument. As a non-statutory planning instrument, it was attached to the urban and rural planning system. The Urban and Rural Law of the

People's Republic of China (which came into force as of January 1st, 2008) provides principles for the making and implementation of urban and rural planning as well as conducting construction activities in planning areas, but does not involve metropolitan areas.

In current China, any existing national laws or regulations do not govern metropolitan planning administration. Although some local governments made progress in metropolitan planning administration, the institutional construction on the national level is almost non-existent. Thus, it leads local governments to pay attention on establishing planning more than implementing planning, sometimes even to neglect planning administration. It also leads to chaos in the planning administration within areas such as organizing the establishment, examination and approval procedures, and the implementation of metropolitan planning.

In the transition from “pre-modern” to “modern”, due to the complexity and particularity of the transition of the great powers, the planning system construction in China has always lagged behind the actual demand of social development. Due to serious deficiencies in the planning administration system, metropolitan planning just appears to be like a “Utopian” imaginary concept.

There exists many research papers on planning system and regional governance in China that provides reference to improve the theory and practice of metropolitan planning. (Tao, 2008; Yu and Yin, 2010; Wang and Li, 2012). In reality, metropolitan planning in China cannot play its role very well in regional harmonious development. Questions now emerge, how to get free from the dilemma faced by the regional development in China? How to make metropolitan planning plays its real role in regional good governance? In what ways can the implementation of metropolitan planning be successfully developed and promoted? The effective institutional mechanism not only promoted the implementation of metropolitan planning, but also strengthened and rationalized regional cooperation. With a background of rapid system transformation and regional reconstruction in China, the development and construction of metropolitan areas need new governance reform so to face and effectively handle prolonged administrative fragmentation and cross-boundary public problems.

In such a context, there is a need for research into the proper development of the Chinese planning administration system and its implementation in metropolitan areas.

1.3 Research scope

Metropolitan areas are a new form of regional spatial organizations in contemporary metropolises. The basic features of metropolitan areas exceeds the regional scope of the administrative areas of cities, regional structures based on multiple urban cores, inter-city integration of land use, joint infrastructure construction and infrastructure sharing between cities, and urban-rural integration.

The concepts and theories of metropolitan area and urban agglomeration were introduced to China in the 1980s (Nin, Shi and Zha, 1998). These concepts have received increasing attention as the economic integration of the Yangtze River Delta was adopted as a national strategy. Domestic studies regarding urban agglomerations were not conducted until recently and scholars' understandings of urban agglomeration differ substantially. Furthermore, the terms used are diverse, such as (large) urban areas, metropolitan area, urban agglomeration, and metropolitan interlocking region. The differences are partially attributable to the translators that introduced the terms and partially to the differing perceptions of scholars (Zhang, 2003; Zhang, et al.,2001; Wu, et al.,2003;Zhang and Yang,2007). For example, the Chinese translation of “metropolitan area” could mean “urban area,” “metropolitan area,” “metropolis,” and “metropolitan interlocking region.”

“Metropolitan area” is a brand new concept in China, hence the confusions and misunderstandings regarding its interpretation. The most common confusion results from the inability to distinguish between metropolitan areas and urban agglomerations, which are two differing forms of regional spatial organizations of cities (Yuan, et al., 2006). For example, Dai Bin (2004) argued that a metropolitan area is a typical form of urban agglomeration, and Fang Chuanglin (Fang, et al., 2011) considered an urban agglomeration as a regional spatial presentation of advanced urban areas and metropolitan areas.

Despite the different understandings, scholars have, of the metropolitan area concept, the basic connotations are similar, which is that metropolitan areas are the products of advanced regional urbanization. In other words, metropolitan areas are neighboring urban or regional spaces that have close socioeconomic relationships and high levels of urbanization as well as integration. As models of urban regional spatial organizations, urban agglomerations and metropolitan areas are the results of large urban regional spatial organizations that have transitioned from simple to

complex structures and from rudimentary to advanced levels. Urban agglomerations and metropolitan areas are both flexible regional units based on functional zones, transcending the boundaries of administrative areas (Liu, 2012).

Because of habitual influence and the lack of necessary awareness, these terms have been used interchangeably in academic research, policy planning, and media reports, resulting in confusion for understanding, expressing, and communicating relevant ideas. For convenience and clarity, this study unified the expressions and used “metropolitan area” to refer to both models in this study. Therefore, in the cases discussed in this study, the term urban agglomerations are referred to as metropolitan areas.

1.4 Research aims

This study aims to find an effective way of moving Chinese metropolitan planning administration towards good governance through thoroughly investigating the relationship between the central and local government and the relationship between the government, market and society.

This study examines the Chinese metropolitan planning administration taking lessons from its past, current development and provides recommendations for its future improvement. Research into the current metropolitan planning administration system in China is also evaluated.

Specifically therefore, this research will:

1. Analyze historic systems to find what has changed since the reform and opening-up policy in 1978.
2. Evaluate the current system in order to determine what the situation is, to find what problems it contains.
3. Make recommendations to improve the future system to find a better way forward for the metropolitan planning administration in China.

1.5 Research questions

This research will discuss the history, current and future system of the Chinese metropolitan planning administration. There are four central research questions implicit in the brief which will guide the analysis:

1. How has it changed since 1978?
2. What situation is the current system in?
3. Why doesn't the current system work better?

4. How can system be improved?

To analyse the historical changes of the metropolitan planning administration, this study outlines the transition of planning system into general background of the overall system transition of China following the reform and opening-up policy movement which started in 1978. This study will gain insights from Chinese decentralization to identify the following issues:

1. What has changed since 1978?
2. What are the basic characteristics and trends of the changes?
3. What factors pushed the changes? And what mechanism was embedded in the changes?

To evaluate the current metropolitan planning administration, research needs to deeply investigate the Chinese present planning system. This study will gain insights from informed policies and local practices to identify the following issues:

1. What is the present planning system in China? How does it works?
2. How and when metropolitan areas and metropolitan planning developed in China?
3. What are the operating mechanisms and affecting factors of current metropolitan planning administration within the present urban-rural system?

In order to unveil reasons why the current system does not work as well as expected, this study will examine below mentioned problems. Focusing on the relationships between the government, market and society in metropolitan planning administration, further work will make deep-rooted explanations for the problems and will discuss the following questions:

1. Where is the gap between actual levels and the planned goals of metropolitan planning?
2. What are the restrictive factors that caused the gap?
3. How do variations in planning systems influence results of metropolitan planning administration?
4. What is the institutional origin of the causes of the failure of such planning?

To achieve good governance, this study will also make recommendations to improve the future system. Focusing on the rationalized adjustment of the relationship between the government, market and society, it will discuss an adjusted direction for the metropolitan planning administration system in China. It will also be discussing the following questions:

1. What principles and guidelines are necessary to optimize the future system?
2. What is the fundamental direction of the system reform?

1.6 Structure of the thesis

There are eight chapters in this thesis with structure as follows:

1. Chapter 1 is an introduction, it concerns with the research background, problem statement, research aim and questions.
2. Chapter 2 is concerned with critical review. From the theories of regional governance to the practice of metropolitan planning management, and to the practice in China, this chapter provides an overview of the current state of knowledge associated with regional governance and the metropolitan planning management.
3. Chapter 3 is concerned with research methodology and data collection. It shows the framework of this study, definite research methods and the ways of data collection. In addition, it explains the reasons behind the selection of case studies and interviewees.
4. Chapter 4 is concerned with historic system. Based on the review of relevant literature and the chronology of planning events, this study outlines the planning system transition into the general background of the overall system transition of China. It gives an analysis of how Chinese planning management system has changed following the reform and opening-up policy since 1978.
5. Chapter 5 is concerned with current system. It describes the current planning management system and development of metropolitan planning in China. It analyzes current situation of metropolitan planning management in China.
6. Chapter 6 is concerned with problems analysis. It discusses existing problems and their root-cause by investigating the relationship between the central government and local government as well as the relationship between government, market and society.
7. Chapter 7 is concerned with future system. It makes recommendations for metropolitan planning management system reform in China. It aims to find a way of moving Chinese metropolitan planning management to a better governance.
8. Chapter 8 is a self-contained summary and criticism of the thesis.

Contribution to academic knowledge and policy thinking of the thesis is summarized. It also addresses the scope of further study.

Chapter 2

2.0 Critical Review: from Regional Governance to Metropolitan Planning Management with the Practice in China

Metropolitan planning (MP) is an arrangement of "spatial order" in the future (Albrechts, 2006; Healey, 2006; Salet, et al., 2003). Also it is an important tool for regional governance (Salet, et al., 2003). Metropolitan planning and management (MP and M) should be changed along with changes in city regional governance. It can be regarded as a specific form of public management. MP&M system varies along with changes in the public management (PM) paradigm. During the past 30 years, such changes were specified on the transformation from Management to Governance (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000).

In the 1980s, there was a move in a number of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries towards New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1995). NPM advocated the promotion of public services marketing through government enterprise and decentralization (Wright, 1994). In the 1990s, cross-boundary political movement occurred, and Regional Development Agencies (RDA) and other regional organizations were boosted, leading to the transformation of "New Localism" and then to "New Regionalism" (Deas and Ward, 2000). Therefore, a comprehensive change of metropolitan governance was encouraged by the new public management movement, and various kinds of formal and informal partnerships were established in metropolitan areas (Hamilton, 2004).

In the late 1990s, Post-New Public Management methods were developed to resolve problems such as the political fragmentation in NPM practice. This led to a new string of government reforms taking place (Christensen, 2012). All of these reforms intended to solve external problems arising out of the political fragmentation in metropolitan areas, through inter-governmental agreements and cooperation between central (or federal government, depending on the nation) and local governments, and also amongst local governments themselves (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). "Governance" is a popular term to describe this new form of public action. It presents the renewal of metropolitan governments (Lefèvre, 1998).

China has abandoned the planned economy mode and the omnipotent-type governance model since 1978, thus opened the door of comprehensive restructuring

on national institution (Yuan et al., 2006). In the context of marketization and decentralization, sustained rapid growth in the provincial economy was observed and that became one of the main features of Chinese regional economic development (Zhang, 2008). Metropolitan areas (MAs) became the most dynamic and promising core areas of Chinese economic development environment (Zhang, 2004). MAs became the new geographical unit of international division (Wu and Zhang, 2007). MAs are formed by a group of cities. In this case, the development of MAs faced the problems such as administrative fragmentation and large numbers of across boundary public issues. The development and construction of metropolitan areas thus called for a real change of regional governance. Related researches in MP&M showed rising concerns by scholars. For example, Salet et al. (2003) discussed the role of MP&M in the Metropolitan governance and spatial planning by comparing case studies of European city-regions.

Numerous studies on regional governance have shown that the change of governance is largely explained by the complexity of social and political structures (Hamilton, 2000; Feiock, 2004; Fontan, et al., 2009). This chapter examines metropolitan planning management taking lessons from its origins, specifically therefore, this research will: 1) Analyze the theoretical development to find the change of its origins; 2) Evaluate current knowledge on metropolitan governance; 3) Make recommendations to improve the future system to find a better way forward for metropolitan planning management system reform in China.

The following review is limited to key publications that provide an overview of the current state of knowledge associated with the metropolitan planning management. This work will critically review – first the change of regionalism and shift of public management, secondly the experimental evidence supporting the change of metropolitan planning management in Western countries, and thirdly the practice of metropolitan planning management in China. Emphasis is specifically placed on Chinese literature of MP&M, in terms of management institutions, management mode, management operation, and planning legislation. Evidences, based on the Chinese practical experiences are also presented and discussed with regards to research on metropolitan planning management.

2.1 Development of regionalism: from regionalism to metropolitan regionalism

The development of regionalism provides with the theoretical framework and guidance on the practice of regional governance. The development of regionalism can be divided into three stages. The first stage starts from the Second World War to the 1970s, when many emerging countries were allied to promote regional cooperation in order to get rid of low degree development. The second stage began in the late 1980s (Väyrynen, 2003). A new perspective of regionalism emerged which was promoted by globalization. This wave was called the "new regionalism" in order to distinguish it from the previous regionalism (MacLeod, 2001). The third stage was the gradual rise of metropolitan regionalism in the 1990s (Brenner, 2002).

2.1.1 The historic path: regionalism

2.1.1.1 Origins of regionalism

Regionalism is a general term for theory and practice of regional cooperation after World War II. In general, it is a kind of interaction and cooperation involving several geographic neighbouring countries, in order to develop a common political, economic, strategic interests and objectives (Ethier, 2001; Väyrynen, 2003). After World War II, national liberation movements lead to the establishment of a large number of newly independent countries. In the beginning of the Cold War, facing confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, no country could just rely on its own forces to play a role on international stage. Therefore, many independent countries initiatively strengthened solidarity with neighboring countries to get rid of the bipolar world order, thus, regional cooperation was formed gradually. In the 1950s and 1960s, a large number of regional organizations had been established in Western Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Africa (Friskén and Norris, 2001). This included the Western European Economic Community (the predecessor of European Union). Along with the development of international regional organizations, regionalism theory had been developed (Väyrynen, 2003). However, there was rarely significant success apart from the economic integration in Western European Countries.

2.1.1.2 Connotation of regionalism

Traditional regionalism essentially emphasized on a kind of ideal hierarchical governance, namely using an authoritative regional singleton government to replace

the local government. It advocated unified regional governance organizational model, so called "compulsory integration". The region had a unique decision-making center and unified regional government agency (Väyrynen, 2003). It could be either some small units joined together as a singleton government or a two-tiered government structure. Traditional regionalism advocates the merging of jurisdictions and consolidation that helps in rationalizing the size of government and also promotes the development of local governments that lack resources. It allowed the citizens to fully participate in decision-making, thereby effectively promoting economic development, equalizing local finance, and providing a cross-boundary service.

2.1.2 New regionalism

2.1.2.1 Background of New Regionalism

In the 1980s, the value of the region had been rediscovered and research on the region started to resuscitate. There is an increasing demand for governments to carry out a series of intra-regional, bilateral or multilateral cooperation with inter-regional cooperative governance as the prerequisite (Hettne, 2003). On the other hand, economic globalization has brought fierce global competition. Single cities have been replaced by city regions which are regarded as the most important source of competitive advantage in capitalist sociality (Storper, 1997). Gilpin (2001) believed that the "Single European Act (SEA)" in 1986 stimulated the United States and other countries to seek their own institutional arrangements for regional cooperation. This then became the starting point of "new regionalism". Frisken and Norris (2001) suggested that the new system's competitive advantage has been formed, and its position and role in the global context is now more prominent. Region is the key factor for coordination of multiple parties and common prosperity (Wallis, 1994); the vital space morphology for fostering competition advantage (Scott and Storper, 2003; Jonas and Ward, 2007). This kind of cooperative governance model cannot only integrate regional resources and guarantee collaborative developments, but also avoids the disadvantages of big government. This model was thus called "New Regionalism".

2.1.2.2 Basic proposition

"New regionalism" can generally refer to theory and practice of the promotion of regionalization, regional cooperation and coordinated development, popular since the late 1980s. It is the "current for the pursuit of balanced regional

development and integration the sum of a series of movements” (Warleigh-Lack, 2006). New regionalism is not just a traditional revival of regionalism, but also emphasized on the importance of "multi-aspects" and "open regional units". It is a multi-level and multi-latitude analysis of regionalism, and the social construction of regional process. The "new regionalism" emphasized that regionalization is a socially constructed, dynamic, and historical process of development. It is a political reform derived from the inside, in order to establish the new order with comprehensive and coordinated developments (Hamilton, 1999; Hettne, 2003).

The “region” in new regionalism is considered as a management unit based on a multi-level network and voluntary model. It emphasizes the feature of flexibility in cooperation mechanisms. Therein, "multi-layer" suggests that the relationship between different organization powers is no longer a vertical relationship, but an equal relationship (Hamilton, 1999). "Network" represents close linkage and interaction among different levels of organization of powers. "Cooperation" here is with the features of being open to inside and beyond the region (Deas and Ward, 2000). New Regionalism is trying to go beyond the dilemma between "state intervention" and "market regulation". It argues that the problem-solving solution should comprehensively apply two mechanisms: competition and cooperation (Hettne, 2003). It is to establish a regional strategy partnership between social public and non-governmental organizations. The focus of regional policy should be placed on fostering the organization, mobilization, and competitive advantage of “regional internal power” (Hamilton, 2004). Along with Hettne’s viewpoint, the formation of a regional role with the independent right is promoted due to the interaction of all kinds of behavioral agents including state, market, and civil society (Hettne, 2003). New regionalism involves the decision-making process of regional issues, cooperation agreements in regions, and also solving problems of regions via government forces, if necessary (Hamilton, 2004). Scott (2007) commented that new regionalism resulted in the landscape of regional governance with the feature of high diversity. A new interactive market was formed in state, society and market, to cope with growing social and policy issues.

2.1.2.3 Differences of regionalism and new regionalism

Both regionalism and new regionalism, have emphasized on the interdependence and synergy between regional bodies. Compared with the former,

new regionalism reviews the revival of regionalism and regional advocates plan in the global vision. From regionalism to new regionalism, it is a historical development process from "rational construction" to "social construction" (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000; Frisken and Norris, 2001). New regionalism relates regionalization as a social construct, dynamic, and historical development process (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000). It emphasizes on multi-level regionalism, pluralism, multiple latitude analysis and social construction of regionalization process. Although with the common target of promotion of region cooperation, the difference between them still exists as illustrated in Table 2.1.

Table 2-1: Comparison of regionalism and new regionalism

Contents	Regionalism	New Regionalism
Philosophical foundation	Construction of instrumental rationality	Social constructivism, communicative rationality
Governance concept	Bureaucracy governance; Single-center management; The highlight of government authority	Pluralistic governance Multi-center network management The highlight of equality, consultation and cooperation
Intergovernmental relations	The upper and lower levels of government is a "command-execute" relationship.	Autonomy and equality, The cooperation between upper and lower levels of government
Regional management agencies	Establishment of regional government with the absolute authority, the unified management to regions	Based on the joint efforts of interests, through a variety of partnerships, Multilevel regional alliance network governance
Responsibilities of regional members	Bureaucratic system within regional members bringing corresponding responsibilities and obligations	Equal negotiations, Power allocation, liability allocation, cost allocation, distribution of benefits, the division of labor contract
Regional openness	Regional boundaries clear, rigid regions, relatively strong boundaries to outside	Fuzzy regional boundaries, flexible and open area, uncertainty cooperation regions, Multi-level governance

Source: Created by the author.

2.1.3 The new conjuncture: metropolitan regionalism

In the 1990s, global capitals faced the operation of localization which reinforced the prerequisite roles of local social system for acceleration of goods chain space diffusion and capital circulation (Storper, 1997). Capital control ability and goods' chain is up-scaling to the global or supra-national level. In the meantime, production capacity and industrial competitiveness are constantly down-scaling to the level of local area. Regional cooperation as a new experimental policy and

institutional reform is to regain attention (Swyngedouw, 1997). It thus leads to a series of growth-oriented policy reforms in metropolis (Wallis, 1994; Hamilton, 1999). Since the mid-1990s, a burgeoning flow of popular and academic books and articles, have focused public attention on the problems of big cities and their surrounding regions (Mitchell-Weaver, et al., 2000).

The main idea of metropolitan regionalism is to achieve cross-administrative governance and cooperation, via constructing a variety of systems, policies and governance mechanisms. Inspired by the concept of new regionalism, metropolitan regionalism is a kind of development strategic framework with the feature of cooperation tendencies and regional characteristics. Swanstrom (1996) pointed that the metropolitan regionalism has changed “from a social welfare justification, aimed at the redistribution of resources, to an economic justification aimed at regional growth and prosperity.”

Since the 1990s, the United States began to go through a new round of metropolitan governance reforms involving the revival of regional planning and the advocacy of regional cooperation (Wallis, 1994; Hamilton, 1999). Defined by Brenner (2002) as, "metropolitan regionalism refers to all strategies to establish institutions, policies or governance mechanisms at a geographical scale which approximates that of existing socioeconomic interdependencies within an urban agglomeration" (Brenner, 2002, p 4-5). Metropolitan regionalism encompassed a broad range of institutional forms, regulatory strategies and governance projects.

2.2 Transformation of public management paradigm: from new public management to metropolitan governance

Since World War II, public management paradigm shifted from the traditional bureaucracy to the new public management, further to the post-new public management, and lastly up to metropolitan governance. The transformation of public management paradigm provides reference to the innovation of management, and guides the changes of relationships between the government, market and society.

2.2.1 New public management

2.2.1.1 Background of new public management

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was widely believed that the traditional public management, characterized as bureaucracy, had been unable to guide the real-world government to cope up with the increase in financial crisis as well as

confidence crisis on government (Hood, 1991). By the beginning of the 1990s and in the most advanced countries, the new model of public sector management was in the process of development, followed by many developing countries (Politt, 1990). The new model has several incarnations, including: “managerialism”, “new public management”, and “market-based public administration or entrepreneurial government” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Therefore, a massive wave of government reform was raised around the world. Hughes (2003) noted, "There has been a transformation in the management of the public sectors of advanced countries. The traditional model of public administration, which predominated for a longer time in twentieth century, has changed since the mid-1980s to a flexible, market-based form of public management. This is not simply a matter of reform or a minor change in management style, but a change in the role of government in society and the relationship between government and citizenry. Traditional public administration has been discredited theoretically and practically, and the adoption of new forms of public management meant the emergence of a new paradigm in the public sector." (Hughes, 2003, p1).

2.2.1.2 Basic connotation of new public management

New Public Management not only refers to a governance management theory, that attempts to replace traditional public management theory, but also refers to a new model of public management. “NPM” movements were derived from Buchanan’s public choice theory and Osborne’s entrepreneurial government theory. The essence of these two theories was the introduction of a market competition mechanism, the establishment of entrepreneurial government, and the supported Reinventing Government (Hood, 1991). NPM was also known as "Managerialism", "Entrepreneurial Government", "The Post-bureaucracy mode" and "Market-based Public Management". The core idea of all of these terms was that government reformation was based on the idea of neo-liberalism (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

Hughes (2003) pointed out that the stereotyped and hierarchical bureaucracy in traditional public management has been gradually transformed into a new form of PM which is flexible and market-based. Compared with the traditional PM, NPM made significant changes regarding the position of government functions, the participation body of PM, and the management tools (see Table 2.2).

Table 2-2: The difference between traditional PM and NPM

Contents	Traditional public management	New public management
Government functions	Paddle Public goods providers	Helm The quality and quantity controller of public goods
Management body	Unity, Government is the only body of public management	Diversity Non-profit organizations, the private sector, public participation
Management tools	Traditional management methods, Hierarchical management	business-like operation in government Emphasis on efficiency Adopting target management, performance management, etc.

Source: Created by the author.

NPM suggests promoting the marketization of supply of public goods via decentralization of authority and enterprization of government (Hood, 1991). Wright (1994) suggests that government departments around the world should not only be reduced, but to be reconstructed thoroughly following the principles of the establishment of private sector. NPM suggests using market forces to transform governments, using market mechanisms in the public sector, promoting competition, shrinking the size of government, and increasing the supply efficiency of public goods as well as services (Wright, 1994; Self, 2000). NPM has completely changed the relationship of traditional models between government and the public. It emphasizes on the roles of market in the public service. It emphasizes on using the market to replace government in providing responsive services and to meet the needs of different citizens.

Therefore, specialized companies handled many public services that performed previously by the government. It needs to provide a cooperation mechanism for all actors who will and can contribute to the fulfillment of a public service in their own interest. Most of actors come from both the public and the private sectors. Thus, the government is no longer simply issue instructions and monitor their implementation, but must shape the framework conditions in such a way that cooperation operates smoothly even without constant oversight (Christensen and Læg Reid, 2008).

2.2.2 Post-new public management

2.2.2.1 Background of post-new public management

In the late 1990s, many countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Norway et cetera, have operated the second round of government reform that is significantly different from the "NPM". Different terms were used by these countries regarding this round of reform, such as "Joined-up Government" and "Holistic Government" (the United Kingdom) (Pollitt, 2003), "Collaboration Government" or "Net-worked Government" (United States), "Horizontal Government" (Canada), "Connecting Government" or "Whole-of-Government" (Australia and New Zealand). This round of government reform, which was based on a critique of NPM, was collectively referred to as "Post-New Public Management" (Christensen and Ltegreid, 2009). They documented two results derived from NPM: (1) it weakened the control of governments from central longitudinally; (2) it brought the fragmentation of management horizontally. The NPM movement intensified and magnified the inherent management fragmentation in traditional bureaucracy. "Holistic Government" was a kind of correction and adjustment for dealing with the "NPM". NPM seriously neglected the cooperation and coordination between departments, which actually strengthened the drawback as fragmentation management of government, and finally led to a fragmentation of institutional structure (Leat et al., 2002).

2.2.2.2 Basic proposition of post-new public management

Post-NPM was a new reform model of government, which was based on the criticism and inheritance of "NPM" following the administration reform road in Western countries. Perri et al. (1999) indicated that previous administrative reforms were established on functions. An overall government theory as the alternative model of functionality organization was proposed under the reflection and criticism on the functionality organization. It was to make horizontal collaboration and integration between the main functions and the service areas within the public sectors (Wilkinson and Appelbee, 1999). Pollit (2003) suggests that "Joined-up Government" is able to exclude policy scenarios of mutual destruction and erosion, promote the cooperation of different stakeholders in a particular policy area, and provide citizens with seamless service rather than separation. Ling (2002) made a theoretical summarization on Post-NPM reform based on the practice of Western

countries, and thus refined a kind as the best organizational model of “Joined-up Government”.

2.2.2.3 Comparison of new public management and post-new public management

From "modern bureaucracy" to the "NPM" in the late 1970s, and to “Post-NPM” in the late 1990s, Western countries followed a path that led to the transformation of the PM paradigm. Table 2.3 illustrates the main theoretical viewpoints regarding traditional bureaucracy, NPM, and post-NPM.

Table 3-3: Comparison of the theoretical viewpoints in public management paradigm

	Traditional bureaucracy	New Public Management	Post- New Public Management
Rise time	Before 1980s	1980-2000	After 2000
Basic theory	Bureaucracy theory classical management theory	New Institutional Economics Modern management theory Public choice theory	Public Value Management Theory ; Collaborative theory; Network governance theory; The whole government theory; Seamless Government theory
Management philosophy	Management of public sector forms	Management of private sector forms	Public-private partnership Central ground combination
Operational Principles	Functional division of labor	Partly integration of government function	Integrated operation of the government
Morphology	Level control	Direct professional management	Network-based service
Core Care	Administration by laws	Operational standards /performance indicators	Meet public demand
Achievement test	Focus on inputs	Focus on output	Focus on results
Power operation	Centralization	Decentralization	Re-centralization / expanded empower
Organizational Structure	Function separation	Cracking Agencies	Collaboration and Integration
Financial operations	Official budget	Competition	Integrated budget
Operational resources	Extensive use of manpower	Information Technology	Network Management
Public service	Government offered, hierarchical departments or professional agencies	Endorsement of privatization and public agencies	Choose an efficient public sector, private sector, community groups, increasing member who is beneficial for customers
Key objectives	Political input, service under the supervision of	Management inputs and outputs, making sure the responses are in line	Effectively deal with issues of public, to achieve public value, expanded from

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	bureaucratic organization	with the needs of economic development and customer	service delivery to the maintaining of system
Service Delivery	Grading system, self-regulatory professional organization	The private sector or the public agency who is Strictly limited	Multi-choice menu, flexible selection according to the practice
Key impetus	Rules and guidance imposed by authority and strong norms	Goals as motivation of individuals and organizations	Mutual recognition, sense of common purpose, commitment to mutual learning
Identification of public benefit	Defined by Politicians and Experts, rarely taking the public's comments into consideration	The sum of individual preferences, senior politicians or administrators capture consumer preferences	Personal and public preferences (from public deliberation), reflect the preference of individuals and the public via an interactive process
Government Services	Government provides a number of services	Strengthen the capacity of the central government	Policy integration to solve the problem of public
Target of managers	Making Responses to political decisions	Agreement with the performance objectives	Respond to the preference of citizens/ users
Role of Manager	Ensure compliance with the rules and procedures	Assisting for development and improvement of performance goals	To play an active role in the direction of the network, to provide and maintain overall capacity of system
Responsibility model	Upwards responsibility via organization and institution, and responsible via political officials	Upwards responsibility via performance contracts, sometimes responsible for customers via market mechanisms	Responsible for multi-parties - Citizens as the supervisor of government - Customers as receiver of service - Taxpayer as source of funds
Public role	Limited to the voting in elections, and to put pressure on the elected representatives	Restrictions - excepting for customer satisfaction survey	Multiple participation (customers, citizens, stakeholders)
Features of the times	Improvement gradually via government operations	The introduction of competition mechanism in government	High integration of government system and public demands

Sources:

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As shown in Table 2.3, the transformation of PM paradigm is fundamentally due to the continuous interaction and constant reconstruction among the three parts as “Government-Market-Society” of Western countries. Thus, transformation was dominated by changes of the relationship of these three parts. The final target was to enhance the government ability and to improve government performance to meet multi-faceted diversified public needs. As McGuire (2006) argued that collaboration is a complex process. The researches on collaborative PM have just begun.

2.2.3 Metropolitan governance

2.2.3.1 Debates on metropolitan government

Since the late 19th century, urbanization in Western countries significantly accelerated. Due to the tradition of local autonomy, therefore, a number of local governments became the shackles for the outward expansion of cities, particularly the large cities. Such "fragmentation" of government structure led to disadvantages like unclear responsibilities, double taxation, and non-cooperative administration, which ultimately hindered such economic development, land planning and environmental protection, as other regional coordinate developments (Martin and Schiff, 2011). In this case, metropolitan government was suggested as the solution for political fragmentation. Since the 1930s, the United States promoted the practices of metropolitan government. Political fragmentation means that there are too many local governments. These independent administrative units are the main obstacle to improve the efficiency of providing services to public. To find a solution, the number of local governments should be lowered down through the processes of merging or consolidation (Wood, 1961).

The core concept of Metropolitan Government is "one government for one area ". Taking Toronto, Winnipeg, and Montreal as examples, many provincial regional governments were established to manage urban development and services after World War II (Vogel, et al., 2010). Montreal Metropolitan Community provided the planning for sewage treatment, waste discharges, environmental protection, transport networks and other social service facilities. It coordinates various resources of departments, makes a series of policies and regulations, avoids duplication of government agencies and waste of resources (Lindstrom, 2010). The establishment of these large regional governments was beneficial for streamlining government functions and providing the most efficient service to the whole region.

After World War II, “area-based government” formed through merging and consolidation was not a large-scale epidemic in the United States. “The giant government” was facing an increasing boycott from citizens and other political parties (Leland and Thurmaier, 2005). “The giant government” operates counter to the traditional concept of the best government with minimal regulation in the United States. It may also overlook some of the economic and cultural needs from certain vulnerable or ethnic groups within the jurisdiction, and thus cannot be an equitable distribution of social and economic resources (Savitch et al, 2010).

Regarding these practical difficulties, Wood (1976) pointed out that the failure of Metropolitan Government in practice is mainly due to two factors: (1) the legality, and (2) the manner it is implemented. The legitimacy was founded on political, psychological and social factors over a period. The legitimacy of metropolitan government was facing pressure from local governments, pressure groups and citizens. As Leach (1991) argued, if people do not know the related structure and operating mechanism, it would be difficult to let them agree with the decisions of government.

2.2.3.2 The advocacy of metropolitan governance

To the 1960s, the public choice school began to strongly criticize the metropolitan government theories. A metropolitan government was composed of multiple coalitions. A government with a simplified structure, but a very broad jurisdiction, finds it much easier to obtain the dominant position in the metropolitan area. Ostrom et al. (1988) pointed out that the election of a metropolitan government would reduce the cost, but it cannot produce an ideal society. From their perspective, a polycentric system of governance in metropolitan areas cannot only benefit the residents as “voted by feet”, but also helps to improve public quality via competition (Bingham, 1991).

In the 1980s, there was a move in a number of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries towards New Public Management (NPM) (Hood C, 1995). NPM advocated the promotion of public services marketing through government enterprise and decentralization (Wright, 1994). In the 1990s, cross-boundary political movement occurred, and Regional Development Agencies (RDA) and other regional organizations were boosted, leading to the transformation of “New Localism” and then to “New Regionalism”

(Deas and Ward, 2000). Therefore, a comprehensive change of metropolitan governance was encouraged by the NPM movement, and various kinds of formal and informal partnerships were established in metropolitan areas (Hamilton, 2004).

In the late 1990s, Post-New Public Management (PNPM) methods developed to resolve problems such as the political fragmentation in NPM practice. This led to a new string of government reforms taking place (Christensen, 2012). These government reforms comprised of developments such as Joined-up Government (Pollitt, 2003), Holistic Government (Halligan, 2004), Networked Government (Stoker, 2006; Eggers and Goldsmith, 2003), and Whole-of-Government (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007).

All of these reforms intended to solve external problems which were arising out of the political fragmentation in metropolitan areas, through inter-governmental agreements, cooperation between central (or federal government, depending on the nation) and local governments, and amongst local governments themselves (Savitch & Vogel, 2000). For example, Joined-up Government aimed to harmonize policies and utilize resources efficiently. In addition, it advocated stakeholders' cooperation to provide seamless public service rather than fragmentation (Pollitt, 2003). Perri et al, (1999) believed that Joined-up Government could solve cross-boundary public problems by involving horizontal synergy and integration among public departments (Perri, Seltzer & Stoker, 1999; Ling, 2002).

Stein (1993) pointed out that there are more complex multi-behavior agent systems in new forms of public action that appeared in most Western countries. The highest legal and management capacity of central government is disappearing thus a new form of public management began to develop. Bingham et al (2005) suggested that it is necessary to introduce new players (e.g. local authorities, industry associations, and business communities) and to establish broad participation mechanisms. Savitch and Vogel (2000) suggested that metropolitan governance is to establish a mechanism for addressing government fragmentation. Adopting the case of Toronto, Williams conducted investigations on the relations between institutional capacity and metropolitan governance. This research argues that the supply capability of an effective system is the key to success of governance. For instance, the Greater Toronto Area Task Force established in 1995 plays an important role in practically coordinating various conflicts and contradictions (Williams, 1999).

With practices of metropolitan governments, more actors and different forms of action were involved. “Governance” is a popular term to describe this new form of public action. It presents the renewal of metropolitan governments (Lefèvre, 1998). Polycentric governance theory advocated decentralization rather than centralization in the governance systems of metropolitan areas (Parks and Oakerson, 1989). Through empirical research, public choice theory proposed a "polycentric governance" model, which argued that the "bureaucracy" governance advocated by "giant government theory" leads to oversupply and unnecessary production. It thus believes that the most effective solution should be "market mechanisms". On the contrary, many small local governments tend to have high efficiency and good responsiveness. From Tiebout's classical theory, "voting by feet" (for a critique, please see Dowding et.al.,1994; Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008), public choice scholars believe that there are a lot of autonomous local governments to create an environment like market, that residents can choose their most preferred administrative jurisdiction about suitable tax and services transactions. They insisted institutionalized fragmentation is an advantage for the effective delivery of public services.

The eternal theme of metropolitan governance is to seek new forms of effective city area management. A significant feature of metropolitan governance is the establishment of various partnerships (Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Albrechts et al., 2003). As two modes for regional governance: Joining Forces and City Regions Net, the former concerns large-scale issues like cross-region, and the latter focuses on the central city and its hinterland. Joint Forces stressed: (1) flexible forms of cooperation; (2) vertical inter-governmental cooperation; (2) participation of stakeholders; (4) capability of addressing crisis. Whereas, City Regions Net stressed: (1) establishment of vertical partnerships among cities, regions and countries; (2) making strategies of regional coordinated development of Cities and metropolitan areas; (3) development of urban-rural coordination and overall planning; (4) breaking boundaries of regions and developing capacity of building partnerships; (5) increasing the responsiveness of cities (Herrschel and Newman, 2013).

2.2.3.3 The initiation of the network governance

Based on the empirical studies on the inter-regional policy of U.S. metropolitan area, there began to form a new perspective for metropolitan

governance in 1990s, called New Regionalism. It emphasized that governance was founded on a collaborative process rather than bureaucracy. Therein, participants include all public and private sector that plays the role of leadership in problem-solving process (Hamilton, 2002). It also emphasized on flexibility and openness, which promotes the emergence of Micro-regions to a certain extent. It was a new level of governance and leads to spatial reconstruction of political scale (MacLeod, 2001; Lord, 2006).

Although the orgies of giant government and polycentric governance showed a great vision of effective governance, to the viewpoint of new regionalism, it remains the plight of the Metropolitan. In recognition of impossibility of the comprehensive government reform, the attention was returned to the promotion of effective metropolitan governance. Therefore, since the 1990s, reformers are no longer trying to establish a regional government; on the contrary, they are more concerned about regional governance. They focused more on the process rather than the structure. They are trying to establish a comprehensive cooperation process between the private/non-profit sectors and the government. Hamilton (2004) pointed out that regional governance with the perspective of new regionalism includes: (1) cooperation between governments; (2) cooperation between public and private sectors. New Regionalism advocates establishment of cooperation, collaboration, networking and partnerships among government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, in order to effectively manage regional issues. Regional governance is a collaborative process of partnerships between public and private sectors, although public-private partnership does not necessarily constitute complete regional governance. However, formal or informal public-private partnerships are an essential part of regional governance (Hamilton, 2004).

New regionalism argues that the metropolitan issue is not just a matter of concern for the central city but also for the entire region. The mobilization of public and private resources through regional governance systems is the answer to this issue (Hamilton, 1999). To effectively achieve this purpose, it requires more collaboration between government leaders and between the leaders of private as well as non-profit organizations. They must be willing to share power and resources in order to achieve self-interest achievement. Citizen participation overcome the barriers of suspicion and distrust, and promotes cooperation in solving common problems (Putnam, et al., 1994). Therefore, Metropolitan governance is resolved through cooperation and

coordination networks, which are composed of various levels of government and private sectors (Heinelt and Kübler, 2004).

Deas and Ward (2000) argued, after 1990s, Cities Alliance like Regional Development Agencies (RDA) promoted the change from "new localism" to "new regionalism". It should not be regarded new regionalism as the result of power decentralization of central government, but an evolution of local governance. It is an interregional political movement within the country. According to the investigations and analysis carried out on relations between regional state government and community in Quebec, Canada, scholars found that network consultative mechanism with multi-participation could be formed between difference scales and roles in local governments as well as community organizations. Metropolitan regional governance could be promoted through negotiations, consultations, shared responsibilities and rights, and joint action (Fontan, et al., 2009). Brenner (2002) argued that metropolitan regional governance should focus on solving social problems including housing, health, education, and ethnicity in the future, rather than to debate on the modes. Brenner insisted that a centralized management or decentralized governance is more reasonable.

2.3 Practices of metropolitan governance: metropolitan planning and its organizations

Metropolitan planning management played an important role in the practice of coordinating various conflicts and contradictions (Williams, 1999). Multi-leveled government placed their hope on metropolitan planning to effectively supply regional public goods and services based on cooperation rather than competition.

2.3.1 Practices of metropolitan planning

Until the late 1970s, affected by Keynesian state interventionism, the administrative system regarding centralization management and bureaucracy had been widely applied. During this time, many countries launched a variety of regional planning lead by central government. France in the 1960s developed a "Paris Industrial Dispersed Plan" and "Balanced Metropolis Building Program"(Moseley, 1980). The United Kingdom developed multiple regional economic planning and space-usage planning with the top-down model. "Regional economic planning committee" had been established in the early 1970s (Wannop and Cherry, 1994; Leach, 1991). Former West Germany in 1965 enacted the federal "Regional Planning

Act", and passed "Federal regional planning framework" in 1975. Netherlands and Japan enacted many "national form planning" and "nationwide comprehensive development plan". The United States had issued a series of acts for promoting economic developments in undeveloped areas and some of the acts includes "Area Redevelopment Act" in 1961; "public Engineering and economic development Act" in 1965; and "Appalachian regional development Act" (Brenner, 2002; Bromley, 2001). In the meantime, the reform and planning of metropolitan area had been flourished along with the rapid recovery and prosperity after the war. Local governments had been integrated into a unified government, referred to as giant government. Many planning of metropolitan areas had been completed naturally via Metropolitan Government (Lefèvre, 1998).

The earliest urban regional planning was from John Claudius London, as a "breathing zone" in 1829. It offered London a growth model – presenting a ring of green belt separation. In 1870, Olmsted proposed construction of urban regional parks. For example, the movement on integrating Greater London Authority began in 1947 (Leach, 1991). The "Town and Country Planning Act" clearly defined the integrated regional planning status of Greater London. In 1967, the "London Local Government Act" led to the establishment of the Greater London council. Although Greater London council was revoked by the Thatcher government in 1986, its influence and reputation become the base of re-establishment of London Metropolitan government in 2000 (Cullingworth and Nadin ,2002). Toronto in 1954 built an effective bi-level metropolitan administration authority. The Upper-Lower level government undertakes the functions like region planning and local zoning, depending on their division of labor (Williams, 1999). Right now, Toronto still is Canada's largest metropolis Government (2.3 million of the population; six separated municipalities; more than 30 suburbs).

Three plans in New York City produced a profound impact to the future. In 1929, Regional Planning Association (RPA), equipped by corporations, citizen and community leaders, conducted a regional planning toward the New York Metropolitan area for the first time. (Johnson, 1995). The Regional Plan of New York and its Environs was published accordingly. Therein, it proposed a thought of "recentralization". The rapid spread of low-density suburbanization was emerged, referred to as "spread city" by RPA. To address the issues like land and environment

due to rapid suburbanization, RPA conducted the second time of regional planning and published "The second regional Planning: A Draft for Discussion". A Region at Risk" and was launched in 1996 by RPA (Hamilton, 1999). For this time, hundreds of "Non-Government Organization (NGO)" contributed to the implementation of planning therefore, it becomes an implementation mode for metropolitan regional planning around the world (Yaro and Hiss, 1996).

2.3.2 Development of metropolitan planning organizations

The rise of metropolitan governance provided extensive space for planning organizational growth. As a result, metropolitan planning management was continuously changing, and displaying a diversified development trend. For example, in America, the Federal Government induced the growth of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) via relevant policies (TRB, 2007).

After 1920, the U.S. and European metropolitan planning and organization began to rise. Taking the United States as an example, in the 1920s, regional economic integration broke through many cities, towns, counties and even state as administrative boundaries, but political fragmentation coming from local autonomy hinders the joint development of these areas. In 1921, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was established. Its main task was and is to coordinate and promote development of ports and airports. However, fragmented political system is difficult to reach a consensus. Thus, the metropolitan Government Council began to rise. In 1929, "Regional Planning and the suburbs of New York" were launched. It provided some proposals including the establishment of satellite cities (Johnson, 1995). In addition, the advocacy of organization – the Regional Plan Association (RPA) was established, to assist the implementation of region planning (Wood, 1961). However, this plan wasn't able to bring significant changes in the New York metropolitan. The growth of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) was beneficial because of the induction of federal government policy.

In 1962, the United States Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1962. This Act demanded that investment in highways in metropolitan areas must be based on transportation planning made by local governments through working together (TRB, 2007). The Act defined the authority of the MPO. MPOs were given a role in regional transportation planning for metropolitan areas, to ensure comprehensive, cooperative and continuing metropolitan planning process. As a

result, State MPOs could be a part of the state government, a regional council of governments, a planning district, or an independent Metropolitan Planning Organization (Nelson & Sanchez,*et.al.*,2004).

With the promotion of the Federal Aid Highway Act, the metropolitan areas began to establish planning commissions, councils of governments, and other metropolitan planning organizations. The status and functions of metropolitan planning organizations in America, for example, have been further strengthened in The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) (Wolfe and Beth Farquhar, 2005). Building on their historical transportation planning role, MPOs (under ISTEA) then had responsibility for establishing and maintaining enhanced planning processes. Globally MPOs not only played an important role in regional transportation, but also motivated the formulation of partnerships in metropolitan areas, which in turn promoted metropolitan planning formulation and implementation (Wolf & Beth Farquhar, 2005). In London, the metropolitan planning organization established the Planning Advisory Committee in 2000. In San Francisco, the Government Association took charge of planning formulation and implementation in the metropolitan area. However, metropolitan planning and its organizations still faced uncertainty. For example, Bromley (2001) indicated that the implementation rate of metropolitan planning was relatively low in many metropolises, and faced uncertainties. Some landmark planning agencies were even cancelled (Bromley, 2001).

With this new government reform, the structure of metropolitan governance changed, becoming more complicated. Institutional capacity building became a key factor in promoting the governance of metropolitan areas. Metropolitan area organizations, such as metropolitan area commissions, played an important role in the practice of coordinating various conflicts and contradictions (Williams, G., 1999).

Currently, the MPOs in United States includes different types of committees and professionals. Therein, Policy Committee is the highest-level decision-making body of the planning organization. The Committee constituted as follows: elected or appointed local officials, representatives of interest groups, federal officials (e.g. Transport Ministry, United Nations Environment Programme, etc.), nonvoting member (e.g. Federal Highway Administration, Bureau of Aviation, Railway

Bureau, consultant of Transportation Ministry, commerce chambers, etc.). They represent the interests of the jurisdiction with the law-conferred floor. An appointed advisory committee is to implement specific policies, and to develop a work plan (Bond et al., 2010). Yet, in some ways, the members are often to consider the interests of minorities too much (Sanchez, 2006).

2.3.3 Construction of institutional mechanisms for metropolitan planning

Since 1980s, many countries have undergone tremendous changes in planning and management system. Under the influence of new regionalism, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany conducted the reform in current planning system based on the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). Since 2000, UK mainly formed the regional program management and regulatory implementation system. Germany conducted the state (region)-local regional planning management and implementation system. National Space Planning Commission in UK and Germany was responsible for conducting the guidelines of national region planning. It established the management and implementation network consisted of traditional forces (i.e. government) and the new forces (i.e. social organizations, the private sector, and civic representatives). These systems provide institutional framework for communication and coordination of such industry, environment, land, transportation and other policies with spatial effects.

After investigating the historical development of MP in Madrid by 1857-1995, Neuman and Gavinha (2005) believed that dialectical relationship between continuity and change is the intrinsic motivation of evolution. Accompanied by rising democratic voices since 1975, the MP in Madrid had been changed from the previous political neutrality technical planning to the political and social development plan. Dodson (2009) focused on “Infrastructure Steering” of Australian metropolitan spatial planning. This research suggests that, in a market-oriented neoliberal era, spatial planning has been seriously weakened, and thus spatial planning is not referred to as facilities planning to some extent.

Metropolitan governance not only relies on infrastructure, but also extensively involves in institutional and political factors (Dodson, 2009). Therefore, urban regional planning system must be restructured to prevent many adverse effects like local over-governing (Eliadis et al., 2005). Hull (2000) pointed out that planning system should be remodeling thoroughly. He noted that the radical reform will not

have much benefit for the public interest. The planning should be regulated by the government domination to achieve the harmonious development of society. In this process, public participation in the planning is required progressively. Kam Ng (2008) reviewed "Reclamation Planning" in Hong Kong. It suggests that the establishment of "Harbour-front Enhancement Committee (HEC)" will make urban planning more transparent, open and participatory. However, this committee is just an advisory institution without legal authority. It is urgent to establish an equitable mechanism of participation, in order to satisfy the needs of civil society. Eser and Konstadakopulos (2000) analyzed the case of spatial development planning in UK, Germany, and EU. It studied the power transfer issue from the perspective of EU, UK, and Germany. They believe that more diversified distribution of power should be emphasized in the future. The upper institutional framework should leave local governments more choice and autonomy, in order to ensure a balance configuration of power. Simpson and Chapman (1999) compared local planning and urban regeneration policy between Edinburgh and Prague. It suggests that the reform of planning system can be long and arduous, particularly facing the challenges of cities and the opportunities of European integration. The planning must regain the primary supports of public and civil, and overcome some issues like the missing of strategic planning and the fragmentation of local politics. The planning system reconstruction should be promoted by means of redevelopment of planning system, legal procedure system, and policy-making cooperation system.

Nevertheless, MP and its organization still have great uncertainty. Ray Bromley pointed out there was a great uncertainty in desirability, legitimacy and the result of MP (Bromley, 2001). In this regard, Brenner (2002) pointed out that the reasons of failure were interstate conflict; competition for political interests between different public agencies; and citizen preferences for local self-government. "Only one way can ensure effective regional planning, which is to create the government corresponding with the geographical scope, and let it own the power to transcend municipal authorities, and have the capability for making policies regarding the region infrastructure development." (Solof, 1998).

Overall, the related studies have the following features: first, the reform of governance emphasizes on the responses to several management issues like marginalization of vulnerable groups; enhancement of regional competitiveness; unbalanced regional development; political fragmentation (Lefèvre, 1998). Second,

it emphasizes on the response of planning system to reform the entire public management. In addition, it attempts to find the reform manner of planning system under the background of social political changes (Herschel and Newman, 2013). It pays close attention to the environment reform of planning system (Dodson, 2009). Third, it emphasizes on the interaction between urban regional planning and regional policy, and advocates promoting good governance via utilization of urban regional planning and other governance tools together (Heinelt and Kübler, 2004; Sanchez, 2006). Fourth, a variety of new forms of governance like partnerships and intergovernmental agreements should be introduced to the planning procedure, in order to promote restructuration of planning institution and reconstruction of planning system (Brenner, 1999; Scott, 2007).

2.4 Discussion on metropolitan planning management practices in China

The urban-rural planning management system has been a hot issue in the human geography and planning academic circles of China during the past 10 years. As a new type of space planning, the metropolitan planning management, studies of the metropolitan planning management along with its rising practice in recent years had gained more and more attention from Chinese scholars.

In current China, the operating of metropolitan planning management based on the urban and rural planning system. The reform of metropolitan planning management needs the promotion from the innovation of the urban and rural planning system (Hu, 2006; Yu and Yin, 2010). As a kind of regional planning, the relevant studies on the metropolitan planning management are also included in the regional planning management. It can provide deep understanding of the research progress of the metropolitan planning management, and provide solid theoretical basis for its reform from critically reviewing on the urban and rural planning system and regional planning management.

2.4.1 Urban and Rural planning management

From the perspective of administration science, term system refers to the institutions regarding managing the organizations of state agencies, division of management power and responsibilities as well as their corresponding relations (Parsons, 1991). It is the sum of organizational forms and relationship forms of the state agencies and legalization of both mentioned above. As one kind of public policies, the urban and rural planning management involves a series of process such

as planning research, planning formulation management, approval management, implementation management, planning supervision and assessment (Yang, 2010)). The urban and rural planning management system refers to the sum of organizational forms, relationship forms, institution forms, etc., regarding the sum of managing the planning management organization, division of management power, operating mechanism and legal guarantee (Chen, 2004).

With rapid urbanization, the urban and rural planning management system is of major concern for many governments of different countries. There are plenty of discussions on relevant topic. The next section gives assessments on relevant literature from four respects including the mode of planning management, planning formulation and implementation management, planning management organization and public participation, and supervision and hearing institution.

2.4.1.1 Debates on the mode of planning management

In China, there are two opinions that are diametrically opposite in relevant to the mode of planning management, “centralization” and “decentralization”. The centralized planning management advocates the vertical planning management and strengthens planning supervision from top to down (Yang, 2002). Zhou (2000) pointed out that the planning power on the formulation, management, adjustment and modification should be centralized on the municipal level to resolve the undefined planning authority. Chen and Cui (2002) taking Changzhou City as an example, analyzed the drawbacks of planning decentralization and holds on centralized and unified planning management. Qiu Baoxing, the vice Minister of MOHURD (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of the People’s Republic of China), insisted on the planning management power of municipal districts that the development zones and park zones shall be centralized and unified (Qiu, 2004). Li and Men (2004) also advocated for the centralization of planning management. The decentralized planning management emphasizes on the administrative decentralization, multi-level governance and social decentralization (Zhang and Wu, 2004; Fang and Yin, 2011). Fang and Yin (2011) stated that the reform of China’s urban planning management should be accordant with the trend of governance and advocated the decentralization, socialization and networking of planning management.

With respect to the debates on planning management “centralization” or “decentralization”, Song and Xu (1999) taking Shanghai as an example, discussed the problems on the decentralized planning management power. They argued that centralization and distribution of planning power within the administration system cannot give answers to solve the current drawbacks of the urban and rural planning management system. Zhuo and Liu (2004) believed that simple administrative decentralization and centralization are not the fundamental components for solving the problems. The reform of China’s urban and rural planning management system should be based on the social background and must take progressive reform (Tian, 2001). Tan (2008) pointed that the planning decentralization is a slow and passive process, which depend on many factors, including social ideology, political system and economic development as a number of complex and long stages. With rapid economic development, urbanization and increasing social democratic consciousness, the planning power will transfer from central government to local government and from government to autonomous organization of citizens (Tan, 2008).

In practice, Guizhou Provincial government established the urban and rural planning committee system and the planning supervisory system in 2003, to promote the vertical planning management. In October 2003, Sichuan Provincial Government published the Trial Method for Sichuan Provincial Stationed Urban Planning Supervisor. In 2006, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHUD) launched the pilot work of urban and rural planning supervisor and deployed the first batch of urban and rural planning supervisors to six cities. So far, the (MOHUD) has dispatched six batches of urban and rural planning supervisors to large cities so that the urban and rural planning can be supervised (Wang and Li, 2013). Either the planning committee system or the planning supervisor system aims to intensify the vertical planning management (Wang et al., 2010).

2.4.1.2 Discussion on the Planning Formulation and Implementation Management

1) The Planning Formulation Management its Institution Construction

The Urban and Rural Planning Law defined the operating procedure and principle of urban and rural planning on different levels (NPC, 2008). Wu (2009) pointed that improving the methods and regulations for planning formulation on each

level so that to meet the requirements of full coverage of urban and rural planning is essential. Due to different scopes in different space plans, the methods and contents of formulating the planning should be different. The prevailing laws and regulations define the relationships between different level plans. However, it lacks necessary institutional guarantee for the planning implementation. Consequently, some scholars appeal to establish the detailed laws, rules and regulations corresponding to statutory planning system including formulation method as soon as possible (Wang, 2008; Wu, 2009). Wang Guangtao, the Minister of MOHURD, suggests setting up the formulating method for the town plans as soon as possible in case of simply applying mechanically urban planning methods in the town planning (Wang, 2008). Based on analysis of the current Chinese planning formulation and implementation system, Zhang et al. (2010) divided the urban and rural planning system into three types, including “strategic planning”, “regulatory planning” and “implementation planning”. They believed that it needs to strengthen the guide function of the strategic planning, and must advocate the strengthening of horizontal coordination of the planning committee.

2) The Planning Implementation Management and its Institution Construction

Some problems still exist in current implementation mechanism of urban and rural planning, such as unclear orientation and disordered sequence of different planning, insufficient implementation connection of urban planning and national economy, and social development planning (Sun, 2002; Zou, 2008; Qiu, 2004). Chen and Shi (2007) discussed the ways for the self-improvement of the mechanisms of implementing planning from the perceptive of government operations. They suggested to establish pre-declaration systems of planning permission, coordination systems with national economy and social development planning, supervision and assessment systems for planning implementation.

Taking Shanghai as an example, Sun (2002) discusses about the coordination mechanism of government agency in the planning implementation. He points out that the implementation of the overall plan should coordinate with others, including institution, target, policy and action coordination. The planning decision and implementation should be separated from each other. Zou (2008) points out that it is inevitable game among multi-parties, vertical and horizontal, superior and subordinate, central and local governments. In the approval of urban overall plan, it

is not only a process in which every party communicates, coordinates and bargains, but also a process to reach a consensus.

2.4.1.3 Advice on the Management Organization and Public Participation

1) Organization Construction for Planning Management

Since 2000, the planning committee and institution construction were discussed in terms of an organization of urban and rural planning management. Wang X.P. (2001) discusses about reform and construction of China's urban planning committee. Taking Shenzhen Planning Commission as an example, Shi and Zhou (2005) analyze problems in operation of the planning committee system from the aspects of institutional and operational rules. They propose recommendations for progressive reform of the decision-making system under the framework of current system. They suggest establishing legal position and optimizing personnel composition of the planning committee to improve the decision-making.

Tang (2008) discusses about the authority and nature of the planning committee. He argues that it is required to change the "official" or "semi-official" nature of the current planning committee, to allow the citizens, public agencies, media, etc., to supervise the whole process of decision-making by planning committee. In terms of different statuses and decision authority of the planning committee, Guo (2009) divides the current planning committees in China into three types, non-statutory consulting and coordination agency, statutory deliberation agency and statutory decision-making agency. Moreover, he points out the trend of the planning committee. He thinks that the nature of the planning committee in China will transfer from "statutory agency affiliated with government sector" to "planning decision organization independent to administrative agency" (Guo, 2009). He puts forward the improvement approach to planning committee in the future from four aspects such as improving rules of procedure within the planning committee.

In addition, Yan (2008) advocates for establishing research agencies for planning decisions. Li et al. (2011) suggests to increase the research departments specially to take charge in providing information and consultation for planning decision, increasing the supervision and assessment departments for the planning implementation.

2) Public Participation in Planning and its Institution Construction

Regarding institution construction of public participation in planning, based on analyzing political and economic basis and practical condition, He and Zhao (1999) advocated setting regulations for public participation and establishing public participation agencies. From the analysis on guarantee of public participation, bodies of public participation and modes of public participation, Hu (2005) indicated that public participation must be defined by means of laws, including the position, channel, means and methods of public participation in urban planning. Others also emphasize on strengthening the construction of procedure of public participation in planning (Sun and Zhu, 2010; Wei, 2007). After issuing of the Urban and Rural Planning Law, Luo (2012) discusses about the institution construction of public participation in planning, and puts forward specific strategy from such aspects as working procedure, working manner and organization guarantee mechanism.

Wang (2006) advocated that the scientific public participation lies in adopting differential public participation forms and mechanism in suitable links of urban planning. In addition, he proposed vertical and horizontal system of public participation. Yang and Yin (2009) discussed more details about the form of public participation in planning permission and planning assessment.

Taking the two public participation cases in Chinese mainland and Hong Kong, Qi and Zhou (2005) made a deep analysis of the system difference between these two cases. Starting with the “PX project” event in Xiamen City, Zhao and Liu (2010) analyzed public participation in planning decision-making. They stated that the governmental administration mode must be converted from traditional unidirectional government to modernized public governance; therefore, it can promote public participation and democratic decision in urban planning. Taking public opinion on statutory plans in Shekou as an example, Li (2010) proposed improving the legal system of public participation, establishing decision mechanism and organization of public participation.

2.4.1.4 Appeal for the Planning Supervision and Hearing Institution

1) The Planning Supervision Institution Construction

Starting with the concepts of “crime” and “punishment” in law science, Zhao and Li (2002) discussed about the criminal liability of urban planning. They stated that in order to improve the planning authority, and to increase the management

force of urban planning, more attention should be paid on planning responsibilities of different actors. Yan (2006) proposed strengthening of the supervision for execution process of planning management by introducing such external supervision means as social supervision and legal supervision. Yu (2007) points that China's planning supervision system is facing a series of problems, for example, lack of legal basis, unclear power and responsibilities, lack of construction and power restriction of planning supervision. To solve such problems requires, especially, authorization of laws and restriction of planning supervision. Liu et al. (2010) discussed the improvement approach to China's urban and rural planning supervision from the following three aspects: administrative independence of planning supervision agency, realization of planning appealing and maintenance, supervision of procedure justice of urban and rural planning.

2) The Planning Hearing Institution Construction

With interest diversification and upsurge of citizen consciousness, it is required to improve the urban planning hearing system. However, such system design of the planning management is in the infeasible grammatical state in the status quo (Zheng, 2011). Wang (2000) thinks that related administrative procedure must be introduced in order for ensuring its fairness, justice, openness and meeting the requirements for democratization, scientization and legalization. In addition, he elaborates the role and method of applying hearing procedure in different links and stages in urban planning. Wang (2005) advocates promoting the openness and democratization process of urban planning according to the Administrative Permission Law, researching and determining cautiously the planning permission range required to hear. Wang et al (2010) claimed that it should be strengthen; non-formal consulting hearing institutionalization in the stage of planning decision-making, protect the stakeholders against equal participation right, cultivate the host team of hearings, establish feedback and openness mechanism of hearing results. Taking Chunshen high-tension line event in Shanghai as an example, Zheng (2011) analyzes the defects of conflicts of China's urban planning management system and points out that design of systems including public participation, administrative review and planning hearing constructs, are constructing an early warning system of conflicts while providing channels for stakeholders to express interest appealing.

2.4.2 Regional and metropolitan planning management

In China, metropolitan planning is a new type of regional planning over the past decade. The relevant knowledge is focused on the system construction of regional and metropolitan planning management in the aspects of management institution, management mode, management operation and planning legislation.

2.4.2.1 Planning management institutions

In order to coordinate inter-city or inter-regional conflicts, most Chinese scholars believe that there is a need to establish inter-regional planning authority (Rong, 2003; Li et al., 2006). In 1995, Yan and Zhou pointed that it is necessary to establish a regional planning management institution, to coordinate the interests conflicts cross boundary (Yan and Zhou, 1995). Based on analyses on the collaboration mechanism of the Yangtze River Delta, Ning et al. (1998) pointed that it is important to form inter-district planning management organization. Various functions of the Authority can firstly be considered to be established and then gradually transit it to functions-integrated regulatory agencies. Zhang and Wu (2001) considered that it should progressively establish regional planning authorities, to strengthen organizational leadership of regional planning and implementation. Hu (2006) suggest establishment of comprehensive planning council in national and provincial government. Niu (2004) recommends building “Planning office” as a permanent inter-regional coordination institution, which is controlled by the representatives of central and local government. Zou (2005) is nevertheless against this opinion, and implies that it will bring a big impact on the existing administrative system. Tao (2007) considers the administrative region's division and government management is the bottleneck of trans-province metropolitan development in current China. Based on the governance theory, he puts forward a new conformity thought —‘trans-province region governance’ and provides suggestions on organization framework and policy supporting for it. Fang et al. (2007) considered the Coordinated Development Plan of Extended Metropolitan Region in the Pearl River Delta, they argue that establishing an effectively coordinated regional planning organization is vital to the planning implementation. Although many scholars agree with the establishment of regional planning organizations, there is the lack of researches on the nature and function of such organizations.

2.4.2.2 Planning management mode

The core mission of MP&M should be coordinating the interests. With the development of regional economy, Xu (2006) states that traditional urban system planning cannot guide the sustainable development of the region. He points that regional strategy, city size and floating population will be the main drives of urban system innovation. He argues that urban system planning in China should focus more on the study of regional strategy and planning for space control. The mode should be able to promote the transaction from a purely spatial layout planning to regional planning and coordination and the transaction from a compulsory planning to negotiation-based planning model (Zhang and Wu, 2001). Based on analyses of some individual modes and some problems brought by the jurisdiction for planning management, Tian (2001) raises the requirement for the shift of the jurisdiction under the situation of rapid urbanization and global economic integration. She insists for a rational and scientific planning management system should cross territorial jurisdiction. She advocates the establishment of the planning committee or government agency on the high level to unify the planning management, promoting the horizontal cooperation of local governments (Tian, 2001).

The reform of regional planning system is supposed to start from a normative negotiation mechanism among upper, lower, and local governments (Li et al., 2006). Shen (2006) proposes that it needs the common participation and consultation of different sectors, government functions, interest groups and professionals (i.e. the experts instead of the general staff). Considering Pearl River Delta Townships, Fang et al. (2007) propose a collaborative planning framework with three procedures. They state that the implementation ordinances of the Coordinated Development Plan of Extended Metropolitan Region in the Pearl River Delta specifies the responsibilities of governments and related departments at different levels in urban-rural spatial administration, and sets up an effectively coordinated regional and urban-rural planning administration system (Fang et al., 2007). Xu provides three modes to consolidate the implementation of planning management, town coalition, vertical planning administration, and trans-regional growth administration (Xu, 2006). Tao (2008) proposes a joint planning operation mode, the establishment of MP organization corresponding central and provincial government and the establishment of MP operation mechanism among provincial government, corporations, and social organizations.

2.4.2.3 Planning management operation

A large number of scholars agreed that planning is a dynamic process. For enhancing its effect, it is necessary to establish and run the whole-process control system used to operate planning and implementation (Fang, 2002). It should emphasized the transaction from "centralized system" to "contract system". Liu et al. (2001) considers that the effective way is "top-down" in organization manner and "bottom-up" in operation. Shen (2006) believes that the current practice of the regional planning in China should be corrected. The regional planning isn't simply an overall allocation of the production forces nationally and positioning them spatially. In this, a "from top to bottom" imperative control of the state in allocation of the production forces like in the period of planned economy, previously, should be eliminated, the function and different roles between the state and the market should be distinguished more clearly so in order to make contributions to building up a planning management system. He points that it is important to search for an essential framework and ways of action as well as innovation of the management system on the base of new regionalism and through all side renewing of the concept and nature of regional planning (Shen, 2006). Comprehensive planning of the major issues can reduce adverse effects of asymmetric information on planning decisions and benefit for the integration of different interests and the coordination of conflicting plans (Wang, 2004). For real implementations, it should establish a comprehensive partnership among upper/lower/local government, private sector, and social community (Zhang, 2004). Based on different stages in the planning management of Extended Metropolitan Region in the Pearl River Delta, Fang et al. (2007) put forward a new system and targeted strategies. In the plan-making phase, it is required to establish the coordination systems at both provincial and city levels. In the plan implementation phase, it is required to establish the classified spatial governance system, the regional coordinated development system and the administration system. In the supervision phase, it needs to be carried out through the annual implementation report, dynamic supervisory information system and planning supervisor system. In each of the aforementioned phases, the coordination conferences and public participation system helps to guarantee the coordination in the planning implementation (Fang et al., 2007). The new system will help to realize the collaborative planning, pragmatic planning and coordination among departments as well as public participation.

2.4.2.4 Planning legislation

In China, no regional planning law exists. Scholars have pointed out that the lack of related legislation is the main reason of chaotic management. It calls for the legislation of regional planning as soon as possible. For example, Hu (2006) argued that it is urgent to pass legislation for giving regional planning with a certain authority in the market allocation process of resources. The urban and rural planning law covers some contents of regional development plan. Moreover, there are regulations and approaches for regional plan making and approval. Particularly, it is necessary to build "Regional Planning Act" or "Land and Regional Planning Act" as soon as possible, and to make appropriate changes on the current "Urban Planning Act" and "Land Management Law". Meanwhile, Shen (2006) argues that a system approach in regional planning in China should be adopted as to legitimate researches, specifically with reference to the criteria, overall framework and appropriate procedures in legislation. Many scholars like Fan (1998), Fang (1999), and Yu and Yin (2010) also call the strengthening of regional planning legislation. Tao (2008) pointed out that it should also build a "cross-border Metropolitan Planning Act" or "National Region Planning Law" in nationwide scope, and clarify management organization, management responsibilities, management procedures (procedure planning, procedure opening, procedure participation, programming reviewing), etc. Fang et al. (2011) suggested that the laws as "Regional Planning Law", "Metropolitan Planning Approval Regulations", and "Metropolitan Planning Implementation and Management Regulations". However, a few scholars are against the viewpoint of regional planning legislation, due to the situations such as unclear distributions of powers and conflicting sector planning (Niu, 2004).

2.5 Concluding remarks

From regionalism to new regionalism, from new public management to metropolitan governance, theories and practices of metropolitan governance were developed. A number of studies in regional governance field had carried out. Many scholars in western countries have done research in this area both from theory to practice, yielding deep theoretical knowledge and directing practice as well. The development of theories gives effective guide to the practice. The changes of MPOs and practice of MP&M is a good illustration of the development of regional governance.

Focusing on the relationship between Government, Market, and Society, governance is a process from a balance to another balance, and finally approaching the “good governance”. Like the PM activities, metropolitan governance highlights negotiation, partnership, voluntary and equal cooperation among various agencies and groups. With the change of social and political structures, researchers have made great progress to respond to challenges. In past years, various kinds of partnership and metropolitan governance organization had established in government, non-government organization and civil society, in order to address the common challenges.

Overall, related research has promoted the deepening and development of theories and practice of regional governance. Especially in recent years, with the development of regional cooperation, more focus is paid to MP&M by current research, more deep and detailed problems were concerned. Yet in the author’s opinion, most studies have focused on mature metropolitan areas in developed countries, such as America, Britain and the European, studies on practice of developing countries are less and disperse. Compared with developed countries, the developing countries maybe face problems that are more complex during the rapid regional development. Governance transformation placed stress on the response to the economic problems to promote regional competitiveness. Developing country are currently facing serious regional problems such as imbalanced regional development, and administrative problems such as political fragmentation all because of uneven regional economic development. Metropolitan governance also stressed upon the importance of the interactive relationship between regional planning and regional policy. It advocated that MP&M should push metropolitan areas towards good governance together with other governance tools. How to strengthen the capacity and institution building needs more attention.

Due to different culture and social systems, there are still differences in regional governance within China and western countries (Vogel, et al, 2010). The experience in regional governance of Western Countries provides with a valuable use for reference to the reform and improvement of developing countries.

In the past 30 years, China's regional development had gained successful experience and learned some lessons as well. Although the metropolitan is a new thing in China, theoretical discussions and demonstration analysis on the MP&M have made some breakthroughs by Chinese scholars. From urban planning

management to regional planning management, Chinese scholars have made important as an overall progress. There are a variety of outlooks for Chinese future urban-rural planning system reform, but few studies involved constructions of its operating mechanisms. There are many research papers on planning system and regional governance in China. Scholars have made a large number of research outcomes in the field regional coordination, regional alliance, regional governance innovation, and regional planning in the multi-disciplinary comprehensive angle. These relevant research results provided reference for understanding the metropolitan planning system in China, and are also useful to improve the theory and practice of metropolitan planning. Specifically research on the metropolitan planning management system and especially on the practical mechanism is limited to the scope of this study.

From the survey, it is evident that the regional development theories in China are enriched. However, at the same time, it also showed that research on metropolitan planning management in China is still on its early stages. Published studies (e.g. Fang et.al, 2010; Gu,2007; Wang, 2007;Hong, 2009; Tang, 2011,etc.) relayed the experiences of developed countries with respect to metropolitan planning management, with less focus upon suggesting how to construct a good Chinese metropolitan planning management system. Moreover, these research results discuss metropolitan development from a mainly theoretical angle, and less discussion is presented from an empirical angle. When the actual situation of the Chinese metropolitan planning system is mentioned, research always lacks substantial evidence of real life experiences. Existing research on metropolitan planning management system is therefore limited. In the meantime, when the study mentioned the mechanism of planning management system transformation, there still lacks a theoretical analysis framework. Due to the lack of basic database on metropolitan areas, some research is still in qualitative description level thus less quantitative analysis involved.

In fact, metropolitan governance is a complex system; it needs systematic and deep analysis. Therefore, it needs to be further developed in many research areas. In China, the planning management is sub-ordinate of administrative management. As an important part of the administrative system, the planning management system changed by the administrative system transition. Only within the permissive range of the administrative rules, MP&M will be valid. The planning management system

can't be fully understood without enough concern from the administrative system. The existing literature showed that evaluating the development history of Chinese metropolitan planning and regional planning, that metropolitan planning management system transformation needs further development. To achieve the goal of cross-boundary governance, metropolitan planning needs an innovative planning system mechanism as a necessary prerequisite. The mechanism also requires strong support from a series of system designs and arrangements such as governance models and structures.

Chapter 3

3.0 Research methodology and data collection

As a tool of governance, metropolitan planning could be used to achieve the goal of cross-boundary governance. However, the metropolitan planning practice in China has shown that it cannot play its role very well. The literature review above showed that there has been a variety of outlooks for Chinese future urban-rural planning system reform, but few studies involved constructions of its metropolitan planning management system. To achieve good governance, metropolitan planning system needs an innovative system mechanism as a necessary prerequisite.

This research aims to find a way to reach good governance of metropolitan planning management. How to arrive at its research objectives and to answer the research questions of this dissertation mentioned in the introduction? The literature review serves to highlight that there are a number of gaps in current knowledge that need to be filled in order to achieve this aim. Focusing upon the development of Chinese metropolitan planning management, this study will review the history, analyze the current status and make recommendation to the future.

Focusing on the core issues, based on the critical literature review, this chapter constructs the study framework, definite research methods and the ways of data collection for this dissertation. First, it presents the analytical framework. It also elucidates the research focus and propositions. Secondly, it presents the research technical route from epistemological perspective. Thirdly, it introduces the methods of data collecting. In addition, it explains the reasons behind the selection of case studies and interviewees.

3.1 Analytical framework

From Administrative management system to Urban-rural Planning management system, and to metropolitan planning management system, from historical system to current system, and to future system, from the perspective of governance, this research construct an analytical framework to study the development of metropolitan planning management system in China, aim to find a way to good governance. Please see figure 3-2.

The interpretative framework of this research for the accumulation of knowledge follows a social constructivist approach. The epistemological perspective

of social constructivism views reality as being ‘socially constructed’ by interactive and subjective interpretations, identities, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions of various actors and the researcher itself (Rust, et al., 2005; Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2011; Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006).




Figure 3-2: Research analytical frameworks

Source: Created by the author.

It is the argument of this thesis that the lagging of system construction in metropolitan planning management is the main root cause of ineffective metropolitan planning practice. In what ways can the metropolitan planning play its role successfully in regional development? It needs a new system towards good governance. To move from governance to good governance, Chinese metropolitan planning management system needs three steps: (1) analyzing the historical system to know about the background; (2) examining the current system to know the point; and (3) recommending the future system to achieve the aim.

3.1.1 Historical background analysis

In China, the planning is not only served as one of the means of government adjustments and controls, it is also an important function of Government at all levels. As a governmental function, the planning management was subject to the administrative management. Only when it operated within the permissive range of

the administrative rules, the planning could be valid. If not giving the required concern for the administrative system on which the planning operation depends, the planning management system transition can't be fully understood. Therefore, this research firstly located the planning system transition into the general background of the overall social system transition of China, and analyses the transition of the administrative system.

How to examine changes of the administrative management system? It uses the perspective of decentralization (Figure 3-3). Since the reform and opening-up policy implementation in China during the late 1970s, the decentralization of power has been the fundamental power in promoting Chinese institutional transition and governance transformation. Therefore, using decentralization as the main line, focusing upon the change of relationships between the Government, market and society, this study tracks the changes in the administrative system.




Figure 3-3: Research technical route of the historical background analysis

Source: Created by the author.

With the decentralization and changes of administrative system, the planning management system has changed. Focusing upon governance transformation, it summarizes the change of the historical planning management system. Focusing upon the power distribution, combined with planning events, it provides insights into the basic characteristics and driving mechanisms of the planning management system in different stages.

3.1.2 Current situation examination

As a type of non-statutory spatial planning in China, the metropolitan planning management is largely based on the urban and rural planning management

system. A detailed understanding of the Chinese urban and rural planning system is beneficial for us to comprehend the operating mechanisms and problems in MP&M. It introduces the components of the urban and rural planning system and the development of metropolitan areas and its planning in China.

How metropolitan planning management performed in the current urban and rural planning system? Does it work well? To find the answer, it describes the current situation of metropolitan planning management by explaining the legal bases of planning, organizations responsible for establishing planning, examination and approval agencies, and implementing agencies. From the data analysis by surveys and interviews, it dissects the major problems in metropolitan planning management (Figure 3-4).




Figure 3-4: Research technical route of the current situation examination

Source: Created by the author.

If we want to move the current metropolitan planning management system to good governance, it is required to find out the origin of the system from where the problems generated. As the planning management system works within the administrative system and political system, there is a need for examining the problems within the overall social system. Therefore, it is required to investigate the relationships between the government, market and society to find out fundamental institutional factors producing the problems.

3.1.3 Future system recommendation

The reality of the metropolitan planning implementation informed that the current system cannot work well. Thus, how to get free from the predicament of inefficient metropolitan planning management? As a public service, the planning management system changes with public management, final towards to good

governance. On basis of the global public management paradigm transformation and in view of the overall trend of the governance transition, it makes recommendation regarding an improved metropolitan planning management system in China (Figure 3-5).




Figure 3-5: Research technical route of the future system recommendation

Source: Created by the author.

Furthermore, due to different social culture and political environment between China and the West, it is almost impossible to resolve the problems in the metropolitan planning management of China in accordance with the western pattern. It needs to take into account China's national conditions and special political features. It is the start of the planning management system reform. If it ignores the national conditions in China, there is nothing which can be done to improve the future system. With references to good governance, considering the specific national conditions of the great power transformation in China, it discusses the overall direction of the metropolitan planning management system reform.

3.2 The methodological research approach

The following sections describe the research design of thesis.

3.2.1 Research phases and Methods

This study is divided into 4 research phases as shown in Figure 3-6.




Figure 3-6: Research phases and research methods

Source: Created by the author.

3.2.1.1 Phase I: Literature research

A review of the metropolitan (regional) planning management literature provides a basis for the conceptual framework of this study. Based on Critical literature reviews, it sharpens the research objectives and designs the conceptual framework.

3.2.1.2 Phase II: Data collection

Focusing upon the development of Chinese metropolitan planning management, this study reviews the history, analyses the status and makes recommendation for future. Due to different stages, data collection is divided in different way (see figure 3-7).




Figure 3-7: Data collection methods within 3 steps of this work

Source: Created by the author.

Based on rapid qualitative surveys, to know the overall conditions of the metropolitan planning management system, this study analyses the transition process of the urban-rural planning management system of China. To know the current situations of metropolitan planning management, it analyses local practices of metropolitan planning management in China. It adopts a case study approach to discuss local experiences and problems in the metropolitan planning management. It also adopts a questionnaire and interview approach to obtain data from governmental officials who worked at different department, planners who worked at planning companies and professors who worked at planning schools in various universities.

3.2.1.3 Phase III: Problems Research

For the transition of governance to good governance, Chinese metropolitan planning management system needs three steps:

- 1) Focusing upon governance, it discusses Chinese style decentralization and administrative systems. This will provide insights into the characteristics and driving mechanisms of the Chinese planning management system transformation.
- 2) Examining practices of formulation organization, approval organization, implementation organization and management of metropolitan planning, it will analyse the major problems of Chinese metropolitan planning

management.

- 3) Investigating the relationship between central local governments and the relationship between government, market and society, it will analyse the origin of the system that causes these problems.

To clarify these questions, the method applied will be: (1) Documents Review; (2) Questionnaire and interviews; and (3) Synthesis of Findings.

3.2.1.4 Phase IV: Recommendations

On basis of the analysis at the aforementioned phases, it will critically evaluate the results obtained through the process of data collection. It will make recommendations to the future regarding an improved metropolitan planning management system.

3.2.2 A qualitative approach

Research may be divided into two obvious different types: qualitative and quantitative (Silverman, 1998; Neuma and Neuman, 2006; Williams, 2011). According to the opinion of Amaratunga et al. (2002), the qualitative approach concentrates on words and observations to express reality and attempts to describe people in natural situations. In contrast, the quantitative approach grows out of a strong academic tradition that places considerable trust in numbers that represent opinions or concepts (Sandelowski, 2000). A qualitative method is an approach to the study of the social world, which seeks to describe and analyze the culture and behavior of humans (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012), which is regarded to be the most suitable for looking at changes processed over time and understanding people's meanings. This dissertation aims to make clear the development of the metropolitan planning management system in China. As a tool of governance, the metropolitan planning management system involves different actors, including the government, market and society.

In this research, it takes a phenomenological, qualitative fieldwork method to study the behaviors and relationships of different actors in the planning management system in order to reach an in-depth understanding of the meanings that they place upon. Taking a qualitative methodological research approach, it will gain an in-depth insight of changes in the development.

3.2.3 A case study approach

The research aims to examine the development of the metropolitan planning management system, furthermore aims to investigate problems in reality and thereby exploring improved path, from practice and theory. It is not a pure theoretical research. This research aims to ‘explain what is happening’ and is guided by practical, applied questions, which suits for using the social constructivist paradigm (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006).

Correspondingly, this research provides a critical interpretation of how and why problems raised in the practice of the metropolitan planning management. Yet, it is a kind of testing-out research more than a problem-solving research. It tries to find the limits of the current system and ultimately aims to improve it. So what are the situations of the current system? How it works? And why it doesn’t work well? How to improve it? Therefore, it involves an explanatory dimension (Williams, 2011). A case-study approach can be used in this perspective. Focusing upon these questions, it uses an explanatory ‘what, how and why’ questions as inquiry line to arrive at a case study approach, as well as histories and experiments as research strategies (Yin, 1994; Noor, 2008). A case study approach will be adapted to report upon the local experience and problems of the metropolitan planning management.

According to Yin (1994), research strategy should be chosen as a function of the research situation. He stressed that choice of research strategies should depend on the conditions: (1) the type of question posed; (2) the control over actual behavioral elements; and (3) the degree of focus on historical or contemporary events. Although each research strategy has its own specific approach to collect and analyze empirical data (Table 3-3), there are overlapping areas, which bring complexity to the process of strategy selection.

Table 3-4: Research strategies versus characteristics

Strategy	Form of research question	Requires control over behavioral events?	Focuses on contemporary events?
Experiment	How, why		
Survey	Who, what, where, how many, how much	No	Yes
Archival analysis	How, why	No	Yes/no
History	How, why	No	No
Case study	How, why	No	Yes

Source: Yin, R. K. (1994). *Case study research: Design and methods*. Sage publications.

Undertaking case studies ‘is a way of investigating an empirical topic’ (Yin, 1994). The sources of evidence for the case studies include primary documents, secondary documents, and systematic interviewing. This research also applies a survey approach to get primary data from the attitude of different actors in the metropolitan planning management system. Therefore, it uses a quantitative method to analyze the outcome of the survey. Just as Yin said in his book, case studies can include quantitative evidence (Yin, 1994).

All of these research approaches provide the powerful grounds for the research aim.

3.2.4 Selection of case studies

Case studies mainly focus upon the east China, especially on the Yangtze River Delta. The eastern region takes a lead in Chinese development, and always takes the forefront in institutional innovations and transformation. Investigation and evaluation of practices in metropolitan planning management in eastern region can be a guide for the future development of other areas in China.

3.2.4.1 The main case: the Yangtze River Delta

The Yangtze River Delta (YRD) lies at the east China, includes Shanghai, Jiangsu Province and Zhejiang Province, covers an area of 210,700 square km (Figure3-8). It is the most important agricultural, handicraft industrial and economic center for China since Tang Dynasty.




Figure 3-8: The location of Yangtze River Delta in China

Source: Created by the author.

After the Chinese economic reform program, which began in 1978, the core of the Yangtze River Delta, Shanghai, became the most important economic center in China. It is emerging to become one of Asia's commerce centers now. The urban build-up in the area has given rise what may be the largest concentration of adjacent metropolitan areas in the world. In 1961, French geographer Jean Gottmann (1915-1994) first gave a list of the world's largest megalopolises in his book (Table 3-4). In his opinion, megalopolis is a region as a vast metropolitan area and the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) was the sixth biggest metropolis in the world. It is home for over 80 million people in 2007, of which an estimated 50 million are urban residents. By 2009, it was considered to be the home of nearly 90 million people, of which an estimated 80 million were urban residents.

Table 3-5: The largest metropolises in the world given by Gottmann in 1961

Metropolises	Cities
Indo-Gangetic Plain	Islamabad, Delhi, Lahore, Karachi, Kanpur, Kolkata, Varanasi, Dhaka
Blue Banana	Dublin, Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham, London, Randstad, the Netherlands–Rhine-Ruhr, Frankfurt/Rhine-Main, Rhine-Neckar, Basel, Zürich, Milan.
Taiheiyō Belt	Chiba, Tokyo, Kawasaki, Kyoto, Kobe, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima.
Great Lakes Megalopolis	Chicago, Toronto, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Dayton, Columbus, Grand Rapids, Toledo, Akron Rochester, Buffalo.
Northeast Megalopolis	New York, Boston, New Jersey, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Philadelphia, Hartford, Richmond, Norfolk.
Yangtze River Delta (YRD)	Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Jingjiang, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, Taizhou, Nantong, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Jianguyin, Zhoushan.

Source: Gottmann, J. (1964). *Megalopolis: the urbanized northeastern seaboard of the United States*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

According to the 6th National Population Census, by 2010, the permanent resident population of Shanghai, Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces reached 156 million (The Center of Modern Chinese City Studies, 2011). With the rapid growth of human population, the economic growth, productivity and per capita, income in this area surpasses other concentrative metropolitan regions in China. By 2009, the Yangtze River Delta's GDP amounted to 7179412 trillion RMB (about 71794 trillion GBP), accounting for 21.41% of the national GDP (National Bureau of Statistics of

China, 2011). The economic growth of Yangtze River Delta is obviously important to China's economic growth.

At present, Yangtze River Delta not only China's largest economic core area, the most dynamic and competitive area, but also is the most important region and in a leading position to meet international competition and international cooperation in China. With the social and economic development of China, this area plays an important role in the world.

In modern times, the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) metropolitan areas are centered at Shanghai. The core areas of the YRD covers 16 cities in different administrative level (Table 3-5).

Table 3-6: The main cities of the Yangtze River Delta

City Administrative Level	Cities
Provincial-level municipality	Shanghai
Sub-provincial-level city	Nanjing , Hangzhou, Ningbo
Prefecture-level city	Jiangsu Province : Yangzhou , Taizhou, Nantong, Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou Zhejiang Province : Huzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Zhoushan, Taizhou

Source: Created by the author.

The Yangtze River Delta is the most typical metropolitan area. It is a vast metropolitan region as Gottmann's megalopolis. It has formed a networked and polycentric spatial pattern. In this area, there are different spatial scale metropolitan areas, involving administrative level in one administrative area or across administrative boundary. As a mega system, the Yangtze River Delta metropolitan region is flanked by several sub-mega system, including Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Ning-Zhen-Yang, and Su-Xi-Chang metropolitan area (Table 3.4).

There are multilevel cities in a metropolitan area. For example, the Su-Xi-Chang metropolitan area (SWC MA) consist of three administrative level cities (Table 3-7).

As the most important and competitive regions in China, the issue of how to promote regional cooperation and coordinated development of YRD is the most discussed topic of concern not only among the academic circle, but is also the focused attention of the government (Fang, etc, 2010). Although with the progress of regional cooperation and coordination continues in the Yangtze River Delta, the

social and economic developments have made great achievements. However, the cooperation among cities of the region is the premise of regional harmonious development. The rational choice made by the fragmented different level governments, showing an irrational result of the whole regional development. The issues of repeated infrastructure construction and environmental pollution emerged constantly in the YRD.

Table 3-7: The metropolitan areas in the Yangtze River Delta region

Level	Spatial scales	Administrative area		Metropolitan area	Main cities
Mega system	Metropolitan region	Cross province administrative boundary region		The Yangtze River Delta region	16 cities
Sub-mega system	Metropolitan area	Administrative area		Shanghai Metropolitan area	Shanghai
		Cross municipality administrative boundary	Jiangsu Province	Ning-Zhen-Yang Metropolitan area	Nanjing, Yangzhou, Zhenjiang, Taizhou
				Su-Xi-Chang Metropolitan area	Changzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou, Nantong
			Zhejiang Province	Hangzhou Metropolitan area	Hangzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing
Ningbo Metropolitan area	Ningbo, Zhoushan, Taizhou				

Source: Created by the author.

Table 3-8: The components of SWC MA (2012)

Prefecture-Level	County-Level City	Designate Town
Suzhou	5	60
Wuxi	2	32
Changzhou	2	37
TATOL	9	129

Source: Created by the author.

In order to promote regional cooperation, the governments in different level have initiated some metropolitan planning, such as the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou metropolitan planning (2001-2020), the Nanjing metropolitan planning (2002-2020), the Nanjing metropolitan planning (2006-2020), and the Yangtze River Delta

regional planning (2010-2015),etc. Some planning has been implemented by government.

As the YRD is the most developed area in China. It involves multiple metropolitan areas. The planning and practice in these metropolitan areas are advancing more quickly than others in China. From a governance approach, this area involves different administrative level governments. The selection of this area as a case study is representative and typical in essence. It will be enlightening and helpful to other areas.

3.2.4.2 Comparative cases: other metropolitan areas in China

A comparative case method is also applied in this research. In relation to examine the whole development condition of the metropolitan planning management in China, the planning and practice of other metropolitan areas outside the east China will also be investigated. Alike other developed concentration areas in China, the Pearl River Delta. Just as Bryman (1988) said, a research should select more cases and as much as possible to avoid the subjectivity and preferences in a case study. Therefore, the case study mainly focuses upon the Yangtze River Delta, supplemented by other metropolitan areas as a comparison approach. Comparing their planning practice and summarizing experiences and lessons can provide theoretical thinking and practical reference for the further development of the metropolitan planning management system in China.

3.3 Methods of data collection

As argued, to observe the metropolitan planning management system in China involves the study of the administrative system and relationships between government, market and society. How it run? To what extent does it work? That depends on the administrative system structures and the behaviors that individual actors place upon. Therefore, it adopts a field approach in order to get the attitudes and opinions of actors in the practice of metropolitan planning and management. The fieldwork is comprised of multiple sources of evidence (Neuman and Neuman, 2006; Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).

Firstly, a detailed desk-study of secondary literature and documentation will be accessed and analyzed. Secondly, it is predominantly based upon questionnaires and interviews approach to understanding the real world of the metropolitan planning management system (MP&M system) in China.

The research timeframe focuses upon the 2-year period between October 2011 and September 2013 during which especially two extensive rounds of interviews were undertaken (September to December 2012, and April to June 2013). The dissertation also considers recent development since the fieldwork was undertaken.

The methods of data collection are elaborated in the following.

3.3.1 Documentary analysis

The secondary literature and documentation have been accessed in this research, such as written reports, administrative and other internal documents, formal studies, newspapers articles and news in website. Longitudinal materials dating from 1978 to the present, various documents and governmental policies were gathered, including administrative management policies, regional policies and planning events, *etc.*, which are relevant to Chinese governance changes and the administrative system reform are also considered.

Historical materials is mainly obtained through existing studies and documentation, which including research articles and monographs, official publications specific to regional policies, National Five-Year Plans, administrative handbooks, the great conference reports of Central Government, as well as recent reports from newspapers and websites. Relevant monographs and articles published over years carry on abundant information to illustrate the progress of regional development. Governmental documents and policies provide specific information on individual projects. Planning events provide changes of planning practice and construction process of planning management system.

All of these are best for reviewing and tracking social-political changes and regional transformation.

3.3.2 Questionnaires

A questionnaire is a research method including a series of questions aim to gather information from respondents. As a type of survey, questionnaires are always used in measuring separate variables, for instance it includes questions on preferences, behaviors, facts (Oppenheim, 1992). Attitude is a state of inclination for an individual to evaluate objects or aspects in a favorable or unfavorable manner (Dawes, 1972). Attitude is also a powerful instrument to determine the response of people regarding the policy and planning decisions (Oppenheim, 1992). Attitude is

not directly observable and therefore strategies such as inferred cues and interrogation using questionnaire surveys have been the methods of choice in attitude measurements (Dawes, 1972). In this research, it adopts the questionnaire survey instrument to explore the dimensions of attitude towards the current situation of MP&M system. These dimensions were established by literature research, personal communication with expert researchers, semi-structured interviews, and the collaborative workshop with planners and officials.

Compared with some other types of surveys, questionnaires are easy to compile data because it often standardizes answers. Generally, questionnaires with questions are aggregated into either a scale or index (Likert, 1974; Adèr and Mellenbergh, 2008). It can help simplify and quantify people's attitudes towards objects and aspects. Likert scale is a well-known way (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).

However, such standardized answers may frustrate the respondents. Questionnaires are sharply limited by the fact that respondents must be able to read the questions and respond to them. Therefore, in this way, it is very necessary to design the questionnaire carefully and prudently. Strengthening the design of survey questionnaires can expand and clarify evaluation findings.

Focusing upon the purpose of this study, paper-pencil-questionnaire has designed. Before designing the formal questionnaire, the author designed the draft of the questionnaire and constructed the pre-survey in view of the preliminary research and personal experience for metropolitan planning management. The formal items have piloted based on modifying the initial questionnaire in two rounds workshop to improve the format, clarity, and wording.

To ensure scientific and rational questions of questionnaire, a 1-day workshop was held to discuss the design of questionnaire sections and items. The participants of the workshop were experts, planners and officials. They are the main people who are involved in the practice of planning management system in China. All of them have abundant experiences on this topic. In this workshop, the participants gave their opinions to discuss each question and option of the questionnaire based on their practical experiences and reflections. Then the questionnaire was improved by observing and reflecting upon the results of workshop, another 1-day workshop followed immediately. The final questionnaire was discussed and confirmed in this workshop. After evaluation by the panel of

experts, the final questionnaire has organized into clearly marked sections dealing with attitudes at metropolitan planning management, which has totally 12 sections.

Regarding cognitions of the nature of metropolitan planning, metropolitan planning management and planning committee, it adopts categorical measurement scale. It has 5 sections adopting categorical items.

Table 3-9: Variables and their measurement scale

Variables	Description	Measurement scale
Work unit	Professional identity	Categorical
Attitude to the nature of metropolitan planning		Categorical
Attitude to the competent department of metropolitan planning management		Categorical
Attitude to problems in metropolitan planning management	Awareness to respond to problems	Five-point Likert 1. Very serious 2. Serious 3. Don't know 4. Not serious 5. Not very serious
Attitude to reasons in metropolitan planning management	Disposition to respond positively to reasons	Five-point Likert 1. Very acceptable 2. Acceptable 3. Don't know 4. Unacceptable 5. Very unacceptable
Attitude to participants in metropolitan planning management	Respond to the main participants	Five-point Likert 1. Very important 2. Important 3. Don't know 4. Not important 5. Not very important
Attitude to the nature of planning committee		Categorical
Attitude to the reform measures of metropolitan planning management	Reform measures concern	Five-point Likert 1. Very important 2. Important 3. Don't know 4. Not important 5. Not very important

Source: Created by the author.

Measuring attitudes to problems in metropolitan planning management, it adopts a 5-point Likert format with response from 1-Very serious, 2- Serious, 3- Don't know, 4- Not serious to 5- Not very serious. Measuring attitudes to reasons and root causes in metropolitan planning management, it adopts a 5-point Likert format with response from 1-Very acceptable, 2- Acceptable, 3- Don't know, 4- Unacceptable to 5- Very unacceptable. Measuring attitudes to reform measures in

metropolitan planning management, it adopts a 5-point Likert format with response from 1-Very important, 2- Important, 3- Don't know, 4- Not important to 5- Not very important. The third one "don't know" option ensured that respondents could give their answers honestly to the items. In the questionnaires of this study, 7 sections with 41 attitude items are designed in Likert scale (Table 3-8). Please see Appendix 1 in the end of this thesis.

For the results of response from the questionnaire survey please see Appendix 2 in the end of this thesis. These responses are analyzed and interpreted in chapter 5 and chapter 6.

3.3.3 Interviews

As a method of qualitative data collections, interview plays a vital role in influence assessment to know more information behind observed results. According to Yin (1994), a direct observation from field investigation about the conditions can gain some indications about the organization or site's climate. It can obtain useful information about people's perceptions to some issues from interviews. The sampling strategy of interviewees can help us achieve the triangulation of data and evidence concerning general case facts. This research applies a semi-structured in-depth interview with 46 planners, governmental officials, and academics within the Yangtze River Delta.

In a structured interview, the researcher asks a standard set of questions and does not allow one to divert (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). While a semi-structured interview allows new ideas to generate from the interview according to what the interviewee says. The interviewer in a semi-structured interview generally has a framework of themes to be explored. Focusing on the problems in the metropolitan planning management system in China, an informal grouping of topics and questions were designed to ask different participants in different ways.

As interview guides, these topics and questions help interviewers to focus upon the problems without constraining them to a particular format. This freedom can help interviewers to make the appropriate question according to interviewees and their context.

In this research, it adopts face-to-face interviews. The face-to-face interviews can produce higher response rates as compared to telephonic interviews in survey research. In addition, it can help interviewers make clear research questions and

elicit interviewees' answers in time, seek follow-up information (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).

Questions and issues of interviews in this study mainly focus upon operation subsystem. The law and regulation subsystem, administration subsystem and operation subsystem work together to make up current Chinese urban-rural planning system. In these three subsystems, the two formers were given, the last one was flexible. The key to success of planning management is its operating mechanism. Focusing upon problems in actual operations, it can reflect real world of the current system. Through questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews, it can collect first-hand information from the government officials in different levels, planners and experts. It can discover little-known details about the real of the grass-roots political power and planning power in operating practice. It provides rich fresh material for the deep analysis and provides strong support for the argument.

Interview transcripts, field notes and observations provide a descriptive account of the study (Pope, Ziebland and Mays, 1999). In this study, the process of each interview has been recorded by highly sensitive audio recording systems. At the same time, field notes have been taken through hand in key words or short phrases, and then summing up the conclusive statements.

Then, it analyzes the audio-recordings and field notes of the interview, transcribes the information into data in the form of text, and identifies data by searching through reading the field notes and repeating the record process. The contents of the interviews were transcribed into the narrative form to identify further themes and categories. It offers summary statement or words for each interview in the transcript, and moves away some deviations which are 'off the topic'. Then these transcripts were given as feedback to the interviewees to verify and confirm. From these steps, it can avoid the reporting bias and potential bias caused by the interviewers.

When all the data was transcribed, verified and confirmed, it sorts and organises to manage data in computer, compiles list of categories in large volumes to further analyse and interpretation.

The questions and responses of the interview are analyzed and informed in the following chapter 5 and chapter 6 and chapter 7.

3.3.4 Sampling: Selection of respondents and interviewees

3.3.4.1 The selection of interviewees for questionnaire and interviewing

Regarding planning management system in China, due to weak participations of the public in the urban planning management especially for the decisions of regional planning, it directly involves three groups: government officials, experts and planners. The government officials usually work in the related administrative and professional management institutes. The planners are those technical staffs who are working in the planning company, and the related experts are those professional people who are working in the university or research institutes. Other people indirectly participate in planning management through these three groups. Therefore, respondents of the questionnaire and interviewees of the interviews for this study are mainly focused on these three kinds of people: government officials and leaders of the government planning management department at prefecture-level and county-level, experts in regional and urban planning, and planners with abundant practical experience.

3.3.4.2 The determination of the number of respondents

1) Government officials

The respondents of this group were mainly selected from Jiangsu Province. It is the largest Province in Yangtze River Delta. According to Chinese administrative system, the main leaders who are in charge of planning management in a city include one vice mayor (Municipal planning leader), one planning director (Planning Bureau leader) and one chief planner (Planning Bureau technical leader). There are 13 prefecture-level cities in Jiangsu Province. This study chooses government officials from 10 cities as interviewees. The total number of questionnaires sent to government officials was 30.

2) Planners

This group was chosen from main Planning and Design Institutes or company. There is one main planning and design institute in each prefecture-level cities in Jiangsu Province, but usually the important prefecture-level cities have double Planning and Design Institutes comparing to the normal prefecture-level cities. There are 4 important prefecture-level cities, namely Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, and Xuzhou, so there will be nearly 17 main Planning and Design Institutes. Each of them was

delivered 10 questionnaires. The total number of questionnaires sent to planners was 170.

3) Experts

Experts were mainly chosen from the universities who have passed urban planning specialty evaluation. Urban planning specialty evaluation for Universities are operated by The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of Urban Planning Assessment Commission which are consigned and authorized by Ministry of Education and The Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development. It is focused on evaluating teaching qualities and conditions of urban planning degree. As the basic quality guarantee of higher professional education, specialty evaluation and accreditation is of fundamental importance to the overall improvement of higher education level of a university. According to data from the Personnel Division of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD), there are almost 180 universities which have set up urban planning degrees but only 30 of them have pass the urban planning specialty evaluation in the end of May 2012 (Table 3-9). This means that these 30 universities are the best in urban planning area. Therefore, this study invites 1-2 urban planning professors from each of those 30 universities which represented the highest level of Chinese urban planning research. The total number of questionnaires sent to experts was 50.

The total number of questionnaires delivered was 250. After the size of questionnaire was determined, this study sent 250 questionnaires, and took back 230 questionnaires. The number of valid returned questionnaires is 226, with the effective rate of 90% (Table 3-10). The detail information of respondents please see Table 3-10 and Figure 3-9.

Table 3-10: Statistics of universities succeed in the specialty evaluation of urban planning in China

No.	List of Universities
1	Tsinghua University
2	Southeast University
3	Tongji University
4	Chongqing University
5	Harbin Institute of Technology
6	Tianjin University
7	Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology
8	Huazhong University of Science and Technology
9	Nanjing University
10	South China University of Technology
11	Shandong Jianzhu University
12	Southwest Jiaotong University
13	Zhejiang University
14	Wuhan University
15	Hunan University
16	Suzhou University of Science and Technology
17	Shenyang Jianzhu University
18	Anhui University of Architecture
19	Kunming University of Science and Technology
20	Sun Yat-sen University
21	Nanjing University of Technology
22	Central South University
23	Shenzhen University
24	Northwest University
25	Dalian University of Technology
26	Zhejiang University of Technology
27	Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture
28	Guangzhou University
29	Peking University
30	FuJian University of Technology

Source: The Personnel Division of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (2012). Available at : <http://edu.mohurd.gov.cn/data/MaterialFolder/Affiche/8da8937b-1c0d-492b-a53f-a895a8bd976a.pdf>. (Accessed: 15 October, 2013).

Table 3-11: The quantity and the quality of questionnaire

Respondents	Questionnaire number	Answered questionnaire number	Effective questionnaire number	The response rate, (%)	The effective rate, (%)
Governmental officials	30	26	26	87	87
Planners	170	158	154	93	91
Experts	50	46	46	92	92
Total	250	230	226	92	90

Source: Created by the author.

Table 3-12: The composition and proportion of respondents

Respondents	Respondents number	the proportion of respondents, (%)	Effective Respondents number	the proportion of effective respondents, (%)
Governmental officials	30	12	26	12
Planners	170	68	154	68
Experts	50	20	46	20
Total	250	100	226	100

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 3-9: The profession of effective respondents

Source: Created by the author.

3.3.4.3 The sample characteristics of interviewees

The interviewees were extracted from the samples of 226 people surveyed. This study selected those representative people who were willing to cooperate with the interview. It includes 16 governmental officials, 14 planners and 16 experts. The total number of interviewees is 46. For detail information of interviewees please see Table 3-12-13 and Figure 3-10.

Table 3-13: The composition and proportion of interviewees

Interviewees	Interviewees Number	The Proportion of Interviewees, (%) n=46
Governmental officials	16	35
Planners	14	30
Experts	16	35
Total	46	100

Source: Created by the author.

Table 3-14: The sample characteristics of interviewees

Interviewees	Number	Work Unit
Governmental officials	16	Suzhou Municipal Development and Reform Commission Suzhou Planning Bureau Policy Research Office of the Suzhou Municipal Government Yangzhou Planning Bureau Nanjing Planning Bureau Zhangjiagang Planning Bureau The new District Branch of Wuxi Planning Bureau
Planners	14	Suzhou Planning Information Center Suzhou Institute of Planning and Design Co.,LTD Jiangsu Institute of Urban Planning and Design Nanjing Academy of Urban Planning and Design Co.,LTD Changzhou city Planning and Design Institute Yangzhou Institute of Planning and Design Co.,LTD
Experts	16	School of Architecture, Tsinghua University School of Architecture, Southeast University Collage of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Nanjing University School of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Zhejiang University School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Suzhou University of Science and Technology Collage of Architecture and Urban Planning, Nanjing University of Technology
Total	46	

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 3-10: The profession of interviewees

Source: Created by the author.

3.3.5 Biases and prejudices

Everyone has some biases and prejudices. These biases and prejudices cause misinterpretations. In order to reduce the research biases and to escape from these prejudices as much as possible for this study, it was necessary to ensure that the response from the questionnaire and interview is valid and effective. It takes effective steps to reduce, control and identify the possible bias.

Firstly, paper-pencil-questionnaire was established by literature research, personal communication with experts, semi-structured interviews with planners and officials. The formal items have piloted based on modifying the initial questionnaire in two rounds workshops to improve the format, clarity, and wording.

Secondly, Data triangulated with multiple respondents, and sources. Government officials and planners came from Jiangsu Province, which is one of the top areas in China. The expert's came from universities at the best level in urban planning area, which represented the highest level of Chinese urban planning research. These respondents have abundant practical experience in planning management and they are typical and representative in nature. The sampling strategy of interviewees can help us achieve the triangulation of data and evidence concerning general case facts. One group maybe biased, but different groups can be used to check, and help in keeping the balance.

Thirdly, data was verified and confirmed which came from respondents to reduce the biases from the interviewers. It was taken in September to December in 2012. The data was to be collected and converted to electronic form with as few classification errors as possible.

Fourth, a well-designed analysis of the collected data can further reduce errors. A debate as to whether qualitative researchers should have their analyses verified or validated by a third party (Mays and Pope, 1995; Barbour, 2001). Solicit more opinions and compiling them can reduce personal biases. It constructs the peer debriefs in the period from April to June in 2013. Inter-rater reliability by another qualitative researcher analyses the data independently and give their comments. It also compared the results concerning individual opinions to identify common sense. In this step, investigator triangulation (Janesick, 1994) was applied by comparing and discussing the transcripts of the interviewees and experts.

This process can make the analysis more rigorous and can help in reducing the element of bias.

From these steps, the presentation and results of the data collection was intended to be without bias or skewed perception using substantial data withholding any information speculation.

3.3.6 Confidentiality and sensitivity

The conclusion will be more persuasive and reliable if the sociologists have several methodologies, observations, different theories and multiple statistics (De Vaus, 2002; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). According to this, the author used literature review, questionnaire, telephonic interviews and face-to-face interview as methods for data collection.

The author has been working and teaching for long and have experience in urban planning. The author took charge of several research projects close related to this study during the working time. Those completed projects lay a solid foundation for this study. At the same time, the author often works as an expert taking part in planning review meetings to evaluate and discuss planning projects. Particularly, in the process of leading the research projects “Research on the system and mechanism of different space scale urban agglomerations planning”, which are supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the author has collected large amount of data from interviewing several urban planning experts, officials and planners. Depending on these activities, the author has deep understanding of local practice and the real conditions of planning management in China.

People are more truthful while responding to the questionnaires regarding controversial issues, in particular, because their responses are anonymous (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). However, it has to admit that it is difficult to get real responses to social surveys in China, especially to some social sensitive questions. Regarding data collection in this study, it is easy to get governmental documents, reports and rules about planning management, but it is hard to achieve the real conditions of local planning management for further research. Most of interviewees will refuse to answer those sensitive questions when the questions involve some government leaders or the planners’ behaviors, which leads to the slow progress of data collection for the study.

After having so many problems for the survey, it changes the strategy for data collection. The author used own relationship to carry on the survey and finally finished it.

1) The author has 13 years urban planning teaching experience in Suzhou University of Science and Technology. The graduate students are distributed all around China. Most of them are working in the planning company or Planning Bureau. With their assistance, the author finished the interviews and questionnaire in aspect of technical staff-planners.

2) With the greatest support from the Chief Planner of Suzhou Planning Bureau, Mr. Xiang, the Director of Policy Research Office of the Municipal People's Government of Suzhou, Mr. Wan, and Mrs. Zhang, she is working at Yangzhou Planning Bureau, the author finished the interviews and questionnaire in aspect of Government officials.

3) With the help from the friends those who worked at universities, the author have access to a plenty of information from professors who are experts in planning. With support from the experts, the author finished the interviews and questionnaire in aspect of experts.

After finishing all the data collection, the author builds up the database and manages all the data with MS Excel. Since Excel is the most commonly used table-processing software, large quantities of data can be stored through Excel. This study also makes use of Excel tools in the analysis of these data, and draws diagrams from and of statistics results. From analyzing and comparing the result with real data collection from questionnaire and interviews, it can see the real world of the metropolitan planning management system in China.

3.4 Summary

This chapter introduces the research methodology and methods of data collection. Based on fieldwork, the research involves methods in Sociology, Politics and Economics, etc. Inter-disciplinary research operates all over the study. Combining situational observation and experiences, paper-pencil-questionnaires and semi-structured interview techniques, this study is to intensively investigate the changes and situations of the metropolitan planning management system in China from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives.

Statistics numbers in China are not always opened and transparent. Due to this limitation and data feasibility, it is difficult to obtain the real data and conduct in-depth studies. The evidence of the real life has been much harder to come by if only relying on official data. This study overcomes these difficulties by pulling some strings of personal relationships. Through literature study, interview and questionnaire, this study manages to get the real of the planning management system in China, to ensure the smoothness of this research work.

In short, through the above methods, it can obtain the overall condition of the planning management system in China. It also can provide it with a real operating situation. It can help us to gain an intimate knowledge and lay the groundwork for future study of the planning management system in China.

Chapter 4

4.0 Historical Background: Transformations of China's Urban and Rural Planning Management System

From modern bureaucracy to the new public management in the late 1970s, and subsequently to the post-new public management in the late 1990s, Western nations have transformed their mind-set from ruling to governing a country and the public management paradigm has shifted from reason-based to discourse-based construction. The essence of the transition is the constant interactions among the government, market, and society in Western nations as well as a product of unceasing reconstructions. Paradigm shifts are governed by the dynamic relationships among the government, market, and society. Modern China originated from a patriarchal society with a history of more than 2,000 years. The fundamental feature of a patriarchal society is an isomorphic state-family structure, and the national political structure is a political extension of the family system. In both systems, the patriarch or the emperor (or king) possesses supreme and unlimited power. In patriarchal societies, freedom is a privilege enjoyed exclusively by the rich and powerful but not granted to the general public (Qin and Jin, 2010). The Chinese economic reform in 1978 initiated the nation's effort to modernize the country and comprehensively restructured itself from a traditional society to a modern society.

China's economic reform was essentially a comprehensive institutional transition that released substantial energy and became the fundamental force driving China's rapid economic development for over 30 years (Peng and Heath, 1996; Naughton, 1996; Ying, 2003; Zheng, et al, 2009). Yu Keping argued that the Chinese political reform that has been implemented since 1978 was essentially a governance reform rather than a reform in the political system. Specifically, this type of reform does not alter the fundamental political framework; instead, the reform is focused on governmental governance or the governmental management system. The procedure of this type of governance reform is characterized by the following transitions: from single-level to multilevel governance, from centralization to decentralization, from the rule of man to the rule of law, from a control-oriented to a service-oriented government, and from democracy within the Party to social democracy (Yu, 2008).

Such institutional transitions constantly shape relationships between the government and market, as well as the nation and society (Nee, 1992; Shirk, 1993). Accordingly, this transition profoundly altered China's original socioeconomic foundations and promoted a revolution of the entire administrative management system (e.g., planning management system) (Naughton, 1996; Yang, 2004; Ji, 2013). These changes originated from the subsequent decentralization resulting from China's economic reform (Montinola, et al., 1995; Lin and Liu, 2000; Jin, et al., 2005).

Although the existing literature analysed the development history of the metropolitan planning or regional planning in China, it still lacks deep research on the metropolitan planning management system. The prospect for the urban- rural planning management system reform was more, and the research on the urban- rural planning management system transition of China since the reform and opening-up policy is obviously insufficient. Meantime, the concern on the mechanism of the planning management system transition was obviously insufficient, without the theoretical analysis framework.

Urban and rural planning management is a crucial component of administrative management. Urban and rural planning and its operations are only effective within the range permitted by the administrative management system (Zhang, 2006). What are the characteristics of transitions in China's urban and rural planning management system since the economic reform? What are the mechanisms for urban and rural management system transitions? This study examines China's decentralization, administrative management system reform, urban and rural planning management system reform, and planning management system transitions in the larger context of governance transitions. It explains panoramically the transitional process and mechanisms driving China's urban and rural planning management system since 1978.

4.1 Changes of governance in China: from centralization to decentralization

4.1.1 The traditional Chinese bureaucratic system: Monarchy

In the Tang Dynasty the Chinese central government has established a large bureaucratic system, the "Three Departments and Six Ministries" system (Liu, 2001). The three departments are the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu Sheng), the

Department of State Affairs (Shang-shu Sheng), and Chancellery (Men-xia Sheng). The six ministries are the Ministries of Personnel, Defence, Revenue, Justice, Rites, and Works (Figure 4-11). This Three Departments and Six Ministries system (Sānshěng Liùbù) was the main central administrative structure adopted in China during its imperial period.




Figure 4-11: The three departments and six ministries system of China in Tang Dynasty

Source: Created by the author. Data compiled from Liu H. B. (2001). The Sansheng (Three Departments) under the Zhongshu menxia (Secretariat-Chancellery) System and Their Functions and Powers during the Tang Dynasty-Also on the Changes in the Operation of State Power in the Middle Ancient Times. *Historical Research*, (2):15-29.

The political systems in imperial China involve an uncontrolled and unlimited political centre, which could potentially and was likely to interfere constantly with socioeconomic life (Jin, 1991). In feudal societies, “the ideological activities and philosophies in life that Chinese people had were confined by bureaucratic politics” (Wang, 1981). Additionally, “the traditional Chinese political culture was based on the feudalist authoritarian political system, the being focused to maintain the feudal monarchy, the despotism and monarchism centered on monarchical power. Consequently, pragmatism was used as the ideological basis, and was supplemented by morals and politics. State authority affects and governs all aspects of society, resulting in pan-politicism, a tradition with distinct Chinese characteristics. Pan-politicism is also called “totalitarianism” (Wu, 2006). Wang (2000) stated that the most prominent feature of the bureaucracy in traditional societies was that all members of the society were confined to well-defined despotic hierarchical levels. This type of system is essentially a bureaucratic political system rather than bureaucracy because it differs substantially from the spirit of modern

bureaucracy.” Wu Si (2008) defined the traditional bureaucratic political system in China as officialism, which refers to “the sum of the unspoken-rule systems established by individual officials, the departmental regulations established by *Yamen* (i.e., local bureaucrats’ offices), and the emperor’s law devised by the emperor. These three bodies of regulations have separate legislative power and freedom.” According to Wu, this type of officialism, where “power has the last say” has influenced China in all ages. Today, Chinese traditional officialdom standard thought still has profound influences on the politics and social and daily life in China.

4.1.2 Mao's all-round socialist politics: totalitarian rule

Since 1949, a highly centralized political system that accommodates to a planned economy has gradually formed in the new China. Domestic and international scholars generally consider the China in the Mao era (prior to the economic reform) a typical model of a totalitarian country (Walder, 1986; Zou, 1994). Zou Dang (1994) defined totalitarianism based on the relationship between a state and society: “The power of political organizations can affect and control, at any time and in a non-restricted manner, all strata of a society and the guiding ideologies in all fields. Totalitarianism refers to political societies that operate based on this guiding ideology.” In addition, “the freedom and rights of the people and groups in this type of society are not protected by morals, public opinions, laws, or constitutions. Instead, the degree and content of the freedom enjoyed by people and groups are determined by the political authorities.” Four typical features of totalitarian states are the party-state, one-party, government-society, and government-enterprise systems. Victor Nee provided an insightful interpretation of these systems: The most surprising feature of the people’s communes in China (consisting of administrative departments, production brigades, and production teams) is the lack of well-defined organizational boundaries between the state and the society (Nee, 1992). Although the administrative departments in communes constitute of, in form, the lowest organizational level of the state, the actual boundary of the state cannot be defined clearly. Communes are built on formal and informal relationships, including village-based organizations such as militias, branches of the Communist Party, brigades, teams, farmer associations, women’s federations, and the Communist Youth League of China. These organizations were set up by the state, rather than by the villagers, to ensure governmental control over

the villages. The paramilitary form of people's communes reflects the logic of state authority (Tang, 1999).

4.1.3 Governance since the reform and opening: decentralization

In 1978, an unprecedented reform was initiated in China. The marketization of the economy and the decentralization in politics drove the overall restructuring in China. Economically, private ownership and market forces have been increasing since the economic reform, while administrative powers are withdrawn substantially from resource allocation. Politically, the central government has been transferring political and economic management authorities to local governments since the 1980s. The administrative management system of one-level-down management substantially enhanced the autonomy to which local governments are entitled. Particular scholars have called the marketization reform in China "privatization with Chinese characteristics" (Yang, 2004). Qian and Weingast (1996) defined this model as "market-preserving federalism." Harvey called it "state-manipulated market economy" or "neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics," a product resulting from the combination of authoritarianism and particular elements (e.g., privatization) in neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005).

Since the reform and opening-up policy implemented in China in the late 1970s, the decentralization of power has become foundational factor and driving force to promote Chinese institutional transition and governance transformation. In China's decentralization, the central government was the central authority. Power was dispersed from the central government to local governments (i.e., administrative decentralization), from governments to markets (i.e., market-oriented decentralization), and from governments to societies (i.e., social-oriented decentralization) (Montinola, et al., 1995; Brandt and Zhu, 2000). The decentralization of three dimensions, administrative, market-oriented and social-oriented decentralization occurred in different stage (See Figure 4-12).




Figure 4-12: Three dimensional decentralizations in China

Source: Created by the author.

In the vertical axis, power devolves from central government to provincial government, to prefecture-level, county-level and township-level government (see Figure 4-13). In the horizontal level, power also shifts from government to market and also to society (see Figure 4-14). This brought about the reconstruction of multiple relationships between central and local governments, government and market, nation and society.




Figure 4-13: Vertical decentralization in China

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 4-14: Horizontal decentralization in China

Source: Created by the author.

Administrative decentralization refers to the constant distribution of socioeconomic management powers and responsibilities from central government to local governments in an effort to increase the enthusiasm and innovation of local governments (Cohen and Peterson, 1997; Zhou, 2004). The purpose of administrative decentralization is to adjust the relationship between the central government and local governments (Zhou, 2004; Cai, and Treisman, 2006). Market-oriented decentralization refers to the constant transformation from government-guided resource allocation to market-guided resource allocation in an effort to establish and optimize a market economy (Montinola, et al., 1995; Bardhan, 2002; Jin, et al., 2005). The purpose of market-oriented decentralization is to adjust the relationship between governments and markets (Lin and Liu, 2000). Social-oriented decentralization refers to the process of partially transferring social management powers and responsibilities from governments to societies in order to strengthen the autonomy of a society (Sano, 2000; Jin, et al., 2005; Guthrie, 2012). The purpose of social-oriented decentralization is to adjust the relationship between the nation and society (Guthrie, 2012).

Time differences exist for the decentralizations of these three dimensions. The top-down administrative decentralization in China started broadly in the 1980s and was further strengthened in the 1990s. The shift (i.e., decentralization from governments to markets) to market-guided resource allocation began in 1992, when China's market economy was established. Social-oriented decentralization, which emphasized deregulation of the government's management of society, started in 2004. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao first proposed to build the service-oriented government in a report at a conference in the Party School of the CPC Central

Committee (Wen, 2004). In September 2004, the fourth Plenary Session of the sixteenth Central Committee of the CPC (Communist Party of China) set up the target to build a well-off society in an all-round way. The time differences in decentralization resulted in obvious characteristics for each stage of governance changes in China. Considering that the administrative decentralization began at the end of the 1970s, the market-oriented decentralization began in 1992, and social-oriented decentralization began in 2004, the timing of decentralization in the three dimensions differed significantly, generating obvious characteristics for each transitional stage in China’s governance (see figure 4-15).




Figure 4-15: The changes of Chinese governance

Source: Created by the author.

4.2 The planning management system reform resulting from the administrative decentralization

4.2.1 The background of administrative decentralization

Before the economic reform, the dominant form of economy in China was a planned economy (Peng and Heath, 1996; Yang, 2004). To accommodate this situation, national powers were constantly concentrated, forming a highly consolidated and centralized management system. In this top-down single-object management model, the focus was central power, and administrative commands were dominant (McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Qian, 2000; Wong, 1991). The primary characteristics of such a system are (a) the non-separation of parties and governments, (b) the non-separation of governments and societies, and (c) the non-

separation of government and enterprises. The greatest disadvantage of a highly centralized power management system is that powers are excessively concentrated. According to the intense statements of Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of economic reform regarding excessively centralized powers, the existence of certain negative phenomena were closely related to the highly centralized power management system that existed for a long time in China. The leading organizations at various levels manipulated numerous affairs that they should not and could not have been addressed (Deng, 1994:328). Excessively centralized powers are the greatest obstacle limiting socioeconomic development.

4.2.2 Responses of the administrative management system reform

To stimulate the enthusiasm and initiative of local governments in relation to economic development, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, China implemented reforms to the administrative management system that focused on adjusting the relationship between central and local governments. These adjustments are widely known as the administrative decentralization reform (Shen and Dai, 1990; Wang and Ren, 2009). Administrative decentralization refers to the level-upon-level dispersal of socioeconomic management powers from central government sectors to subordinate governments and local governments through administrative commands rather than laws. In the 1980s, top-down administrative decentralization was intensive. Vital economic development power (e.g., industry and commerce, taxation, and land) was transferred successively from central government to local departments. Compared with fiscal federalism observed in Western countries, China's administrative decentralization focused more on the financial incentives for local governments (Wang , et al , 2007). After three finance distribution negotiations between the central government and local governments were held in 1983, 1985, and 1988, reform of the normalized tax sharing system was implemented in 1994 (Zhang, 2006). This type of reform is referred to as the fiscal system of market-preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1996; Qian and Weingast, 1997). Fiscal decentralization has resulted in definite and stable profit expectations for local governments. Accordingly, local governments can invest an increasing amount of energy in developing local economies and increasing local fiscal levies.

Since top-down level-upon-level decentralization was taking control, the central government's overall control over the economy and society was reduced. From 1979 to 1983, the people's commune system that integrated government administration and commune management abrogated, denoting the start of market-oriented rural reform (Putterman, 1993; Qian, and Weingast, 1997). In urban areas, a contracted management system for state-owned enterprises was implemented to energize enterprises. In addition, the central government reduced military control over society. Moreover, the central government's control over the founding and registration of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) has reduced. Chinese citizens also gained increased freedom of speech (Huang, 2003; Yu, 2008). Nevertheless, various governments, particularly the central government, held immense power over markets and society in the 1980s. With the acquiescence of local governments, private economies rapidly developed in a few south-eastern coastal provinces (e.g., Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian). However, because of the significant influence of ideologies, private economies failed to obtain legal status throughout China and thus practiced illegally (Qian, 2000). Around the same period, social organizations faced substantial suppression from the central government. Thus, NGOs barely existed and their development was illegal. Generally, from 1987 to 1992, China's totalitarian system gradually collapsed. Consequently, "powerful governments, weak markets, and weak societies" were the main characteristics of China's social and political structure (Yu, 2008).

4.2.3 The planning management system reform

4.2.3.1 Initiation of the planning management system reform

After the communist regime has established in 1949, China adopted the Soviet model for various systems such as planning management. During the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), urban and rural planning ceased entirely and planning management organizations were eliminated (Dong, 2004:402-414). After the economic reform, urban and rural planning regained attention. Governmental planning management organizations of various levels have successively resumed. Under the influence of the long-term highly centralized management system, the planning management system followed a typical centralized management model from the late 1970s to early 1980s. Specifically, (a) the function positioning of urban planning was the extension, embodiment, and

spatial implementation of national economies and social planning; (b) planned investment from central government was the only source of capital for local urban construction; and (c) The urban planning management still keep the same way within the planned economy system. Assigning top-down compulsory commands was the primary management manner (Song and Xu, 1999). With the execution of administrative decentralization, urban and rural planning management decentralization has initiated in the 1980s.

4.2.3.2 The planning management decentralization

With the promotion of administrative decentralization, the planning management system shifted from vertical management to local management. After the Beijing planning and construction committee established in 1983, planning management departments were successively established for province, prefecture-level, and county-level governments in the middle and late 1980s. Local governments have power and responsibility to manage the resources and finances (Yeh and Wu, 1999). Consequently, planning management departments became the most important local government agencies. Local governments can conduct planning for cities, towns, and townships based on their own developmental and construction demands without the intervention of higher planning authorities. The Chinese state council announced the Urban Planning Regulations on January 5, 1984. These regulations divided urban planning into two stages (i.e., overall planning and detailed planning). A system of examination and approval at various levels have been employed for overall urban planning. In the vertical regime structure that includes the central government, provinces, prefecture, counties, and townships, examination and approval at various levels in urban planning overall means that the urban planning decisions of local governments are examined and approved by government at the level above. Detailed urban planning decisions have thoroughly examined and approved by the local government. Under this examination and approval system, provinces, cities, and townships all possess various planning management powers, increasing the autonomy of local governments regarding urban constructions.

4.2.3.3 Local governments have become investors in urban construction

After administrative decentralization was implemented, local governments provided substantial capital for urban construction through starting enterprises.

Subsequently, the structure where the central government was the only investor in urban construction was changed. After the administrative decentralization, various levels of local government (e.g., province, prefecture, and township) had the power to examine and approve project investments of varying value (Qian, 2000). Fiscal decentralization led to differences in fiscal balances, and they have been completely controlled by local governments. To promote local economic development and absorb considerable surplus rural labor, local governments (e.g., county and township) partially transformed fiscal balances into investments to proactively establish enterprises and generate profits (Lin and Liu, 2000). The dispersal of project investment examination and approval authority to local governments provided the preconditions for local governments to establish enterprises. In the 1980s, when the development of private economies was constrained, township enterprises founded by local governments developed rapidly, providing local governments with substantial profit beyond tax incomes (Wong, 2000). In south Jiangsu and other regions in which township enterprises are adequately developed, the township enterprises controlled by local governments generated considerable capital for developing and constructing small cities and towns, becoming a fundamental force driving rural urbanization in China at that time (Ning, 1998; Cui and Ma, 1999). For example, with the collective economic rapid development, the total industrial output value of the township enterprises in Suzhou, which focusing on the collective economy, exceeded the total industrial output value of the state-owned economy at the same time. The collective economy became one of the most important capital sources for the local urban construction (Wang, et al., 2007).

4.3 The planning management system reform resulting from market-oriented decentralization

4.3.1 The background of market-oriented decentralization

During the spring season of 1992, Deng Xiaoping's southern tour speech created opportunities for reforming China's market economy system (Deng, 1992). In October 1992, the Communist Party of China announced the reform goal of establishing a socialist market economy system. After this market economy was proposed, privatization became a trend throughout the country. The concrete effects of this were:

(a) Private economies obtained legal status. In 1993, a constitutional amendment legalizing private economies was passed. Subsequently, private economies rapidly developed, becoming the main entities of the market economy by promptly replacing state-owned economies and collective economies (Qian, 2000).

(b) State-owned enterprises were privatized. With the goal of establishing modern enterprise systems, drastic privatization of state-owned enterprises was conducted.

(c) Collective economies were privatized. Although collective economies succeeded in competition with state-owned enterprises, with private economies continuing to flourish, their economic benefits considerably declined. Within this context, privatization of township enterprises with a focus on collective economies has implemented nationwide. For example, in the 1980s, the collective economy in Suzhou garnered national attention and the model was adopted by other regions. However, in 1994, collective economies encountered a series of obstacles. The Suzhou municipal government initiated a property reform of the township enterprise. By the end of 2001, 15,800 enterprises underwent reform, accounting for 99.4% of all township enterprises in Suzhou (Wang, et al, 2007:137-138).

(d) A substantial amount of foreign capital flooded China's market. After 1992, China intensified its opening-up policy, subsequently attracting an extraordinary amount of direct foreign investments.

4.3.2 Responses of the administrative management system reform

Privatization-oriented market economy reforms require positive responses from administrative management system reforms; otherwise, the transformation from a planned economy system to market economy system could not be achieved. The administrative decentralization that occurred in the 1980s contributed to the collapse of China had a highly centralized system and enhanced the enthusiasm of local governments. However, administrative decentralization is generally a process of power adjustment and redistribution between the central government and local governments, and between superior and subordinate governments within an administrative management system. Thus, administrative decentralization did not follow the traditional method of “centralization–decentralization” in the administrative management system before 1978. Essentially, the vicious circle of “standardization leading to a dead end and freedom leading to chaos” was not

overcome. In an effort to establish a market economy, reform of China's administrative management system was initiated in the 1990s with an emphasis on transforming government functions. The core issues of this transformation in government functions were the responsibilities of governments and the manner in which governments address these responsibilities. The key task in the transformation of government functions was separating the administration and enterprises. A substantial amount of government management power was laterally transferred to markets. The rights of production operation were transferred to enterprises, thereby ensuring they became the primary entities of markets.

Top-down administrative decentralization was also implemented. Specifically, (a) according to local principals, the central government delegated the management of numerous state-owned enterprises to local governments at various levels; (b) to facilitate the establishment of a market economy, the central government transferred the responsibility of operating certain departments that were previously vertically managed, such as commodity pricing, auditing, quality supervision, and customs, to local governments. Subsequently, municipal and county governments obtained autonomic rights similar to those of local governments in Western countries. With department operational powers transferred to local governments, the investment and foreign trade examination and approval rights were also dispersed, ever increasing the autonomy of local governments.

Governments considered power in relation to resource allocation. Consequently, markets have gradually replaced governments regarding resource allocation. The importance of markets in resource allocation continues to increase. Additionally, the price competition mechanism assumed the powers that the central government had dispersed to local governments, becoming a driving force of economic restructuring (Harvey, 2005: 130). The market economy also became the most fundamental and vital strength that facilitated economic growth in China. The thriving market economy provided positive development conditions for NGOs. However, with restrictions from ideologies and traditional political systems, the development of NGOs and social organizations was slow. In addition, the central government opposed the development of various types of NGOs and selectively incorporated NGOs into the social governance system (Fan, 2010). After constant administrative and market-oriented decentralization, China's social and political

structure gradually evolved from “powerful governments, weak markets, and weak societies” into “powerful governments, powerful markets, and weak societies”.

4.3.3 The planning management system reform

The development of a market economy has profoundly altered the foundation of planning operations. With the transformation of the administrative management system, the planning management system has also altered.

4.3.3.1 The devolution of planning management power

Administrative decentralization, particularly fiscal decentralization, cultivated local governments’ subjective consciousness regarding profits, whereas the market economy stimulated local governments’ sense of competition. In the 1990s, with the substantial influx of foreign capital, local governments were competed intense for floating capitals. The role of local governments shifted from an “agency-oriented regime” to a “profit-oriented regime” (Yang and Su, 2002), through the consideration of an increasing number of economic and political interest factors when making decisions and taking actions (Wu, 2003). Local governments actually became super enterprises. But their power and right is far beyond an enterprise. They control the public resources (e.g., land, environment, and public utilities) and have administrative power and right of establishing regulations (e.g., tax policies and urban planning). These are special powers of the government which can’t be given to the enterprises (Zhang and Wu, 2004). In the 1990s, local governments began to establish development zones and promote investment. Since 2000, local governments have occupied lands and conducted land auctions on a large scale. The enterprise efforts of local governments are becoming increasingly obvious. Local governments manage cities as if they are companies. Urban planning has become one of the few crucial tools for local governments to intervene in social and economic development (Zhang et al., 2002). For example, up to the end of 2000, Suzhou possessed 5 national level development zones, 10 provincial level development zones and more than 200 township industrial zones (Wang, et al., 2007).

To facilitate the large-scale construction of development zones and develop local economies, further devolution of planning power has commonly been adopted by provincial and municipal governments at the time (Wong and Tang, 2005). Municipal planning bureaus dispersed their planning power to counties and districts,

and even townships and towns (Chien, 2008). The county and district governments further distributed planning power to the management committees of the development zone under their administration. The committees of development zones assumed total responsibility for affairs such as the investment promotion, planning, and construction of development zones. The management committees of development zones have granted independent decision-making power regarding the development, implementation, and supervision of planning (Wang and Li, 2013). During that period, the planning management of development zones was not under the administration of urban planning authorities. The central government began to strengthen the vertical management of planning in 2004, when the planning management of development zones ceased to be independent.

4.3.3.2 Public-private partnership (PPP) in planning implementation and management

The privatization of state-owned enterprises and collective economies deprived local governments for direct control over economies. Within this context, a priority for local governments was to inspire private departments to promote urban development and participate in urban construction. In the middle and late 1990s, as results of the formation of government enterprises, various municipal governments successively established government-owned organizations such as urban investment companies. Additionally, local governments formed various types of partnerships with private organizations such as real estate companies, to prompt private departments to participate in the development and management of urban infrastructure. This phenomenon was a powerful advocate of planning implementation. According to regime theory (Stone, 1993), local governments and private departments have formed various types of alliances since 1990. These PPPs have now become the essential driving force of urban sprawl and rapid urbanization. From initial adjusting then to facilitate markets, urban planning is losing its social function expeditiously. Some critics have asserted that the greatest issue during China's urban planning transformation was the lack of fairness (Chen, 2004). The core value of urban planning should be to uphold social justice (Sun, 2006).

4.3.3.3 The marketization of planning making

Before 1992, planning and design corporations were typically the responsibly of planning administration authorities. As official organizations, they directly

supervised the corporations with the help of planning administration authorities. In the 1990s, with the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, reforms to property rights have broadly implemented in planning and design units. The reform objectives mainly focused on the following aspects, therefore, the outcomes of reforms coming out.

(a) To expose planning and design units to markets, thereby facilitating their emergence as independently managed market entities responsible for their own profits and losses. This action contributed to a collapse in the government's administrative monopoly of planning management.

(b) To enhance the planning quality and the government's planning management efficiency. Market competition crucially guaranteed increased product quality. Competition in the planning and design field rapidly enhanced the standard of planning and design. Furthermore, as urban planning projects are public service, the marketization of planning formulation can increase the management efficiency of planning authorities.

(c) To improve the professional skills of planners. Market competition forces enterprises to constantly enhance their competencies by cultivating talents that markets demand. Since the start of the 21st century, China's enormous planning and design market has been opened to the entire world, enabling foreign planning and design companies to compete in China's planning and design markets. In numerous medium and large-sized cities, local governments also established management systems such as open bidding in planning and design.

4.4 The planning management system reform resulting from social-oriented decentralization

4.4.1 The background of social-oriented decentralization

4.4.1.1 The conspicuousness of social justice issues

As the 21st century began, under the consistent intensification of reforms (e.g., market economy reform), new contradictions and problems emerged. The depth of reform into a market economy restructured not only social hierarchies, but also regional spatial structure. Since the 1990s, Chinese society has become increasingly polarized; even today, this phenomenon continues to intensify. Disparities between districts and between urban and rural areas increased rapidly, and regional development imbalances and social justice issues began to manifest.

China became a fractured society (Sun, 2004). After 1978, China converted into a market economy manipulated by governments, an outcome that integrated neoliberalism elements with authoritarianism (Harvey, 2005: 120-122). During the middle and late 1990s, marketization reforms in fields such as medical treatment, education, housing, and senior care had eliminated much of the government's public services responsibilities, exacerbating the shortage in public services. Scholars have criticized China for following a marketized path that lacks public services (Xiao, 2012). These issues have aroused such intense public indignation towards governments that since the mid-1990s, the incidence of civil disorders rise drastically. According to relevant data released by governments, the number of civil disorders increased from 10,000 to 74,000 between 1994 and 2004. Furthermore, the number of participants in these civil disorders increased from 730,000 to 3,760,000 between 1994 and 2004 (Feng, 2006). In 2010, the number of civil disorders exceeded 100,000(Li and Liu, 2013).

4.4.1.2 The awakening of citizens' consciousness of rights

With the market economy reform, pluralistic societies in China were formed. Accordingly, the right consciousness of Chinese citizens was awoken. The number of movements advocating various rights increases considerably every year. Political civil disorders also occur frequently. After 2000, with the rapid urbanization process, local governments occupied a massive number of lands from farmers and forced demolitions and removals. This sparked a rapid increase in rights advocacy and violent incidents, triggering major social contradictions.

For example, since 2007, large-scale group events arising out of the major industrial project sites had occurred repeatedly (Table 4-14). These events had a common feature, i.e. the project construction could lead to serious pollutions for the locals, and the project planning sites did not asked for public opinions.

In the 21st century, with the assistance of new media such as the Internet, citizens' awareness of subjectivity and rights, and their participation in politics is increasing. China's civil societies are developing faster than ever. According to the 31st statistical report on Internet development in China released by the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC) on January 15, 2013, by the end of December 2012, the number of Internet users in China was 564 million. The number of new Internet users in 2012 was 50.9 million. The popularizing rate of the Internet

in China was 42.1%. The number of mobile Internet users in China was 420 million, an annual growth of 18.1%. The number of micro blog users was 309 million, an increase of 58.73 million since the end of 2011 (China Internet Network Information Center, 2013). Public opinion and social conflicts on the Internet, especially conflicts between governments and civilians placed enormous pressures on the government. Generally, changing social foundations and the emergence of major social issues urged government authorities to accelerate governance reforms.

Table 4-15: Events arising out of major industrial project sites since 2007

Event Name	Time of Occurrence	Events	Response of Local Government
Xiamen “PX event”	May 2007	Thousands of people got together in the mode of “taking a walk”, to protest against the chemical project construction.	PX project was suspended
Shanghai magnetic suspension event	January 2008	Some citizens of the community along the magnetic suspension line got together and protested in the mode of “taking a walk”.	The government adopted the remedial measures such as investigating the public opinions around.
Panyu event	November 2009	Thousands of people got together to protest against the construction of Panyu waste incineration plant	The project was put aside
Dalian “PX event”	August 2011	12,000 persons of Dalian got together to protest against PX project construction	The project shut down
Shantou Haimen event	December 2011	Ten thousand of people protested against the project construction of the power plant in the mode of hedging the expressway.	The local government promised to suspend perpetually.
Shifang event	July 2012	Ten thousand of people protested against the construction of the contaminated industrial enterprise.	The project was suspended.
Qidong event	July 2012	Ten thousand of people got together to protest against the construction of the paper making pollution discharge project	The project was cancelled perpetually.
Ningbo “PX event”	October 2012	Thousands of people got together to protest against the extension of chemical plant of Zhenhai District	The project was suspended.
Hainan event	October 2012	Thousands of people got together to protest against the construction of the coal fired power plant	The project was moved.

Source: Wang Y. and Li G.B. (2013) *Research on Management System of the Urban Agglomeration in China*. Southeast university press.

4.4.1.3 The decline of central government authorities

Following 20 years of administrative decentralization, the strengthening of local forces was a striking contrast to the weakening of central government authorities. The phenomenon of weakening central governmental powers and strengthening local governmental powers has been further enhanced. Essentially, since the start of the economic reform, central-local contradictions have never ceased. In China's current political structure, for local governments, citizens is composed of nominal delegates of political power, and the central government is the actual delegate of political power (Yu, 2008; Zou, et al., 2011). As the delegate, the central government entrusts political power top-down level-upon-level to various levels of local governments through administrative decentralization. Based on principal-agent theory, as agents of political powers, local governments possess private information of their own behaviors and capabilities. Consequently, local governments may use this information as an advantage to pursue their own profits, jeopardizing the interests of clients. Severe information asymmetry exists in reality (Zhou, 2004). Local governments frequently resort to opportunism when executing policies mandated by central government (Zhang, 2006). They actively execute policies that satisfy their own interests and avoid implementing policies that are not beneficial. This phenomenon significantly reduced the authority of central government.

Moreover, the process of decentralization and re-centralization between central and local governments has never stopped. Such as land use quotation, projects (certain amount of investment) approved and Tax (fiscal) system.

4.4.2 Responses of the administrative management system reform

In the past, administrative system reforms emphasized responding to the needs of economic system reforms regarding administrative management system reforms. However, either unintentionally or purposefully, the relationship between economic system reforms and administrative management system reforms was ignored. Politically, administrative system reforms are essential components of political system reforms. Administrative system reforms that lack political system reforms cannot resolve core problems for governments. The previous two administrative management system reforms were effective in weakening the highly centralized management system and establishing administrative management

systems that facilitated a market economy. However, the traditional management paradigm and model in which governments' management of society is interpreted simply, as government control of society remained unchanged. This is the primary reason for government failures. Encountering the increased diversity of profit entities and the normalization of profit gaming, this is clear that traditional administrative management models of control cannot adjust to social development.

In 2004, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced the development goal of establishing service-oriented governments (Wen, 2004). In the 2005 Report on the Work of the Government, Premier Wen announced again the goal of developing service-oriented governments. In October 2006, the Decision on Several Important Issues in Building a Socialist Harmonious Society was passed at the 6th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee. In this document, the connotations, essence, and basic concept of establishing service-oriented governments was explained in detail. In November 2012, the report presented at the 18th Party Congress proposed universal values (e.g., freedom, democracy, and nomocracy) to advocate the reform of administrative management and political systems for the first time. Because the core of administrative management system reform is political system reform (e.g., democratic politics), the difficulty is extremely high and progress is slow.

The key factor in establishing service-oriented governments and promoting reforms of the administrative management model is remodeling the relationship between governments and society. As a country, China reduced the intensity of its management of society and citizens by returning to society the rights that originally belonged to it and reshaping the relationship between the country and society. Government functions are separated from social management. Based on this condition, promoting the socialization of public management is an important channel for establishing service-oriented governments. In recent years, China's high-level governments have repeatedly emphasized that for all affairs citizens and social organizations can manage themselves, that the market competition mechanism can effectively regulate, and that industrial organizations or agencies can manage autonomously, governments should relinquish management powers (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2012).

After the long implementation of administrative decentralization, local protectionism and local opportunism were severe. However, since the beginning of

the 21st century, the central government has retrieved some economical management powers from local governments to strengthen central authority. In an attempt to maintain central authority and improve the policy execution efficiency of central government, some vital economic departments (e.g., customs, industry, commerce, land, environmental protection, and energy sources) have returned to the vertical management of central government or provincial governments instead of local governments. Specifically, departments such as customs and energy sources are under the vertical management of central government. Departments such as taxation, industry, commerce, land, and quality and technology supervision are under the vertical management of provincial governments. Regarding the effects of vertical management, researchers have found through a number of empirical studies that the vertical management system has not only weakened the interference from local governments, but also reduced their enthusiasm to develop economies. Consequently, for central government the losses of the vertical management system outweigh the benefits (Yin, 2011).

4.4.3 The planning management system reform

4.4.3.1 The establishment of a socialized planning management system

Against the background of a substantial increase in the number of planning rights advocacy incidents and the administrative system reform emphasizing changing planning management models, national planning authorities proposed the reform goals of democratic planning in 2004. Public participation was the key factor promoting the transitions in planning management models. The Urban Planning Law of 1990 was replaced by the Urban and Rural Planning Law of 2008, which marked the preliminary establishment of urban and rural planning management system towards to socialization.

Regarding planning formulation, implementation, and supervision, the Urban and Rural Planning Law has the following specifications for the socialization of urban and rural planning management (National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, NPC, 2008):

(a) During the planning formulation stage, the responsible authority is required to draft urban and rural plans, consult experts and the public by conducting demonstrations and consultations, and present the approval rates and reasons with the materials submitted for examination and approval.

(b) During the planning implementation stage, urban and rural planning authorities of city and county governments are required to publish the general layouts of legal site plans and the engineering design plan of projects. When changes to planning conditions are approved, it should publish the legally amended planning conditions.

(c) When modifying the general layouts of regulatory detailed planning and the engineering design plan of the projects, urban and rural planning authorities are required to consult the interested parties in planning areas.

(d) During the planning implementation supervision stage, both organizations and individuals have the right to query, report, and initiate legal action for behaviours that violate urban and rural planning powers. After supervising urban and rural planning implementations, the supervision, inspection, and processing results should be published for public reference and review. The replacement of the Urban Planning Law with the Urban and Rural Planning Law reflects the substantial progress in legislation regarding public participation in planning (please see Table 4-15).

Table 4-16: Comparison on public participation contents in Urban Planning Law (1990) and Urban and Rural Planning Law (2008)

	Relevant article contents	Public rights
Urban Planning Law	Article 28 The People’s Government of City should publish upon approval.	Right to know
Urban and Rural Planning Law	Article 8 Organs organizing the establishment of urban and rural planning should publicize legally approved urban and rural planning in a timely manner, except for contents which should not be disclosed as required by laws or administrative regulations.	Right to know
	Article 9 All entities and individuals should abide by urban and rural planning which have been legally approved and disclosed, be submit to the administration of such planning, and have the right to inquiry of the competent department of urban and rural planning about whether a construction behavior affecting their interests is in compliance with the planning requirements. Any entity or individual shall have the right to report or accuse of any act in violation of any urban and rural planning to the competent department of urban and rural planning or other related department. Such department shall promptly accept the report or accusation and organize manpower to investigate and handle it.	Participation right Right of supervision
	Article 16 When filing a provincial urban system planning, a city overall planning or a town overall planning for examination and approval, the organ establishing the planning shall file the deliberation opinions of the members of the standing committee of	Right of expression

CHAPTER 4 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

<p>the people’s congress at the same level or the deputies to the people’s congress of the town as well as the changes in the planning made in accordance with the opinions together.</p>	
<p>Article 22 The people’s government of a township or town shall take charge of establishing the township or village planning, and shall file such planning with the people’s government at the next higher level for examination and approval. A village planning shall be consented to by the villagers’ meeting or the villagers’ representative meeting before it is filed for examination and approval.</p>	<p>Right of expression</p>
<p>Article 26 Before filing an urban or rural planning for examination and approval, the organ establishing it shall announce the draft of the planning and collect opinions from experts and the general public by way of argumentation, hearing or other. The draft shall be announced for at least 30 days. The organ establishing the planning shall fully consider the opinions of experts and the general public, and attach an explanation on the adoption of the relevant opinions and an explanation to the materials filed for examination and approval.</p>	<p>Right of expression</p>
<p>Article 40 The competent department of urban and rural planning under the people’s government of the city or county or the town people’s government specified by the people’s government of the province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the Central Government shall publicize the general site layout of the site detailed planning and the engineering design plan which have been deliberated and adopted according to law.</p>	<p>Right to know</p>
<p>Article 46 The organ establishing a provincial urban system planning, a city overall planning or a town overall planning shall organize the related departments and experts to evaluate the implementation of the planning on a regular basis and collect public opinions by argumentation, hearing or other ways. The organ shall submit an evaluation report attached with the collected opinions to the standing committee of the people’s congress at the same level, the people’s congress of the town and the organ examining and approving the planning.</p>	<p>Right of expression</p>
<p>Article 48 To modify a regulatory detailed planning, the organ establishing it shall demonstrate the necessity of the modification, take counsel with the interested persons within the planning area, submit a special report to the organ examining and approving it, and set about to prepare the modification plan after obtaining the consent of the organ examining and approving the planning.</p>	<p>Right of expression</p>
<p>Article 50 The general site layout of a site detailed planning or an engineering design plan approved according to law may not be modified without approval. If it is really necessary to modify it, the competent department of urban and rural planning shall hear the opinions of the interested parties in the form of hearing, etc.</p>	<p>Right of expression</p>
<p>Article 54 Supervision and inspection situation as well as handling results shall be opened according to law for the general public to refer to and supervise.</p>	<p>Right of supervision</p>

Source: Compiled from NPC (National People’s Congress). (1990). *The city Planning Law 1990*. Beijing: National People’s Congress, People’s Republic of China; NPC (National People’s Congress). (2008). *The Urban and Rural Planning Law 2008*. Beijing: National People’s Congress, People’s Republic of China.

4.4.3.2 The open operation of the planning formulation management

In 1969, Arnstein proposed the ladder of citizen participation theory, in which citizen participation was divided into three stages (i.e., nonparticipation, tokenism, and citizen power) and eight types of participation ladders (i.e., manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control) (Arnstein, 1969). Before 2004, although citizen participation in planning was increasing, it remained in the tokenism stage. Most citizen participations were in the stage of making public planning results and responses to published planning results. The dominant power of making planning decisions was still in the hands of governments. Comparatively, public opinion had a limited influence on planning decisions. In recent years, citizen participation has been incorporated into various stages of planning management. For example, in October 2006, the revision program for overall planning in Shenzhen was launched. This three-year program involved investigation, research, discussing planning drafts, finalizing planning, conducting opinion surveys, consultation, discussion, and result publication. Citizens could participate in the entire process of overall planning revision, which was a departure from the previous model of citizen participation in urban planning (Zou, et al., 2011).

According to the overall planning formulation flow, the editing and revision works can be divided into three phases: investigation, discussion of planning draft, and formation of planning results. The public participation in the overall planning formulation of Nanjing and Shenzhen works can be summarized in six aspects: Organizers, Organizational Purposes, Publicity, Participants, Participation Ways and Solutions (Table 4.16).

Compared with the 1990s, substantial progress has been achieved regarding citizen participation in China's urban planning revision stage. The method of citizen participation has evolved from governments consulting the public to governments codetermining urban planning with citizens. In addition, planning formulation management has gradually shifted from a closed operation to an open operation.

Table 4-17: Public participation features in urban overall planning editing and revision of Nanjing city and Shenzhen city

Planning phase		Nanjing	Shenzhen
Investigation	Organizers	Planning Bureau of Nanjing City	Planning Bureau of Shenzhen City
	Organizational Purposes	Collect the opinions for the implementation evaluation of the planning of the previous edition; collect the intentions of the citizens for the planning	Collect the public opinions, and analyze the public demands
	Publicity	Conduct the publicity for the public participation of planning through the newspaper, and the website of Planning Bureau	Conduct the publicity for the public participation of planning through the journal, TV, broadcast and internet
	Participants	Government departments, general public, all industrial associations, experts and scholars in all circles	Government departments, general public, all industrial associations, non-government organization and social organization, enterprises and public institutions, experts and scholars and professionals in all circles
	Participation Ways	Questionnaire survey on site Network survey	Shenzhen TV opened up the programs relevant to the public participation of planning. Shenzhen radio station set up the topic discussion for the public participation of planning, and collected the public opinions through the internet. Questionnaire survey in various forms.
	Solutions	Form the special analysis report for the advisory opinions	Set up the database, classify, count and analyze the public opinions
Planning draft	Organizers	Planning Bureau of Nanjing City	Planning Bureau of Shenzhen City
	Organizational Purposes	Collect the public opinions and suggestions for the planning scheme	Collect the public opinions and suggestions for the planning scheme
	Publicity	Conduct the publicity and mobilization for one week in the places involving square and the gate of community	Mobilize through the media such as TV, newspaper, broadcast and website
	Participants	Experts and scholars, citizens	Relevant government departments, experts and scholars, citizens
	Participation Ways	Questionnaire survey, discussion meeting	Discussion meeting, forum

	Solutions	Form the special analysis report for the advisory opinions	Classify, count and analyze the public opinions
Discussion meeting of planning achievements	Organizers	Planning Bureau of Nanjing City	Planning Bureau of Shenzhen City, jointly with the relevant government of the urban area
	Organizational Purposes	Collect the public opinions and suggestions for the planning achievements	Collect the public opinions and suggestions for the planning achievements
	Publicity	Conduct the publicity and mobilization through the modern media Organize the “group for planning of accessing the community” to conduct the site publicity in all districts and counties	Conduct the publicity and mobilization through the modern media
	Participants	Focusing on government departments, experts and scholars	Focusing on government departments, experts and scholars
	Participation Ways	Discussion meeting Survey by the fax, e-mail and network	Discussion meeting Conduct the questionnaire survey by various means such as hotline, e-mail, official website, and letter mail
	Solutions	Dispose by three ways involving adoption, partial adoption, and explanation, without feeding back the disposal of the citizen opinions	Dispose by five ways involving “existing expression”, “adoption”, “partial adoption”, “no adoption” and “explanation”, with partly feeding back the disposal of the citizen opinions

Source: Created by the author. Data from the author’s survey and interviews (January 2012 – March 2012).

4.4.3.3 The strengthening of vertical supervision on planning management

Between 1996 and 2003, with the expanding market economy and influx of foreign capital to China, a large-scale nationwide local government enclosure movement emerged, triggering a rush development zone construction. The enclosure movement resulted in massive land wastes (He and Su, 2000; Wang and Cui, 2003), serious social issues (e.g., the loss of land and the unemployment of tens of millions of farmers as well as numerous farmer rebellions), and ecological problems (Ouyang, 2004).

According to the data provided by the Ministry of Land and Resources, during the period of seven years from 1996 to 2003, the cultivated area of China had reduced to 1,850,000,000 mu from 1,950,000,000 mu. It had reduced for 100,000,000 mu (about 67,000 km²) during 7 years, with the reduction of about 14,290,000 mu every year on average, and the per capita cultivated land of China was dropped to 1.43 mu. In 2004, while clearing nearly 7,000 development zones all over the country, the center discovered that the area of the land occupation for the new projects in the developments had been up to 74,000,000 mu, and 40% of the land was in idle state (Ouyang, 2004). The local government wantonly enclosed the land of the peasants, leading to the enormous wastage of the land resources, and intensifying the social contradiction and ecological crisis. These were the most direct motivations of moderate planning management centralization.

In May 2002, the State Council issued the No. 13 Circular on Notice of Strengthening City and Countryside Planning Control (State Council, 2002). It stipulates that the administrative powers of planning management at the municipal level should not disperse to the lower-level government. Powers that had already been decentralized should be corrected immediately. Theoretically, city districts do not have district-level planning management organizations. However, if necessary, municipal planning departments can establish agencies in city districts. In August 2002, The Ministry of Housing of Urban-Rural Development and other eight Ministries jointly issued the implementation decision of the Circular of the State Council on Strengthening the Supervision and Management of Urban and Rural Planning. This circular also required the establishment of supervision mechanisms for planning implementation and administrative correction and accountability systems (Qiu, 2004; Li and Men, 2004). For further strengthening of the centralized

and standardized management of planning, with the promotion of housing and urban-rural development departments, a nationwide urban and rural planning management operational system reform was implemented. Actions that were substantially influential included the establishment of provincial and municipal planning committees as well as urban and rural planning examiners (Qiu, 2004). Following the establishment of a planning committee in Guizhou Province in 2003, urban and rural planning committees at provincial and municipal levels were established nationwide by 2008 to centralize the management of planning. Meanwhile, to strengthen the vertical management of planning, housing and urban-rural construction departments referenced the planning inspector systems adopted in other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) and launched pilot programs of urban and rural planning supervisors in 2006. By October 2012, housing and urban-rural construction departments had assigned seven groups of urban and rural planning supervisors (116 in total) to 103 middle and large-sized cities (Wang and Li, 2013, p83).

4.5 Concluding remarks

4.5.1 Decentralization promoting China's system transitions and reconstructing multiple relationships

A long history resulted in the traditional bureaucratic political system determines the centralized administrative system China. China's economic reform started from changes in the planned economy system and totalitarianism. Essentially, reform is a system transition process of constantly abolishing old systems and establishing new systems. Since its economic reform, decentralization has been the fundamental force driving China's institutional transitions and governance transformations. With the promotion of constant decentralization, China entered an era of comprehensive system transitions.

Administrative decentralization was the first to begin, reaching its peak in the late 1990s. Subsequently, centralization became the trend for numerous government departments. Market-oriented decentralization started in the 1980s. However, because of the restrictions of ideologies, market-oriented decentralization only intensified in 1992 (when a socialist market economy was proposed) and continues even today. Social-oriented decentralization implemented in the 1980s and 1990s had stagnated until 2004, when social-oriented decentralization was promoted. The

administrative decentralization and market-oriented decentralization emphasized economic system reforms. Social-oriented decentralization focused on social and political system reforms, which were more difficult to conduct in China compared with economic system reforms. Compared with administrative decentralization and market-oriented decentralization, the development of social-oriented decentralization had been slow for 10 years, resulting in the current situation that political system reforms significantly lag behind economic system reforms.

Decentralization has benefited China's economic development and profoundly restructured the relationships among governments, markets, and societies. From the "powerful governments, weak markets, and weak societies" in the 1980s to the current "powerful governments, powerful markets, and weak societies", massive changes have occurred in China's social economic infrastructure. Although China has maintained a powerful central government, compared with the totalitarianism government before the economic reform, the authority boundaries of the current government are substantially smaller. Current social powers remain weak; however, the decentralized social powers accumulated from the central government over the 30 years have already exerted significant effects. Citizens have substantially more rights now than before the economic reform.

4.5.2 Planning management system changes with administrative system reform

The existing planning management system was initiated in the centrally planned economy in 1949. The centrally planned economy laid deep influences on the planning approach. With the overall stressed incurred in China's social and economic transformation from the centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy in 1978, changes of the planning management system are under way.

Through the above analysis, it is evident that the development of Chinese planning management system reflects and reacts to the social, political and economic background. The planning management system changes with the administrative management system.

According to the characteristics of various decentralization stages, China's administrative management system reform can be divided into three stages:

(a) The first stage was from 1978 to 1991, during which administrative management system reforms were implemented to correspond to administrative decentralization. The emphasis of these reforms was top-down decentralization.

Local autonomy and the enthusiasm for economic development significantly increased.

(b) The second stage was from 1992 onwards, during which administrative management system reforms were conducted to respond to markets. The emphases of the reforms were enterprise privatization and the separation of governments and enterprises.

(c) The third stage was from 2004 onwards, during which administrative management system reforms were conducted to correspond with society. The emphases of the reforms were a transition in management models and the establishment of service-oriented governments.

Urban and rural planning management systems actively respond to administrative management system reforms in different periods, and in general, kept pace with the reform direction of administrative management systems (see Fig. 4-16). Since 1978, the following characteristics have been noticed in the transitional stages of urban and rural planning management systems.

(a) From 1978 to the late 1990s, planning was decentralized. Since the beginning of the 21st century, especially after 2004, an appropriate centralization trend emerged. However, compared with that of 1978, the decentralization of planning management powers was significant.

(b) After 1992, planning management rapidly responded to transitions in market and government functions. With the local government enterprising tendency, from the marketization of planning design to the marketization of planning implementation, from planning formulation management to planning implementation management, the strong communities of interests formed by local governments and private capital have become the crucial forces driving urban sprawl for more than 10 years.

(c) After 2004, with the promotion of administrative management reforms in their corresponding periods, planning management has been developing toward the direction of democratization. However, with the influences of administrative system reforms and stagnant political system reforms, the democratization of planning management will be a long-term process.

All of these changes as the consequence of the three dimensions of decentralization, administrative, market-oriented and social-oriented decentralization

occurred in different stage, brought. The China's planning management system initiated in the centrally planned economy has to adjust to cope with new tasks and challenges, to meet the demands and changes of the social and political system. The China's planning management system has tried to keep pace with the times.

4.5.3 The social foundation of governance determines the direction of planning management system transformations

The transition of the planning management system is essentially a systematic transition. Planning management system changes with transformations in social-political structure. Over the last 30 years, the administrative management system reform has become the most direct and fundamental force driving urban and rural planning management system reforms. As a vital component of administrative management, urban and rural planning is only effective and legal when operated within the administrative management system framework.

With the rise of China's civil societies and growing public consciousness of rights, China's politics and society are rapidly separating. Increasing social powers are exerting unprecedented pressure on government authorities (Tang, 2008; Ma, 2013; Sun, 2012). The social foundation of Chinese governance is the result of more than 30 years of institutional transitions and the starting point for future institutional transitions. Starting points determine paths. Thus, the social foundation of governance largely determines the path and direction of system transformations.




Figure 4-16: China’s administrative management system and planning management system reforms amid the background of decentralization since 1978

Source: Created by the author.

Chapter 5

5.0 Current Situation: Urban and Rural Planning System and Metropolitan Planning Management

Countries or regions adopt specific urban planning system, which serves as the basis of urban construction and development. The urban and rural planning system adopted by a state defines the operational space of urban and rural planning activities. In addition, it defines the rules and logic that people should comply with during these planning activities (Healey, 2006).

The Chinese urban and rural planning system has established gradually with waves of industrialization and Urbanization (Yeh and Wu, 1999). The first City Planning Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated in 1989. Subsequently, the basic system and institutions for conducting urban planning management has devised accordingly (Chen, 2007). Promulgated in 2008, the Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People's Republic of China emphasized that urban planning is essentially a type of public policy. The planning management systems should accommodate the tendency of urban planning transiting to public policies (Shi, 2008).

In China, as a type of non-statutory spatial planning, metropolitan planning is subject to the urban and rural planning system. In the context of the current planning system, the metropolitan planning operating system is largely based on the urban and rural planning management system. A detailed understanding of the Chinese urban and rural planning system is beneficial for us to comprehend the operating mechanisms and problems in metropolitan planning management (MP&M). This chapter introduces the components of the urban and rural planning system and the development of metropolitan areas and its planning in China. From the organizations of establishment, replies, and implement, this chapter analysis the status of the metropolitan planning management system in China.

5.1 The Chinese urban and rural planning system

Urban planning is a social practice, a governmental function, and a specialized technology. Urban planning systems constitute the institutional frameworks and organisational structures for achieving urban development.

Comprehensive spatial planning systems have been established in countries and regions such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Albrechts, et al, 2003; Brownill and Carpenter, 2007; Wilson, 1994). Due to different resource status, the level of social development, the stage of economic development, and historical and cultural traditions, the spatial planning system is different.

The Chinese urban and rural planning systems consist of three subsystems, the regulatory, administrative, and operating subsystems (Chen, 2007). In each subsystem, there are different parts based on different classifications (see figure 5-17).




Figure 5-17: The urban and rural planning system in China

Source: Created by the author.

5.1.1 The regulatory subsystem for planning

The regulatory subsystem a country adopts for urban and rural planning is a sum of the fixed legislation governing the planning organization, planning technology, and planning operating systems in the country.

The regulation subsystem is the core of the planning system, providing legal bases and basic procedures for the other two subsystems (Luan, 1999; Zhang and Luo, 2008). The administrative and operating subsystems should be worked within the regulatory subsystem. Just like in many machines, the regulatory subsystem, is

the big wheels, gives the orders and makes the administrative and operating subsystems, the little wheels, work on (figure 5-18). The generation and development of planning system are often marked by significant changes in the regulatory subsystem.



Figure 5-18: The relation of three Subsystems for planning

Source: Created by the author.

5.1.1.1 The process of constructing the regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning

The regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning is an institutionalised form of the management agencies, power allocation, and operating mechanisms associated with urban and rural planning. Constructing a legal system for governing urban and rural planning is the basis of and ensures the effects yielded by urban and rural planning (Luan, 1999; 2008).

The urban and rural planning system currently implemented in China was established gradually with the social development and reforms that occurred in the country (Chen, 2007) (figure 5-19).

In July 1956, the State Infrastructure Commission promulgated the Provisional Measures on Urban Planning Establishment, marking the beginning of the construction of an administrative system for urban planning.

In March 1978, the State Council held a third meeting on urban work, where the Opinions Regarding Improving Urban Construction was drafted. Thus, the construction of the Chinese legal and regulatory system for urban and rural planning was enhanced.

In January 1984, the State Council promulgated the Regulations on City Planning. It was the first body of administrative regulations that the Chinese government devised for governing urban planning. The regulations provided legal bases and protection for the management of urban planning in China.




Figure 5-19: The process of constructing the regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning

Source: Created by the author. Data compiled from Chen X L. (2007). *The framework of urban planning in the background of the socialist market economy*. Beijing: China Building Industry Press, 2007, p 38-41.

In December 1989, the City Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China (here in after referred to as “the City Planning Law”) was adopted at the 11th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. This was the first Chinese law governing urban planning and construction, signifying a great leap forward in the construction of a Chinese legal and regulatory system regarding urban planning.

On October 28, 2007, the Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China (here in after referred to as “the Urban and Rural Planning Law”) was promulgated.

The promulgation of the Urban and Rural Planning Law was a landmark, indicating that China has adopted a multilevel comprehensive regulatory subsystem centered on the Urban and Rural Planning Law (Luan, 2008). This subsystem provides statutory bases and procedures for the administrative and operating subsystems of urban and rural planning. From the “city” changed to the “urban and

rural”, the new planning law covers the whole area. It shows that the government not just only focuses on the city development. It shows that changes of governance structure of China. This is the new starting point of changes of planning management in China.

5.1.1.2 The structure of the regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning

The Chinese regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning consists of the vertical and horizontal subsystems (Luan, 1999).

1) The vertical subsystem

The vertical subsystem divided based on the structure of the national legal system specialized for urban and rural planning with characterized by higher-level law and lower-level law. This criterion based on different grade of laws. The Urban and Rural Law is the core and top of the vertical subsystem (Luan, 1999; Zhang and Luo, 2008). In this vertical subsystem, the higher-level laws are superior to the lower ones. The lower-level laws are restricted by and supplement and perfection of the higher-level laws.

In the vertical regulatory subsystem of urban planning, the Urban and Rural Planning Law is the parent law. Based on it, a comprehensive regulatory system was formed by related laws, such as the administrative regulations promulgated by the State Council, the departmental rules enforced by the competent department of urban and rural planning under the State Council, and the local regulations, rules, and administrative measures promulgated by local governments (Luan, 1999). This subsystem comprises four levels (Table 5-17).

2) The horizontal subsystem

The horizontal subsystem divided based on the relevance of laws and regulations to urban planning (Luan, 1999). It includes the specialized laws and regulations for urban planning, and includes related laws and regulations, administrative rules. The connection of laws and regulations in the horizontal subsystem is not closely and stability as the ones in the vertical subsystem. It mainly depends on inner links between different objects. They coordinate with each other although the legal status of some inequality.

In this vertical system, the regulations at a lower level must comply with the principles and emphases of the regulations at a higher level (see figure 5-20).

Table 5-18: The vertical regulatory system for urban and rural planning

Category	Content	Example
National laws	Legal documents adopted at the People’s Congress or its Standing Committee	The Constitution
Administrative laws and regulations	Specific laws and related regulations promulgated by the State Council	The Urban and Rural Planning Law
Administrative rules	Rules with general binding forces that are devised by the departments of the State Council, governments of provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, and people’s governments that have legislative power. These rules are often published in the forms of “Order of the Minister,” “Order of the Governor,” and “Order of the Mayor.”	Examples: the Measures for Formulating City Planning and the Measures for Formulating Village and Town Planning
Normative documents	Regulations promulgated by the competent department of urban and rural planning under the people’s government above the county level or the people’s government of the county level. These series of regulations aim to facilitate the process of urban and rural planning. These regulations contain details regarding the specific procedures that should be followed during planning.	

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 5-20: Levels of the regulatory system for urban and rural planning

Source: Created by the author.

The horizontal regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning consists of the principal law (i.e., the basic law) and subordinate regulations, special laws, and related laws (Figure 5-21, Table 5-18).




Figure 5-21: The horizontal regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning

Source: Created by the author.

Table 5-19: The horizontal regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning

Category	Content	Example
The principal law		Urban and Rural Planning Law (2008)
Subordinate regulations	Specific regulations that supplement details for relevant provisions in the principal laws. These subordinate regulations often contain detailed articles that can be directly implemented or legislation provisions that address specific problems in urban planning.	Standard for Basic Terminology of Urban Planning (2006) Measures for Formulating City Planning (2006) Code for Transport Planning on Urban Road(1995) Regulations for Supervising Urban Construction (1992)
Special laws	Laws specifically made for addressing particular issues that occur during urban planning. These special laws are necessary because the principal laws, which should be generally applicable and relatively stable, should not be confined to providing statutory bases for specific topics.	Regulation on the Protection of Famous Historical and Cultural Cities, Towns and Villages (2008)
Related laws	A sum of other laws and regulations related to the process or effects of urban and rural planning	Administrative License Law of the People's Republic of China(1985) Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China(2004) Construction Law of the People's Republic of China (1994) Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nature Reserves (1994)

Source: Created by the author.

The Urban and Rural Planning Law is the principal or basic law in the Chinese regulatory subsystem for urban and rural planning. This law is the centre of the regulatory system adopted for urban planning in China. This law primarily contains legal provisions about establishment, implementation and modification of urban and rural planning, supervision and inspection, legal liability, etc.

5.1.2 The administrative subsystem for planning

The administrative subsystem for planning is the institutional setup of the competent department of planning from the national government to local government, and the division of power and responsibilities among these authorities at various levels. There are two basic systems of administrative subsystem, which are centralization and decentralization (Hutchcroft, 2001). In a centralized system, such as the systems adopted in the United Kingdom and France, upper-level governments have greater rights to intervene with the planning establishment and planning management performed by lower-level governments (Yeh and Wu, 1999; Albrechts et al., 2003). By contrast, in a decentralized system, such as the one adopted in the United States, local governments have full autonomy over planning establishment and planning management (Liu, et al., 2001; Albrechts et al., 2003).

The Chinese administrative subsystem for urban and rural planning integrates centralization and decentralization (Zou, 2004; Zhu and Zhang, 2005; Yu, 2008). Specifically, a hierarchical management system for establishing and approving urban and rural planning projects is implemented based on the centralized system (Luan, 1999; 2008; Chen, 2007).

5.1.2.1 Administrative Organizations of Planning Management

The administrative subsystem for urban and rural planning consists of competent administrative departments responsible for overseeing urban planning at various levels (Yu, 2004, p99). These departments exercise the rights to make administrative decisions and administrative enforcement (Table 5-19).

The vertical administrative relationships among competent departments of urban and rural planning at various levels constitute the vertical administrative system of urban and rural planning. The competent departments at various levels manage the urban and rural planning in their respective administrative areas by the law and regulatory subsystem. Additionally, higher-level urban and rural planning

authorities supervise and provide operational guidance for lower-level authorities (figure 5-22).

Table 5-20: Competent departments of urban and rural planning at various levels

Administrative Level	Competent departments of urban and rural planning
National Level	The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of the People’s Republic of China
Provincial or Autonomous Region Level	Governmental Departments of Housing and Urban-Rural Development under the provincial or autonomous region people’s government
Municipality Level	Urban and Rural Planning Bureaus under the people’s government of the city
County Level	Urban and Rural Planning Bureaus, or Housing and Construction Bureaus under the county people’s government
Town Level	Construction Management Station, Planning Management Office

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 5-22: The vertical administrative system of urban and rural planning

Source: Created by the author.

The competent departments of urban and rural planning at various levels are responsible to the governments at the same levels (Yu, 2004, p97). This structure constitutes the horizontal administrative system for urban and rural planning (Figure 5-23). As a kind of public policy, urban and rural planning needs various departments jointly executes together (Luan, 2008; Zhang, 2004; Zhang and Wu, 2004). Competent departments should cooperate with other governmental

administrative authorities at the same level to represent the position of the government. Therefore, the administrative subsystem for urban and rural planning is not limited to the relationships among competent departments of urban planning at different levels; instead, it also involves the relationships between competent departments and the local government, competent departments and other governmental departments at same levels.




Figure 5-23: The horizontal administrative system for urban and rural planning

Source: Created by the author.

5.1.2.2 Institutions of planning administrative management

The administrative powers involved in urban and rural planning comprises rights of establishment, examination and approval, and implementation of planning. The Urban and Rural Planning Law explicitly defined the authorities and responsibilities of different level governments on planning administrative management (Table 5-20). The division of authorities and responsibilities fully reflect that the Chinese planning administrative system is a combination of centralization and decentralization.

Table 5-21: Institutions of Chinese planning administrative management

	Authorities and Responsibilities
Establishment Management	<p>The competent department of urban and rural planning under the State Council shall, together with other relevant departments under the State Council, organize the establishment of the national urban system planning, which shall be used to guide the establishment of provincial urban system planning and overall planning of cities.</p> <p>The people’s government of a province or autonomous region shall organize the establishment of its provincial urban system planning.</p> <p>The people’s government of a city shall organize the establishment of the overall planning of the city.</p> <p>The county people’s government shall organize the establishment of the overall planning of the town where the county people’s government is located.</p> <p>The overall planning of any other town shall be established by the people’s government of the town.</p>
Examination and Approval Management	<p>The national urban system planning shall be filed by the competent department of urban and rural planning under the State Council with the State Council for examination and approval.</p> <p>The provincial urban system planning shall be filed by the State Council for examination and approval.</p> <p>The overall planning of a municipality directly under the Central Government shall be filed by the people’s government of the municipality with the State Council for examination and approval. The overall planning of a city where the provincial or autonomous region people’s government is located or which is specified by the State Council shall be filed with the State Council for examination and approval after it is examined and approved by the provincial or autonomous region people’s government. The overall planning of any other city shall be filed by the people’s government of the city with the provincial or autonomous region people’s government for examination and approval.</p> <p>The overall planning of the town where the county people’s government is located shall be filed the planning with the people’s government at the next higher level for examination and approval.</p> <p>The overall planning of any other town shall be filed with the people’s government at the next higher level for examination and approval.</p>

Source: Compiled from NPC (National People’s Congress). (2008). The Urban and Rural Planning Law 2008. Beijing: National People’s Congress, People’s Republic of China.

5.1.3 The operating subsystem for planning

The operating subsystem for urban and rural planning in a country is a sum of the operational mechanisms implemented in the planning. Specifically, this subsystem is established on tasks, behaviors, and processes related to planning and can thus be understood as an operating system.


The law and regulation subsystem and the administrative subsystem provide institutional frameworks for implementing planning. The operating subsystem is the organizational structure of urban planning. The operating subsystem consists of two

aspects, namely, the establishment system and the implementation management system for urban and rural planning.

5.1.3.1 The planning formulation subsystem

The planning formulation subsystem, also called the planning technology subsystem, includes the objectives, tasks, and effects that the planning at various levels should achieve, the contents and blueprints necessary for completing the tasks, and the technological specifications established for the planning at various levels.

From the perspective of legality, planning can be divided into statutory and non-statutory planning (see figure 5-24).



“↓” here presents that the lower-leveled plan should closely follow the requirements of the plan at a higher level, while the dashed arrow shows the untight tutorship between the Conceptual Plan and Master Plan; here presents plan types that are not compulsorily required in practice.

Figure 5-24: Urban and rural planning system currently adopted in China

Source: He, J., Bao, C. K., Shu, T. F., Yun, X. X., Jiang, D. and Brwon, L. (2011). Framework for integration of urban planning, strategic environmental assessment and ecological planning for urban sustainability within the context of China. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 31(6), 549-560.

Statutory planning is the most basic, necessary, and vital form of planning, the establishment of which is mandatory in all parts of China (Luan, 1999; He, et al., 2011). The Urban and Rural Planning Law explicitly defined the chief contents and approval procedures regarding this type of planning.

Non-statutory planning is governed by no uniform rules. Local governments formulate relevant plans always based on the actual needs of local construction and management.

1) Statutory planning

Statutory planning refers to the planning that competent authorities must perform as stipulated by the laws and regulations governing urban planning. The law defines the responsible body for the formulation, formulation procedure, formulation contents, and approval procedures.

The current statutory planning system for urban and rural planning implemented in China consists of the following three tiers: the urban system plan, overall plan, and detailed plan (NPC, 2008). The term “urban and rural planning” as mentioned in the Urban and Rural Law includes urban system planning, city planning, town planning, township planning and village planning (see figure 5-25). City or town planning includes overall planning and detailed planning. Detailed planning includes regulatory detailed planning and site detailed planning.




Figure 5-25: The current statutory planning system for urban and rural planning

Source: Created by the author.

2) Non-statutory planning

Non-statutory planning, also called informal planning, is not a type of mandatory planning stipulated by the laws and regulations governing urban planning. The contents of non-statutory planning can be similar to those in statutory planning; however, the procedures adopted in non-statutory planning are not required to comply with those defined for statutory planning. Non-statutory planning is an adjunct to the statutory planning (figure 5-26).




Figure 5-26: The statutory planning and the non-statutory planning in China

Source: Created by the author.

Non-statutory planning has a longer history compared with statutory planning. Before the institutions for implementing statutory planning were promulgated, all planning was non-statutory. The statutory overall plans cannot effectively address or accommodate the rapid changes that occurred in cities, therefore, the non-statutory planning coming out (Li and Men, 2004; Qiu, 2004). Of course, the bodies responsible for establishing planning (i.e., local governments at various levels) must rely on non-statutory planning to perform the functions that statutory planning are unable to perform.

Abramson (2011) describes how nonstandard practices can emerge in the current context of rapid urbanization. As a national phenomenon, it presents challenges to official standard urban-planning practice. To some extent, non-statutory planning can compensate for the abstract components in statutory planning and overcome the restrictions resulting from the spatial functions of statutory planning. Using overall plans as an example, recent construction planning and metropolitan planning effectively compensate for the gap in overall plans (Table 5-21).

Table 5-22: The effects of non-statutory planning on statutory planning

Type of plans	Effects of plans
Recent construction planning	Providing concrete and detailed contents to parts of the statutory planning
Outline of the planning	Acting as a type of tentative plan for statutory planning, which consumes large amounts of time in the formulation and approval processes and involves complex considerations
Metropolitan planning strategic planning conceptual planning	Overcoming the limits that statutory planning has in unified spatial functions

Source: Created by the author.

5.1.3.2 The implementation management subsystem for planning

The implementation management subsystem for urban planning consists of the organizations responsible for implementing urban planning, the planning management of the construction projects, and the supervision and inspection related to urban planning management (NPC, 2008).

1) The organisations responsible for implementing urban and rural planning

Governments (as collectives) and governmental departments are the organizations responsible for implementing urban and rural planning. The primary responsibilities are to promote multi-level plans being implemented effectively. In China, lower-tier plan is the tools and approaches for implementing higher-tier plan (Luan, 1999). The competent departments always establish lower-tier plans to extend the contents and requirements of higher-tier plans, thus to promote the implementation of plans effectively (Qiu, 2004).

2) Control over the implementation of urban and rural planning

Controlling urban planning implementation is an operational approach adopted in construction management necessary for ensuring the actual implementation of urban and rural planning. In China, any construction within a city or town planning area must apply for planning permissions (NPC, 1990; 2008). To build any building, infrastructure, road, pipeline or other engineering project within a city or town planning area, the planning permissions should be apply in advance. The permissions include the written proposal of location, the construction land use permit and the planning permit on construction project (Chen, 2007).

The planning permission system provides the working mechanism and procedures for urban planning to comprehensively regulate and specifically manage

urban construction activities (Wang, 2011). Therefore, this control provides effective institutional guarantees for the management of urban planning implementation. Additionally, the law stipulates that planning approval officials can judge at their discretion when reviewing individual cases.

3) Supervising and inspecting urban and rural planning implementation

The Urban and Rural Planning Law explicitly defined the mechanisms for supervising and inspecting planning implementation (Luan, 2008; Shi, 2008). According to the Urban and Rural Planning Law, the people’s governments at or above the county level and the competent departments of urban and rural planning under them shall make more efforts in supervising and inspecting the formulation, examination and approval, implementation and modification of urban and rural planning (Shi, 2008). There are three aspects of supervising for the urban and rural planning, the supervision from the People’s Congress, the supervision from an upper-level body, and the supervision from the public (NPC, 2008) (Table 5-22).

Table 5-23: The mechanisms for supervising urban and rural planning

Category	Function	Contents of supervision
Supervision from upper-level bodies	Full supervision	Upper-level governments or competent authorities overseeing urban and rural planning are fully responsible for supervising and inspecting the behavior and decisions that lower-level governments of competent planning authorities have during the processes of planning formulation and implementation.
Supervision from the People’s Congress	General supervision	Focused on supervising the implementation and revision of planning
Social supervision	General supervision	Focused on supervising behavior that violates the planning

Source: Created by the author.

5.2 Development of Metropolitan Areas and Metropolitan Planning in China

Driven by the constantly and rapidly increasing economic growths, China has entered the stage of regional economic integration (Fang et al., 2011). In the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, two regions characterized by a relatively high level of urbanization, spatial structures such as metropolitan areas have occurred. Local governments have begun to define metropolitan area building as a vital strategy for achieving regional economic development. The formation and

development of metropolitan areas is and will remain one of the most crucial phenomena in Chinese regional economies in the near future (Yuan et al., 2006; Zhang, 2004).

5.2.1 The development of Chinese metropolitan areas

In the 1980s, the waves of economic reforms and the resulting growth of the market economy accelerated the urbanization of China (Ning, 1998; Yeh and Wu, 1999). The concepts and theories related to metropolitan areas were introduced to China and received considerable attention when the economic integration of the Yangtze River Delta was adopted as a national strategy (Wu, 2000). In the 1990s, the development of Chinese cities entered a golden age because of the waves of marketization, globalization, and the increasing convenience of regional transportation (Tao, 2007). The functions of cities became more comprehensive, urban land sprawled, and outward radiation increased. By the end of the 1990s, the following three metropolitan areas have formed in China: the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan areas. During the same period, numerous metropolitan areas were mushrooming: the central China, Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan, Shandong Peninsula, Wuhan, and Liaodong Peninsula metropolitan areas (Fang et al., 2011).

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the simultaneous development of regional urbanization and urban regionalization was the most prominent feature of Chinese regional development. The implementation of the 10th Five-Year Development Plan (2001–2005) was the first time that the central government proposed providing guidance for achieving orderly development in densely populated urban areas. The strategy the country adopted for achieving urbanization development was focusing on vital small towns, actively developing small- and medium-sized cities, improving the functions of cities that act as regional centers, enabling large cities to radiate their effects on neighboring areas, and leading an orderly development of densely populated towns and cities (NDRC, 2005). By the end of 2003, the level of urbanization in China had reached 40.15 % (Guo, 2004). With the process of urbanization accelerating, metropolitan areas have formed in the most economically and socially developed regions in China, such as the Yangtze River Delta, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the Pearl River Delta, the central and southern areas of Liaoning Province, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenyang.

Additionally, regional and local metropolitan areas have gradually formed in areas surrounding large- and medium-sized cities with an advanced level of economic development.

The 11th Five-Year Development Plan (2006-2010) stated that “metropolitan areas should be used as a principal form in promoting urbanization. A network should be built using major metropolitan areas as the bases, the coastline, the Beijing-Guangzhou line, and the Beijing-Harbin line as the vertical axes, and the Yangtze River and the Longhai railroad as the horizontal axes. ... This network will effectively facilitate the formulation of the spatial layout for sustainable Urbanization”(State Council, 2006). Numerous scholars have argued that the 11th Five-Year Development Plan clearly defined the integration of spatial planning and construction planning in economic development. Thus, harmonious regional development can be achieved, which would be a major contribution of this five-year plan (Fan,2006; Naughton, 2005; Hu, et al.,2010).

The Report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (2007) emphasized “focusing on improving overall carrying capacity, basing on megacities, and building metropolitan areas that radiate their effects on neighboring regions to develop novel economic growth poles.” Thus, the endogenous influence of Urbanization will become a driving force for economic development (Wen Jiabao, 2007). Consequently, governments at various levels across China actively planned metropolitan areas.

In 2007, a researcher at the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) published a media article indicating that “10 metropolitan areas will be formed in China.” They are the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Shandong Peninsula, central and southern Liaoning, central China, midstream basin of the Yangtze River, areas west to the Taiwan Strait, Sichuan-Chongqing, and Shaanxi-Henan metropolitan areas (Xiao and Yuan, 2007). Specifically, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River Delta metropolitan areas are expected to dominate the development of the Chinese economy in the next two decades. Statistics have shown that these 10 metropolitan areas cover 9.99% of the total area of land in China. As of 2005, the total population of these 10 areas accounted for 35.02% of the total population, and the total GDP accounted for 52.83% of the national GDP. In other words, these 10 metropolitan

areas, which cover less than one tenth of the area of the country, accommodated more than one third of the population and contributed to more than half of the GDP (Fang, et al., 2011). Therefore, these 10 metropolitan areas are expected the strongest development potential in China and will become the 10 pillars of the national economy (Xiao and Yuan, 2007).

The 11th Five-Year Development Plan explicitly proposed using metropolitan areas as the chief promoters of urbanization. The 12th Five-Year Development Plan emphasised “scientifically planning the functional positions and industrial layouts of cities located in a metropolitan area.”

In 2012, the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research (IGSNRR) published the Report on Chinese Metropolitan Area Development 2010, stating that 23 metropolitan areas have formed in China (Fang, et al., 2011). Specifically, the Yangtze River Delta metropolitan area has become one of the six largest international metropolitan areas, as shown in the figure 5-27.

According to Chinese Social Sciences Weekly in Shanghai, a report on Chinese Megacity Region Development Index of 2013 published on November 19, 2013. It was the first blue book that addressed the development index of megacities in China. According to the report, there are approximately 30 megacities (economic zones) have been planned or built in China (Zhou, 2013). The following reports present a map of the current and overall trends of the metropolitan area development in China.

- 1) In 2005, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) named three metropolitan interlocking regions and 13 urban-town agglomerations in the National Urban System Plan 2005–2020.
- 2) In 2007, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has proposed 10 metropolitan areas.
- 3) In 2010, according to the report on Chinese metropolitan area development 2010 published by the IGSNRR, there were 23 metropolitan areas (Fang, et al. 2011).
- 4) In 2013, according to the report on China Megacity Region Development Index in 2013 published by the Institute of Urban Sciences at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, there were 30 megacities (including economic zones) in China (Liu, et al., 2013).

With the proposal of novel urbanization strategies in China, more than 10 ministries and departments, including the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Land and Resources, and MOHURD led by the NDRC to establish the National Plan for Promoting the Healthy Development of urbanization 2011–2020, proposing well-defined strategies for developing metropolitan areas (Land Resource Net, 2013). The plan for New Type of Urbanization (2014-2020) commissioned by the Xinhua News Agency in March 2014. It emphasizes metropolitan areas will be the growth poles of regional economic development (Xinhua News Agency, 2014).

These showed that a new round of urban planning is ongoing, and as a primary form of future Urbanization, metropolitan areas have attracted increasing attention. There are three national-level metropolitan areas, the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, and Bohai Rim metropolitan areas. According to the First Financial Daily, a government insider revealed that the Chinese government is considering adding another two national-level metropolitan areas, the midstream Yangtze River and the Chengdu-Chongqing metropolitan areas (figure 5-28) (Lin and Wang, 2013). These five national-level metropolitan areas will mark a new stage of urbanization and metropolitan area development in China.

5.2.2 The development of metropolitan planning in China

The development of metropolitan areas involves more than spatial changes. Advances in the industrialisation that occurred in China caused urban industrial structures to adapt and adjust constantly. The connections between the industrial economies in various cities have tightened (Luo and Shen, 2005). Local governments have more authority and responsibility for economic and urban development. However, resource is limited in a region. Sometimes, the development of a city maybe affects the development of its neighbors (Tao, 2006). Local and upper-level governments have begun to realize that urban development must be released from the constraints of individual frameworks. According to Mumford, “the hope of the city lies outside itself.” (Mumford, 1961, p193). In addition to becoming the focus of upper-level governments in developing regional economies, metropolitan areas are also vital strategies for local governments to define the future development of cities and seek external economies to benefit the cities (Tao, 2006).




Figure 5-28: The national level metropolitan areas in China

Source: Created by the author.

However, rapid urbanization has resulted in conflicts among resources, environment, population, and society. These conflicts cannot be overcome because of the internal limits of individual cities. Therefore, metropolitan planning has become a recent focus on urban planning. The Pearl River Delta was the first region affected by the economic reform in 1978. Following a decade of rapid development, issues such as land use abuse, environmental degradation, and chaotic intercity competition occurred. To resolve these issues, the provincial government of Guangdong resolved, in December 1994, to plan a Pearl River Delta economic zone. The economic zone planning consisted of five tasks: environmental, infrastructure, industrial development, metropolitan area, and social development planning. Specifically, metropolitan planning was organized and established by the Guangdong Provincial Construction Commission and completed in the middle of 1995 (Zou, 2006). This project was the first planning conducted in China for establishing metropolitan areas.

Into the twenty-first century, the formulation of metropolitan planning has become increasingly popular. In 2001, the provincial government of Jiangsu resolved to establish a metropolitan area centered on Nanjing, the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou region, and Xuzhou. In May 2002, the People's Government of Jiangsu Province approved the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou Metropolitan Area Plan established by the Jiangsu Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the provincial branch of the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design. This plan became the first metropolitan area plan approved by a municipal government in China. Subsequently, the Jiangsu Provincial Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development led a team to establish the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou Metropolitan Area Plan (2001–2020), the Nanjing Metropolitan Area Plan (2002–2020), and the Xuzhou Metropolitan Area Plan (2001–2020). In 2004, the Henan Provincial Government initiated the formulation of the Central China Metropolitan Area Plan; the Hunan Provincial government initiated the formulation of the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Metropolitan Area Plan, which was revised in 2008. In November 2004, the NDRC initiated the formulation of the metropolitan planning for the Yangtze River Delta and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei regions. In the same year, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development completed the plan for establishing a Pearl River Delta metropolitan area (Wang and Li, 2013, p101).

The planning of the two metropolitan areas defined by the NDRC, which are the Yangtze River Delta and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan areas, marked a historical high point for the development of metropolitan planning in China. The regional planning Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan areas “constituted a blueprint for the future development of the core areas that are leaders in the Chinese economy. These plans are inspiring and comprehensive metropolitan planning (Yu et al., 2010). Additionally, the spatial development frame of these metropolitan plans were incorporated into the five-year plans and were used as valuable preliminary studies for the 11th Five-Year Development Plan (Department of Regional Economy, NDRC, 2011).

In this context, various provincial governments have recently begun to engage in metropolitan planning. For example, metropolitan planning centered on large cities such as Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Ningbo enhanced the competitiveness of these cities, increased the opportunities for these cities to develop, comprehensively coordinated the various resources in the regions, and led surrounding small- and medium-sized cities to achieve integrated development. This is a vital practice trend.

Statistics have shown that there are nearly 80 metropolitan plans in different level have issued since the release of the 11th Five-Year Development Plan (Fan and Hong, 2012). The Chinese government has formulated and promulgated a series of planning and policies to serve as guidelines for regional development. The purpose was to develop a novel form of economic geography based on balanced and coordinated development and promote coordinated regional development. Therefore, more than 10 metropolitan areas have emerged based on the national strategic vision, including the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta metropolitan areas in the east, the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan and Wuhan metropolitan areas in the centre, and the Chengdu-Chongqing metropolitan area in the west (Li Keqiang, 2013).

Due to different development stage, the objectives and tasks of these metropolitan areas are different. The focus defined for eastern areas, where economic development is rapid, is enhancing regional coordination and functions; in central and western areas, the focuses are building core cities and enhancing the competitiveness of the core cities. These measures implemented with the goal of resolving the common problems that occur in regional development (Table 5-23).

Table 5-24: The objectives and tasks defined for the metropolitan planning in various Chinese regions

Regions	Objectives and tasks
Eastern regions	(1) Metropolitan planning should reflect the demands of prioritized; development and spatial development; (2) Focusing on enhancing and integrating functions; (3) Focusing on the coordination among cities, towns, and regions.
Central and western regions	(1) Dense metropolitan areas or urban economic zones are built centred on provincial capitals; (2) Focusing on enhancing the aggregation and radiation effects of provincial capitals.

Source: Created by the author.

Metropolitan planning is not part of the statutory planning in the urban and rural planning system currently implemented in China. The objective of metropolitan planning is to resolve the regional issues that are difficult to resolve in the overall plan formulated during statutory urban planning. As an innovative approach in the Chinese urban and rural planning system, the metropolitan planning emphasizes promoting regional economic development (Ng and Tang, 2004). Therefore, multiple administrative bodies need work together to achieve good regional governance (Wang, 2003). Metropolitan planning highlights the developmental requirements for urban-rural integration and regional integration governance (Luo, et al., 2009; Yang, 2009). Different objectives and tasks of metropolitan planning in different parts of China can be more effective and practical for the regional governance.

5.3 Current situation of metropolitan planning management in China

How metropolitan planning management performed in the current urban and rural planning system is a worthwhile question. As part of the spatial planning system, the system of metropolitan planning management consists of the regulatory, administrative, and operating subsystems. The following subsections describe the current system developed in metropolitan planning management by explaining the legal bases of metropolitan planning, the setup of management agencies, the distribution of power in planning management, and the power operation in planning management.

Interregional planning is a vital feature of metropolitan planning. Depending on the classification criteria, Chinese metropolitan areas can be divided into various types. In the following subsections, metropolitan are explained by various types of

interprovincial and intercity metropolitan areas based on administrative affiliations. After conducting investigations and confirming with the governmental departments that established metropolitan planning, this study summarizes the status of metropolitan planning management in China by analyzing the following four aspects: the legal bases, organizations responsible for plan formulation, examination and approval authorities, and implementation authorities in metropolitan planning.

5.3.1 The legal bases of planning

5.3.1.1 The lack of national legislations governing regional planning

The implementation of metropolitan planning should focus on the coordination across administrative regions. Metropolitan planning is a form of non-statutory regional planning. Without legal bases, it would cause regional planning lacking of protection from law. Consequently, the planning implementation would not be effectively in practice.

Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has gradually established a regional planning system focused on regional development planning (including national economy and social development planning and land planning), land use planning, and urban system planning. Specifically, watershed, transportation, mineral, and disaster mitigation planning are included in this system (Xie and Xiang, 2005). Despite the varying focuses of different types of planning, they all share one characteristic, that is, planners adopt technical approaches to analyze, predict, and promote regional development. This is a scientific and reasonable process. Although the regulations of urban system planning defined in the Urban and Rural Laws, there have not enough legal bases provided for the across-boundary regional planning. Therefore, the across-boundary regional planning lacks sufficient authority and binding power. Some metropolitan plan have no explicit delivering organization with rights and responsibilities in the procedures and formulation of planning. For example, the Yangtze River Delta Regional planning should be implemented by the governments of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang (Zou, 2006). This problem is particularly prominent in regional planning that involves coordination.

At the national level, regarding regulations about urban system planning management, which only defined in a few written national policies and regulations (Xie and Xiang, 2005). Such as in the Provisional Measures on Establishing and Approving Regional Planning which promulgated by the State Infrastructure

Commission in 1956, the City Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China promulgated in 1990, and the Urban and Rural Planning Law promulgated in 2008. Additionally, regulations specific to regional planning can only be found in relevant laws (Table 5-24).

Table 5-25: The primary Chinese planning systems involved in regional planning

Types of planning	Regulatory bases of planning	Bodies responsible for establishing plans	Examination and approval authorities
The Planning for National Economic and Social Development	Constitution	Governments above the county level	People’s Congress at the same level
Urban and rural planning	Urban and Rural Planning Law	Governments above the county level and administrative bodies responsible for urban planning	State Council, provincial governments, and governments of prefecture-level cities
Overall planning on land use	Land Administration Law	Governments at various levels	State Council, provincial governments, and governments of prefecture-level cities
Mineral resources plans	Mineral Resources Law	Ministry of Land and Resources	State Council
Water resource planning (basin-specific planning and regional planning)	Water Law	Water-related competent authorities above the county level	The planning of major rivers should be examined and approved by the State Council and that of other rivers should obtain approval from the people’s governments at the same local level.
Environmental protection planning (including pollution prevention and mitigation, water and soil conservation, and desert prevention and transformation)	Environmental Protection Law, Water and Soil Conservation Law, Law on Desert Prevention and Transformation	Environment-related administrative and competent authorities above the county level	State Council or people’s governments at the same local levels
Transportation planning (including railways, highways, and ports)	Railway Law, Highway Law, and the Law on Ports	The Ministry of Railways and specialized management departments at various local levels	State Council and local governments at various levels

Source: Xie, H.F. and Xiang, J.B. (2005). Regional planning encountering public policy planning. *Economic Geography*, 25(5):604-606.

Currently, regulations for regional planning included in the Urban and Rural Planning Law and other relevant laws. Because the legal status of regional planning is undefined, few national laws and regulations have been devised for governing metropolitan planning in the past decade (Chen, 2007). Consequently, the governments are explicitly required to prepare and administrate regional plan, and the responsibilities that the national, provincial, and municipal management authorities overseeing metropolitan planning should assume in implementing and the management procedures. For example, as a type of regional plan, Provincial Urban System Plan should be produced and monitored by provincial Department of Housing and Urban-rural Development (NPC, 2008). The urban system plan is specified in the Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People's Republic of China, the basic law which governing urban and rural planning in the country. However, it defined in an administrative range. Sometime, some metropolitan plans beyond the administrative boundary. Special regulations for the across boundary metropolitan plans are not clearly defined, such as the bodies responsible for organizing and establishing, supervising and implementing.

5.3.1.2 Local attempts to formulate ordinances governing planning implementation

In the absence of national legislation governing metropolitan planning, local governments explored the legislation specific to metropolitan planning by integrating the relevant practices. Progress has attained in the management of metropolitan planning. For example, the planning of three major metropolitan areas located in Jiangsu Province has examined and approved by the provincial government, and the legislative efforts have made at the People's Congress of Jiangsu Province (Luo and Shen, 2005). In July 2006, after completed the coordinated development planning for urban and town agglomeration of the Pearl River Delta (2004), the “regulation on the implementation of the coordinated development planning for urban and town agglomeration of the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province” was passed at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th People's Congress of Guangdong Province. This is the first local regulation in China formulated to govern metropolitan planning and a novel attempt at devising relevant legislation (Zou, 2006; Fang et al., 2005). The regulation consists of 21 provisions, defining the legal status of urban-town agglomeration planning, the regulatory authorities that

governments at various levels have in planning, the agencies responsible for managing the planning, and the relevant managerial procedures. In September 2007, the Government of Hunan Province formulated the Regulation on the Regional Planning for the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Metropolitan Area in Hunan Province by referencing the regulation on the implementation of the coordinated development planning for urban and town agglomeration of the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province (Zou, 2011).

Regarding metropolitan planning, although local governments such as those in Guangdong and Hunan have promulgated local regulations governing the implementation of metropolitan planning, subsequent administrative and legal support and supplementary local regulations are lacking. However, the implementation and management of planning necessitates the formulation of a series of supplementary and relevant documents and regulations. Currently, cross-city metropolitan planning that is within the boundary of a province is implemented and managed by the local provincial government; however, the coordination and management in Cross-province metropolitan planning is difficult because these projects often cover large areas, involve numerous administrative bodies, and differ substantially between projects (e.g., the metropolitan planning in the Yangtze River Delta). Presently, no uniform management has performed in the Cross-province metropolitan planning conducted in China (Shi, 2008). Therefore, the cross-region metropolitan planning in China is placed in an ineffective vacuum because of the lack of economic control capability and regulatory authority.

5.3.2 Organizations responsible for establishing planning

The Urban and Rural Planning Law stipulates people's governments above the county level are the designated administrative management departments responsible for organizing and establishing urban planning. Article 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Law has clarified the organization for plan making. The people's governments of Provinces and autonomous are responsible for organizing the preparation of provincial urban system plan (NPC, 2008). The people's governments of a city shall organize the formulation of the overall planning of the city. Regarding the power to establish planning, the law provides no comprehensive definition of the scope of this power. Without taking the urban system planning into account, there are two types of

metropolitan plans, cross-province and cross-city metropolitan planning in China. The organizations of them are different.

5.3.2.1 Cross-province metropolitan planning

Cross-province metropolitan planning is established and organized using one of the following three models:

1) Dominated by the NDRC: Led by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), planning and establishment task forces consisting of provincial governments and expert scholars are formed to establish Cross-province metropolitan area plans. For example, during the 11th Five-Year Development Plan, the NDRC dominated the formulation of three major metropolitan area plans. They are the Yangtze River Delta (Regional Planning of the Yangtze River Delta [2009–2020]), the Pearl River Delta (The Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta [2008–2020]), and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region (Regional Planning of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Metropolitan Area [2006–2010]). Specifically, the scope defined in the Regional Planning of the Yangtze River Delta (2009–2020) comprises Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, and Zhejiang Province, covering a total area of 210,700 km². The scope defined in the Regional Planning of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Metropolitan Area consists of Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hebei Province, covering a total area of 183,700 km².

2) Dominated by the MOHURD: Led by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD), task forces consisting of provincial governments and expert scholars are formed to establish relevant plans, such as the Plan for the Urban System Building in the Yangtze River Delta (2006–2020).

3) Dominated unilaterally by a local provincial government: In this model, the metropolitan areas are spread across several provinces and cities, and the planning should be organized and established unilaterally by the provincial government governing the central city of the metropolitan area. Examples of this model include the Nanjing Metropolitan Area Plan (2002–2020) and the Xuzhou Metropolitan Area Plan (2001–2020) organized and established by the Government of Jiangsu Province. Specifically, the Nanjing metropolitan area comprises the entire areas of Nanjing, Zhenjiang, and Yangzhou, and the southern area of Huai'an City in Jiangsu Province, as well as the entire areas of Ma'anshan, Chuzhou, and Wuhu in Anhui Province.

5.3.2.2 Cross-city metropolitan planning

Cross-city (within one province) metropolitan planning is established and organised using one of the following three models:

1) The MOHURD and provincial governments collaborate to establish relevant planning, such as in the formulation of the Coordinated Development Planning for Urban and Town Agglomeration of the Pearl River Delta (2004–2020).

2) Provincial governments authorize the Provincial Department of Housing and Urban-rural Development (PDHURD) to dominate relevant establishment, such as in the formulation of the Overall plan for the Metropolitan Area in the Shandong Peninsula (2006–2020) and the Plan for Metropolitan Areas in Central Yunnan Province (2009–2030).

3) Provincial governments and the Provincial Development and Reform Commission (PDRC) jointly dominate relevant establishment, such as in the formulation of the Regional Plan for the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Metropolitan Area (2008–2020) and the Outline of the Master Development Plan for the Metropolitan Area in Central China (2006–2020).

In summary, the lack of a management system that can be employed for establishing metropolitan planning results in disorganized planning formulation. In Cross-province and cross-city (within one province) metropolitan planning, planning formulation models dominated by the NDRC and the MOHURD exist simultaneously (Table 5-25).

Table 5-26: The formulation models of metropolitan planning in current China

Type	Organizations Responsible for Establishing Planning	Typical Case
Cross-province metropolitan planning	National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)	Regional Planning of the Yangtze River Delta (2009–2020) ; Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020); Regional Planning of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Metropolitan Area (2006–2010).
	the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)	Urban System Building in the Yangtze River Delta (2006–2020).
	Provincial Government	the Nanjing Metropolitan Area Plan (2002–2020); the Xuzhou Metropolitan Area Plan (2001–2020)
Cross-city metropolitan planning	MOHURD collaborated with provincial governments	Coordinated Development Planning for Urban and Town Agglomeration of the Pearl River Delta (2004–2020)
	Provincial Governments authorize Provincial Department of Housing and Urban-rural Development (PDHURD)	Overall plan for the Metropolitan Area in the Shandong Peninsula (2006–2020); the Plan for Metropolitan Area in Central Yunnan Province (2009–2030).
	Provincial governments and the Provincial Development and Reform Commission (PDRC)	Regional Plan for the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Metropolitan Area (2008–2020); the Outline of the Master Development Plan for the Metropolitan Area in Central China (2006–2020).

Source: Created by the author.

5.3.3 Examination and approval agencies regarding planning matters

In practice, the mechanisms and procedures adopted for examining and approving metropolitan area plans are similar to those currently used for examining and approving the overall plans of urban planning: an examination and approval system divided into multiple administrative levels. Depending on the bodies responsible for organising and establishing the plans, the examination and approval agencies are different (Table 5-26).

5.3.3.1 Cross-province metropolitan planning

The systems employed for examining and approving Cross-province metropolitan area plans can be divided into two types:

1) Metropolitan area plans that organised and established under the leadership of the NDRC approved and published by the State Council. Examples

include the Regional Plan for the Yangtze River Delta (2009–2020) and the Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020).

Table 5-27: Examination and approval agencies of metropolitan planning

Type	Organizations Responsible for Establishing Planning	Examination and Approval Agencies	Typical Case
Cross-province metropolitan planning	National Development and Reform Commission	the State Council	Regional Planning of the Yangtze River Delta (2009–2020) ; The Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020); Regional Planning of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Metropolitan Area (2006–2010).
	Provincial Government	Provincial Government	the Nanjing Metropolitan Area Plan (2002–2020);the Xuzhou Metropolitan Area Plan (2001–2020)
Cross-city metropolitan planning	MOHURD collaborated with Provincial Governments	the State Council	the Coordinated Development Planning for Urban and Town Agglomeration of the Pearl River Delta (2004–2020)
	Provincial Governments authorize (PDHURD)	the standing committees of provincial people’s congresses	the Overall plan for the Metropolitan Area in the Shandong Peninsula (2006–2020); the Plan for Metropolitan Areas in Central Yunnan Province (2009–2030).
	Provincial Government and the Provincial Development and Reform Commission	Provincial Government	the Regional Plan for the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Metropolitan Area (2008–2020); the Outline of the Master Development Plan for the Metropolitan Area in Central China (2006–2020).

Source: Created by the author.

2) Metropolitan area plans established, examined, approved, and published unilaterally by provincial governments. For example, the Nanjing Metropolitan Area Plan (2002–2020) and the Xuzhou metropolitan area plan (2001–2020) has established and approved by the People’s Government of Jiangsu Province.

5.3.3.2 Cross-city metropolitan planning

The systems employed for examining and approving cross-city metropolitan area plans can divide into three types:

1) Plans for metropolitan areas that have defined in the national strategies should examine, approve, and announce by the State Council, such as the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Metropolitan Area Plan (2008–2020). Metropolitan areas defined as key areas in the national strategies examined and approved using a multiple-level system.

2) Plans established jointly by the MOHURD and provincial governments, such as the Coordinated Development Planning for Urban Agglomeration of the Pearl River Delta (2004–2020), are approved and announced by the standing committees of provincial People’s Congresses (legislative bodies at the provincial level).

3) Metropolitan area plans established, evaluated, examined, approved, and announced by the same provincial governments, such as the outline of the master development plan for the metropolitan area in central China (2006–2020), the overall plan for the metropolitan area in the Shandong Peninsula (2006–2020), and the plan for metropolitan areas in central Yunnan Province (2009–2030). Currently, most of metropolitan area plans are established, approved, and announced unilaterally by provincial governments.

5.3.4 Implementing Agencies

The agencies responsible for implementing metropolitan area plans can be divided into the following two types:

(1) Permanent offices are set up by provincial governments to implement and manage the metropolitan area plans.

For example, the Provincial Government of Guangdong set up the Management Office of the Urban-Town Agglomeration Planning in the Pearl River Delta to instruct, coordinate, and supervise governments in implementing the plans in the Pearl River Delta above the city level. Another example is the Provincial Government of Yunnan’s formulation of the Coordination and Leadership Group for Building the Economic Zone in Central Yunnan to implement the plan for metropolitan areas in central Yunnan Province. Under this group, a management office for the metropolitan planning in Central Yunnan was set up to implement, manage, and supervise the plan. The outline of the master development plan for the metropolitan area in central China (2006–2020) has implemented by the Urbanization Leadership Office of Henan Province, which is responsible for coordinating and implementing the plan. This office is affiliated with the leadership group for the coordination and development of metropolitan areas in Central China.

(2) The absence of implementing agencies: In most cases, no designated agencies are set up to implement metropolitan planning.

For example, the Regional Planning of the Yangtze River Delta has implemented jointly by the governments of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai without clear definitions of authority.

Currently, challenges in metropolitan planning are common (Shi and Zou, 2004; Luo and Shen, 2005). Metropolitan planning is a type of large-scale spatial planning as well as top-level plans in the overall planning of cities. The implementation of metropolitan planning has driven primarily by the urban and rural planning performed by local governments.

Generally, the implementation of top-level plans depends on the achievement of bottom-level plans. Top-level plans, such as metropolitan planning, cannot be achieved without the support of urban and rural planning from local governments.

5.4 Concluding remarks

5.4.1 A comprehensive urban and rural planning system has been established in China.

Centered on the Urban and Rural Planning Law, a legal system consisting of national and local laws, administrative regulations, as well as local rules has been preliminarily established in China. Additionally, a multiple-level urban and rural administrative system, an formulation system that incorporates statutory and non-statutory urban and rural planning, and a management system for controlling and supervising the implementation of urban and rural planning have been established.

The urban and rural planning system defined the scope for operating urban and rural planning as well as the rules and logic those planners should comply to during urban and rural planning, and standardized the operating procedures and principles that should be adopted at various levels of planning. The implementation and management of urban and rural planning must be conducted within the boundaries of the urban and rural planning system.

5.4.2 The responsibilities that governments at various levels assume during urban and rural planning are well defined.

The Urban and Rural Planning Law explicitly defined the responsibilities that governments at various levels should assume during planning. The law provides rigorous provisions regarding the legal responsibilities that governments have in establishing, examining and approving, and implementing plans. Specifically, the responsibilities of governments include organizing the formulation, examination and

approval, and implementation of plans. Governments and responsible individuals must undertake corresponding legal liabilities should they fail to fulfill their designated responsibilities.

5.4.3 The establishment of the metropolitan planning management system is at an exploratory stage.

The rapid development of Chinese metropolitan areas contributed to flourishing regional economies. Because of the support provided by national policies and the great attention that governments at various levels pay to relevant projects, metropolitan planning at various levels has been achieved. Nevertheless, metropolitan planning was not implemented in China until recently, and this type of planning is non-statutory. Additionally, the current Urban and Rural Planning Law do not contain provisions that govern the planning and management of metropolitan areas, and no managerial and technical specifications have been formulated.

Despite the attempts that local governments have made to manage metropolitan area plans, such as the local regulations that provincial governments (e.g., those of Guangdong and Hunan) promulgated to govern the implementation of metropolitan area plans, assistive and relevant local regulations have not been formulated. Therefore, it can conclude that the management and system building of metropolitan planning, as a novel type of spatial planning in China, is at an exploratory stage.

Table 5-27 shows the current stage of the metropolitan planning management in China. It shows that many agencies responsible for establishing, approving, and implementing relevant plans. It may lead to the overlap or conflict functions among numerous agencies. Although attributed to numerous causes, this chaos relate closely to the short history of metropolitan planning and implementation in China.

Table 5-28: Current management of the metropolitan area plans in particular Chinese cities

Type	Title	Geographical scope	Examination and approval agencies	Formulation agencies	Implementation management agencies	Measures for conducting implementation management
Cross-provincial	Regional Planning of the Yangtze River Delta (2009–2020)	Sixteen cities: Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, Taizhou, Nantong, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Huzhou, Jiangxing, Shaoxing, Zhoushan, and Taizhou	Executive Meeting of the State Council	NDRC	Local governments	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Implemented by two provinces and one city; 2. The NDRC supervises and inspects the planning implementation.
	Nanjing Metropolitan Area Plan (2002–2020)	The entire cities of Nanjing, Zhenjiang, and Yangzhou, and the southern area of Huai'an City in Jiangsu Province, as well as the entire areas of Ma'anshan, Chuzhou, and Wuhu in Anhui Province	People's Government of Jiangsu Province	the Housing and Construction Department (HCD) of Jiangsu Province	None	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Implemented by the provincial government; 2. Assisted by the provincial government, competent authorities responsible for urban and rural planning in various cities implement and manage the plans.
Cross-city	Coordinated Development Planning for Urban Agglomeration of the Pearl River Delta (2004–2020)	Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Jiangmen, Zhongshan, Dongguan, downtown Huizhou, Huidong County, Boluo County, downtown Zhaoqing, Gaoyao City, and Sihui City	Standing Committee of Guangdong Provincial People's Congress	MOHURD and the People's Government of Guangdong Province	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The management office of the urban agglomeration planning in the Pearl River Delta; 2. A coordination meeting mechanism was established; the mechanism consists of joint meetings and special meetings. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Permanent formulations: The Management Office for Urban Agglomeration Planning in the Pearl River Delta was established for overseeing the implementation of relevant planning; 2. Measures for Implementing the Plan for Urban Agglomeration in the Pearl River Delta were formulated; 3. Joint mechanisms that ensure the coordinated development of urban agglomerations were promoted. 4. Inspection mechanisms for ensuring the implementation of the plans were established.
	Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou Metropolitan Area Plan (2001–2020)	Three cities in Jiangsu Province: Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou	People's Government of Jiangsu Province	HCD of Jiangsu Province	None	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. All projects were implemented by the provincial government; 2. An organization for coordinating the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou metropolitan planning was established; the organization includes an expert advisory committee; 3. Assisted and coordinated by the provincial government, competent authorities responsible for the urban and rural planning in various cities implement and

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					manage the plans.
Overall plan for the Metropolitan Area in the Shandong Peninsula (2006–2020)	Eight cities (i.e., Jinan, Qingdao, Zibo, Yantai, Dongying, Weihai, Weifang, and Rizhao) and Zouping County (a county under the administration of Binzhou City)	People’s Government of Shandong Province	HCD of Shandong Province	None	1. Implemented by the provincial government; 2. Assisted and coordinated by the provincial government, competent authorities responsible for the urban and rural planning in various cities implement and manage the plans.
Metropolitan Area Plan for Central Zhejiang Province (2008–2020)	Eleven counties (including county-level cities and districts) in Jinhua, Quzhou, and Lishui	People’s Government of Zhejiang Province	HCD of Zhejiang Province and the People’s Government of Zhejiang Province	None	None
Regional Planning for the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Metropolitan Area (2008–2020)	The cities of Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan	State Council	PDRC of Hunan Province	1. A leadership and coordinating committee for the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Metropolitan Area was established; 2. A coordination mechanism was established, consisting of joint meetings and special meetings.	1. A leading coordination committee was set up for the comprehensive supplementary reform and experimental zones regarding two types of social construction in the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan metropolitan area; 2. Under the organisation of the provincial government and the dominance of the municipal governments, marketisation was conducted to strengthen the coordination and management of provincial power; 3. Established a negation system between the provincial government and the municipal governments of Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan; 4. Established a multiple-level coordination and supervision mechanism.
Overall plan for the Metropolitan Area in Central China (2006–2020)	Nine cities (i.e., Zhengzhou, Luoyang, Kaifeng, Xinxiang, Jiaozuo, Xuchang, Pingdingshan, Luohe, Jiyuan), 14 county-level cities, 33 counties, and 340 towns	People’s Government of Henan Province	PDRC of Henan Province	1. The Leading Group Office for the Metropolitan planning in Henan Province; 2. A mechanism for conducting joint meetings among relevant departments in nine cities and provinces	1. An office affiliated to the Leadership Group for the Coordination and Development of Metropolitan Areas in Central China was set up; relevant functions are performed by the Urbanization leadership office, which is responsible for comprehensively coordinating and implementing relevant plans; 2. Joint meetings are conducted among nine municipal governments and relevant departments in the provincial governments.

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				has been established.	
Overall plan for the Wuhan Metropolitan Area (2007–2020)	Wuhan, Huangshi, Ezhou, Xiaogan, Huanggang, Xianning, Xiantao, Qianjiang, and Tianmen	State Council	PDRC of Hubei Province and the Office of Wuhan Metropolitan planning	1. The provincial leading group office; 2. A work conference mechanism that involves experts and committee members.	1. The Leadership Office for the Wuhan Metropolitan Area is responsible for establishing and implementing relevant plans; 2. Regional committees for performing comprehensive management will be established; 3. A work conference system will be established for the Expert Advisory Committee of Wuhan Metropolitan Construction.
Plan for Metropolitan Areas in Central Yunnan Province (2009–2030)	Kunming, Qujing, Yuxi, and Chuxiong Yi Minority Autonomous Prefecture	People’s Government of Yunnan Province	HCD of Yunnan Province	Under planning	1. Under the framework of the Coordination and Leadership Group for Building the Economic Zone in Central Yunnan, the management office for the metropolitan planning in central Yunnan was set up to implement relevant plans. The office is a permanent formulation affiliated to the provincial MOHURD; 2. Joint mechanisms for ensuring the coordinated development of metropolitan areas will be established; 3. The Management Office for the Metropolitan planning in Central Yunnan dispatches inspectors to supervise the implementation of the plans at various cities.
Plan for Building the Shanxi-Henan Metropolitan Area (2008–2020)	Five cities (i.e., Xi’an, Xianyang, Baoji, Weinan, and Tongchuan) and one district (i.e., Yangling district) and 54 affiliated counties (including county-level cities and districts)	People’s Government of Shaanxi Province	HCD of Shanxi Province	1. Implemented by the provincial government, and 2. A region-specific evaluation system is implemented.	1. Implemented by the provincial government, and 2. A region-specific evaluation system is implemented.
Metropolitan Area Plan for the Hohhot-Baotou-Ordos Area (2010–2020)	Hohhot, Baotou, and Ordos	People’s Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	HCD of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	None	None

Source: Created by the author.

Chapter 6

6.0 Problems Analysis: Main Problems and Root Causes of Metropolitan Planning Management


Metropolitan planning is classified as cross-regional strategic level planning. Management systems for metropolitan systems involve relationships between not only the different levels and departments of the government, but also the market, country, and society (Qi and Song, 2010). In this chapter, it examines the core problems of metropolitan planning management within the overall social system to decipher the institutional causes of these problems. It follows two crucial theoretical perspectives, which are the interaction and interactive processes between different interest groups: government, market and society. It combines with surveys and interviews to analyze present situations and problems of metropolitan planning management in China.

6.1 Power and responsibility of urban and rural planning between governments

Government authority refers to the power for managing administrative matters and tasks and responsibilities assumed by each-level of government regarding public affairs and services (Shao and Zhou, 2012). Generally, rationally leveled government authority is a highlight of modern bureaucracy. In modern national political systems, government authorities are typically granted powers that are correspondingly constrained through specific laws passed by national legislatures, especially through a nation's constitution.

Planning is an act that is a crucial responsibility of the government. Planning authority is a form of administrative authority that refers to the power and responsibility of each level of governments in processing and planning affairs (Shao and Zhou, 2012). Government planning power and responsibility primarily focus on planning, controlling, and guiding objectives. Chapter 2 of the Urban and Rural Planning Law reflects the fundamental concept of *each-level government, each-level planning power, each-level responsibility* and the principle of absolute subordination (low-level government planning) to high-level planning (from high-level

governments) regarding statutory regulations of urban and rural planning systems (figure 6-29).



Principle: Each level Government must make plans within the scope of its planning power and responsibility

Principle: the low-level government planning absolute subordinates to the high-level planning authority

Figure 6-29: Principles of planning power and responsibility in different level governments

Source: Created by the author.

For cross-boundary region metropolitan planning, current urban and rural planning laws and regulations lack specific definitions regarding various levels of government planning power and responsibility. From a management perspective, current metropolitan planning in China consists of various organizational bodies and approval institutions. The current lack of definitive government authorities causes management chaos and inefficient implementation during metropolitan planning, especially in the cross-boundary metropolitan planning. Some types of metropolitan plan have not clear delivering organization, such as the Regional Plans of the Yangtze River Delta which should be implemented jointly by the governments of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai. In addition, overlapping responsibilities among departments of vertical governments also confuse their corresponding planning powers and responsibilities, resulting in conflicts between various levels of spatial planning and the planning conducted by different levels of governments.


6.1.1 Undefined planning power and responsibility between vertical governments

6.1.1.1 Undefined planning power and responsibility between government levels

In China, low-level governments are within the administrative jurisdiction of high-level governments. Low-level governments serve as points that constitute a surface formed by high-level governments. County-level governments must coordinate township developments; province-level (including autonomous regions, municipalities, and special administrative regions) governments must coordinate county developments; and the central government must coordinate provincial developments. Levels of planning projects also consist of general and specific relationships. Low-level planning consists of city, township, and village construction management; high-level planning coordinates these specific development activities from a national, provincial, municipality or county level. Based on the principle of each-level government, each-level planning power and responsibility hierarchical management systems, high-level planning represents each-level government demands for allocating and managing spatial resources; thus, low-level planning must not violate these principles and requirements. In addition, guiding concepts, urban development, and spatial policies confirmed by high-level planning must implement through specific content in low-level planning. Government planning power and responsibility at various levels must not exceed their corresponding

administrative regions and statutory administrative authorities (Li, 2008; the legislative affairs commission of the NPC Standing Committee, 2008).

From the author’s survey, a total 80% of the respondents considered that planning conflict between the superior and the subordinate are *very serious* or *serious*.



In practice, overlapping responsibilities between vertical governments cause confusion among their corresponding planning power and responsibility, resulting in conflicts between the spatial planning and government planning at various levels. In statutory urban and rural planning systems, general townships planning and controlled detailed planning often violate township systems and overall planning, respectively. According to urban and rural planning regulations, high-level township system planning is one of the bases for overall urban planning. In reality, overall urban planning often exceeds population scales defined by township systems or high-level planning. For example, in structural planning for towns under the administration of Suzhou Municipality as defined in the overall planning of Suzhou Municipality (2007–2020), Taicang was defined as a secondary city, the population of which was predicted to reach 0.4–0.5 million by 2020. However, in a subsequent Taicang overall plan (2010–2030), the population of the city was predicted to reach 0.67 million by 2020 (Table 6-28). Hence, the overall planning conducted by different levels of government yielded different population size predictions for the same city. Every government level intends to expand their jurisdiction, consequently resulting in conflicts between various planning projects.

Planning power and responsibility are especially confusing in nonstatutory metropolitan planning; thus, organizing and planning conflicts between high- and low-level governments are especially severe.

Table 6-29: The predicted population of Taicang city in different level planning


The Level of Overall Planning	The Formulation Entities	Time-frame of Planning	Year of Prediction	The Population of Predicted Year (1000 People)
The Overall Planning of Suzhou Municipality (2007-2020)	The People's Government of Suzhou Municipality China Academy of Urban Planning And Design Suzhou Planning and Design Research Institute Co., LTD Suzhou Planning Information Center	2006-2020	2020	400-500
The Overall Planning of Taicang City(2010-2030)	The People's Government of Taicang City Jiangsu Institute of Urban Planning And Design	2010-2030	2015	570
			2020	670
			2030	800

Source: The Overall Planning of Suzhou Municipality (2007-2020); the Overall Planning of Taicang City (2010-2030).

6.1.1.2 Localism in planning

The process of the Chinese economic reform largely reflected redistributing central and local benefits. Since the Economic Reform, the Chinese government was decentralized, granting power to local governments and enabling such governments to become increasingly independent profit entities. The tax-sharing reform in 1994 further distinguished central and local interest boundaries and determined individual behavioral orientations. The central and local governments formed individual independent benefits, often competing to control and distribute resources (Wang, 2011). After gaining substantial economic control and independent economic benefits, local governments contradict and economically contrast with the central government. Localism rapidly propagates as local interests are stimulated and regional competition is intensified (Luo and Shen, 2007). Local governments pursue regional economic development and financial growth by using their resource allocation rights to maximize self-interests (Song, 2007). Specifically when central macroeconomic controls negatively affect local interests, local governments are inclined to developing economic resistance by adopting countermeasures, thereby protecting self-interests.

From the author's survey, a total 63% of the respondents considered that opportunistic behaviors of local government in planning operation is *very serious*, 21% of the respondents considered is *serious*.



Urban land and spatial resources

must be managed through urban planning, which, to a certain degree, guide and control the overall scale, direction, and spatial layout of urban investments. Inevitably, urban planning is a crucial instrument and channel of the government for increasing sources of financial income and coordinating and balancing conflicts of interest. Localized planning refers to local governments formulating, examining, approving, and selectively implementing high-level planning guidelines to protect regional public or governmental interests (Tao, 2008). In environments where planning power and responsibility are undefined, the emergence of localism aggravates planning conflicts between government levels. These regional planning cases, divided by administrative powers, deeply influenced by localism; thus, fragmented planning and management contradictions are intensified between government levels (Wu, 2003).

Currently, local economic effects such as competition between the cities and governments of different administrative regions in the Yangtze River Delta region and reconstructions are common. Rational decisions in fragmented administrations tend to present unorderly and irrational overall developments. The short-term revenues and developments that cities and regions achieve are often at the cost of long-term losses and uncoordinated large-scale developments (Tao, 2008). A common set of rules is under taking through regional planning to guide overall regions toward positively interacting and orderly competing developments (Wang, 2011).

Since 2000, different levels of administrative regions in the Yangtze River Delta region have formulated different levels and types of regional planning (Table 6-29; Figure 6-30). For example, the Jiangsu Province riverfront development overall plan, Jiangsu Province riverfront industrial development plan, Nanjing

metropolitan planning, and Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou metropolitan planning have formulated in Jiangsu; Hangzhou–Jiaxing–Huzhou metropolitan planning and Hangzhou Bay regional metropolitan space strategic development planning have formulated in Zhejiang; and Three-Hour metropolitan planning have formulated in Shanghai. However, these metropolitan plans flawed, exhibiting various degrees of localism in which different ideologies substantially surpassed realities in formulation processes. Therefore, the operability of these projects became severely challenges. In the background of a decentralized market economy, localism, which is driven by local interests, becomes a major challenge in current regional planning (Gu and Li, 2006).

Table 6-30: Related regional planning established in the Yangtze River Delta since 2000

	Planning	Time Frame of Planning	Organs Organizing the Formulation of Planning	Involved Cities
Jiangsu Province	Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou metropolitan planning	2001-2020	The Housing and Construction Department of Jiangsu Province	Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou
	Nanjing metropolitan planning	2002-2020	The Housing and Construction Department of Jiangsu Province	Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, Maanshan, Chuzhou, all the Administrative Area, Wuhu Huaian Xuyixian, Jin Huxian and Chaohu , Hexian, Hanshanxian.
	The Riverfront development overall plan	2003-2010	The People's Government of Jiangsu Province	Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Yangzhou, Taizhou, Nantong ,Etc. Six Urban Areas. Jurong, Danyang, Jiangyin, Zhangjiagang, Changshu, Taicang, Yizheng, Jiangdu, Taixing Corporation, Jingjiang, Rugao, Tongzhou, Haimen, Qidong.
	The Jiangsu Province coastal and development overall plan	2005-2015	The People's Government of Jiangsu Province	Lianyungang, Yancheng and Nantong City Downtown and Ganyu, the East China Sea, the Clouds, the South, Xiangshui, Littoral, Reflected Light, Dafeng, Dongtai, Jiangsu Haian, Some, Tongzhou, Haimen, Qidong.
	Jiangsu Province riverfront industrial development plan	2006-2010	The People's Government of Jiangsu Province	Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Yangzhou, Taizhou, Nantong, Jurong, Yang, Danyang, Jiangyin, Zhangjiagang, Changshu, Taicang Yizheng, Jiangdu, Taixing Corporation, Jingjiang, Rugao, Tongzhou, Haimen, Qidong.
	Southern Jiangsu	2013-	The People's	Nanjing, Wuxi, Changzhou,

	modernization demonstration area planning	2030	Government of Jiangsu Province	Suzhou And Zhenjiang
Zhejiang Province	Hangzhou Bay regional metropolitan space strategic development planning	2004-2020	The Housing and Construction Department of Zhejiang Province	Hangzhou, Ningbo, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Huzhou and Zhoushan
	Hangzhou metropolitan economic zone development planning	2007-2020	The People's Government of Zhejiang Province	Hangzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing
	Urban agglomeration planning of Zhejiang Central Area	2008-2020	The Housing and Construction Department of Zhejiang Province	Jinhua, Wuyi, Pujiang, Panan, Lanxi, Yiwu, Dongyang, Yongkang
	The Zhejiang Province ocean economic zone development planning	2011-2020	National Development and Reform Commission	Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Zhoushan, Taizhou
The Yangtze River Delta	The Yangtze River Delta regional planning	2009-2020	National Development and Reform Commission	Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou Taizhou, Nantong, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Zhoushan, Taizhou

Source: Created by the author.

As an analogy, regional planning involves automated pawns in a game of chess as localism emerges. Overall, strategic considerations severely challenged by opportunistic behaviours of local governments (Ouyang, 2009). Theoretically, local governments have responsibilities to make the metropolitan planning into practical actions from ideologies. The central and provincial governments have absolute advantage and capability in planning powers operation, it is easy to make metropolitan planning coming true through traditional administrative procedures. However, it was so different in reality in China. Local governments always use their absolute advantage in asymmetric information to resist instructions from high-level government (Zhao, 2005; Zhou, 2008). When executing metropolitan planning, local governments often selectively follow high-level planning guidelines and only perform some parts good for them.





Figure 6-30: Different type regional plans in the Yangtze River Delta

Source: Created by the author.

The author’s investigation showed that 91% and 89% of the respondents did not consider insufficient planning time and technique led to the problems in metropolitan planning management. Contrastively, 88% of the respondents as the root causes for conflicting government planning bodies; 89% of the respondents considered that the superior planning doesn’t meet the needs of local governments. Therefore, local governments should disregard high-level planning guidelines when local interests are unmet.



As a professor in regional planning said,

To protect local interests, local governments will not passively obey high-level government arrangements but selectively execute high-level planning guidelines. Generally, local governments proceed when high-level planning protects and increases local benefits; local governments usually ignore planning guidelines that are unfavourable to local interests. (A professor of Nanjing University, 2012, personal communication, 18 September).

6.1.2 Undefined planning power and responsibility between government departments

Decentralization granted local governments increasing autonomy and permission to manage. Planning management authority is currently rare and one of the effective means of control, thus becoming the focus of different government levels and departments competing for authority.

6.1.2.1 Planning power and responsibility and departmental divisions

In vertical and lateral government decentralization, the central power distributed into dispersed powers, especially public authorities. Departmental functions and privileges lack defined boundaries, responsibilities lacked symmetry and overlap, and decision-making, execution, and supervision became integrated, thus resulting in severely overlapped public governance (Li and Yu, 2010).

Undefined planning power and responsibility exist not only between high- and low-level governments but also between government departments. At the turn of the century, metropolitan areas emerged, and so did competition among authorities over regional planning between multiple departments (Hu, 2006). From national, provincial, to municipal levels, urban functions are planned, and territories and development and reform departments are heavily divided (Niu, 2004; Xu, 2008), resulting in current management bodies having overlapping metropolitan planning responsibilities.

As market economies developed, the status and role of social economic development planning, which was a responsibility of the former National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) progressively diminished. After 2005, socioeconomic development planning began to be redirected from specific and microscopic industrial development planning toward spatial planning (Chen and Liu, 2005). Moreover, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD, formerly the Ministry of Construction), Provincial Department of Housing and Urban and Rural Development, and city and county planning bureaus (planning at the material level), which responsible for urban planning began to focus on diverting regional planning in socioeconomic developments. Emphasis was placed not only on cross-regional coordinating matters associated with infrastructure construction, urban work divisions, resource exploitation, and environmental

protection, but on also spatial coordinating matters associated with urban and rural populations, resources, and environments. Regarding farmland protection-based overall land-use planning, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) and subordinating local territorial departmental administrators also began to divert toward integrating coordinated planning based on spatial development, land use, and governance.

When regional planning focused on metropolitan areas emerged, MOHURD, MLR, and NDRC struggled for administrative authority over large scale spatial planning (Table 6-30, Figure 6-31). The power struggle extended from central and provincial levels to municipal and county levels (Figure 6-32). Additionally, railway, traffic, and environmental protection departments further divide metropolitan planning power and responsibility.

Figure 6-31: The current divisions and struggles between different ministries and commissions over regional planning privileges

Ministries and commissions	Planning basis	Type of planning	Typical cases
the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)	<i>City Planning Act; Urban and Rural Planning Act</i>	Urban-type regional planning, metropolitan region planning, metropolitan planning	Metropolitan region planning (e.g., Pearl River Delta Megalopolis, Shandong Peninsula Megalopolis) or metropolitan planning (e.g., Nanjing Metropolis Circle, Xuzhou Metropolis)
the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR)	<i>Land Management Act</i>	Land use planning, territorial planning	Pilot urban territorial planning in Shenzhen and Tianjin
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)	The National Eleventh Five-Year Development Planning (<i>Ordinance on Planning Organisation</i>)	Metropolitan region planning, comprehensive metropolitan planning	Greater Changsha Metropolitan Region Planning, Greater Wuhan Megalopolis and Central Plain Megalopolis Planning, Yangtze River Delta Megalopolis and Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Metropolitan Region Comprehensive Planning

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 6-32: Regional plans made by different departments in China

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 6-33: Regional plans made by different departments in the Yangtze River Delta

Source: Created by the author.


As social interests diverge and entrepreneurial governments emerge, government departments become not only an administrative body, but also a relatively independent profit entity. Interest-oriented departments have become a crucial characteristic of administrative operations (Sun, 2004). As government departments have emerged as profit entities, departmental authorities tend to expand striving for increasing departmental and member benefits (Chen, 2010). Multiple departments striving to gain metropolitan planning authority substantively aim to expand their authority and increase benefits. Regarding benefits, no departments intend to forfeit their authority. As the current Premier Li Keqiang, responded in an international press conference on March 17, 2013, “breaking through the partisan gridlock and special interests are more difficult than touching the soul” (Xinhuanet, 2013).

The NDRC, MLR, and MOHURD individually formulated different forms of regional spatial planning systems including regional, territorial, and township planning systems, which are largely repetitive and spatially overlapping; the departments lacked administrative coordination, resulting in contradictions. Therefore, planning management and implementation rights and responsibilities lack a common and well-defined specification for stability and regulation.

Critics indicated that excessively large amounts of officially organised metropolitan planning projects have proposed. Although these projects have varying titles, the contents are similar.

Therefore, the work performed overlap and resources are wasted. Moreover, planning bodies are uncoordinated, contradicting each other and consequently challenging scientific, practical, and authoritative natures (Wang, 2004; Hu, 2006).

When mentioned the nature of metropolitan planning and metropolitan planning management, 90% of the



respondents considered that metropolitan planning was a kind of social and economic development planning. For the same reason, 78% of the respondents considered that metropolitan planning management should be under centralized management by specialized departments of the National Development and Reform Commission.

As a professor in urban planning said,

Problems such as overlapped range of authority and misplaced, crossed, or lost functions continued to occur, hampering legalization in different regional planning processes. (A professor of Tongji University, 2012, personal communication, 5 October).


Regarding departmental division for planning power and responsibility, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development promoted the Three Compliance (sān guī hé yī). But it does not work well. Just as another professor in Urban Planning said,

Three Compliance can be easily implemented on technical problems such as guiding concepts, organisation methods, and progress deadlines. However, there no departments are willing to forfeit automatically their powers. It is difficult to eliminate departmental interests. (A professor of Southeast University, 2012, personal communication, 30 October).

6.1.2.2 Departmental planning conflicts


The struggle for spatial planning power and responsibility between the three major government departments further generates planning conflicts. Planning between different departments contains major contradicting contents. For example, different planning arranges different types of land use for the same land space.

Conflicts between departmental planning intensified anarchism in spatial management (Hu, 2006). Conflicting departmental planning causes several confusions among local governments.





In the investigation from the author, 89% of the respondents considered that planning conflict between different departments are *very serious* or *serious*.

In the investigation, the primary causes of planning conflicts between different departments were similar to the causes of planning conflicts between government levels. The respondents largely



considered that organizational timing and techniques are not primary causes of planning conflicts; instead, the primary cause of departmental planning conflict was institutional factors. A majority of the respondents (89%) considered that a focus on departmental interests caused departmental planning conflicts.



For example, the Yangtze River Delta region currently has two sets of overall planning projects: Yangtze River Delta Regional Planning, formulated by the NDRC, and the urban agglomeration development planning in the Yangtze River Delta, formulated by the MOHURD (Table 6-30; Figure 6-34, 6-34).

In Yangtze River Delta Regional Planning, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Nanjing were represented as the three sublevel city groups; in the urban agglomeration development planning in the Yangtze River Delta, the delta region was divided into four sublevel city groups (The Economic Observer, 2006). The first city group is centred in Shanghai, extending from Changzhou (west) to Hangzhou (east). The second city group extends from the border in Changzhou (east) to the Nanjing Metropolis Circle (west), which includes Hefei, Ma'anshan, Wuhu, and Tongling. The third city group consists of the Ningbo—Shaoxing city group, which extends south to Wenzhou. The fourth city group is the central Jiangsu city group comprising Taizhou, Nantong, and Yangzhou.

Table 6-31: Comparison of the Yangtze River Delta regional planning projects

	The urban agglomeration development planning in the Yangtze River Delta	Yangtze River Delta Regional Planning
Lead department	MOHURD	NDRC
Planning period	2007–2020	2009–2020
Scope of planning	All administrative regions in Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui, approximating 340,000 km ² of land area (23 cities).	Including Shanghai Municipality, Jiangsu Province, and Zhejiang Province, totalling a land area of 210,700 km ² (25 cities).
Planning positions	Emphasis placed on the coordination between population, industries, and township developments and resolving resource and environmental restrictions in industrial developments. This project grants overall upgrades to industrial structures and coordinates township system models. In addition, this is a physical and advanced regional planning for regional major fundamental facilities.	This project implements overall strategies for national regional developments, promotes urban and rural coordinated developments, strengthens common construction and utility of regional fundamental facilities, elevates resource conservation and environmental protection standards, and increases overall competitiveness and sustainable development capacity of the Yangtze River Delta region. This project also serves as a basis and guideline for future planning and development in the Yangtze River Delta region.
Spatial layout	Four major sublevel city groups	<i>Yī hé jiǔ dài</i> (a core and nine focal development strips) regional development spatial layout and the construction of three major metropolitan circles.

Source: ① *Yangtze River Delta Regional Planning* (2009–2020); ② International Finance News. (2006). *Should Yangtze River Delta be generalized?* [online]. April 6, 2006. Available at: http://news.China.com/zh_cn/finance/11009723/20060406/13223978.html. (Accessed: 1 March, 2013).

Although different city groups and metropolitan planning consists of varying titles and emphases, these projects share similar contents, leading to extensive work overlaps, resource wastage, organisation ineptitude, and mutual denial, not to mention the violation of the scientific, practical, and authoritative aspects of planning (Hu, 2006).




Figure 6-34: Comparison of the planning scope in the Yangtze River Delta regional planning projects

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 6-35: Comparison of the spatial structure in the Yangtze River Delta regional planning projects

Source: Created by the author.

For example, the Pearl River Delta Megalopolis successively proposed three planning projects (Tab 6-31).

Table 6-32: Three successive Pearl River Delta megalopolis planning projects

Title	Planning period	Scope of planning	Core content	Lead department
Pearl River Delta Economic Zone Megalopolis Planning	1995–2010	In 1994, the Guangdong government delimited the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone, which comprises 25 cities and 3 counties (i.e., Guangzhou, Shenzhen), totalling an area of 41,600 km ²	Delimiting spatial governance zones, determining urban level structures and spatial layouts, and coordinating between neighbouring areas	Guangdong Province
Pearl River Delta Megalopolis Coordinated Development Planning	2004–2020	The Pearl River Delta Economic Zone, which comprises 25 cities and 3 counties (including Guangzhou and Shenzhen), totalling an area of 41,600 km ² in which construction land covers an area of 6,640 km ²	Four types of spatial control models, nine types of policy zone divisions, recent highlighted action plans	MOHURD & Guangdong Province
Pearl River Delta Regional Reform and Development outline	2008–2020	The scope covers the Pearl River Delta Megalopolis and relevant collaborations with Hong Kong and Macao	Macro level institutional arrangements and strategic direction, emphasising coordination of socioeconomic developments in the planning region and comprising industrial development, regional coordination, environmental protection, social construction, and system innovations	NDRC

Source: Created by the author.

The Guangdong Province government proposed the first plan, the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone Megalopolis Planning (1995-2010) (Figure 6-36). The emphasis of the project placed on coordinating between cities, villages, relevant district departments, and contradictions unsolvable by counties and cities themselves (Fang, et al., 1997). The second plan, the Pearl River Delta Megalopolis Coordinated

Development Planning (2004–2020) (Figure 6-37), which was co organized by MOHURD and the Guangdong Province government, elaborated on the spatial management model guided by implementations (Fang, et al., 2005; Zou, 2006). The third plan, the Pearl River Delta Regional Reform and Development Planning Outline (2008–2020) (Figure 6-38), which proposed by the NDRC, resembled a national economic and social development plan. This plan becomes a current and future programme of action and basis for formulating relevant exclusive planning guiding the Pearl River Delta Megalopolis region. However, the inconsistency and coordination and cooperation problems between the MOHURD and NDRC-led projects became a major challenge for planning executives.

Just like a professor in urban planning said that,

Various sectors and departments direct their own plans in which most involve planning control and land use demands that require coordination between urban and land use planning. Excessive planning types mean increasing difficulty to coordinate planning implementations; disputes are common results of the lack of planning coordination. (A professor of Tongji University, 2012, personal communication, 10 November).




Figure 6-36: Spatial structure of the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone megalopolis planning (1995-2010)

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 6-37: Spatial structure of the Pearl River Delta Megalopolis coordinated development planning (2004–2020)

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 6-38: Spatial structure of the Pearl River Delta regional reform and development planning outline (2008–2020)

Source: Created by the author.

6.2 Power and responsibility in planning management between government and market

As the President of the Urban Planning Society of China (UPSC) Zhou Ganzhi mentioned in the 2009 Annual Conference of China city Planning, the excessive administrative interference to urban planning should be solved at present China (Qian, 2009).” In fact, the planning management in current China is constrained by official and businesspersons’ intentions. The official and investment intentions often keep on a tight leash, manipulating respective organisation and implementation processes, resulting in the lack of planning authority (Luo and Shen, 2005; Tao, 2008; Ma, 2013).


6.2.1 Administrative interference

6.1.2.1 Planning swayed by administrative commanding officials

Strategic metropolitan planning considered as a programme of action guiding future regional developments and urban constructions. Under the added pressure of intense external competition and internal system performance expectations, local government leaders increasingly rely on strategic planning to realize policy objectives within tenure (Zou, 2004). This becomes the primary reason for local leaders interfering with planning. Moreover, traditional systems, in which powers are unconstrained, provided essential conditions for leaders interfering with planning.

For example, the overall planning adopts long-term targets in the range of 15–20 years to guide the future development and constructions. However, the tenures of mayors often last a few years; the mayors’ primary challenge is to make political achievements within limited time and resource conditions. Under the top-down official appointed system, new local government leaders often must free themselves from previously laid out frameworks by the preceding local government to obtain their own political achievements. Mayors are extremely likely to and must adopt major actions, which not only adjusts urban development goals in overall planning configurations, but may also fundamentally changes the urban development directions and overall layout. Hence the sayings “one mayor, one plan” and “mayor leaves, plan changes” (Zou, 2004), which results in short-lived strategic planning (Zhang, 2002).

Metropolitan planning is a type of strategic planning vital for regional developments and overall urban arrangements. However, casual adjustments and changes have commonly practiced when leadership goals are unmet. In July 2000, strategic policies for constructing the Nanjing, Xuzhou, and Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou metropolitan areas has formulated during the third Jiangsu provincial urban work meeting; the n leader proposed three urban metropolitan strategies, which aimed to drive provincial socioeconomic developments. However, because leaders changed terms at the end of 2002, new ideas were proposed regarding riverfront development strategies and the Riverfront Regional Development Planning was formulated. Although this plan did not involve completely rejecting the metropolitan spatial layout in the Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou urban development plan, new township spatial reorganisation projects were proposed. Cities in the Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou metropolitan areas and Central Jiangsu were reorganised, regrouping cities such as Changzhou-Taizhou and Nantong-Yushan (Luo and Shen, 2005). Similar to partial implementations of the Jiangsu Riverfront Planning, the three metropolitan planning implementations (including Nanjing metropolitan planning) were also neglected and stranded.



From the author's survey, a total 91% of the respondents considered that the problems of administrative interference in planning are *very serious* or *serious*.

In the author's interviews, local officials partially expressed their understanding and frustrations toward local leaders' interfering behaviours.

The investment or construction activities of certain cities in China are mainly decided by the will of officials. In high-level decision-making, the layout of a city is often decided by a few officials. We consider that most constructions and renovations aimed to improve cities, but several plans used for political achievements and even tunnelling between officials and businesspersons. (An official working in Policy Research Office of the Suzhou Municipal Government, 2012, personal communication, 8 September).

In political achievement perspective, many lower-level governments set investment driven by GDP growth targets. Some officials are tempted by instant success and are keen in making and presenting highlights and political achievements. Thus, urban planning projects were arbitrarily changed at will and building facilities were repeatedly constructed and demolished. (An official working in Suzhou Municipal Development and Reform Commission, 2012, personal communication, 16 September).

Adhering to the present political achievement perspective, the saying one term of a leader, one train of thought, one set of plans is well understood. Plans organised by the preceding leader may be fully justified. It should be promote and implement by succeeding leaders. However, who takes credit cannot be clearly distinguished. Under these conditions, successors are often inclined to reorganise planning and strongly promote new implementations to distinguish their own political achievements. (An official working in Yangzhou Planning Bureau, 2012, personal communication, 15 November).

Experts support the same opinions. Just like a professor in urban planning said,

Politicians always want to get more political achievements in a short time. Consequently, most politicians can hardly focus on long-term regional planning because long-term projects usually sacrifice short-term effects, thus influencing political achievements. Therefore, objectively, local officials lacked encouragement and motives to devote work in long-term planning. (A Professor of Suzhou University of Science and Technology, 2012, personal communication, 10 November).

6.1.2.2 Planning committees influenced by governments

Planning committee systems are considered as a tool for breaking through closed operative conditions and promote socialised and scientific planning management (Yin, 2006). Promoting urban planning committee systems helps reduce arbitrariness in planning revisions (Qiu, 2004); lawmakers emphasise eliminating the arbitrary decisions of certain local leaders and excessive discretion of planning management departments to strengthen scientific and democratic values in major decision-making in urban and rural planning problems. Collective decision-making methods through planning committees replaced personal decision-making practices by administrative heads from the past, taking into account both the justice and efficiency of urban planning (Liu and Tang, 2007; Tang, 2008).

In 1998, Shenzhou City established the first domestic planning committee by referencing empirical planning managements from Hong Kong (Guo, 2009). In

2003, the MOHURD and the Guizhou Province government jointly promoted pilot operations of urban planning committees. Since then, most provinces and cities established planning committees. There are two main changes in the decisions of the metropolitan planning management. Firstly, it absorbs experts and academics as member's constitution (Table 6-32). It shifts the decision-making power and planning implementation power to the planning committee. According to an explanation by MOHURD officials, one of the purposes of planning committees is to reduce the interference of local government heads toward strategic planning (Guo, 2009; Yin, 2006).

Table 6-33: Types and characteristics of several megalopolis planning committees in China


	Shenzhen	Wuhan	Xiamen	Shanghai	Changchun
Head	Mayor	Mayor	Mayor	Mayor	Secretary of municipal party committee and Mayor
Agency heads	Director General of Planning	Director General of Planning	Director General of Planning	Director General of Planning	Director General of Planning
Members	14 government officials 15 experts and scholars	31 government officials 20 experts and scholars	8 government officials 11 experts and scholars	12 government officials	—
Designation	Government appointed and employed	Government appointed and employed	Government appointed and employed	Government appointed and employed	Government appointed
Member term	5 years	5 years	5 years	5 years	—
Office	Local planning bureau	Local planning bureau	Local planning bureau	Local planning bureau	Local planning bureau

Source: Created by the author.

The planning committee for the metropolitan areas has set up in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Nanjing and other cities since 2004 (Guo, 2009). These planning committees are building up for the single-center metropolitan areas in one administrative area. The planning committee for the Chang-Zhun-Tan metropolitan areas, which is multi-center metropolitan areas cross municipal administrative boundary. It is a new stage of the development of the Chinese system. It will promote the metropolitan planning management moving to the multi-level governance from bureaucratic management, and promote decision democratization and management socialization, and then to achieve the multiple network governance.

Although the planning committee bring new development of the metropolitan planning management, the transfer of Chinese metropolitan planning authority is not sufficient. There are too much official members in the planning committee. In reality, the planning committees are nominally *official agencies* or *semi-official agencies*, they are essentially government agencies controlled by local government heads. In these agencies, local government heads symbolically become the principal planners. It will slow down the development of the metropolitan planning management moving to good governance.

When asked “What type of agency is the planning committee?” There are 82% of the respondents considered such committees as governmental agencies. 16% of the respondents considered the planning committee are a semi- governmental agency, and 3% of the respondents considered it a social agency. 89% of the respondents considered that the planning Commission can’t get the planning out of the interference from administrative intervention.



Zou and Chen (2003) analysed planning committee operative mechanisms in Shenzhen City and indicated that the planning committee becomes the government’s technocrats, which are largely contained by the government. Based on actual investigations in certain regions, planning committees not only cannot promote socialization and democratization, but also easily become the mouthpiece for directing the leader’s will in the name of collective decision-making because actual constraints and supervision do not exist. Oftentimes, official planners’ recommendations cannot alter final political decisions (Zou, 2006).

As the author interviewing with experts in urban planning, they said,

Major planning usually discussed by planning committees, but leaders still possess the right to make final decisions. Using the collective decision-making

format of the planning committee not only frees leaders in decision-making, but also reduces the responsibilities of a leader who commits decision-making errors. (A professor of Southeast University, 2013, personal communication, 12 April).

Currently, planning committees, to a certain degree, constrains leaders from abusing power and interfering with planning. However, the problem of centralised power was never be solved from fundamentally. (A professor of Nanjing University of Technology, 2013, personal communication, 7 May).

6.2.2 Power without responsibility in planning management

With the process of market-oriented decentralization in China, the market is the major forces of resource allocation. Urban planning is the primary means for allocating public resources. Because the government retreats from direct management, planning becomes a crucial instrument for the government to employ macro controls (Zhang et al., 2002). Urban planning administrative behavior influences the interests of stakeholders; struggles between rent-seekers and urban planning department and personnel are unprecedented. Departments closely related to planning such as the MOHURD and territorial departments are high level and power (true power) departments. Prior to placing real constraints on planning powers, the MOHURD and planning departments naturally become severe disaster areas of planning power corruption. From organising to implementing planning projects, planning power corruption penetrates throughout almost each management segment.

6.2.2.1 Rent –seeking behavior in planning management

Presently, power rent-seeking in the stage of planning organization primarily takes the form of the *kickbacks* of planning design fees. Planning organization kickbacks refers to a commissioning party (officials, in the name of the government) who pays (planning design fee) commissions planning organization tasks to planning design units or individuals and appropriates a percentage of funding from the planning design fee. Planning organization kickback is a typical type of political corruption and is a common means for planning power rent-seeking.

Since the planning design market reform of the last century, planning design companies must survive in intense market competition. From the perspective of planning design companies, different levels of the government are the planning

design market's largest source of demand and have naturally become clients for which planning design companies compete.

An investigation on planning design businesses showed that 82% of the participants responded that most planning design items are from different local governments, accounting for 80% of their operating income; 89% of the participants had *very steady* or *steady* government clients. From the perspective of local governments, government officials often decide the type of planning and number of projects to commission a company and plan a budget. Under these conditions, local officials often conduct rent setting and rent-seeking during planning organizations. An investigation showed that in the planning design market, numerous planning design companies form stable long-term collaborative relationships with local governments; kickbacks seem to become a mutually abided *unspoken rule*. Investigation also showed that 91% of the planning design company participants have heard of giving officials kickbacks, and that 73% of the respondents had given kickbacks. Regarding government officials receiving kickbacks, 93% of the first-hand participants responded either *very severe* or *severe*.

As a professor in urban planning said,

Without supervision system, the leader has control every steps in planning projects, including funds. If companies want to undertake the planning design projects from government, they always satisfy the leader who controls the project. (A professor of Nanjing University, 2013, personal communication, 15 May).

6.2.2.2 Power corruption in the planning implementation stage

If power alienation in the planning organisation stage compared to a mere “minor sickness” of corrupt planning, then power corruption appearing during the planning implementation management stage is a “severely ill” planning corruption. Since 2002, a series of major planning corruption cases occurred during the planning implementation management stage (Table 6-33).

In these cases of planning power corruption, potentially enormous commercial opportunities and profit margins make planning managements focal surveillance zones of high corruption incidences and incentives of planning power corruptions. Centralised power without constraints is a crucial precondition to planning power corruption. The primary characteristics of planning power corruption include powers

and private departments such as real estate agencies forming alliances and being involved in different political corruptions.

Table 6-34: Typical cases of planning power corruption in China


Corruption case	Time of incident	Position	Amount (RMB) Incomplete statistics	Primary bribery conduct
De-Zhao Li	2002	Former Kunming City Director General of Planning	Approximately 3.4 million	Increased building floor area ratio for developers, changed charity to commercial land use
Li Xu	2003	Former Deputy Director of the Planning and Management Bureau of Chengdu	Approximately 2.3 million	Violated planning examination and approval rules
Ren-Jie Jiang	2004	Former Suzhou Deputy Mayor, in charge of urban planning and construction	Approximately 109 million	Manipulated land auction violations, passed multiple conveniences for private businesses
Zhi-Guang Zhang	2005	Former Qingdao City Director of the Planning Department	Approximately 8.6 million	Violated planning examination and approval, privately increased building floor area ratio for developers
Zheng Wang	2007	Former Director of the Chongqing City Urban Planning Bureau Shapingba Branch	Approximately 9.66 million	Violated planning examination and approval, privately increased building floor area ratio for developers
Hua Zeng	2007	Former Kunming City Director General of Planning	Approximately 2 million	Privately changed land use for developers, increased building floor area ratio for developers
Xiao-Qi Liang	2008	Former Deputy Director of the Chongqing City Urban Planning Bureau	Approximately 16 million	Privately changed land use for developers, increased building floor area ratio for developers
Yong Jiang	2008	Former Director of the Chongqing City Urban Planning Bureau	Approximately 17 million	Privately changed land use for developers, increased building floor area ratio for developers
Xing Hu	2008	Former Kunming City Deputy Mayor, in charge of planning	Approximately 40 million	Manipulated land auction violations, directed subordinate officials in planning examination and approval violations, and increased building floor area ratio for developers
Mai-Yong Xu	2011	Former Hangzhou City Deputy Mayor, in charge of urban planning and construction	Approximately 199 million	Manipulated land auction violations, passed multiple conveniences for private businesses
Xiang-	2012	Former Changsha City	Approximately	Violated planning

Ling Gu		Deputy Director	60 million	examination and approval, privately increased building floor area ratio for developers
Jun Hu	2012	Former Deputy Director of the Shanghai Urban Planning and Land Resource Administration Bureau	Approximately 7 million	Violated planning examination and approval, helped bribers obtain planning design projects

Source: Wang Y. and Li G.B. (2013) *Research on Management System of the Urban Agglomeration in China*. Southeast university press.

In currently exposed planning corruption cases, inappropriate interference by administrative power in planning exceeds general corruption cases in quantity. For example, the cases of the former Suzhou Deputy Mayor Ren-Jie Jiang and Hangzhou Deputy Mayor Mai-Yong Xu both involved deputy mayors who were responsible for urban construction, planning, and real estate developments; the bribes amounted to over 200 million RMB. In another example, the Taiyuan planning corruption case in 2011, which was triggered by the bribery records of an intermediary who functioned between the local planning bureau and a developer, involved more than 60 provincial and city officials (Tu, 2011).

From the author’s survey, a total 95% of the respondents considered that the problems of power corruptions in planning are *very serious* or *serious*.



Urban planning is a type of spatial control planning and rigid

constraints must be established for different construction projects. However, in practice, planning control indicators often become bargaining advantages driven by land finance, power, and money interests; the nature, floor area ratio, storeys, greening rate, and public facilities of land lots are arbitrarily changed. Some officials use discretion to arbitrarily modify controlling details of planning to sell power; officials gain personal interests through urban planning and are secretly manipulated by developers. This has been proven through the series of director generals convicted of committing corruption during planning. Changing the nature of land lots and floor area ratios are common in recent planning system corruption cases in China. Urban

planning corruptions are not only limited to the director generals of planning; anyone with decision-making powers can be involved in official–businessmen collusions.

As professors in urban planning said,

Floor area ratio has been compared to a black hole, which has consumed the careers of numerous city officials in China. Floor area ratio refers to the ratio of total building area to land use area in construction zones. To real estate developers, large floor area ratios provide increased sales areas, which contribute to increased profits. To residents, floor area ratio directly influences living comfort. (A planner working in Suzhou Institute of Planning and Design Co.,LTD, 2013, personal communication, 7 June).

Why is planning problematic? Enormous commercial opportunities and profit margins are obtainable in urban planning. In cities where land costs are high, minor changes to land lot boundaries and spatial arrangements may not be noticeable to the public; however, these generate tens of millions in profits for real estate developers. (A professor of Suzhou University of Science and Technology, 2013, personal communication, 25 May).

In urban constructions, local leaders often change urban planning through giving personal orders, slipping approval notes, and adopting special matters, special handling methods to shape urban planning into specific construction projects. Numerous loopholes in the formulation and operation of urban planning opened up the possibility of power rent-seeking. Thus, urban planning blueprints become blueprints of fortune for some officials. (A professor of Tsinghua University, 2013, personal communication, 11 June).

6.3 Weak social participation in planning management

Since 2004, along with social diversification and interest gaming normalisation, planning management in China began to adopt public participation mechanisms. In 2007, this system has written in the Urban and Rural Planning Act. Academia has long held different expectations toward public participation in planning. The essence of public participation in planning is a socialisation process (Tang, 2002) and crucial content for realising democracy in planning (Liang, 1999; Nie and Zhou, 2005; Zhao and Liu, 2010). Planning is a spatial resource reallocation process centred on land use regulations as well as a process of interest redistribution (Wang, 2009). Public participation not only breaks government monopoly on planning affairs, also helps balance interests (Chen, 2000) and strengthens checks and balances toward power (Guo and Sun, 2004).

In Western countries, planning is not only a government management activity but also a socio-political process. Planning participation is a fundamental socio-political right of citizens. In 1969, Arnstein (1969) proposed the ladder of citizen participation theory, in which citizen participation was divided into three stages (i.e., nonparticipation, tokenism, and citizen power) and eight types of participation ladders (i.e., manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control) (Figure 6-39) .

Currently, the public participation in the overall planning remains in symbolic stages. In present planning systems, metropolitan planning is a high-level government planning for overall urban planning. The practice and relevant news are scarce regarding public participation in metropolitan planning. As relevant media commented, the NDRC-led Yangtze River Delta Regional Planning drew national attention since its activation in November 2004. However, core problems such as the organizational format, progress, and contents remain to be publicized (Zhu and Gao, 2011). For interprovincial metropolitan planning such as Yangtze River Delta Regional Planning, hearing the opinions of city government representatives, integrating, and coordinating the interests of different parties are crucial sources of legality in planning. However, during the Yangtze River Delta Regional Planning organization process, numerous prefecture-level cities were excluded from participation, needles to see the public. The public are far away from participation. It can be say the public participation in regional plans is weak. During the process of planning organisation, there has nothing about public participation but local city leaders' participation. The planning organisation unit held some work sessions with local officials of Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou. However, their voice may not be able to be heard. This plan reflected the will of the Jiangsu Provincial Government instead of the results of spontaneously reached collaboration and consensus between cities (Luo and Shen, 2005). The coordinated cities lacked sufficient information exchange and interaction.







Figure 6-39: A ladder of citizen participation

Source: Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Institute of planners*, 35(4), 216-224.

In October 2009, the author participated in organisation and investigation works for the Changsha–Zhuzhou–Xiangtan City Cluster Ecological Green Core Area Spatial Development Strategic Planning. The planning was organised by committee offices coordinated by comprehensive experimental area leaders from Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan in Hunan Province. The Ecological Green Core Area is located at the centre of the Changsha–Zhuzhou–Xiangtan City Cluster, involving 18 townships (e.g., counties and townships under the administration of Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan), and covering an area of 545 km². An investigation showed that during the entire planning organisation process, local governments at the township level are primarily in charge of receiving investigation and research work and providing relevant data. During the organisation process, township representatives did not engage in any consultation and high-level officials never heard their ideas and opinions. Clearly, the right of speech of local governments was deprived severely in this planning system.


In investigations on existing metropolitan planning management problems, 84% of the respondents considered that the lack of public participation in metropolitan planning is either *very serious* or *serious*.

With the rise of awareness of civil rights, the voices of public participation become more and more (Luo and Shen, 2005; Wang and Li, 2013). However, who needs to be involved in the public participations in the metropolitan planning management? There are different opinions. The metropolitan planning is involved multiple cities. Due to weak public participations



in the urban planning management, the common people hardly get a chance to participate in metropolitan planning making or implementation. To improve the quality and effect of metropolitan planning management, it not only needs the participation of government officials, it also needs a common collaboration of the experts and profession association.


Investigation results differentiated regarding the importance of public participation for different stages of metropolitan planning. Only 5% of the respondents considered public participation during the



organization stage of metropolitan planning *very important* or *important*. 16% of the respondents considered professional associations participating in formulating metropolitan planning are *very important* or *important*.


A total of 96% of the respondents considered the participation of experts and scholars in metropolitan planning organisational decision-making *very important* or *important*, and 90% of the respondents considered local government participation in metropolitan planning formulations *very important* or *important*.

Actually, most metropolitan areas planning made led by the superior government. However, from the author’s survey, most of the respondents hold that the superior government participating in metropolitan planning




formulations are *not very important* or *not important*. Only 32% of the respondents considered roles of the superior government in metropolitan planning formulations are *very important* or *important*.


Thus, most respondents considered the emphasis of public participation to be metropolitan planning implementation supervision instead of organisational decision-making. 88% of the respondents considered public participation during the




supervision stage of metropolitan planning *very important* or *important*. 90% of the respondents emphasised the local governments’ effects during the supervision stage of metropolitan planning.



Regarding the role of experts and professional associations in metropolitan planning implementation and supervision, 65% of the respondents considered experts participating in the supervision stage of metropolitan planning are *very important* or *important*. 70% of the respondents considered professional associations participating in the supervision stage of metropolitan planning are *very important* or *important*.



Same to responding in the formulation stage, only 39% of the respondents considered the superior governments participating in the supervision stage of metropolitan planning are *very important* or *important*.



Thus, what role is suitable for the superior government in the metropolitan planning management?

Regarding public participation in planning, the interviewees said that,

During the formulation process of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou Metropolitan Planning, the Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou representatives did not have

decision-making rights; these planning sessions merely present the intentions of the provincial government. (An official working in Suzhou Municipal Development and Reform Commission, 2013, personal communication, 18 May).

Observed from practical levels, public participation mostly involves expert opinions, hearings, and seminars during urban planning. The various appearances of topics easily showed the absence of public opinion in the crucial stages of urban planning. (A professor of Tongji University, 2013, personal communication, 23 May).

In numerous cities, the public can often only obtain censored and incomplete information. Public expression channels and supervision capacities are limited, and essential viewpoints and recommendations remain unexpressed. Public participation manifests passive and end participation; participation effects almost entirely depend on the value-orientations of the administrator who controls public management. In fact, the substantive participation rights of the public are lost. (A planner working in Nanjing Academy of Urban Planning and Design Co.,LTD, 2013, personal communication, 22 June).

6.4 Restricted cooperation between local governments

Metropolitan planning involves multiple local and city governments and relates to integrating regional resources, rearranging spaces, and coordinating and balancing the interests of various parties. Theoretically, metropolitan planning must be based on mutual benefits and an agreed upon *contract* after consultations with multiple parties. These contracts are then justified and possibly followed and executed by different parties. In the age of interest diversification, regardless of planning organization or implementation, metropolitan planning requires constructing, between local governments, not only a coordinated linkage planning mechanism but also a wider cooperative platform, to guide individuals toward group rationality, maintain, and enhance mutual benefits. In China, where regional integration mechanisms are strengthened progressively, numerous regions have established loose coordination organizations through local government promotions.

Using the Yangtze River Delta Megalopolis as an example, since 1990, Yangtze River Delta regional integration accelerated along with developments in Pudong, Shanghai. In this context, local governments began to promote spontaneously

regional cooperation. In 1992, based on a voluntary principle, 14 cities in the Yangtze River Delta formed an Urban Collaboration Directors Joint Committee. In pursuit of common interests and using the committee as a symbol, the Yangtze River Delta regional governments began to promote regional cooperation from the bottom up. In 1997, to further strengthen city cooperation, 15 city governments established the Yangtze River Delta Economic Coordination Association based on spontaneous participation and equal consultations. By the end of 2012, the Yangtze River Delta Economic Coordination Association had held 12 meetings; corresponding member cities had also signed a series of mutual collaborative agreements (Table 6-34).

Table 6-35: Previous Yangtze River Delta economic coordination association meetings and corresponding agendas

Time	Meeting location	Main topics and signed agreements
1992	—	15 member cities (including Shanghai) voluntarily established the Economic Coordination Joint Meeting System, which is the predecessor of the Yangtze River Delta Economic Coordination Association
April 28–30, 1997	Yangzhou	First meeting: Constructing a Highly Competitive Economic Community Signed the Yangtze River Delta Economic Coordination Association Memorandum
May 6–7, 1999	Hangzhou	Second meeting: Ecology, Culture, Economy Regional technological collaboration, state-owned enterprise reforms
April 26–28, 2001	Shaoxing	Third meeting: Jointly building a grand tourism circle Deepen thematic areas of collaboration such as tourism
August 15–16, 2003	Nanjing	Fourth meeting: World Exposition and Yangtze River Delta economic linkage development Accepted Taizhou (Zhejiang) as a member city; signed the Further Promoting Economic Collaboration and Development Agreement, Further Strengthening Economic Technological Exchange and Collaboration Agreement, and Yangtze River Delta Road Transportation Integration Joint Declaration
November 2, 2004	Shanghai	Fifth meeting: Complete Coordination Mechanism, Deepen Regional Collaboration Established the Urban Economic Coordinate Association Special Funds; Modified Urban Economic Coordinate Association Memorandum; and signed the Yangtze River Delta Regional City Collaboration Agreement and Jiangsu–Zhejiang–Shanghai Small and Medium Enterprises Collaboration and Development Agreement
November 22, 2005	Nantong	Sixth meeting: Promote Regional Logistics Integration, Enhance Yangtze River Delta Overall Competitiveness

		Signed the Yangtze River Delta Economic Coordination Association Memorandum Amendment and Yangtze River Delta Regional City Collaboration (Nantong) Agreement
November 24, 2006	Taizhou	Seventh meeting: Enhancing Regional Development Planning and Yangtze River Delta International Competitiveness Signed the Yangtze River Delta Regional City Collaboration (Taizhou) Agreement
December 11, 2007	Changzhou	Eighth meeting: Implementing Jiangsu–Zhejiang–Shanghai Main Leadership Forum Spirit and Propel Yangtze River Delta Coordination Development Signed the Yangtze River Delta Regional City Collaboration (Changzhou) Agreement
March 27, 2009	Huzhou	Ninth meeting: Jointly Responding to Financial Crisis and Promoting Yangtze River Delta City Collaborations Signed the Yangtze River Delta Regional City Collaboration (Huzhou) Agreement
March 26, 2010	Jiaxing	Tenth meeting: Promoting the Scientific Developments in Yangtze River Delta City Group Accepted six member cities including Hefei. Meetings renamed as Mayoral Joint Meetings of the Yangtze River Delta Economic Coordination Association Signed healthcare, finance, and exhibition collaboration agreements and the Yangtze River Delta Regional City Collaboration (Jiaxing) Agreement
March 31–April 1, 2011	Zhenjiang	Eleventh meeting: Yangtze River Delta City Collaboration in the Age of High-Speed Rail Signed nine special collaboration agreements including the Industrial Park Joint Building Collaboration and Agriculture Collaboration and the Yangtze River Delta Regional City Collaboration (Zhenjiang) Agreement
April 17–18, 2012	Taizhou (Zhejiang)	Twelfth meeting: Linking the Land and Sea, All-Win Developments: Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Developments Signed 10 (nine special collaboration) patent cooperation agreements
April 13–14, 2013	Hefei	Thirteenth meeting: Yangtze River Delta City Group Integration Development New Bonuses: Innovation, Green, Integration Signed the Yangtze River Delta City Collaboration (Hefei) Agreement and Yangtze River Delta Urban Environment Protection Collaboration (Hefei) Declaration

Source: Created by the author.

Based on urban economic coordination meetings in the Yangtze River Delta, Luo et al. (2007) summarised five types of idealised city collaboration arrangements: development-, promotion-, coordination-, resource-, and strategic-type agreements. They considered that three types of city collaborations exist in metropolitan areas in China: bureaucratic-, spontaneous-, and mixed-type collaborations (Tab 6-35).

Table 6-36: Typologies of partnership in thematic cooperation in the YRD region

Type	Development	Promotional	Coordination	Resource-based	Strategic
Mechanism	Spontaneous	Spontaneous	Hierarchical/hybrid	Spontaneous/hybrid	Hierarchical/spontaneous
Mobilization	Local	Local	Local or regional	Regional or local	Local and regional
Aims	Joint development for mutual benefit	Joint place marketing, joint promotion of growth and investment, image building	Improving service provision and accessibilities	Resource sharing (both human and natural resources)	Strengthening competitiveness and alleviating inter-city competition
Partners	Local authorities, private sectors, academic elites	Local authorities	NGOs-sponsored, authority-led (both city governments and provincial governments)	Authorities	Authorities
Actions	Joint agreement	Joint promotional brochures and promotional meetings	Joint agreement, infrastructure coordination, streamlining relevant policies, etc.	Joint agreement	Formulating broad strategies and cooperation intention
Examples	Tourism cooperation	Tourism promotion, promotion of investment	Transportation cooperation, infrastructure coordination	Education cooperation, human resource, port cooperation	Common market, standardizing policies of investment

Note: Local refers to cities within a province and regional refers to provinces and city under the administration of central government (Zhixiashi).

Source compiled from: (1) Luo, X., and Shen, J. (2009). A study on inter-city cooperation in the Yangtze river delta region, China. *Habitat International*, 33(1), 52-62. (2) Luo X.L. and Shen J.F. (2007). Models of Inter-city Cooperation and Its Theoretical Implications: An Empirical Study on the Yangtze River Delta. *Journal of Geographical Sciences*, 62(2):115-126.

The type of city collaboration determines the performance of collaborations (Luo and Shen, 2009). Bureaucratic city collaborations performed the worst, whereas small-scale mixed-type city collaborations have the best performance (Tab 6-36).

Table 6-37: Mechanism of inter-city cooperation and efficiency assessment

Items	Hierarchical partnership	Hybrid partnership	Spontaneous partnership
Mobilization	Higher-level government	Both higher-level government and its subordinate governments	Local government
Mechanism	State regulation	Both mutual interests & state regulation	Mutual interests (market-like mechanism)
Actors	Governments at higher levels as leader, subordinate governments, academic elites	Governments at different levels, other actors	Governments, NGOs, private sectors, academic elites, etc.
Role of higher-level government	Greatest	Great	Small
Efficiency	Less effective	Effective	Effective
Degree of cooperation	Not deep and close	Deep and close	Very deep and close
Case	Su-Xi-Chang Metropolitan Planning		The Yangtze River Delta Economic Coordination Association

Source compiled from: Luo, X., and Shen, J. (2009). A study on inter-city cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta region, China. *Habitat International*, 33(1), 52-62.

Presently, Yangtze River Delta Regional city collaborations, to a certain degree, represent the highest regional coordination standard in China. However, city collaborations in the Yangtze River Delta region remain far from ideal; constructions of coordination mechanisms remain far behind from regional socioeconomic development demands and thus elicited different criticisms. Critics indicated that the topics and contents of previous urban economic coordination meetings are highly repetitive, city collaboration progress is slow (Tao, 2006), and collaborations in environmental and land resource protection are insufficient (Song and Wu, 2010). Numerous institutional bottlenecks remain in Yangtze River Delta regional collaborations (Chu, 2011).

In view of the three major metropolitan planning formulated and envisioned by the Jiangsu Province government, the main problem is administrative constraints. Nanjing and Xuzhou metropolitan planning crossed provincial borders and included partial cities and counties of Anhui, Shangdong, Henan into the circle, thereby giving true connotations of economic regionalisation to the two metropolitans. However, in the statutory aspect, metropolitan planning levels are absent in China,

thus, the greatest challenge for the Nanjing and Xuzhou metropolitan areas is recognition and coordination from the three provinces. Current administrative systems cannot easily implement metropolitan planning, which should be backed by formulating laws and regulations. Formulating metropolitan planning laws and regulations and establishing central and interprovincial coordination mechanisms are imperative (He, 2003).


An investigation on problems existing in metropolitan planning managements showed that 94% of the respondents considered lacking of local coordination mechanisms are *very serious* or *serious*.

Regarding these issues, the interviewees said that,

Cross-boundary region metropolitan planning is difficult to implement. The key lies in the contradiction between administrative and economic planning; some very sharp questions completely separated designated administrative region officials when executing economic zoning functions. (An official working in Suzhou Municipal Development and Reform Commission, 2013, personal communication, 28 May).

Metropolitan planning involves industrial development, urban layout, function zoning, environmental protection, and infrastructure layout; these require not only in-depth collaboration between multiple government levels but also extensive cooperation between the government, social organisations, and private departments. Local government collaboration is a mere premise to metropolitan planning. Furthermore, collaborative standards between local governments remain far-fetched from metropolitan planning requirements. In China, the way of metropolitan planning from a “utopia” to practice remains long. (An official working in Suzhou Planning Bureau, 2013, personal communication, 8 June).

To break through the fortress constructed in interest gaining, deeper mechanistic barriers must be touched in addition to constructing a large-scale coordination mechanism. To realise regional integration, local governments must first eliminate the propagation of self-interests. To accomplish this,



financial and authority systems at the national level must be reformed. (A professor of Zhejiang University, 2013, personal communication, 19 June).

6.5 The institutional origin of problems in metropolitan planning management

Presently, various problems exist in metropolitan planning managements: undefined planning power and responsibility between government levels and departments, corrupt planning power, weak public participation, and underdeveloped lateral coordination mechanisms between local governments. What are the institutional factors leading to these problems? If the planning management system is viewed as a rule, then administrative management and political systems are rules determining the rule of the planning management system. The planning management system changes along with administrative management and political system evolutions. Numerous chronic problems existing in planning managements often reflect major flaws of the political system. In addition, present metropolitan planning management systems are struggling in a multitude of difficulties, which is essentially a metropolitan governance crisis. This crisis consists of irrationality in relationships between government levels and local governments and imbalance in national and societal relationships.

6.5.1 Overlapping responsibilities and undefined planning power

Undefined planning power and responsibility further cause the overlapping responsibilities among the vertical government departments. The term *overlapping responsibilities* refers to a highly unified and consistent configuration of lateral functions, duties, and agencies in different government levels. Overlapping responsibility is an overall characteristic in the relationship between vertical government departments in China as well as the main institutional cause of internal contradictions among government departments (Zhu and Zhou, 2005; Zhou, 2005).

Article 89 of the Constitution (2004) and Articles 59 and 61 of the Local Government Organisation Act provided principle regulations for authorities of the central government, local governments above county levels, and township governments. Especially in Articles 59 and 61 of the Local Government Organization Act, low-level governments must implement decisions and orders of high-level national administrative agencies and process other directives from high-

level governments (NPC, 2004). This specifies that high-level government duties cover low-level government duties; low-level governments must undertake all possible directives from high-level governments.

From centrally planned economy, lower-level government should follow the higher-level government's policy, central government make policy and allocate resources; local government is responsible for delivery of policy and apply necessary resources. The sectorial government system is for policy and resources allocation and delivery. The departments of local governments were characterized by sectoral dominance or sectoral separation (Yu, 2014, p97). These departments are not only responsible to their governments but also responsible to their higher hierarchical sectoral departments. These characteristics have created great uncertainties and inefficiencies in policy delivery. There are overlapped responsibilities among the vertical government departments. The contradictions and overlapping responsibilities between different government organizations may create problems in regional development policies (Yu, 2014, p136).

This bureaucratic system, which is not based on the division of duties, is essentially different from the bureaucratic systems of advanced Western countries. Critics indicated that current laws lack clear division over the duties of different government levels. Except for foreign affairs and defence, which belong to central government authorities, local government authorities are almost entirely extensions of central government authorities (Song, 2007). Local governments are almost entirely reprints of the central government; each level of the local government is a miniature version of the central government (Liu, 2007). The consequence of this system is overlapping government authorities, which lack independence; levels of governments can interchangeably override each other's respective authorities (Zhu and Zhang, 2005).

Between governmental departments, function overlaps and crossovers caused by unclear authority divisions are also extremely frequent. In April 2009, the Wuhan municipal government investigated the functions of 56 departments and discovered 46 overlapping duties (He, 2013). In the recent Super-Ministry System Reform, emphasis was placed on resolving departmental function overlaps (Gong et al., 2008). In March 2013, former NDRC director Kai Ma indicated that the purpose of the Super-Ministry System Reform is to progressively solve a series of problems

including overriding and missing government functions, crossing duties, detaching responsibilities, competing for power, evading responsibilities, and reconfiguring redundant agencies (Ma, 2013). In the emergence of sectionalism from recent administrative examination and approval reform, the Director of the Legislative Affairs Office of Guangzhou Municipal Government Ming-Chang Wu stated that “the mentality that ‘responsibilities belong to others, power belongs to me’ is typical of departmental power struggle” (Li, 2013). In the institutional environment where government functions and departments overlap, the objective reality is that different government levels and respective departments struggle for power and evade responsibilities because of self-interests. This is also the root causes of the struggles for metropolitan planning power and responsibility engaged by the departments of development and reform, homeland, and planning construction.

Overlapping responsibilities between government levels and overlapping departmental functions are the sources of undefined systems. Since the economic reform, despite administrative decentralization changing vertical government relationships to a certain degree, fundamental changes to centralized power never occurred; fundamental changes in overlapping responsibilities between high- and low-level governments never occurred. Marketization reform in China is actually an ongoing adjustment process in the relationships between central and local power and interests. However, to a large extent, these adjustments have long been spontaneously influenced by people, events, and timing and lack defined legal bases and rules of procedure. The central and local governments have always been in the state of repeated gaming on the problem of centralization and decentralization and are highly arbitrary and uncertain. Central governments are highly arbitrary in adjusting authorities of local governments; decentralized power can always be withdrawn (Xue, 2005). Consequently, authority divisions can never be clarified between central and local governments and achieve stability and sustainability. This is similar in planning domains; decentralization and centralization are highly arbitrary; the optimal example is the planning decentralization in the 1980s followed by moderate planning centralization in 2004.


From the author’s survey, when mentioned about reasons for planning conflict between the superior and the subordinate governments, 77% of the respondents

considered as for lacking of local coordination mechanisms between the superior and the subordinate governments.

When mentioned about reasons for planning conflict between departments of governments, 87% of the respondents considered lack of local coordination mechanisms between departments of governments are the reason of planning conflict between departments of governments.

Only a few respondents hold that hasty time, quality and level for planning formulation are the reasons for planning conflict between the superior and the subordinate governments, and between different departments.

Attitude to reasons for planning conflict between the superior and the subordinate governments




As the author interviews, the interviewees said that,

Departments having controlled regional developmental functions are comparatively dispersed throughout China. Functional work division is unclear and the controlled directions of departmental policies vary; thus, regional management effects are often limited. (An official working in the new District Branch of Wuxi Planning Bureau, 2013, personal communication, 22 May).

Currently, these decentralised management models consist of two apparent flaws. First, different departments have different interests and goals; contradictions are common when departments implement their policies. Second, decentralised management cannot effectively prevent repetitions in relevant projects and policies, thereby wasting public resources. (An official working in Nanjing Planning Bureau, 2013, personal communication, 15 June).

Attitude to reasons for planning conflict between different departments



6.5.2 Power balances and power corruption in planning management

Based on the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, which is a nongovernment organization that monitors corruption behaviors in countries worldwide, China ranked 80th in 2012 and belonged among countries with severely corrupt governments (Saisana and Saltelli, 2012). In China, corruption activities are not limited to planning but also widespread in the entire public authority departments. Corruption can be found in different social and institutional environments. Centralized power without constraints is the root cause of power corruption. The Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Jinhua Li, indicated in November 2012 that corruption is ultimately a system-related problem. When power is over centralized without checks and balances, the sole reliance on moralizing leaders can hardly contain the spread of corruption (Li, 2012).

Weak checks and balances is one of the crucial reasons for ineffective power constraints. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches in China do not follow

the tries political principle of advanced Western countries. The rights to the three branches are unified under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Decentralization and checks and balances relationships do not exist between different powers; everything is led by the CPC (Yu, 2008). In legal principles, different levels of the National People's Congress (NPC) and their corresponding Standing Committee are legislative agencies. Agencies of the highest power monitor each government level and court. However, in reality, severe flaws exist in the NPC. For example, NPC representatives are not truly elected but CPC-appointed (Yu, 2008). The NPC lacks special supervision agencies and cannot monitor individual duties.

A weak constraint of power from the society is another crucial reason for ineffective power constraints. Democratic elections have not yet been implemented in China; the government and public do not form contractual relationships. Local government officials are appointed by the central and other high-level governments and are not produced from elections. The public are mere nominal state sovereigns. Based on actual political logics, authorities are strictly limited to responsibilities appointed by the actual source powers and disdain the abstract popular sovereignty. Between local governments and citizens within their corresponding jurisdictions, nominally or substantively, true contract relationships and their corresponding responsibilities do not exist (Liu, 2007). When officials are appointed, the society does not have the methods and means to monitor powers despite strong intentions.

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Acton, 1948: 364). In top-down official appointed systems, the supervision of low-level officials by high-level officials is one-to-many in nature; thus, effective information cannot be obtained and true constraints cannot be realized through this type of supervision system. Authoritarian regimes free most official behaviors from social constraints and ineffective constraints on official powers are the root causes of corrupt powers, which include planning power and responsibility. Since the 1990s, a series of system reform strongly encouraged capital powers and national power alliances. Capital and national powers were supposed to mutually check and balance, but they not only failed to fill their corresponding positions through mutual constraints but also resulted in severe political corruptions through money trading (Tang, 2008). Unconstrained powers and capitals free from checks and balances form two major

sources of pressing forces in Chinese society (Wang and Li, 2013). As a critic stated, political systems without decentralized checks and balances are backward political systems and direct causes of corruption (Pan, 2008).

In the field of planning, planning power without checks and balances the accountability to the society inevitably leads to severe corruption. In urban development, main decisions are usually made by mayors rather than by people's representatives (Zhang, 2002). Especially in the metropolitan planning management, the lower-level governments and few people can involve in the system. In the metropolitan planning formulation, some decisions are usually made by the director of top government without the participation of other cities or towns. This top-down decision process is easy to cause the power abuse and corruption. The results of which is the other interest body has no initiative to the implementation. Just as it mentioned before, without the participation of main cities, the metropolitan planning of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou could not work well. There are no more laws or regulations in the metropolitan planning implementation. Few power restriction and more discretionary power, it easy to cause the power corruption. Many corruption cases have been reported by international Medias. The practice gives reference to the innovation of regional governance. It needs to improve the socialization of planning management.


Based on the investigation of the importance of reform measures in the metropolitan planning management system, respondents largely considered that the “openness of government planning management information” and “public participation in the supervision of planning implementations” is more crucial than “expanded vertical planning managements by the central government.”

A total of 90% of the respondents considered that information openness in government planning managements is either very important or important. 76% of the respondents considered that public participation in the supervision of planning implementations is either very important or important.

If “openness in government planning managements” and “public participation in the surveillance of planning implementations” are considered supervision of power by the society, and “expanded vertical planning managements by the central government” are a form of top-down management within the government system,

then results indicate that the respondents highly expect strengthening constraints on powers through supervision by the society.

Attitude to reasons for corruption in planning management



Regarding these issues, the interviewees said that,

To prevent planning entirely willed by high-level officials, rigid constraints should be maintained at a high level from system constructions. Once planning has been confirmed, whoever implements changes must undertake legal responsibilities in which especially high-level officials that make decisions outside their jurisdictions must be severely punished. (A professor of Zhejiang University, 2013, personal communication, 17 May).

Based on the present system, urban and rural planning belongs to government authorities. Thus, the phenomenon of one term of a leader, one set of plans, one batch of construction is actually an abuse of government executive behaviours. Thus, the abuse of executive powers must be overcome to fundamentally solve the problem of planning corruption. (A professor of Southeast University, 2013, personal communication, 23 May).

Planning organisation and implementation functions are primarily concentrated in municipal governments. The currently active Urban and Rural Planning Act remains largely principle-based regarding misconduct punishments and has poor operability; involvements in economic crimes generally do not constitute legal responsibilities. This legal system provided considerable freedom for decision-making in planning. (An official working in the Policy Research Office of the Suzhou Municipal Government, 2013, personal communication, 22 May).

Similar to undefined governing duties, a system for seeking responsibilities must be established to control planning chaos. Once problems arise during planning, the organiser, examiner, and approver must assume responsibility to minimize the chances of arbitrary planning by local officials. (A professor of Suzhou University of Science and Technology, 2013, personal communication, 3 June).

6.5.3 The strong administrative system and weak social participation

From a historical perspective, an authoritarian centralized system was established in China in 221 B.C. during the Qin Empire, and this regime remained for more than 2,200 years. After a new regime was established jointly by the CPC in 1949, the centralized system succeeded. The Economist's Democracy Index from the United Kingdom evaluated the democratic qualities of 167 countries. Based on the magnitude of democratic indices, all countries were divided into nations of full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes. In 2012, China ranked 142nd out of 167 countries and resembled a typical authoritarian regime or dictatorship regime (Index, D., 2012). Under this regime, the tyranny of the minority exists instead of that of the majority.

The level of public participation is closely related to national democracy. Essentially, public participation problems cannot be solved by the planning management system itself but is ultimately a problem related to political participation and people's rights. Article 35 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China specifies that "citizens of the People's Republic of China have the freedom to speak, publish, form assemblies and associations, and demonstrate." However, these basic civil rights protected by the constitution were seldom be exercised. For example, in the 2013 Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders, the news media freedom of China was ranked 173rd out of 179

countries and regions (Freedom House, 2013). The existing so-called “public opinion” can all be delusions elaborately imposed by the officials. Given that rights related to access to information and freedom of speech are not protected in China, public political participation is not feasible.

Urban construction involves interest adjustments for different profit entities such as developers, residents, and governments and is a complex process involving different interactions; the interests of residents, developers, and governments should be considered and different participation system arrangements should be established and perfected. Urban planning can be based neither on maximizing government benefits nor blindly favoring developers but must seek balanced joint developments in diverse interest demands. However, in the practice of urban planning, numerous urban residents often can only obtain filtered and processed incomplete information; channels for expression and capacities for supervision by the public are limited. Crucial viewpoints and suggestions from the public do not have the opportunities to be truly expressed. Public participation is only manifested as passive and end participation; participation effects are almost entirely determined by the value-orientation of administrators who control public management. In fact, the public loses substantive participation rights because of different reasons.

Compared with previous laws and regulations such as the Urban Planning Act, the Urban and Rural Planning Act in 2007 reflected considerable progress in public participation system construction. However, considerable segments during formulating and implementing urban and rural planning lacked specifications on public participation; the conversion from public participation opinions to bases for decision-making processes also lacked detailed operable specifications (The national urban planning practice management committee, 2011). The rules for programmed formulations are keys to develop effectively public participation and priorities for current public participation system construction (Wang and Li, 2010; Sun and Zhu, 2010).

Regarding these issues, the interviewees said that,

In recent years, public decision-making and public participation in China have increased. However, public participation in urban planning still remains in minority participation. The technicality of planning was deliberately magnified. It obstructed channels for expressing public interests. To some extent, the

democracy of planning is largely ignored. (A professor of Tongji University, 2013, personal communication, 23 May).

It is difficult to promote public participation in planning. The depth of public participation in planning is closely related to the democratisation of China. Without political reform, democratised planning is among the most unattainable reform. (A professor of Southeast University, 2013, personal communication, 12 June).

The formulation of urban planning must follow openness and transparency principles, respect civilian opinions, consider the recommendations of different field experts, and implement public notices and hearing systems for urban planning and adjustments to give the public, who are the inhabitants of cities, the right to know, participate, and supervise. (A professor of Nanjing University, 2013, personal communication, 12 June).

The advancement of public participation in urban planning relies on elevating the public's enthusiasm and capacity for effective expression. The enhancement of public participation capacities is determined by multiple factors, which includes the elevation of public democratic and legal awareness and sense of responsibility. In China, establishing this awareness requires an objectively long process. (A planner working in Jiangsu Institute of Urban Planning and Design, 2013, personal communication, 26 June).

6.5.4 Flawed coordination mechanisms and limited local unity

Under active executive zoning management systems in China, executive unaffiliated urban areas are severely disjointed. Based on local interest considerations, intense non-cooperative gaming between different municipal governments exist. Coordination mechanisms are lacking in cross-executive region metropolitan collaborations on the national level, severely obstructing lateral collaboration relationships between municipal governments. This is contributed by three reasons from empirical practice in numerous regions. First, regional integration and developments and public managements lack the guidance of national-level policies and incentive mechanisms. Second, regional collaboration mechanisms consist of more executable items than systemized arrangements. Third, legal bases for coordinated regional development have not yet been developed.

China currently lacks legal and regulatory bases directed at coordinated regional developments in regional management. In the constitution or local organization laws, specific guidelines regarding government collaborations are nonexistent.

Furthermore, concerns regarding the establishment, rights, and responsibilities of relevant mechanisms involving local governments in collaborations were never mentioned (Liu, 2007). Consequently, policy adjustments and functional regulations by the government lacked legal bases; basic supports were missing in primary government functions such as formulating strategies, planning, policymaking, coordinating, and regulating regional economies. In addition, this causes the lack of the most fundamental bases for domestic regional management system arrangements and government basic functions during the reform of government agencies. Moreover, regional collaboration and mutual assistance mechanisms are mostly stagnated at the policy level.

Just as Vogel et al. (2010) referred that region building is achieved through both top-down and bottom-up processes, but the central government lacks full commitment towards a region; and local governance lacks a participatory political legitimization process. The city region as an ‘imagined community’ but continues to see conflicting and diverse interests.

It is difficult to promote public participation in planning. The depth of public participation in planning is closely related to the democratisation of China. Without political reform, democratised planning is among the most unattainable reform.

Solving regional collaboration difficulties require different parties to establish mutually beneficial and all-win development ideas based on overall interests. In addition, high-level coordination mechanisms should be established to feasibly solve specific problems during collaboration processes. (A professor of Tongji University, 2013, personal communication, 23 May).

Presently, there are lack of communication channels between collaborating local governments and coordination mechanisms. Consensus between governments is mostly backed by local leaders and thus lacks legal effects and stability. Thus, collaboration mechanisms become ineffective once local leaders change positions. (A professor of Nanjing University, 2013, personal communication, 12 June).

6.6 Concluding remarks

Undefined planning power and responsibility between government levels and departments, planning power alienation, weak public participation in planning, and the lack of local government planning coordination mechanisms are the primary

problems in the present metropolitan planning management and corresponding systems. Under executable decentralization, overlapping responsibilities between high- and low-level governments, and departmental duty overlaps are the overall institutional causes leading to undefined planning power and responsibility. Insufficient marketised and socialized decentralizations led to excessive and centralized government power, which are the overall institutional causes for power rent-seeking and corrupted planning. On the national level, flaws in regional coordination mechanisms are crucial reasons suppressing local collaborations. Through the analyses in this chapter, four crucial conclusions are deduced.

6.6.1 The lack of a modern bureaucratic system is the primary characteristic of metropolitan planning management systems.

A modern bureaucratic system is based on rational and functional work divisions and a political system using the legal system as a code of conduct. Problems such as chaotic metropolitan planning management agencies, undefined government level and departmental planning duties, and severe planning corruption all explained the lack of internal modern bureaucratic spirit in metropolitan planning managements (i.e., rationality, rule of law, and contractual spirits). The status of metropolitan planning managements and political systems in China are not only consistent but also coincide with the transformation process from traditional to modern Chinese society. The common point is the lack of a modern bureaucratic system.

6.6.2 The lack of a systematic supply is currently the biggest problem in metropolitan governance.

Regional coordination is essentially the coordination of interests. Promoting the implementation of city group planning and healthy development of city groups require the formation of a multiparty governance structure. This structure provides a platform constructed of interactive exchange, demand, and interest consultations from interest negotiation, exchange, and conflict, toward the eventual integration between different levels of local governments. This first requires constructing a government collaborative governance mechanism and developing a corresponding external institutional environment. Regardless of metropolitan planning implementation or cross-regional governance, the government plays the role of meta-

governance. Thus, metropolitan planning management, executive, and political system reforms are inseparable.

6.6.3 Numerous dilemmas in metropolitan planning management essentially indicate a governance crisis.

This is a crisis caused by internal government contradictions, government–market relationship irrationalities, and state–societal relationship imbalance, in which the government is situated in the centre of the crisis. If use one sentence to describe this crisis, it most appropriate to use the First Inaugural Address of Ronald Reagan in 20 January 1981: “In this present crisis government is not the solution to our problem whilst government is the problem” (Reagan, 1981).

6.6.4 Rationalized relationships are the essence of metropolitan planning management system reform

In China, the metropolitan planning management system involves different relationships. The essence of its reform is the rationalized adjustment of two relationships. One is the internal relationships within governments (see Figure 6-40), which involves the relationship between superior and subordinate governments at different levels, the relationship within local governments in the same level, and also the relationship among different departments of the same government. Other is relationships among the government, market and society (see Figure 6-41). The focus of the metropolitan governance and planning management system reform is the allocation of power and responsibility among different interest groups.




Figure 6-40: The internal relationships within governments

Source: Created by the author.




Figure 6-41: The external relationships outside governments

Source: Created by the author.

Chapter 7

7.0 Prospects for the Future: Recommendations for Metropolitan Planning Management System Reform

Regarding system transition, goals determine directions and beginnings determine paths. Paths leading to the same goal can be diverse. Planning management system reform not only revolutionises the management and governance in the planning field, but also thoroughly adjusts the relationships between governments and markets, governments and society. Because of the relationships among metropolitan planning management (MP&M) systems involving political system reform and governance transitions, it needs the discussion of the problems that can be encountered in the MP&M system reform according to the macroscopic background of governance transitions in China.

The severe problems faced by metropolitan planning management reflect a metropolitan governance crisis. This chapter discusses the following topics: 1) addressing the governance crisis in MP&M field, 2) determining the overall direction of MP&M system reform; and 3) developing the MP&M system reform to good governance. It comprises of four sections:

Section 1 analyses the overall direction of the MP&M system reform in China. MP&M system reform is fundamentally a system transition. The goal of reform regulates the overall system transition direction. According to the relationship between MP&M system and administrative management system and governance, MP&M system reform is discussed in the overall administrative context. Based on the governance content and transition background in China, it explores the overall direction of MP&M system reform.

Section 2 examines the starting point of MP&M system reform, which determines the system transition path. Although the metropolitan governance goals may share commonality in numerous aspects between China and Western countries, the paths to governance reform can differ considerably because of different beginnings.

Section 3 offers political suggestions for MP&M system reform based on the overall directions of MP governance transition and prominent problems encountered in MP&M.

Finally, Section 4 proposes supporting and coordinated reforms for MP&M systems.

7.1 Overall reform direction of the metropolitan planning management system

7.1.1 Pursuit of good governance

Generally, good governance denotes the process of maximizing social public welfare through the cooperative management and partnership between governmental and civil organisations and between public and private sectors (Yu, 2008). In 1997, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established five principles for good governance (Table 7-37) that were cited widely and included universal values, such as freedom and democracy (Graham, Amos and Plumptre, 2003).

Yu (2008) indicated that good governance is critical to the future of China and the most vital source of political legitimacy in the twenty-first century. For forward-looking Chinese leaders, the goals of governance reform are specific, including democracy, rule of law, justice, responsibility, transparency, integrity, efficiency, and harmony (Yu, 2008: 22).

The essence of good governance is gaining universal value, which, in philosophy, refers to a finite set of concepts recognised by all people (Yu, 2008; Rhodes, 1996). Whenever universal value is mentioned, freedom, democracy, and rule of law are implied. Overall, formulating and implementing universal value is the outcome of human natural order, and is the optimal solution arrived at repeated trial-and-error processes in human history (Leftwich, 1993).

Table 7-38: Five principles of good governance

Good Governance Principles	The UNDP Principles and related UNDP text on which they are based
1. Legitimacy and Voice	<p>Participation – all men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their intention.</p> <p>Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.</p> <p>Consensus orientation – good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.</p>
2. Direction	<p>Strategic vision – leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded.</p>
3. Performance	<p>Responsiveness – institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders.</p> <p>Effectiveness and efficiency – processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources.</p>
4. Accountability	<p>Accountability – decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organizations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on the organizations and whether the decision is internal or external.</p> <p>Transparency – transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.</p>
5. Fairness	<p>Equity – all men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their wellbeing.</p> <p>Rule of Law – legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights.</p>

Source: Graham, J., Amos, B., and Plumptre, T. (2003). Principles for good governance in the 21st century. *Policy brief, 15*, 1-6.

7.1.2 Intention of political reform in China

It has been discussed in the previous section - the relationship between the planning management system and the administrative system in China. It indicated that planning management system transition is directly controlled by administrative management system and political system reform. Political system reform, including the administrative management system, is a critical prerequisite of planning management system transition. It also provides a possible reform direction for the planning management system. Although it requires more time to move China into a modernised country, the governance transition path in China since 1978 has been clear. Yu (2008) indicated that the tendencies of governance transition over the recent three decades in China comprise changes from centralisation to decentralisation, rule of man to rule of law, command and control-oriented

government to service-oriented government, and intraparty democracy to social democracy. The following section analyses the political reform intention of the Chinese central government based on a report by the Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress, and organized State Government Work Report (SGWR) regarding political system reform issues.

7.1.2.1 Report statement regarding political reform by the Communist Party of China National Congress

Held every 5 years, the CPC National Congress is the most crucial political congress in China. Typically, each congress establishes the future national reform and development directions for the next 5–10 years. The goals of previous congressional assemblies were as follows.

The 16th CPC National Congress: Increase civil rights when participating in politics, insist on equality before the law, promote scientific and democratic decision-making, and enhance the restriction and monitoring of power. Jiang Zemin's report at 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (On November 8, 2002)

The 17th CPC National Congress: Protect the right of people to know, participate, express, and supervise. Establish basic strategies for legal governance of the nation to expedite constructing a socialist nation with legal governance. Expedite administrative management system reform and establish a service-oriented government. Complete the power restriction and supervision system. Hu Jintao's report at 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (On October 15, 2007)

The 18th CPC National Congress: Further promote stable political system reform. Complement socialist negotiation and a democratic system. Comprehensively promote legal governance of the nation. Establish wholesome restriction and supervision systems of power operation. Hu Jintao's report at 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (On November 8, 2012)

7.1.2.2 The State Government Work Report statement regarding political reform

Annually, on March 5, the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China reports government work content, primarily including the

arrangement of annual work goals and foci of the central government. Previous goals were showed in Table 7-38.

Table 7-39: Regarding on political reform in the state government work reports (2000-2013)

Year	Political reform emphasis
2000	Enhance integrity construction and anticorruption campaign to curb lavish waste by the government.(Zhu Rongji,2000.3.05)
2001	Strengthen state-owned enterprise reform and develop socialist democratic politics and rule of law (Zhu Rongji,2001.3.05).
2002	Expedite governmental function transition and enhance developing anticorruption campaign (Zhu Rongji,2002.3.05).
2003	Further governmental function transition and endeavour to construct a highly efficient and practical government that possesses integrity and diligence (Zhu Rongji,2003.3.05).
2004	Promote governmental function transition, rule of law, and democratic decision making (Wen Jiabao,2004.3.05).
2005	Build a service-oriented government (Wen Jiabao,2005.3.05).
2006	Establish democratic politics (Wen Jiabao,2006.3.05).
2007	Build a government that conforms to a code of conduct; operates with justice, transparency, diligence, high efficiency, righteousness, and integrity; and fulfils people's expectations (Wen Jiabao,2007.3.05).
2008	Promote government affairs publicity and enhance the anticorruption campaign(Wen Jiabao,2008.3.05).
2009	Promote rule of law, democratic decision making, and anticorruption(Wen Jiabao,2009.3.05).
2010	Endeavour to construct a service-oriented government that fulfils people's expectations(Wen Jiabao,2010.3.05).
2011	Enhance integrity construction and the anticorruption campaign(Wen Jiabao,2011.3.05).
2012	Propose that reform must strengthen the relationship between the government and the market, between the central government and all levels of local governments, and between the government and civil and social organisations(Wen Jiabao,2012.3.05).
2013	Continue upholding rule of law, complete the power restriction and supervision system, and construct institutional power balance mechanisms(Wen Jiabao,2013.3.05).

Source: The state government work report, 2000-2013.

According to the political reform intentions of the CPC and the Chinese central government which begun in 2000, political reform has been established on the concepts of limited government, service-oriented government, and responsible government. The Chinese government has attempted to promote the transition from a despotic regime to a democratic administration by gradually adjusting the relationship among the government, market, and society. In the 18th CPC National Congress, universal values, such as freedom, equality, democracy, and rule of law,

were written into the CPC National Congress report for the first time, indicating that the CPC has selected a path of market economy based on democracy and rule of law.

In addition, the Chinese political reform process has been restricted by progressive reform. According to Zhou Ruijin (2011), the former associate editor of *People's Daily*, which is the most influential newspaper of the CPC, reform in China can be divided into three stages (Table 7-39). According to the frame of progressive reform, the political reform in China is an extended process that cannot be completed quickly.

Table 7-40: Reform progress in China since 1978

Stage	Period	Focus of reform
1	1978–2008	Focus on economic system reform, including political and social system reforms
2	2009–2025	Focus on social system reform, including political system reform promotion.
3	2026–2050	Focus on political system reform, including further improvement and development of economic and social systems.

Source: Zhou R.J. (2011) “Xin Hai hundred years: on the reform roadmap of China seeing from the view of world evolution”, *Spring and Autumn Annals*,9, 1-11.

7.1.3 General reform goal of metropolitan planning management system

Governance and governance transition generally regulate the direction and available paths for MP&M system transition. Planning is a fundamental function of government, and planning management is a crucial component in administrative management. If limited government, responsible government, service-oriented government, and a democratic administration are regarded as the goal of Chinese governance reform, then the overall planning management system administrators, including MP system administrators, should respond actively to the governance goals. Planning management and administrative management systems should be employed simultaneously to transform of the power operating model and management methods actively. It will promote the planning management transition from control to governance based on the goal of implementing good governance.

The ultimate goal of using MP as a tool for metropolitan governance is to pursue good governance. MP&M system innovation must also be considered based on the good governance goals, such as freedom, democracy, and rule of law. Regarding the current situation of Chinese MP&M, the core of reform is to promote MP&M based on rule of law, democracy, and science.

Firstly, it should reconstruct planning legitimacy. Promoting MP&M legislative construction, implementing relevant technological regulations, and regulating planning management operation provides a legal basis for planning management. Moreover, planning legitimacy relies on governmental authority and requires the recognition of multiple stakeholders and extensive public participation.

Secondly, it should reconstruct planning power structure. Planning management should be publicised gradually and transparently to terminate closed-end management; this requires ending the governmental monopoly over planning, establishing balance mechanisms that prevent power alienation, and developing wholesome power restriction and supervision systems to form effective planning power supervision and restriction. Reconstructing planning power is not limited within the government (among hierarchical governmental levels, among governmental sectors, and among local governments); reconstruction of planning power structures exists between the government and society.

Thirdly, it should extend regional cooperative mechanisms. Unlike the administration of an urban planning management administrative region, MP tends to involve multiple administrative regions. Confronted with emerging regional public management problems, MP&M should be transformed from administrative region management to regional public management or cross-regional cooperative governance. To achieve such a transition, a series of coordinating reform measures, such as governmental cooperative mechanisms, regional coordination mechanisms, and regional policy systems, should be adopted, promoting the reform of MP&M.

7.2 The starting point of metropolitan planning management system reform

The beginning of system transition determines the path. In addition to the direct effect political systems exert on planning management system transition, the development of history, tradition, culture, and civil society influences the beginning of system transitions, thereby constraining the transition of planning management systems. Analysing these “soft constraints” can facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the past, present, and future of the MP&M system.

7.2.1. Insufficiency of modern bureaucracy

Modern bureaucracy is a political organisation system based on rule of law in which division of work and a power hierarchy are formed according to functions and

positions of the officials. The division of central and local government authorities is a fundamental systematic arrangement established in the constitution of many Western countries. The levels of administrative system are built following the modern bureaucratic regulatory, its organizational structure, power system, and functions are designed following the bureaucratic organisational characteristics, from the central government to the local townships with the least amount of authority in China. However, the Chinese political organisational system merely resembles the form, not the essence, of an authentic rational bureaucracy (Liu and Zhou, 2008).

(1) Modern bureaucracy is a typical type of rational–legal authority. Administrative power is operated according to legal authority, emphasising law-based administration. China had featured a rule of man tradition for more than 2000 years. Establishing a democratic nation with rule of law is a long process, in which rule of man exerts more critical and continual effects on many public governance activities than does rule of law (Yu, 2008). In contemporary Chinese society, the notions of rank consciousness and supremacy of power are prevalent. Autocratic power is the most prominent characteristic in contemporary Chinese society, and in the planning management field, strong ideology regarding administrative officials exists. Administration lacking rule of law is the exhibition of non-standardised power operation.

(2) Modern bureaucracy is a political organizational system based on the principle of functional division (governmental hierarchical division and department specialisation). However, in the centralised Chinese government, governmental hierarchy lacks specific division of legal work, and the boundary between governmental sector responsibilities is obscure, creating an overlapping management phenomenon. The planning responsibilities of developmental and reform departments, construction departments, and national land departments lack definite boundaries. The uncertainty of the MP&M mechanism leads to chaotic planning management and results in inefficient MP implementation.

(3) The underdevelopment of Chinese bureaucracy is exhibited prominently in the insufficient balance of power. Despite the robust cultural inheritance of corruption in Chinese history, the fundamental problem lies in the lack of critical systems that supervise and restrict power effectively. Such deficiency causes laws and regulations to be overlooked during implementation. In recent years, numerous

power corruption cases have occurred in planning compilation and implementation management fields because of the administrative monopoly in planning management. Another cause for this corruption is that power has not been effectively supervised and restricted.

According to Wang (2002), “Because of traditional inertia and other historical reasons, Chinese administration is generally at the stage of inadequate bureaucratisation. Thus, the most crucial mission is to construct modern bureaucracy within suitable scopes”. The emphasis of Chinese governance reform is to end despotism and build modern bureaucracy. The analysis of results for the MP&M problems indicated that regardless of the blurred planning responsibility boundary between governmental hierarchies and governmental departments or planning power alienation, the major problem of the MP&M system is the lack of modern bureaucracy. Thus, constructing modern bureaucracy is crucial to beginning the MP&M system transition.

7.2.2 Underdeveloped civil society

The primary characteristic of the inadequate modern bureaucracy in China is that public authority (power) is not restricted effectively (Sun, 2012). Power without restriction and capital without checks and balances are two major restricting forces existing in contemporary Chinese society (Liu, 2009), primarily resulting from the substantially underdeveloped civil society. Deng (2008) indicated that a self-organized civil society conforming to pluralism and independent of the nation is an indispensable prerequisite for democracy. The restriction and supervision of power relies on the checks and balances of power, and on supervision and restriction stemming from civil society. Since the Chinese economic reform, civil organizations as the main body of civil society have experienced considerable changes and have been given opportunities for survival and development. However, compared with civil organizations in Western countries, the civil organizations in China are substantially less independent. Yu (2008) indicated that civil society in China is typically government-dominated and is a transitional organisation from governmental to nongovernmental organisations. Restricted by despotic traditions and ideology, the overall development of current nongovernmental organisations has been marked by a series of institutional and legitimacy difficulties.

Civil society is a necessary condition for good governance. Dahrendorf (1988:41–45) emphasized that without civil society, freedom, democracy, rule of law cannot be guaranteed. In China, prominence of good governance represents the return of national power to society.

Planning management system reform is the planning management process directed towards good governance and the comprehensive adjustment of the relationship between nation and society. This process is operate able and has practical meanings only according to progressive political regime reform frames. For example, theoretically, the legitimacy of planning needs extensive public participation. However, in reality, planning public participation related to the developmental level of democracy, is closely connected with public participation awareness and aspirations. The purpose of MP is to promote local cooperation, and local governments are the leading forces behind promoting local cooperation, preventing the public from being involved in MP. In addition, MP involves large-scale spatial planning, performed for public good. Participating in MP preparation and decision-making requires professional knowledge, which most citizens' lack.

Based on the rooted despotic culture and tradition, as well as the current civil society development in China, the government must establish relevant comprehensive regulations to guide public participation gradually and systematically. The MP&M system reform in China should be performed while emphasising on the tangible social system and environment. Over-idealisation is unfeasible.

7.3 The orientation of metropolitan planning management system reform

In general, good governance regulates the goal of metropolitan planning management (MP&M) system reform. The current situation of the nation and society, and the relation between these two entities in China regulates the practically operable paths available in MP&M system reform.

7.3.1 Outline and tasks of the metropolitan planning management system reform

Primary problems in Chinese MP&M had caused by the defects in the Chinese political regime (see Chapter 6). Based on this context, MP&M system reform in China essentially requires promotion through administrative management system reform and political reform. MP&M system reform dissociated from administrative and political systems is unimaginable, and achieving substantial breakthroughs is


impossible. Moreover, MP&M system reform is a complex system of engineering, extensively involving the adjustment of the relationship among governmental hierarchical levels, among governmental departments, and between the government and society.

According to research aim of this study, the author gave some reform measures in questionnaire to observe the attitude of various respondents on the metropolitan planning management reform. The investigation results showed that most respondents considered constructing cooperative mechanism as the key factor for improving the metropolitan planning management.

From the author's survey, 94% of the respondents considered improving the planning cooperative mechanism between local governments *as, are very important or important*. 93% of the respondents considered perfecting the open system for government information about planning *are very important or important*. 89% of the respondents considered strengthening the planning coordination between departments *are very important or important*. 82% of the respondents considered encouraging social groups and citizens to participate in the planning implementation and supervision *are very important or important*.

Only 5% of the respondents considered promoting public participation in planning decision *are very important or important* to improve the metropolitan planning management. 19% of the respondents considered strengthening the planning power centralization and line management and 40% of the respondents considered establishing the law and regulation systems for metropolitan planning *are very important or important* to improve the metropolitan planning management.

Attitude to reform measures of the metropolitan planning management



Meanwhile, each respondent gave their attitude that three measures should take priority over all other reform measures in the metropolitan planning management reform. 88% of the respondents selected improving the planning cooperative mechanism between local governments, 73% of the respondents selected strengthening the planning coordination between departments, 65% of the respondents selected perfecting the open system for government information about planning, 30% encouraging social groups and citizens to participate in the planning implementation and supervision, 20% of the respondents selected strengthening the planning power centralization and line management, 12% of the respondents selected

establishing the law and regulation systems for metropolitan planning, 8% of the respondents selected promoting public participation in planning decision. From the survey, it can be concluded that most respondents lay their emphasis on the governmental cooperation and social supervision.

Guiding by good governance, this study aims to find a way to move the Chinese metropolitan planning management to good governance. However, proposing a concrete and overall plan for Chinese MP&M system reform is beyond the scope of this study. Thus, it merely proposes basic tasks and reform methods of MP&M system reform to facilitate achieving the goal of good governance based on the contemporary Chinese society and institutional environments. According to the problems in current metropolitan planning management system, following the basic principle of urban and rural planning management system, the study provides a reform orientation of MP&M system. To achieve good governance, it also needs clear recommendation in prioritized list of MP&M system reform (Table 7-40).

Table 7-41: Tasks in prioritized list of the metropolitan planning management system reform

	Interval of time	Targets	Tasks	Relationship adjustment
Short-term priorities	2-3 years	Constructing the regulatory subsystem for planning	Promoting legislative construction and improving regulatory systems for metropolitan planning	Government and Market
Medium-term priorities	3-5 years	Enhancing the administrative subsystem for planning	Integrating spatial planning authority and regulating administrative systems for metropolitan planning	Governments
Long-term priorities	6-10 years	Improving the operating subsystem for planning	Establishing restriction mechanisms and regulating operational systems for metropolitan planning	Government, Market and Society

Source: Created by the author.

7.3.2 Promoting legislative construction and improving regulatory systems for metropolitan planning — clarifying the relationship between government and market

Regional planning laws should be implemented forthwith to improve the MP&M Law system. According to macroscopic to microscopic views and from top

to bottom, a comprehensive planning legal system should be constructed to ensure reliable spatial planning compilation, coordination, and realisation.

7.3.2.1 Promoting metropolitan planning legislation

Currently, defects in laws have resulted in the lack of a legal basis for metropolitan planning management. Thus, the nation must implement national-level metropolitan planning regulations based on the practice and implementation of regional planning regulations in Guangdong and Hunan, thereby gradually promoting metropolitan planning legislative work and improving the spatial planning regulation system.

7.3.2.2 Implementing metropolitan planning technical standard documents

According to the existing urban–rural planning technical standard basis, this study conducts an in-depth investigation of the technical problems encountered during metropolitan planning compilation and implementation processes to establish fundamental technical terms of metropolitan planning and technical standards for planning compilation. This approach can facilitate the scientific planning compilation of metropolitan areas, and provide a technical basis for metropolitan planning management.

7.3.3 Integrating spatial planning authority and regulating planning administrative systems — adjusting the relationship between governments

Based on the concepts of vertical division of work, cooperation between departments, and horizontal coordination, a complete and unified Chinese spatial planning system was constructed to reasonably and specifically divide spatial planning authorities, ensure MP&M structural organisation, determine management authority, and improve organisational management systems. According to the inter-jurisdiction characteristics of MP, spatial planning authority integration involves three dimensions: vertically integrating the spatial planning authorities between governmental hierarchies, horizontally integrating the spatial planning authorities promoting local cooperation, and interdepartmentally integrating spatial planning authorities. Through the integration of spatial planning authorities, all levels of government are clearly structured and have specific responsibilities in the planning management system. The objective of coordination between departments, identical

policy goals, and realisation of responsibility is achieved within the interior of same-level governments.

7.3.3.1 Vertical integration of spatial planning authorities

Although the Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People's Republic of China consolidates the principle of first-level government, planning, and authority, the isomorphic responsibility of governmental hierarchies in real life blurs the spatial planning authority between governmental hierarchies, thereby generating numerous conflicts. Therefore, planning authorities should be reasonably distributed among vertical governmental agencies. Based on the political reform commitment to establish a service-oriented and responsible government, various scales of public goods and services have been provided as a basis upon which to reasonably and clearly determine the rights, responsibilities, authority, and property ownership between central and local governments. Based on these provisions, the central, provincial (regional and direct-controlled municipalities), and city and county (equal level) governments arrange planning authorities to prevent cross or overlapped planning authorities among various vertical levels of government.

7.3.3.2 Horizontal integration of spatial planning authorities

Horizontal integration denotes the planning authority adjustment and management cooperation among horizontal governments. The unfavourable implementation outcome of the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou Metropolitan Area planning (Luo and Shen, 2005) suggested that promoting a local cooperative model through top-to-bottom mandatory command was inefficient. In the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta areas, local governments have adopted top-to-bottom methods to promote regional cooperation based on principles of common interest, volunteering, and equal consultation. Local governments adopt a bottom-to-top method to promote regional cooperation in specific fields, such as tourism and finance, in which cooperation has been effectively developed and gradually become the fundamental coordination power in the Yangtze River Delta. This cooperation includes extensive collaboration among local governments, among vertical governmental hierarchies, and among inter-jurisdiction governmental organisations.

To promote the implementation of national spatial planning in local areas, the central government can use the method of allocating capital to aggregate stakeholders in spatial planning for cooperation and encourage local governments to

collaborate and co-participate in regional governance (Wolf & Beth Farquhar, 2005). Based on the rational division of authorities and property ownership of various governmental levels and the comprehensive understanding of the regional cooperative experiences in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta regions, the central government has extended local government cooperation to the field of MP. By horizontally integrating planning authorities, local governments can establish cooperative partnerships and promote inter-jurisdiction planning coordination and cooperation.

7.3.3.3 Interdepartmental integration of spatial planning authorities

Spatial planning authorities between governmental departments are not divided specifically, thereby causing competition over MP authority among departments (Hu, 2006 ; Xu, 2008). Developmental and reform departments head the national economic and social development planning and major functional area planning. Construction departments are in charge of urban and rural planning. National land departments are responsible for land use planning, and environmental departments command ecological and environmental planning. Transportation departments are responsible for planning infrastructure, such as roads. Each planning system is independent and features various levels and depths of concrete planning, from top to bottom. In addition, emerging planning schemes, such as metropolitan planning, MP, and metropolitan development strategic planning, lack corresponding and competent authorities. When these numerous planning schemes are implemented eventually in spatial environments, they encounter problems such as overlapping content, joint coordination, management division, and multiple management. Thus, the planning authority should integrate among departments.

In recent years, considerable practices regarding socioeconomic development plans, urban and rural planning, and land use planning in Guangdong and Shanghai have been implemented. The planning system reform incorporating three categories of planning has facilitated considerable progress, resolving the major technology-related barriers. It expects that the integration of interdepartmental planning authorities to be realised within the next 5 years.

The three categories of planning in one and inter-jurisdiction planning management system reform emphasise on the diverse aspects. The planning system reform of three categories of planning in one and multiple planning integration

focuses on diminishing and removing the departmentalism and localism involved in planning management, and transforming planning management from administration in administrative regions to regional public management.

7.3.4 Establishing restriction mechanisms and regulating planning operational systems — decentralizing to the society

Excessive and overly centralised power that is unchecked, unbalanced, and unsupervised is the primary cause of non-standardised planning operation in China, and a critical source of planning corruption. To resolve the corruption problem in the planning field, political ideals should be introduced gradually, such as freedom, democracy, and decentralisation, into the reasonable reconstruction of planning management systems. Decentralisation involves the top-to-bottom decentralisation within governmental agencies, and decentralising authorities within society, transferring the power of public management to society. Through continual decentralisation, the societal check, balance, and restriction mechanism of power can be improved to promote dissociated planning decision-making, implementation, and supervision; thus, robust power operational restriction and supervision systems can be established and unplanned operation of planning can be avoided.

7.3.4.1 Improving planning committee systems and promoting planning decision-making mechanism reform

Planning decision-making is relevant to the authoritative distribution of social resources, influencing the intention expression and interest balance of various political subjects and interest groups. The planning committee is an organisation that collectively decides how to resolve major problems in regional and urban development. However, for more than 10 years, the implementation of the local planning committee system has had limited effect on eroding the planning management monopoly of the government (Guo, 2009; Zou and Chen, 2003). Therefore, the planning committee system should be improved.

First, the characteristics and legal status of the planning committee should be confirmed. Authorised by separate levels of people's congresses, national, provincial, city and county planning committees have been established to function in spatial planning examination and approval, and supervise planning administrative implementation. As the planning committees at all levels gradually achieve the required functions, relevant laws should be implemented to ensure the legal position

of planning committees and enable the committees to actualise rule of law. When the planning committees legally operate independently, decentralisation from administrative executive authorities can be achieved.

Second, the methods used to select reconstruction planning committee members should be changed, as well as the planning committee characteristics, to eliminate the governmental element in planning committees. The planning committees should be constructed as independent nongovernmental organisations to elevate the level of committee democratic decision making and attaining a democratic negotiation system. Through extensive representativeness and negotiators decision-making systems, democracy can be realised.

Third, the decision-making process of the planning committees should be open to the public. The planning committees should be empowered to make decisions regarding regional and urban development, coordinate major interest adjustment, and supervise planning implementation. Therefore, the committee power should be checked and balanced by multiple parties with social rights and political powers. To prevent the planning committee from wrongly deciding or deciding against public will, citizens, the judiciary, and news media, relevant authorities should have the right to supervise the entire examination, decision-making, and implementation process of the urban planning committees. In addition, an error correction mechanism for planning committee decision making should be established to promote regional and urban sustainable development.

7.3.4.2 Improving public planning participation systems and promoting planning management method reform

From the perspective of good governance, which maximises public interest, the nation and society have the optimal statuses, coordinating to manage the social and political affairs of both parties. From the perspective of democratised and science-oriented planning decision-making, public participation is the embodiment of democratised planning, regulating the scientific scope of planning decision making to a substantial degree. The government should actively promote public participation regulations and gradually improve the public participation system.

Firstly, a multiple participation negotiation mechanism during planning compilation should be constructed. MP involves multiple local stakeholders. To avoid multiple interest conflicts that cause ineffective planning during planning

implementation, public participation during the planning compilation process should be enhanced to promote organisation forms that are open to multiple parties and that ensure the multiple participations of stakeholders. In MP compilation and planning implementation sections, objectively and meticulously examining the needs of each stakeholder is particularly necessary. The utmost effort should be to negotiate through various approaches, such as vertical governmental negotiation and interdepartmental negotiation, thereby minimising conflicts and influences. Fully negotiated MP is similar to an agreement among multiple stakeholders, such as all governmental levels, governmental sectors, and the public, facilitating planning implementation promotion and enhancing planning operability.

Secondly, the public right to know about the planning should be ensured. From MP compilation management to the planning decision-making process and planning implementation management, the authoritative operations should be opened and transparent throughout management sections to ensure the citizens' right to know. In the current civil society development situation in China, the general public can rarely participate in planning decision making, particularly large-scale spatial planning. Therefore, planning decision-making should be open to nongovernmental representatives, scholars, and experts. Public participation in planning can begin with the most feasible section, which is public supervision, followed by the promotional sequence of democratic supervision, democratic management, and democratic decision-making. When information is fully open, the public can participate in planning and claim part of supervising power. Thus, the entire process of planning management should emphasise openness and involve extensive social supervision.

Thirdly, planning public hearing systems and relevant comprehensive procedures should be established. Public hearing is a concrete form of public participation that has become a crucial symbol of public decision-making system reform in China. In 2007, the Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People's Republic of China introduced the hearing system into urban and rural planning management. The planning hearing system is beneficial for maintaining social justice, promoting public participation and democratic supervision, improving openness and transparency of public decision making, and regulating the planning decision-making process, thereby enhancing planning management performance (Wang, et al. 2010). Nonetheless, in reality, the loss of hearing procedural systems

has resulted in a merely formative planning hearing. As Justice of the United States, William Orville Douglas, stressed in *Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath*: It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice (Nardulli, et al.,1985). Therefore, regulating the planning hearing procedure is imperative, as well as institutionalising the procedure and providing a clear MP for public participation. For MP, the implication of the hearing system involves public supervision and restriction on power, and provides a chance for local governments to overthrow the unreasonable planning of high-level governments.

7.3.4.3 Establishing planning supervision inspection systems and promoting enhancement of planning management performance

The Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People's Republic of China specifies the concrete content required for implementing urban planning supervision and inspection, including supervising people's congresses at the same level, higher-level urban and rural planning departments, and the public and news media. All sections in regional planning compilation, examination, approval, and implementation in China lack supervision mechanisms. In addition, the independent administrative systems among local governments have caused multiple problems, such as ecological partitioning and severe inter-jurisdiction environmental pollution, such as the pollution of the Taihu Lake basin. Planning supervision and inspection should be emphasised in MP to ensure effective implementation and maintain the authority and importance of MP (Wang, et al. 2010). According to the dissociation principle of planning management decision making, implementation, and supervision, a multilayer planning supervision system should be established to enable planning management to include the entire process of MP planning compilation, implementation, and evaluation.

Firstly, the supervision of power-to-power comprise three types. (1) Top-to-bottom supervision: The MP decision makers, examiners, and approvers should supervise the planning implementation by local governments, such as extending the urban and rural planning supervisor system and establishing MP implementation annual report systems. (2) Bottom-to-top supervision: A reconsideration and appeal system should be established to supervise the omission or abuse of power by higher-level governments during planning implementation. (3) Supervision between

governments of the same level: relevant provincial departments should annually report the planning implementation situation to a standing committee, and planning management departments should annually report the planning implementation situations to a people's congress at the same level.

Secondly, the supervision of right to power should be proposed. By employing modern media technologies, all planning management processes involved in planning compilation, implementation, evaluation, and supervision should be open to the extensive social supervision by society and media. The processes including planning outcomes, assumed authorities by various levels of government during planning, planning implementation project archiving and fundraising, annual reports regarding planning implementation by various governmental levels, planning evaluation reports, planning compilation, hearings developed during implementation, and meeting minutes from coordination meetings should be conveyed openly to society for supervision using modern media.

Thirdly, the planning implementation monitoring information system can be established to construct a unified and dynamic spatial information system that can be used to supervise the planning implementation situation in real time. For example, the European Spatial Planning Observation Network is a crucial technical platform for promoting European spatial planning implementation (Albrechts et al., 2003). Constructing a national- and provincial-level implementation dynamic monitoring information system can substantially improve the management performance of planning implementation, supervision, and evaluation sections (Zou, 2006). Through the evaluation and supervision effect exerted by planning implementation, problems can be indicated to ensure that the government can flexibly address urban disparities and challenges in unstable environments, adjust planning strategies at any time, implement planning adjustment dynamisation, ensure planning timeliness, improve planning implementation capacity, and ensure the sustainable development of regional spaces.

7.4 Complementary and supporting reforms for the metropolitan planning management system

If the ultimate goal of planning management system reform is good governance, then MP is merely one of numerous governance tools. From blueprints to implementation, MP could not be separated from the support of other governance

tools. Planning management is legitimate and functional only according to the permission of a social political system. Although MP&M is a part of spatial planning management, which is included in administrative management, MP&M reform exerts a comprehensive effect on the national level. Without the support of relevant complementary reform integration, such as administrative management system reform and national and social relationship reform, substantial breakthroughs in planning management system reform are difficult. Planning management system reform is a system of engineering that requires external, institutional support and constructing an institution cluster.

Because the system mechanisms complementing MP&M systems are complex, the authors had no intention or capacity to construct a cluster of institutions. The following section explores the complementary reform of the MP&M system according to two dimensions: a regional coordination mechanism and regional policy supply.

7.4.1 Constructing regional coordination mechanisms

Because MP involves numerous administrative units and local governments that administer independently, repetitive construction in a region could never be forbidden, malicious competitions become frequent, and inter-jurisdiction public problems gradually gain prominence. Therefore, the Chinese government requires a novel governance model with which to replace the management model involving rule by a single governmental entity. An effective local government cooperation mechanism and regional coordination mechanism should be constructed. Through the communication, negotiation, and cooperation among multiple stakeholders, inter-jurisdiction public problems can be effectively resolved, leading to sustainable development of regional coordination.

7.4.1.1 Governmental cooperation mechanism

Generally, MP is a powerful tool used to promote across boundary governance and a collective action agenda for guiding comprehensive regional coordination development (Graham, et al., 2003). The main goal of across boundary governance is to provide good regional governance, which are the crucial cause of government existence and the major responsibilities of governments. Regardless of MP implementation or across boundary governance, central government and local governments should work together to perform metagovernance. Thus, creating a

network-based governmental cooperation governance mechanism is crucial to implementing MP. When a novel social management model and provision of encouragement and restriction is constructed, all subjects of administration will be guided to participate in coordination developmental actions and various types of institutional implementations.

Among the primary tasks required to promote cooperation among local governments is changing governmental functions. Regional malicious competition and noncooperation among local governments is rooted in the “offside” and absence of government. The government emphasises enhancing macroscopic adjustment and control, requiring the market mechanism function to be fully developed and reducing unnecessary administrative intervention for competitive fields and problems that can be resolved by the market. Thus, governmental function transitions must continue to promote separating enterprises from administration, property from administration, and market intermediary organisations from administration to resolve the governmental offside occurring in economic functions. Moreover, the government should promote the return of functions to divert governmental functions to social management and public services. Investing substantial effort in promoting social public service system construction and protecting ecological environments can resolve the longstanding absence of governmental functions regarding society and ecology.

Therefore, the governmental cooperative mechanism should be improved. Various local government cooperation partnerships should be established based on common interest and equal negotiation. Regional public goods should be provided through voluntary alliance or administrative agreement among local governments (Yan, 2008). Based on numerous formal and informal institutional arrangements of local governmental bodies, stable endogenous order can be formed to protect the long-term operation of regional coordinating development. A reasonable interest incentive mechanism is the institutional basis with which to achieve long-term cooperation among local governments (Yang, 2011).

7.4.1.2 Regional coordination mechanism

Because the institutional arrangement of inter-jurisdiction problems includes stakeholder group participation, deliberation of addressing ecological compensation,

infrastructure, and major projects, a coordination mechanism is the fundamental path for coordinating regional conflicts (Wei and Gao, 2011).

First, the basic functions of the market mechanism involved in resource distribution should be fully developed. Effective resource distribution is actualised by market competition. To dissolve the boundaries between administrative regions, all types of monopolies and regional blockage that hinder market resource distribution should be eliminated, enabling productive factors to flow freely. Based on the free flow of productive factors, regional compensation and support mechanisms can be established to correct the market defect and resource price distortion, achieving the sustainable development of critical problem regions. Regional compensation refers to rewarding the regions that gain external benefits from protecting cultivation fields, ecological systems, and natural resources; in addition, regional compensation indicates that compensation should be paid for the loss resulting from destruction of cultivated fields, ecological systems, and natural resources. Unlike the compensation mechanism, the support mechanism enables support and assistance for regions encountering justice and moral difficulties involving central or higher-level governments (Qin, 2011).

The cooperation and participation mechanisms should then be enhanced. According to the principles of sharing resources, complementary advantages, equal and mutual benefits, and common development, the governments have endeavoured to promote cooperation among governments and enterprises, constructing novel inter-jurisdiction, multilayer, interdisciplinary, and multiform regional cooperative styles to form long-term mechanisms for institutionalised regional cooperation. The interest appeal mechanism and negotiation solution mechanism used to solve conflicts between regions should be improved immediately to encourage construction of regional governance models involving multiple subject participation (including regional cooperative organisations, enterprises, and various intermediary organisations) and reduce the administrative intervention of all governmental levels.

Moreover, construction of a sharing mechanism should be expedited to facilitate resource sharing and gradually enable equalisation of public services between urban and rural areas and among administrative regions. Regional information liaison institutions should be established to promote an information

liaison mechanism involving the joint participation of enterprises, society, and the government.

7.4.2 Optimizing regional policies to support metropolitan planning management system reforms

Regional policies can optimise the internal regional source distribution, enabling the productive factors inside a region to flow reasonably. Regional policies comprise three subsets, namely, regional economic policies, regional social policies, and regional ecological policies. In addition, regional policies have the following functions: guiding (incentive), adjustment, restriction, and interest distribution (Figure 7-42). If MP compilation management is considered to be a blanket agreement approved through contracts between governments, then the MP implementation management can be substantially promoted according to regional policies. MP without regional policy support is merely a utopian fantasy.




Figure 7-42: The component and function of regional policies

Source: Created by the author.

7.4.2.1 Regional economic policies

Diverse social economic policies are the most critical protection used when promoting various planning implementation measures. MP implementation requires substantial support from economic policies. An interactive mechanism comprising

industrial, financial, and land policies should be established to maximise the regional economic policy effectiveness.

First, flexible regional financial policies should be adopted to promote MP implementation. In a metropolitan region, provincial and city governments can adopt various financial approaches to promote equalisation of basic public services, enable productive factors to be concentrated at goal-specific areas, and encourage enterprises and citizens to conserve resources and protect the environment.

Second, industrial policy optimisation should be employed to develop the spatial arrangement of metropolitan regional industries, the policies of which should comply with the overall national and industrial policy requirements. By dissolving the administrative boundaries, promoting productive factors, and enabling enterprises to move freely among inter-jurisdiction regions, the spatial distribution of resources can be optimised.

Third, land policies can be employed to guide concentrated construction in metropolitan areas. Currently, the lack of construction land indicators has become the greatest obstacle hindering development in nearly all metropolitan regions. Revitalising and optimising construction land in metropolitan core developmental regions requires protecting cultivated land, creating compensation mechanisms, and maintaining the requisition–compensation balance of cultivated land in large spatial scales. For crucial ecologically sensitive regions within metropolitan areas, ecological and environmental protection should be established as the focus for creating compensation mechanisms, such as ecological protection and ecological rehabilitation based on the principle of sustainable resources.

7.4.2.2 Regional social policies

Social policies involve citizen welfare and social justice concerns, exerting a critical effect on maintaining harmonious social relationships and stability, promoting overall social development, improving quality of life, and achieving beneficial operation of society. Compared with economic policies, the social policies in China have been enacted relatively late (Cheng, 2010). The entirety and systemisation level of such policies are insufficient and policy identity is weak (Yu, 2008).

The ultimate goal of MP is to achieve the sustainable development of comprehensive regional coordination. Currently, the major problems encountered in

Chinese social development are differentiated regional development and excessive economic inequality, which represents the injustice in society and should be addressed by social policies. Establishing social policy systems based on the ideal of justice while preventing the control of economic policies, synchronising improvement of the social justice level and social wealth accumulation, obtaining social justice, and promoting the healthy development of society has become an imperative problem in Chinese society. In addition, maintaining the basic rights of social members should be established as a crucial goal for social policies. When basic rights are protected effectively, members of society can engage in equal social interactions and express concern for, as well as participate in, social affairs. Consequently, social isolation can be eliminated and social integration can be achieved.

7.4.2.3 Regional environmental policies

Frequent inter-jurisdiction pollution in river basins and the discord between separate administrative systems have become a primary cause leading to deteriorated overall environmental quality in China. At the beginning of MP, the government should emphasise regional environmental problems and determine a balance between the environment and development. Including environmental problems into regional cooperation frames and coordinating problems from a metropolitan level can resolve the environmental problems.

The key to implementing regional environmental cooperation is establishing an environmental management policy. This study suggests that an inter-jurisdiction environmental protection and coordination committee that involves the operation and participation of multiple departments be established in metropolitan regions to consolidate integrated decision-making environmental and developmental mechanisms. The regional governments should construct inter-jurisdiction environmental management coordination mechanisms and information report mechanisms, share environmental supervision information, establish a report mechanism for major environmental incidents in the region, create a collaborative mechanism for pollution management, and jointly coordinate environmental infrastructure and environmental protection construction. The supervision accountability mechanisms of regional environmental protection have proposed for regional ecological and environmental protection responsible systems, in which

accountability is distributed specifically. Trade mechanisms for inter-jurisdiction pollution discharge rights, comprehensive ecological compensation mechanisms, and comprehensive public participation mechanisms in ecological protection are introduced to the system.

7.5 Concluding Remarks

As the proverb expresses, “Rome was not built in a day.” China has a limited amount of time in which to implement MP, and the management system is seriously deficient. In such circumstances, MP&M reform in China requires a lengthy process to progressive reform.

Firstly, from the perspective of planning management and administrative management relationships, the progressiveness of political and administrative system reform fundamentally regulates the progressiveness of the planning management system. The planning management system reform can not be dissociated from the administrative system reform.

Secondly, reforms of the planning management system should be start from the adjustment of four relationships.

(1) Adjusting the relationships among vertical governmental hierarchies to clarify planning management organisation and planning authority division;

(2) Adjusting the relationships between the government and market to improve planning functional transition and planning management marketization;

(3) Adjusting the relationships between the nation and society to promote planning public participation and planning management socialisation;

(4) Adjusting the relationships between horizontal governmental levels to encourage horizontal government collaboration and promote across boundary governance.

Planning management system reform essentially requires concrete spatial and temporal contexts in which to adjust reasonably the previously mentioned relationships. However, these relationships are not constant, and develop dynamically. Forming reasonable relationships is the result of long-term and interactive negotiation among multiple stakeholders. Because of a deepening market economy, rational return of the government, and growing social power, the MP system will change according to the varying relationships between the government and market, and between the nation and society.

Finally, regarding a social system background that promotes planning management system reform, planning management system transition is affected by numerous soft factors, such as the institutional environment and citizen quality. Soft factors vary slowly, indicating that planning management system reform cannot be achieved immediately. According to the current situation of citizen social development in China, the emphasis of MP&M system innovation is not in promoting public participation in planning, but in establishing coordination mechanisms among horizontal governments, thereby facilitating the cooperative governance among local governments.

The complexity of a spatial planning system and planning management system cannot be constructed based on temporary rationality, nor can it be accomplished effortlessly. The aforementioned concept of an MP&M system is imprecise and does not include every detail. According to current cross boundary governance problems and regional public management deficiencies, the relationship between progressive reform of the overall system and local field reform should be addressed properly. The nation should actively relinquish power and encourage provincial and city governments to plan management system innovation. Bottom-to-top policy promotion includes spatial planning management system innovation within metropolitan regions. The central government should actively learn from trial experiences and bottom-to-top promotion, implementing top-to-bottom reform at an appropriate time. Without supports from top to bottom, the local reform practice will encounter difficulty in achieving substantial breakthroughs.

Chapter 8

8.0 Conclusions

This thesis looked at the development of the metropolitan planning management system in China. This chapter's conclusions start by the structure of the thesis and present a summary of the key findings. Whilst the previous chapter presents the implications for the future system, this chapter highlights the key findings of this study. It discusses its contribution to both academic and policy thinking. In the end, it discusses the issues for future research.

8.1 Layout of the thesis

This study aims to find a way moving the metropolitan planning management (MP&M) in China to good governance. How to get this objective in a gradual progress? It is required to understand the historical and current situation of the metropolitan planning management system. Therefore, the main body of this study involved three sections.

(1) Historical basis analysis: Metropolitan planning management is embedded into the administrative management systems and public governance paradigm changes. In relevant domestic and international studies and a summary of Western public management paradigm changes, it combined Chinese governance practices to analyse characteristics and mechanisms of the planning management system change in China.

(2) Current problem analysis: Based on the investigations of officials, experts, and planners, this study conducted in-depth analysis of the current characteristics, problems, and foundations of the Chinese metropolitan planning management (MP&M) system.

(3) Future development recommendation: Based on the governance content and principles of good governance, this study depicted the basic directions and overall frame of Chinese metropolitan planning management system changes. Furthermore, it explored the complementary reform of metropolitan planning management systems from two dimensions: regional coordination mechanism and regional supporting policies.

8.2 Key findings

8.2.1 The Chinese planning management system changes with the overall institutional environment

Chinese economic reform began from planning economic system and totalitarianism. Since the Chinese economic reform, China has entered an era of complete system transformation. Three type of decentralisation (i.e. administrative decentralisation, market-oriented decentralisation and society-oriented decentralisation) has promoted Chinese institutional transformation and transition of governance. The planning management system is an organic component of administrative and political systems. The planning management system in China changes with the overall institutional environment. Administrative management system reform has become the most direct and fundamental motive for promoting the transition of urban and rural planning management system.

The central government planning management organisation frequently changed in the past; however, since the Chinese economic reform in 1978, it is now found to be stabilised and top-to-bottom planning management organisations have been constructed at all levels of government. When decentralisation was implemented in the 1980s, the independence of local governmental planning management was enhanced. Planning formulation and implementation have been pushed into market gradually. With changes in the administrative management model and awakened public awareness about rights, planning management systems have improved progressively. It promoted the model of planning management changing from control government to governance-oriented.

Overall, planning management system changes occurred predominantly after the Chinese economic reform. After 30 years of exploration, the cumulative effect exerted by this type of progressive system change is exceptional.

8.2.2 Inadequate modern bureaucracy is the primary characteristic of current planning management systems

Modern bureaucracy is a type of political organisational system that employs rules of law as the code of conduct based on rational and functional division of labour (ref). From the central government to town-level governments, the organisational structures, power system, and function division of all levels of

government are designed according to modern bureaucracy. Compared with authentic rational bureaucracy, the contemporary Chinese administrative system and social management still retains considerable traditional rule elements. The isomorphic responsibilities of vertical governmental hierarchies, ambiguous duties among governmental departments, informal operations of public power, and so on, all of these suggest that modern bureaucracy in China is still insufficient.

Contemporary Chinese planning management has numerous problems, such as competition over spatial planning authority among multiple departments, strong hierarchical ideology in planning administration, rent-seeking behaviour in planning management and power corruption in the planning implementation stage. Because of inadequate modern bureaucracy, it lacks specific authoritative division among functional departments, and inefficient power supervision and restriction mechanisms, which caused the problems in the metropolitan planning management system.

8.2.3 Reform of the metropolitan planning management system needs improving and surpassing moderately the bureaucracy

Since the 1970s, Western countries have experienced changes in public management paradigms, shifting from modern bureaucracy to new public management and then to post-new public management. These changes have prompted the governments to change governance structures from ruling to governance and from rational construction to discursive construction and social construction. Both new public management and post-new public management are constructed on the basis of a rational inner core of modern bureaucracy. From one type of balance to the other, these management paradigms have not shifted from the rational inner core of modern bureaucracy, but have been adjusted and amended to comply with modern bureaucracy. At the centre of the entire social management system, the government does not experience fundamental changes.

Because of inadequate modern bureaucracy, Chinese governance reform must improve the modern bureaucracy and involves bureaucratic innovation in local fields. MP is a crucial tool and model representing cooperative governance among local governments. The inner essence should be transitioned from administration in administrative regions to interjurisdictional administration. Metropolitan planning (MP) and its implementation require local governments to cooperate in all dimensions. To

establish complete MP&M systems, regionalism and departmentalism pervasive in planning should be overcome. First, based on planning functional division of labour and planning authority integration, complete spatial planning systems and corresponding planning management organisations should be established to mitigate the legal defects of MP&M and promote rule of law in planning. When a planning management bureaucracy is established and improved, theories compatible to constructing modern bureaucracy, such as discursive construction and network governance, can be derived from new public management and post-new public management. These theories can be integrated into constructing a new-era Chinese MP&M system to promote integration between departmental planning and regional planning.

8.2.4 Decentralization to the society is the basis for improved planning management systems

In Western countries, new public management is based on public choice theory, which advocates terminating the administrative governmental monopoly on social public affair management and proposing marketization of public goods supply and socialisation of social public affair management. Since the Chinese economic reform, China has performed well economically. However, the political regime reform has been delayed. Because of the severely delayed reform in certain key fields, an extensive association has been formed between unbalanced power and unrestricted capital, shaping the Chinese power market economy and profoundly reconstructing the Chinese social hierarchy, propelling China into a transformation trap (Sun, 2012). The 18th CPC National Congress initially specified the political regime reform target and emphasised developing democracy (e.g., grassroots democracy and negotiation democracy) and establishing complete power operational restriction and supervision systems. Power restriction and rule of law is fundamental to improve modern bureaucracy.

To address the non-standardised operations of planning power and the frequent occurrence of planning power corruption, rule of law and regulating the planning administrative power operation have become the primary focus of planning management system construction in contemporary China. According to the principles of power-to-power checks and balances and rights-to-power checks and balances, the power-to-power checks and balances planning management system

must initially be established to improve the MP&M system. When establishing a planning management system, in which, legislation (decision-making), execution (administration), and supervision are associated, the government must balance each administrative subject of legislation, execution, and supervision in MP to confine power within the boundary of laws. In addition, realistically in a plural society, the nation should expedite decentralisation and promote “sunshine plans” to abolish the enclosed operation of planning management, gradually introducing public supervision to each section of power operation in planning management and exposing the power operation process to the public. The standardisation of planning management power operation is enhanced to defend planning power alienation to the utmost. Based on public supervision, a civil society will develop and thrive, gradually promoting public participation and vertical development in planning.

8.2.5 Improved metropolitan planning management system needs support from other governance tools

From a macroscopic view, without the support of administrative and political system reforms, the planning management system reform cannot exist for a long time, and eradicating the main problems, encountered in practical planning management, becomes impossible. Based on the relationships between MP and across governance, MP can be both the goal and approach. As an approach, MP can serve as an intergovernmental contract and a tool used to promote across boundary governance. MP and other governance tools can jointly promote across boundary governance progress to actualise the sustainable development of comprehensive regional coordination. As a goal, MP is based on the common interest of multiple parties in a society to realise the collective action agenda of regional good governance. When other governance tools are properly employed, planning is legitimate and can be actually and effectively implemented.

Although improved modern bureaucracy, checks and balances of power, and promotion of governance tool development are critical to MP&M system innovation, inadequate modern bureaucracy is a common problem in Chinese administrative management. Moreover, MP&M system construction cannot be developed without intergovernmental cooperative mechanisms, regional coordination development mechanisms, and regional multiple governance tool development. MP implementation cannot be dissociating from the support of various regional policy

tools. These fundamental institutional problems cannot be resolved from the planning management level. Therefore, the key reform of the MP&M system is not within MP itself or the planning management system field; instead, it relies on the effective supply of top-level systems outside the planning management system.

8.3 Contribution to academic knowledge

This thesis studied the development of the metropolitan planning management system in China from the perspective of governance. It analyses the evolution, present situation and problems of the metropolitan planning management system in China, and discusses the direction of the transformation of the metropolitan planning management system in the future.

This thesis provides an original contribution and adds to academic knowledge in following aspects.

The key findings of this thesis have shown that institutional and social environments restricted the metropolitan planning management (MP&M) system. It highlights the importance of the Chinese administrative system to the planning management system. It constructs a theoretical analysis framework from the perspective of decentralization. Based on this theoretical analysis framework, embedding the metropolitan planning management system into Chinese administrative system, it examines the changes of the planning management system in broad context of governance transitions of China since 1978 while only focusing on the institutional and social environments; it is able to fully understand Chinese metropolitan planning management system. Therefore, based on social-political transformation, the gap in the current knowledge surrounding Chinese metropolitan planning management has been filled by providing valuable insight into constantly changing mechanisms of metropolitan planning management system. It therefore provides a different perspective to examine and improve the metropolitan planning management system in China.

This study evaluated current situation of the metropolitan planning management system. Firstly, it undertakes a case study approach to address the problems in current system. Plenty of data was derived from the experience of local practices; it provides plenty of information and evidence of Chinese regional governance and metropolitan planning management for the future studies. Focusing on the relationships between different level governments, the relationships between

government, society and market, it gains an in-depth insight of the behaviours and meanings that different actors place upon in the planning management system. Secondly, it adopted the questionnaire survey instrument and interviews to analyse the dimensions of attitude towards the current situation of MP&M system. Based on questionnaire survey, it focused upon the attitudes of three groups: government officials, experts and planners. From analysing and comparing the result with real data collecting from questionnaire and interviews, it provided the actual demonstration of the metropolitan planning management system in China. Therefore, it provides a deeper understanding of changes in Chinese planning management and a platform for the analysis of Chinese metropolitan planning management challenges.

As good governance is the common pursuit, goal of the MP&M system in China is to find a way which can move the current system to good governance. Due to different social-political background, it cannot simply use the Western paradigm. The Chinese planning management system reform must emphasize the beginning of the reform. The uniqueness of transformation of a powerful nation determines the differences in concrete approaches and paths for institutional reform. This thesis discussed the MP&M system reform in the overall administrative context. It explored the overall direction of the MP&M system reform and supporting reforms for developing the metropolitan planning management to good governance. It analyses the political reform intention of the Chinese central government in recent years. It gave a starting point and the orientation of the metropolitan planning management system reform. It highlighted the importance of the Chinese political system to the reform of the MP&M system. It believed that the metropolitan planning management system reform should be working within the political system reform. Thereby, it suggested that the MP&M system reform needs support from other governance tools, i.e., regional coordination mechanisms, regional policies. Therefore, this thesis developed theories and practice of public management and metropolitan governance in China.

In conclusion, this thesis provided efforts on how to make the metropolitan planning management system move towards good governance and make it work better. In simpler words, this thesis contributed to the understanding of how to develop the metropolitan planning management system.

8.4 Contribution to policy thinking

The fieldwork findings illustrated that the current Chinese planning management system does not work well in the metropolitan planning management. This thesis identified main factors that are regarded as conducive to develop the metropolitan planning management system. These include three sections: 1) promoting legislative construction and improving regulatory systems for metropolitan planning; 2) integrating spatial planning authority and regulating planning administrative systems; and 3) establishing restriction mechanisms and regulating planning operational systems.

As a tool of regional governance, the metropolitan planning management system reform needs support and coordinated reforms from other governance tools. However, without permissions of the social political system, the metropolitan planning management system can't play its role effectively in regional governance. In order to make a response to the challenge during the society-transforming period, the government's functions must change to the modernization of administrative management with gradual adjustment.

In conditions of short-time practice of the metropolitan planning, imperfect restrictive mechanism and balance mechanism of the planning power operation, the construction of the metropolitan planning management system needs changes, step by step, so eventually good governance can be achieved.

This thesis provided policy recommendations for Chinese metropolitan planning management system reform. In the meantime, it also provided suggestions for governments to make decisions. A report extracted from this study has been submitted to the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) in the end of November 2013. It will help the governments make policies decisions. It is believed that this study tends to improve the capacity and effect of metropolitan planning management practices in China.

8.5 Scope for future research

The metropolitan planning management is essentially a complex social process. It needs multiple theories to explain and explore. This dissertation employed the perspectives of governance to understand Chinese metropolitan planning management system. Although this thesis has shown significant findings from the

analyses - information obtained from local practice and data obtained through surveys, however, there are certain limitations inherent in this study.

This thesis mainly focused on the development of Chinese metropolitan planning management. The research methodology applied was particularly suited in gaining an in-depth insight into the real world of the metropolitan planning management in China. Practices in metropolitan governance from local governments have shown that it needs to break through the institutional restraint and must establish new relationships between different level of governments, relationships between government, society and market. Yet, all of these should be connecting with the political system. Therefore, the further development of the metropolitan planning management system needs top-level institutional design from the central government. Top-design is very important for the metropolitan planning management system. It can guarantee and promote the reform of the metropolitan planning management system. Moving to good governance is the key point of top-level design and it lies in the core beliefs and objectives of top-level government. However, how to make top-level design and gain the support from the central government? This was beyond the scope of this thesis but could be addressed within further work.

The essence of a planning management system reform is an institutional choice. Numerous factors, such as historical culture and tradition, economy, and society, may affect the planning management system of a country or region. Various combinations of factors and diverse levels of influence have contributed to the diversity in planning management systems in countries worldwide. Despite their coexistence, the development stage, social culture, and regime of China differs from that as in advanced Western countries, of which none can provide a planning system for the Chinese planning system to imitate during reconstruction. Moreover, in the recent three decades, as a developing country, China has developed the characteristic of time-space compression, including the compression of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization. Corresponding with such compressions, all types of thought conflict, and economic, social, political, and ecological problems, which slowly resolved in Western countries over 200 to 300 years, have been condensed into contemporary China. The uniqueness of the problems determines the uniqueness of the solutions. Constructing the Chinese planning management system and administrative system has individual approach. Ways of applying the experiences of

Western countries while combining the uniqueness of China to explore a direct and progressive reform path suitable for China should be further investigated in future studies.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Survey questionnaire

This survey is designed to determine the problems, reasons and solutions of the metropolitan planning management system. Please answer all questions based upon your belief and experience. All your answers and information are strictly confidential and will not be released. Neither you nor your government will be identified with the data you provide. Thank you for your cooperation.

0. Your occupational identity is ____
- A. Governmental official
 - B. Planner
 - C. Expert
1. How do you think about the nature of metropolitan planning? It is a kind of ____
- A. Social and economic development planning
 - B. Regional and urban planning
 - C. General plans for land use
 - D. Don't know
2. How do you think about the nature of metropolitan planning management? It should be under centralize management by specialized departments of ____
- A. National Development and Reform Commission
 - B. The Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development
 - C. Ministry of Land and Resources
 - D. Don't know
3. The followings are some problems in metropolitan planning management. What is your attitude towards these problems? Please give the number which can represent your attitude towards the question.

- 1-Very serious
 - 2- Serious
 - 3- Don't know
 - 4-Not serious
 - 5- Not very serious

Please put a circle around the number

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| A. Planning conflict between the superior and the subordinate | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| B. Planning conflict between different departments | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| C. Administrative interference in planning | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| D. Planning power corruptions | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| E. Lack of local coordination mechanisms | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| F. Lack of public participations | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| G. Opportunistic behaviors of local government in planning operation | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| H. No law to appropriate for planning management | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| I. Lack of advanced technology and modern management techniques in planning management | 1 2 3 4 5 |

4. The followings are some judgments about reasons for planning conflict between the superior and the subordinate. What is your attitude towards these issues? Please give the number which can represent your attitude towards the question.

- 1-Very acceptable
 - 2-Acceptable
 - 3- Don't know
 - 4-Unacceptable
 - 5- Very unacceptable

Please put a circle around the number

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| A. Due to the hasty time for planning formulation, the subordinate planning is in accordance with the superior planning not well | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| B. Due to the quality and level of planning formulation, the subordinate planning is in accordance with the superior planning not well | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| C. The superior planning is out of time, it can't meet for the requirements of social development | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| D. The superior planning isn't out of time, but it just stand on behalf of the local interest and partial interest | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| E. The superior planning doesn't meet the needs of local governments | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| F. Lack of planning coordination mechanisms between the superior and the subordinate governments | 1 2 3 4 5 |

5. The followings are some judgments about reasons for planning conflict between different departments. What is your attitude towards these issues? Please give the number which can represent your attitude towards the question.

- 1-Very acceptable
- 2-Acceptable
- 3- Don't know
- 4-Unacceptable
- 5- Very unacceptable

Please put a circle around the number

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| A. The hasty time for planning formulation | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| B. The quality and level of planning formulation | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| C. Departmental protectionism | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| D. Lack of planning coordination mechanisms between departments of governments | 1 2 3 4 5 |

6. The followings are some judgments about reasons for corruption in planning management. What is your attitude towards these issues? Please give the number which can represent your attitude towards the question.

- 1-Very acceptable
- 2-Acceptable
- 3- Don't know
- 4-Unacceptable
- 5- Very unacceptable

Please put a circle around the number

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| A. Some officials whose morals have been corrupted | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| B. Planning power too concentrated and lack of effective administrative supervision | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| C. Lack of effective social supervision | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| D. Excessive planning power and a closed managing and operating system | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| E. Light punishment result in planning power corruption | 1 2 3 4 5 |

7. The followings are the main bodies participating in planning formulation. Please evaluate the importance of the following main bodies participating in formulating stage. Please give the number which can represent your attitude.

- 1. Very important
- 2. Important
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Not important
- 5. Not very important

Please put a circle around the number

- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|
| A. The superior government | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| B. Local governments | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| C. Experts | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| D. Profession association | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| E. Common people | 1 2 3 4 5 |

8. The followings are the main bodies participating in planning implementation and supervision. Please evaluate the importance of the following main bodies participating in implementing and supervising stage. Please give the number which can represent your attitude.

1. Very important
 2. Important
 3. Don't know
 4. Not important
 5. Not very important

Please put a circle around the number

- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|
| A. The superior government | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| B. Local governments | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| C. Experts | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| D. Profession association | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| E. Common people | 1 2 3 4 5 |

9. How do you think about the Planning Commission? It is a kind of ____

- A. Governmental Agency
- B. Non-Governmental Agency
- C. Semi-Governmental Agency
- D. Don't know

10. Can the Planning Commission get the planning out of the interference from administrative intervention?

- A. Yes
- B. No
- C. Don't know

11. The followings are reform measures aim to improve the metropolitan planning management. Please evaluate the importance of the following reform measures effecting on the metropolitan planning management. Please give the number which can represent your attitude.

1. Very important
2. Important
3. Don't know
4. Not important
5. Not very important

Please put a circle around the number

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| A. Strengthening the planning power centralization and line management | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| B. Improving the planning cooperative mechanism between local governments | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| C. Strengthening the planning coordination between departments | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| D. Establishing the law and regulation systems for metropolitan planning | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| E. Perfecting the open system for government information about planning | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| F. Promoting public participation in planning decision | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| G. Encouraging social groups and citizens to participate in the planning implementation and supervision | 1 2 3 4 5 |

12. The followings are reform measures aim to improve the metropolitan planning management. Which three measures do you think should take priority over all others ? Please select 3 options which can represent your attitude. ____

- A. Strengthening the planning power centralization and line management
- B. Improving the planning cooperative mechanism between local governments
- C. Strengthening the planning coordination between departments
- D. Establishing the law and regulation systems for metropolitan planning
- E. Perfecting the open system for government information about planning
- F. Promoting public participation in planning decision
- G. Encouraging social groups and citizens to participate in the planning implementation and supervision

Appendix 2: Summary of questionnaire statistics

1. How do you think about the nature of metropolitan planning? It is a kind of ____
- Social and economic development planning
 - Regional and urban planning
 - General plans for land use
 - Don't know

Table Q-1 Attitude to the nature of metropolitan planning

Issue No.	Sample	A		B		C		D	
	total	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
1	226	25	11%	179	79%	4	2%	17	7%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

2. How do you think about the nature of metropolitan planning management? It should be under centralize management by specialized departments of ____
- National Development and Reform Commission
 - The Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development
 - Ministry of Land and Resources
 - Don't know

Table Q-2 Attitude to the nature of metropolitan planning management

Issue No.	Sample	A		B		C		D	
	total	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
2	226	32	14%	176	78%	6	3%	12	5%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

3. The followings are some problems in metropolitan planning management. What is your attitude towards these problems? Please give the number which can represent your attitude towards the question.

Table Q-3 Attitude to problems in metropolitan planning management

Issue No.	Items	1. Very serious		2. Serious		3. Don't know		4. Not serious		5. Not very serious	
		N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
3	A	102	45%	79	35%	6	3%	35	15%	4	2%
	B	89	39%	112	50%	9	4%	10	4%	6	3%
	C	148	65%	59	26%	4	2%	9	4%	6	3%
	D	167	74%	48	21%	3	1%	4	2%	4	2%
	E	133	59%	80	35%	3	1%	8	4%	2	1%
	F	124	55%	65	29%	7	3%	20	9%	10	4%

APPENDICES

	G	142	63%	48	21%	8	4%	19	8%	9	4%
	H	167	74%	45	20%	5	2%	6	3%	3	1%
	I	65	29%	45	20%	21	9%	59	26%	36	16%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

4. The followings are some judgments about reasons for planning conflict between the superior and the subordinate. What is your attitude towards these issues? Please give the number which can represent your attitude towards the question.

Table Q-4 Attitude to reasons for planning conflict between the superior and the subordinate

Issue No.	Items	1. Very serious		2. Serious		3. Don't know		4. Not serious		5. Not very serious	
		N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
4	A	5	2%	8	4%	6	3%	89	39%	118	52%
	B	7	3%	12	5%	6	3%	76	34%	125	55%
	C	25	11%	26	12%	6	3%	80	35%	89	39%
	D	85	37%	67	30%	6	3%	45	20%	23	10%
	E	102	45%	98	43%	6	3%	12	5%	8	4%
	F	93	41%	81	36%	21	9%	23	10%	8	4%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

5. The followings are some judgments about reasons for planning conflict between different departments. What is your attitude towards these issues? Please give the number which can represent your attitude towards the question.

Table Q-5 Attitude to reasons for planning conflict between different departments

Issue No.	Items	1. Very acceptable		2. Acceptable		3. Don't know		4. Unacceptable		5. Very unacceptable	
		N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
5	A	14	6%	16	7%	9	4%	88	39%	99	44%
	B	16	7%	17	8%	9	4%	87	38%	97	43%
	C	156	69%	45	20%	9	4%	10	4%	6	3%
	D	123	54%	74	33%	15	7%	11	5%	3	1%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

6. The followings are some judgments about reasons for corruption in planning management. What is your attitude towards these issues? Please give the number which can represent your attitude towards the question.

Table Q-6 Attitude to reasons for corruption in planning management

Issue No.	Items	1. Very serious		2.Serious		3.Don't know		4. Not serious		5. Not very serious	
		N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
6	A	3	1%	6	3%	2	1%	89	39%	126	56%
	B	36	16%	45	20%	2	1%	68	30%	76	33%
	C	76	34%	96	42%	2	1%	36	16%	16	7%
	D	127	56%	77	34%	2	1%	14	6%	6	3%
	E	23	10%	36	16%	2	1%	56	25%	109	48%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

7. The followings are the main bodies participating in planning formulation. Please evaluate the importance of the following main bodies participating in formulating stage. Please give the number which can represent your attitude.

Table Q-7 Attitude to the main bodies participating in planning formulation

Issue No.	Items	1. Very important		2.Important		3.Don't know		4. Not important		5. Not very important	
		N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
7	A	26	12%	45	20%	10	4%	68	30%	77	34%
	B	129	57%	75	33%	2	1%	12	5%	8	4%
	C	136	60%	81	36%	0	0%	8	4%	1	0%
	D	12	5%	25	11%	22	10%	89	39%	78	35%
	E	2	1%	10	4%	3	1%	99	44%	112	50%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

8. The followings are the main bodies participating in planning implementation and supervision. Please evaluate the importance of the following main bodies participating in implementing and supervising stage. Please give the number which can represent your attitude.

Table Q-8 Attitude to the main bodies participating in planning implementation and supervision

Issue No.	Items	1. Very important		2.Important		3.Don't know		4. Not important		5. Not very important	
		N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
8	A	32	14%	56	25%	16	7%	59	26%	63	28%
	B	134	59%	69	31%	0	0%	13	6%	10	4%
	C	88	39%	59	26%	7	3%	36	16%	36	16%
	D	69	31%	89	39%	4	2%	56	25%	8	4%
	E	100	44%	90	40%	9	4%	18	8%	9	4%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

9. How do you think about the Planning Commission? It is a kind of ____

- A. Governmental Agency
- B. Non-Governmental Agency
- C. Semi-Governmental Agency
- D. Don't know

Table Q-9 Attitude to the nature of Planning Commission

Issue No.	Sample	A		B		C		D	
	total	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
9	226	178	79%	6	3%	36	16%	6	3%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

10. Can the Planning Commission get the planning out of the interference from administrative intervention ? ____

- A. Yes
- B. No
- C. Don't know

Table Q-10 Attitude to the role of the Planning Commission

Issue No.	Sample	A		B		C	
	total	N	P	N	P	N	P
10	226	4	2%	201	89%	21	9%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

11. The followings are reform measures aim to improve the metropolitan planning management. Please evaluate the importance of the following reform measures effecting on the metropolitan planning management. Please give the number which can represent your attitude.

Table Q-11 Attitude to reform measures of the metropolitan planning management

Issue No.	Items	1. Very important		2. Important		3. Don't know		4. Not important		5. Not very important	
		N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P	N	P
11	A	16	7%	28	12%	8	4%	72	32%	102	45%
	B	156	69%	56	25%	5	2%	7	3%	2	1%
	C	156	69%	46	20%	12	5%	8	4%	4	2%
	D	43	19%	48	21%	17	8%	56	25%	62	27%
	E	164	73%	45	20%	0	0%	12	5%	5	2%
	F	5	2%	6	3%	13	6%	57	25%	145	64%
	G	95	42%	93	41%	16	7%	6	3%	18	8%

Note: N= Number, P= Percentage.

12. The followings are reform measures aim to improve the metropolitan planning management. Which three measures do you think should take priority over all others ? Please select 3 options which can represent your attitude. ____

- A. Strengthening the planning power centralization and line management
- B. Improving the planning cooperative mechanism between local governments
- C. Strengthening the planning coordination between departments
- D. Establishing the law and regulation systems for metropolitan planning
- E. Perfecting the open system for government information about planning
- F. Promoting public participation in planning decision
- G. Encouraging social groups and citizens to participate in the planning implementation and supervision.

Table Q-12 Attitude to the importance about reform measures of the metropolitan planning management

Issue No.	Items	Sample	Number	Percentage
12	A	226	46	20%
	B	226	198	88%
	C	226	165	73%
	D	226	26	12%
	E	226	146	65%
	F	226	19	8%
	G	226	68	30%

Source: Own creation

Appendix 3: List of publications

One monograph and 11 papers published in journals have so far come out of this study, i.e.:

1. **Wang Y.** and Li G.B. (2013). *Research on management system of the urban agglomeration in China*, Southeast university press.
2. **Wang Y.** and Li G.B. (2013). 'The foundations of justice: study on restructuring of urban and rural planning system'. *Planners*, 29(5): 60-64
3. **Wang Y.** and Li G.B. (2012). 'Research progress and prospection of the management system reform of urban and rural planning'. *Urban Problems*, (12): 79-84.
4. **Wang Y.** and Jiang L. (2011). 'The dilemma of the implementation of the Yangtze River Delta regional planning'. *Advanced Materials Research*, 450-451:1086-1093.
5. Li G.B. and **Wang Y.** (2015). 'Evolutionary game analysis on the change of urban and rural planning administrative system in China'. *Urban Development Studies*. (7):64-70.
6. Li G.B. and **Wang Y.** (2015). 'Resource configuration in urban planning under market economy'. *Planners*, (4):10-15.
7. Li G.B. and **Wang Y.** (2014). 'Analysis framework of new urbanization based administration decentralization'. *Planners*. (4):10-14.
8. Li G.B., **Wang Y.** and Yuan Z.J. (2013). 'An institutional analysis framework for the spatial structure evolution of the Chinese urban agglomeration based on Corporatism'. *City Planning Review*, (10):9-13.
9. Shi W. and **Wang Y.** (2013). 'Implementary mechanisms of European spatial planning and experiential enlightenment to China'. *Planners*, 29(3):98-102.
10. Guo X., Li G.B., Shi W. and **Wang Y.** (2013). 'EU's disintegration and its warnings for regional integration in China'. *Modern Urban Research*, (9):115-120.
11. Li G.B. and **Wang Y.** (2012). 'A study of the different norms in contemporary Western distributive justice theories'. *Journal of Suzhou University of Science and Technology (Social Science)*. (4): 20-24.