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ZERO-SUM CONCEPTIONS IN
SOVIET-AMERICAN COMPETITION**

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Ever since 1960, the year of African independence, the United States and the Soviet Union have been involved in growing competition for influence on the continent of Africa. Although the level of involvement of the two super-powers in Africa has fluctuated during the course of the past two decades, since at least the middle of the 1970s the two countries have expanded significantly their respective roles in the affairs of the continent. For the Soviet Union the opportunities presented by the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the overthrow of the monarchy in Ethiopia and the ensuing militarization of Soviet policy in Africa represented a watershed in Soviet policy. By the beginning of the present decade the USSR was involved in an ever-growing manner in events throughout the continent--from direct military involvement in Ethiopia and Angola to expanded political, military and economic support for a host of countries. In recent years, the United States has responded by increasing its involvement in the affairs of a continent which it had largely viewed in the past as the preserve of its European allies. Military support for regimes as diverse as those of King Hassan of Morocco, President Mobutu of Zaire, and President Siad Barre of Somalia, plus expanded diplomatic and economic efforts in the southern portion of the continent have been motivated, in large part, by a concern for the growing role of the Soviets and their Cuban and East German allies in determining the future course that the countries of Africa will take. To date neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has managed to achieve long-term successes measured in terms of stable influence over a number of years in a particular country or region. For the Soviets the overthrow of radical friends in Ghana and Mali in 1965 and 1968 and the break in relations with former recipients of Soviet largesse in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia represented serious setbacks to a policy aimed at expanding the Soviet role on the continent.

On the other hand, U S support for Emperor Haile Selassie did not prevent the radicalization of the Ethiopian political system, and the growth of a Soviet military presence (in conjunction with their allies) is viewed in Washington as an escalating threat to the long-term strategic interests of the West

As Walter Clemens has argued, Soviet and American policies in Africa have been based primarily on mutual efforts to gain an advantage in a worldwide competition between the two superpowers and on the assumption that a gain for one necessarily meant a loss for the other ¹ In spite of the evidence amassed during the postwar period that policies in the Third World based primarily on factors relevant to the global superpower conflict are not likely to succeed, the leaderships in both Moscow and Washington continue to take such a zero-sum approach to developments in Africa In fact, after something of a hiatus in superpower competition in Africa from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, such competition has expanded almost exponentially during the past six or seven years The costs of the broadening Soviet-American conflict in Africa --and in the Third World more broadly--are great For the two superpowers they include the large sums spent on arming and training the military of client or allied states For the countries of Africa they involve an increasing focus on military-security problems to the possible exclusion of social-economic issues, the likely escalation of destructiveness of local or regional conflicts, and the possible loss of autonomy in relations with the superpower patron Moreover, superpower involvement in the affairs of Africa brings with it the possibility of confrontation between the two major nuclear powers that could have disastrous results for all of mankind

1 The Place of Africa in the Soviet-American Global Competition

To a substantial degree Africa has been peripheral to the major aspects of Soviet-American conflict during most of the three and a half decades since the end of World War II. This conflict has focused far more on Europe, the Middle East and East Asia during the past thirty years, in particular in the 1950s as the Soviet Union and the United States sought to consolidate the positions that they had inherited in the wake of the destruction of their major international competitors during the war. The Soviet effort to expand and consolidate power in the regions adjacent to Soviet territory and the U S attempt to contain what was viewed as a major threat by the Soviets to the security of the free world was limited in large part by the inability of the USSR to project power into areas not contiguous to the Soviet Union. In Africa, the continuing presence of the European colonial powers also acted as an important deterrent to Soviet involvement, as did the Soviet refusal under Stalin to view bourgeois nationalists as anything more than refined agents of Western imperialism.² Not until African states began to achieve independence in the late 1950s and, especially, the early 1960s were the Soviets afforded opportunities to deal directly with the peoples of Africa. The major thrust of this policy focused on establishing contacts with and supporting anti-Western elements within Africa--Sékou Touré after his split with French President de Gaulle, Patrice Lumumba after the post-independence Belgian intervention in the Congo (Leopoldville), and Kwame Nkrumah after his turn to the left in the early 1960s--and was motivated, in my view, primarily by the goal of competing with the West for influence in an area of potential importance for the exercise of international power.

For the most part, Soviet policy in Africa during the 1960s proved to be a failure. Soviet efforts in such countries as Ghana, Guinea and Mali were

thwarted by the overthrow of pro-Soviet leaders (Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966 and Keita in Mali in 1968) and by the lessening importance of Sékou Touré in the evolution of African politics. Only in the Muslim portions of the continent had Soviet investments of resources and support resulted in what appeared to be, at the beginning of the 1970s, the expansion of political, economic and security ties. Egypt was in the process of becoming what many Western commentators viewed as a client or satellite of the Soviet Union. Prior to the abortive coup attempt in which communists were implicated, President Nimeiry of Sudan had moved in a strongly anti-Western direction, and the new military government of Siad Barre in Somalia had turned increasingly toward the U S S R and was on the verge of declaring Somalia a Marxist-Leninist state. Elsewhere, Soviet relations with the Algerian government of President Boumedienne had developed favorably after the initial shock experienced by the Soviets when Lenin Peace Prize winner President Ben Bella was overthrown by Boumedienne in 1965. Yet, as is evident from the perspective of 1982, the apparent strong Soviet position in Muslim Africa was built on a fragile foundation. Within a relatively short period of time growing differences between the Soviets and the leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Somalia expanded to the point that relations were virtually severed and, by the end of the 1970s, these three countries were among the most vocal critics of Soviet policy in Africa. However, as the Soviets lost their positions in these countries, ~~there~~ overall African policy took on a much more military orientation and resulted in a much broader and more extensive involvement in the affairs of the continent--involvement oriented largely toward the enhancement of the Soviet position in the global conflict with the United States.

Throughout the 1960s U S policy in Africa remained largely an adjunct of the policies of its European allies. Although the United States had encouraged the process of decolonization during the years immediately following the Second

World War, the ideological-political-military confrontation with the USSR resulted in a growing concern in the U S about the possibilities for communist gains throughout the Third World. By the middle of the 1950s U S policy in the developing countries, including in Africa, was oriented more toward the issue of containing the expansion of Soviet power and influence than it was toward active support for national liberation. The United States was generally willing to leave the issue of political developments in Africa to Great Britain, France and the other European colonial powers, although it was willing in crisis situations, such as the Congo crises of 1961-65, to become directly involved. Such involvement, however, tended to be motivated largely by the concern that political chaos might provide the opportunity for Soviet advances on the continent.

The U S did develop or expand political, economic and military relations with a number of African states during the 1960s--in particular with Ethiopia in the Horn, Morocco and Libya in the north, and a number of other Western-oriented governments. With few exceptions, however, the United States did not develop an active approach to Africa during the first decade after the movement toward independence on the continent. Its policies consisted primarily of support for the initiatives of its allies and of occasional reactions to what were viewed as threats to Western interests emanating from the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of the 1970s, therefore, direct superpower involvement in Africa was limited largely to the northern portion of the continent, where the focus of both Soviet and American interests was more on the Middle East than it was on Africa proper. Throughout the decade the situation was to change substantially as the alliances of local states with the superpowers shifted--Egypt, Sudan and Somalia from the USSR to the U S and Libya and Ethiopia from the U S to the Soviet Union, radical regimes came to power in the former Portu-

guese colonial territories, and Cuba and the East European states began to play an important role, in conjunction with the Soviets, in the affairs of Africa

2 The Evolution of a Forward Soviet Strategy in Africa

Before turning to an examination of the place of Africa within the overall policy of the Soviet Union it is important to understand the primary objectives of the Soviet leaders in the areas of foreign policy and international security. During his address to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1971 Leonid Brezhnev outlined the basic priorities of Soviet foreign policy. These goals were included almost verbatim in the new Soviet constitution of 1977. The USSR's foreign policy is aimed at ensuring favorable international conditions for building communism in the USSR, protecting the Soviet Union's state interests, strengthening the positions of world socialism, supporting the peoples' struggle for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving general and complete disarmament and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.³ Soviet foreign policy, in this formulation, operates at four distinct, but interrelated, levels. Of primary importance is the protection of the security of the Soviet state and the strengthening of the Soviet political and economic system--ensuring favorable international conditions for the construction of communism in the USSR and protecting Soviet state interests. Examples of this aspect of Soviet policy during the past decade have been both the continuing buildup of Soviet military capabilities and the creation of political and economic ties with the outside world that were seen as useful for the achievement of such goals as domestic economic growth.

The second level of Soviet foreign policy objectives concerns the protection and strengthening of the Soviet position in those countries in which the USSR has

has already established a dominant position. The irreversibility of communist development as enunciated in the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (and of Afghanistan in 1979) are among the most obvious concrete indications of this policy objective. The maintenance of the dominant Soviet position in Eastern Europe has become almost coterminous with the defense of the Soviet system itself, as recent Soviet commentary concerning the danger of revisionist and anti socialist activities in Poland has demonstrated.

The third level of Soviet policy is the competition with the West for influence in the Third World. Support for national liberation movements aims at the creation of close ties with Third World leaders and the reduction of residual Western influence throughout the developing countries. Emphasis on social progress implies the attempt to use the newly-established relations for the purpose of promoting the establishment of the preconditions for Soviet-style socio-political systems that will eventually enter the world socialist system. The final element of Soviet foreign policy objectives is the prevention of general war and the maintenance of peaceful coexistence in relations with the imperialist states of the West.

These strategic objectives of Soviet policy, although distinct from one another, are integrally interrelated. The strengthening of the Soviet Union itself provides capabilities that enable the Soviet leadership more effectively to pursue objectives farther afield, while the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World can add to Soviet security and development.⁴

To what extent does the history of Soviet involvement in Africa coincide with these objectives? How does one explain the apparent qualitative shift in Soviet African policy in the latter half of the 1970s which was characterized by much greater involvement? Is it possible that, within the near future, Africa

will rise on the scale of Soviet foreign policy priorities? These are a few of the question that we hope to answer in the present discussion. In addition, we hope to demonstrate the factors that have enabled the Soviets to expand their involvement and the primary means that they have employed in their efforts to expand that involvement.

Although the Soviets initiated contacts with Africa soon after the decision to abandon Stalin's Eurocentric policy concentration in the mid-1950s and the establishment of contacts with a number of developing countries in Asia, the primary expansion of Soviet involvement in Africa came in 1960--the major year of African decolonization. Within a few years that were deeply involved in a number of African countries, although, as we have seen, by the end of the decade most of their initial efforts at establishing influence had failed. The overthrow of several progressive African leaders, the intrusion of the military into the political process in much of Africa, and the continuing economic dependence of most African countries on the West led to a complete reassessment of Soviet African policy by the end of the decade--in line with the much broader reevaluation of the foundations of Khrushchev's Third World policy.

Throughout the 1960s Soviet involvement in Africa, even during the period of almost euphoric expectations about the rapid progress of Africa toward socialism, was extremely limited. Trade, economic assistance, military contacts, and other forms of interaction ranked extremely low when compared with Soviet relations with the countries of Asia and the Middle East.⁵ Yet, even this modest involvement was scaled down after the defeats suffered by the USSR in the late 1960s. Only the training programs for Africans--both academic programs and the training of technicians and future cadres for Africa--continued to expand.⁶ Not only did the Soviets lack the capabilities to take advantage of the rapidly changing situation on the continent--e.g., their inability to provide effective support to friendly leaders when the latter were faced with strong domestic opposition--

but Africa ranked low on the Soviet leaders list of foreign policy priorities. Developments in Africa were of little relevance to the primary Soviet concern of defending and strengthening the empire, and the Soviets were not yet in a position to challenge Western interests in the African region.

The period since the beginning of the 1970s has witnessed an important shift in Soviet policy in Africa--just as it has been a period of change in the global position of the USSR. The change in policy was generally not foreseen by Western analysts, many of whom had concluded that the Soviets had virtually written off Sub-Saharan Africa as an area of major interest and involvement.⁷ They were, therefore, ill-prepared in 1975 when the Soviets intervened directly and massively in Angola--even at the risk of damage to their policy of détente with the West. In retrospect it seems quite clear that Soviet policy in Angola was part of a reinvigorated Soviet effort to consolidate and to expand its global political and military role at the expense of both the United States (and its European allies) and Communist China. The more recent intervention of the Soviets and their Cuban allies in the Horn of Africa is yet another indication of the much more active Soviet effort to extend its worldwide position of influence and potential control.

As others have already shown, Soviet involvement in Angola escalated significantly in the period after March 1975.⁸ By late 1975 and early 1976 the introduction into the civil war on the side of the MPLA of both large amounts of Soviet military equipment (including tanks, artillery and plane) and more than 12,000 Cuban troops played the decisive role in the MPLA's coming to power. Intermittent reports indicate that Soviet and Cuban support continue to be of crucial importance to the MPLA in maintaining its position in the face of guerrilla operations. In the Ogaden the active participation of Cuban troops resulted in Ethiopia's driving the Somali-supported forces out of the area and in Eritrea

their assistance helped to undermine the position of the rebels. However, the purpose of the following comments will not be to review the details of past Soviet policy in Angola and Ethiopia. Rather we shall attempt to evaluate probable Soviet motives and to place Soviet policy within the broader context of overall Soviet policy in the Third World.

In some respects the crushing of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 represents a turning point in Soviet foreign policy. Since that time the Soviets have expanded their efforts at consolidation in Eastern Europe within both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In addition, while the middle and late 1960s had witnessed something of a reduction in Soviet activities in portions of the Third World--in particular in Africa--there has been a significant revival of that activity during the past decade. This does not mean that the Soviets have been extraordinarily successful. In fact, their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and Sadat's denunciation of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Agreement four years later, as well as the more recent break between Somalia and the Soviet Union, are evidence of Soviet failures. The point is, however, that during the 1970s the Soviets renewed the drive for influence throughout much of the Third World. The goals of this drive are based primarily on a continuing Soviet effort to expand positions of influence and power in direct competition with the United States. In 1975 Angola offered them the possibility of bringing to power a political party, the MPLA, which would be dependent upon the Soviets for their very existence and would, presumably, be amenable to providing the Soviets with the facilities to form a base of operations in southern Africa. The value of such facilities for the Soviets--as for the United States in the past--has been evident. During the Angolan war, for example, the Soviets were able to use the airport facilities of Brazzaville as

a staging area for supplies flowing to the MPLA, just as they later employed Aden as part of their supply line to Ethiopia. Port facilities in Angola now provide the Soviets with an opportunity to operate in the south Atlantic that was unavailable to them in the past, just as port facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean gave them an advantage during the 1973 Middle Eastern war that they did not possess six years earlier.

Soviet intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975 and their continued support of the MPLA government has been based on a variety of factors. As Legum and Marchum both have demonstrated, Soviet rivalry with China for influence in Africa was more important than competition with the United States.⁹ The MPLA victory in Angola effectively eliminated the immediate possibility of Chinese influence in that country and also played an important part in the substantial reduction of Chinese involvement elsewhere in Africa. But, given the beginnings of U.S. interest in supporting Neto's opponents, demonstrated by the granting of \$300,000 in aid to the FNLA, the Soviets were also concerned with preventing the consolidation of American influence in Angola.

In addition to the direct competition with the Chinese and Americans in Angola, the location of Angola in relationship to white-dominated southern Africa presumably played a role in Soviet calculations. The continuing and escalating conflicts in Zimbabwe (since resolved), Namibia, and South Africa provided the Soviets with opportunities to gain a presence in the region, should national liberation movements which they support come to power. Friendship with Angola and Mozambique and a Soviet presence in these countries facilitates Soviet support for the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa. Although Angola and, for that matter, all of southern Africa are of minimal immediate strategic importance for the Soviet Union, regimes friendly to the

Soviets and the availability of bases of operation in the region would provide important leverage vis-à-vis the West in case of a future conflict situation. Soviet vessels operating out of ports in southern Africa, coupled with a Soviet naval presence in the western Indian Ocean operating out of Aden and the Horn of Africa would provide the USSR with the possibility of disrupting vital Middle Eastern oil supplies to Western Europe and the United States.

After the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the rapid radicalization of the revolutionary council which replaced him, the Soviets saw the opportunity for both undermining the U.S. position in the Horn of Africa and for expanding their own base of operations in northeastern Africa.¹⁰ Their expulsion from Egypt apparently played a role in this decision, for they had lost base-rights in Egypt. However, they soon learned that their increasing support for the new Ethiopian rulers was strongly opposed by Somalia, in spite of the substantial support that they had supplied to the regime of President Siad Barre. After unsuccessful attempts to mediate in the territorial conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, the Soviets opted for the friendship of the larger and potentially more important Ethiopia. By fall 1977 massive Soviet and Cuban support began to flow into Ethiopia and during early 1978 this support played the major role in destroying the efforts of Somali tribesmen in the Ogaden--with the direct support of the Somali government--to break away from Ethiopian control. Later Soviet and Cuban support were transferred to Eritrea, where the Ethiopian government faced a second major effort at secession.

The Soviets ultimately decided that a unified and pro-Soviet Ethiopia in control of much of the northeastern portion of Africa was worth the risks involved. Yet the risks were substantial. Not only did they result in the virtual breaking of relations with Somalia and the strong opposition of two former So-

viet friends--Egypt and the Sudan--but they also led to a deterioration of Soviet relations with a number of Middle Eastern and African countries and exacerbated problems with the West

This cursory summary of several of the most important recent developments of Soviet policy in Africa must be complemented with a discussion of the broader aspects of Soviet involvement on the continent. However, before examining the instruments employed by the Soviets in their attempts to expand their position in Africa, it is necessary to discuss the outlines of U S policy

3 U S Policy in Africa The Reaction to Soviet Initiatives

It is a bit more difficult to list the primary goals of the United States as they relate to Africa. For most of the postwar period, as we have noted, Africa--especially those portions south of the Sahara--have been outside the primary focus of U S foreign policy. Yet there has been a set of distinguishable U S interests in the affairs of the continent. First, there was the goal of gaining access to military facilities of strategic importance to the United States. Wheeler Air Force base in Libya and the multipurpose military facilities in Asmara, Ethiopia were primary examples of this aspect of U S policy. These military facilities were important to the United States primarily for purposes of strengthening U S capabilities in the global competition with the Soviet Union. In Ethiopia, for example, the relationship that was established between the U S and the government of Emperor Haile Selassie was based primarily, in the words of Marina Ottaway, on an exchange relationship, rather than an alliance.¹¹ In return for guaranteed military facilities provided to the U S the Ethiopian government received substantial military assistance, including the creation and arming of a modern army.

The second U S goal in Africa related to the fear of an expanding Soviet role in the affairs of the continent. After the establishment of political, economic and military contacts between the USSR (and some of its European allies) with individual African states in the early and mid-1960s, growing concern was voiced in the United States concerning the penetration of Africa by the Soviet Union. At this time the issue was primarily one of the influence of the USSR in radicalizing existing governments, such as those of Ghana, Guinea, Mali and a bit later Sudan. The U S reaction to developments in Africa tended to be based on the assumption that any gains--in presence or influence--by the Soviet Union in the development of its relations with Africa represented an automatic loss for Western interests.

Increasingly the American concern for Soviet (or communist) expansion in Africa came into conflict with a third U S policy interest in Africa--namely, with the goal of facilitating the process of independence for colonial territories. In the immediate postwar period decolonization had been a major goal of the United States, and the U S government exerted various pressures on its allies to speed up the granting of independence. With the onset of the Cold War, however, and the increasing concerns for U S and Western military security, decolonization dropped on the list of U S foreign policy priorities. Continued access to important military facilities in the Portuguese Canary Islands, for example, took precedence over support for the elimination of Portuguese colonial rule in Africa. Although support for political independence for the remaining colonial territories remained a part of U S policy, that policy was pursued only sporadically and only when it did not threaten other U S interests.

The escalation of U S involvement in the Vietnamese War during the latter half of the 1960s had a number of important implications for U S Policy in Africa.

Most important, probably, was the fact that the growing international and domestic problems associated with the conduct of the war precluded the development of a coherent U S African policy. The United States continued to view Africa largely in terms of the initiatives of its European allies. Little effort was put into following--not to speak of influencing most developments on the African continent. A second implication of the Vietnam War for U S policy was to be seen most vividly only in the mid-1970s, when domestic revulsion to the debacle in Vietnam--coupled with the effects of the Watergate scandal and the revelations of various covert CIA activities abroad--created an atmosphere in which it became virtually impossible for the U S government to initiate any type of major involvement--especially of a military sort--in Africa.

Although the Soviets had become deeply involved in Somalia during the 1960s--and especially after the 1969 coup that brought the military government of Siad Barre to power--it was not until the Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola in late 1975 that American concerns about the military role of the Soviets in Africa began to exert an influence on U S policy. During the Angolan War Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford sought Congressional support for the expansion of the limited U S military assistance to the two nationalist factions fighting the Soviet-backed MPLA. However, the domestic reactions to the recent events of defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate affair resulted in effective opposition to any U S military involvement in Angola. Moreover, the direct intervention of South African troops into the war in support of UNITA and FNLA brought about a rapid shift within Africa in support of the MPLA faction of President--and, by implication, of Soviet and Cuban assistance to the MPLA. The end result was an eventual MPLA victory and the consolidation of power throughout most of the country--a victory that would have been impossible without Cuban-Soviet support.

The Carter administration, prodded by U S ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young, began a gradual reconsideration of U S policy in Africa. For the first time since the 1940s it appeared that concerns of the African states themselves--as opposed to the importance of Africa for superpower competition--were to determine U S policies. Greater emphasis began to be placed on dealing with problems endemic to the African states themselves and the concerns of bilateral U S -African relations. The Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa was not viewed exclusively and necessarily inimical to all U S interests, and the U S attempted to improve relations with a number of self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states--in particular with Mozambique. However, the rapid deterioration of the situation in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78--especially the Somali intervention in the Ogaden in support of the irredentist West Somali Liberation Front and the Soviet-Cuban decision to intervene on the side of Addis Ababa with massive military support--rekindled U S fears of Soviet gains in the continent at the expense of Western interests.

Although National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated a policy of countering Soviet expansionist designs in Africa, the U S response to the Soviet intervention in the Horn was quite limited. The nature of the conflict itself--an obvious invasion of Ethiopia by Somalia--and the orientation of the Somali government made it difficult for the U S to do much more than warn the Soviets and Cubans against an invasion of Somali territory. In response to Siad Barre's calls for Western military support, the United States responded, with the promise to assist Somalia should Soviet and Cuban-backed Ethiopian troops move across the border into Somalia proper. It was not until after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the last days of 1979 that the U S seriously considered the Somali offer of use of the military facilities abandoned by the Soviets with they were expelled in 1977 in return for U S military assistance.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan there has evolved a growing concern in Washington about the expansion of Soviet military involvement in Africa. However, this has not yet resulted in a U S effort to match the Soviets in the use of military power on the continent. Rather, the U S response has tended to follow two separate, but interrelated, lines. On the one hand--primarily in the northeastern portion of the continent most important from a strategic perspective to U S interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region--the U S has attempted to strengthen its military position vis-à-vis the Soviets by negotiating agreements with Kenya, Somalia, Egypt, and, further afield, Oman, for access to military facilities. In return, the U S has promised security support to the host states--security support which has been very slow to arrive in some cases. Elsewhere on the continent the United States has continued a policy initiated in the 1970s of attempting to play a more active role in facilitating negotiated settlements of major regional conflicts.

This policy actually began in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger introduced shuttle diplomacy as a means of bringing about the cease fire. For the better part of a decade the U S has dominated the attempt to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli confrontation by acting as mediator and facilitator of the process of negotiations.

In Sub-Saharan Africa the first major U S involvement as a mediator occurred during the Lancaster House negotiations which resulted in the resolution of the war in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe and the establishment of the independent state of Zimbabwe. Even though the U S role at Lancaster House was secondary to that of the British, it was important in working out the final agreements. Here, as in the earlier discussions between Egypt and Israel, American policy was based on several assumptions. First, it had become clear that in those cases in which the USSR had succeeded in gaining a major presence, in particular a military pre-

sence, they had been able to take advantage of local or regional conflicts. The peaceful resolution of such conflicts would eliminate the perceived need of the participants to turn to the Soviets and Cubans for military support and the likelihood that Soviet military support could be turned to a Soviet advantage.

More recently, in the case of the war in Namibia, the United States has continued to pursue a policy of encouraging negotiated settlement of African conflicts, although the prospects for such a settlement still seem exceedingly weak.

U S African policy under the Reagan Administration has shifted somewhat from the policy of the Carter years. Most important has been the revival--at least in official rhetoric--of the primacy of the Soviet-American confrontation. U S African policy once again appears to be dominated by the concern with Soviet expansionist designs on Africa and the growing military role of the Soviets and their allies throughout the continent. Public considerations of resuming military support to UNITA in Angola, of providing South Africa with limited access to U S military equipment, and the expanded commitment of military support to countries in the northeast quadrant of the continent are all examples of this new orientation. One partial result has been a deterioration of U S relations with a number of black African states which view the policies of the Reagan Administration as inimical to the interests of the black populations of Namibia and South Africa.

To a certain degree U S policy under President Reagan has returned--after only a relatively brief respite under President Carter--to an emphasis on super-power confrontation as the major motivating factor in U S African policy.

4 Military Assistance and Arms Transfers in Soviet and American Policy

Military assistance and arms transfers have been an integral part of both Soviet and U S policy toward developing countries ever since the beginnings of Soviet-American competition in the Third World ¹² The U S policy of alliance building under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the mid-1950s, as well as the establishment of Soviet relations with a number of Middle Eastern states at approximately the same time, incorporated security support and arms transfers as an essential element of the expansion of bilateral relations. During the past decade the military aspects of Soviet policy toward the developing world--and toward Africa in particular--have outstripped most other forms of contact. Military support, including the transfer of weapons systems and the provision of military training, have become the single most important element in Soviet relations with a number of countries of Africa. During the period 1972-79 Soviet military deliveries to Third World countries averaged \$3,553 million per year, compared with deliveries of economic assistance averaging only \$515 million (see Table 1). The major recipients of the increased Soviet deliveries during the latter half of the past decade were Libya and Algeria, which pay for weapons with hard currency, Iraq, Ethiopia, and Angola. Not only have Soviet sales and deliveries increased substantially during the past ten years, but the regional distribution of deliveries has also been extended. Until 1973 approximately 86 percent of all Soviet arms commitments and deliveries went to a few countries in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. With the expansion of Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1970s that area has also become a major recipient of Soviet military equipment, and the USSR has replaced France as the primary arms supplier for Africa. Between 1975 and 1979 new commitments of military support to Sub-Saharan Africa and actual deliveries made up about 14

percent of both new commitments and deliveries to developing countries. In addition, North Africa received 22 and 30 percent respectively of new commitments and deliveries. Comparable figures for the period 1956-74 are 3.8 percent of new commitments and three percent of deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa and 14.8 and 4.9 percent of new commitments and deliveries to North Africa.¹³ (See Tables 2 & 3)

Although arms transfers and military assistance have been an important element in U.S. relations with the Third World during the past quarter century, their place in U.S. policy in Africa has been quite limited. Prior to the mid-1970s only Ethiopia, among the Sub-Saharan African states, was an important recipient of U.S. military supplies. As has been noted, the U.S. relationship with Ethiopia was based on an exchange of U.S. military support to Ethiopia in return for access to military facilities in Asmara. During the period 1974-78 the U.S. supplied less than 4.0 percent of armaments shipped to Africa (minus Egypt), while the Soviets provided more than 55.0 percent. During that period only one African country, Kenya, obtained as much as half of its armaments from the U.S., while 18 African countries received more than half of their weapons from the USSR. (See Table 3)

The arms export program of the USSR has differed in composition from that of the United States. Most important has been the greater role of military services in the American program. Until quite recently U.S. deliveries of such services have been nearly four times as great as those of the USSR as the result of a much larger provision of training and technical assistance and of a military construction program unparalleled by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Soviet deliveries of weapons systems to all developing countries have been slightly larger than those of the U.S. and have made up a greater portion of the total Soviet arms exports than is the case in the U.S. program.¹⁴ Since the mid-1970s, how-

ever, Soviet military-related services have grown markedly. Moreover, this growth was complemented by the services provided by Soviet allies--Cuba and East Germany in particular.¹⁵ An additional difference between the Soviet and U S programs concerns the time elapsed between sale and delivery. Soviet weapons are usually delivered to Third World customers much more rapidly than are those of the United States--within 12-18 months, on average, compared with U S lead times of up to three years.¹⁶ In recent months, Somalia and Egypt have both complained about the failure of the U S to deliver weapons promised almost two years ago.

No matter how one measures the Soviet military support program in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, the evidence indicates its growing importance in Soviet policy during the 1970s. Before proceeding with our examination of the reasons for the expansion of Soviet military support in the Third World, it is important to understand a number of factors inherent in the Soviet economic-political system which affect the ability of the Soviets to engage in the type of military support operations that they have developed. First, the Soviet Union has become the largest producer of conventional military equipment in the world.¹⁷ Exports have become the most effective means of disposing of this huge surplus of weapons and, as we shall see below, have become an important supplementary method of earning hard currency.¹⁸ Moreover, given the focus of the Soviet economy on military production, this sector has become the most efficient and competitive of all sectors of the Soviet economy. Soviet military equipment is usually qualitatively equal to, or even superior to, comparable equipment obtainable from other suppliers. The Soviets have, therefore, large stockpiles of surplus weapons of good quality and recent vintage that they can make available to Third World states. The growing availability of such weapons has coincided with the pheno-

menal expansion of the market for weapons throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America¹⁹

Another factor relevant to Soviet arms transfer policy has been the growth of the Soviet navy and its operation in waters far from Soviet territory. By the beginning of the 1970s this fleet was operational and required access to facilities throughout Asia and Africa. Arms transfers to certain Third World states have provided the exchange in Soviet attempts to acquire access to such facilities.

The primary purposes of Soviet arms assistance and sales, however, have remained political. Yet, over time, the very nature of the political aspects of Soviet policy in the Third World has evolved. Initially, the primary concern of the Soviet Union in extending military assistance to developing countries was the desire to undermine Western influence and strategic interests in regions of strategic concern for Soviet security--especially the Middle East and South Asia. The 1955 agreement to supply weapons to Egypt valued at more than \$250 million, as well as later agreements with Yemen, Syria and Iraq²⁰ were all designed to undermine the attempts of the United States to ring the Soviet Union with an alliance system. The Soviets were able to take advantage of the growing antagonisms between revolutionary nationalist arabs and the West, plus the festering hostility between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in order to gain a presence in the Middle East. The provision of weapons, although by no means the sole method employed by the USSR, was the most effective method available to them to make an impact on political developments in the region.

Closely related to the Soviet goal of weakening Western dominance in Third World areas was the desire to establish and extend the presence of the Soviet Union itself. In almost all cases where Soviet military equipment was supplied to developing countries, Soviet military technicians arrived along with the equip-

ment, in order to instruct the local military in its use. A corollary to this policy was the training of officers from developing countries in the Soviet Union. In Africa the major cases of such Soviet involvement have been Egypt at the beginning of the 1970s, Somalia until 1977, and Angola and Ethiopia where the Soviets and their allies have played a major role in training and even commanding the local military. However, a number of other African states have become increasingly dependent on the Soviets and their allies for military support.

As noted above, technical training has also been an essential element of U S military assistance in the Third World. However, given the very limited nature of the U S military involvement in Africa, only a very few countries have benefitted from such training. Only in recent years has Egypt become an important recipient of U S military assistance, including training. Earlier Ethiopia, Morocco, and a few other countries were involved in U S military training programs.

In addition to the goal of gaining political access through military support, another purpose of Soviet policy has been the effort to provide stability for countries that have turned to the USSR for assistance. This has become an especially important element of Soviet policy in Africa since the mid-1970s, where the Soviets and their East European and Cuban allies have provided not only military equipment and technical assistance, but even the military personnel needed by revolutionary movements or regimes, as in Angola and Ethiopia, to seize power or to consolidate that power. Throughout Africa the East Germans, in consort with their Soviet mentors, have been providing military and security training for a number of revolutionary governments--e g Somalis (before 1977), Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, among others.²¹ This emphasis on the training of elite

palace guards and domestic security police has resulted from the experiences in the 1960s of progressive regimes favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union, when leaders such as Nkrumah in Ghana were easily overthrown. The presence of well-trained and loyal security forces is now viewed by the Soviets as essential to stabilize the existence of progressive Marxist-Leninist governments in a number of African countries.

Before we examine the military-strategic and economic motives of Soviet military policies in Africa, mention should be made of another relevant political factor. The Soviets have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the international environment has undergone substantial change in recent years, that the role of the capitalist West is receding and that a new international correlation of forces has emerged. However, only by actively engaging in events on a global scale can the Soviets demonstrate to leaders throughout the world that their assessment of the changing international balance is indeed accurate. If nothing else, the Soviets have shown in recent years that they have both the ability and the willingness to provide effective military support to their allies. The success of the MPLA in Angola or of the revolutionary leadership in Ethiopia is attributable primarily to Soviet (and Cuban) military support. The provision of various forms of military assistance in Asia and Africa has been among the most important means employed by the Soviets to verify their claim that a changing international balance of forces has already emerged. The image of the USSR as equal--or even superior--to the United States may well influence Third World leaders to work out a modus vivendi with the Soviets, or with their clients, given the possibly dominant future role of the Soviet Union in the international system.

Integrally connected with the Soviet desire to strengthen its global role is the continuing competition with the United States and China. Over the course

of the past 15 years, or so, Soviet policy in the Third World has been based, in large part, on the desire to expand the capability of projecting power abroad in support of Soviet state interests. These projection capabilities depend upon two separate but interrelated developments. First, there was the need to produce the military equipment necessary to exert military power in regions beyond the territory under the immediate control of the Soviet army. The second requirement was access to military facilities throughout the Third World at which to refuel, repair, and refurbish the newly-developed military capabilities. The transfer of military equipment, along with economic assistance and other forms of support, has been employed as part of an overall policy of competition with the West for the acquisition and maintenance of such strategic access.²² Since the late 1960s the Soviets have been especially successful in creating a network of such facilities throughout the Indian Ocean area, the Middle East, and various parts of Africa that now permits them to influence developments in areas far from Soviet territory.

Regional conflicts, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict, were of importance in providing the Soviets with initial access to military facilities in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In Africa, the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia has afforded the USSR with a dual opportunity--first, the acquisition of large-scale military facilities in Somalia, and later, after their decision to opt for support for the new revolutionary regime in Addis Ababa and the resulting loss of the Somali facilities, the acquisition of new (though inferior) installations in Ethiopia. The civil war in Angola and the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in the Horn have indicated both the extent of existing Soviet military facilities and their importance to the USSR in supporting its allies and clients. Without access to air facilities in Algeria, Benin, Congo, Guinea, and elsewhere in West Africa, the rapid and large-scale shipment of Soviet military

equipment and Cuban troops to Angola would have been impossible ²³

A final point must also be made concerning the impermanence of the Soviet military position in some of the countries in which they have acquired military facilities. Both Egypt and Somalia expelled the Soviets when their goals and those of the Soviet Union clashed and recent events in the Middle East have resulted in a reduction of Soviet access in Syria, at the time of the Lebanese civil war, and Iraq after the introduction of Soviet equipment into Ethiopia. The Soviets have apparently been aware of the tenuous nature of their military presence in the developing world and have generally followed a policy of establishing parallel, or backup, facilities. For example, throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s they simultaneously courted North Yemen, South Yemen, Somalia and Egypt. When Somalia expelled the Soviets as a result of the latter's military support for Ethiopia, the Soviets were still able to use the facilities in South Yemen. In West Africa, as well, the Soviets have developed a parallel set of facilities in Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Mali ²⁴

The United States has also found that its access to military facilities in Africa--and elsewhere in the Third World--is also dependent upon the vagaries of local developments. Coups d'Etat, as in Libya and Ethiopia, have resulted in the loss of military facilities that had been developed over the period of a decade, or more. In addition, changing political-military circumstances have resulted in invitations to enter regions--as in Somalia, Sudan and Egypt during the recent past. The major point to consider is the fact that military access has been granted to the two superpowers only when the host states have seen such a presence as important for its own security interests.

One final point should be made about the development of the Soviet arms transfer program. In addition to the political and military-security aspects of the program, there is also the growing importance of the hard-currency earnings

← that the Soviets derive from arms sales ²⁵ For the period 1973-78 an estimated 43 percent of all military deliveries were paid for in hard currency--\$7,390 million of a total of \$17,200 million This represents approximately one-third of the total hard currency deficit in merchandise trade experienced by the USSR during those years Ever since the rise in OPEC oil prices and the resulting availability of large amounts of hard currency in a number of oil-producing countries, the Soviets have been receiving hard currency for most of the weapons supplied to the Middle East In Africa, however, only Libya, which has become a major recipient of Soviet weapons, pays for its purchases with hard currency

The available evidence shows that arms exports to Third World states have become an important sources of hard currency and that they now play a major role in covering the deficits in Soviet trade with the industrial West Although the economic factor is not among the most important influences determining Soviet arms transfers--and in Africa it plays a very small role--it is likely that it increasingly comes into consideration as the Soviet leadership makes its decisions concerning the value of providing arms to various Third World customers

Although there has been an increase in U S arms supplies to individual African states in recent years, the increase has been quite modest in comparison with the growth of Soviet deliveries In the case of U S security assistance to Africa the primary motivations have been the desire to gain access to regional military facilities--as in Kenya and Somalia--and the goal of supporting countries which see themselves threatened by Soviet-backed states or movements.

5 The Zero-Sum Nature of Soviet and American Policies in Africa

To a very substantial degree Soviet and American policies in Africa in recent years--and, in fact, throughout most of the postwar period--have been

characterized largely by concern for the activities of the other superpower Soviet policy has been motivated primarily by a desire to gain advantages in the global competition with the United States, while American policy--though less clearly single-minded than that of the USSR--has usually consisted of a reaction to Soviet initiatives. In spite of much evidence to the contrary, both of the two global superpowers appear to have operated on the assumption that a gain for one represented an automatic loss for the other. There has been little evidence of any form of cooperation in dealing with matters of mutual interest. One reason for this, perhaps, is the relative unimportance of Africa--at least those portions south of the Sahara--for the USSR in any other than a military-security sense. Although Soviet trade with Africa has expanded during the past thirty years, it remains an insignificant 1.7 percent of total Soviet trade (see Table 4). Even those African states which have established close political and military ties with the USSR (such as Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia) continue to conduct most of their commercial relations with the West. For the United States, on the other hand, trade with Africa has been of growing importance--especially imports of petroleum and other strategic raw materials (see Table 5).²⁶

Even though Africa has not ranked high on the list of recipients of U.S. economic assistance, U.S. aid has been substantially larger than that of the Soviet Union. Through 1979 total Soviet economic assistance committed to the countries of Africa since the inception of the aid program in the 1950s amounted to \$4,415 million (\$5,555 million including Egypt), while that of the U.S. came to \$7,491 (\$12,571 million including Egypt). (See Table 6). During the period 1975-79 new commitments of Soviet aid to Africa, excluding \$2,000 million to Morocco for the expansion of phosphates production, totalled \$572 million. During the same period U.S. aid amounted to \$6,477 million (\$2,345 million excluding aid to Egypt).

In spite of the expansion of Soviet and U S involvement in the affairs of Africa during the past decade, Africa still remains an area of secondary importance for the policies of the two countries. Its major importance--in particular for the Soviets--has been to provide strategic access that is viewed as beneficial for the global military-political competition with the United States.

Soviet goals in Africa have included 1) the reduction of Western military and political influence, 2) the containment of possible Chinese influence, 3) the establishment of a network of military facilities that will enable Soviet military forces to project power in a region far from the Soviet homeland, and 4) at a much lower level of importance, the possible economic benefits that can be gained for the Soviet economy. Soviet military assistance and arms transfer programs--the most important element of Soviet policy in Africa--have been motivated by political and strategic concerns and have been related to Soviet support for ideologically compatible allies, the search for strategic benefits, and the building of the foundations for future political influence.

For the United States the goals, although similar, have tended to be a bit broader than those of their Soviet competitors. 1) containment of Soviet military and political influence in Africa, 2) the acquisition of access to military facilities useful in the military competition with the Soviet Union, and 3) much more important than in the Soviet case, the securing of U S economic interests in the region.

One of the results of this growing superpower competition in Africa has been the tendency in recent years for African states to be forced to take sides in the global superpower conflict. Moreover, the introduction of more sophisticated weapons into regional conflicts in Africa has led to the escalation of the level of military conflict and has, in many cases, resulted in an increasing percentage of national income being committed to military security--while developmental needs

have been given lower priority. The increase in military expenditures in both Zaire and Zambia in recent years at the time that economic problems have plagued both countries is an example of this point.

To date neither the U S nor the USSR has been able to make stable gains in their relationships with the African states. Yet both countries continue to view the African continent as an area of competition. Soviet gains are viewed as threats to U S interests by both the Soviet and U S leaderships. So far neither of the two superpowers has emerged a winner, although it is possible to argue that the Africans have often been the losers, in the sense that superpower involvement has not been beneficial to the long-term interests of the local population. Whether the recent Soviet approach to certain African states, which has emphasized the establishment of domestic political systems based on the Soviet model, will prove to be more successful in stabilizing the Soviet position is a question that should be answered during the 1980s.

NOTES

- ¹Walter C Clemens, Jr , 'The Superpowers and the Third World Aborted Ideals and Wasted Assets, unpublished paper prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 26, 1982
- ²See, for example, E M Zhukov, 'Voprosy natsional no-osvoboditel noi bor'by posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny, Voprosy ekonomiki, no 9 (1949), pp 57-58
- ³Article 29 of the Soviet constitution can be found in Robert Sharlet, The New Soviet Constitution of 1977 Analysis and Text Brunswick, OH King s Court Communications, 1978, p 85 For Brezhnev s speech at the 24th Party Congress see 24 S ezd KPSS (stenograficheski otchet) Moscow Politicheskai Literatura, 1971, pp 27-28 At the most recent 26th Party Congress in February 1981 Brezhnev emphasized the crucial role of the Soviet peace program and dropped all reference to the world revolutionary process Brezhnev s report is published in New Times, no 9 (1981), pp 18-48 The portion dealing with foreign policy is on pp 19-29
- ⁴The preceding discussion has drawn heavily on Theodore H Friedgut, 'The Middle East in Soviet Global Strategy, The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, V, no 1 (1980), pp 69-70
- ⁵Through 1970 Soviet economic and military assistance to Africa comprised 14 7 and 6 1 percent respectively of total assistance to the Third World (12 5 and 2 1 percent, without North Africa) In 1970 trade with Africa made up 17 1 percent of trade with developing countries (12 9 percent without North Africa) Figures are calculated from U S Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Communist States and Developing Countries Aid and Trade in 1970 Research Study, RECS-15, September 22, 1971, pp 2, 18, 29
- ⁶Ever since the inception of the Soviet program of educating students from the Third World, Africans have made up more than half of the total In 1970, 10,990 Africans (including 1,210 from North Africa) were in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe--up from 8,865 fiveyears earlier, By 1979 the figure had reached 27,090 (including 3,430 from North Africa) See Communist States and the Developing countries in 1970, p 14; U S Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Communist Governments and Developing Nations Economic Aid and Trade /in 1966 / Research Memorandum, RSB-80, July 21, 1967, p 8, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-79: A Research Paper ER 80-10318U, October 1980, p 22
- ⁷See, for example, John D Esseks, Soviet Economic Aid to Africa 1959-72 An Overview, in Warren Weinstein, ed , Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa New York Praeger, 1975, p 114 and Roger E Kanet, 'The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries Policy or Policies?' The World Today, XXXI (1975), pp 344-45
- ⁸See the excellent treatments of Soviet policy by David E Albright, Soviet policy /in Africa /, Problems of Communism, XXVII, no 1 (1978), pp 20-39, and by Colin Legum, 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa, Foreign Affairs, LIV (1976), pp 745-62

- ⁹ Ibid , pp 407-25
- ¹⁰ For an excellent treatment of the issues involved in the Horn see Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa New York: Praeger, 1982, passim
- ¹¹ Ibid , p 167
- ¹² This section draws upon the author's L'Union Soviétique et les Pays en Voie de Developpement Le rôle de l assistance et de transferts d Armes, in Jean-Louis Martres, ed , Les Relations Internationales de l U R S S Paris Economica, forthcoming
- ¹³ CIA, Communist Aid Activities in 1979, p 14
- ¹⁴ During the period 1974-77 support and services made up 61 percent of U S military deliveries and 65 percent of new sales, figures for the USSR are 42 and 40 percent Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Arms Flows to LDCs US-Soviet Comparisons, 1974-77 ER 78-10494U, November 1978, p 11
- ¹⁵ In 1979, 15,865 military technicians from the USSR and Eastern Europe were working in the developing countries--up from 12,070, 10250 and 9,080 in the three preceding years In 1979 18 percent of these advisors were in North Africa and an additional 25 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa Cuban military technicians, most of whom were actually carrying out combat roles in Angola and Ethiopia, numbered an estimated 34,315 in 1979--down from 38,650 the year before More than 96 percent of the Cubans were in Sub-Saharan Africa See CIA, Communist Aid Activities in 1979, p 6, CIA, Communist Aid Activities in 1978, p 4 For a discussion of East European involvement in Africa and the role of military assistance see Roger E Kanet, East European States in Africa, in Thomas H Henriksen, ed , Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa Stanford, CA The Hoover Institution Press, 1982, pp 23-56
- ¹⁶ CIA, Arms Flows to LDCs, p 5
- ¹⁷ In recent years they have been producing about six times as many tanks as the U S , three times as many armored personnel carriers, eight times the artillery pieces, and twice as many combat aircraft See Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1978 Washington U S Government Printing Office, 1977, p 11
- ¹⁸ For a discussion of Soviet production capacities see Michael Checinski, Structural Causes of Soviet Arms Exports, Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, XXIII (1978), p 178
- ¹⁹ The developing countries' share of total world arms imports rose from an annual average of 56 percent for the period 1963-66 to 81 percent in 1978 See United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-1973 Washington ACDA, 1974, p 72, ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978 Washington ACDA, 1980, p 117
- ²⁰ For discussions of these early arms deals see John D Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp 7-21, Uri Raanan, The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy Cambridge, MA The M I T Press, 1969, pp 13-172 and Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East New York Harper and Row, 1978, pp 57-65

- ²¹ See Jiri Valenta and Shannon Butler, East German Security Policies in Africa, in Michael Radu, ed , Eastern Europe and the Third World New York Praeger, 1981, pp 142-68 See, also, Honeckers Afrika-Korps: Hilfstruppe für Moskaus Machtstrategie, Der Spiegel, XXXIV, no 10 (3 March 1980), pp 43 ff
- ²² For a careful discussion of the issue of differentiating between military bases and other military facilities see Richard B Remnek, "The Politics of Soviet Access to Naval Support Facilities in the Mediterranean, in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds , Soviet Naval Diplomacy New York Preger, 1978, pp 357-61
- ²³ For a discussion of the importance of these facilities, see Walter F Hahn and Alvin J Cottrell, Soviet Shadow Over Africa Washington Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1977, esp pp 60ff
- ²⁴ Nimrod Novik examines Soviet efforts to establish multiple facilities in the Red Sea region in On the Shores of Bab Al-Mandab Soviet Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics Philadelphia Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979 For a discussion of the West African network, see New Soviet Role in Africa Alleged, The New York Times, December 10, 1975, p 11
- ²⁵ In a study published in 1976, Gur Ofer concluded that the delivery of Soviet weapons to its Arab customers constituted a heavy and ever increasing supply burden, an increase that creates even heavier claims on increments of new available resources It would appear that recent developments require a re-assessment of his conclusions Gur Ofer, Soviet Military Aid to the Middle East--An Economic Balance Sheet, in U S Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in a New Perspective A Compendium of Papers Washington U S Government Printing Office, 1976, p 223
- ²⁶ For list of strategic minerals imported by the U S from Africa see L H Gann and Peter Duignan, Africa South of the Sahara The Challenge to Western Security Stanford, CA Hoover Institution Press, 1981, p 75

Table 1

SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH
NON-COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1955-1979

(In millions of current U S dollars)

	Deliveries		New Agreements
	USSR	USA	USSR
Total, 1955-79	35,340	66,874	47,340
1979	6,615	6,679	8,365
1978	5,400	7,976	2,465
1977	4,705	7,130	8,715
1976	3,085	5,928	5,550
1975	2,040	3,325	3,325
1974	2,225	4,430	5,735
1973	3,135	5,735	2,890
1972	1,215	3,975	1,690
1971	865		1,590
1970	995		1,150
1955-69	5,875		5,080

SOURCES For Soviet data, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-79 A Research Paper October 1980, ER 80-10318U, p 13 For data on the United States, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Handbook of Economic Statistics 1980, October 1980, pp 104-106

Table 2

DELIVERIES OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARMAMENTS TO AFRICA, 1967-76

(In millions of current U S Dollars)

	Arms Imports from USSR, 1967-76	Arms Imports from USA, 1967-76	Total Arms Imports of Country, 1967-76	Soviet of Total, 1967-76	U S Percentage of Total, 1967-76
TOTAL, <u>All Develop- ing Countries</u>	10,753		34,631	31 1	
TOTAL, <u>Africa</u>	2,051	404	5,131*	40 0	7 9
Algeria	315	5	445	70 8	1 1
Angola	190	-	315	60 3	-
Benin	1	-	10	10 0	-
Burundi	-	-	-	-	-
Cameroun	-	5	15	-	33 3
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	-
Cent African Rep	1	-	5	20 0	-
Chad	5	-	10	50 0	-
Congo	10	-	20	50 0	-
Equat Guinea	5	-	5	100 0	-
Ethiopia	-	135	190	-	71 1
Guinea	50	-	55	90 1	-
Guinea-Bissau	5	-	5	100 0	-
Ivory Coast	-	1	30	-	3 3
Kenya	-	5	51	-	9 8
Liberia	-	5	5	-	100 0
Libya	1,005	65	1,835	54 8	3 5
Madagascar	1	-	5	20 0	-
Mali	25	-	25	100 0	-
Morocco	10	55	350	2 9	15 7
Mozambique	15	-	20	75 0	-
Nigeria	70	31	221	31 7	14 0
Somalia	181	-	185	97 8	-
South Africa	-	30	500	-	6 0
Sudan	65	1	100	65 0	1 0
Tanzania	30	1	125	24 0	0 8
Tunisia	-	40	65	-	61 5
Uganda	65	-	81	80 2	-
Zaire	-	30	240	-	12 5
Zambia	10	-	81	12 3	-

* Includes all countries of the region

SOURCES U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-1976 Washington U S , ACDA, 1978, pp 157-160

Table 3

DELIVERIES OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARMENTS TO AFRICA, 1974-78

(In millions of current U S Dollars)

	Arms Imports from USSR, 1974-78	Arms Imports from USA, 1974-78	Total Arms Imports of Country, 1974-78	Soviet of Total, 1974-78	U S Percentage of Total, 1974-78
TOTAL, <u>All Develop- ing Countries</u>	17,550		50,750	34 6	
TOTAL, <u>Africa</u>	7,400	480	13,100*	56 5	3 7
Algeria	1,200	-	1,500	80 0	-
Angola	410	-	725	56 6	-
Benin	20	-	30	66 7	-
Burundi	5	-	10	50 0	-
Cameroun	-	10	30	-	33 3
Cape Verde	20	-	20	100 0	-
Cent African Rep	-	-	-	-	-
Chad	10	-	10	100 0	-
Congo	30	-	40	75 0	-
Equat Guinea	10	-	10	100 0	-
Ethiopia	1,300	100	1,600	81 3	6 3
Guinea	50	-	50	100 0	-
Guinea-Bissau	10	-	10	100 0	-
Ivory Coast	-	-	10	-	-
Kenya	-	50	100	-	50 0
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-
Libya	3,400	-	5,000	68 0	-
Madagascar	20	5	30	66 7	16 7
Mali	100	-	110	90 0	-
Morocco	20	170	950	2 1	17 9
Mozambique	130	-	180	72 2	-
Nigeria	80	30	200	40 0	15 0
Somalia	300	-	500	60 0	-
South Africa	-	20	600	-	3 3
Sudan	30	30	110	27 3	27 3
Tanzania	110	-	180	61 1	-
Tunisia	-	20	80	-	25 0
Uganda	110	-	120	91 7	-
Zaire	-	20	260	-	7 7
Zambia	40	-	140	28 6	-

* Includes all countries

SOURCES: U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978 Washington: U S , ACDA, 1980, pp 160-162

Table 5

U S TRADE WITH NON-COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

(In millions of current U S Dollars)

	1978		1979		1980	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Total Trade	143,663	171,978	181,816	206,816	220,705	240,834
Total Trade with Developing Countries	57,639	74,511	68,576	96,221	88,164	117,223
Middle East-N Africa	14,834	19,245	13,781	25,704	15,343	31,534
Sub-Saharan Africa	2,384	7,214	2,135	11,051	3,153	14,676
Latin America	23,971	24,778	30,552	32,869	41,304	39,523
South & East Asia	13,509	21,675	18,436	24,910	23,723	29,813

SOURCE: CIA ALMANAC 1980.

New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1982

SOVIET TRADE WITH NON-COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

(In millions of Current U S Dollars)

	1975		1978		1979		1980	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Total Trade	33,166	36,805	51,365	49,758	64,488	57,553	73,955	66,250
Total Trade with Developing Countries	4,568	4,138	7,708	4,077	9,563	4,848	10,236	7,487
Unspecified Residual	1,877	11	3,599	64	4,183	37	4,556	162
Specified Total	2,691	4,127	4,109	4,102	5,380	4,811	5,680	7,425
Middle East-N Africa	1,652	1,824	2,634	1,741	3,324	1,836	2,944	1,935
Sub-Sharan Africa	185	324	404	429	515	555	529	536
Latin America	15	116	134	756	113	791	150	2,210
South Asia	623	700	884	777	1,360	1,118	1,901	1,853
East Asia	29	220	51	310	68	511	156	892

¹Residuals are computed by subtracting the summation of trade for individual developing countries from the total for Soviet trade with developing countries listed in the official Soviet foreign trade yearbooks. These amounts are believed to consist mainly of Soviet military shipments

SOURCES SSSR, Ministerstvo Vneshnei Torgovli, Vneshniala Torgovlia SSSR; Statisticheskii Sbornik, for the appropriate years. The following exchange rates were used to convert from rubles to dollars: 1975-\$1 38; 1978-\$1 44; 1979-\$1 52; 1980-\$1.49

Note: The devaluations of the dollar exaggerate the growth of Soviet trade with developing countries over the past decade. Calculated in rubles, Soviet exports to the developing countries rose by 7.1 and 10.1 percent in 1978 and 1979, while imports dropped by 5.5 percent in 1978 and rose by 12.7 percent the next year. In 1980 exports rose by 9.2 percent and imports by an enormous 59.7 percent.

Table 6

U S AND SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
EXTENDED TO AFRICA, 1946-1979

(In Millions of current U S dollars)

	U S A		USSR	
	All African Countries ¹	Egypt alone	All African Countries ¹	Egypt alone ²
1946-79 ³	12,571	5,080	5,555	1,440
1979	1,486	885	95	0
1978	1,546	943	2,010	0
1977	1,325	908	31	0
1976	1,415	1,017	369	0
1975	705	370	67	0
1974	321	21	17	0
1973	258	1	10	0
1972	301	2	0	0

¹Includes loans and grants to all African states, including Egypt

²The last commitment of Soviet aid to Etypt was made in 1971

³Soviet assistance began in the mid-1950s; the figures cover the period 1954-79

SOURCES: For U S data, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Handbook of Economic Statistics 1981 November 1980, pp 102-103 For Soviet data, annual issues of the Central Intelligence Agency s assessments of communist countries aid to the Third World, for which the title varies The most recent issue is Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-79: A Research Paper, October 1980, ER 80-10318U

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