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In this issue:

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South Sudan “arrivals” in the White Nile State (Sudan) Not citizens, not IDPs, not Refugees: What are they?*

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المستخلص :

تتناول الورقة الظروف الحياتية للاجئين من جنوب السودان إلى ولاية النيل الأبيض . وتبين الورقة أن المنظور التقليدي لدراسة قضايا اللاجئين لا يستطيع أن يفسر تعقيد التطورات الجديدة التي طرأت على ظاهرة اللجوء نتيجة للتحويلات العولمية على مستوى منظمة الامم المتحدة أو الدول الاوربية أو الدول الافريقية . وتنادى الورقة بضرورة ايجاد منظور جديد لدراسة اللجوء يحفظ للاجئ كرامته وانسانيته ويساعد فى حل مشكلات اللجوء كظاهرة عالمية بين الدول المتقدمة والدول النامية .

Introduction:

This paper discusses the living conditions of the so called “arrivals,” South Sudanese refugees in Sudan, most of whom now reside in the White Nile State (58 %) and in Khartoum (23%), and the rest of which live in different parts of Sudan. The focus of this paper, however, is on those who live in the White Nile State. It is no longer possible to apply the conventional perspectives used in refugee studies to understand the complex situation of South Sudanese “arrivals” in Sudan. It

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is also not possible to apply the terms usually used to describe and define refugees, IDPs, asylum seekers, the stateless, and “other people of concern,” “to analyze the conditions of these “arrivals,” as they do not fall in any of these categories. Repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration are not possible solutions in the case of the South Sudanese refugees as they may be for other categories. Unlike the handling of straightforward cases of refugees, the international community does not have any laws or means to pressure or sanction either the Sudan or South Sudan governments for their treatment of the “arrivals.” This is so because there is no recognized international definition of “arrivals” and no standard international procedures to apply in such unprecedented circumstances. This could be viewed as a symptom of the worldwide shift from a humanitarian attitude towards refugees (typical of the post-WWII era) to a political and, subsequently, security-driven one due to the explosion, in the 1990s and until now, of the refugee phenomenon (Malkki 1995). Sudan and South Sudan are acting very much the same way other countries, and particularly European countries, do. European countries, in fact, have not setup generally agreed upon rules and measures to collectively deal with refugee issues up to now; they singularly adopt a political stance that guarantees the security of their societies and national borders instead. The recording of the conditions that brought the “arrivals” in Sudanⁱⁱ has no precedent in the literature on refugees. There are a number of factors that can explain the phenomenon. The most important of them is globalization. The new global dynamics have compressed time and space and weakened barriers between countries for the passage of capital, commodities, ideas, and, to a lesser degree, human beings (specifically labor). On the one hand, the strength of national sovereignty and controls (especially of the developing countries) have largely been reduced, while internal and regional conflicts have significantly increased. On the other hand, the current capitalist system led by the U.S. is running into difficulties that might bring about its total collapse, and hence the rise of new world structures or systems. The outcome of the previous dynamics and factors is manifested in a wide, international population mobility and re-drawing

of the demographic map. The old rules of the game guaranteeing the stability of the world since WWII appear to have lost much of their efficacy. It should not come as a surprise that every country pursues its own interests and strives to protect its political, social, and cultural security and identity.ⁱⁱⁱ

The argument here is simply that it will not be possible to understand the present situation of the refugees in general, and that of the South Sudanese “arrivals” in particular, without locating the issue within the larger framework of international population mobility. In any case, it is the refugees, however they may be defined, who suffer the burdens of the changing international circumstances. New global perspectives have to be pursued in order to address the emerging refugee issue. No country, however, seems to care about them; and the international community does not appear to be ready to provide them with proper protection and sound solutions.

South Sudan refugees in Sudan: A brief history

Following South Sudan’s independence in 2011, and up until now, there have been wide-spread armed conflicts between the South Sudan government’s army (mainly Dinka) and the non-Dinka rebel factions (mainly Nuer, Shiuluk, and other Equatorians). This has resulted in chaos, insecurity, killings, rape, and other horrors of war, in addition to massive destruction of property and means of livelihood. The situation has been exacerbated by the, more often than not, contested, insecure and embattled ground areas along the Sudan and South Sudan borders. Accordingly, considerable numbers of South Sudanese fled to seek refuge in neighboring countries, Sudan included.^{iv}

Up to now, many problematic issues—social, cultural, political, economic, and related to security—between Sudan and South Sudan remain unresolved despite the many agreements that have been signed since the post-referendum period.^v As detailed by Abdalbasit Saeed (2011, vi), the outstanding issues between the two countries include: division of oil revenues, collaboration on the production and transport of oil, population movement across the border, and disputes over borders and contested resources—especially arable land, pasture land,

and water access points—in the sensitive “borderline belt” that stretches across the country from east to west. What is of relevance for us here is the undefined situation of many South Sudanese now residing in Sudan.

At the time of the referendum (March 2011), which was to decide on whether Sudan would remain united or would be divided into two countries, only Sudanese of Southern Sudanese origin were allowed to vote. It was reported by the Sudanese authorities that Sudanese nationality would be revoked for those who voted for separation and registered for leaving Sudan. Those who selected unity would retain theirs. Over 90% of the voters chose separation. Many of them abandoned their official jobs and other occupations and kept their children from going to school, and those who owned houses and other forms of property sold them off at low prices. But because of either not being able to withstand the armed conflicts, or cope with living conditions in South Sudan (especially for those who had been born or lived most of their lives in northern Sudan) a considerable number of those who had left decided to come back to the Sudan. Because of the lack of proper registration records and efficient means of control, keeping track of who is of Sudanese nationality has not been easy for Sudanese authorities. Some of the returnees (especially those who were government employees) turned in their official papers to the respective Sudanese authorities before leaving; yet, many Southerners at the time of the referendum did not even bother to indicate whether they wanted separation or not. The chaos that ensued posed a lot of challenges and had serious implications for all parties involved: Sudan and South Sudan governments, UNHCR, the refugees themselves, and the host communities. What is of concern for us here are the positions of, and repercussions for, the ultimate victims of this ambiguous situation, the South Sudanese refugees, as exemplified by the case of the White Nile State.

By October 2014, it was estimated that the number of refugees entering the Sudan from South Sudan washigher than 100,000—mostly of Shiuluk, Nuer, and Dinka ethnic origins (Khogali 2015, 23-24). Their destinations were the Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, while the

vast majority headed to Khartoum and the White Nile States. The refugees entering the White Nile State have mainly come from the Upper Nile and Unity provinces. Two places, Alagaya on the eastern bank of the White Nile and Kilo 10 on the western bank—in the al-Jablain and al-Salam localities respectively—were designated to receive the “arrivals.”^{vi} Kilo 10’s population has now been redistributed into five locations (al-Redais 1, al-Redais 2, al-Kashafa, Jouri, and Um Sanghour). Alagaya received an extension camp along with the Dabbat Bosen “waiting station.” The Sudan government in fact calls the receiving locations “waiting stations” and not “camps,” in addition to calling the refugees “arrivals.” By doing so, it tries to avoid the legal, political, and humanitarian complications tied to accepting them as refugees (as will be explained in more detail later).

In the White Nile State, the situation is further complicated by the fact that many of the “arrivals,” especially the Shiuluk, were Sudanese citizens before the secession and were residing in the area as citizens with houses and regular jobs, speaking fluent Arabic. Some of them intermarried with the Arabs and other local populations. In fact, some “arrivals” did not sell their houses and other forms of property when they left the Sudan. Upon coming back, neither the place nor the people in the area were strangers to them. For some of these returnees, it’s basically business as usual, except for the fact that they are now no longer citizens, refugees, IDPs or stateless. For them, the historical and socio-cultural bonds are stronger than the political borders or political identification. However, they find themselves now in a precarious and very confused situation, especially when it comes to dealing with authorities and official institutions (e.g., educational or health facilities) or UN bodies. This applies to all “arrivals” in all other parts of Sudan, especially Khartoum.

The research problem

For all those concerned with refugee issues, the unique situation of the White Nile State “arrivals” poses a number of problems: a) humanitarian; b) related to policy; and c) theoretical. In humanitarian terms, in the case of Sudan, South Sudanese in the White Nile State do

not enjoy the benefits that are usually granted to ordinary refugees as stipulated by international conventions. Though some of them may be quite familiar with the area to which they return and might have homes and/or established relationships, they are no longer citizens of Sudan. They have to put up with host communities who have their own resources and interests. The “arrivals” cannot deal with the host communities under the new circumstances as equals. Policy-wise, the Sudan government does not have a strategy to deal with this situation, and because of its own political and security interests, it does not want to accept the “arrivals” as refugees. For the UNHCR, the South Sudanese crossed the international borders between Sudan and South Sudan fearing for their lives, and, as such, they are, technically speaking, refugees and should be treated accordingly.^{vii} As of now, and because of Sudan government’s position, UNHCR has had to reach an understanding with the government itself^{viii} in order to mitigate the hardships to which the “arrivals” are subjected, and treat them as “others of concern”^{ix} (a term which is also not well-defined in UNHCR’s conventions). The only thing UNHCR can do is to deal with the matter pragmatically, as *ade facto* situation.

As stated above, the situation of South Sudan refugees in Sudan also poses some theoretical problems; specifically, how to conceptualize the refugees’ identity boundaries in relation to socio-cultural aspects and state political borders. In the case at hand, crossing the political borders no longer defines who a refugee is. Other theoretical issues relate to the interaction of international laws, policies, and institutions with other countries and local communities whose national laws embolden them to pursue their own interests. One might wonder about how the international and national laws interact. In our case, UNHCR and other UN agencies are expected to apply international laws while the Sudan Government pursues its own interests, and while dealing with local institutional bodies operating on the ground.

In the discussion of all these matters, the primary focus will be the South Sudanese in the White Nile State as people who live under desperate circumstances and with no acknowledged identity or international status. Other important matters to consider in dealing with

the presence of the South Sudan “arrivals” are the host communities, whose role is pivotal in relation to how the “arrivals” are received, perceived and treated; the government (policy and management); UNHCR (international policies and laws and conventions); and researchers (theory).

The position of the Sudan Government

Sudan Government’s policy towards the “arrivals,” a term especially coined for South Sudanese refugees, is rather ambiguous. In the early stages of the influx, the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, declared in public speeches that the incoming South Sudanese would be welcomed as “dear guests” (*diouf*). On another occasion they were described as “citizens” (*muatinun*); and yet on a different occasion they were called “arrivals” (*wafidun*). None of these terms, including “arrivals,” have been officially incorporated into written decrees or directives. In fact it is Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), originally set up to deal with IDPs, that has been entrusted to handle the “arrivals” or *wafidun*—instead of the national Commission for Refugees (COR), which endorsed using the term officially. The term has no legal or political connotations; as it does not exist in any local or international laws or political protocols or dealings. It simply denotes administrative measures to be used in their case. But even these measures are not clear-cut and, accordingly, not understood in the same way by those who are supposed to implement them. One of the undertones of *wafidun* is that they are supposed to be treated as citizens; while in fact they are not. In practice, some are kept in what the Sudan government calls “waiting stations” (rather than camps), registered, and their movement somewhat restricted; they can leave the stations only after being granted permission. Officially, after getting the necessary permits, they are allowed to engage in gainful economic activities and to use any medical, educational or other services beside what they are provided in the “waiting stations.” In reality, outside the “waiting stations,” and especially in big cities, many of the services mentioned are not accessible to them, or, if they are, they are very difficult to access. At any rate, the Sudan is adamant about not calling

them or giving them the status of refugees. This approach can only be extrapolated from Sudan’s long and deep historical experience with refugees and IDPs in its eastern, western, and central parts within the local, regional and international contexts, evermore overlapping as a result of globalization.

Sudan has experienced migration as a host country for passing pilgrims or traders from neighboring countries for many centuries. Moreover, many foreigners, in particular Greeks, Syrians and Lebanese, Egyptians and Indians, were called in by the British to facilitate their colonial administrative system (IOM 2011, 26, 71). After its independence, Sudan heeded the international recommendations to give refuge to asylum-seekers; specifically, in 1965, to refugees from Zaire (the current Democratic Republic of the Congo), Uganda, and later from Chad, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, Sudan has not developed a comprehensive migration management strategy (IOM 2011; Hassan 2015; Karadawi 1999). Despite this, many ministries and national institutions in Sudan are involved in various aspects of migration policy and management, their efforts not yet entirely coordinated.^x At any rate, Sudan’s national initiatives in the field of migration management are strongly supported by the international institutions (also under the framework of regional initiatives),^{xi} especially with the increasing needs of some European countries to cooperate with Sudan on migration matters.^{xii}

The great influx of Ethiopians and Eritreans during, and after, the 1970s has brought millions of refugees to eastern Sudan. Successive Sudan governments have had security, political, and economic concerns about their presence. The present government is opposed to the idea of integration (one of the three solutions presented by UNHCR for the problem of refugees; repatriation and resettlement being the other two) as it would entail economic and security burdens beyond its abilities. Regionally, either the refugees themselves, or their original countries, do not want the repatriation option for their own reasons. European countries, the U.S., and other Western or developed nations have restricted the number of refugees to be resettled in their countries. UNHCR, on its part, is finding it difficult to maintain the status quo

without possibility of a durable solution in the near future. To bring this prolonged process to an end, UNHCR has suggested—and in some cases implemented—what it calls a “cessation fund.” This simply means granting the refugees a specific sum of money, once and for all, leaving them in the country where they reside. No additional financial, legal, or technical assistance is to be offered to them or to the host country after that; it is then up to the host country to tackle the problems caused by their presence. Obviously, this is not a lasting solution because it does not address the core causes behind the refugee status or the identity issues that go with it, nor does it take into consideration the challenges faced by the host country—in this case, Sudan. Sudan has serious issues with this approach.^{xiii}

On the other hand, granting the South Sudanese “arrivals” the status of refugees implies approval of the protection afforded to them by UNHCR and other international organizations. It also means that INGOs can have free access to refugee locations under the umbrella of UNHCR. Already being under international scrutiny and tight sanctions, the Sudan government fears that these organizations might pass vital information which could be used against it; for Sudan, Darfur is a living example. Moreover, by not admitting the South Sudanese as refugees, Sudan is free from international pressures and, actually, could use the “arrivals” as a means of pressure against South Sudan when negotiating unresolved security, economic, political, and border issues. The issue for Sudan is how to internally translate its position to policies and practical measures in a pragmatic way.

Sudan has a set of its own rules and principles for dealing with both refugees and IDPs but not well-defined policies or strategies (Karadawi 1999; Hassan 2015). Thus, it was easy for the government to withdraw the South Sudan refugee portfolio from the COR (Commission for Refugees—the counterpart of UNHCR) and assign it to the HAC (Humanitarian Assistance Commission)—whose real mandate are the IDPs and not the refugees—in order to keep UNHCR away from being directly involved in the matter. As mentioned, the HAC, which has no experience in dealing with refugees, has to delegate its new administrative and management responsibilities of registering,

receiving, and running the camps (“waiting stations” in Sudan government’s lingo) to the Sudan Red Crescent (SRC). The COR has thus been absolved of any executive duties, and its role has been reduced to an advisory and coordinating one. This has resulted in some jealousies and grudges between the two governmental units.^{xiv}

However, the Sudan government has setup a new structure, the High Coordination Committee, whose chairperson is al-Bashir’s vice president (who was heading the COR before assuming this position). The new structure is a supervisory and coordinating body constituted by HAC, COR, SRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, and WFP and set up to review and approve the general plans; oversee disbursement of all funds; and assess, evaluate, and monitor the progress of the work related to the South Sudan “arrivals.” The structure is replicated at the state level. In reality, the functioning of the structure is not as neat as might be inferred by this description. The COR is but one of eleven units of the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security; nonetheless, the ministry has no say over its business with the “arrivals.” In the White Nile State, the *wali* (Governor) has appointed a representative to head the state’s sub-High Coordination Committee, while in fact its chairperson is supposed to be COR’s assistant commissioner in the White Nile State. This has also led to some confusion in the chain of authority, command and responsibility ranking. Again, though SRC’s officials work within the coordinating sub-committee at the state level, they report to and communicate directly with the SRC headquarters in Khartoum. Finally, it is clear that, given the standard of the existing resources and capacities of the implementing bureaucratic units at the locality level, local authorities might not be able to face the challenges of such a complicated situation.

The position of UNHCR

On the other hand, UNHCR (the UN agency responsible for protecting and maintaining refugees) was not sure about providing the “arrivals” with the services it usually offers to regular refugees at first; as the “refugee status” has to be first and foremost acknowledged by the host country.^{xv} Sudan, as mentioned, does not at all acknowledge the

incoming South Sudanese as refugees. However, after some form of dialogue, both UNHCR and the Sudan government came to a form of cooperation in addressing the “arrival” issue despite their disagreement.^{xvi}

Within the larger category of “people of concern” (including IDPs, refugees, asylum-seekers, and the stateless) there is the not-so-well-defined sub-category of “other people of concern”; for UNHCR the “arrivals” fall under this last sub-category.^{xvii} UNHCR has a special emergency fund to meet the cost of the operations required to support them.^{xviii} As its mandate stipulates, the agency is a non-political organization and should not be directly engaged in executing actual operations; it releases funds to other organizations to do that, and then it ensures, through supervision, evaluation and monitoring, that the projects are accomplished according to specifications. UNHCR’s main tasks revolve around humanitarian matters, and are implemented on condition of the concerned country’s approval. Despite the fact that the definition and the issues related to the South Sudanese refugees have very strong political undertones, UNHCR is solely focused on the humanitarian aspects, or so it set out to be. However, if the stay of the “arrivals” proves to be a prolonged process, which will more likely than not be the case, UNHCR will find itself in the same position it faces with the prolonged stay of refugees; namely, lacking the funds to support them indefinitely. The difference here is that, unlike the case of refugees or IDPs, there are no set rules for durable solutions or steps to be taken for the “other people of concern” category. “The ambiguous term and status of arrivals”^{xix} has practically limited the ability of UNHCR to intervene according to international law or UN regulations. The only option available for UNHCR in the case of the “arrivals” is to act pragmatically and indirectly, and not as a member of the High Coordinating Committee.

The High Coordinating Committee, set up by the Sudan government, decides on all aspects of planning, monitoring, and disbursement of funds related to the “arrivals.” The resulting projects are offered in tandem with international and national organizations according to sectors: shelter, education, health, infrastructure, water, or electricity.

At a lower level, UNHCR collaborates with relevant ministries to make sure that the projects are completed and run properly, and that the services are up to standard and accessible to the “arrivals.” In the White Nile area this does not seem to be difficult because the registered numbers and classification of the “arrivals” are relatively well-documented, and the services well-managed by the Sudan Red Crescent in the “waiting stations.” However, there are still some problems due to the high mobility of the “arrivals” in and out of the “waiting stations.”^{xx}

In practice, and despite what may appear like a neat description of the process above, it is almost impossible to verify the numbers of “arrivals” and their actual whereabouts once they slip out of the “waiting stations” and head somewhere else inside the White Nile area or Khartoum.

White Nile State: The geographical and socio-economic context

The following section discusses the general layout of the White Nile State: geographical location; environmental conditions; population characteristics; and socio-economic features. The White Nile State, being in the southern part of the Sudan, is strategically located between Sudan and South Sudan and comprises eight localities; two of them, namely the al-Jabalain and al-Salam localities, host the South Sudan “arrivals.” The total area of the White Nile State is estimated to be around 40 square kilometers, with a total population of 1,717,000. Its two major cities are Kosti and Rabak; the former is the economic center, while the latter is the capital of the state (Yousif and al-Toam 2014, 13-14).

The al-Jablain and al-Salam localities are the two places where the “waiting stations” are located. Getting from the “waiting station” in al-Salam to the one in Kosti takes about one to one and half hours by car; whereas, the “waiting stations” in al-Jablain are connected to Rabak by an asphalt road, the distance between the two being about 95 km. Many villages can be seen along the road on both sides of the White Nile. Judging by the casually built houses, and by the large cattle

herds, one could conclude that the majority of the inhabitants are agro-pastoralists and that many of the settlements are rather recent.

The region between the Kosti and Rabak towns and the “waiting stations” is a monstrously flat clay plain, except for some low sandy dunes indicating sand encroachment and desertification. The surface is almost devoid of any natural vegetation, suggesting that the land is annually under rain-fed cultivation. The average annual rainfall in the White Nile State is about 600 mm (Khogali 2015).

In terms of the socio-economic conditions and income-generating activities, traditionally, the area surrounding the al-Jabalain and al-Salam localities has been—as mentioned earlier—known to be a homeland for agro-pastoralist groups. However, up to the early 1970s, large cotton schemes existed on both sides of the White Nile. Kosti was an important commercial river-port connecting the north and the south, and a strategic town linking northern and central Sudan to its western regions. The establishment of the cement factory in Rabak, and the sugar industries in Kenana and Asalaya turned the region into an industrial hub.

The main tribes of the region are Seleim, Nazza, and Ahamda and some other small groups who claim Arab origin, or West African and Nilotic descent. The Arab tribes cultivate dhura (sorghum) and raise livestock, mainly cattle and sheep, which feed on the scanty vegetation that grows during the rainy season and on the remains of the crops after harvest. The other groups engage mainly in fishing, trade, and making of handicrafts. The majority of the population in the White Nile State—except for the urban centers—is agro-pastoralist or pastoral nomadic, with many owning large cattle herds. However, some live in recently built mud villages along the main roads on the sides of the White Nile and engage in petty trade, seasonal labor, and government employment.

The cement and sugar industries provide seasonal job opportunities for some of the “arrivals” as both unskilled workers and technical staff. During the agricultural season, some “arrivals” (especially women and healthy men) and host community men, work as casual laborers in harvesting dhura and sesame in the nearby farms or collecting

vegetables grown on the river banks. Otherwise, the surrounding markets offer petty jobs (for example, in shops and flour-mills) and menial jobs (cleaning). Men among the “arrivals” usually travel to Khartoum in search of work, leaving their women, elderly and children behind. Overall, despite the huge potential in economic resources (particularly livestock, agriculture, fishing, and industries for example), rural areas show evident signs of poverty.

“Arrivals” and “waiting stations”: A general description^{xxi}

Four “waiting stations” were established in January 2014 in four different geographical locations. The distance between Rabak, the capital, and the “waiting stations” ranges from 85 to 95 kilometers. There are two “waiting stations” in al-Jablain (Alagaya and Dabbat Bosen), and five in al-Salam (al-Redais1, al-Redais2, al-Kashafa, Jouri, and Um Sanghour). Alagaya (in al-Jablain) and Kilo 10 (in al-Salam) were the original “waiting stations.” Then Kilo 10 was relocated and divided into the aforementioned five stations.

The Sudan Red Crescent Society (SRCS) is the organization responsible for all “waiting stations” and for the administration, in collaboration with relevant government bodies, UN agencies, and NGOs, of services to South Sudanese “arrivals.” More specifically, the partners with which SCRS works include: State Ministry of Health; State Ministry of Social Welfare; Commission for Refugees; UN agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, and WFP); national and international NGOs (e.g., Plan Sudan, Médecins *Sans Frontières*, Ithar); security and military bodies; and local administrative units and officials.

These partners cooperate to cover the costs of different services such as health, food and nutrition, shelter, environmental health and sanitation, water supply, education, and order and security. However, security is solely administered by Sudan government authorities. The partners also coordinate efforts and assist in establishing the necessary structures inside and outside the “waiting stations” (e.g., shelters, clinics, children’s “friendly spaces,” crossings).

A number of tribal chiefs and committee heads (including women) from among the “arrivals” at the “waiting stations” assist in keeping

order in collaboration with responsible members of SRCS and other security staff.

Population and social categories of “arrivals” at the “waiting stations”
According to Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) officials, the total numbers of “arrivals” in all “waiting stations” is estimated to be 55,920, distributed as shown in the following tables^{xxii}:

Table (1): Number of “arrivals” per “waiting station”

Locality	Alagaya	Al-Redais	Al-Kashafa	Jouri
Total Number of “arrivals”	10,812	16,934	11,230	12,909
Total Number of families	2,311	3,062	1,804	2,063

Table (2): Demographical distribution of “arrivals” in different “waiting stations”

Categories	Percentage
Women	15-25%
Pregnant women	7-9%
Breastfeeding women	7-10%
Children <18 years	65-70%
Accompanied minors with foster families	0.5-1%
Unaccompanied minors	0.03-0.05%

Below is a descriptive account of the numbers contained in the tables above:

- A. Women: The percentage of women in the four “waiting stations” constitutes 15-25% of the “arrivals.” Among them 7 to 9% are pregnant and 7 to 10% are breastfeeding. In the majority of cases women are responsible for taking care of the rest of the family, especially the young, the elderly, and the disabled. Many physically able men are still in the combat zone, or have taken off and gone to Khartoum. This burden puts a lot of psychological stress on women. Women play a very important role in the committees responsible for keeping order in the “waiting stations.” They act as liaisons between the “arrivals” and the “waiting station” administration.
- B. Children: Children below 18 years of age constitute 65-70% of the total population. Of these children, those with foster families

represent 0.5-1% and the unaccompanied are 0.03-0.05%. Children do not have dedicated facilities—except for the so-called “child-friendly spaces”—nor are they given special consideration in terms of food provisions. Child-friendly spaces are thatched roof enclosures used to allow young children to play in a safe environment.

- C. The disabled: The physically or mentally impaired of both genders and of all ages are about 0.1-0.4% of the population, and, like other vulnerable categories, they receive no special care, other than that extended by their female relatives.
- D. The elderly: The percentage of elderly people—i.e., over 60—in all “waiting stations” is about 2.5-5%. These people however do not receive any particular attention with regards to their needs. Their family members—especially the women—carry the burden of looking after them.

Environmental impact and public health issues in the “waiting stations” A large number of latrines were dug within the “waiting stations,” with a 50-individuals-per-latrine ratio as the target. The latrines have now been replaced by 3-meter-wide barrels scattered around the “waiting stations.” Most “arrivals” use them (80% of them according to camp administrators), exception made for children and women. Children are not familiar with the new barrels installed and many women get rid of their waste at night and in hidden corners of the shelters. Chemicals are sprayed now and then, but household flies continue to breed and pose serious environmental hazards.

The Environmental Health Department of the State Ministry of Health is responsible for getting rid of waste in partnerships with NGOs. It is also responsible for the regular spraying of insecticides, and it leads education campaigns/sessions (either going door-to-door or through general sessions) to disseminate information regarding communicable diseases (malaria, diarrheal diseases, etc.), self-hygiene, and breastfeeding, for instance.

The natural vegetation in and around the “waiting stations” suffers from the excessive clearing for purposes of collection of wood, resulting in deforestation and de-vegetation.

Social services and amenities in the “waiting stations”

The objective of this paragraph is to provide a general review of the provisions and services offered to the “arrivals” in the “waiting stations,” and to describe their living conditions.

Education: Basic school education is available in all “waiting stations” and is run by the Ministry of Education in partnership with UNICEF and other NGOs (e.g., Plan Sudan and Ithar). The majority of the teachers in the “waiting stations” or nearby schools are from the “arrivals” community. Many of these male and female teachers formerly worked in the schools of Sudan before separation or later in South Sudan after separation. The total number of students in each “waiting station” ranges between 1,300 and 1,500 pupils.

At the pre-school education level, 450 to 500 children use the “friendly space areas,” which are instead run by the Ministry of Social Affairs and by NGOs. These are meant to serve as safe areas for children while their mothers pursue other gainful activities.

Some of the biggest challenges to education within the “waiting stations” are shortage of space, materials, and staff; irregular schedules; uncertainty of which curriculum (Sudan’s or South Sudan’s) or language of instruction (Arabic or English) to use; uncertainty about the students’ future and what higher educational system they will join. Only a few basic-level schools exist in the nearby host communities, and even the existing ones are far apart. In all cases, buildings and teaching materials are appallingly inadequate; additionally, there is a severe shortage of staff (in some schools there are only 2-3 teachers). Poverty forces many pupils to work and abandon classes for short periods of time to pay the school’s monthly fees. The teachers play a cardinal role as community opinion leaders, but also work as volunteers, assisting in the Red Crescent’s activities, either as teachers or community workers. Moreover, they act as important bridges between the “arrivals” and the host communities.

Water: The main source of water in all “waiting stations” is the White Nile River. Water from the river is brought in through pipes, after being chlorinated and tested. It is distributed through a few points inside the “waiting stations,” and is available all the time.

Food and nutrition: “Arrivals” are supplied with monthly rations of basic food provided by WFP—as indicated in table (3) below:

Table (3): Monthly food rations per “arrival”:

Item	Ration per month
Dhura (Sorghum)	14,25 KG
Oil	0,9 Liter
Salt	0,3 KG
Lentils	1,8 KG

As table (3) indicates, the supplied food items are limited in kind and amount (supposedly according to international criteria). They do not include vegetables or other items the “arrivals” might need—e.g., milk, meat, and sugar. The “arrivals,” in fact, sell some of the dhura to host communities and use the money to purchase some of the items not included in their rations.

Health services: Health services in all “waiting stations” (except Jouri) are provided through SRCS, but under the supervision of *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF). All health clinics are to some extent identical in terms of services provided, staff, referral system, diseases they treat. In each clinic the staff consists of 1 or 2 medical officers, 3 to 5 medical assistants, 5 to 7 nurses, 1 or 2 pharmacist assistants, 1 or 2 lab technicians, 5 to 7 midwives, nutritionists and community health workers. The diseases most commonly treated are respiratory tract infections, diarrheal diseases, malaria. The daily rate of patients per waiting station is 100 to 120. Medical cases in need of referrals to a higher level of care are sent to the Kosti general hospital. The clinic has no ambulance service; SRCS administration cars are used for that purpose.

Not surprisingly, there are cases of mental illness and psychiatric problems among “arrivals,” according to the medical staff. Staff and

health stations are not equipped to deal with them. None of the medical staff in the “waiting stations” has training in psycho-trauma. Moreover, there is no regular psycho-trauma screening or counselling system on the ground, or even an ad hoc service. It is important to note that there is no a specific medical service for children or people with disabilities. Also, there are no screening checks for infectious diseases upon admission to the “waiting stations.” However, there are some vaccination services offered to “arrivals” by the ministry of health upon entering Sudan’s international borders.

For comparative purposes, table (4) and table (5) below display figures relating to the medical personnel:

Table (4): Health personnel in the Al-Jablain and Al-Salam localities:

Locality	Al-Jablain locality	Al-Salam locality
Total population	201,000	132,996
Total “arrivals” (percentage of total population)	10,812 (5%)	45,108 (34%)
Hospitals	3	3
Primary health care centers	16	23
Medical doctors	4	4
Nurses	15	7
Medical assistants	16	15
Community health workers	4	8
Midwives	97	65
Social workers/psychologists	1 (psychologist)	1 (psychologist)
Vaccination technicians	47	6
Nutritionists	4	1 + 19 (volunteers)
Public health inspectors	7	4
Others	38	76

Table (5): Health personnel at the “waiting stations”:

Waiting station	Alagaya	Al-Redais	Al-Kashafa	Jouri
Medical doctors	1	1	3	1
Medical Assistants	2	1	2	2
Nurses	3	2	5	4
Pharmacist assistants	3	1	1	1
Lab technicians	2	1	1	1
Midwives	3	2	2	5
Community health workers	0	5	5	4
Social workers	2 (few visits)	0	0	0
Psychologists	0	0	0	0
Nutritionists	1	0	1	0
Volunteers	16	16	0	

It is quite evident from the tables above that the number of health professionals is not evenly distributed. With the exception of the number of midwives, with a high concentration in the al-Jablain and al-Salam localities, the number of other health professionals is proportionately higher in the “waiting stations” than in the localities. This explains why members of the host communities prefer to use the health facilities located inside the “waiting stations.” In addition, the supplies and quality of medicines are generally better because they are well funded.

Income generation in the “waiting stations”

Only a few job opportunities are available for the “arrivals” inside the “waiting stations” such as teaching, nursing, or cleaning. In every “waiting station” there is a makeshift market where petty trade takes place. Traders come from the host community, a few of them are women from the “arrivals” community. Some “arrivals” sell small things in canteens attached to their dwellings. Among the Shiuluk “arrivals,” one individual owns a metal workshop, a flour-mill, a butchery, and a *nadi al-mushahad* (or watching club) for viewing of

international football matches and movies. Otherwise, the destitute “arrivals” obtain cash to buy sugar, tea, and other necessities by selling some of the dhura or oil or lentils from the monthly rations they receive. Outside the “waiting stations” few job opportunities exist, except for those related to the dhura and sesame harvest season. Those with a good education and technical skills (e.g., teachers, nurses, or clerks) usually have no issues working within the “waiting stations” or in the host communities.

Host community

Dar Muharib, of Arab origin, with all the tribal sub-sections, dominates the population of the Alagaya area on the eastern side of the White Nile. Scattered small groups of Arab or non-Arab origin exist there as well. On the western bank of the White Nile, around al-Redais, the Arabs of the Seleim tribe and its branches co-exist with considerable numbers of Hausa (of West African origin) and Ahamda and Hassaniyya (both of Arab origin). As indigenous people, they have lived in the area for centuries. For most of the Arab tribes on both sides of the White Nile, agro-pastoralism is the mainstay of their livelihood. Cultivation, small jobs and trade by both Arabs and non-Arabs are also a common practice. Under the local government’s system on the one hand and tribal system on the other, host communities officially deal with the “arrivals” and the “waiting stations” administration through their Popular Committees and community dignitaries. The main income-generating activities in the surrounding villages are agro-pastoralism, sale of animal products, rain-fed agriculture, cultivation along the river banks, wood-cutting, coal-related activities, fishing, small trade and market-peddling; with a few individuals working as government employees.

Relationship between “arrivals” and host communities

Relations between the host communities and the “arrivals” are not new. Many “arrivals” were in the north as students, teachers, officials, traders, etc. Dar Muharib, Seleim and Ahamda pastoralists regularly entered the Nuer, Dinka, and especially the Shiuluk lands for grazing during the dry season. Some of the “arrivals” had homes and

acquaintances in the region. Moreover, some of the “arrivals” and host community members are related by marriage and/or kinship. Many of the “arrivals”—especially those coming from adjacent areas—speak Arabic and are accustomed to the habits and traditions of their northern neighbors. Now, they exchange friendly social visits, greet on special occasions, and attend wedding ceremonies held in the nearby villages. Both groups are enthusiastic supporters of their football teams. The “arrivals” of the al-Redais waiting station are exceptionally proud of their football team, which beat all other neighboring teams. Overall, both groups have positive things to say about each other, except for the al-Redais “arrivals” expressing concern about harassment of their women by young individuals of the host community. Also, there are instances of quarrels starting when younger individuals from the host community consume beer inside the “waiting stations.” Any such quarrels are dealt with by the elders and community leaders of the two groups.

There is an underlying give-and-take as host communities donate the land used for the “waiting stations” and, in return for that, they partake in some services, such as health facilities, education, or water supply, provided to the “arrivals” by the donors.

Some general remarks on the position and status of South Sudanese arrivals

1. “Arrivals” faced huge socio-economic challenges before, during and after settling in the “waiting stations,” leading to psychological and psychiatric problems. The numerous cases collected in the research process document this, but have not been included in this paper.
2. Women, children, the disabled and the elderly in particular suffer due to the absence of young and healthy men.
3. Because of socio-historical reasons, “arrivals” are generally welcomed by the host communities, and the relationship between the two parties is one of cooperation, acceptance and peaceful co-existence, except for the isolated disputes.

4. Indicators that need to be studied further point to the fact that the presence of the “arrivals” in the White Nile State is a positive addition to the economy of the area.
5. Sports (especially football), traditional dancing and music, sponsoring of social and public events, or joint agricultural and fishing ventures can arguably further the social cooperation and income-generating activities to the benefit of both “arrivals” and host communities.
6. Issues pertaining to the South Sudanese’s undefined status need to be resolved as they place gigantic psychosocial pressure on the group.
7. The cultural and socio-economic rights of the “arrivals” though guaranteed in the agreements between Sudan and South Sudan, are not observed by state authorities in practice.
8. “Arrivals” in general fall victims to the contentious and rocky political relationship between the two governments of Sudan and South Sudan. They are used by the two countries in their political maneuvers against each other.

Some final reflections^{xxiii}

Since the dawn of history, human beings have known and experienced the phenomenon of migration. However, the scientific study and formulation of specific laws for certain aspects of migration (e.g., refugees and internal displacement) are rather recent. Concerns with problems related to refugees started only after the First World War and gained momentum following the Second World War; whereas issues of internal displacement have come under international focus in the 1990s only. With changes in international relations and internal complications in nation-states due to globalization dynamics, new forms of refuge-taking and internal displacement have started to appear. As of now, it is estimated that there are about 65.3 million people of concern, 21.3 million of whom are refugees.^{xxiv} The steep increase of these numbers could be attributed to global political and

economic developments. Many scholars, for example, allude to the fact that regional or international interests and competition, resulting in devastating forms of violence, armed conflicts, or even military interventions in some cases, could be cited as causes of this type of out-migration. The whole world is being impacted by this. The phenomenon is no longer confined to a particular country or region.^{xxv} For instance, massive waves of refugees are swamping the European shores while huge numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in their respective countries are posing real economic, political, and social and military security challenges to their own governments and to world powers and organizations. Countries like Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Hungary, or Israel in some cases have been compelled to take drastic singular political and security measures contrary to the humanitarian principles followed in earlier years.

To fathom magnitude and impact, the phenomenon ought to be understood in its totality, in a comprehensive way. Repercussions of what is happening in Iraq, Syria or some parts of Africa, with large numbers of citizens becoming asylum-seekers, are not limited to the countries or regions of origin, as these persons infiltrate many other far-away countries. Those who don't die in the attempt to reach European soil find themselves facing long periods in asylum-seekers' camps. In some cases, a great number of them are mistreated (e.g., in Hungary), sent against their will to a third country (Israel sends asylum-seekers to Rwanda, Kenya, or Uganda), or thrown in prisons in the desert (Israel). This situation necessitates new formulations of international perspectives, laws, protocols, and regulations since the old ones are no longer suitable for the new realities.

The case of the South Sudanese refugees, while showcasing some of the elements identified above, is unlike any other (with the possible exception of East Timor, itself a very unique case). South Sudan's refugees do not fall under the categories of IDPs, refugees, citizens, or the stateless—categories used in international and regional conventions. Taking South Sudan refugees in Sudan as an example, this paper aimed at shedding some light on refugee issues in their local and international complexities, and on how Sudan struggles to cope

with them in view of the changing local, regional, and global circumstances.

Looking at the larger picture, Sudan is now supposed to act in the horn of Africa much the same way Turkey is supposed to act in Europe—as a territory in which the refugee stream is being stopped. “Help them where they are” and “We Pay – You do” sum up the new political stance towards these developments. Locally based studies of the complexities inherent to these processes, as in the case of the South Sudanese “arrivals,” become fundamental in exposing the reality behind such political watchwords.

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i This is a term used by the Sudan Government. Why the Sudan Government has opted to use the term “arrivals” rather than “refugees” for this category of individuals will be explained further in this paper.

ii The only case that might be somewhat similar to that of Sudan is East Timor. For a comparison between South Sudanese refugees and East Timorese refer to Krista Davina (2014) and UNHCR (2002).

iii The latest withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union could be seen as the beginning of this process.

iv See the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan, Maison de la Paix, Geneva, www.smallarmssurveysudan.org.

v The most important of which is the [Cooperation Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan](#) of 27 September 2012, which contains resolutions on economic matters, security arrangements, border issues, and status of nationals. See the United Nations Peace Agreements Database website and appendix 3 in this paper.

vi For a comprehensive description of the Alagaya and Kilo 10 “waiting stations” (camps), refer to the DIMARSI Report (2014) and Mustafa Khogali (2015).

vii Regarding the UNHCR and Khartoum disagreement over South Sudanese refugees, see Sudan Tribune, 3 April 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php>? The Tribune reads: “The United Nations office in Sudan has disclosed disagreement between the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Sudanese government on the description of the South Sudanese citizens who fled to Sudan due to the ongoing conflict in the new-born state.” It goes on stating: “Khartoum, since the start of the South Sudanese crisis last December, refuses to describe them as refugees saying they will be considered as Sudanese

citizens and are free to settle where they want...[and] refuses to establish refugees camps.”

The UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator at the time was quoted stating that “the Sudanese government refuses to describe the southerners as refugees while demanding humanitarian assistance for them.” “How can assistance be offered to them if they are not refugees?” the coordinator was reported asking. He went on to say that “Khartoum must look at this issue in a logical and objective way particularly as the two sides are bound by international laws and regulations”; and that “description of the fleeing southerners as refugees would enable them to secure the necessary funding from donors.” In this regard he explained, “we currently help the southerners from the fund which must be allocated to Sudanese areas.”

^{viii} An MOU was signed between the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), Commission of Refugees (COR), Sudanese Red Crescent Society (on one side) and UNHCR (on the other side) following the visit by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to Sudan on 15 December, 2014. The MOU concerns “the promotion of Humanitarian Assistance to displaced persons from South Sudan and other receiving communities and returnees in the State of White Nile”; its objective is the enhancement of the efforts of the Government of Sudan in receiving and supporting them. Per the MOU, UNHCR is to make available \$4 million to establish water, health, education, rule of law, and Al- Redais harbour rehabilitation projects. The MOU acknowledges the importance of cooperation with the authorities of the White Nile State. The parties agree to the implementation of the projects under the supervision of a High Technical Committee composed by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, HAC, White Nile State, COR, UNHCR, National Intelligence and Security Service, Military Intelligence, representatives of health, water, and education ministries, and SRCS.

^{ix} “Others of concern” refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall into any group (refugees; IDPs; asylum-seekers; and the stateless), but to whom UNHCR extends its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other grounds. See <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>.

^x Poor coordination still exists between the concerned governmental units; e.g., Ministries of Social Welfare; International Cooperation; Interior; and Foreign Affairs. This was quite apparent in dealing with European countries on migration and refugee issues. For example, the Ministry of International Cooperation signed an agreement with Germany without coordinating with the other ministries.

^{xi} IOM (2011, 26, 71); and see relations with UNHCR and European Commission discussed below.

^{xii} Refer to footnote 17 on page 8 and footnote 25 on page 17.

^{xiii} Sudan’s experience with refugee issues goes back to the 1960s when UNHCR persuaded it to accept the influx of refugees from Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and other neighbouring countries. Since then the two entities have expressed opposed views on refugee matters on a number of occasions. See Ahmed Osman al-Zaki (n.d.) and Ahmed Karadawi (1999). For a reflection on the position of UNHCR, see the executive summary in Ambroso, Crisp, and Albert (2011). The report urges UNHCR to opt for integration and suggests the steps to implement it.

^{xiv} Interviews with a high-ranking COR official who requested to remain anonymous (February 2016).

^{xv} During the great famine of the mid-1980s, hundreds of thousands of migrants from Ethiopia and Eritrea fled their countries and took refuge in Sudan. At that time UNHCR refused to acknowledge them as “refugees.” However, after a lot of pressure on the part of Sudan, UNHCR accepted to treat them as “people of concern”; see Khalid Dafaalla (2006, 26).

^{xvi} Commenting on the protracted relationship between Sudan and the European Union (with its close links to UNHCR), European Union Commissioner even Mimica described it as “sometimes complicated.” He added that, “Sudan is now at the forefront to fight irregular migration and human trafficking and smuggling in Sudan and the Horn of Africa.” Written statement by the European Union Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development; European Commission website, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58546>, accessed 10 April 2016. Also, for the prolonged disagreement between Sudan and UNHCR refer to footnote 5 on p. 2.

^{xvii} Visit UNHCR’s website at www.unhcr.org for international law relating to the protection of refugees and other persons of concern; also see UNHCR’s Refworld at www.refworld.org.

^{xviii} One of the donors is the European Commission, which also has an emergency fund to be used in similar cases. See the European Commission website at http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm.

^{xix} See Sudan Tribune, 3 April 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?>

^{xx} The UNHCR operational update for South Sudanese in the White Nile State in February 2016 reported that individual bio-metric registration had been finalized in all seven sites, and that a total of 64,651 “arrivals” had been individually registered. It declared “through completion of this exercise UNHCR has an accurate demographic profile of the South Sudanese ‘arrivals’ and their specific needs”; and that “the total number of South Sudanese ‘arrivals’ in Sudan is currently 167,811, following the completion of UNHCR’s individual registration exercise in the seven sites in White Nile State.”

^{xxi} The information contained in this paragraph is based on the work of Mustafa Khogali (2015), on the DIMARSI Report of 2014, and on materials collected from three fieldwork trips (January 2015, December 2015, and January 2016).

^{xxii} DIMARSI Report (2014, 2015). These numbers were collected before the expansion of the waiting stations; therefore, they are only partial. Moreover, the statistics related to the “arrivals”—lay statistics for Sudan in general—are extremely flawed and could not be verified with certainty.

^{xxiii} I am indebted to Leif Manger for the improvements he suggested to the paper’s structure and for some of the ideas in this section.

^{xxiv} The most recent UNHCR figures indicate that “[a]n unprecedented **65.3 million** people around the world have been forced from home. Among them are nearly 21.3 **million refugees**.” [Http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html](http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html).

^{xxv} As a result of a cooperation agreement between Sudan and Germany on the issues of migration and refugees, and in order to raise the capabilities of the Sudanese apparatuses responsible for them, Germany offered Sudan 51 million euro. The German minister of cooperation explained that Europe suffers from the same problem, and that Germany is ready to work jointly with the international community to support Sudan in the area of migration and refugees (al Jarida Daily, 3 March 2016).