# Spatializing Difference

*Bernhard Langer*

How does architecture function as a medium to structure, facilitate or prevent social and individual practices? And how can this power of architecture best be conceptualised? In order to discuss these questions, I will take up the literal meaning of the word medium and try to locate the political or social power of architecture in its function to mediate between two particular socio-cultural "spaces", to serve as in-between of different areas, to set up a boundary, to demarcate a difference, and to qualify separations and points of communication. Modernism held it axiomatic that architecture exerts socio-political power. Le Corbusier went as far as to claim that only architecture can provide remedy for social matters: "On the day when contemporary society, at present so sick, has become properly aware that only architecture ... can provide the exact prescription for its ills, then the time will have come for the great machine to be put in motion."[1] And as late as 1967, Walter Gropius defined the modern, functionalist architect as the "Apollo of the democracy."[2] Despite its antagonism to modernist doctrines, much of contemporary architectural theory (of either Derridean or Deleuzean bent) sticks to this concept of a strong socio-political function of architecture. For Jacques Derrida, architecture partakes centrally in the conceptual construction of our world. Architecture, through its close relationship to concepts of structure, order and hierarchy, helps regulate "all of what is called Western culture."[3] Architecture grasps the very core of our identity: "We appear to ourselves only through an experience of spacing which is already marked by architecture."[4]

Since architecture is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which harbors contradictory logics, as Robert Venturi prominently emphasized, and since society is even more complicated, it is difficult to argue with analytical rigour for any clear and deterministic relationship between architecture and social processes. This insight has in the past led to wholesale rejections of any strong political function of architecture. Leon Krier, to name only one, used to argue against any deterministic political function of architecture. In defence of Albert Speer's architectural classicism, he writes: "There is neither authoritarian nor democratic architecture, no more than there are authoritarian or democratic *Wienerschnitzel*. Architecture is not political; it is only an instrument of politics."[5]

This paper will add an argument to this ongoing debate. To do so, I will briefly critizise one model, dominant for decades, of interpreting the relation between architecture and society or politics: the model of language, meaning, representation or text. Since criticism of this paradigm is well known, I will keep my critique short and mention only one argument, which will help to formulate an alternative conceptual approach.

## The linguistic paradigm

Postmodern and deconstructivist theorists focus, in most cases, on formal or visual properties of architecture (the use of certain geometrical shapes, of iconic forms, etc.), which are said to embody a certain meaning or message, or as deconstructing a certain discourse. Charles Jencks and Mark Wigley[6] offer paradigmatic examples. The main point of critique is, firstly, that a definition of architecture through its visual properties is a very particular and narrow point of view. It detaches the object from their immersion in practices and isolates them in order contemplate their meaning.[7] The distance of visual apprehension accounts, on the one hand, for the fact that there are formally similar architectural settings with different success or acceptance.[8] This distance or detachment is, on the other hand, necessary for any interpretation, for it invites the "play of the signifier" (Roland Barthes). But it also, secondly, makes space for different codes to be applied, which correspond to different taste cultures and different forms of habitus. For Pierre Bourdieu, formal and semantic readings of artefacts depend on the academic habitus. The academic habitus is characterized by having time (time to contemplate) and being not involved, i.e. distanced and disengaged. It tends to miss out the bodily, the unconscious and the collective dimension of how architecture is experienced. This construction transforms practically engaged objects into objects of contemplation, the timeliness of practical, mainly unselfconscious engagement gives way to the suspended time of conscious contemplation, bodily inscribed patterns of behavior are substituted by an immobile eye, the subject as a social agent gives way to a subject enmeshed in signifying structures, etc. Going through these transformations, architecture turns into an object, thrown vis-à-vis a subject that underlies its construction, which then calls for "uninterested" contextualization: "it seeks to be deciphered, we must find signs within it ...," writes Roland Barthes of the city of Paris, distanced through the position of the observer on the Eiffel Tower.[9] For Bourdieu in Social Sense, this leads not only to a confusion of the user's codes of reception with the architect's aesthetic codes, but furthermore to an overall doubt in the usefulness of the "textual paradigm" in an analysis of performative effects of the built environment. Against a method that focuses on meaningful units within an act of understanding, one can quote Marshall McLuhan: "Everybody experiences far more than he understands. Yet it is experience, rather than understanding, that influences behavior."

The consequence of this criticism for any interpretation of the more directly performative function of architecture is that only those practices should count as relevant which are common, soci-

ally shared and figure in everyday practice. Architecture influences social behavior only insofar it partakes in the construction of everyday practices and is perceived as such by the agents of these practices. Architectural space is, on this level of analysis, embodied space. Not only the big symbols of architecture are in question – the Classical Orders, the monuments, or a deconstruction of these – but the small symbols, the ways in which architecture organizes, hierarchizes and systematizes activities, behaviors, orderings, visibilities, movements. The question is, then: How can architecture epistemologically be constructed as an entity that acts as a medium in this sense?

## Architecture as difference

One description of architecture as a boundary within or between different socio-cultural and behavioral contexts is offered by Rem Koolhaas' text on the Berlin Wall.[10] Koolhaas suggests that the Berlin Wall can serve as a model for a concept of architecture: it is a material structure where one comes "eye to eye with architecture's true nature."[11] The true nature of architecture is revealed when one realizes that its impact – its meaning, its function, its effects – is utterly independent of its formal appearance, which is in constant flux.[12] Its significance derives, more directly, from the host of performances, rituals, scripted behaviors it instigates: from the rituals of legal border crossings to the illegal attempts to cross it through tunnels, to daily routines of inspections (military in the East, touristic in the West.). And, at the most serious level of "event", the wall was the stage for numerous deaths. The source of its meaning lies not in its materiality or form, but in the fact that it mediates between different socio-political contexts: through the marking of a boundary, the mise-en-scene of a political borderline or the marking of a qualitative difference. Koolhaas writes: "Were not division, enclosure (i.e., imprisonment), and exclusion – which defined the wall's performance and explained its efficiency – the essential stratagems of any architecture?"[13]

The idea to see the "nature" of architecture in setting up a boundary is in tune with post-metaphysical philosophy. Martin Heidegger, for example, writes: "A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing."[14] For post-metaphysical philosophy generally, it is the edge, the boundary, the parergon, the limit, the difference that took the place of ousia or essence in traditional ontology. Difference is not only epistemological precondition for (conceptual) identities, but is played out on the level of facticity of beings, as negotiation of boundaries, as claiming of territories, as setting up of qualitative differences.

In contrast to language-based approaches, I propose, as a heuristic device, that architecture works on a fundamental level the same way as the Berlin Wall: architecture is a stretched, diversified, internally structured wall, or a complex of screens and filters. A material boundary, be it drawn or built, be it soft, hard, permeable, fortified, inviting, interrogating, repulsing or neutral, derives its relevant qualities primarily not from its material presence, but from its immersion in networks of wider socio-economic structures, and from the intervention it marks, micropolitically, in them. Architecturally, a boundary becomes interesting according to the qualities of the (socio-economic) 'spaces' on each side, and the negotiating practices between these qualities. To illustrate this claim, I will stick to "simple," basic and material forms of mediation, in contrast to technologically arranged forms of interactive architecture.

## Forms of mediation

The idea that architecture exerts its social effects in being a system of physical enclosures is prominent in anthropology and in architectural theory.[15] The principal, most basic, most brutal function of a wall is to create a strong boundary. Architecture, in this case, turns into a non-medium: its function is to impede any flow of material, bodies and information, or to reduce it to a certain degree, serving the purpose of isolation, exclusion and purity. For Aristotle, the principal function of the city wall lies in this: by walling off the hostile nature, human nature is free to unfold, peace and happiness can evolve[16] (fig. 1). Similar ideas were prominent in the Enlightenment era: The French rationalist philosopher Claude-Adrien Helvetius held that an early interest in flowers can be stimulated by locking a child up in a room that is entirely empty but for a pot of flowers. The isolated existence of flowers would leave a lasting impression on the tabula rasa of his memory, which would stimulate a lasting in-



**1 |** *The "Plinian Race", discrepant others beyond the edge of the civilized world*

terest in flowers and even could make the young man a painter of flowers.[17] He reasons like Aristotle: By isolating, a purified realm can be established, the essence can unfold. For Robin Evans, who traced parts of the history of the wall, its most important feature in architectural history was to isolate in order to expel "the terrors of overcommunication."[18] He sums up his brief historical account of the wall: "The cumulative effect of architecture during the last two centuries has been like that of a general lobotomy performed on society at large, obliterating vast areas of social experience. It is ... an agency for peace, security and segregation which, by its very nature, limits the horizon of experience – reducing noise-transmission, differentiating movement patterns, suppressing smells, stemming vandalism, cutting down the accumulation of dirt, impeding the spread of disease, veiling embarrassment, closeting indecency and abolishing the unnecessary; incidentally reducing daily life to a private shadow-play."[19] (fig. 2)

Although Evans does not refer to Mary Douglas, he interprets architecture in the light of her pure-impure distinction.[20] Architecture establishes purified realms where certain concepts of the good can unfold by excluding all that does not match and by radically reducing or selecting all sorts of transmission. The paradigm of an architecture of exclusion is the prison. But architecture that serves the means of strict isolation is the exception. Far more often, architecture mediates between two spaces: it sets up a filter, structures communication, arranges points of contact and transition, etc. The architectonic paradigms of this filter- or mediating function are entry- and threshold situations. "A step through the thinnest of all doors is enough to leave one world and enter another," writes Rudolf Arnheim.[21] From the domus to the late-medieval Bürgerhaus, from the city palais of the 18th century to the palaces of the 19th century,

the entry situation has drawn architectural fantasy, artistic expenses and social expressivity. It marks a decisive border – legally, psychologically, historically; it is the place of encounter of private inside and public outside, the appellation of the other, the intrusion into my world. Since a spatial structure marked by a boundary or threshold is crucial for religious experience (the word temple derives from temno, to cut), the meaning of thresholds has had, sometimes until today, a ritual and religious dimension. Uncountable rituals surrounded windows, doors and thresholds, and some of them are still alive. It was custom in many cultures to bury the dead under the threshold, as e. g. in Greece, where the threshold is one of the "stages" of burying the dead, moving historically from the inside of the house, from the stove, to the outside.[22] The threshold, hence, for long continued to be the locus of spirits and rituals: harmful ones (in antiquity, in order to could harm an enemy, one buried something under the threshold, like nails of a coffin or bones or human hair), apotropaic ones (in lower Germany, it was usual to carry the coffin of a suspect dead below the raised threshold out of the house to block its return) and uncountable others, esp. concerning liminal experiences in life, such as birth, adolescence, marriage, etc.[23] This ritual and religious dimension of the threshold is often bound up with bodily constraints: In Northern European block-houses, a raised threshold, the drischbel, made the entry way very low, requiring to bow down in order to enter, which was explicitly understood as a gesture of submission by assuming a position of defencelessness when entering.[24]

Gates possessed similar significance. The god of gates, Janus was worshipped in one of the most ancient temples in Rome, which had the form of a passage between two parallel walls with arched gates at either end – which were shut in peacetime and opened in war[25] (fig. 3). This temple manife-



**2 |** *Experimental cell partition walls for the Millbank Penitentiary, by Michael Faraday and Abel Blouet; the goal was to prevent as far as possible all communication between the prisoners confined in contiguous cells. By using irregular surfaces, the pattern of sound waves should be scrambled, words should lose their definition*



**3 |** *The Temple of Janus, a coin minted to commemorate one of the rare occasions when its gates had been shut*

sted a passage from one side to another, e.g. from war to peace. Janus was the gate personified: he was the god of all beginnings and openings, master of the first month (January), god of mornings and watcher of birth. As openings in boundaries and walls join two spaces, Janus had two faces. But also in other cultures, the gates of cities, towns and forts were protected by hybrid creatures: scorpion-men, bull-men and lion-men and women, like the Egyptian sphinx.[26]

Gates were important for different reasons on a socio-economic scale. Not only did one pass in and out by the city gate, it was also a place where one waited, waiting for the guards to check one's goods, to pay one's toll, and, waiting, chatted, drank, and slept. The outside of the gate therefore assumed an importance of its own; inns were built there and the seeds of new extra-mural communities were sown. A faubourg, a false town, was thus established, a parasite attaching itself to one of the citys' lifelines.[27]

Boundary situations can also be employed by architects. Beatriz Colomina offers a lucid interpretation of the function of a wall in Adolf Loos' house for Josephine Baker (1928; fig. 4). This specifically complex wall embodies a form of breakdown between inside and outside. As usual for Loos, the look is turned away from the outside world onto the inside. But in this project, the subject and object of the gaze are reversed. The inhabitant, Josephine Baker, is now the primary object, and the visitor, the guest, it she looking subject. The most intimate space – the swimming pool, paradigm of a sensual space – occupies the center of the house, and is also the focus of the visitor's gaze.[28]

Other architectural elements that serve as ambivalent space layers between outside and inside are verandas, pergolas, arcades, galleries, covered walkways, etc. Riegler/Riewe often employ this means. Facades become membranes, they become an accessible, transformable and vital "in-between" zone (fig. 5). In the unrealised Study Center for the Technical University Graz, the building has a translucent outer shell which can be opened in

part and would have exposed the movement in and through the building.

## How to build a theory?

Depending on the point of view, an individual or a group or a building or something else can be described as an unitary, homogeneous phenomenon as much as a heterogeneous, complex, or rhizomatic one. Saying this should not be seen as a plea for a total relativism, but as a reminder of the epistemological problem of the context of reference. Every statement and every concept is dependent on a discourse, on certain theoretical agendas and non-scientific biases. The more abstract the concept, the more it is functionally dependent on these contexts. To illustrate this problem with regard to the main concepts this essay employs, I will discuss a prominent and ambitious theoretical project that conceptualises architecture in a similar way as proposed here, as a system of boundaries: Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson's notion of a "social logic of space." (fig. 6 and 7)



**5 |** *Riegler/Riewe, Technical University Graz, studies center, unrealized project, 1991*



**4 |** *Josephine Baker House, first floor*



**6 |** *Four theoretical buildings with identical geometrics*

For Hillier and Hanson, the simplest building form is the cell: a boundary, a space within, an entrance, and a space outside which is qualified through its relation to the entry. A building is a partition of a cell, a settlement is a cluster of cells. Their basic axiom is that "human spatial organisation (settlements and buildings) is the establishment of patterns of relationships composed essentially of boundaries and permeabilities of various kinds"[29] and that "the spatial organisation is ... the organising principle of social reproduction."[30] This is considered a clear-cut narrative that even allows, in further stages of development, for some degrees of formalization and mathematical treatment of spatial patterns or configurations. In order to formalize, the elements (architectural boundaries) must be well defined to the degree of univocity. To achieve this, their conceptual value must be numerical, representing degrees of a certain precisely described quality. The word 'precise' derives form prae-cidere, to cut off, which means for concepts that precise ones describe only one, isolated experiential dimension or parameter, cutting off all others. The experiential parameter described in Hillier and Hanson's diagrams is, as they write, "encounter patterns." In order to build a model, they further introduce the concept of randomness: Architecture structures an otherwise random encounter pattern. They write: It is a "basic, unstructured awareness of others" that is "powerfully influenced by architectural form."[31] To sum up their

premise: Architecture is conceptualised as a system of boundaries that structure society at a fundamental level which is that of initially random encounter patterns.

But what is implied in this concept? What do their diagrams presuppose, what do they explain? If architecture is a system of boundaries, what do they bound? Instead of encounter patterns one should talk more precisely of physical proximity patterns of physical bodies and visibility as such. People can be very close and/or see each other without any "encounter" taking place. Nor can one accept their idea that architecture implies order as restriction of an otherwise random process. It is hard to believe that in the absence of architecture – say on an open field – encounter patterns would happen randomly. This would imply that there are no other determining factors at all. Finally, their conception of encounter patterns assume a very limited categorical framework. The structure of space interfaces two kinds of relations: those among the inhabitants of the system (those who own or inhabit the space), and those between inhabitants and strangers. But is it really true, one might ask, that all encountered people are always categorized as inhabitants or strangers? Only in rare cases, for example in an exclusive polo club, the category "inhabitant" is clearly defined through membership and social standing. Non-members are recognized as strangers, as long as they do not work there. But even here, encounters between inhabitants or between inhabitants and strangers have hardly anything in common that is independent from other factors as appearance, gender or age. Additionally, the factor "architecture" cannot define the category "stranger." In order to use architecture as an explanatory pattern, these problematic notions have to be defined by other means. Other cultural modes of perception must define who counts as stranger and who does not. Hence, it is inaccurate at least to assume that architecture is a "fundamental dimension" of society.

## Reversals

Although theories that try to approach architecture as a system of thresholds or boundaries with scientific rigor tend to tumble into epistemological problems, many architects and theorists today strive for a recovery of the ritual power of architecture – they acknowledge that the boundaries are the places where things happen, but enact a reversal: the goal is not to create purity, exclusion, isolation through strong territorial markers but a hybrid condition, continuous transformation, smooth spaces, etc. Boundaries are weakened by softening their architectural definition, by hybridising them via interactive media or simply by maximising boundary lines between different functional zones



**7 |** *Permeability maps of fig. 6*

in order to create maximal interaction, e.g. in Rem Koolhaas' project for Parc de La Villette. The Roman god Janus who had two clear faces looking in opposite directions is replaced by the Manimal which combines the characteristics of man, lion and snake in one ambiguous image, standing for hybridity, continuity and indecidability. Boundaries are deliberately softened, weakened or stretched, but their significance is confirmed through negation (fig. 8).

This ideology reflects the debate on public space. It is typical for many contemporary writers to value messiness, diversity, communication across socio-cultural boundaries, heterogeneity, uncertainty, disorder, even "risk," "tension," or "pain"[32] over purity. Democracy is or must be characterized, today, by the absence of an organic unity, by conflict and difference. Public space, writes Rosalyn Deutsch, "is structured around an impossibility and is therefore irrevocably split by antagonisms."[33] For Setha M. Low, "public spaces ... are places where disagreements can be marked symbolically and politically or personally worked out."[34] When Richard Sennett describes the suburb in a similar vein as a purified social space,[35] he identifies a spatial boundary with a moral one and contains this distinction within a moral judgement: seclusion and purity is bad, openness and mixture is good. But this reversal is, at least in its most extreme forms, just the flipped coin of Aristotelian essentialism. Heterogeneity as such is as little essentially good as homogeneity can be, since both are relational and highly context-dependent concepts. Richard Sennett inadvertendly displays this dilemma through an inconsistent use of examples, for example in his account of the Jewish ghetto in Venice.[36] A rigorously separated area with a high degree of enforced cultural homogeneity turned out to be one of the most productive centres of Jewish culture. Cultural homogeneity was, in this case, highly creative.

Apart from this, social differences are, in many cases, not spatially identical with architectural ones. Even a strong boundary, such as a heavy front door in a typical suburban house in the United States may not be the primary territorial marker. Instead of the door, the boundary line is already marked by the edge of the well-mowed lawn. Or take a house wall along a sidewalk. Often, for commercial uses, the space between wall and street is occupied, e. g. to display wares in front of a shop window, to create sidewalk cafés, etc. In these cases, architecturally unmarked boundary lines transgress the assumed property lines. The territory withdraws when the shops are closing. Built form may only suggest boundaries, the permanent form is subjected to interpretation.[37] In these examples, it is the performative context that finally decides where boundaries are drawn. The cell which determines forms of encounter in Hillier and Hanson's theory is in most cases temporally and spatially soft, depending on practices and performances. One could exaggerate and maintain that architectural boundaries do not determine social ones but the inverse is the case: since architectural boundaries are always soft, it is social practices that determine their precise location. And since they are always soft, there is no need to try to dissolve them, because they would loose their meaning entirely: boundaries will be drawn by non-architectural means, then.

Jonathan Z. Smith, a theorist in religious and ritual studies, makes an argument for strong spatial boundaries. He writes that the primary function of the marked-off space of the temple is to demarcate a difference. Once admitted into the temple, the ordinary becomes significant and sacred. For him, it is enough to draw a boundary in order to invite meaning which, in turn, justifies the boundary.[38] Against the inverted essentialist position described above, one can argue with Jonathan Smith for the positive effects of strong spatial boundaries, of exclusion and inclusion, of isolation. Only by affirming a boundary, by constructing a strong boundary, meaning is invited. For Boris Groys, museums, for example, need isolation from the urban and social fabric, from economic restraints and everyday activities, they need to establish a "purified realm" in order to make contemplation of wider issues possible. Museums and other paradigmatic structures of isolation – schools, hospitals, military camps, shopping malls and polo clubs – provide not only ideological indoctrination, social segregation and discipline, but also positive and potentially creative effects. The paradigm of this architecture would not be the prison but rather the refrigerator – and who would want to live without a refrigerator today?



**8 |** *Janus*

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Notes:

1  Le Corbusier: *The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to Be Used as the Basis for Our Machine Age*, New York, 1967, p. 143.

2  Gropius, Walter: *Apollo in der Demokratie. Neue Bauhausbücher*, Mainz/Berlin, 1967.

3  Derrida: *Point de folie – Maintenant l'architecture*, pt. 8 – "Architecture can help materializing a conceptual hierarchy 'in stone or wood' and inscribing a 'archi-hieratical order' into the economy of our living. Architecture mediates this order and therefore does nothing less than to 'regulate all of what is called Western culture.'"

4  Ibid., pt. 3.

5  Krier, Leon: *Vorwärts, Kameraden, Wir Müssen Zurück*, in: *Oppositions 24,* 1981, pp. 27–37, p. 37; see also: *An Architecture of Desire*, in: Krier, Leon (ed.), Speer, Albert, 1985.

6  Jencks, Charles: *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture*, New York,  Johnson, Philip, Wigley, Mark: *Deconstructivist Architecture*, New York, The Museum of Modern Art, 1988.

7 The visual (the aesthetic) has been traditionally seen as a mode of detachment, of distance and de-engagement; In this respect, the postmodern 'textual paradigm' is in fact a modern paradigm, since Modernity is, as e.g. Martin Jay terms it, "ocularcentric". Martin Jay: *The Scopic Regimes of Modernity*, in: Foster, Hal (ed.): *Vision and Visuality*, Seattle, 1988, pp. 3–27.

8  Not only are there innumerable formally similar modern projects failing and successfully subsisting, but the same is true for building design on a different position on the aesthetic spectrum, as the divergent reception of apartment buildings by Ricardo Bofill demonstrate: similar building design is received poorly (both by critics and inhabitants) in the case of his Taller de Arquitectura in the French exurban new towns of Cergy-Pontoise, Marne-la Vallée, and St Quentin-en Yvelines, and favourably in the urban Montparnasse. See Ellin, Nan: *Postmodern Urbanism*, New York, 1996, p. 158. From this follows that formal and semantic codes (which are usually seen to be central by architects and critics alike) are in most cases not primary factors in the reception of architecture by its users, except if they blatantly offend cultural standards.

9  Barthes, Roland: *The Eiffel Tower*, in: Leach, Neil (ed.): *Rethinking Architecture*, London/New York, 1997, pp. 172–180, p. 176.

10 Koolhaas, Rem: *The Berlin Wall*, 1971, in: *S, M, L, XL*, New York, 1995, pp. 212–232.

11 Ibid., p. 225.

12 "It is not stable, not a single entity. It is more a situation, a permanent, slow-motion evolution." In its first stage, the wall consisted of concrete blocks, bricked-in windows and doors. In its second stage, built as a wall, it comprised a changing scenario or sand, mines, antitank crosses, guard towers, doghouses, and at intervals sections through the entire system: the border crossings. (220f)

13 Op. cit., note 10, pp. 226 – Jeffrey Kipnis criticized Koolhaas: "Architecture cannot determine political space. The Berlin Wall, for example, while constituting a tangible barrier, and undeniably effective in impeding movement between East and West, nevertheless required a vast infrastructure of soldiers, dogs, barbed wire and electronic surveillance in order to achieve its purpose." See Harrison, Jane: *The Politics of Space*, Conference at the AA 4/5 March 1993, *AA Files no 26*, Fall 1993, pp. 72–77. Nevertheless, architecture marked the locus and co-constituted the forms of rituals that took place.

14 Heidegger, Martin: *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York, 1971, p. 154.

15  Wilson, Peter J.: *The Domestication of the Human Species*, New Haven/London, 1988. Wilson puts forward the thesis that the erection of (domestic) walls plays a central role in the evolution of human society, culture and behaviour, for example modes of attention: "living behind a wall affects the various aspects of attention, and people so affected must respond. This occurs in part by specializing attention, by developing modes of surveillance, supervision, and inspection, and by evolving stratagems of evasion and display". See Wilson, *The Domestication of the Human Species*, p. 182. For architectural theory, take for example: Hillier, Bill and Hanson, Julienne: *The Social Logic of Space*, Cambridge/Mass, 1984; for a discussion of Hillier and Hanson, see below.

16 See Sibley, David: *Geographies of Exclusion*, London/New York, 1995, pp. 49ff

17 Evans, Robin: *The Rights of Retreat and the Rites of Exclusion: Notes Towards the Definition of Wall*, in: Evans, Robin: *Translation from Drawings to Buildings*, Cambridge/Mass, 1997, pp. 35–53, p. 46.

18 Ibid., p. 42.

19 Evans, Robin: *Figures, Doors and Passages*, in: Evans, Robin: *Translation from Drawings to Buildings*, Cambridge/Mass, 1997, pp. 54–91, p. 89f.

20 Douglas, Mary: *Purity and Danger*, London, 1966.

21 Arnheim, Rudolf: *The Dynamics of Architectural Form*, Berkeley/California, 1984, p. 92.

22 Eitrem, S.: *Hermes und die Toten*, Christiania, 1909.

23 Weiser-Aall, L.: *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*, 7. Bd., hg. v. H. Bächtold-Stäubli.

24 Schier, Bruno: *Hauslandschaften und Kulturbewegungen im östlichen Mitteleuropa*, Göttingen, 1966, pp. 116ff.

25  Rykwert, Joseph: *The Idea of a Town*, Cambridge/Mass, 1982, p. 137.

26 Ibid., p. 142.

27 Quantrill, Malcolm: *Ritual and Response in Architecture,* London, 1974, p. 42.

28 There are circular windows into the water, the guest is able to watch her swimming. Additionally, the swimming pool is lit from above, by a skylight, so that inside it the windows would appear as reflective surfaces, impending the swimmer's view of the visitors standing in the passages.

29  Hillier, Bill and Hanson, Julienne: *The Social Logic of Space*, Cambridge/Mass, 1984, p. 55.

30 Ibid., p. 143.

31Ibid., p. 25.

32 The "new urbanism", criticizes Benjamin R. Barber, offers "life without risk, diversity without tension, community without pain, and tradition without history." in: Barber, Benjamin R.: *Malled, Mauled, and Overhauled*, in: Hénaff, Marcel, Strong, Tracy B., (eds): *Public Space and Democracy*, Minneapolis/London, 2001, pp. 201–220, p. 208.

33 Deutsche, Rosalyn: *Agoraphobia*, in: Deutsche, Rosalyn: *Evictions*, Cambridge/Mass, 1996, pp. 269–327, p. 278.

34 Low, Setha M.: *On the Plaza. The Politics of Public Space and Culture*, Austin, 2000, p. 240.

35 First in: *The Uses of Disorder*, Harmondsworth, 1970, – Against this strong position it has been argued that the (British) suburbs can provide a refuge for eccentrics: Cohen, Stanley, Taylor, Laurie: *Escape Attempts*, London, 1976.

36 See Sennett, Richard: *Flesh and Stone*, London, 1994.

37 See also Habraken, J. H.: *The Structure of the Ordinary*, Cambridge/Mass, 1998.

38 Smith, Jonathan Z.: *To Take Place*, Chicago, 1992.


Credits::

1 *Sebastian Munster's Cosmographei*, Basle, 1550.

4 Münz, L., Künstler, G.: *Adolf Loos: Pioneer of Modern Architecture.*

6 Hillier, Bill and Hanson, Julienne: *The Social Logic of Space*, Cambridge, 1984.

7  Ibid.

8  Museo Nazionale, Rome, 63360