From Mission Cringe to Mission Creep?

Implications of new peace support operations doctrine

Michael Pugh

Table of Contents

Note on the author

Dr Michael Pugh is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations,
Department of Politics, University of Plymouth, UK. He was Senior
Research Fellow of the Economic and Social Research Council in 1994-95.
He is the chief editor of the international quarterly journal, *International
Peacekeeping*. In 1995 he published *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping*
(Manchester University Press and St Martin's Press, New York), co-
authored with Jeremy Ginifer, Eric Grove and others. He has written many
articles and book chapters on peacekeeping and humanitarianism, and his
edited book *The UN, Peace and Force* is published by Frank Cass, London
in 1997.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

One of the features of post-cold war thinking about peace support
operations has been the perception of dysfunctional gaps between sets
of criteria: requirements, intentions and performance. Attempting to get
a better fit, so that intentions, requirements and performance are well-
matched has been a basic motive behind prescriptive analysis in general
and doctrine development in particular. This paper acknowledges that
doctrine is not dogma. Indeed dogma is hardly a viable end-state in a
world where the practice of peace support is in such a state of flux.
Doctrine has the function of a guidebook, a point of reference rather
than a blueprint. However, to be of any value it also has to define terms
and principles. In this and other respects it therefore serves as an
indicator of an evolving military discourse. The argument here is that if
new peace support operations are to be as formative as old
peacekeeping operations, it is important to examine some of the
implications of new doctrine. Doctrinal development has been
particularly advanced in the United Kingdom, and can be said to
amount to a British capture of the international debate in the mid-
1990s, reflected in two Army Field Manuals *Wider Peacekeeping*
(hereafter AFM WP) and by the first draft of *Peace Support
Operations* (hereafter AFM PSO).[1] Particular reference will be made,
therefore, to UK doctrinal development.

The analysis begins by highlighting two problems that doctrinal
developments seek to overcome: "cringe" and "creep". It then
considers the implicit choices that are presented in tackling them and
points out the implications of a military spectrum approach to doctrine.
Although the choices reflected in doctrine may be rational from a
military point of view, their political acceptability is a critical issue that
also needs to addressed.

Mission Cringe

Both mission cringe and mission creep have pejorative connotations, but cringe is more a matter of rhetoric and perception, since the impact of doing nothing is less easily measured than the impact of something done. In respect of cringe: one person's abject appeasement is another's life-saving conflict avoidance.

Cringe is my own short-hand term for a group of perceived inadequacies which give rise to allegations of doing nothing, avoiding the issue and appeasing bullies. It suggests that there are discrepancies between desirable ends and the means attempted (or not attempted) to achieve them. It is primarily a problem at the level of UN mandates, political will and strategic planning. Without discussing its justification in particular cases, accusations of cringe have been directed at political leaders who are seen to wash their hands like Pontius Pilate rather than divert resources for a peace support operation, appealing to such criteria as lack of finance, lack of public support or absence of national interest. Gaps between ends and means also arise if the Security Council issues flawed mandates or states do not provide the relevant and properly-configured forces to fulfil the mandate, leaving soldiers exposed to casualty and capture. The former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was highly critical of this kind of political "cowering" in his reports on UNPROFOR.[2]

Others have blamed the United Nations for sticking to an "all or nothing doctrine", presenting strategists and politicians with the stark options of enforcement or consensual peacekeeping.[3] Inability to respond appropriately to crises has, of course, led to various reforms and arrangements for improving information flows, assessments and decision-making in the United Nations system. Nevertheless, the United Nations is frequently perceived as having "too little credibility" in its reactions.[4]

Unlike politicians who often seem balked in their search for perfect solutions, the military are used to working in imperfect environments, inured to living with improvisation and making the best of gaps in

resources. Flexibility and initiative with limited resources is especially relevant in fluid situations and, as in the Nicosia airport incident in Cyprus in 1974, bravura in a position of weakness can sometimes pay off.[5] But imputations of appeasement or cringe on the part of military commanders is often misplaced.[6] To support mandates, military commanders are furnished with mission statements that indicate what has to be achieved, why, when and where. Commanders then estimate the risks and responsibilities and in the light of this decide how to implement the mission statements. Their estimate or "appreciation" is a critical part of the planning. It is at this stage that any seeds of under-achievement by military forces might be sown. Commanders will have varying styles and cultures that may lead them to appreciate risks and benefits or estimate resources in ways that result in under-achievement. But for the most part, peacekeeping commanders are constrained in making their estimates by the traditional operational concept of peacekeeping - inoffensive posture, vulnerability and bluff - thereby limiting the scope for military initiatives. It takes a considerable leap of the imagination to envisage General Patton in charge of consensual peacekeeping. This "enforced cringe" is also liable to produce moral dilemmas for peacekeeping forces that have no mandate to go beyond self-defence, in the tasks of protecting refugees, for example, and that have to abide by highly restrictive rules of engagement (RoE).

Even if new peace support doctrine allows for less constrained parameters in the devising of military appreciations, thereby opening up greater possibilities of military enterprise, it will remain the case that for all types of politically-sensitive international operations, military initiatives cannot be expected to compensate for lack of political will or contradictory mandates. Military personnel should not be left in the lurch, like the Dutch in the Srebrenica enclave in Bosnia in 1995, or be expected to cope with a mission impossible.[7] It is axiomatic that doctrine should seek to provide an element of immunity, to protect military forces from unnecessary danger and loss of life. Equally, it is vital that political authorities shoulder the responsibility of devising the right kind of mandate, sending the right kind of force and providing a political underpinning to the particular concept of

8

operations. In sum, it is doubtful whether peace support operations, of whatever type, can be extended to cope with all situations. Nor can a change in military doctrine by itself fix the cringe that is essentially the product of politics.

Mission Creep

The reverse problem, mission creep or overspill, is the main focus of this discussion. Although throughout history armed forces have been diverted to undertake functions that were not intended for them, commanders would prefer not to rely on improvisation, even when, as in the British Army, improvising appears to achieve the status of a virtue. Mission creep can, of course, reflect an impetus to seize the initiative and take advantage of opportunities for improving security and prospects for peace. Or it may reflect the need to carry out an unforseen task (such as repairing communications) in order to enable the force to operate at all. In this respect mission creep can be organic to the force, growing from within as an extension of its competence. By contrast, externally imposed, unintended, unprepared or unplanned escalation, or the extension and prolongation of activity, can be as unwelcome in its consequences as flinching from tasks. In the characterisation provided by Daniel and Hayes:

> *Mission creep occurs when there is an incremental increase in the tasks assigned UN forces to the point that the tasks far exceed initial expectations of what the forces had planned for and were equipped to achieve.*[8]

The absence of organic intention, then, is a defining feature of mission creep. It can be divided into three basic types: *vertical*, *horizontal* and *temporal*. The first two are bound to overlap in certain situations because some new tasks, such as the protection of humanitarian aid convoys, may entail greater potential use of force than patrolling.

Vertical Creep

In the context of doctrinal development, perhaps the most critical problem facing soldiers in the new conflict environments, as presented in *Wider Peacekeeping*, is unintended escalation over the strategic consent divide. The manual opens with this issue, and whilst countenancing tactical use of force, it cautions against uncontrolled escalation in the strategic use of force.[9]

> *Since the Wider Peacekeeping operational environment is, however, likely to be complicated, violent and volatile, the danger of* inadvertently *crossing the consent divide may often be present. In such circumstances, there will frequently be temptations to mix the two approaches [peacekeeping and enforcement]. Wider Peacekeeping doctrine, however, seeks to identify and guard against this danger* [my emphasis].[10]

The *Wider Peacekeeping* manual leaves open the possibility of deliberate escalation, by using other types of military forces. This might be depicted as having a vertical dimension because force escalation is traditionally associated with ladders, a convenient metaphor if cringe is regarded as a harmful snake!

Horizontal Creep

It seems equally apt to use horizontal imagery for depicting a range of "tasks" (used here in the sense of "assigned duty") that cut across military combat functions and integrate with non-military activities. Horizontal creep is used to mean that soldiers are burdened with multifunctional tasks, often of a non-military nature, for which they may be unprepared or ill-equipped. It was assumed in *Wider Peacekeeping* that peacekeepers would be able to undertake various tasks, from relocating displaced populations to apprehending wanted persons. These would require special techniques for

which the soldiers would receive training.[11] But critics have pointed out that military forces can do more harm than good, and that military guardianship of humanitarian assistance and personnel, for example, can create as many problems for the independence and impartiality of civilian agencies and NGOs as it solves in attempting to provide secure space.[12]

Temporal Creep

Troop contributing countries have long been aware of, and concerned about, the problems of open-ended operations with no exit point. Extending the timeframe of operations has also been referred to as a form of mission creep.[13] UN operations have often started later than originally envisaged, and have gone on for longer. Since UNEF I the Security Council has insisted on time-bound limits and the Secretary-General has had to justify extending the mandate for additional periods. Strictly speaking, there is an element of intention and plannning in these renewable mandates, though initial expectations may be that missions will have a limited life. Time problems are not fixed by military doctrine but by structures and political will. In spite of interesting ideas from Canada and the Netherlands for mitigating the problems of deployment delay by improving the UN's rapid response capability, and in spite of the availability of rapid response units from states such as Denmark, the critical variable in determining when forces are deployed is political decision-making. In fact, as illustrated by the difficulty in getting together a peacekeeping force for the Eastern Zaire Great Lakes crisis in the last three months of 1996, delays may even forestall ill-conceived interventions. However, once states decide to send forces, further delays can occur in transport and logistics provision, diplomatic clearance and coordination, to the disadvantage of military effectiveness. But even the best-prepared operation, arriving on time, can get into difficulties as in Namibia.[14]

Quick-exit strategies have been imposed on operations in advance of deployment, as in the decision to deploy a UK logistic support group of 650 to Angola in 1995, for three months and not a day longer, as well as the

better-known example of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. Finite limits on participation can have certain advantages. For example, they can act as an incentive and reassurance for troop contributing countries, and may induce participants in complex emergencies to meet deadlines. But they may also put an artificial constraint on dealing with the situation. The need for the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (SFOR) suggests that setting a time limit does not substitute for long-term political solutions. It may also reinforce a band-aid or quick-fix mentality.

The Military Spectrum Approach

The emerging doctrines of peace support operations in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and in NATO, represent a common shift towards a military spectrum approach, in which peacekeeping and peace enforcement are part of a range of military options. Hitherto, *Wider Peacekeeping*, the US *FM 100-23*, the December 1995 *NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations* and the UN's own pronouncements, had not proposed using the same forces for sliding from peacekeeping to enforcement and back again. In spite of the confusingly varied nomenclature used by different states for peace support operations, they had commonly articulated a distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.[15] However, France, the largest and most active European peacekeeper by 1992 and a leading supporter of strengthening the UN and European security orders, was developing a less conservative approach. The French General Staff noted a requirement to act under a Chapter VII mandate in a "no consent, no aggressor" context, in order to restore peace (*restauration de la paix*). This would be non-offensive interpositional peacekeeping in an internal conflict but, and on this point France was exceptional at the time, with a mandate to switch to overwhelming force if necessary against all-comers who disturbed the peace. It differed from peace enforcement, which is also action under Chapter VII, in that peace enforcement, according to the French view, crossed the boundary into war.[16] The defining peace restoration mission for France was Operation

Turquoise in Rwanda in mid-1994 which established a protection zone in the south-west of the country. Of course, in this instance the potential challengers did not possess powerful or sophisticated military equipment on the same level as, say, the Bosnian Serb forces in former Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, the UK had the distinct advantage of a more widely-understood language and a field manual that received public exposure and was eventually published as *Wider Peacekeeping* by the Stationery Office in London. It is also clear that the UK took a lead in developing a revisionist approach to its own *Wider Peacekeeping* doctrine. The UK's first draft of AFM PSO indicates a major doctrinal shift to a spectrum discourse, rather than representing an up-dating or consolidation of the former doctrine.

It also meshes with advances in the militarisation of peacekeeping in three respects. First, the 1990s have seen a more military, professional approach to peacekeeping management by the UN, as evidenced by various reforms in the DPKO: establishing a round-the-clock Situation Centre, increasing the staff from 6 in 1989 to about 450 in 1996, establishing an equipment maintenance and assembly store in Brindisi and so forth. Second, the concept of the UN subcontracting to proficient coalitions of the willing and able has been established for peace enforcement operations. Third, whereas there was no real doctrine of peacekeeping beyond the Hammarskjöld principles during the Cold War, there were more insistent calls for a military doctrine of peacekeeping in the early 1990s. The requirement for a post-cold war doctrine had been answered by the British Army's *Wider Peacekeeping* manual. Since then, the revision of British Army doctrine recognises that the principles of war can be adapted to peace support operations and that enforcement "is set to increase" as the most appropriate response in complex emergencies where the situation in volatile.[17]

This is not to say that cold war peacekeeping was entirely devoid of military professionalism. The British Army in Cyprus, for example, was highly professional in its approach. But peacekeeping was hardly treated seriously in the UK until the production of the *Army Field Manual: Peace Keeping Operations* in 1988, and the subject was not taught at the Royal

1 3

Military Academy, Sandhurst until 1994. There can be little doubt that, since the end of the cold war, far more attention has been paid within the UK, the UN and among contributing states to the need for high levels of military professionalism and competence for peace support operations.

Above all, the new doctrine reflects a decision to deliberately incorporate the possibilities of vertical creep in operations in a controlled way and not assume that peacekeepers are appropriate in volatile situations. Indeed the reliance by blue helmet forces on consent can lead opponents to see this as a weakness from which to take advantage, thereby underlining a cringe posture on the part of the peacekeepers.[18]

Correspondingly, horizontal creep may have to be dealt with by emphasising the distance between military and non-military tasks. One should not overstate the case here. The military priority is bound to prevail in the military mind. But the more peacekeeping is seen as being a military rather than diplomatic function the less room there may be for horizontal activities. A reciprocal relationship between the two kinds of overspill probably involves an element of mutual exclusion to the extent that the incorporation of escalation creep may preclude the incorporation of horizontal creep. Not surprisingly, therefore, advocates of escalation potential have also been vociferous against task creep.[19] Indeed, *Wider Peacekeeping* suggested that transiting to peace enforcement:

> *would, for instance, require substantial force restructuring and redeployment, the evacuation of unarmed monitors and civilian workers and the probable termination of humanitarian operations.*[20]

The logic of military preferences results in stones being cast in one pool rather than another, and the rationality of the choice for military establishments can hardly be denied. They are choosing to deal with vertical mission creep by trying to eliminate its inadvertence and making it intentional. This institutionalises it as part of a military spectrum, and it clearly has a combat-oriented ontology which challenges the diplomatic basis of old peacekeeping and even wider peacekeeping.[21] This is not the

1 4

same as a continuum, or seamless transition from one kind of operation to another. Rather, the spectrum is segmented. Although a likely consequence of loss of credibility in a peacekeeping force is withdrawal, a transition from one segment to another is certainly envisaged: "A PK [peacekeeping] force can make the transition to PE [peace enforcement] provided that the necessary preparations [restructuring, evacuation of civilians and termination of humanitarian activities] have previously been made."[22]

The Hammarsjköld principles, *The Nordic Tactical Manual, Wider Peacekeeping* and *FM 100-23* made austere distinctions between peacekeeping and enforcement and emphasised the break between relatively inoffensive and relatively combative configurations. In December 1995 NATO doctrine also stated that:

> *Peace enforcement is fundamentally different from peacekeeping and requires a conscious political decision and a clear UN Mandate. It is normally not possible for the same PSF [Peace Support Force] to move from one operation to the other, unless this possibility was foreseen and planned for; there are fundamental differences in the required organisation, training, attitudes, and equipment between peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces.*[23]

By contrast, the emerging peace support operations doctrine allows planning for moving from one type of operation to another in a controlled way with escalation dominance. In essence, the problem of mission creep is solved by controlling it. New distinctions are made between peace enforcement and war. Unlike warfare, peace enforcement operates within strict limits such as impartiality in the targets of enforcement, minimum use of force consistent with the task and the preclusion of "war winning" objectives.[24] Nevertheless, peace support operations can become part of proper soldiering rather than a distraction or a black art. Hammarskjöld's rubric that "peacekeeping is not soldiers' work but only soldiers can do it", is translated into "peace support is soldier's work and only soldier's can do it".

The adoption of an approach based on continuity rather than disjunction in military behaviour perhaps offers a more consistent and comfortable framework for military establishments, or at least for certain military cultures, than does the old discontinuity in military behaviour that peacekeeping always presented. As the new British doctrine comments in regard to training:

The conduct of PK [peacekeeping] may limit the use of force to self-defence purposes, however, there may be the requirement, in the conduct of any operation, to escalate to enforcement and war fighting.[25]

The doctrine shift is designed to offer a better fit between requirements, intentions and performance. Important military questions arise from new peace support doctrine - whether transitions are to be stepped or smooth; if, when and how helmets are to be changed from blue to green; whether it is more logical to provide a third force for third options. In theory, switching between roles, from the modestly-armed and transparent peacekeeper to the camouflaged combat soldier may not be a mission impossible. In carefully controlled domestic environments and schedules, soldiers can switch from warfighting roles to disaster relief for the civil power and back again. Needless to say, intrastate conflicts are not carefully controlled environments. However, the impact on military effectiveness is not the point at issue in this paper, but the non-military implications of the new doctrine.

Non-military Implications of the Doctrine Shift

Among the important considerations that will impinge on peace support operations, five can be readily identified.

Constitutional issues

The legal basis for moving from peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations, and the closely-related issue of subcontracting, raises serious constitutional points. The use of Chapter VII for enforcement activities by

16

UNIKOM, UNISOM II and, eventually, by UNPROFOR was perfectly legitimate (coming close to the original purpose of article 43). Consensual peacekeeping, despite lack of express provision in the UN Charter, also has a firm legal basis. In effect, UN authorisation is not even required for states or groups of states to conduct it. However, delegated *enforcement* action does require Security Council authorisation (under article 53). The legal status of operations that transit from peacekeeping to enforcement is therefore uncertain. There is no provision for an operation that commences as a consent-based presence, without the need of UN authorisation, and then, in accordance with new doctrine, develops into a grey-area of enforcement whilst maintaining a peacekeeping label outside article 53. What has tended to happen is that the Security Council has given its *imprimatur* to a regional 'peacekeeping operation' after it has commenced (as in Chad and Liberia), but then turned a blind eye to its subsequent evolution as an enforcement operation.

Such looseness is dangerous. It allows "considerable coercive freedom for regional defence and security organisations, which are, as practice has shown, subject to even greater domination and abuse" than UN operations.[26] Further, as David Gibbs points out, it is possible that such franchised operations could constitute "a new means for established powers to project their influence or, stated more plainly, a new type of imperialism."[27] Consequently, the value of having the participation of the Permanent Five Security Council members in Chapter VI consensual peacekeeping is open to question. A study by INCORE (Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, University of Ulster) already suggests that the P5 might be excluded on the grounds that they are perceived to be overtly following national interests.[28] One solution is the subsidisation by the wealthier states of regional institutions and states for peacekeeping, thereby also avoiding the human and economic costs of involvement in conflicts deemed of peripheral interest to the wealthy - much as the United Kingdom and France are subsidising African peacekeeping competence. In the short term, however, this is likely to increase dependency on western equipment, expertise and logistic support.[29]

On the other hand, for the UN to assume control over enforcement or "grey area" operations is not necessarily desirable. If constitutional controls over peace enforcement are desirable, "to help prevent charges of western domination [...] as well as curbing excessive uses of force',[30] the exercise of control might, in turn, endanger the UN's credibility and neutrality. It could undermine the UN Secretary-General's authority as an impartial negotiator. In sum, without secure constitutional foundations for "grey area" operations, intervention by the most powerful states, either controlled or uncontrolled, could undermine the UN's legitimating function.

Political Acceptability

The political acceptability of a military spectrum in which vertical mission creep is deliberately embraced may not be acceptable to troop providers taking risks and for those being policed or protected whose future co-operation may be jeopardised. The shift in doctrine eclipses the former consensus around traditional guidelines. It is quite possible that the new doctrine will be universally-accepted to produce a new doctrinal consensus. However, the consensus may not be so robust and long-lasting as the previous Hammarskjöld consensus for two reasons.

First, change in the environment of peacekeeping has been so rapid that doctrine has difficulty keeping up with practice. It is a central paradox of doctrinal development that the demand for consistent guidance is greater at a time when the pace of change has made it more difficult to discern dominant trends and more problematic to devise new, lasting principles. As in general warfare, the military establishments always seem to be reacting to and preparing for the previous crisis.

The experience of Somalia engendered great caution about mixing traditional peacekeeping and enforcement. The Rwanda crisis suggested the need for robust *restauration de la paix* by well-armed, though relatively small, and rapidly-deployed forces. The UNPROFOR mission in former Yugoslavia initially appeared to confirm the need for separation of peacekeeping and combat functions, because the Security Council had

disastrously fudged the two concepts, and the IFOR mission subsequently encouraged a military spectrum approach. The Great Lakes crisis (Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda) in the latter part of 1996 testified to the great muddle that seemed to prevail. For it was not at all clear what an external force would do in that region, how it would be configured and what its rules of engagement would be.

Second, Hammarskjöld's principles were relatively uncontroversial because they were based on limited, consent-based inter-state peacekeeping. The character of new peace support operations is riskier, and this may discourage states from subscribing, though qualms may be suppressed if escalation is anticipated rather than inadvertent.[31] So far, among the Nordic states, Denmark has subscribed to NATO peace support operations doctrine (and its tank company in UNPROFOR shelled and killed Bosnian Serbs when returning harassing fire). Sweden and Finland were also involved in IFOR, though the former is guided by a doctrine similar to wider peacekeeping called "extended multifunctional peacekeeping", and the latter has constitutional inhibitions on involvement in enforcement.[32] However, if casualties are suffered as a consequence of association with a military spectrum approach, and another incident occurs of the kind that affected the second Multinational Force in Beirut in 1982, then the attitude of these and other states may change.

Exclusion on Military Grounds

The new doctrine portends a growing gap between military efficiency and political representation. It entails a high level of military proficiency on the part of contributing forces. In peace support operations that could entail enforcement, military protection of the force is paramount. Consequently, there is no room for incompetent and fainthearted military components in a force. High levels of professionalism and capability are required. Advocates of peacekeeping reform have correctly anticipated pressures for standardisation in training and harmonisation of operating procedures. The United States appears to be taking a leading position on training, and there

are recommendations that criteria, to which some Third World states are unlikely to conform, should determine the suitability of contributions to peacekeeping by other states.[33] It would also be logical to create an international inspectorate to reject troops from countries that do not meet rigorous combat requirements.

However, these criteria will have consequences in terms of representation and political legitimacy, because selected multinational forces are likely to be drawn from a limited number of capable states. It may be essential, then, to spend as much effort in improving the competence of unrepresented states as in refining the peace support doctrine of hegemonic states.

Division of Labour

The new doctrine for peace support operations subscribes to a "division of labour" approach. This is designed to exploit the comparative advantage of types of specialisation. At the same time, several studies suggest that because complex situations require complex answers, a holistic approach to peacekeeping and external involvement has to be adopted. Both the Canadian and Dutch studies into improving rapid response acknowledged that peacekeeping was less a purely military vocation than in the past.[34] The INCORE study places considerable emphasis on a holistic approach to military training, going beyond military skills and in effect incorporating multifunctional task creep.[35]

The two approaches, the holistic and the division of labour, are not necessarily incompatible. But the militarisation of peacekeeping could well make it increasingly difficult to mesh with civilian aspects of operations, especially in the military guardianship of civilian humanitarian activities.[36] The military will not wish to be hampered by civilian tasks; the humanitarian agencies do not want to be tarred with the military brush. A divorce between military and civilian components, to the detriment of the latter in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement has been a consequence of the division of labour approach.[37]

2 0

British Army doctrine emphasises the need for coordination of effort through a campaign plan developed by a Head of Mission, normally the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative.[38] But managing the plan, and particularly the relationship between military-civilian components, is likely to be increasingly demanding if divisions of labour leads to specialist autonomies and greater prospect of the use of force. One particular European government's defence ministry has adopted the military spectrum approach for peace support measures whilst another of its ministries (meshing the management of negotiations, sanctions and conflict prevention with humanitarian relief) is heading in the opposite direction.[39] Consequently, when the two impinge upon one another their working relationships have to converge from goals and methods that may be drifting further apart.

Given that the multiplicity of actors in complex emergencies are likely to resist coordination and attempt to maintain their independence, the best that can be hoped for is probably the *facilitation* of cooperation to concert military civilian efforts and avoid duplication. A logical consequence of increased division of labour in external intervention would be to create a body of professional coordinators/facilitators - though they might function by uniting all the other actors in distrust of this new layer of international bureaucracy![40]

Simultaneously, powerful market imperatives to exploit comparative advantage are pushing military establishments with volunteer forces towards *internal*, marketised divisions of labour. Economic imperatives are increasing the civilianisation of support functions. In the United States, for example, where the culture of market testing and contractorisation has gone furthest, the out-sourcing of base installation and management has been partly justified on the grounds that it is a waste of talent for soldiers to be digging latrines, especially in conflict situations. Manpower cost savings in the order of 25 per cent can be made. Increased militarisation of field operations will necessitate a rigid division of labour that may become problematic in conflict. Will soldiers be obliged to protect and rescue private company personnel? What will be the status of these personnel

under international law? What control will commanders have over them? Will they be subject to military discipline? These and a great many other related questions, and the military consequences of the market in peace support operations, need to be given thorough consideration.[41]

The Challenge of Divergent Perceptions

As Hugo Slim has indicated, the military and civilian cultures in external interventions possess certain similarities and exhibit a "peculiar mimicry", but they also have crucial differences.[42] Civilians working in complex emergencies are not themselves homogenous, of course, but they share features that distinguish them from the military: often a profound unease about military ethics and culture, a gender balance not seen in the military, and a greater degree of accountability to their host communities. The new military doctrine may widen the distance between military and civilian because of its emphasis on the division of labour approach.

Furthermore, although both military and non-military commentators share the perception that conflict environments are grey and messy, locating peace support operations on a spectrum of force could, even unintentionally, encourage the notion that there can be military fixes of deep-rooted political problems, a notion that may be exacerbated by the pressure for quick exit strategies. It is worth emphasising that concerns about grey area operations cannot be dismissed as a case of "academics" wishing the world were a less messy place. On the contrary, an appreciation that situations are messy and volatile, leads to a concern that interventions do not create more mess in the long term.

Humanitarian workers and political negotiators have to deal with the situations after the military have gone. This is one of the reasons why, in general, UN officials have recoiled from the view that peacekeeping can be extended in an escalatory fashion, even if it seems to limit flexibility both before commitment and in the field. For example, Marrack Goulding, former Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations and subsequently for Political Affairs, argued for strict conditions for the use

2 2

of force by the UN, conditions perhaps unlikely to be fulfilled, though not as part of a military spectrum and not necessarily undertaken by peacekeepers.[43] The new UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, however, may be more favourable to extending the use of coercion into what he calls *inducement*. This departure from the principle of host consent, would be limited to situations where peacekeepers might take coercive action, used impartially, in response to breaches of undertakings that factions have made.[44]

Conclusion

The formulation of principles and doctrine for peacekeeping has, of course, lagged behind developments in practice. Indeed third party operations occurred in Europe as a crisis management instrument after the First World War (in the Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite, for example), long before the term "peacekeeping" was coined, and without any apparent need to define criteria. During the cold war, the basic principles were effectively institutionalised by experience in a relatively settled international system. But during the cold war the restricted use of peacekeeping and the restricted range of states participating in the mainly uncontested interventions, meant that the principles, though paradoxically unmilitary in character, could be relatively uncontroversial and readily subscribed to by participants. For some forty years there was little political debate about the general function of peacekeepers and the principles they should follow, though the Congo crisis was a significant exception.

Since 1989, the demand for new doctrine has followed the rapidly changing demands for new peacekeeping. The British Army provided a model for post-cold war doctrine in *Wider Peacekeeping* that was "wide" in its acceptance, perhaps because it was based on the old discourse that peacekeeping was not soldiers' work, but an extension of diplomacy in fragile peace. Whether the doctrine of peace support operations can be sustained militarily and politically will depend on its relevance to future crises, for military doctrine has always trailed behind experience. Just as

generals are condemned to fight the next war according to what they should have done in the previous conflict, the same will be true of peace support operations. The difficulty will be lessened if doctrine draws on cumulative experience rather than simply reacting to the lessons of the most recent intervention.

Now, more than in consensual operations, the new peace support operations carry great burdens of expectation to uphold normative humanitarian principles and a multinational cooperative spirit. But it has to be remembered that peace support operations reflect failures in world politics. They attempt to deal with the manifestations of problems rather than the problems themselves. That the new circumstances of international peacekeeping require new doctrine is a convincing, legitimate and powerful thesis. However, as doctrine writers themselves no doubt appreciate, guidelines are not a panacea and we need to be aware of the non-military implications of escaping from the snake by climbing the ladder. Disassociation from the old discourse, insularity from civilian and conflict resolution functions and increased emphasis on combat capability can serve to protect military establishments from the horrors of missions impossible. But it is unlikely to overcome the political deficiencies of mission cringe. As Shashi Tharoor has remarked, it is essential to do the right thing as well as do the thing right.[45]

Notes

[1] Although the authors of *Wider Peacekeeping* conducted widespread consultations, the doctrine did not emerge from within the UN or have the imprimatur of any globally-representative international military forum. Its preeminence eclipsed Irish/Nordic experience, and this was touted by proselytes as only right and proper, on the grounds that Britain's military experience in Ireland, for example, was as relevant as Irish experience in Lebanon. See Michael Pugh, "The Politics of New Peacekeeping Doctrine", in Knud Erik Jørgensen, *European Crisis Mangement*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997 (forthcoming).

[2] Secretary-General's Reports: S/1994/291, 11 March 1994, paras 16-17; S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, paras 12-13.

[3] J.G. Ruggie, "The United Nations and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or Whether?", in Michael Pugh (ed.), *The UN, Peace and Force*, London: Cass, p.10.

[4] Shashi Tharoor, "Foreword", in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, xvii.

[5] Francis Henn, "The Nicosia Airport Incident of 1974: A Peacekeeping Gamble", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 1994, pp.80-98.

[6] For example, the vilification in the US press of General Michael Rose in Bosnia.

[7] See Jaque Grinberg, "Can UN Peacekeepers do the Job?", in D. Bourantonis and M. Evriviades (eds), *A United Nations for the Twenty-First Century: Peace Security and Development*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp.187-200.

[8] Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates Through the Employment of Military Force", in Pugh (ed.) (n.3 above), p.125 n.22.

[9] *Wider Peacekeeping*, Chapter 2, "Conceptual Approach".

[10] Ibid., p.13.

[11] Ibid., Chapter 3, "Operational Tasks" and Chapter 5, "Operational

Techniques". Perhaps the UK has been more flexible in deploying soldiers for all kinds of unsoldierly tasks with its long history of Military Aid to the Civil Administration and switching from warfighting to "hearts and minds" operations. This is an untested proposition and I would not wish to exaggerate impressionistic differences between military cultures.

[12] Nicholas Stockton, "An NGO Perspective on Civil Reconstruction", Conference on the Role of Military in Humanitarian Emergencies', Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, October 1995; discussions with the emergency planning directorate of ActionAid, London, 31 July 1996.

[13] Rt. Hon Nicholas Soames, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, BBC TV "Mission Angola", *Defence of the Realm* series, shown in 1996.

[14] See Virginia Page Fortna in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994, pp 364-5.

[15] F. Lentfer, *Doktrin for fredsstøttende operationer*, København: Forsvarsakademiet, 1996, from which information was kindly supplied in English by Knud Erik Jørgensen.

[16] Angela Kane, "Other Selected States: Motivations and Factors in National Choices", in Daniel and Hayes (eds) (n.4 above), pp.125-7; Daniel and Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates Through the Employment of Military Force", in Pugh (ed.), (n.3 above).

[17] First Draft, Army Field Manual: Peace Support Operations, n.d., [hereafter AFM PSO], ch.2, p.7; ch.4, pp.7-9.

[18] Ibid., ch.1, p.2.

[19] Comments made at World Disaster Report Conference, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Overseas Development Institute, London, 29 May 1996.

[20] *Wider Peacekeeping*, Chapter 2, p. 13.

[21] Counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and "small war" are thereby considered appropriate experience. AMF PSO, ch.1, p.1.

[22] Ibid., ch.3, p.4.

[23] Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic, Bi-MNC Directive, *NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*, 11 December

1995, para. 1-4. This echoes the UN Secretary-General's view in "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", UN Doc. S/1995/1, 3 Jan. 1995, paras 35-36.

[24] AFM PSO, ch.3, p.1.

[25] Ibid., ch.7, p.12.

[26] Nigel D. White, "The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues", in Pugh (ed.), n.3 above, p.63; Supplement to Agenda, n.21 above, para.88.

[27] David Gibbs, "Hegemony in the UN", unpublished paper, p.39. This issue is explored at greater length in: Laura Neack, "U.N. Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.32, No.2, 1995; Phyllis Bennis, *Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN*, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996.

[28] A survey of attitudes of Irish and Nordic peacekeepers by INCORE indicates that the perceptions of British, US and French peacekeepers are not always flattering. Some responses suggested that the French were too "trigger-happy" and that the British behaved as if they were in Northern Ireland. "The Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers", Final Report, INCORE, University of Ulster, Derry, 1996, pp.112-13, 162.

[29] France, the UK and the Western European Union, have been prepared to assist African states and institutions, and the United States provided $25 million to the OAU's Conflict Resolution Division. Roy May and Gerry Cleaver, "African Peacekeeping: Still Dependent?", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.4, No.2, 1997 forthcoming.

[30] White, (n.26 above), p.62.

[31] Italy threatened to withdraw its contingent from Somalia in July 1993 after the offensive against the Aideed clan in Mogadishu, but had a brigade in IFOR.

[32] Bo Huldt, "Working Multilaterally: The Old Peacekeepers' Viewpoint", in Daniel and Hayes (eds), (n.4 above), pp. 112-13; and Flemming Lentfer, *Doktrin for fredsstøttende operationer*, København: Forsvarsakamiet, trans. and with information kindly supplied by Knud Erik Jørgensen, Århus

University, from "Sweden's Participation in Peace Support Operations", Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm, 1995.

[33] Bennis (n.27 above), pp. 106-8; Thomas S. Szayna, Preston Niblack and William O'Malley, "Assessing Armed Forces' Deficiencies for Peace Operations", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.3, 1996, pp. 77-91.

[34] Government of Canada, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, Ottawa, 1995, p. 66; "A UN Rapid Deplyment Brigade, A Preliminary Study", annexto letter from Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the UN Secretary-General, 7 April 1995, UN doc. A/49/886.

[35] INCORE, see n.28 above, p. 162.

[36] Micheal Pugh, "Humanitarianism and Peacekeeping", *Global Security*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1996, pp. 205-224.

[37] See, Annika S. Hansen, "Political Legitimacy, Confidence-Building and the Dayton Peace Agreement", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.4, No.2, forthcoming summer 1997.

[38] AFM PSO, ch.2, p.5.

[39] Unattributable source in discussion with John Carlarne, November 1996, Plymouth Peacebuilding Project, International Studies Research Centre, University of Plymouth.

[40] For a discussion of this issue, see Michael Pugh and S. Alex Cunliffe, "The Lead Agency Concept in Humanitarian Assistance: the Case of the UNHCR", *Security Dialogue*, Vol.28, No.1, 1997, pp.17 30.

[41] See, Rhys Dogan and Michael Pugh, "From Military to Market Imperatives: Peacekeeping and the New Public Policy", paper presented at the BISA Conference, University of Durham, 17-18 December 1996.

[42] Hugo Slim, "The Stretcher and the Drum", in Jeremy Ginifer (ed.), *Beyond the Emergency*, London: Cass, 1997.

[43] Marrack Goulding, "The Use of Force by the United Nations", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.1, pp. 1-15.

[44] Kofi Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century", in Michael Doyle and Olara Otunnu (eds), *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century*, New York: International Peace Academy, 1997 (forthcoming).

[45] Tharoor (n.4 above), ix.

From Mission Cringe to Mission Creep?

Implications of new peace support operations doctrine

Michael Pugh

IFS

INSTITUTT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER

▲▲▲▲▲▲▲▲▲

In 1996 UK Army doctrine writers revised the concept of wider peacekeeping and produced a draft of Army Field Manual, *Peace Support Operations*. The doctrinal revision, which has also been influential in NATO, attempts to deal with the inadequacies of peacekeeping in situations of volatile consent by establishing a military spectrum approach. The danger of vertical mission creep, i.e. peacekeepers being drawn into an escalation of violence for which they are unprepared and ill-equipped, is addressed by incorporating the possibilities of escalation and coercion in a planned and controlled way. This approach is a rational choice from a military perspective because it offers greater protection to military deployments. However, it represents a move towards a combat-oriented concept that raises legal, political and cultural issues, and could result in insularity from civilian and conflict resolution approaches.

Michael Pugh is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Plymouth, UK.

IISS
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES