

**INDIA, SOUTH ASIA
AND THE SUPERPOWERS
WAR AND SOCIETY**


March, 1983

Stephen P Cohen

Program in Arms Control, Disarmament
and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
330 Davenport Hall
607 South Mathews Street
Urbana, Illinois 61801

LIBRARY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

NOTICE According to Sec 19
(a) of the University Statutes
all books and other library
materials acquired in any man-
ner by the University belong to
the University Library. When
this item is no longer needed
by the department it should
be returned to the Acquisition
Department University Library



INDIA SOUTH ASIA AND THE SUPERPOWERS
WAR AND SOCIETY

Stephen P Cohen

University of Illinois at Urbana

Revised March 3 1983

A Paper Presented to the Richard L Park Memorial Symposium
REGION AND NATION IN INDIA at the University of Wisconsin Madison
November 3-4 1982

DRAFT COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS WELCOME NO QUOTATION OR CITATION
WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

PROLOGUE

Dick Park played a critical role in my decision to go to South Asia and to pursue my interest in comparative military sociology strategy and foreign policy. He persuaded me in 1961 that such work would be of interest to the scholarly community and that it was feasible to carry out my research in India. I was particularly gratified therefore when he asked me to collaborate on what turned out to be his last book India Emergent Power? and still impressed at his analytical powers. This paper builds on some ideas we discussed in the writing of that book but were not able to incorporate. I will above all miss his criticism and support.

I STATE AND REGION

Regionalist theory has usually emphasized the growth of trade commerce cultural relations linguistic commonality and even mail flow to identify a growing "region" Such regions were in the 1950s and 1960s thought to be the natural successor to individual nationalisms Against this standard South Asia was an area of declining regionality through the 1950s and especially after 1965 when civilian ties between India and Pakistan were sharply limited Indeed some informed Indian writing made the argument that these ties only served to exacerbate Indo-Pakistan conflict and welcomed Pakistan's attempts to become in spirit (if not geography) a West Asian or Islamic state ¹

I have always regarded the regionalistic school as excessively ethnocentric for the only region ever really studied carefully was Europe and the Western half at that It strikes me as self-evident that India in itself represents a "region" in terms of its size and diversity--together a match for Europe Latin America or Africa--and that the accomplishment of thirty-five years in keeping this "region" intact has been a minor miracle of our time This can also be said of even a truncated Pakistan still a diverse sprawling and substantial political entity

But what of "South Asia" (or the "Indian Subcontinent" as some would have it)? Can we speak of regionalism in the classical sense? Obviously not the two biggest South Asian states have been locked in conflict since 1947 and are now on the verge of nuclearizing their arms race Even in its relations with its smaller neighbors India can hardly be said to enjoy a cordial relationship as disputes over

immigration water food trade transit and Bombay films are continuing sources of irritation

This is a far cry from the South Asia envisaged by Nehru Gandhi or even Jinnah² While divided the future shape of the Subcontinent they were agreed that the region's military forces should face outward not inward Instead relations between India and Pakistan (and at times India and impoverished Bangladesh) have become highly militarized with at least a million armed men two thousand tanks and about a thousand sophisticated aircraft (some now proudly manufactured in the region) poised for action

This essay attempts to assess this new regionalism' one in which the major regional states are locked together in an ambiguous embrace of love and hate expectation and dread Indeed it seems that many regional states are tied together more firmly by their mutual fear suspicion and distrust than they are by mutual trade or commerce--hate and fear can be as strong a bond as greed We will focus on the structure and etiology of regional conflict seeing it as a perverse form of regionalism our argument will be that while some degree of conflict is inherent in structural and physical disparities between the South Asian states recent strategic developments present new opportunities as well as new perils in the move from the present system of regional hostility to another arrangement of the pieces

II THE STRUCTURE OF SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT TYPOLOGIES

Armed conflict in South Asia has three striking attributes First it has occurred frequently and with increasing intensity From the time the British withdrew from the Subcontinent in 1947 there have been four major and several minor inter-state wars³ Several of

these have had momentous political and human consequences. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war led to the only successful partitioning of a post-colonial state. The same war saw the deaths of hundreds of thousands (some claim millions) of civilians, as did the riots preceding and accompanying Partition. Second, these wars have been quite diverse in nature. Some have involved infantry, armor, and air battles which were modelled on the classic World War II pattern; others have had elements of "national liberation war" and still others have been internal wars in which peripheral areas have sought autonomy or independence. Third, the conflicts of South Asia carry an increasing potential for destructiveness. Despite the occasional extensive loss of civilian casualties, there has been some sense of a "gentlemen's agreement" between at least India and Pakistan; even the Chinese were restrained in not bombing population centers during the 1962 war. This may not hold true in the future, as both the political stakes may have increased for all parties concerned and the region is on the brink of a quantum jump of sheer destructive power. Afghanistan, which must be included in any comprehensive definition of South Asia, would be a grim precursor of things to come, with its shattered social infrastructure, a Soviet army of occupation, and a quarter of its population driven beyond its borders or dead. The conflicts of South Asia fall into five categories. The first are the wars fought between India and Pakistan proper. In a sense, these would not have been fought had Partition not created two separate states in 1947. These wars--1947, 1965, 1971--have involved enormous numbers of troops and billions of dollars of military equipment, virtually all of it once obtained from abroad but now increasingly fabricated in the two

states Indo-Pakistan conflict has a special quality about it more than one general on either side has characterized these struggles as a "communal riot with armor " The very identity of Pakistan (an avowedly Islamic state) and India (a secular state with a large Hindu majority) stand as a challenge to the other even communal riots within these states have contributed to war between the two The continuing struggle over Kashmir--with its predominately Muslim population under Indian control--is widely described as either one of the main causes of conflict between the two states or as a consequence of their mutual distrust it may be both at the same time ⁴

Kashmir is also the last example of an obsolete kind of war wars of national consolidation When India was partitioned there were a number of semi-autonomous princely states remaining in the Subcontinent when some of them hesitated to join India or Pakistan force was quickly applied to bring them under control No princely state has been allowed to maintain even token armed forces and the identities of such states have been obliterated completely in India ⁵ Pakistan retains some of them for administrative purposes but they are largely run by the central government in Islamabad While they are primarily of historical interest today it must be remembered that some of these princely states were vast and well established identities (Hyderabad in central India had sixteen million people and a substantial army) and their absorption was a major challenge to the new states of India and Pakistan India's military conquest of Portuguese territories in 1961 falls into this category although Goa was not a princely state

A third variety of conflict in South Asia involves the struggle of the periphery against the center. In both India and Pakistan there are major tribal populations--in India's Northeast Nagas, Mizos, and others, and in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan Pathans and Baluchis, who are part of the world's largest remaining tribal society. In India there is also a second 'periphery' located in the isolated tribal belts areas of several major states (especially West Bengal, Bihar, and Andhra). Many of these areas were allowed considerable autonomy by the British, and some tribal groups expected that independence would continue this pattern.⁶

Even today there are large areas of India and Pakistan where normal administrative procedures do not apply, and tribal customs exist without serious interference from central government officials. In some regions in both states special para-military units have been raised from local populations (but commanded by officers on deputation from the army) to provide a token governmental presence and to watch the frontiers. These are backed up by regular army units, where tribal power spills over into a campaign for independence, then neither state has hesitated to use massive ground and air power to assert national sovereignty. This task is complicated because many tribal groups (especially in Pakistan) have close ties across the international frontier and move freely back and forth using foreign territory as a safe-haven. In India some groups resent the encroachment of plains Indians and fear the destruction of their tribal culture, and in a few regions tribal and poor peasant groups have been mobilized along classic Maoist revolutionary lines. In dealing with these conflicts both India and Pakistan have carefully studied counter-insurgency

doctrine and in several cases have made their own contribution to this branch of the science of war

A fourth variety of conflict in South Asia has pitted regional states against non-regional powers. The 1962 Sino-Indian war in the Himalayas and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union are best seen as the latest examples of a long search for influence if not dominance in the limitrophic shatter-zone. The names of the players have changed but elements of the "great game" remain. It still does matter to China, the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan who controls the marchland across their borders. States such as Nepal and Afghanistan have survived by maintaining a tenuous balance between their powerful neighbors; recent events in the latter indicate how tenuous it is and how great is the price of miscalculation. For India and Pakistan the situation is further complicated by the sometimes confusing role that the U.S. has played for at least twenty years. While motivated primarily by considerations of anti-communism, American support has necessarily affected the relationship between these two states, sometimes defeating the original purpose of assistance. One symbolic but important example will suffice. In 1962 the nuclear aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal to demonstrate support for the Indians in their struggle against Communist China. Exactly nine years later the Enterprise again sailed into the Bay, this time in an implied threat to India and to demonstrate to China that it was willing to support their mutual ally, Pakistan.

Finally, we must also note the possibility of a fifth type of conflict in South Asia: nuclear war. It is conceivable that within the next few years both India and Pakistan will have acquired the

capability of delivering at least a few nuclear weapons India's nuclear objectives are probably quite ambitious a missile system capable of reaching China Pakistan 'only' seeks a few weapons to deter India In either case there are major implications for the way in which these two states might fight a conventional war in the future a nuclear weapon will force major changes in strategy and tactics it might also provide the umbrella under which massive conventional wars can take place--just as it might make the dangers of escalation so great that such wars will never occur again And of great importance will be the implications of an Indian or Pakistani nuclear system on the war plans of the major nuclear powers (two of which adjoin the region)

These calculations of the interaction between levels of violence are not new to the region Historically there has always been a linkage at a lower level of violence between Indian and Pakistani capacity to control insurrection and outright conventional war the 1947 war over Kashmir the 1962 Sino-Indian war the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and the 1971 war in East Pakistan all began as low-level conflicts and escalated when one side or the other saw that it was losing or that a higher level of violence might work to its relative advantage The ease with which the region has slipped into large-scale war does not offer much reassurance for the future

III IMAGES OF WAR

The image of South Asia held in the West is that of a poor overcrowded region whose states are unnecessarily diverting resources to weaponry and away from peaceful economic pursuits From this perspective the level of poverty is so great that it exceeds the

horrors of war thus Indian and Pakistani arms budgets are immoral in a way that such expenditures in the West are not. Since such poverty is self-evident and pernicious and the disasters of war are clearly man-made and perverse the regimes which devote any resources to expenditures beyond those necessary for internal order are either stupid or delinquent. Therefore either a program of education or pressure or both is justified on the part of the liberal West in dealing with Indians, Pakistanis and others who wish to purchase our advanced jet fighters, our tanks or (most recently) our nuclear fuel.

Reinforcing the view that war is a luxury that the poor cannot afford is another perspective: nuclear war is a danger that man cannot risk. Since the introduction of nuclear weapons this argument has dominated the American strategic literature. All wars, even those between weak regional powers, run the risk of escalation. Ultimately this means the employment of nuclear weapons and no rational purpose can be served by a nuclear exchange. "Limited" wars may be possible but even conservative strategists do not advocate them lightly. When regional states approach or step across the nuclear threshold then the risks and costs of regional war increase in geometrical progression. Even if the superpowers are not sucked into regional nuclear conflicts the physical and political fallout (including the proliferation of weapons to Africa and Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia) affects us all.

Whatever the degree of truth contained within these images they are not widely shared by the security elites of South Asia.⁸ While the region is usually associated with philosophies of non-violence and non-alignment, Indian and Pakistani elites in fact have a world-view

strongly shaped by war and the threat of war

First there is a widespread--and not entirely inaccurate--impression that the region lost its independence because of an inability to adjust to modern warfare in the 17th Century. The colonial powers--Portugal, Holland, France, and finally the British--brought not only superior weaponry but also superior methods of military organization. A lesson from this period is that independence and freedom is not only dependent upon a willingness to fight, but on the possession of the most modern military technology.

Second, independence was partially achieved by the threat of violence--more precisely because the British were unable and unwilling to use force to contain the wave of rebellion that swept over India in 1946. The Royal Indian Navy had mutinied, discharged soldiers were being formed into guerilla and robber bands, terrorism and sabotage were increasing, the political parties were mobilizing for direct action, and no one was able to stop the spreading communal riots. Both India and Pakistan were born to the accompaniment of one of this century's most terrible mass slaughters, and the knowledge that they could recur is one of the unspoken assumptions of regional relations.

Third, these communal riots were followed by a direct struggle between India and Pakistan for control over Kashmir. Even though their respective armies were commanded by British generals (and for a while there was a joint British command), an inconclusive war broke out thirty-three years later. Indian and Pakistani troops today face each other across the same cease-fire line.

Indians and Pakistanis see a direct linkage between the events of

strongly shaped by war and the threat of war

First there is a widespread--and not entirely inaccurate--impression that the region lost its independence because of an inability to adjust to modern warfare in the 17th Century. The colonial powers--Portugal, Holland, France, and finally the British--brought not only superior weaponry but also superior methods of military organization. A lesson from this period is that independence and freedom is not only dependent upon a willingness to fight, but on the possession of the most modern military technology.

Second, independence was partially achieved by the threat of violence--more precisely because the British were unable and unwilling to use force to contain the wave of rebellion that swept over India in 1946. The Royal Indian Navy had mutinied, discharged soldiers were being formed into guerilla and robber bands, terrorism and sabotage were increasing, the political parties were mobilizing for direct action, and no one was able to stop the spreading communal riots. Both India and Pakistan were born to the accompaniment of one of this century's most terrible mass slaughters, and the knowledge that they could recur is one of the unspoken assumptions of regional relations.

Third, these communal riots were followed by a direct struggle between India and Pakistan for control over Kashmir. Even though their respective armies were commanded by British generals (and for a while there was a joint British command), an inconclusive war broke out thirty-three years later. Indian and Pakistani troops today face each other across the same cease-fire line.

Indians and Pakistanis see a direct linkage between the events of

1947 and their present political and military stalemate. The 1947 war led to the rearmament of India and Pakistan and this in turn almost triggered a war in the 1950s after India was plunged into a major conflict with China in 1962 it received some military grant and sales assistance from the West.⁹ This aid shifted the balance between India and Pakistan and shaped perceptions and expectations in both states leading to a minor skirmish and then a major war in 1965 again over Kashmir. The way in which this war was fought shaped internal Pakistani expectations and fanned secessionist feelings in East Pakistan when these feelings were expressed through the ballot box and a civil uprising they led to the events (especially the mass movement of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan into India) which caused India to consider its options and then assume de facto direction of the Bangladesh liberation movement. A full-scale invasion in the East led directly to the creation of the new state of Bangladesh. But during that war a decision was taken by India which prepared the ground for a new kind of escalation. Concerned about India's lack of political support and the outright hostility of Pakistan's powerful allies, Indira Gandhi authorized work on a nuclear explosive device apparently immediately after the 1971 war. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initiated Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and the stage was set for a nuclear arms race. In brief, some of the most significant events in the Subcontinent have been war-related and war itself has had major unanticipated consequences.

Fourth, both states found themselves occupying territory which was deemed strategic by others. Pakistan overlooks the approach to the Persian Gulf and shares a border with Iran. It has a long (and

disputed) border with Afghanistan and controls Afghanistan's access to the sea it is thus the legatee of the British Indian Empire in its relations with the Russians. The Indians share a long frontier with China a frontier which is still in open dispute. Even if these two new states had tried to ignore their proximity to Russia and China they were encouraged to exploit it by the Western powers who were eager to erect barriers to communist expansionism.

Fifth there are a number of latent and active regional disputes which have led to threats of force and may yet result in open warfare. One such dispute is over the distribution of water resources which are shared by several countries. India and Pakistan once barely managed to avert open conflict over this issue and more recently there have been differences between India, Nepal and Bangladesh over the use of Ganges and Brahmaputra waters.¹⁰ Two similar issues are the treatment of immigrant or ethnic minorities (Nepalis in India, Indians in Sri Lanka) and the access through one South Asian state to another or to the sea (Nepal through India, Afghanistan through Pakistan). There is little regional cooperation on such matters. This is partly because of the difficulty of compromise when resources are inadequate for one state let alone two but partly because of the different strategic perspectives of India and its smaller neighbors. Hawkish Indians argue that regional cooperation will come when the smaller states of the region acknowledge India's dominance as a regional great power. India could then afford to be generous in such negotiations. Some of India's neighbors remain skeptical and insist (as does Pakistan) on the retention of a substantial military capability to defend interests. Others seek regional arrangements so that they ought

to present a more united front to their giant neighbor. Should India grow impatient with the attempts of its smaller neighbors to assert their independence it is not inconceivable that it will use force to bring them into line as it used force against Hyderabad, Junagadh, Goa, Kashmir, and more recently Sikkim.

Finally, both states have been continuously active within their own territories in suppressing tribal and regional revolt. Some of these have been easy to manage, others (such as the Naga and Mizo rebellions) are semi-permanent in nature. They stand as vivid reminders that the power of the central governments of India and Pakistan extend only as far as effective military force can be applied, even if the application of that force generates its own resentment among Baluchis, Pathans, Mizos, Nagas, and others.

To summarize some of the experiences and images of war in South Asia in proposition form, these seem to be most important:

---The world is neo-Hobbesian--in regional terms the cynical Kautilya still provides guidance for many Indians and martial Islam for many Pakistanis; no one can be trusted unless one has the power to enforce an agreement.

---Indo-Pakistan relations (and to a lesser degree Indo-Bangladesh relations) are still affected by communal and religious tension; this means that the very identity of one state is a challenge to the identity of the other; it also means that the internal management of minority groups (Muslims in India, Hindus in Bangladesh, Tamils in Sri Lanka) is not merely a domestic but an international problem as well.

---Self-reliance is vital. This view came early to India, more

recently to Pakistan Without its external arms suppliers will exploit the nation's vulnerability during wartime and attempt to manipulate regional relations

---For India regional war can best be prevented by the existence of a single dominant and tolerant regional great power (itself) India has achieved this dominance vis a vis Bangladesh Nepal and Sri Lanka but not Pakistan

---For Pakistan regional war can best be prevented by the possession of countervailing military power a close association of the smaller states which surround India and the support of friendly external powers

---The borders of South Asia are long permeable to protect and highly susceptible to penetration from the outside Subversion of restless domestic tribes and ethnic minorities by outsiders is expected

---Both India and Pakistan believe that they face multiple military threats India from China and Pakistan Pakistan from India and the Soviet Union they are thus particularly resistant to suggestions that they settle their own bi-lateral disputes since such disputes have long since become entangled with broader Sino-Soviet and U S - Soviet conflicts

---Despite the presumed manageability of war it can have profound and unexpected domestic political consequences

---Nuclear weapons are most likely to be used when one state possesses them and another does not the only historical example of their actual use in wartime is "proof" of this assertion

IV MILITARISM THE MILITARY AND POLITICS

It is widely thought that war is an effective means of

centralizing state power yet some evidence suggests that war is feared by ruling elites as threatening to their power. The experience of South Asia supports both arguments. 'preparation for war' 'militancy' in Stanislaw Andreski's terms is a device used by elites of India and Pakistan to enhance their own power and that of the central governments. Yet these elites are aware that actual warfare can lead to unpredictable results and that after every major conflict the power of central leaders has suffered. This is most obviously true after military defeat (India in 1962, Pakistan in 1971) but it is also true to some degree after military stalemate (Ayub's decline began after Pakistan fought to a draw in 1965 when victory was expected). Even victory proved costly to Indira Gandhi after 1971 she managed to consolidate her own power but the cost of the war affected Indian economic growth and the euphoria generated by the defeat of Pakistan may have raised popular expectations to unfulfillable levels. In the long run security elites of both states would seem to find a state of no-war no-peace to be an optimum situation. It allows them to internationalize domestic problems (such as the treatment of religious or ethnic minorities) and domesticate international problems (the status of Kashmir, the support of insurgents by external powers) a degree of international tension justifies the continued build-up of state-owned defense production facilities, work on nuclear explosives and an evasive attitude toward regional detente. a degree of domestic tension justifies the maintenance of preventive detention laws or martial law, censorship of the press and an elaborate domestic intelligence network. it is hard to govern India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the best of times even without the advantage of such

arrangements

While the politics of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are all characterized by this civilian militarism, there are important differences between India on the one hand and Pakistan and Bangladesh on the other in the degree and effectiveness of actual civilian control over the military.

India is the surprise of the Third World in that its army has not played a significant role in politics. This has not prevented outside observers from predicting the imminent intervention of the generals following the example set by Pakistan and even Bangladesh. The most superficial examination of these countries indicates why the military have not intervened in India, although it also points to some weaknesses in the system. First and foremost, Indian civilian politicians and civil servants retained a complex administrative and fiscal control system instituted by the British in the early 20th Century. Secondly, and of utmost importance, Indian politicians managed their affairs in such a way as to provide at least reasonably effective government and accepted a good portion of the blame for the military defeat of 1962. In Pakistan, the military were less competent but more important for the survival of the state and as they began to interfere in politics as early as 1953, this praetorianism provided both an excuse and a way out for the political community to escape its responsibility to govern. Only Bhutto saw the problem clearly but he lacked the personal qualities which would enable him both to govern effectively and pacify the military. A similar situation occurred in Bangladesh when it became clear that Mujibur Rahman was not equal to what may have been an impossible task.

There is considerable self-satisfaction among Indians at their nearly unique achievement and they tend to assume that their generals will never stage a coup. In fact there has been a slow accretion of power by the military partly because civilians are extremely attentive to their requests for modern weapons but also because the Indian political system has entered a period of enormous uncertainty. Defense has become a politically important ministry because of the patronage it commands and because of its association with the military it was used subtly by several defense ministers to enhance their own power and quite crudely for the same purpose by Bansi Lal. It is possible that should no clear leadership emerge from the present political disorder in India that the military will be consulted by one political faction or another (or by Mrs. Gandhi herself) there was some indication that this occurred during the Emergency and if the process continued over a period of years the end of the decade could find the Indian military confronted with the same dilemma faced by the Pakistan and Bangladesh armies in recent years.¹¹ If the chaos of politics begins to affect preparedness of the country does the military itself have an obligation to itself and to the state to support those groups (or intervene itself) to restore order and stability? I doubt that this will occur soon but continued political disorder a renewal of conflict with one or more neighbors and the nuclearization of the region could change the context in which civilian control is presently exercised and prove the pessimists correct.

V ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC FUTURES

When Dick Park and I wrote about India's emergence as a regional dominant power we were engaged in a task of persuasion rather than one

of prediction. Indeed, even the Nixon Administration had admitted India's dominant regional status by 1972, we were belaboring the obvious, although there are still some who refuse to acknowledge the realities of the situation.¹²

What we were not sensitive to were the possible variations implied in the regional-dominant position and the influence that outside powers might have on regional balances (or more properly imbalances). We did suggest the possibility of Pakistan developing close ties with the Soviet Union. This was seemingly an outlandish idea, but in fact, one quite popular in Pakistan even today, and even among the not-so-pro-American Pakistan military.¹³

Predictions about the future are risky, but there will be a future. T. S. Eliot made the point when he wrote that "We cannot think of a future that is not liable like the past to have no destination," and he muses (along with Krishna--most appropriately for this essay) that the future remains "pressed between yellow leaves of a book that has never been opened." Without presuming to open the book, it is possible to suggest the range of likely futures in five or ten years from now. What will the regional structure of South Asia be then? Will we look back to 1982 or 1983 (as we might look back to 1963-4 or 1968-9, two critical years) and say that if only this or that had been done, then the region would be quite different?

Excluding the improbable, the unlikely, or the unpredictable (nuclear war, unprecedented mass famine, destructive political chaos), but assuming a continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan, dependence on Middle Eastern oil, and new accretions of nuclear technology, what is the range of the near-term future? I see four alternative regional

security structures

1) India vs Pakistan

Essentially a continuation of thirty-four years of hostility between India and Pakistan with each seeking and obtaining support from one or more outside powers. The alignment might remain India + U S S R vs Pakistan + PRC and U S A. The rivalry between the two subcontinental powers is likely to be nuclearized perhaps extended to the Gulf (where each will have to harmonize its interests with its superpower patron) and above all remain unstable. Both sides will be prepared for conventional war have adopted a first-strike doctrine and will be trying to figure out how to utilize nuclear weapons for tactical as well as strategic purposes. This is a regional system with a high degree of instability.

2) India vs Pakistan managed by U S S R

This system is likely only if there is a major change of government in Pakistan. The Soviet Union may then emerge as the "balancer" of South Asia inducing and threatening both regional powers into cooperation. Conceivably the Soviet Union might find a fully cooperative Pakistan amenable to "Finlandization" now openly advocated by some Pakistani intellectuals and abandon its support for India altogether in favor of the strategically equally useful Pakistan.

3) Indian domination

An exasperated India concerned about a competing rival supplied by outside powers and on the verge of nuclearization may simplify regional relations by eliminating Pakistan as a military power. A re-vivisected Pakistan (with an independent but disarmed West Punjab) would not tilt the balance of Indian domestic politics and would only temporarily

complicate India's relations with the Gulf States but it would put Indian and Soviet troops across the border (the Indus?) from each other unless India was willing to continue its balancing role vis a vis China it would not find the Soviets generous in the distribution of spheres of influence and a variation of #2 might emerge

4) India as regional leader by consensus

A system in which Indian economic and military dominance is apparent and accepted but other regional states are allowed the possibility of opting out by expanding their ties with each other and (most importantly) external powers Nuclear proliferation may have occurred but by negotiation and agreement between India and Pakistan (as to levels targets command and control procedures etc) mechanisms exist to establish regional consensus on the flow of weapons into the region the development of nuclear weapons the role of regional states in the Gulf and the presence of superpowers in the region India is primus inter pares but all states have veto power that can be enforced by their withdrawal

Getting from Here to there

In an optimistic frame of mind I would attach the following probabilities to these four scenarios #1 continuation of the status quo (or worse) 40% #2 South Asia as a Soviet sphere of influence 15% #3 Indian domination 15% #4 regional consensus 30% In my pessimistic moments I reverse the inner and outer percentages I view #4 as the best possible regional security arrangement Although its imperfections and risks would fill a book it is consistent with the character and needs of regional states How do we get from here to there? The following are specific steps which are useful in their own

right and which buffer or reduce inflammatory perceptions in the minds of superpower elites as well as regional leaders

A Pursue a settlement of territorial disputes recognizing that whether intra-regional or between regional states and an outside power security as well as symbolic interests are at stake Some of these disputes (i e Kashmir) cannot be "settled" without an extraordinary amount of obfuscation and will take time and a step-by-step approach Others such as India-China may be amenable to more sensational swaps of territory as Krishna Menon originally proposed

B As part of these settlements reduce or redeploy armed forces hopefully as part of a gross reduction of arms Indians say that they will not wait for a Pakistani attack before striking in "the next war " Pakistanis say the same thing adding that their geography makes it necessary for them to mount an "offensive-defensive" This is a formula for disaster particularly if nuclear weapons enter into the arsenals of both states I will explore this in detail below

C Pursue long-term economic projects which are mutually entangling and which create costs for both sides if either decides to pull out Such projects might include joint ventures in the Gulf sharing of river water the co-production of electricity (in nuclear facilities as David Lilienthal was arguing just before his death) and even weapons coproduction or sharing

D Develop a region-specific doctrine supplementing non-alignment which protects the interests of the smaller regional states while conceding to the largest its dominant status Such a doctrine might provide guidelines for regional summits mechanisms for joint responses to events elsewhere (particularly when the interests of

one or more regional states are at stake) and which set down the conditions for the economic political or military presence of a superpower in the region

Some Specific Problems

The most likely future (#1) may occur because no important power is very unhappy with it--or at least every important power can veto any change by threatening to bring about something worse

In the case of the superpowers the Soviet Union probably favors the present imbalanced balance between India and Pakistan and will manipulate it for its own ends They may not wish to make Pakistan an ally or even become the arbiter of a the region which is of mixed or margin interest to the Soviets ¹⁴ This would change to the degree that they come to view Pakistan as a Southwest Asian or Gulf power The U S does not lose from the present arrangement but it would gain from a regional accord (even if it was excluded from the region) So the superpowers present obstacles--but not insuperable ones--to movement towards Scenario #4

The smaller regional powers including Pakistan gain their leverage through conflicts between India and other states The current India-China border negotiations will threaten such states unless assurances of the preservation of legitimate external ties (including military ones) are part of an arrangement

For slightly different reasons there are many groups and institutions in India that oppose regional reconciliation if it does not mean absolute Indian dominance Not only do specific groups favor the present arrangement for ideological reasons but their careers are linked to the Indian military-industrial complex This has served as a

useful safety-valve for domestic political purposes but reduction in arms levels in India (and in Pakistan as in 1951 and 1977) would raise domestic political problems

There are technical military and arms control problems associated with Scenario #4. The rapid introduction of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in the region is part of a broad technical military revolution the difficult thing about such revolutions is that it is not possible to predict how they will turn out and whether PGMs and other new weapons may not make it more difficult to achieve a reduction in arms a pull-back of forces etc. Both India and Pakistan have 'two-front' war situations but they are asymmetrically vulnerable to air attack and have different kinds of vulnerability "on the ground". India's Jaguars have pushed the Pakistan Air Force to within sixty seconds of Afghan bases and both countries have high-value targets open to attack from the other side (nuclear facilities irrigation and hydel works as well as population centers). Wars in the region have necessarily been limited and it only remains to specify their future parameters. talk about "regretting the next war" is not very helpful and feeds first-strike fanaticism in both countries

To summarize the nuclear proliferation issue it needs only to be pointed out that coordination of regional nuclear programs will yield far more influence on superpowers and oil states than competition which is used by outsiders for their own purposes. If India and Pakistan can agree on levels or plateaus no first-strike declarations and some command and control procedures then outsiders need only ratify the arrangement--as long as it does not promote proliferation into more unstable regions

South Asia's movement from Scenario #1 to something else has already begun. The Soviet invasion and the competition for oil and energy has ensured that nuclear energy and nuclear weapons will remain linked. Since 1972 Indian generals have been increasingly unwilling to adopt a patient or tolerant attitude towards Pakistan and this in turn goads Pakistan to search for a weapon that will forever replace fickle friends. In short there is good cause for war in South Asia and reason to believe that it would "normalize" relations between India and its neighbors once and for all. Yet despite the temptation the costs of changing the regional structure by force are enormous. My estimation is that more people will die in a war in which only dams were attacked than one in which cities were targets. Scenario #4 is worth considering and India is the key factor.

India must debate the question whether or not it wants permanently hostile neighbors or whether it wishes to reach a peaceful settlement with them. Does it subscribe to Kautilya's image of the world or Nehru's? Are Soviet weapons more important than good relations with the neighbors against whom those weapons will be used? My own answer would be no. Weapons can be acquired elsewhere but India's neighbors will stay in the region forever. Without an Indian willingness to debate and move on this issue other states can do very little--but they can do something.

The U S in particular can play a constructive twofold role. First it can encourage China to grant those territorial concessions which will satisfy Indian security interests without harming its own. Second it can link American arms transfers to regional states to criteria jointly established by India and Pakistan. The same (but

broadened to include other regional states) applies to regional economic projects. Thirdly, it can continue its pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, but not ignore the possibility of a political settlement. Any attempt to bleed the Soviets indefinitely may be gratifying, but it will hardly take much pressure off of NATO or China.

In the end, the two major regional powers, Pakistan and India, will largely shape regional developments. Pakistan is the state with most to gain and most to lose. No Pakistani leader can easily enter into a regional accord with India without ironclad guarantees that it will not again be subjected to pressure, attack, or even dismemberment. The Pakistani nuclear program is not in itself such a guarantee, nor can American or Chinese assurances be relied upon in a major crisis. The only guarantee that counts is one given by the Indians, but that in turn places Pakistan at the mercy of the shifting balance of power within India. But Pakistan is not without resources in affecting that balance of power: it can agree to compromise on territorial issues, and it can provide assurances in matters of communal harmony, relations with the Islamic world, and induction of weapons into the region.

India, as the region's dominant state, has been urged by neighbors and friendly outsiders to act in a magnanimous fashion. Yet this is politically unpopular in India, and many Indian elites still see their own country as weak, fragile, and vulnerable. They prefer to react, not to undertake new initiatives, and they remain suspicious of the efforts of other regional states to develop protective ties with outside powers. It may take another shock as great as the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan to prompt India to assume the leadership role
which is its due

FOOTNOTES

1 Not much interest has been shown in South Asia as a regional system For a pioneering study see Sisir K Gupta India and Regional Integration in Asia (Bombay Asia Publishing House 1964) for a survey of recent Indian thought see Bimal Prasad ed India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi Vikas 1979)

2 A useful pictorial summary of different plans for restructuring the Subcontinent after independence is presented in Joseph E Schwartzberg ed A Historical Atlas of South Asia (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1978) p 72

3 There is no good history of India's or Pakistan's wars let alone a regional overview For a good account of 1947 see Lt -Gen L P Sen Slender Was the Thread (Poona Sangam Press 1973) Russell Brines' The Indo Pakistani Conflict (London Pall Mall 1968) is the best study of that war and for 1971 see both Siddiq Saliq Witness to Surrender (Karachi Oxford University Press 1978) and the three-volume study by Maj -Gen Sukhwant Singh India's Wars Since Independence (New Delhi Vikas various publ dates)

4 For the best study of the Kashmir dispute see Sisir Gupta Kashmir A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Bombay Asia Publishing House 1966)

5 The classic study is V P Menon The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Bombay Orient Longmans 1956) Also see Wayne A

Wilcox Pakistan The Consolidation of a Nation (New York Columbia University Press 1963)

6 See Myron Weiner Sons of the Soil (Princeton Princeton University Press 1978) for a thoughtful study of nativist movements in India

7 This is not shared by some Besides those who develop doctrine for limited nuclear war (doctrine which is read in South Asia) there are those such as Kenneth Waltz in the U S and many in Europe Who do not regard the proliferation problem as very critical They argue that the global system can manage the gradual increase in nuclear states See Waltz The Spread of Nuclear Weapons More May be Better (London IISS Adelphi Paper No 171 1981)

8 See Stephen P Cohen Perception Influence and Weapons Proliferation in South Asia (unclassified report prepared for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research U S Department of State August 20 1979)

9 This totalled about \$90 million in grants What was galling to India and Pakistan was the cut-off of American support as soon as hostilities began in 1965 hurting Pakistan far more than India See Stephen P Cohen "U S Weapons and South Asia A Policy Analysis " Pacific Affairs 49 1 (Spring 1976) p 50

10 This is an issue virtually untouched by contemporary scholarship

Wilcox Pakistan The Consolidation of a Nation (New York Columbia University Press 1963)

6 See Myron Weiner Sons of the Soil (Princeton Princeton University Press 1978) for a thoughtful study of nativist movements in India

7 This is not shared by some Besides those who develop doctrine for limited nuclear war (doctrine which is read in South Asia) there are those such as Kenneth Waltz in the U S and many in Europe Who do not regard the proliferation problem as very critical They argue that the global system can manage the gradual increase in nuclear states See Waltz The Spread of Nuclear Weapons More May be Better (London IISS Adelphi Paper No 171 1981)

8 See Stephen P Cohen Perception Influence and Weapons Proliferation in South Asia (unclassified report prepared for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research U S Department of State August 20 1979)

9 This totalled about \$90 million in grants What was galling to India and Pakistan was the cut-off of American support as soon as hostilities began in 1965 hurting Pakistan far more than India See Stephen P Cohen "U S Weapons and South Asia A Policy Analysis " Pacific Affairs 49 1 (Spring 1976) p 50

10 This is an issue virtually untouched by contemporary scholarship

for a hard-headed analysis of the political and strategic stake see Jagat Mehta "The Annual Floods A Challenge to International Diplomacy " Times of India September 25 1982

11 For a warning that should be heeded see Romesh Thapar An Indian Future (New Delhi Allied 1981) and "The Military Establishment " Economic and Political Weekly May 12 1979

12 See the astonishingly inept memorandum circulated by the Heritage Foundation at the time of Indira Gandhi's visit to the United States in 1982

13 Cohen and Park India Emergent Power? (New York Crane Russak 1978) pp 68 ff

14 There remains some uncertainty as to the relative value of India for the Soviets in their dealings with China and the Non-Aligned Movement as compared to Pakistan's value vis a vis the Islamic world Afghanistan and the Gulf It obviously suits the Soviet interest to let India and Pakistan believe that they each remain--or are becoming --of great strategic importance to the Soviet Union

for a hard-headed analysis of the political and strategic stake see Jagat Mehta "The Annual Floods A Challenge to International Diplomacy " Times of India September 25 1982

11 For a warning that should be heeded see Romesh Thapar An Indian Future (New Delhi Allied 1981) and "The Military Establishment " Economic and Political Weekly May 12 1979

12 See the astonishingly inept memorandum circulated by the Heritage Foundation at the time of Indira Gandhi's visit to the United States in 1982

13 Cohen and Park India Emergent Power? (New York Crane Russak 1978) pp 68 ff

14 There remains some uncertainty as to the relative value of India for the Soviets in their dealings with China and the Non-Aligned Movement as compared to Pakistan's value vis a vis the Islamic world Afghanistan and the Gulf It obviously suits the Soviet interest to let India and Pakistan believe that they each remain--or are becoming --of great strategic importance to the Soviet Union