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Occasional Paper

The Dimensions of Militarization in the Third World

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IN THE THIRD WORLD

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Abstract

Observers increasingly have expressed concern about what has been described as the militarization of the third world. Yet it is seldom clear what is meant by the term "militarization." This paper represents an attempt to cut through the multitude of conflicting conceptualizations, provide a more precise and operational meaning of the term, and differentiate between militarization and militarism. Two forms of militarization are identified and the multiple dimensions of militarization are operationalized and utilized in an evaluation of the nature and extent of contemporary third world militarization. It is shown that militarization in the third world is not advancing as rapidly as it once was and may not be the problem some have assumed it to be.

Many observers of the world military order have become increasingly concerned with a phenomenon known as "militarization." Concern has been voiced about global militarization,¹ but more often it is expressly third world militarization that has evoked the greatest concern.² This preoccupation with third world militarization derives from explicitly normative considerations. Some claim that militarization is the greatest problem confronting the third world today, that the South "is squandering its resources on the quest for internal and external security"³ and that most third world countries are "being overwhelmed by excessive military burdens."⁴ Others see militarization as a disease, a disease that, like all diseases, must be eradicated.⁵

Yet despite the near-universal condemnation of militarism, it is not always clear what militarization is. Even though analysts have devoted considerable effort to distinguishing between different types of militarization, identifying its sources or causes, and worrying about its effects, there is a great deal of conceptual confusion surrounding use of the term. The relationship between militarization and militarism is also unclear.

This paper represents an attempt to cut through the welter of sometimes conflicting conceptualizations to provide a more precise and operational meaning of the term "militarization." An effort is also made to differentiate between militarization and militarism. Most importantly, having operationalized the concept, the multiple dimensions of militarization, or at least

one form of militarization, are identified and utilized in an evaluation of the nature and extent of contemporary third world militarization. My objectives, therefore, are limited to clarification, operationalization, and measurement and do not encompass an investigation of the causes or consequences of militarization.⁶ In pursuing even these limited objectives, however, it will be shown that although some concern about militarization is warranted, militarization in the third world is not advancing as rapidly as it once was and may not be the great problem some have made it out to be.

THE MEANING OF MILITARIZATION

Militarization remains, for many, an ambiguous and somewhat nebulous term. Many of those who have utilized the term have failed to define it or have done so in rather general terms. Analysts who have attempted to define or otherwise indicate the meaning of the term provide have provided us with unclear, incomplete, or contradictory conceptualizations. We have been offered broad, all-encompassing and narrow definitions, vague and relatively specific definitions, nonoperational and empirically based, operational definitions, normative and more-or-less objective definitions, definitions that stress either the domestic or international aspects, and definitions that include both internal and external dimensions. Some have equated militarization and militarism, using the two terms interchangeably, while others have attempted to distinguish between the two concepts. A few analysts, finally, seem to have denied the utility of precisely delineating the concepts of militarization and militarism.⁷

Jagat Mehta, in what is the lead-off piece for a collection of conference papers, neglected to even attempt to denote the concept of militarization.⁸ Miles Wolpin used the term to refer to "a process in which increasing state resources are allocated to the armed forces and/or military related activities."⁹ Augusto Varas, simply and prejudicially, defined militarization as "an overemphasis on the importance of armed forces." For Varas, militarization "entails both growing

military power -- a response to multiple political- diplomatic and economic situations both regional and extracontinental -- and growing military involvement in, and control of, domestic politics "10 SIPRI used the term militarization broadly, to indicate " a steady growth in the military potential of states Such growth is usually accompanied by an increasing role for military institutions both in national affairs, including the economic, social and political spheres, and in international affairs "11 For Francis Beer, "Militarization includes international legal justification for war, alliances, military trade and aid, and militance, dominance of military elites and militaristic behavior in domestic government, economy, society, and culture "12

In contrast to the conceptualizations provided by SIPRI, Varas, and Beer, which included domestic and international dimensions, for Chulacheeb Chinwanno " militarization refers to the process of transformation of society from a civilian to a military orientation" and is defined as "the process by which norms, institutions, and other aspects of society are penetrated, dominated, or influenced by the military establishment "13 Similarly, Richard Falk has discussed militarization in terms of repressive, militaristic governance, thereby emphasizing the internal dimensions of militarization 14

Richard Tanter, on the other hand, recognized, at least implicitly, the international as well as the domestic dimensions Tanter used militarization to refer to two related

phenomena

The first dimension of militarization is the technological and the fiscal the proliferation of weapons, of increased destructive capacity, requiring greater state expenditures on equipment and personnel. The second dimension is at the level of social structure and government the prevalence of governments using organized force rather than ideological hegemony to secure the domination of major social groups. The spread of military organization in a society links both conceptions.¹⁵

Wallensteen, Galtung, and Portales more explicitly recognized the international and domestic dimensions in their identification of two forms of militarization (1) social formation and structure -- "institutionalized and routinized relations within states and between states, in which military behavior comes to be preferred," and (2) behavior -- "the preference for violent courses of action at the expense of nonviolent ways of influence."¹⁶ Wallensteen and his colleagues, however, have not clearly differentiated between these two forms of militarization -- a behavioral preference for violent, or military, action is common to both, and is the essence of both forms. But most importantly, the emphasis on the behavioral aspects of these two forms of militarization would seem more appropriate in the conceptualization of militarism than militarization.

Several observers have taken on the difficult, but necessary, task of distinguishing between militarization and militarism.¹⁷ For Eide and Thee, "Militarisation manifests itself in the increase in armaments, advances in the destructive capacity of weapons, growing number of people under arms, and dramatic

increases in military expenditure "¹⁸ Eide and Thee, implicitly at least, seem to view militarism as "The inclination to rely on military means of coercion for the handling of conflicts"¹⁹ -- a view which would appear to stress behavioral preference, or "inclination," for violent, military, courses of action. Later in the same volume, Thee identified militarism as " a rush to armaments, the growing role of the military in national and international affairs, the use of force as an instrument of supremacy and political power, and the increasing influence of the military in civilian affairs " Militarization, on the other hand, is viewed " as being an extension of military influence to civilian spheres "²⁰ While Thee's conceptualization of militarism is in accord with that he offered in conjunction with Eide, and Eide and Thee's characterization of militarization is distinct from their characterization of militarism, Thee's definition of militarization is not clearly differentiated from his definition of militarism. Furthermore, Michael Klare has subsumed Thee's characterization of militarization in his delineation of the concept of militarism. For Klare, the notion of militarism includes " the notion of excess, of the growing encroachment of the military over civilian institutions a dynamic condition characterized by the progressive expansion of the military sphere over the civilian "²¹ Alfred Vagts, in his classic work on the history of militarism, wrote that " mili- tarism has connoted a domination of the military over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, and

emphasis on military considerations, spirits, ideals, and scales of value, in the life of states "22 Both Klare and Vagts have included Thee's notion of militarization in their characterizations of militarism

The task of distinguishing between militarization and militarism and determining the nature of the relationship between the two concepts is not rendered any less difficult by the depiction of the relationship provided by a group of analysts assembled by the World Council of Churches In their 1977 report, militarism was described as the result of militarization

Militarisation should be understood as the process whereby military values, ideology, and patterns of behaviour achieve a dominating influence on the political, social, economic and external affairs of the State, and as a consequence the structural, ideological and behavioural patterns of both the society and the government are 'militarised '23

Here the World Council of Churches' group of experts has posited that which Klare and Vagts labeled militarism to be militarization and the cause of militarism 24

The task of clarifying the distinction between militarization and militarism can be accomplished by distinguishing between two different forms, or manifestations, of militarization The first is militarization as process -- the form of militarization described by the World Council of Churches' group of experts, Thee, Chinwanno, Wallensteen and his coauthors, and Tanter in his second dimension of militarization, the form of militarization that results in militarism as characterized by Eide and Thee, Klare, and Vagts This first form of militarization is the form

that contributes to the militarism characteristic of Skjelbaek's first two forms of militarism (1) militaristic behavior, defined as "the excess use of violence,"²⁵ and (2) militarism of the mind, i e , militaristic ideologies, values, and beliefs about human nature and social relationships ²⁶ The first form of militarization identified here, the process form, therefore, does result in, or at least contribute to, the militarism of Eide and Thee, Klare, and Vagts, and must, as Dieter Senghaas has argued, " be understood within an analysis of militarism "²⁷

But it is typically not militarism, and therefore not this first form of militarization, militarization as process, that is evident in the third world What is present in the third world, and of central concern here, is the second form of militarization -- military buildup This is the form of militarization identified by Eide and Thee, Wolpin, Varas, SIPRI, and in Tanter's first dimension of militarization ²⁸ Skjelsbaek's third dimension of militarism, structural militarism, both the national level (which concerns the relative size of the military sector and the relationship between the military and other sectors) and the international level (which concerns inter-alliance and intra-alliance relations),²⁹ can more accurately be considered a component of the second form of militarization than of militarism This second form of militarization, military buildup, is characterized by increases in military spending, the size of the armed forces, arms imports, arms production, by an enlargement in the military's demands upon society and the economy, and, conse-

quently, by a possible accompanying increase in the political role and influence of the military and the actual appropriation of the state apparatus by the military. It is this form of militarization that enables third world countries to engage in domestic and interstate violence of the most modern, industrialized variety. The second form of militarization therefore, like the first, can contribute to the militarism described by Eide and Thee, Klare, and Vagts. Yet there is likely to be a mutually reinforcing, reciprocal relationship between the second form of militarization and militarism, not simply the unilinear, causal relationship found between the first form of militarization and militarism, where process militarization results in militarism.³⁰

THE DIMENSIONS OF MILITARIZATION

This characterization of the second form of militarization allows us to identify operational dimensions of militarization. Unlike some of the conceptualizations noted above, it is relatively precise and unambiguous. It is also free of the normative, judgmental elements that can be detected in most characterizations -- elements that are also evident in depictions of militarism, most notably those by Vagts and Klare.

The following six categories of indicators can be used to operationalize the dimensions of the second form of militarization.

- A Military Expenditures (MILEX)
 - value of MILEX
 - MILEX as a proportion of GNP
 - MILEX as a proportion of central government expenditures (CGE)
 - MILEX growth rates
- B Armed Forces
 - size of the armed forces
 - armed forces per 1000 people
- C Arms Imports
 - value of arms imports
 - arms imports as a proportion of total imports
 - arms import growth rates
- D Arms Production
 - value of arms production
 - arms production as a proportion of GDP
 - arms production as a proportion of total industrial production
- E Wars
 - number of interstate wars over time
 - number of intrastate wars over time
 - length of interstate and intrastate wars
 - casualties resulting from interstate and intrastate wars
- F Military Regimes
 - number of military regimes

-- change in number of military regimes over time

These six sets of indicators can be used to gauge the extent of militarization in the third world. They will be used here to measure the level and extent of third world militarization for the developing world as a whole and for five regions of the third world.

Military Expenditures

As shown in Table 1, the military expenditures of developing countries increased from \$95.3 billion in 1973 to a high of \$164.9 billion in 1982 before dropping to \$162.6 billion in 1983. Despite the real increase in third world military spending during this period, however, the rate of growth of military spending has actually declined since 1963. Third world military spending increased at an average annual rate of 7.2 percent during the period 1963-1973. Between 1973 and 1983, third world military expenditures increased at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent (see Table 2). But the rate of increase slowed to only 2.1 percent per year during the years 1980-1983 (see Table 2). As a result of the slowdown in the rate of growth of third world defense spending, MILEX increased at a higher annual rate for developed countries than for developing countries during the years 1980-1983 -- 4.1 as opposed to 2.1 percent³¹. And even though MILEX as a proportion of GNP and per capita MILEX were higher in 1983 than in 1973, the proportion of central government expenditures (CGE) devoted to MILEX declined from 22.5 to 18.5

percent during these years and MILEX/GNP increased only slightly (see Table 2)

Similar spending patterns can be discerned for the five regions of the third world identified in Tables 1 and 2³² African military spending more than doubled between 1973 and 1983, climbing from \$7.4 billion to \$16.2 billion, and per capita MILEX also increased. Yet MILEX/GNP and MILEX/CGE increased only marginally. African military spending increased at an average annual rate of 6.5 percent from 1963-1973, 7.3 percent from 1973-1983, but dropped to only 3.2 percent from 1980-1983.

Defense spending in East Asia increased from \$46.9 billion in 1973 to \$64.6 billion in 1983. Per capita MILEX also increased during this period, but MILEX/GNP and MILEX/CGE actually declined -- from 4.0 to 3.5 percent and 22.4 to 16.2 percent, respectively. Although the average annual rate of growth of defense spending increased from 7.5 percent during the years 1963-1973 to 11.8 percent during the years 1973-1983, it increased by a mere 2.1 percent per year during the years 1980-1983.

In Latin America, defense spending in 1982 was \$4 billion higher than it was in 1973 -- \$12.0 billion as opposed to \$8.0 billion -- but actually dropped \$1.5 billion from 1982 to 1983. Spending increased at an average annual rate of 3.9 percent during the period 1963-1973, and 3.4 percent during the period 1973-1983. But between 1980 and 1983, Latin American countries yielded a negative defense spending growth rate -- an average

yearly "growth" rate of -0.7 percent. In addition, MILEX/GNP and per capita MILEX were virtually identical in 1973 and 1983, and MILEX/GNP declined from 8.0 to 4.9 percent.

The pattern was much the same in the Middle East. Defense spending increased from \$23.8 billion in 1973 to \$62.9 billion in 1982. But, as in Latin America, defense spending in the Middle East actually declined from 1982-1983. Military spending increased at an average annual rate of 14.7 percent from 1963-1973, 7.6 percent from 1973-1983, and then only 3.7 percent from 1980-1983. Although per capita MILEX in 1983 was almost double what it was in 1973, MILEX/GNP increased only slightly, from 14.1 percent in 1973 to 15.7 percent in 1983, and MILEX/CGE declined from 36.1 to 26.9 percent during the course of these years.

South Asia is the only region that does not conform to the pattern. South Asian military spending increased from \$4.9 billion in 1973 to \$8.8 billion in 1983. Even though there was little change in MILEX/GNP and per capita military spending, and MILEX/CGE declined during the years 1973-1983, the rate of growth of defense spending continued to increase. Military expenditures increased at an average yearly rate of only 2.9 percent during the period 1963-1973, 5.3 percent during the period 1973-1983, and then 9.5 percent during the years 1980-1983.

Despite the South Asian exception to the general pattern, it is clear that there has been a dramatic slowdown in the advance of militarization as measured by the dimension of military spending. Militarization is still on the rise in the third

world, but it appears to be advancing less rapidly than formerly, at least along this dimension. In four of the five regions of the developing world, military spending absorbs less than five percent of GNP. And even though countries in four of the five regions in 1983 devoted 14.9 percent or more of total government spending to defense (Latin America was the exception), the proportion of CGE accounted for by defense spending was lower in 1983 than in 1973 in four out of five regions (East Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia).

Armed Forces

As with militarization measured in terms of military expenditures, militarization measured according to the size of the armed forces and armed forces growth rates reveals that militarization is still increasing, but at a slower rate. The third world's military forces, as shown in Table 3, were larger in 1983 than in 1973 for the developing world as a whole and in four out of the five regions (South Asia was the exception). Yet the rate of growth of the third world's armed forces has declined. The average annual rate of growth of the armed forces was lower during the years 1980-1983 than during the years 1963-1973 or 1973-1983 for the third world in general and for three out of five regions -- Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East. The average yearly growth rates for Latin American and South Asian militaries were higher during the years 1980-1983 than during the two other time periods, but African, East Asian,

and Middle Eastern militaries all experienced negative growth rates (see Table 4) An evaluation of this second dimension of militarization, therefore, shows that growth in the armed forces component of militarization has been reduced to a slow crawl

Arms Imports

The third world imported \$266.5 billion worth of arms during the years 1973-1983³³ -- 78.6 percent of total world arms imports during those years³⁴ The value of arms imports was higher in 1983 than in 1973 for the developing world as a whole and for four out of five regions -- Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia (see Table 5) But a closer look at the data for the arms import dimension of militarization reveals a few wrinkles

First, the value of arms imports was less in 1983 than in 1982 for the third world as a whole and for each of the five regions³⁵ Second, the percentage of total imports attributed to arms imports was lower in 1983 than in 1973 for the developing world in general and for three of the five regions -- East Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia Arms imports accounted for 2.2 percent of total Latin American imports in 1973 and 3.5 percent in 1983, a rather slight increase In Africa, too, the percentage of total imports accounted for by arms imports was greater in 1983 (6.6 percent) than in 1973 (2.2 percent), but the figure for 1983 does represent a drop from that for 1978 (9.8 percent) Furthermore, only in the Middle East did arms imports comprise

more than 7 percent of total imports in 1983. Third, arms import growth rates have declined across-the-board.

Arms import growth rates have dropped for both the third world as a whole and for each of the five regions. Third world arms imports grew at an average annual rate of 7.0 percent during the years 1973-1983. During the latter part of this period, 1980-1983, however, annual growth rates declined to 0.0 percent. The same pattern is evident for each of the five regions. Average yearly arms import growth rates were in every case lower for the years 1980-1983 than for the entire period 1973-1983. And three regions, Africa, East Asia, and South Asia, experienced negative growth rates.³⁶

An examination of this third dimension of militarization, therefore, again leads to the conclusion that the rate of growth of third world militarization is on the decline.

Arms Production

Analysts have devoted an increasing amount of attention to the growth of the third world's defense industries.³⁷ That attention is justified by the tremendous expansion in defense production capabilities that took place in third world countries during the 1970s.³⁸ Over thirty developing countries now produce major weapons systems: aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, and naval vessels.³⁹ The value of major weapons manufactured in the third world from 1950-1984 totaled \$12.7 billion (in constant 1975 dollars). Ninety-two percent -- \$11.7 billion worth -- of

total production occurred during the years 1970-1984 (43 percent, or \$5.5 billion worth, took place during 1980-1984) 40

Despite the increase in arms production capabilities and in the value of total defense output, defense manufacturing has not yet become a major industrial activity in the third world. Data for the value of arms production, arms production as a percentage of GDP, and arms production as a percentage of total industrial production for the third world's top nine defense manufacturers are presented in Table 7. As can be seen in the table, the figures for 1983 demonstrate that arms production is a rather minor economic enterprise. Only in Israel did arms production contribute more than 0.4 percent of GDP in 1983. And again, only in Israel did arms production comprise more than 1.1 percent of total industrial production in 1983. Militaristic industrialization is not in evidence in the third world, despite the concerns of some observers 41

War

It has often been noted that virtually all of the wars that have taken place since 1945 have occurred in the third world 42. Yet it is unclear whether the incidence of war in the third world has increased or decreased over time. As can be seen in Table 8, 25 interstate and 32 intrastate wars were initiated in the developing world during the years 1945-1980. Of the 25 interstate wars, 15 were initiated during the years 1965-1980, as opposed to only 10 during the longer period 1945-1964. The 15

interstate wars initiated during the years 1965-1980, however, resulted in substantially fewer battledeaths and lasted only slightly longer than the 10 wars initiated during the years 1945-1954 (1,356,061 as opposed to 2,169,930 battledeaths and 336 months as opposed to 316 months, respectively)

Of the 32 intrastate wars, 12 were initiated during the longer period 1945-1964 and 20 were started during the shorter period 1965-1980. The latter 20 wars resulted in larger casualties and lasted longer than the earlier wars.

The number of interstate wars in the third world, therefore, has been increasing, even though the length and severity of the wars have not increased. The number of intrastate wars, on the other hand, has also been increasing, as has their length and severity.

Military Regimes

The number of military-dominated regimes in the third world has clearly increased. In 1973, 33 out of 110 developing countries had military-dominated governments.⁴³ In 1985, according to data presented by Sivard, 56 out of 107 developing countries had military-controlled governments.⁴⁴ Even though there are some coding problems with the Sivard data, it is clear that a greater proportion of third world regimes are now dominated by the armed forces. Militaries in Asia and Africa have not yet, evidently, begun to return to the barracks, as their counterparts in Latin America have. Despite the trend toward

democratization in Latin America, this dimension of militarization is apparently not yet on the wane. However, military appropriation of the state apparatus may not result inevitably in militarization or militarism. The military's usurpation of civilian roles and functions may well result in the civilianization of the military rather than the militarization of polity and society 45

CONCLUSION

The conceptualization of militarization provided here has allowed an empirical assessment of the extent of third world militarization. It has been shown that concern about militarization is justified, but the trends for the six dimensions of militarization that have been identified and examined here are not all in the direction of ever increasing militarization. Even though the number of wars fought in the third world, both interstate and intrastate, has apparently increased over time (at least through 1980), and the proportion of military-dominated regimes has increased to just under half of all third world regimes, indicators for the other four dimensions of militarization point to a slowing, and perhaps even a future halt or reversal, in the rate of growth of militarization. The rate of growth of military spending has begun to decline and there is evidence of real declines in defense spending. Armed forces growth rates have slowed to a crawl. Arms imports are flat and in some cases declining. Military production, though increasing, remains, as Brzoska and Ohlson have pointed out, "a minor industrial activity"⁴⁶. Militarization, therefore, while not yet on the wane, is not advancing as rapidly as it once was, and is barely holding its own along four of the six dimensions examined here. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the "problem" of militarization in the third world has been somewhat overblown.

Notes

1 See Peter Wallensteen, Johan Galtung, and Carlos Portales, eds , Global Militarization, (Boulder Westview Press, 1985), Francis A Beer, Ch 5 "Militarization," in Peace Against War, (San Francisco W H Freeman and Company, 1981), pp 186-301, Helena Tuomi and Raimo Vayrynen, eds , Militarization and Arms Production, (New York St Martin's Press, 1983), Miles D Wolpin, "Comparative Perspectives on Militarization, Repression and Social Welfare," Journal of Peace Research, Vol 20, No 2, (1983), pp 129-155, and "Indicators of Militarization," in U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA Publication 123, pp 16-17

2 See Jagat S Mehta, ed , Third World Militarization A Challenge to Third World Diplomacy, (Austin Lyndon B Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 1985), Augusto Varas, Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America, (Boulder Westview Press, 1985), Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide, eds , The World Military Order The Impact of Military Technology on the Third World, (London MacMillan Press LTD, 1979), Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, eds , Problems of Contemporary Militarism, (London Croom Helm, 1980), Bo Huldt and Atis Lejins, eds , Militarism and Militarization, (Stockholm The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1983), "Burdens of Militarization," special issue of International Social Science Journal, Vol 35, No 1 (1983), Ulrich Albrecht,

"Technology and Militarization of Third World Countries in Theoretical Perspective," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol 8, No 2 (1977), pp 124-126, Asbjorn Eide, "Arms Transfer and Third World Militarization," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol 8, No 2 (1977), pp 99-102, and William J Foltz, "The Militarization of Africa Trends and Policy Problems," in William J Foltz and Henry S Bienen, eds , Arms and the African Military Influences in Africa's International Relations, (New Haven Yale University Press, 1985), pp 171-193)

3 Jagat S Mehta, "Third World Militarization A Challenge to Third World Diplomacy," in Mehta, op cit , p 5

4 Ibid, p 19

5 See Marek Thee, "Militarism and Militarisation in Contemporary International Relations," in Eide and Thee, op cit , pp 15 and 31, and Kjell Skjelsbaek, "Militarism, its Dimensions and Corollaries An Attempt at Conceptual Clarification," in Eide and Thee, p 79

6 That I have left for a subsequent piece

7 See, for instance, Kjell Skjelsbaek, "Militarism, its Dimensions and Corollaries An Attempt at Conceptual Clarification," in Eide and Thee, op cit , p 78, and Ulrich Albrecht, "Militarism and Underdevelopment," in Eide and Thee, p 109

8 Jagat S Mehta, "Third World Militarization A Challenge to Third World Diplomacy," in Mehta, op cit , pp 3-34

9 Wolpin, op cit, p 144, note 1

10 Varas, op cit , pp 26 and 27

- 11 SIPRI, Ch 12, "Militaryization and Arms Control in Latin America," in World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1982, (London Taylor and Francis, 1982), p 393
- 12 Beer, op cit , p 12
- 13 Chulacheeb Chinwanno, "Militaryization in Thai Society," in Wallensteen, et al , op cit , p 111
- 14 Richard Falk, "Militaryisation and Human Rights in the Third World," in Eide and Thee, op cit , pp 207-225
- 15 Richard Tanter, "The Militaryization of ASEAN Global Context and Local Dynamics," Alternatives, Vol 7, No 4 (Spring 1982), pp 507-508
- 16 Peter Wallensteen, Johan Galtung, and Carlos Portales, "Preface," in Wallensteen, et al , op cit , p x11
- 17 Some, however, use the two terms as if they were synonymous See, for instance, Richard Falk, "Militaryization and Human Rights in the Third World," in Eide and Thee, op cit , pp 207-225, and Huld and Lejins, op cit
- 18 Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, "Introduction," in Eide and Thee, op, cit , p 9
- 19 Ibid, p 9
- 20 Both quotations are from Marek Thee "Militaryism and Militaryisation in Contemporary International Relations," in Eide and Thee, op cit , and can be found on p 15
- 21 Michael T Klare, "Militaryism The Issues Today," in Eide and Thee, op cit , p 36 Emphasis is the author's

22 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, revised edition, (Meridian Press, 1959), p 14

23 As quoted in Ulrich Albrecht, "Militarism and Underdevelopment," in Eide and Thee, op cit , pp 111-112

24 For a comprehensive overview of the historical debate on the meaning of the term "militarism" see V R Berghahn, Militarism The History of an International Debate 1861-1979, (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1984)

25 Skjelsbaek, op cit p 87

26 Ibid, pp 89-93

27 Dieter Senghaas, "Militarism Dynamics in the Contemporary Context of Periphery Capitalism," in Eide and Thee, op cit , p 195 On this point see also Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society, (Berkeley University of California Press, 1971), pp 184-186

28 Beer's characterization of militarization contains elements of both of the two forms of militarization identified here

29 See Skjelsbaek, op cit , pp 93-99

30 Perhaps we should utilize the British spelling, "militarisation," for the first form, and reserve the Americanized version, "militarization," for the second form to help differentiate between the two

31 ACDA, WME&AT 1985, ACDA Publication 123, August 1985, p 4

32 All data in this section of the paper is from Tables 1 and 2

33 Derived from data in Table 5

34 Derived from data in ACDA, WME&AT 1985, p 89

35 Unless otherwise noted, all data presented here is from, or derived from, Tables 5 and 6

36 The assessment offered here is supported by a CRS report by Richard F Grimmett, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1977-1984," Report No 85-86 F, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, April 19, 1985

37 See, for instance, Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds , Arms Production in the Third World, (London and Philadelphia Taylor and Francis, 1986), James E Katz, ed , Arms Production in Developing Countries An Analysis of Decision Making, (Lexington D C Heath and Company, 1984), James E Katz, ed , The Implications of Third World Military Industrialization Sowing the Serpents' Teeth, (Lexington D C Heath and Company, forthcoming May 1986), and Andrew L Ross, Security and Self-Reliance Military Dependence and Arms Production in Developing Countries, Ph D dissertation, Cornell University, August 1984

38 For details see Ross, op cit

39 Derived from data presented in M Brzoska and T Ohlson, "Arms Production in the Third World An Overview," in Brzoska and Ohlson, op cit , p 16

40 Derived from data in Brzoska and Ohlson, op cit , p 8

41 See, for instance, Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf, "The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of Military-Oriented Technology," in Kaldor and Eide, eds , pp 219-220, Herbert Wulf, "Dependent Militarism in the Periphery and Possible Alternative Concepts,"

in Stephanie Neuman and Robert E Harkavy, eds , Arms Transfers in the Modern World, (New York Praeger, 1979), pp 250-251, and Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, (New York Hill and Wang, 1981), pp 148-149

42 See, for instance, Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military Expenditures 1985, (Washington, D C World Priorities, 1985), p 9

43 Derived from data in Richard P Stebbins and Alba Amoia, eds , The World This Year 1973 Supplement to the Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, (New York Simon and Schuster for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1973)

44 Sivard, op cit, p 24

45 On this point see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, (New York The Free Press, 1971)

46 Brzoska and Ohlson, op cit , p 21

Table 1
Military Expenditures (MILEX)
 1973-1983

Year	MILEX ¹ (billion dollars)	<u>MILEX</u> GNP %	<u>MILEX</u> CGE ² %	MILEX per capita ³
All Developing Countries⁴				
1973	95 3	5 4	22 5	32
1974	111 1	5 6	22 6	37
1975	129 2	6 2	22 2	42
1976	139 6	6 2	22 3	44
1977	137 8	5 8	20 3	43
1978	142 9	5 8	20 2	44
1979	145 6	5 6	19 5	44
1980	150 9	5 5	18 9	44
1981	158 3	5 7	19 1	45
1982	164 9	5 9	19 3	47
1983	162 6	5 8	18 5	45
Africa				
1973	7 4	2 7	11 7	22
1974	8 4	2 8	11 6	24
1975	11 7	3 8	12 5	31
1976	13 3	4 1	13 2	35
1977	14 5	4 2	14 3	37
1978	15 2	4 4	15 1	37
1979	16 0	4 4	15 5	38
1980	14 6	3 9	13 7	34
1981	16 0	4 3	15 7	36
1982	16 1	4 4	15 1	35
1983	16 2	4 5	14 9	34
East Asia⁵				
1973	46 9	4 0	22 4	33
1974	49 2	4 1	22 3	34
1975	51 4	4 1	21 5	35
1976	52 3	4 0	20 6	35
1977	53 6	3 9	19 5	35
1978	56 3	3 8	17 6	37
1979	62 6	4 0	17 8	40
1980	60 8	3 7	16 7	38
1981	61 9	3 6	16 8	38
1982	63 8	3 6	17 0	40
1983	64 6	3 5	16 2	40

Table 1 (cont)

Year	MILEX	<u>MILEX</u> GNP %	<u>MILEX</u> CGE %	MILEX per capita
Latin America				
1973	8 0	1 6	8 0	26
1974	8 5	1 5	7 2	27
1975	9 2	1 6	7 1	29
1976	10 2	1 7	7 6	31
1977	10 9	1 7	7 3	32
1978	10 5	1 6	6 8	30
1979	10 3	1 5	6 6	29
1980	11 0	1 5	6 3	30
1981	11 2	1 5	5 6	30
1982	12 0	1 6	5 5	30
1983	10 5	1 5	4 9	27
Middle East				
1973	23 8	14 1	36 1	220
1974	34 4	13 0	34 0	308
1975	44 9	15 3	33 2	391
1976	52 5	15 2	33 4	443
1977	49 4	13 4	28 1	405
1978	51 2	14 6	30 2	406
1979	47 9	11 9	26 1	369
1980	55 0	12 3	25 8	412
1981	59 4	13 1	28 1	432
1982	62 9	14 5	27 8	445
1983	60 9	15 7	26 9	418
South Asia				
1973	4 9	3 2	21 1	6
1974	5 0	3 2	21 2	6
1975	5 9	3 5	19 9	7
1976	6 0	3 4	18 8	7
1977	5 8	3 1	17 3	6
1978	6 3	3 1	16 3	7
1979	6 3	3 2	15 9	7
1980	6 7	3 2	15 8	7
1981	7 2	3 3	16 6	7
1982	7 9	3 5	17 0	8
1983	8 8	3 7	18 4	9

Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA Publication 123, August 1985, pp 47-50

Notes

- 1 Billions of constant 1982 U S dollars
- 2 Central Government Expenditures
- 3 Constant 1982 dollars
- 4 As determined by the U S ACDA
- 5 ACDA's figures for East Asia, unfortunately, include data for one developed country -- Japan

Table 2
MILEX Growth Rates¹
1963-1983

	1963-73 (%)	1973-83 (%)	1980-83 (%)
All Developing Countries	7 2	4 7	2 1
Africa	6 5	7 3	3 2
East Asia	7 5	11 8	2 1
Latin America	3 9	3 4	-0 7
Middle East	14 7	7 6	3 7
South Asia	2 9	5 3	9 5

Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-1973, ACDA Publication 74, 1975, pp 14-19, and U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA Publication 123, August 1985, p 4

Note

1 Average annual growth rates in percentages

Table 3
Armed Forces 1973-1983

Year	Armed Forces (thousand)	Armed Forces per 1000 people
All Developing Countries¹		
1973	15096	5 2
1974	16300	5 5
1975	15640	5 1
1976	15832	5 1
1977	15760	5 0
1978	16148	5 0
1979	16430	5 0
1980	16440	4 9
1981	17230	5 0
1982	17473	5 0
1983	17528	4 9
Africa		
1973	933	2 8
1974	962	2 8
1975	1003	2 7
1976	1092	2 9
1977	1319	3 4
1978	1313	3 3
1979	1268	3 1
1980	1295	3 1
1981	1501	3 4
1982	1547	3 4
1983	1526	3 3
East Asia²		
1973	8031	5 8
1974	8988	6 3
1975	7847	5 4
1976	7841	5 3
1977	7850	5 2
1978	8269	5 4
1979	8424	5 5
1980	8634	5 5
1981	8867	5 6
1982	8787	5 5
1983	8547	5 3

Table 3 (cont)

	Year	Armed Forces (thousand)	Armed Forces per 1000 people
Latin America			
	1973	1208	4 0
	1974	1248	4 1
	1975	1297	4 1
	1976	1328	4 1
	1977	1436	4 3
	1978	1484	4 4
	1979	1488	4 3
	1980	1548	4 3
	1981	1585	4 3
	1982	1656	4 4
	1983	1715	4 5
Middle East			
	1973	1283	11 9
	1974	1406	12 6
	1975	1648	14 7
	1976	1764	14 9
	1977	1499	12 3
	1978	1580	12 5
	1979	1759	13 5
	1980	1828	13 7
	1981	2026	14 7
	1982	2124	15 1
	1983	2114	14 5
South Asia			
	1973	2313	3 0
	1974	2350	3 0
	1975	2452	3 0
	1976	2362	2 8
	1977	2182	2 6
	1978	2102	2 4
	1979	2082	2 4
	1980	1724	1 9
	1981	1817	2 0
	1982	1878	2 0
	1983	2119	2 2

Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA Publication 123, August 1985, pp 47-50

Notes

1 As determined by the U S ACDA

2 ACDA's figures for East Asia, unfortunately, include data for one developed country -- Japan

Table 4
Armed Forces Growth Rates¹
1963-1983

	1963-73 (%)	1973-83 (%)	1980-83 (%)
All Developing Countries ²	3 8	1 3	0 3
Africa	9 0	5 5	-1 4
East Asia ³	3 8	0 8	-2 7
Latin America	2 2	3 5	3 6
Middle East	6 7	4 6	-0 4
South Asia	4 0	2 6	12 8

Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-1973, (Washington, D C ACDA Publication 74, 1975), pp 14-19, and U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, (Washington, D C ACDA Publication 123, August 1985), p 6

Note

1 Average annual rate of growth in percentages

2 As determined by the U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

3 The ACDA's data for East Asia, unfortunately, include data for one advanced industrial country -- Japan See note 42

Table 5

Arms Imports 1973-1983

Year	Arms Imports ¹ (million dollars)	<u>Arms Imports</u> <u>Total Imports</u> %
All Developing Countries¹		
1973	20122	8 7
1974	15969	4 7
1975	15295	4 1
1976	19322	5 2
1977	22683	5 4
1978	25606	5 6
1979	28689	5 7
1980	27654	4 6
1981	31588	5 3
1982	32080	5 9
1983	27501	5 7
Africa		
1973	921	2 2
1974	1388	2 4
1975	2347	3 3
1976	4090	6 2
1977	4979	6 7
1978	7932	9 8
1979	6544	8 3
1980	6281	6 0
1981	6667	6 4
1982	6230	7 4
1983	4627	6 6
East Asia²		
1973	8532	6 5
1974	4076	2 1
1975	3671	2 1
1976	2072	1 1
1977	1861	1 0
1978	2228	1 0
1979	4941	1 9
1980	4989	1 6
1981	3919	1 3
1982	3850	1 4
1983	3295	1 2

Table 5 (cont)

Year	Arms Imports (million dollars)	<u>Arms Imports</u> Total Imports %
Latin America		
1973	1127	2 2
1974	838	1 0
1975	966	1 2
1976	1501	1 9
1977	1551	1 8
1978	2084	2 3
1979	2321	2 3
1980	2060	1 7
1981	2843	2 4
1982	3040	3 3
1983	2411	3 5
Middle East		
1973	7345	21 5
1974	7565	14 7
1975	6383	9 3
1976	8746	11 3
1977	11343	11 7
1978	11504	11 1
1979	12224	11 7
1980	11435	9 1
1981	15206	11 3
1982	15685	11 2
1983	14898	12 2
South Asia		
1973	882	7 7
1974	721	4 4
1975	537	2 9
1976	1173	7 6
1977	1603	9 5
1978	818	4 2
1979	1294	5 7
1980	1944	6 5
1981	2024	7 1
1982	2285	8 9
1983	1510	6 8

Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA Publication 123, August 1984, pp 89-93

Notes

1 Millions of constant 1982 U S dollars

1 As determined by the U S ACDA

2 ACDA's figures for East Asia, unfortunately, include data for one developed country -- Japan

Table 6
Arms Import Growth Rates¹
1973-1983

	1973-83 (%)	1980-83 (%)
All Developing Countries	7 0	0 0
Africa	18 1	-9 4
East Asia	1 9	-11 9
Latin America	12 8	5 5
Middle East	9 2	8 6
South Asia	11 6	-6 2

Source U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, ACDA Publication 123, August 1985, p 8

Note

1 Average annual growth rates in percentages

Table 7

**Arms Production, GDP, and Total Industrial Production
1983**

	Arms Production ¹ (millions)	<u>Arms Production</u> GDP (%)	<u>Arms Production</u> Total Ind Prod (%)
Argentina	102	0 2	0 6
Brazil	84	0 1	0 2
Egypt	60	0 4	1 1
India	251	0 3	1 0
Israel	309	2 6	9 6
Korea, North	44	-	-
Korea, South	61	0 1	0 4
South Africa	105	0 2	-
Taiwan	118	-	-

Sources Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds , Appendix 1, Arms Production in the Third World, (London and Philadelphia Taylor and Francis, 1986), pp 291-304, and World Bank, World Development Report 1985, (New York Oxford University Press, 1985), pp 178-179

Note

1 Constant 1975 dollars

Table 8
Wars in the Third World
1945-1980

A Interstate Wars

Years	Number of Wars Initiated	Duration (months)	Battledeaths
1945-54	7	278 0	2,125,700
1955-64	3	38 1	44,230
1965-74	8	143 6	1,278,561
1975-80	7	182 4	77,500

B Intrastate Wars

Years	Number of Wars Initiated	Duration (months)	Battledeaths
1945-54	2	49 4	1,001,000
1955-64	10	386 8	787,500
1965-74	14	510 1	1,821,626
1975-80	6	193 2	96,500

Source Derived from data in Melvin Small and J David Singer, Resort to Wars International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980, (Beverly Hills Sage, 1982), pp 92-99 and 229-232