

Political Trust of Emerging Elites and Initial Conditions: The Effect of Varieties of Socialism

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Abstract

This paper, unlike the vast existing literature on political trust, focuses on trust in *post-socialist* countries, and more specifically on their *emerging elites*, rather than on their general populations. Studying emerging elites is important in the context of establishing democracy and the survival of democracy. We stipulate that political trust is significantly determined by historical legacy: *type* of socialist regime, accounting for path dependence and thus, for pre-socialist legacies. Utilizing individual-level data from an institutional survey, we find that distinguishing between different types of socialism is instrumental in explaining trust of emerging elites. Our findings have implications for policies aimed at fostering political trust in post-socialist countries and more importantly for discerning future patterns of political and social developments.

JEL codes: O57, P20, P39

1. Introduction

In the past twenty years, former socialist countries have attempted to depart from their socialist past, to profoundly restructure their political and economic institutions, and furthermore, to change people's attitudes and behavior. Among other goals, reforms have aimed at rebuilding trust in the government, which was significantly compromised in the last decades of socialist rule due to the prevalence of corruption, nepotism, shortages of goods and inability to provide for the citizens. Yet trust in government in the post-socialist world remains low to this day (see e.g. Rose 2004). This raises the question: If trust is a slow-moving institution (see e.g. Mishler and Rose 2001, p. 31), can we find evidence to suggest that current levels of trust are determined by historical legacies? In particular, could young people, who did not experience the socialist reality, still be affected by the legacies of socialism?

This paper introduces and tests new hypotheses on the determinants of trust in government with particular relevance to *post-socialist countries* and their *emerging elites*. We argue, in line with the cultural¹ theory on trust, that trust in government, through path dependence, is significantly affected by historical legacies and hence, possesses significant inertia. More specifically, our analysis emphasizes the role of the socialist past, and, importantly, the type of socialist regime, for trust in government. A number of papers have established that the socialist past has had a negative effect on current levels of political trust (e.g. Makarová 2004a; Uslaner and Badescu 2004; Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Rose 2004). However, the effect of different types of socialist regimes, and furthermore the effect on trust of young people and emerging elites, has not been investigated in the existing literature.

We know that the socialist regimes differed significantly in degrees of political repression, exposure to the West, mobility and ability to push forth market-oriented reforms (e.g. Kitschelt 1995). Furthermore, we know that countries in the socialist bloc had significantly different pre-socialist historical legacies, which are likely to have affected their readiness to accept socialism as well as the type of socialist regime that was established (e.g. Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007, Kitschelt 1995). The clustering of all former socialist countries into one group, thus, seems inappropriate as it obscures the salient features of

¹ Mishler and Rose (2001, p. 31) present a discussion (and references) of the cultural theory on trust.

regime types as well as the deeply rooted historical legacies that could have affected the socialist period. To delineate among different types of socialist regimes, we use and improve upon the typology put forth by Kitschelt (1995), which specifically takes into consideration path dependence and pre-socialist historical legacies.

We explore the effect of historical legacies on the political trust of a sub-group of the populations of the post-socialist countries – namely, young people who were born during the years of the demise of socialism and who are likely to become the future political and social elite of their countries or the international communities. These young people are least likely, as compared to the general adult population, to be affected by this historical legacy, but most likely to become involved in the political and social arena of their countries in the future. A finding that the past has a significant influence on this generation of emerging elites would suggest that the claim also holds, potentially even more significantly, for the general populations of these countries and, moreover, that the historical past is not only affecting the present but will have an effect on future developments in the post-socialist world.

Studying young people and emerging elites is important for several reasons. First, the attitudes of young people are crucial for the long run survival of unconsolidated and emerging democracies (Forbrig 2005). Second, the values and behavior of elites are important, because elites – people who "hold important positions, have influential roles and important functions in the polity" (Eldersveld 1989, p. x quoted in Stevens et al. 2006, p.607) –to a large extent control political, economic and social processes (e.g. Bottomore 1993, p. 72; Acemoglu 2005). Third, elites are 'opinion leaders' for the masses (Stevens et al. 2006). Studies not only find that shift in mass attitudes closely reflects changes in elite attitudes (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Hill and Hurley 1999; Zaller 1992), but that elites in democratic polities are more committed to democratic values (e.g. Stein 1998; Sullivan et al. 1993). That is, elites play a crucial role "in establishing norms of democratic conduct" (Stevens et al. 2006, p. 607). Hence, analysis of emerging elites can give some new insights in the ongoing political processes and the future paths of democratic and economic development of transition and developing countries.

We put forth a number of hypotheses on how different historical legacies – socialist and pre-socialist – have affected trust in government. Using individual-level data from an institutional survey, we test our hypotheses empirically. We find that the socialist legacy has a negative effect on trust in government, a result which supports the findings of Uslaner and Badescu (2004) and Rose (2004). However, the strength of the causal effect of the socialist legacy on trust in government is not uniform across socialist countries, but rather varies depending on the particularities of the socialist regime in place. Our results also find support for the claim that the socialist legacy within different republics of the same country (e.g. Yugoslavia) was distinctly different, in part due to pre-socialist historical developments, which through path dependence affected both the socialist past and the post-socialist reality.

Uncovering a differential impact of types of socialist regimes may have important implications for appropriate policy, aimed at fostering political trust as well as at legitimizing democracy more generally. In addition, exploring the differential impact of different socialist regime types might help us shed light on the reasons for the differences in patterns of political participation observed in transition countries (see Letki 2004, p. 670; Kluegel and Mason 1999, p. 46).

Our main contribution to the extensive literature on the determinants of political trust is therefore two-fold. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of the role of initial conditions, and more specifically, type of socialist regimes (and partially pre-socialist historical specifics), for political trust. Thus, our paper contributes to the growing literature on the role of initial conditions for institutional development and performance (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, de Melo et al. 2001, Acemoglu et al. 2001, Zukowski 2004, Berkowitz and Clay 2006).

Second, we focus our research only on young people, who we believe represent the emerging elites of the post-socialist countries. Examining political trust of emerging elites in the post-socialist countries has not been tackled by the existing literature. Most articles that examine determinants of political trust have largely focused on Western established democracies (e.g. Uslaner and Brown 2005; Damico et al. 2000; Fahmy 2006) as opposed to new unstable or consolidating ones (e.g. Mishler and

Rose 2001 and 2005; Uslaner and Badescu 2004; Letki 2004). Furthermore, the majority of existing work (e.g. Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Letki 2004; Brady and Kaplan 2001; Karaman 2004) has focused on countries' general populations. Only a few studies (e.g. Fahmy 2006; Forbrig 2005; Stevens et al. 2006) have given specific attention to young people and/or elites, their involvement in politics and the determinants of their political involvement.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion on the determinants of trust in government. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Determinants of Trust in Government

2.1. The Socialist (and Pre-Socialist) Legacy

The cultural theory of trust holds that trust in political institutions changes slowly, because it is "rooted in cultural norms and communicated through early-life socialization" (Mishler and Rose 2001, p. 31) and, thus, norms and beliefs are inadvertently transmitted from generation to generation. In accord with this, the persistent effect of the socialist experience for (dis)trust in government has been noted by a number of studies (e.g. Rose 2004; Makarová 2004a; Gibson 2001). Socialist regimes managed to instil a deep distrust in the government. First, the regimes determined their political and economic goals based on ideology rather than on needs and in response to citizens' demands (Makarová 2004b, p.12). The lack of responsiveness to citizens' needs and demands, in turn, led to lack of trust in the government. Second, the repressive nature of the socialist regimes led to substantial reliance on 'closed' personal networks and connections as a mechanism to avoid the intrusiveness of the centralized state or even as a direct response to the government's purposeful strategy of instigating suspicion towards other people in the population (Mishler and Rose 2001, p. 39; Gibson 2001, p. 53). Third, to overcome the bureaucratic and restrictive nature of the socialist governance, citizens resorted to bribing government officials as means of getting material comfort (Makarová 2004b, p. 13; Uslaner and Badescu 2004).

Thus, it is natural to expect that, because of the above-mentioned factors, people from former socialist countries are likely to exhibit lower levels of trust in government than people from Western countries. Consequently, we hypothesized that that the socialist legacy negatively impacts trust in

government regardless of whether post-socialist countries failed to democratize or have successfully democratized in the last two decades.

Cultural norms are slow moving institutions (Roland 2004). Given that political (dis)trust in transition countries is the product of decades of repressive socialist rule, we expect the historical legacy of socialism to persist as key determinant of political trust. Moreover, as suggested by Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007), the readiness to accept socialism and the functioning of socialist regimes established in the region could reflect legacies from previous historical periods. Therefore, the functioning of various types of socialism might be in part determined by centuries-old cultural norms, which are likely to possess strong inertia. In line with this argument, we extend our analysis so as to test for the possible influence of pre-socialist legacy along with the socialist legacies. We use Kitschelt's (1995) categorization of socialist regimes to account for the survival of pre-socialist legacies under socialism. Kitschelt (1995) stresses path-dependency in the development of different types of socialism. In particular, he argues that the pre-socialist political regime, economy, and political mobilization had a strong influence on the type of socialist regime that developed in various Central and Eastern European countries (Kitschelt et al. 1999, pp. 19-38).

Socialist regimes were far from uniform. According to Kitschelt (1995, p. 453), "[c]ommunist regimes exhibit at least three different configurations characterized by variations in, first, the extent of 'contestation' over policy-making within and beyond the communist party elite, second, in the leeway for the articulation of popular dissent in the party, and third, in the extent of bureaucratic professionalism (competence, rule adherence, performance orientation) or patronage, corruption, nepotism as operating principles of the state apparatus." Hence, putting all former socialist regimes in one category can be misleading and furthermore, could obscure the differential effects of the three characteristics – contestation, dissent, and bureaucratic professionalism – on trust.

Kitschelt's typology was put forth in the context of analysis of party systems. Hence, it naturally excluded criteria such as economic and social aspects of socialist life, which are important for our purposes. Hence, we include two additional criteria, not tackled by Kitschelt (1995), in our socialist

regime typology: (1) the level of economic freedom, and (2) the overall restrictiveness of the regime. The rationale for the inclusion of these criteria is as follows. First, the level of economic freedom of a regime can be a good predictor for the ability of the regime to provide for its citizens. For example, a regime that allowed more economic freedom was less likely to experience shortages in essential foodstuffs and materials. The lack of shortages and the higher likelihood of material well-being, as well as access to Western markets, provided citizens with some assurance that the state could provide for their needs and consequently increased confidence in the government. Second, overall restrictiveness of the regime was likely to lead to less trust both in other people and in the government. The socialist regimes varied significantly with respect to their overall restrictiveness. Some aspects of restrictiveness are covered by Kitschelt's typology of popular dissent and contestation. However, restrictiveness on travel, personal freedoms, minority rights are also important, but are not included in Kitschelt's criteria.

Building upon Kitschelt's typology, incorporating the two additional criteria on level of economic freedom and overall restrictiveness, and borrowing Kitschelt's (1995 and 2001) labels for types of socialism, we classify all former socialist countries into three types of regimes: Accommodative socialism, Bureaucratic socialism and Patrimonial socialism. According to this typology, Accommodative socialism allowed for intermediate levels of contestation and some dissent (Kitschelt 1995). It was also characterized by the presence of some market-oriented reforms, access to the West (partially due to geographic proximity) and distancing from USSR ideology/political influence. Bureaucratic socialism exhibited a high level of bureaucratic institutionalization – in other words, a high quality of the bureaucracy – but little opportunity for political contestation (Kitschelt 1995). It allowed for some economic freedom but little political freedom. Finally, Patrimonial socialism had low levels of bureaucratic professionalism, and consequently high levels of corruption and nepotism, few opportunities for contestation, little to no economic freedom, high degree of restrictiveness and isolationism, and no access to the West (Kitschelt 1995).

It should be emphasized again that this typology allows for the possibility of a non-uniform effect of type of socialism within socialist country borders. This would suggest that while all republics of former

Yugoslavia shared the same socialist regime, the functioning of the regime might have worked differently in Slovenia and Macedonia, for example. This non-uniform implementation could be a direct consequence of pre-socialist legacies, such as the level of experience with markets prior to socialism as well as the exposure to corruption in the government. Therefore, this typology is suggestive of the effect of long-lasting historical legacies, which have accumulated and evolved over a century or more.

Based on this typology and the above discussion on the significance of each criterion for political trust, we stipulate that socialist regimes that were more deeply plagued by corruption and nepotism instilled in their citizens a profound distrust in government. On the other hand, regimes, which exhibited high level of bureaucratic professionalism, through their adherence to rules and competence, provided consistency and predictability, which led to higher levels of trust in the government. Furthermore, socialist regimes that allowed for more contestation over policy making and popular dissent were less likely to instill a sense of profound distrust in the government.

More specifically, we expect that people from Patrimonial socialist regimes are likely to have the lowest levels of trust in the government, while people from Accommodative socialist regimes are likely to have the highest level of trust in the government among the three types. People from Bureaucratic socialist regimes, thus, are likely to have less trust in the government than people from Accommodative regimes but more than people from Patrimonial regimes.

2.2. Socialist Legacy – An Alternative Classification

It is plausible, however, that differences among socialist regimes simply reflect different responses of socialist leaderships to contemporaneous problems. This, in turn, would suggest that variations in type of socialist regime are not affected by pre-socialist historical specifics, but simply by the socialist reality. If that is the case, then presently independent states that were part of the same socialist state should show similar attitudes with regard to political trust and, thus, should be classified as having had the same type of socialist regime type – i.e. all former Soviet Republics should be classified under a particular type of regime, and so should all Yugoslav republics.

Consequently, as a robustness check, we use an alternative typology, in which we introduce an additional (i.e. fourth) type of socialist regime – Yugoslav socialism. The introduction of this new socialist regime type reflects Yugoslavia’s peculiar place in the socialist bloc. Although a socialist state, it pursued a unique path after the Tito-Stalin split and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist International Bureau in 1948. It consciously distanced itself from the influence and ideology of the Soviet Union. In addition, Yugoslav socialism was characterized by self-management, and therefore higher degree of economic freedom. The cases of Slovenia and Serbia are illustrative of our alternative typology. Under the original typology, Slovenia is treated as an Accommodative socialism country, while Serbia is classified as Patrimonial socialism country. However, they were both republics of Yugoslavia and shared one central government. Hence, under the alternative typology, both Serbia and Slovenia are grouped in one category. Moreover, given the particularities of Yugoslavia – more specifically, the socialism of self-management, which did not exist anywhere else – it is logical to create a new category, which captures only Yugoslav socialism. Thus, Slovenia and Serbia fall under Yugoslav socialism under the alternative typology.

The alternative classification also affects the placement of states outside Yugoslavia. For example, according to our original typology, Latvia, which was a republic of the former Soviet Union, is an Accommodative socialism country and is therefore treated differently from other former Soviet Republics, such as Kyrgyzstan, which is classified as Patrimonial socialism country. In the alternative typology, however, Latvia and Kyrgyzstan are treated as being subjected to the same type of socialism under a central USSR government and are both classified as Patrimonial socialism countries.

In sum, in the alternative typology all Yugoslav republics are grouped in one category – Yugoslav socialism, all Soviet republics in another – Patrimonial socialism. The rest of the countries in our sample remain in the original types to which they were assigned in Typology 1. Under the alternative typology, we stipulate that Yugoslav socialism had less detrimental effect on trust in government, as compared to Patrimonial and Bureaucratic socialism, due to its openness, self-management and consequently lesser

extent of centralization. We maintain the claim that, even under the alternative typology, Patrimonial regimes had a more negative effect on trust than Bureaucratic regimes and Accommodative regimes.

Based on the discussion above, we put forth the following hypotheses. To begin with, in accord with the literature (Makarová 2004a; Uslaner and Badescu 2004; Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Rose 2004) on the relationship between types of socialism and political trust, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: Socialism has a negative effect on trust in government.

Our additional hypotheses test whether different types of socialism affected trust in government differently.

Hypothesis 2: Different types of socialism affected trust in government to varying degrees.

Hypothesis 3: People from Patrimonial socialist regimes have less trust in the government than people from Accommodative socialist regimes.

Hypothesis 4: People from Patrimonial socialist regimes have less trust in government than people from Bureaucratic socialist regimes.

Hypothesis 5: People from Bureaucratic socialist regimes have less trust in the government than people from Accommodative socialist regimes.

Hypothesis 6: People from Yugoslav socialist regimes have more trust in the government than people from Patrimonial socialist regimes.

Hypothesis 7: People from Yugoslav socialist regimes have more trust in the government than people from Bureaucratic socialist regimes.

Figure 1 presents visually the placement of socialism on an ordinal scale, representing political trust. Table 1 summarizes the criteria for the classification of the different types of socialism regimes while Table 2 presents the classification of countries in our sample according to the typologies discussed in this section. While our first classification follows closely Kitschelt's typology, the introduction of the additional two dimensions necessitates a change in the country assignment in three instances. Unlike Kitschelt (1995), we classify Slovakia under Bureaucratic socialism rather than Patrimonial socialism; furthermore, we put Croatia and Slovenia under Accommodative socialism, whereas Kitschelt (1995)

finds their typology unclear. Our second typology in Table 2 draws on our alternative specification, introducing Yugoslav socialism.

2.4. Performance Indicators

Performance-related variables have also been associated with trust. Performance theory stipulates that as rational decision-makers, people base their political trust on observed institutional/government performance rather than on exogenously determined norms or demographic characteristics (Mishler and Rose 2001; Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Kim 2005, Hetherington 1998). Studying ten Central European and former Soviet states, Mishler and Rose's (2001) empirical findings suggest that corruption has a negative effect on trust. Poverty also seems to have a negative influence on trust in a study on South Korea (Kim 2005). Satisfaction with one's financial conditions has positive effect on trust (Catterberg and Moreno 2006).

We do not include performance indicators in our regressions for a number of reasons. First, (economic and political) performance indicators are significantly affected by historical legacies and furthermore, might be affected by trust. An extensive literature has, in fact, established a clear dependence of current performance on initial conditions (see e.g. Beck and Laeven 2005, Berglof and Bolton 2003). Thus, including performance indicators as explanatory variables along with historical legacy variables poses significant estimation problems (due to multicollinearity and possible endogeneity).²

Second, as pointed out by Mishler and Rose (2001, p. 31), "in post-Communist countries, the replacement of undemocratic by democratic regimes necessarily introduces a fundamental institutional discontinuity." We argue that this recent drastic change and the volatility of transition economies and their political environments have made it difficult for individuals to evaluate governments on the basis of their performance.

² Moreover, if performance indicators affect trust, but are simultaneously affected by exogenous variables, such as historical legacy, or by trust, then omitting them from our regressions effectively means that we estimate reduced form equations of political trust on exogenous variables.

This is particularly true for our sample. The majority of students in our sample live outside their home country and rely primarily on scholarship money from the university, which suggests that their financial well being is not directly linked to the economic situation in their country. As a result, the economic well-being of individuals in our sample is, to a large extent, disassociated from government's abilities to provide for its citizens. Thus, at best individuals in our sample can judge government performance on the basis of past experience rather than current performance.

3. Empirical Specification

This section presents a detailed discussion of our data and why it allows us to analyze emerging elites (Section 3.1), the measure of our dependent variable (Section 3.2), and finally the measures of our explanatory variable (Sections 3.3 and 3.4).

3.1. Data on Emerging Elites

We use data from a survey, administered during the 2006/2007 academic year at Central European University (CEU), targeting the population of students officially enrolled at CEU during 2006/2007.

CEU is an international graduate university with students from over 100 countries, where more than 60% of the students come from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (fSU). The mission of the University is "to become a change maker in the region [CEE and fSU] and beyond, with a special focus on contemporary challenges of open society, and democratization."³ In accord with this mission, the majority of CEU students tend to return to their home countries and become active members of the political, economic and social elite of their countries. There are instances where CEU alumni have already become high-ranked government officials, e.g. Estonian Minister of Education; Assistant Minister, Ministry for European Integration of Croatia; Secretary, Council for Regulatory Reform at the Government of the Republic of Serbia. Students from the 2006/2007 cohort (the targeted population of the survey used in this paper) are also well-placed to reach highly influential jobs in the future: they have found employment in the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, The Georgian Ministry of

³ www.ceu.hu (mission)

Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Policy Association for an Open Society in the Czech Republic, the Romanian Institute for Public Policy and the European Environmental Bureau, to name a few.⁴

Figure 2 presents a pie chart of the various areas of job placements of CEU graduates. As can be seen from the chart, more than half of CEU graduates get jobs in non-profit international organizations, advocacy groups and universities/research institutes. Another 12% are employed in the government or in diplomatic service. Given the above mentioned statistics as well as the types of students that CEU attracts with its mission, we argue that our sample allows us to analyze emerging or future elites in the region of CEE and fSU.

Existing surveys, such as the World Values Survey, which have a much bigger sample and a rich pool of survey questions on a variety of individual characteristics, are not well tailored to analyzing emerging elites, which we defined above as the political, social and economic leadership of states. To identify the likely members of the future elite, respondents should be selected on three dimensions at the minimum: age, educational attainment and career placement (or at the least future ambition to pursue a career in business, politics, or academia). None of the existing cross-country databases provides all three of these criteria. For example, to have a career in government or international diplomacy, graduate education is increasingly expected. This is particularly true for the 45 European states that participate in the Bologna process,⁵ where an MA or a PhD degree is a requirement to enter high-level jobs in government or business. However, many databases, including the World Value Survey, do not make a distinction between different types and levels of university education – associate, undergraduate, graduate, professional, and vocational.

⁴ More information on placement of CEU students is available at the CEU Alumni website: http://web.ceu.hu/careers/Alumni_placement.html

⁵ For the full list of participating countries, see http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/EHEA2010/BolognaPedestrians_en.asp#P132_13851.

Although a few surveys (e.g. the European Social Survey) do differentiate between first and second-stage tertiary educational attainment, they do not provide information on the universities where respondents, who are students at the time of the survey, are enrolled. Thus, it is not possible to verify and/or predict their likely job placement. Databases are also generally silent about the career ambition of respondents as well as their field of study and the names of the universities, which could be useful in collecting information on job placements.

Consequently, it is impossible to gauge how likely it is that (student) respondents in the existing surveys will eventually become the future elite of their countries or the international community. Having motivated why our survey, unlike existing surveys, allows us to analyze emerging elites, we proceed with a description of the measures of our variables.

3.2. Measure of Trust in Government

To measure trust in government, we use the following question, borrowed and modified from the World Values Survey: "Based on your experience, how much confidence do you have in the national government? Please answer the question for your home country (or the country where you have lived the longest)." The trust in government variable ranges from 0 (no confidence) to 10 (great deal of confidence).

3.3. Measuring Historical Legacy

The proxies for historical legacy, according to Typology 1, are a set of dummies (SC_1 , SC_2 , SC_3 , and NW). Our control group are students from Western Europe, USA and Canada. SC_1 takes value 1 if an individual comes from a country which had a Bureaucratic socialism regime, 0 otherwise. SC_2 takes value 1 if an individual comes from a country, which had an Accommodative socialism regime, 0 otherwise. SC_3 takes value 1 if an individual comes from a country, which had Patrimonial socialism, 0 otherwise. NW takes value 1 if an individual comes from a country that had other historical background (South America, Africa, Asia excluding socialist countries).

As mentioned in Section 2, we use an alternative typology, Typology 2, to check the robustness of our results. This typology assumes that all republics of the Soviet Union were subjected to the same

restrictive system and repressive policies and hence, fall in the category of Patrimonial socialism. Moreover, the typology assumes that all Yugoslav republics benefited equally from self-management, political disassociation from the USSR and access to Western ideas and hence all fall in a new category, labelled Yugoslav socialism. Thus, in the robustness test specification, we introduce one more historical legacy dummy variable, SC₄, which takes value 1 if an individual comes from former Yugoslavia and 0 otherwise.

Table 2 shows the typology of all countries in our sample according to historical legacy. The typology in column 1 follows largely Kitschelt's classification. The typology in column 2 follows the alternative classification based on the territory of the socialist states.

3.4 Control Variables

While our primary concern is to analyze the effect of the socialist legacies on trust, we control for the effect of interpersonal trust on political trust. Although some authors have disputed the link between interpersonal trust and trust in institutions and organisations (e.g. Miller et al. 2004, Mishler and Rose 2001), we follow Lane (1959), Cole (1973), and Damico et al. (2000) and stipulate that if a person has overall trust in people, (s)he is more likely to project that trust onto his/her trust in institutions and organisations. Alternatively, a person who has experienced significant hardship and little support within the society is likely to distrust people and have little confidence in the government.

To measure trust in people, we use the following question, borrowed and modified from the World Values Survey: "Generally speaking (not just at CEU), would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be careful when dealing with people." The 'trust in people' variable ranges from 0 (you can never be too cautious) to 10 (you can trust most people).

Demographic and socio-economic variables have also been identified as potential determinants of trust in government (see e.g. Espinal et al. 2006, Uslaner and Badescu 2004, p.19). Mishler and Rose (2001), for example, find that age matters – older citizens tend to have more trust in the government than younger people. Kim (2005) finds a significant negative effect of education on trust. Catterberg and Moreno (2006), on the other hand, find that both age and gender do not significantly affect trust. Because

of the homogeneity of our data with regard to most socio-economic and demographic variables, we do not expect these factors to play a role, but we nevertheless include them as control variables. The demographic variables included in our analysis are gender, age and education (i.e. degree pursued). Since CEU provides only graduate education, the degree variable indicates if the student is enrolled in a Master's, Doctoral, or Non-degree program at the time of the survey.

4. Discussion of Results

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Tables 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics. The average age of respondents is 26 years, with the largest number of students in the 22 to 30 age cohort. Approximately half of the survey participants are female, which gives a balanced gender representation. As indicated in Table 3, survey respondents have, on average, some trust in people (5.88 on the scale of 0 to 10), but relatively low trust in the national government (3.93). On average, individuals from former socialist countries trust the government less than individuals from non-socialist countries (see Table 4). Furthermore, a quick glimpse at descriptive statistics in Table 4 reveals that on average individuals from Patrimonial socialist regimes have the lowest level of trust in government (3.23), followed by individuals from Bureaucratic socialist regimes (3.70). People from Accommodative socialist regimes have on average less trust in government than people from the West but more than people from Non-West, non-socialist countries.

4.2. The Role of Socialism for Political Trust: OLS Results

In this section we report our regression results on the role of different types of socialist regimes on trust in government. We test our hypotheses using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).⁶ Table 5 shows results from our regressions on the determinants of trust in government.

In Table 5, Column 1 we regress trust in national government on the Bureaucratic, Accommodative and Patrimonial socialism dummies, the Non-West non-socialist dummy, and control variables. The typology of socialist countries follows Typology 1, described in detail in Section 2. All

⁶ The literature on institutions and development (has demonstrated the validity of and) resorts to the use of OLS to estimate regressions with ordinal dependent variables rather than ordered probit (e.g. Acemoglu et. al 2002, Beck & Laeven 2006).

three socialist regime variables enter the regression negatively; two of them, Patrimonial and Bureaucratic socialism, enter significantly at the 5% level. Accommodative socialism enters significantly at the 10% level. This supports our claim that each of the three types of socialist regimes led, on average, to lower trust in government when compared to Western Europe (Hypothesis 1). A test of joint significance of all socialist regime variables yields an F-statistic of 8.19, which also provides a confirmation of Hypothesis 1 that socialism had a negative effect on trust in government.

We next use an F-test to check the null hypothesis that the three socialist dummies are the same. The resulting F-statistic, 4.96, suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis of equality (Hypothesis 2). This result supports our claim that different types of socialism have affected trust in government to varying degrees.

Consequently, we test empirically whether each of the three dummies, capturing types of socialism, is statistically different from the other two dummies. We find that the effect of Patrimonial socialism is statistically significantly different from the effect of Accommodative socialism (indicated in table 5 with the superscript P on Accommodative socialism). Moreover, our results, following expectations, show that people from Patrimonial socialism regimes have lower levels of trust in the national government than people from Accommodative socialist regimes (Hypothesis 3). Patrimonial socialism instilled in people a profound distrust for government due to its repressive policies, corrupt practices, and economic policies of isolationism. Accommodative socialism, on the other hand, due to its relative tolerance for some dissent, market-oriented economic reforms, and importantly, access or proximity to the West, had a weaker, and significantly different from Patrimonial socialism, negative effect.

The functioning of these two socialist regime types could reflect the pre-socialist legacies. Countries classified under Patrimonial socialism are successors of the Ottoman Empire or the Russian Empire. In both cases, there was little or virtually no experience with markets prior to the 20th century. Moreover, there was significant isolationism from the West and a persistence of corruption and nepotism. On the other hand, countries under Accommodative socialism had significant exposure to Western ideas

as well as geographic proximity to the West. Thus, the differential impact of Patrimonial vs. Accommodative socialist legacy on trust in the government could partly capture the effect of pre-socialist legacy.

We do not find support for Hypothesis 4, which stipulates that the effects of Patrimonial socialism regimes, and of Bureaucratic socialism regimes, on trust in government are different. We also do not find support for Hypothesis 5 that the effects of Accommodative socialism regimes, and of Bureaucratic socialism, on trust in government are different. Both results could potentially be explained by the fact that Bureaucratic socialism was an in-between type of socialism – it provided more economic freedom, less economic hardship and higher bureaucratic quality than the Patrimonial regimes, but was more politically repressive than Accommodative socialism. In terms of the data, it is plausible that these two results of insignificance are driven by the much smaller number of observations we have for Bureaucratic socialism, as opposed to Patrimonial and Accommodative socialism. One other possible explanation for the lack of significance could be the particular classification of countries we relied on. Hence, we proceed with a discussion of our results using the alternative typology of countries into regime types.

4.3. Alternative Typology of Socialist Regime Types: Robustness Check

As a robustness check, we regress trust in government on the historical dummies defined under the alternative typology of socialist regimes, discussed in detail in Section 2. Table 5, column 2 presents our results. We find that all types of socialism, with the exception of Accommodative socialism, have a significant negative effect on trust in government (as compared to the control group – West). Hence, the empirical results, similarly to the results in the previous section, provide support for Hypothesis 1.

The insignificant effect of the Accommodative socialism dummy under the alternative specification, suggests that this type of socialism, when compared to the West, does not seem to explain variation in trust in the national government. The two countries– Hungary and Poland – included in this regime type had significant economic reforms, political freedoms and access to the West. Moreover, unlike typology 1, the Accommodative socialism type here excludes Yugoslav Republics (Slovenia and

Croatia) and fSU Republics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). The aforementioned republics had some economic freedom, access to the West and some opportunity for dissent in a local context. However, all these freedoms might have been partially counterbalanced by the actions of the central governments of Yugoslavia and USSR respectively. It should be emphasized that both in the case of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, the central socialist governments were located outside of the borders of these republics; the potential imposition from outside of approaches, ideas and priorities, could have been perceived as a form of imperialism and as such, left a remnant of dis(trust) in government. This, in turn, could explain why Accommodative socialism had a significant negative effect, when compared to Western Europe, under the original typology but not under the alternative typology.

A test of joint significance of all socialist regime variables in Column 2 of Table 5 yields an F-statistic of 7.88, which suggests that the socialist historical legacies, and distinguishing socialist legacies by type, help explain cross-sectional differences in trust in national government (Hypotheses 1 and 2).

We find that the effect of Patrimonial socialism is statistically significantly different from the effect of Accommodative socialism (indicated with the superscript P on Accommodative socialism). Furthermore, people from Patrimonial socialism regimes, on average, have lower levels of trust in the national government than people from Accommodative socialist regimes (Hypothesis 3). The result supports the view that Hungary and Poland, both of which experienced reforms during socialism and had more market-oriented development prior to socialism, were less negatively influenced than states with more repressive socialist systems and little experience with market economies.

Furthermore, we find that Accommodative socialism is statistically significantly different from Yugoslav socialism (indicated with the superscript A on Yugoslav socialism). People from former Yugoslavia, according to our results, have lower levels of trust than people from Accommodative socialism.

Surprisingly, we also find that people from former Yugoslavia, on average, have lower trust in the national government than people from Patrimonial regimes (conflicting Hypothesis 7). This result is contrary to our expectation that self-management as well as freedom of movement and distancing from

the Soviet Union led to a smaller negative effect of Yugoslav socialism on trust in government as compared to Soviet socialism, for example. This could be attributed to the fact that we group countries like Serbia and Slovenia in one category, when it is plausible that the socialist reality in these two republics was distinctly different, perhaps also due to pre-socialist initial conditions. While Slovenia and Croatia were part of the Habsburg Empire, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia were under Ottoman rule for four or more centuries. As mentioned earlier, this more distant historical legacy could have long-lasting influence and could have contributed to a divergence in the levels of trust within former Yugoslavia. If that is the case, the common Yugoslav socialist legacy might be offset by the Ottoman or Habsburg legacies, which will render the original typology (in line with Kitschelt's) more appropriate. Furthermore, the events of the 1980s and 1990s in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, could have contributed to significant changes of trust in the government, which might be the reason for the significant negative effect of the Yugoslav dummy.

In sum, the results from the tests using the two typologies suggest that the classification of socialist regime types, which takes into consideration pre-socialist legacies and assumes heterogeneous effects of socialism within the borders of a country, might be more appropriate and better able to capture the varying degrees of economic freedoms, mobility, bureaucratic quality and contestation.

4.4. The Effect of Control Variables on Political Trust

Having analyzed the effect of types of socialism on trust in government, we now turn to a discussion of the other explanatory variables. We find a statistically significant positive effect of interpersonal trust on trust in government in regressions with both historical classifications. This result confirms the claims of Lane (1959), Cole (1973), and Damico et al. (2000) that interpersonal trust affects political trust. Moreover, our results cast doubt on Kim's (2005) findings that there is a negative relationship between political trust and social trust.

Some studies (Muller and Seligson 1994; Brehm and Rahn 1997) have suggested that interpersonal trust is affected by trust in government or alternatively that interpersonal trust is affected by the socialist past. Thus, including interpersonal trust as an explanatory variable could potentially lead to

an endogeneity problem or to a change in the values of the coefficients on our socialist dummy variables. In the absence of a good choice of instrumental variables in case of an endogeneity problem and to address the concern that interpersonal trust might also be affected by socialist legacies, we run the regressions with and without interpersonal trust to see if there is any significant change in results. Column (3) of Table 5 presents results without interpersonal trust as an explanatory variable. The exclusion of trust in people for the most part (with the exception of Accommodative socialism) does not seem to change the sign and significance of the relationship between historical legacy and trust in government, which leads us to conclude that the inclusion of trust does not bias significantly our results on the impact of historical legacies on political trust. We find that age, gender and degree do not have any significant effect on trust. This is in line with our expectation, given the specificities of our sample and the focus of this paper.

5. Conclusion

This article has put forth historical legacy as a determinant of trust in government of young people, who are likely to become the future elites of their countries and the international community. Our empirical results indicate that historical legacy explains much variation in individuals' trust in government. The paper not only suggests that post-socialist states should not be treated as a homogeneous group, but that the question of when and how Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is likely to catch up with the West is not the central question to pursue.

Confirming the results of Uslaner and Badescu (2004) and Catterberg and Moreno (2006), we find that the socialist legacy matters, as it negatively affects trust in government. Furthermore, our results indicate that distinguishing between different types of socialism is instrumental in explaining trust in government. This suggests that we cannot treat the post-socialist countries as one homogeneous group. Furthermore, it suggests that conventional labelling – consolidating democracy, consolidated democracy, authoritarian state – of Central and Eastern European countries cannot adequately predict the level of trust. We account for one dimension of the heterogeneity that exists among post-socialist countries. This

heterogeneity, in turn, might have important implications for the appropriate policies aimed at fostering political trust and, indirectly, political participation.

Since our study focuses on young people, who are least likely to have been affected by the socialist legacy, our results imply that the effect of type of socialist legacy, as well as pre-socialist path dependence, on trust of the general populations of these countries might be even stronger. Furthermore, our study focuses on emerging elites – thus, the dynamics of political trust, described in this paper, might have long-lasting implications for the political and social developments of the post-socialist states. For example, some scholars have suggested that "political participation thrives on distrust" (Uslaner and Brown 2003, p. 13). In that case, our empirical results on emerging elites could suggest that countries that had repressive socialist regimes are likely to experience more dynamic democratic development in the imminent future than countries with less repressive regimes, which might be more complacent about democracy building.

Further research could seek to test the effects of historical legacy on data of emerging elites that is more comprehensive in scope and size, such as the top graduates in Social Sciences of national universities of countries in the region.

Figure 1: The expected placement of types of socialism on an ordinal scale of political trust:





Figure 2: Areas of Employment of CEU graduates

Area of employment (all CEU graduates)



Source : CEU Alumni Office, <http://web.ceu.hu/careers/GraduatesStatistics.html>

Table 1: Criteria for Typology of Socialist Regimes

| Type of Socialism | Features (based on Kitschelt (1995)) |
|--------------------------|---|
| Accommodative socialism | Intermediate levels of contestation Some dissent Reforms (market-oriented) Some access to West Desire for independence from USSR ideology/political influence |
| Patrimonial socialism | Low level of bureaucratic professionalism Low opportunities for contestation No dissent Highly restrictive No economic freedom No access to West |
| Bureaucratic socialism | High level of bureaucratic institutionalisation Little opportunity for political contestation |
| Yugoslav socialism | Self-management Free movement to the West Desire for independence from USSR ideology/political influence Intermediate levels of contestation Some dissent |

Sources: Kitschelt (1995), Kitschelt (2001) and authors' classification

Table 2: Historical Legacy Typology

| Category | Countries (Typology based on Kitschelt 1995) | Countries (Alternative Typology) |
|--|--|--|
| Yugoslav socialism | None | Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro |
| Bureaucratic socialism | Czech Republic, Slovakia | Czech Republic, Slovakia |
| Accommodative socialism | Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia | Hungary, Poland |
| Patrimonial socialism | Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Mongolia | Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Mongolia Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania |
| "West" | Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States | |
| "Non West" i.e. non-socialist rest of the world (Africa, Asia, Latin America) | Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine Autonomy Territory, South Africa, Sudan, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey | |

Note on Table 2: We exclude individuals who are citizens of currently socialist regimes (China, Vietnam), first because we do not have enough cases, and, second, due to the fact that analysing presently socialist states captures a somewhat different phenomenon from the one we set out to explore.

Table 3: Summary Statistics

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|------------|
| Gender | 445 | 1.503371 | .5005514 | 1 | 2 |
| Age | 434 | 26.92166 | 3.816621 | 21 | 46 |
| Trust in People | 438 | 5.883562 | 2.230977 | 0 | 10 |
| Trust National Government | 436 | 3.931193 | 2.556909 | 0 | 10 |

Source : CEU Survey

Scale of variables: gender (1-male, 2-female), trust in people (0 to10), trust in national government (0 to 10)

Table 4: Trust in Government by Historical Legacy

| Historical Legacy | Mean | St. Dev. |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Patrimonial socialism | 3.23 | 0.178 |
| Bureaucratic socialism | 3.70 | 0.446 |
| Accommodative socialism | 4.2 | 0.236 |
| Non-west, non-socialist | 4.08 | 0.459 |
| West | 4.89 | 0.323 |

Table 5: Determinants of Trust in Government

| Independent Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Trust in people | .290*** (4.92) | .307*** (5.29) | |
| Non-Western countries (excluding socialist) | -.546 (0.90) | -.597 (-0.97) | -.477 (0.78) |
| Yugoslav socialism | | -2.435*** ^{A, P} (4.86) | |
| Bureaucratic socialism | -1.280** (2.36) | -1.291** (2.40) | -1.232** (2.14) |
| Accommodative socialism | -.829* ^P (1.94) | -.746 ^{P, Y} (1.61) | -.672 (1.61) |
| Patrimonial socialism | -1.797*** (4.55) | -1.619*** ^{A, Y} (4.01) | -1.757 *** (4.62) |
| Age | -.052 (1.36) | -.0471 (1.16) | -.039 (1.01) |
| Degree | .129 (0.40) | .063 (0.19) | .055 0.16 |
| Gender | -.280 (1.10) | -.299 (1.17) | -.257 (1.01) |
| Obs. | 381 | 381 | 393 |
| R-Squared | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.07 |

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; reported t-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors. The tables report significance level for two-tailed tests.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%

^A Significantly different from Accommodative socialism Dummy

^P Significantly different from Patrimonial socialist Dummy

^Y Significantly different from Yugoslav socialist Dummy

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