


ACDIS COH 10
1985
OCCPAP
ACDIS Library

The Military and
Constitutionalism in India

Stephen P. Cohen

LIBRARY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

NOTICE According to Sec 19
(a) of the University Statutes
all books and other library
materials acquired in any man-
ner by the University belong to
the University Library. When
this item is no longer needed
by the department it should
be returned to the Acquisition
Department University Library



The Military and
Constitutionalism in India

Stephen P Cohen
University of Illinois
at Urbana

January 15, 1985

DRAFT NOT FOR QUOTATION
OR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

Presented to the Conference on India's Democracy
Princeton University, March 14-16, 1985

I Introduction

The essence of the modern professional soldier lies in his corporate management of violence [1] The professional soldier is dedicated to the study of the risks and opportunities of war, he is subject to political guidance, and he has a conservative, realistic outlook on both war and life He is reluctant to go to war -- knowing better than the amateur the risks that war entails -- but he is insistent upon preparedness for war The modern officer is a bureaucratized intellectual who devotes much of his time to learning his profession this is necessary because the nature of the profession changes as one reaches its higher levels Tactical and battlefield considerations are then supplanted by political, social, economic, and psychological factors Above all, the professional soldier is a universal type -- like the doctor or engineer -- and can be found in all parts of the world Despite national variations, the professionalism of a particular officer corps can be measured against this abstract, universal model, for the model is derived from the nature of the task, the management of violence it is not time or culture bound

The Indian officer corps closely follows this type [2] Not all officers are Clausewitzes or Auchinlecks, and there is a good deal of time-serving, corruption, and incompetence, but the hard kernel of professionals is there, and they have found their way to higher ranks in as great numbers as their counterparts in other professional military systems This is remarkable, considering the fate of most other post-colonial military establishments It means that the Indian military (and, still to a considerable degree, the Pakistani military) are able to adapt to changing military circumstances, that they have a balanced understanding of their role in state and society, and that they have the ability to remedy professional defects In the words of a popular

19th Century military metaphor, the professional officer remains the 'brain' of the military, able to direct its legs and arms, and when necessary, able to recreate and transform those appendages to meet changing resources and circumstances

There is abundant evidence to support this characterization of the Indian military as professional. Their own internal publications -- journals, books, and studies written by and for the officer corps -- demonstrate not only a fairly high order of professional skill but an attentiveness to military developments elsewhere in the world. The model of the Indian military appears to be the better Western military establishments, although they remain aware of their own unique historic structures and problems. Indeed, in some areas, such as counter-insurgency and high-altitude warfare they have had as much experience as any other military.

In historic and comparative terms, this military establishment is something of a puzzle. While most "developing"[3] states have undergone extended periods of military rule, civilian control over the Indian military remains unchallenged. While one institution after another has been Indianized, the services retain many trappings left over from the British Raj, in an era of democratic equalitarianism, the Indian army has many caste-based units recruited from the so-called "martial races". The most recent paradox arises from the military's expanded role in governing Assam and Punjab. There are at least 40 million Indians living under de facto martial law, making India one of the world's largest military dictatorships, while it is simultaneously the world's largest democracy.

To some, these anomalies suggest the imminent breakdown of the Indian political system. Outside observers, and some Indians, have been arguing for

many years that a coup is likely, impending, or inevitable. More realistically, one can observe the slow expansion of military influence within the Indian political system, although that influence is considerably less than one encounters in several industrial democracies, most notably the U.S. One can also observe the militarization of Indian political discourse, and the growth of an enormous military - industrial - political complex.

These examples suggest several important linkages and the need for a broad definition of the term 'constitution'. As for the former, it is important to remember that there are innumerable contacts between the military and the broader society which supports and sustains it, and which it is sworn to defend. The armed forces deal with peasants and presidents, with village caste structures and nuclear delivery systems, they manipulate public opinion and they are ultra-sensitive to that opinion, they draw their resources from Indian society, and they make important technical and cultural contributions to that society. These are not discrete, watertight activities. Military intervention in several of India's neighbors was triggered by a variety of strategic, political, professional, and social causes, not merely the disobedience or ambition of a few generals.

Similarly, the term 'constitution' has several different meanings. One refers to the formal, written document that contains a set of rules and procedures by which the Indian people governs itself. This "Constitution of India" has explicit and important references to the military. However, another 'constitution' refers to the unwritten social and ideological underpinnings of a society -- what is sometimes referred to as "political culture" [4]. The two are intertwined. The formal political document is worthless unless sustained by values and resources present in the broader political culture, the latter,

however, can be gradually modified by laws and acts, and such laws and acts can be powerful deterrents in the right political environment

We do not regard the present role of the Indian military as anomalous, although it certainly is unique in many ways. It is not an historic accident, but the product of careful planning. It has not been static, but has undergone significant structural and doctrinal change. What remains an open question, however, is whether the pattern of gradual, adaptive change will continue. Recent events suggest it may not, and highlight the importance of a fresh look at the Indian military.

-- The salience of the military's coercive dominance within India has been recently dramatized with the breakdown of police and paramilitary forces in several states, after a major attempt to insulate the armed forces from civil disorder. When thousands of Sikh soldiers themselves mutinied after the occupation of the Golden Temple, the fragility of the barrier between a unified and a disintegrated India -- and the military's vital role in maintaining that barrier -- was emphasized as never before since 1947.

-- India's external security environment remains unsettled. Leaving aside the armed stalemate with China and the recent war scare with Pakistan (which emanated largely from the Indian side), new problems have arisen with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and after five years, the Soviet Union has increased military activity in that part of South Asia that it occupies.

-- Events elsewhere in South Asia suggest vulnerabilities in India's own political culture. Since 1970 there have been extended spells of martial law in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Since India is itself undergoing some of the same stresses that led to military rule in both of these states, it is important to note the similarities and differences between them, not only for the sake of

understanding India, but because its neighbors look to India as a model -- Finally, certain recent events have had a direct and dramatic impact upon the military, and may have far reaching consequences. It is hard to say which of these is most significant -- the murder of Mrs. Gandhi, the mutiny of Sikh soldiers, the development of a Khalistan movement, direct military rule in the Punjab, and the continuing arms race with Pakistan. A host of minor events and trends have taken their toll as well -- the bypassing of paramilitary forces in quelling riots in Bombay, the dramatic increase in retired unemployed servicemen, irregularities in senior promotions, controversy over caste recruitment to the army, and a protracted struggle by all three armed services to improve the quality and quantity of their weapons in order to implement new, offensive military doctrines.

While this chapter will touch upon most of these events and problems, our central theme and perspective will remain that of the military itself. In the final analysis, it is the restraint of the armed forces that allows civilian control, pluralist politics, and democratic civil liberties to survive, if not thrive, in India. Our central concern is less how the military defends the Indian state from internal and external threats than the mechanisms, values, and procedures which have limited its political role, even as it has become socially, economically, and culturally more important.

We are -- with one exception -- not concerned with the social composition or caste structure of the larger military establishment, as this does not bear directly upon the political and constitutional role of the armed force. The important exception is the reduced recruitment of Sikhs, a process which became a Sikh grievance and a matter of special concern to some Sikh officers.

Finally, because of India's special qualities, certain comparative insights may be useful. India is a democratic, poor, federal system, it is South Asian, pluralist, and multi-lingual, it shares in the British imperial and colonial traditions, it is surrounded by powerful and sometimes hostile neighbors, as well as weak and dependent ones, it could easily acquire a nuclear weapons capability and is also, in places, economically and technologically advanced. The role that its military plays is not exactly comparable to any other state, but there are important structural, ideological, economic, and strategic points in common with Pakistan, the U S , Bangladesh, China, Israel, and others. Pakistan has a similar army, but different political context, Israel has a similar political system, but a different kind of army, China is the right size and economic level, but differs in ideology and political structure. We shall be attentive to comparisons throughout this chapter not only for purposes of explication, but because of the special achievements of India's civil-military structure.

II The Indian Officer Corps A Group Biography

Since the future political role of the military is ultimately dependent upon the restraint (or intervention) of the officer corps, it is vital that we describe that officer corps. This task is simplified by the fact that the officer corps is itself a formal bureaucracy, and thus slow to change. Its members have written extensively about the social, bureaucratic, and even political problems they face. We can also draw inferences about the impact of particular major events or trends, basing our analysis upon known consequences in other military establishments. It is thus possible to treat the Indian military as a kind of extended, historical family, in which succeeding generations undergo somewhat different experiences while sharing certain key familial characteristics. The major age and rank groups constitute successive military generations. Some of the critical historic events that shaped them are summarized in Figure 1.

The British Trained Generations, 1920-47

While the Indian army and navy can trace their origins back to the 18th Century, Indians were not brought in as King's Commissioned Officers (KCO) until the 1920s, and then in very small numbers. They were followed by Indian Commissioned Officers (ICO) trained in India after 1932 [5]. The present Indian military establishment is led entirely by officers recruited and trained in independent India. Indeed, the bulk of them entered after 1962-3, when the army was almost tripled in size.

The KCOs imbibed a number of lessons from the British which are still relevant. They came to view India from the "top" down, this was easy for many

of them who had themselves come from aristocratic or elite families. They adopted an all-India perspective at a time when India did not exist as a unified state. They regarded their role as ensuring internal and external security for the entire subcontinent, and thought in sub-continental terms.

The KCOs and ICOs were taught that the manpower of the Indian Army was second to none -- that if properly led, the Indian soldier was the finest in the world, and that this leadership amounted to a trust, almost a religious obligation. Earning the respect of his troops was the highest aspiration of a young officer, British or Indian, a situation which still exists in considerable measure today and which is unparalleled in the non-Western world [6]. No other armies except for India and Pakistan have managed to carry on this mystical bond so far into independence and turn it to their organizational advantage.

Finally, the Indian officer learned early that "politics" (in the partisan sense) were to be kept out of the mess, particularly since such politics were likely to be a major source of trouble and grief for the army. The Indian Army was -- in the 1960s -- the only force standing behind the Indian police in case of civil disorder, and was frequently called in for "aid to the civil power" duty. This sometimes meant disaster relief, but more often meant quelling a political or religious riot and restoring order. Indian officers and their men saw first-hand the consequences of massive civil disorder in the inter-war period, the broader lesson was that India was so vast and disorderly a country, that they would have a hard time managing it. They were taught that the army should remain above politics, if not, it could be torn apart in an instant by sectarian differences and then nothing would keep India from anarchy. This view remains central to the belief system of Indian officers (and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis as well) -- it obviously warns against involvement in politics, but

it did -- in Pakistan and Bangladesh -- encourage involvement when the military came to believe that their own organization was being contaminated by political rot

From 1932 onwards Indians were no longer trained at Sandhurst, but at the Indian Military Academy, Dehru Dun. They were not eligible to command British troops, and their pay and perquisites were on a lower scale than that of the KCO. They differed in other ways as well. As the Indianized units became clogged with Indian officers their contact with the British declined, few had ever been abroad, and they tended to come from less affluent families, and were persuaded to join the Indian Army not for prestige or glory, but for material or narrow careerist reasons. Young Indians who joined the army from 1932 onward were more influenced by nationalist currents, although few had any thoughts of revolution from within the military establishment. Yet, the day did come in World War II when a number of them joined the Germans and Japanese, taking their troops with them, and turned against the British and fellow Indians.

The Indian National Army was not a historical anomaly, but revealed one circumstance under which the Indian Army could be suborned [7]. The Germans and Japanese appealed to Indian nationalism, and were eventually to have the support of Subhas Chandra Bose, Nehru's great rival. But the I N A was formed by Mohan Singh, an I C O, before Bose came over to the Axis powers. Mohan Singh wanted to liberate India, he built the I N A along secular lines, breaking down the caste and religious structure of the Indian Army and narrowing the gap between officer and sepoy. The I N A experiment worked well as a political movement, but met with disaster when put to the test of combat.

All of the British and most of the Indian officers of this period were strongly anti-I N A, chiefly because they felt that the I N A officers had

betrayed their oath of allegiance. Later generations of Indian Army officers have quite a different view of Bose and the I N A. The I N A legend was cultivated by Indira Gandhi, and younger officers now regard the movement as patriotic and just. This reveals a sharp decline in support for classic notions of military honor, the meaning of a personal oath, and the military profession in India and is reflected in the current controversy about the fate of those Sikh soldiers who mutinied after the invasion of the Golden Temple.

The Post-War Generations

There was no great rush to join the armed forces after 1947. The fact that the Indian military was "national" did not substantially change geographical recruitment patterns. Officers still came mostly from the Punjab. A sampling of the cadets in the National Defense Academy in the mid-50s indicated that the Punjabis remained about a third of all entrants, with nearby Delhi supplying about 15%, and Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore and Kerala supplying less than 5% each, and West Bengal and Andhra less than 1% each in some years [8].

However, all close observers of the Indian military have concluded that there has been a precipitous drop in the social status of the armed services and a change in the kind of person that becomes an officer. The causes for this are easy to list: the suspicions of Nehru towards the military, the downgrading of the military in the official order of precedence, the severance of a direct association with the British, the decline in pay, working conditions, and general quality of life, and the subordination of national defense to a foreign policy which relied more on diplomacy than military force.

This situation changed somewhat when the army (and, to a lesser extent, the air force) was rapidly increased in size just after the 1962 conflict with

China Patriotic young Indians rushed to join the armed services in large numbers, and many mediocre officers who were not purged after the 1962 disaster found themselves rapidly promoted to higher rank. The increase in officer slots from 1962 to 1973 increased by 50% for lieutenant-generals to three hundred percent for lieutenant-colonels, and all officer slots above that rank increased by an average of 266%.

This "Chinese" generation of officers are now all in the process of retiring. Only a few senior officers will stay on. In turn, this means that the number of officers who do not reach colonel (or even lieutenant-colonel) is dramatically increasing. Every year about 55,000 weapons-trained personnel leave the military for civilian life. While the strength of the Indian Army is now about 850,000, there are a minimum of 990,000 retired soldiers, not counting former members of the paramilitary forces [9]. An increasing number of these are officers, who were temporarily accommodated in the army by a 1980 expansion of higher ranks. These in turn were the first members of the big group of officers who had entered in 1962-3. The army also changed the ratio of staff to command posts (reportedly from a ratio of 1:1 to 1:2), creating a bulge of officers with no units to command who will find it difficult to achieve promotion [10]. The problems of some retired officers and jawans are acute, especially when they have not acquired any civilian-relevant skills. They will constitute a well-trained, dissatisfied, and increasingly large body of ex-soldiers [11].

Bright young Indians from "good" families have stayed away from the military, especially the army for years. At the elite private schools the first preference for graduates (after a college education) has become foreign firms and then Indian private firms. In their place have come the sons of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) and Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO).

If this is a trend, it may have one important social-political consequence. It will complete the breakdown of the elitist character of the officer corps, especially in the army. More precisely, it will be one generation removed from the peasantry, as the largest single category of entrant into the NDA and IMA are sons of NCOs and JCOs, who have themselves spent several years of service as other ranks. Just as the special rank of JCO is retained in India (and Pakistan) to provide the OR with an opportunity for social mobility, the JCO is increasingly seen as the upward route for his ablest son. The problem of social decline has been extensively studied by the military itself, and very senior officers openly describe the intellectual calibre of leadership material attracted to the armed forces (especially the army) as 'intellectually mediocre "[12]

The decline in the formal status of the Indian Army officer has been fully documented in the military's own journals. Before independence, a secretary in the government of India ranked below a lieutenant-general, afterwards, he came to rank with a full general. The COAS ranked with the judges of the Supreme Court in 1948 but was senior to chief ministers outside their states or the Secretary General, GOI. By 1951 the Chief became junior to the judges of the Supreme Court, and by 1963 was made junior not only to Chief Ministers outside their states but even to the Cabinet secretary and Secretary General, "notwithstanding the fact that the latter's emoluments are less "[13]. The inequities exist at lower ranks as well. In the late sixties a major with fifteen years of service would have less seniority than a police officer with six years of service, and if the two were working together (as in the Border Security Force, officered by the police) the former would be subordinated to the latter.

The career opportunities in the Indian Administrative Service are now much better than those for an Indian Army officer. An analysis by one of India's leading soldier-scholars, the then Brigadier S K Sinha, points out that every one of the 3,000 IAS officers is bound to become Commissioner or Collector in twenty years and achieve the statutory status of a major-general. Compared with the pyramidal structure of the armed forces, the IAS and police are rectangular in shape. As an army officer will only be guaranteed of reaching lieutenant-colonel in twenty-four years, the IAS cadre, one tenth the size of the officer corps, has some fifty appointments at secretary-level equitable with the army's sole general slot [14]

A follow-up study noted that the situation had actually worsened after the 1971 war when the Chiefs of the three service staffs were placed below the Comptroller and Auditor General and lieutenant generals were placed below the chief secretaries of states (even though one might be a corps commander with responsibility for the defense of half a dozen states) [15]. Further, individual states can establish their own warrant of precedence for officers of the rank of brigadier and below, some created "ludicrous anomalies". In Tamilnadu, Bihar and Orissa a brigadier is now ranked above a deputy commissioner and IAS officers with less than 25 years of service, but is below such an officer in Rajasthan (in fact, he ranks below an officer with as little as nine years of service), and in Rajasthan, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland, brigadiers are ranked below deputy commissioners.

Similar disparities in pay and pension allowances and in difficult housing conditions have contributed to the decline in status of the military profession in India to the point where the subject has become a regular feature of the professional military literature. Significantly, virtually no such complaints

are heard from the navy or air force. Thus the largest service is the one in greatest social decline, and the two armed services that are weakest within the government remain the most popular among the general educated elite of India.

This military is neither elitist nor ideological, but is officered by average talent. Officers are increasingly the product of the military culture itself, many having been taught entirely in cantonment schools, raised in the cantonment atmosphere, and obligated entirely to the military for their livelihood and enhanced status from cradle to funeral pyre. But, the officer is not isolated from his own society. The contemporary officer is keenly aware of the personal and institutional corruption which surrounds him, even among the political leadership of the state. Published reports indicate that this corruption has touched the military directly [16]. In particular, contact with the broader civilian society in the area of recruitment, and in purchases of stores and equipment are known for their "opportunity". Young officers who want to make money on the side gravitate to recruiting details, where bribes of several thousand rupees are not uncommon.

There is one important principle involved in this brush with corruption. A man who resists temptation from this direction, who resists pressures from family, caste or friends to bend the rules, and who tries to uphold the highest professional standards will feel doubly betrayed by the politician who uses him and his men for corrupt goals. He will also regard a threat to his service as a threat to himself, since he is unlikely to have any place to go after resignation. In brief, the military becomes increasingly sensitive to lateral pressures from a materialistic society and to pressures from above, when the officer corps is both professional and drawn from the lower middle class.


Future Generations

All available evidence indicates that the young officers now in the Indian army -- the colonels of the year 2000, and the generals of 2010 -- are very much like their predecessors. The conclusions of one recent study of young boys in higher secondary schools indicate that central (state run and somewhat less prestigious) school students favor the military profession at a far greater rate than the so-called convent schools (which are more or less private and whose students are somewhat more upper class) [17]. The lure of private industry has reduced the status of all but few government-related jobs for the average Indian. Very few sons of commissioned officers join the army -- probably not more than 10%, according to one study, "today there is no such thing as martial tradition. Sons who automatically joined the old man's regiment are now plumping for civvy street." The incentive is gone. The so-called good families no longer consider the armed forces as a last resort for a not very intelligent offspring. Even he goes to a firm [18].

This lack of interest in the armed forces by the educated and upper class families of India is not without parallel in other countries, including Pakistan and the United States. It is probably related to the decline in interest within the army in the fighting branches, which had traditionally attracted the best and the brightest. Now there are severe shortfalls in officer volunteers for the infantry and artillery while branches such as the service and ordnance corps are oversubscribed [19].

The change in the social composition of the army officer corps and the shifting interests of those who do join may not or may not indicate a diminution of officer quality and the overall fighting capacity of the armed forces. Without the test of war, such changes are hard to measure. However, the senior

Figure 2 WARS OF THE INDIAN MILITARY TYPE AND DURATION



----- = intermittent or potential

_____ = continuous active

levels of the armed forces are deeply concerned over these social changes, and have pressed the government to improve working conditions

The major conclusions to be drawn from the above discussion are that India's armed forces, especially the army, are increasingly regionally and socially representative of Indian society. The gap between officer and jawan is closing rapidly, Indian officers have come to show a dramatic preference for branches (and services) which are civilianized, i.e. where they can learn a useful skill in anticipation of the day when they will return to civilian society.

Does this change in the social composition of the officer corps have political implications? In itself, probably not. Those who fear the Indian Army as the last bastion of an elite upper class need not worry. Nor are there likely to be direct political consequences of this shift in social class. The Pakistan Army underwent a similar transformation after World War II and remains politically active. The U.S. military, also saw its social composition alter after World War I and transformed after World War II, but remains politically inert. As we shall discuss below, any change in the political role of the Indian armed forces will depend more upon actions of the civilians than the armed forces and probably come about through other routes. Nevertheless, military grievances over pay and status are substantial, and may be contributing factor to an increased role for the armed forces.

III The Military Experiences of the Indian Army

It is important to note the type of armed conflicts that the Indian Army has engaged in, since this does have some bearing upon their political role. Figure 2 summarizes these conflicts. It shows that the Indian Army has been almost continuously active since 1947 at every level from police action to preparation for nuclear war. How has this shaped the views and potential political role of the Indian military?

Partition Riots and Internal War

From 1947 onward the Indian armed forces (especially the army) has been intermittently involved in a variety of internal security tasks, ranging from the suppression of communal violence, to fairly large-scale counter-insurgency actions. Indeed, the first "war" that the independent Indian Army engaged in was the bitter communal violence surrounding Partition. The savagery of Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh came as a shock even to those officers who had seen combat in World War II. Almost simultaneously, the Indian Army was engaged in a war with Pakistan and local raiders over control of Kashmir [20]. These experiences ultimately convinced both military and civilian of the need to create a buffer between the army and such unpleasant tasks. No army can train efficiently for conventional war and stand by for riot control. Not only does the latter disrupt training cycles and demand different kinds of tactics and doctrine, but conflict with Pakistan meant that the army could no longer be permanently quartered in and around India's major cities.

Thus, in the 1950s and the 1960s, a number of important paramilitary forces were created [21]. The attitude of the Indian Army towards these forces is decidedly mixed. On the one hand there is universal agreement that such forces

are necessary to insulate the military from direct involvement with communal, regional, religious, or other civil disorders. On the other hand, the officers are jealous of these paramilitary forces. The officers and men of such forces receive considerably better pay and serving allowances than the army itself, and often a status and authority which they do not deserve. The military would like to control such forces, or be able to place their own officers and men in them on a temporary basis [22]

From the mid-fifties onward, the army was called upon to deal with recalcitrant tribal groups who were seeking autonomy or independence. The army has been continuously deployed in Nagaland, Mizoram, and elsewhere in a counter-insurgency role. Some of the counter-insurgency literature that it has produced out of the Nagaland experience can stand with the best written on the subject [23]

The army has accepted close political supervision of its actions in Nagaland and Mizoram and understands the need for restraint. The tribal struggles do not have the potential (as does Punjab or Kashmir) for rapid escalation and they serve the useful purpose of giving various units combat experience under controlled circumstances. Yet there is a certain chaffing with political control. It is exacerbated when the army must work with police officers of lesser experience, or with paramilitary forces over which it has limited or no control.

"A Communal Riot with Armor"

The three wars between India and Pakistan have had a special quality about them. In the words of one Indian general, they are more like 'communal riots with armor,' than wars between sovereign states. The identities of India (a

secular state with a large Muslim minority) and Pakistan (an avowedly religious state) stand as a challenge to each other, and both are extremely sensitive to the domestic politics of the other, especially in communal matters

There is considerable evidence that in recent years all three Indian services have studied strategies of pre-emption or first-strike should there be another war with Pakistan. The U S I of India Journal often carries articles discussing such strategies involving a move from defense to pre-emption [24]. For all three services the idea of a short, sharp, aggressively fought war is partly linked to their demands for new weapons systems (an additional aircraft carrier and nuclear submarines for the navy, the DPSA for the IAF, and a new generation of armor and more APCs for the army), but it is also rooted in the "never again" attitude that derives from the wars of 1962, 1965, and 1971.

However, civilians (including Indira Gandhi) have been wary of this line of argument. While not reluctant to use force, she openly criticized "the theory of deterrence" before graduates of the National Defense College -- one of the main centers for the study of strategy (and deterrence) in India. The concept of deterrence, she argued, along with theories of arms races "only weakens the will of the nation while not deterring opponents" [25]. In this, her views were derived from her father, who was outspokenly critical of the superpower argument that their conflict was an arms race, and that their security was best protected by a strong, deterrent nuclear force.

Interventions Chinese, American, Soviet

India's armed forces have also had to cope with external interventions into South Asia by the two superpowers and China. Each influenced the military's thinking in important ways.

The most disastrous experience was the defeat by China in 1962. This was a watershed in Indian thinking about the importance of preparedness, modern equipment, and the need to maintain standing forces. It taught the Indian military that a division in training is of no use against an enemy advancing towards your major cities, and ten divisions a year away was a cruel joke. Similarly, modern equipment located in the inventories of the U S or Great Britain, or on the drawing boards in Krishna Menon's armaments factories (which were turning out high-quality espresso machines in considerable number) could be translated into the death of one's close comrades and friends.

The 1962 war and its aftermath also showed that the Indian Army was professional enough to reconstruct itself after a shattering military and moral defeat [26]. It had the full support of the political community and some foreign assistance, but basically the post-1962 expansion and reform was an internal military achievement.

Its success in this effort did not obscure two vital lessons drawn by most officers. The first was that the performance of the officer corps itself ranged from mediocre to incompetent, with a very few brave (and largely posthumous) exceptions. The second lesson (somewhat easier to accept) was that the military as a whole had been betrayed by the politicians, including Nehru and Krishna Menon. The lesson was applied in 1965 when the then COAS, J N Chaudhuri, asked for and was granted operational freedom, a situation exactly opposite that of 1962, when Nehru, Menon, and senior intelligence officers and civil servants controlled the tiniest movement of army units [27]. The turning point was the skirmish over Kutch in Spring, 1965, which led Chaudhuri to ask the Defense Minister (Y B Chawan) and the Prime Minister (Lal Bahadur Shastri) for guidance. He ultimately prepared the "appropriate moves" which included a

counterattack across the international frontier in case of a Pakistani attack in Kashmir itself [28] The '65 pattern was followed in modified form in 1971. Once permission to attack was given the army was left entirely on its own in the east until the Pakistan Army surrendered. This time the army played a greater role in the peacemaking process and insisted that some territories taken from Pakistan not be returned for tactical military reasons.

Two other external interventions in South Asia must be noted. The first was the sailing of the U S S Enterprise and its escort vessels towards the Bay of Bengal in 1971. There have been rumors and published anecdotal accounts of preparations to resist the Enterprise should it interfere with Indian operations in East Bengal. With a growing air-sea surveillance capability, as well as specific responsibilities that extend as far as the Andamans, it can be assumed that there are plans to resist a future naval incursion should it be required [29].

The second external intervention of consequence is the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. The military regard this as an unmitigated disaster from two perspectives: the first being that it has enabled Pakistan to acquire new weapons, and the second that it has raised an entirely new set of problems for the military should Pakistan itself deteriorate. Unlike 1971, when East Pakistan was virtually isolated from all important external contacts, a deterioration in Pakistan's internal stability would not mean a free ride for the Indian Army. Now, only Pakistani military capabilities are somewhat greater, but there is the possibility that the Soviets will play a direct military role in Pakistan (by assisting some Pakistani groups or attacking Pakistani military installations) or an indirect military role (by trying to restrict Indian movement to the West through diplomacy and the cutoff of spares

or parts) Needless to say, the advent of the Soviet Union as a presence in South Asia vastly complicates the Indian position, as it is both a potential collaborator and a rival for the role of dominant South Asian power

Nuclear War

Finally, the Indian military has at least a theoretical interest in nuclear war The subject was included in the army's Staff College syllabus as early as the mid-fifties, but only when an Indian weapon became a distinct possibility (by the late sixties) did the army take the bomb seriously [30] From an army perspective, there is some fear that the budget for conventional weapons would be cut to supplant a nuclear weapon and its delivery systems Army officers have also raised the problem of control Not only are they concerned that another service might assume the responsibility for nuclear weapons, but this would further strain inter-service cooperation

The arguments in favor of nuclear weapons are more muted The most powerful of these is that a nuclear weapon would enable India to meet China on equal terms and gain permanent strategic superiority over Pakistan The political and strategic consequences of this view are that India would be able to settle the border dispute with China in a way which satisfies Indian honor and security requirements, and that in any future conflict with Pakistan there would be no need to hold back

While one can find both advocates and critics of an Indian nuclear weapon in the military, most officers apparently subscribe to the "option" strategy, although there has been a subtle movement towards rather than away from nuclear acquisition The military, after wishing that the issue would go away, have positioned themselves so that while they cannot be accused of pressuring the

government to go nuclear, they will be the first to stake a claim for control over nuclear weapons once the decision is reached. Civilian concern over army control over a nuclear weapon is one factor operating against a decision to go nuclear and to hang on to the "do-nothing" option as long as possible.

To summarize, the war experiences of the Indian armed forces have been as diverse as those of any other modern military. They range from internal wars of national consolidation and counter insurgency, to war with Pakistan and China, and have begun to involve planning for nuclear war. Most of these conflicts have involved the army, but recent changes in doctrine, and additions of new, modern equipment, have given the air force and navy a greater role in any future conflict. The latter two services are especially attuned to threats from the sea.

The Indian military has undergone a complete transformation from being an imperial auxiliary, lacking any significant modern weapons, to something approximating a balanced military force, possessing nearly all modern arms. Yet, it retains its domestic internal security role, and in recent years has expanded this role to include the governance of several Indian states. This suggests that we must carefully examine not only the institutional and social means by which this large and powerful military machine is controlled, but the increasing political role played by the military.

IV The Armed Forces and the Policy Process

The Indian armed forces play a remarkably small role in the shaping of security and defense-related policies, and virtually no role in the shaping of policies outside this area. Indeed, probably no military of equivalent importance or size has less influence. This situation was not inherited from the

British, but was assembled, piece by piece, over the years, and is now enshrined in various constitutional and bureaucratic structures. We will examine these below, and then discuss vulnerable points in Section V.

Formal Structures

As India achieved independence in 1947, a number of structural and constitutional arrangements were instituted, which had the net effect of ensuring that decisive military power would remain in the hands of the Union government, and that within that government the armed forces would be strictly subordinate to civilian political and administrative control [31]

The initial step involved removing the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, from the Governor General's Executive Council, when the interim government was formed in September, 1947. He was replaced by a civilian defense member (Sardar Baldev Singh). A Defense Member's committee was created, and had the commander-in-chief, the defense secretary, and the financial advisor as members. After August 15, 1947, this was transformed into the Defense Minister's Committee, and the heads of the air force and the navy joined it. The army C-in-C then became theoretically equal to the heads of the other, much smaller and weaker services (In 1955 the heads of all three services were renamed as chiefs of their respective staffs, further reducing their status).

The Indian Constitution of 1950 further clarified the power of the union government and the dominance of civilian authority. It makes clear that India is a union, not a federation of states, and that the latter have no right of secession. This Union has exclusive power to ensure the "defense of India and every part thereof including preparation for defense and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to

effective demobilization ' Indeed, this is the first item on the list of subjects exclusively reserved for the Union government

Theoretically, the 'supreme command of the defense forces of the union' is vested in the President of India, but the President is obligated to be "regulated by law," and de facto control over the government apparatus was vested in the Prime Minister Article 74 (1) of the Constitution states that "There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions " Conventions, established over the years, and later constitutional changes, have ensured that "aid and advice' is authoritative, and no President has attempted to exercise independent command over the armed forces

Indian defense policy has usually been formulated at the highest level by a subcommittee of the cabinet Originally termed the Defense Committee, then the Emergency Committee (after the 1962 war with China), it is now called the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet The chiefs of staff of the armed services are not members of this committee, but may be invited to sit in on meetings They are members of the Defense Minister's Committee, and have their own interservice committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee This committee is chaired by the service chief with the longest tenure on the committee, ensuring that the dominant service, the army, will not automatically chair this committee 'Collectively, the Chiefs of Staff Committee is the highest professional advisor to the government on defense matters "[32] The present structure is summarized in Figure 3

While civilian defense officials claim that this complicated system of committees ensures authoritative political guidance to the military and sound military advice to the politicians,[33] many in the military would disagree


They have written that because of the increase in the ministerial membership of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs, the actual participation of the service chiefs at the highest level of decision making has become more diffuse, and there is a tendency not to invite the service chiefs even when defense matters are discussed [34] Instead, the services have been represented by the Defense Secretary, further weakening their access to what is, on paper, the final decision-making authority on defense matters

Further, the Defense Minister's Committee has been virtually replaced by the Committee on Defense Planning (CDP), under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary The CDP includes the Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries for Defense, Defense Production, Finance, External Affairs, and the Secretary of the Planning Commission, as well as the chiefs The CDP thus reduces the direct access of the military to the political decision makers, and by sheer numbers, implies the dominance of civilian bureaucrats, and even a lessening of the role of the Minister of Defense, since the secretary of the CDP can report directly to the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs

Bureaucratic and Political Control

The Indian military are not only legally circumscribed, but have been bureaucratically and politically contained by the powerful Ministry of Defense and successive ministers of Defense In peacetime, the Ministry of Defense dominates the defense policy process It has three major functions the approval or ratification of service-originated proposals (and the scrutiny of their financial implications), all policy concerning the location and operation of defense industries -- including the choice of weapons that will be produced in these industries -- and all public information and policy statements

Figure 3 Higher Defense Organization



Source Jerrold F Elkin and
 W Andrew Ritezel "The Debate
 on Restructuring India's Higher
 Defense Organization," Asian
 Survey, Vol 24, No 10, Oct 1984,
 p 1073

pertaining to defense and security matters. The Ministry of Defense has no operational authority, but it also decides what is or is not a 'policy matter', and hence fit for ministry or cabinet level review.

The civilian officials of the Defense Ministry regard themselves as the pivot on which the defense policy process revolved. The ministry's class I cadre remains quite small, considering their responsibilities and influence. Generally, the civilians who fill these positions have only the most rudimentary military or defense background. Since their tenure is only five years, K Subrahmanyam notes that for their first two or three years they are still acquiring knowledge about an unfamiliar field, they are only in a position to contribute to policymaking during the last half of their tenure. Few have had extensive international experience. Typically, they are intensely aware of the internal political and social aspects of defense, not the role of defense policy as an instrument of foreign policy.

These shortcomings of civilian officials, coupled with their enormous veto power over what the generals propose, greatly irritates the military. One retired officer, now a defense writer, characterizes the civilian defense official as "one who can talk about and pronounce judgment upon the knottiest professional problem with nonprofessional competence but professional air" [35]. For their part, senior civilian defense officials have pointed out the caution and timidity of the military, to the point where they are incapable of intelligently sustaining a war, and hence fail at their chief role to support diplomacy during a conflict.

Over the years a variety of appointments have been made to the Defense portfolio, and these fall into two types. The first have been politically weak but administratively competent individuals, who have "managed" the military and

the Ministry of Defense. With one exception, Mrs Gandhi's appointments were in this category. This exception was Bansi Lal, who reportedly abused his authority and angered the military. His friendship with Sanjay Gandhi made him too politically powerful for the military to oppose. He exploited, harassed, and humiliated senior officers, and on more than one occasion used his position to arrange special military facilities for Sanjay Gandhi and other favored politicians. The abuses were particularly evident during the Emergency. After she returned to power in 1980, Mrs Gandhi reverted to her earlier pattern by the appointment of first R Venkataraman and then S B Chawan to the Defense portfolio. Rajiv Gandhi's appointment of P V Narasimha Rao as his Defense Minister indicates that he, too, does not wish to appoint a potential political rival to the post, nor an administrative incompetent.

Earlier, more activist Ministers had been appointed by Nehru (Krishna Menon and Y B Chawan) and during the Janata period (Jagjivan Ram). Menon and Ram, in particular, involved themselves in recruitment, training, and promotion practices with mixed reactions from the armed services. Some trace the present conflict over reductions in Sikh recruitment back to Jagjivan Ram's concerted effort to broaden the army's recruitment base.

The Chiefs' Controversy

The Indian military have accepted, but not enjoyed, their ever-lessening influence at the higher levels of the policy process. They are faced with a dilemma as long as they retain active command over their respective services, civilian officials are reluctant to increase their influence within the central decision making process. The Indian chiefs have enormous operational authority, especially during wartime, but only advisory power at the center. There they

are treated as formal equals, despite the obviously greater operational authority of the army COAS, and kept well away from the ultimate level of decision-making

Naturally, the armed services -- especially the army -- would like to change this arrangement, and this issue lies at the heart of the long-standing debate over the role of the chiefs. Should there be a fourth chief, as in the U S and U K ? If so, who should it be? The suggestion of a fourth chief goes back at least to 1949, and was raised again in the 1960s by General J N Chaudhuri and more recently (in 1982) another COAS, General Krishna Rao [36]

The army is the natural advocate of an expanded joint chiefs system along the lines of the British Chief of Defense Staff system or the U S Joint Chiefs. In virtually every Western country (they argue) such a system exists for coordinating military operations during wartime, and providing coordinated and combined advice to civilians. The Indian system has been notorious for the lack of both. During 1965 and 1971 there was very little inter-service coordination (in 1962 the navy and air force were not involved in the fighting in any significant way). P C Lal, the then Air Marshal, claims that Chaudhuri created the problem in 1965 by his unilateral determination of army strategy and failure to consult with the other two services, Lal himself determined what the IAF strategy targeting would be in 1971, apparently without reference to army wishes. Other accounts indicate that the successful combined operations against Karachi were due more to good luck and fortunate timing than integrated military planning.

Somewhat disingenuously, the army advocates of a CDS system claim that the Chief need not be from the army, but might be an air force or navy man. Whoever it was would presumably have to leave his own service parochialism behind.

The CDS system is strongly opposed by most navy and air force officers and a good number of politicians and the civilian bureaucracy. The navy and the IAF naturally feel that they would never get to hold the chairmanship. Further, since the Indian military fights on or near its own borders, a CDS system is unnecessary since proper coordination could take place within the current system -- especially if the army would cooperate.

The political arguments against the CDS system are not as openly voiced, but in the current situation are powerful and final. First, there is the long-standing civilian suspicion of men in uniform, and a deep-seated belief (held by Nehru and, apparently, Mrs. Gandhi) that the military remain a potential trouble spot for Indian democracy. Creating a fourth chief would mean creating a fourth general, or even an officer of field marshal rank, without good cause. More to the point, it runs counter to the divide and rule strategy employed by Nehru, Shastri, and Indira Gandhi, implemented by the civilian bureaucrats, and directed against the armed forces -- in particular, the army [37]. In India, the navy and the air force present no credible political threat, but the army might. The present arrangement reduces the army chief to no more than equal (and less than equal, when he does not chair the Joint Chiefs committee). Would changing this system actually improve the quality of military advice (ask those civilians who oppose change) when the military at best are not terribly inventive? Reshuffling the chief's system -- they argue -- would not improve military decision making, but it might enhance the political power of the military.

An additional word is in order on the selection of the chiefs particularly the COAS. This has two dimensions: the failure of a Sikh to become chief of the army staff (even though the army's officer corps is about 15-18% Sikh), and

the apparent manipulation of appointments to ensure that the COAS would be an officer who was politically acceptable to the government. We shall discuss the problem of the Sikhs when looking at the Punjab crisis, although it should be noted that Sikhs have become chiefs of the Air Force Staff and Navy Staff.

When considering promotions to the COAS position, the first step is the preparation by the Defense Ministry bureaucracy of a statement of qualifications and experience of the five regional commanders -- northern, southern, eastern, western and central, plus the vice chief of staff -- all lieutenant generals. The six constitute a panel from which the COAS is selected by a cabinet subcommittee for appointments presided over by the Prime Minister.

Until recently, the principle of seniority has been followed in promoting the COAS from this group (promotions at earlier levels are made largely by the military itself). There had earlier been great controversy when Lieut. Gen. Harbaksh Singh and Lieut. Gen. P. S. Bhagat, two outstanding officers, were allowed to retire because they barely lacked seniority.

The first overt violation of the seniority principle came on June 1, 1975, barely a month before the imposition of the Emergency, when Lieut. Gen. T. N. Raina was made COAS, jumping over at least one other officer with greater seniority. The second violation occurred in May, 1983, in an even more controversial appointment [38]. One of India's most brilliant soldiers, Lieut. -Gen. S. K. Sinha, was superseded by Lieut. -Gen. A. S. Vaidya, even though Sinha was Vice-Chief of the Army Staff, and thought to be in line to become the new chief. Vaidya was thought to have seriously compromised himself with public criticism of the ruling CPM government in Tripura and praise for the election alliance between Congress (I) and another party. He was attacked in the press by the CPM party leadership as having given "political statements", and the

defense public relations service had to issue a statement to the effect that the Indian army "continues to remain apolitical in its best tradition '[39] Sinha responded to his supercession by turning in his resignation. Several newspapers reprinted some of his perceptive writings on the problems of civil-military relations in India. He has since entered politics and received widespread support from a group of journalists and retired officers who regard him as one of the best officers ever produced by the Indian Army [40]

These two incidents occurred under Mrs. Gandhi, and it is widely believed that she was responsible for the supercessions. Her defenders argued that the principle of seniority was not inviolable, although they had earlier used it to justify the retirement of otherwise very well qualified generals. These episodes fit into the broader pattern of her style of governance, in which appointments were made -- and unmade -- as a matter of convenience and later justified. The practice disturbed the military, and tended to encourage senior officers to curry favors from the political leadership, further dividing them. The generals could accept a system in which promotion was based on a principle of merit, or one based upon strict seniority, but a system in which promotions are made in order to keep the military divided is likely to have exactly the opposite effect in the long run.

While the military's formal role in the higher decision-making system has probably declined over the years, there has been a considerable expansion of military influence at other levels. Under Mrs. Gandhi, retired senior officers were appointed as governors, headed various defense production and research facilities, and served on various public commissions and agencies. In some cases active duty officers have received non-military appointments to such bodies. The newest (1984) Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal M. L.

Khatre, had been head of the giant manufacturing and research complex, Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. Quite often, senior officers are immediately appointed to such choice positions immediately upon retirement (Gen K V Krishna Rao was made Governor of the militarily sensitive states of Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura in June, 1984)

There is considerable indirect evidence to show that these government-controlled appointments are not given to recalcitrant officers, but to those who have cooperated with the government during their tenure in the military. As the social status of the armed forces continues to decline, it will be easier for the government to use post-service employment as a reward to pliable officers, especially if these officers have no other career or income to fall back on.

As in the case of manipulation of promotion to the seniormost positions in the armed services, this strategy may be effective in the short run, but it further embitters those officers who have not "cooperated", and who feel that their colleagues have sold out the profession for personal advancement. Indeed, for every officer that receives an ambassadorship, or the directorship of a defense laboratory or production facility, there must be two or three equally well qualified who do not, and who may join the pool of the embittered and resentful.

V Civil-Military Relations Subordination or Equality?

In a reasonably well developed political system, such as India's, with a long tradition of civilian dominance over the military, any change in the relationship between the two will be incremental, not dramatic. Despite this, there is a long tradition of alarmist writing about the imminent take-over of the military in India. This has been a popular subject for journalists who have been predicting the increased intervention of the army for years [41]

Scholarly analyses have usually been more restrained. Their picture of a large, diverse, sprawling military establishment, divided into three services, numerous commands within each service, all directed by political and bureaucratic elites fully aware of the need to maintain civilian authority, legitimacy, and control is essentially accurate [42]. Interestingly, even the journalists have begun to subscribe to this view, and predictions of military take-over have been replaced by relatively balanced analysis. The Indian Army is now held up as an exception to the dismal parade of coup and counter-coup [43]

Although I am one of those who have made a strong case for regarding India as an exception to the widespread pattern of military intervention, optimism about the political role of the Indian military is premature, and a number of the barriers to military intervention have been removed or weakened. Others remain, but the circumstances under which they, too, will vanish are not difficult to imagine. In brief, it is necessary to reconsider the assumptions upon which the conclusions of non-intervention are based.

Military intervention in politics will always be a function of the size and complexity of the political system (the more complex, the harder it will be for

the military to govern it), and the size and complexity of the military (the more complex, in some ways the easier it is to steer from the center, and the greater its institutional stake in the overall system), and the prevalent form of civilian control (whether the military are ruled because they are different than civilians or just like them) Armies the size and complexity of India's do not intervene lightly, but because of overwhelming pressures and political compulsions Above all they will intervene to protect their own institutional integrity or to protect a political order which in turn shields them or which they value as citizens

The Indian Army is a long way from overt intervention but there have been many signals that some of the barriers to intervention -- or increased military influence -- have disappeared The most important such barrier -- the legitimacy, integrity, and competence of the central political system -- has badly eroded in the past fourteen years This erosion includes the decline of the Congress party (except as a vehicle for Indira Gandhi's personal rule) and the simultaneous failure of opposition parties to demonstrate their ability to govern effectively, fairly, and without serious corruption For the professional soldier there was not much choice between the capricious Janata government and the willful combination of Bansi Lal and Sanjay Gandhi Service resentment over political incompetence -- especially when that incompetence affects the conduct of war or the readiness of the military to fight a war, runs deep [44] Some day it may be the force which propels the military into politics Nor are the armed forces, especially the army, passive observers of the deterioration and increasing violence and lawlessness of Indian politics They have begun to play a direct role in the political system through the rear entrance called "aid to the civil power "

From Aid to the Civil to Military-Civilian Partnership?

One of the central myths of the Indian political system is that the Indian military is "apolitical " This is true only insofar as the armed forces do not rule India, and the decision-making process is dominated by civilians It is also true that the folklore of the mess says that politics and the military profession do not mix, and that young officers are taught that the Indian military must remain apolitical However, it is not true in the sense that the military know nothing about politics, or that they do not act in support of political objectives, or that they do not themselves directly govern more and more of India

Most officers, especially army commanders, are very well informed about domestic politics, let alone broader strategic and foreign policy issues Every part of India is in an area command, and many cities are part of or adjacent to cantonments or bases In each of these cases the area commander has, as part of his professional duties, a complete knowledge of local politics He will be able to recite with precision the factions, interests, and objectives of each local political, religious, or other interest group In this he is supported by the military's own intelligence services and close liaison with police and civilian bureaucracies

This knowledge is important should the military be called upon 'in aid of the civil power " After independence it was recognized that "aid to the civil" could be damaging to the preparedness of the armed forces The example of Pakistan (where the army ultimately intervened in central politics after having been repeatedly called out to prop up civilian authority) was also noted These two considerations led to the creation of a massive structure of paramilitary

forces, which were to serve as a buffer between the regular armed forces and the rough and tumble of domestic disorder

Despite these paramilitary forces -- and in a few cases because of them -- the direct intervention of the armed forces in state and local matters has steadily increased in the past few years. Most of these interventions have been limited, and were quick "in and out" operations. In this sense, the military have acted in support of the political structure, providing ultimate force in situations where political solutions had failed and where the police could not cope.

The increase in such interventions has been dramatic. During 1951-70 the army was called in to suppress domestic violence on approximately 476 occasions [45]. By contrast, the figures for the eighteen month period, June 1979-December, 1980 saw sixty-four instances of army assistance to civil authorities. Table 1 lists these by state and purpose, although the category "other" suggests official censorship, perhaps to conceal disturbances in the paramilitary and other security forces themselves. Some of these are listed in Table 2. A list of typical army interventions is presented in Table 3.

These data suggest that the paramilitary security forces within India are themselves a security problem for the army. The literature on the subject indicates deep army concern about the failings of these forces, beginning in 1973, when the Uttar Pradesh Armed Constabulary took up arms against the government in a labor dispute. This concern is justified, since the number of and size of these paramilitary forces is increasing faster than their reliability and efficiency.

The army's support of political authority in these aid to the civil operations has led into actual military rule in more than one state. The legal

basis for enhanced army responsibility varies, but a number of ordinances, promulgated under the President's emergency powers, are now in place

-- the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1956, subsequently amended) whereby the union government declares a state or district a "disturbed area. In areas where the declaration comes into force, army and paramilitary commanders are given authority to arrest suspects, conduct searches, and use lethal force without regard to the authority of the District Magistrate (who ordinarily supervises aid to the civil operations)

-- the National Security Act (1980) authorizes security forces to arrest and detain suspects for up to six months without a warrant. Although there are provisions for judicial review, the intent of the legislation is to give the armed forces a relatively free hand in dealing with agitators, terrorists, and rioters. Many provisions of this act are identical to those of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) which was the legal basis for the Emergency of 1975-77

-- the Essential Services Maintenance Act allows army troops to replace striking workers in "vital" industries such as oil production and rail transport. The industries are effectively taken over by the army pending settlement of the dispute. Strikers can be subject to arrest under provisions of the National Security Act

-- the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (1967) allows the center to ban subversive organizations. This currently applies to rebellious Sikh organizations in the Punjab and several insurgent groups in the northeast

-- the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance (1984) was designed to help the army root out Sikh terrorists in the Punjab [46]. This provides for secret tribunals to try terrorists and is based upon the presumption of guilt --

TABLE 1
Army Deployments in Support Of Civil Authorities
June 1979 - December 1980

<u>State</u>	<u>Reason for Deployment</u>			
	<u>Law & Order</u>	<u>Maintenance of Essential Services during Strikes</u>	<u>Disaster Relief</u>	<u>Other*</u>
Bihar	6	1	1	4
Gujarat	4	-	4	1
Punjab	2	2	-	5
Karnataka	-	-	3	1
Delhi	2	2	-	5
Haryana	-	-	2	1
Kerala	3	-	-	-
Orissa	3	-	1	-
Madhya Pradesh	3	-	2	3
Tamil Nadu	2	-	1	-
Andamans & Nicobar	2	-	-	-
Meghalaya	4	1	1	1
Assam	2	-	5	-
West Bengal	-	-	1	12
Manipur	2	-	1	-
Nagaland	2	-	-	11
Tripura	1	-	-	-
Uttar Pradesh	17	-	2	27
Jammu & Kashmir	7	-	-	40
Arunachal Pradesh	1	-	-	1
Mizoram	1	-	2	25
Himachal Pradesh	-	1	1	14
Maharashtra	-	-	14	2
Andra Pradesh	-	-	2	1
Rajasthan	-	-	3	3
Sikkim	-	-	-	3
TOTAL	64	7	46	159

*This category includes inter alia, mine detecting, bomb disposal, vehicle recovery, and road and bridge maintenance

Source Lt Colonel M M L Ahuja, In Service of the People, Sainik Samachar, Jan 17, 1981, p 46

Table 2, Disturbances Within Peacekeeping Forces

Since 1978

<u>Year</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Cause of Unrest</u>	<u>Outcome</u>
1978	Tamil Nadu	CRPF strike state police unwilling to move against strikers†	2 batt BSF end strike
1979	Gujarat	police strike	army restores order 5,000 arrested, firing
1979	Bhubaneswar, Puri, Trivandrum, Cuttack, Neemuch, Thumba, Cochin Madras, Pt Blair, Delhi, Bokaro	CRPF, CISF, RPF strikes	Army & BSF disarm strikers 24 CISF & 3 army jawans killed at Bokaro 3 CRPF mutineers killed in Delhi
1979	Tamil Nadu	police strike	BSF CRPF arrest 3,000 police
1979	Bombay	abortive police strike	BSF, CRPF quell Cong supported strike
1980	various Bihar, W B industrial locations	CISF strike, clash with police	army disarms CISF
1981	Gujarat	police ineffective during caste reserv protests	army restores order
1982	Bombay	police strike	army restores peace
1984	Army barracks in Bihar, Maharashtra, Tripura, Rajasthan, elsewhere?	uncoordinated mutiny by 1,500 Sikh jawans in aftermath of Army actions in Golden Temple	loyal army units capture mutineers, some flee to Pakistan? Under trial for mutiny?

Source newspaper reports, Ministry of Defense Annual Reports

Table 3 Army Deployments, Aid to the Civil Power

<u>Year</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Duration</u>
1973	Assam	language riots	1 month
	Lucknow, U P	police unrest	3 weeks
	Arunachal P	tribal violence	1 week
	Imphal, Manipur	riots	1 week
	Nasik, Mah	electoral violence	2 days
1974	Baroda, Guj	communal violence	1 week
	Ahmedabad, Guj	food riots	3 weeks
	Dhanbad, Ranchi, Bihar	communal disorder	2 weeks
	Patna, Bihar	student riots	1 week
	all India	national rail strike	3 weeks
	W Bengal, 4 districts	riots	2 weeks
1975	all Indian port cities	docker's strike	1 week?
	Delhi	communal riots	1 week?
	Cooch Behar, W B	rural unrest	1 week
1976	State of National Emergency declared, army not called out in aid-to-the-civil		
1977-79	no army utilization mentioned during Janata years in Ministry of Defense <u>Annual Reports</u> except for aid-to-the-civil in cases of natural disaster		
1980	Assam	anti-foreigner stir & election violence	continuous
	Tripura*	tribal violence	6 mos
	Meghalaya*	tribal insurgency	continuous
	Manipur*	student/tribal unrest	1 month
	Nagaland*	tribal violence	continuous
	U P ,M P ,Gujarat, Delhi, & elsewhere?	communal violence	2 months
	Bihar	CISF strike	1 week?
1981	Assam	anti-foreigner	1 year
	Gujarat	anti-reservation stir	3 months
1982	Assam	anti-foreigner	1 year
	Arunachal P	student/tribal unrest	4 weeks
	Goa	communal disturbances	5 days
	Baroda, Gujarat	communal disturbances	2 weeks
	Kerala	communal disturbances	4 days
	Maharashtra	Bombay police strike	1 month
	Mizoram, Nagaland*	election violence	4 days?

Table 3 Army Deployments, p 2

<u>Year</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Duration</u>
1983	No known army deployments other than continuous counter-insurgency operations in northeastern states and peacekeeping duties in Assam Army on alert in several states (Punjab, Haryana)		
1984	Maharashtra (Bombay & nearby suburbs)	communal riots	4 weeks
	Punjab, Chandigarh & nearby areas	Sikh terrorist campaign army mutinies	ongoing from 5 June
	Hyderabad, A P	communal riots, political disorder	4 days?
	New Delhi and many other cities	riots in wake of Mrs Gandhi assassination	1 week?
1985	no new deployments ordered continuing security deployments for domestic unrest in northeastern states, Assam, Punjab, and perhaps selected districts in Haryana and J & K		

* The Indian Army has been on continuous alert status and active in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist activities in these states for several years

Source newspaper reports and Ministry of Defense Annual Reports

the accused must prove himself or herself innocent. It also confers special powers upon the security forces.

This stunning array of legislation and ordinance has given the military and paramilitary forces ultimate power in many affected areas of Assam, Punjab, Kashmir and other states. For millions of Indians the effective government is the local area or sub-area commander, the system may be less protective of civil liberties than even the present martial law system in Pakistan, where civil courts and religious courts function parallel to the martial law system and appeals from decisions by the latter have been frequent and successful. As an informed Pakistani military writer has noted of the situation of the Indian army in Assam: "Such a state of affairs is certainly not martial law but it may well contain all its normal concomitants, such as a suspension of civil liberties, imposition of press censorship, search and arrest without warrants and enforcement of curfew order in sensitive and badly affected areas." By itself, such involvement may be necessary and desirable, but the same commentator notes that "the military's repeated deployment in situations of extreme civil disorder could, on the one hand, induce the civil authority to lean more and more upon it, and, on the other, give the military establishment the sugary foretaste of power," as it did in both Pakistan and Bangladesh [47].

This is an accurate observation. The Indian military, especially the army, is so deeply enmeshed in policy, commercial, and other local industrial problems in various parts of India that it cannot help but be contaminated by the contact. This does not mean that its fighting qualities will lessen, but it will lead to the growth of a corporate interest in such activities, largely for the material rewards they produce.

Civilian Control From "Objective" to "Subjective" ?

Samuel Huntington suggests that civilian control over the military ultimately takes one of two forms. 'Objective' control is exercised by a legitimate civilian elite which respects, and encourages, the differences between it and the military professionals. The latter are devoted to their profession and maintain a conservative, restricted ethic. By contrast, "subjective" control is brought about through the merger of civilian and military values. The armed forces are controlled because they share dominant civilian values and their distinctiveness is blurred.

India has been undergoing a transition from objective to subjective control for a number of years. At first, the difference between civilian and political elites was very extreme, and there were important social and class differences between the two. However, the military are now recruited from the same social classes as the political and administrative leadership, and are in some ways more representative of the country. Increasingly, the military are called upon to permanently take over tasks, such as aid to the civil power and the maintenance of civilian services that they would have rejected thirty years ago. Further, they are also called upon to voice the values and attitudes which are held by politicians -- they are asked to become "committed" in the same way that the civil service has asked to identify itself with the values and aspirations of Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress Party [48].

At the same time, some politicians, most notably Mrs. Gandhi, have encouraged military-like values and attitudes, a form of civilian militarism. Unlike her father, Mrs. Gandhi cultivated the legend of Subhas Chandra Bose and the secular, neo-totalitarian, egalitarian, militarism of the Indian National Army.

Although the comparison may not be exact, some of Mrs Gandhi's appeal would seem to be due to the similarities rather than the differences between herself and Bose. She is certainly a secularist and professes faith in democracy, although perhaps democracy of a special variety. Her speeches are dominated by references to the need for discipline and order. There is no doubt that she believes that internal and external enemies require continual vigilance, militancy, and preparedness. In the face of such enemies, even the enemy poverty, civil liberties are expendable. [49]

This appeal proved to be very popular, and it will be important to see whether any other national politician attempts to exploit the theme of militancy and militarism. It certainly does find resonance in certain regions of India, especially those with strong, local, martial traditions.

Similarly, it will be important to see whether the military are again called upon to make statements in support of specific political parties. It only takes a few such statements to have a great impact upon the entire military establishment and the political community, for if the military give the impression that they have even implicitly thrown their support to one or another political leader, they will be rapidly cultivated by all politicians.

Several astute observers have addressed this development. Romesh Thapar has observed that India's new breed of officer, drawn from the

middle classes of the Subcontinent, will invariably come to reflect the varied emotions of that Subcontinent, "making politics very much a part of the culture of the Indian military establishment, even though the same distance still continues to be maintained between it and the politicians "[50]

This politicization is intensified by the involvement of politicians in military matters, particularly in weapons purchases. There is also military concern over pay scales, promotion opportunities, status, and the difficulties of maintaining a normal family life -- especially important for an army whose peacetime deployment structure must be along some of the most rugged terrain in the world. Finally, there is a great increase in the number of officers due to retire, and they all face great uncertainty in securing post-service employment of suitable status and compensation.

Thapar places the blame for this situation on the political community, "which thinks only of itself and ignores the problems of the country. This is politicization with a vengeance, because the story from the world outside trickles back to the carefully controlled cantonments. Today it is well understood that anyone in uniform can find himself in that soul-destroying civilian fix, despite his many years of training and capability-building."

He offers several remedies, including the revision of the higher defense decision-making process, and clipping the power of the "ill-informed IAS network." He argues for a renewed trust and reprofessionalism of the Indian Army on the part of the political-bureaucratic hierarchy. "Without both, India will find itself with a million-man army that has lost its professionalism, that reflects

the worst qualities of Indian life, and that has important parochial service interests to protect "

A number of senior officers have written along these lines for several years, and the military literature is replete with nostalgia for an era when the army kept to its narrow professional concerns. But the involvement of the military in important "social" (i.e., often political) tasks, their entanglement in strike breaking, the maintenance of essential services, and in an extended police role, have not exactly been resisted by army commanders. No senior officer has resigned his commission (as far as I know) on the grounds that the armed forces were being called on to undertake inappropriate tasks. They have, perhaps, decided to bend under pressure. As one of India's most literate retired officers has written,

Let's face it, whether the civil servant or the soldier likes it or not, the political system and its ideologies have now become part and parcel of his daily living and the environment in which he works. Wrongly or rightly, they have been allowed to permeate into almost all facets of his professional and cultural life, and he can no longer pretend to remain outside this system and yet be effective as he has managed to do so in the past. [The services] will have to learn to live with the particular ideology and be "committed" to it without appearing to be political.

Brigadier Grant, who has in the past, advocated an apolitical and neutral officer corps sadly concedes that "sympathizers" will do better than

"neutrals "[51]

If the trend is to continue, then there is reason to be concerned about the future professional integrity of the Indian armed forces, especially the army. There is already a functional differentiation between officers who pursue strictly professional goals and those who take advantage of the increasing opportunities for corruption. Those who seek money and corruption can find it -- particularly in the recruiting commands, in the service and supply corps, in the neo-martial law slots in the Punjab and elsewhere, and in any position which brings the officer into contact with civilian contractors and manufacturers. As in Pakistan, part of the Indian Army may become entangled in a corrupting civilian society and part will remain true to its professional ethic.

However, increasing corruption within the armed forces is not likely to lessen the chances of a future military intervention. The example of Pakistan[52] indicates that corruption and civilian meddling in internal military promotions and policies can be a contributing factor in the decision to intervene. Indeed, the young Pakistani officer is taught, as is his Indian counterpart, that intervention is undesirable, and that the military cannot effectively run the country without ruining itself, that their country is too large and too complex to be run from the center, and that military rule runs against the historic traditions of the armed forces. All this turns out to be irrelevant when the military face a situation of domestic political breakdown which ultimately (and sometimes, quite rapidly) affects the integrity of the military. For, above all, soldiers in both countries are taught that while they are the first line of defense against external enemies, they are also the last barrier to

internal disarray. When the politicians, the bureaucrats, and the paramilitary have crumbled, only the armed forces stand between national integrity and national dissolution. Therefore, they tend to regard any incident which affects their own internal integrity as of transcendental importance. Pakistan underwent such an experience as a consequence of several ill-fated aid to the civil power operations in Bengal and Punjab in the 1950s. These convinced the military not only of their own supreme importance but of the threat to their integrity from civilian incompetence. We now turn to the tragic, but comparable events in the Punjab in 1984, which may turn out to be equal in their importance.

VI The Punjab Crisis and the Army

No single event in modern Indian history has so affected the armed forces as the Punjab crisis of 1983-4. While the 1962 loss to China was humiliating, and revealed serious internal military problems, it led to a purge of incompetents and a major rebuilding effort. The army was stronger after the war than before it. The events of 1984 are quite different. The integrity of the armed forces has been seriously shaken at every level, and affects all three services, the Punjab crisis has altered the strategic assumptions upon which the armed forces have based their war plans, if it worsens, it could lead to the disintegration of the Indian armed forces.

Others will deal with the origins of the Punjab crisis and be in a better position to discuss solutions to what Rajiv Gandhi has publicly identified as the greatest threat to India's democracy. We will only sketch out the connections between the crisis and the Indian armed forces, and note certain strategic implications. Indeed, the latter are what distinguishes the Punjab crisis from those regional crises elsewhere in India.

Sikhs and the Indian Military

Sikhs have been a major component of the Indian Army for over 130 years, or about five generations. They constituted about 25% of the Indian Army during World War II, and have always been regarded as among the most effective of the army's classes. In the army they comprise two separate regiments. One is the Sikh Regiment, largely made up of Jats, the other is the Sikh Light Infantry, made up of Mazbhis and Ramdasias -- scheduled

castes One of Mrs Gandhi's assassins, Beant Singh, was reportedly a Mazbhi Sikh who had been discharged from the army [53] Sikhs are also found in several other infantry regiments which recruit on a mixed basis They are present in large numbers in the Army Service Corps, the engineers, artillery, armor, and other specialized branches They are also found in large numbers in the Air Force (perhaps a quarter of the IAF pilots are Sikhs), and there are substantial numbers in the Indian Navy [54]

After independence it was decided to freeze the number of "pure" one class regiments in the Indian Army, but this did not substantially limit Sikh enrollment, which may have been about 20% of the other ranks, and perhaps a somewhat greater number of officers However, because of a policy established in 1953, and further modified in 1963 by the Military Affairs committee of the cabinet (which stated that no state would have a dominant position in recruitment), a concerted effort was made to make the army more representative and to recruit from those states which had not traditionally provided many soldiers (Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Gujerat, Andhra Pradesh, among others) [55] In 1974 the Punjab was still providing over 15% of the army, it was assigned a quota commensurate with its population size of 2.6% of all of India The figure includes Hindus, however

The recruitment issue was taken up by Sikh politicians, and comprised one of the demands of the Akali Dal's Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973 The current President of India, Giani Zail Singh, was then Chief Minister of Punjab (1972-77) and took up the issue of Sikh recruitment with Mrs Gandhi (then Prime Minister) and the Union Defense Minister (Jagjivan Ram) The Akalis and other Sikh politicians demanded that fitness and merit be the sole criteria for recruitment to the armed forces, retired Sikh officers

have complained that in order to exclude Sikhs, recruiting officers follow a discriminatory policy towards qualified Sikh candidates

By 1981 the Punjab was still sending four times its population percentage to the army, which led the then army chief, O P Malhotra, to remark that "I don't think that people of these states [referring to Punjab and Harayana, another traditional recruiting ground] have any reason to be dissatisfied "[56] By this time the overall percentage of "traditional", i e previously recruited classes, had dropped to 40%, and "all classes" comprised 60% of the army The actual figures are not available [57] It is not clear where Gurkhas are counted, although their numbers -- even though they are not Indian citizens -- have increased since the new policy went into effect

Other regions of India have had exactly the same kind of controversy over 'reservations" The Sikhs, like high caste Hindus, resent the effort to increase scheduled caste and backward caste representation in government services However, they differ from these groups in two ways discontented and angry Sikhs have the skills and resources to effectively resist government policy with violence, and they have a religious sanction for their claim to a major role in the armed forces

The issue of derecruitment is very important for practical and ideological reasons In terms of simple employment opportunities the Sikhs have always regarded the armed forces as prestigious and profitable There must be well over 300,000 retired Sikh soldiers living in the Punjab, most of whom would like to place at least one male relative in the army, navy, or air force They fear that this door will be shut

What is especially galling is that Sikhs regard the newly recruited classes as inferior. As an old Sikh recruiting handbook stated, all Sikh traditions are ultimately martial traditions, and the Sikh community is reluctant to yield their special claim to "martial" status [58]. They find the norms of a secular democracy, where all groups are now regarded as "martial," [59] to be naive and misguided, especially when the vital interests of the state are involved. Sikh proponents of Khalistan are persuaded that they could survive as an independent country because of the martial qualities of the Sikh "nation."

Resentment and Mutiny

There is a long history of resentment among Sikhs in the armed forces -- especially the army. No Sikh has ever become chief of the army staff, despite the great over-representation of Sikhs in the senior ranks of the army. In 1962 six of the Indian Army's lieutenant-generals were Sikhs (two of them were to die in an air crash in 1963). Out of 28 major-generals thirteen were Sikhs, and of seventy-nine brigadiers, there were thirty Sikhs [60]. Sikhs failed to reach the position of COAS in 1969 and 1974 when non-Sikh generals received extensions in their term of service. There is a belief that other groups within the officer corps do not treat Sikh officers with proper respect. For the most part, however, Sikh soldiers have had a brilliant reputation and had no incentive or inclination to support terrorist, separatist, or other extreme dissident Sikh groups. Indeed, they had been deeply involved in the many anti-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations undertaken by the Indian Army, especially in the northeast. Sikh generals, officers, and jawans have been prominent in

Nagaland, Assam, and elsewhere, and some Sikh regiments, especially the Sikh LI, had acquired a reputation for ferocity

Ironically, it may well have been the anti-terrorist efforts intended to cope with disturbances at the Asian Games that precipitated active dissent among retired Sikh officers. Many of them were harassed en route to the games in New Delhi and several then proceeded directly to the Punjab, offering their services to the Akali agitation. Major-General Jaswant Singh Bhullar has been quoted as on this episode

We had gone to Delhi and I found that in spite of the fact that we showed them my identity card, we were taken out of the bus at about nine places in Harayana. I told them I was a retired Army officer but they did not listen and were very rude and abusive. I felt very humiliated. I have taken part in practically every war and been wounded twice. It was very upsetting to think that I had to prove my patriotism in this country and to think I needed a passport or some document in order to be able to go to Delhi [61]

Worse was to come

Several thousand Sikh ex-servicemen met in a convention at Amritsar on January 23, 1983. Among them were five retired major generals and other retired officer of general rank sent their messages of support. The convention provided the leadership for a Volunteer force which the Akalis began to organize in March-April, 1983. Several senior retired officers joined Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and helped train his followers [62]. One, Major-Gen Shubeg Singh, had earlier organized the Mukhti Bahini and was a

recognized expert in insurgency warfare. He later was accused and acquitted, of theft [63]. Jaswant Singh Bhullar, was active in the Punjab agitation and later came to the United States as an officer of the World Sikh Organization and an advocate of Khalistan [64].

By the time Operation Bluestar was launched, most Sikh units had been moved out of the Punjab. They were not informed in advance of the attack on the Golden Temple and several thousand Sikhs, in a variety of training and active field units mutinied. While the government attempted to minimize the seriousness of the mutinies, it is known that they included units guarding Santa Cruz airport in Bombay, and combat units in Rajasthan. Jawans and officers from these units may have fled to Pakistan. These mutinies could not have been surprising, since there is not that much difference between the known and public grievances of retired Sikh soldiers and the concerns of Sikhs in the armed forces. Indeed, given the gravity of the occupation of the Golden Temple, the government may have expected more units to mutiny. Unconfirmed rumors are now circulating that most Sikh units are being kept well away from the Punjab and even that Sikh pilots are being taken from certain key air force squadrons.

Many Indians were surprised at the Sikh mutiny, but should not have been. All Indian Army regiments bind their members with a religious as well as a civil oath, a practice which the British merely carried over from earlier Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim armies. Sikh soldiers are accompanied into battle by unit priests and the Granth Sahib. The desecration of their religion signalled a call to arms because of their oath, not in contradiction to it. Thus, a new controversy has arisen between those who have argued for clemency for the mutineers on religious grounds, and those

who would have them punished on civil grounds [65] The dilemma facing the Indian government is analogous to that faced by the British when they began to try Indian National Army officers in 1946 At that time nationalism won out over military discipline, this time the chappal may be on the other foot

The situation in the Punjab remains grave from both the Sikh perspective and the army's Sikhs, including at least 300,000 retired service personnel and their families, are now subject to even harsher laws and regulations than those enforced in Nagaland, Mizoram, and elsewhere They know exactly what the army patrols think of them and their Sikh co-religionists, for they only recently faced sullen and armed tribesmen in the northeast [66] The entire Sikh community has undergone a revolutionary alteration in their self-image, from a "we" which included Hindus, in opposition to Pakistan, to a "we" which excludes Hindus and has rediscovered the many common elements between Sikhism and Islam [67] This is truly the stuff out of which new nations are made, and the Khalistan movement is now receiving very wide support from Sikhs within India as well as outside it This is support offered by default Conversations with retired Sikh officers indicate a realistic appraisal of the weaknesses inherent in "Khalistan," but a fatalistic willingness to support the cause in the absence of what they regard as fair terms from the government of India [68]

As for the Indian Army, their occupation of the Punjab is unprecedented and dangerous There is no conceivable military solution to the Punjab situation Yet, the army is called upon to supervise the most intimate and detailed aspects of life in the state This will further

embitter the Sikh population in the Punjab, and cause the army to regard all Sikhs -- including those in the armed forces -- as potential terrorists. No "aid to the civil power" doctrine can provide effective guidelines for such a situation.

Strategic Considerations

To make matters worse, the Punjab is strategically vital to the armed forces. The Punjab frontier is the most likely battleground should a new war break out with Pakistan. It is ideal tank country, and there are important strategic targets (primarily on the Pakistani side) which demand not only complete control over Indian Punjab but the active cooperation of its population. In 1965 and 1971 that cooperation was freely and generously offered by Sikh farmers, transport owners, and merchants. Now, the situation is more akin to German-occupied France and the Indian Army simply cannot trust the local population should a new conflict break out.

Further, the major road and rail routes to Kashmir run through Punjab, and a prolonged crisis in Kashmir would find the army at a severe disadvantage. The army and the various paramilitary units in the Punjab cannot now prevent numerous acts of sabotage, despite an extended curfew. In the event of a crisis with Pakistan or in Kashmir, such sabotage would severely hamper the movement of troops, supplies and food.

Finally, the Punjab crisis has had one unprecedented impact upon the Indian armed forces. Given the evidence of the mutinies that occurred in June, 1984, the continued alienation of retired Sikh officers, and the close links between Sikhs in the military and those out of it it is reasonable to assume that no Sikh unit can be fully trusted, especially in

a situation which involved in the Punjab itself. The government has been forced to unprecedented statements about the attempts to spread disaffection in the ranks of the armed forces" -- the situation may be much worse [69]. This probably means that the overall integrity of the Indian armed forces, especially the army, is badly weakened. If Sikhs comprise about 12% of the army, then the effective fighting strength of the army is probably reduced by at least that figure (more, if non-Sikh units must be deployed so as to contain another mutiny).

This decline in the efficiency and reliability of the Indian armed forces is probably greater than the increase in the capabilities of Pakistan's armed forces since 1982, the two combined do not add up to a shift in the strategic balance between India and Pakistan, but it must reduce Indian dominance to mere superiority. This poses no immediate threat to India since the present Pakistani leadership is not likely to engage in any strategic adventurism, but a further decline in relative Indian capabilities would create new temptations and new problems. A different Pakistani leadership might meddle in Kashmiri or Punjabi politics, safe in the knowledge that India had lost its capacity for escalation dominance, conversely, an insecure India might turn to nuclear weapons to make up for its relative decline in conventional capabilities, finally, a worsening of the Punjab crisis could lead to open guerilla warfare in that state, widespread sabotage, and the breakdown in the integrity of the Indian armed forces if their critical Sikh component should be removed.

VII Conclusion

This chapter began by noting the wide range of interaction between the Indian military and Indian society and politics. The armed forces are under strict constitutional constraints and play a very limited role in the central decision making process, although they have somewhat more operational authority than many of their foreign counterparts. Because of India's insecure regional environment, they must devote a great deal of time to preparation and planning for war (this would seem obvious, but most armies in Latin America and Africa will never have to fight). The Indian armed forces are sending more and more trained individuals into civilian society every year, and their role in the vast military production industry is also growing. The domestic law-and-order role of the army has dramatically increased in recent years, and there is also a new trend for civilian politicians to praise some of the military virtues while asking the armed forces to commit themselves to specific social and ideological goals.

None of this adds up to a dramatic change in the historically limited political role of the Indian armed forces. There will be no coup in India, there is no chance of a "colonels" or "brigadiers" conspiracy to seize power, although there are many angry and bitter officers, especially among the Sikhs. There may be further terrorism, but the structure of the Indian civil-military system is fundamentally sound, and -- for most Indians -- the legitimacy of the political system remains high. Our frequent allusions to Pakistan have indicated that under certain circumstances a professional army committed to democratic politics can intervene to reform

the system, and many Indian observers are properly concerned that India might now be where Pakistan was in the mid-50s [70]. However, the military in Pakistan have acted to protect not only their interests but Punjabi interests, whereas no single ethnic group dominates the Indian armed forces. Further, Pakistan was in a more critical strategic situation than India, and its generals had developed direct foreign ties to military suppliers which gave them enhanced authority within Pakistan. Finally, the Pakistani political system never put down as deep roots as India's, and the military there were certain that they could govern more effectively than the civilians. The Indian armed forces have no such foreign ties and they are less confident than their Pakistani counterparts that they could govern their country.

However, we must reiterate that the future role(s) of the Indian military may be different from those of the past. We conclude this chapter by noting where such changes may occur.

A New Constitution?

The constitutionally-determined role of the Indian armed forces is quite narrow and specific. The President remains the commander-in-chief while policy direction is provided by the prime minister. One of the strengths of the present constitutional arrangement is that it provides some check to any prime minister tempted to politicize the military. However, there are frequent discussions of a change in this structure, moving towards elements of a French or American system in which the presidency becomes a more "political" office. In such a system the military would find it even harder to resist efforts to politicize them,

and to conform to a particular political or social ideology. Any significant alteration in the Indian Constitution in this direction appears now to be unlikely, but if it were to occur, it would be in response to a sense of peripheral decay and central weakness in India's federal structure.

Somewhat more likely is a gradual, even informal, modification of the Indian federal balance with the military and paramilitary forces as pawns in a subtle struggle for power. This process has been underway for some time, particularly in those Indian states with non-Congress governments. They resist the introduction of the regular armed forces or centrally controlled paramilitary units, and have instead begun to create their own armed militias [71]. They have the right to do so in order to maintain law and order (a state responsibility), but it has also been argued that this right is not absolute, and that the Union government has "overriding" law and order responsibilities [72]. This controversy contains the seeds of intense Union-state conflict, up to and including serious violence, and if pressed to that point, further heavy military involvement in the management of an Indian state.

From Objective to Subjective Civilian Control?

If officers are further encouraged to conform to a dominant political and social ideology, and they do, they will compromise their conservative institutional perspective on national issues and begin to formulate political and social positions of their own. While this may suit the politicians in the short run, sooner or later it will lead to a divergence based on the corporate interests of the officer corps (at the very best),

or a split in the officer corps, or the movement of the officer corps in directions more extreme than those now contemplated by the politicians. The acceptable price of civilian control is a military with essentially inward looking, conservative views. In the past, this ethic was strengthened by the class origins of the officer corps, but now such views must be inculcated. It is tempting to ask the military to serve political ends -- increasingly as saviors of the law and order situation -- but each such request further politicizes the military by bringing them into too close contact with civilian society and by placing more and more civilian tasks in their hands. And, while force is effective in the short run it will also fail and the military will then blame their failure on civilians. A controversy has grown up around the purported success or failure of "Operation Bluestar," with the military blaming poor civilian intelligence for their own problems in rooting out Bhindranwale and his supporters, the military apparently demanded -- and received -- a free hand when they were called out in over forty Indian cities to control rioters after Mrs Gandhi's assassination, and have been fulsome in praise of their own operations as if to show the rest of India that they really could carry out a domestic military operation with speed and skill [73]. It is true that these events are unprecedented and that disasters of this magnitude may never reoccur, but the rapid expansion of the army's role after Bluestar and the assassination suggest that the armed forces are on the edge of a new activism.

Changes in the Strategic Environment?

The Indian armed forces have for years planned for war against two major powers, China and Pakistan, and prepare for minor conflicts against smaller neighbors. Now, however, they find both superpowers increasingly interested in South Asia and face the prospect of regional nuclearization. They have never had "enough" military hardware to deal with all possible security threats, and now these threats are multiplying. The Indian armed forces are probably not big enough to mount an offensive strike against a major neighbor, but may be too big for a purely defensive strategy. Further, the armed forces tend to emphasize the most dangerous element in every situation, partly out of a desire to persuade civilians that they are short of weapons and equipment. Their motto, like many professional armies, is "more is enough".

There is some risk that their legitimate but exaggerated concern over weapons inferiority will lead them to an apocalyptic strategic perspective, and a search for political supporters within the Indian system. This was impossible under a strong prime minister, but in a coalition or weak government it is likely that some in the military will attempt to trade their implicit support in exchange for additional equipment, better pay, and other benefits.

Expansion of the Aid to the Civil Role?

The expansion of the army's law and order function is perhaps the most dangerous trend of all, from the point of view of military integrity and an expanding military role in politics. The past few years have seen a

creeping military role, and in the Punjab, Assam, and elsewhere "martial law' in all but name India is well below the threshold at which the military decides that it should rule if it is going to be asked to do so by civilians, but every additional aid to the civil operation brings it that much closer

Decline in Political Legitimacy?

The armed forces operate at the margin of moral behavior, and their obedience to civilian authority will continue only as long as that authority is regarded as legitimate -- and hence legitimize the behavior of the military In a developed political system, such as India's, legitimacy is the consequence of effective performance in open and free elections and a degree of competence in matters which directly affect the military In the case of Nehru and Mrs Gandhi, there was also a direct, even charismatic link to the jawans, NCOs and JCOs, over the heads of the officers No general could compare his own popularity with that of such leaders However, in the absence of such a charismatic leader, civilian legitimacy must be based on the actions of politically effective and administratively competent ministers who are able to protect the vital interests of the military and the state Civil servants cannot substitute for them, as they lack any mandate other than "civilian control," a mantra that will not survive genuine military concern

As for the future, it is yet to be seen whether the government of Rajiv Gandhi will be able to reverse a trend in which political legitimacy was increasingly personalized and thus increasingly vulnerable Nor is it self-evident that his government will be able to successfully resolve those

foreign and domestic problems, most notably the Punjab crisis, which are least amenable to charismatic appeal, but which are viewed by the military as vital to their -- and India's -- survival

FOOTNOTES

1 The best formulations are found in Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York The Free Press, 1960) and Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1956) For a recent liberal attempt to explain -- and perhaps even support -- military rule in the "Third World," see Irving Louis Horowitz, Beyond Empire and Revolution Militarization and Consolidation in the Third World (New York Oxford, 1982)

2 There are no objective histories of the Indian military since independence, although there are very good studies of individual wars, units, battles, and problems For a survey see V Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green (Bombay Allied, 1974) by a former government official, and for a survey of current historical writing by a government historian, see Sri Nanadan Prasad, The Military History of India (Calcutta K P Bagchi, 1976) My own book, The Indian Army Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Berkeley University of California Press, 1971) examines the development of the professional officer in British India and the first twenty-four years of independent India

3 "Developing" is only a slightly less obnoxious term than "Third World" India has a fully developed political system and many economic and social problems There are richer countries incapable of dealing with problems of lesser magnitude, and no poorer countries better able to cope

4 For a modern formulation see Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds , Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1965) However, the concept dates back to Aristotle's comparative analysis of the written and unwritten constitutions of various Greek city-states in The Politics

5 For a detailed survey of the British-trained Indian officers, see Cohen, The Indian Army, Chapter 5, "The Professional Officer in India "

6 Many British officers were sure the Indian Army would degenerate they simply could not believe that Indians could take their place For a sophisticated version of this view see Arnold Toynbee, The World and The West (New York Oxford, 1953), pp 24-26

7 Cohen, The Indian Army, pp 149-161

8 Ibid , p 183

9 The potential political role of retired officers in India is a subject of considerable importance about which little is known (other than they were prominent in the Khalistan and Bhindranwale movements) For an insightful report see Hugh and Colleen Gantzer, "Alienation of ex-servicemen," Indian Express, Bombay, July 27, 1983, and A L Bery, "The Retired Soldier A Sentimental and Material Alienation," The Statesman, Calcutta, October 18, 1983 The U S I of India has organized courses for retiring officers since the 1960s, and the U S I of India Journal regularly carries articles on the problem of post service employment For a useful survey, see Brig N B Grant (ret) Retiring Age in the Armed Forces, Report of a U S I Seminar, No 3, December, 1975

10 B M Sinha, Hindustan Times, March 16, 1982

11 A group of ex-servicemen formed a party in the Punjab (Rashtriya Raksha Party) with the stated purpose of uniting ex-servicemen throughout India Indian Express (Bombay), July 5, 1983

12 Maj -Gen K S Bajwa, "Military Leadership and the Changing Social Ethos," U S I of India Journal, July-September, 1978 Bajwa urges a "realistic" approach as the Indian Army must work with poor quality officer material

13 Brig S K Sinha, "Career Prospects for Officers in Armed Forces," U S I of India Journal, July-Sept , 1968, p 265

14 Ibid

15 Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM, "The Army as a Career," U S I of India Journal, July-Sept , 1977

16 See the article by Major-General PM Pasricha on military leadership and corruption in Strategic Analysis, IDSA, New Delhi, November, 1983, Sudhansu Mohanty, "Honesty in the Forces," The Statesman, Calcutta, Feb 4, 1984, press coverage of the Samba spy scandal, the Larkin spy scandal, and the recent court martial proceedings against Major-General D S C Rai in India Today, April 30, 1984

17 R P Gautam, "Causes of Higher Secondary Students Preference for Military Career," U S I of India Journal, Oct -Nov , 1979

18 Bikram Vohra, "Fair Deal for our Fighting Men," Illustrated Weekly of India, June 23, 1974 For a rare feminist critique of the military's recruitment and employment policies see Dr A Mahajan, "Women in the Armed Forces A Case Study of India," a paper presented to the 1980 IUS Seminar

19 Exact figures are contained in "Asking for More," India Today, January 31, 1985, based on a leaked army document presented to the Fourth National Pay Commission Not only are the figures remarkable, but so is the explicit linkage of a demand for greater pay with the army's heightened internal security role the document begins with a discussion of Operation Bluestar and the security problems of the Punjab

20 Although official histories of these events have been prepared by the Historical Division of the Indian Ministry of Defense, not all have been released (nor have the histories of some later wars)

21 For a survey see K P Misra, 'Paramilitary Forces in India,' Armed Forces and Society, Spring, 1980, 371-388 Misra believes that having established the buffer between the military and society, the system has become coup-proofed A more cautious military assessment is Maj -Gen S K Sinha, "In Aid of the Civil Power," U S I of India Journal, June 1974, pp 115-123 He notes that the Indian military engaged in 476 "aid to the civil power" actions between 1961 and 1970 The Indian Coast Guard was established on August 19, 1978 as the seagoing counterpart of the Border Security Force, relieving the Indian Navy of the anti-smuggling role and the task of protecting off-shore oil installations against limited threats The navy ultimately favored the creation of the Coast Guard for a number of practical reasons, but it also enabled it to argue for a blue water capability Vice Admiral V A Kamath, "The Emergence of the Indian Coast Guard," U S I of India Journal, July-September 1979, pp 231-240

22 The Pakistan Army does this with the Khyber Rifles and other Frontier Force's Regiment wings, regular army officers are sent on deputation for two or more years, command a larger unit than they would in the regular army, and then return to their home regiment Stephen P Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley University of California Press, 1984)

23 Two books by Col Vijay Kumar Anand are of special merit Conflict in Nagaland (Delhi Chanyaka, 1980) and Insurgency and Counter-insurgency A Study of Modern Guerilla Warfare (Delhi Deep and Deep, 1981)

24 For three recent statements of IAF, IN, and army thought on first-strike or pre-emptive war, and the relationship to deterrence (especially of Pakistan) see, "India's Defense Policy and Doctrine for 1980s," the keynote address by CAS Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh, before the Second Annual Session of the National Congress for Defense Studies, Poon University, June 7, 1982, 'The

Pre-Emptive Naval Strike in Limited Wars,' by Cdr K R Menon, I N , U S I of India Journal, Jan March, 1978, pp 46-54, and Deep Thrust," by Lt Col J K Dutt, U S I of India Journal, Jan -March 1978, pp 69-74

25 Speech to NDC, reported in FBIS, Nov 24, 1981, as taken from Delhi station of AIR

26 I reviewed the literature produced by the 1962 war in "India's China War and After," Journal of Asian Studies, Aug , 1971, 847-857 Since then, a number of additional important books have been published, triggered off by Lt Col J R Saigal, The Unfought War (Bombay Allied, 1979) which charges the senior military leadership with incompetence, one of the NEFA divisional commanders has his rejoinder in Niringan Prasad, The Fall of Towang, 1962 (New Delhi Palit and Palit, 1981)

27 P C Lal, who must have looked up the evidence after he became Chief of the Air Staff, claims that Krishna Menon never even informed the Indian Air Force that India was going to war with China

28 Gen J N Chaudhuri, India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies (New Delhi U S I of India, 1973), Second Lecture, pp 42 ff

29 Well within the range of possibility are the planned defenses of the vulnerable offshore oil rigs in the Arabian Sea, the Indian Navy has devoted considerable study to this problem, and articles on the subject are available in some Indian military journals

30 For a sampling of Indian military attitudes towards nuclear weapons, see E A Vas, "The Bomb," U S I of India Journal, Oct -Dec 1967, 309-320 , 'A Nuclear Policy for India," U S I of India Journal, Jan -March, 1969, p 27 and D K Palit, ed , Nuclear Shadow over India, U S I of India, 1981

31 For surveys of the defense policy process see Subrahmanyam citations below

and A L Venkateshwaran, Defence Organisation in India (New Delhi Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1967), P V R Rao, India's Defense Organization Since Independence (New Delhi U S I of India, 1977), P R Char1, "Civil Military Relations in India," Armed Forces and Society, Vol 4, No 1, November 1977, 3-28, and Jerrold F Elkin and W Andrew Ritezel, "The Debate on Restructuring India's Higher Defense Organization," Asian Survey, Vol 24, No 10, October, 1984, 1069-1085 For an excellent survey of the defense budgeting process see Raju Thomas, The Defense of India (Delhi MacMillan, 1978)

32 Char1, p 13

33 Venkateshwaran, p 125 However, the most perceptive analyst and critic of the Indian defense policy process (and the weakness of both civilian and military personnel) is K Subrahmanyam He was also instrumental in getting the military to undertake operations research in the mid-60s See 'The Cultural Dimension of Managerial Reform,' Defense Manager [Management], Oct , 1974, 10-16 Also, his books contain references to the problem of defense organization in India See especially Perspectives in Defense Planning (New Delhi Abhinav, 1972) and Defense and Development (Calcutta Minerva, 1973)

34 The military have now begun attacking the process in earnest Defense Manager (Later titled Defense Management) has carried several perceptive articles criticizing the present system as cumbersome, inefficient, and wasteful For an explicit reference to Venkateshwaran, arguing a "crying need at the moment to decentralize decision-making in the higher echelons" see Brig V Nagabhusan, "Management of Defense Effort," Defense Manager, Oct , 1974, 20-25 The author, an engineer serving with a corps headquarters, suggests that the service headquarters should not only be the originators and implementers of

plans but "should also be vested with adequate authority in both the spheres of approval of plans and apportioning of financial resources -- within the gambit of approved policies and appropriations " In other words, no civilian bureaucratic interference

35 Maharaj K Chopra, India The Search for Power (Bombay Lalvani, 1969) p 245 f

36 Gen Krishna Rao's suggestion that there should be a chairman of the JCS was promptly refuted by Indira Gandhi's civilian defense minister, R Venkataraman The subject was extensively discussed in the Indian press, see Indian Express, June 5, 1982 and Times of India, July 14, 1982, and Elkin and Ritezel

37 K Subrahmanyam, who is less concerned about civilian control than an effective system of decision-making and war fighting is in favor of a Chief of the Joint Chiefs or a Chief of the Defense Staff, but wants a truly multi-service staff to be built up before the appointment, and then to be followed by giving the actual command of combat units to this CDS/CJCS system He sees individual service parochialism and pride as a barrier to good defense management, not as an aid to a "divide and rule" system of civilian control "Chief of Defense Staff for India," Defense Manager, April, 1975, 5-8

38 Sinha had taken over as Vice-Chief of the Army Staff in January, 1983, expecting to become Chief a year later Instead Vaidya's appointment was announced on May 31, 1983 Sinha is the author of two military books and an important study on Indian defense organization, Higher Defense Organization in India (New Delhi USI of India, 1980) The best account of the whole episode is in India Today, December 31, 1983

39 Both stories in The Hindu International Edition, January 8, 1983

40 See The Statesman, Calcutta, June 4, 1983, Kuldip Nayar, various columns reprinted in India Abroad, June 17, 1983 and The Muslim (Islamabad), June 28, 1983

41 The most influential of these has been Neville Maxwell, who has written that the 1965 war brought the Indian Army into a position of respect and influence within the state parallel to that which the Pakistan Army had enjoyed from the beginning," that the deterioration of the Indian polity was creating a "vacuum", and that "military government would solve few if any of India's problems, but unless present trends are reversed continued avoidance of military intervention in the 1970s would be more surprising than intervention itself " Times (London), January 28, 1969

42 Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, "Generals and Politicians in India," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 1964, pp 5-19

43 See, for example, June Kronholz, "The Big Indian Army is Tough, Respected, Keeps out of Politics," Wall Street Journal, September 16, 1981, Mohan Ram, "The Generals Stand Aloof," Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb 27, 1981, and Salamat Ali, "In Step with Tradition," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 31, 1984

44 This anger at politicians was muted in 1962 because the military's own performance was so dismal. However, it permeates the large formal and informal literature generated by retired officers, and is present -- often in carefully worded terms -- in some studies written by serving officers. Even the late Air Chief Marshal, P C Lal, India's most distinguished air force officer, has written of his discontent and disappointment with inept civilians.

45 Lieut -Gen S K Sinha, Of Matters Military (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1980), p 37. For a discussion of the armed forces expanding aid to the civil power activities see Jerrold F. Elkin and W. Andrew Ritezel, "Military Role

Expansion in India,' forthcoming

46 For an analysis see A G Noorani, 'The Terrorist Ordinance,' Economic and Political Weekly, July 28, 1984

47 Brig A R Siddiqi (ret), "Indian Army in Assam Some Implications," Dawn, Lahore, Feb 23, 1983 Kuldip Nayar has similarly written about the ambiguous role that the Indian Army played in the removal of Dr Farooq Abdullah as Chief Minister of Kashmir, suggesting that the dependency of the Indian government on the military was more and more resembling Pakistan's earlier experiences The Telegraph, Calcutta, July 24, 1984

48 The question of political influence in the military has been hotly debated in the military, especially since Indira Gandhi came to power For two contrasting views see Brig N B Grant, 'The Committed Soldier,' U S I of India Journal, April-June, 1974, pp 134-137 and Brig J Nazareth, U S I of I Journal, July-September, 1972, pp 228 ff Grant argues that some compromise with Indira Gandhi's call for 'deeply involved, deeply committed' civil servants cannot help but be applied to the military Nazareth takes a much tougher line against "the danger of being infected" since the armed forces were once before "emasculated by unscrupulous politicians" it could happen again, democratic armies face a greater danger than those in dictatorships for they are under greater political pressures to conform, the triple threat of becoming physically flabby, infected with 'the lust for money or personal gain' and "political interference" all confront the Indian Army, and only strict adherence to professional standards can preserve the military itself, and in the long run the state it defends

49 Stephen P Cohen, "The Military," in Henry C Hart, ed , Indira Gandhi's India (Boulder Westview press, 1976) p 210

50 Romesh Thapar, An Indian Future (New Delhi Allied, 1981) See also "The Military Establishment," Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, May 12, 1979, and "The Militarisation of Indian Politics," EPW, July 28, 1984

51 Brig N B Grant, "Apolitical or Committed?," Hindustan Times, September 3, 1984

52 Those concerned about the possible Pakistanization of India might consult Stephen P Cohen, The Pakistan Army, and Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore Progressive, 1976)

53 The Telegraph (Calcutta), November 11, 1984 and Washington Post, November 1, 1984

54 The Indian Navy and Indian Air Force do not recruit by class Some of the army branches, e g engineers, recruit on a territorial basis Thus, Sikhs living in South India can join the Madras Sappers, and Sikhs living anywhere in India can join the IAF and IN

55 Cohen, The Indian Army, pp 187 ff

56 Sainik Samachar, January 1981, p 8

57 I have seen different estimates of the number of Sikhs in the Indian armed forces The Economist (June 16, 1984) states that the two Sikh regiments together account for about 16,000 soldiers (roughly equivalent to a full division), but that the total number of Sikhs in the army is about 95,000, implying that there are about 79,000 Sikhs in other infantry regiments and in various other fighting and support arms Sanjoy Hazarika of the New York Times has quoted a "military analyst" that there were about 20,000 Sikhs in the Indian army, or 2% of its strength (June 14, 1984) This figure must exclude Sikhs outside of their two regiments No source gives figures for Sikhs in the IAF and IN, but the percentage of pilots must be very high, as all pilots are

officers, and there are many more Sikh officers in the armed forces than other ranks -- perhaps 20-25% of the total

58 "All Sikh traditions, whether national or religious, are martial, in times of political excitement -- and to the Sikhs politics and religion are closely allied -- the militant spirit re-asserts itself " Maj A E Barstow, 2/11th Sikh Regiment, Sikhs (Handbooks for the Indian Army, Calcutta, Central Publications Branch, 1928), p 40 This is one of the recruiting handbooks written for officers commanding particular regiments, in this case, Sikhs

59 Cohen, The Indian Army, p 190

60 These figures from Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Sikhs and the Indian Army," The Muslim (Islamabad), April 29, 1984

61 Tavleen Singh, "Bhindranwale's Generals," The Telegraph, Calcutta, June 18, 1984

62 Ibid

63 Shubeg Singh was the "worst victim" of official media distortion, according to one study of official media after Operation Bluestar See Pritam Singh, "AIR and Doordarshan Coverage of Punjab after Army Action," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 19, No 36, September 8, 1984

64 See Bhullar, "Akali Agitation and the Services," Illustrated Weekly of India, April 10, 1983, and, for his post-Bluestar views, India Abroad, November 9, 1984, after he became secretary general of the WSO

65 The Supreme Court has been petitioned, alleging prolonged torture and inhuman treatment of imprisoned mutineers by the army authorities, and a public statement has been issued by Lieut -Gen Harbaksh Singh (ret), reiterating these charges, and explaining the religious background of the Sikh soldiers' actions For a critical view of Harbaksh's statement, see "Using Religion,"

Economic and Political Weekly, September 8, 1984

66 This sense of hurt and alienation is vividly present in much of the literature distributed overseas by various Sikh groups and individuals For a perceptive analysis see Jaswant Singh, "Punjab The Challenge Within," Illustrated Weekly of India, June 24-30, 1984, and for an eyewitness report of martial law in the Punjab see Sahnaz Anklesaria, "Fall-out of Army Action A Field Report," Economic and Political Weekly, July 28, 1984

67 Pakistanis, who have reason to be pleased at the opportunities presented to them by the disaffection of the Sikhs, are cautious in their support of Khalistan The new-found similarities between Sikhism and Islam could rapidly fade, although maps of the erstwhile Khalistan do not include any Pakistani territory, historic Sikh kingdoms included much of what is now Pakistani Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province, finally, "Khalistanis" openly speak of "balancing" Pakistan and India From a Pakistani perspective, therefore, support for Khalistan not only risks alienating and angering India but -- should it be successful -- might worsen Pakistan's strategic position, let alone stimulate its own internal dissidents to renewed action

68 Some of the leading supporters of Khalistan claim that it will become an anti-communist ally of the United States, and with Israel, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, will form a tier of religious-based states that will contain the Soviet Union They also claim that Khalistan can survive by "balancing" India and Pakistan, and by manipulating supplies of food grains and water to these states Some of the more realistic supporters of Khalistan acknowledge the difficulties it would face, but feel that their allegiance to the Indian union has been permanently severed, and foresee civil war, mass migrations, or the "Palestinization of Armenianization" of the Sikhs

69 See the Press Trust of India story, "Forces Being Denigrated," based on Ministry of Defense 'sources' which attack those who would "denigrate" the military in the press, as well as those who have forgotten the sacrifice of the army in the Golden Temple. Presumably, such sources are senior army officers, angry at the sympathy given to the 2,000 or so Sikh soldiers who had mutinied. Also see "Leave the Army Alone," editorial, Times of India, Bombay, November 28, 1984, which also attacks "lurid" and exaggerated press reports of army brutality.

70 Girilal Jain, "Army in Supportive role," Times of India, Bombay, and Romesh Thapar, "The Militarization of Indian Politics," Economic and Political Weekly, July 28, 1984.

71 For a discussion of Tripura's "Special Force Battalion," see The Statesman (Calcutta), December 12, 1984.

72 An excellent discussion of federal aspects of the law and order problem is in several chapters of Abhijit Datta, ed., Union-State Relations (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1984), especially chapters and comments by K. K. Dass, G. C. Singhvi, and Amal Ray.

73 After Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, Lieut.-Gen. G. S. Rawat (Vice-Chief of the Army Staff) summarized the situation in a press interview: the army played a "vital role" in bringing the situation "totally under control," it was on a "mission of peace," and had to frustrate all attempts "to undermine the stability and integrity of the country," whether from within or without. The delay of four days in restoring normalcy was explained by the fact that the army had to move units from some considerable distance to occupy all or parts of the states of Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, West Bengal and Tripura, as well as Delhi and many other cities, Times of India, Bombay,

November 6, 1984 However, other reports indicate that much of the army was being diverted to the Pakistani frontier for annual maneuvers and that the actual aid-to-the-civil operations in Delhi were incompetently managed For example, the public was told that the army had arrived in Delhi on November 1, but it did not show up in force until three days later, nor was a joint army-police command post established, and army officers have complained of inadequate or misleading police and civilian intelligence See Richard Nations, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 15, 1984 and "Who are the Guilty," Economic and Political Weekly, Nov 24, 1984, a summary of the findings of the Indian People's Union for Democratic Rights and People's Union for Civil Liberties on the causes and consequences of the Delhi riots