

TRANSNATIONAL CONTENTIOUS POLITICS: THE ROLE OF DIASPORAS IN CIVIL  
CONFLICT

Lucia Ellen Bird

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in  
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences.

Chapel Hill  
2019

Approved by:

Navin Bapat

Anna Bassi

Mark Crescenzi

Stephen Gent

Cameron Ballard-Rosa

© 2019  
Lucia Ellen Bird  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

## **ABSTRACT**

Lucia Ellen Bird: Transnational Contentious Politics: The Role of Diasporas in Civil Conflict  
(Under the direction of Navin Bapat)

Diasporas are increasingly relevant transnational nonstate actors in international politics, including civil conflicts. Extant scholarship has examined the determinants and consequences of external support to civil conflict actors. However, the majority of this research focuses on traditional support from active, or state, sponsors. This dissertation endeavors to expand this vein of scholarship to include diasporas' influence on contentious politics in their homelands by asking three interconnected questions. First, why do foreign diasporas participate in civil conflicts by providing financial, material, or political support to militant groups in diasporas' homelands? I argue that diasporas' participation in homeland civil conflicts depends on their level of host state integration. Specifically, I find empirical evidence to support my argument that moderately integrated diasporas are both willing and able to support homeland militants. Second, under what conditions does diaspora participation in homeland contentious politics escalate violence versus facilitate peace? Using a formal model, I find that the probability of peaceful resolution to conflicts in diasporas' homelands is directly related to the degree of optimism diasporas have regarding the quality of the deal produced by negotiations between homeland conflict actors. I also provide evidence to support this hypothesis using press releases from a Palestinian American diaspora organization, the American Task Force on Palestine. Third, I ask why some diaspora members develop hawkish preferences toward contentious politics in their homelands. Drawing on insights from psychology, I find empirical evidence to support my moral foundations theory-based argument. To test these hypotheses, I use quantitative and formal analytical methods and various data sources, including the UCDP Non-state Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA), Non-State Armed Groups Dataset (NAG), the Computational Event Data System Levant Dataset (CEDS), the Arab Democracy Barometer (ABIII), as well as others.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My experience as a PhD student at UNC-Chapel Hill affirms Norman Vincent Peale's claim that "the more you practice the art of thankfulness, the more you have to be thankful for." During this time, I have been fortunate to experience the mentorship, guidance, and kindness of the faculty in the Department of Political Science, my advisor and committee in particular; my family; and my friends. I would first like to express my deepest appreciation to Navin Bapat, my advisor and friend, who ensured that I left our discussions with more questions than answers but also inspired the curiosity and supplied the tools to find the answers. Additionally, this project would not have been possible without the support of Anna Bassi (and her family), who encouraged me to aspire to lofty goals and always listened to (and improved) my first attempts at presentations. I would also like to sincerely thank Mark Crescenzi, who never fails to imbue students with the need to, first, tell the story and then address about the data. I am deeply indebted to Stephen Gent, whose feedback on formal modeling reminds me to make sure my theory connects to the real world. I am also very grateful to Cameron Ballard-Rosa, who always asked exactly the right questions to tie the strands of my theory together. Finally, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Tom Carsey for his dedication to enriching the lives of his students through inspiring teaching, rigorous research, and active engagement in the Department of Political Science and the Odum Institute.

In addition, I would like to sincerely thank the faculty with whom I interacted at Georgia Tech, especially Dr. Margaret Kosal and Dr. Lawrence Rubin. Dr. Kosal inspired my early interest in research, and her recommendations on my technical writing continue to improve my work today. Dr. Rubin provided invaluable guidance during the graduate school application process, and I will be forever grateful for his encouragement throughout the PhD program, especially regarding my choice to research the role of diasporas in conflict.

My family never wavered in their support of my efforts in this program, even when I doubted myself. My mother, Lucia Nugent, played a decisive role in serving simultaneously as editor, advisor, and strategist by reading and revising my papers; finding bugs in my code; and giving excellent advice about classes, research, and life throughout the program. Thanks very much for giving me so much more than “half of what I need.” I also sincerely appreciate the continuing support of my stepfather, Paul Nugent, who always “happened to pick up” a trip to RDU at exactly the right time so that we could play tennis and have dinner at the Carolina Club. Additionally, my father, Vic Bird, and stepmother, Kay Harley, were especially helpful during this time by asking relevant questions about my research, listening patiently to my professional and personal grievances, and offering useful advice. I also gratefully acknowledge the patient encouragement of my siblings, Maria, Chris, and Alex, and our family dogs, Beau and Zuzu, who kept me grounded during this program and reminded me of what was really important: family, love, and food.

Finally, I would like to recognize the assistance of my colleagues and friends, without whom this program would have been much more difficult. First, I would like to thank Brice Acree, Tyler Steelman, Dan Gustafson, and Rob Williams for providing invaluable assistance on statistics and game theory throughout this program. Additionally, I very much appreciate the women in the International Relations subfield at UNC, especially Chelsea Estancona, Menevis Cilizoglu, and Lindsay Tello, who coauthored with me, provided recommendations on theory development, and served as mentors. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my friends, including Amy Sentementes, Caroline Carlson, Ryan Williams, Lucy Britt, Heather Ba (and Bo Ba), Joe Long, and Cliff Keller, who provided constructive criticism on my research; recommended best practices for teaching; advised during the job market; and, of course, enjoyed Mexican food with me as needed.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	viii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . .	x
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
Methodology . . . . .	5
Dissertation Outline . . . . .	5
CHAPTER 2: MOTIVATIONS OF DIASPORA PARTICIPATION IN HOMELAND CIVIL CONFLICT . . . . .	6
Introduction . . . . .	6
Diasporas and Host State Integration . . . . .	7
Diaspora Integration and Homeland Politics . . . . .	10
Data and Methods . . . . .	14
Analysis . . . . .	26
Conclusion . . . . .	32
CHAPTER 3: DIASPORA SUPPORT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT . . . . .	35
Introduction . . . . .	35
The Role of Diasporas in Intrastate Conflict . . . . .	37
A Model of Diaspora Support in Intrastate Conflict . . . . .	41
Equilibrium Solutions . . . . .	45
Theoretical Implications . . . . .	53
Empirical Predictions . . . . .	54
Data and Methods . . . . .	55
Analysis . . . . .	66

Conclusion . . . . .	72
CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS OF HAWKISH ATTITUDES AMONG	
DIASPORA MEMBERS . . . . .	75
Introduction . . . . .	75
Microfoundations of Attitude Development . . . . .	76
Moral Foundations of Diaspora Members' Hawkish Attitudes . . . . .	80
Data and Methods . . . . .	83
Analysis . . . . .	92
Conclusion . . . . .	99
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION . . . . .	104
Why do diasporas intervene in homeland civil conflicts? . . . . .	104
How does diaspora support affect conflict termination? . . . . .	105
Why do some diaspora members become hawkish? . . . . .	107
Final Remarks . . . . .	108
APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2 . . . . .	109
APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3 . . . . .	119
Formal Model . . . . .	119
Quantitative Test . . . . .	134
APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4 . . . . .	138
REFERENCES . . . . .	141

## LIST OF TABLES

1	Host State Integration Status and Factors Influencing Homeland Participation .	11
2	Major Variables of Interest in Dataset of Primary Model . . . . .	15
3	Summary Statistics of Dichotomous Dependent Variable: Diaspora Support . .	16
4	Identification of Frequency of OECD Host States in Primary Model . . . . .	18
5	Summary Statistics of Continuous Independent Variable in Primary Model . .	21
6	Examples of Diasporas at Different Ranges of Integration . . . . .	23
7	Summary Statistics of Continuous Control Variables . . . . .	23
8	Logistic Regression Results . . . . .	27
9	Correlation between Independent and Control Variables in Primary Model . . .	31
10	Variance Inflation Factors . . . . .	31
11	Percent and Expected Percent of Observations Correctly Predicted . . . . .	32
12	Model Parameters and Ranges . . . . .	43
13	Major Variables of Interest in Dataset . . . . .	57
14	Summary Statistics of Continuous Control Variables . . . . .	65
15	Negative Binomial Regression Results . . . . .	67
16	Correlation between Independent and Control Variables . . . . .	70
17	Variance Inflation Factors . . . . .	71
18	Major Variables of Interest in Dataset . . . . .	84
19	Summary Statistics of Binary Dependent Variable . . . . .	85
20	Items Used to Measure Moral Foundations in Survey . . . . .	85
21	Summary Statistics of Binary Control Variables . . . . .	88
22	Summary Statistics of Continuous Control Variable . . . . .	91
23	Logistic Regression Results . . . . .	93
24	Correlation between Independent and Control Variables . . . . .	98
25	Variance Inflation Factors . . . . .	99



26	Percent and Expected Percent Correctly of Observations Correctly Predicted by Logistic Regression Model . . . . .	99
27	Major Variables of Interest in Dataset in Secondary Analysis . . . . .	109
28	Identification of Frequency of OECD Host States in Secondary Analysis . . . .	109
29	Correlation between Independent and Control Variables in Secondary Analysis	109
30	Sources of Diaspora Support Associated with Militant Groups I . . . . .	111
31	Sources of Diaspora Support Associated with Militant Groups II . . . . .	112
32	Sources of Diaspora Support Associated with Militant Groups III . . . . .	113
33	Types of Diaspora Support . . . . .	114
34	Summary Statistics of Continuous Independent and Control Variables in Secondary Analysis . . . . .	114
35	Logistic Regressions Results with U.S.-based Diasporas . . . . .	115
36	Logistic Regression with Fixed Effects Results . . . . .	116
37	Logistic Regressions Results with Battle Deaths Control Variable . . . . .	117
38	Logistic Regression Results with Alternative Measures of Diaspora Support (Primary Model) . . . . .	118
39	Equilibria across Cases . . . . .	133
40	Included CEDS Actors . . . . .	134
41	Included CEDS Actions . . . . .	134
42	Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables . . . . .	134
43	Poisson Regression Results . . . . .	135
44	Negative Binomial Model with Alternative Control Variables Results . . . . .	136
45	Ordinal Logistic Regression Results . . . . .	140

## LIST OF FIGURES

1	Types of Outside Support, 1991-2000 . . . . .	9
2	Frequency of Types of Diaspora Support . . . . .	17
3	Frequency of Diaspora Incomes in Primary Model . . . . .	20
4	Regime Types among Homelands . . . . .	24
5	Logistic Regression Estimates . . . . .	28
6	Predicted Probability of Diaspora Support Conditional on Diaspora: Native Income Ratios . . . . .	29
7	ROC Plots . . . . .	33
8	Types of Outside Support, 1991-2000 . . . . .	38
9	Diaspora Support in Civil War . . . . .	42
10	Unique Cases to Solve . . . . .	47
11	Case 2 Continuum . . . . .	53
12	Cases Surviving Both Assumptions . . . . .	54
13	Frequency of Cooperation between Homeland Conflict Actors . . . . .	58
14	Frequency of Types of ATFP Press Releases . . . . .	59
15	Frequency of Attitudes Identified by ATFP Press Releases . . . . .	61
16	Frequency of Israeli Militarized Operations into Palestinian Territory . . . . .	62
17	Distribution of Political Party of Israeli Prime Minister . . . . .	63
18	Distribution of Leadership in Gaza Strip . . . . .	64
19	Negative Binomial Coefficient Estimates . . . . .	69
20	Expected Count of Cooperative Interactions . . . . .	70
21	DHARMa Scaled Residual Plots . . . . .	72
22	Summary Statistics of Ordinal Control Variables . . . . .	90
23	Logistic Regression Estimates . . . . .	95
24	Predicted Probabilities of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Purity (Identity Preserving) Moral Foundation . . . . .	96

25	Predicted Probabilities Associated with Homogenizing Morals . . . . .	97
26	ROC Plot . . . . .	100
27	Distribution of Diaspora Incomes over Time in Primary Model . . . . .	110
28	Predicted Probability of Diaspora Support Conditional on U.S.-based Diaspora:Native Income Ratios . . . . .	110
29	ROC Plots for Primary and Secondary Models Excluding Key Independent Variables . . . . .	115
30	Complete List of Cases . . . . .	119
31	Cases Surviving Assumption . . . . .	120
32	Equilibrium Offers within Intervals . . . . .	120
33	Case 1 Continuum . . . . .	121
34	Case 2 Continuum . . . . .	125
35	Case 3 Continuum . . . . .	129
36	ATFP Attitude Distribution over Time . . . . .	135
37	Expected Count of Cooperative Interactions, Primary Model . . . . .	137
38	Predicted Probability of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Morals and Education Level . . . . .	138
39	Predicted Probability of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Morals and Political Informedness . . . . .	138
40	Predicted Probability of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Morals and Religiosity . . . . .	139
41	Predicted Probability of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Morals and Threat .	139
42	ROC Plot for Model Excluding Key Independent Variables . . . . .	139

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Why do diasporas, or subsocietal groups living abroad rather than in their countries of origin, participate in contentious politics in their homelands, and how does this participation influence outcomes of civil conflicts in diasporas' homelands? For a recent example, consider the Syrian diaspora since the start of the civil war in Syria in 2011. In Syria, the protests of the Arab Spring eventually culminated in a civil war between dictator Bashar al-Assad and opposition forces, composed of secular citizens and Islamist radical armed groups (Carey, 2018). Diaspora participation in the Syrian civil war, most visible in the arrival in Syria of foreign fighters from various countries throughout the world, has internationalized and exacerbated this conflict.<sup>1</sup> In addition to the Syrian diaspora that existed prior to the civil war, more than five million Syrians have become refugees in foreign countries, producing a new Syrian diaspora (*Syria Emergency*, 2018).

While many Syrian refugees reside in neighboring states, this new diaspora is also dispersed globally throughout Europe and North America. In Western, developed states, Syrian diaspora members have legal freedoms and access to financial and material resources that were previously unavailable. For example, members of the Syrian American diaspora have lobbied the U.S. Government to intervene militarily or condemn human rights violations committed by the Syrian government against civilians (Alloush, 2018). In addition to such political aid, individual Syrian American diaspora members have provided material support in the form of foreign fighters, such as Syrian American Ahmad Abousamra, who joined the precursor organization to IS and then managed social media for IS (Jenkins, 2014; *Official: American May Be Key in ISIS Social Media Blitz*, 2014; Cruickshank, 2017).

Foreign diaspora intervention has influenced the dynamics of the Syrian civil war by

---

<sup>1</sup>Additionally, several foreign states, including Russia, the U.S., Iran, and Turkey, and nonstate armed groups, such as Hezbollah and the Islamic State (IS), have joined this conflict (*Global Conflict This Week: Atrocities Continue in Syria*, 2018).

attempting to alleviate the asymmetric distribution of power between the Syrian government and opposition groups.<sup>2</sup> The impact of the Syrian diaspora is not a unique political phenomenon; diasporas have taken on roles in conflicts across varying temporal and geographic contexts. For example, the Irish American diaspora contributed financial and material support, such as firearms, to operatives in the Provisional Irish Republican Army during the Troubles in Ireland (Byman, 2006). Similarly, prior to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in the U.S., the Sri Lankan diaspora provided political and material aid, also in the form of weapons, to the Tamil Tigers to improve their capacity against the Sri Lankan government (Chalk, 2008).

These empirical examples demonstrate the significance of diaspora participation in civil conflicts. While extant literature evaluates the role of active support from state sponsors to civil conflict actors, a dearth of research, especially using quantitative or formal methods, focuses on diaspora sponsors' impact on civil wars. Prior scholars use qualitative case studies to illustrate the motivations and influence of diasporas' decisions to intervene in homeland conflicts. Thus, this literature lacks generalizable, replicable findings regarding diaspora participation in homeland contentious politics. Under what conditions do diasporas intervene in civil wars in their homelands by sending financial, material, or political aid? What is the impact of such diaspora support on negotiations between homeland conflict actors? Why do some individual diaspora members develop a tolerance or even preference for violent conflict in their homelands?

In this dissertation, I aim to answer these questions. Diasporas' integration experience in their homelands and preferences toward contentious politics influences whether and how they intervene in conflicts in their homelands. Some diasporas assimilate into their host states to take advantage of the educational, professional, and economic opportunities available; however, others attempt to intervene in homeland conflicts to influence conflict duration and termination. Additionally, while some diasporas prefer the continuation of homeland conflicts, others prefer its peaceful resolution. These distinct preferences determine diasporas' effects

---

<sup>2</sup>State intervention has also enhanced the capacity of both the Syrian state and its opposition (*Civil War in Syria*, 2019).

on negotiations between conflict actors in diasporas' homelands. Moreover, individual diaspora members develop these different preferences on homeland conflicts based on preexisting values and belief systems. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will summarize the empirical chapters of this dissertation, briefly discuss the methodological approaches I use to answer the aforementioned research questions, and conclude with an outline for the remainder of the dissertation.

In the second chapter, I consider why foreign diaspora groups, which often emigrate in pursuit of improved opportunities abroad, participate in homeland conflicts by providing financial, material, and diplomatic aid to militant groups in their homelands. The rational choice framework predicts that diasporas should optimize on the educational, professional, and political opportunities in their host states to maximize their welfare, but diaspora members integrate into their host state at varying rates. Though diasporas may become either fully incorporated into mainstream society or remain completely separated, some diasporas experience segmented assimilation in their host states. This moderate range of integration produces diasporas with both the capacity and motivation to send valuable resources to militants in the diaspora's homeland. In the Syrian case, the new diaspora produced by the civil war is experiencing this moderate range of integration. Syrian diaspora members' median household income in the U.S. is \$52,000 as compared to the median household income of \$55,000 for natives in the U.S. This indicates that, while Syrians are approaching income parity with natives in the U.S. and thus have useful resources for Syrian opposition militants, they have not quite achieved economic equality with natives or complete integration into the U.S. In line with theoretical expectations, Syrian American diaspora members are currently more likely to support homeland militants.<sup>3</sup>

The third chapter includes a formal model that evaluates the impact of diaspora participation on homeland civil conflicts. Diasporas may take on different roles in conflict: some prefer peaceful settlements that end conflict, but others favor conflict continuation or

---

<sup>3</sup>Prior to the onset of the Syrian civil war and ensuing refugee crisis, the Syrian American diaspora's median household income was \$58,687 as compared to median household income for natives in the U.S. at \$49,445. Thus, Syrians previously had achieved a high level of integration. In line with my expectations, Syrians were less likely to be involved in diaspora organizations or homeland politics before the civil war (Alloush, 2018)

escalation. My formal model analyzes how these peace- and conflict-preferring diasporas may influence the outcomes of homeland civil wars. I argue that diasporas' attitudes regarding the outcome of negotiations drive the solution to this model. This makes a novel theoretical contribution to the bargaining literature. Theoretically, conditions exist under which diaspora actors may force homeland militants to reject a settlement that would bring peace, even when this deal should be preferable to war. When diaspora groups are more pessimistic regarding the outcome of negotiations, hawkish diasporas may induce militants to reject peace to credibly signal strength to the homeland government. Regardless of diasporas' expectations, the probability of negotiations between homeland civil war actors increases as the homeland government's capacity declines. A durable peace, in which militants with both hawkish and dovish diasporas sponsors accept the deal, is most likely when the homeland government's capacity is relatively low and diasporas are optimistic about the outcome of negotiations. In the case of the Syrian civil war, the majority of Syrian diaspora members remain pessimistic about the outcome of the conflict and the quality of peace following the termination of the conflict (Hindy and Ghaddar, 2017). The diaspora's lack of confidence about the credibility of the Syrian government or the utility of a deal between the opposition and the government contributes to the failure of a negotiated settlement to end the conflict.

In the fourth chapter, I explore why diaspora members develop dovish versus hawkish preferences regarding homeland contentious politics. Using insights from political psychology on the micro-level determinants of support or tolerance for violence, I identify hypotheses related to individuals' moral foundations. I argue that diaspora members that highly value *identity-preserving* morals of care, loyalty, and purity are likely to have hawkish preferences regarding homeland conflicts. Diaspora members that esteem *homogenizing* morals, which include authority and fairness, are less likely to be hawkish. The Syrian diaspora demonstrates a tendency to support hawkish foreign policies, including militarized intervention by Western host states, regarding the civil conflict in their homeland (Moss, 2016). While comprehensive survey data concerning the moral foundations of the most recent Syrian diaspora do not exist, the transnational diaspora displays many of the identity preserving morals. For example, Syrian diaspora members have provided humanitarian aid

and medical care, through diaspora organizations such as Hand in Hand for Syria, to Syrians remaining in the conflict zone (Ahsan, 2013). Similarly, the Syrian diaspora boasts powerful kinship connections and much intra-group loyalty, as evidenced by the migration of new Syrian immigrants toward countries, such as Germany, with large preexisting Syrian diaspora populations (Sasnal, 2015).

## **Methodology**

To analyze diaspora participation in contentious politics in their homelands, I use statistical analyses and formal modeling. In Chapter 2, I use a new dataset that encompasses diasporas' varying integration levels into their hosts states and presents a new measure of diaspora participation in conflicts in their homelands. In Chapter 3, I devise a game theoretic model to evaluate the impact of diasporas on civil conflict termination in their homelands. I empirically evaluate the hypothesis derived from my model using statistical analyses of data from 2003 to 2015 regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, I employ the Computation Event Data System (CEDS) Levant Event Data, which provides information on conflict resolution or cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli actors, and original data I collected using press releases from an American Palestinian diaspora organization. Finally, I quantitatively analyze the validity of the direct relationship I predict between identity preserving morals and hawkish attitudes among diaspora members using data from the third wave of the Arab Barometer, which covers the years 2012-2014.

## **Dissertation Outline**

This dissertation will proceed as follows. In the next three empirical chapters, I will provide theoretical frameworks to explain key aspects of diasporas' transnational participation in contentious politics, including why diasporas intervene, the impact of intervention, and the development of belligerent attitudes among some diaspora members. I will also quantitatively analyze the proposed theories using empirical data in these chapters. Finally, I conclude by discussing this research's theoretical contributions to the literature on foreign intervention into civil war, substantive implications for policymakers, and future directions for scholarship on diasporas in transnational politics.



## **CHAPTER 2: MOTIVATIONS OF DIASPORA PARTICIPATION IN HOMELAND CIVIL CONFLICT**

“I’m a biology major at the University of North Texas. I’m a senior with a minor in physics, chemistry and Arabic...I hope my country Syria will be free.”<sup>4</sup>

### **Introduction**

Omar Kattan, a Syrian American diaspora member, abandoned a comparatively comfortable lifestyle and professional aspirations in dentistry to join the Islamic State (IS) (Engel, Plessner, Connor and Schuppe, 2016). Kattan, who grew up in Indiana and then moved to Texas with his Syrian American family, was an active, social student before graduating from the University of North Texas, where he participated in intramural sports and community service and worked toward his ultimate goal of becoming a professor of dentistry (Ayala, Fancher and DeBruijn, 2016). Instead of continuing to integrate into the United States (U.S.) and take advantage of the educational and professional opportunities available in his host state, Omar opted to actively participate in the civil conflict in his family’s homeland. While some diaspora members have opted to contribute by becoming foreign fighters, others have sent financial donations that have strengthened IS’s military capacity (Shatz, 2014). Omar’s decision to physically join IS’s ranks represents an extreme case of the puzzle motivating this paper: why would diaspora members opt to reengage with their homelands in lieu of taking advantage of the economic and political opportunities and (typically higher) living standards present in diasporas’ host states?

I argue that segmented assimilation, or a moderate level of integration, into the host state produces diaspora members that are most likely to participate in transnational contentious politics by aiding homeland conflict actors. Diasporas’ decision to provide such

---

<sup>4</sup>Quote from Omar Kattan, a Syrian American foreign fighter who traveled to Syria to join IS (Gordon, 2016).

passive support is a function of their motive and capacity to mobilize on behalf of militants engaged in homeland civil conflicts. Diasporas that are fully incorporated into their host states may have resources that would benefit homeland conflict actors, but they lack the motivation to send aid. Conversely, diasporas that are fully dissimilated from their host states are likely to be motivated to provide passive support, but lack the necessary resources. Diasporas that experience segmented assimilation, however, have a resource base that is sufficient to provide assistance to militants and maintain a strong enough tie to homeland politics to inspire motive.

I will next address the relevant literature on foreign support to insurgencies in civil war. Then, I will develop my theoretical framework accounting for why diasporas that experience segmented assimilation are those most likely to provide passive support. I will test this argument using logistic regression on a global dataset of diaspora participation from 2000 to 2009. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the academic and policy-relevant implications of this study.

### **Diasporas and Host State Integration**

First, I explore the term “diaspora.” Broadly, diasporas have been defined as a sect of the population living abroad rather than in their states of origin, which I refer to as diasporas’ “homelands” (Connor, 1986). Further clarification efforts by scholars resulted in specific explanations for why diasporas reside abroad and how they interact with their “host states,” the term I use to refer to diasporas’ new countries of residence, and homelands. Safran (1991) accounts for their residence in host states by noting that diaspora members or their ancestors have been dispersed from one particular original location to more than one host state. This dispersal may be profit-seeking, such as to pursue professional opportunities or new trade routes, or due to more traumatic events, such as substate violence in the homeland (Cohen, 2008). Furthermore, diaspora members typically possess a “collective memory” of an “idealized” version of the homeland, its people, and its history, which may produce an interest in return among diaspora members (Cohen, 2008). Thus, diasporas may maintain relationships with family and friends in their homelands due to feelings of “empathy and co-responsibility” that motivate contributions to homeland stability and development (Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991). Furthermore, Sheffer adds that diasporas, particularly “ethnic diasporas,”

share certain cultural, religious, linguistic, and ideological similarities (Sheffer, 2007, 1986). The nature of the relationship between the host state and diaspora remains under debate, with some scholars arguing that diasporas will struggle to integrate into their host states and so remain isolated from mainstream society (Safran, 1991). Other scholars, however, suggest that diasporas may eventually become fully incorporated into host states (Cohen, 2008; Putnam, 2007).<sup>5</sup>

The Kurdish diaspora, the “world’s largest nation without a state,” exemplifies a typical diaspora (Caryl, 2015). While an estimated thirty million Kurds reside in the ancestral Kurdish homeland that is currently divided between four traditional states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria), around 870,000 Kurds live in Western Europe, the U.S., and Canada (Ember, 2005; *The Kurdish Diaspora*, 2017). Kurds moved abroad to pursue economic opportunity, often as “guest workers” to Western European countries, and political freedom, as a result of repression experienced by nationalizing states and the defeat of Kurdish self-governance movements (Ember, 2005). Additionally, in the vein of Anderson’s (1991) “long distance nationalism” in which diaspora members and homeland residents can share and contribute to language, religious practices, and cultural traditions without living in the same space, the transnational Kurdish diaspora reconstructs the homeland by consuming Kurdish media, which characterizes eastern Turkey as “Northern Kurdistan” and the Turkish state as an “occupier” (Keles, 2015). Furthermore, diaspora Kurds have engaged in efforts to develop homeland institutions through initiatives including the creation of a Kurdish legislature, the National Congress of Kurdistan, and multinational diaspora protests following the Turkish capture of the Kurdish nationalist leader Ocalan (Ember, 2005). Moreover, though linguistic heterogeneity exists due to the division of the Kurdish homeland, Kurds have maintained a common cultural identity through shared music, theatrical productions, and literature based on their national experiences (*The Kurdish Diaspora*, 2017). Finally, some Kurdish diaspora members have experienced racism, exploitation, and alienation in their host states; however, other Kurds have successfully integrated professionally, academically, and socio-economically


---

<sup>5</sup>Putnam argues that, while immigrants are likely to face challenges to integration in the short term, they may, in the long term, integrate fully and benefit the host state by advocating for a more inclusive conceptualization of citizenship.

(Ember, 2005).

While diaspora scholars have identified some patterns in relationships between diasporas and their host states, this relationship demands further examination due to its impact on diaspora participation in homeland politics. Passive support, which is aid from transnational nonstate actors including diasporas, nongovernmental organizations, and transnational crime networks, occurs nearly as frequently as active sponsorship by states. The relative frequencies of these types of support are displayed in Figure 1 (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau and Brannan, 2001).<sup>6</sup> Though the subject of state sponsorship has received much scholarly attention, a theory of the conditions under which diasporas take on a role in homeland conflicts is lacking (Salehyan, 2007; San-Akca, 2016; Byman, 2013). States may intervene in civil conflicts to undermine state rivals (Saideman, 2002; Maoz and San-Akca, 2012), to pursue geostrategic interests related to security or economic objectives (Regan, 2000; San-Akca, 2009), or to benefit conflict actors with which the state shares ideological or ethnic ties (Saideman, 2012; Byman et al., 2001).

*Fig. 1: Types of Outside Support, 1991-2000*



---

<sup>6</sup>This graph uses data on active versus passive support (from diaspora actors) from Byman (2001).

Transnational nonstate actors, specifically foreign diasporas, represent an opportunity for further progress in scholarship on foreign support for intrastate conflict actors.

International political economy (IPE) scholars have incorporated alternative foreign sponsors by investigating the role of remittances in policymakers' decisions regarding exchange rate regimes (Singer, 2010). Conflict scholars, however, have yet to formally analyze or empirically test, using cross-national data, the role of diasporas in civil wars.<sup>7</sup> The puzzling phenomenon of diaspora members' choice to reengage in homeland conflicts that they could avoid, due to their residence abroad in host states, requires further explanation.

To participate in homeland civil conflicts, diasporas must have both the motivation and the capacity to send aid to conflict actors. Diaspora participation occurs as a function of a diaspora's integration into the host state, which underlies their motivation to reconnect with homeland conflicts actors and capacity to send useful resources home. Drawing upon insights from sociology, diasporas may experience a range of integration in host states, from complete dissimilation to full incorporation into the mainstream society of the host state. The moderate range of integration, referred to by sociologists as segmented assimilation, is the most likely phase of integration to produce diasporas with both the motivation and capacity to intercede in homeland politics.

### **Diaspora Integration and Homeland Politics**

Diaspora members' experience of integration into the host state exists along a continuum. This continuum ranges from dissimilation, in which diasporas are intentionally differentiated from the mainstream population in the host state due to homeland ties or socioeconomic inequality (Yinger, 1981), to incorporation, in which immigrants accept host state processes, practices, and relationships and simultaneously abandon homeland culture and connections (Zhou, 2012). Incorporated diaspora members also participate in the political institutions of the host state and obtain jobs in the primary market sector rather than "enclave economies," which are typically located in an area densely populated by the diaspora and

---

<sup>7</sup>Collier and Hoeffler (2004) represent an important first step in this direction; however, they only consider the relationship between the size of diaspora populations in the U.S. and the likelihood of recurrence of civil war in diasporas' homelands.

characterized by professional specialization in certain sectors (Portes and Manning, 1986).

At the moderate range of integration is segmented assimilation, in which original diaspora members and their descendants assimilate into the marginalized groups of the host state, such as previously excluded immigrants, criminals, or gangs, rather than the mainstream (Gans, 1992; Portes and Zhao, 1993; FitzGerald, 2014).<sup>8</sup> This moderate level of integration produces a mixed experience for diasporas, in which their members are allowed some, but not total, access to social, political, and economic opportunities in the host state. While segmented assimilation may include immigrants that are “upwardly mobile,” others experience “downward mobilization” and remain socially ostracized and economically disadvantaged (Zhou, 2012). The lack of economic opportunity may result from a scarcity of resources available to the state, which forces the diaspora to turn inward to obtain goods and services from ethnic elites, further undermining the relationship between diaspora members and the host state (Wimmer, 2002). I argue that the type of integration that diasporas experience influences their transnational interactions with the homeland, as illustrated by Table 1.

*Table 1: Host State Integration Status and Factors Influencing Homeland Participation*

<b>Range of Integration</b>			
Factor	Dissimilation	Segmented Assimilation	Incorporation
Capacity		<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
Motive	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	

The diaspora’s level of integration influences whether diasporas are incentivized to participate in homeland contentious politics. The decision to engage in homeland civil wars depends on two factors: the diaspora’s capacity to send resources to the homeland and the diaspora’s motivation to provide assistance to militants in the homeland. This capacity and motivation framework parallels work by Most and Starr (2015), which emphasizes the impact on war of opportunity, the environmental and structural conditions surrounding actors, and willingness, the microlevel strategies undertaken by actors to pursue their interests. First,

---

<sup>8</sup>Alternative conceptualizations, which are important but less relevant to my theory, include selectivity, which emphasizes the distinction between those individuals that remain in the homeland and those that seek opportunity abroad (FitzGerald, 2014), and transnationalism, which considers the “horizontal” connections between nonstate actors that transcend conventional state authority (Vertovec, 2004).

diasporas must obtain the necessary financial, material, or human resources to send to homeland militants. This resource availability is determined by the openness of the economic market in the host state, as well as the ease with which immigrants can obtain academic and professional training. Additionally, diasporas must have the opportunity to send aid to the homeland, which depends on whether the host state is incentivized to intervene to stop foreign flows of resources. The host state's intervention depends on its interests, capacity, and regime type.<sup>9</sup> When the host state is politically or strategically aligned with the diaspora or the militant group the diaspora sponsors, diaspora aid is likely to be permitted. Also, the level of host state capacity determines the effectiveness of policies designed to prevent or facilitate the flow of diaspora aid. Last, democratic host states are more likely to provide legal, political, and economic freedoms that allow diasporas to support homeland conflict actors than autocratic host states, which repress their populations so that homeland identities cannot be maintained nor resources sent abroad (Safran, 2007).<sup>10</sup>

Second, diasporas must be motivated to send aid to militants fighting the homeland government. To stimulate this motivation, diaspora members must first be sufficiently informed on the political and economic developments in their homeland. This requires freedom of information in the host state and open communication between individuals in the homeland and host state. If this information is publicly available, diaspora members may develop and maintain strong loyalties to ethnic groups in the homeland. In addition to freedoms related to the media and expression, host states can also enact policies that highlight ethnic differentiation, such as implementing policies of segregation or structuring political representation according to ethnic groups (Nagel, 1986). When host states emphasize distinctions between the diaspora and mainstream population, diasporas are less likely to

---

<sup>9</sup>Due to data limitations, diasporas' host states are limited to democracies in the empirical analysis.

<sup>10</sup>Safran additionally suggests that democracies may be so appealing that diasporas drop their homeland identity since ethnic collectivism is unnecessary for survival. I argue, however, that the share of remittances flowing from host states to the homeland (three times that of official development aid), in addition to phenomena like foreign fighters from Western European democracies, provide evidence countering this argument (*Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016*, 2016). Safran also notes that authoritarian leaders may overly repress to the point at which diasporas' homelands become very appealing; however, I argue this is overshadowed by the likelihood of high levels of protectionism and repression of free speech, which prevents diasporas from engaging in domestic politics in the host state or transnational politics.

integrate into the host society and more likely to contribute to homeland conflicts. In addition to developing identity ties to the homeland, the diaspora must be incentivized to challenge the existing status quo, which, in the case of civil war, usually occurs when opposition to the homeland government exists and is in need of support from foreign diaspora members.<sup>11</sup>

At the two extremes along the integration continuum, differentiation and incorporation, homeland participation is unlikely. When diasporas are completely differentiated, they are unlikely to have the capacity to contribute to homeland conflict actors even though diaspora members are likely to identify with the homeland and so be motivated to assist the militants. Thus, while dissimilated diasporas may be driven to support militants in their homelands, their lack of resources renders their impact meaningless. Diasporas that are completely incorporated into the host state, while likely capable of providing resources to homeland conflict actors, typically identify more strongly with the host state and so lack the motivation to send aid to homeland militants. Rather than investing in risky homeland conflicts, incorporated diasporas expend their resources on efforts to further assimilate into the host state by obtaining higher education; professional certifications; and other socioeconomic markers of success, such as home ownership. These efforts are frequently accompanied by an acceptance of host state values and culture and abandonment of homeland connections. Thus, while incorporated diasporas have the means to assist militants, they lack the will.

Conversely, segmented assimilation occurs when diasporas experience a confluence of factors that simultaneously enhances their capacity to mobilize to support the militants and stimulates their interest in the homeland intrastate conflict. Segmented assimilation produces diasporas with some capacity to obtain useful resources to support homeland militants since they are moderately integrated. Furthermore, these diaspora members are also excluded from complete political, economic, and social incorporation due to structural conditions in the host state, which produces a motivation to maintain or develop homeland connections.<sup>12</sup> In

---

<sup>11</sup>For example, the diaspora may be interested in improving the welfare of the homeland population by removing a repressive regime in power.

<sup>12</sup>By structural conditions, I refer to institutional policies, historical factors, and societal practices that



addition to this exclusion experience, diasporas experiencing segmented assimilation were incentivized to exit their homeland, but failed to have or obtain links with other successful immigrants abroad. This indicates that diaspora members at these moderate levels of integration are likely to be interested in challenging the homeland status quo and motivated to support militants opposing the government. Thus, the segmented assimilation experience is most likely to produce conditions that lead to diaspora contributions to militants groups in the homeland. This argument is summarized in the following hypothesis:

*H<sub>1</sub>*: Diasporas that experience segmented assimilation in the host state are more likely to provide aid to homeland militants.

## **Data and Methods**

### ***Data***

I test the hypothesis using an original dataset composed of a subset of the universe of cases identified by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan's Non-state Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) (2009). These data are at the dyad-conflict level, which I expand to the dyad-year level. I subset the NSA data to match original data that I gather to determine diasporas' relative levels of integration into host states. I identify diasporas' relevant host states using the World Bank's Global Bilateral Migration Data (Ozden, Parsons, Schiff and Walmsley, 2011).

The data available regarding the key explanatory variable in my theory, the diaspora's degree of integration into their host states, limit the range of potential host states that can be included in this statistical analysis. Because I operationalize the economic dimension of integration by measuring diasporas' human capital, the universe of potential host states in this analysis includes members of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OECD), which provide data on immigrants' earnings and professions (Waters, Tran, Kasinitz and Mollenkopf, 2010). Using the Global Bilateral Migration Data, my primary model defines the diaspora's host state as the state with the largest diaspora population.<sup>13</sup> While my main

---

produce a hierarchy in the host state, such as racial inequality in the criminal justice system in the U.S. (Hackett, 2018).

<sup>13</sup>Nearly one quarter (24%) of diasporas' original host states, or destination countries with the largest number

analysis considers host states with the largest diaspora population, diasporas may exist in multiple host states. To alleviate concerns related to defining the diaspora's host state as the state with the largest diaspora population, I conduct a secondary analysis in which the host state is defined as the state with the median size of diaspora population (from the universe of potential OECD hosts).

I identify individual diasporas' levels of economic integration into their host states using data on diaspora members' incomes from the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC), the U.S. American Community Survey, and the Pew Research Center.<sup>14</sup> These data are available from 2000 forward, so my dataset includes the conflicts from the NSA dataset and information on diasporas' integration into their host states from OECD countries from 2000 to 2009.<sup>15</sup> In total, 475 observations comprise this new dataset. Table 2 describes key variables of interest for three dyad-year observations from the dataset used in my primary model, and Table 27 in Appendix A describes key variables of interest for three observations in the secondary model.<sup>16</sup> Little problematic correlation exists in the primary or secondary model data.<sup>17</sup>

Table 2: Major Variables of Interest in Dataset of Primary Model

Dyad	Host	Year	Dia. Sup	Inc. Rat.	(Inc. Rat.) <sup>2</sup>	ln(Home GDP)	Home Reg.	Host Glob.	Dist.
Sri Lanka-LTTE	Canada	2000	1	0.81	0.65	10.96	2	90.96	13789
India-Naxalites	U.K.	2004	0	1.39	1.94	14.73	3	87.92	12106
Israel-Hamas	U.S.	2009	1	1.03	1.07	12.01	3	79.93	9449

of immigrants from the homeland, are OECD members. Furthermore, more than one half (51%) of diasporas have an OECD state as one of their top three emigration destinations in terms of population size.

<sup>14</sup>The incomes are reported annually in current U.S. dollars for the U.S. and monthly in nominal local currency for each of the OECD states. See *America Community Survey (ACS)* (2017); *Median Household Income Among U.S. Hispanic Origin Groups, 2013* (2015); *Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)* (2017) for more details. I create a ratio of diaspora to native median incomes for each observation.

<sup>15</sup>Please note that the host state data from the Global Bilateral Migration Data, which is provided in nine year increments, limit the range of years, as population data are not available from this source after 2009.

<sup>16</sup>The primary model includes data for the diaspora's host state defined as the state with the largest diaspora population.

<sup>17</sup>I include correlation tables associated with data from the primary and secondary models when discussing the robustness tests described in the Analysis section and Appendix A.

### *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable of interest in this analysis is diaspora interaction with militants in their homelands, specifically, whether diasporas support militants. I measure passive support from diasporas using a dichotomous variable that indicates whether militants received aid from diasporas in a given year. I gather data for diaspora support using a number of sources, including the NSA dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009), the UCDP External Support Dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér, 2011), San-Akca's Nonstate Armed Groups (NAGs) Dataset (2016), and other qualitative sources.<sup>18</sup> I positively code this binary variable if any of the aforementioned sources show diaspora support to militants. Table 3 indicates that fewer militant groups receive some form of diaspora support than do not.

*Table 3: Summary Statistics of Dichotomous Dependent Variable: Diaspora Support*

	<b>Number of Dyad Years</b>	<b>Percentage of Dyad Years</b>
No diaspora support	279	58.7%
Diaspora Support	196	41.3%

To ensure that passive support from diaspora sponsors occurred in the dyad-years identified by the NSA and NAGs dataset, I use qualitative sources, including case studies and historical accounts such as Byman's Outside Support for Insurgencies, 1991-2000; the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management data; and the Mapping Militant Organizations project.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, I positively code diaspora support in a yearly observation when militants receive any one of three types of support from diasporas: financial, political, or military aid.<sup>20</sup> Financial support refers to money sent from members of transnational diaspora communities to militants in the homeland that sustains the group or enhances the militants' capacity for violence, such as Eritrean diaspora communities that raised money for the conflict efforts of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in the 1970s

---


<sup>18</sup>Please see Tables 30-32, located in Appendix A, for a complete list of the sources associated with each observation.

<sup>19</sup>See Byman et al. (2001); Mullenbach (2017); *Mapping Militant Organizations* (2017) for more details. I include immigrant and refugee communities in my definition of "diaspora."

<sup>20</sup>Please see Table 33 in the Appendix for the types of diaspora support each militant group in my dataset receives.

(Schmitz-Pranghe, 2010). Political support refers to lobbying by diaspora members in their host states to raise awareness of the plight in their homeland, which the militants are often striving to rectify. For example, the transnational Armenian diaspora groups lobby their host governments on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh separatists in Azerbaijan (Rieff, 1997). Military support refers to diaspora members' provision of arms, intelligence, sanctuary (for example, hosting militants in refugee camps), and fighters that directly amplifies militants' ability to wage war. Sri Lankan diaspora communities located in India, Malaysia, Europe, and North America sent unsophisticated weapons to LTTE fighters in the 1970s and 1980s (*Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam*, 2015). Figure 2 displays the frequency with which diasporas send each type of support, and the most common type of diaspora support is financial.

Fig. 2: Frequency of Types of Diaspora Support



### *Independent Variables*

I argue that diaspora members' level of integration into the host state determines their homeland participation. Specifically, I argue that the moderate range of integration, in which diasporas experience segmented assimilation, is the most likely to produce homeland-oriented diaspora members. Several dimensions of segmented assimilation exist: social, such as discrimination by mainstream society toward immigrants; political, such as legal definitions of

immigrants and their eligibility for state entitlements; and economic, which refers to diasporas' human capital as measured by earnings, income, and degree of professionalization (Waters et al., 2010). To obtain a measure of segmented assimilation that is unique to a particular diaspora, I operationalize integration as diasporas' human capital in their host states. Specifically, I create a continuous variable that is a ratio between diasporas' and natives' incomes in host states using data from the U.S. American Community Survey, the Pew Research Center, the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC), and the International Labor Organization of the UN (ILO).<sup>21</sup> To operationalize segmented assimilation, I gather data from diasporas' host states, as identified by the Global Bilateral Migration Data. The universe of host states for the primary analysis is identified in Table 4, and Table 28 in Appendix A describes the universe of host states for the secondary analysis.<sup>22</sup>

*Table 4: Identification of Frequency of OECD Host States in Primary Model*

<b>Host State</b>	<b>Frequency of Observations</b>	<b>Frequency of Dyads</b>
Belgium	10	4
Canada	27	5
France	40	15
Germany	29	6
Greece	1	1
Netherlands	6	1
Portugal	14	4
United Kingdom	99	22
United States	249	65

The U.S. provides yearly information in the American Community Survey (ACS) on diasporas' median incomes.<sup>23</sup> For each year in my analysis, I create a ratio by comparing the diaspora's median income to the natives' median income in the U.S.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, I use data

<sup>21</sup>See *America Community Survey (ACS)* (2017); *Median Household Income Among U.S. Hispanic Origin Groups, 2013* (2015); *Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)* (2017); *Mean nominal monthly earnings of employees by sex and economic activity (Local Currency)* (2017) for more details.

<sup>22</sup>Table 4 indicates the frequency of host states defined as hosting the majority of the diaspora. Table 28 in Appendix A includes the host states defined as those hosting the median populations of diasporas.

<sup>23</sup>See *America Community Survey (ACS)* (2017) for more details. Typically, the ACS provides the information on respondents' race, so I assume this takes into account both recent immigrants and diaspora members more broadly.

<sup>24</sup>The ACS began producing comprehensive information on immigrants' median incomes in 2005, so I deflate

from the Pew Research Center to gather income data on Central and South American diasporas in the U.S., which are not individually reported in the ACS.<sup>25</sup>

In addition to the U.S., several OECD countries represent host states of diasporas, as illustrated by Table 4.<sup>26</sup> Little granulated data on income of immigrants, differentiated by native country, exist in individual OECD states. Instead, OECD states have reported economic and educational data on immigrants, differentiated by country of origin, in the Database on Immigrants in OECD countries (DIOC) since 2000. While median incomes are not specifically reported in the DIOC, diaspora members residing in OECD states provide information on their sectors of occupation, categorized according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations.<sup>27</sup>

To determine the level of integration of a diaspora group in an OECD host country (that is not the U.S.), I identify the largest occupational sector associated with the relevant immigrant group. I then identify the average monthly wage earned in each occupational category from the International Labor Organization of the UN.<sup>28</sup> Much like the operationalization of the independent variable for diasporas in the U.S., I create a ratio composed of the mean monthly income for the primary sector of diasporas relative to the mean monthly income in the diasporas' OECD host states using data from the ILO.<sup>29</sup> Figure 3

---

the income for the years prior to 2005 included in my analysis.

<sup>25</sup>See Median Household Income Among U.S. Hispanic Origin Groups, 2013 (2015) for more details. Hispanic median incomes are available, but I am interested in country-level diaspora incomes. For robustness, I compare data from the Pew Research Center on specific diaspora incomes to continent-level values that I have for immigrants in these years, and they are very similar (*Median Family Income of Recent Immigrant Arrivals*, 2015).

<sup>26</sup>The U.S. represents the OECD host state for more than half of the diasporas included in my sample.


<sup>27</sup>See *ISCO-08 Structure, index correspondence with ISCO-88* (2016) for more details.

<sup>28</sup>See *Mean nominal monthly earnings of employees by sex and economic activity (Local Currency)* (2017) for more details. Canada, which is a host state for several diaspora groups, does not report income statistics in the ILO data. I identify average annual earnings in Canada from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics by Statistics Canada (*Average annual earnings of women and men, by occupation*, 2008).

<sup>29</sup>See *Mean nominal monthly earnings of employees by sex and economic activity (Local Currency)* (2017) for more details.

illustrates the frequency with which incomes are earned by various diasporas.<sup>30</sup>

Fig. 3: Frequency of Diaspora Incomes in Primary Model



The ratio of diaspora to native income is an appropriate measure to operationalize the concept of segmented assimilation. This ratio indicates the degree to which the diaspora has successfully taken advantage of opportunities in the host state. When the ratio is low, diasporas are more likely to be dissimilated from the host state. Conversely, I expect that, as the ratio rises, diasporas approach incorporation into the host state. Segmented assimilation occurs at the moderate range of integration between the ratio levels associated with dissimilation and incorporation.<sup>31</sup> I expected the upper range of segmented assimilation to occur as diaspora members approach income equality with natives, represented by a ratio value of 1, and the lower range to occur one standard deviation below income parity, represented by a ratio of 0.7. Summary statistics of this continuous independent variable are displayed in Table 5 for the primary model and Table 34 (in Appendix A) for the secondary model. Table 6 includes examples of diasporas across differing ranges of integration.

To provide empirical validity for this measure, consider the income ratio value for three diasporas across different years and host states. First, the Karen diaspora from Myanmar

<sup>30</sup>I provide a distribution of diaspora incomes over time in Figure 27 in Appendix A.

<sup>31</sup>In future work, I will expand on the current operationalization of segmented assimilation to include social and political dimensions of integration.

Table 5: Summary Statistics of Continuous Independent Variable in Primary Model

	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
Income Ratio	0.30	1.00	0.80	0.30	1.60

primarily resides in the U.S., and the value of the income ratio between this diaspora and natives in the U.S. is 0.59.<sup>32</sup> This value, 0.59, is relatively low on the diaspora to native income ratio range, indicating a diaspora's experience of dissimilation. Dissimilation occurs when diasporas are specifically differentiated from the mainstream population in their host states, which may be due to socioeconomic inequality, host state policies, or the nature of ties maintained with the homeland. Karen diaspora members lack significant economic resources and face social prejudice in their host state. For example, the majority (65%) of diaspora members have only attained a high school education or less, 35% live in poverty, and just 28% are proficient in English (*Burmese in the U.S. Fact Sheet*, 2015).<sup>33</sup> Additionally, Karen diaspora members are not exempt from the prejudices faced by other immigrants due to Americans' skepticism regarding the refugee status of this diaspora and fears regarding increased competition in the labor market (Winn, 2017). These socioeconomic disadvantages result in the dissimilation experienced by Karen diaspora members.

Second, the majority of the Chechen diaspora from Russia resides in Germany. The value of the income ratio between Chechen diaspora members and natives in Germany is 0.82, which is in the moderate range of the spectrum of integration.<sup>34</sup> This indicates the Chechen diaspora's experience of segmented assimilation in Germany. According to the International Labour Organization, Chechens diaspora members primarily work in the craft sector in areas such as machinery repair and maintenance, textile production, and construction (*International Standard Classification of Occupations*, 2004). While this provides useful economic resources for Chechen Germans, they still have not quite achieved economic parity with German

<sup>32</sup>This reflects the 2000 value, but this value does not change drastically over time in the data.

<sup>33</sup>Among natives in the U.S., conversely, only 41% or fewer have obtained only a high school education, and only 15% live in poverty (*Burmese in the U.S. Fact Sheet*, 2015). Additionally, 70% of all Asian immigrants are proficient in English (*Burmese in the U.S. Fact Sheet*, 2015).

<sup>34</sup>The value of the ratio is 0.82 in 2003, but the value does not vary widely over time in the dataset.



natives, who primarily work in the services sector in areas such as banking, business, and administration (Dauth, Findeisen and Südekum, 2017). Moreover, Chechens in Germany emigrate from a country with an emerging market economy (Russia), according to the International Monetary Fund, which scholars argue likely widens the wage gap between natives and immigrants (Beyer, 2017). Finally, Chechens experience social isolation due to religiously motivated policies implemented by the Chechen community and alienation by the mainstream German population (Rochowanski, 2013). This produces lower socioeconomic outcomes due to the Chechen diaspora's lack of valuable relationships with German natives, who can provide immigrants with useful information regarding the labor market (Kanas, Chiswick, van der Lippe and van Tubergen, 2012). Thus, the Chechen diaspora experiences segmented assimilation in Germany.

Third, the Filipino diaspora in the U.S. has become primarily incorporated into the mainstream population. The income ratio of Filipinos to natives in the U.S. is 1.51, which is a relatively high value on the range of integration.<sup>35</sup> Incorporated diasporas typically accept host state processes, practices, and relationships while allowing connections with the homeland to weaken. Members of incorporated diasporas frequently participate in the primary labor market and participate in host state political institutions. Filipinos typically obtain high levels of education, with half or more of this diaspora obtaining a bachelor's degree (*Filipino Immigrants in the United States*, 2018). This academic achievement yields professional and financial success for Filipino diaspora members, with 67% working in the primary labor market in the management, business, science, and arts sectors (*Filipino Immigrants in the United States*, 2018).<sup>36</sup> The Filipino diaspora in the U.S., therefore, represents a diaspora that experiences a high level of integration, or incorporation.

In addition to the ratio of diaspora to native incomes, I include a squared term of this ratio. Diasporas must have the capacity to support militants in the homeland, so I expect the ratio of incomes, which represents economic integration of diasporas into their host states, to

---

<sup>35</sup>This reflects the 2006 value, but the ratio is fairly stable over time.

<sup>36</sup>Comparatively, only 32% of all Americans obtain bachelor's degrees, and 62% of natives in the U.S. work in the primary labor market (*Filipino Immigrants in the United States*, 2018).

Table 6: Examples of Diasporas at Different Ranges of Integration

	<b>Dissimilation</b>	<b>Segmented Assimilation</b>	<b>Incorporation</b>
Diaspora Type	Karen American (0.59) Somalian American (0.35) Iraqi American (0.58)	Chechen German (0.82) Tamil Canadian (0.81) Eritrean American (0.78)	Filipino American (1.51) Acehnese Dutch (1.49) Indian British (1.39)

be positively associated with diaspora support. However, motivation is also required for diasporas to participate in homeland conflicts, which I argue drops when diasporas become incorporated into their host states. Thus, I expect a point of economic integration to exist at which diasporas no longer provide aid to homeland conflict actors. I therefore include the squared term to allow for the parabolic relationship I expect between diaspora integration and participation in homeland civil wars.

#### *Control Variables*

I include some control variables on which to condition my independent variables of interest. First, I include a variable representing state capacity in the homeland, which I operationalize using gross domestic product (GDP), a measure commonly employed by scholars to indicate state strength (for example, Fearon and Laitin 2003). I condition my analysis on state capacity because an alternative explanation for diaspora support might be diasporas' interest in shoring up weak militants against a very powerful homeland government. I obtain GDP data from Gleditsch's Expanded Trade and GDP Data (Gleditsch, 2002). GDP, the values of which I take the natural log of due to the skewed nature of the data, proxies the homeland government's capacity to fight the militants, with whom the diaspora share some affinity. Summary statistics for the continuous control variables are displayed in Table 7 for the primary model and Table 34 (in Appendix A) for the secondary model. I expect that the probability of diaspora aid to homeland militants increases with the strength of the homeland government.


Table 7: Summary Statistics of Continuous Control Variables

	Minimum	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Maximum
$\ln(\text{Homeland GDP})$	7.00	11.80	11.90	1.90	15.20
Dist. from Home to Host State	475.00	8674.60	9449.00	3799.50	14227.00
Host State Globalization	70.50	82.90	80.40	4.30	91.00

Second, I include a variable that measures the regime type of the homeland

government.<sup>37</sup> This measure is important to consider in my analysis as the diaspora's perception of the regime type in the homeland likely influences whether the diaspora decides to support opposition that challenges the regime, but is outside the scope of my integration based theory. I gather these data measuring homeland government regime type from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Cole, 2014). I transform the raw Polity scores into a regime type score by identifying homelands with scores between -10 and -6 as autocracies, -5 and 5 as anocracies, and 6-10 as democracies (Marshall and Cole, 2014). As indicated by the distribution of regimes types displayed in Figure 4, the majority of homeland regimes are classified as democratic, followed closely by anocratic. I expect this variable to be inversely related to diaspora's propensity to support homeland militants.

*Fig. 4: Regime Types among Homelands*



Third, I include a measure that indicates the distance between the diaspora's homeland and host state. Multiple potential explanations relating this variable to diaspora support exist. For example, the proximity between diaspora's host state and homeland may influence the diaspora's desire to provide aid to homeland militants to avoid the negative consequences of an undesirable government staying in power in a neighbor of the diaspora's host state. Conversely, a diaspora that lives in a host state far from the homeland may be more inclined to

---

<sup>37</sup>Host state regime type may condition the effect of integration on diaspora participation. Due to data limitations, I only included OECD host states, which are democracies. When more data becomes available, I will include autocratic host states and test for the potentially mediating effect of regime type.

send support due to strong emotions of guilt, empathy, or responsibility. These explanations, however, are outside of the scope of my theory. I obtain the data on distance between the homeland and host state using Gleditsch's distance between capital cities dataset (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001). In line with the former of the aforementioned explanations, I expect the relationship between the distance and diaspora aid to be direct.

Finally, I include a variable that indicates the degree of globalization present in the diaspora's host state, which may influence diaspora members' capacity and motivation to participate in homeland civil wars. Globalization refers to the flows of people, information, ideas, capital, and goods across conventional state borders (Nye and Keohane, 1971). An alternative theory to the integration-based framework that I propose is that diasporas' decision to aid homeland militants is influenced by the level of globalization present in the host state. I measure globalization using the 2017 KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2017). Specifically, I use the social globalization dimension of the index, which is defined as the proliferation of concepts, information, and individuals across conventional state boundaries and measured as communication that crosses borders; access to Internet, TV, and foreign press; and proximity of domestic to international culture (Dreher, 2017).<sup>38</sup> This social dimension of globalization is appropriate given that diaspora members' ability to connect with friends and family in the homeland is the key explanatory factor in this alternative theoretical framework. Because the universe of diasporas' host states consists of OECD member states from 2000 to 2009, the majority of the hosts experience high levels of globalization. I expect that the probability of diaspora support increases with the host state's level of globalization.

## ***Methods***

To test the validity of my hypothesis that segmented assimilation produces diaspora members that are more likely to support homeland militants, I employ generalized linear models using logistic regression. The primary model evaluates my theory as it applies to host states, identified as those OECD member states that contain the largest diaspora population. The secondary model includes host states as defined by the OECD member state with the

---

<sup>38</sup>Cultural proximity is measured by, for example, the number of McDonald's restaurants and Ikea stores in a country (Dreher, 2017).

median size of the diaspora population. Both the primary and secondary models in this analysis can be broadly specified as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Diaspora Support}_{d,st} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Income Ratio}_{dst} + \beta_2 (\text{Income Ratio}_{dst})^2 + \\ & \beta_3 \ln(\text{Homeland GDP})_{lt} + \beta_4 \text{Homeland Regime}_{lt} + \\ & + \beta_5 \text{Distance between Homeland and Host State}_{ls} + \\ & + \beta_6 \text{Host State Globalization}_{st} + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

where  $d = \text{diaspora}$

$l = \text{homeland}$

$s = \text{host state}$

$t = \text{year}$

## Analysis

As previously mentioned, I employ logistic regression models to test my theory that the diaspora's level of integration into its host state influences the probability with which the diaspora supports homeland conflict actors. The results of these tests, which are displayed in Table 8, broadly support my theoretical framework.<sup>39</sup> First, I report the noteworthy results of my primary and secondary logistic regression models. These two models differ in that the primary model's data are drawn from OECD host states with the largest population of diaspora members while the secondary model includes data gathered from OECD host states with median diaspora populations.

In both of these models, the income ratio is positively and statistically significantly related to diasporas' provision of aid to homeland militants. Additionally, the squared income ratio is negatively and statistically significantly related to diaspora participation in homeland conflicts, which indicates the presence of a concave curve. Both of these variables behave as predicted by my theory. The indicator for homeland state capacity, the natural log of gross

---

<sup>39</sup> Additionally, Figure 5 display the results of these regressions.

Table 8: Logistic Regression Results

	<b>Primary Model:</b> Majority Diaspora Host	<b>Secondary Model:</b> Median Diaspora Host
(Intercept)	-20.14* (3.78)	-1.04 (2.23)
Income Ratio	18.45**** (2.93)	9.67**** (2.20)
(Income Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	-11.42**** (1.56)	-3.56**** (0.98)
$\ln(\text{Homeland GDP})$	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.06)
Homeland Regime Type	0.72**** (0.21)	0.14 (0.20)
Distance between Homeland and Host State	0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Host State Globalization	0.13**** (0.04)	-0.05** (0.02)
$N$	438	438
AIC	437.98	538.13
BIC	552.29	652.44
$\log L$	-190.99	-241.07

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$


\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$

domestic product (GDP) in the homeland, is negatively but not statistically significantly related to diasporas' provision of aid to militants in the homeland. The regime type of the homeland, operationalized based on a classification of Polity scores in the homeland, is directly and statistically significantly related to the probability with which diasporas support homeland militants, which is contrary to my expectation. The direct relationship may result from the higher probability with which diasporas may become informed about, and consequently act upon, the political events in their homelands if the regime is transparent enough to allow information to flow across borders. I provide an illustration of the results by plotting the coefficients associated with the primary and secondary models in Figure 5.

As a robustness test, I include an analysis of data in which the U.S. is the host state of each diaspora, and the results of this test are displayed in Table 35 in Appendix A. In this specification, the income ratio remains positive and statistically significant, and the squared

Fig. 5: Logistic Regression Estimates




income ratio remains negative and statistically significant. I also run the primary and secondary models with host state, homeland, and year fixed effects, the results of which are displayed in Table 38 in Appendix A. The results of the fixed effects models are consistent with the primary and secondary models' results. I additionally run the primary and secondary models with a variable that controls for conflict intensity, operationalized as battle deaths per conflict-year, and the results hold (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). However, the limited nature of data collection on battle deaths reduces my dataset by 37%, so my main models exclude the number of battle deaths as a control variable.<sup>40</sup> Last, I include robustness tests, the results of which are displayed in Table 38 of Appendix A, in which the dependent variable is measured as each separate component of diaspora support (financial, military, and political). The results from the primary and secondary models hold when the dependent variable is measured as financial and military, but not political, aid from diasporas. Thus, the variables associated with economic integration behave largely as expected in the main models and alternative specifications.

Because I employ logistic regression, I also present the predicted probabilities associated with the results of the primary and secondary models in Figure 6.<sup>41</sup> The key

<sup>40</sup>I present the results of this additional test in Table 37 in Appendix A.

<sup>41</sup>I also present the predicted probabilities associated with the U.S.-based diaspora data analysis in Figure 28 in Appendix A.

Fig. 6: Predicted Probability of Diaspora Support Conditional on Diaspora: Native Income Ratios



variables in my models, the income ratio and squared income ratio, achieve statistical significance, so I interpret the substantive implications by considering the associated predicted probabilities. Figure 6 illustrates the effects of integration levels, operationalized as the ratio of incomes between diaspora members and natives in the host state, on the probability of diaspora aid to militants (in my primary model). Probability of diaspora support, displayed on the y-axis, is bounded between 0 and 1. The x-axis displays the ratio of incomes between the diaspora and natives in the host state. The low range of ratios indicates diasporas experiencing dissimilation, the moderate range represents diasporas' experience of segmented assimilation, and the high range illustrates incorporated diasporas.<sup>42</sup>

The level of integration that diaspora members experience in their host states is the key variable outlined by my theoretical framework. Specifically, I argue that diasporas experiencing segmented assimilation are those more likely to participate in homeland conflicts by providing aid to militants. Fully incorporated or dissimilated diasporas, conversely, are less likely to support militants since they lack either the motivation or resources to do so. The predicted probabilities associated with my primary and secondary models provide evidence in support of this integration-based hypothesis.

In Figure 6, the solid blue line represents the probability of support by integration

<sup>42</sup>Diaspora members may obtain incomes higher than the natives, which accounts for some of the ratios that are above 1.



level of diasporas. The middle range of the solid blue line, which represents when diasporas experience segmented assimilation, is associated with a higher probability of support to militants than the extremes of the solid blue line, which represent dissimilation (occurring at the lower end of the x-axis) and incorporation (occurring at the higher end of the x-axis). The moderate range occurs as the ratio of incomes approaches 1, which represents equality between diasporas' and natives' incomes.<sup>43</sup> Moderate integration occurs when diasporas gain some financial capacity but are still not completely incorporated into the host state, represented by diasporas' acquisition of income parity with or advancement over natives' income. Thus, though approaching income equality, these diasporas remain unincorporated and so are still motivated to maintain ties to the homeland. The dashed blue lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates, which indicate that, in repeated sampling, 95% of the intervals calculated would contain the population mean. The rug plot, displayed beneath the predicted probabilities, illustrates the distribution of the ratio of diasporas' to natives' incomes. The vertical red line represents the average of the diaspora versus native income ratio.

To contextualize the predicted probabilities, I will discuss the predicted probabilities associated with the empirical cases of diaspora integration and homeland participation. First, the dissimilated Karen American diaspora is located on the lower range of integration with an income ratio of 0.59. The predicted probability associated with this value of the ratio is 0.31, suggesting the Karen diaspora is less likely to participate in homeland conflicts. Empirically, the Karen diaspora does not provide support to conflict actors in the homeland, which is in line with my theory. Second, the Chechen German diaspora experiences segmented assimilation with an income ratio of 0.82. The predicted probability of this diaspora aiding homeland militants is relatively higher, with a value of 0.44. The data indicate that, as expected, Chechen Germans do send financial and military aid to homeland militants. Third, the incorporated Filipino American diaspora, with an income ratio of 1.51, is associated with a predicted probability of just 0.003. This highlights the improbability of Filipinos' provision

---

<sup>43</sup>While this relationship is more apparent in Figure 6a, associated with the primary model, the general curve predicted by the segmented assimilation theory remains in Figure 6b associated with the secondary model.

of support to homeland militants. Again, as predicted by my theory, Filipinos empirically avoid participation in homeland conflicts.

Table 9: Correlation between Independent and Control Variables in Primary Model

	<b>Inc. Ratio</b>	<b>(Inc. Ratio)<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>ln(Home GDP)</b>	<b>Home Reg.</b>	<b>Distance</b>	<b>Host Glob.</b>
Inc. Ratio	1	0.988	0.340	0.440	0.101	0.181
(Inc. Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	0.988	1	0.346	0.425	0.145	0.178
ln(Home GDP)	0.340	0.346	1	0.440	-0.115	0.212
Home Reg.	0.440	0.425	0.440	1	-0.164	0.211
Distance	0.101	0.145	-0.115	-0.164	1	-0.247
Host Glob.	0.181	0.178	0.212	0.211	-0.247	1

Finally, I conduct diagnostic tests to evaluate the robustness of my model. I first identify that little problematic correlation exists between the independent and control variables in the datasets used in the primary and secondary models, as demonstrated by Tables 9 and 29 (in Appendix A).<sup>44</sup> Next, I calculate variance inflation factors to analyze the severity of problems associated with multicollinearity in the preliminary and secondary models. Rogerson recommends that VIF levels not exceed 5 (2001). Though the VIF levels exceed this threshold for the key variables of interest representing integration (income ratio and the squared income ratio), multicollinearity is to be expected given the nature of these variables. The VIF levels do not exceed 5 for the other variables in my models, indicating that a severe multicollinearity problem does not exist in the analyses.

Table 10: Variance Inflation Factors

	<b>Primary Model:</b> Majority Diaspora Host	<b>Secondary Model:</b> Median Diaspora Host
Income Ratio	6.23	5.61
(Income Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	6.42	5.62
ln(Homeland GDP)	1.14	1.21
Homeland Regime Type	1.29	1.26
Distance between Homeland and Host State	1.26	1.26
Host State Globalization	1.82	1.20

Additionally, I provide the percent of observations correctly predicted by my models, as well as the expected percent of observations correctly predicted by my models. Herron

<sup>44</sup>Mild correlation exists between the economic variables in my dataset, including the income ratio between the diaspora and natives in the host state, the income ratio squared, and the GDP in the homeland. Moderate correlation exists between the regime type in the homeland, the income ratio of diaspora to natives in the host state, and the income ratio.

recommends calculating the expected percent correctly predicted in addition to the percent correctly predicted, which may imply more precision of estimates than is accurate (1999). Table 11 demonstrates that the primary and secondary models correctly predicted the majority of observations.

*Table 11: Percent and Expected Percent of Observations Correctly Predicted*

	<b>Primary Model:</b> Majority Diaspora Host	<b>Secondary Model:</b> Median Diaspora Host
Percent Correctly Predicted	75.3 %	67.1%
Expected Percent Correctly Predicted	67.8%	58.2%

To test the predictive capacity of the main model in this paper, I also present the Receiver-Operator Characteristic (ROC) plot associated with the primary and secondary models in Figure 7.<sup>45</sup> The area under the curve of the ROC plot indicates the accuracy of the model, with a value of 1 representing a perfect test. The value of the area under the curve for the primary model is 0.84, indicating that the model's ability to accurately predict diasporas' support of homeland militants is high.<sup>46</sup> The value of the area under the curve for the secondary model is 0.73, suggesting the model decently predicts diaspora support of homeland militants.<sup>47</sup>

## Conclusion

In this analysis, I argue that diaspora integration influences diasporas' willingness and capacity to participate in homeland contentious politics. My statistical analysis provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that moderately integrated diasporas are more likely to support homeland militants. The predicted probabilities associated with my primary model


---

<sup>45</sup>The ROC plots associated with the primary and secondary models excluding the key independent variables are displayed in Figure 29 in Appendix A.

<sup>46</sup>The value of the area under the curve for primary model that excludes the key independent variables associated with income ratios is 0.65. This suggests that incorporating the income ratio variables into the primary model improves the correct prediction of diaspora participation.

<sup>47</sup>The value of the area under the curve for secondary model that excludes the key independent variables associated with income ratios is 0.64. This suggests that incorporating the income ratio variables into the secondary model improves the correct prediction of diaspora participation.

Fig. 7: ROC Plots



demonstrate the expected curvilinear relationship: diasporas that experience moderate (low and high) levels of integration are more (less) likely to provide aid.

Moderately integrated diasporas can provide resources to homeland militants because they are somewhat integrated into the labor market in the host state; crucially, these diasporas are also motivated to preserve homeland connections due to their isolation from mainstream society in the host state. Alternatively, dissimilated or incorporated diasporas lack the capacity or motivation to participate. Though dissimilated diasporas would like to engage in homeland conflicts, they cannot financially or materially support militants because of their inability to participate fully in their host state. Incorporated diasporas, conversely, have taken advantage of opportunities in their host states and, while they have useful resources, lack interest in homeland conflicts as they increasingly identify with their host states.

Scholarship on diaspora participation in homeland contentious politics may expand both theoretically and empirically. While authors primarily evaluate the conflict-escalating impact of diasporas, including dovish diasporas' efforts to resolve conflicts may broaden our understanding of diaspora participation in homeland politics. For example, the Acholi British diaspora has facilitated the Kacoke Madit conferences, which provide opportunities for peace building among Ugandan civilians, the Acholi diaspora, the Ugandan and Sudanese governments, the Lord's Resistance Army, and other relevant actors (Poblicks, 2002).

Additionally, future work might include the social and political aspects of diaspora integration into the host state, which may further clarify the role of integration in diasporas' participation in homeland politics.

In addition to contributing a novel explanation of diaspora support, this analysis has important implications for policymakers. Policymakers should recognize the significance of immigration and integration policy choices on transnational conflict. Policymakers in host states with salient diaspora communities should increase the ease of diaspora incorporation into host state society and continue policies designed to curb minority participation in domestic and transnational violence. For example, Sweden implemented labor market-focused reforms to immigrants' language and vocational training programs, which might be established elsewhere to improve immigrant integration (Farchy, 2014). Specifically, host states should promote economic, educational, and social integration to advance immigrants' efforts to adjust to their host states.

## **CHAPTER 3: DIASPORA SUPPORT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT**

### **Introduction**

While states that sponsor civil war actors have been the subject of academic inquiry and policymakers' efforts to stabilize conflict zones, diasporas that take on a similar role in civil wars in their homelands have been understudied. To enhance fighting capabilities or gain bargaining leverage, some militant groups may seek state sponsorship, but others may only have access to diasporas. Globalization and technological advances in communication and travel have increasingly allowed diasporas to participate in the onset, continuation, and resolution processes of substate conflicts in their homelands.

Some diasporas may undertake efforts to sustain or intensify civil wars in their homelands. Conversely, other diasporas may contribute to homeland conflict resolution by creating opportunities or encouraging efforts to negotiate a settlement between conflict actors. Diasporas' distinct preferences on conflict and interactions with homeland militants suggest that diaspora intervention may exacerbate violence under some conditions, but may instead suppress violence in other cases. In addition, diaspora groups may diverge in their attitudes regarding the quality of the deal produced by negotiations to end the civil conflict in the homeland. Some diasporas may be pessimistic about the settlement produced by negotiations, but others may be optimistic about the concessions the government will offer to the militants.

For example, the Irish American diaspora contributed to the conflict capacity of violent nonstate actors, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), in Ireland until at least the 1980s. Through nongovernmental organizations such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAI), diaspora members provided financial aid, which was used to buy weapons and support the dependents of imprisoned Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members; material aid, such as weapons; and political support in the form of lobbying the U.S. government regarding Northern Ireland's status (Hanley, 2004; Byman, 2006). During this time, many members of the Irish American diaspora community that sponsored substate

armed groups maintained the idea that the ultimate goal of a united Ireland would be achieved only with violence and were disinclined to favor negotiations with the United Kingdom (U.K) government (Cullen, 1997). However, British Prime Minister Thatcher and Irish Taoiseach FitzGerald signed the Anglo-Irish agreement, in which the Republic of Ireland obtained some role in the affairs of Northern Ireland and allowed for the union of Ireland if a majority voted in favor of this decision, in 1985 (Shannon, 1986). The relative success of this treaty in terms of concessions to the Irish encouraged the Irish American diaspora to favor efforts to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. The Good Friday agreement, which was signed in 1998, set up a power-sharing government and allowed for future sovereignty issues to be decided upon by a majority of Northern Ireland voters (*The Good Friday Agreement-An Overview*, 2013). The Irish American diaspora's preferences regarding the Northern Ireland civil conflict and optimistic attitude regarding the deal produced by negotiations influenced the acceptance of the Good Friday Accords and ensuing (relative) peace.<sup>48</sup>

Alternatively, diasporas may be pessimistic about the quality of the agreement that negotiations in the homeland will produce. For example, the Kurdish diaspora initially proved beneficial to Kurdish Iraqis after the 2003 war by cooperating with their host state governments (in Europe and the U.S.) in an attempt to grant the Kurds regional autonomy, develop infrastructure, and improve education opportunities in post-war Iraq (Natali, 2007). However, the Iraq situation eventually deteriorated, and the external governments decreasingly prioritized the Kurdish diasporas preferences. The diaspora, then, proved to be so nationalistic that it undermined, rather than advanced, the Kurds efforts to negotiate a settlement to avoid conflict (Natali, 2007; 209). Specifically, Kurdish Iraqis wanted to make a compromise regarding the culturally valuable city of Kirkuk, but the diaspora abroad proved to be “a thorn in [the] side” of Iraqi militants due to the diaspora members’ aggressive rhetoric that failed to address the practical situation on the ground (Natali, 2007). The diaspora lacked understanding of the benefits that a negotiated solution regarding Kirkuk would bring to Kurds in the homeland.

---

<sup>48</sup>Some challenges to implementation, such as decommissioning militants’ weapons and reforming the security sector, have occurred (*The Good Friday Agreement-An Overview*, 2013).

These variations in diasporas' preferences on homeland conflict and attitudes regarding negotiated settlements raise the question of when diasporas' participation facilitates peace versus escalates violence. I will address this question using a game theoretic model, which provides a prediction of the impact of intervention by distinct types of diasporas on conflict outcomes in diasporas' homelands. The model demonstrates an inverse relationship between the probability of negotiations and the homeland government's capacity in conflict. Moreover, the model suggests that the results of negotiation will produce a durable peace when the government's capacity is low *and* the diaspora sponsors are optimistic regarding the results of negotiations.

### **The Role of Diasporas in Intrastate Conflict**

Scholars distinguish between two types of external support to militants engaged in civil war. Active support refers to material, financial, and diplomatic aid provided by states to militants (Byman et al., 2001). Passive support refers to aid from transnational nonstate actors, such as diasporas, nongovernmental organizations, and transnational crime networks that benefits militants (Byman et al., 2001; Asal, Pate and Wilkenfield, 2008). While passive support to militants occurs nearly as frequently as active support, as illustrated by Figure 1,<sup>49</sup> most of the literature on foreign intervention in civil wars focuses on the causes and consequences of active support to civil war actors.<sup>50</sup> Byman argues that passive support results from a capable government's unwillingness to counter aid from domestic nonstate actors, such as political parties, private corporations, and individuals (2006). San-Akca offers an empirically driven expansion of this definition by identifying passive support as any successful effort by militants to obtain aid from foreign nonstate actors (2016). In this study, I focus on passive support from diaspora actors, such as the Irish American diaspora's financial,

---


<sup>49</sup>This graph uses data on active versus passive support (from diaspora actors) from Byman (2001).

<sup>50</sup>Scholars have addressed the benefits militants receive from state sponsorship, including financial aid, political legitimization, sanctuary to avoid homeland government repression, military training, and weapons provision (Norton, 2007; Bapat, 2007; Byman, 2013; Salehyan, 2007; Byman, 2005; Jenkins, 1986). Potential drawbacks of state support include loss of autonomy (Horowitz, 1985), fractionalization (Byman, 2013), undermining of militants' relationship with the population (Weinstein, 2006), and a decline in security because sanctuary states may be more willing to give up valuable information about the militants to avoid punishment (Carter, 2012).



material, and political support of the PIRA during the 1970s “Troubles” (Hanley, 2004; Byman, 2005). Some scholars underappreciate diaspora influence due to the assumed uniformity and shallowness of this aid (Byman et al., 2001; Sheffer, 2003). Others suggest diasporas may encourage transnational nonviolent protests due to their international lobbying ability (Asal, Conrad and White, 2014; Adamson, 2013) and may incentivize militants’ use of violence since diaspora members do not personally experience the costs of conflict (Asal, Legault, Szekely and Wilkenfeld, 2013).

*Fig. 8: Types of Outside Support, 1991-2000*



While diaspora members may exit their homelands due to the same traumatic event, a single diaspora may experience intra-group heterogeneity due to differentiation among members’ rationale for emigration, socioeconomic class, and political orientation in the host state and toward the homeland. For example, members of the Armenian diaspora remain fractionalized, even after the establishment of an Armenian state, by duration of residence abroad, manner of emigration, linguistic variation, ideological disputes regarding the influence of the Soviet Union on Armenia, and degree of education and professionalization (Gevorkyan, 2016). While the presence of differing factions within a diaspora limits the usefulness of a unitary actor assumption, social choice theory suggests diaspora communities

may choose a method to aggregate individual preferences, such as emphasizing a Pareto efficient outcome for all group members or creating a voting rule mechanism (Brown, 1975). Thus, diaspora members may informally elect to allow the most engaged faction to make collective decisions regarding homeland political participation.

Diasporas can have varying effects on militant behavior. Since Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identified the relationship between size of diasporas in the U.S. and likelihood of recurring intrastate conflict, scholars have examined how hawkish diasporas drive militants to use or escalate violence in civil wars (Byman, 2013; Keles, 2015; Adamson, 2013). Hawkish intervention occurs when popular support for the militants is high among the diaspora community, which is simultaneously hostile toward the homeland government. Voluntary and compulsory financial support from diasporas helps militants to promote the group's ideology via propaganda, pay salaries for fighters and their dependents, finance travel and communications costs, train new recruits, provide logistical support, allocate welfare goods, and administer mass media outlets (Hess, 2007; Shelley, 2014; Koser, 2007; OECD, 2008). Foreign diasporas may also provide material aid, in the form of foreign fighters, weapons, and intelligence reports (Sheffer, 2003).

Conversely, diasporas can constrain militants' capabilities in civil war. While diaspora support is conventionally thought to be exclusively beneficial to militants since it is cheaper, more reliable, and less constraining than state support, diasporas may develop exogenous interests in the outcome of the homeland civil war and thus take actions to alter militants' agendas (Byman et al., 2001; Horowitz, 1985). Participation by diasporas that prefer peace could produce unanticipated consequences for militants, such as forcing them to negotiate an end to the conflict with the homeland government or to accept liberal values, such as democracy or multiculturalism, learned in the host state (Shain, 2002; Bercovitch, 2007).

Because distinct types of diasporas may participate in homeland civil wars, predicting the impact of diaspora engagement a priori is difficult. Diasporas lack formalized institutions to clearly aggregate and make public their collective preferences. The members of diasporas may voice different interests in the outcome of the homeland conflict, so the consequences of passive support to homeland actors are often unknown to international actors, including the

homeland government. While militants are likely to be familiar with their diaspora supporters, and therefore aware of the diasporas' intentions regarding the dynamics and outcome of the conflict, the homeland government may not be so informed. Diaspora members frequently maintain relationships with friends and family in the homeland, which, due to advances in communications technology, do not necessarily draw the attention of or require approval from the homeland government (Keles, 2015). Given this lack of knowledge concerning participating diasporas' interests concerning the conflict, homeland governments may not be able to act optimally to end the conflict and reinstate domestic order.

The homeland government cannot perfectly observe which actors within the diaspora are driving the movement to participate in the homeland civil war and is therefore uncertain about whether the intervening diaspora will exacerbate or deescalate violence. This environment of uncertainty affects the government's strategic behavior toward the militants. When the militants send signals of interest in negotiations, the government is unsure of how to respond to this signal most effectively. If perfectly informed on the nature of the diaspora supporting the militants, the government would be able to appropriately negotiate a settlement that induces militants to stop fighting. However, given the government's incomplete information regarding diaspora type, the militants may strategically leverage the government's ignorance to achieve higher concessions or force the government to the negotiating table and then renege on the deal by subsequently resuming conflict. While negotiating with militants whose diaspora sponsors encourage hostility makes the government worse off, failing to negotiate with militants supported by a pacific diaspora also represents a missed opportunity for conflict resolution.

The homeland government, which is operating under incomplete information, must decide how to react to militants benefiting from some type of diaspora support. Previous scholarship has not adequately identified the impact of uncertainty regarding the nature of the participating diaspora on the homeland government's strategic decision regarding negotiations in conflict. I next present a model that illustrates how the homeland government strategically responds to militants with diaspora sponsorship based on its own capacity, which in turn influences the probability with which homeland conflict actors reach a negotiated settlement.

## A Model of Diaspora Support in Intrastate Conflict

This model illustrates the impact of support from a nonstate actor, such as a diaspora group, on the dynamics of a foreign civil war. The homeland government (G) and militants (M) comprise the strategic players in this game and are engaged in civil conflict at the start of this game. The diaspora actor enters the game as a decision maker that influences the strategic actors' decisions; specifically, M's capacity in conflict is a function of diaspora support. I do not treat the diaspora as a unitary, strategic actor due to intra-diaspora variation. While diaspora members may exit their homelands due to analogous traumatic events, diasporas may experience fragmentation due to differentiation among members' motivation for emigration, socioeconomic class, and preferences regarding host state politics and homeland conflict violence levels. Additionally, I characterize the diaspora as a decision maker rather than a strategic actor. Diaspora actors respond to the strategic players' decisions based on a predetermined threshold of expected concessions from G to M. While the diaspora's decision influences the game's outcomes, the diaspora's threshold is set a priori, and the diaspora does not behave strategically during the game. I characterize diasporas as nonstrategic because utility maximization may not be their sole objective. Sentiments of collective responsibility, empathy toward kin, or even guilt may instead inspire diaspora intervention in homeland politics (Cohen, 2008).<sup>51</sup>

Figure 9 presents a signaling model that describes the interactions between the conflict actors, as influenced by the nonstrategic diaspora. The game begins with Nature's draw of a dovish ( $D_D$ ) or hawkish ( $D_H$ ) diaspora that participates in a civil war in the homeland.  $D_D$  prefers negotiations to occur between homeland conflict actors that produce what  $D_D$  perceives to be a generous offer of concessions from G, which M accept. Therefore,  $D_D$  provides aid to M that reject an unfair deal from G, which is defined as a level of concessions that is less than  $D_D$ 's reservation price ( $x < \hat{x}_D$ ).  $D_D$  refuses to provide aid to M that reject a generous deal from G, which is defined as a level of concessions at or above  $D_D$ 's reservation price ( $x \geq \hat{x}_D$ ).

---

<sup>51</sup>Additionally, in an early version of my dissertation game, I included the diaspora as a strategic actor, and the results did not vary significantly from these.

The game unfolds in the following way: M initially decide whether to attack G or

<sup>53</sup>This assumption about  $D_H$ 's decision regarding  $M$ 's reaction to  $G$ 's offer differs slightly from the standard bargaining model and influence just one equilibrium.  $D_H$ 's preference to support when  $M_H$  attack is innocuous, so the separating equilibria are not affected. Additionally, the pooling equilibrium in Case 3 is relatively unaffected since  $G$  matches  $D_H$ 's aid (regardless of the level of concessions  $x$ ), and  $M_H$  rationally accepts  $G$ 's offer. However,  $D_H$ 's assumption influences the pooling equilibrium in Case 2 since  $M_H$  reject  $G$ 's offer, which exceeds  $D_H$ 's reservation price, to incentivize  $D_H$ 's aid, which represents a higher utility than  $G$ 's offer. The choice regarding  $D_H$ 's preference to support when  $M_H$  attack *or* reject a good deal to signal strength, as well as to punish when  $M_H$  reject a bad deal and signal weakness, is a stylized effort to formally incorporate the conflict-preferring nature of  $D_H$ .

Table 12: Model Parameters and Ranges

Parameter	Interpretation	Range
$\mu_D$	G's prior belief that the diaspora is dovish	$\mu_D \in [0,1]$
$1-\mu_D$	G's prior belief that the diaspora is hawkish	$\mu_D \in [0,1]$
$p$	G's probability of victory in conflict	$p \in [0,1]$
$C_{M,G}$	Costs of fighting	$C_{M,G} \in [0,1]$
$\theta$	Support to M from D	$\theta \in [0,1]$
$x$	Level of concessions G offers during negotiations	$x \in [0,1]$
$X_{D,H}^*$	Equilibrium offer by G during negotiations	$X_{D,H}^* \in [0,1]$
$\hat{x}_D, \hat{x}_H$	Reservation prices of $D_D$ and $D_H$	$x_{\hat{D},H} \in [0,1]$

negotiate with G to seek concessions. The nature of the intervening diaspora influences M's payoff. If M attack when  $D_D$  is participating, the payoffs to M and G consist of:  $1-p-C_M$  and  $p-C_G$ , with  $p \in [0,1]$ . With  $D_D$  sponsorship, M's payoff is a function of their probability of winning,  $1-p$ , less the cost of fighting  $C_M$ , with  $C_M \in [0,1]$ . Because M do not at least attempt to negotiate with G,  $D_D$  refuses to provide aid. The payoff to G is composed of the probability  $p$  with which G wins less the cost of fighting  $C_G$ , with  $C_G \in [0,1]$ .

If  $D_H$  intervenes, conversely, the payoff to M and G consist of:  $1-\theta p-C_M$  and  $\theta p-C_G$ . M's payoff is a function of their probability of winning,  $1-p$ , weighted by  $\theta$ , less the cost of fighting  $C_M$ . The parameter  $\theta$ , with  $\theta \in [0,1]$ , represents the discount to G's probability of winning that results from aid provided to M by  $D_H$ .<sup>54</sup> Aid from the diaspora may be in the form of financial, material, or human resources. More populous, wealthy, or politically active diasporas will be more beneficial in terms of resources sent to supplement M's resistance. The payoff to G is the probability of victory  $p$ , weighted by  $\theta$ , reduced by the cost of fighting  $C_G$ .

If M negotiate, G responds. G may make some level of concessions  $x$ , with  $x \in [0,1]$ , or ignore M's request for negotiations. If G ignores M,  $D_D$  nonetheless appreciates M's attempt to negotiate and provides aid to M. Therefore, the payoffs to M and G are:  $1-\theta p-C_M$  and  $\theta p-C_G$ . Conversely, G may ignore M that have a participating  $D_H$ .  $D_H$  refuses to support M that have defied  $D_H$ 's preferences by attempting to negotiate and being ignored. Therefore, the payoff to M and G are:  $1-p-C_M$  and  $p-C_G$ .

G may instead decide to offer M some level of concessions. G lacks information on

---

<sup>54</sup>The parameter  $\theta$  is inversely proportional to diaspora support because  $\theta$  discounts G's probability of victory. Therefore, when diaspora support is high,  $\theta$  is low, and vice versa.

D's preferences concerning violence in the homeland.<sup>55</sup>  $D_D$  prefers that M in the homeland make sincere efforts to resolve the conflict diplomatically, yet requires M to exclusively accept a reasonable level of concessions.<sup>56</sup> Therefore,  $D_D$  rewards M by providing  $\theta$  support when M reject concessions deemed too low by  $D_D$  ( $x < \hat{x}_D$ ).  $D_H$  most prefers that M continue the conflict and refuses to support those that attempt to negotiate. If, however, M are offered a high level of concessions that they reject ( $x \geq X_H^*$ ),  $D_H$  is satisfied that M have displayed a signal of strength and continues to send aid. G, which prefers to negotiate an efficient deal that ends the civil war, is uncertain of the nature of the participating diaspora. Therefore, G lacks complete information regarding diaspora type and so is unsure of the appropriate level of concessions to offer M.

If G offers some level of concessions, M make the final move by deciding whether to accept G's offer or reject the deal and fight. If M accept the deal offered by G, the payoffs to M and G are:  $x$  and  $1-x$ , regardless of diaspora type. M receive  $x$ , which refers to the level of concessions offered to M by G. G receives the payoff of achieving an end to the conflict, which effectively preserves the status quo of G maintaining sovereignty in the homeland, less the concessions  $x$  offered to M.

If M supported by  $D_D$  reject the deal and continue the conflict, their payoff depends on the level of foregone concessions. If the concessions from G are too low ( $x < \hat{x}_D$ ), then  $D_D$  rewards M by continuing to send aid. When  $D_D$  rewards M with support, the payoffs to M and G are:  $1-\theta p - C_M$  and  $\theta p - C_G$ .<sup>57</sup> M's payoff is the improved probability with which they win the conflict  $1-\theta p$ , less the cost of fighting  $C_M$ . The reduced probability of victory  $\theta p$ , less the costs of fighting  $C_G$ , comprises G's payoff. If M reject a generous offer from G ( $x \geq \hat{x}_D$ ), however,  $D_D$  punishes M by removing aid. When  $D_D$  refuses to support M, the payoffs to M

---

<sup>55</sup>I assume G is incompletely informed on the nature of the participating diaspora because diasporas frequently experience generational and geographical fractionalization. Additionally, diaspora support is commonly clandestine. Thus, G may misperceive the true nature of the leading coalition of diaspora actors, as well as their level of aid to M.

<sup>56</sup>Note that  $D_D$ 's preferences are aligned with M's because both prefer M receive and accept a high level of concessions.

<sup>57</sup>The indicator function  $i=1$  when  $D_D$  supports M.

and G are:  $1-p-C_M$  and  $p-C_G$ .<sup>58</sup> M's payoff is the reduced probability with which they win the conflict  $1-p$ , less the costs associated with conflict  $C_M$ . G's payoff consists of its probability of victory  $p$ , which is reduced by its cost of fighting.

If M receive support from  $D_H$  and reject G's concessions, their payoff again depends on the level of rebuffed concessions. If M reject a high offer and thus send a signal of strength ( $x \geq \hat{x}_H$ ),  $D_H$  rewards M with aid. Thus, when  $D_H$  supports M, the payoffs to M and G are:  $1-\theta p-C_M$  and  $\theta p-C_G$ .<sup>59</sup> M's payoff is composed of their increased probability of victory  $1-\theta p$ , less the costs of fighting  $C_M$ . G's payoff is its reduced probability of victory due to diaspora aid  $\theta p$ , less the cost of conflict  $C_G$ . Alternatively, if M reject a low offer from G ( $x < \hat{x}_H$ ),  $D_H$  refuses to support M since  $D_H$  preferred negotiations never to occur and the rejection of a low offer fails to credibly signal strength. When  $D_H$  refuses to send aid, the payoffs to M and G are:  $1-p-C_M$  and  $p-C_G$ .<sup>60</sup> M's payoff is the probability of winning without diaspora aid  $1-p$ , less the costs of fighting  $C_M$ . G's payoff consists of its probability of victory  $p$ , which is decreased by the costs associated with conflict  $C_G$ .

## Equilibrium Solutions

I solve this signaling game using the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) solution concept due to the presence of incomplete information. I first solve for what occurs during the bargaining subgames between G and M. D's attitude toward negotiations, formally represented as reservation prices ( $\hat{x}_D$  and  $\hat{x}_H$ ), illustrates the quality of the deal that D expects to obtain from negotiations. D's attitudes, which are known to G, drive the equilibrium offers made by G in the bargaining subgames.<sup>61</sup> The level of concessions that G offers is a function of whether D provides aid to M. D takes this decision based on its type and attitude toward negotiations. If D agrees with M's decision to reject G's offer, D supports M and increases M's utility from  $1-p-C_M$ , representing M's probability of defeating G alone, to  $1-\theta p-C_M$ ,

---

<sup>58</sup>The indicator function  $i=0$  when  $D_D$  removes aid from M.

<sup>59</sup>The indicator function  $I=1$  when  $D_H$  supports M.

<sup>60</sup>The indicator function  $I=0$  when  $D_H$  removes aid from M.

<sup>61</sup>While D's type is private information, D's attitudes are assumed to be publicly available information.



which indicates the increased probability of M's victory against G due to diaspora aid. Thus, G's offers exist within three intervals, ranging from G offering nothing to everything to M in concessions:  $[0, 1-p-C_M]$ ,  $[1-p-C_M, 1-\theta p-C_M]$ ,  $[1-\theta p-C_M, 1]$ .

D's attitudes produce 12 cases, differentiated by the level of concessions G offers.<sup>62</sup> Figure 30 (in Appendix B) includes all possible locations of D's attitudes within the range of equilibrium offers G might make, ranging from few concessions  $[0, 1-p-C_M]$  to moderate concessions  $[1-p-C_M, 1-\theta p-C_M]$  to high concessions  $[1-\theta p-C_M, 1]$ .<sup>63</sup> In solving this game, I make an assumption: D exclusively participates in the homeland civil war when the settlement negotiated by civil war actors is at least as beneficial as what militants obtain from conflict alone  $(1-p-C_M)$ .<sup>64</sup> I make this assumption because diasporas prefer to do nothing if their intervention harms the militants.

I focus my analysis exclusively on the cases that survive this assumption and represent unique equilibrium solutions, which limits my cases of consideration to the three included in Figure 10.<sup>65</sup> These cases are differentiated by D's attitudes toward the quality of the deal produced by negotiations in the homeland. In Cases 1 and 2,  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic about negotiations, indicated by the reservation prices of  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  being located in the middle interval of G's concessions  $[1-p-C_M, 1-\theta p-C_M]$ . In Case 3,  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are optimistic about negotiations, so  $D_D$ 's and  $D_H$ 's reservations prices are in the highest range of G's concessions  $[1-\theta p-C_M, 1]$ .

### ***Pessimistic Diasporas: Cases 1 and 2***

#### ***Separating Equilibria***

Consider the case in which  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic about the outcome of negotiations, which G observes even though diaspora type remains private information, and

---


<sup>62</sup>For a more expansive discussion of the cases, see "Game Preliminaries" in Appendix B.

<sup>63</sup>For a lengthier description of the effects of D's decision on M's and G's payoffs, see "Game Preliminaries" in Appendix B.

<sup>64</sup>Figure 31 in Appendix B illustrates the cases that survive this assumption.

<sup>65</sup>For more information about the consolidation of cases based on unique equilibrium offers, see "Game Preliminaries" in Appendix B. Additionally, the unique cases that survive the assumption also survive the intuitive criterion check.

Fig. 10: Unique Cases to Solve



$M_D$  negotiate while  $M_H$  attack.<sup>66</sup> After signaling an inclination to negotiate,  $M_D$  accept G's concessions if an appropriate level that satisfies  $M_D$  is offered.<sup>67</sup> In the separating equilibrium, interest in negotiations credibly signals to G that  $D_D$  is participating in the civil conflict in the homeland. Thus, G makes an offer that satisfies  $M_D$  ( $x^* = \hat{x}_D$ ). After sending a signal of an inclination to negotiate,  $M_D$  accept a negotiated settlement with the government to end the conflict if the appropriate level of concessions is offered ( $x \geq \hat{x}_D$ ).<sup>68</sup> Depending on its capacity, G chooses between ignoring and offering some level of concessions, ranging from nothing to that which satisfies  $M_D$  ( $\hat{x}_D$ ). G offers concessions acceptable to  $M_D$  when G is relatively weak ( $p < \hat{p}$ ).<sup>69</sup>  $M_D$  have a dominant strategy to negotiate regardless of G's decision. If G ignores  $M_D$  or offers too few concessions ( $x < \hat{x}_D$ ),  $D_D$  rewards  $M_D$  for attempting to negotiate by sending aid.  $D_D$ 's support increases  $M_D$ 's utility to  $1-\theta p-C_M$ . If G offers concessions that satisfy  $M_D$  ( $x^* \geq \hat{x}_D$ ),  $M_D$  accept. In both of these cases,  $M_D$ 's utility from negotiating exceeds the utility of attacking, so  $M_D$  are not incentivized to deviate to attack ( $1-\theta p-C_M > 1-p-C_M$ ).

$M_H$  prefer to attack rather than negotiate because  $D_H$  support cannot be activated by rejecting, regardless of G's offer. If G ignores the attempt to negotiate, this decision reveals G's perception that  $M_H$  are relatively weak and undeserving of concessions, which displeases

<sup>66</sup>No equilibria exist in which  $M_D$  attack and  $M_H$  negotiate because  $M_D$  have a dominant strategy to negotiate, regardless of G's offer.

<sup>67</sup>Note that, for  $M_D$  to be satisfied,  $D_D$  must also be satisfied because G's concessions meet  $D_D$ 's reservation price.

<sup>68</sup>G offers  $\hat{x}_D$  because diasporas are pessimistic about negotiations in Cases 1 and 2.

<sup>69</sup>See Appendix B for derivation of  $\hat{p}$ .

$D_H$  and causes  $D_H$  to revoke aid. This lowers  $M_H$ 's utility to  $1-p-C_M$ , which incentivizes  $M_H$  to attack, thereby ensuring diaspora aid and a higher utility ( $1-\theta p-C_M$ ), rather than negotiate with G.

When  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic and  $D_H$  require more concessions than  $D_D$ , G fails to offer enough concessions to, through  $M_H$ 's rejection, signify strength to and stimulate aid from  $D_H$ . G may make some offer of concessions between none and the level that satisfies  $M_D$  ( $x^*=x_D$ ). Regardless of whether G offers nothing or concessions to satisfy  $M_D$ ,  $D_H$  removes aid, which lowers  $M_H$ 's utility to  $1-p-C_M$ .  $M_H$ , therefore, prefer to attack to guarantee  $D_H$ 's support rather than negotiate and provoke  $D_H$ 's punishment ( $1-\theta p-C_M > 1-p-C_M$ ).

When  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic and  $D_D$  requires more concessions than  $D_H$ , G's equilibrium offer is higher than the level of concessions required by  $D_H$ , or  $D_H$ 's reservation price ( $x^*=x_D > x_H$ ). By rejecting G's generous offer, defined as concessions equaling or exceeding  $D_H$ 's reservation price,  $M_H$  credibly signal strength to G and activate  $D_H$  aid. With  $D_H$  support,  $M_H$ 's utility increases to  $1-\theta p-C_M$ , which matches  $M_H$ 's payoff from attacking. Therefore, regardless of G's decision,  $M_H$  are not incentivized to deviate from the strategy of attacking in the separating equilibrium.

**Proposition 1:** When dovish and hawkish diasporas are pessimistic about negotiations, the separating PBE in pure strategies are:<sup>70</sup>

$$\text{Separating} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Case 1 : } \hat{x}_H > \hat{x}_D : \quad \sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate}\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack}\}; \sigma_G = \{\text{ignore}\} \\ \quad \sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, reject}\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, reject}\}; \sigma_G = \{x^* = 0\} \\ \quad \sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, accept}\}; \sigma_G = \{x^* = \hat{x}_D\} \\ \text{Case 2 : } \hat{x}_H > \hat{x}_D : \quad \sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate}\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack}\}; \sigma_G = \{\text{ignore}\} \\ \quad \sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, reject}\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, reject}\}; \sigma_G = \{x^* = 0\} \\ \quad \sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, reject}\}; \sigma_G = \{x^* = \hat{x}_D\} \end{array} \right.$$

<sup>70</sup>In the separating equilibria, the dovish militants negotiate, but the hawkish militants attack. The homeland government may ignore, offer nothing, or offer concessions to the dovish militants, who can reject or accept them.

**Proof:** See Appendix B.

### *Pooling Equilibrium*

Consider the case in which both  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic about the outcome of negotiations.<sup>71</sup> In Case 1, when  $D_H$  requires more concessions than  $D_D$ , no pooling equilibrium exists because  $M_H$  are incentivized to deviate from negotiate to attack, regardless of  $G$ 's decision. If  $G$  ignores  $M_H$ 's attempt to negotiate,  $D_H$  punishes  $M_H$  for not conforming to  $D_H$ 's preferred strategy of attacking by refusing to send aid, which decreases  $M_H$ 's utility to  $1-p-C_M$ . If  $G$  offers some level of concessions, the rejection of this deal also fails to activate  $D_H$  support. The minimum level of concessions  $G$  can offer, which  $M_D$  and  $M_H$  should rationally accept ( $x^*=1-p-C_M$ ), is not enough to satisfy  $D_H$ 's reservation price and credibly signal strength to  $G$ . Thus,  $M_H$  prefer to attack and trigger  $D_H$  aid than to negotiate and be ignored or offered too few concessions by  $G$  ( $1-\theta p-C_M > 1-p-C_M$ ).

In Case 2, when  $D_D$  expects more in concessions from  $G$  than  $D_H$ , a pooling equilibrium in which  $M_D$  and  $M_H$  negotiate, exists.  $G$ 's observation of  $M$ 's signal of an interest in negotiations does not credibly reveal  $M$ 's type. Because of this incomplete information,  $G$  is uncertain about whether to ignore  $M$  or offer some level of concessions.  $G$  prefers to make a deal with  $M$  that sincerely want to resolve the conflict, but to avoid negotiations with  $M$  that are not negotiating in good faith.

After observing  $M$  attempt to negotiate,  $G$  may ignore  $M$ , offer nothing, or make some concessions to  $M$ . These concessions may be lower ( $x^*=1-p-C_M$ ) or higher ( $x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$ ).  $G$ 's decision to offer fewer concessions dominates the decisions to ignore and offer nothing, so these do not represent equilibrium strategies for  $G$ .  $G$  offers higher concessions ( $x^*=x_D=1-p-C_M$ ) when  $G$  is weaker ( $p < \hat{p}$ ).<sup>72</sup>  $M_D$  accept these concessions because this deal meets  $D_D$ 's reservation price and represents a higher payoff than deviating to attack ( $x_D > 1-p-C_M$ ).

After signaling an intent to negotiate and receiving  $G$ 's offer ( $x^*=x_D$ ),  $M_H$  can accept

---

<sup>71</sup>No equilibria in which  $M_D$  and  $M_H$  attack exist because  $M_D$  have a dominant strategy to negotiate.

<sup>72</sup>Note that, in Case 2,  $D_D$  requires more concessions than  $D_H$ , so  $x_D > x_H$ . Additionally, see Appendix B for the derivation of  $\hat{p}$ . Finally, in terms of beliefs,  $G$  prefers to offer  $x_D$  when  $G$  is more certain that  $D$  is dovish ( $\mu_D > \hat{\mu}_D$ ).

or reject G's deal. When  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic and  $D_D$  expects more from concessions than  $D_H$ , G's equilibrium offer ( $x^*=x_D$ ) exceeds  $D_H$ 's reservation price ( $x_D > x_H$ ). By rejecting G's generous offer, defined as concessions higher than  $D_H$ 's reservation price,  $M_H$  signal strength and activate  $D_H$ 's support.  $M_H$ 's strategy to attack does not represent a profitable deviation, so  $M_H$ 's decision to negotiate and reject G's offer represents an equilibrium strategy.

**Proposition 2:** When both the dovish and hawkish diasporas are pessimistic about negotiations and the dovish diaspora expects more concessions than the hawkish diaspora, the pooling PBE in pure strategies is:<sup>73</sup>

$$Pooling \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Case 2 : } x_D > x_H : \sigma_{M_D} = \{negotiate, accept\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{negotiate, reject\}; \sigma_G = \{x = X_D^* = x_D \\ \text{when } \mu_D > \hat{\mu}_D \} \end{array} \right.$$

**Proof:** See Appendix B.

### ***Optimistic Diasporas: Case 3***

#### ***Separating Equilibrium***

Consider the case in which both  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are optimistic about the outcome of negotiations and  $D_H$  requires more concessions than  $D_D$ , and  $M_D$  negotiate while  $M_H$  attack.<sup>74</sup> Like in the separating equilibria in Cases 1 and 2, G knows that only  $M_D$  signal an interest in negotiations in the separating equilibrium in Case 3. After observing  $M_D$ 's signal of an inclination to negotiate, G can ignore or offer some level of concessions, ranging from nothing to a deal that satisfies  $M_D$  (and their  $D_D$  sponsors). G's strategy to offer concessions acceptable to  $M_D$  dominates the strategies to ignore and offer no concessions. G therefore offers a satisfactory deal ( $x^*=x_D=1-\theta p-C_M$ ) to  $M_D$  in equilibrium. If  $M_D$  reject this generous offer,  $D_D$  punishes by removing aid and decrease  $M_D$ 's utility to  $1-p-C_M$ . Therefore,  $M_D$  accept G's offer, which satisfies the participating  $D_D$ , in equilibrium.  $M_D$  are not incentivized to deviate to attack since  $D_D$  refuses to support  $M_D$  that do not at least attempt to negotiate.

---

<sup>73</sup>In the pooling equilibrium, both dovish and hawkish militants negotiate. The homeland government offers concessions that satisfy the dovish militants, who accept. The hawkish militants reject this offer.

<sup>74</sup>No separating equilibria exist when  $M_D$  attack and  $M_H$  negotiate because  $M_D$  have a dominant strategy to negotiate, regardless of the level of concessions G offers.

In the separating equilibrium,  $M_H$  attack rather than deviate to negotiate, even if  $G$  offers high concessions ( $x^*=1-p-C_M$ ). When  $D_H$  is optimistic about negotiations and requires more concessions than  $D_D$ ,  $G$ 's maximum offer is less than the level of concessions  $D_H$  requires to be satisfied by negotiations ( $\hat{x}_H > 1-\theta p-C_M$ ). Even if  $M_H$  reject  $G$ 's maximum offer ( $x=1-\theta p-C_M$ ),  $D_H$  does not believe that  $M_H$ 's rejection of  $G$ 's concessions credibly signals  $M_H$ 's strength or resolve to  $G$ . Therefore,  $D_H$  punishes  $M_H$  by revoking aid, reducing  $M_H$ 's utility to  $1-p-C_M$ . To avoid losing support,  $M_H$  do not deviate from attack to negotiate.

When the government offers a generous deal ( $x=\hat{x}_D$ ),  $M_D$  accept the concessions.  $M_D$  cannot obtain a higher utility by attacking because  $D_D$  punishes militants that fail to attempt to negotiate by removing aid.<sup>75</sup> When  $G$  offers concessions that satisfy  $D_D$  ( $x=\hat{x}_D$ ),  $M_H$  prefer to attack rather than attempt to negotiate. In the highest interval (in which Case 3 occurs),  $G$ 's offer is less than  $D_D$ 's reservation price ( $\hat{x}_D < \hat{x}_H$ ).  $D_H$  does not believe that this offer is high enough to, through rejection, credibly signal strength to  $G$ . Therefore,  $D_H$  punishes  $M$  by removing aid. To avoid losing support from  $D_H$ ,  $M_H$  attack instead of engaging in negotiations.

**Proposition 3:** When both the dovish and hawkish diasporas are optimistic regarding the outcome of negotiations, the separating PBE in pure strategies is:<sup>76</sup>

$$Separating \left\{ \begin{array}{l} Case\ 3 : \hat{x}_H > \hat{x}_D : \quad \sigma_{M_D} = \{negotiate, accept\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{attack, accept\}; \\ \sigma_G = \{x = X_D^* = \hat{x}_D\} \end{array} \right.$$

**Proof:** See Appendix B.

### *Pooling Equilibrium*

Consider the case in which  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are optimistic about negotiations and  $D_H$  requires more concessions than  $D_D$ . A pooling equilibrium exists when  $M_D$  and  $M_H$

---

<sup>75</sup> $M_D$ 's utility from accepting  $G$ 's offer,  $\hat{x}_D$ , exceeds the  $M_D$ 's payoff from attacking,  $1-p-C_M$ .

<sup>76</sup>In the separating equilibria, the dovish militants negotiate while the hawkish militants attack. The government offers concessions that satisfy the dovish militants, who accept.

negotiate.<sup>77</sup> In the pooling equilibrium, M's signal of an interest in negotiations does not allow for G to update its beliefs on D's type. Under uncertainty, G must decide whether to ignore M's signal of an inclination to negotiate or offer some level of concessions to M. These concessions may range from 0 to a lower offer  $(1-p-C_M)$  to a higher offer  $(1-\theta p-C_M)$ . G's strategy to offer the higher level of concessions ( $x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$ ) dominates ignore and offer nothing, so these are not equilibrium strategies. G offers higher concessions when G is weaker ( $p < p^*$ ).<sup>78</sup>

After signaling an interest in negotiations,  $M_D$  accept the higher concessions from G. This deal meets  $D_D$ 's reservation price ( $x^*=x_D=1-\theta p-C_M$ ).  $M_D$  do not deviate from negotiate to attack because  $D_H$  will punish  $M_D$  for not trying to negotiate, which is associated with a lower payoff of  $1-p-C_M$ .

$M_H$  can accept or reject G's equilibrium offer ( $x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$ ) after signaling to G an interest in negotiations. When  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are optimistic and  $D_H$  requires more concessions than  $D_D$ , G's equilibrium offer is lower than  $D_H$ 's reservation price ( $\hat{x}_H > x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$ ). Therefore,  $M_H$  cannot reject G's deal to credibly signal strength to G and activate  $D_H$ 's aid. Rather than rejecting G's offer and losing  $D_H$ 's support, which decreases  $M_H$ 's utility to  $1-p-C_M$ ,  $M_H$  accept G's offer.  $M_H$ 's decision to attack does not represent a profitable deviation ( $1-\theta p-C_M=1-\theta p-C_M$ ) from the decision to negotiate and accept G's deal.

**Proposition 4:** When both the dovish and hawkish diasporas are optimistic about the outcome of negotiations, the pooling PBE in pure strategies is:<sup>79</sup>

$$Pooling \left\{ \begin{array}{l} Case\ 3 : \hat{x}_H > \hat{x}_D : \quad \sigma_{M_D} = \{negotiate, accept\}; \sigma_{M_H} = \{negotiate, accept\}; \\ \sigma_G = \{x = X_D * \text{ when } \mu_D \geq \mu_D^*\} \end{array} \right.$$

---

<sup>77</sup>No pooling equilibria exist in which both  $M_D$  and  $M_H$  attack because  $M_D$  have a dominant strategy to negotiate.

<sup>78</sup>For derivation of  $p^*$ , see Appendix B. Additionally, in terms of beliefs, G offers ( $x^*=x_D=1-\theta p-C_M$ ) when G is more certain that D is dovish ( $\mu_D > \mu_D^*$ ).


<sup>79</sup>Both dovish and hawkish militants negotiate and accept the government's high offer.

**Proof:** See Appendix B.

## Theoretical Implications

In this section, I discuss the theoretical innovations of my formal model. My model makes a novel contribution to the bargaining literature by identifying the conditions under which a rational actor might reject a negotiated settlement that appears to offer a utility equal to or greater than the utility the actor would gain from conflict. Bargaining theorists typically assume that rational actors accept any deal that provides them with a utility at least as high as what they expect to gain from fighting to avoid the costs associated with conflict (Fearon, 1995). However, the militants' equilibrium strategy of rejecting the government's offer in Case 2, which is displayed in Figure 11, suggests conditions under we might find an exception to this assumption.

Fig. 11: Case 2 Continuum



In Case 2,  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic about the outcome of negotiations between homeland conflict actors and  $D_D$  require more concessions than  $D_H$  ( $\hat{x}_D > \hat{x}_H$ ). Here, a pooling equilibrium exists in which both  $M_D$  and  $M_H$  negotiate. While  $M_D$  then accept G's offer of concessions,  $M_H$  enter into negotiations but subsequently reject G's offer, which exceeds  $D_H$ 's reservation price. Although  $M_H$ 's strategy to reject seems counterintuitive, consider the effect of  $D_H$ 's decision on  $M_H$ 's utility, which provides logic for  $M_H$ 's choice.

In this model, D is a decision maker that rewards obedient homeland M by sending support to improve their capacity in conflict. Alternatively, D punishes M that contradict D's preferences, which differ by diaspora type, by removing aid. D's choice to provide aid to M (or not) influences M's and G's chance of winning the homeland conflict.  $D_H$  prefers the militants fight, rather than negotiate, with G. If  $M_H$  negotiate,  $D_H$  punishes  $M_H$  for disobeying unless the negotiations collapse because  $M_H$  reject G's generous offer to signal strength and resolve in conflict. If negotiations fail due to  $M_H$ 's rejection,  $D_H$  reward  $M_H$  by sending aid. When the diasporas are pessimistic about the outcome of negotiations and  $D_D$  requires more concessions than  $D_H$ ,  $M_D$  have an opportunity to activate  $D_H$ 's aid through




rejection of G's generous deal. If G makes such high concessions to  $M_H$ , then  $M_H$  can reject this offer to signal strength and incentivize  $D_H$  to reward by sending aid, which produces a higher payoff for  $M_H$  than accepting G's offer ( $1-\theta p-C_M > \hat{x}_D$ ).

This equilibrium expands on previous bargaining models by identifying the conditions under which the assumption that rational actors accept any deal that is at least as beneficial as conflict may be invalid. This innovation is interesting to scholars of international conflict because I explain why some negotiations, specifically those in which militants are supported by hawkish diasporas, fail. In these cases, militants may endeavor to signal strength to foreign diaspora sponsors rather than accept an offer of concessions, which might terminate the conflict, from the homeland government.

## Empirical Predictions

From my model, I also derive empirical predictions about the probability that negotiations to resolve civil conflict will occur. The equilibria of my model suggest that the probability of negotiations is a function of D's attitudes and G's capacity in conflict. To make empirical predictions, I add another assumption regarding D's attitudes. Theoretically,  $D_D$  may require more from concessions than  $D_H$ , which produces both pooling and separating equilibria when D are pessimistic about negotiations. For empirical predications, however, I assume that  $D_H$  require more concessions than  $D_D$ . This more accurately reflects reality as hawks are more likely to require higher concessions from negotiations than doves to be satisfied. Therefore, I restrict the equilibria under consideration for empirical predictions to those in which  $D_H$ 's reservation price exceeds  $D_D$ 's. This limits the cases to those in which D are pessimistic (Case 1) and optimistic (Case 3), which are displayed in Figure 12, and  $D_H$  require more concessions than  $D_D$  ( $\hat{x}_H > \hat{x}_D$ ).

Fig. 12: Cases Surviving Both Assumptions



When  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic and  $D_H$  requires more concessions than  $D_D$ , only a

separating equilibrium, in which  $M_H$  attack and  $M_D$  negotiate, exists.  $M_H$ , in anticipation that  $G$  will not make enough concessions to activate  $D_H$  aid by rejection, prefer to attack rather than attempt to negotiate. Thus, conflict becomes more likely since  $M_H$  prefer to fight than even attempt to enter into negotiations.

When  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are optimistic about negotiations and  $D_H$  is more demanding than  $D_D$ , my model predicts both conflict and the opportunity for its resolution. A separating equilibrium occurs here when  $M_D$  negotiate and accept  $G$ 's offer, but  $M_H$  fight without attempting to negotiate. In the pooling equilibrium when both  $M_D$  and  $M_H$  negotiate, however, peace may also arise when  $G$  is weak and offers a high level of concessions.  $M_D$  accept  $G$ 's high offer, which satisfies  $D_D$ 's reservation price. When  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are optimistic and  $D_H$  require more concessions than  $D_D$  ( $\hat{x}_H > \hat{x}_D$ ),  $M_H$ 's rejection of  $G$ 's high offer is still not high enough to credibly signal strength to  $G$  in a manner that activates  $D_H$ 's aid. Thus, the alternative to  $M_H$ 's acceptance of  $G$ 's generous offer ( $x^* = 1 - \theta p - C_M$ ) is fighting without diaspora aid, which produces a utility of  $1 - p - C_M$ .  $M_H$  rationally choose the higher payoff associated with accepting  $G$ 's deal ( $1 - \theta p - C_M > 1 - p - C_M$ ).<sup>80</sup> This can be formalized as:

**$H_1$ :** When diasporas are optimistic about the outcome of negotiations, a peaceful resolution to the civil conflict in the homeland is more likely.

## **Data and Methods**

### ***Data***

I test the hypothesis derived from my model using a new dataset that includes original data measuring diaspora attitudes and cooperation between conflict actors in the diasporas' homeland. To gain leverage on my research question, I opt to focus the quantitative analysis on a single diaspora interacting with conflict actors in the diaspora's homeland. Specifically, I consider the Palestinian American diaspora's influence on negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority and its constituent actors. This case provides an

---

<sup>80</sup> A separating equilibrium may also occur when diasporas are optimistic, however, this is the only case in which the potential exists for both  $M_D$  and  $M_H$  to negotiate and accept  $G$ 's offer. Thus, the probability of negotiations is highest when both  $D_H$  and  $D_D$  are optimistic. I assume that  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are normally distributed, so only half of the theoretical distribution ( $M_D$ ) negotiate and accept when  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are pessimistic. Instead, both  $M_D$  and  $M_H$  (the entire distribution) negotiate and accept when both  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are optimistic. Thus, the probability of peace is highest in the pooling equilibrium in Case 3.

appropriate context in which to evaluate the empirical validity of my game because the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians have been ongoing since 1991 and a salient diaspora connected to the militants exists. While terminology regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict actors is contentious, I will describe the scenario in the language used in my formal model. In this case, the Israeli state represents the homeland government, the Palestinian Authority represents the militants that oppose the homeland government, the Palestinian diaspora residing in the U.S. represents the diaspora sponsors, and interactions between these actors from February 2003 to May 2015 represent the political phenomena of interest.

Data regarding diasporas are limited, which makes empirical evaluation, both qualitative and quantitative, difficult (Sheffer, 2003). However, I use originally collected data on Palestinian American diaspora members' attitudes toward the conflict in their homeland to evaluate the empirical implication of my formal model. Specifically, I collect and code press releases made by the American Task Force on Palestine (ATFP). The ATFP is an American nonprofit organization that aims to inform Americans and the U.S. Government regarding state-building, institutions improvement, and economic development in the fledgling Palestinian state and serve as a channel through which Palestinian diaspora members can voice their opinions (*The American Task Force on Palestine*, 2017). Furthermore, the ATFP perceives that Palestinian statehood, along with security and peace for neighboring Israel, is central to American national interests and undertakes efforts to improve American-Palestinian relations (*The American Task Force on Palestine*, 2017).

To analyze the empirical validity of my hypothesis that the probability of peaceful resolution to conflict between Israelis and Palestinians should increase as the Palestinian diaspora becomes more optimistic, I consider peace-oriented interactions between relevant actors in this case. I broadly construe peace- and negotiations-related interactions as cooperative efforts intended to normalize relations between Israel and Palestine. These actors include formal Israeli government actors, the Palestinian Authority (including PLO and Fatah representatives), and the Palestinian diaspora in the U.S. Table 13 describes key variables of

interest for three observations from my dataset, in which little problematic correlation exists.<sup>81</sup>

*Table 13: Major Variables of Interest in Dataset*

<b>Date</b>	<b>Coop.</b>	<b>Att. Diff.</b>	<b>Isr. PM</b>	<b>Hamas</b>	<b>Isr. Op.</b>	<b>Iraq Civ. Fatalities</b>	<b>U.S. Stock</b>
May 2005	6	1	1	0	0	1396	66.48
Jan. 2009	0	-5	0	1	1	372	51.38
Feb. 2015	2	1	1	1	0	1625	102.78

### *Dependent Variable*

To gather data on the dependent variable in this analysis, which is negotiations that produce a durable peace, I identify peace-oriented activities between relevant actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I use the Computational Event Data System (CEDS) Levant dataset, which includes event data that are machine coded from Reuters news reports (Yilmaz, Schrodt and Gerner, 2008). These data provide information on the actors and character of events, for example “consulting,” “engaging in negotiation,” or “meeting at a third location” between actors such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Israeli government (Schrodt, 2012). From these data, I identify the number of cooperation-oriented interactions between relevant Israeli and Palestinian actors from February 2003 to May 2015, a time period for which I also have data on the independent variable, which is diaspora attitudes regarding negotiations.<sup>82</sup> Figure 13 illustrates the frequency of incidents of cooperation over the time period for which I have data from February 2003 to May 2015, and the summary statistics for the dependent variable are available in Table 42 in Appendix B.


### *Independent Variable*

As previously mentioned, data on diasporas are relatively scarce, so my focus on the Palestinian case is also partially motivated by the existence of data for my independent variable of diaspora attitudes. Some survey data illustrative of Palestinian diaspora members’ attitudes toward negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians exist. These data, however, are relatively time limited and so not conducive to quantitative analysis (*Arab Barometer*, 2013; *Results of PSR Refugees’ Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Lebanon on*

<sup>81</sup>I further evaluate correlation in my dataset when discussing robustness tests in the Analysis section.

<sup>82</sup>Tables 40 and 41 in Appendix B display complete lists of included actors and actions from the CEDS data.

Fig. 13: Frequency of Cooperation between Homeland Conflict Actors



*Refugees' Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement*, 2003).


Thus, I obtain data on diaspora attitudes by collecting and coding ATFP's press releases (*ATFP: In Media*, 2017). Specifically, I gather the nearly 1000 press releases from January 2003 to April 2015 and group these into monthly time windows. For each of the 960 press releases published during this 148 month period, I identify the attitude of the Palestinian diaspora, who created and made public these press releases. I characterize a press release as "optimistic," "pessimistic," or "Not Applicable."<sup>83</sup> Additionally, I lag the independent variable data on negotiations by one month to allow time for an effect on incidence of negotiations to result from variation in diaspora attitudes. Figure 14 displays the distribution of diaspora attitudes in the ATFP press releases from January 2003 to April 2015.

Diasporas' attitudes may vary due to the activation of "collective memory," social interactions in the host state, or international events. First, members may become more

---

<sup>83</sup>I exclude "Not Applicable" (NA) press releases from my analysis since they are often related to topics that are unrelated to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, such as the annual ATFP Gala. In total, I classify 450 press releases as NA.

Fig. 14: Frequency of Types of ATFP Press Releases



optimistic regarding the homeland when religious or cultural events trigger diaspora-wide nostalgia for the homeland (Safran, 1991). Second, when diasporas reside in heterogeneous host states, cooperative interactions between diverse religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups incentivize diasporas' hopefulness about similar potential cooperation in their homeland. Third, political phenomena between international actors unrelated to the diaspora or its homeland may occur that encourage diasporas regarding contentious politics in their homelands.<sup>84</sup>

I code these press releases based on the language and tone conveyed by ATFP through the press release. Optimistic press releases suggest the Palestinian diaspora members are hopeful about the interactions in their homeland producing a worthwhile peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Examples of phrases included in optimistic press releases are "peace has received public support in one form or another of the United States, the United Nations, the Arab League, and the majority of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples" (*America Must*

<sup>84</sup>For example, the end of the apartheid policy in South Africa may have positively affected diaspora members' interest in negotiating a solution to their homeland conflict.

*Restore its Middle East Credibility*, 2003); “agreement also demonstrates to the Israeli and Palestinian people that there is still hope for a peaceful settlement” (*ATFP Co-Hosts Abed Rabbo-Beilin Meeting with Arab and Jewish American Leaders at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2003); and “I think it sent a clear signal about the two-state solution. It’s non-negotiable. It has now become a pillar of U.S. policy” (*Obama strong on Palestinian state*, 2003).

Pessimistic press releases imply that the Palestinian American diaspora believes that Israeli-Palestinian interactions will produce suboptimal deals for Palestinians or are unlikely to produce a durable peace. Additionally, pessimistic press releases characterize homeland interactions between relevant actors as conflictive and likely to undermine the possibility of cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. Examples of phrases found in press releases that I coded as pessimistic include “As a massive land grab seems more within reach, it has encouraged extremists while the voices of peace grow increasingly faint and dispirited” (*Time for better decisions to be made on Palestine-Israel*, 2003); “low expectations are in order (regarding the 2007 Annapolis Summit)” (*The Annapolis Summit*, 2007); and “In my view, it seals the fact that there will be no conflict-ending deal by the end of this year” (*Olmert departure makes Mideast peace more elusive*, 2008).

To operationalize my independent variable, I create a variable that takes into account the degree of optimism and pessimism that the Palestinian American diaspora expresses in a given month through press releases. Specifically, I create a variable that measures the difference between the optimistic and pessimistic press releases published within one month. Figure 15 displays the distribution of the independent variable, and Table 42 displays the summary statistics associated with this variable in Appendix B.<sup>85</sup>


### *Control Variables*

I include several control variables on which to condition my analysis. First, I include a variable that indicates whether the state of Israel is formally engaged in a ground invasion of the Palestinian territories, specifically the Gaza Strip. I positively code months in which Israel

---

<sup>85</sup> Additionally, I display the number of optimistic and pessimistic ATFP articles over time in Figure 36 in Appendix B.

Fig. 15: Frequency of Attitudes Identified by ATFP Press Releases




formally launched a military operation, including air strikes and ground invasion, into the Gaza Strip. I collect these data from official reports by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Operation Cast Lead: Israel strikes back against Hamas terror in Gaza*, 2009; *Operation Protective Edge: The facts*, 2014) and the Israel Defense Forces (*Operation Pillar of Defense* (2012), 2012). Such Israeli military activities include Operation Cast Lead, from December 2008 to January 2009, Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012, and Operation Protective Edge for two months from July to August 2014. I condition my analysis on the presence of an Israeli military operation because an alternative explanation for cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians might be the lack of militarized incursions by the Israeli state into Palestinian territory. As indicated in Figure 16, the majority of months in my dataset do not include Israeli military actions into Gaza. I expect this variable to be inversely related to cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

Second, I include a variable that indicates whether the Israeli Prime Minister belongs to the Likud party. I positively code this variable if the Israeli PM belongs to the Likud (*List of prime ministers of Israel*, 2018). The Likud party is the original conservative party in Israel,



Fig. 16: Frequency of Israeli Militarized Operations into Palestinian Territory




supporting the nationalistic principle of the Jewish people's right to Eretz Israel, supporting the settlement movement, and allying with other right-wing and religious parties in Israel (*Guide to Israel's political parties*, 2013). While the Likud party has no official stance on the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, current Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, of the Likud party, voiced his opposition to Palestinian statehood during his 2015 election campaign (Lazaroff, 2015; Rudoren, 2015). Therefore, I include this variable because another explanation for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation is the presence of a liberal Prime Minister, from, for example, the Zionist Union or Meretz parties, that is more likely to support the two state solution. As demonstrated by Figure 17, the majority of months include an Israeli Prime Minister who is a member of the Likud party.<sup>86</sup> I expect the presence of a Likud Prime Minister to be inversely correlated with cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

Third, I include a variable that identifies whether the militant group Hamas controls the Gaza Strip. I positively code this variable if Hamas is in power during the month of

<sup>86</sup>Kadima, the centrist left party, was in control of the Israeli Knesset from November of 2005 to May of 2006.


Fig. 17: Distribution of Political Party of Israeli Prime Minister



observation (*Middle East: Gaza Strip*, 2018). Hamas obtained the majority of seats in the Palestinian Parliament in 2006 but failed to form a functional unity government with Fatah. Following this electoral victory and the subsequent discord, Hamas seized political and military control of the Gaza Strip in June of 2007 (*Middle East: Gaza Strip*, 2018). While Hamas's 1988 charter calls for the destruction of the state of Israel, the group's most recent policy document has been updated to reflect a more moderate stance including accepting the 1967 borders between Israel and Palestine but still refusing the legitimacy of the Israeli state (Qiblawi, Dewan and Register, 2017). I include this control variable due to the possibility that the absence of Hamas in Palestinian leadership facilitates Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. Figure 18 demonstrates that, during the time span included in my dataset, Hamas was most frequently the actor in control of the Gaza Strip. I expect the presence of Hamas in Gaza leadership to be inversely correlated to cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians as the months included in my dataset occur prior to the (minor) moderation of Hamas' official principles.

Fourth, I include a measure of the number of civilians killed in Iraq in a given month,

Fig. 18: Distribution of Leadership in Gaza Strip



which I gather from publicly available data presented by the Iraq Body Count project, which records conflict-related deaths following the 2003 U.S. intervention into Iraq (*Documented civilian deaths from violence*, 2018). Table 14 provides the summary statistics associated with this continuous control variable. Political psychologists suggest that increased exposure to violence and stress incentivizes more negative and aggressive inter-group interactions (Zeitsoff, 2014). Thus, I include this variable to control for the possibility that a spurious third variable, specifically the violence associated with the conflict in Iraq, may explain the Palestinian American diaspora's attitudes toward a negotiated resolution in the homeland, the degree of cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians, and the proposed relationship between these two variables. I expect the number of civilians killed in Iraq to be inversely related to cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian actors.

Fifth, I include a variable that measures the monthly total share prices for all shares in the U.S. (*Total Share Prices for All Shares for the United States*, 2018). Economic downturns exacerbate citizens' negative sentiments toward outgroups and incentivize increasingly antagonistic policies (Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013). Therefore, I include American

stock prices to account for the possibility that economic health in the U.S. may affect the Palestinian American diaspora members, its attitudes toward and interactions with homeland conflict actors, and cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian actors. I expect this variable to be directly related to my response variable measuring cooperation in the diaspora's homeland since economic security in diaspora's host state is likely to improve attitudes toward the potential for peace in the diaspora's homeland. Table 14 provides the summary statistics associated with monthly U.S. stock prices.

*Table 14: Summary Statistics of Continuous Control Variables*

	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
Iraq Civilian Fatalities	2.00	1087.50	846.00	879.50	4088.00
U.S. Stock Price	44.20	74.70	74.80	15.10	103.80

## ***Methods***

I use a negative binomial regression to test the validity of my hypothesis that optimism among diaspora members living abroad is directly related to negotiated resolutions to conflict in diasporas' homelands. I use a negative binomial model, rather than a Poisson, due to the presence of overdispersion in my data, which includes a dependent variable that is a count of the number of peace-, negotiations-, or cooperation-oriented events between Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>87</sup> Overdispersion is problematic because its presence suggests that the assumptions of the Poisson distribution are violated, meaning the standard errors will be incorrect. Thus, I opt for a negative binomial regression in this analysis, which can be

---

<sup>87</sup>I also provide the results of a Poisson regression in Table 43, which are substantively similar to those of the negative binomial, to test my hypothesis in Appendix B.

specified as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cooperative Interactions}_{mgt} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Attitude Difference}_{dst} + \beta_2 \text{Israeli PM Party}_{gt} + \\ & \beta_3 \text{ Hamas Leadership in Gaza}_t + \beta_4 \text{Israeli Military Operation}_{gt} + \\ & + \beta_5 \text{Iraq Civilian Fatalities}_t + \beta_6 \text{U.S. Stock Price}_{st} + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

where  $m$  = *homeland militants*

$g$  = *homeland government*

$t$  = *month*

$d$  = *diaspora*

$s$  = *host state*

## Analysis

As discussed previously, I employ negative binomial models to test my hypothesis that optimism among diasporas regarding the quality of the deal produced by negotiations increases the probability of peaceful resolution between homeland conflict actors. Table 15 displays the results of this test, which broadly supports the implication of my formal model. First, I report the notable results of this negative binomial model, identified as the primary model. The primary independent variable of interest (“Difference in Attitudes”) identifies the degree of optimism that Palestinian diaspora members have regarding the deal produced by negotiations. This variable is positively and statistically significantly related to my dependent variable of number of Israeli-Palestinian interactions concerning negotiated resolution and so behaves according to my theoretical framework.<sup>88</sup>

I also run these models with alternate U.S.-centric control variables, including the president’s party, unemployment levels, gas prices, and military casualties in Iraq, as well as one additional Israel-oriented control variable, which is Jewish settlement population. The results of these additional models are displayed in Table 44 in Appendix B, and the

---

<sup>88</sup>To account for possible endogeneity between the independent and dependent variables, I include a robustness test in which I replaced the difference in attitudes variable with the count of NA press releases. When I substitute the NA count as the independent variable in the primary model, there is no statistically significant relationship with cooperation in the homeland.

Table 15: Negative Binomial Regression Results

	Primary Model
(Intercept)	1.29** (0.61)
Difference in Attitudes	0.29*** (0.04)
Israeli Operation	-0.57 (0.82)
Israeli Prime Minister Party	-0.62** (0.24)
Hamas Control in Gaza Strip	-1.30*** (0.27)
Civilian Fatalities in Iraq	0.00** (0.00)
U.S. Stock Price	-0.00 (0.01)
$\theta$	1.97* (0.51)
$N$	148
AIC	440.72
BIC	536.63
$\log L$	-188.36

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$

substantive interpretation remains the same. Model 2 includes a control variable for the political party of the U.S. president, which might influence whether Palestinian American diaspora members are optimistic about a negotiated resolution in their homelands and the degree of cooperation in which Israeli and Palestinian actors are willing to engage (*The 44 Presidents of the United States who came before Donald Trump*, 2017). I also include two alternate substitutes for U.S. stock prices, which is included in the primary model to measure economic health in the diaspora's host state. First, Model 3 substitutes a variable measuring monthly U.S. unemployment levels for U.S. stock prices (*Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey*, 2018). Model 4 substitutes a variable measuring monthly U.S. gas prices levels for U.S. stock prices (*Monthly Retail Gasoline and Diesel Prices*, 2018). Model 5 substitutes a variable measuring monthly U.S. military casualties in Iraq for civilian fatalities in Iraq, which measures tolerance to conflict-related violence in the U.S. (*Iraq*

*Fatalities*, 2018). Model 6 includes a control variable for the population of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territories, which might influence both Palestinian Americans' attitudes toward deals produced by negotiations and the potential for cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians (*Number of Settlers by Year*, 2017).

The control variables behave as expected in my primary model, the results of which are displayed in Table 15. First, the indicator for Israeli military operations into Palestinian territories is negatively, but not statistically significantly, associated with cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>89</sup> Second, the political party of the Israeli prime minister is inversely and statistically significantly related to peaceful interactions between homeland conflict actors. Third, Hamas's position in leadership in the Gaza Strip is inversely and statistically associated with negotiations-related interactions between Israeli and Palestinian actors. Fourth, the monthly number of civilians killed in Iraq is negatively and statistically significantly related to cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian representatives. Finally, monthly U.S. stock prices is negatively, but not statistically significantly, associated with incidents related to negotiated resolution between Israelis and Palestinians. I illustrate the results of this negative binomial regression by plotting the coefficients associated with the primary model (Model 1) in Figure 19.<sup>90</sup>

I employ negative binomial regression, the results of which cannot be interpreted directly. Therefore, I also present the expected counts of cooperative interactions associated with the primary model in my analysis in Figure 20. The key independent variable in my model, which measures the degree of optimism that the Palestinian American diaspora has regarding the outcome of negotiations in the homeland, achieves statistical significance. Therefore, I interpret the substantive implications of my analysis by considering the associated expected counts.


Figure 20 displays the effect of increasing levels of diaspora optimism on the

---

<sup>89</sup>Israeli military operations occurred when Israel invaded the Gaza Strip; however, negotiations and cooperation continued between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Israel.

<sup>90</sup>In this plot, the bars denote 0.05 (inner) and 0.95 (outer) confidence intervals. Furthermore, the coefficients in red are statistically significantly related to cooperation in the homeland, but those in blue are not.

Fig. 19: Negative Binomial Coefficient Estimates




predicted number of peace-, negotiations-, or cooperation-oriented interactions between Israelis and Palestinians (in the primary model). The predicted count of cooperative incidents in the homeland, which is displayed on the y-axis, is bounded between 0 and 200.<sup>91</sup> The x-axis represents the degree of optimism of the Palestinian American diaspora regarding negotiations in their homeland, which is operationalized as the difference between optimistic and pessimistic press releases in one month. The low range of differences in attitudes represents when Palestinian Americans were more pessimistic, and the high range of differences indicates when the Palestinian diaspora in the U.S. was relatively optimistic regarding a deal produced by negotiations between Palestinian and Israeli conflict actors.

The degree of optimism that diasporas hold regarding negotiated resolution to conflicts in their homelands is the key empirical variable implied by my formal model. Specifically, I argue that, as diaspora become more optimistic, the cooperation-oriented interactions between conflict actors in diasporas' homelands increase. The expected counts associated with my

<sup>91</sup>While, theoretically, the number of cooperative interactions ranges from 0 to 200, the maximum value of this dependent variable in the observed data is 15.



Fig. 20: Expected Count of Cooperative Interactions



primary model provide empirical support for the implication of my formal model. In Figure 20, the blue and red lines represent the expected count of peace-oriented activities between Palestinian and Israeli representatives based on diaspora members' optimism. These point estimates are calculated by holding the majority of the control variables at their means (for continuous variables) and modes (for dichotomous variables). However, I allow the key independent variable, diaspora attitudes, to vary. Additionally, the blue line represents when the Israeli prime minister is a member of the centrist party Kadima, and the red line indicates when the Israeli prime minister belongs to the Likud.<sup>92</sup> The increasing slopes of these lines demonstrate that, as diasporas become optimistic, the expected number of cooperative interactions increase.

Table 16: Correlation between Independent and Control Variables

	Att. Diff.	Isr. Op.	Isr. PM	Hamas	Iraq Civ. Fatalities	U.S. Stock
Att. Diff	1	-0.097	-0.194	-0.097	0.296	0.113
Isr. Op.	-0.097	1	-0.051	0.110	0.030	0.025
Isr. PM	-0.194	-0.051	1	-0.226	-0.433	-0.152
Hamas	-0.097	0.110	-0.226	1	-0.040	0.522
Iraq Civ. Fatalities	0.296	0.030	-0.433	-0.040	1	0.357
U.S. Stock	0.113	0.025	-0.152	0.522	0.357	1

<sup>92</sup>The control variable determining these lines does not substantially alter the interpretation of these expected counts. For example, Figure 37 illustrates the expected counts associated with allowing the control variable Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip to vary.

Finally, I conduct diagnostic tests to evaluate the robustness of my model. First, Table 16 illustrates that little problematic correlation exists between my covariates.<sup>93</sup> In addition to considering possibly problematic correlation, displayed in Table 16, I calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) to evaluate the severity of issues relate to multicollinearity that might exist in my primary model. Rogerson advises that VIF levels remain below 5 (2001). As indicated by Table 17, the VIF levels do not exceed 5 for the independent or control variables in my primary model. Thus, a severe multicollinearity problem does not exist in this analysis.

*Table 17: Variance Inflation Factors*

	<b>Primary Model</b>
Difference in Attitudes	1.04
Israeli Operation	1.01
Israeli Prime Minister Party	1.22
Hamas Control in Gaza Strip	1.38
Civilian Fatalities in Iraq	1.18
U.S. Stock Price	1.36


Additionally, as previously mentioned, I also use a Poisson regression to evaluate my hypothesis since my dependent variable is a count. However, I ultimately use a negative binomial regression due to the presence of overdispersion in my data. The residual deviance associated with my Poisson regression in Table 43 is 240.87 on 141 degrees of freedom. Conventionally, the ratio between residual deviance and degrees of freedom is 1, but my ratio is 1.71, suggesting overdispersion is present. Moreover, I find a dispersion value of 1.89, again implying overdispersion.<sup>94</sup> Figure 21 displays plots that simulate new data from the fitted Poisson model and compare observed data to these simulated values. These plots suggest overdispersion is present since the residual versus predicted quantile lines should be straight and at y-values of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75. Thus, a negative binomial regression is the appropriate model to employ in this analysis.

---

<sup>93</sup>Moderate correlation exists between U.S. Stock and the presence of Hamas in the government of the Gaza Strip; however, this is not a strong relationship.

<sup>94</sup>I calculate this value using the `dispersiontest` function from the AER statistical package in R (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990, 1998, 2005).

Fig. 21: DHARMa Scaled Residual Plots



## Conclusion

In this section, I will discuss the substantive implications of this formal theory and quantitative analysis, possibilities for further scholarship, and relevant policy recommendations. My formal model predicts, and my statistical analysis provides evidence to support, the potential for optimistic diasporas to incentivize peaceful resolutions to conflicts in their homelands. This indicates that diasporas' attitudes toward negotiations, and influence on militants' capacity in conflict, affect conflict dynamics in their homelands.

Previous scholarship may have understated the role of transnational diaspora actors since these nonstate actors cannot offer the same degree or variety in types of support as state sponsors (Byman et al., 2001). I argue that diaspora communities constitute an important external actor in explaining the outcomes of civil wars. The formal model presented in this study improves upon past work by identifying the diaspora as a decision maker that can reward militants by providing aid or punish them by removing aid, which can influence the decisions made by both homeland conflict actors. The results of this analysis suggest that, contrary to some scholarship and concerns in the policy community, diasporas' optimism

regarding negotiation outcomes can increase the prospects for peace in diasporas' homelands. Specifically, when diasporas are more optimistic regarding the value and viability of the deal, we are more likely to see militants accept a deal from the homeland government and adhere to the terms of the deal. My quantitative analysis provides empirical evidence in favor of the implication of my formal model since increasing levels of optimism among the Palestinian American diaspora are associated with higher incidence of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian actors.

Future work concerning the role of diasporas in conflict will be improved by theoretical and methodological expansion. First, scholarship might expand on this research agenda by considering a preliminary issue in the role of diasporas in homeland conflicts. Specifically, future work should address why diasporas would be incentivized to participate in homeland conflicts, given that their benefits from engaging more fully in the host state probably outweigh the utility of maintaining homeland ties. Additionally, data regarding diasporas' attitudes over a longer time period would be helpful in further evaluation of the hypothesis derived from my formal model. Specifically, the capacity to measure Palestinian diaspora members' attitudes toward negotiations in the 1990s, especially during the Oslo Accords in 1993, would be useful in evaluating my theory. The addition of this data would likely provide more variation in my independent variable; if the trend I currently see holds, Palestinian diaspora members' expectations should be higher during the 1990s.

The findings of this analysis are informative to academics, by contributing to the broad debate on the effects of external support of militants engaged in civil conflict, and to policymakers, by providing knowledge of an increasingly relevant type of nonstate actor. While diasporas may lack the range that state supporters have, diasporas are nonetheless influential in outcomes of civil wars. Moreover, my analysis sheds light on current policy issues related to transnational aspects of substate conflicts, such as foreign fighters from European diaspora communities traveling to the Levant to join IS. The results of my analysis, which counter the conventional discourse on diaspora aid to militants, suggest that diasporas' involvement, regardless of their dovish or hawkish nature, may help homeland conflict actors reach negotiations when diaspora members are optimistic regarding the outcome of

negotiations. The substantive results, therefore, provide evidence in support of continuing diasporas' host states' policies to harness the peace-inducing potential of their diaspora communities and contribute to mediation efforts so that diasporas' perspectives on conflict are included in a manner that increases diasporas expectations regarding the utility of negotiations.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup>For example, see the U.S. State Department's Countering Violent Extremism initiative, which includes efforts to engage with youth and women, specifically, to prevent radicalization and recruitment among American immigrant populations.

## **CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS OF HAWKISH ATTITUDES AMONG DIASPORA MEMBERS**

“I am pro-violence. I think Castro should be overthrown by a revolution.” -Jorge Mas Canosa, founder of Cuban American National Foundation

### **Introduction**

Jorge Mas Canosa, a Cuban-born American, established the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), a nonprofit Cuban exile organization that aims to influence American policy toward the Cuban regime in a manner that brings about “positive change” through on the ground partners in Cuban civil society groups (*Cuban American National Foundation: About Us*, 2018). During an interview with the *Miami Herald*, Canosa defended the use of violence by Cuban opposition to the Castro regime and later admitted to participation in attempted assassinations of the Cuban dictator (Walsh, 2011). Canosa’s aggressive preferences regarding the political status quo in Cuba clearly motivated his efforts to violently remove Castro from power. However, the underlying cause of Canosa’s, and other diaspora members’, initial development of such hawkish preferences demands further explanation.

Some diaspora members may be dovish in nature, preferring that durable peace and economic development return to their homelands (Hammond and Ali, 2012; Koser, 2007; Cochrane, Baser and Swain, 2009). Hawkish diaspora members, conversely, hold violence-oriented preferences aimed at sustaining or exacerbating conflict in their homelands. Scholars currently lack a cohesive theoretical framework to account for the origins of diaspora preferences. Thus, the motivating question for this paper is: why do some diaspora members develop hawkish attitudes toward conflicts in their homelands?

I argue that moral foundations theory (MFT), a framework to study individual preferences from social psychology, can be used to understand diasporas’ sentiments toward contentious politics in their homelands. Specifically, I argue in favor of a novel configuration

of the moral foundations to account for diasporas' unique status as residents of a host state that nonetheless retain interest in the political dynamics of their homelands. Instead of the binding and individualizing morals identified by Haidt and his associates (Haidt, 2012, 2007; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva and Ditto, 2011; Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik and Ditto, 2012), I propose the moral foundations can be classified according to the social consequences they produce among individuals. Specifically, varying combinations of the moral foundations divergently affect society by either preserving groups' unique identities or homogenizing a national population. Diaspora members that highly value morals that promote individual group identity are more likely to develop hawkish attitudes toward homeland conflicts because of their intra-group emphasis and seclusion from the dominant population in the host state. Conversely, diaspora members who highly regard morals that force homogeneity within a state are less likely to develop hawkish attitudes due to their preference for equality and assimilation into the host state, as well as inclination to defer to established leadership in the host state.

In the next sections, I will address extant literature from political and social psychology on potential motivations of individual preferences for violence or aggression. Then, I will develop my moral foundations-based theory accounting for why some diaspora members become hawkish in their preferences on political outcomes in their homelands. I will test this argument using logistic regression on survey data from Palestinian diaspora members living in Jordan, which were collected from December 2012 to January 2013. Last, I will conclude by discussing the academic and policy implications of my analysis.

### **Microfoundations of Attitude Development**

Some scholarship in international relations addresses the formation of foreign policy preferences (Chittick, Billingsley and Travis, 1995; Gries, 2014; Holsti and Rosenau, 1996). This literature contributes insights concerning the effect of domestic politics on foreign policymaking, including the causal mechanisms underlying important phenomena in international relations, such as the democratic peace. Gaps remain in terms of accounting for why individuals develop certain policy preferences in the first place, as well as how an individual's status as belonging to a particular subsocietal group, such as a diaspora, affects

foreign policy attitudes. Moreover, extant scholarship has broadly analyzed foreign policy preferences, rather than specifically considering the development of one type of attitude. Conflict is among the most rare and critical empirical phenomena that occurs in the international system; thus, scholars need to explain development of a preference for the use of force. Diasporas are increasingly transnational relevant actors; consequently, examining the origins of diaspora members' preference for aggression in international or homeland politics is necessary.

Social scientists have defined diasporas, addressed their host state integration experiences, and evaluated their effects on events in their homelands; however, scholars have yet to fully address the source of diasporas' political preferences (Cohen, 2008; Portes and Manning, 1986; Saideman, 2012). Similarly, while political psychologists have examined the determinants of individuals preferences for aggression using demographic, religious, and psychological factors, a comprehensive framework to explain foreign policy preference formation among diasporas is needed. Space for improvement in the current literature exists. First, few scholars specifically focus on diaspora members, who have unique experiences residing in their host states but maintaining ties to their homelands. This dual identity likely influences diaspora members' perspectives on domestic and foreign policy choices by policymakers in their homelands and host states.<sup>96</sup> Second, scholars in this area have failed to generate clear, replicable findings regarding the determinants of such preference for violence. For example, ambiguity remains regarding the effects of gender, education, and wealth on tolerance for violence, even among citizens in the mainstream population.<sup>97</sup> Third, the current frameworks for understanding diaspora members' attitudes regarding foreign policy remain primarily ad hoc; therefore, a more holistic theoretical approach is needed. Specifically,

---

<sup>96</sup>Victoroff et al. (2012) represent an important exception by providing a useful preliminary examination of attitude development among diasporas. They consider the factors influencing views of suicide terrorism held by the "Muslim" diaspora; however, this classification of the diaspora is overly ambiguous given that the Muslims included in the survey varied widely in terms of their homelands, host states, and socioeconomic conditions (Victoroff, Adelman and Matthews, 2012).

<sup>97</sup>For example, some scholars contend that deprivation incites violence, but others argue that higher incomes and education levels allow opportunities for individuals to radicalize and support or participate in violence (see Learner 1958, Gurr 1970, and Krueger and Maleckova 2002).



international relations scholars have recently turned to work in political psychology, including research on emotions, the personality traits, and moral convictions, to theorize determinants of preference formation (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto and Haidt, 2012; Kertzer, Powers, Rathbun and Iyer, 2014).

Specific demographic characteristics are associated with the propensity with which individuals acquire tolerance for aggression. However, the interaction of such demographics with an individual's status as a diaspora member residing in a host state remains understudied. Scholars have found that perpetrators and supporters of violence tend to be male, more highly educated, and relatively more wealthy than the local population (Berman and Laitin, 2006; Krueger and Maleckova, 2002; Berrebi, 2007; Wike and Samaranayake, N.d.). Additionally, the majority of scholars contend that religious conviction may incentivize support for or participation in political violence (Hoffman, 2006; Rapoport, 1990; Gambetta, 2005). Although these findings are reasonable when considering the general population, an individual's identification as a diaspora member may modify these results.

While male individuals among the general population may be more likely to exhibit or act on aggression, female diaspora members living in host states may take on new roles due to the displacement of the diaspora from the homeland, which may invert traditional practices from the homeland, and the opportunity structures present in diasporas' host states, such as policies of gender equality. Thus, the impact of gender, especially across different subsocietal groups residing in different states, requires further evaluation. Additionally, the association between higher levels of education and wealth and acceptance of violence may be problematic (for example, see Krueger (2007), Krueger and Maleckova (2003), and Berrebi (2007)).<sup>98</sup> Diaspora members' acquisition of education and wealth in host states requires them to at least partially integrate into their host states to take advantage of economic opportunities, which may inhibit taste for violence. Finally, scholars primarily agree that age is inversely related to

---

<sup>98</sup>Shafiq and Sinno find that income's effect varies by country and target (2010). Jordanians and Pakistanis with higher incomes are less likely to approve of suicide bombings against civilians, but wealthier Moroccans are more likely to support the use of this tactic against civilians. Additionally, Jordanians, Pakistanis, and Turkish individuals at higher levels of income are less likely to support suicide bombings against Westerners in Iraq; however, Lebanese earning higher incomes are more likely to approve of suicide bombings against Westerners in Iraq.

support for political violence (Haddad and Khashan, 2002; Fair and Shepherd, 2006).<sup>99</sup>

However, this may be a direct relationship in the case of diasporas since older diaspora members are more likely to have been born and resided in the homelands, and their memories of and experiences in the homeland may incentivize their support for political violence.

Moreover, scholarly debate exists regarding the influence of religion on individuals' tolerance for violence. The majority of scholars contend that, due to the post-death rewards of martyrdom, religious conviction ensures individuals are more likely to accept the use of violence to achieve policy goals (Hoffman, 2006; Rapoport, 1990; Gambetta, 2005). Alternatively, some scholars contend that religious individuals are more likely to commit to cooperation, altruism, and in-group identity (Ginges and Norenzayan, 2009). While debate on the effects of religion are worthwhile when evaluating the general population, diaspora members are more likely to experience exclusion from mainstream society and consequently cohere into closely knit subsocietal groups. Diaspora members may strive to maintain in-group identity and consequently seek to protect their marginalized group from mainstream society in their host state, as well as the homeland regime, which may be responsible for their exit from the homeland. This need to preserve diaspora identity, religion, and culture may embolden members to employ a range of protective methods, including violence.<sup>100</sup>

Inconclusive prior research on attitude development incentivizes an examination of the psychological factors related to individuals' emotions, personalities, and morals. First, the threat of violence and fear for personal safety inspires aggressive behavior within the general population (Duntley, 2015; MacLaren, Best and Bigney, 2010; Hubbard, Dodge, Cillessen, Coie and Schwartz, 2001; Dodge, Price, Bachorowski and Newman, 1990; Dodge and Frame, 1982). Similarly, individuals demonstrating anxiety and depression are more likely to support religiously or politically motivated violence (Victoroff, Adelman and Matthews, 2012). The relationships between safety concerns, emotional distress, and aggression, however, may be

---

<sup>99</sup>Haddad and Khashan specifically find that younger Lebanese are more likely to approve of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.

<sup>100</sup>For example, the perception that Islam is under threat, requires defense, and should be more globally influential is correlated with support for political violence (Wike and Samaranayake, N.d.; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman and Orehek, 2009)

mediated by diasporas' relationships to homeland friends and family. Instead of personal concerns, the experience of safety threats or emotional disorders among kin in the homeland may inspire preferences for aggressive behavior or policy among diaspora members.

Additionally, individuals' personality traits may motivate their policy preferences toward aggression. Political psychologists use the Big Five personality trait framework, which includes the characteristics of extroversion, agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism, to explain individual preferences for political violence. Specifically, a direct relationship exists among the demonstration of low levels of agreeableness in individuals in mainstream society and aggressive or antagonistic behavior (Gleason, Jensen-Campbell and Richardson, 2004; Martin, Watson and Wan, 2000; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell and Hair, 1996). Proponents of MFT, which considers the impact of care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity values on individual preferences, argue that the "binding" morals (including loyalty, authority, and purity) predict support for coercive foreign policy (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2011; Kertzer et al., 2014; Koleva et al., 2012). The binding versus individualizing (consisting of care and fairness morals) dichotomy between morals well characterizes mainstream society but fails to adequately explain preference formation in subsocietal groups, such as diasporas.

### **Moral Foundations of Diaspora Members' Hawkish Attitudes**

To account for the development of hawkish attitudes among diaspora members, I use MFT, which improves on prior ad hoc scholarship by offering a coherent theoretical framework to explain domestic and foreign policy attitudes. MFT scholars divide moral foundations into two categories: "individualizing," which include care and fairness, and "binding," which include loyalty, authority, and purity (Graham et al., 2011). Those who score highly on the care moral foundation are likely to be empathetic and protective of vulnerable members of society, and individuals scoring highly on the fair moral foundation prefer equality and justice (Graham et al., 2012; Haidt, 2012; Koleva et al., 2012). Individuals favoring the loyalty moral are motivated by relationship between teams and coalitions, which may be ethnic, religious, or political in nature (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2011). Those scoring highly on the authority moral respect traditions, institutions, and superiors (Haidt,

2007, 2012; Graham et al., 2012). Individuals that score highly on the purity moral dislike contamination, which may be biological, social, religious, or cultural (Koleva et al., 2012). Among the mainstream population, those who score highly on the individualizing morals prefer cooperation among international actors to solve global challenges, but individuals scoring highly on binding morals are more likely to favor resorting to violence to obtain foreign policy goals (Kertzer et al., 2014). However, diaspora members' preferences on the use of force may diverge from mainstream society due to the experiences and incentives unique to diaspora actors.

Thus, I propose a novel configuration of morals, which takes into account the unique status of the diaspora as a societal subgroup, to explain members' hawkish attitudes regarding contentious politics in their homelands. Instead of the conventional individualizing versus binding paradigm, I argue that the appropriate dichotomy is *identity preserving* morals, including the care, loyalty, and purity foundations, versus *homogenizing* morals, including the authority and fair morals. I expect a direct relationship between the identity preserving morals and diaspora members' hawkish attitudes but an inverse relationship between the homogenizing morals and diaspora members' hawkishness.

Identity preserving morals emphasize in-group cohesion and the maintenance of group identity. The care moral is inspired by individuals' reactions to cruel treatment of the weak members of society, so motivates diaspora members' compassion for and inclusion of members of their own victimized subgroup.<sup>101</sup> The loyalty foundation motivates individuals to cultivate stable coalitions capable of overcoming collective action problems to pursue goals, which further distinguishes diaspora members from the mainstream society of their host state. Individuals scoring highly in the purity moral are disgusted by variables that might spoil the sanctity of their body or social group, which may incentivize diaspora members to protect their group from external corruption by solidifying boundaries between the diaspora and perceived threats to their subgroup in the host state or homeland.

The identity preserving morals predict hawkish attitudes due to their intra-group focus

---

<sup>101</sup>This victim status may result from structural conditions in diasporas' host states, homeland economic challenges, or political repression.

and “othering” of the mainstream society in their host state and the homeland opposition. First, diaspora members scoring highly on the care moral seek to resolve wrongdoing against victims, which may include the diaspora or homeland kin. The interaction of compassion and a need to protect incentivize and justify the use of aggression in homeland conflicts. Second, diaspora members scoring highly on the loyalty moral prioritize relationships within the diaspora or with homeland kin over attempts to assimilate or peacefully resolve conflicts; furthermore, these bonds may legitimize the use of violence and dehumanization of the opposition in the homeland.<sup>102</sup> Third, diaspora members that score highly on the purity moral, due to their emphasis on physical, cultural, and spiritual sanctity, favor the health of the group (the diaspora and homeland kin) above all else and therefore may excuse the use of violence against the homeland opposition. I formalize this argument in the first hypothesis:

***H<sub>1</sub>***: Diaspora members that highly value the identity preserving morals are more likely to have hawkish attitudes regarding homeland conflicts.

Individuals scoring highly on the homogenizing morals prefer the dominance of mainstream cultural conventions, the establishment of effective political institutions, and the suppression of challenges to uniformity and equality. The authority moral motivates diaspora members to submit to hierarchical authority, especially represented by the government; thus, individuals scoring highly in authority conform to host state laws and social norms.

Individuals that highly value the fair moral prefer equal, just treatment of all citizens and thus favor assimilation into host states to ensure such treatment is also applied to the diaspora.

The homogenizing morals disincentivize hawkish attitudes among diaspora members because these morals encourage assimilation into host states and conflict with revisionist goals diaspora members may have. First, diaspora members that score highly on the fair moral believe that all people should be treated equally, which requires subsocietal groups to integrate into the mainstream society and prefer equality and justice to aggression. Second, while individuals from the mainstream population scoring highly on authority may favor more aggressive foreign policy (Kertzer et al., 2014), diaspora members are unlikely to replicate

---

<sup>102</sup>Cohen (2013) further evaluates the relationship between loyalty and actual use of violence in conflict.

this relationship. Henry et al. argue that individual preference for hierarchical authority predicts hawkishness in Western, industrialized societies, but undermines hawkishness in traditionally subordinated groups perceiving themselves to be victimized by the status quo (2005). Thus, while anti-authoritarianism among diasporas legitimates aggression to improve the diaspora's or homeland kin's position, those diaspora members that favor authority accept the status quo, including traditional methods to resolve conflicts and cooperation. I formalize these expectations in the second hypothesis:

*H<sub>2</sub>*: Diaspora members that score low on the homogenizing morals are more likely to hold hawkish preferences regarding contentious politics in the homeland.

## **Data and Methods**

### ***Data***

While data on diasporas at the member level are scarce, I am able to test these hypotheses using individual level data from the Palestinian diaspora. Specifically, I identify a subset of data from the third wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer (ABIII), which was collected from 2012 to 2014 (*Arab Barometer III*, 2014). These data provide information on the attitudes, values, behaviors, identities, and political preferences of respondents from twelve countries in the Middle East and North Africa (*Arab Barometer III*, 2014). I subset these survey data to include only respondents that identify as members of the Palestinian diaspora. The Palestinian diaspora members included in this subset reside in Jordan, where the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan conducted in person surveys from December 2012 to January 2013.<sup>103</sup> The number of Palestinian diaspora members surveyed is 501, and the individual respondent is the unit of analysis. Table 18 displays a brief overview of the variables of interest for three diaspora members included in this analysis.<sup>104</sup>

### ***Dependent Variable***

The dependent variable in this analysis is diaspora members' responses to a survey question evaluating the peace treaty between Jordan (the host state of the diaspora) and Israel,

---

<sup>103</sup>In the future, I plan to collect original data of diasporas originating from a range of homelands and residing across various host states.

<sup>104</sup>No severe correlation exists in this dataset.

Table 18: Major Variables of Interest in Dataset

Respondent	Auth.	Pur.	Loy.	Fair	Care	Sex	Edu.	Pol.	Age	Rel.	Res.	Threat
1	2	2	0	0	3	1	3	3	32	1	1	3
2	3	3	0	0	3	0	5	2	25	1	1	1
3	1	2	0	2	2	1	6	2	42	0	1	1

which represents the opposition to the diaspora’s preferred conflict actor in the homeland.<sup>105</sup> Specifically, respondents identify whether they prefer to maintain or abolish the treaty between Israel and Jordan.<sup>106</sup> The variable in its original collection is ordinal, with respondents identifying as “strongly supportive” or “supportive” of maintaining or abolishing the treaty. However, my theoretical framework accounts for whether or not diaspora members have hawkish preferences, as opposed to the degree of hawkish preferences they may hold. Thus, a binary variable is more appropriate for this analysis.<sup>107</sup> Diaspora members’ identification of support for maintaining versus abolishing the peace treaty provides a measure of whether these individuals are hawkish. I code diaspora members that prefer to abolish the treaty as hawkish and diaspora members that tolerate the status quo and maintaining the peace treaty as not hawkish.<sup>108</sup> Table 19 displays the summary statistics associated with the binary dependent variable indicating whether respondents are hawkish.<sup>109</sup>

### *Independent Variables*

The independent variables of interest in this analysis correspond to the five moral foundations proposed by MFT. I will first describe the variables used to operationalize the

<sup>105</sup>In this case, the specific homeland actors associated with the Palestinian diaspora are the Palestinian Authority, or (in extreme cases) Hamas or other militant groups.

<sup>106</sup>The treaty referred to in this survey is most likely the most recent formalization of peace and cooperation between Israel and Jordan, signed in 1994 at Wadi Araba (Schenker, 2014).

<sup>107</sup>In addition, there are only a few respondents included in two of the four categories, which produces some uncertainty on the estimates associated with those two groups. Therefore, using a binary variable is more helpful in evaluating quantities of interest, such as predicted probabilities. However, the results of the ordered logistic version of this analysis are largely similar.

<sup>108</sup>I do not code the diaspora members that opt to maintain the status quo as “dovish” because I believe that dovish attitudes require more than simply preferring to have no conflict. This is in line with other work in international relations that considers “positive peace,” which argues that the appropriate definition of peace involves more than the lack of war (Diehl, 2016; Richmond, 2008; Galtung, 1996; Reid, 2017).

<sup>109</sup>Please note that the summary statistics tables refer to totals that exclude missing data (NAs).

Table 19: Summary Statistics of Binary Dependent Variable

Hawkish Attitude	Number of Respondents	Frequency of Attitude
0	139	31%
1	311	69%

Table 20: Items Used to Measure Moral Foundations in Survey

Moral	Survey Question	Response Frequency
Care	Considering your country's constitution, what is the importance of the constitution guaranteeing social protection and health insurance for the poor?	Very important 72.1% Important 21.6% Not that important 5.1% Not important at all 1.2%
Loyalty	How important is resolution of the Palestinian question in terms of challenges your country is facing today?	Very important 1.8% Important 11.7% Not important 86.5%
Purity	How much do you agree with the principle that the government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law?	Strongly agree 39.5% Agree 48.0% Disagree 10.6% Strongly disagree 1.9%
Authority	To what extent do you agree or disagree with "Citizens must support the government's decision even if they disagree with them?"	Strongly Agree 10.1% Agree 42.1% Disagree 28.6% Strongly disagree 19.2%
Fairness	How important is "narrowing the gap between rich and poor" as a feature of democracy?	Very important 18.6% Important 18.9% Not important 62.5%

identity preserving morals, which include care, loyalty, and purity, and then the homogenizing morals of authority and fairness. Table 20 provides the items from the survey used to operationalize each of the five moral foundations.<sup>110</sup>

The first independent variable is the care moral foundation, which refers to the degree to which individuals focus on relieving suffering, especially among those perceived as vulnerable subgroups, such as children (Haidt, 2012). I operationalize this ordinal variable using respondents' answer to a question concerning the role of the government in providing

<sup>110</sup>Responses to these questions represent imperfect approximations of survey questions designed to test individuals' valuations of morals. To cross-validate my selection, however, a political psychologist reviewed the survey questions and identified a separate collection of questions she believed represented the moral foundations best. The questions I chose to operationalize the morals represent the items on which we overlapped. In the future, I plan to conduct my own surveys of diaspora members.



protection and health insurance for a vulnerable subgroup in society, the poor.<sup>111</sup> This is a valid question to assess this moral foundation because it identifies the degree to which individuals feel a responsibility for nurturing and protecting weak groups within the society. If diaspora members claim this to be “very important,” I highly score them on the care moral foundation (with a value of 3). If diaspora members believe protection and insurance for the poor to be “important,” I assign these a value of 2 on the care moral. If diaspora members claim this to be “not that important,” I score them with a 1 on the care moral foundation. If diaspora members found protection and insurance to be “not important at all,” they receive a score of 0 on the care foundation.

The second independent variable is the loyalty moral foundation, which considers the degree to which individuals cultivate their own group, its membership, and the relationships between members, as well as punish those who betray or harm the group (Haidt, 2012). I measure this ordinal variable by assessing the degree to which diaspora members believe that resolution to the Palestinian question is one of the main challenges currently facing Jordan, the diaspora respondents’ host state.<sup>112</sup> This is a valid strategy to assess how loyal diaspora members are because it indicates the degree to which diaspora members have internalized the Palestinian issue and consequently consider it to be a major issue on the political agenda for Jordanian leaders. If diaspora members indicate that this issue is “very important,” I score them as highly loyal (with a value of 2). If diaspora members evaluate the Palestinian question as “important,” I scored them as loyal (1). If diaspora members claim the Palestinian issue is unimportant, I score them as disloyal and assign a value of 0 on the loyalty moral foundation.

The third independent variable is the purity moral foundation, which refers to the degree to which individual dislike spiritually, socially, physically, or biologically disgusting things (Graham et al., 2012). I focus on the spiritual and social aspect of this moral due to the political and religious orientation of these survey questions. Specifically, I operationalize this

---

<sup>111</sup>See Table 20 for the specific wording in this question and response.

<sup>112</sup>See Table 20 for the specific wording in this question and response.

ordinal variable with individuals' responses to a question concerning whether the government should enact laws that comply with Islamic law.<sup>113</sup> When diaspora members "strongly agree" with this proposition, I score them as high on the purity moral foundation (with a value of 3). When diaspora members "agree" with this idea, they receive a score of 2 on the purity moral foundation. If diaspora members "disagree" that the government's laws should comply with Islamic law, they receive a score of 1. If diaspora members "strongly disagree" with this proposal, I score them as lowest on the purity moral scale with a 0.

The fourth independent variable is the authority moral foundation, which evaluates individuals' regard for tradition, institutions, and hierarchy (Graham et al., 2012). To score diaspora members on this ordinal variable, I use their responses to a question concerning whether individuals should support government policies with which they disagree.<sup>114</sup> This is a valid measure because the answers illustrate the degree to which diaspora members believe that established leadership should be trusted and government policies followed (even in the presence of doubt regarding the quality of the policy). I score diaspora members that "strongly agree" with this as highly authoritative with a value of 3. Diaspora members that "agree" with this idea receive a score of 2. When diaspora members "disagree" with this claim, I score them as 1 on the authority scale. Diaspora members that "strongly disagree" with the idea that the government should be supported when doubt exists are scored as low on the authority scale (with a 0).

The final independent variable is the fair moral foundation, which considers the degree to which individuals value equality and justice (Koleva et al., 2012). I score diaspora members on their esteem for the fair moral using a question concerning whether the government should undertake efforts to lower inequality (see Table 20 for the specific wording in this question and response). This is an appropriate measure because individuals' responses clearly demonstrate the degree to which they value socioeconomic equality. When diaspora members believe that the government's efforts to reduce inequality are "strongly important," I score

---

<sup>113</sup>See Table 20 for the specific wording in this question and response.

<sup>114</sup>See Table 20 for the specific wording in this question and response.

them as high on the fair moral scale (2). Diaspora members that believe this endeavor to be “important” receive a score of 1 on the fair moral. I identify diaspora members that do not believe inequality reduction is important as low on the fair moral scale (with a 0).

### *Control Variables*

I include some control variables on which to condition my independent variables of interest. First, I incorporate a dichotomous variable representing the respondent’s sex. Though disagreement exists, scholars have found that gender influences the likelihood with which an individual supports the use of violence to obtain political objectives (Wike and Samaranayake, N.d.; Fair and Shepherd, 2006). Table 21 presents the summary statistics of this binary variable. I positively code females. While I expect this variable to be inversely related to a diaspora member’s propensity to have hawkish attitudes, this is outside of my theoretical scope and so included as a control variable.

*Table 21: Summary Statistics of Binary Control Variables*

		<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Frequency of Sex</b>
Sex	Male	241	48.1%
	Female	260	51.9%
Residence	Rural	36	7.2%
	Urban	465	92.8%

Second, I include a measure of the residence type of the respondent. Residents identified as residing in a primarily urban versus rural area.<sup>115</sup> I integrate this dichotomous variable to account for recent scholarship considering the political consequences of the population density of the area in which an individual lives. Specifically, Sng et al. propose that more densely populated areas force individuals to emphasize the future when developing their sociopolitical preferences, leading to people from more densely populated regions having lower fertility rates, enrolling their children in school sooner, and developing future-oriented plans (2017). Densely populated areas, in the context of the Palestinian

---

<sup>115</sup>The definition of “urban” varies across countries, though a few general similarities in these exist, including a political or administrative geographic unit, a threshold population size (around 2000 inhabitants), population density, and type of primary economic sector (unassociated with agriculture) (*The State of the World’s Children*, 2012). In the context of these data, the Jordanian definition of “urban” includes municipalities with 5,000 residents or more (*World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision*, 2014). While the Arab Barometer does not specifically define its coding of “urban” in the Jordanian context, the researchers frequently use definitions employed by the country in which the survey data are being collected.

diaspora members responding to the Arab Barometer in Jordan, are more likely to be urban. Given that urban dwellers are more likely to be future-oriented, they likely also have a longer time horizon and are concerned with the shadow of the future, which incentivizes more cooperative attitudes (Axelrod, 1984). While I expect individuals that live in urban areas to be less likely to develop hawkish attitudes, this is outside of the scope of my theory. I code urban residence as 1 and rural residence as 0. The summary statistics of this binary variable are located in Table 21. I expect an inverse relationship between residence and the dependent variable of hawkish preferences.

The third control variable I include is education. Scholars debate the effects of education on individuals' support for political violence, with some suggesting that poverty and lack of education spurs support for violence and others arguing that higher levels of education are correlated with support for, and execution of, political violence (Gurr, 1970; Krueger and Malečková, 2003; Berrebi, 2007). Thus, the impact of education may influence the probability with which a respondent supports violence, but this is outside of the scope of morals-oriented theory. This ordinal variable increases from 1, which indicates illiteracy, to 7, which represents acquisition of a Master's degree or higher education.<sup>116</sup> Figure 22 illustrates the distribution of this variable. In line with rational choice theory, I expect more highly educated individuals to be more interested in an efficient resolution to conflict and so fail to acquire hawkish attitudes. Thus, I expect an inverse relationship between a respondent's education level and their probability of hawkish attitude development.


Fourth, I include a control variable for the degree to which an individual is politically informed. To identify how politically informed a diaspora member is, I use responses to a question asking the degree to which individuals follow political news. The levels with which individuals are politically informed range from 0, indicating that respondents do not follow the news, to 3, indicating that respondents follow the news to a "great extent."<sup>117</sup> Table 22

---

<sup>116</sup>Specifically, illiteracy is coded as 1, elementary education as 2, preparatory/ basic as 3, secondary as 4, professional or technical degree as 5, a Bachelor's degree as 6, and a Master's or above as 7.

<sup>117</sup>Specifically, individuals that fail to follow any political news at all receive a score of 0, individuals that follow the news to a "limited extent" receive a score of 1, individuals that follow the news to a "medium extent" receive a score of 2, and individuals that follow the news to a "great extent" receive a score of 3.

Fig. 22: Summary Statistics of Ordinal Control Variables



shows the distribution of this ordinal variable. I expect that more politically informed diaspora members are more likely to be hawkish given that they are more aware of the political situation facing their Palestinian kin in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel.

The fifth control variable that I include is an ordinal variable measuring a respondent's degree of religiousness. Scholars have debated whether the beliefs or the communal aspect of religion is more likely to influence political preferences, but scholars tend to find that some aspect of religiosity influences individuals' attitudes regarding support for and use of violence (Hoffman, 2006; Ginges and Norenzayan, 2009; Haddad and Khashan, 2002; Kruglanski et al., 2009). Thus, diaspora members' commitment to their religion may independently affect their propensity to develop hawkish attitudes, so I condition my key independent variables on this control variable. I code diaspora members' religiosity using a scale ranging from 2, indicating a response of "religious," to 0, indicating a response of "not religious." Figure 22 provides the distribution of this variable. I expect that more religious individuals are more likely to support the use of violence to obtain policy goals.

Sixth, I incorporate a control variable that measures the degree to which individuals

believe that they are threatened. Specifically, the survey question asks whether individuals feel that their family's safety and security are ensured. I code diaspora members' perception of threat using a scale varying from 3, representing diaspora members' belief that their safety is "absolutely not ensured," to 0, indicating that diaspora members believe they are "fully ensured." Figure 22 displays the distribution of this variable. I include this variable because political psychologists observe that fear of violence and for personal safety is likely to trigger aggression (Duntley, 2015; MacLaren, Best and Bigney, 2010; Hubbard et al., 2001). Consequently, I expect that this variable is directly related to the likelihood with which a respondent develops hawkish preference.

The final control variable that I incorporate into this analysis is the age of a respondent. This is a continuous variable that ranges from 18 to 77 years. Table 6 displays the summary statistics of this variable. Extant work suggests that, as individuals become older, their views regarding the use of and support for political violence moderate (*Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World*, 2007). Thus, I expect age to be inversely correlated with the probability with which diaspora members are hawkish.

Table 22: Summary Statistics of Continuous Control Variable

	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Med.</b>	<b>St. Dev.</b>	<b>Max.</b>
Age	18	39	37	14	77

## ***Methods***

To test the validity of my hypotheses that (1) the identity preserving morals are directly related with individuals' development of hawkish preferences and (2) the homogenizing morals are inversely related to such hawkish attitudes, I use logistic

regression.<sup>118</sup> This model can be specified as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Hawkish Attitude}_i = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Care Moral Foundation}_i + \beta_2 \text{Loyalty Moral Foundation}_i + \\ & \beta_3 \text{Purity Moral Foundation}_i + \beta_4 \text{Authority Moral Foundation}_i + \\ & \beta_5 \text{Fair Moral Foundation}_i + \beta_6 \text{Sex}_i + \beta_7 \text{Residence Type}_i + \\ & \beta_8 \text{Education Level}_i + \beta_9 \text{Degree of Political Informedness}_i + \\ & \beta_{10} \text{Degree of Religiosity}_i + \beta_{11} \text{Family Threat Level}_i + \beta_{12} \text{Age}_i + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

where  $i$  = individual diaspora member

## Analysis

In this section, I discuss the results of my logistic regression used to test the validity of my hypotheses that the probability of diaspora members' possession of hawkish attitudes rises with high scores on the identity preserving morals but falls with high scores on the homogenizing morals.<sup>119</sup> The results of this test (identified as primary model), which are displayed in Table 23, primarily support my theoretical framework.<sup>120</sup> First, I report the noteworthy results of the logistic regression model. The identity preserving morals of care, loyalty, and purity are positively associated with a diaspora member being hawkish, as expected, but only purity retains statistical significance. Thus, the immediate results of my statistical analysis somewhat support my first hypothesis. The authority and fair moral foundations, which are homogenizing, are both inversely and statistically significantly associated with diaspora members being hawkish. Therefore, the homogenizing morals conform to my theoretical predictions. As a robustness check on the primary logistic model, I also run an ordinal logistic regression, which includes the dependent variable as an ordinal

---

<sup>118</sup>I also use an ordinal logistic regression, the results of which are similar to the logistic regression and displayed in Table 45 in Appendix C.

<sup>119</sup>In the future, I plan to run a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to analyze the two underlying dimensions of morals, homogenizing and identity preserving, that I theorize.

<sup>120</sup>In addition to the model including all of the five moral foundations simultaneously, I run robustness tests that include only one moral per model. The direction and statistical significance of each independent variable in these models remain consistent with the primary model.

variable measuring the level of an individual's hawkish attitude (see Table 45 in Appendix C). The results remain similar regarding the findings on the authority, purity, and fair morals. However, care is also positively and statistically significantly related to a diaspora member having hawkish attitudes. As previously mentioned, the measure for the care foundation does not retain significance in the logistic regression, which I consider to be a more appropriate and rigorous test of my theory.

Table 23: Logistic Regression Results

	<b>Primary Model</b>
(Intercept)	−0.37 (1.02)
Care Moral Foundation	0.15 (0.18)
Loyalty Moral Foundation	0.26 (0.28)
Purity Moral Foundation	0.36** (0.16)
Authority Moral Foundation	−0.47**** (0.13)
Fair Moral Foundation	−0.35** (0.15)
Sex	−0.73*** (0.24)
Residence Type	0.53 (0.45)
Education Level	−0.02 (0.10)
Degree of Political Informedness	−0.08 (0.12)
Degree of Religiosity	0.13 (0.22)
Family Threat Level	0.64**** (0.19)
Age	0.01 (0.01)
<i>N</i>	414
AIC	485.60
BIC	694.95
log <i>L</i>	−190.80

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$




The variable measuring a respondent's sex is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with the probability with which an individual displays hawkish preferences, as expected. The location of a respondent's residence is positively, but not statistically significantly related to the likelihood that a diaspora member is hawkish, which is contrary to my prediction. This may result from the disproportionate amount of diaspora living in urban areas (see Table 21). A diaspora member's level of education is inversely, though not statistically significantly, associated with having hawkish attitudes. The degree to which an individual is informed about the political events in his or her country is negative and insignificant, which contradicts my expectations. This finding may be caused by politically informed diaspora members' heightened awareness of what they perceive as an intractable status quo and their consequential interest in avoiding the use of conflict, which has not yet proven successful. While the degree to which an individual identifies as religious is positively related to hawkish preferences, this estimate does not reach statistical significance. The level of threat experienced by respondents or their family members is directly and statistically significantly related to their likelihood of being hawkish, as predicted. Finally, age is positively, but not statistically significantly, related to whether an diaspora member becomes hawkish. This finding on age opposes my prediction, but may suggest, in this specific case, a generational effect in which those diaspora members that directly experienced the start of the conflict develop and maintain more aggressive attitudes than the younger generations.<sup>121</sup> Figure 23 provides an illustration of these results with a plot of the coefficients associated with my logistic regression model.

I employ logistic regression, so I also present the predicted probabilities associated with the results of the model, which are displayed in Table 23. Three of the five measures of the moral foundations achieve statistical significance. Thus, I interpret the substantive implications of my results by considering the predicted probabilities associated with the statistically significant morals, which include the purity, authority, and fair moral

---

<sup>121</sup>In the case of the Palestinian diaspora residing in Jordan, the older diaspora members are more likely to have personally experienced displacement and the associated conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians during the establishment of the state of Israel and its aftermath.

Fig. 23: Logistic Regression Estimates




foundations.<sup>122</sup> Figure 24 illustrates the divergent effects of scoring low or high on the purity moral, conditional on age, on the probability of a diaspora member being hawkish. The probability with which a diaspora member holds hawkish preferences, shown on the y-axis, ranges from 0 to 1. The x-axis indicates the age of surveyed diaspora members, which range from 18 to 77 in the data. I condition on a respondent's age due to the inverse relationship between age and preference for violence expected by scholars (Haddad and Khashan, 2002; Fair and Shepherd, 2006). However, age of a diaspora member and hawkishness are directly correlated, indicating that respondents' personal connections to the homeland may justify their support for violence to rectify political conditions in the homeland.<sup>123</sup>

I argue that diaspora members who highly value identity preserving morals, which include purity, are more likely to have hawkish attitudes. Figure 24 provides evidence in

<sup>122</sup>In addition to the predicted probabilities presented in the main text, which are conditioned on age, I plot predicted probabilities of hawkishness by statistically significant morals conditioned on the ordinal control variables of level of education, political informedness, religiosity, and family threat in the Appendix.

<sup>123</sup>Additionally, I condition on age because it is the only continuous control variable in my dataset, which increases clarity of predicted probability plots.

Fig. 24: Predicted Probabilities of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Purity (Identity Preserving) Moral Foundation




support of this hypothesis. The solid blue line, which represents the highest score of purity available, is associated with a higher probability of being hawkish than the solid red line, which indicates the lowest level at which diaspora members can value purity. Diaspora members highly value purity when they strongly believe that civil law should comply with Islamic law, but score low on purity if they believe civil law need not comply with Islamic law. In fact, diaspora members that most highly value purity are 25% more likely to have hawkish attitudes toward the conflict in their homeland than diaspora members that score lowest on purity. In addition to purity, age has some effect (though this is not statistically significant) on the probability with which a diaspora member is hawkish. The rising solid lines, which show the simulated point estimates, indicate that diaspora members' propensity to be hawkish increases with age. The dashed lines demonstrate the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates, indicating that 95% of the intervals calculated would have the population mean in repeated sampling.<sup>124</sup>


<sup>124</sup>While there exists some overlap between the confidence intervals, this does not necessarily mean that there is no statistically significant difference between the point estimates associated with low versus high

Fig. 25: Predicted Probabilities Associated with Homogenizing Morals

(a) Predicted Probabilities of Hawkish Attitudes Conditional on Authority Moral Foundation



(b) Predicted Probabilities of Hawkish Attitudes Conditional on Fair Moral Foundation



Additionally, I present the predicted probabilities associated with the homogenizing morals, including the authority and fair moral foundations, in Figure 25.<sup>125</sup> These plots demonstrate the distinct effects of extreme scores on the authority and fair morals, conditional on age, on the probability that a diaspora member is hawkish. On both plots in Figure 25, the y-axis displays the range, from 0 to 1, of the probability that a diaspora member has hawkish preferences. Similarly, the x-axis on both plots of homogenizing morals illustrates the range in age of respondents, varying from 18 to 77.

I argue that diaspora members who highly regard the homogenizing morals, including the authority and fair foundations, are less likely to have hawkish attitudes. Figure 25 provides support for this hypothesis. The solid red lines indicate the simulated point estimates associated with the lowest values of the authority and fair moral foundations, and the solid blue lines illustrate the point estimates associated with the highest scores associated with the authority and fair morals. I score diaspora members as low on the authority moral if they strongly disagree with supporting governments whom they doubt and as high if they strongly

levels of valuation of purity. Point estimates are significantly different from each other when:  $x_1 - x_2 > 1.96(\sqrt{SE_1^2 + SE_2^2})$ , which is the case here.

<sup>125</sup>The predicted probabilities associated with the authority moral are on the left, and predicted probabilities associated with the fair moral are on the right.

agree with supporting governments even in the presence of doubt. Also, I identify diaspora members as scoring low on the fair moral foundation if they believe narrowing inequality is unimportant and scoring high on the fair moral foundation if they believe narrowing inequality is very important. On both the plots for the authority and the fair moral foundations, the solid red lines, representing low scores on the authority and fair morals, are associated with higher probabilities of holding hawkish preferences than the solid blue lines, which indicate high scores on the authority and fair morals. Specifically, diaspora members who score lowest on the authority moral are 28% more likely to be hawkish than diaspora members that most highly value authority. Similarly, a diaspora member who displays the lowest level of esteem for the fair moral is 16% more likely to have hawkish preferences than a diaspora member that highly values the fair moral. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence for these estimates, meaning that, in repeated sampling, 95% of the intervals calculated would include the population mean.

Table 24: Correlation between Independent and Control Variables

	Auth.	Pur.	Loy.	Fair	Care	Sex	Edu.	Pol.	Age	Rel.	Res.	Threat
Auth.	1	-0.104	0.073	-0.005	-0.032	0.145	-0.026	-0.012	0.011	0.089	-0.001	-0.109
Pur.	-0.104	1	-0.050	0.006	0.086	0.021	-0.013	0.048	0.059	0.139	-0.041	-0.089
Loy.	0.073	-0.050	1	0.056	0.052	-0.026	-0.017	-0.006	-0.037	0.038	0.040	-0.022
Fair	-0.005	0.006	0.056	1	-0.054	-0.010	-0.008	-0.087	-0.006	-0.033	-0.139	0.002
Care	-0.032	0.086	0.052	-0.054	1	0.043	-0.030	-0.008	0.025	0.022	-0.067	-0.043
Sex	0.145	0.021	-0.026	-0.010	0.043	1	0.038	-0.048	-0.039	0.241	-0.064	0.030
Edu.	-0.026	-0.013	-0.017	-0.008	-0.030	0.038	1	0.220	-0.207	-0.029	-0.047	0.063
Pol.	-0.012	0.048	-0.006	-0.087	-0.008	-0.048	0.220	1	0.034	0.075	0.042	-0.099
Age	0.011	0.059	-0.037	-0.006	0.025	-0.039	-0.207	0.034	1	0.251	-0.014	-0.004
Rel.	0.089	0.139	0.038	-0.033	0.022	0.241	-0.029	0.075	0.251	1	-0.142	-0.081
Res.	-0.001	-0.041	0.040	-0.139	-0.067	-0.064	-0.047	0.042	-0.014	-0.142	1	0.020
Threat	-0.109	-0.089	-0.022	0.002	-0.043	0.030	0.063	-0.099	-0.004	-0.081	0.020	1

Finally, I conduct diagnostic tests to evaluate the robustness of my model. First, Table 24 illustrates that little to no problematic correlation exists between the covariates.<sup>126</sup> Second, I calculate variance inflation factors (VIF), which Rogerson advises remain under 5, to analyze the degree of multicollinearity in the logistic regression model (2001). As displayed in Table 25, the VIF levels do not exceed 5 for any variables in my model, showing a severe multicollinearity problem is not present in my analysis. Next, I provide the percentage of

<sup>126</sup>Very low correlation exists between sex and religion (.241) and age and religion (.251). This is not unexpected given that older people and women tend to be more religious than younger people (*U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious*, 2015; *The Gender Gap in Religion Around the World*, 2016).

observations and the expected percentage of observations correctly predicted by my model, as Herron recommends to ensure that a more precise estimate than is accurate is not implied (1999). Table 26 demonstrates that the model correctly predicts the majority of the cases.

*Table 25: Variance Inflation Factors*

	Primary Model
Care Moral Foundation	1.02
Loyalty Moral Foundation	1.02
Purity Moral Foundation	1.03
Authority Moral Foundation	1.02
Fair Moral Foundation	1.03
Sex	1.06
Residence Type	1.04
Education Level	1.05
Degree of Political Informedness	1.05
Degree of Religiosity	1.09
Family Threat Level	1.03
Age	1.05

To test the predictive capacity of the logistic regression model used in this paper, I also present the Receiver-Operator Characteristic (ROC) plot in Figure 26. The area under the curve (AUC) in the ROC plot provides an evaluation of the accuracy of the model, with an AUC of 1 being a perfect model. The value of the AUC of the logistic regression model in this paper is 0.72, indicating that the model's ability to correctly predict a diaspora member's development of hawkish preferences is fair.<sup>127</sup>

## Conclusion


In this section, I will discuss the substantive implications of this statistical analysis for my theory, possibilities for further scholarship, and relevant policy recommendations. I argue

<sup>127</sup>Conversely, I present the ROC plot associated with a model that excludes the key independent variables associated with the five moral foundations in Figure 42. The AUC in the model excluding these variables is 0.65, which indicates that integrating the moral foundations into the equation improves the correct prediction of a diaspora member's hawkishness.

*Table 26: Percent and Expected Percent Correctly of Observations Correctly Predicted by Logistic Regression Model*

	Logistic Regression Model
Percent Correctly Predicted	72%
Expected Percent Correctly Predicted	63%

*Fig. 26: ROC Plot*



diaspora members who highly value the identity preserving morals are likely to hold hawkish preferences toward homeland conflicts, but diaspora members who score highly on the homogenizing morals are less likely to have hawkish attitudes. My statistical analysis provides a reasonable degree of support for the theorized relationships between the moral foundations and individuals' development of hawkish attitudes, both in the immediate results from the logistic regression and the predicted probabilities associated with the statistically significant key independent variables. Specifically, I find that higher scores on the identity preserving moral that achieves statistical significance, purity, are associated with a higher likelihood of a diaspora member being hawkish. Conversely, lower scores on both statistically significant homogenizing morals, including the authority and fair foundations, predict higher probabilities of diaspora members holding hawkish preferences.

The logistic regression results illustrate that all of the moral foundations behave as expected, but the variables representing the care and loyalty morals fail to achieve statistical significance. While these morals may not actually be significantly related to the probability with which a diaspora member is hawkish, the quality of the questions operationalized to

measure these morals may be suboptimal. I operationalize the questions that most closely approximate the care and loyalty morals as the measures for these variables. However, the Arab Barometer is conducted with a focus on political institutions and democracy; thus, many of the questions are framed in the context of appropriate policies enacted by the government. Specifically, I operationalize individuals' beliefs regarding whether the government should be responsible for social protection and health insurance for the poor as their valuation of care. In fact, an individual might score highly on the care moral if asked directly about whether relieving the suffering of the vulnerable members of the population is important or if asked a similar question in which religious, not political, institutions were responsible for the poor. A question that more closely approximates the care moral foundation might better demonstrate the relationship between the care moral and hawkish preferences. Similarly, identification of a question for the loyalty moral, which assesses individuals' esteem for salient subgroups, is difficult. The majority of the survey questions related to national, cultural, or religious loyalty are framed in the context of the respondents' residential state, which is Jordan for the Palestinian diaspora members surveyed. This is problematic in that such questions may not appropriately evaluate diaspora members' loyalty to the Palestinian people. While I operationalize loyalty as respondents' interest in resolving the Palestinian issue, alternative questions might better appraise diaspora members' esteem for loyalty and demonstrate a statistically significant relationship with the probability of a diaspora member holding hawkish preferences.

The results of my empirical analysis are intuitive. The identity preserving morals serve to maintain intra-group links and promote an "othering" of those that do not belong to the diaspora or its homeland population. Thus, diaspora members that score highly on the identity preserving morals are more likely to be motivated to opt for extreme measures to achieve their objectives in the homeland. These extreme measures may include violence, and hawkish preferences among diaspora members illustrates such toleration or preference for violence. Alternatively, diaspora members that highly value homogenizing morals are more likely to defer to host state institutions and favor equality of treatment across all subgroups of the population in their host state and homeland. Thus, diaspora members who highly rank the



homogenizing morals are less likely to tolerate the use of violence or hold hawkish preferences.

Future scholarship on the study of psychological determinants of political preferences will benefit from theoretical and empirical expansion. MFT, when framed in the novel configuration of identity preserving versus homogenizing morals that I propose, provides insights on the determinants of hawkish attitudes among diaspora members. Similar reworking of MFT to examine foreign policy preferences among population subgroups offers a useful new direction in international relations literature. Mansfield and Mutz identify that individuals' preferences on economic foreign policy decisions are frequently influenced by concerns about the domestic economy as a whole rather than individuals' rational self interest (2009). However, IR scholars have yet to theorize how such sociotropic preferences develop. Kertzer et al. make a useful initial step in this direction by using MFT to account for foreign policy attitudes of the population at large (2014). I endeavor here to continue in this vein of scholarship, and ensuing research in IR should undertake efforts to fill this preference formation gap by building on insights from political psychology, specifically MFT.

Furthermore, future analyses of diaspora preference formation should work to incorporate a variety of types of diasporas and host states in which they reside. The analysis here offers a useful preliminary effort to account for diaspora members' political attitudes, but data limitations require that I focus on conflict-motivated diasporas residing in developing states. Future data collection efforts should include surveys of diaspora members that are both conflict- and opportunity-driven. Additionally, such surveys should be conducted on diasporas residing in WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) states. An expansion of the data in both of these areas will allow diaspora scholars to consider whether the theoretical expectations posited here hold across various empirical contexts.

In addition to providing a cohesive theoretical framework to account for hawkish attitudes among diaspora members toward their homeland conflicts, this analysis has implications for policymakers. When diaspora members score highly on the homogenizing morals, they are less likely to have hawkish preferences. Policymakers in diasporas' host states that are interested in curbing hawkish attitudes among diaspora groups should enact

policies that increase the appeal of such morals among diaspora members. For example, policies that minimize diaspora members' perception of the mainstream population and diaspora group as disparate entities may inhibit hawkish attitude development. Thus, integration-oriented policies, such as language or job training, may prove useful in undermining the development of diaspora members' hawkish preferences.

## **CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION**

This project address several questions regarding the roles diasporas adopt in transnational contentious politics. Under what conditions do some diasporas participate in contentious politics in their homelands? How do such interventions affect the termination of homeland conflicts? Why do some diaspora members become hawkish regarding homeland politics? This dissertation provides answers to these questions in the three previous empirical chapters. First, I identify the integration-related conditions that increase the probability with which diasporas participate by providing economic, material, or diplomatic aid to conflict actors in their homeland. Second, I formally analyze the effects of dovish and hawkish diaspora intervention on the resolutions of conflicts in diasporas' homelands. Last, I examine the individual-level psychological factors that contribute to diasporas' acquisition of hawkish attitudes regarding civil conflicts in their homelands.

My concluding chapter summarizes the theoretical frameworks and primary findings of the quantitative analyses in the three empirical chapters. I next discuss the substantive conclusions of this research for academics and the implications for policymakers. I then include the future steps in further development of this vein of research. I conclude by discussing the contribution of this dissertation to the larger literature on support from external actors in civil wars.

### **Why do diasporas intervene in homeland civil conflicts?**

Chapter 2 considers the motivations of diasporas abroad to reengage in contentious politics in their homelands. Building on sociological research on integration of immigrants, I argue that diasporas experience integration on a spectrum, ranging from dissimilation, in which diaspora members are completely separated, to incorporation, in which they are fully integrated into mainstream society of their host states. In the moderate range of integration, diaspora members experience segmented assimilation, in which they have access to some, but not all, resources and opportunities available in their host states. Moderately integrated

diasporas, thus, have both the will and the ability to intervene in politics in their homelands because they have the means to provide aid and are simultaneously insufficiently socially integrated into their host states. I provide empirical evidence in favor of this proposition using logistical analyses of diasporas residing in OECD host states from 2000 to 2009.

The theoretical mechanism of integration and empirical findings regarding its impact on diaspora aid to militants in diasporas' homelands produces both novel insights for academics and useful implications for policymakers. While qualitative case studies examining diasporas' role in civil wars in their homelands exist, this study offers the first explanation regarding diaspora intervention in their homelands that is based on quantitative analyses and generalizable results across varying diasporas, homelands, and host states. For policymakers, these findings suggest the importance of continued diaspora integration in an effort to propel diaspora members toward the incorporation phase of integration, in which they lack the motivation to send support to homeland militants. Specifically, policymakers should continue or expand programs designed to aid in the social, economic, and political integration of diaspora members into mainstream society.

In terms of future work, I plan to augment this current analyses by collecting new data that expands my operationalization of both the dependent and independent variables. Specifically, the current analysis focuses exclusively on diaspora support to conflict actors. In the future, I plan to identify mechanisms that produce and gather data regarding diasporas' efforts to contribute to peace-building and conflict resolution in their homelands. Additionally, my current measure of the independent variables relies on an economic indicator of diasporas' integration, their annual income. In the future, I plan to extend this measure to evaluate the impact of social and political factors related to integration, as well.

### **How does diaspora support affect conflict termination?**

The third chapter evaluates the effects of diaspora influence on civil conflicts in their homelands using a game theoretic model. While the signaling model I employ allows for the existence of multiple types of diaspora sponsors given the nonunitary nature of diaspora actors, I find that diasporas' attitudes regarding the quality of peace produced by negotiations actually affect duration and outcome of homeland civil conflicts. Although a negotiated

settlement between militants and the homeland government becomes more likely as the government weakens, I identify that the conditions most promising for peace occur when the intervening diaspora is optimistic about the prospect of the deal produced by negotiations between homeland conflict actors. I provide empirical evidence, using data from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the attitudes of the Palestinian diaspora in the U.S. as illustrated through press releases from the ATFP, to support the proposition that optimism improves the potential for peaceful or cooperative interactions between homeland conflict actors.

The hypothesis derived from my formal model regarding the significance of diaspora attitudes has implications for both the academic and policymaking communities. My model contributes to the substantive literature on passive support from diaspora communities by examining a manner by which diasporas can influence conflict and peace in their homelands. Additionally, the solution to my formal model offers a novel insight for game theorists by proposing conditions under which a standard assumption in bargaining theory might be questioned. Specifically, scholars typically assume that rational actors accept any deal that is offered that provides a utility at least equal to the utility of conflict. I find that some circumstances exist in which rational actors might reject an offer that appears to have a utility equal to or greater than conflict to activate passive support from diaspora communities abroad and thereby achieve a higher utility than the proposed concessions. The model's implication, and the empirical analyses to test this finding, suggest that diasporas offer a unique opportunity for the governments in the host states in which they live. Specifically, state actors might opt to harness the peace-building potential of diasporas. For example, efforts to improve diasporas' attitudes toward homeland conflicts by incorporating diaspora members into mediation and negotiation efforts may aid in earlier termination of homeland civil conflicts.

Future steps in this project are primarily empirical in nature. Specifically, I aim to expand the temporal depth of the quantitative analysis in the specific case of the impact of the Palestinian diaspora on peace-oriented interactions between Palestinians and Israelis, as well as the geographic breadth by evaluating the role of additional diasporas from other

homelands. While I collected available data from 2003 to 2015 regarding American Palestinian attitudes toward the conflict in their homeland and cooperative incidents between Israelis and Palestinians, I would like to extend this time frame to include major negotiations that occurred between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government in Oslo in the early 1990s. Moreover, I would like to widen my analysis to also evaluate the effects of diasporas originating from homelands in diverse regions of the world. Examples of such diasporas might include the Colombian American diaspora and the negotiations between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the Irish American diaspora and the Good Friday Agreement.

### **Why do some diaspora members become hawkish?**

Chapter 4 asks why some diaspora members develop hawkish attitudes toward civil conflicts in their homelands. Using insights from political and social psychology, I argue that diaspora members who strongly associate with the identity-preserving morals (care, loyalty, and purity) are more likely to hold aggressive preferences regarding contentious politics in their homelands. Conversely, diaspora members that weakly identify with the homogenizing morals (authority and fairness) are less likely to be hawkish. I empirically show this using individual-level data from Palestinian diaspora members residing in Jordan.

The fourth empirical chapter provides new, individual-level findings on a previously understudied group in political science, psychology, and sociology that are useful to academics and policymakers. Specifically, I provide a new theoretical framework for understanding how a unique social group obtains preferences regarding contentious politics. Furthermore, the psychologically based analysis suggests that policymakers should undertake efforts to reduce the probability with which diaspora members will hold identity-preserving morals and increase the potential for diaspora members to develop homogenizing morals. This implies that host state government should undertake efforts, such as language and job training programs, to promote the integration of diaspora members.

In terms of future steps for this project, I plan to use MFT to evaluate diasporas' foreign policy preferences in alternative contexts. For example, the current analysis in the fourth chapter exclusively considers the Palestinian diaspora in Jordan due to data limitations.

However, I plan to run my own surveys in the future to consider diasporas originating from other homelands and residing in other states. I believe the findings regarding diasporas' moral foundations will hold across different economic development levels of host states, but I would like to provide empirical evidence to support this.

## **Final Remarks**

In addition to the theoretical insights and empirical findings presented in the individual chapters, this dissertation makes a unique contribution to the literature on external support to civil conflict actors. First, my work offers the first global empirical measure of diaspora support in homeland civil wars from 2000 to 2009, as well as a quantitative test that provides evidence to account for why such support occurs. This improves on past work concerning diasporas, which is predominantly qualitative in nature. Second, I offer a novel formal model to evaluate decision-making by actors involved in civil conflicts in which a diaspora sponsor participates. This represents an important step forward in the analytical rigor scholars apply to diasporas while also recognizing and analyzing the potentially non-rational motivations for diasporas' strategies. Third, this dissertation provides a useful interdisciplinary approach to understanding the role of an increasingly relevant transnational actor in international relations.

Finally, this dissertation offers several opportunities for future research on diaspora participation in contentious politics in their homelands. For example, I plan to add an additional quantitative test that evaluates a direct measure of diaspora support to homeland conflicts, which will produce substantively interesting and policy-relevant conclusions regarding diaspora participation. I have collected data on this measure for the universe of cases identified by the Nonstate Actor Dataset from 2000 to 2009. I plan to expand this empirical measure of diaspora support to 1964 to 2010. Additionally, I plan to conduct surveys on diasporas in the U.S. to analyze whether identity-preserving morals predict hawkishness among diaspora members in Western, industrialized societies. Last, several additional opportunities to examine the impact of diasporas on international politics exist, including the role of diasporas on foreign aid decisions by host states and institution development in post-conflict environments in diasporas' homelands.

## APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2

Table 27: Major Variables of Interest in Dataset in Secondary Analysis

Dyad	Host	Year	Dia. Sup	Inc. Rat.	(Inc. Rat.) <sup>2</sup>	ln(Home GDP)	Home Reg.	Host Glob.	Dist.
Sri Lanka-LTTE	Hungary	2000	1	1.63	2.65	10.96	2	77.25	7314
India-Naxalites	Norway	2004	0	0.77	0.59	14.73	3	86.72	6037
Israel-Hamas	New Zealand	2009	1	1.07	1.115	12.01	3	74.16	16327

Table 28: Identification of Frequency of OECD Host States in Secondary Analysis

Host State	Frequency of Observations	Frequency of Dyads
Australia	2	1
Austria	53	22
Belgium	21	7
Canada	11	1
Denmark	43	10
Greece	16	9
Hungary	13	2
Ireland	37	10
Luxembourg	37	7
Netherlands	1	1
New Zealand	83	21
Norway	71	16
Spain	15	2
Sweden	4	1
Switzerland	48	10
United Kingdom	20	4

Table 29: Correlation between Independent and Control Variables in Secondary Analysis

	Inc. Ratio	(Inc. Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	ln(Home GDP)	Home Reg.	Distance	Host Glob.
Inc. Ratio	1	0.988	0.340	0.440	0.101	0.181
(Inc. Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	0.988	1	0.346	0.425	0.145	0.178
ln(Home GDP)	0.340	0.346	1	0.440	-0.115	0.212
Home Reg.	0.440	0.425	0.440	1	-0.164	0.211
Distance	0.101	0.145	-0.115	-0.164	1	-0.247
Host Glob.	0.181	0.178	0.212	0.211	-0.247	1



Fig. 27: Distribution of Diaspora Incomes over Time in Primary Model




Fig. 28: Predicted Probability of Diaspora Support Conditional on U.S.-based Diaspora:Native Income Ratios




Table 30: Sources of Diaspora Support Associated with Militant Groups I

Militant Group	Sources			
CNDD-FDD	NSA <sup>1</sup>	NAG <sup>2</sup>	Byman 2001 <sup>3</sup>	Sellstrom 2015 <sup>4</sup>
Palipehutu-FNL	NSA	McCulloch 2014 <sup>5</sup>		
LTTE	NSA	NAG	Richardson 2013 <sup>6</sup>	HRW <sup>7</sup>
Opp. All.	NSA	Stedman et al. 2002 <sup>8</sup>		
FDLR	NSA	Stedman et al. 2002 <sup>8</sup>		
MFDC	NAG	Griffiths 2013 <sup>9</sup>		
GIA	NSA	Byman 2001	UCDP Ext. Sup. <sup>10</sup>	U.S. DoS Terr. <sup>11</sup>
AQIM	U.S. DoS Terr.	NAG		
PJAK	NSA	NAG	Costigan&Gold 2007 <sup>12</sup>	MAROB <sup>13</sup>
PKK/Kadek	NSA	NAG	UCDP Ext. Sup	MAROB
Rep. of S. Ossetia	NSA	DADM <sup>14</sup>		
Rep. of Chechnya	NSA	NAG	Brody 2017 <sup>15</sup>	
ADF	U.S. DoS Terr.	Scorgie-Porter 2015 <sup>16</sup>	NAG	

<sup>1</sup> NSA refers to the case description notes associated with the Non-state Actor Data: Version 3.4 (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> NAG refers to the Non-state Armed Group Dataset (San-Akca, 2016).

<sup>3</sup> “Byman’s Out. Sup.” refers to Byman’s Outside Support for Insurgencies, 1991-2000 (Byman et al., 2001).

<sup>4</sup> Sellstrom, Angela. 2015. Stronger than Justice: Armed Group Impunity for Sexual Violence. Technical report, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

<sup>5</sup> McCulloch, Allison. 2014. *Power-Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies*. Routledge.

<sup>6</sup> Richardson, Louise. 2013. *The roots of terrorism*. Routledge.

<sup>7</sup> *Funding the “Final War:” LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora*. 2006. Reuters.

<sup>8</sup> Stedman, Stephen John, Donald S. Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens. 2002. *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

<sup>9</sup> Griffiths, Claire, ed. 2013. *Contesting Historical Divides in Francophone Africa*. University of Chester Press.

<sup>10</sup> Hogbladh, Stina, Therese Pettersson, and Lotta Themner. 2011. “External Support in Armed Conflict 1975-2009, Version 1.0.”

<sup>11</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism*. 2000-2009. United States Department of State-Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

<sup>12</sup> Costigan, Sean and David Gold. 2007. *Terronomics* Routledge.

<sup>13</sup> Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) “Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior Dataset.” College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

<sup>14</sup> Mullenbach, Mar J. 2017. Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. University of Central Arkansas.

<sup>15</sup> Brody, Marc. 2017. “The Chechen Diaspora in Turkey.” *North Caucasus Weekly* 6.

<sup>16</sup> Scorgie-Porter, Lindsay. 2015. “Economic Survival and Borderland Rebellion: The Case of the Allied Democratic Forces on the Uganda-Congo Border.” *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*.

Table 31: Sources of Diaspora Support Associated with Militant Groups II

Militant Group	Sources
BLA	NAG MMO 2015 <sup>17</sup>
Kashmir ins.	NSA Byman 2001 USIP <sup>18</sup>
AQAP	Byman 2012 <sup>19</sup> Aly et al. 2016 <sup>20</sup>
Fatah	Vittori 2011 <sup>21</sup> NAG Barhoum 2017 <sup>22</sup> DADM
PIJ	NAG Trinkunas&Giraldo 2007 <sup>23</sup>
Hamas	NAG Clarke 2015 <sup>24</sup>
PFLP	NAG U.S. DoS Terr. Richardson 2013
PNA	Vittori 2011 Barhoum 2017 DADM
Ansar al-Islam	U.S. DoS Terr. NAG MMO 2015
ISI	U.S. DoS Terr. NAG MMO 2015
SLM/A	NSA UCDP Ext. Sup. Hale&Kadaoda 2016 <sup>25</sup> NAG
JEM	U.S. DoS Terr. Merz et al. 2007 <sup>26</sup>
NRF	Small Arms Survey <sup>27</sup> Sassen 3007 <sup>28</sup>
SPLM	Byman 2001 Madibbo 2015 <sup>29</sup>
EIJM	NSA USIP <sup>30</sup>
Taliban	Clarke 2015 Helfont 2012 <sup>31</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Mapping Militant Organizations*. 2017. Stanford University.

<sup>18</sup> *The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict: Opportunities for Economic Peacebuilding and for U.S. Policy*. 2004. United States Institute of Peace.

<sup>19</sup> Byman, Daniel. 2012. "Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliate Organizations." Saban Center at Brookings.

<sup>20</sup> Aly, Anne, Stuart MacDonald, Lee Jarvis Thomas Chen. 2016. *Violent Extremism Online*. Routledge.

<sup>21</sup> Vittori, J. 2011. *Terrorist Financing and Resourcing* Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>22</sup> Barhoum, Khalil. 2017. "The Origin and History of the PLO."

<sup>23</sup> Trinkunas, Harold and Jeanne Giraldo. 2007. *Terrorism Financing and State Response*. Stanford University Press.

<sup>24</sup> Clarke, Colin. 2015. *Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare*. Praeger.

<sup>25</sup> Hale, Sondra and Gada Kadoda, eds. 2016. *Networks of Knowledge Production in Sudan: Identities, Mobilities, and Technologies*. Lexington Books.

<sup>26</sup> Merz, Barbara, Lincoln Chen and Peter Geithner, eds. 2007. *Diasporas and Development*. Harvard University Press.

<sup>27</sup> Tanner, Victor and Jerome Tubiana. 2007. *Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups*. Small Arms Survey.

<sup>28</sup> Sassen, Saskia. 2007. *Deciphering the Global: Its Scales, Spaces, and Subjects*. Routledge.

<sup>29</sup> Madibbo, Amal. 2015. *Canada in Sudan, Sudan in Canada: Immigration, Conflict, and Reconstruction*. MQUP.

<sup>30</sup> *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. 2004. United States Institute of Peace.

<sup>31</sup> Helfont, Tally. 2012. "The Foreign Fighter Problem: Recent Trends and Case Studies." Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Table 32: Sources of Diaspora Support Associated with Militant Groups III

Militant Group	Sources			
UIFSA	Byman 2001	NAG	Salehyan et al. 2011 <sup>32</sup>	
Al-Shabaab	NSA	Hammond&Ali 2012 <sup>33</sup>	Miller 2010 <sup>34</sup>	NAG
Hizbul-Islam	Tarrosy et al. 2011 <sup>35</sup>	Ozerdem&Podder 2015 <sup>36</sup>	NAG	
MEK	U.S. DoS Terr.	Costigan&Gold 2007	NAG	DADM
LURD	Brabazon 2003 <sup>37</sup>	Tan 2006 <sup>38</sup>	NAG	DADM
FLRN	Sprague 2012 <sup>39</sup>	Chossudovsky 2004 <sup>40</sup>		
RUF	Hazen 2013 <sup>41</sup>	NAG		
Rep. of Nagorno-Karabakh	NSA	Minasyan 2011 <sup>42</sup>	NAG	
OLF	Byman 2001	Lyons 2009 <sup>43</sup>	NAG	
IMU	U.S. DoS Terr.	Richardson 2013		
JIG	Byman 2012	Richardson 2013	U.S. DoS Terr.	NAG
UFDR	NSA	NAG	USCIRF <sup>44</sup>	
CPJP	NSA	NAG	USCIRF	
Al Qaida	NSA	NAG	U.S. DoS Terr.	
Patani ins.	Casino 2012 <sup>45</sup>	NAG		
Hezbollah	U.S. DoS Terr.	NAG	Levitt 2013 <sup>46</sup>	Clarke 2015

<sup>32</sup> Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham. 2011. "Explaining external support for insurgent groups." *International Organization*. 65(4).

<sup>33</sup> Hammond, Laura and Ibrahim Ali. *Case and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peacebuilding*. 2012. Chatham House.

<sup>34</sup> Miller, Greg. 2010. "U.S. charges 14 with giving support to Somali insurgent group." *The Washington Post*.

<sup>35</sup> Tarrosy, Istavan, Lorand Szabo and Goran Hyden. 2011. *The African State in a Changing Global Context: Breakdowns and Transformations*. Lit Verlag.

<sup>36</sup> Ozerdem, A. and S. Podder. 2015. *Youth in Conflict and Peacebuilding*. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>37</sup> Brabazon, James. 2003. Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Technical report. The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>38</sup> Tan, Andrew. 2006. *Politics of Terrorism: A Survey*. Routledge.

<sup>39</sup> Sprague, Jeb. 2012. *Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti*. Monthly Review Press.

<sup>40</sup> Chossudovsky, Michel. 2004. "Ten Years Ago: U.S. Sponsored Coup d'Etat. The Destabilization of Haiti." *Global Research*.

<sup>41</sup> Hazen, Jennifer. 2013. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Cornell University Press.

<sup>42</sup> Minasyan, Kayz. *The Relations between the Diaspora and Nagorno-Karabakh: Information, Development Process, Solidarity*. 2011.

<sup>43</sup> Lyons, Terrence. 2009. "The Ethiopian Diaspora and Homeland Conflict." Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies.

<sup>44</sup> *Increasing Sectarianism and Violence in the Central African Republic*. 2013. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.

<sup>45</sup> Casino, Vincent Del. 2012. "Drugs, sex and the geographies of sexual health in Thailand, Southeast Asia." *Social and Cultural Geography*.

<sup>46</sup> Levitt, Matthew. 2013. "Hezbollah as a Criminal Organization." *The Washington Institute*.

Table 33: Types of Diaspora Support

Militant Group	Types of Diaspora Support		
CNDD-FDD		Military	Political
Palipehutu-FNL		Military	Political
LTTE	Financial		
Opp. All.			Political
FDLR			Political
MFDC		Military	Political
GIA	Financial	Military	Political
AQIM	Financial	Military	
PJAK	Financial		Political
PKK/Kadek	Financial		Political
Rep. of S. Ossetia			Political
Rep. of Chechnya	Financial	Military	
ADF	Financial		
BLA	Financial	Military	
Kashmir ins.	Financial		
AQAP	Financial		
Fatah	Financial		
PIJ	Financial		
Hamas	Financial	Military	
PFLP	Financial	Military	
PNA	Financial		
Ansar al-Islam	Financial		
ISI	Financial		
SLM/A	Financial		
JEM	Financial		
NRF	Financial	Military	Political
SPLM	Financial		Political
EIJM			Political
Taliban	Financial		Political
UIFSA	Financial		
Al-Shabaab		Military	
Hizbul-Islam		Military	
MEK	Financial		
LURD		Military	Political
FLRN	Financial		
RUF	Financial		
Rep. of Nagorno-Karabakh	Financial		Political
OLF	Financial		Political
IMU	Financial	Military	Political
JIG	Financial	Military	Political
UFDR		Military	
CPJP		Military	
Al Qaida	Financial		
Patani ins.	Financial		
Hezbollah	Financial		

Table 34: Summary Statistics of Continuous Independent and Control Variables in Secondary Analysis

	Minimum	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Maximum
Income Ratio	0.40	0.90	0.80	0.30	1.80
Dist. from Home to Host State	1540.00	8131.90	6037.00	3993.50	16327.00
Host State Globalization	66.40	84.10	85.50	6.30	92.90

Table 35: Logistic Regressions Results with U.S.-based Diasporas

	U.S.-based Diasporas Model
(Intercept)	−20.43**** (3.32)
Income Ratio	28.56**** (4.27)
(Income Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	−13.41**** (1.86)
$\ln(\text{Homeland GDP})$	−0.07 (0.09)
Homeland Regime Type	0.11 (0.19)
Distance between Homeland and Host State	0.00*** (0.00)
Host State Globalization	0.07** (0.03)
$N$	438
AIC	469.23
BIC	583.54
$\log L$	−206.62

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$

Fig. 29: ROC Plots for Primary and Secondary Models Excluding Key Independent Variables




Table 36: Logistic Regression with Fixed Effects Results

	Host State	Homeland	Year	Host State and Year
(Intercept)	−13.26 (3765.81)	32.39 (17730.43)	−21.66**** (4.03)	−5.57 (3764.67)
Income Ratio	23.56**** (4.35)	63.05* (36.14)	18.71**** (3.04)	23.58**** (4.38)
(Income Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	−13.14**** (2.17)	−32.89** (15.63)	−11.67**** (1.62)	−13.16**** (2.19)
$\ln(\text{Homeland GDP})$	−0.14 (0.11)	−2.17 (1.91)	0.00 (0.07)	−0.15 (0.11)
Homeland Regime Type	0.57** (0.24)	2.23** (0.94)	0.75**** (0.22)	0.59** (0.25)
Homeland-Host State Distance	0.00** (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00**** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Host State Globalization	−0.17 (0.17)	0.04 (0.51)	0.15**** (0.04)	−0.25 (0.39)
$N$	438	438	438	438
AIC	393.59	237.19	451.07	409.93
BIC	654.86	1102.62	712.34	818.16
$\log L$	−132.80	93.41	−161.54	−104.97

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$

Table 37: Logistic Regressions Results with Battle Deaths Control Variable

	<b>Primary Model:</b> Majority Diaspora Host	<b>Secondary Model:</b> Median Diaspora Host
(Intercept)	−20.63**** (4.59)	−14.73**** (3.92)
Income Ratio	20.07**** (4.31)	22.04**** (3.57)
(Income Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	−12.32**** (2.22)	−8.20**** (1.45)
$\ln(\text{Homeland GDP})$	0.08 (0.09)	0.04 (0.08)
Homeland Regime Type	0.78*** (0.24)	0.25 (0.25)
Homeland-Host State Distance	0.00*** (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Host State Globalization	0.11*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
Battle Deaths	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
$N$	327	327
AIC	324.60	368.59
BIC	445.88	489.87
$\log L$	−130.30	−152.30

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$



Table 38: Logistic Regression Results with Alternative Measures of Diaspora Support (Primary Model)

	<b>Financial</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Financial and Military</b>
(Intercept)	−19.81**** (4.44)	−13.70**** (4.13)	−7.14** (3.48)	−18.83**** (3.67)
Income Ratio	26.41**** (4.74)	13.59*** (5.01)	−0.39 (3.03)	18.69**** (3.00)
(Income Ratio) <sup>2</sup>	−15.53**** (2.42)	−8.59*** (2.66)	−1.78 (1.71)	−11.83**** (1.62)
$\ln(\text{Homeland GDP})$	0.56**** (0.09)	−0.29**** (0.08)	−0.48**** (0.09)	0.08 (0.07)
Homeland Regime Type	0.24 (0.22)	0.46* (0.28)	−0.02 (0.27)	0.77**** (0.21)
Homeland-Host State Distance	0.00** (0.00)	−0.00* (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	0.00**** (0.00)
Host State Globalization	0.01 (0.03)	0.12**** (0.04)	0.16**** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.03)
$N$	438	438	438	438
AIC	395.90	292.85	281.40	427.47
BIC	510.20	407.15	395.70	541.77
$\log L$	−169.95	−118.42	−112.70	−185.73

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$


\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$

## APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3

### Formal Model

#### Game Preliminaries


Fig. 30: Complete List of Cases



To illustrate the effects of D's decisions on the payoffs of M and G, consider Case 3, in which both  $D_D$  and  $D_H$  are optimistic about the outcome of negotiations for M. In this case, G may offer lower ( $x^*=1-p-C_M$ ) or higher concessions ( $x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$ ). If G makes the lower offer,  $D_D$  is disappointed because this offer falls below  $D_D$ 's optimistic expectations regarding concessions ( $\hat{x}_D > 1-p-C_M$ ).  $D_D$ , therefore, rewards M for rejecting this low offer by providing aid (parameterized as  $\theta$ ). This aid increases the militants capacity and the payoff to  $1-\theta p-C_M$ , which is higher than G's low concessions ( $1-\theta p-C_M > 1-p-C_M$ ).


If G offers higher concessions ( $x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$ ),  $D_D$  is disappointed because G's offer remains less than  $D_D$ 's optimistic expected outcome of negotiations ( $\hat{x}_D > 1-p-C_M$ ). Thus,  $D_D$  rewards M for rejecting the offer of  $x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$ . This increases M's payoff to  $1-\theta p-C_M$ . Therefore, M obtains the same utility from accepting G's offer of  $x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$  and rejecting

Fig. 31: Cases Surviving Assumption



the deal, which activates diaspora aid and raises M's payoff to  $x^*=1-\theta p-C_M$ . To prevent future conflict, G offers concessions that match M's utility with diaspora aid activated,  $1-\theta p-C_M$ , in Case 3. The levels of concessions for militants with dovish and hawkish diaspora sponsors are similarly derived for all intervals and displayed in Figure 32.

Fig. 32: Equilibrium Offers within Intervals



Of the six cases that survive the assumption, I focus on the cases representing unique equilibrium solutions. D's type and attitude toward negotiations determine the level of concessions G offers within a specific interval. G may make the same offer in different intervals because D's attitude regarding negotiations may be effectively same across intervals.<sup>128</sup> Furthermore, some cases have identical solutions because G's offer of concessions in various intervals of the remaining cases is a function of the combination of D's attitude regarding the outcome of negotiations, which may represent the same values of concessions.<sup>129</sup> Finally, if M are indifferent between accepting and rejecting G's offer, I make

<sup>128</sup>For example, in the interval representing  $D_H$ 's pessimism toward negotiations, M receive the same offer as when  $D_H$  is optimistic toward negotiations ( $x^*=1-p-C_M$ ) because G is aware M will accept concessions within the interval  $[1-p-C_M, x_H]$ ,  $[1-\theta p-C_M]$ . G, to maximize its own utility, makes the efficient offer of lowest possible concessions ( $x_H^*=1-p-C_M$ ).


<sup>129</sup>For example, the solution to Case 5 includes the same values of concessions made by the government as

a standard assumption in bargaining theory that M accept the offer.<sup>130</sup>

### Equilibrium Solutions to Cases 1, 2, and 3

#### Case 1

Fig. 33: Case 1 Continuum



#### Separating with $\sigma_{M_D}$ =negotiate and $\sigma_{M_H}$ =attack

$M_D$  accept if  $x \geq X_{D^*}$ , with  $X_{D^*} \geq \hat{x}_D$ .

$M_H$  accept if  $x \geq X_{H^*}$ , with  $X_{H^*} = 1 - p - C_M$ .

G's utilities:

$$U_G(\text{ignore}) = \theta p - C_G$$

$$U_G(x = 0) = \theta p - C_G$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_G(x = X_{D^*}) &= 1 - X_{D^*} \\ &= 1 - \hat{x}_D \end{aligned}$$

G is indifferent between ignoring and offering 0:

$$U_G(\text{ignore}) = U_G(x = 0)$$

$$\theta p - C_G = \theta p - C_G$$

G prefers to offer  $X_{D^*}$  rather than ignore or offer 0 when  $p < \hat{p}$ :

$$U_G(x = X_{D^*}) \geq U_G(\text{ignore}, x = 0)$$

$$p < \frac{1 - \hat{x}_D + C_G}{\theta} = \hat{p}$$

those made in Case 3. Similarly, the equilibrium solution to Case 6 is based on the same values of concessions made by the government as those made in Case 1. Thus, I report the solutions to these four cases just once per unique solution (in Cases 1 and 2).

<sup>130</sup>In Case 4,  $M_H$  are indifferent between accepting and rejecting  $\hat{x}_D$ , so I assume they accept G's deal. Therefore, the solution in Case 4 is identification to the solution in Case 3.

$M_{D,H}$ 's initial decisions:

When G ignores, neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate}) &\geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack}) \\
 1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M \\
 U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) &\geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate}) \\
 1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M
 \end{aligned}$$

**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{ignore}$ .

When G offers 0, neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate}) &\geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack}) \\
 1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M \\
 U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) &\geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate}) \\
 1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M
 \end{aligned}$$

**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{offer } 0$ .

When G offers  $X_D^*$ , neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate, accept}) &\geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack}) \\
 \hat{X}_D = X_D^* &\geq 1 - p - C_M \\
 U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) &\geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate}) \\
 1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M
 \end{aligned}$$

**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^* = \hat{X}_D$ .

Separating with  $\sigma_{M_D} = \text{attack}$  and  $\sigma_{M_H} = \text{negotiate}$

$\nexists$  equilibria in Case 1  $\therefore M_D$  have dominant strategy to negotiate when G offers  $X_D^*$  (and  $M_D$  accept) or  $X_H^*$  (and  $M_D$  reject).

Pooling on Negotiate

$M_D$  accept if  $x \geq X_D^*$ , with  $X_D^* \geq \hat{X}_D$ .

$M_H$  accept if  $x \geq X_H^*$ , with  $X_H^* = 1 - p - C_M$ .

G's utilities:

$$EU_G(\text{ignore}) = \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(p - C_G)$$

$$= \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G$$

$$EU_G(x = 0) = \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(p - C_G)$$

$$= \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G$$

$$EU_G(x = X_D^* | M_H \text{ accept}) = \mu_D(1 - \hat{X}_D) + (1 - \mu_D)(1 - \hat{X}_D)$$

$$= 1 - \hat{X}_D$$

$$= \mu_D(1 - \hat{X}_D - \theta p + C_G) + \theta p - C_G$$

$$EU_G(x = X_H^*) = \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(1 - X_H^*)$$

$$= p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p)$$

G is indifferent between offering 0 and ignoring  $\therefore$

$$EU_G(\text{ignore}) = EU_G(x = 0)$$

$$\mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G = \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G$$

G's offer of  $X_H^*$  dominates offering 0 and ignoring  $\therefore$

$$EU_G(x = X_H^*) \geq EU_G(\text{ignore}, x = 0)$$

$$p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p) \geq \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G$$

$$C_G(1 - \mu_D) + C_M(1 - \mu_D) \geq 0$$

Solving for  $\hat{X}_D$  level that makes G indifferent<sup>131</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(x = X_H^*) &= EU_G(x = X_D^*) \\
p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p) &= 1 - \hat{X}_D \\
\hat{X}_D &= 1 - p - C_M + \mu_D[p(1 - \theta) + C_G + C_M] \\
\hat{X}_D &= X_H^* + \mu_D[p(1 - \theta) + C_G + C_M]
\end{aligned}$$

G offers  $X_D^*$  when  $\mu_D \geq \hat{\mu}_D$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(x = X_D^*) &\geq EU_G(x = X_H^*) \\
1 - \hat{X}_D &\geq p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p) \\
\mu_D &\geq \frac{\hat{X}_D - X_H^*}{p(1 - \theta) + C_G + C_M} = \hat{\mu}_D
\end{aligned}$$

Alternatively, this can be solved in terms of  $p$  to show that G offers  $X_D^*$  when  $p < \hat{p}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(x = X_D^*) &\geq EU_G(x = X_H^*) \\
1 - \hat{X}_D &\geq p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p) \\
p &< \frac{1 - \hat{X}_D - C_M + \mu_D(C_G + C_M)}{1 - \mu_D + \mu_D\theta} = \hat{p}
\end{aligned}$$

$M_{D,H}$ 's initial decisions:

When G offers  $X_H^*$ ,  $M_H$  are incentivized to deviate and no equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate}, \text{reject}) &\geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack}) \\
1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M \\
U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) &\geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate}, \text{accept}) \\
1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M
\end{aligned}$$

---

<sup>131</sup>Note that  $\hat{X}_D = 1 - p - C_M$  iff  $\mu_D[p(1 - \theta) + C_G + C_M] = 0$ .

When G offers  $X_D^*$ ,  $M_H$  are incentivized to deviate and no equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate}, \text{accept}) \geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack})$$

$$\hat{x}_D \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

$$U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) \geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate}, \text{accept})$$


$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq \hat{x}_D$$

### Pooling on Attack

$\nexists$  equilibria in Case 1  $\therefore M_D$  have dominant strategy to negotiate when G offers  $X_D^*$  (and  $M_D$  accept) or  $X_H^*$  (and  $M_D$  reject).

### Case 2

Fig. 34: Case 2 Continuum



### Separating with $\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate}$ and $\sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack}$

$M_D$  accept if  $x \geq X_D^*$ , with  $X_D^* \geq \hat{X}_D$ .

$M_H$  accept if  $x \geq X_H^*$ , with  $X_H^* = 1 - p - C_M$ .

G's utilities:

$$U_G(\text{ignore}) = \theta p - C_G$$

$$U_G(x = 0) = \theta p - C_G$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_G(x = X_D^*) &= 1 - X_D^* \\ &= 1 - \hat{x}_D \end{aligned}$$

G is indifferent between ignoring and offering 0:

$$U_G(\text{ignore}) = U_G(x = 0)$$

$$\theta p - C_G = \theta p - C_G$$



G prefers to offer  $X_D^*$  rather than ignore or offer 0 when  $p < \hat{p}$ :

$$U_G(x = X_D^*) \geq U_G(\text{ignore}, x = 0)$$

$$p < \frac{1 - \hat{X}_D + C_G}{\theta} = \hat{p}$$

When G ignores, neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate}) \geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack})$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

$$U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) \geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate})$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, reject}\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{ignore}$ .

When G offers 0, neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate}) \geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack})$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

$$U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) \geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate})$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, reject}\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{offer 0}$ .

When G offers  $X_D^*$ , neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate, accept}) \geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack})$$

$$\hat{X}_D = X_D^* \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

$$U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) \geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate})$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{attack, reject}\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^* = \hat{X}_D$ .

Separating with  $\sigma_{M_D}$ =attack and  $\sigma_{M_H}$ =negotiate

$\nexists$  equilibria in Case 2  $\because M_D$  have dominant strategy to negotiate when G offers  $X_D^*$  (and  $M_D$  accept) or  $X_H^*$  (and  $M_D$  reject).

Pooling on Negotiate

$M_D$  accept if  $x \geq X_D^*$ , with  $X_D^* \geq \hat{X}_D$ .

$M_H$  accept if  $x \geq X_H^*$ , with  $X_H^* = 1 - p - C_M$ .

G's utilities:

$$EU_G(\text{ignore}) = \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(p - C_G)$$

$$= \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G$$

$$EU_G(x = 0) = \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(p - C_G)$$

$$= \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G$$

$$EU_G(x = X_D^* | M_H \text{ reject}) = \mu_D(1 - \hat{X}_D) + (1 - \mu_D)(\theta p - C_G)$$

$$= \mu_D(1 - \hat{X}_D - \theta p + C_G) + \theta p - C_G$$

$$EU_G(x = X_H^*) = \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(1 - X_H^*)$$

$$= p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p)$$

G is indifferent between offering 0 and ignoring  $\because$

$$EU_G(\text{ignore}) = EU_G(x = 0)$$

$$\mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G = \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G$$

G's offer of  $X_H^*$  dominates offering 0 and ignoring  $\because$

$$EU_G(x = X_H^*) \geq EU_G(\text{ignore}, x = 0)$$

$$p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p) \geq \mu_D(\theta p - p)$$

$$+ p - C_G$$

$$C_G(1 - \mu_D) + C_M(1 - \mu_D) \geq 0$$

Solving for  $\hat{X}_D$  level that makes G indifferent:

$$EU_G(x = X_H^*) = EU_G(x = X_D^*)$$

$$p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p) = \mu_D(1 - \hat{X}_D) + (1 - \mu_D)(\theta p - C_G)$$

$$\hat{X}_D = \frac{X_H^* (1 - \mu_D)}{\mu_D} - \frac{(1 - \theta p + C_G)(1 - 2\mu_D)}{\mu_D}$$

G offers  $X_D^*$  when  $\mu_D \geq \hat{\mu}_D$ :

$$EU_G(x = X_D^*) \geq EU_G(x = X_H^*)$$

$$\mu_D(1 - \hat{X}_D - \theta p + C_G) + \theta p - C_G \geq p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p)$$

$$\mu_D \geq \frac{p(1 - \theta) + C_G + C_M}{1 - \hat{X}_D - 2\theta p + 2C_G + p + C_M} = \hat{\mu}_D$$

Alternatively, this can be solved in terms of  $p$  to show that G offers  $X_D^*$  when  $p < \hat{\hat{p}}$ :<sup>132</sup>

$$\mu_D(1 - \hat{X}_D - \theta p + C_G) + \theta p - C_G \geq p + C_M - \mu_D(C_G + p + C_M - \theta p)$$

$$p < \frac{\mu_D(1 - \hat{X}_D + C_M + 2C_G) - C_G - C_M}{1 - \mu_D - \theta + 2\mu_d\theta} = \hat{\hat{p}}$$

$M_{D,H}$ 's initial decisions:

When G offers  $X_H^*$ ,  $M_H$  are incentivized to deviate and no equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate}, \text{reject}) \geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack})$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

$$U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) \geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate}, \text{accept})$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

---

<sup>132</sup>No equilibria exist when  $p > \hat{\hat{p}}$  and G offers  $x_H^*$  because the hawkish militants would deviate to attack since their payoff from attacking  $1 - \theta p - C_M$  exceeds their payoff from negotiating and accepting  $x_H^* = 1 - p - C_M$  or negotiating and rejecting when the diaspora does not support, which results in a payoff of  $1 - p - C_M$ .

When G offers  $X_D^*$ , neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate}, \text{accept}) \geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack})$$

$$\hat{X}_D \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

$$U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate}, \text{reject}) \geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack})$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - \theta p - C_M$$


**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate}, \text{accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{negotiate}, \text{reject}\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^*$  when  $\mu_D \geq \hat{\mu}_D$ .

### Pooling on Attack

$\nexists$  equilibria in Case 2  $\therefore M_D$  have dominant strategy to negotiate when G offers  $X_D^*$  (and  $M_D$  accept) or  $X_H^*$  (and  $M_D$  reject).

### Case 3

Fig. 35: Case 3 Continuum



### Separating with $\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate}$ , $\sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack}$

$M_D$  accept if  $x \geq X_D^*$ , with  $X_D^* = 1 - \theta p - C_M$ .

$M_H$  accept if  $x \geq X_H^*$ , with  $X_H^* = 1 - p - C_M$ .

G's utilities:

$$U_G(x = 0) = \theta p - C_G$$

$$U_G(\text{ignore}) = \theta p - C_G$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_G(x = X_D^*) &= 1 - X_D^*, X_D^* = 1 - \theta p - C_M \\ &= \theta p + C_M \end{aligned}$$

G is indifferent between ignoring and offering 0:

$$U_G(x = 0) = U_G(ignore)$$

$$\theta p - C_G = \theta p - C_G$$

G prefers to offer  $X_D^*$  rather than ignore or offer 0:

$$EU_G(x = X_D^*) \geq EU_G(ignore, x = 0)$$

$$\theta p + C_M \geq \theta p - C_G$$

$$C_M \geq -C_G$$

$M_{D,H}$ 's initial decisions:

When G offers  $X_D^*$ , neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists :

$$U_{M_D}(negotiate, accept) \geq U_{M_H}(attack)$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - p - C_M$$

$$U_{M_H}(attack) \geq U_{M_H}(negotiate, accept)$$

$$1 - \theta p - C_M \geq 1 - \theta p - C_M$$

**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{negotiate, accept\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{attack, accept\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^*$ .

Separating with  $\sigma_{M_D} = attack$ ,  $\sigma_{M_H} = negotiate$

≠ equilibria :  $M_D$  have dominant strategy to negotiate, regardless of whether they accept  $X_D^*$  or reject  $x < X_D^*$ .

Pooling on Negotiate

$M_D$  accept if  $x \geq X_D^*$ , with  $X_D^* \geq 1 - \theta p - C_M$ .

$M_H$  accept if  $x \geq X_H^*$ , with  $X_H^* \geq 1 - p - C_M$ .

G's utilities:

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(\text{ignore}) &= \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(p - C_G) \\
&= \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G \\
EU_G(x = 0) &= \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(p - C_G) \\
&= \mu_D(\theta p - p) + p - C_G \\
EU_G(x = X_D^*) &= \mu_D(1 - X_D^*) + (1 - \mu_D)(1 - X_D^*) \\
&= \theta p + C_M \\
EU_G(x = X_H^*) &= \mu_D(\theta p - C_G) + (1 - \mu_D)(1 - X_H^*) \\
&= p + C_M - \mu_D(p - \theta p + C_G + C_M)
\end{aligned}$$

G is indifferent between offering 0 and ignoring  $\therefore$

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(\text{ignore}) &= EU_G(x = 0) \\
p - C_G - \mu_D(p - \theta p) &= p - C_G - \mu_D(p - \theta p)
\end{aligned}$$

G's offer of  $X_H^*$  dominates offering 0 and ignoring  $\therefore$

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(x = X_H^*) &= EU_G(\text{ignore}, x = 0) \\
p + C_M - \mu_D(p - \theta p + C_G + C_M) &\geq p - C_G - \mu_D(p - \theta p) \\
C_M(1 - \mu_D) &\geq -C_G(1 - \mu_D)
\end{aligned}$$

G offers  $X_D^*$  when  $\mu_D \geq \mu_D^*$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(x = X_D^*) &\geq EU(x = X_H^*) \\
\theta p + C_M &\geq p + C_M - \mu_D(p - \theta p + C_G + C_M) \\
\mu_D &\geq \frac{p(1 - \theta)}{p(1 - \theta) + C_G + C_M} = \mu_D^*
\end{aligned}$$

Alternatively, this can be solved in terms of  $p$  to show that G offers  $X_D^*$  when  $p < p^*$ :<sup>133</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(x = X_D^*) &\geq EU(x = X_H^*) \\
\theta p + C_M &\geq p + C_M - \mu_D(p - \theta p + C_G + C_M) \\
p &< \frac{\mu_D(C_G + C_M)}{1 - \theta - \mu_D + \mu_D \theta} = p^*
\end{aligned}$$

$M_{D,H}$ 's initial decision:

When G offers  $X_H^*$ ,  $M_H$  is incentivized to deviate, and no equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) &\geq U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate, accept}) \\
1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M
\end{aligned}$$

When G offers  $X_D^*$ , neither  $M_{D,H}$  is incentivized to deviate, and an equilibrium exists  $\therefore$

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{M_D}(\text{negotiate, accept}) &\geq U_{M_D}(\text{attack}) \\
1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - p - C_M \\
U_{M_H}(\text{negotiate, accept}) &\geq U_{M_H}(\text{attack}) \\
1 - \theta p - C_M &\geq 1 - \theta p - C_M
\end{aligned}$$

**WPBE:**  $\sigma_{M_D} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_{M_H} = \{\text{negotiate, accept}\}$ ;  $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^*$  when  $\mu_D \geq \mu_D^*$ .

#### Pooling on Attack

$\nexists$  equilibria  $\therefore M_D$  have dominant strategy to negotiate, regardless of whether they accept  $X_D^*$  or reject  $x < X_D^*$ .

#### **Summary of Equilibria**

---

<sup>133</sup>No equilibria exist when  $p > \hat{p}$  and G offers  $x_H^*$  because the hawkish militants would deviate to attack since their payoff from attacking  $1 - \theta p - C_M$  exceeds their payoff from negotiating and accepting  $x_H^* = 1 - p - C_M$  or negotiating and rejecting when the diaspora does not support, which results in a payoff of  $1 - p - C_M$ .

Table 39: Equilibria across Cases

Case	Separating Equilibria	Pooling Equilibria
1	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate, reject}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack, accept}, \sigma_G = \text{offer } 0$	
1	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack}, \sigma_G = \text{ignore}$	
1	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate, accept}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack, accept},$ $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^* \text{ when } p < \hat{p}$	
2	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate, reject}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack, reject}, \sigma_G = \text{offer } 0$	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate, accept}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{negotiate, reject},$ $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^* \text{ when } \mu_D \geq \hat{\mu}_D$
2	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack}, \sigma_G = \text{ignore}$	
2	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate, accept}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack, reject},$ $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^* \text{ when } p < \hat{p}$	
3	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate, accept}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{attack, reject}, \sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^*$	$\sigma_{M_D} = \text{negotiate, accept}, \sigma_{M_H} = \text{negotiate, accept},$ $\sigma_G = \text{offer } X_D^* \text{ when } \mu_D \geq \mu_D^*$



## Quantitative Test

*Table 40: Included CEDS Actors*

<b>Israeli Government Actors</b>	<b>Palestinian Authority and Constituent Actors</b>
Israel	Palestinian Occupied Territories
Israeli Government	Occupied Territories Government
Israeli Likud Party	Palestinian Liberation Organization
Israeli Labor Party	Palestinian Occupied Territories Military
Israeli Opposition Parties	Fatah
Israeli Judicial System	
Israeli Police	
Israeli Defense Forces	
Israeli Legislature	

*Table 41: Included CEDS Actions*

<b>CEDS Actions</b>	
Engage in negotiation	Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation
Express intent to meet or negotiate	Consult
Sign formal agreement	Express intent to cooperate
Declare truce, ceasefire	Return, release prisoners
Make optimistic comment	Make a visit
Meet at a third location	Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation
Make an appeal or request	Praise or endorse
Demobilize armed forces	Agree to engage in material cooperation
Discuss by telephone	Host a visit
Provide economic aid	Engage in material cooperation
Retreat or surrender militarily	Express intent to yield
Provide military aid	Express intent to release persons or property
Yield	Investigate crime, corruption, human rights abuses

*Table 42: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables*

	Minimum	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Maximum
Cooperation	0.00	1.60	1.00	2.40	15.00
Difference in Attitudes	-15.00	0.20	0.00	2.70	12.00

Fig. 36: ATFP Attitude Distribution over Time




Table 43: Poisson Regression Results

	Alternative Model
(Intercept)	1.28*** (0.45)
Difference in Attitudes	0.21**** (0.03)
Israeli Operation	-0.65 (0.72)
Israeli Prime Minister Party	-0.45*** (0.17)
Hamas Control in Gaza Strip	-1.18**** (0.18)
Civilian Fatalities in Iraq	0.00**** (0.00)
U.S. Stock Price	-0.00 (0.01)
$N$	148
AIC	483.76
BIC	567.68
$\log L$	-213.88

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$

Table 44: Negative Binomial Model with Alternative Control Variables Results

	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>
(Intercept)	0.84 (0.70)	1.38** (0.64)	1.49*** (0.54)	1.28* (0.69)	2.60*** (1.01)
Difference in Attitudes	0.28*** (0.04)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.04)
Israeli Operation	−0.54 (0.82)	−0.55 (0.82)	−0.63 (0.82)	−0.47 (0.84)	−0.33 (0.83)
Israel Prime Minister Party	−0.03 (0.44)	−0.51 (0.32)	−0.60** (0.24)	−0.65** (0.27)	−0.09 (0.39)
Hamas Control in Gaza Strip	−0.61 (0.48)	−1.26*** (0.30)	−1.12*** (0.32)	−1.22*** (0.34)	−0.65 (0.44)
Civilian Fatalities in Iraq	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)		0.00* (0.00)
U.S. Stock Price	−0.00 (0.01)			−0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
U.S. President Party	−0.80 (0.51)				
$\theta$	2.09* (0.56)	1.96* (0.51)	2.02* (0.53)	1.83* (0.47)	2.13* (0.58)
U.S. Unemployment		−0.06 (0.11)			
U.S. Gas Price			−0.19 (0.21)		
U.S. Military Casualties				0.00 (0.00)	
Jewish Population in Settlements					−0.00 (0.00)
$N$	148	148	148	146	148
AIC	440.35	440.57	440.01	438.62	440.13
BIC	548.25	536.48	535.92	534.09	548.03
$\log L$	−184.17	−188.28	−188.01	−187.31	−184.06

Standard errors in parentheses


\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$

Fig. 37: Expected Count of Cooperative Interactions, Primary Model



## APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4

Fig. 38: Predicted Probability of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Morals and Education Level




Fig. 39: Predicted Probability of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Morals and Political Informedness




Fig. 40: Predicted Probability of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Morals and Religiosity




Fig. 41: Predicted Probability of Hawkish Attitude Conditional on Morals and Threat




Fig. 42: ROC Plot for Model Excluding Key Independent Variables




Table 45: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results

	<b>Alternative Model</b>
Care Moral Foundation	0.30** (0.15)
Loyalty Moral Foundation	0.14 (0.22)
Purity Moral Foundation	0.33** (0.14)
Authority Moral Foundation	−0.47**** (0.11)
Fair Moral Foundation	−0.38*** (0.12)
Sex	−0.48** (0.20)
Residence Type	0.22 (0.40)
Education Level	−0.11 (0.08)
Degree of Political Informedness	−0.05 (0.10)
Degree of Religiosity	0.02 (0.18)
Family Threat Level	0.65**** (0.16)
Age	0.01 (0.01)
AIC	990.34
BIC	1050.73
Log Likelihood	−480.17
Deviance	960.34
Num. obs.	414

Standard errors in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.1$

\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.001$

## REFERENCES

- Adamson, Fiona. 2013. Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War. In *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel. Cambridge University Press.
- Ahsan, Saleyha. 2013. "Syrian Diaspora Leads Aid Effort." *New Internationalist* .
- Alloush, Basma. 2018. "Syrians in the USA: Solidarity Despite Political Rifts." *Arab Reform Initiative* .
- America Community Survey (ACS)*. 2017. United States Census Bureau.
- America Must Restore its Middle East Credibility*. 2003. American Task Force on Palestine.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso.
- Arab Barometer*. 2013.  
**URL:** <http://www.arabbarometer.org/>
- Arab Barometer III*. 2014. Center for Strategic Studies in Jordan.
- Asal, Victor, Amy Pate and Jonathan Wilkenfield. 2008. "Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior Data and Codebook Version 9/2008 online." <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp>: Online.
- Asal, Victor, Justin Conrad and Peter White. 2014. "Going Abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations." *International Organization* 68(4).
- Asal, Victor, Richard Legault, Ora Szekely and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2013. "Gender ideologies and forms of contentious mobilization in the Middle East." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3).
- ATFP Co-Hosts Abed Rabbo-Beilin Meeting with Arab and Jewish American Leaders at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. 2003. American Task Force on Palestine.
- ATFP: In Media*. 2017. American Task Force on Palestine.



- Average annual earnings of women and men, by occupation*. 2008. Statistics Canada, Survey of Labor and Income Dynamics.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books, Inc.
- Ayala, Eva-Maria, Julie Fancher and Eline DeBruijn. 2016. "2 men from Dallas area linked to ISIL." *The Dallas Morning News* .
- Bapat, Navin. 2007. "The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(4).
- Bercovitch, Jacob. 2007. A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution. In *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers?* United Nations Publications.
- Berman, Eli and David Laitin. 2006. Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets: Evidence on the Tactical Use of Suicide Attacks. In *Suicide Bombing from an Interdisciplinary Perspective*.
- Berrebi, Claude. 2007. "Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians." *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 13(2).
- Beyer, Robert. 2017. "The Performance of Immigrants in the German Labor Market." *SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research* .
- Brown, Donald. 1975. "Aggregation of preferences." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 89(1).
- Burmese in the U.S. Fact Sheet*. 2015. Pew Research Center.
- Byman, Daniel. 2005. *Deadly connections: States that sponsor terrorism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Byman, Daniel. 2006. "Passive Sponsors of Terrorism." *Survival* 47.
- Byman, Daniel. 2013. "Outside Support for Insurgent Movements." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36(12).
- Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan. 2001. *Trends in outside support for insurgent movements*. Rand Corporation.

- Cameron, A.C. and P.K. Trivedi. 1990. "Regression-based Tests for Overdispersion in the Poisson Model." *Journal of Econometrics* 46(3).
- Cameron, A.C. and P.K. Trivedi. 1998. *Regression Analysis of Count Data*. Cambridge University Press.
- Cameron, A.C. and P.K. Trivedi. 2005. *Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, Glen. 2018. "Syria's Civil War." *Bloomberg* .
- Carter, David. 2012. "A blessing or a curse? State support for terrorist groups." *International Organization* 66(1).
- Caryl, Christian. 2015. "The World's Next Country." *Foreign Policy* .
- Chalk, Peter. 2008. "The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 9(2).
- Chittick, Willian, Keith Billingsley and Rick Travis. 1995. "A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs." *International Studies Quarterly* 39(3).
- Civil War in Syria*. 2019. Council on Foreign Relations.
- Cochrane, Feargal, Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain. 2009. "Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32(8).
- Cohen, Dara. 2013. "Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)." *American Political Science Review* 107(3).
- Cohen, Robin. 2008. *Global diasporas: An introduction*. Routledge.
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war." *Oxford economic papers* 56(4):563–595.
- Connor, Walker. 1986. The impact of homelands upon diasporas. In *Modern diasporas in international politics*. Croom Helm.

*Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World*. 2007. United States Institute of Peace.

Cruickshank, Paul. 2017. "ISIS lifts veil on American at heart of its propaganda machine." *CNN* .

*Cuban American National Foundation: About Us*. 2018. Cuban American National Foundation.  
**URL:** <http://canf.org/about-us>

Cullen, Kevin. 1997. "The IRA and Sinn Fein: America and the Conflict." *PBS Frontline* .

Cunningham, David, Kristian Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan. 2009. "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4).

*Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)*. 2017. OECD.Stat.

Dauth, Wolfgang, Sebastian Findeisen and Jens Südekum. 2017. "Sectoral employment trends in Germany: The effect of globalisation on their micro anatomy." *Vox* .

Diehl, Paul. 2016. "Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace." *International Studies Quarterly* 60(1).

*Documented civilian deaths from violence*. 2018. Iraq Body Count.

Dodge, Kenneth A. and Cynthia L. Frame. 1982. "Social Cognitive Biases and Deficits in Aggressive Boys." *Child Development* 53(3).

Dodge, Kenneth A, Joseph Price, Jo-Anne Bachorowski and Joseph Newman. 1990. "Hostile Attributional Biases in Severely Aggressive Adolescents." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 99(4).

Dreher, Axel. 2017. "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization." *Applied Economics* 38.

Duntley, Joshua. 2015. Adaptations to Dangers From Humans. In *The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology*. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Ember, Melvin. 2005. Kurdish Diaspora. In *Encyclopedia of diasporas : immigrant and refugee cultures around the world*. Springer.

- Engel, Richard, Ben Plessner, Tracy Connor and Jon Schuppe. 2016. "The Americans: 15 Who Left the United States to Join ISIS." *NBC News* .
- Fair, C. and B. Shepherd. 2006. "Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29(1).
- Farchy, Emily. 2014. "Finding the Way: A Discussion of the Swedish Migrant Integration System." *OECD: Better Policies for Better Lives* .
- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3).
- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1):75–90.
- Filindra, Alexandra and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. 2013. "Together in Good Times and Bad? How Economic Triggers Condition the Effects of Intergroup Threat." *Social Science Quarterly* 94(5).
- Filipino Immigrants in the United States*. 2018. Migration Policy Institute.
- FitzGerald, David. 2014. The sociology of international migration. In *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines*. Routledge.
- Galtung, Johan. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. Sage.
- Gambetta, D. 2005. *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*. Oxford University Press.
- Gans, Herbert. 1992. "Second-Generation Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic Futures of the post-1965 American Immigrants." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15(2).
- Gevorkyan, Aleksandr. 2016. "Development through Diversity: Engaging Armenia's New and Old Diaspora." *The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute* .
- Ginges, J. and A. Norenzayan. 2009. "Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks." *Psychological Science* 20(2).
- Gleason, Katie, Lauri Jensen-Campbell and Deborah Richardson. 2004. "Agreeableness as a predictor of aggression in adolescence." *Aggressive Behavior* 30(1).

- Gleditsch, Kristian. 2002. "Expanded Trade and GDP Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(3).
- Gleditsch, Kristian and Michael Ward. 2001. "Measuring Space: A Minimum Distance Database." *Journal of Peace Research* 38.
- Global Conflict This Week: Atrocities Continue in Syria*. 2018. Council on Foreign Relations.
- Gordon, Scott. 2016. "2 North Texas College Students Listed as ISIS Fighters." *NBC Dallas Fort Worth News* .
- Graham, Jesse, Biran Nosek, Jonathan Haidt, Ravi Iyer, Spassena Koleva and Peter Ditto. 2011. "Mapping the Moral Domain." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 101(2).
- Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, Sena Koleva, Matt Motyl, Ravi Iyer, Seam Wojcik and Peter Ditto. 2012. Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. Elsevier.
- Graziano, William, Lauri Jensen-Campbell and Elizabeth Hair. 1996. "Perceiving Interpersonal Conflict and Reacting to It: The Case for Agreeableness." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70(4).
- Gries, Peter. 2014. *The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives Over Foreign Affairs*. Stanford University Press.
- Guide to Israel's political parties*. 2013. BBC News.  
**URL:** <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21073450>
- Gurr, Ted. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press.
- Hackett, Ashley. 2018. "A Report to the UN Reveals Deep Racial Disparities in America's Criminal Justice System." *Pacific Standard* .
- Haddad, S. and H. Khashan. 2002. "Islam and terrorism: Lebanese Muslim views on September 11." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(6).
- Haidt, Jonathan. 2007. "The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology." *Science* 316(5827).
- Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion*. Pantheon.

Hammond, Laura and Ibrahim Ali. 2012. "Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-building." *Chatham House* .

Hanley, Brian. 2004. "The politics of NORAID." *Irish Political Studies* 19(1).

Henry, P., J. Sidanius, S. Levin and F. Pratto. 2005. "Social Dominance Orientation, Authoritarianism, and Support for Intergroup Violence between the Middle East and America." *Political Psychology* 26(4).

Herron, Michael. 1999. "Postestimation Uncertainty in Limited Dependent Variable Models." *Political analysis* 8(1).

Hess, Michael. 2007. Substantiating the Nexus Between Diaspora Groups and the Financing of Terrorism. In *Terrornomics*, ed. Sean Costigan and David Gold. Ashgate Publishing Company.

Hindy, Lily and Sima Ghaddar. 2017. "A Nation in Pieces: Views from Syrians in Exile." *The Century Foundation* .

Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press.

Högladh, Stina, Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér. 2011. "External Support in Armed Conflict 1975-2009 -presenting new data." Unpublished manuscript presented at the International Studies Association Convention in Montreal 2011,.

Holsti, Ole and James Rosenau. 1996. "Liberals, Populists, Libertarians, and Conservatives: The Link between Domestic and International affairs." *International Political Science Review* 17(1).

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press.

Hubbard, Julie, Kenneth Dodge, Antonius Cillessen, John Coie and David Schwartz. 2001. "The Dyadic Nature of Social Information Processing in Boys' Reactive and Proactive Aggression." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 80(2).

*International Standard Classification of Occupations*. 2004. International Labour Organizatoin.

*Iraq Fatalities*. 2018. Iraq Coalition Casualty Count.

*ISCO-08 Structure, index correspondence with ISCO-88*. 2016. ILO Bureau of Statistics.

Jenkins, Brian. 1986. "Defense Against Terrorism." *Political Science Quarterly* 101(5).

Jenkins, Brian. 2014. "When Jihadis Come Marching Home: The Terrorist Threat Posed by Westerners Returning from Syria and Iraq." *RAND* .

Kanas, Agnieszka, Barry R. Chiswick, Tanja van der Lippe and Frank van Tubergen. 2012. "Social Contacts and the Economic Performance of Immigrants: A Panel Study of Immigrants in Germany." *International Migration Review* .

Keles, Janroj Yilmaz. 2015. *Media, Diaspora and Conflict: Nationalism and Identity amongst Turkish and Kurdish Migrants in Europe*. I.B. Taurus.

Kertzer, Joshua, Kathleen Powers, Brian Rathbun and Ravi Iyer. 2014. "Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes." *The Journal of Politics* 76(3).

Koleva, Spassena, Jesse Graham, Ravi Iyer, Peter Ditto and Jonathan Haidt. 2012. "Tracing the threads: How five moral concerns (especially Purity) help explain culture war attitudes." *Journal of Research in Personality* 46(2).

Koser, Khalid. 2007. African diasporas and post-conflict reconstruction: An Eritrean case study. In *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers*. United Nations Publications.

Krueger, Alan B. 2007. *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*. Princeton University Press.

Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?: The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers." *The New Republic* .

Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Malečková. 2003. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(4):119–144.

Kruglanski, Arie, Xiaoyan Chen, Mark Dechesne, Shira Fishman and Edward Orehek. 2009. "Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers' Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance." *Political Psychology* 30(3).

*Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey*. 2018. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

- Lacina, Bethany and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2005. "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths." *European Journal of Population* 21.
- Lazaroff, Tovah. 2015. "How the Parties Stand on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process." *The Jerusalem Post* .
- Lerner, Daniel. 1958. *The passing of traditional society*. Free Press.
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam*. 2015.
- List of prime ministers of Israel*. 2018. Britannica.
- MacLaren, V., L. Best and E. Bigney. 2010. "Aggression-hostility predicts direction of defensive responses to human threat scenarios." *Personality and Individual Differences* 49(2).
- Mansfield, Edward and Diana Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Voting, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63(3).
- Maoz, Zeev and Belgin Belgin San-Akca. 2012. "Rivalry and State Support of NonState Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946–20011." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(4).
- Mapping Militant Organizations*. 2017. Stanford University.
- Marshall, Monty and Benjamin Cole. 2014. "Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility." *Center for Systemic Peace* .
- Martin, René, David Watson and Choi K. Wan. 2000. "A three-factor model of trait anger: dimensions of affect, behavior, and cognition." *Journal of Personality* 68(5).
- Mean nominal monthly earnings of employees by sex and economic activity (Local Currency)*. 2017. International Labour Organizatoin.
- Median Family Income of Recent Immigrant Arrivals*. 2015. Pew Research Center.
- Median Household Income Among U.S. Hispanic Origin Groups, 2013*. 2015. Pew Research Center.
- Middle East: Gaza Strip*. 2018. CIA.



- Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016*. 2016. World Bank Group.
- Monthly Retail Gasoline and Diesel Prices*. 2018. U.S. Energy Information Administration.
- Moss, Dana. 2016. "Diaspora Mobilization for Western Military Intervention During the Arab Spring." *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* 14(3).
- Most, Benjamin and Harvey Starr. 2015. *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics: With a New Preface by Harvey Starr*. University of South Carolina Press.
- Mullenbach, Mark J. 2017. Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. Technical report University of Central Arkansas.
- Nagel, Joanne. 1986. The Political Construction of Ethnicity. In *Competitive Ethnic Relations*. Academic Press.
- Natali, D. 2007. Kurdish interventions in the Iraq war. In *Diasporas in Conflict: Peacemakers or Peace-wreckers*. United Nations Publications.
- Norton, Richard. 2007. *Hezbollah: A Short History*. Princeton University Press.
- Number of Settlers by Year*. 2017. PeaceNow.
- Nye, Joseph and Robert Keohane. 1971. "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction." *International Organization* 25(3).
- Obama strong on Palestinian state*. 2003. American Task Force on Palestine.
- OECD. 2008. *Terrorist Financing*. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Financial Action Task Force.
- Official: American May Be Key in ISIS Social Media Blitz*. 2014. ABC News.
- Olmert departure makes Mideast peace more elusive*. 2008. American Task Force on Palestine.
- Operation Cast Lead: Israel strikes back against Hamas terror in Gaza*. 2009. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*Operation Pillar of Defense (2012)*. 2012. Israel Defense Forces.

*Operation Protective Edge: The facts*. 2014. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ozden, Caglar, Christopher Parsons, Maurice Schiff and Terrie Walmsley. 2011. "Where on Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration 1960-2000." *The World Bank Economic Review* .

Poblicks, Nyeko Caesar. 2002. Kacoke Madit: A diaspora role in promoting peace. In *Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda*. Conciliation Resources.

Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhao. 1993. "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* .

Portes, Alejandro and Robert Manning. 1986. The Immigrant Enclave: Theory and Empirical Examples. In *Competitive Ethnic Relations*. Academic PR.

Putnam, Robert. 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twentyfirst Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2).

Qiblawi, Tamara, Angela Dewan and Larry Register. 2017. " Hamas says it accepts '67 borders, but doesn't recognize Israel." *CNN* .

Rapoport, D. 1990. Sacred terror: A case from contemporary Islam. In *Origins of terrorism*. Cambridge University Press.

Regan, Patrick. 2000. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. University of Michigan Press.

Reid, Lindsay. 2017. "Finding a Peace that Lasts: Mediator Leverage and the Durable Resolution of Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(7).

*Results of PSR Refugees' Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Lebanon on Refugees' Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement*. 2003. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.

Richmond, Oliver. 2008. *Peace in International Relations*. Routledge.

- Rieff, David. 1997. "Case Study in Ethnic strife." *Foreign Affairs* .
- Rochowanski, Almut. 2013. "Integration a Hard Road for Young Chechen Men." *Institute for War and Peace Reporting* .
- Rogerson, P. A. 2001. *Statistical Methods for Geography*. Sage.
- Rudoren, Jodi. 2015. "Netanyahu Says No to Statehood for Palestinians." *The New York Times* .
- Safran, William. 2007. "Democracy, pluralism, and diaspora identity: An Ambiguous relationship." *Opportunity structures in diaspora relations: comparisons in contemporary multilevel politics of diaspora and transnational identity* .
- Safran, Willian. 1991. "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return." *Diaspora: A journal of transnational studies* 1(1).
- Saideman, Stephen. 2002. "Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(1).
- Saideman, Stephen. 2012. *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict*. Columbia University Press.
- Salehyan, Idean. 2007. "Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups." *World Politics* 59(2).
- San-Akca, Belgin. 2009. "Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 32(4).
- San-Akca, Belgin. 2016. *States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups*. Oxford University Press.
- Sasnal, Patrycja. 2015. "Who Are They? Two Profiles of Syrian Refugees." *The Polish Institute of International Affairs* .
- Schenker, David. 2014. Twenty Years of Israeli-Jordanian Peace: A Brief Assessment. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Schmitz-Pranghe, Clara. 2010. "Modes and potential of diaspora engagement in Eritrea." *Diaspeace Project* .

- Schrodt, Philip A. 2012. Event and Actor Codebook V1.1b3. In *Conflict and Mediation Event Observations*.
- Shafiq, M. and A. Sinno. 2010. "Education, Income and Support for Suicide Bombings: Evidence from Six Muslim Countries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1).
- Shain, Yossi. 2002. "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution." *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 22(2).
- Shannon, William. 1986. "The Anglo-Irish Agreement." *Foreign Affairs* .
- Shatz, Howard J. 2014. "How ISIS Funds its Reign of Terror." *The RAND Blog* .
- Sheffer, Gabriel. 1986. *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. Croom Helm.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. 2007. "The Diaspora Phenomenon in the Twenty-First Century: Ideational, Organizational, and Behavioral Challengers." *Opportunity Structures in Diaspora Relations: Comparisons in Contemporary Multi-level Politics of Diaspora and Transnational Identity* .
- Shelley, Louise. 2014. *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Singer, David. 2010. "Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World." *American Political Science Review* 104(2).
- Sng, Oliver, Steven Neuberg, Michael Varnum and Douglas Kenrick. 2017. "The Crowded Life Is a Slow Life: Population Density and Life History Strategy." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 112(5).
- Syria Emergency. 2018. UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency.
- The 44 Presidents of the United States who came before Donald Trump*. 2017. The Telegraph.
- The American Task Force on Palestine*. 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.americantaskforce.org/>

*The Annapolis Summit*. 2007. American Task Force on Palestine.

*The Gender Gap in Religion Around the World*. 2016.

**URL:** <http://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/22/the-gender-gap-in-religion-around-the-world/>

*The Good Friday Agreement-An Overview*. 2013. Democratic Progress Institute.

*The Kurdish Diaspora*. 2017. Institut Kurde de Paris.

*The State of the World's Children*. 2012. UNICEF.

*Time for better decisions to be made on Palestine-Israel*. 2003. American Task Force on Palestine.

*Total Share Prices for All Shares for the United States*. 2018. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

*U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious*. 2015.

**URL:** <http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/>

Vertovec, Steven. 2004. "Religion and Diaspora." *New Approaches to the Study of Religion* .

Victoroff, Jeff, Janice Adelman and Miriam Matthews. 2012. "Psychological Factors Associated with Support for Suicide Bombing in the Muslim Diaspora." *Political Psychology* 33(6).

Walsh, Daniel. 2011. *An Air War with Cuba: The United States Radio Campaign Against Castro*. McFarland.

Waters, Mary, Van Tran, Philip Kasinitz and John Mollenkopf. 2010. "Segmented Assimilation Revisited: Types of Acculturation and Socioeconomic Mobility in Young Adulthood." *Ethnic Racial Studies* 33(7).

Weinstein, Jeremy. 2006. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge University Press.

Wike, R. and N. Samaranayake. N.d. "Where Terrorism Finds Support in the Muslim World." **URL:** <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/26/where-terrorism-finds-support-in-the-muslim-world>

- Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. Cambridge University Press.
- Winn, Patrick. 2017. "The biggest group of current refugees in the US? Christians from Myanmar." *Public Radio International* .
- World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision*. 2014. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division.
- Yilmaz, Omur, Philip Scrodt and Deborah Gerner. 2008. Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO): An Event Data Framework for a Post Cold War World. In *International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Gartner. Routledge.
- Yinger, Milton. 1981. "Toward a theory of assimilation and dissimilation." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4(3).
- Zeitzoff, Thomas. 2014. "Anger, Exposure to Violence, and Intragroup Conflict: A "Lab in the Field" Experiment in Southern Israel." *Political Psychology* 35(3).
- Zhou, Min. 2012. Segmented Assimilation and the Immigrant Experience of Asian Immigrant Children. In *The Oxford handbook of the politics of international migration*., ed. Marc Rosenblum and Daniel Tichenor. Oxford University Press.