

IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)
Volume 24, Issue 5, Ser. 7 (May. 2019) 26-34
e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845.
www.iosrjournals.org

The Primacy of Use over Naming

Alok Kumar Sahu

M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D. Research Scholar, Humanities And Social Sciences, IIT Bombay, Mumbai, Maharashtra,
INDIA

Corresponding Author: Alok Kumar Sahu

Abstract: In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein proposed the notion of meaning that accounts for the large variety of contexts in which we apply the term “meaning”. This paper agreement with the manner in which Wittgenstein enhance his conception of meaning emphasizing his methodology of observation and description of particular cases. By applying a descriptive approach, Wittgenstein demonstrated that meaning of the term do not reside in physical or mental objects as well as in its correlations. As a result of contrasting denotative theory as well as correspondence theory of meaning and recognizing the inadequacy of the accounts of meaning he has proposed earlier in his *Tractatus*. But in later work he has suggested that only one conception of meaning which could not be invalidated, at least for a large class of cases. This is none other than the notion of meaning which is regarded as public in nature. Consequently, the meaning of a term is not its denotation but its “use” in the language. Hence, by upholding the slogan i.e., “meaning is use” here I want to illustrate the supremacy of use over “naming” concerning to Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*.

Keywords: Naming, Use, Pictorial form, Isomorphic-relation, Language-game, Forms of life.

Date of Submission: 07-05-2019

Date of acceptance: 23-05-2019

I. INTRODUCTION

Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the prominent and influential philosopher in the twentieth century philosophy. Instead of early Wittgenstein, later Wittgenstein did not recommend any theory concerning “meaning”. Here Wittgenstein’s attempt is to establish an activity-based philosophy pertaining to language. He has made a shifting from “explanatory paradigm” to “descriptive paradigm” for the better understanding of philosophy of language. For him philosophy is not a “theory” but an “activity” (*TLP# 4.112*). Generally, his philosophy can be construed in two phases such as Early-Wittgenstein and Later-Wittgenstein. His two seminal work such as *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations* are like two sides of the same coin in my understanding, though there many scholars have advocated that, the later work is the rejection of earlier one. By those works Wittgenstein contributes a lot to the realm of philosophy.

In this paper I want to highlight that, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is an all-inclusive manner for understanding his theory of meaning without any obstacle. So, it is an attempt to construe the critical analysis of the aspects of theory of meaning dealing with Wittgenstein’s earlier and later philosophy. To illustrate that the importance of USE, that is primordial for meaning and how it operates a superiority on NAMING is one of the mottos of this paper. Like other philosophers, Wittgenstein also has a curiosity for the fundamental nature of the “Reality”. Regarding this he makes a clear-cut discussion on this by the virtue of language in his earlier work. He advocates that, “language represent the reality”. Here language and thoughts are interwoven we can’t segregate them. Purpose of the philosophy is not to answering about the metaphysical questions, rather the clarification of our language with the proper logical analysis. Because philosophical problems arise out of the misunderstanding of our logic of language. So, in order to eradicate our misunderstandings, analysis of language is very much essential, because by proper analysis of language not only we are able to get proper understanding but also, we can resolve the so-called philosophical problems. In his earlier philosophy Wittgenstein answered the philosophical questions with the proper analysis of language and by means of which he elaborated the importance of language in human existence. From analysis of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it can be said that language is an indispensable necessity for human life. Precisely, it is the *sine qua non* of human existence.

II. OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER

This paper illustrates that how Wittgenstein’s “use theory of meaning” is distinct from the “picture theory of meaning”. In *Tractatus* Wittgenstein mentions that meaning of a term is determine by its conformity with reality. The pictorial relation between language and world plays a crucial role for meaning. Language is the congregations of proposition and a proposition is made out of names. Here every name refers something in the

reality in the virtue of pictorial relation thereby name becomes meaningful. So naming is the prerequisite for meaning. But in later work, he describes that meaning of a word or any sentence is determined by its use. So here use is regarded as the vital ground for meaning. If it is so then here a question arises that, how two different grounds would serve as a means for the same meaning? Along with these issues I want to make a constructive description that, how Wittgenstein's notion of use is superior than naming pertaining to meaning. It also explores that, why Wittgenstein makes a shift from an explanatory paradigm to a descriptive paradigm in the domain of philosophy of language.

Section-I

1.1. The Notion of Language, Thought and Reality

If anything is significant in Wittgenstein's philosophy whether it is earlier or later i.e., the inherent relation between language, thought and world (reality). It is one of the bedrocks for his early work i.e., logical form which is the essence of language, thought as well as of the reality. But on the other hand, in his later philosophy he has propagated a new dimension which is diametrically opposed to his prior views. In *Tractatus* he advocates that meaning is determined by the logical form, which is previously fixed. But in *Philosophical Investigations* we have seen a divergent principle i.e., "use" provides the meaning of a term as well as the proposition. One of the leading debates has made in the twentieth century philosophy is that how language represents the world. At that time an important task of the philosophers is to examine the relationship between language and thought on the one pole, thought and the world on the other pole. They have believed that world or the reality is represented by language. All analytic philosophers have agreed with the view that "language mirrors the reality". But here question arises how language does this? How language, thought and reality is related? What is the relationship between meaning and signs? These are some of the fundamental queries for language philosophers. The way that human thinks and the way they well-expressed the thoughts are somehow expressed by language.

No doubt, Wittgenstein has influenced by his ancestors. His way of looking towards language and reality is something unique, because he differs from the traditional way of explaining things in the world and in relation between language and reality. According to him, if we uphold the traditional way of understanding then the answer will be same and we cannot have contributed anything as new. But the vital point is that Wittgenstein does not want to propagate any new theory rather he was doing philosophy as an activity. By analyzing his philosophy, it can be understood that, in his both earlier and latter phase he provides philosophy is an activity (TLP-4.112)¹, it means it shows that there are no possibilities of constructing any theory in philosophy. He believes that the meaning of reality is "forms of life" what he describes in his *Philosophical Investigations*. These forms of life express their expression in the virtue of language game. In a sense every language game is embedded a form of life. I have mentioned that language learning is a mastery of such techniques and what we are mean by "reality" is that, we have experiencing in language. Hence, it is to be understood that, our consciousness receives as well as depicts reality by means of language. According to Wittgenstein, "reality is alethic in nature. Here alethic refers, to the various modality of truth, such as necessity, possibility or impossibility"². We may understand it by the following instance, the meaning of the term "red" is neither an example of red in the world, nor the sum total of all red colored things. Instead of a red object which may use as a sample in order to describe the meaning of the term red i.e., a part of an explanation in which way the term red is used. This explores that, Wittgenstein's conception of the meaning of a term or an expression that which is given by an explanation of "use" in his later works.

So far as my knowledge goes, one thing to be noted that in early Wittgenstein, language has a certain limitation. In other words, it has an onus function of language is to picturing the reality. The underlying truth functional grammatical structure of language does not permit a proposition to have more than one "sense". That's why Wittgenstein mentions that each proposition has a determinate sense. Despite of this, in the preface of *Tractatus* he makes that one of the maxims of this work is to make a distinction between saying and showing. For him, what can be said in language said clearly and what can't say in language makes us passed over in silence (TLP#7).³ However, there are some sort of cases where certain things cannot be put in to in language but that can be shown. Hence, the concept of saying and showing is regarded one of the nubs of his earlier philosophy. But on the other hand, for later Wittgenstein language is embedded with form of life. In *Tractatus* he deals with ideal language where as in *Philosophical Investigations* he deals with ordinary language. In *Tractatus*, language has a single underlying essence as well as meaning of the term or proposition is fixed,

¹ Wittgenstein, L. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness with an introduction by Bertrand Russell, this edition Published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library (Routledge), 2002, p-29.

² Dictionary meaning of the term "alethic".

³ Ibid. p-89.

which a-priori in character. But in *Philosophical Investigations* there is no any fixed boundary for language and it possess multiple task. Here, the meaning is determining by use and that meaning is a temporal phenomenon.

By analyzing *Tractatus* one of the major things would be found that, Wittgenstein provides a triangular relation between language, thought and reality. According to Wittgenstein, language and thoughts are interlinked. Language represent the reality. If reality is represented by language, then it must be transferrable to other. Therefore, it possesses meaning. Here world is not only interlinked with language but also to the thought. There, language and thought represent the same logical forms. World is the totality of facts, not of things (*TLP#1.1*).⁴Where a fact is a state of affairs and the state-of affairs is the combinations of object. And also, Wittgenstein mentions that, “The sum-total of reality is the world” (*TLP#2.063*).⁵

Thus, precisely it can be said that Wittgenstein concerning both of his work dealt reality by means of language, though the way is different such as: theoretical explanation and method of description respectively concerning the theory of meaning, *Tractatus* dealt picture theory whereas *Philosophical Investigations* dealt use theory under the purview of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. But he claims that use theory of meaning is not a theory in the sense that picture theory of meaning is dealt.

1.2. Picture Theory of Meaning in *Tractatus*

The *Tractatus* was primarily deal with the logical analysis of language. The picture theory of meaning was the prerequisite of the symbolic representation of language; therefore, it has central role in *Tractatus*. Its main aim is to display the isomorphic relation between language and reality. It’s one of the vital subject matter of our discussion is about language of the world and its relation with the fact. Wittgenstein maintains that “we make to ourselves picture of the facts” (*TLP#2.1*) and here it is also remarked that “the picture is a model of reality” (*TLP#2.12*).⁶It is to be assume that he thought that the core of language lies in the representation of how things are would be exists. Thus, representation is possible by the arrangement in form between what is represent and what is being represented. There are a number of elements would be existing in any picture that constitute the picture. Therefore, a state of affairs is a possible combination of objects (2.01) and each element in a picture represents an object, the combination of objects in a picture represents a state of affairs (2.131).⁷ For example: Cat is on the mat. It is a proposition that depicts a possible state of affairs. It is a complex statement. But by analyzing it, we could find that there are two names which are the elements of the proposition and those names must represent two objects in the reality. Wittgenstein has remarks that, in a pictorial relation “the form of the representation is a logical form, that is why the picture is named as a logical picture” (2.181). Therefore, every picture is a logical picture.

In *Tractatus* Wittgenstein wants to illustrate two major issues such as: he has intents to show that how language being works* and other one is how the understanding of language is able to solve the philosophical problems*. According to him, philosophical problems are not empirical problems that’s why any empirical means could not solve them. Philosophical problems are conceptual problems that’s why they need conceptual clarification. The major idea of *Tractatus* is that the basic structure of the language logical in nature. “What can be said, said it clearly and meaning fully” is one of the statements of Wittgenstein where what can be said is same as what can be thought of. So, if anything which is exists beyond the limits of language is nonsensical. Under the purview of language thinking and reality are interdependent. In this context Wittgenstein tells about the picture mirroring capacity of language and both language and reality have the same structure. Language consists of propositions and these propositions are made out of elementary propositions. And elementary propositions are constitutions of names (names are words). Ultimately it can be said that names are the constituents of the language. But on the other hand, world is consisting of facts (*TLP#1*). Here facts are all constitutes of the state of affairs and they are combination of objects (which are things) (*TLP#2.01*). As I have mentions some times before that both language and reality (world) have the same structures. In the virtue of that structure language pictures the reality*. So “language has a pictorial form”. Since, there is an inseparable relation between language and the reality. And this relation is “pictorial in nature”. In order to explain the relation between language and world he advocates the following aphorisms.

- In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them (*TLP#2.13*).
- In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects (2.131).
- The elements of the picture are related to one another in a determinate way; that constitutes the picture (2.14).
- In order to be a picture a fact must have something common with that, what it depicts (2.16).

⁴ Ibid. p-5.


⁵ Ibid. p-9.

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Addis, M., *Wittgenstein: A guide for the perplexed*, Continuum Publisher, London, New York, 2006, P-28.

- A picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it the way it does - -correctly or incorrectly—is regarded as its pictorial form (2.17)
- A picture is a model of reality (2.12).⁸

In order to understand the concept of meaning, the analysis of language and reality is very much essential. By the analysis of language and reality we should reach at from complex to simple unit. Following figure can provide us a clear understanding of picturing relation between language and world.



1.3. The pre-requisition of Naming for meaning

In order to understand the picture theory of meaning one must have to go step by step. This theory also called as representational theory of meaning. It suggests that, there is an inseparable relation between language and reality. There is one to one relation being establish between language and reality when propositions picture the elements of reality. All of the reality is made out of facts which have existence. These facts are of existence meaning, and truly, here state of affairs is truly representing by the proposition. Wittgenstein was maintaining that, the parallel between elementary propositions and state of affairs*. Where, the state of affairs is constituting by name which signifies. Here name mirrors object and the elementary propositions are nothing but made out of names. And state of affairs is the collection of objects. Thus, because of this picturing relations, proposition gets their meaning. So far as my knowledge goes, this is the nub of picture theory of meaning. One of the maxims of *Tractatus* is to give a desirable justification for the relation between language and reality.

“Language mirrors the reality” is one of the vital slogans of *Tractatus*. As we know that language is the congregation of propositions. In the words of Wittgenstein following aphorisms explains the realm of language as well as about the picture of reality.

- 4.001 – The totality of propositions is language.
- 4.01 – A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.
- 4 – A thought is a proposition with sense.⁹

Therefore, the primary function of the proposition is to picture the reality. Wittgenstein mentions that, a proposition is true if it represents an existing state of affairs. However, a proposition is composite it does not mean that it simply consists of names. He makes a clarification regarding the position of the proposition and name. Here names are resembled with point where as propositions are resembled with an arrow (3.144). One thing is crucial that a set of names does not express any sense but only a fact can able to express a sense (3.142). Hence, it is to be said that a point is nothing but a name in a proposition. If a name does not name something, then it is not a meaningful symbol. So, in order to be a meaningful symbol (word) it must refer something. Therefore, a name means it refers something in reality. In the virtue of this referring act name (word) becomes meaningful. But this “referring” is possible because of “naming”. Ultimately, for meaning “naming” is prerequisite. In short, it can be said that in *TLP* for meaning naming is primordial.

Section-II

I. A paradigm shift

We have seen that there are multiple interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. As Wittgenstein himself critique on his early philosophy and claims that his later philosophy is somehow different from his early works. Of course, it is one of the remarkable judgements by him for his philosophical position. The reason is that, he himself realized that there are some mistakes in his early works. That’s why he takes a move from his early thought and has promote a mature dimension in his later philosophy. One of the instances is that, in *Tractatus* he has advocated that, “meaning” is fixed which is a-priory in nature and for “meaning” naming is prerequisite. Both language and world have a common form. Because of that common form language pictures reality. But in *Philosophical Investigations* he opines that meaning is determine by “use”. Which is context

⁸ L. Wittgenstein, *TLP*, 2002, PP-9-11.

⁹ Ibid. pp-22-23.

dependent. It is a temporal phenomenon. So, from this it can be assumed that, he makes a paradigm shift from essentialism to pluralism and an explanatory paradigm to descriptive paradigm. By analyzing his later philosophy in this section, I want to show his “meaning is use” slogan¹⁰ will be justifying the title of this paper. Wittgenstein begins *Philosophical Investigations* with a quoting of Augustine.¹¹ Where he describes the Augustine’s nature of language. In Augustinian account, a sentence is the combinations of names and every name corresponds something thereby words have meaning. There is a co-relation being established between word and an object. So precisely, for meaning “naming” is prerequisite and indispensable.

Backer and Hacker advocates that, “the Augustinian picture of language is basically in-built with the program of the *Tractatus* henceforth *Tractatus* is a complete evidence of the Augustinian picture of language”.¹² In contrast to it in *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein provides us a novel approach in order to answer the questions regarding the relationship between language and reality. By introducing language games, the later Wittgenstein provides us a new dimension, for thinking about language and world. So, by our conceptual refinement we are able to deal earlier positions.

In the realm of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein’s view on language and its relation to things is interlinked with the notion of criticisms that is an attack on his own views in *Tractatus* explicitly. I cannot undertake here a complete treatment of Wittgenstein’s view of language as well as the notion of meaning in *PI* but his rejection of the essentialism is one of my tasks to illustrate here. In *PI* Wittgenstein posits such positive attempts like, theory of “meaning as use” and his conceptions of Languages would help us to overcome traditional views.

II. Wittgenstein’s Critique of the view on *Tractatus*

In the first section of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein was criticizing on Augustine’s picture of language that, which is interwoven with the conception *Tractatus*. Augustine opines the denotative stand point. The term ‘denote’ is very essential for him. For denotative theorist language is the combinations of sentences. And every sentence is made out of the combinations of words which are names. This idea of Augustine is similar to the idea of *Tractatus* that I have discussed it sometimes before. Here question arises how the words becomes meaningful. A word has meaning when it denotes/corresponds something. So, the meaning of the words is its denotation. For instance, ‘Pen’ is a term. It became meaningful if it refers something. One thing is mentioned in this passage that, “Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.”¹³ Every word has meaning in the sense that Augustine does not make any distinction between kinds of words. Hence, every word must be correlated with something. So, all words are sound in the sense that all are verbal signs. So according to denotative theory when a sign correlated with its signification it becomes meaningful. But the question is that, there are some words which has no reference still they are meaningful. For example, ‘Dinosaur’. So far as my knowledge goes, I think that here both Wittgenstein and Augustine fail to explain the proper nature as well as purpose of words in language. Because despite of nouns there are also other terms which could played a very important role in the realm of language. There are different kind of words like noun, verb, preposition, articles, connectives etc. has been used in language regarding their purpose and position. But he only gives emphasis on noun henceforth his theory of language somehow nouns centric. In *TLP* Wittgenstein himself also opines same view that:

“A name means an object. The object is its meaning (*TLP*#203) and he also put onward the idea that an atomic proposition constitutes nothing other than names, where all the words of that propositions which constitutes it are the representatives of object”.¹⁴

For him a name has sense if it names something. So, the criterion of meaning of a term is its reference, if it is so then what about words like and, if...then, either...or, this, that and so on. How we get their referent? He takes all words as name in language. But in later he recognized that, in ordinary manner not all words are regarded as names.

Later Wittgenstein responses that meaning is a temporal as well as social phenomenon. It does not depend on the co-relation between name and its referent. Rather it depends upon ‘use’. If it is so, then what is mentioned by Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* i.e. “naming is prerequisite” would not fulfil the requirement of meaning. That’s why he proposed an idea of “LANGUAGE GAME” where words are getting their meaning by

¹⁰Nicholas Melville and Kristijan Krkac, *The Primacy of Function over Structure Analogy Reading of Wittgenstein’s “Meaning is Use” Aphorism*, Original Paper UDC [1:81]:81’ 371 Wittgenstein, L. 2015.

¹¹*The Confessions*.

¹²Language, *Language Games and Ostensive Definition*, Author(s): James F. Harris Source: *Synthese*, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Oct., 1986), pp. 41-49 Published by: Springer Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20116330> Accessed: 10-11-2018 11:46 UTC.

¹³ Hacker, P.M.S and Joachim Schulte, *Philosophical Investigations*, P-5.

¹⁴ Ray Monk, *How to read Wittgenstein*, Granta Books Publication, London, 2005, p-73.

means of fulfilling the communicative demand. I will discuss the notion of language game in details in next step.


III. Meaning is grounded in “Use”

In later work Wittgenstein has given much more attention to ordinary language in contrast to the realm of ideal language. His realization is that by following a logical language we have face a lot of problem. Though early Wittgenstein was adopted ideal language as a tool to remove the ambiguity as well as many more philosophical problems from ordinary language but the results becomes opposite. So ideal language also fails to give the conceptual clarification thereby philosophical problems remain unsolved. That is why in *PI* he takes ordinary language as a means to treat philosophical problems as well as to understand the relation between language and the reality.

In *PI* Wittgenstein was criticizing his picture theory of meaning. He also raised his voice against the opinion that “pictorial form” is the criterion for meaning. Because it is nothing to do with meaning. According to him, ostensive definitions are less-capable to providing a meaning of a proposition. He adopts the language game with an activity of language as what I have mentions earlier. He elaborately describes about the nature of language game. For him a game is that which follow certain rules. So, it is to be the fact that rules are applied within the domain of a language game. In the realm of a game following a rule means to understand its use. Without participating in a game some one cannot understand its rules. Because understanding of the rule is inbuilt with practice. That’s why in order to grasp the rule of a game one must have to be a participant of that game. Now, here question arises who formulate these rules? Of course, there are language user and they have played only a constitutive role but not regulative role. Hence, Linguistic agents are not the rule maker but the communicative demands formulate these rules in a form of life. There are multiple linguistic community and they have many language games depending upon their form of life. So, Wittgenstein has used the term “language game” in order to emphasize that, “the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life”. (*PI*#23). He gives variety of language games in the following manner:

- Giving orders, and acting on them.
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing).
- Reporting an event.
- Speculating about the event.
- Acting in a play.
- Singing rounds
- Cracking a joke; telling one.
- Solving a problem in applied arithmetic.
- Translating from one language into another and so on.¹⁵

One of the central ideas of language game is an attack against any forms of structuralism. Including Wittgenstein all ideal language philosopher in early phase claims that all language has a single underlying essential structure. That is logical form which is hidden in nature and because of it proposition as well as word possess meaning in a representational way. Thereby, in *TLP* meaning is fixed i.e., a-priori in nature and one word has only one meaning. But in *PI* Wittgenstein dilutes this structural explanation. And has established a “linguistic pluralism”. There are many sentences as well as words they have a number of uses such as assertion, question, command, signs, words respectively. Therefore, language keeps growing on changing and words are flexible in nature. So, a single word also possesses many meanings because of its accommodative power. For example:



Generally, we know that the word “sharp” means edge. That’s why we have used it to refer a knife that which is called sharp knife. But from the above figure we could find that, the same word has used to refer different thing like; sharp nose, sharp mind and sharp tongue. Here the term sharp is meaningful in every context because it fulfills the demands of these contexts.

Thus, in a sense it can be said that, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language game” (*PI*# 21 &43).¹⁶ So a word has a meaning when it is used in a particular context in a language game in response to a particular communicative demand. So, words are purposive as well as normative in nature. Precisely, meaning

¹⁵ Ibid, p-15

¹⁶ See the page number 13 and 25of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*.

of a term is neither determined by an object nor subject rather it is by its use. Therefore, meaning is a temporal phenomenon. It keeps on changing depending on contexts. So, meaning is socially construed.

IV. The Forms of life

Wittgenstein's later philosophy advocates that a sentence possesses meaning if it includes in a "form of life". A word does not mean anything in isolation. By itself words are dead. Therefore, very language is a public phenomenon which is socially construed.¹⁷ Outside the domain of form of life language as well as words has no meaning. It just only an utter sound and it refers nothing. In short, it can be said that language is conventional in character. So, truth and falsity of the proposition is decided by its use. It is to be said that, meaning of an utterance or a group of signs is possible only in the context of a language game in a form of life. Therefore, words are context specific and used in a form of life in a certain way to conform certain practice. The practices are performed by language user. In the absence of practices language goes on holidays (*PI*#38) and it is the cause for philosophical problems. The traditional believes is that the hidden structure of proposition is its grammar and on the basis of which it provides meaning. But Wittgenstein's in *PI* proposed a new orientation of grammar which is nothing other than "use".

V. Wittgenstein's Critique on Essentialism

We have used some words in our language as general term. Which are meant for such class. For example, game, tree, table, chair, dog etc. So first, we must understand that, what is a class? Class is a set of things/beings having some property in common. If we said tree, then it not only refers an individual tree rather it depicts a class of tree where many members come under a class. Wittgenstein very aware about the using of these kinds of words in language. He has given a contrast view regarding the notion of generality in *Philosophical Investigation* which is independent of any form essentialism.

He has been given the reason that why people like denotative theorists were falling in the trap of generality. They were craving for generality because they have several tendencies which relate to philosophical confusion. In a sense, because of philosophical confusion they were bewitched with the concept of generality. Now I shall discuss some tendencies in the following manner.

A) The tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term.¹⁸ For example, "game". We are thinking that there are some characteristics which are common to all games and initially we assume that these common properties are the deciding factors for using the general term "game" for all game. Another example, "family". We have used this term for family members of a family because they have something common i.e., family likeness though they have some crisscrossing relationship. Hence, the idea of "general concept" is the results of common property that which exist in individuals.

B) A tendency also ratted in our usual forms of expression. Those who can understand a general term, they said that the word "leaf" is a general term because it possesses a general picture of leaf which is differ from particular picture of leaf. It shows that when someone utters the word leaf an image of a leaf comes to our mind. That which again connected with the idea that meaning of a word is its image. Here our tendency has differentiated from a class concept of leaf to a particular leaf. So, a particular image of leaves is a means to attain the general idea of leaf. "We are inclined to think that the general idea of a leaf is something like a visual image, but one which only contains that which is common to all leaves. (Galtonian composite photograph.)"¹⁹ Here actually we are confused between the bearer of a name with the meaning of the name because we treat that all words as proper names. But Wittgenstein argues against our tendencies of 'craving for generality' and said that there is nothing in this world which are regarded as general but there are only exist particulars because nature does not provide any generality. Even, if we look in between twin child then we should find some differences.

C) Because of our acceptance of an idea of generality like the term 'dog', 'leaf', 'tree' etc., we are falling under the confusion between a state of hypothetical mental mechanism and a state of consciousness.

D) To adopt the method of science is another source of our craving for generality.

Wittgenstein has argued against any form of generality. Because science upholds the method of explanation to reach at any certainty and in mathematics a generalization has been used to unifying the

¹⁷ 41stInternational Wittgenstein Symposium on "Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics" Kirchberg am Wechsel, 5.-11. August 2018, p-180.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Wittgenstein, L. *The Blue Book*, P-18

treatment of different topics. Like that, philosophers had adopted these methods to giving answer for philosophical questions. In the eyes of Wittgenstein this tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and it is the cause that leads philosophers into complete darkness. So, to rescue the philosophers from darkness he has suggests that, the job of philosophy is not to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Because philosophy really is 'purely descriptive'.²⁰ Why the nature of philosophy is descriptive? The job of philosophy is descriptive in the sense; it describes the phenomena as they were. By description we must get understanding. Because description would provide understanding. I have already discussed it in the beginning section that, philosophical problems arise out of our misunderstanding of the logic of our language. Logically it has presupposed that if we have understood language then we can solve the philosophical problems. On the other hand, if we have adopted the concept of generality then we must have to fall in the trap of theorization, because generality is the grounds for theorization. And a theory can only give an explanation but not description. It is the job of science. An explanation leads towards cause effect relationship by means of which we are inclined to an essence. And to seeking essence means to looking for a foundation. But Wittgenstein rejects the any form of essentialism as well as foundationalism in the sphere of philosophical inventions. Thus, philosophy of language is not an art of theorization rather it is an art of understanding by means of descriptions.

Wittgenstein advocates that, both naming and describing does not comes under the purview of same level. It is to be said that naming is a preparation for description. For him, naming is none other than putting a piece in its place on the board that is a move in the chess. So, by naming of a thing nothing could be happen. It is just play as a name in the language game. We have to understand that Wittgenstein was emphasizing on the notion of meaning in his both early and later work. In *TLP* he preaches that a word possesses meaning when its names something. But in *PI* he has describes that a word does not have any meaning independent of its use. In the words of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language must get rid up any sort of theoretical explanation. Because following a rule in the sphere of language means to experience it. In this context, it could be understood that he adopts a pragmatic approach toward the language. Despite of his early philosophy in *PI* we have seen that he has moves towards a pragmatic stance instead of an explanatory domain. Because he gives much more importance on activity. At the end it can be said that Wittgenstein's shifting from an explanatory frame work to a descriptive paradigm may give a new orientation to philosophy.

III. CONCLUSION

Language is socially construe. The notion of language game and form of life are bedrock for the understanding the concept of meaning under the sphere of language game. From the comparative analysis of both early and later philosophy of Wittgenstein concerning the concept of "meaning" it can be said that, in order to be a meaning of a word or an expression need not be look upon either naming or any explanations, either object or mental entity or internal phenomena, rather we have to look upon public phenomena. It would be neither depending upon any co-relational conception (for instance, between name and object) nor any pictorial relation. But it is our day to day used language, which gives us a platform to deal the subject matter like "conception of meaning". Therefore, in order to have meaning or providing meaning we have to looks something different that will be able to be a possible means. So, it is none other than "language-game" where words are used. So, to asking question like, what is the meaning of a word means we have to see that how the word is used in a language game. Hence, it is the fact that, a word will get meaning when it is used in a language game in response to a particular communicative demand of a particular form of life. Here, it would be understood that language is publicly communicable/shareable. Words are being used in language. And words are getting their meaning when they have used in that language. Therefore, "meaning" is public as well as social. And for the meaning of a word or an expression "use" is primordial instead of naming. At the end it can be said that our thesis "meaning is use" provide the proper grounds/evidence to justifying the title of this paper i.e., "The Primacy of Use over Naming".

REFERENCES

- [1]. Wittgenstein, L. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness with an introduction by Bertrand Russell, this edition Published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library (Routledge), 2002, p-29.
- [2]. Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigation*. Ed. by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (4th ed.). (P. xxvii [not printed]). West Sussex: Blackwell. (First published in 1950.), 2009.
- [3]. Addis, M. *Wittgenstein: A guide for the perplexed*, Continuum Publisher, London, New York, 2006, p-28.
- [4]. Augustine, Saint. *The Confessions*, Image Publisher, 23rd August, 1960.

²⁰ Ibid.

- [5]. James F. Harris. *Language, Language Games and Ostensive Definition*, Source: Synthese, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Oct., 1986), pp. 41-49 Published by: Springer Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20116330> Accessed: 10-11-2018 11:46 UTC.
- [6]. Monk, R. *How to read Wittgenstein*, Granta Books Publication, London, 2005, p-73.
- [7]. Melville, Nicholas., and Kristijan Krkac, *The Primacy of Function over Structure Analogy Reading of Wittgenstein's "Meaning is Use" Aphorism*, Original Paper UDC [1:81]:81' 371 Wittgenstein, L. 2015.
- [8]. 41st International Wittgenstein Symposium on "*Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*" Kirchberg am Wechsel, 5.-11. August 2018, p-180.
- [9]. Wittgenstein, L. *The Blue Book*, Harper Perennial Published, 1960 (1958 1st Ed.), p-18.

IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) is UGC approved Journal with Sl. No. 5070, Journal no. 49323.

Alok Kumar Sahu." The Primacy of Use over Naming." IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS). vol. 24 no. 05, 2019, pp. 26-34.