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**Indo-Pakistan Normalization Process:
The Role of CBMs in the Post-Cold War Era**

Moonis Ahmar
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and
International Security
Department of International Relations
University of Karachi, Pakistan

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Abstract

Conflict resolution is considered essential for durable peace and security between warring groups and states and confidence building is deemed a first step for conflict resolution. Indo-Pakistan conflicts are of a complicated nature and the tasks of conflict resolution and confidence building are discussed, examined, and analyzed in this paper. The end of the cold war has given India and Pakistan an opportunity to normalize their relations and revitalize their approach for dealing with issues related to security matters and the well being of their future generations. For conflict resolution between India and Pakistan it is necessary that the two countries should first develop confidence and trust by adopting confidence building measures (CBMs). Conflict resolution is the end and CBMs should be adopted as a means to this end by New Delhi and Islamabad.

The key argument in this paper is India and Pakistan have not maintained a balance between military and nonmilitary CBMs. Military CBMs have been adopted with the sole purpose of avoiding war and not to normalize Indo-Pakistan relations. Therefore the importance of nonmilitary CBMs has been undermined. As a result, Indo Pakistan relations have not reached a stage of normalcy. The Gordian Knot of Indo Pakistani conflict can only be cut if the two countries adopt strategies to establish a CBM regime. Such a regime should be established by governmental and nongovernmental circles in India and Pakistan to institutionalize the process of conflict resolution and confidence building in military and nonmilitary fields. If the two countries succeed in breaking free of the vicious cycle of confrontation then it will become possible to seek positive results from CBMs. The task is difficult, but not impossible because the two countries have launched the first generation of confidence building measures. Nonetheless the proposed CBM regime will go a long way in establishing conflict and tension free relations between India and Pakistan.

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Indo-Pakistan Normalization Process The Role of CBMs in the Post Cold War Era

Moonis Ahmar

Introduction

With the demise of the cold war and the unfolding of a new political order on the international scene approaches to the problems of war and peace have also begun to change. The need to resolve conflicts peacefully by adopting confidence building measures (CBMs) at military and nonmilitary¹ levels is being realized in many circles. Conflict resolution is considered essential for a durable peace between warring groups or states and confidence building is deemed a first step for conflict resolution. Hence conflict resolution and confidence building are interlinked in launching the process of peace and cooperation in different parts of the world.

The world is experiencing the outbreak of new conflicts yet the settlement of old ones is also required. Some of these conflicts have either been resolved or are near to settlement² whereas in the case of other conflicts it is becoming increasingly difficult to find a solution³. Indo Pakistan conflicts are of a complicated nature and the tasks of conflict resolution and confidence building are discussed, examined and analyzed in this paper. The end of the cold war has given India and Pakistan an opportunity to revitalize their approach to dealing with issues related to security matters and the well being of future generations.

When conflict resolution and CBMs are mentioned in the context of the Indo Pakistan normalization process the practical application of these techniques is questioned given the decades of animosity and hostile state of the relationship. For conflict resolution between India and Pakistan it is essential that the two countries first develop confidence and trust by adopting confidence building measures. Conflict resolution should be the desired end, and CBMs should be adopted by New Delhi and Islamabad as a means to that end. This paper attempts to examine the application of CBMs as a prerequisite for conflict resolution between India and Pakistan in the post cold war era. In addition to discussing the conceptual framework of CBMs it also spells out the relevance of CBMs that India and Pakistan have adopted in the recent past to accomplish war avoidance, deescalation of conflicts and normalization of relations.

CBMs Significance for India and Pakistan

Past attempts to resolve tension and promote cooperation between India and Pakistan have either been abortive or have met with resistance from various political circles in the two countries but one cannot disregard the fact that in the changing political environment, neither India nor Pakistan can afford to sustain the policy of confrontation. The costs of cold war and noncooperation particularly at the current economic level are colossal to those countries as well. In this regard the significance and importance of CBMs for India and Pakistan must be taken into account. It is in the interest of New Delhi and Islamabad to build an infrastructure for the peaceful settlement of disputes first, by establishing mutual trust and second, by adopting confidence building measures.

Though it is true that past endeavors toward conflict resolution and CBMs between India and Pakistan cannot be described as a "success story" the two countries have not entirely failed in dispute resolution. India and Pakistan succeeded in settling some of their most complicated disputes over the distribution of river water.

1 Military CBMs are mainly related to measures taken on the governmental level to defuse border tension, monitor military exercises and avoid the accidental outbreak of war. Non military CBMs are adopted on the governmental and non governmental levels to promote economic, political and socio cultural cooperation so as to remove mutual mistrust and fears. For an interesting discussion on CBMs see George D Moffett, *Confidence Building for Peace*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 24 September 1992.

2. Some of the conflicts that have been resolved in the last ten years are the Namubian and Eritrean conflicts. Whereas conflicts that are near to settlement are in Cambodia, Afghanistan and South Africa. W. Scott Thompson, *Conflict and Conflict Resolution: On to the Twenty First Century*, *Dialogues on Conflict Resolution: Bridging Theory and Practice* (Washington D.C. United States Institute of Peace, March 1993) p. 9-20.

3 These conflicts are between Arabs and Israelis over territories captured by Israel during the June 1967 war, between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and between Serbs, Muslims and Croats over Bosnia. Ibid.

by signing the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 and the Rann of Kutch Treaty in 1968. New Delhi and Islamabad have also managed despite a threatening security environment in the subcontinent to hold on to the first generation CBMs⁴ related to war avoidance and deescalation of accidental crises.

The process of implementing conflict resolution and CBMs between India and Pakistan can receive impetus from similar processes that are being launched in other conflict ridden areas of the world such as Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific Zone, the Middle East, and in some parts of Africa and Latin America.⁴ Such a process was launched in Europe involving the United States and the former Soviet Union under the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided an infrastructure for détente and confidence building measures at military and nonmilitary levels in the post Helsinki accords period.

It is high time for India and Pakistan to take similar initiatives for durable peace and cooperation in South Asia, especially when India and China are holding talks to adopt CBMs for the peaceful settlement of disputes and normalization of relations. Therefore, the mechanism for conflict resolution and CBMs in South Asia should be examined in the light of similar efforts being made in other parts of the world. Such developments can give an impetus to the process of détente in South Asia, particularly between India and Pakistan.

Indo-Pakistan normalization of relations has two important dimensions: first, security measures for deescalation of tension, war avoidance, and understanding of how to settle unresolved issues. These measures are related to military affairs and fall under the category of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The second dimension involves nonsecurity steps taken for normalization, particularly in political, economic, and sociocultural fields. Here, there is also a vision for cooperation in areas like environment, water resources, energy, infrastructure (telecommunication links, integration of road and railway networks, integration of power grids), agriculture, industry, science, and technology.

In the last forty-seven years, there have been many ups and downs in Indo-Pakistan relations. The two countries have missed numerous opportunities to improve their ties; the existing level of tension is a reminder of past bitterness and hostility. In the light of historical acrimony, one viable option open to overcome the stalemate is to systematically apply the tools of conflict resolution and CBMs.

The role of CBMs in the Indo-Pakistan context is crucial because without establishing proper trust and mutual confidence, New Delhi and Islamabad cannot move ahead for peace and stability in South Asia. Apart from other merits of CBMs, this framework gives warring parties an opportunity to develop mutual trust so as to reduce the level of confrontation and move towards cooperation. Because the center of rivalry and conflict in South Asia is between India and Pakistan, the adoption of CBMs must involve these two countries. Indeed, peace and security in South Asia depend on normal and cordial ties between New Delhi and Islamabad. The same is true in the case of the viability of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established in December 1985.

Several steps have been taken by India and Pakistan in the past, particularly in the post Simla accord period, to defuse tension and to overcome the crisis in confidence. In the early 1990s, serious initiatives were taken by both sides to institutionalize the process of CBMs, particularly in the military field. Such steps and initiatives will be discussed in detail in the following pages. Because the level of tension in Indo-Pakistan relations has escalated recently, there is a need on the part of the two countries to salvage CBMs that they have already adopted. The failure of these CBMs could lead to an all-out war in the subcontinent. Moreover, it is imperative for New Delhi and Islamabad to explore possibilities for other CBMs, particularly in nonmilitary fields.

⁴ For example, in Northeast Asia, the process of conflict resolution and CBMs received an impetus when North and South Korea signed the Non-Aggression Pact in 1992 and decided to start talks on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. In Southeast Asia, a significant breakthrough has been achieved to settle the Cambodian conflict. In the Middle East, peace talks are going on between Israel, the Palestinians, and Arab states. In Africa, the Namibian dispute has been settled. Eritrea has emerged as an independent state after years of fighting with Ethiopia, and talks are going on to seek a political compromise between the black majority and white minority in South Africa. Latin America, Brazil and Argentina decided to establish conflict-free ties and share their expertise in the nuclear field. In Nicaragua, peace returned after years of civil war when elections were held in 1989. In the South Pacific, efforts for peace and cooperation gained strength when the majority of the South Pacific countries agreed to form zones of peace, freedom, and neutrality. Conflict resolution in the above-mentioned examples was possible only when the warring parties adopted confidence building measures. India and Pakistan can learn lessons from such examples.

CBMs The Conceptual Framework

CBMs are defined in both military and nonmilitary terms. In essence, confidence building measures tend to reduce tension between two or more adversaries by establishing mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate in military and nonmilitary fields.

CBMs are arrangements designed to enhance assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states. CBMs constitute building blocks that can provide operational substance to the notion of common security.⁵

What CBMs can accomplish is the promotion of stability in both peacetime and in crisis situations by providing tangible and verifiable assurances to build confidence regarding the purpose and character of military activities.⁶

CBMs are an established pattern of behavior giving each nation reasonable assurance that no other country will attack or exploit a situation to the serious disadvantage of another.⁷

Confidence building is, by nature, a process in which each previous measure forms a basis for further measures that progressively and cumulatively consolidate and strengthen the building of confidence.⁸

The idea of promoting the feelings of trust and confidence between hostile states or groups forms the logical basis of CBMs. As a matter of fact, the exercise of military and nonmilitary CBMs could be futile if the parties concerned lack mutual trust and are suspicious about intent. According to James Macintosh, confidence building is a concept notable for the imprecision of various attempts to define it.⁹ In this connection, it should be taken into account that there is a clear distinction between CBMs applicable in security (military) and nonsecurity fields. It is a fallacy to view CBMs in terms of military security alone.

Theoretically, CBMs provide a mechanism not only for war avoidance and conflict management, but also help to promote economic, political, sociocultural, and other types of cooperation between hostile states and groups. As far as the military aspect of CBMs are concerned, they minimize the danger of surprise attack, escalation of conflict, miscalculation, or misunderstanding in vital areas of the security of states. Jonathan Alford defined CBMs as measures that tend to make military intentions obvious.¹⁰ A US Department of State publication defines CBMs as

Agreements between countries to increase openness, mutual understanding, and communication designed to reduce the possibility of conflict through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications and to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack or political intimidation, thereby increasing stability in times of calm as well as crisis.¹¹

The functions of military CBMs can be broken down as

- Direct communication
- Shared information
- Notification
- Verification, observation, and monitoring
- Stabilization and regulation of military arrangements
- Crisis management

⁵ For a conceptual study of CBMs, see Johan Jorgan Holst, "Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival* (January/February 1983) 2.

⁶ John Borowski, "The World of CBMs," *Avoiding War In The Nuclear Age: Confidence Building Measures for Crisis Stability* (London: Westview Press, 1986) p. 9.

⁷ See Abbot Brayton, "Confidence Building Measures in European Security," *The World Today* (October 1980) 382.

⁸ *Comprehensive Study of the Groups of Governmental Experts on Confidence Building Measures*, United Nations A/36/474 p. 13. ¹⁴ quoted in Ljubivoje Acimovic, "Future Perspectives of Confidence Building Measures as a Means to Stabilize International Relations," in Karl Kaiser, ed., *Confidence Building Measures* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag GmbH, 1983) p. 120.

⁹ See James Macintosh, "Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," in R. B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch, eds., *Confidence Building Measures and International Security* (New York, N.Y.: Institute of East West Asian Studies, 1987), quoted in Andrew Mack, "Confidence and Security Building Measures and Military Security," *Disarmament* XIII (3) (1990) 142.

¹⁰ W. Epstein and B. T. Feld, eds., *New Directions in Disarmament* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1981), quoted in Andrew Mack, *Ibid.* p. 143.

¹¹ "Arms Control: Confidence Building Measures," *Gist* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, January 1985) 1. Also cited in John Borowski, "The World of CBMs," *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age* (London: Westview Press, 1986) p. 9. ¹⁰

The purpose of such measures is to enhance a firm belief in the announced intentions of other states with respect to their security policies and the facts with regard to the military activities and capabilities that sustain those policies¹² In addition military CBMs tend to improve the political environment of defense forces or the process that could lead to their use in such a way that the chances for political as opposed to military approaches to existing conflicts are improved¹³

CBMs fall into three main categories

Transparency measures These measures provide for the sharing of information on the size shape, and movement of armed forces and reduce the chances of surprise attack

Communication measures Under these measures the most effective arrangement is the hot line that is designed to lower the risk of accidental war

Constraint measures These measures include the regulation of various military activities and limit peacetime maneuvers that could be viewed as threatening by an adversary¹⁴

CBMs can undoubtedly be identified as steps contributing to the propagation of confidence Yet CBMs as a specific concept dealing with the military aspects of security implying a special category of measures for implementation have their own identity and a special rather precise place and meaning in the contemporary history of international relations¹⁵

Some of the most important aims of CBMs as stated in the Helsinki Final Act, are elimination of the causes of tension and consolidation of peace and security in the world, reinforcement of mutual confidence and, thereby promotion of greater stability and security in Europe exclusion of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state and reduction of the danger of armed conflict and of a possible misunderstanding or mistaken calculation of military activity¹⁶

CBMs are an institutional process that may take years or decades to render positive results Within this process the parties concerned must show political will particularly on the policymaking level to reduce tension resolve conflicts and embark on meaningful cooperation conduct direct communication with each other discourage negative propaganda, suspicions and mistrust against each other express ability to control domestic political factors that may negatively influence CBMs and demonstrate patience and willingness to act with prudence particularly in a crisis situation According to Qin Huasun a Chinese expert on disarmament CBMs are a step-by step process involving certain conditions

Geographical scope bilateral arrangements given top priority followed by multilateral arrangements in small regions that can then be gradually expanded to encompass large areas (as needed)

Measures to be taken CBMs should take precedence and those should be developed into security arrangements for disarmament at a later stage

Nature of contacts and meetings between countries emphasis should first be laid on scholarly discussions and a low level of contacts to prepare the ground for high level meetings

Timing institution of CBMs and security mechanisms should be viewed as a continuous process of gradual evolution, which needs time and patience¹⁷

According to Christian Harleman the following tools related to confidence building measures should be used for the settlement of regional conflicts

Practical mechanisms for containing conflicts and facilitating their settlement.

Practical arrangements required to deal with demobilization including disarmament and arms control elections and human rights monitoring and humanitarian assistance

Meeting regional conflicts with a flexible response corresponding to each particular situation and local conditions

12 For a detailed study of the theoretical and conceptual framework of CBMs see Johan Jorjan Holst p 2 15 and Karl Kaiser Back to the Politics of Conflict in Karl Kaiser ed *Confidence Building Measures* (Bonn Europa Union Verlag GmbH 1983) p 1 4

13 Karl Kaiser Ibid p 1

14 George D Moffett

15 Ljubivoje Acimovic Future Perspectives of Confidence Building Measures as a Means to Stabilize International Relations in Karl Kaiser ed p 113 14

16 Adam Daniel Rotfeld Confidence and Security Building Measures in Robert D Blackwill and F Stephen Larrabee *Conventional Arms Control and East West Security* (London Duke University Press 1989) p 360

17 Qin Huasun "Confidence Building Measures in the Asia/Pacific Region" *Disarmament* XIV (3) (1991) 150

Implementation of confidence building arrangements for example providing machinery for bilateral or multilateral arms control verification

Regional peacemaking centers interlinked and coordinated with existing or future disarmament centers

These centers should promote peacekeeping and peace building activities explore the theoretical and practical process of ending hostilities and of enhancing the capacity of regional organizations to conduct regional peacekeeping/peace building operations and, when required, contribute to international peace In the more practical aspects of such a mandate a peacekeeping center should provide the framework and coordination necessary to establish a regional standby peacekeeping force The center should also have the capacity to provide the necessary tools (verifiers) for some peace building activities in other words verification of regional or bilateral disarmament and arms limitation treaties In the peace building efforts the center would also develop other practical mechanisms for resolving disputes in a nonviolent manner and in such a way as to promote and develop military integration in the region ¹⁸

With regard to CBMs in nonmilitary fields sustained efforts have to be made to establish economic political and sociocultural contacts between states in conflict with each other There is a thin line that differentiates military and nonmilitary CBMs In fact, success in the adoption of CBMs in the military field is linked to the outcome of CBMs practiced in the nonmilitary field Over emphasis on either military or nonmilitary CBMs may be counterproductive and vitiate efforts made for peace and stability in a particular area.

CBMs were institutionalized as a mechanism for war avoidance and cooperation in security and nonsecurity affairs among the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act But with the passage of time the application of CBMs became common in other conflict and crisis ridden areas of the world particularly in the third world In this regard Qin Huasun suggested the adoption of the following CBMs in the military field for the Asia/Pacific countries in particular and the world in general

Nuclear weapon states should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states

In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons the countries concerned may set up Nuclear Weapons Free Zones or Zones of Peace, whose status should be respected by nuclear weapon states

Military bases troops and military equipment, especially nuclear weapons that are set up or stationed on the territory of other countries must be dismantled or withdrawn no country in the Asia/Pacific region should send military forces overseas

Military equipment retired as a result of disarmament measures in other parts of the world should be destroyed It should not be transferred to Asia and the Pacific because such transfers will only constitute new factors of instability in this region

Every country should exercise self restraint in terms of armaments and military spending and should not seek to achieve a level of armaments higher than that required for its legitimate defensive needs Every country should also take measures to make its military strategy and the structure of its armed forces strictly defensive in nature

In regions where conditions are appropriate the countries concerned can and should, through consultations on a voluntary basis reach arrangements for the exchange and verification of military information and statistics and for the declaration and mutual inspection of military maneuvers ¹⁹

According to the same author the following nonmilitary confidence building measures should be implemented

Political and diplomatic relations between countries established and developed on the basis of the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity mutual nonaggression noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and peaceful coexistence

Economic relations between countries established and developed on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit The search for fair and reasonable political solutions to the existing problems of the regional hot spots must be expedited

An end must be put to aggression against and occupation of other countries influence in the internal affairs of other countries and all forms of external expansion and hegemony

International disputes must be settled in a strictly peaceful manner that is through negotiations and consultation

¹⁸ Christian Harleman "Regional Conflicts Peace keeping and Disarmament in the Peace Building Process" *Disarmament* XV (3) (1992) 127 28

¹⁹ Qin Huasun "Confidence Building Measures in the Asia/Pacific Region" p 151 52

No country should seek to impose its social system and ideology upon other countries much less interfere in the internal affairs and violate the sovereignty of other countries under such pretexts

The exchange of staff and information in the political, economic social and cultural fields should be promoted among all countries especially among those whose relations for whatsoever reason, are tense²⁰

Some of the military and nonmilitary CBMs stated by Huasun have been tried in tension areas of the Asia/Pacific region such as Cambodia, between North and South Korea and between China and the former Soviet Union. But will it be possible to follow some of the above suggested measures—particularly those concerning disarmament, a strict policy of noninterference and nonintervention to be followed by states and the peaceful settlement of disputes in the Indo Pakistan context? These measures seem to be idealistic in nature and would require enough political will be expressed by New Delhi and Islamabad

It is essential that the approach to CBMs be based on reciprocity and be above suspicion Both parties should be willing to talk to each other matters of conflict and be receptive to establishing conflict free relations It is an uphill task and both sides involved in the process of CBMs and conflict resolution should be consistent in their endeavors and ready to give concessions Half hearted CBMs can only discredit the normalization process

Against this background the tasks of conflict resolution and CBMs are crucial given the existence of unresolved conflicts in the Asia/Pacific region particularly between North and South Korea, Cambodia, and among the South Asian countries While CBMs have relatively deescalated tensions in Northeast and Southeast Asia the situation in South Asia appears to be very pessimistic

The two major countries of South Asia—India and Pakistan—experience a high level of tension particularly because of the Kashmir dispute SAARC which was launched in December 1985 to promote regional cooperation in South Asia, has failed to achieve this objective because of the unstable relations between New Delhi and Islamabad.

CBMs and the Indo Pakistan Conflicts

In the case of India and Pakistan the sustained level of tension owing to Kashmir and other disputes calls for the adoption of a new serious and practical approach to overcome decades of hostility and mistrust. But, given the institutional shape of Indo-Pakistan conflicts is it possible for the two countries to revamp their relationship and establish conflict free relations?

Recent events in the post cold war era particularly in the former Soviet Union have sent shock waves through the influential circles in India and Pakistan that are concerned with the upsurge of ethnic and religious forces in the sub-continent If India and Pakistan do not take cognizance of this situation and instead continue with their past policy of confrontation the outcome may be similar to what is going on in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. If economic reforms are not properly introduced, if democratic institutions are not protected from the impending rise of fascist forces and if decentralization at all levels of government and the economy is not established to guarantee the rights of minorities then the results could be disastrous for the two countries

Turmoil in the subcontinent will destabilize not only South Asia, but will also affect peripheral areas such as Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and Central Asia Nevertheless there is strong evidence that attitudes are changing in New Delhi and Islamabad on matters of conflict.

Despite accumulating billions of dollars worth of weapons²¹ and embarking on the dangerous course of a nuclear arms race neither India nor Pakistan have been able to achieve a sense of security On the contrary the Indo-Pakistan arms race and noncooperation with each other in economic commercial and other areas of bilateral interest have proved to be counter productive Judged from any angle the people of India and Pakistan are not better off as compared to those living in countries where the process of conflict resolution and confidence building has achieved the desired results

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ India's defense expenditures during 1991 were \$8.07 billion its defense budget for 1992 was \$7.41 billion Pakistan's defense expenditures during 1991 were \$3.23 billion and its defense budget for 1992 was \$3.29 billion See *The Military Balance 1992-93* (London IISS 1992) p 131-135

The task of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan is well suited to the application of CBMs. One school of thought in Pakistan—largely composed of academicians, journalists, some segments of the intelligentsia, former policymakers, and retired servicemen—asserts that despite escalation in Indo-Pakistan conflicts, both countries have not gone to war partly because they have adopted certain CBMs (as described below) concerning deescalation of tension and war avoidance. Although New Delhi and Islamabad have not signed the No War Pact nor a formal arrangement for war avoidance, the costs of war and the CBMs adopted at the military level have contributed to prevention of any future war in the subcontinent.

The Simla Agreement, signed by India and Pakistan on 1 July 1972 in the Indian city of Simla, is also cited by the same school as a model for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The agreement was signed in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971 and pledged to normalize bilateral relations between India and Pakistan and settlement of outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, by peaceful means. Therefore, one can justify the relevance of CBMs for war avoidance, especially when unsettled disputes between the two countries are explosive in nature and have a potential to subvert attempts for peace and cooperation.

The second school of thought in Pakistan—composed of hardliners in various political parties, religious groups, segments of academicians, journalists, and the establishment, both civilian and military—disregards the importance of CBMs in the Indo-Pakistan context. It argues that India's quest for preeminence in the South Asian region is detrimental for the normalization process. Hence, unless India amends its policy vis à vis its neighbors by abandoning efforts for regional domination, it is meaningless to talk of CBMs. The same school of thought favors Pakistan's disengagement from SAARC and establishment of close links with the newly formed economic cum political bloc of West and Central Asian countries, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). This school holds that as long as India does not respect the sovereignty of its small neighbors, SAARC cannot emerge as a useful regional organization. Settlement of outstanding disputes, particularly of Kashmir, is also cited as a precondition for the application of military and nonmilitary CBMs in Indo-Pakistan relations.

Regardless of the current negative reaction to conflict resolution and CBMs between India and Pakistan, serious thinking about cooperation is being done by intellectuals and academicians in the two countries. A few rounds of unofficial dialogue between the two sides to discuss the possibilities of cooperation have also been held in New Delhi and Islamabad.

On the governmental level, no significant breakthrough has been achieved to normalize Indo-Pakistan relations, although some initiatives from the nongovernmental side are being taken. For instance, on 25 April 1990, "Academics for Peace in South Asia" passed a resolution in New Delhi that stated, "the unity of the people of South Asia makes conciliation rather than confrontation the natural inclination of the people of this region regardless of natural boundaries." The resolution further stated that the real problems of the people of South Asia cannot be solved by war. The present international situation had demonstrated the futility of armed confrontation as a method of resolving conflicts between states and that political institutions were capable of resolving conflicts without recourse to violence. The academicians appealed to all scholars and professionals to ensure the primacy of reason and dialogue so that war ceases to be a legitimate option for resolving disputes. Concerned citizens were urged to send representatives to their political leaders expressing opposition to war and faith in peaceful resolution of conflicts. The "Academics for Peace" requested that the political leaders of India and Pakistan set in motion the processes that would ensure there were no future wars.²²

On 9 September 1991, a seminar sponsored by the Pakistan Chapter of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity was held at Lahore that called for a new regional order for SAARC countries through closer political and economic cooperation. The speakers at the seminar maintained that the security predicament of the South Asian countries relates to democracy, peace, and development. As pointed out in that seminar by an eminent Indian journalist, Bhabani Sen Gupta,

The responsibility for not resolving the vital questions is on political parties that thrive on conflicts because they have no program for uplifting society. The rulers of the area boomed their guns not only on another state but also on their own people and spent huge resources for the maintenance of law and order to stay in power. We are not at war but we are not at peace either. Despite tension between India and Pakistan, no war is possible because both governments have lost their patrons and thus don't enjoy the authority.

22 "Academics Favor Talks With Pak," *The Hindustan Times*, 26 April 1990.

required for launching an offensive. The end of the cold war and changes around the world should have brought the countries of the region closer. Instead, they remained as isolated as ever before. The result was that they were spending huge resources to build and strengthen their armies as if they wanted to maintain the conflict and tension. History was witness to the fact that military might was no longer a solution to the problems that had assumed complexity in the region and that there is no other way to resolve them except to turn to each other and start a dialogue to rectify the wrongs done in the past. We must make a new start, so the behavior must change.²³

Similarly, in a signed statement issued on 30 January 1993 a number of Pakistani journalists, intellectuals, politicians, and columnists urged Islamabad and New Delhi to improve the ties that have deteriorated sharply as a result of the destruction of the Babri Mosque in the Indian city of Ayodhya on 6 December 1992 and have reached their lowest ebb since 1971. Both countries appear to be drifting towards confrontation.²⁴ The group stated.

The forces of fascism were getting stronger in the subcontinent and had been trying to undermine democratic institutions in both countries by exploiting religion and preaching a narrow, anti-humanist version of nationalism. It is necessary to fight this intolerance and bigotry if we are not to drift into another war that could have disastrous consequences for the entire subcontinent. But unfortunately, the subcontinent appears to be bereft of statesmanship in this unhappy decade. It is truly in the interests of India and Pakistan to work for a peaceful solution of all outstanding disputes between them so as to pave the way for peace and tranquility in the region that could benefit the subcontinent and mankind.²⁵

The assertion of Indian and Pakistani intellectuals, academicians, and other sections of intelligentsia against the forces of fascism and violence will go a long way toward strengthening the process of peace and cooperation in the subcontinent. However, one cannot underestimate the influence and power of those forces that have a vested interest in perpetuating tension and conflicts between India and Pakistan at all levels. The strategic thinkers of India and Pakistan should realize the gravity of the situation and adopt a constructive approach to deal with the issues of peace and security affecting the two states.

It was rightly stated by an analyst on security affairs in the *National Defence College Journal* of Pakistan that.

The intellectuals of the two countries realize that defense spending for arms buildup is adding to the miseries of the two peoples and, therefore, a way has to be found to achieve rapprochement between India and Pakistan. However, neither side is prepared to lower their guard or give into the demands or even the proposals of the other. Somehow this deadlock or stalemate has to be broken. Leaders of both countries must develop the political environment necessary to undertake each other's point of view and show a willingness to resolve the basic issues like Siachen, Wular Barrage, and demarcation of boundaries.²⁶

But will it be possible to lower the political temperature and ease Indo-Pakistan tension? Unfortunately, the political environment in India and Pakistan is charged with ill will, animosity, and mutual suspicion. Steps taken toward normalization and cooperation could not be sustained because of the periodic outbreak of tensions encouraged by hardliners.

Some optimism regarding the Indo-Pakistan normalization process was expressed by the former Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh when he visited Pakistan to attend the SAARC opposition parties seminar organized by the Pakistan Peoples Party. Talking to journalists at the Karachi Press Club on 7 September 1992, he said.

Despite the serious problems between India and Pakistan that have not allowed them to develop friendly relations, the two neighbors are being forced by the changing political scenario and their compelling economic needs to enter into an agreement on the pursuit of common interests. Confrontation would lead us nowhere. We cannot afford war because it would only bring destruction and misery for our people.²⁷

One may not agree with the views of V. P. Singh, but the question remains as to what extent the policy makers of India and Pakistan will subscribe to demands for peace and cooperation. A pragmatic approach to change the

23 See Seminar Calls For Regional Order For SAARC States *Dawn* 10 September 1991

24 See "Intellectuals Urge Pakistan India to Improve Relations" *Dawn* 20 January 1992

25 Ibid

26 S. Irtaza Hussain "Conventional Force Reduction—Prospects and Implications For Pakistan and India" *NDC Journal* (1990) 37

27 *Dawn* 8 September 1992

course of things in Indo Pakistan relations would require reversal of conventional wisdom and each nation's psyche

The war psychosis so frequently projected by the vested interest groups from both sides must be replaced by serious endeavors for confidence building leading to conflict resolution between New Delhi and Islamabad. Major disputes between India and Pakistan are an obstruction to the course of normalization but progress in other areas could ultimately help settle these disputes. Building on mutual trust particularly at the policymaking level²⁸ is also essential for the success of CBMs

The major concern of India, Pakistan and certain external powers—the United States, Peoples Republic of China and Russia—is to keep the level of tension under control and avoid the outbreak of hostilities. Their primary concern is based on the possibility of nuclear catastrophe if war breaks out

Since January 1990 when the Kashmir dispute assumed alarming proportions both countries have been obsessed with an inexorable state of 'new cold war' on the subcontinent. One can frequently hear war slogans and reports regarding troop mobilization on the Indo Pakistan borders. For instance a Pakistan foreign office spokesman said on 17 March 1993 in Islamabad that India has concentrated the bulk of its troops on the Pakistani borders posing a continuous threat to Pakistan's security²⁹. India has reacted to these Pakistani charges by implicating Pakistan in terrorist acts in the Indian controlled part of Kashmir in the Indian Punjab and in the Bombay bomb blasts of March 1993

Needless to say the political atmosphere of India and Pakistan is charged with emotions and resentment against each other. Interestingly despite a threatening posture adopted by the regimes and hawkish elements of the two countries the normalization process has not been entirely abandoned and talks on nuclear nonproliferation, Siachen Wular Barrage, Sir Creek, and improved economic ties (discussed below) may yield some positive results in the foreseeable future

Some assurances are now being given by official circles in New Delhi and Islamabad to overcome the present impasse in their relationship. At a press briefing given in Islamabad on 17 January 1993 Pakistan's additional secretary for foreign affairs maintained that Pakistan would continue its efforts to achieve normal relations with India and was against confrontation. He hoped that India would proceed towards normalization between the two countries and the present situation would be overcome³⁰. The Indian leaders have also rejected notions regarding the threat of war. In the past the two countries succeeded in managing crises and averting the outbreak of hostilities. In order to avoid direct military confrontation with India, Pakistani security forces have several times stopped militant Kashmiris—mainly belonging to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)—from crossing the Line of Control (LOC)

Beyond rhetoric about the need to avoid war and normalize ties some concrete CBMs were taken in the late 1980s by New Delhi and Islamabad in this regard. The turning point came following the holding of the military exercises by India called "Brasstacks" along the borders of Pakistan during the winter of 1986-87. In early December 1986 India began deploying troops on the joint borders in what was termed as "routine exercises". But such exercises threatened peace in the subcontinent. Taking cognizance of the situation both governments belatedly called for a reduction in their military presence and talks were held in New Delhi on 30 January 1987 between senior foreign ministry officials of the two countries. An official Indian spokesman in New Delhi said on 1 February that both sides had proposed concrete measures to prevent further escalation of tension and a memorandum of understanding was signed on 4 February that provided for the withdrawal of forces from both sides to a "peace time position" over the next fifteen days³¹. President Zia's visit to Jaipur to see the cricket match and his meeting with Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi also helped deescalate the tension between the two countries

28 Brahman Chellaney "A Regional Framework For Stability" *Indian Express* 1 May 1991

29 "Indian Troop Deployment On Border Poses Threat" *FO Dawn* 18 March 1993

30 *Dawn* 18 January 1993

31 *Kessings's Record of World Events* XXXIII (3) (1987) 34496. See also *Spotlight* 13 June 1990. For a detailed account of Indo-Pakistan tension during Operation Brasstacks see Rikhye Ravi *The War that Never Was: The Story of India's Strategic Failures* (New Delhi: Chanakya 1988) p 2. Robert G Wirsing *Pakistan's Security Under Zia 1977-1988* (New York, NY: St Martin's Press 1991) p 99. Surendra Chopra *Post-Simla Indo-Pak Relations: Confrontation to De-escalation* (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications 1988) p 188

Moreover on the occasion of the fourth SAARC summit held in Islamabad in December 1988 the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi as a friendly gesture announced the cancellation of routine exercises by the Indian military along the Pakistani borders Pakistan reciprocated when it invited international observers including those from India to see military exercises in December 1989 called "Zarb-e-Momin". Such steps taken by Pakistan and India proved to be useful for building mutual trust and confidence and the deescalation of tension.

Since 1990 India and Pakistan have moved systematically to evolve an infrastructure for border crisis management supervised by the Director General of Military Operations from both sides. On these grounds it became possible for New Delhi and Islamabad to communicate directly at the times of crisis along their borders.

According to some sources in the spring of 1990 India and Pakistan were on the brink of a nuclear war. This deadly situation was reportedly averted when the US administration called on Robert M. Gates then the Deputy National Security Advisor serving in the White House to fly to New Delhi and Islamabad and defuse tension between the two adversaries.³² Some of the CBMs dealing with border tension and military exercises (see below) were tested in August 1991 when tension was high along the Poonch sector. The Director of General Military Operations for Pakistan then contacted his Indian counterpart and expressed his country's concern regarding unprovoked Indian attacks on a Pakistan post in that sector and was told that such incidents if repeated in the future may jeopardize the CBMs adopted by the two countries over a period of time.³³

Amid the fragile nature of peace in the subcontinent CBMs taken on the military level have relatively reduced the risk of an accidental war. Given the success of military CBMs agreed to between New Delhi and Islamabad India and Pakistan could embark on adopting nonmilitary CBMs. These CBMs are essential in terms of filling the gaps in the Indo-Pakistan normalization process and giving an institutional shape to the tasks of peace, stability and cooperation.

The following list depicts different categories of existing and potential CBMs applicable in the case of India and Pakistan.

CBMs in the political field There has been no major breakthrough in easing political tensions particularly with regard to propaganda campaigns against each of the two countries. People to people interaction is also marginal because of severe restrictions and hostile political relationships. Renewed tension between Islamabad and New Delhi on the Kashmir dispute has impeded progress in ameliorating political ties. Informal rounds of Indo-Pakistan dialogue have however been held in New Delhi and Islamabad. Participants in that dialogue held extensive discussions on ways and means to normalize relations between the two countries. Up till now eight meetings have been held between the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao over the last three years. Six rounds of foreign secretaries talks have also been held since July 1990.

CBMs in the economic field Progress has been very slow given a lack of will on the part of the regimes. Past agreements that were part of the Indo-Pakistan joint commission efforts have been put in cold storage. A sense of insecurity prevails in Pakistan regarding India's ambitions to capture Pakistani markets.

CBMs in the cultural field As in the economic field, there has been no real progress in the sociocultural field. The cultural agreement signed between the two countries in December 1988 is nonexistent for all practical purposes. It seems, because of political tensions that breakthroughs in social and cultural fields cannot be achieved currently.

CBMs in defense and security This is the only area in which India and Pakistan have made substantial progress in the last few years. CBMs in these areas are periodically discussed by the directors general for military operations and between foreign secretaries and defense secretaries of the two countries.

CBMs in the environment There is a tremendous opportunity for adopting CBMs in this area. Both countries are obsessed with problems related to environmental pollution and the scarcity of water. The two countries can also cooperate in areas such as energy, forests, communications and disposal of nuclear and other waste.

In order to successfully apply nonmilitary CBMs in the Indo-Pakistan context the following requirements need to be achieved:

Cessation of mutually hostile propaganda; this would require the adoption of a new approach to dealing with crisis management, particularly in areas in which emotions and sentiments are highly charged.

32 Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," *New Yorker*, 29 March 1993, p. 56-73.

33 *The Muslim*, 28 August 1991.

The parties involved in CBMs should encourage dialogue at both governmental and nongovernmental levels. In this connection private diplomacy or informal talks among nongovernmental experts in media, academia, business science and technology should be encouraged and period meetings and seminars should be held to review progress and identify new areas of cooperation. In addition, people to people interactions³⁴ help establish a higher level of trust and confidence.

Relations between the two countries should be based on equality noninterference and nonintervention in each other's internal affairs.

Negotiations talks or dialogue on CBMs should be above the level of suspicion and mistrust and not based on preconceived notions.

The two countries should begin with small issues of cooperation such as environmental protection health education, energy sports and so forth. These are the areas where proper interaction will lead to the building of mutual trust and confidence. The Indo-Pakistan Agenda for CBMs should, however be based on realistic assumptions and take into account impediments in this regard.

Conflicting issues should not be exaggerated or propagandized because such a practice has vitiated the Indo Pakistan normalization process in the past. For example the Indo Pakistan normalization process suffered a serious setback when hardliners in both countries took advantage of the destruction of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya and unleashed a propaganda campaign against each other. The destruction and burning of mosques and temples in India and Pakistan and the outbreak of communal riots in the aftermath of incidents in Ayodhya escalated tension between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Reciprocal steps should be taken to deescalate tension, and such attempts should be well publicized so that at the nongovernmental level the tactics of anticooperation lobbies could be effectively countered. For eliminating a sense of ill will mistrust, suspicion and hatred against each other it is imperative to remove all such stuff from academic syllabi of the two countries which indoctrinates the younger generation of India and Pakistan against each other. Serious attempts particularly among the educated class through workshops seminars and other joint activities should be used to encourage positive thinking for conflict resolution and durable peace in the subcontinent.

India and Pakistan should demonstrate practical good will and harmony. Such an exercise would help dispel fears of domination and intervention.

As a big neighbor India should adopt the policy of magnanimity vis à vis Pakistan so that Islamabad's sense of insecurity regarding New Delhi could be removed.

India and Pakistan must keep a balance between military and nonmilitary CBMs. It has been a practice of the two countries in the recent past to focus more on CBMs at the military level and overlooked the significance and opportunities for nonmilitary CBMs in fields like economics environment, water resources infrastructure (communications power stations etc.) education, culture science and technology.

Institutional linkages between India and Pakistan for monitoring the process of CBMs should be created. These linkages should be used to fill in the gaps that develop in the normalization process. The two countries should take all possible steps to ensure that the normalization process develops in a balanced way.

Positive interactions in business and commerce need to be promoted so that each side has an economic stake in the other. Such a step would restrain the spread of ill will insecurity and negative feelings.

CBMs History of Proposals

Over the years a number of proposals have been presented concerning CBMs to defuse tension along the borders and normalize bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. CBMs presented from the Indian side have been more often directed to the establishment of political economic and sociocultural relations with Pakistan.

The Indian argument regarding suggested CBMs is notwithstanding territorial and political disputes. New Delhi and Islamabad can go ahead with their normalization process. Contrary to the Indian argument Pakistan gives much importance to the settlement of outstanding disputes particularly Kashmir before embarking on nonmilitary CBMs. Thus Pakistan's stand on CBMs particularly nonmilitary CBMs has been somewhat different from India's stand. For Islamabad the relevance of CBMs with India exists only when New Delhi

³⁴ People to-people diplomacy has been defined by an Indian author as outside the stereotyped diplomacy that is conducted by the chanceries of different countries. In people to-people diplomacy there has to be an opportunity as well as the urgency of interaction among nations at the popular level. See Nikhil Chakravarty 'People To People Diplomacy Needed' *The Tribune* (Chandigarh) 6 May 1992.

abandons its policy of domination in South Asia and stops its interference in Pakistan's internal affairs particularly in Sindh

In fact, both sides undermine the necessity to simultaneously adopt military and nonmilitary CBMs. India has its own reasons to emphasize the adoption of nonmilitary CBMs before settling the Kashmir dispute and Pakistan feels it is meaningless to go for these CBMs without settling its disputes with India. However, both India and Pakistan favor the adoption of military CBMs. The stalemate on the simultaneous adoption of military and nonmilitary CBMs has deepened their confrontation.

Some circles quote the Simla Agreement as a model for the Indo-Pakistan normalization process, especially references concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes. Institutional measures for cooperation taken by India and Pakistan in the post-Simla accord period, however, account for only partial success. There have been frequent ups and downs owing to political tension.

New Delhi and Islamabad saw two reasons to adopt military-oriented CBMs. First, Islamabad felt a threat coming from what it perceived as Indian designs to attack Pakistan's nuclear installations. Second, the escalation of border tension resulted from "Operation Brasstacks" launched by India in the winter of 1986-87 and the subsequent deployment of Pakistani forces along the Indian borders in response could have led to an accidental war between India and Pakistan with the possibility of nuclear involvement. Given this background, the key objective of Indo-Pakistan military CBMs has been to avoid the outbreak of an accidental war and establish a communication line between the top military brass of the two countries.

In the summer of 1990, when the Kashmir dispute threatened a new outbreak of hostilities in the subcontinent, India and Pakistan decided to launch bilateral talks at the foreign secretary level for deescalation of tension and normalization of relations. The readiness on the part of India and Pakistan to start foreign secretaries' talks despite escalation of Kashmir and other disputes could be termed as an "exercise in confidence building." Instead of going to war, India and Pakistan decided to exercise restraint and deescalate tension by holding talks at the foreign and defense secretaries' level.

Several rounds of talks at both levels have been held since, and almost half a dozen CBMs have been adopted by the two countries. Such progress is in sharp contrast to past Indo-Pakistan periods of increased tension that have resulted in three wars in the twenty-five years since independence.

In August 1990, India proposed five nonmilitary CBMs to improve relations with Pakistan:

- Statements [should be] made by political and military leaders in Pakistan disassociating themselves from [acts of] terrorism and subversion in the [Indian states of] Punjab, Jammu, and Kashmir.
- The handing over of [ten] fugitives who have been operating from Pakistan. India also asked Pakistan to hand over Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front leader Amanullah Khan. Such a request was promptly turned down by Pakistan.
- Seizure [by Pakistan] of arms and ammunition [that are] being smuggled into India and the arrest of infiltrators [who have been] crossing into India.
- Cessation of official statements and pronouncements from Pakistan inciting violence and striking communal passion in India.
- Closure of officially sponsored funds that have been put in Pakistan in connection with recent developments in Jammu and Kashmir.³⁵

Military CBMs presented by India were:

- Prior notice of military exercises, including troop movement.
- Regular contacts between military establishments.
- Prevention of air violations.
- Exchange of military delegations.
- Joint patrolling.
- Closure of camps, stoppage of supply of arms and support to political intruders.
- Reaffirmation of certain elements of the Simla accord that envisaged step-by-step resolution of all bilateral disputes and issues.

35 See "To Improve Ties with Pakistan, India Suggests Five New Steps," *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 12 August 1990.

Pakistan repeatedly denied allegations levied by India on supporting terrorist activities in its controlled part of Kashmir and in the province of Punjab. It rejected the Indian demand to hand over JKLF leader Amanullah Khan. Islamabad has often blamed India for interfering in Sindh and encouraging separatist elements there. In order to reduce tension between India and Pakistan, it is essential that some agreement be reached on a policy of noninterference and nonintervention in each other's internal affairs. The two countries can discuss areas of political divergence in the normalization talks periodically held in New Delhi and Islamabad.

Currently six rounds of talks have been held and discussion on a wide variety of topics has led to signing a number of agreements on CBMs. Former Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh described the first round of Indo-Pakistan normalization talks held in July 1990 as a "good sign" and stated that the dialogue would continue. He maintained that Islamabad talks were preliminary and exploratory in nature. To accept anything spectacular out of this meeting would be misplaced. We had offered a package of confidence building measures as a part of our effort to improve relations to resolve problems.³⁶

For Pakistan, a major impediment to normalizing its relations with India continues to be the Kashmir dispute. Unless the core and central issue of Kashmir is taken up and resolved, normalization of relations with India is not possible.³⁷

Two conclusions could be made from examining the Indo-Pakistan normalization talks. First, these talks are held at the official level and agreements signed are merely restricted to military/security matters. Second, because of political reasons, progress achieved in these talks will not be durable. For example, after the sixth round of talks held in August 1992 and the subsequent defense secretaries' talks held in November of the same year, political relations between the two countries deteriorated to an alarming extent, particularly when two visiting Pakistani nationals were reportedly killed by Indian security forces.³⁸ Diplomats from each side were manhandled and communal violence against Muslims in India reached an unsurpassed level in the backdrop of events in Ayodhya. Therefore, gains achieved in Indo-Pakistan talks are lost when something goes wrong quickly; the two countries are back to square one. Tables 1 and 2 depict different military and nonmilitary CBMs taken by India and Pakistan, progress made in Indo-Pakistan normalization, obstructions for the application of CBMs, and the role of domestic politics vis à vis efforts for Indo-Pakistan normalization.

TABLE 1 First Generation CBMs (Military)

<i>Issues</i>	<i>Agreements</i>
Protection of Nuclear Installations	On 31 December 1988 India and Pakistan agreed to exchange detailed information on nuclear power and research facilities and to refrain from attacking each other's nuclear installations. Earlier, in December 1985, an understanding between the two countries had been reached in a meeting between President Zia and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
Notification of Military Exercises	On 6 April 1991 India and Pakistan signed an accord pledging not to hold military exercises near their borders without first informing their military counterparts. In April 1992, foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan exchanged instruments of ratification on military exercises, maneuvers, and troop movement.
Airspace Violations	On 6 April 1991, in an accord signed between India and Pakistan, it was agreed to allow each other's civilian aircraft to fly and land in each other's territories through specified corridors.
Regular Telephone Contacts [Hot Line]	In the third round of foreign secretaries' talks, it was decided that the abandoned regular telephonic contacts between the Directors General of Military Operations be renewed routinely on a weekly basis to exchange information about military exercises, maneuvers, and airspace violations.
Redeployment of Troops in Siachen	Six rounds of talks at the defense secretaries' level have been held to settle the Siachen dispute. The last round of talks was held in New Delhi but failed to achieve any breakthrough.
Other Issues	Meeting of Surveyors General to discuss demarcation of the land boundary in Sir Creek, Wular Barrage/Tulbul navigation project.

³⁶ *Dawn*, 21 July 1990.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 13 August 1990.

³⁸ See "Killing of 2 Pakistanis in India," Islamabad-Delhi Tension Mounting, *Dawn*, 22 October 1992.

TABLE 2 First Generation CBMs (Nonmilitary)

<i>Issues</i>	<i>Agreements</i>
Economic and Other Areas of Cooperation	On 10 March 1983 India and Pakistan signed an agreement establishing an Indo Pakistan Joint Commission to strengthen good neighborly relations and promote cooperation in a range of areas outside political and military questions. Four subcommissions were established to promote cooperation in economic health science and technology sports travel tourism, and consular matters. On 31 December 1988 India and Pakistan signed an accord to end double taxation of each other's airlines. It exempted the profits of the two national airlines operating in or through each other's territory from taxation by the other country.
Communications	In May 1984 India and Pakistan decided to establish through bookings on their respective railways issue double entry transit visas and install coaxial cable between Amritsar and Lahore.
Travel	In May 1984 India and Pakistan signed proposals on group tourism and a letter of intention, easing visa difficulties and police reporting in either country. In the third meeting of Indo Pakistan Joint Commission held in July 1989 decisions were made for extending facilities for travel and tourism.
Agricultural research	An Indo Pakistan subcommission also dealt with agricultural research and exchange of scientific literature information and methodologies.
Cultural cooperation	In December 1988 India and Pakistan signed an accord to increase cultural cooperation and exchange. At the third meeting of Indo Pakistan Joint Commission held in July 1989 a three year (1989-91) cultural exchange program was approved that envisaged cooperation in education, art and culture, and sports exchange of newspapers and periodicals participation in each other's films festivals exchange of film delegations and radio and TV professionals translation and exchange of books periodicals and other educational cultural and sports publications. They also agreed to ensure that there was no misrepresentation of facts about each other's country in text books. This agreement was to be automatically renewed after the expiration of its original duration unless any of the two signatories notified in writing its desire to cancel it.
Treatment of diplomats	In August 1992 India and Pakistan signed an agreement regarding a code of conduct on treatment of each other's diplomats.

Following is the list of resolved and unresolved conflicts between India and Pakistan

Conflicts resolved

Division of Assets and Liabilities It was decided in December 1947 that the Government of Pakistan would receive 750 million rupees from India as its share of the balances in undivided India.

River Water Dispute The Indus water treaty signed in September 1960

Rann of Kutch Boundary Dispute Resolved by a three member commission in Geneva in 1968

Salal Dam Agreement Signed in 1978

Conflicts Yet To Be Resolved

Kashmir It is the only major outstanding unresolved dispute between India and Pakistan since 1947. The matter has been on the UN agenda since 1948. India and Pakistan have fought two wars over Kashmir and the recent deterioration in relations between New Delhi and Islamabad is related to an uprising in the Indian controlled part of Kashmir.

Siachen Since 1984 India and Pakistan have been militarily engaged over the Siachen Glacier. Historically the agreement of 27 July 1949 that defined the cease fire line between India and Pakistan in Kashmir left its northern end vague thence north to the glacier. In the Simla Agreement, a line of control was drawn up afresh and defined on 12 November 1972 but it did not extend to the Siachen Glacier. In 1984 the race for control over Siachen began between India and Pakistan. In June 1989 on the occasion of the fifth round of the Indo Pakistan defence secretaries talks the two countries were close to an agreement on Siachen. They had agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement based on redeployment of their forces to reduce the chances of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to ensure a durable peace in the Siachen area. But, according to Pakistan, India

backed out of the understanding it had reached with Islamabad in June 1989. Since then no breakthrough has been achieved on the settlement of the Siachen dispute.³⁹

Nuclear Issue The Indo-Pakistan disagreement on the question of nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia not only concerns New Delhi and Islamabad but also external powers. India has termed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 discriminatory and has refused to sign it and has called for the inclusion of China for any sort of understanding on the nuclear issue. Pakistan has made it clear that it will not unilaterally sign the NPT unless India does the same.

Wuler Barrage The Wuler Barrage dispute concerns a barrage to be constructed by the Indian Government on the Jhelum River below the Wuler Lake in order to improve the lake's navigability during the winter when there is a drop in the water level. New Delhi launched the Tulbul Navigation Project to regulate the decrease of water. The Jhelum is one of three rivers that the Indus Treaty of 1960 (signed by India and Pakistan) assigns to Pakistan for unrestricted use, but with precise exceptions. One of them is any control or use of water for navigation by India provided it has not diminished the volume of water. Storage of water or construction of storage works is forbidden. The issue therefore, is whether the barrage on river Jhelum will be a project for the control or use of water for navigation or is a storage work. Since the waters will be confined for some time in order to raise the level of Wuler Lake there will be storage temporarily. India has shown concern for the lower riparian (Pakistan) and suspended work on the project.⁴⁰ Talks on the Wuler Barrage are continuing between New Delhi and Islamabad. Pakistan wants certain safeguards from India that the volume of water in the Jhelum river as it enters Pakistan will not be diminished and that the Wuler Barrage project will be in the interest of both India and Pakistan.

Demarcation of Sir Creek Sir Creek is a 60-mile long estuary in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch. The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal's Award signed on 19 February 1968 apart from settling the Rann of Kutch dispute did not demarcate the boundary from the top of Sir Creek westward to north of the Creek on the Arabian Sea. The Tribunal noted that in view of the aforesaid agreement, the question concerning the Sir Creek part of the boundary is left out of consideration. It has now become a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. India contends that the boundary lies in the middle of the Creek. Pakistan claims that it lies on its eastern bank on the Indian side and therefore the entire Creek belongs to Pakistan. Pakistan insists that the creek boundary be delimited first so as to establish the point on land from which the sea boundary is to be limited. India's concerns center on the maritime boundary.⁴¹ The Sir Creek dispute is included in Indo-Pakistan parleys to settle conflicts but no breakthrough has been achieved so far.

From the information presented above and Tables 1 and 2 three important points can be made. First, since 1972 India and Pakistan have been interested in adopting CBMs in the military security field to the neglect of significant nonmilitary CBMs. As a result the two countries have failed to achieve any major durable success toward peace and stability in the subcontinent. Second, India and Pakistan have not moved systematically towards the goal of tension-free relations. There is lack of political will on the part of the regimes in power—past and present—to institutionalize the normalization process by giving serious consideration to nonmilitary CBMs. Third, India and Pakistan in the past have been successful in resolving some of their conflicts such as river water disputes and the Rann of Kutch boundary dispute. If the two countries have previously managed to settle some of their outstanding disputes there is a possibility that they can achieve similar success now.

Indo-Pakistan difference in perceptions concerning CBMs is twofold. First, New Delhi wants Pakistan to agree on applying CBMs related to political, economic, and cultural fields and argues that outstanding disputes should either be frozen or left aside for future discussions. In this regard, India cites the Simla Agreement as a model for its normalization of relations with Pakistan. But Pakistan feels that the entire process of CBMs cannot render positive results unless the following measures are adopted by the two sides:

Settlement of bilateral disputes particularly those related to Kashmir, Siachen, Wuler Barrage, Sir Creek, and the protection of the Muslim minority in India. Some circles in Pakistan argue that if the Kashmir dispute is settled according to the UN Security Council resolution, a major breakthrough can be achieved for normalizing relations with India. Another point of view in this regard is that even if the Kashmir dispute is settled, other conflicts may obstruct the road to peace and cooperation in the subcontinent. Against this background, it will be difficult to cut the Gordian Knot in Indo-Pakistan ties because decades of animosity and ill will between the two countries has made it rather difficult to start a new era of friendship in Indo-Pakistan relations.

39 A. G. Noorani, "Sir Creek, Wuler and Siachen," *Indian Express*, 5 August 1991. See also Pravin Sawhney, "The Strategy of Siachen," *Indian Express*, 24 August 1992.

40 A. G. Noorani, "Sir Creek, Wuler and Siachen."

41 A. G. Noorani, *Ibid.*

Settlement of the nuclear issue based on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia and the simultaneous signing of the NPT by the two countries

Adherence to the policy of noninterference and nonintervention in each other's internal affairs

India should dispel fears and doubts present among its neighbors regarding its regional ambitions and expansionist tendencies

Pakistan knows that it cannot win a conventional war with India therefore the best possible strategy to effectively cope with the Indian threat will be to achieve nuclear capability and use it as a deterrent to any future Indian designs against Pakistan's territorial sovereignty

Pakistan's sense of insecurity vis à vis India was institutionalized with its dismemberment in 1971 and the role of New Delhi in this regard. On these grounds it is argued by some Pakistani strategic thinkers that equipped with nuclear capability Islamabad can successfully overcome the strategically weak position it found itself in in 1971

Given the serious risks involved in a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent both India and Pakistan must adopt a realistic approach to nuclear weapons in South Asia that takes into account costs, risks, and environmental dangers. Even if India and Pakistan do not exercise the nuclear option, the threat of an accidental war with the possibility of a nuclear exchange would loom large. Even by adopting CBMs, India and Pakistan cannot fully eliminate the nuclear threat.

It goes without saying that Indo-Pakistan relations have an overwhelming bearing on peace and conflict in the South Asian region, thus making the application of CBMs crucial. Amity, goodwill, and trust between the two countries would accelerate the process of regional cooperation in South Asia⁴² and ensure stability in the Asia/Pacific region. However, according to some scholars, the primary objective for India since 1947 has been to exclude the major external powers from achieving any significant influence or role in the subcontinent. Since this has not been possible for a variety of reasons, New Delhi has instead sought to manipulate and limit the involvement of external powers in the region in ways that serve Indian objectives and interests. When one or more major powers would not cooperate, India has invited the involvement of the other as a counterweight. In other words, it has used balance of power politics despite its rhetorical aversion to that principle. Whereas the other South Asian states, in most instances, have perceived the external powers in terms very different from New Delhi,⁴³ on these grounds, India's quest for preeminence in the region compelled other South Asian countries to involve other powers on terms that imposed their bargaining position with New Delhi and contributed to their security in other ways as well.⁴⁴

India's role vis à vis its neighbors is thus a decisive factor in the application of CBMs. Much is required particularly from New Delhi's side to ease tension and hostility so that the present deadlock on the improvement of bilateral relations with Islamabad is removed.

Challenges to CBMs

Some of the challenges to the application of CBMs in the Indo-Pakistan context come from domestic political factors. There are strong forces within the two countries that miss no opportunity to accentuate the level of tension and hatred. An Indian journalist, Nikhil Chakravarty, has very well described how extremist elements in India and Pakistan have succeeded in perpetuating ill will and hatred between the two countries. He says:

We have a relationship of low tension between India and Pakistan, accentuated by provocation by extremists on both sides. The wall of ignorance and suspicion that divides our two countries has been reinforced by a whole lot of taboos and restrictions. We have a visa system that demands reporting regularly to the police, which can by no means be regarded as congenial. We do not exchange newspapers, we hardly exchange television programs though we watch each other's surreptitiously across the frontier. There are few press correspondents in each other's territory and we depend largely on foreign wire services to shape our

42 A. M. Vohra, "Relevance of South Asian Cooperation," *The Muslim*, 9 March 1984; Prem Shankar Jha, "What India and Pakistan Can Do," *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 19 August 1992.

43 Leo E. Rose, "South Asia and the Outside World," in A. Jeyaratham Wilson and Dennis Delton, eds., *The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1982), p. 320.

44 *Ibid.*

attitudes towards each other. Our scholars and specialists meet occasionally mainly at international gatherings. Cases of direct interaction (not to speak of interface) are few and far between.⁴⁵

Outbreak of communal riots, interference in each other's internal affairs and an arms buildup provide legitimacy to hawkish elements and enable them to destabilize the process of normalization. Beyond any shadow of doubt, extremists and hardliners are a threat to the cause of confidence building between India and Pakistan.

Indeed, vested interest groups have badly hampered efforts for peace between India and Pakistan. Emotionally charged statements are being issued from both sides to subvert attempts being made for deescalation of tension. For instance, opening the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) campaign in the eastern region of India, the party leader L. K. Advani said in Calcutta on 24 March 1991 that he expected the people of Pakistan to realize the folly of partition and join the Indian union sometime in the future. A unification was not unlikely as in the case of East and West Germany which represented two different systems of government that had come together. The people of Pakistan would realize their cultural unity with India and that Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal and Bhutan could join the federation, i.e. Akhand Bharat.⁴⁶ However, he ruled out the use of force in making Pakistan a part of India.

Even if one disregards the militancy of BJP in Indian politics and its covert ambition to undo partition, some circles in Pakistan cannot remain oblivious of such a political development. Their fears and apprehensions are legitimate given the fact that BJP is no longer an insignificant political party with three members in the Indian Lower House but now has around 119 members. It is a substantial force to reckon with. Like India, Pakistan also has political groups⁴⁷ that have a hardline posture vis à vis New Delhi. Their slogans like "Crush India" and their dreams of hoisting the Pakistani flag over the Red Fort of Delhi are equally reprehensible and fanciful. Given the fact that extremist groups have substantial influence in both India and Pakistan, the tasks of conflict resolution and confidence building could become difficult. On the official level too, the recent approaches have not been in consonance with the spirit of goodwill and amity. A Pakistan foreign ministry spokesman launched a bitter tirade against New Delhi when he said in Islamabad on 24 February 1993 that:

It was New Delhi that was responsible for the difficulties in the relations between the two countries. India has remained unwilling to resolve its disputes with Pakistan in accordance with the Simla Agreement. There were three main instances when the Indian attitude has been nonresponsive towards reconciliation gestures by Islamabad. First, India's negative reaction to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's proposal for talks on the Jammu and Kashmir problem in accordance with Article 6 of the Simla Agreement. Second, the Indian rejection of [the] Prime Minister's proposal for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia. Third, the Indian refusal to withdraw its forces from the Siachen Glacier area where New Delhi had committed a violation of the Simla Agreement.⁴⁸

Similarly, making a policy statement at the commencement of a three day debate on foreign policy in the National Assembly on 17 February 1993, the State Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mr. Siddiq Khan Kanju, said that:

India's large conventional forces remain as serious as ever and has virtually closed the process of dialogue. Pakistan's relations with India have never been easy. Today these relations are passing through a very difficult period. India has adopted an inflexible position on all issues between the two countries, from the core issue of Kashmir to the simple question of the demarcation of the Sir Creek area. India assumed the notion that it was the largest power in South Asia and entitled to have its own way, whether right or wrong. We can never accept this assumption. The Prime Minister has proposed a dialogue in seven meetings with his Indian counterparts but, unfortunately, the reply received from the Indians has foreclosed the avenue of any meaningful dialogue.⁴⁹

Indo-Pakistan tension escalated rapidly during December 1992 for two reasons: first, the maltreatment of Pakistani diplomats in New Delhi and the killing of two Pakistani citizens in India. Second, the destruction of the Babri Mosque accentuated the negative feelings in Pakistan and India and led to the near suspension of diplomatic relations.

45. Nikhil Chakravarty.

46. See news item "Pakistan Should Rejoin India," *The Telegraph* (Calcutta) 25 March 1991.

47. As in the right wing *Jamaat-i-Islami* and a section within the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Anti-Indian feelings are forcefully expressed in the case of the Kashmir dispute or the communal riots in India.

48. *Dawn*, 25 February 1993.

49. *Ibid.*

In a regular briefing of Islamabad's diplomatic press corps a foreign ministry spokesman advised Pakistani nationals against travel to India. He pointed out that in view of the recent deaths of two Pakistani travelers in India at the hands of Indian security forces and other cases of harassment and torture the government strongly recommends that Pakistanis should avoid traveling to India.⁵⁰ Such a warning was unprecedented and unsurpassed in recent years and depicted the new level of tension between the two countries. India and Pakistan also expelled some of each other's diplomats and Pakistan asked India to reduce its diplomatic staff in Karachi a step that India had taken earlier against Pakistan's diplomatic mission in Bombay.

The Indian Government, however, reacted vehemently to Pakistani criticism regarding its policies. In a statement issued in New Delhi in October 1992 the Indian Government condemned the Pakistan National Assembly's resolutions on Kashmir. It described the Pakistani action as "a blatant attempt at interfering in India's internal affairs." The statement reiterated that "Kashmir is and will remain an integral part of India." It further stated that the resolution passed by Pakistan's National Assembly was a "deliberate attempt to continue active support by Islamabad of terrorist and subversive activities in Jammu and Kashmir." This resolution once again creates doubt about Pakistan's sincerity in reducing tension with India.⁵¹

Charges and counter charges by the two sides should be seen in the dichotomy of the lack of a responsible approach adopted by the policymakers of India and Pakistan on handling conflicting matters and by the role played by the media of the two countries in escalating tension.

Conclusions

The Gordian Knot of Indo-Pakistan conflict can only be cut if the two countries adopt the following strategies to establish a CBM regime. Such a regime should be established by the governmental and nongovernmental circles of India and Pakistan to institutionalize the process of conflict resolution and confidence building in South Asia.

Formation of a task force of nonofficial experts in economic, political and security fields. The task force should have an in-depth understanding of their country's official policies and its objective should be to establish political will among the elites of India and Pakistan for normalization in their relations. All such efforts could be carried out within the framework of private diplomacy by the influential circles at the governmental and nongovernmental level of the two countries. The role of private diplomacy in CBMs was examined by a Western scholar who pointed out that private diplomacy seems best suited to develop the preconditions for problem solving that is by creating a readiness on the part of governments to consider moving toward the resolution of issues. In pursuit of this broad objective private activities may range from establishing contacts with appropriate private persons on the other side to develop a clear image of the interests and perceptions of one's counterpart on particular issues to create new pictures or concepts about how a question of mutual interest might be resolved.⁵² Détente achieved (during the Nixon and Carter years) between Washington and Moscow was also the result of years of private diplomacy conducted by experts and former government high officials for that purpose. India and Pakistan can learn from these experiences.

Help and assistance could be received from experts of countries who are involved in CBMs in other parts of the world. Their expertise and suggestions on the mode of deescalation of tension could help the experts of India and Pakistan to tactfully handle their conflicts.

In a situation where Indo-Pakistan tension has reached an alarming stage one possible strategy to diffuse tension could be the visit of task force members to each country and the holding of a dialogue on the modalities of the normalization process. Some of the think tanks that influence the policymaking process of India and Pakistan have tried to deescalate tension by organizing seminars and conferences, symposia, or a close door session. But the scope of such activities for conflict resolution and confidence building should be broadened and should focus more on dialogue based on new thinking instead of rhetoric.

Maintaining high level diplomatic contacts helps to promote dialogue in a polarized atmosphere. In Indo-Pakistan relations one can hear reports regarding the visits of foreign secretaries and other governmental officials. The failure of diplomacy may lead to further erosion in Indo-Pakistan relations with predictable consequences.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 3 December 1992.

⁵¹ See "Government Condemns Pakistan's Kashmir Resolution," *Delhi All India Radio Network in English*, reproduced in *FBIS Daily Report Near East & South Asia* (28 October 1992) 45.

⁵² Philip D. Stewart in David Newson, ed., *Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union* (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy) p. 9.

The hot line between the director generals of military operations of India and Pakistan was resumed in 1991 to avert any miscalculation or a crisis situation. At present the need is to use that channel effectively for reviewing the border situation, especially in Punjab and Kashmir.

As mentioned earlier, both India and Pakistan must give due importance to CBMs on a nonmilitary level. There is a need to form a CBM regime to monitor the process of conflict resolution through confidence building measures. It should include the members of the proposed task force and policymakers and should coordinate with similar groups and governments in other parts of the world so as to share expertise and experience on conflict resolution and confidence building.

As suggested by Christian Harleman, the proper infrastructure for confidence and peace building should be set in place for conflict resolution and management. In this regard, an important step for the successful application of CBMs between India and Pakistan should be coordination between peace and conflict resolution centers of the two countries. Apart from dialogue on the governmental level, it is imperative that like minded groups and institutions who are concerned regarding the Indo Pakistan Cold War should get together and ponder on ways and means to ease tension and institutionalize the process of normalization. Such people should explore possibilities to end decades of hostilities between the two neighboring countries. Notwithstanding impediments, the process has started and, if sustained efforts are made, positive results for conflict and tension reduction could be achieved.

There are three possible outcomes with regard to the existing level of tension between New Delhi and Islamabad:

Maintenance of the status quo: that is, the propaganda campaign will continue and each country will persist in charging the other with intervention in their internal affairs. It means sustaining a no war and no peace situation.

The situation may take an alarming turn for the worse if border tension escalates and existing CBMs in the military field such as the hot line and troop monitoring may collapse. Such an eventuality will lead to the outbreak of the fourth Indo Pakistan war, thus inviting the predictable catastrophe.

It is possible that, as a result of official and nonofficial diplomatic endeavors, Indo Pakistan tension may be defused and the two countries may decide to settle their outstanding disputes through negotiations. Given the existing level of tension, there still exists a remote possibility of deescalation in Indo Pakistan relations. Much depends on the outcome of existing fragile efforts for normalization between New Delhi and Islamabad.

But contradictory statements are currently being issued by the policymakers of India and Pakistan on various critical aspects of their relationship. One circle in both countries is not hesitant to unveil a looming threat of war in the subcontinent. Whereas the other circle present in both countries calls for the holding of meaningful dialogue for crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Nonetheless, confidence building measures have a tremendous scope for conflict resolution in the subcontinent. But in practical terms, the mechanism of CBMs depends upon the institutionalized processes of cooperation between the two countries and management of accidental crises like the Babri Mosque and treatment of each other's diplomatic staff.

Future prospects of CBMs in Indo Pakistan relations, however, depend upon the holding of normalization talks, deescalation in propaganda warfare, and New Delhi's readiness to dispel fears and suspicions in Islamabad regarding its political ambitions in South Asia. The same is true in the case of Pakistan, as it should understand the Indian charges regarding interference in Punjab and Kashmir.

If the two countries succeed in getting out of the vicious cycle of confrontation, it will become possible to seek positive results from CBMs. The task is difficult but not impossible because the two countries have launched the first generation confidence building measures.

The need is to stabilize and strengthen this process and reinforce endeavors for conflict resolution by adopting CBMs at both the nonmilitary and military levels, particularly in economic and political fields. If the CBMs fail to remove past animosities and mistrust, the normalization process between India and Pakistan may not yield positive results. A CBM regime consisting of a balanced program holds the key for conflict and tension free ties between India and Pakistan. Therefore, the road to CBMs passes through both New Delhi and Islamabad and the two countries should each feel equally responsible for making such a regime a success.

Moonis Ahmar is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Karachi, Pakistan. He was a Ford Visiting Scholar with the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for the spring 1993 semester. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Karachi in 1992. His area of specialization is conflict resolution and confidence building with particular reference to India and Pakistan. His publications include *Confidence Building Measures in South Asia* (Geneva, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1992), *The Soviet Role in South Asia* (Karachi, Area Study Centre for Europe, 1989), and *Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Since the Withdrawal of Great Britain* (Karachi, Area Study Centre for Europe, 1985). He is working on three research projects: "Non-Security CBMs Between India and Pakistan," "Institutional Arrangements for War Avoidance Between India and Pakistan," and "Conflict Resolution and Confidence Building in the New Central Asia."