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## **1992: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO**

**Lt Col John M. Foley, USAF  
Research Associate**

**June, 1989**

## **LT COL JOHN M FOLEY, USAF**

**Lt Col Foley is the Deputy Director for Architecture and Requirements in the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Directorate at Military Airlift Command Headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Commissioned in 1971 through the ROTC Program at the University of New Hampshire, Lt Col Foley is a master navigator with over 3,500 hours in the C-130, including combat duty in Vietnam. Upon completion of graduate studies in Operations Research, he served five years as a Pentagon mobility analyst for Air Force Studies and Analyses. He wrote this article while assigned as an Air Force Research Associate to the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security Program at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.**

# **1992 Implications for NATO**

**Lt Col John M Foley, USAF**

Research Associate with the Program in Arms  
Control, Disarmament, and International Security  
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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This paper represents the views of the author and does not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of the Air Force. The paper has been cleared for public release by security and policy review authorities.

*He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils, for time is the greatest innovator, and if time of course alter things to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better what shall be the end?"*

*- Francis Bacon*

## 1992 IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

### INTRODUCTION

This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since its inception in 1949, critics have hovered over NATO predicting its inevitable end, the critics are still waiting. During the four decades of its existence, the alliance has maintained the peace in Western Europe despite the massive military forces opposing each other. However, like any lengthy relationship, NATO has had to face many crises over the years and to adjust to enormous political and economic changes. Heading into the decade of the 1990s, NATO faces new challenges and opportunities that could alter both the nature of the alliance and the east-west confrontation in Europe. Principal among these is the European Community's (EC's) program for 1992. By December 31, 1992 twelve Western European countries are scheduled to reach agreement on sweeping economic proposals which will create an internal market where goods, services, capital and people move as freely across national borders in Europe as they do across state borders in the United States (US). Such a community would constitute the world's largest single market, thereby giving it greater influence in its relations with the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. The implications of the plans of the EC go far beyond trade and extend to political and military affairs. This paper examines the implications for NATO and the US of increased cooperation and cohesion among the EC nations.

Today the 16 members of NATO are confronted with new challenges that range from the charm and arms control proposals of Soviet President Gorbachev to concerns that the present structure of NATO is antiquated and inadequate. However, these issues present not only challenges but also opportunities for the alliance. For example, the apparent willingness of Gorbachev to reduce conventional military forces in Europe has sharply reduced the perception of the Soviets as a threat in the eyes of many Europeans. The prospects for meaningful force reductions in Europe, if real, provide the opportunity for creating a safer, more stable situation in Europe.

Combined with the challenges facing NATO the impending completion of the 1992 program by the EC provides a unique opportunity for Europe. Although the economic integration of the twelve members of the EC deals directly with economic and political measures, the 1992 program offers Western Europe the strengthened institutional machinery and increased defense industrial cooperation that is necessary for Europe to play a more equal role with the US in NATO. A more effective European pillar in the alliance would correct a serious imbalance that currently exists. In principle, NATO is an alliance of equals. In fact the US has dominated the alliance on all major issues.

This paper will explore the possible futures for NATO in light of the challenges it faces. Three of many possible scenarios are examined here: (1) NATO might make few, if any, changes. Essentially it would continue as it has for the last four decades. (2) Another possibility might be that the Europeans assume a more significant portion of their own defense within the alliance. In this option, Western Europe would become more of an equal partner with the US. (3) The final option envisions an independent Western Europe responsible entirely for its own defense.<sup>1</sup> Certainly, the future of Europe and NATO depends on many factors. This paper will look at some of the problems confronting NATO, examine the possible impacts of the 1992 program, and conclude with some observations on the three possible directions outlined above for NATO.

## CHALLENGES FOR NATO

Major changes have taken place in Europe over the 40 years of NATO's existence. The Western European states have gone from ravaged, war-torn economies facing a menacing Soviet threat after World War II to thriving industrial giants confronted by a Soviet Union with a dynamic leader who is desperate to improve relations with the west. As NATO moves into its fifth decade, two areas stand out as major challenges: the Soviets' willingness to make significant reductions in conventional forces in Europe, especially weapons which are viewed as offensive and threatening such as tanks, and the relationship between the US and the evolving European Community. While representing significant challenges, these twin issues also present the west, especially the US, with an unprecedented opportunity to move from military confrontation to mutual cooperation.

The incredible popularity of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Western Europe is due to his radical proposals to make unilateral cuts in Soviet troops and equipment, his apparent readiness to negotiate, and his personal charm. Taken separately, any one of these three things would be important. However, the three of them combined have had an overpowering effect on western perceptions of the Soviet threat. Practically overnight the Soviets are no longer perceived as a threat in the eyes of the majority of people in Western Europe, especially the population of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

The Soviets' eagerness to reduce the level of troops and equipment in Europe is driven more by the need to shift expenditures from the military to the ailing consumer sector of the economy than by altruism. Gorbachev appears to realize that the fear and distrust of his country have been fueled by the massive Soviet superiority in conventional forces in Europe. Consequently, he has embarked upon a program with dual purposes. At the same time, reductions of Soviet forces in Europe will save the Soviets money at home and they will reduce European fears as well.

On this second front Gorbachev has been successful beyond his wildest dreams. A recent poll commissioned by a West German television network on the eve of Gorbachev's recent visit to Bonn asked people whether Gorbachev was a man they could trust. An unprecedented 90 percent of the respondents said yes. No other world leader including the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl even came close to that rating.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that the West Germans are the most receptive to Gorbachev and his initiatives has led some analysts to suggest an ulterior motive to the Soviet leader's peace offensive. They see Gorbachev's objective as splitting West Germany from the NATO alliance. Success for such a scheme would present NATO with a serious challenge, since Germany plays a central role, both geographically and militarily, in confronting the Soviet threat to Western Europe.

A possible counter to such a Soviet plan might be a unified Western Europe within NATO under West German leadership. This unification could take place through the political institutions of the European Community and would alleviate the second major challenge confronting the alliance - the search for a European identity within NATO. Such a solution would raise its own problems centered around the willingness of the other European states to accept the leadership of the FRG.

When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, the European members were dependent economically and militarily on the US. In the ensuing 40 years, the Europeans have been content to follow American leadership in setting the political agenda of the alliance. However, times have changed. The Europeans, especially the West Germans, want a new formula - a role in NATO commensurate with their growing economic power. While a thriving European economy has always been an American goal, little thought was given to the possibility that an economically strong, united Europe might be capable of identifying interests different from America's. For example, the Europeans have always had a different perspective on the political role of the alliance. They repeatedly refer to the Harmel Report adopted by NATO in 1967, which outlined two objectives for the alliance: the traditional one of security through defense and a second one of improved east-west relations through arms control agreements.<sup>3</sup> This traditional desire for detente with the east explains in part Gorbachev's popularity in the west. The problem in the past that the Europeans have had in acting upon their political desires has been their inability to deal with the US from a unified position. This is where the European Community can make a significant difference.

## THE EC AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO

Many discussions about Europe these days revolve around the date 1992, the deadline for the creation of an internal market in Western Europe without frontiers. Members of the European Community are optimistic about the prospects for the successful completion of the negotiations necessary to create a barrier-free internal market. At the EC's European Council meeting in June 1988, the ministers declared that progress towards completing the internal market had now reached the point where it is irreversible, a fact accepted by those engaged in economic and social life.<sup>4</sup> However, the progress made to date and the obstacles to be overcome for the twelve members of the EC indicate that they still have a long way to go to meet the 1992 deadline. Since December 1988 marked the midpoint of the internal market program, it is useful to examine how far the Europeans have come before discussing what impact the EC will have on the NATO alliance.

The EC is actually a combination of three communities: first, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), second, the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The ECSC, created by the Treaty of Paris in April 1951, proved so successful that the six member states—Belgium, France, the FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—decided to extend it to all areas of their economies. Hence in March 1957 they signed the two treaties of Rome creating the EEC and Euratom. The communities were enlarged in 1973 with the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, in 1981 with the addition of Greece, and again in 1986 with the membership of Spain and Portugal to arrive at the current twelve members.<sup>5</sup>

These treaties were amended and fortified in July 1987 by the Single European Act (SEA)<sup>6</sup> which has enabled the EC to make significant progress towards economic integration. This Act set the EC on its current course of action with 1992 as a deadline. Provisions of the SEA strengthened the four community institutions—the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the Court of Justice. Perhaps more importantly, the act mandates the creation of an area without economic frontiers by December 31, 1992. The simple fact that a deadline exists has had a positive effect on progress. During the 1970s, economic integration outlined in the Treaty of Rome had come to a halt. The 1992 deadline represents a political commitment by member countries to put aside their differences over trade barriers. The act also gave formal legal status to cooperation among member states in the field of foreign policy. In order to comprehend the developments in Europe, it is necessary to understand the institutions that have been established. The task of establishing the internal market resides with the four community institutions.



The European Parliament (EP) has 518 members elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term. The four most populous countries—France, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have 81 seats, Spain has 60, the Netherlands has 25, Belgium, Greece, and Portugal have 24 each, Denmark has 16, Ireland has 15, and Luxembourg has six.<sup>7</sup> Under the Treaty of Rome, the EP was restricted to giving its opinion on Commission proposals. Unlike national parliaments, the EP still does not have legislative powers, it remains largely an advisory body. However, the EP does have the power to reject the EC budget in total - a rather blunt instrument which it has used three times since 1979. With the substantial gains made by the Greens and other peace groups in recent elections, the EP has become an institutional forum for discussion on a wide range of security issues. In 1982, a Danish member of the EP, Niels Haagerup, said: "If the European community still has a future, it is inevitable that security and one day even defense will become issues of her concern. Many of us have underlined how absurd it is to construct an economic and political European community and to consistently leave out security and defense."<sup>8</sup>

The Council of Ministers consists of 12 members — one from each of the member states. Membership usually varies with the subject being discussed. Thus, if an agricultural topic is under consideration, the Ministers for Agriculture will sit on the Council. Normally, the foreign minister represents his country on the Council. A major change authorized by the SEA permits Council decisions by a qualified majority instead of unanimity on most issues.<sup>9</sup> Exceptions to the majority rule occur when Commission proposals are altered or for certain important decisions like fiscal harmonization.

Under the Treaty of Rome, most Council decisions had to be unanimous. Essentially, this provision permitted a single nation to veto a proposal that it considered not in its national interest. This procedure severely hampered the Council's ability to make decisions of vital interest to the Community. Under the new rules set up by the SEA for qualified majority voting, 54 votes out of a total of 76 are needed to approve a Commission proposal. Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have ten votes each, Spain has eight votes, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal have five votes each, Denmark and Ireland have three votes each, and Luxembourg has two votes.<sup>10</sup> The Council of Ministers works closely with the Commission to adopt regulations and set community policy.

The Commission consists of 17 members appointed by their respective governments. It is composed of at least one representative from each country. The Commission serves as the executive branch of the EC, initiates community policy and investigates alleged violations of the Treaties by governments, firms, or individuals. A major responsibility of the Commission is to propose measures to the Council which will foster the

development of EC policies. If it did not submit legislative proposals to the Council, the progress of the community would come to a halt. The Commission can also refer disputed cases to a Court of Justice whose judgment is binding.

The Court of Justice ensures that implementation of the Treaties is in accordance with the rules of law. The 13 judges are appointed for six years by agreement among the member governments and are assisted by six advocates-general. The court hears cases brought by the Commission against governments for infringements of the Treaties. It also hears complaints brought by governments against decisions of the Commission and actions brought by individuals. Between the years 1952 and 1987, more than 4,000 cases have been brought before the court.

The most important actions pertaining to the economic integration of the community were contained in a White Paper issued by the Commission in 1985 outlining a total of 300 proposals to be acted upon by the Council. Ten major proposals fall into three main categories: removal of physical barriers, technical barriers, and fiscal barriers. Through elimination and regrouping, the original 300 proposals have been pared down to 279. The Commission has formally presented over 250 of these to the Council for approval. At present, the Council has adopted about 100 of the required measures.<sup>11</sup> Quite understandably, the measures which have been adopted so far have been the least controversial. Most of the remaining proposals range from controversial to divisive. Although over three years are left before the deadline of December 31, 1992, the Commission has recommended giving member states sufficient time to incorporate Community measures into national law. Effectively the Council only has about two more years to complete most of its work. At the current pace, they will have to speed up their progress to achieve their goal, especially since the Council deals not only with the White Paper measures but also those relating to other bodies such as the customs union.

The EC Commission's overall assessment of the progress made by the Council is satisfactory. The twelve member states have displayed a sense of cooperation and a willingness to make adjustments in order to achieve consensus. Many difficult problems involving controversial areas remain to be solved. The fact that the countries are even talking about some of these issues surprises many people. However, the Europeans realize that the future prosperity of Europe could be at stake. In an exhaustive study of the potential benefits of the single market program (the Cecchini Report), the European Commission touts the prospect of a 5 percent growth in Community GNP, price reductions of 6 percent and two million new jobs. As if these benefits were not enough, they cite the prospect of a 7 percent rise in GNP, five million new jobs, three years additional growth and a reduction of one third in the dole queues of Europe if appropriate accompanying policies are also

adopted <sup>12</sup> With numbers like these, it is no wonder that the 1992 spirit has caught the imagination of the people of Europe

Progress has been excellent in two areas the removal of technical barriers to trade in goods and services and in the liberalization of capital movements Approximately seventy of the adopted measures relate to the removal of technical barriers The new approach to technical regulations and standards is in place and working This approach limits regulation to essential requirements in the areas of health and safety and in selected cases to the environment or consumer protection Measures adopted by the Council include directives on pressure vessels and toys, common positions on construction products and electromagnetic compatibility and proposals on machine safety and personal protective devices A comprehensive set of European Standards is still being developed

In the area of capital movements, the directive liberalizing the movement of long-term capital is already in force Beginning in 1990, the directive liberalizing the movement of short-term capital, including bank accounts from country to country, comes into force Measures dealing with the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (academic degrees and professional certification) are near completion and should be adopted this year The recognition of degrees for architects and most of the medical professions is now in effect These directives will permit citizens of Europe with professional qualifications to practice their skills throughout the Community

Significant progress has also been made in the area of transportation services In 1986, the Council liberalized maritime transport between member states and with third countries In 1987, the Council adopted measures which created greater openness and competition in European air transportation Finally, in 1988, the Council agreed to abolish road haulage quotas within the Community by the end of 1992

Progress in other major areas has been limited, especially in plant and animal health, fiscal policy, and the free movement of persons The problem in plant and animal health centers on the wide range of controls imposed by different member states Attempts to rationalize these controls or at least to bring them closer together have met with little success The critical issue in the fiscal arena is the harmonization of indirect taxes, particularly the value added tax (VAT) and excise duties Several countries view legislation on the VAT as infringing on their sovereignty since it is similar to a national sales tax and is a major source of revenue Debate has raged for over two years on this issue with very little progress Progress on Citizens Europe has also been stagnant The directives concerning the right of residence and freedom of movement for travellers have made no progress Currently, only persons who are gainfully employed have a general right of residence The

Commission's desire to extend that right to migrant workers has met with stiff opposition from the leading industrial countries<sup>13</sup>

Solutions to the problems of dealing with weapons, terrorism, and drugs have centered around the present system of frontier controls. In a stern message to the Council of Ministers, the Commission stated, "If evidence or reasonable suspicion exists, of course an individual can be stopped or apprehended. But what must go is the routine, mindless interference with the great mass of ordinary innocent travellers going about their legitimate business."<sup>14</sup>

Member states are still light years apart on many of the issues essential to the success of the 1992 program. Recently British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher decided against reappointing Lord Cockfield as EC Commissioner because she regarded him as having gone native.<sup>15</sup> Apparently Cockfield does not share Thatcher's nationalistic view on issues such as VAT and border controls. The fact that Cockfield lost his position despite consensus among the Community member states that he had done a superb job indicates the magnitude of the differences in at least one country.

While the Cecchini report predicts near miraculous economic benefits, there are also more somber predictions in the report that have received little or no publicity. For example, the report estimates initial job losses could be as high as 500,000. If so, the employment situation in Europe will get worse before it gets better. Once the competitive environment of 1992 arrives, industries characterized by inefficiency and overcapacity will be hit hard.

Despite its shortcomings the EC has become a force for cooperation among the Europeans. Since the 1970s, European Political Cooperation (EPC) has been an element of the EC but was operating on the basis of intergovernmental agreements. Under provisions of the SEA, EPC received formal legal status. The EPC is now a forum for consultation on a wide range of political and policy issues. European NATO members taking part in the EPC usually discuss policy issues prior to attending NATO council meetings. Europe could use the EPC to foster increased defense cooperation in the areas of procurement and arms control.

The case for arms collaboration is well documented. With level or declining defense budgets and increasingly more sophisticated and expensive weapon systems, individual countries are facing structural disarmament - the phenomenon of more and more money buying fewer and fewer weapons. Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., who coined the phrase, is a former Navy Department official and author of a report for the Pentagon entitled *Pooling Allied and American Resources to Produce a Credible Collective Conventional Deterrent*. He writes, "The causes are political. The needed solutions are also political."<sup>16</sup> He concludes that a European defense

industrial community is essential to producing weapons and equipment efficiently. The defense industry must be made as efficient and productive as the commercial arena. The institutional machinery of the EC could provide the necessary structure to sustain European defense cooperation. Solutions to the problem will require cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic. The Americans and the Europeans both realize that no one country can afford to develop and produce every weapon all by itself.

The major weakness of EPC is that none of its recommendations or proposals are binding. Unlike the formal Commission of the EC which proposes legislation, the Council of Ministers which makes decisions, or the European Parliament which controls the noncompulsory portion of the community's budget, the EPC has no real power. In this light, the European Council could become the instrument for developing and fostering cooperation among member states and with the US. Only through consensus among the Europeans can a way be forged around the sensitive political, industrial, and commercial interests that exist in all countries involved.

Too often in the past, the Europeans have been unable to reach agreement among themselves. Hence, they had little choice but to adopt the US position. If the Europeans seek to have more influence in the Alliance, they will need to speak with one voice. This requires a degree of political cooperation which can best be achieved through the EC. One notes that EC membership does not include all the countries of Western Europe or NATO. Iceland, Norway, and Turkey are members of NATO but not the EC. Ireland is a member of the EC but is not a member of NATO. However, the EC contains all the countries that would be considered key players from an economic, political, and military standpoint.

#### POSSIBLE FUTURES FOR NATO

The issues confronting the NATO alliance are potentially contentious and divisive, but NATO has a long history of successfully facing such issues. The real question is whether the forces for change in the relationship between the US and Western Europe will bring about a constructive restructuring of the alliance and if so, what form the new relationship will take.

The future of NATO depends on many factors, those that pose the greatest challenges to the alliance are Soviet diplomacy, and the desire for a greater European voice in defense policy. The level of cooperation achieved by the NATO members will determine the outcome. The possible futures for NATO range from total disintegration of the alliance and a fragmentation of the European members to the establishment of a federation of European states with close economic and political ties to both the US and the Soviet Union. Given the proper circumstances either of these extreme visions are possible, however, they are also highly unlikely. I consider three possible futures which seem much more probable. (1) the continuation of the status

quo, (2) a stronger Western Europe within the NATO alliance, and (3) an independent Western Europe capable of providing its own defense with little assistance from the US

The strongest argument in favor of the status quo is undoubtedly the success of the alliance over the last 40 years in preventing war. There have been over 130 wars throughout the world since the end of WW II, yet, Europe has experienced the longest period of peace in its recorded history. The US and the Europeans are still strongly committed to NATO. This is demonstrated once again by the fact that despite fears that the question of tactical nuclear modernization in West Germany would fragment NATO at the summit in May 1989, President Bush and West German Chancellor Kohl reached a compromise satisfactory to all members of the alliance.

The status quo is comfortable for the Europeans and allows them to criticize US policy without losing US support, the onus for unpopular decisions can be shifted to the Americans. This happened during the INF negotiations. When negotiations appeared to be stalled, the Europeans complained of a lack of consultation. NATO gives even the small European members the feeling that they have an input in the making of US foreign policy decisions.

The argument for outcome one, the status quo, does not take into account the 1992 program and the search for a European identity in security policy. The EC has given the Europeans a new self confidence and a desire to have more influence in their relations with both the US and the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, the status quo for NATO is unsatisfactory to its European members. Opting for the status quo means that Europe will remain dependent on the US. In fact, the EC is heading in the opposite direction. The EC will create a single market of 320 million consumers with a gross domestic product approximately equal to that of the US. The admitted long term goal of the 1992 program is the gradual withering away of national sovereignty. Under these circumstances the status quo does not seem likely.

President John F. Kennedy first proposed the idea (outcome two above) of a twin pillars approach for NATO security based on the US and a united Western Europe in his Independence Day speech in 1962.<sup>17</sup> Such an approach would give Europe a greater voice in defense policy while retaining close economic, political, and military ties with the US. An essential condition for this option to succeed is that European NATO countries define a common security interest. One problem that has prevented this in the past has been the lack of an institutional framework for a heightened, more unified, European role within NATO. The EC could provide the necessary structure.

Nils Andren of the National Defense Research Institute in Stockholm offers an interesting scenario in which the FRG plays the leading role in a politically unified Europe<sup>18</sup> As the leading economic power in the EC, Germany would insist on a stronger political role in any alliance that was realized best in a European setting Membership in a highly integrated EC would prevent West German domination and would help prevent forces within the FRG from becoming purely nationalistic One may question whether the other Western European countries would accept West German leadership However, none of the other West German options seems very attractive Strengthening only the relationship between the US and the FRG appears less attractive to the other European countries who would have less chance of protecting their interests Certainly a move toward unilateral detente with the Soviets would be unwelcome in the West as well The one country which might resist such a strong West German influence is France

The French have always considered themselves as leaders and not followers<sup>19</sup> Andren admits that for France to be prepared to accept extended European integration under West German leadership it would have to possess enough economic and political weight to maintain national self confidence Great Britain and the Benelux countries, too, would demand counterweights to a dynamic Federal Republic to overcome their apprehensions toward such a development<sup>20</sup> The political integration of the EC could provide the necessary counterweight

Greater European cooperation can actually strengthen the alliance in several respects First, it could be the starting point to involve France more actively in the military portion of NATO The recent formation of a joint Franco-German brigade highlights this possibility Second, prior consultation and debate among the Europeans will enable them to carry on a more effective dialogue with the US No longer will the US be faced with dealing with a dozen different views Third, it can serve as a means of managing the gradual reduction of the US presence in Europe when it comes

The third option envisions an independent Western Europe In this scenario Western Europe would provide for its own conventional defense relying on the strategic nuclear deterrent of the US It is also conceivable that the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain could provide Europe with its own nuclear deterrent However, the prospects that either France or Britain would subjugate their nuclear forces under European control seem remote An independent Western Europe implies that the EC would have to be successful to the point that national interests were subordinated to community goals European defense industries would collaborate on all major defense projects to achieve the economies of scale necessary to meet budget constraints In order for the Europeans to provide a credible conventional defense on their own, the Soviets would have to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe to a level where they no longer posed an offensive

threat Any increase in military spending to compensate for the loss of American troops could virtually be ruled out based on current spending trends

One could argue that an independent Western Europe would create more problems than it would solve Option three gives the Europeans the greatest degree of autonomy, but it destroys vital links between the US and Europe and creates new conflicts A number of economic and trade problems have already surfaced as a result of the 1992 program The term fortress Europe has been used to express concerns that the EC's internal market will be closed to competition from the US and Japan<sup>21</sup> The EC's position is that it reserves the right to make access to the benefits of 1992 for non-EC firms conditional upon a guarantee of similar opportunities - or at least nondiscriminatory opportunities - in those firms own countries<sup>22</sup> The concept has become known as reciprocity In 1987, similar reciprocity language was included in a draft US trade bill The EC objected that reciprocity provisions could provide an excuse for protectionism Mikhail Gorbachev also spoke of Soviet concerns about the EC's 1992 program On a recent visit to West Germany, the Soviet President said that everyone is trying to assure us that 1992 will not become the year of finishing work on an impenetrable wall across Europe But so far we have not heard the economic or political arguments convincing enough to dispel such apprehensions<sup>23</sup>

The US defense industry has already experienced difficulty in the European arms market Europe's defense companies receive subsidies and other assistance from their states The EC is considering a proposal which would require member states to collect duties on imported defense equipment The French and Germans opted to develop and build their own attack helicopter rather than purchase the US built AH-64 Apache off the shelf The Franco-German program, the PAH-2, will cost nearly double the Apache and will not be available until near the turn of the century<sup>24</sup>

The fault is not just with the Europeans There has traditionally been a reluctance in Congress to purchase weapons not built in the US This situation has led to a prevalence of the NPH syndrome on both sides of the Atlantic where equipment that was not produced here could not be purchased

A strong independent Western Europe would be decoupled from the US militarily and to a large extent politically Any detachment of the links between the US and Europe ignores the central role Europe plays in security issues between the US and USSR As long as Europe remains the center of attention for the two superpowers, the Western Europeans must maintain close ties to the US The Soviets are unlikely to let the Eastern European states become independent because of the enormous attraction of the West both economically and politically But the close cultural affiliation between



Eastern and Western Europe, especially the two Germanies, probably means that a divided Europe with no US involvement would be unstable

## CONCLUSIONS

The future of NATO depends on many complex factors which make accurate predictions nearly impossible. However, an examination of the three possible directions for NATO discussed in this paper gives some insight into the issues involved and leads to general conclusions about the prospects for each option.

Option one, the status quo, seems less and less available. The perception in Western Europe of a diminished Soviet threat, the prospects for a conventional arms control agreement which would make significant asymmetrical force reductions, and the economic and political cooperation fostered by the EC are forces for change which can be slowed but not arrested. The direction of change is much more difficult to predict. If Europe's destiny is to be truly independent of the US, it is unlikely that there will be a direct transition to option three. Continuity in Western Europe's evolution towards unity makes more sense. A logical step in the transition process would involve a progression first to a partner Europe.

The two pillar concept of the NATO alliance, where the US and West Europeans are equal partners, has several advantages over the other options. It would solve European complaints about US dominance in the alliance. Coupled with the EC's 1992 program, it would help foster European unification by encouraging Europeans to take more responsibilities for defense and policy making. Without a unity that Europe can only possess through the success of the EC, there can be no voice in NATO equal to that of the US. A partnership with the US would involve the Europeans more concretely in the arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Conventional and theater nuclear arms are key issues for NATO's future offering the prospect of reshaping the relationship between east and west. NATO must avoid a repetition of the division caused by the INF decision, and an equal European partner is the right beginning. Finally, European and American defense industries must cooperate, there must be no fortress Europe or fortress America.

Europe and NATO are at a crossroads. The Soviets' willingness to make serious asymmetrical arms and troop reductions in Europe combined with the economic and political integration taking place in the EC presents the US with a golden opportunity to fundamentally reshape Europe by making NATO the vehicle to end the confrontation with the Soviets and make Europe a kinder, gentler place for all Europeans.

## NOTES

- 1 For a more complete description of West European models see Nils Andren Continuity in Change West European Futures in Continuity of Discord, ed Robert J Jackson (New York Praeger 1985) pp 258 260
- 2 The rating for President Bush was 58% and for Chancellor Kohl was 50% See Serge Schmemmann Gorbachev in Bonn Sees Postwar Hostility Ending New York Times June 13 1989 p 6
- 3 The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report) contained in NATO and the United States by Lawrence S Kaplan (Boston Twayne Publishers 1988) p 223
- 4 Completing the Internal Market. An Area Without Internal Frontiers (Brussels Commission of the European Communities Com (88) 650 November 17 1988) p 1
- 5 Emile Noel Working Together The Institutions of the European Community (Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1988) p 5
- 6 Single European Act (Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities Supplement 2/86) p 5
- 7 Noel Working Together p 32
- 8 Ferdinand Kinsky A European Defense System Proposals for Restructuring NATO in Continuity of Discord ed Robert J Jackson p 129
- 9 Noel Working Together p 25 26
- 10 Ibid p 6
- 11 Completing the Internal Market p 4
- 12 Paolo Cecchini The European Challenge 1992 The Benefits of a Single Market (Hampshire UK Wildwood House 1988) cited in Completing the Internal Market p 1
- 13 Ibid p 7
- 14 Ibid p 8
- 15 1992 The Bad News International Management September 1988 p 23

- 16 Thomas A Callahan Jr The Structural Disarmament of NATO NATO Review June 1984 p 21
- 17 John Roper European Defense Cooperation in Evolving European Defense Policies eds Catherine M Kelleher and Gale A Mattox (Lexington MA D C Heath and Co 1987) p 44
- 18 Andren Continuity of Discord pp 267 268
- 19 Dr Edward A Kolodziej Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois refers to France as a closet superpower
- 20 Andren Continuity of Discord pp 269
- 21 Peter Montagnon Fortress Europe Feared by Tokyo and Washington Financial Times (London) November 17 1988 special supplement p 9
- 22 1992 Europe World Partner European Community News (Washington DC EC Office of Press and Public Affairs October 20 1988) p 3
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- 24 Richard Burt European Defense Protectionism Could Weaken Alliance with U S Aviation Week & Space Technology November 7 1988 p 75

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