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**Master Thesis**

**Integrated Missions**  
**The Challenge of Planning and Command**

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## Abstract

Civil-Military Integration is a growing trend in modern peace operations. Most leading nations and international organisations are developing integrated structures at strategic levels and have started to change their doctrines to include a broader spectrum of tools disposable to the national as well as the international community. The UN has established and is implementing their concept of Integrated Missions which aims to link the long term development and short term peacekeeping effort into their peace-building strategy.

This thesis is analysing this concept, focusing on the planning and structuring of Integrated Missions and exploring what consequences it will have to the military component. First the thesis reviews some of the important historical developments toward civil-military integration and multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping during the 1990s. The Military Force Commander became a military adviser to a political leader, and the UN operations became more civil in form and function and the military's task portfolio widened to include an increasingly number of non-military tasks. Further the thesis is establishing a theoretical model of an integrated mission in a wider peace building context involving the humanitarian sector, the UN country team and the non-governmental organisations. Planning and structure of a mission is focused. This model is then brought to the practical level by doing a single case study of the ongoing UN Mission in Sudan, focusing on the planning, the establishment and structure as mandated in Security Resolution 1590. This mission seems to be well integrated already from the beginning involving the UN Country Team in the strategy and planning. The mission has a unified plan coordinated with the humanitarian work plan for Sudan.

The concept of Integrated Mission implies that the military component must share their planning, information, staff and logistics with the civilian sector in the operations. The UN is focusing on implementation of the concept in their future missions, establishing more integrated structures at mission HQ level and more integrated processes at all levels. The military must provide more expertise in form of intelligence and joint level staff experiences in order to establish the new integrated structures. Further the humanitarian sector of the UN (OCHA) and the peacekeeping sector (DPKO) seem to focus on coordination of their policy documents and de-confliction of roles especially when it comes to the military involvement in humanitarian efforts. Integration is much about understanding roles; avoiding duplication of effort and trying to bring synergies in a comprehensive strategy.



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## Abbreviations

AU	African Union
AMIS	African Union Mission in the Sudan
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination (UN) Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO)
CIVPOL	UN Civilian Police
CMOC	Civil Military Operation Centre
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
EU	European Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GO	Governmental Organisation
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
IMPT	Integrated Mission Planning team
ISS	Integrated Support Services
ITF	Interdepartmental Task Force
JLOC	Joint Logistic Operations Centre
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
MONUC	Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPCON	Operational Control
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRT	Provisional Reconstruction Teams
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PBSO	Peace Building Support Office
PBC	Peace Building Commission
RC	Resident Coordinator
SMT	Senior Management Team
SHIRBRIG	Multinational United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade
SG	Secretary General
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission to Sudan
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UMAC	Unified Mission Analysis Centre
UNMIK	United Nation Mission in Kosovo
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNOSOM	United Nation Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nation Protection Force
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program



## 1 Introduction

Civil-Military integration has become the dominating trend in the international community's response to conflict and crisis. Seminars, articles and discussions are now marked by the new buzzwords; "Integrated Approach", "Comprehensive Approach", "System Wide Thinking", "The Whole of Government Approach" etc.<sup>1</sup> The military forces are increasingly involved in non-military tasks, supporting humanitarian actors, doing reconstruction work, supporting local elections and so on. Joint civil-military operations are ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq with so-called Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT).<sup>2</sup> The trend indicates that civil-military integration not only is a strategic initiative but also part of the development on the ground. The blurring of the civilian and military sphere is in other words moving to a new dimension and the field of civil-military relations will probably be even more important in future operations. These ideas and trends are a logic consequence of the complex environment facing all actors involved in post conflict peace-building operations.

Today the international community, including the United Nations (UN) is involved in a record high number of peace operations of which most involves peace-building or nation building efforts.<sup>3</sup> The UN is involved in 15 different peacekeeping missions covering the whole spectrum of operations, from traditional monitoring missions via complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping to running de facto a UN protectorate in Kosovo.<sup>4</sup> Most missions and their mandates combine the political, security, humanitarian, development, and human rights dimensions in the post conflict phase. The UN is also increasingly working together with regional organisations like North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) in so-called "hybrid operations" in which the UN provide one component.<sup>5</sup>

The UN response to the increasingly complex environment is the concept of Integrated Missions which aims to achieve better coherence and unity of effort between the development and peace-building actors, the humanitarian actors and the UN peacekeeping missions.

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<sup>1</sup> Stuart Gordon. "The Changing role of the military in assistance strategies" *Research Report 21: Resetting the rules of engagement: Trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations* (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2006), pp. 39-51.

<sup>2</sup> For a good description on the development of PRTs, see Robert M. Perito, "The US experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified", *Special Report*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), available at: [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org).

<sup>3</sup> Ian Johnstone (ed), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007: A project of the Centre on International Cooperation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note 31 March 2007" (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2007): <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>

<sup>5</sup> Bruce Jones, with Feydal Cherif "Evolving Models of Peacekeeping Policy Implications & Responses", *External Study* (2003), available at: [pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library)

Integration is stated to be the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peace-building (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, and rule of law and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy.”<sup>6</sup>

The only in depth study on the subject, the *Report on Integrated Missions* published in 2005 concludes that the success of the implementation is mixed.<sup>7</sup> There seems to be lack of understanding of the system, each others roles, culture and lack of common doctrines and procedures. Most of the criticism has come from the humanitarian community which seems to have the biggest resistance towards the concept. The main problem for the humanitarian actors seems to be their fear of being part of the political agenda and thereby part of the conflict, with the consequence of becoming targeted by spoilers (some examples have aroused from Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan).<sup>8</sup> Protection of the so-called “humanitarian space” where they can uphold their principles of impartiality, neutrality, and humanity is highlighted in their criticism. The report highlights that the problems of integration are centred on structure and processes. There is no culture for integrated processes and the stow-piped structure within the UN system as well as within the missions hampers the integration processes. The report suggests improvement along three broad lines: Mission planning, mission design and leadership and management.<sup>9</sup> From the military point of view there seems to be no critical discussion towards integration, despite the fact that it might affect the military component in several areas.

Since the military still is the dominant component in most of the UN peacekeeping missions and that the whole mission largely depends on military assets it seems obvious that more integrated structures and processes will affect the military. Civil-military interaction in the planning, in the structures and ultimately on the ground will probably increase. The question is how, and to what extent? Assuming that integration is something more than just coordination it seems logical that civilian actors will be more involved in military planning at different levels, and vice versa. Will there be a need for a civil-military integrated headquarters at the field level in order to succeed with this concept and if so, what challenges will that bring to the table? Integrated planning processes must be developed, sharing of information and intelligence, interoperability in procedures and systems may be needed.

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<sup>6</sup> Kofi Annan, “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions” (New York, The Secretary General, 2006), p.1

<sup>7</sup> Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, Karen von Hippel, “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations”, *External Study* (2005).

<sup>8</sup> Erin A Weir, “Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative”, KAIPTC Monograph (Accra, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2006).

<sup>9</sup> Eide, et al, 2005, pp 38-43.

Improved communication, coordination, and cooperation across components at all levels are probably needed, and thereby the CIMIC (civil military coordination)<sup>10</sup> functions must be strengthened. How will the command and control issues be solved, not unimportant to the military component given earlier troubled experiences from Somalia and Bosnia?<sup>11</sup>

### **Problem**

Based on the above-described trends and development towards an Integrated Missions approach and possible challenges my research question will be:

*How will an Integrated Mission affect the military role and function in a peacekeeping mission?*

In order to answer this question I will focus the research to the following three issues:

- 1) What is the reason behind integration and who is to be integrated from the complex of actors involved in peace-building in a post conflict environment?
- 2) How is the UN planning their Integrated Missions and how is the integrated approach reflected in mandates, plans and concept of operations (CONOPS)?
- 3) How the structure of an Integrated Mission organised and what is the military role and function in an Integrated Concept?

### **The scope and argument for the study**

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the concept of Integrated Mission, how it is planned and organised and ultimately how the increased civil-military integration will affect the military component when it comes to planning and command of missions. The thesis will give an overview of the concept, the status and how the UN is approaching the concept in their missions in the field. The main reason for studying the UN explicit is the fact that UN peacekeeping missions in many ways has had a civil-military structure in their operations since the early 1990s and thereby it should be possible to find experiences and lessons from earlier operations. The UN is also the only organisation able, at least in theory, to bring all actors together in a truly integrated approach. The latest developments and the growing importance of UN operations, especially to the Norwegian Government is also an argument for this study.

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<sup>10</sup> The term CIMIC is a contested concept with many different definitions. UN is using coordination while NATO uses civil-military cooperation, the US is using CMO (civil military operations), and the UN and humanitarian community are using civil-military coordination (CMCoord).

<sup>11</sup> David Alberts, Richard E. Hayes, *Command arrangements for Peace Operations* (Washington: National Defence University, 1995).

## Definition of key terms

This paragraph will clarify some key concepts important in order to understand the overall context of the integrated approach and the UN terminology. The UN is categorising their response to conflicts as follows:<sup>12</sup>

- **Preventive Diplomacy** is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.
- **Peace-making** is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.
- **Peacekeeping** is a United Nations presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of agreements relating to the control of conflicts (cease fires, separation of forces, etc) and their location (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.
- **Peace-enforcement** may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
- **Peace-building** is critical in the aftermath of conflict...it includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid relapse into conflict.

## Peacekeeping

The classic distinction between the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building effort is not that clear anymore and today the different categories intermingles. Peacekeeping is as described above, a UN presence in the field with some kind of observers or formed units, police or military, normally aiming to stabilise a situation after an agreement to end the conflict has been reached. Peacekeeping is not intended to be a long term project although some missions last for decades. Peace-building missions are normally political missions focusing on political long term assistance to the country involved, and do not involve formed military or police units. The challenge today is that peacekeeping missions has become more complicated, and has increasingly entered the peace-building sphere. The Brahimi Report stated that peace-building had become an integral part of all peacekeeping operations.<sup>13</sup> The

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<sup>12</sup> United Nations, *General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations* (New York: DPKO, 1995), pp. 5-6.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations, A/55/305 - S/2000/809, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (New York: UN, 2000), para 35.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) sees peacekeeping as a distinction to peace-building, but acknowledges that multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions are complementing the peace-building effort. In the “UN Guidelines on Integrated Missions Planning Process”(IMPP) it is stated: “...the United Nations sometimes mounts multi-disciplinary peace support operations of which a peacekeeping mission is a component”.<sup>14</sup> In other words the peacekeeping missions have become a part of the peace-building effort, but still distinct from a peace-building mission which is political, normally led by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA).<sup>15</sup>

The UN categorises the peacekeeping operations in three broad categories: Traditional Peacekeeping, Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping and Transitional Administration.<sup>16</sup> Traditional peacekeeping features response to inter-state conflicts, typically an observer/verifying mission or a buffer between parties with military force (UN Interim Force in Lebanon is one example). Multi-dimensional peacekeeping features respond to intra-state conflicts, proactive support to parties, involving civilian and military capabilities and a wide area of tasks, including those normally in the category of peace-building (UN missions in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti are examples). Transitional administration involves UN temporary authority over the civil functions and administration in a given country or province of a country. This includes authority over the legislative, executive and judicial structures (UN Mission in Kosovo and Timor Leste are two examples). Transitional administration is highly complex, and implies involvement from the broad spectrum of those capacities normally needed to run a country (Economic, Health, Police, Military, Customs, Political, and Energy etc).

### **Methodology**

To answer the problem and questions raised in this thesis I will rely on a qualitative exploratory research design combining what can be called status and case study approaches. Status research implies a representative or selected sample of one or more phenomena is examined to determine its special characteristics.<sup>17</sup> In this thesis the characteristics of the UN Integrated Missions will be the phenomena to examine. The aim is to understand the background, the development and ultimately to provide a theoretical framework for the discussion. This will be an ideal model which can be analyzed and discussed towards a case

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<sup>14</sup> DPKO, “Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General (2006).

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, Department of Political Affairs web page: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/fieldmissions.html>

<sup>16</sup> Challenges of Peace Operations Project, “Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations-draft 2-07/08/06” (2006), pp. 10-14. Available at: <http://www.challengesproject.net>

<sup>17</sup> Chris Hart, *Doing Your Masters Dissertation* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2005).

representing the reality in operations. The Case study will explore how the concept of Integrated Mission is approached in reality and bring differences and challenges to the table for discussion and analysis.

Data collection will rely on secondary and primary techniques. Secondary means reviewing literature, documents and data collected for other purpose than the study at hand.<sup>18</sup> This technique is relevant in order to establish an understanding of the peacekeeping context, the status of the Integrated Mission concept and the theoretical framework. Primary techniques imply data collection from sources related to the topic and the problem.<sup>19</sup> The primary collection will rely on informal conversations and briefings from a sample of personnel serving in UN headquarters in New York and conversations with officers and civilians who have served in different UN missions lately. For the case study I will use official documents, some semi structured interviews and conversations with a sample of officers in central positions able to provide a broader picture and understanding.

Case selection is a challenge since the UN is involved in a wide range of different missions, and according to the literature no mission is alike. For this research I will rely on a case, which at least involves the complexity of actors and a military component, and preferably is defined as an Integrated Mission. In other words a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation will be the case to choose. The term “integrated” has so far only occurred as part of the mission name in the current police operation in Timor Leste (UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste) and in the two latest established political missions established in 2005 and 2006 (UN integrated office in Sierra Leone and Burundi).<sup>20</sup> According to the *Report on Integrated Missions* all missions should in principle be integrated, at least those started recreantly. The multi-dimensional missions described in literature as integrated, is the former mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the ongoing mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the mission in Congo (MONUC), and also the mission in Sudan (UNMIS).<sup>21</sup>

My selection will be to look closer into UNMIS for three main reasons. Firstly it is the latest multi-dimensional mission established (2005); secondly it involves the complexity of actors needed to point out the challenges I’m looking for in my thesis; thirdly it gives me access to sources and documentation, which is quite good since Norwegian officers have

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<sup>18</sup> Hart, 2005, pp. 354-362.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note 31 March 2007”: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote>.

<sup>21</sup> Eide, et al, 2005.

served or are serving in central staff positions within the mission. I have also access to officers who were involved in the planning for the start up of the mission and thereby could provide some reliable information on the integration challenges in that aspect. Even though I study UNMIS especially, I will also use some lessons identified from other missions in the discussion. The literature will provide a range of lessons learned and identified from several missions, and briefings from strategic level will involve lessons from the broader picture.

#### **Sources, literature and research status**

This paragraph will give an overview of the sources I have relied on in this study, and also an overview of the past research within the field of Integrated Missions. Finding and selection of the most relevant literature for research on this topic has been a challenge. There is an overwhelming amount of literature within the field of peacekeeping, but hardly any covering Integrated Missions explicit. Writings on Integrated Missions are limited to the already mentioned independent study *Report on Integrated Missions* published in 2005, some conference reports on the subject,<sup>22</sup> and several critical articles from the humanitarian community. Two examples which give a good overview are: “Resetting the rules of engagement, trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations,” published by Humanitarian Policy Group in 2006<sup>23</sup>, and “Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the humanitarian Imperative”, a monograph published by the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Centre in 2006.<sup>24</sup> Another example is the study report “Challenges to humanitarian Space”<sup>25</sup> from the Monitoring and Steering Group in Liberia, which is a more in depth study on civil-military interaction in the field. Generally the writing from the humanitarian side is dealing with the problems of civil-military integration in the field, and the problem of military interference into their spheres.

The *Report on Integrated Missions* will provide a basis for my study, since it is the only in depth past research of the topic, and the core document the UN seems to rely on when it comes to implementing the concept. The report is the result of an independent study of how well the integration ambition was implemented in 6 different UN missions. The study group conducted field visits to the missions and conducted over 700 interviews and thereby I will consider the report to be quite reliable. This report was followed by a conference on the topic

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<sup>22</sup> Kari Osland (ed), *The UN & Integrated Missions*” *Conference Proceedings* (2005).

<sup>23</sup> Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, ”Resetting the rules of engagement: Trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations” (2006), available at: [www.odihpn.org](http://www.odihpn.org)

<sup>24</sup> Weir, 2006.

<sup>25</sup> Sida Lewis, “Challenges to Humanitarian Space” (Liberia, Monitoring Steering Group, 2005).

in Oslo in 2005 which aimed to discuss the recommendations from the previous report.<sup>26</sup> The conclusion from this conference was broadly speaking the same as the previous report. All agreed that integration was the way to make the UN more effective, and there was consensus on implementing inclusive planning processes. Further it was stated that many UN missions now are focusing on integration, but that the degree varies. It was also stated that not everything should be integrated, and that the situation in the field should decide how, and in what degree the mission should integrate. Higher level of violence implied less integration and need for independency from the humanitarian sector. Asymmetric integration was suggested, deeper integration in development sector, lighter in humanitarian. When it comes to ongoing research, the Norwegian Government has initiated a project on Integrated Missions as a follow-up of the conference held in Oslo.<sup>27</sup> This project is in the form of a series of workshops, coordinated with the UN's doctrine development project. This is an ongoing project which aims to concretise how the UN should be able to implement the integration ambitions in the future.

In order to get a better overview of the topic and of the development of UN peacekeeping, it has been necessary to look into the literature from a different angle. Firstly I have tried to get an overview of the UN development in different operations throughout the 1990s by studying some of the latest published literature and secondly concentrated on literature covering civil-military relations more explicit. Besides from published books found at the library most of the relevant sources are available at the Internet. I have downloaded many reports and documents from official web pages from different institutions. Of course there is a danger that the sources not are credible on the web, but I have only used official web pages from normally credible institutions. UN's web page "UN.org" is a good address to get access to resolutions, documents and lessons learned studies. The page also has good links to other important sources like OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The "Centre on International Cooperation" located at New York City University has also been used in order to get access to lessons learned reports and reviews of past peace operations. This is a research institution funded by 36 different institutions including the government of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, UK, Netherlands, Japan, Ireland and Canada, doing research on peace operations. The Centre has published four literature reviews on peacekeeping managed by Ian Johnstone. The latest of these:" Recent Thinking on Peacekeeping: Comprehensive Literature Review No. 4" covers

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<sup>26</sup> Kari Osland (ed), "The UN & Integrated Missions, Conference Proceedings" (Oslo, NUPI, 2005).

<sup>27</sup> See Norway Mission to the UN: <http://www.norway-un.org/News/missions+project.htm>



the most relevant writing within the field of peacekeeping and were quite helpful to get the first overview.<sup>28</sup> The literature is dominated by case studies, especially inductive studies that draw lessons from practice. The studies of UN record; their problems and failures during the 1990s still dominate the literature. However there are several works published recently that seems to balance the negative view with more positive studies.<sup>29</sup>

The UN development of the 1990s is covered in a multitude of literature and studies. I have chosen to rely on the recently published *United Nations Interventionism 1991-2004*, which is a sample of eight case studies of major UN interventions starting with Cambodia in 1992, ending with Sierra Leone in 2000-01. Further I have focused on two important works covering civil-military relations in peacekeeping during the same period. Thomas G Weiss book *Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect* and Michael C Williams' *Civil-military relations and peacekeeping*. Weiss is discussing the growth of the humanitarian agenda during the 1990s,<sup>30</sup> while Williams is studying the challenges of civil-military interactions during the surge of peacekeeping in the 1990s.<sup>31</sup> I have also briefly looked into the two classical works *The Soldier and the State* by Samuel Huntington and *The Professional Soldier* by Morris Janowitz. For Huntington, the central skill of the soldier is the "management of violence," the art of planning, organizing, and employing military force. He believed in the distinctiveness of the military mindset. He says that it is "pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist and instrumentalist in its view on military profession. It is in brief realistic and conservative".<sup>32</sup> I will argue that Huntington's theory probably is the one which is most rooted in the military culture, focusing on disconnection from the civilian society to uphold military professionalism. Janowitz on the contrary had the opposite view, seeking more integration between civilian and military spheres. Both theories written in the light of the US Army's policing and reconstruction of Germany and Western Europe after WWII which in many ways can be compared to the multi-dimensional peacekeeping and peace-building efforts throughout

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<sup>28</sup> Ian Johnstone, "Peace operations Literature Review" (2005), available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>

<sup>29</sup> See two interesting studies: Michael Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, Quantitative study of 121 civil wars of which 27 had a UN intervention is interesting, especially for those who promote integration and holistic approaches. They found that the UN operations had an impact, and that the most successful operations were those addressing the wider spectrum of problems in a society and not only the military. James Dobbins study, comparing US and UN-led operations, found that UN peace-building was more successful than the US, especially measured against the input (recourses, forces, and equipment). Much of the reasons were the UN's ability to address the whole spectrum of the societies, from political to military problems.

<sup>30</sup> Thomas G Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2004).

<sup>31</sup> Michael C. Williams, "Civil-military relations and peacekeeping", *Adelphi Papers*, nr 321, 1998.

<sup>32</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 68.

the world today. The military's traditional focus on being disconnected from the political and civilian matters might at least explain some of the reasons why civil-military integration can be problematic and challenging.

The final category of sources I have used is official UN documentation, resolutions, reports, guidelines, policy documents from the humanitarian as well as from DPKO on civil-military interactions. The most important documents from UN regarding Integrated Missions is the mentioned "Brahimi Report", the SG "Guidelines on Integrated Missions", DPKO's "Integrated Mission Planning Process" document, and their "Policy Directive on Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC)". When it comes to doctrines and guidelines I have relied on DPKO's *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* published in 2003 and also the drafted "Capstone Doctrine" which probably will be implemented as the core UN doctrine document. For the case study of UNMIS, I will mainly use official documentation from the peace process, the planning of the mission and progress reports from the SG to the Security Council. This will be broadened with some interviews and conversations with officers who have served or are serving in the mission.

### **Structure of the thesis**

Following this introduction, chapter two will present the historical background and the development of the peacekeeping environment leading to the call for integration and answer the question of why integration has become the core issue in today's peace operations. Focus will be on the two principal dimensions the integrated approach is trying to bring together; the Peacekeepers and the Humanitarian / development sector. Chapter three will then explore and present a theoretical framework of the concept of Integrated Mission. This will be done through modelling a generic Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Mission in an integrated context. Focus will be on planning, structure and the military components role and function. Chapter four will present the case of UNMIS and discuss differences and challenges compared to the theoretical framework. Focus will be on the planning, mission structure, the processes and how this is affecting the military component. The final chapter will synthesize the findings and ultimately review the main implications the integrated concept might have on the military component.

## 2 New demands, new tasks, more actors, the origins of integration

In the introduction I mentioned that the call for integration is a logic consequence of the increasingly complex environment the modern peacekeepers find themselves in. The concept of Integrated Mission is argued to be introduced by the Brahimi report in 2000, with the proposal to establish the “Integrated Task Force” at the strategic level in order to gain a more coherent strategic planning before launching new missions. Bruce Jones argues that it was developed for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999 with all components (EU, OSCE and UNHCR) reporting to the SRSG. Barth Eide states that the first formal call for integrated and unified approach within the UN came with the Secretary General (SG) report on *Renewing the United Nations—a programme for Reform* in 1997. SRSGs were given more authority and he instituted a system of Integrated Missions.<sup>33</sup> However it can be argued that this only is the culmination of the development starting in the early 1990s, when the UN entered a new type of peacekeeping which demanded broader approaches and developed the civil-military structure within their missions. In a visit at DPKO I was told that “integration is nothing new to the UN, we are just trying to do it better”.<sup>34</sup> This chapter will look into the main reasons why integration has become the core issue of the UN’s approach to peace operations. UN peacekeeping missions changed in form and structure during the 1990s, many lessons were identified, and the humanitarian agenda led to an increasingly crowded area of operations. This chapter will focus on these dimensions, and end with a description of the complex of civilian actors the military peacekeeper has to cope with in planning and execution of the operations in an integrated context.

### **The humanitarian agenda and the new demand for peacekeeping during the 1990s**

The rise of the humanitarian agenda is one of the main arguments why integration has become necessary and important. The basis is the change of warfare during the 1990s which led to increased demands for peacekeepers, and more humanitarian effort, which again created an increased market for the non-governmental humanitarian sector. The end of the Cold War triggered the increase of intrastate warfare, with increased targeting of civilians and humanitarian suffering. According to a Human Development Report from UNDP (UN Development Program) in 1994, seventy-nine of eighty-two armed conflicts started since 1989 were civil wars. “By the late of the 1990s virtually all of the twenty-five or so wars with more than one thousand annual deaths...were within states rather than between them.”<sup>35</sup> These wars

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<sup>33</sup> Eide, et al, 2005, p. 11.

<sup>34</sup> Kelvin Ong, Brief on DDR at the Norwegian Delegation to the UN, 8 January 2007.

<sup>35</sup> Weiss, 2004, p. 12.

took place within civilian societies, in urban areas, and the tactics used by parties included systematic targeting of civilians. The humanitarian suffering exploded and refugee problems rose within war torn countries as well as in the regions. The UN intervened with peacekeepers in higher rate than ever. From 1956 to 1988 only 13 peacekeeping missions had been conducted, from 1988 to 1996, 29 new operations were established.<sup>36</sup> The peacekeepers met a new environment with new demands. It can be argued that they had a steep curve of learning during the 1990s, struggling with old interpretation of their concepts, lacking recourses, possessed inadequate mandates, and generally faced a situation, in which they not were prepared to handle. The initial success with operations in Namibia (1989-90) and to some extent Cambodia (1992-93) was overshadowed of the failures in Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1992-95) and in Rwanda (1994).<sup>37</sup> Despite many problems these missions contributed to the transformation of UN peacekeeping towards civil-military structures and a wider task portfolio for the military arm of the missions.

The operations in Namibia in (UNTAG) and Cambodia (UNTAC) can be argued to be pioneer missions for the development of multi-dimensional peacekeeping. They involved larger civilian footprints within the missions, new task portfolio for the military components and were the first to be headed by a civilian political leader (SRSG). The central objective of these missions was to create conditions for the holding of free and fair elections. UNTAG consisted of a civilian component of 2 000 personnel, and a military component of 4 500 troops. It deployed at almost 200 different locations throughout the country. The Force Commander was the military adviser to the SRSG and reported through him to the Secretary General. The military logistic element worked closely with the civilian element.<sup>38</sup> Lakhdar Brahimi praises the then SRSG Martti Ahrisaari in his innovative approach in designing and implementation of this mission and argues that it was the start of the new generation of peacekeeping.<sup>39</sup> This development continued with the operation in Cambodia which was a complex multi-dimensional operation combining a large civilian component with a Joint Military component consisting all military functions. UNTAC consisted of 15 547 mil troops, 893 mil observers, 3 500 civilian police, 1 140 international civilian staff, 4 830 local civilian staff. The military component had an air support group with 10 fixed wing and 26 helicopters,

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<sup>36</sup> United Nations, DPKO website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.

<sup>37</sup> Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (ed), *United Nations Interentionism 1991-2004* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>38</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition* (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 203-215.

<sup>39</sup> Lakdar Brahimi, "United Nations Peace Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A Few Personal Thoughts" *FIIA Report 14* ( 2006), available at: [http://www.upi-fiaa.fi/doc/FIIA\\_report\\_14.pdf](http://www.upi-fiaa.fi/doc/FIIA_report_14.pdf)

signal unit, logistic battalion and also a naval element. As stated by Berdal and Leifer: “It was the most ambitious and expensive undertaking in the peacekeeping experience of the organisation”.<sup>40</sup> Berdal and Leifer highlight the problems of strategic planning (or lack of it), command and control problems and the logistical challenges and they argue that the lessons from Cambodia “not should be a model for future operations”.<sup>41</sup> However despite these problems, the civil-military design of this operation would influence and strengthen the way the UN should design its future operations. The mission had a civilian-military structure at HQ and sector level in the provinces with a political leader (SRSG) as the highest authority. Further the military component was given a wide portfolio of tasks, from classical verification of withdrawal of troops to supporting disarmament and demobilisation programs, reconstruction tasks, provide security at reception centres for refugees, and even running the civil communication network. The UN civilian police also changed their tasks from being monitors and observers to become the actual executive police force with authority to arrest.<sup>42</sup> All these functions and innovations can be found in most of modern multi-dimensional peacekeeping the UN is conducting today.

Simultaneously with the operation in Cambodia, the UN also intervened in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992. Two operations that would intensify the humanitarian agenda of the 1990s, and further expand the UN’s spectrum of operations. These missions were initiated solely on humanitarian reasons in which the main objective was to protect the humanitarian personnel.<sup>43</sup> Again new barriers were crossed for UN peacekeeping in which support to the humanitarian organisations became the core tasks. The need for coordination and cooperation between a growing numbers of actors were clearly demonstrated in these two missions. The operation in Somalia started with a small chapter VI based mission with 4500 troops to support delivery of humanitarian aid and changed to a US led chapter VII enforcement operation with 36000 troops (UNITAF). UNITAF involved a multinational UN and a large national component (US) which not accepted to be under UN command. The mission had no political component, and according to Weiss, “many observers argued that UNITAF spent its energy on treating the symptoms and not the actual disease”.<sup>44</sup> Clearly it was an example on a mission based on “military solutions” not addressing the real problems and consequently led to problems for the peacekeepers. UNITAF was replaced in 1993 by the

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<sup>40</sup> Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, “Cambodia” in *United Nations Interentionism 1991-2004*. p. 32.

<sup>41</sup> Berdal and Leifer, 2007, p. 63.

<sup>42</sup> Berdal and Leifer, 2007, pp. 42-55.

<sup>43</sup> Weiss, 2004, p. 72.

<sup>44</sup> Weiss, 2004, p. 65.

first chapter VII mission under UN command (UNOSOM II). The mission had a strong mandate but was not able to generate forces to fill the structure and thereby lacked the resources to fulfil the mandated tasks. Command and control weaknesses, understaffing, different rules of engagements (ROE) between the contingents and ultimately the US decision to engage in war against one of the clan leaders led to mission failure and retreat in 1995.

The UN operation in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) starting as an interim arrangement to establish and protect three demilitarized zones in Croatia in 1992 also proved to be more complex and more demanding than the UN planners had hoped for. The peacekeeping forces were deployed to support the UNHCR's (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) humanitarian relief operation and evolved with the ongoing war into Bosnia in 1992-95. The UN continuously added new tasks and changed the structure without having any clear strategy besides supporting the UNHCR. The UN peacekeepers found themselves in the centre of an evolving civil war involving belligerents with no intention to neither end the fighting nor respect the UN interrupting their activity. The UN troops arrived into war zones with light forces, based on traditional peacekeeping mentality with the intent to escort humanitarian convoys and provide security at airfields and ports. The refugee problems increased with intensity and by late 1992, it was over two million displaced persons within Bosnia leading to high pressure on the UNHCR as well as the UNPROFOR forces. The World Food Program and UNICEF became operational in 1992, the World Health Organisation in 1993. By 1993 UNHCR staff grows from 19 to over 700 deployed personnel in 29 different offices with a budget rising from \$295mill to over \$500mill.<sup>45</sup> UNPROFOR faced serious problems to deal with the operational environment, and the main problem was that it was not structured, nor manned to establish security for the humanitarian effort in a war zone. However the need for a better coherent strategy, better cooperation with the different actors as well as the humanitarian sector was recognized and had been learned when the international community entered Kosovo five years later.

#### **Civil-military relationships, challenges and lessons from Cambodia to Bosnia**

The operations in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia brought hard lessons to the UN as well as other actors involved in peacekeeping. Closer cooperation between the civilian and military actors was needed both in the strategic planning as well as in the field at the tactical level. Michael Williams argues that framing of the mandates at strategic level is a civilian preserve and that it needs more adequate military advice and input. He also stresses the importance that

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<sup>45</sup> Weiss, 2004, p. 91.

peacekeeping operations encompass overlapping political, military and humanitarian components. Field headquarters must establish and maintain close contact and cooperation with an increasingly number of other actors. The tensions between the military and civilian actors are the same as Huntington argued happened in the 1950s Europe. Huntington opinion was that they occur because of different culture, different agendas and lack of understanding of each other's roles. Williams added that the officers and especially the senior officers' lack of experience of cooperation with civilians is another factor, which hampers the relationship. As earlier mentioned the military culture is marked by Huntington's theory about professional traditions, keeping distance to the civil society and not involve civilians into military matters.<sup>46</sup> One important innovation within the military structures coming from this reality is the development of the Civil-Military Coordination and Cooperation structures (CIMIC) designed to improve the relationship and coordination between the civilian actors and the military. The function of CIMIC is a consequence of the need for coordination on the ground, starting in Somalia with US establishment of so-called Civil Military Coordination Centres (CMOC)<sup>47</sup> and continued with establishment of CIMIC functions within military staffs in UNPROFOR and the later NATO operations.

Command and Control has been a continuous issue of debate and discussion in UN operations since the lessons of the early 1990s. Especially Western Nations seem to have become "allergic" to UN command. This is recently exemplified when European countries returned to the UN operation in Lebanon demanding establishment of a UNIFIL strategic cell beside the DPKO in New York, reporting directly to the SG.<sup>48</sup> There is common agreement that unity of command is essential in operations, however there are few nations, if any at all, that accept a full multi national command of their forces. Dual commands, national interference, bypassing of lines has been more normal than the exception in UN as well as other multinational operations. Williams argue that the UN's approach with a civilian political leader; (SRSG) in the field who also is the senior authority of all UN components can promote better cooperation, coordination and faster decision cycles. The UN civilian control structure developed in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the initial lack of the same in Bosnia highlights the advantages of having such structures in the field. In addition to the SRSG role, UNTAC had a civilian structure in all the 21 provinces headed by a Director of Civilian Affairs with a military commander, a UN Civilian police commander and a human-rights officer by his side.

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<sup>46</sup> Huntington, 1957.

<sup>47</sup> CMOC is an office established by the military, outside military camps to facilitate cooperation.

<sup>48</sup> Nicoletta Pirozzi, "UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Europe's contribution", *European Security Review*, nr 30 (September, 2006): <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/ESR30.Lebanon.pdf>

This was poorly developed in Bosnia with the civilian head of mission (Stoltenberg until 1994) based in Geneva leaving much of the local diplomacy and politics to the military commanders. The problem was that lack of civilian control from an SRSG in the field led to lack of understanding of the military situation within the civilian leadership in the UN HQ, and lack of strategic and political situation awareness in the military command in Bosnia. Williams argue that the SRSG should have more power to exercise his/her authority and thereby better be able to pull a mission's political, civil and military elements into a common approach.<sup>49</sup> The same problems and the same recommendations are verified in a Swedish case study of the UN mission in Haiti (1995).<sup>50</sup> The UN seems to have taken this into account today as the SRSG is stated to be the highest UN authority within a theatre of operations.<sup>51</sup> However, contributing nations are those who decide if this is going to work or not, as they still have the opportunity to interfere in the chain of command.

The problem of national interference and reluctance to delegate full authority to the UN is the greatest problem to effective command and control. The national interference increases with increasingly level of violence in the area of operations. The three operations in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia are good examples on how not to organise command and control. Berdal and Leifer are pointing at the problem in UNTAC with national intervention. Force Commander and SRSG had serious problems in securing loyalty from many of the battalions; some were even taking orders from their embassies in Phnom Phen. The hostile environment and many inexperienced troop contributing countries within the UN force were the main reasons for this problem.<sup>52</sup> Williams is describing the experiences from Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) as a "Dies-United-Nations"<sup>53</sup> and that four chains of command effectively operated. One to the UN, one to Washington, one used by the US Special Forces and a final one to contributing nations home governments. Dual command is always an issue, not only in UN operations, but also NATO, EU and other multinational command structures. The trend towards more "hybrid operations" in which the UN only will provide one component will probably imply that dual or even triple command problems will continue.<sup>54</sup> Learning to cope with such issues and involvement of troop contributing countries in the pre-

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<sup>49</sup> Williams, 1998.

<sup>50</sup> See for instance: Leif Ahlquist (ed), *Co-operation, Command and Control in UN Peace Support Operations* (Stockholm: Nordstedts Tryckeri AB, 1998) and Rick Hooper and Mark Taylor, "Command from the Saddle: Managing United Nations peace-building missions" *Fafo report 266* (Oslo: Centraltrykkeriet AS, 1999).

<sup>51</sup> Annan, 2006, p. 3.

<sup>52</sup> Berdal and Leifer, 2007, p 56.

<sup>53</sup> Williams, 1998, p 47.

<sup>54</sup> Bruce Jones, with Feydal Cherif, 2003.



planning will probably reduce such intervening. A clear understanding of the situation in the field, and that it can develop to the worse is very important discussing the mandate of the mission.

Coordination and cross sector communication is one answer to cope with the problems of command and control. The lessons from Cambodia is that a mutual understanding of each others roles, cultural differences, ability to communicate and to understand the new environment is equally important as having a coordination structure. The UNTAC mission had joint civil-military structure, joint civil-military coordination groups and also conducted joint operations with the civilian side. Despite all these structures and mechanisms coordination was difficult to achieve. The military had initial resistance to adjust to the supporting role, sharing information with civilians were not common in the military culture and doing joint operations with police and civilian electoral observers was strange for most of the troops. The consequence of the development in these operations was that military had to change their mentality and also establish new functions like the CIMIC in their structures and within their staffs.

The changes towards a more civil-military structure in the field and the need for better planning and coordination were also mirrored at the UN HQ level. The UN created and restructured the military as well as the humanitarian functions within the HQ. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs (later OCHA) was established in 1992 and the office responsible for peacekeeping was reorganised as the Department for Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) the same year, in order to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage operations. The political, operational, logistics, civil police, de-mining, training, personnel and administrative sections were all co-located under DPKO. Further in 1993 the Situation Centre was established in order to maintain around the clock communications with the field and provide information necessary to missions and troop contributors. However there has been a continuous complaint towards the capacity within DPKO especially on the ability to plan, and command large operations. This was highlighted in the Brahimi Report, and is still under debate. The problem today is that the UN again has reached all time high in number of operations and the capacity within DPKO again is stretched beyond its limits.<sup>55</sup> Again restructure of the DPKO is on the agenda to be able to support the increasingly number of complex peacekeeping operations the UN are involved in.

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<sup>55</sup> Ian Sinclair, conversation at the DPKO mil planning service 9 January 2007.

### **The growth of the humanitarian sector and the civilian actors**

The growth of the humanitarian sector is the other dimension important to understand as it can be considered as one of the catalysts for integration of the UN efforts. This sector has evolved with the transformation of peacekeeping and developed to be one of the main tools for UN involvement in peace-building efforts. The humanitarian sector consists of civilian non-profit organisations working with humanitarian activity like relief, recovery and development. There is a distinction between humanitarian relief and development, but many organisations work in both spheres. For the argument in this chapter I will treat all under the generic name humanitarian sector. The sector can be categorised as follows: Donor governments, including government organisations (GOs), Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non governmental organisations (NGOs).<sup>56</sup> The donor governments provide financial support for IGOs and NGOs. The main IGOs come from the UN system: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN development Programme (UNDP). Despite being UN organisations these organisations do not answer to the Secretary General but to autonomous governing boards and are operating according to distinct mandates, which may explain why it can be difficult to get them on board in an integrated structure.<sup>57</sup> The private organisations, the NGOs are divided in national and international NGOs (INGO). Some examples of the largest INGOs are: CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision, Médecins sans Frontiers, Catholic relief Service, Mercy Corps and the International Rescue Committee. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is regarded as a category of its own, since it has specific recognition in international humanitarian law. It has observer status in the UN General Assembly, and its chief delegate meets weekly with the president of the Security Council.

The humanitarian sector was dominated by ICRC and the classic UN agencies established in the 1950s and 60s. UNICEF was established in 1946, UNHCR in 1951 and World Food Programme 1961. The sector has evolved with conflicts and disasters, and exploded with the surge in conflicts in the 1990s. The international response was to intervene with military force to stabilize the conflicts and create a secure environment for the humanitarian work. This created access for more civilian actors and organisations and ultimately the market grew. Thomas Weiss argues that the military deployment into crisis and

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<sup>56</sup> Weiss, 2006, pp. 2-6.

<sup>57</sup> Weir, 2006, p. 29.

conflict areas has facilitated a six fold increase in emergency spending the last decade. ICRC had almost monopoly over emergency delivery until the mid 1980s. From only 700 NGOs in 1939, the number of international NGOs (operating in more than three countries) were estimated to be around 20 000 in 1995. Updated numbers from another source show that the number had risen to 50 000 in 2002. “Near 90 percent of them has been formed since 1970 and they disperse more money than the UN (\$7billion in 2002)”.<sup>58</sup> Another indicator proving the growth of the sector is the humanitarian costs of the wars in 1990s. Official development assistance devoted to relief, grew from \$1 billion in 1990 to almost \$5, 9 billion in 2000.<sup>59</sup> UNHCR had 20 NGO partners in the 1960s of which half were large international NGOs. Between 1994 and 2003 UNHCR channelled \$3-4 billions through over 700 NGO partners of which 419 were local or national NGOs.<sup>60</sup> Today the organisation has a staff of around 6,689 people operating in 116 countries with annual budget of \$1 billion.<sup>61</sup> This development and surge in numbers of INGO`s and NGOs led to dual efforts and competition in getting funding from donors.

The result of this surge and competition was a call for coordination and strategic guidance. This started with the General Assembly resolution 46/182 intended to strengthen the UN response to both complex emergencies and natural disasters.<sup>62</sup> Following this resolution several new strategic coordination bodies were established. The position of Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) were created in 1992. DHA expanded the mandate to include the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy in 1998 and was renamed to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The resolution also created the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) which is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. The IASC is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and ensures inter-agency decision-making in response to complex emergencies. Participants include all humanitarian partners, from UN agencies, funds and programmes to the Red Cross Movement and NGOs. The latest development within this sector is that in 2005, the IASC and its partners agreed to establish the so called “cluster approach” to their efforts, which implies

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<sup>58</sup> John Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 5.

<sup>59</sup> Weiss, 2004, p. 12.

<sup>60</sup> UNHCR, “NGO partnerships in Refugee Protection: Questions and answers”(2004), available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/partners/PARTNERS/41c162d04.pdf>

<sup>61</sup> UNHCR: <http://www.unhcr.org>

<sup>62</sup> United Nations, GA Resolution 46/182: Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations (New York, General Assembly, 1991).

that there will be a lead agency in nine different areas of humanitarian activity.<sup>63</sup> This approach is also to be implemented in the field and coordinated by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Resident Coordinator (RC). OCHA will be the lead agency when it comes to coordination and mobilising humanitarian action and also the core coordinator between all humanitarian agencies in the field, while the UNDP will be the lead agency within long term development efforts.<sup>64</sup> The head of the UN agencies, funds and programmes in a particular country will compose what is called a UN Country Team (UNCT). The RC will be the leader of this team which will be working on long term projects. The UN Country Team<sup>65</sup>, the RC and the HC will be important cooperation bodies in planning and execution of Integrated Mission if the concept is to work as hoped for.

#### **Summing up this chapter:**

This chapter has reviewed why integration has become the main issue in UN approach to peace operations. It has pointed at some lessons learned from operations during the pioneer work of the early and mid 1990s. The new environment provided new challenges to the UN peacekeeper as well as the UN humanitarian actors. The UN mission structure changed from pure military to combined civil-military structures as also happened at HQ level. The development created a market for privatisation of the humanitarian sector and ultimately the theatre of operations became more crowded with actors. Competition and lack of coordination and cooperation characterized the situation throughout the 1990s. Both the humanitarian and the peacekeeping sector of the UN started their reform processes in the early 1990s, and have established and still are working to improve their coordination mechanisms. The Brahimi report highlighted the need for comprehensive planning involving all relevant actors as a key to improve the approaches to the UN peacekeeping efforts.<sup>66</sup> The aim was not only to maintain status quo, but also to actively influence the situation, addressing both the immediate security problems and the root causes of the conflicts. Finally the chapter has pointed on the complex of actors involved in the humanitarian and developing sector which the military arm of a peace keeping mission has to cope with in an integrated context.

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<sup>63</sup> The nine areas are Agriculture, Camp coordination, early recovery, education, emergency, health, nutrition, protection, and water sanitation. Further information can be found on OCHAs web on humanitarian reform: <http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=79>

<sup>64</sup> OCHA representative: Brief on The humanitarian System and its interface with the military New York, 9 January 2007.

<sup>65</sup> For an overview and where to find UN country teams, see UNDG web: <http://unctdatabase.undg.org/>. Here you also can find who are resident coordinators and humanitarian coordinators in each country.

<sup>66</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations": A/55/305 (New York, UN, 2000).

### 3 Planning and structuring of UN Integrated Missions, a theoretical framework

According to the *Report on Integrated Missions* there is no common organisational model or definition of what an Integrated Mission should look like, or how it should be designed. Stuart Gordon identifies two principal versions in his study, one maximalist and a minimalist version. The former implies that OCHA is fully integrated within the UN's overall mission structure (UN mission in Afghanistan is an example), and the minimalist is that OCHA has a separate identity focusing on coordination and information sharing rather than unified organisational framework (UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire is one example).<sup>67</sup> The main point from the *Report on Integrated Mission* is that "form must follow function"<sup>68</sup>, which means that the design should be adapted to the situation on the ground and the strategy the UN are to follow. So what is really an Integrated Mission? The report is suggesting the following definition, "an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in transition from war to peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management network".<sup>69</sup> The SG guidelines is focusing on linking the different dimensions of peacekeeping and peace-building and says "an Integrated Mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process".<sup>70</sup> Further the SG's guidelines is focused on structure and processes to facilitate communication and coordination between the Mission and the UN agencies already present in the country. Clearly the concept is about making the UN better in thinking strategy, involving all their tools and thinking longer term commitment to their efforts.

The central idea with the Integrated Mission is that the actors involved in a peacekeeping/ peace-building effort are to be better coordinated, and that they all are working towards a common agreed end state for the peace-building effort. In order to achieve that, it is necessary to have a strategic and operational planning process that brings all actors together. Agreement on goals, priorities and phases of the operation is vital to successful transition from conflict to peace. When integrated planning is achieved and a strategy agreed upon, the next step is the challenge to put that into effect on the ground. This will involve coordination, de confliction, prioritising etc. As the situation evolves in theatre, adjustments and new priorities are needed. All this activity will demand a well functioning command and control structure as

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<sup>67</sup> Gordon, 2006, p. 50.

<sup>68</sup> Eide, et al, 2005, p. 17.

<sup>69</sup> Eide. et al, 2005, p. 15.

<sup>70</sup> Annan, 2006, p. 1.

well as mechanisms for coordination at the tactical level. This chapter will describe and explain how this structure and processes is intended to function in a UN integrated context. It will present a model of the Integrated Mission in the wider context, the linkage between the long term and short term commitment. Further it will describe how the integrated planning is intended to take place in order to achieve this linkage. Finally the chapter will present how the structure and processes is supposed to work at field level.

### **Status of the Integrated Mission**

First it is useful to review the status of the Integrated Mission as it has developed since the critical report from 2005. Several improvements have taken place and it seems that policy documents and guidelines are beginning to manifest both in the peacekeeping sector (DPKO) and in the humanitarian sector (OCHA). First of all the SG issued his guidelines in 2006, clarifying the relationship and authority of the SRSG and Deputy SRSG who also will act as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Resident Coordinator (RC). This will give the SRSG ability to coordinate and control the effort between the peacekeeping mission and the actors within the humanitarian and development sector. DPKO has developed an “Integrated Planning Process (IMPP)” which aims to pull the actors together in planning for a mission. DPKO has also issued policy documents to every peacekeeping mission, regarding structural changes within the mission HQs (Establishment of Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC). At strategic level the Peace Building Commission (PBC) and the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) has been established to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery.<sup>71</sup> The commission has started their work focusing on the two follow up peace-building missions in Burundi and Sierra Leone which can be regarded as test beds for how this commission develops.<sup>72</sup> Clearly it is an indication that the UN is taking steps to plan longer term commitment also after a peacekeeping mission has ended. The humanitarian sector has as mentioned in previous chapter taken steps to strengthen in-country coordination and also to strengthen their network and cooperation with DPKO when it comes to integrated planning. The OCHA`s focal point for the IMPP will “work with DPKO on overall, planning and lessons learned related to Integrated Missions and will ensure that humanitarian concerns are fully reflected in the planning process”.<sup>73</sup>

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
<sup>71</sup> United Nations, S/RES/1645.

<sup>72</sup> Carolyn Mc Askie, Open debate of the Security Council 31 Jan 2007. Available at: <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/pdf/mcaskie31jan07.pdf>

<sup>73</sup> Nancy Lucas (managing editor), *OCHA in 2007* (Geneva, OCHA, 2007), p. 35. Available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/DocView.asp?DocID=5326>

### The complex of actors in an integrated wider context

In the previous chapter I described the complex of actors within the humanitarian community, the UN Country Team, the HC/RC role and the multitude of humanitarian and development actors operating in the theatre of operations in which a peacekeeping mission is to deploy. In order to get a clearer picture of the overall context, a model of the operational context is useful. The model will present a generic peacekeeping and peace-building environment. It will present the different phases a peace-building effort evolves through in transition from war to long lasting peace, and finally how the actors relate to each other and how ranking of priorities change as the operation evolves. The model is a modification of a similar model described in the UN “Capstone Doctrine” draft<sup>74</sup>, but can be seen as a synthesis of the literature studied for the topic.



**Figure 1: The Integrated Mission in a wider context**

Between the two extreme points from war to peace, it is a period of international and local effort involving many different actors. When a war ends, and a peace agreement or a cease fire agreement is reached, and if the parties agree to a peacekeeping presence, the UN will authorize a peacekeeping mission, either established by the UN or a regional organisation. The

<sup>74</sup> Challenges of Peace Operations Project, 2006.

model shows how a peace-building effort from the different actors evolves through three broad phases: stabilization, transition and consolidation.<sup>75</sup> These phases are not fixed or time bounded and does not have absolute boundaries. They will overlap, and the different actors may switch back-and forth between the phases depending on how the situation evolves.

The stabilisation phase follows immediately after the cease-fire/ peace agreement and the priority is to establish a safe and secure environment and to manage the immediate consequences of the war. Humanitarian relief and helping the local population which is occupied with basic survival and re-organisation of their lives is the main effort. This phase varies in length but traditionally it will last from 3- 12 months.<sup>76</sup> The transition phase will typically start with establishment of an interim government, followed by some type of election to select a transitional government. The priorities changes from humanitarian relief to development efforts like recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation. The peacekeeping forces may change in structure, lower their profile and change their priorities towards supporting the development actors. This phase may last from one to three years or longer. The consolidation phase is focused on supporting the elected government and the civil society. Development programmes, security sector reform programs, reintegration of earlier combatants into society and so on are the core issues. The peacekeeping force will handle more responsibility to the local government, and the UN Country Team. Dependent on the situation, and the strength of the local leadership and government, the UN may establish a political peace-building mission in order to support the local leaders and make sure that the country not relapses into conflict again. To often has the UN ended their engagement with the peacekeeping mission to early and used the election as a benchmark for end state.

The model shows that the UNDP and the country team will be present in theatre already before a conflict erupts. As the conflict evolves, humanitarian actors will enter the scene to take care of immediate humanitarian relief. If diplomacy succeeds and peace agreement is reached, a peacekeeping force will be prepared. Since the UN not have any rapid response force, a regional military force will be given the responsibility of the initial stabilization of the situation. Examples from missions in Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sudan show that the UN will need time to generate forces, funds, equipment and so on. In Haiti the US led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which deployed in March 2004 was replaced by the larger UN mission 3 months later. In Côte d'Ivoire the

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<sup>75</sup> Cedric de Coning (ed), 2006.

<sup>76</sup> Bruce Jones (ed), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).



ECOWAS (Economic Community Of West African States) forces established in 2003, was replaced by a larger UN force (UNOCI) in April 2004. In Burundi the AU (African Union) led mission established in 2003 was replaced by UN (ONUB) after 12 months.<sup>77</sup> Such initial stabilisation forces have limited capacities and are normally only capable of focusing on basic military tasks, securing vital areas so that the UN force can be generated and deployed. The UN brings a civil-military capacity and will incorporate a broad spectrum of civilian effort as well. The UN mission may take over the whole mission from the regional organisation or it may establish a parallel mission as in Kosovo. However the ideal for an Integrated Mission is to have all components, military and civilian under the umbrella of the UN, reporting through the SRSG.

As the mission progress, the number of actors will grow. Humanitarian relief will dominate the initial period and evolve gradually to involve more development actors. Tasks changes from relief to reconstruction, capacity building, re-integration and supporting the local government. The peacekeeping force will change structure and profile as time evolves and situation changes. From having a large and robust military component in the beginning it will downsize, and change the tasks from security to peace-building efforts. The UN traditionally establishes “new” missions with new names, new structure and mandates as the situation evolves. A good example can be found in the UN operations in Timor Leste since 1999. As the violence in Timor Leste escalated in the summer of 1999, the chapter VI based UN mission (UNAMET) was replaced with a chapter VII International Force to East Timor (INTERFET) to restore peace. The UN established a transitional administration (as they did in Kosovo) late 1999. INTERFET was replaced with a new robust UN mission (UNTAET) in 2000. This mission ended with the successful elections and independence declarations in 2002. Following this, the UN established a UN support mission (UNMISSET) which focused on capacity building, police training and support to the elected government. The Timorese government gradually assumed responsibility for managing day to day affairs, and in 2005 this mission was replaced with a Peace Building Office (UN office in Timor Leste). This mission had no military component and consisted largely by advisers and observers. In 2006 the UN established a new police dominated mission (UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste) to support the local police in upholding law and order.<sup>78</sup> The example from Timor Leste shows how the UN adapts and changes their priorities as the situation evolves on the ground. The problem is that there is a tendency to perceive the different missions as separate and not part of

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<sup>77</sup> Jones (ed), 2006.

<sup>78</sup> Jones, (ed), 2006, pp. 61-76.

a larger, long term strategy, at least among those who criticise the UN and are looking for failed missions.

The model shows that the SRSG arrives with the UN Integrated Peacekeeping Mission and establish the link to the humanitarian and development community through his Deputy SRSG, which also is to be the HC/RC. SRSG is to be the highest UN authority in theatre and thereby control or at least coordinate the UN`s overall strategy within theatre.<sup>79</sup> Traditionally the UN humanitarian coordinators and resident coordinators have remained outside the peacekeeping structure and not been part of a UN military dominated intervention. As mentioned in the introduction this has also been one of the main reasons for the resistance towards the concept. However one of the big challenges will be to integrate long term humanitarian and development plans with the shorter term focused planning which characterises the peacekeeping mission. A peacekeeping mission has to date been planned for short time efforts, while the UN Country Teams are working in 10-20 years timeframes. OCHA and UNHCR`s annual planning cycles are setting strategic objectives for their priorities and focus on a yearly basis. The UNHCR is for instance conducting their annual planning exercise at country level with all their partners and NGOs in the first quarter of the year which ends in the Country Operations Plan. This plan describes operational goals, sector objectives, priorities and budgets are distributed.<sup>80</sup> The planning of an Integrated Mission must take such practical facts into account, and the SRSG can not have too large expectations to influence and change these plans when arriving in theatre. Involvement of the humanitarian sector, the UN Country Team will thereby be of outmost importance, not only to tap them for information, but to coordinate and de-conflict such practical issues as the different actor`s plans and focus of effort, and possibilities and opportunities for cooperation and mutual support.

### **The planning for an Integrated Mission**

Integrated planning implies that the process at the strategic as well as the operational level take all relevant actors into account. Ideally the planning must incorporate, from the beginning, a comprehensive peace building approach that addresses the causes as well as the symptoms of the conflict. The *Report on Integrated Mission* highlighted the “lack of strategic culture and strategic guidance in the UN planning processes”.<sup>81</sup> The new idea is that any peace operation

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<sup>79</sup> Annan, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>80</sup> UNHCR, *Partnership: An Operations Management Handbook for UNHCR partners* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2003), pp. 58-59.

<sup>81</sup> Eide, et al, 2005, p. 20.

should be evaluated in a longer term and in a wider context which means to integrate the humanitarian and development programs into the process. The peacekeeping mission and the concept of operations (CONOPS) will in addition to addressing the imminent security needs also be adapted and adjusted to the UN Country Team and humanitarian effort. The practical consequences will be that the UN peacekeepers will avoid duplication of efforts, it will imply better coordination and de-confliction between the humanitarian sector and the peacekeepers.

The *Integrated Mission Planning Process* (IMPP) is the basis planning tool for all new missions. At the strategic level the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) is intended to provide long term strategic input to the planning process. When a situation occurs and the Security Council decides to establish a UN Mission an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) will be established. This is an ad-hoc planning staff composed of the relevant departments and agencies, as well as representatives from the UN Country Team (UNCT). The military, police, logistics, political, humanitarian, development, and human rights arms of the UN is vital in the process. The planning staff will change in structure as the process goes on, it may be expanded or reduced depending on priorities and needs. The planning process evolves through three broad stages: “advance planning”, “operational planning” and “review and transition planning”.<sup>82</sup> The advance planning is the strategic assessment which will be an analysis of the situation on the ground, humanitarian situation, existing UN and other activities etc. The aim is to give the SG a clear understanding of the in-country situation and the dynamics of the conflict, clarify goals, identify risks, and develop strategies accordingly. The PBSO together with the UNCT will be vital in this stage to provide the information and analysis needed to establish a Strategic Planning Directive, which is the SGs directive to start the operational planning. This directive gives the strategic objectives, it reflects the interagency support, and it formally designates DPKO to take lead in the IMPP process.

The next step is the foundation planning which aims to develop the comprehensive concept of operations for the Integrated Mission for submission to the UN Security Council. The most important part of this stage will be the so called “technical survey” which deploys to the theatre to conduct country level assessment and thereby will be the critical window to involve and deepen the involvement of the UNCT and other actors involved in the operation. The IMTF will also designate some members of the team to remain in country to support the UNCT involvement in the process and the UNCT may also send members to the UNHQ to participate in the process within DPKO. The result of the technical survey is the draft mission

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<sup>82</sup> See model of the planning process in appendix B to this thesis.

plan. Budget planning is also done in an integrated manner which means that the budget planning group works closely with the UNCT to ensure understanding of resource gaps, and optimize synergies between the peacekeeping force and the UNCT. In other words it may save costs, or it may imply that the Peacekeeping Mission must enter theatre with more assets in order to be able to support the UNCT. The key output of this stage is the SG report which is detailing the concept of operations (CONOPS). This report will be submitted to the Security Council which then will result in authorisation to a mandate.

The planning process will now enter the more detailed stage of operational planning aiming to develop the Advanced Draft Mission Plan, the Mission Budget Report and the Directive to the SRSG. The mission plan will provide the detailed operational strategy for implementing the mandate and the framework for achieving integration and coherence. Mission objectives, mission structure, coordination mechanisms, command and control arrangements including relationships with the UNCT, thematic and functional strategies (DDR, Human Rights, rule of law, protection of civilians, etc) will be formulated. The Directive to the SRSG initiates the transfer of the planning responsibility to the Peacekeeping Mission. When the SRSG and his planning team takes over most of the details will be sorted out, therefore it is important that key leaders (SRSG, Force Commander, and Police Commissioner) are involved in the IMTF process as early as possible. SRSG together with the senior managers will establish what is called an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) which will finalise the mission plan. This will commence with an exercise at the country level to review and validate the plans, and end with the adoption of the finalized Mission Plan by the SRSG, and endorsement by the UNCT.


The result of this planning process which continuously is aiming to involve the UNCT will result in a mission plan which will be integrated in form, and contain objectives and tasks to all components, ranking of priorities, support to the UNCT and so on. The IMTF concept has not yet been fully implemented and DPKO has struggled to get all actors to the table. Some comments from a representative in the Military Division was that “changes takes time, when time is critical we tend to fall back into old habits...it has also been a problem that the different agencies are sending people with no authority to take decisions in the IMTF and that slower the whole process”.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Ian Sinclair: Conversation DPKO mil planning service, 9 January 2007.

## The Integrated Mission structure

Having established a common, clear and integrated strategy with agreed vision and focus of effort, the next step is to put this into effect on the ground. As the previous chapter described the UN has developed their civil-military mission structure throughout the last decade of peacekeeping. However with the Integrated Mission follows additional structural changes as well. The Under Secretary General DPKO has given the establishment of integrated organisational structures at headquarters and in the field as a priority goal to improve integration in the operations.<sup>84</sup> This paragraph will describe and explain how a generic mission structure will look like, with emphasis on the new functions that are intended to improve the integration at field level.



**Figure 2: The Integrated Mission HQ structure<sup>85</sup>**

The structure and size of a UN mission depends on the task and the mandate that is given, but generally it consists of a military component headed by a Force Commander, a police component headed by a Police Commissioner and civilian component covering several sectors (political, electoral, judicial, legal, human rights, security and administrative support). They all sort under a common force headquarter (HQ) structure under the direct authority of the SRSG and his/her Senior Management Team (SMT). The components share a single mission budget

<sup>84</sup> Jean Marie Guèhenno, "Peace Operations 2010" 30 November 2006, p.4.

<sup>85</sup> Challenges of Peace Operations Project, 2006, p. 34.

and have integrated support services. The integrated joint services within the HQ consist of the: Integrated Security Section (ISS), Joint Logistics centre (JLOC), the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and the Joint Operations Centre (JOC). These services are staffed by civil and military personnel and provide support to the whole mission.

The figure above show how the HQ of a mission is organized. It may vary is size and form, but in principle it will look like this model. The SMT consists as mentioned of the senior commanders / managers of respective components. This team is a core function and a well functioning SMT can be considered as a pre-condition for success in implementing and execution of the Integrated Mission. As members of the SMT each senior leader will act in the corporate interests of the overall mission and the operation. The SMT is a governance forum to discuss problems, set and review the Integrated Mission plan, decide on priorities and changes in plans. The team will meet regularly to support the decision-making of the SRSG and should provide a clear, unified strategic direction for all mission components. From a military point of view the Force Commander will be the adviser to the SRSG on all military matters. The Deputy SRSG/ HC/RC will provide advises on the humanitarian and development side of the operation. The Police Commissioner naturally advice on law and order and local security matters which fall under police activities. The Chief Administration Officer (COA) is vital in order to create flexibility and endurance in the operations. COA is delegated financial authority within a tightly centralized UN financial management system, oversees the budget, financial operations, local procurement and property control. COA answers to the 5<sup>th</sup> committee (Administrative and Budgetary) in New York regarding the budget.<sup>86</sup>

Two other vital functions to support the integrated approach within a mission are the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). All missions have been given directions to establish these functions in a policy directive from DPKO.<sup>87</sup> The intent is “to ensure that all peacekeeping missions have in place integrated operations monitoring, reporting and information analysis hubs at Mission headquarters to support the more effective integration mission-wide situational awareness, security information and analysis for SMT decision making”.<sup>88</sup> The JOC provides a central point for the collection of operational information from the field in order to provide the mission’s senior leadership and

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<sup>86</sup> The system of detailed funding gives the SRSG little flexibility if the mission changes character and operational needs goes beyond the budget. Tension has often aroused between the military and COA regarding such issues. Source: Informal conversation at DPKO, planning service 9 January 2007.

<sup>87</sup> DPKO, “Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres” DPKO Policy Directive 31 May (2006),

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

UNHQ with an accurate and up-to-date picture of the general situation throughout the area of operations and alert them to incidents that may require their attention. During times of crisis, the JOC becomes the crisis management centre for the operation and ensures that senior managers are provided with the information required to make informed decisions. The JOC is jointly staffed and is supposed to be a 24-hour situational centre focusing on current day to day situation.<sup>89</sup>

The JMAC provides the capacity to collect, and synthesise all-source information to produce medium and long term integrated analysis. JMAC products should provide the SMT with improved understanding of trends, implications and developments within the theatre of operations. Analytical products will provide basis for enhanced mission planning and decision making. The JMAC has an integrated structure, designed to encourage contribution from all components of the mission. Joint input as well as joint analysis and output is the idea behind this function. In military terms this can be compared to a J2 cell which collects information from a multitude of sources, analyses the information and provide intelligence to the mission. In UN there is still aversion towards the term “intelligence”, and according to a Force Commander “we don’t talk about intelligence in UN, we call it information”<sup>90</sup>; however the JMAC will do essentially the same thing. Qualified analysts are required in the JMAC which for the military means intelligence experience. Both functions (JOC and JMAC) are to liaise and share information with the UNCT and as appropriate non UN entities in the country. The staffing of these functions will reflect the multidimensional composition of the mission. The policy document states that these functions shall be prioritized and established as first priority in new missions; however it also states that these structures are not to replace any existing management, command or decision making structures at any level.<sup>91</sup> Ongoing missions are supposed to establish these from their current structures, which will imply to thin out current staffs, or as many missions have done, rely on the military headquarters.

The UN logistic system is composed of a mixture of capabilities provided by national military logistic units, UN international civil servants, UN field service support personnel, Host Nation Support and contracted services. National Support Elements (NSE) is integrated into the overall UN logistics support system, but remains under national command. The logistic functions which are considered to be common to the mission as a whole is; provision of accommodation, infrastructure, civil engineering and geographical systems, transport

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<sup>89</sup> DPKO, “JOC-JMAC Policy Directive”, p. 3.

<sup>90</sup> Brief on UNMIS at the Conference on “Peace, Security and Stability”, London 27 April 2007.

<sup>91</sup> DPKO, “JOC-JMAC Policy Directive”, pp. 2-3.

resources, major vehicle repair and maintenance services, movement control and air or riverine/ maritime support services, installation and maintenance of mission wide communications, medical and dental services, provision of general supply items (water, fuel, rations, construction and defence materials).<sup>92</sup> Critical operational and strategic capacities like aviation are separated as an independent component serving the whole mission, as well as other missions in the same region. One example is the aviation section in the Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) which has grown to become a major aircraft operator operating a fleet of 86 aircraft and 1, 647 personnel. This aviation section is supporting over 60 airports and airfields, as well as over 150 landing sites across the Mission area.<sup>93</sup> This section is now serving the missions in Burundi and Sudan as well. Aviation also serves non UN actors in respective areas of operations.

The main problem with the UN logistic system is that it is not geared to the dynamics of modern peacekeeping which are required to switch to a more robust posture and back again at various points in its lifecycle. It is a reality that UN field operations continue to be constrained by complex bureaucratic procedures conceived in a non-operational context.<sup>94</sup> A mission that has an administration which is flexible enough to adapt quickly to changing circumstances on the ground clearly stands a better chance of success. This requires good logistic planning and re-sourcing and close integration between the uniformed and administrative components of a mission. The Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) is the focal point for cooperation and mutual assistance between the mission and other agencies including NGOs. The JLOC brings together logistics officers from all participating entities, conduct information sharing, and joint planning of movement control, use of airfields, sea ports, access routes and so on.

This paragraph has explained the Integrated Mission overall structure. New integrated services common to the whole mission in the JOC and JMAC functions which will provide the SRSB and the Senior Management Team with up-dated situational awareness and medium to long term analysis to give the leaders basis for clear decisions. The SMT is to direct and set priorities for the mission. Joint Logistics is vital in order to sustain the mission and the Integrated Mission will probably open more access for the humanitarian community to the UN logistics. This will most likely put more pressure on the UN logistic system, especially when it comes to transport and air assets. This will require a reform of the financial system from the

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<sup>92</sup> DPKO, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2003), pp 125-133.

<sup>93</sup> MONUC homepage, background note: Available at: <http://www.monuc.org/news>.

<sup>94</sup> DPKO, 2003, pp 125-133.



strategic level. The mission HQ has traditionally been kept as small as possible to save costs, but clearly there is possible to see the contours of a joint integrated headquarters occur. The consequences of this will probably that the military component must expand their staffing and establish JOCs and JMACs at the mission HQ level. To the military component this will probably demand more intelligence and analytical expertise as well as operational level experience.

### **The Military Components role and function in the Integrated Mission**

The military component is vital to most UN peacekeeping. The structure of the force varies in accordance with the given tasks and mandate. Normally the force will consists of national formed units (company, battalion or even brigade size units), military observers, staff officers, liaisons officers and advisers. The forces are normally deployed in sectors and taking responsibility over designated areas. The military force includes most of the standard military functions like combat forces, combat service and support, and logistic units. The military primary function is to provide a safe and secure environment in the theatre of operations, and the secondary role is to provide support to the other components. Security is a precondition for moving ahead with the other elements of the peace-building process. There is several examples in ongoing missions that lack of a secure environment will hamper the peace-building effort and slower the progress (Iraq and Afghanistan are two current examples).


Typical military tasks are: Support to peacemaking and political negotiations (advisers), liaison to parties, observation, surveillance and monitoring, interposition between belligerents, provide a secure environment, support disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), mine and explosive clearance, enforcement of sanctions, support security sector reform, support to maintain law and order, and support the humanitarian activities with logistics and security. The military has increasingly been tasked to protect civilians under chapter VII mandates and most missions have this as a standard task in their mandates.<sup>95</sup> The military component is also involved in development tasks and projects within their areas of deployment. Such activities are in UN terms called “Community Support”<sup>96</sup> which is activities undertaken in support of the community to improve conditions and build confidence in the peace process (NATO would call this “hearts and minds” campaigns”). The spectrum of tasks has steadily been growing with the increasingly complex environment and actors involved. The figure below shows how the military component relates to the other components and

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<sup>95</sup> This is a result of the SG Report “In larger Freedom” from Sept 2005 where he focused on the responsibility to protect. See: United Nations webpage on the report: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>

<sup>96</sup> Coning, 2006, p 195-204.

functions within an Integrated Mission. The model clarifies the SMT, the components and how they contribute to a common mission objective.



**Figure 3: The Military Role in Integrated Mission**

The military function and role does not change in principle in the Integrated Mission context. The primary role is still to provide security and uphold stability in the theatre of operations and priority must be given to the military tasks. However with the Integrated Mission structure and approach, some new challenges can be identified. As mentioned in previous paragraphs the military must contribute staff officers into the JOC and JMAC structures and probably be those who establish and operate these. The military command structure already have a command and control system, they have the communication assets, the skills in running operation centres and also intelligence (J2) elements which will be important in these structures. When it comes to support and coordination with the other components within the mission this is solved through normal coordination and communication between the staffs. Changes of main efforts, requests for larger support to future operations will be lifted to the SMT who discusses, evaluate the overall picture and consequences and take decisions.

The other important consequence to the military in an integrated context is to support the humanitarian and development actors if requested and decided by the SMT. With the

integrated concept this will be better planned, coordinated and probably demand more resources from the logistic and engineer units as the mission progress towards the transition phase. The model above shows that the humanitarian and development actors and organisations not formally are integrated into the peacekeeping structure but that the Deputy SRSG/ HC/RC is the linking point between the mission and the UNCT. HC/RC is the focal point for coordination at the senior command level, and all requests for military support will in principle go through HC/RC and be decided in the SMT. However the practical coordination on the ground will be done through normal CIMIC functions which will be established at the different levels within the Mission.

Civil Military Coordination and cooperation is regulated in DPKOs policy document, “Civil-Military Coordination Policy”.<sup>97</sup> This document acknowledges that the resources and capabilities unique to formed units allow for a broader range of interaction in the non-security area. This includes use of military resources to provide support to humanitarian relief and the military’s participation in reconstruction and rehabilitation projects as parts of the overall development effort. It is stressed that such support must be complementary and avoids duplication. The policy document is developed in cooperation with OCHA to facilitate coordination with the humanitarian community. However it should be noted that the humanitarian agencies have agreed on a common policy that they will normally only request or accept support from military or civilian police based on three requirements: 1) the capability must be unique, 2) the capability cannot be provided in a timely manner and 3) use of military and civilian police is a last resort. The core document on the humanitarian side is the “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies”.<sup>98</sup> Despite these basic principles the attitude varies within the civilian community, especially when it comes to the NGOs. Some will not interact with the military at all (MSF) and some are more relaxed and adapts to the situation.

When it comes to command and control during civil led operations the military units will not be under civilian command but remain in their established command and control status. UN military support to tasks outside the mission will normally be limited by funding which not cover such tasks. National contingents who receive resources through national channels to conduct projects in their designated area must coordinate this effort through the missions CIMC structure in order to avoid duplication and interruption of ongoing or planned

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<sup>97</sup> DPKO, “Department of Peacekeeping Operations Civil Military Coordination Policy”, available at: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/DPKO\\_CMCOORD\\_Policy.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/DPKO_CMCOORD_Policy.pdf)

<sup>98</sup> IASC, “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper, 28 June (2004).

activities from the civilian sector. Trust funds can also be established for recourses that are provided outside the UN system from nations or other volunteer organisations.

Looking behind such formalities, if an Integrated Mission is to succeed the coordination and communication between the military and civilian actors, inside the mission as well as outside the mission is important. As we learned in chapter two on the UN operation in Cambodia, despite all structures, coordination was difficult due to human factors and cultural differences. Unity of effort within a mission does not occur automatically and demand open minded flexible and professional officers and troops. UN missions consist of an average of more than 40 different nationalities<sup>99</sup>, which implies significant cultural differences, both national and professional. Such differences must be respected, understood, appreciated and managed. Clash of cultures will occur within the military units, the force and between the military and civilian personnel. Many civilian organisations and governments function with a high degree of ambiguity, while the military has a result oriented and brief oriented culture. The civilians don't have the planning culture as the military has, they rather want to discuss matters, and has time to wait with the decision until they have more information.<sup>100</sup> The military is action oriented, and tends to rush to decisions and finish the task. It is even mentioned in the UNHCRs field guide to military interaction; "A military operation is focussed on achieving the stated objective, the "end state", completing the mission, and "going home".<sup>101</sup> Reconciling these differing "institutional cultures" is a major challenge for commanders in integrated operations as well as in other multi-national peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, cultural diversity is one of the UN's main strengths, and comparative advantage and has to be harnessed, despite the occasional difficulties it may create.

### **Summing up this chapter**

This chapter has reviewed the concept of Integrated Mission through theoretical models of the operational context a mission will operate within. The peace-building effort evolves through three broad phases, stabilisation, transition and consolidation. The UN Integrated Mission will likely take over responsibility from a regional military force, it will enter a context witch already have presence of other actors, civilian and military. The UN Country Team will in most cases have operated in the area over a long time, and has already a long term strategy for development in the area. The humanitarian effort will increase as the military establish

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<sup>99</sup> <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unoci/facts.html>

<sup>100</sup> Richard Brown, quote from the peace and reconstruction seminar in London, 24<sup>th</sup> April 2007.

<sup>101</sup> UNHCR, *UNHCR and the Military a Field Guide* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2001), p. 26.

security in the theatre of operations and evolve towards reconstruction and recovery as the operation progress. Integrated Mission is about linking the short term peacekeeping with the longer term peace-building and to develop a unified strategy within the UN system. Planning must thereby include the UNCT and other stakeholders from the beginning and the relationship must be strengthened as the planning progress to the field level. Having established common agreed strategy and plans between the humanitarian/ development and the peacekeeping force the next step is to put this into effect on the ground. The mission will establish joint integrated service functions like; Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), Integrated Support Services (ISS) and Joint Logistic Operations Centre (JLOC). The military component will be vital in establishing these functions; however they should all have civil-military structures.

The SRSG, the Force Commander, the Police Commissioner, the Chief Administration Officer and the Deputy SRSG/HC/RC is the senior management team of the mission and the focal point for coordination, guidance, change of priorities, setting policies and operational guidance to the mission. The military primary role is to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment so that the peace-building effort can progress, and to focus on the military tasks given in the mandate. Secondary role is to support the civilian sector in humanitarian relief and also development effort if that is possible and wanted by the HC/RC. All military support and involvement in civil operations must be coordinated through the missions CIMIC structure and with the HC/RC. CIMIC functions will be important in order to facilitate mutual understanding and support between the military and the UNCT and humanitarian actors. Policy documents regulate the support to civil operations. Cultural awareness and ability to understand each others roles, professional and national culture is important to succeed with Integrated Missions. Communication and coordination across components is essential.

#### 4 Case study UNMIS – A Unified Mission

The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established by the Security Council Resolution 1590 on 24 March 2005 to support the Sudanese peace process and assist the parties implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005, which put an end to a 21 year long civil war between the north and south Sudan.<sup>102</sup> The Secretary General (SG) stressed the importance of unity of effort and a unified strategy within the UN system, agencies, funds and programmes in establishing this mission. The mission has a seven year perspective; it has a comprehensive strategy, a unified mission plan and clearly intends to assist the Sudanese people to establish a long lasting peace.<sup>103</sup> UNMIS mandate was expanded to support a similar peace agreement in Darfur (Darfur Peace Agreement of 5 May 2006) by Resolution 1706 on 31 August 2006. This chapter will not discuss this part of the UNMIS mandate in detail but focus on the mission founded in resolution 1590 which illustrates the points of discussion regarding the Integrated Mission approach. This chapter intends to explore and discuss how UNMIS has approached the concept of Integrated Missions. The aim is to bring the theory into practice and ultimately answer some of the challenges and implications to the military component. The chapter will start with a description of the background to the conflict then the basis for the UNMIS mandate and mission will be described. The discussion will then be focused on the factors described in previous chapter; the planning, the structure with integrated services, and the military component with its role and functions.

##### **Background**

Sudan is the largest country in Africa and Middle East in terms of area. It is the size of Western Europe with an area of 2, 5 million square kilometres (See map in appendix C). The distances from western borders along Chad to the eastern border along the coastline of the Red Sea is about 1750km, and the distance from the Egyptian border in the north to the border of Uganda in the south is about 2050km. Sudan has common borders with nine countries: Egypt and Libya in the north, Chad and the Central Africa Republic in the west, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya in the south and Ethiopia and Eritrea in the east. The population is estimated to be the 39,379,358 in 2007.<sup>104</sup> The Capital Khartoum located in the centre of the northern part of Sudan at the junction of the Blue and White Nile has over one million inhabitants, and with the districts around the population is over 4 million. Khartoum is the centre of all governmental institutions and federal ministries and most of the higher educational

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<sup>102</sup> United Nations, “Resolution 1590”, S/RES 1590 (New York, Security Council, 2005).

<sup>103</sup> United Nations, “Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan”, S/3005/57(2005), p 10.

<sup>104</sup> CIA the world fact book web: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>

institutions. In the South lies the regional Capital Juba with about 200 000 inhabitants. The city is a river port and the southern terminus of traffic along the White Nile. It is a strategic important city as a transportation hub with roads connecting it to Kenya, Uganda and DR Congo. Juba was under Government control throughout the civil wars and consequently became the main area of battle between the rebel forces Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and Sudan Army Forces (SAF).<sup>105</sup> The terrain in Sudan is generally flat plains, with mountain ranges in the West, South and in the East. The climate varies from the very dry deserts in the North to swampy rain forest in the South. Sudan's rainy season lasts for about three months (July to September) in the north, and up to six months (June to November) in the south. The road net is badly developed in Sudan and much of the existing roads in the South were damaged during the war. The size of the country, the terrain, the climate and the limited infrastructure is a huge challenge for the UN and the international organizations working in the country.


The signing of the peace agreement in 2005 between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A ended Africa's longest and most intractable wars of which more than two million people were killed, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people fled the country as refugees.<sup>106</sup> Since Sudan became independent from Britain and Egyptian rule in 1956, it has been at war for 34 years interrupted by 11 years of peace between 1972 and 1983. The insurgency campaign driven by SPLM/A has roots in the fear from the non-Arabic dominated southern people being dominated by the Arabs which is dominating in the North. According to Ian Johnstone the war has been about a range of issues: resources (oil, water, minerals and land areas), national identity and self determination. The war damaged Sudan's economy and led to food shortages, resulting in starvation and malnutrition. The main battlefield has been the southern areas (marked with red on the map in figure 4 below) leading to severe damage of infrastructure and community. The war had come to a stalemate and both parties saw the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as a way out of a conflict that gradually eroded their own political authority. The South Sudan is granted a degree of autonomy for an interim period of six years, followed by an option of independence in 2011, while the North retains its dominance in the National Government and continues to apply Islamic (Shari a) laws.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Jonah Fisher, "Southern Sudan's frontline town" BBC News, 20 April (2005): <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4461663.stm>

<sup>106</sup> Johnstone, 2006, p. 34.

<sup>107</sup> Johnstone, 2006, p. 34.



**Figure 4: Sudan Conflict Areas<sup>108</sup>**

In addition to the main North-South civil war, there has been other, and still are ongoing conflicts in Sudan involving a multitude of other armed groups and parties. These are not covered in the CPA, but are influencing the situation and also the UNMIS forces and mission. The conflict in Darfur (see map above) is the most serious of these, involving rebellion groups, government forces and the so called “janjaweed” militia which is the Government of Sudan’s tool for conducting what they call a counter insurgency campaign. The conflict has also spread into Chad which declared war on Sudan the 23rd December 2005.<sup>109</sup> The humanitarian situation has increasingly worsened and OCHA estimated that over 2 million of the regions 6 million people were IDPs in January 2007,<sup>110</sup> many as a result of raids on villages by the janjaweed militia. The UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions on the conflict in Darfur, and the African Union (AU) was authorized to establish a monitoring mission in 2004, which now has been expanded to a protection force (AMIS) involving about 7600 troops and police.<sup>111</sup> In Eastern Sudan, along the borders toward Eritrea, there is also armed opposition towards the government by groups conducting sabotage attacks on oil pipelines and attacks on government patrols. In the South the Uganda based paramilitary group “Lords resistance Army” is operating along the border to Uganda and into southern Sudan towards Juba. The consequence of these wars is that the humanitarian situation in

<sup>108</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudan>

<sup>109</sup> Stephanie Hancock, “Chad in a State of War with Sudan”, BBC news, Friday 23 December 2005: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4556576.stm>

<sup>110</sup> US Agency for International Development (USAID), “Sudan Complex Emergency: Situational Report nr 13, Fiscal Year 2007”, March 30, 2007.

<sup>111</sup> Johnstone, 2006, p. 39.



Sudan is one of the main challenges to the stability and peace in the region. According to a USAID updated report, IDPs in Sudan counted 5,7 million, of which 3,7 was from Southern Sudan, 2 million in Darfur and about 70 000 from East Sudan. Refugees in Sudan coming from neighboring conflicts in Eritrea, Uganda, and DR Congo counted 150000.<sup>112</sup>

The civilian humanitarian efforts have been substantial and ongoing for a long time in Sudan. As the country has borders with nine other countries of which nearly all have been marked by conflicts since early 1960s the refugee problem has been constant for decades. UNHCR and the government of Sudan signed an agreement on cooperation regarding refugee affairs in 1967 which was the start of cooperation with the international community through the UNHCR.<sup>113</sup> Since then and throughout the 1980s, refugee influxes have never come to a halt. The ongoing operation called “Operation Lifeline Sudan”<sup>114</sup> was established in 1989 by the two UN agencies, UNICEF and the WFP and supported by more than 35 other INGO`s. UNDP is conducting the Sudan Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP).<sup>115</sup> UNHCR has a major operation ongoing taking care of refugees, returnees and is working closely with other UN agencies, NGOs and local community organizations.<sup>116</sup> The number of International organisations conducting humanitarian and development work has continuously grown, especially after the peace agreement was signed. In 2005 it was 13 UN agencies and more than 35 INGOs working in Sudan, in 2007 there are 22 UN agencies, 8 NGOs, and 76 INGOs conducting a total of 776 different projects.<sup>117</sup> The UN Country Team under the leadership of the Deputy SRSG /HC/RC, UNMIS has in other words a huge challenge in coordination of projects, funds and agencies.

#### **The basis for UNMIS mission and its mandate**

UNMIS is established on the basis of the peace agreement (CPA)<sup>118</sup> from 2005 which consists of four protocols, two framework agreements and two annexes regarding the implementation modalities. This covers the areas where the parties have agreed and the requests to the international community to monitor and verify their agreements. It also covers requests for support from the international community when it comes to development, reconstruction and construction in war torn areas, particularly in southern areas. The process towards the signing

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<sup>112</sup> US Agency for International Development (USAID), March 30, 2007.

<sup>113</sup> UNHCR web: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/southsudan?page=intro>

<sup>114</sup> UN Department of public information web: <http://www.un.org/av/photo/subjects/sudan.htm>

<sup>115</sup> UNDP web: <http://www.sd.undp.org/rrp/index.htm>

<sup>116</sup> UNHCR web: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/southsudan?page=intro>

<sup>117</sup> United Nations and Partners, “Work Plan for the Sudan” web: <http://www.unsudanig.org/workplan/workplan.html>

<sup>118</sup> The full text of the CPA can be found at : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6AZBDB?OpenDocument>

of the agreement was marked by several secondary goals and agreements which also made it possible for the UN to start preparations early and also establish an advance mission (UN Advance Mission to the Sudan) in 2004. In order to understand the UNMIS approach to their Mission and modus operandi the basis for the mandate is important to be familiar with. The main points will be highlighted in this paragraph.

In the Machakos Protocol of 29 July 2002, the parties resolved the status of state and religion and the right of self determination for the people of South Sudan, they agreed on establishment of international monitoring mechanisms to supervise the agreement. In the Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period (six years) of 25<sup>th</sup> Sept 2003 the parties agreed on an international monitored cease fire which would come into effect of the date a comprehensive agreement had been signed. This agreement included request for international monitoring and assistance of redeployment and demobilisation of military forces, the forming of new so-called Joint Integrated Units (JIU)<sup>119</sup> and international support to implement DDR programmes. In the Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pre-interim and Interim Period of 7 January 2004, the parties agreed on wealth sharing mechanisms and the reconstruction of the war-affected areas, they also requested the international community to take a strong and constructive role in providing post conflict reconstruction assistance to Sudan. The Protocol of Power Sharing of 26<sup>th</sup> May 2004 was the agreement on devolution of powers to the states (26 states in Sudan) and to the Government of Southern Sudan. Further they agreed on that general elections shall be conducted at all levels and completed by the end of the third year of the interim period (2009). International observers are requested to participate and support this process. The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abei Area of 26<sup>th</sup> May 2004, the parties agreed on administration of the area and the international monitors should verify the implementation of these arrangements. As a response to the progress and agreements, the Security Council established an advanced political mission (UNAMIS) by resolution 1547 of 11 June 2004.

UNAMIS was mandated to “facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for a larger peace support operation following signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement”.<sup>120</sup> The mission consisted of an SRSG, two Deputy SRSGs, a Chief Miladviser, a Police Adviser and 94 international staff, including military liaison and political and civil affairs staff, public information officers and experts in logistics and administration. This

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<sup>119</sup> Joint Integrated Units is the basis for the new national army in Sudan, and involves 39000 troops.

<sup>120</sup> United Nations, “Resolution 1547: S/RES/1547” (New York, Security Council, 2004), pp. 2-3.

mission was important in the process towards the final agreement and also to facilitate the deployment of a larger peacekeeping mission. Jan Pronk who had been leading the UN peacemaking efforts during the negotiations towards the peace agreement was appointed to be the SRSG. The SG appointed two Deputy SRSG`s, of which one was appointed the dual role of Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC/RC).<sup>121</sup> UNAMIS started their work in July 2004, established HQ in Khartoum, the senior leaders established high level contact with the parties by participating in the peace process, the staff established local contacts, liaisons, conducted logistic preparations including establishing working relationships with the parties. Jan Pronk was involved in the Darfur processes and the mission also expanded to support AU`s establishment as well. Field offices were set up covering political, civil, military, police, humanitarian, logistic support and liaison functions. It also set up a small field office in Kassala to engage in civil and military liaison function with the local actors on the ground in the east of Sudan. UNAMIS continued their preparatory work until the SC decided to establish the peacekeeping force UNMIS in Resolution 1590 on 25th March 2005 as requested by the parties in the peace agreement.

The Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities of 31 December 2004 framed the details of the military tasks to the UN. The mechanisms to be created and the timetable were agreed for implementation, monitoring and verification. The parties requested that the SRSG or his deputy participated in the Ceasefire Political Commission and the Force Commander in the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee. They requested participation of UN officers as chairs and monitors in Joint Military Committees, and that the UN should have operational control over Verification Monitoring team, Joint Military Commission (JMC) and Civilian Protection Monitoring Team. These requests were to become some of the main tasks to UNMIS and are vital as instruments to bring the parties together and to maintain the dialogue and communication. Further they requested assistance in mine action, and that the UN should provide establishment, capacity building and training of the police. The international partners were requested to have a supporting role to the national institutions conducting DDR. Funding and technical assistance was requested especially assistance for the funding of its army.

The CPA was signed the 9<sup>th</sup> January 2005 and clearly stated that the parties requested the international partners and the international community in assisting Sudan to a lasting peace:

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<sup>121</sup> United Nations, "Progress report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1547" (New York, Security Council, 2004), p. 2.

“The documents represented a concrete model for solving the wider problem of conflict within the country and that, if successfully implemented, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would provide a model of good governance in the Sudan that would help to create a solid basis for the preservation of peace and would make unity appear attractive”.<sup>122</sup> In order to succeed the UN and the international community and organisations must cooperate and coordinate their efforts across sectors. The mandate in SR 1590 is clearly based on consent and invitation from the parties, with the main intent to observe, monitor, verify and assist in implementation of the agreement. The mandate covers supporting and assistance tasks in all sectors, political, military, police, civil administration, human rights, humanitarian and reconstruction and capacity-building.<sup>123</sup> The UN and the SG had already made a good foundation for success by establishing the advance mission and made sure that the senior managers in UNAMIS also became the leaders of the following UNMIS mission.

### **Integrated planning for UNMIS**

In Chapter three it was stated that one of the most important pre-conditions for success with Integrated Mission is to get the UN Country Team and the civilian humanitarian/ development sector on board in the strategic planning as well as in the operational planning in the field. The most important is the actual contacts and relationships that must be established in the field in the theatre of operations. Further it stated that the strategic process should be done through establishment of what is called an Integrated Task Force. The planning for UNMIS had many advantages in achieving these aspects. Firstly the fact that the UN participated in the peace process implied that the planning and actions taken could be taken sequentially as the situation developed with the agreements. The long lead time meant that DPKO as well as other departments were in front of the situation, they had time to discuss, evaluate and come up with a unified solution. Thirdly the planning benefited from the smart composition of the senior management team and finally of course the already mentioned decision to deploy the advance mission (UNAMIS). Despite these advantages, UNMIS should struggle to build up the mission as authorised in Resolution 1590.

The planning for the UNMIS mission was initiated as the peace talks and negotiations made progress and the parties came to agreements. The statement from the President of the Security Council on 10<sup>th</sup> October 2003 welcomed the progress and establishment of the Verification and Monitoring Team, the Joint Monitoring Commission and the Civilian

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<sup>122</sup> UNMIS web: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/background.html>

<sup>123</sup> For details and full text of the mandate see SR 1590.

Protection Monitoring Team. He also assured the parties that the UN intended to support them in the implementation. He stated: "...requests the Secretary-General, in this connection, to initiate preparatory work, as soon as possible, in consultation with the parties, the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) facilitators and the International Observers, on how the United Nations could best fully support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement."<sup>124</sup> Following this an Interdepartmental Task Force on Sudan was established headed by Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun who came from the position as Director of the Africa Division in Department of Political Affairs (DPA). He was also to be appointed to be the principal Deputy SRSG in Sudan from 1 August 2004<sup>125</sup> and thereby could ensure that the planning he had headed in the HQ also was coordinated and linked to the planning and preparations on the ground. The ITF was established to integrate the efforts of the wider UN system and to help develop a forward looking strategy for an effective UN role in support of the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement in the Sudan.

When it comes to integration of actors in the theatre of operations the SG dispatched an assessment mission from 27 Nov to 16 December 2003 in order to consult with the parties at all levels, the Donor community, UN Country Team (UNCT), INGOs and existing monitoring missions. Further a special adviser with staff from DPA and DPKO deployed in March 2004 to consult with senior officials from neighbouring countries, Sudan parties and IGAD members which was involved in the peace negotiations. In April 2004 a logistic expert team was deployed to assess the infrastructure, the possible areas for camps, HQs etc.<sup>126</sup> The team worked closely with the UNCT to establish a future common logistic strategy. UNCT had been operating Operation Lifeline since 1989 and had good experience with the area and the logistical challenges in Sudan. Logistic proved to be one of the biggest challenges as a consequence of the size of the country, and the fact that most of the infrastructure in south was destroyed. Distance from Port Sudan to Khartoum is 662km, and takes about 1hour with fixed wing aircraft. From Khartoum to the regional capital Juba in South the distance is about 1192km and takes 1, 5 hours with fixed wing aircraft.<sup>127</sup> These practical challenges implied that UNMIS had to plan a decentralised Concept of Operations (CONOPS) with integrated civil-mil sector HQs, and also strengthen the sectors to be able to sustain their operations.

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<sup>124</sup> United Nations, "Statement by the President of the Security Council: S/PRST/2003/16 (New York, Security Council, 2003)

<sup>125</sup> UNMIS web: <http://www.unmis.org/english/zerihoun.htm>

<sup>126</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan: S/204/453" (New York, Security Council, 2003), p. 1.

<sup>127</sup> UNMIS, "Flight distances between towns" (Khartoum, UNMIS, 2005), Available at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/>

The next big step in the planning on the ground was the mentioned deployment of the UNAMIS mission. DPKO relied on the planning element of the UN Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for establishing the HQ of the advanced mission to Sudan. They were deployed from July 04 to February 05. SHIRBRIG was also to continue their contribution in UNMIS from April to December 2005. They provided the nucleus of the Force HQ, the Joint Military Coordination Office and the Integrated Support Services and also deployed a HQ security unit. The commander of SHIRBRIG served as Deputy Force Commander.<sup>128</sup> The unit proved to be important in the planning and preparation for UNMIS, they could prepare and make the transition to UNMIS smoother. They also created breathing space to DPKO in the always time consuming force generation processes. However as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the process of generate the forces and also the civilian staff proved to be challenging. Some facts are worth highlighting. The authorized forces of 10 000 military and 715 police took over two years to reach. In June 2005 the military had 10 percent of its strength, while the police had 3, 6 percent. Four months later in November 2005 the military had reached 37, 3 percent and the police 31 percent. By March 2006, one year after the initial deployments the military component had reached 78 percent and the police 66, 2 percent of its strength. By 31 March 2007 the military reached 96, 4 percent (8766 troops, 999 observers) and the police had 92, 6 percent of mandated personnel (662), international civilian staff 900, local civilian employees 2 282 and 186 UN volunteers. The total personnel strength in UNMIS by 31 March 2007 was 13 395.<sup>129</sup>

The reason for such delays is made of up several factors. According to a representative in DPKO, the main factor was that the UN had established large missions in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and still were strengthening the mission in DR Congo. All these missions are large multi dimensional missions, logistical demanding and creating heavy burdens on troop contributing nations.<sup>130</sup> The logistical challenge in Sudan has been the second major factor to the delays in deployments. Long lines of communication and limited aviation assets hamper the tempo in deployment. Critical assets were lacking and it was simply not possible to transport the troops out in their sectors. Security within the area of operations was also an issue. In January February 2006 all UN convoys needed armed escort south of Juba due to the activity from Lords Resistance Army. This implied that the then limited amount of UN

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<sup>128</sup> Arnt Ståle Lund, Brief on SHIRBRIG, Africa Seminar NUPI 2006.

<sup>129</sup> DPKO web: Background note 31 March 2007. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote010101.pdf>

<sup>130</sup> Ian Sinclair, Conversation in Mil Planning Service DPKO, 9<sup>th</sup> January 2007.

infantry units became overstretched, and that the logistic convoys had to be postponed.<sup>131</sup> With the surge in UN peacekeeping that has been ongoing since 2003 the challenge to generate forces has become a main problem to DPKO. The planned strengthening of UNMIS (strengthen the military up to 17300 and police up to 3300 and also 16 formed police units) to be able to support AMIS in Darfur has proven to be difficult and may indicate that most nations is reaching their limits.<sup>132</sup>

The design of the SMT and the selection of the persons for these positions was probably one of the most important factors contributing to the focus on integration and involvement of the UNCT. History has told us that personalities matters, and also the *Brahimi Report* pointed on the need for quality in personnel chosen for senior positions. In UNMIS the quality and experience and the composition seem to be well thought-through. It seems that the SG favored continuity and experience. All had many years within the UN system, nearly all has experience from Sudan or Africa, and most important they were deployed with the advance mission in August 2004 and had plenty of time to establish good relations to the parties, actors and between themselves. The SRSG Jan Pronk and his Principal Deputy has already been mentioned. SRSG was directly involved in talks and negotiations with the parties, both in the CPA and also in Darfur, and his Principal Deputy came from the Interdepartmental Task Force on Sudan involved in the strategic planning. The other important position in the integrated concept is the HC/RC which requires good knowledge to the humanitarian and development sector and good relations to the organizations and actors. Manuel Da Silva was appointed the position as DSRSG/ HC/ RC in August 2004. He is responsible for the humanitarian aspects of the UN mission in Sudan including DDR of ex-combatants, Returns and Resettlement of Displaced Persons, Protection issues, Mine Action and general Humanitarian Coordination (see figure 5 on the organisation below). As HC/RC he is also leading the UNCT on humanitarian coordination and development issues. His qualifications should vouch for success. He has worked for the UN WFP Food programme in Sudan; he was the first HC in Angola and eventually taking their role as UN RC and Resident Representative of UNDP. He was the Director of the Division on Complex Disasters in UN headquarters in New York, Department of Humanitarian Affairs. He has also served as the HC for the Horn of Africa, coordinating the humanitarian response to the drought of 2000. The SRSG worked closely with UNCT to ensure a unified strategy, which also is reflected in the Unified Mission Plan. However the UNCT is involved in a huge humanitarian operation and

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<sup>131</sup> United Nations, S/206/160, p. 2.

<sup>132</sup> United Nations, S/RES/1706.

the ambition to coordinate is overwhelming. As shown in the model of the humanitarian structure in Sudan, the practical coordination outside the mission is managed by OCHA. Note that this structure also is mirrored at sector level.

### HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION STRUCTURE IN SUDAN




Figure 5: Humanitarian Coordination Structure in Sudan<sup>133</sup>

### The Sudan Unified Mission Plan

The theory on Integrated Mission presented in chapter three (page 28) states that the strategic as well as the operational processes takes all relevant actors into account. The discussion above shows that the planning for UNMIS was focused on achieving this ambition already from the outset in 2003. The Secretary General stressed that this mission had to be planned and executed in a comprehensive and integrated way in order to succeed. He secured continuance by appointing senior leaders already familiar with the area and who also was directly involved in the peace processes. The head of the Interdepartmental task force became the DSRSG, and the other DSRSG HC/RC was a seasoned leader familiar with both the humanitarian as well as the development sectors. SRSR was aware the importance of integrating the UNCT at all levels. The logistic and support planning team worked closely with the UNCT regarding the concept for logistics. The advanced mission (UNAMIS) with professional planners from SHIRBRIG secured that the HQ and the framework for UNMIS CONOPS was prepared. The planning resulted in the “Sudan Unified Mission Plan” which is the core document for the implementation of the mission. This document covers the basis for the mission, the mission structure, the programmes covering: Political affairs, Military, Police,

<sup>133</sup> Cedric de Conig (ed), “Coordination in Complex Peace Operations, “From Peacekeeping to Peace-building” in African Civil-Military Coordination Course Programme (South Africa, ACCORD, 2006), p. 151.



Civil Affairs, Electoral Assistance, Governance and Rule of Law, Human Rights and Protection of civilians, Gender and Public Information. All sectors are given definite tasks. Further the Humanitarian Assistance and Recovery and Development sector is also included with the following programmes: humanitarian assistance, return and reintegration, mine action, DDR and Sustainable development.

The plan has a seven years perspective which is quite unique in such operations. The mission has taken four phases, harmonized with those in the CPA; pre interim period (6months), period up to national elections (3 ½ years), period up to referendum (2 ½ years) and period following the referendum, pre exit. The objective is stated to be achieved by addressing more than just monitoring the peace. “It will assist in the further building of peace. The strategy of the Mission will respond to the root causes of the decades of conflict”.<sup>134</sup> The unified approach is stressed to make sure that the activities and initiatives are coherent and mutually reinforcing. Further it is stated that: “the Mission will to a large extent, build upon existing resources expertise and experiences and comparative advantages of the UN Country Team”.<sup>135</sup> UNMIS has developed six principles for their operation that is worth reviewing: 1) One shared objective, 2) Common assumptions and parameters, 3) Responsibility to Consult, 4) Responsibility to collaborate, 5) Responsibility to maximize shared resources and 6) Common decision making.

The principle of responsibility to consult is interesting. As we learned from previous chapter, unity of effort and integration does not come by themselves. “All actors within the context of the unified Mission shall be subject to a duty to consult other stakeholders prior to making decision or undertaking action which may impact on other agencies or components work or affect the success of the mission as a whole”.<sup>136</sup> SRSG is in other words stressing that the success of integration in fact relies on the ability to tear down classic walls between components, to have an inclusive attitude, to look up colleagues, discuss and then decide what to do. Those familiar with the military way of doing this, clearly will identify that this may be a challenge. The same goes for those familiar with some humanitarian actor’s reluctance toward discussing with the military. From the military point of view it is probably the sharing of information and intelligence together with operational planning that is most challenging. Information tends to be classified when it enters the military information system and the military planning for operations involves the civilians only in the final stage of the planning.

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<sup>134</sup> Pronk, p. 11.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

<sup>136</sup> Jan Pronk, “Sudan Unified Mission Plan” (Khartoum, UNMIS, 2005), p. 30.

Operational Security is highlighted within the military and they see the civilian to be to reluctant and relaxed and leaking information to early. However in an integrated context such obstacles have to be dealt with, and with the military in a supporting role as they are in UNMIS, it is even more important. The principles stated by the SRSG in the Unified Mission Plan can in fact be recommended as general principles for a coming doctrine on Integrated Missions. All are relevant in getting the actors together toward a common agreed goal.

The final interesting aspect with this plan is that the UN Country Teams Work Plan for Sudan is to “be seen as a part of the mission plan.”<sup>137</sup> The Work Plan for Sudan covers the humanitarian and development sectors strategic plan for the coming year. The different humanitarian and recovery and reconstruction projects, which actor is doing what, where, priorities, aims, objectives and funding is covered in this plan. “It outlines what the United Nations believes are the most urgent needs that can and must be addressed by the United Nations system and its partners within a one-year timeframe.”<sup>138</sup> The Work Plan of 2007 also includes UNMIS projects which indicate that the integration within this field actually is working. The Unified Mission Plan together with the Work Plan for Sudan shows that the integration between the peacekeepers and the UNCT has been functioning. The SRSGs focus on involvement of the UNCT seem to have been a success when it comes to the planning, the next is to look into how the structure and coordination mechanisms is organised in the field.

### **UNMIS Integrated Structure**

The UN Mission in Sudan is as stated in the mission plan “a multidimensional operation with a unified character...and the success of the work in Sudan depend on a common subscription of all components to the system-political, humanitarian, human rights, development, economics and military.”<sup>139</sup> To succeed with the above discussed planning and the interaction between the different components an integrated structure is also needed. As described in chapter three the integrated structure with integrated services is argued to be a pre-condition for success when it comes to an integrated approach. Further the senior management team was described as the most important function to succeed bringing the leaders together in a decision forum serving the whole Mission. This paragraph will explore and discuss how this is organised and functioning in UNMIS. Not all functional areas or components will be covered but focus on the most important, and those affecting the military component.


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<sup>137</sup> Pronk, p. 30.

<sup>138</sup> OCHA Sudan: <http://www.unsudanig.org/workplan/2007/index.html>.

<sup>139</sup> Pronk, p. 16.

The model below (figure 6) gives a broad overview over the organisation of UNMIS and will be the basis for the discussion. The blue boxes represent the UNMIS Integrated HQ structure while the green organisation chart shows the military component which is deployed in six sectors throughout South Sudan. Note that all sector commands also have a civilian field office mirroring the structure at the HQ level. The UNMIS HQ is as mentioned located in Khartoum with all components co-localised enabling coordination and cooperation between them. The HQ was established in Khartoum in order to be in day-to-day dialogue with the Sudanese Government. UN Country Team is located with one office in Khartoum and one in Juba, enabling unified planning and coordination in the humanitarian and development sector. (An overview of the UNMIS and OCHA deployment can be seen in appendix D and E).



**Figure 6: UNMIS Mission structure**

The civilian/ military integrated functions and the civilian sections are headed by respective Deputy SRSGs, Chief of Staff, and Director of Administration (DOA). The military is also providing staff to the following integrated services in the mission HQ: Unified Mission Analysis Cell (UMAC), Integrated Support Services and Integrated training Cell. UNMIS has not been able to establish an integrated Joint Operations Centre, but rely on the JOC within the

military HQ.<sup>140</sup> UNMIS is using the term “Unified” instead of “Integrated”, a decision by the SRSG, but essentially the aim is the same, to get every UN agency and partner towards a common agreed objective. The integrated services were established by UNAMIS staff before UNMIS came in to effect. The UMAC is collecting; coordinating and analysing information from civilian and military sources. They analyse risk and develop risk management advice. Further they produce reports and policy documents to improve the ability of the Mission to adapt and manage crises. Finally they prepare all Mission wide reporting to UNHQ in New York. The UMAC cell is struggling to reach the ambitions set in the DPKO policy document to become a true analytic and intelligence provider to the SMT. Like other UN missions (Liberia, Congo) lack of qualified personnel and comprehensive data systems is a problem. The UMAC will require that it is staffed with intelligence officers and civilian analytical staff with the qualifications and experience needed. High turnover of personnel is also a challenge which means that the cell continuously must conduct on-the-job training with new personnel. UNMIS has started to recruit local employees to some positions in this cell, and that might solve some of these problems, especially when it comes to analyse information in local language and to uphold continuity.<sup>141</sup>

The JOC is not integrated in UNMIS but located within the military HQ. There has not been provided resources to establish an integrated JOC neither personnel nor equipment. Despite this fact it seems to work well at least for the Force Commander and the military component.<sup>142</sup> According to former chief of staff the main challenge is that the staff is bringing “bad habits” from earlier missions and that it will take time to implement new structures and concepts. “To gear the HQ in a common battle rhythm is the main challenge” in that aspect.<sup>143</sup> The DPKO ambition that all missions shall establish a Joint Integrated Operations Centre (JOC) and a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) will take time to implement. Main problem is lack of qualified personnel and lack of funding for the needed equipment. Today the JMAC/UMAC system is more an info management cell than a true analysis cell providing decision support to the senior managers.

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<sup>140</sup> Lt Gen Jahbir Singh Lidder, Conversation in London, 25<sup>th</sup> April, 2007.

<sup>141</sup> For a detailed analysis of the JMAC concept see: Mark Malan, “Intelligence in African Peace Operations: Addressing the Deficit” KAIPTC Paper no 7 (2005), p. 18-25.

<sup>142</sup> Lidder, 2007.

<sup>143</sup> Lund, 2007.

The policy document on JOC-JMAC and the ambitious goals set in the Under Secretary General DPKOs document “Peace Operations 2010”<sup>144</sup> seem to indicate that the integration process at this level will be further focused and prioritised in the future and thereby it is possible to see that a fully integrated new HQ structure is emerging. One question should be whether this is needed or worth the costs? One comment from a former chief of staff in UNMIS was that as long as the HQs are co-localised as in UNMIS there is no need to establish another civil-military HQ above all other. Communication and coordination across components should be possible without establishing a new in practice HQ. They will demand more personnel and staffing, and that will logically thin out the footprint on the ground. A consequence for the military is to provide more officers to new headquarter structures, or integrate civilian into their own JOCs. However as stated in DPKO policy on JOC and JMAC the new structure shall not replace the current and that will in practice mean a new structure at the Mission HQ level.<sup>145</sup>

When it comes to integrated logistics, the UNMIS mission Integrated Support Services plans, coordinate and delivers logistical services mission wide. They are coordinating the functioning of mission logistics resources, personnel and equipment as determined by the priorities given by the senior management of the mission. Military logistics and support units including Force Medical unit, Force Military Aviation Unit, Force Transport Company and Force Engineer Construction Company are all integrated military components of the logistic system. Due to the size of the country and the bad road conditions, aviation is the main operational mobility within the theatre. Aircraft and helicopters are a critical asset to UNMIS as well as other organisations in the area and require close cooperation with the civilian sector. There is also a growing need to regional cooperation between missions when it comes to strategic and operational air assets. As exemplified with the aviation section in MONUC which serve the mission in Burundi, UNMIS and also Eritrea in addition to its own in DR Congo. Regional cooperation between missions has become a desired need in UN operations in Africa as the needs are bigger than the available resources. When it comes to cooperation with the humanitarian sector it is the UN Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLOC) based in UNMIS HQ which is tracking logistic recourses, contractors and provide information and coordination to the humanitarian agencies through their web based information platform.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> Jean Marie Guèhenno, ”Peace Operations 2010”, 30 November 2005

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/selectedPSDG/guehennoDPKO2010.pdf>

<sup>145</sup> DPKO, pp. 2-3.

<sup>146</sup> For more information on Joint Logistic Centre see web: <http://www.unjlc.org/sudan/contact/>

The senior management team (SMT) has been accounted for earlier, but a quick review is useful. The SMT in UNMIS consists of the SRSG, Force Commander, Principal DSRSG, Police Commissioner, DSRSG/HC/RC and Director of Administration (DOA). According to Force Commander this team meets everyday in a morning meeting where Force commander orients the mission about the military situation. Since all are co-localised it is easy to meet, de-conflict and sort things out when needed. The SMT seems to function according to the intention in the integrated concept. One main point to highlight from the Force Commander is that the main thing to remember in an integrated concept is to understand roles and functions and use the mechanisms to coordinate. "Everybody must understand their respective role, integration does not mean interference...there is a tendency that the civilians are treating the military as a warehouse, ordering services and expecting delivery by the hours."<sup>147</sup> This is of course a result of the fact that it is still the military which has the resources and is easy to contact in their camps or when they are out on patrols. The SMT is not able to solve all tension and problems, much of the decisions are decentralized to sector commanders. UNMIS has faced big challenges with the need to have a scattered CONOPS combined with the distances and logistical challenges. Sector command is thereby the most important level to sort out the short term needs and problems.<sup>148</sup> The distances from Force HQ to the sector HQs implies that all transport between must mainly be done by aircraft. From Khartoum to sector 1 in Juba there is about 1300km by air, to sector 2 in Wau 1150km, sector 3 Malakal 700km, sector 4 Kadugli 600km, and to sector 5 in Ed Damarzin it is about 450km (See map Sudan in appendix B). Further mission decentralization is on the agenda and UNMIS has started a phased programme to strengthen especially sector 1 in Juba enabling them to deliver increased and more efficient support. Logistical, administrative and operational challenges and the fact that there is a need to have closer interaction with the government in southern Sudan are the main reasons for this.

#### **UNMIS military component role and function**

The Military Component is the core of UNMIS. Authorized strength in resolution 1590 was 9250 troops and 750 military observers. By 31 March 2007 the mission had reached to 8766 troops and 599 military observers (With the Darfur expansion in SR 1706 the authorized strength is raised to 27 300 military). Today there is 60 different nationalities within the military component (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kenya, China is the dominating nations in number of troops).The Military Force HQ is located in Khartoum together with the

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<sup>147</sup> Lidder, Conversation, 25 April 2007

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

Mission HQ. The military HQ is organised as a standard military HQ with G-staff functions (G1 personnel, G2 Information, G3 operations, G4 Logistics, G5 CIMIC, and G6 communications and signals) The Force Commander provides operational control (OPCON)<sup>149</sup> to the military component, including all formed units, observers, liaisons and those staff officers in integrated services.

The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is decentralization due to the fact of the realities on the ground, the tasks agreed with the parties, the need to liaise on day to day basis, the need for coordination with civil sector etc. The area of operations has been divided into six sectors, each headed by a civilian sector director supported by a sector military commander in charge of all military personnel within the sector. Each sector consists of a UN task force with an infantry battalion as the core force and protection element (Coys in sector 4 and 6). Further each sector has Combat Service and Support Units (CSS) which consists of transport coy, engineer coy, de-mining coy, helicopter unit (civil or mil), role 2 medical coy (role 3 in sector 4). There are observer groups in each sector operating from two to four team sites. One decentralised battalion size reserve headquartered in sector 4, one coy garrisoned in sector 1, 2 and 3. In addition to this there is a Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office in Juba to support the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, and finally a Redeployment Coordination HQ, located in Eastern Sudan responsible for monitoring the redeployment of troops in that area. The detailed deployment in sectors and sites can be seen in appendix D.

The purpose of the military components mission is to monitor and verify the Ceasefire Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The key tasks given to the military component is as follows:<sup>150</sup>

- a) Support the acceptance of the overall peace agreement.
- b) Establish liaison with the Parties, agencies and other actors.
- c) Monitor and verify lines of disengagement
- d) Monitor and verify assembly areas and redeployment of forces
- e) Monitor and verify formation of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs).
- f) Provide force protection within the AOR.

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<sup>149</sup> OPCON: Means the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned to accomplish specific missions or tasks limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of these units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of the components of the units concerned. It does not in itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. Where forces are placed under OPCON, a UN Force Commander can not change the mission of the forces or deploy them out of the area agreed to by the TCCs without the prior consent of respective TCC.

<sup>150</sup> DPKO, "Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries Deploying Military Units to the United Nations Mission in Sudan ( New York, Force Generation Service, 2005), pp. 25-26

- g) Protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and ensuring the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel.
- h) Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within capabilities.
- i) Open land, air and waterways lines of communication.
- j) Assist within capabilities the DDR process.
- k) Support within capabilities UN programme in the region.
- l) Advise and assist the African Union Mission (AMIS) in the Darfur region.

The military roles in UNMIS can be described in three broad areas. 1) Observation, monitoring and verification role. 2) Protection Role. 3) Supporting and assisting role. The first role and the primary task are to monitor and observe that the parties implement the agreement they have signed. That they withdraw their forces, that they start to demobilise and that the new so-called Joint Integrated Units are formed. This is the core motive for the UNMIS operation and what can be described as a “main effort” for the military component. To succeed in upholding the dialogue and keep the pressure on the parties to redeploy their forces and demobilise as agreed will be the key to stabilize and establish a lasting peace and be able to progress with the next steps. The tools UNMIS has chosen for this task is the Ceasefire Joint Military Commission structure. At the ground they have established Joint Monitoring Teams with the observers in each sector. They conduct the day-to-day monitoring and verification by upholding contact with the parties, verify that units actually are redeployed out of their positions etc. These teams report to the sector level Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC) which in turn reports to the Cease Fire Joint Military Commission (CFJMC) headed by the Force Commander. This is the main point for dialogue where the parties inform about their status and agrees on adjustments in timings and so on. The result from this commission goes to the final political level the Ceasefire Political Committee. The nature of these tasks requires close cooperation with the parties to build trust and uphold the consent from the parties to UNMIS. The mandate of UNMIS is in nature consent based and the mission and tasks can not be solved without the parties support and that themselves take responsibility for their own progress. UNMIS can uphold pressure, but not force the implementation on the parties.

The Protection role is the main role of the formed units (Infantry) which in sum consists of about 4000 troops. The protection forces are responsible for protecting UN personnel, staff, installations and equipment as well as protect civilians who come under imminent treat or danger and to secure freedom of movement for UN units and personnel. This part of the mission is mandated in chapter VII which imply that the forces can use force to solve these tasks. Typically the forces guards installations and camps, patrols the area of



responsibility and conduct escorts of convoys. UNMIS military forces are not responsible for the local security and the law and order within the areas but assist if required and requested. These tasks imply cooperation with the civilian authorities, the UN civilian staff and agencies as well other civilian organisations if for instance escorts are provided. The supporting and assist role implies to support the UN development programme, humanitarian efforts, the parties DDR process and also to assist the AMIS peacekeeping force in Darfur. These tasks require close cooperation, communication and liaison with the different elements that shall be supported.

In the context of integration the nature of UNMIS task portfolio requires close liaison and cooperation with the parties and their armed forces as well as close cooperation with the civilian and humanitarian sector. The sector levels also have a civilian structure covering most of the functions as the headquarters has (political, police, human rights etc). As mentioned above the CONOPS is decentralized and the sector command must solve most of the problems at this level. Another important point is that the humanitarian and development structure at the HQ level also is mirrored at sector level. OCHA has an office in all sectors (see map in appendix D) enabling cooperation. The dialogue towards OCHA is normally done by UNMIS Civil-Military Liaison Officers. The CIMIC structure is worth to mention as it in fact is not so well developed in UNMIS or in other UN missions. CIMIC in UNMIS consists of totally 10 officers (0,001 percent of the total strength). Three in UNMIS HQ and one in each sector command. The CIMIC officers are referred to as Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLLO) and the primary function is to liaise towards the local OCHA office and the other agencies present in the sectors.<sup>151</sup>

CIMIC below sector level is a national responsibility and as Cedric de Coning argues very few of the dominating nations providing troops to the UN has developed CIMIC structures and functions within their forces. “CIMIC is more or less a Western phenomenon and very few nations outside Europe, USA, and Australia have CIMIC doctrines and structures”.<sup>152</sup> However, the units are conducting Civil-Military Operations like “community support” or so called “quick impact projects”. Community support is tasks conducted to support the local community and to build confidence in the peace process (road repair, bridges, support to social services, clinics etc). Quick Impact Projects are projects intended to support an urgent need on short notice at local level. They are funded in the Mission budget

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<sup>151</sup> Coning, 2006, pp. 165-172.

<sup>152</sup> Coning, Interview NUPI, March 2007.

normally coordinated by the civil affairs. The CIMIC function focusing on liaison harmonizes with the DPKO Civil-Military Coordination Policy document. However reading the definition in this document almost everything UNMIS do relates to CIMIC. “UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support and planning at all levels between humanitarian organizations, development organizations or the civilian population, to achieve respective objectives.”<sup>153</sup> The point is that CIMIC covers a wide area and since the Mission it serves more or less is based on CIMIC the responsibility firstly is the commanders at all levels secondly those who actually does the coordination on the ground. However in accordance with the policy document agreed with the humanitarian and development sector the focal point for requests from the civilian goes through the local OCHA office which takes the issue up to HC/RC level if needed or the local CIMIC liaison on smaller day-to-day issues.

The lessons from the UNMIS operation the first two years are that everything is going slower than the timelines and phases originally planned for. The main focus of the military component has been the struggle to build forces and deploy and establish in respective sectors. Problems with force generation, delay in troop contributing countries, problems with logistics, limited aviation resources and security problems in the area of Juba has hampered the planned deployment. By September 2005 only the Force HQ, sector 1 in Juba and the observer teams could be declared operational. By December the military component had managed to deploy about 40 percent of its forces.<sup>154</sup> The consequence was that the parties were relaxed in starting the processes agreed in CPA, no Joint Integrated Units were formed and UNMIS struggled to be able to verify numbers the parties claimed to have withdrawn. By March 2006 the situation had improved and the military strength had raise to 78 percent of the planned structure.<sup>155</sup> Problems with Lords Resistance Army activity south of Juba hampered the deployment and every UN columns needed escort which in turn led to overstretched protection units and further delay for the logistic deployment. By June 2006 the force was almost complete and finally operational in the area of operations.<sup>156</sup> The rainy season increased the mobility problems due to lack of helicopters. The main problem has been force generation and troop contributing countries delay in deploying critical assets. The Pakistani aviation unit, force demining companies and the Chinese contingent was over a year delayed. In an operational

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<sup>153</sup> DPKO, “Civil-Military Coordination Policy” (2002), p 3.

<sup>154</sup> United Nations, S/2005/821.

<sup>155</sup> United Nations, S/2006/60.

<sup>156</sup> United Nations, S/2006/426.

environment like Sudan, lack of helicopters, engineers and medical units will hamper the whole operation and ultimately give a negative picture towards the UN from the parties and local population which do not see any progress as expected in the CPA. However the latest status report from the SG indicates progress in the parties' redeployment and formation of the new Joint Integrated Units and that UNMIS military component has intensified its verification and monitoring. On the contrary the security situation continues to be tense, one UN soldier had been killed in January 2007 and there have been several attacks on humanitarian organisations in the South. Other armed groups and the Lords Resistance Army elements activity imply that the military increasingly must focus on security tasks.<sup>157</sup>

When it comes to the cooperation with the humanitarian sector the lessons is that the level of cooperation varies much as a result of the problems mentioned above. However the steadily increased UN presence in the areas resulted in more humanitarian activity by civil organisations. "Nearly 1,8mill people including about 120 000 returnees every month, have been assisted with general food distributions. More than 600 new water sources have been constructed".<sup>158</sup> During the first quarter of 2006 UNMIS military component supported humanitarian efforts in providing medical and engineering services and by deploying UN military observers to reduce tensions. The UNMIS engineer and medical units has been occupied with supporting the local communities in road repair and also equipping and supporting medical clinics.<sup>159</sup> One of the main problems within the humanitarian sector is that they only manage to raise 50 percent of the funds requested for in the Work Plan for 2005, and consequently the military has to support reconstruction projects within their sectors. However UNMIS seem to prioritize local capacity building and include the local population in much of the reconstruction efforts. The latest quarterly report from the SG states: "UNMIS engineer units have assisted in road repair and construction, but wherever possible, local labor is trained to carry out such tasks".<sup>160</sup> As the situation in Darfur developed throughout 2006 into 2007 the humanitarian problems has been rising. "Over 2 million people are now internally displaced, and their numbers continue to rise, while 1, 9 million conflict affected residents remain largely dependent on external aid".<sup>161</sup> Darfur will influence UNMIS and the military component is likely to be even busier with protection and security tasks supporting the humanitarian organizations during 2007.

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<sup>157</sup> United Nations, S/2007/213

<sup>158</sup> United Nations, S/2006/160

<sup>159</sup> United Nations, S/2007/213

<sup>160</sup> United Nations, S/2006/160

<sup>161</sup> United Nations, S/2007/213

### **Summing up this chapter**

This chapter has reviewed and discussed how UNMIS has approached their task in an integrated manner. The whole mission seems to be marked by an integrated strategy from the outset and that the planning in many ways succeeded in integrating the UN Country Team and the humanitarian sector. The SG focused and stated that in order to succeed with the UN effort in Sudan had to be planned and executed in an integrated unified manner. SRSG followed this appeal and stressed this in his own planning at country level. The SG designed a unified Senior Management Team for the advance mission (UNAMIS) which had the task to prepare and make the transition to a larger peacekeeping force smoother. UNCT was involved early in the planning; they had the area knowledge, the experience with humanitarian operations since early 1960s and were currently running “Operations Lifeline”. The preparation for UNMIS had many advantages as it could be prepared sequentially as the parties came to agreements throughout 2003-2004. The SRSG and his senior managers were to continue in their positions in UNMIS, the SRSG as well as the Force Commander was involved in the peace process which led to the signing of the CPA in January 2005. UNAMIS with the staff from SHIRBRIG managed to deploy rapidly and was partly operational in July 2004 and could start the work and planning for UNMIS. Logistic planning, development of a CONOPS and establishment of liaison and contact with the parties was prioritized.

The planning in 2004 resulted in a Unified Plan for Sudan coordinated with the UNCT Sudan Work Plan. HQ was established in Khartoum with all components co-localized. Six sector commands with civil field offices and three to four team sites in each sector. UNCT had one office in Khartoum and one in Juba, OCHA established offices in all UNMIS sectors all enabling coordination and cooperation. UNMIS biggest challenge has been the deployment and establishment in sectors and sites. The Mission lacked critical assets and was not fully operational before June 2006. The military mission is to observe, monitor and verify that the parties comply with their CPA and keep the deadlines they have agreed on. Secondary task is to support the humanitarian effort the recovery and reconstruction efforts and the DDR program. First year has been focused on deployment and construction of their own camps, sites and facilities and road repair in order to improve the mobility. The mission itself requires close coordination and cooperation with the parties as well as within the UN Mission and the humanitarian sector outside.

## **5 The Implications of the Integrated Missions to the military component**

This thesis started with a presentation of the dominating trend towards increased civil-military integration in today's peace operations. Nations and the international organisations are realizing that a longer term effort and a more comprehensive strategy is needed in order to succeed bringing the conflict areas from war to lasting peace. The UN has been developing an integrated civil-military structure in their multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission since 1989. The peacekeeping operations of the 1990s brought hard lessons and also innovations which the UN operations are marked by today. The self examination of the UN after the failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda led to a call for reform of the UN system and approach to peacekeeping. The Brahimi report recommended better coordination and common strategy to UN peace operations. The Concept of Integrated Mission is established and implemented in most of UN's multi dimensional operations. DPKO has implemented an integrated planning process and has also ambitions to further change the structure of the missions, establishing Joint Mission Analysis Centres and Joint Operational Centres and Integrated Training Service in addition to the already Integrated Support Services. The operation in Sudan was planned and established as a unified mission and clearly is operating as an integrated manner. The question of how this concept is going to affect and influence the military component will be answered by synthesising the findings from the previous three chapters.

### **Historical lessons**

First of all the historical lessons from the development towards integration "forced" all organisations involved in peace operations to recognise that the environment had changed and that everybody had to change their thinking and approach towards such operations. We learned that the military alone could not solve the problems and that a short focused mentality of, "get the mission done, do the election and go home", not would be cost effective. The UN was likely to return to the country again. The operations in Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia pioneered the way toward integration. The humanitarian agenda raised and the theatre of operations became increasingly crowded. The practical consequences for the military was a wider task portfolio involving increasingly more non-military tasks which required more communication, coordination and cooperation with the civilian actor in the theatre. Commanders had to be able to talk to and cooperate with civilian personnel on operational matters, contradictory to Huntington's ideal being separated from the civilians and focused on the military profession of orchestrating violence.

Structural changes occurred as the UN Mission increasingly became civilized in form and function. The Military Force Commander had to step down from being head of mission to become the military adviser to the SRSG. With the new tasks and focus the UN Mission staff became civilized as well. The logistics had to serve more than just the military forces. Civilian Police became part of the structure and generally more partners became involved in the peacekeeping effort. The military component established CIMIC as new functions within their staff to improve coordination with the humanitarian sector which increasingly took up more space in the area of operations.

### **Integrated Planning**

The Integrated Mission Planning Process focuses on involving all relevant actors and the intent is to bring the long term development programmes and the shorter term peacekeeping operations together in a coherent strategy for the UN effort. The Military components advising role will increase and be important when planning for new operations. In a complex integrated context the military is not likely to have the main effort, at least not in the strategic plan. The UN Country Team may need the military support to be able to continue their operation and thereby improve the progress toward long lasting peace in an area. On the other hand the military will still be the dominating and core actor for a UN peacekeeping mission and all other components and agencies will depend on the military to provide a secure environment. The operational main effort must thereby be the military component which establishes the framework for the civilian parts of the mission and operation.

Integrated planning implies that military planners constantly must be in dialogue and cooperate with the civilian parts of the mission and even more important, with the UN Country Team down to the tactical level in the field. Such interaction demand that the military traditional culture of “telling others what they intent to do” must change to more “what can we in common achieve and how can I support you” type of questions. In other words the dialogue must take place before decisions are taken so that everybody is on the same sheet of the map and are pulling towards the same agreed common objective and end state. The history has told us that this not will be easy and probably the consequences is more interaction in pre-mission training or even joint integrated courses at staff colleges and military participation in civilian courses as well. The SRSG UNMIS advice on everybody’s responsibility to consult will be useful to achieve a common understanding and to synchronise the actions taken to solve the problems. “A unified approach of all UN agencies also implies the duty to consult each other about each other’s work, the duty to cooperate and to use a common infrastructure and

common services. Finally this unified approach requires the acceptance of a unified command.”<sup>162</sup>

### **Integrated Structure**

With the Integrated Mission follows an integrated structure which the UN has developed since the early missions in Namibia in 1989 and Cambodia in 1992. The Under Secretary General DPKO has set out structural changes in his “Peace Operations 2010” document and has instructed all UN peacekeeping missions to establish the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). Two functions that in many ways will complete the development towards a true Joint Integrated Headquarters covering all of the traditional J1-6 structures we find in military joint headquarters.

The UN has as we learned from UNMIS not been able to reach the ambitions with the JOC and JMAC functions yet due to lack of personnel and equipment. However the consequences for the military will be that more staff officers must be provided to fill these new structures, and for the JMAC that requires intelligence analytical qualifications. For the JOC function qualifications and experience from military JOCs and crisis management experience will be needed. Another challenge with this is the clash of culture that probably will increase especially when we integrate the intelligence function into the JMAC. Sharing of information with external actors has not been common in a military system and some barriers have to be moved and broken down. But again Integration is something more than sharing unclassified information about what different agencies and organisations are doing and what they know. It is about creating a unified effort, an agreed and common strategy, a common plan; it is about prioritising and as Pronk states accepting that you are part of a larger complex system. When it comes to the structure below the Mission headquarters it will also consist of a civil-military structure, but here there will be more coordination and liaison than integration. The civil field office will have most of the same function as in the HQ, but the implications to the military component will not change at this level.

### **Integrated Command**

The Integrated Mission implies acceptance of a unified command. The SRSG is the highest authority in the theatre of operations and he manages the operation through his Senior Management Team. The SMT is a forum for discussion and decision and the core instrument for the commanders to agree on a comprehensive approach. History has told us that the

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<sup>162</sup> Jan Pronk, “Fifteen guidelines for Peacekeepers” Weblog no 41, 25 February 2007. Available at: <http://www.janpronk.nl/index120.html>

relationship between the SRSG and the Force Commander as well as the other senior leaders is of utmost importance to succeed in the mission. The SMT must be designed and build as a team before they arrive in the operations. The UNMIS example that all participated in the planning and was cooperating almost six months before they entered the Mission is probably a unique situation, but anyway the UNMIS example has shown that a strong and well prepared SMT will be important to succeed with the integrated concept.

When it comes to military command the Force Commander will continue to execute Operational Control (OPCON) over all military personnel within the UN Mission, also those designated to integrated services. Sector Commanders will do the same within their sectors. The troop contributing countries (TCC) will continue to exercise full command over their forces and in theory be able to interfere in the chain of command. However as the history from the 1990s has shown, such issues should be clarified before the troops enter the area. As we learned from the UNMIS planning process, integration of the TCCs early in the Integrated Task Force will ensure that they not enter the area of operations not knowing what they really have said yes to, and that they are able to sort out caveats and restrictions before they arrive in the area. Not covered in this thesis but the Force Commander has to be aware of all such obstacles before he decide on the CONOPS. Currently this is an issue in UNMIS expansion toward Darfur and the support for AMIS. When it comes to military support to civilian led operations (UN agencies or INGOs) the forces remains in their normal command structure.

#### **Cimic functions in the military**

The hypothesis that the CIMIC functions within the military units will be more important in an Integrated Mission was not verified in this thesis. On the contrary it seems that the UN is focusing these special functions toward liaison. The UN is defining CIMIC as Civil-Military-Coordination instead of Cooperation. The UN has coordinated their CIMIC policy with OCHA at the strategic level and it states that military support is seen as a last resort for the humanitarian sector. However as we have seen in Sudan the military and the humanitarian sector share logistical assets, the planning for the logistic strategy was done in close cooperation with the UN Country Team and so on. An Integrated Mission will in nature be inclusive when it comes to the peacekeepers and the peace-builders. The military must cooperate and coordinate at all levels and the whole Mission can in some ways be related to the classical understanding of CIMIC. The military component in UNMIS has a task that involves close liaison and dialogue and cooperation with both the parties of the conflict as well as the civilian actors playing in the operation.



## 6 Conclusion

This thesis has analysed the UN concept of Integrated Mission in order to find out how the implementation of concept may affect and influence the military arm. It has reviewed the historical lessons from the 1990s with the growth of the humanitarian agenda and the increasingly complex environment with civil and military players which ultimately led to need for better coordination and cooperation. The call for coherence within the UN and between the different agencies in 1997 enhanced in the Brahimi Report and again with the Report on Integrated Missions in 2005 has intensified the focus on the concept. Integration is now stated to be the guiding principle for UN peace operations and clearly a concept which the UN and DPKO is implementing in their operations. The SG has implemented the model of SRSG as the highest authority and two Deputies of which one has the dual role as HC/RC and is heading the UN country team. DPKO has implemented the Integrated Mission Planning Process which they used in the planning for Sudan. DPKO has also started a process to change the HQ structures in the field, establishing more Joint Integrated Services (JOC and JMAC) which ultimately will lead to more civil-military staffs at that level.

The consequences for the military can be summarised as follows:

- 1) The importance of accurate and clear military advice in the strategic as well as operational planning will increase. The military is only one part of a larger and wider context.
- 2) The interaction with the civilian sector, humanitarian, development, political will increase and the military officers must learn how to approach this to create a constructive dialogue and not only focus on “briefing the others what they do”.
- 3) There will be more integrated civil-military services at HQ level and the military must fill staff positions in the new Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres. This will demand experience from higher level military staffs, crisis response experience and intelligence expertise in the JMAC.
- 4) The CIMIC function within UN is focusing on coordination and liaison and the military support to the civilian actors will be better planned and coordinated at higher levels as part of the overall mission strategy. It may put more pressure on the military logistics especially critical assets like transport, aviation and engineers.



## Appendix A: Statistics UN peacekeeping 2007

This is an overview of the recent Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Missions with their Resolutions, number of tasks in mandates and the size of authorized force structure. The table shows the development from the up-start of the missions to present. The data is collected from DPKO and SC Resolutions on each mission.

Mission	UN Resolution	Tasks	Force structure				Remarks	
			Military (Troops and observers)	Police	Int Civil	Local Civ		
UN Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) 1999-	1258, 1999, (Mil liaison)	8	90	341			Authorized to use all necessary means.	
	1279, 1999, (Observers)		500					
1291, 2000, (Chapter VII)	5537							
1445, 2002	8700							
1493, 2003	10800	18	16700	841				
1565, 2004 (Expansion)	17342 (54 nations)		1028	940	2051			
Strength as of 28 Feb-07								
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 2003-	1509, 2003, (chapter VII)	19	15000	1115				
1694, 2005	14875		1240					
Strength as of 28 Feb 07								
			14056 (52 nations)	1201	524	931		
UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) 2004-	1528, 2004 (chapter VII)	28	6240	350	435			
1609, 2005	7090		725					
1682, 2006	Strength as of 28 Feb 07							
			8053 (45 nations)	1,138	371	524		
UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 2004-	1542, 2004 (chapter VII)	14	6700	1622				
1702, 2006	7200		1951					
Strength as of 29 Feb 07								
			6799 (19 nations)	1802	431	718		
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 2005-	1590, 2005 (Chapter VI)	13	10000	715			Ch VII in parts	
1706, 2006 (expansion)	27300 (authorised)		4015					
Strength as of 28 Feb 07								
			9978 (61 nations)	642	851	2250		
UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) 2004-06	1545, 2004 (Chapter VII)	16	5565 (47 nations)	97	316	383	Mission terminated and replaced with a peace building mission in 2007	
UN integrated office in Burundi (BINUB) 2007-			0	11	242	308		


**UNMIS:** 68 nationalities within the military force, 45 nationalities within the police force. 13 tasks in SR 1590. Tasks related to monitoring and observation, security, DDR program, restructure of local police, facilitate and coordinate return of refugees, support humanitarian assistance, contribute to protect human rights. Acting under Chapter VII: "UNMIS is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, joint assessment mechanism and assessment and evaluation commission personnel, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence".<sup>163</sup> In resolution 1706 the ambition is even higher: "Decided that UNMIS is authorized to use all necessary means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities:"...to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, assessment and evaluation commission personnel, to prevent disruption of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under threat of physical violence. In order to support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, to prevent attacks and threats against civilians, to seize or collect, as appropriate, arms or related material whose presence in Darfur is in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556, and to dispose of such arms and related material as appropriate:."

<sup>163</sup> S/ RES/1590: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/284/08/PDF/N0528408.pdf?OpenElement>



## Appendix B: The Planning Process for a UN Peacekeeping Mission<sup>164</sup>

This is a model of the planning process from initiation of a UN operation to deployment. The Integrated Task Force is shown on the left side.



<sup>164</sup> Challenges of Peace Operations Project, "Capstone Doctrine", 2006, p. 19.



Appendix C: Map over Sudan<sup>165</sup>



<sup>165</sup>United Nations Cartographic Section: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf>





## Appendix D: UNMIS Area of Operations and Deployment April 2007<sup>166</sup>

This map shows how UNMIS is deployed in six sectors throughout South Sudan. All sectors have combined capacity in order to be self sustained in their area of operation. In addition there is a UNMIS liaison cell established in AMIS HQ in Darfur.



Map No. 4249 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS  
April 2007 (Colour)


Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

<sup>166</sup> United Nations Cartographic Section: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unmis.pdf>



## Appendix E: Integrated Presence in Sudan January 2007<sup>167</sup>


This map shows how UNMIS, OCHA and Resident Coordinator Offices are deployed throughout Sudan.



<sup>167</sup> [http://www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/sudan/data/orgnaization\\_presences/Map%20717%20Projected%20UNMIS-RCO-OCHA%20Presence%20in%20Sudan%202007.pdf](http://www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/sudan/data/orgnaization_presences/Map%20717%20Projected%20UNMIS-RCO-OCHA%20Presence%20in%20Sudan%202007.pdf)



Appendix F: The UN agencies deployment December 2006<sup>168</sup>



<sup>168</sup> [http://www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/sudan/data/orgnaization\\_presences/Map%20786%20Agencies%20Presence%20in%20Sudan.jpg](http://www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/sudan/data/orgnaization_presences/Map%20786%20Agencies%20Presence%20in%20Sudan.jpg)



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