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KONRAD (KONNI) ZILLIACUS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA**КОНРАД (КОННИ) ЦИЛЛИАКУС И РЕВОЛЮЦИОННАЯ РОССИЯ**

Аннотация: В статье прослеживается путь Конрада Циллиакуса (1855–1924) от журналиста и писателя до политического активиста. Его идейная эволюция как представителя шведоязычной элиты, получившего хорошее образование и имевшего широкие международные связи, отражает изменения в образе мышления высших кругов финляндского общества. Статьи и книги Циллиакуса были посвящены истории США и американскому обществу, японской культуре, истории Финляндии, революционной России и финляндскому «активному сопротивлению» русификации в т. н. первый период угнетения (1899–1905). Его политическая деятельность включала в себя организацию международной поддержки конституционалистов, создание сети борцов с царизмом и содействие финляндскому «активизму» и сторонникам сопротивления российской власти, таким как «Союз силы» (*Voimaliitto*) и егерское движение. Имя Конрада Циллиакуса часто упоминается в историографии в связи с Финляндией периода русификации, однако он оказался в тени других конституционалистов и «активистов». Порой о нём говорят как об авантюристе-космополите и радикале без настоящих политических предпочтений. В настоящей статье биография Циллиакуса и его сочинения анализируются в контексте проблемы изменений во взглядах шведоязычной элиты Великого княжества Финляндского. Показано, как он пришёл к политическому «активизму» и как происходила его радикализация в период русификации. Его сотрудничество с российскими революционерами служит примером сложного переплетения национализма с другими идеологиями в первом десятилетии XX в.

Keywords / Ключевые слова: Konrad Ziliacus, elite, Grand Duchy of Finland, Russification, Constitutionalists, active resistance, Revolutionary Russia / Конрад Циллиакус, элита, Великое княжество Финляндское, русификация, активное сопротивление, революционная Россия

Introduction

This paper analyses radicalisation process of the Finnish elite after the second half of the 19th century, by looking at Konrad (Konni) Ziliacus (1855–1924) career and activities. Ziliacus was a Swedish-speaking journalist and activist, who organised active resistance among the young Constitutionalists, which formed a special group of the Fennomans party. They represented academically educated, mostly Swedish speaking administrative and cultural elite, vital for the development of the Finnish nationhood, for the Grand Duchy of Finland and its relations to the Russian Empire. Their rather

peaceful attitudes towards the Empire changed when the Tsarist regime tightened control over the Grand Duchy.

Konrad Zilliacus makes an interesting case in the history of the Russian Empire, the Revolutionary Russia, and in the Russification period in the Finnish Grand Duchy, as well as in the history of Finland. This paper explores how Konrad Zilliacus's life story explains his radicalisation in the context of Finnish elite, Russification and revolutionary movement in the Russian Empire.

Konrad Zilliacus's name was linked with the Russian revolutionary parties, which were actively involved with terrorism in Russia in the beginning of the 20th century. By looking at his biography, this paper seeks to find answers on why he became a radical activist. Why a person representing his generation of well-educated Swedish-speaking elite did not see the future anymore within the framework of the Russian Empire?

Many researchers have analysed political development in the Grand Duchy of Finland.¹ This paper will concentrate on the strategies of the Finnish elite to secure Finland's position and the development of Finnish nationalism during the first period of Russification (1899–1905).²

Finnish political nationalism and activism is also widely studied and discussed topic, especially in Finland, and there are quite many interesting and thorough research works.³ However, Konrad Zilliacus has never been in the focus of researchers' analysis. He has been often mentioned, but never discussed in detail in many important studies on Russification period.

This research is a micro-level study of a political actor, Konrad Zilliacus and his relations both to the Finnish and Russian political parties as well as his understandings on passive and active resistance and terrorism, and how the changes in political landscape in Russia and in Finland influenced his views. This paper analyses this development through his writings. Konrad wrote many articles on the Finnish question, for example in newspapers *Nya Pressen* and *Fria Ord* and published many books concerning Finnish history. This paper concentrates on his ideas which were written in his two books,

¹ Sami Suodenjoki, "Kansalaisyhteiskunnan ja Suomen ideat, liikkeet ja julkisuudet ennen vuotta 1917," in Kari Paakkunainen (ed.), *Suomalaisen politiikan murroksia ja muutoksia* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, politiikan ja talouden tutkimuksen laitos, 2012), <https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/36047>, *Politiikan ja talouden tutkimuksen laitoksen julkaisuja* 2012:1; Rauli Mickelsson, *Suomen puolueet. Historia, muutos ja nykyisyys*, (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2006); Risto Alapuro et al. (eds), *Kansa liikkeessä* (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1987).

² Ilkka Liikanen, *Fennomania ja kansa. Joukkojärjestytyksen läpimurto ja Suomalaisen puolueen synty* (Helsinki: SHS, 1995); Päiviö Tommila (ed.), *Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1960).

³ See for example, Tommila (ed.), *Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa*; Risto Alapuro, "Nineteenth Century Nationalism in Finland: a Comparative Perspective," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 2, no. 1 (1979): 19–29; Antti Kujala, *Vallankumous ja kansallinen itsemääräämisoikeus. Venäjän sosialistiset puolueet ja suomalainen radikalismi vuosisadan alussa* (Helsinki: SHS, 1989); Antti Kujala, "Finnish Radicals and the Russian Revolutionary Movement, 1899–1907," *Revolutionary Russia* 5, no. 2 (1992): 172–192.

in *Det revolutionära Ryssland* (Revolutionary Russia), which was published in 1903 and in *Från ofärdstid och oroliga år: politiska minnen* (Memories from the Russification period) which was published in 1920.⁴

Finnish elite within the Grand Duchy of Finland and the early years of Konrad Zilliacus

Konrad's Zilliacus's family background was typical for multinational elite within Russian Empire. The family had German roots tracing back to 17th century in Inghria, from where the Zilliacuses moved to different places in Finland, Estonia and Germany. Konrad's grandfather had moved to Old Finland, where Zilliacus was born in December 18, 1855. His father was a senator Henrik Zilliacus. Both parents used Swedish and German, and some Finnish was also spoken within the family. Although the family soon moved to Helsinki, Carelian ties for the Zilliacus family stayed strong.⁵

Zilliacus's biographer Hermann Gummerus quotes that Konni was "a talented but lazy student."⁶ Nevertheless, he managed to graduate at the age of sixteen and started to study law. During his studies he also spent one semester in Switzerland in order to improve his French. It took five years to him to complete his studies and in 1877, he started at the Court of Appeal in Åbo. Gummerus describes Konni as cheerful and good companion, and that many liked him.

As a surprise for many, Konrad decided to marry a widow, Lovisa Ehrnrooth, who was eleven years older and a mother for seven children. For Konrad this meant that he tried to follow his family's men's footsteps and join for civil service in 1879, which seemed to be natural for him with his background and education. However, work at the General Governor's chancellery was not for him, and he resigned quickly from that post.

In 1881, Zilliacus moved to the countryside with his wife and established an estate. With a new enthusiasm for work, he started to develop the estate. Although, he had some knowledge in this field, operating the estate specialised in horses was very costly. He also travelled to Paris and Moscow to show his horses. Despite of his agricultural and international activities, he also maintained his contacts and networks in Helsinki.

A turning point in his life was when the estate in Kellokoski went bankrupt in 1889 and he had to leave the country, so that his wife's property could be saved. Konrad's career was saved by his networks and he found a job as correspondent for the Helsinki-based

⁴ Konrad Zilliacus, *Det Revolutionära Ryssland. En Skildring af den revolutionära rörelsens i Ryssland uppkomst och utveckling*, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: Boström, 1903); Konni Zilliacus, *Från ofärdstid och oroliga år. Politiska minnen. II* (Helsingfors: Söderström, 1920).

⁵ Herman Gummerus, *Konni Zilliacus. Suomen itsenäisyyden esitaistelija* (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1933), 9–10.

⁶ *Ibid*, 10.

newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet*. With this new job, he sailed to United States to report on Finnish emigrants in the States.⁷

Zilliacus's years as correspondent in the United States gave him a different understanding of Finns, who did not share his social status. Moreover, the problems of migration and nationalism became more concrete to him.⁸ Zilliacus published regularly news and stories from the States, which received popularity in Finland.⁹ This however, did not prevent him to suffer from constant lack of money, which put him into same position as many others migrants in the United States were. Eventually, he had to accept manual work in order to survive.¹⁰

It seems that Zilliacus' nationalism grew during his American years. Most of the Finns he met, spoke Finnish, and the question of maintaining the native language became more frequent. At the same time, news from Finland became more worrisome. These concerned Finland's status, which the Fredrikshams's peace treaty defined with its own system of national self-governance with Finnish civil servants. The Grand Duchy of Finland had its own legislative organ, the Senate, which was independent with regard to the Duchy's internal matters. Finland was also freed from providing recruits for military service, and had its own postal service, systems of customs, finance and credit.

This all became under threat when unification processes were intensified within the Russian Empire.¹¹ While the reasons for the unification process within the Russian Empire were much more involved with the foreign and security policy of the Empire than with the exceptional status of Finland, the Finns took these discussions and measures as direct threat to their autonomy.

In his memoirs *Sortovuosilta*, Zilliacus acknowledges, that his experiences and the news from home influenced him greatly. He describes, how in at a dinner party few American fellows had told him that Finland had no other way than to surrender on Russia's demands and how this had irritated him.

"It is possible that if you take into consider Tsarist regime's understanding on fairness and justice, which is shared in other places as well ... but as hopeless it seems, I am sure that resistance will take place.

⁷ Ibid, 17–18.

⁸ Ibid, 19–20.

⁹ He published several books such as *Mariquita och andra historier från världens utkanter* (1890), *Utvandrarehistorier* (1892), *Några landsmän jag träffat* (1895), *Nya utvandrarehistorier* (1897), and *Indiankriget. Amerikanska gränsmarkshistorier* (1898).

¹⁰ Gummerus, *Konni Zilliacus*, 38.

¹¹ Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire. A Multiethnic History* (Abingdon (Oxon.)—New York: Routledge, 2013), 260.

And what comes to me, I will take part in this fight, even if I have to crawl back home to be part of this fight.”¹²

The Constitutionals — passive and active resistance

During the period of Finnish autonomy, the Swedish speaking elite perceived Finland as a constituent state.¹³ This perception was based on the Finnish constitution, which guaranteed the Finns autonomy within the Russian Empire, and which the Finnish elite considered to be untouchable. Tsar Nikolai II challenged this view when he issued a manifesto in February 1899. The manifesto stated that the Tsar had a right to issue laws in Finland without consulting representative organs of the Finnish Grand Duchy. This started the first Russification period, which divided the Finnish elite on how to defend the autonomy.

Russification period provoked different tactics within the Grand Duchy. Its elite’s strategy was to defend Finland’s autonomy and to develop Finnish nationhood. However, within the elite there were different views and emphasis on how to do it.

J. V. Snellman was a driving force for political nationalism and for development of the Finnish nationhood. After his death, his party, the Fennomans (*suomettarelaiset*) started to split into different fractions — to more conservative Old Finns (*vanhasuomalaiset*) and to more liberal Young Finns (*nuorsuomalaiset*). In addition to this, the Finnish political spectrum included the Swedish Party, which opposed policies of the Fennomans and a new political party called the Finnish Workers’ Party was founded in 1899.

The Fennomans were a conservative party that pursued a strategy to strengthen Finnish language and its status in order to create a Finnish nationhood. In the beginning of the Russification period, the leadership of the Party chose as its tactic to not resist the new statutes issued by the Tsar. It estimated that by avoiding conflicts and strengthening Finnish language, the nation would have had better chances for survival.¹⁴ However, this tactic led to a split within the party.

The younger generation challenged the chosen tactic and presented an alternative tactic, which was based on legal argument on the Finnish constitution as a guarantor of the autonomy of Finland. This group, which was now called as the Constitutionals and was led by Senator Leo Mechelin, adopted the concept of the passive resistance.¹⁵ The concept of passive resistance meant that the Constitutionals urged Finnish people to ignore the law. They opposed the new law on language, and urged Finnish people

¹² Konni Zilliacus, *Sortovuosilta. Poliittisia muistelmia* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1920), 7.

¹³ Osmo Jussila, *Suomen suuriruhtinaskunta. 1809–1917* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2004); Eino Jutikkala, Juhani Nyssönen and Kauko Pirinen, *Suomen historia*, 6th ed. (Helsinki: WSOY, 2002); Matti Klinge *Keisarin Suomi* ([Espoo]: Schildt, 1997).

¹⁴ Pirkko Rommi, “Myöntöväisyyssuuntauksen ideologia,” in Tommila (ed.), *Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa*.

¹⁵ Lauri Hyvämäki, “Perustuslaillinen ideologia,” in Tommila (ed.), *Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa*.

to resist drafts for the Russian army. At the same time passive resistance meant that the leaders of the Constitutionalists tried to seek international support for the Finnish question.

For Konrad Zilliacus, the Constitutionalist project provided a perfect platform to use his skills as a writer and international activist. Zilliacus's career as a writer, novelist and journalist started to flourish in beginning of the 1890s. In 1893 he managed to receive an agreement for the new book, which took him all over the world and eventually after many events, he landed in Japan. After spending two years in Japan, Zilliacus with his new family arrived to Paris in 1897, and finally, in 1898 returned to Finland.

In his memoirs, Konrad Zilliacus describes how the Finnish elite was bewildered how to react on February manifestation and the feeling of betrayal that the manifesto caused. While others tried to draft argumentations to convince the Tsar of the unique position of Finland and its people's loyalty to the Tsar, Zilliacus decided to seek international support.¹⁶

"I decided to travel abroad to see if there was any chance in Europe to express support for Finland on the basis made by the Dutch (officer) or on something other."

Konrad Zilliacus became radicalised when he was working as a journalist in *Nya Pressen*, where he started to work when he returned to Finland. His writings in *Nya Pressen* were nationalistic and political, and they immediately provoked countermeasures by the regime. The paper itself was closed in June 29, 1900, because of Konrad's article. Zilliacus immigrated to Stockholm, where he continued his activities in different publications.¹⁷ The Constitutionalists, many of whom now lived in Stockholm, started to publish a new journal called *Fria ord* (Free word). This was the paper where Zilliacus continued his writing career.

Beside his journalistic work, Zilliacus specialised in smuggling, when the Constitutionalists needed to deliver *Fria ord* to Finland. This activity expanded also into larger smuggling network, which slipped all kind of publications and people through the Russian-Swedish border. In his memoirs, Zilliacus describes in detail how he prepared these operations and what kind of game there was between Tsarist authorities and the Finnish activists.¹⁸ Zilliacus helped also Russian revolutionaries by renting his boat to them and helping them to smuggle revolutionary publications and the revolutionaries themselves. During the time of these operations the skills of Zilliacus and his comrades improved, and they became experts in navigation in the Finnish gulf.

¹⁶ Zilliacus, *Sortovuosilta*, 8–11.

¹⁷ Matti Klinge, "Zilliacus, Konni (1855–1924)," *Kansallisbiografia-verkojulkaisu. Studia Biographica 4* (Helsinki: SKS, 1997–), July 30, 2007, <http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:skes-kebg-003698> (accessed December 30, 2018).

¹⁸ Zilliacus, *Sortovuosilta*, 92–93.

Senator Leo Mechelin and Konrad Zilliacus were working together at first. In the beginning of the Russification period, Zilliacus had acted as mediator and creator of networks for the Constitutionalists, between Leo Mechelin and international experts, when the Constitutionalists sought for international support for the Finnish cause. One of these acts of support was an address of the International cultural activists, who expressed their support for Finland, and which the Constitutionalists tried to deliver to Tsar.

The relations between Mechelin and Zilliacus became more complicated. Mechelin had used Zilliacus's services, when it came to the publishing, smuggling and international networking, but later he started to worry that his name or the Constitutionalist cause would be associated with illegal activities and forms of resistance. This frustrated Zilliacus, who advocated for a more active role in Finnish resistance. His idea was to unite all forces that resisted the Tsarist regime — the Russian revolutionaries, Polish nationalists, and the Japanese government

In 1902 Konni Zilliacus wrote a book *Det revolutionära Ryssland*, which described activities of the Russian revolutionary parties starting from the Decembrists to the revolutionary parties of the early 20th century.¹⁹ The aim of the book was to introduce actors, practices and ideas of those forces who resisted the Tsarist regime inside Russia, and to inspire Finnish activists on how to organise their resistance.

Konrad's relationship with Russian revolutionaries was an issue, which caused a conflict between Leo Mechelin and Zilliacus. Mechelin did not want that the activities of the Constitutionalists and the Finnish cause would be associated with the revolutionaries in Russia. First, most of the Finnish Constitutionalists were conservative social reformists who were ideologically far from the radicals of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party and the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Second, according to Leo Mechelin the case of Finland was to be discussed in the level of the international community, since the case was about the Finnish state and the Finnish nationhood. Therefore, his aim was to create pressure against the Tsar with the help of the international academic and cultural elite.

Passive resistance as a tactic was challenged when the General Governor Nikolai Bobrikov received special mandate to finish the Finnish resistance in 1903. As part of his mandate, he could exile disobedient Finnish elite, and many members of the group of Constitutionalists received this sentence. Instead of finishing resistance, this manoeuvre of the Tsar radicalised many of the members of the Constitutionalists, many of whom also belonged to the cultural elite in Finland.

¹⁹ Konrad Zilliacus, *Vapauden liike Venäjällä* (Stockholm: Svanbäck, 1903).

A Finnish historian Matti Lauerma has pointed out how passive resistance of the Constitutionalists changed into active resistance – into the idea that violence needs to be resisted with violence.²⁰ According to him, the main reason was in the Constitutionalist's reluctance to start an open conflict with the Tsarist regime, which the Constitutionalists thought would be devastating for the party. Therefore, they chose as their tactic to stick strictly with the law. However, General Governor Bobrikov's actions and conservatism of the Constitutionalists made younger generation to demand more severe actions against Russification.

Konrad Zilliacus was close to the Kagal, an organisation founded as an underground movement to resist Russification. His brother and many friends were part of the organisation. Although, he was not in the leadership of this organisation, Zilliacus's activism was reflected there as well. In the short description of a Kagal meeting, which was held in April, 1903, the organisation emphasises the need to involve a large strata of Finnish society to the resistance. An emphasis was made on information, spread by the newspapers:

*“Papers like Fria ord and Vapaat lehdet have been valued by the several speakers. People have acknowledge largely, that this is the only way to follow state-development in our country.”*²¹

Zilliacus became more involved with the activists. The Finnish activists planned political murders – murders of the Finnish officials who cooperated with the Tsarist regime and the representatives of the regime itself, such as General Governor Bobrikov. This plan was conducted by Eugen Schauman in June 16, 1904. Although he was not a member of the Kagal or any other activists, the group of activists welcomed his action. They thought, however, that his suicide was unnecessary, since they considered that they were in war against Tsarist Russia.²²

Interestingly enough, Zilliacus himself does not discuss Bobrikov's murder in his memoirs, when he describes the activities of the Finnish activists in 1903–1904. He concentrates to describe international relations of the activists and his role in organising them. It might be because he was then in Sweden, but also that from his point of view international cooperation in resistance was more important than singular acts of violent resistance.

Zilliacus and the Russian revolutionaries

²⁰ Matti Lauerma, “Aktivismi,” in Tommila (ed.), *Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa*, 138.

²¹ “Kagaalin” arkistoa. *Kokoelma vuosina 1899–1905 ilmestyneitä poliittisia lentolehtisiä, julistuksia, kiertokirjeitä y. m.* (Helsinki: Eduskunnan kirjasto, 1939), 252.

²² Lauerma, “Aktivismi,” 141–142.

Despite of cooperation with the Russian revolutionaries, Zilliacus's attitudes towards terrorism remained ambivalent. The silence on Bobrikov's murder and his earlier writings showed that he did not advocate for the political murder. However, something changed during his exile years in Stockholm. In his memoirs Zilliacus writes, that during the meeting in Amsterdam, which prepared a conference in Paris, the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries had discussed the issue of political murders, attempted murder, and possible new targets of political violence. They had also asked Zilliacus on his position to this issue. According to Zilliacus, he replied that

“...The murders of Sipiagin, Plehve and Prince Sergei have shown that no matter of their high social and political position, they have had no influence whatsoever to the political resistance. They have confused the public, but nothing has changed. One actor has been replaced with another. There are plenty people in Russia, who want to replace them, that there is no organisation that can dream that they can eliminate them all. Danger does not scare them to continue the same policies typical for the regime. In my opinion there is only one political murder worthwhile of an attempt, which would lead the kind of situation which would lead to the social and political system that we want — it would be the murder of the head of the regime — the Tsar himself.”²³

His reply shows that terroristic attacks and political violence had for him only instrumental value. If it had no direct benefits, then there was no use to use such measures. The change in his attitudes towards political murder, and the murder of the Tsar, happened the birth of Prince Aleksei, heir to the Russian throne. The legitimacy and authority of the regency would be significantly lower and this would give the change a chance:

“How long do you think that this government would be unanimous? From the very first day they would start to plot how to influence on him. After three months the whole government and with it the whole Russia would be split into different groups. This would give you — the Russian revolutionaries — a chance to create a revolution in Russia.”²⁴

Despite of these comments, it is hard to associate Zilliacus with the Russian revolutionaries, since the modus operandi for Zilliacus was not social change but only the end of the Tsarist regime and through this the Finnish independence. Zilliacus highlighted active resistance, which consisted of influencing on public opinion and of international cooperation. Terrorism and political violence were means to achieve goals that would be otherwise unachievable, and this connected him, although very weakly, to terrorism and Russian revolutionaries.

In October 1904, Zilliacus organised All-Russian Congress for oppositional and revolutionary parties in Paris. Konrad Zilliacus acted as a chairman in this congress, in which all bigger opposition parties except the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks took part. The resolution of this conference demanded autonomy for all Russian ethnic minorities.

²³ Zilliacus, *Sortovuosilta*, 118–119.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 119.

In this conference, Zilliacus agreed with the Russian revolutionaries and with the Polish nationalists that cooperation against Tsarist regime will continue and develop. The resolution of this conference and the plan for resistance was published.

It seems that Zilliacus' attitude towards political violence changed after the Paris conference, which was in many ways a disappointment for Zilliacus. He had hoped that the common enemy would have been created an understanding on the goals and measures to achieve them. According to Zilliacus, result of the conference — the resolution was so weak, that it had no practical meaning. It had, however, two important moments. This was the clause on the autonomy of the national minorities and the idea of tactics, which would lead to the revolution. Another disappointment for Zilliacus was that the Constitutionalists led by Leo Mechelin refused to sign this resolution.²⁵ Despite of the fact that the resolution condemned autocracy and the violations against the Finnish constitution, the Constitutionalists were afraid that their cause would be defamed as cooperation with the Russian revolutionaries. Instead of active resistance, most of the Constitutionalists wanted to continue their political activities in the framework of parliamentary activities.

For Zilliacus the support from the West was not enough, he sought cooperation also with Japan. When the Russo-Japanese war broke, Zilliacus contacted Japanese military attaché Akashi Motojiri in Stockholm to discuss how to help Japanese to win the war. Zilliacus suggested that the Polish soldiers should be given guarantees that they could safely travel to US, if they would abandon the front.²⁶ This attempt did not succeed, but Zilliacus later kept on maintaining contacts with the military attaché.

Finnish party of Active resistance and the Union of the force

Disappointed Zilliacus organised a new party — the Finnish party of Active resistance (*Suomen aktiivinen vastustuspuolue*), which aimed at armed mutiny and terrorist attacks against the Russian authorities. In its founding conference in November 17, 1904, Johannes Gummerus was chosen as the leader of this party. The Party had its own military wing, which worked together with the workers' activists, especially in Eastern Finland. The programme of the party stated its aims and measures accordingly:²⁷

“§ 1. The party wants to wake up the Finnish people and to make them realise that there is no law in Finland and how the country is depended on Russian autocracy, and how the active, sever and ruthless fight against despotism and its henchmen is needed and justified.

²⁵ Ibid, 132, 136–138.

²⁶ Ibid, 97–98.

²⁷ Lauerma, “Aktivismi,” 143–144.

The Party cooperates with other parties of resistance of other parts in Russia, and sees benefits of this cooperation. The party wants to abolish the feel of loyalty of the people to the Tsar and strengthen its feel of freedom:

- a) by publishing and spreading writings on these issues;*
- b) by delivering weapons among the people;*
- c) by supporting the military wing of the party;*
- d) by other means which are appropriate for the cause*

§ 2 The party supports the work, which individual people have already conducted in order to help the Russian revolution."

The military wing of the party conducted several failed assassinations against Russian officials.²⁸ They even tried to murder the Tsar Nikolai II when he was hunting in Koivisto in 1905, but the attempt failed when the Tsar had left to St. Petersburg before the activists had reached the Koivisto region.

According to Lauerma, the general strike in October and November 1905 (30.10–5.11.1905) reflected growing popularity of active resistance. The Activists took part in planning and conducting of the strike, cooperating with the labour movement.²⁹ However, the result of the general strike, the November manifesto, drove Finnish Activists to the political margin. It was the Constitutionals who considered that it was their tactic, which had led to the victory of the law and the Finnish Constitution. For them the goal was to overrule the February manifesto, which was achieved with the mean of passive resistance.

However, for the Activists the goal had changed. Their goal became the Finnish independence, since Konrad Zilliacus and his supporters did not believe that the situation in Tsarist regime had significantly changed. Therefore, he, and a group of political and cultural elite in Finland started to plan military resistance in order to free Finland.

The headquarters of the military wing of the Activist Party was founded in 1905. Zilliacus also organised the Union of the Force (Voimaliitto) which was supposed to act as militia for the people and to replace the Russian Army in Finland. In May 1905, Union of Force had 125 regional units and about 25 000 members.³⁰ It managed to gather politically active cultural elite, such as Akseli Gallen-Kallela, Alpo Sailo, Aarno Hasselqvist, Mikko Oinonen and Carl Bengts as well as many students. A significant part of the Finnish elite was involved in its activities including future president of Finland, Per-Erik Svinhufud.³¹ These activities aimed at practicing military resistance. They were masked as sports activities, but the fact was that the Union sought to gain weapons from Europe.

²⁸ Ibid, 148.

²⁹ Ibid, 150–151.

³⁰ Ibid, 152.

³¹ "Vaihe Suomen itsenäisyystaistelusta. Voimaliiton 25-vuotismuistio," *Suomen Kuvalehti*, May 16, 1931, no. 20.

Deliveries however failed, the authorities found out the real nature of the union and they closed the union in November 1906.

When Zilliacus's links with Japan were discovered, he had to escape to Sweden again in 1909. In the eve of WWI, he was actively supporting the Finnish jaegers. When he returned to Finland in 1918, he started to write his memoirs. In his memoirs, Zilliacus describes the goals and measures – the strategies and tactics — which the Finnish elite had chosen to resist Russification. These memoirs also reveal how the Finnish elite radicalised and changed its tactic from passive to active resistance.

Conclusions

Konrad Zilliacus's background gave him a strong access to international networks. Despite of having strong ties within the Swedish-speaking elite in Finland, he had also good connections both to the West and to the East. His ties with Russia started from his early years and continued through his adulthood. However, this was not unique in the context of the Grand Duchy of Finland. What is interesting is that with abandoning career path in the civil service, Konrad Zilliacus became better familiar with different social groups and eventually developed a career abroad, especially in the United States.

During his stay in the United States Zilliacus became more aware on the question of nationalism and social hierarchies. Question of Finnish migration, which he studied systematically during those years, made him constantly return to the situation in the Grand Duchy of Finland, as well as to ponder the questions of why these people left the country and how they preserved their Finnishness in a multinational environment in the United States. Moreover, these immigrants were usually Finnish-speaking peasants and workers, and it seems to have enforced Konrad Zilliacus' emotional ties to the Finnish nationhood.

Constitutionalists provided Zilliacus with two things. First, it was a network of the Finnish elite, where he already belonged. His relatives, friends, and peers united to oppose Russification process both in legal and underground means. The Kagal's offered an example how to organise underground activities. Second, the Constitutionalist's newspapers *Nya Pressen* and *Fria Ord* provided Zilliacus with an opportunity to continue his activities as a writer and journalist.

However, Zilliacus's understanding of how to act against Russification was different from leaders of the Constitutionalist party. This was partly because of his personality, as a “man of actions,” and because of his experiences and contacts with different immigrant and political networks abroad. Zilliacus was ready to cooperate with different parties in the opposite site of political spectrum. For him, the main thing was first the autonomy and later the independence of Finland.

Through the group of Constitutionalists and Konrad Zilliacus we have a picture of different forms of resistance and of many conflicts. Within the Fennoman party, the Finnish question included ideological and tactical disputes on the nation building and the protection of the nationhood. In the one end of this dispute, there was a tactic to strengthen the nation through the Finnish language and administration, and on the other end maintenance of the state structure and its strengthening through the legal principles.

There was also dispute between passive and active resistance within the group of Constitutionalist. Through analysis of the activities and ideas of Leo Mechelin and Konrad Zilliacus, we receive a picture of norms and values within the Finnish resistance. It had also national and international dimension. Even though the Constitutionalists sought for international support, it had its limits for them. If we look at Zilliacus activities, they confirm what has been stated on the nature of political opposition during the last year of Tsarist regime. The more severe the measures against resistance were, the more radical it became.

The attitudes towards terrorism among the Finnish elite also changed. In the beginning, the Constitutionalists, such as Konrad Zilliacus did not consider political violence such as terrorism to be justified as a mean of political resistance. Later, he saw justification in terrorism, if it really had an impact to the power relations. When the social conflicts reached their peak in the end of the 1910s in Finland, part of the Finns had adopted means of violent resistance as a measure to achieve their goals.

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