

Ideological Diversity, Hostility, and Discrimination in Philosophy

Uwe Peters,^{1,2} Nathan Honeycutt,³ Andreas De Block,⁴ and Lee Jussim⁵

[Penultimate (updated) draft. The paper is forthcoming in *Philosophical Psychology*.
Comments very welcome.]

Abstract

Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, *ideologies*. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11%) were underrepresented. Moreover, and strikingly, *across the political spectrum*, from very left-leaning individuals and moderates to very right-leaning individuals, participants reported experiencing ideological hostility in the field, occasionally even from those from their *own side* of the political spectrum. Finally, while about half of the subjects believed that discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals in the field is not justified, a significant minority displayed an explicit willingness to discriminate against colleagues with the opposite ideology. Our findings are both surprising and important, because a commitment to tolerance and equality is widespread in philosophy, and there is reason to think that ideological similarity, hostility, and discrimination undermine reliable belief formation in many areas of the discipline.

¹ Corresponding author: u.peters@ucl.ac.uk

² Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, KU Leuven; Dept. of Economics, University College London; Dept. Social and Educational Sciences, University of Applied Science Potsdam

³ Dept. of Psychology, Rutgers University

⁴ Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, KU Leuven

⁵ Dept. of Psychology, Rutgers University

Introduction

“[W]hen I look upon my own discipline, the discipline of philosophy, I find egregious effects of ideology [...]”
(J. Stanley 2015: xvi)

One of the most interesting and salient properties that individuate subjects and groups is their political conviction or *ideology*,⁶ that is, their being, for instance, liberal, conservative, socialist, feminist, anarchist, etc. (Jost et al. 2009). Determining whether subjects “are engines of change or preservers of the *status quo*”, and so identifying their ideology, has in fact been found to be one of the “fundamental dimensions on which people spontaneously distinguish social groups” (Koch et al. 2016: 702).

It is a dimension of social identity that, in the wake of recent dramatic changes in politics throughout the world (e.g., Trump’s US presidency, Brexit, and the rise of populist parties) is becoming increasingly more the target and source of bias and hostility between people (Maher et al. 2018; Iyengar and Massey 2019). Studies found, for instance, that bias and hostility against ideological opponents is now more pronounced than that tied to gender, race, religious, linguistic, or regional out-groups (Westwood and Iyengar 2015; Westwood et al. 2018).

Importantly, ideological bias and hostility might also leak into academic disciplines and contribute to a decrease in viewpoint diversity in them, leading to detrimental epistemic outcomes (Longino 2002: 132; Jussim et al. 2018; Peters 2019). Indeed, studies already found that certain ideological groups are faced with overt or covert biases and discrimination in, for instance, the social sciences (Yancey 2011; Inbar and Lammers 2012; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017).⁷

What do we know about the representation of different political viewpoints, and ideological biases against them among members of the field of *philosophy* (henceforth ‘philosophers’),⁸ in particular? While there has been much discussion in philosophy about diversity and bias against various underrepresented groups in the field (Botts et al. 2014; Brownstein and Saul 2016; Allen-Hermanson 2017a; Kings 2019), there is no systematic and inclusive study pertaining to the distribution of and possible bias against *ideologies* in the field. As Schwitzgebel and Hassoun (2018)

⁶ While the term ‘ideology’ is often used in an evaluative sense imputing to a system of beliefs some negative characteristic(s), we use it in a non-evaluative way as referring simply to political convictions, i.e., political “beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson and Tedin 2003: 64). This neutral notion is prevalent in social psychology and political science (Jost et al. 2009).

⁷ Neither here nor in these studies is it assumed that the underrepresentation at issue is caused solely or mostly by bias. The causal connections are complex: self-selection and other factors might be the main reasons for a group’s underrepresentation. But if there is a bias against a group then it is not unreasonable to assume that it is likely to contribute to that underrepresentation.

⁸ Members of the field of philosophy, and so philosophers for us here, include faculty, researchers, and students.

note, “political viewpoint” is one of the most “under-studied dimensions of diversity [in philosophy]”.⁹

This gap in the research is unfortunate. For there are philosophers with different ideologies, ranging from the political left to the right, who claim their political viewpoints are underrepresented and subject to “ideological bias” and discrimination in the field (Haslanger 2008: 216; Saul 2015; Kings 2019: 214f, 225f; Case 2015; Sesardic 2016). These claims warrant a careful empirical assessment. After all, philosophers and philosophical institutions often emphasize the “imperative of philosophizing to strive for an open community into which all are welcome,”¹⁰ explicitly condemn discrimination based on “political convictions” as “unethical”,¹¹ and define philosophy as “unbridled criticism” (Priest 2006: 207). Such statements of openness, tolerance, and free criticism are clearly tension with ideological biases and discrimination. They beg the question as to whether the field of philosophy is indeed also, just as, for instance, the social sciences (Yancey 2011; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017), affected by these ideology-related phenomena, or not.

The question is especially important when it comes to the field of philosophy. For scientific claims can usually be experimentally tested, but philosophical claims frequently can’t, or simply aren’t. For instance, in ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of science, or philosophy of religion claims are often value-laden and admit no straightforward empirical check: whether abortion is murder, economic equality just, verificationism tenable, or the theodicy problem disproof of God can’t be settled experimentally. Some philosophical research can be experimentally assessed (Knobe and Nichols 2017), but much is accepted on the basis of intuitions and “subtle appeals to plausibility”, which are particularly susceptible to influences of values and biases (Kornblith 1999: 185). To protect themselves from blind spots and errors in their reasoning, philosophers rely thus much more than scientists on social criticism. Since a lack of ideological diversity and ideological biases reduce the scope of social criticism, they threaten the reliability of philosophical belief formation (Peters 2019).

We, a politically diverse team of philosophers and social psychologists, therefore conducted a systematic international survey pertaining to ideological diversity and bias in philosophy. Before turning to the details and results of the survey, we will provide a brief overview of the existing work on the issue.

But first, a final terminological clarification: While the terms ‘bias’, ‘hostility’, and ‘discrimination’ have negative moral connotations related to the idea of unfairness, we shall use these expressions more neutrally in that we grant that some ideological biases, hostility, and discrimination might be epistemically and/or ethically beneficial and justified (Antony 2016; Fantl 2018: 177f). Whether or

⁹ <https://blog.apaonline.org/2018/03/26/tell-us-how-to-fix-the-lack-of-diversity-in-philosophy-journals/>

¹⁰ See <https://philosophy.stanford.edu/about/diversity-and-climate>

¹¹ <https://www.apaonline.org/page/nondiscrimination>

not that is so needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.¹² Our focus here is primarily on exploring the *reality* of ideological biases, hostility, and discrimination in philosophy. We do, however, believe and briefly argue below (section 6) that these phenomena are also often both epistemically and ethically costly enough to consider counteracting them.

1. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Studies that provide insights into the distribution of and possible bias against ideologies in philosophy are rare. Moreover, most of the existing ones were conducted only with US samples, and focus mainly on liberals and conservatives, or Democrats and Republicans.

1.1 *Data on the distribution of ideologies in philosophy*

There are three different kinds of relevant studies. Rothman and Lichter (2009) report findings from the North American Academic Study Survey (NAASS), noting that among philosophy professors (N=26), 79% self-identified as liberals and 4% as conservatives. Relying instead on public voting records of professors in a number of US states, Schwitzgebel (2008) found that among philosophers (N=375), 87.2% were Democrat, 7.7% Republican, 2.7% Green, 1.3% Independent, 0.8% Libertarian, and 0.3% Peace & Freedom. Similarly, Klein and Stern (2009) report three US voter-registration studies finding a 5:1, 9:1, and 24:1 Democrat to Republican ratio among philosophers. Other relevant data come from Bourget and Chalmers (2014), who sent a survey to 1,972 philosophy faculty members at 99 institutions in Anglophone countries, questioning them about 30 philosophical topics. One was related to politics asking respondents whether they favored egalitarianism, communitarianism, libertarianism, or another position not specified. From 931 respondents, 34.8% favored egalitarianism, 14.3% communitarianism, 9.9% libertarianism, and 41.0% other, unspecified positions.

To our knowledge, these three kinds of studies are all that are currently available on the distribution of ideologies in philosophy. Even less is known about the existence and frequency of ideological *bias* in the field.

1.2 *Data on ideological bias in philosophy*

Two surveys provide relevant data. Using the liberal/conservative distinction, Honeycutt and Freberg (2017) polled 618 academics from various disciplines, including philosophy, across four Californian universities. They found an overt bias against both conservatives among liberals and against liberals among conservatives in, for instance, the assessment of grant applications, the

¹² Since using ‘bias’, ‘hostility’ or ‘discrimination’ when it comes to aversive responding to, say, racists or Nazis might come problematically close to expressing sympathy with such individuals (and may amount to what Saul (2017) calls using “fig leaves”), we wish to explicitly allow for some positive, justified instances of ideological bias, hostility, and discrimination (the case just mentioned being one of them).

review of papers, and hiring decisions. Their data analysis doesn't allow for specific conclusions about the field of philosophy, however. Yancey (2011) conducted a study that does. He surveyed 160 US philosophers on whether being a Democrat or a Republican damages acceptance of job applicants. Specifically, participants had to rate their own attitude on a 7-point scale in which 1 indicated that the characteristic at issue would "greatly damage" the participant's own "support to hire" an applicant and 7 indicated that the characteristic would "greatly enhance" it (Yancey 2011: 220).¹³ Yancey found a mean score of 4.248 for Democrats and a mean score of 3.699 for Republicans (2011: 117, 188). Since scoring below the 4.0 mid-point indicated that participants were overall more likely to reject than to accept applicants solely on the basis of their ideology, the data suggest the presence of a bias against Republicans in the sample.

As far as we know, these two studies provide all of the existing professionally gathered and published quantitative data on ideological bias, hostility, and discrimination in philosophy. But there are other relevant findings.

1.3 *Informally gathered data and anecdotes*

Weinberg (2016) used his website *Daily Nous* to ask people working in philosophy "[w]hich ideas are students protected from?" and "[w]hich are faculty fearful to defend?"¹⁴ He reports that from 132 responses, "several of the more popular answers on the list" of "ideas faculty are too scared to defend" were "critiques of feminism, critiques of homosexuality, critiques of race- and gender-based affirmative action, importance of racial differences in IQ and behaviour for social programs, critiques of transgender 'ideology'".¹⁵ These ideas are often considered conservative.

There is also anecdotal evidence of ideological bias.¹⁶ Conservative philosophers have reported fear to express their viewpoints in the field (Shield and Dunn 2016: 104, 123), and claimed they are often ridiculed (Sesardic 2016: 200), or told that their "ideas and sentiments are reactionary, prejudiced, sexist or racist" (Scruton 2014: 12). Similarly, left-leaning philosophers have held that there is, for instance, not only an anti-female but also an "antifeminist bias in philosophy" (Haslanger 2008: 216; see also Saul 2013: 43f, 2015, Kings 2019: 225f). The matter clearly calls for more research.

¹³ Many thanks to Lawrence Lengbeyer for prompting us to be clearer about the details of the study. The clarification that Yancey's participants were asked about their *own* support for the job applicant should also have been added to Peters (2019: 400).

¹⁴ <http://dailynous.com/2016/08/30/ideas-students-protected-from-faculty-fearful-to-defend/>

¹⁵ <http://dailynous.com/2016/09/06/ideas-faculty-scared-defend-follow/>

¹⁶ Student protests against certain invited speakers or lecturers might also suggest some (possibly not discipline-specific) ideological hostility. For an incident involving Peter Singer at the University of Victoria (Canada), see <http://www.martlet.ca/protesters-crash-effective-altruism-debate/>; for a recent case involving Jeff McMahan (and a critical discussion of 'no-platforming'), see McMahan (2019); for an incident involving philosophy classes on abortion, see <http://dailynous.com/2017/03/31/university-suspends-philosopher-lesson-abortion/>

behavior” (Noel and Therien 2008: 10). There is also an overlap internationally when it comes to key components of the meaning of the dichotomy (Bobbio 1996; Lukes 2003). Studies suggest that all “around the world [there is a] recurrent association between the left, egalitarianism and state intervention [to regulate the economy]. By contrast, the right is invariably identified with market liberalization and lesser state intervention [in the economy]” (Rosas and Ferreira 2014: 9; Rockey 2014; Cochrane 2015). Relatedly, a 2018 study focusing on eight countries (Australia, Chile, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, UK, and the US) found that despite the different national histories, left and right “still summarize and mediate the influence that personality features like basic values and core political values may exert on political choices”, and “refer to similar patterns of values and principles across political contexts”, making the “left/right ideology [...] worthy of careful consideration [...] for scholars to address, predict, and compare political preferences across countries” (Caprara and Vecchione 2018: 70, 79). We too thus decided to use self-identification on the left-right spectrum to track political viewpoints.

Notice that one might, for instance, be left-leaning on *social issues* in that one favors personal freedom, equality, social justice, etc., but right-leaning on *economic issues* in that one favors economic freedom, accepts economic inequalities, competitive capitalism, etc. (Crawford et al. 2016: 385). The reverse might hold too. To capture these differences, we asked participants not only about their overall left-right self-identification but also about how they would see themselves on the left-right spectrum when it comes to social and economic issues.

2.2 Main questions and hypotheses

The study was structured around three main questions: (1) How are left/right ideologies distributed in philosophy? (2) Is there a bias, hostility, or discrimination against left/right-leaning individuals or viewpoints in the field? (3) If so, do members of the field take them to be justified? Corresponding to (1)-(3), and partly based on the results of related extant research on the “ideological-conflict hypothesis” (Brandt et al. 2014), which posits that people with different ideologies dislike ideas that conflict with their own and aim to maintain their worldview via motivated information processing against worldview-violating groups, we generated a set of hypotheses (pre-registered¹⁸ prior to data collection). Our main hypotheses¹⁹ were:

- (H1) Philosophers are predominantly left leaning.
- (H2) The more left-leaning the participant, the less hostility they would report experiencing, and, correspondingly, the more right-leaning the participant, the more hostility they would report experiencing.
- (H3) Left-leaning and right-leaning individuals report similar willingness to discriminate against each other.

¹⁸ See our OSF platform at: https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187

¹⁹ Nine hypotheses were pre-registered in total. For all of them and the respective findings, see https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187. We focus only on the four main ones here.

(H4) There is a significant association between ideology and justification of discrimination against left/right-leaning individuals, such that the more right-leaning participants would consider discrimination against the left to be more justified, and the more left-leaning participants would consider discrimination against the right to be more justified.

3. METHOD

We used a survey instrument adapted from Honeycutt and Freberg (2017). It included questions about hostility and discrimination against both left-leaning and right-leaning individuals and contents (i.e., arguments, claims, etc.). That is, the questions were ‘mirrored’ for ideological opposites.²⁰ The instrument, which was hosted on a secure *Qualtrics* site, is available online on an OSF platform (see the link below).²¹ All study material received prior approval by the *Social and Societal Ethics Committee* (SMEC) at KU Leuven, and the *Institutional Review Board* at Rutgers University.

3.1 Sample

In June-July 2018, 1069 participants were recruited from the PHILOS-L server. 275 were excluded using pre-specified data exclusion criteria,²² resulting in a final sample of 794 participants (562 male, 213 female, 19 other/no response; age range: 18-85; average age: 37.1). 691 (87%) were White, 29 multiracial, 24 Asian, 17 Hispanic/Latino(a), 17 Middle-Eastern/North African, 3 Black or African American, and 2 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. 11 declined to state ethnicity. Most participants resided in Europe (67.13%; Table 1). Overall, 38% identified as graduate student, 28.6% as full/associate/assistant professor, 14.4% as post-doctoral researcher, 6.7% as assistant lecturer/teaching assistant, and 5.2% as undergraduate student. 7% selected “other”. As for philosophical traditions, 57.7% of the participants worked in analytic philosophy, 27.6% in continental philosophy, and 14.8% indicated “other”. For area of specialization (participants were able to select more than one), 36.9% mentioned “political philosophy”, 35.3% “ethics”, 21.7% “philosophy of science”, 21.4% “history of philosophy”, 20.3% “epistemology”, 18.4% “metaphysics”, 17.5% “philosophy of mind”, 13% “phenomenology”, 7.8% “aesthetics”, 7.7% “philosophy of religion”, 6.9% “logic”, and 16% selected “other”.

3.2 Measures

We presented participants with different types of questions. The four main types were:²³

²⁰ Previous surveys on political diversity in academia were criticized for only tracking participants’ responses to one particular ideology without also assessing responses to the opposite one (Skitka 2012). Our instrument avoids this.

²¹ https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187

²² Participants were excluded if they didn’t agree to the informed consent or answered less than 50% of the questions.

²³ For all questions, see https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187

(1) *Questions on the distribution of ideologies*

Respondents were asked to indicate their own and their colleagues'²⁴ ideology on social/ethical issues, economic issues, and overall, using the familiar political left-right spectrum, and 7-point scales (1=*Very left-leaning*, 4=*Moderate*, 7=*Very right-leaning*).

(2) *Questions on ideological hostility*

To assess participants' own experience of ideology-related hostility in philosophy, subjects were asked (1) how hostile the climate in their field is toward their own political beliefs, (2) how often they refrain from expressing their political beliefs to colleagues for fear of negative consequences, and (3) how often they think colleagues would discriminate against them on the basis of their ideology (5-point scales were used; 1=*Not at all hostile*, 3=*Moderately hostile*, 5=*Extremely hostile*, and 1=*Never*, 3=*Occasionally*, 5=*All the time*). Participants were also asked to speculate about the hostility they believed left/right-leaning *colleagues* might experience due to their ideology. The same questions (and scales) as before were used, but with the context changed from self to others.

We also added one question asking participants whether they would be reluctant to defend their own argument if it led to a *left-leaning* conclusion, and one question on whether they would be reluctant to do so if the argument led to a *right-leaning* conclusion. Our thought was that ideological hostility might not only emerge in relation to people but also in relation to *contents*, manifesting itself, for instance, in an aversion to support counter-ideological conclusion (claims, arguments, findings etc.; Stevens et al. 2018). We reasoned that a strong reluctance to defend one's own arguments when they lead to counter-ideological conclusions also reflects an interesting asymmetric allegiance to an ideology over academic debate and constructive discourse.

(3) *Questions on willingness to discriminate*

Two sets of four questions captured what we (following others; Brandt et al. 2014) conceptualized as participants' *willingness to discriminate* (henceforth 'WTD') against left/right-leaning individuals/contents in their field. Specifically, we asked participants how often (5-point scale; 1=*Never*, 3=*Occasionally*, 5=*All the time*) they would be negatively influenced in their decision on a grant application, or a paper if that application, or paper seemed to them to take a politically left/right-leaning perspective, how often they would be reluctant to invite a colleague to symposia who is known to be left/right-leaning, and how often they would be inclined to choose the more right/left-leaning job candidate of two equally qualified applicants in hiring.²⁵ Using the same

²⁴ Participants were asked about their 'colleagues in the field'. We didn't specify the term further. But on a natural reading, it designates individuals with whom one is typically interacting when doing philosophy in academia, that is, one's departmental co-workers, including faculty members but also fellow students, postdocs, etc. We acknowledge that it might not always be easy to average over one's colleagues' attitudes.

²⁵ Since there was no mentioning of the quality of, say, the argument supporting the perspective in the grant application or paper, or of the possibly poorer competence of the candidate, the answers to these questions reveal a readiness to discriminate that is based primarily on ideological preference.

questions and scales but with the context changed from self to others, we then also asked participants on their colleagues' behavior with respect to these four issues.

(4) *Questions on justification*

Finally, participants were asked two justification-related questions: "How justified is discrimination (e.g., in hiring/promotion decisions, grants, or manuscript reviews) against left/right-leaning individuals in your field?" (1=*Not at all justified*, 3=*Neither justified nor unjustified*, 5=*Extremely justified*), and "How often *should* politically left/right-leaning ideas, theories, or critiques be discussed in the areas of philosophy where political viewpoints matter?" (1=*Never*, 3=*Occasionally/sometimes*, 5=*All the time*). Our reasoning was that when participants hold that a left/right-leaning idea/theory/critique should, for instance, never be discussed then they take it to be justified that it is never discussed.

In addition to the just mentioned four types of questions, we also left a 'Free Response' section at the end of the survey, asking participants whether there was anything else they wanted to add on what they had seen or personally experienced in their field with regard to their political beliefs. The free comments yielded qualitative data in addition to the quantitative evidence derived from the scales-set answers to questions belonging to (1)-(4).

4. RESULTS (Quantitative data)

4.1 *Distribution of ideological viewpoints and results on (H1)*

As predicted with (H1), participants were primarily left-leaning ($M=2.69$, $SD=1.49$), $t(793) = -24.77$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [2.56, 2.90] (see Table 2), analytic philosophers identifying as slightly less so ($M=2.79$, $SD=1.50$) than continental philosophers ($M=2.47$, $SD=1.42$), $t(675) = -2.60$, $p = .01$, 95% CI [-.56, -.08] (see Table 4, Figure 3). Overall, 74.8% were left-leaning (20.2% 'very left-leaning'), while 14.2% were right-leaning (1.6% 'very right-leaning'). Only 11% were moderates (for classification by rank and subfield, see Tables 3 and 5, Figures 2 and 4). On economic ($M=2.55$, $SD=1.56$) and social/ethical issues ($M=2.77$, $SD=1.61$) too, participants clearly leaned left (see Table 2). Participants also perceived their colleagues as primarily left-leaning ($M=2.50$, $SD=.86$), $t(788) = -48.99$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-1.56, -1.44], and, as a *post-hoc* paired-samples t-test (not pre-registered) indicated, viewed them as more left-leaning than themselves ($M_{diff} = .193$, $SD=1.81$), $t(788) = 2.99$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.07, .32].²⁶

4.2 *Ideological hostility and results on (H2)*

²⁶ This is in line with other studies finding a "lone moderate effect", which emerges when subjects view themselves as the only moderates in a controversy even within their own ideological group (see Keltner and Robinson 1993).

Supporting (H2), a significant correlation was found between ideology and reported personal experience of hostility $r(794)=.47, p<.001$ (see Table 6). The more right-leaning the participant, the more hostility they reported personally experiencing from colleagues, and, overall, the more left-leaning the participant, the less hostility they reported personally experiencing. Participants also perceived right-leaning individuals in the field ($M=2.79, SD=.89$) to experience more hostility than left-leaning subjects ($M=1.78, SD=.64$), $t(779)= 24.40, p<.001, 95\% CI [.93, 1.09] d=1.30$. Looking at it another way, binning participants by ideology (binned: 1-3=left-leaning, 4=moderate, 5-7=right-leaning), a *post-hoc* (not pre-registered) one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences in experiences of hostility by ideology, $F(2, 793)= 151.09, p<.001$. *Post-hoc* Bonferroni comparisons indicated that right-leaning participants reported experiencing more hostility than moderate participants ($M_{diff}=.78, p<.001$) and left-leaning participants ($M_{diff}=1.50, p<.001$), and that moderate participants reported experiencing more hostility than left-leaning participants ($M_{diff}=.72, p<.001$).

Turning now to ideological aversion against/preference for *contents*, participants reported that they would be more reluctant to defend their own argument if it led to a right-leaning conclusion ($M=2.61, SD=1.16$) than if it led to a left-leaning one ($M=1.94, SD=1.02$), $t(647)=-13.39, p<.001, 95\% CI [-.78, -.58] d= -.61$. There was also a weak tendency for more left-leaning participants to express more reluctance to defend a right-leaning conclusion ($r= -.09, p=.023$) (Table 6). There was, however, no association between ideology and how often participants would be reluctant to defend their argument if it led to a left-leaning conclusion ($r=.06, p=.126$). These findings point toward an apparent stigma held by most participants, regardless of their political ideology, against defending right-leaning conclusions. Considered together with our other results, this reluctance to defend right-leaning conclusions may be the by-product of perceived or actual ideological discrimination within the field. It suggests the presence of ideological “self-censorship” (Bar Tal. 2017; Maroja 2019).

4.3 WTD and results on (H3)

As predicted with (H3), significant correlations were found between ideology and the WTD items (i.e., left/right-leaning on paper review, grant review, symposia invitation, hiring; Table 6). The more left-leaning the participant, the more frequently a right-leaning perspective/individual would be viewed negatively in assessing grant applications ($r= -.37, p<.001$), evaluating papers ($r= -.31, p<.001$), inviting colleagues to symposia ($r= -.28, p<.001$), and making hiring decisions involving two otherwise equally qualified candidates ($r= -.36, p<.001$). On the other side, the more right-leaning the participant, the more frequently a left-leaning perspective/individual would be viewed negatively in assessing grant applications ($r=.21, p<.001$), evaluating papers ($r=.15, p<.001$), inviting colleagues to symposia ($r=.08, p=.04$), and making hiring decisions ($r=.24, p<.001$).

But overall, WTD against right-leaning perspective/individuals ($M=2.18, SD=.88$) was significantly greater than WTD against left-leaning perspective/individuals ($M=1.63, SD=.56$),

$t(732)= 16.11, p<.001, 95\% \text{ CI } [.48, .61] d=.74$. To see this differently, consider the binned percentages (participants who responded “occasionally,” “frequently,” or “all the time”) for the WTD questions, broken out by ideology (binned: 1-3=left-leaning, 4=moderate, 5-7=right-leaning; see Figure 5). 32% of the left-leaning participants indicated WTD against right-leaning papers, 42% against right-leaning grants, 38% against right-leaning symposia speakers, and 56% against right-leaning job candidates at least occasionally. In contrast, among right-leaning participants, 20% indicated WTD against left-leaning papers, 23% against left-leaning grants, 12% against left-leaning symposia, and 46% against a left-leaning job candidate at least occasionally (see Figure 5).

Given the apparent skew in the percentages for WTD by ideology, via *post-hoc* analyses (not pre-registered), we tested for left/right differences in frequency of WTD. Four new variables were created for WTD against the opposition (i.e., left vs. right and *vice versa*) for the four dimensions (reviewing a grant, assessing a paper, symposia invite, hiring). For ideology for these tests, we used the binned variable for ideology (1-3=left-leaning, 4=moderate, 5-7=right-leaning).²⁷ Multiple independent samples t-tests to compare WTD against the opposition for left- vs. right-leaning participants showed that left-leaning participants ($M=2.35, SD=.98$) were more likely than right-leaning ones ($M=1.99, SD=.80$) to view negatively the grant application of the opposing ideology, $t(668)= 3.62, p<.001, 95\% \text{ CI } [.17, .56] d= .38$. They ($M=2.14, SD=.98$) were also more likely than right-leaning participants ($M=1.83, SD=.83$) to view negatively a paper of the opposing ideology, $t(669)= 3.04, p<.001, 95\% \text{ CI } [.11, .50] d= .32$. Furthermore, they ($M=2.25, SD=1.07$) were more likely than right-leaning participants ($M=1.55, SD=.79$) to be less willing to invite colleagues of the opposing ideology to symposia, $t(668)= 6.51, p<.001, 95\% \text{ CI } [.49, .91] d= .68$. Last, left-leaning participants ($M=2.67, SD=1.19$) were more likely than right-leaning participants ($M=2.37, SD=1.03$) to not be willing to hire someone of the opposing ideology, $t(668)= 2.45, p=.015, 95\% \text{ CI } [.06, .54] d= .26$.²⁸ Collectively, these analyses indicate that left-leaning participants’ WTD against the right was greater than right-leaning participants’ WTD against the left (see Figures 5, 6 (for WTD by rank), and 7).

Finally, there was no statistically significant difference between analytic ($M=1.64, SD=.57$) and continental ($M=1.61, SD=.52$) philosophers for WTD against left-leaning perspectives/colleagues, $t(641)= -.50, p=.62, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.12, .07]$. A statistically significant difference did emerge, however,

²⁷ For each variable, scores were merged such that, for example, the WTD against the opposition for hiring variable was comprised of the left’s scores for WTD against a right-leaning hire, and the right’s scores for WTD against a left-leaning hire. The same was done for the other three variables. After creating the variables, a Hotelling’s Trace analysis was conducted, $T^2=3.63, F(4, 663)=601.63, p<.001$, and indicated that the population means for the four variables were not equal, allowing us, therefore, to proceed with additional analyses.

²⁸ Chi-square analyses (recoding WTD for the four variables into dichotomous variables with <3=not WTD, 3-5=WTD) corroborated these findings: Chi square tests of goodness of fit to determine whether WTD for left- and right-leaning participants was equivalent across the four dimensions (grant, paper, symposia, hiring) revealed that WTD for left- vs. right-leaning participants was not equivalent for grants, $X^2(1, N=670)=33.58, p<.001$, for papers, $X^2(1, N=671)=103.08, p<.001$, for symposia, $X^2(1, N=670)=70.93, p<.001$, or for hiring, $X^2(1, N=670)=4.68, p=.031$.

for WTD against right-leaning colleagues, $t(638) = 2.89$, $p = .004$, 95% CI [.07, .36]: continental philosophers ($M = 2.32$, $SD = .92$) were willing to discriminate against right-leaning perspectives/colleagues more frequently than analytic philosophers ($M = 2.10$, $SD = .85$).

Moving from participants' reports on how they themselves would act to their view on how they thought *others* would act, we found that the more left-leaning the participant, the more likely they were to believe that a left-leaning perspective/individual would be treated negatively by colleagues in the mentioned contexts (Table 6; grant application $r = -.26$, $p < .001$; paper review $r = -.27$, $p < .001$; symposia invitation $r = -.31$, $p = .04$; hiring decisions $r = -.27$, $p < .001$). And the more right-leaning the participant, the more likely they were to believe that a right-leaning perspective/individual would be viewed negatively by colleagues in these contexts (grant application $r = .39$, $p < .001$; paper review $r = .36$, $p < .001$; symposia invitation $r = .31$, $p < .001$; hiring decisions $r = .34$, $p < .001$). Overall, however, participants reported believing that colleagues would engage in discrimination against right-leaning individuals ($M = 2.74$, $SD = .87$) more often than against left-leaning individuals ($M = 1.97$, $SD = .70$), $t(652) = 17.30$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.68, .85] $d = .97$.

4.4 Justification of discrimination and results on (H4)

398 participants (50.1%) indicated that discrimination against right-leaning contents/individuals in the field (in hiring/promotion decisions, grants, or manuscript reviews) is not at all justified (scale point 1 on the 1-5 scale). 436 (54.9%) indicated the same with respect to left-leaning contents/individuals. 365 participants (51.34%) indicated that *both* types of discrimination are not at all justified.

Moreover, consistent with prediction (H4), there was a significant association between ideology and justification of discrimination against right-leaning individuals in the field ($r = -.37$, $p < .001$) (see Table 6). The more left-leaning the participant, the more justified they believed discrimination against right-leaning individuals to be. But, against (H4), there was no significant association between ideology and justification of discrimination against left-leaning individuals ($r = .000$, $p = .991$).

Providing further insights into participants' views on whether the treatment of certain ideological *contents* is justified, we also found that the more right-leaning the participant, the more frequent the indication that right-leaning ideas, theories, or critiques *should* be discussed more often in the relevant areas ($r = .13$, $p = .001$) (Table 6). But there was no significant association between ideology and opinions on how often left-leaning ideas, theories, or critiques should be discussed ($r = -.07$, $p = .071$). Notice too that while there was, overall, a significant difference between how often participants believed that left-leaning ideas, theories, or critiques should be discussed (when relevant) ($M = 4.02$, $SD = .62$) compared to right-leaning ones ($M = 3.91$, $SD = .72$), $t(645) = 5.52$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.08, .16] $d = .16$, the means for both kinds of contents are quite high and near the

item scale-point of 4 (i.e., “frequently”). Practically speaking, overall, participants reported that both should be discussed (in the relevant areas) relatively frequently, and the effect size is small.

5. RESULTS (Qualitative data)

Turning now from the findings of the quantitative analyses, to the ‘Free Response’ that participants could give at the end of the survey, these responses provide qualitative data that help cast further light on the quantitative findings. For many free responses mention concrete examples of the ideological bias, discrimination, or hostility that respondents experienced, witnessed, or heard about. 231 participants (29.1% of the sample) left comments in the ‘Free Response’ section. We classified them into different, non-exclusive categories.²⁹ Our four main categories were:

- (1) Underrepresentation of/hostility towards left-leaning individuals/views
- (2) Hostility from the left against the left
- (3) Underrepresentation of/hostility towards right-leaning individuals/views
- (4) Doubts about ideological bias/hostility/discrimination

We’ll briefly consider some of the responses classified as (1)-(4). A list of all responses is freely available on our OSF platform.³⁰

5.1 *Underrepresentation of/hostility towards left-leaning individuals/views*

28 responses fell into this category.³¹ Overall, people who were very left-leaning reported significantly more experiences of bias, discrimination, and hostility than liberals or moderately progressives, writing, for instance,

In my experience the discrimination is against those *critical of liberalism* from a left-wing/feminist/anti-colonial perspective. Liberal left-wing philosophers don’t have any difficulties – if anything, theirs is the dominant view. But anyone further left will experience a hostile environment (e.g. anarchists, Marxists). (68)³²

I do not think milquetoast liberal views are marginalized. I think more radical, broadly ‘left,’ communist, feminist, racial liberationist, etc. views are. (95; and see also 98, 137, 152, 172, 175, 218, 223)

²⁹ Two of the authors independently classified the responses and afterwards crosschecked their classifications.

³⁰ See the *Supplementary Data PHILOS-L Survey* file at:
https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187

³¹ Since feminist views and environmental concerns and concerns about animal welfare are usually seen as part of a left-leaning orientation, we included responses related to them in this group.

³² The numbers in the brackets refer to the list of responses in the *Supplementary Data PHILOS-L Survey* file.

I had a grant application rejected in the last few years, and one of the reasons stated was that I am a feminist and a feminist cannot conduct a fair inquiry in the area of the grant application. (37)

Some respondents maintained that “neoliberalism”, or the capitalist “system” itself contributes to an ideological bias against, and an underrepresentation of, radical left-wing views and individuals in academic philosophy (67, 51). Others suggested that hostility toward (radical) left-leaning views might in fact be internal or related to certain philosophical traditions:

Analytic philosophy is built on a fairly right wing foundation anyway, of the individual logical man using atomised premises to create an argument. When one deviates from this, the boundaries of the discipline are heavily policed. (79; see also 137)

The antipathy towards ‘continental’ philosophy also sometimes plays out in hostility towards left-wing political critique springing from that tradition. (175)

5.2 *Hostility from the left against the left*

Echoing some of the remarks just mentioned but more explicitly stating the source of hostility, one respondent wrote about the marginalization of certain left-leaning views by a “liberal majority” (95), while another added that the “discipline is politically liberal, which means hostile to both conservative and socialist critique” (172). Comments of this kind suggest that left-leaning individuals may be hostile to others on their own ideological side because they are *too* left. Adding further complexity to the phenomenon, people that self-identified as moderately left-leaning also sometimes reported that they faced hostility for being not left *enough* by those on the far left. In fact, 11 responses mentioned hostility against moderately left-leaning individuals or views from the far end of their own political side, saying, for instance:

I for one did not feel comfortable voicing pro-Hillary sentiment during the primary, mainly for fear of censure from more left-leaning colleagues. (27)

I said that I am left-leaning and sometimes feel pressure to stay quiet about my beliefs. [...] I think this pressure is not coming from right-wing members of the profession, but from left-wing members who might believe that I am not left-wing enough (170, see also 231, 12, 16 99, 107, 52, 111, 115, 209)

5.3 *Underrepresentation of/hostility towards right-leaning individuals/views*

76 responses fell into this category, sometimes containing colorful expressions of experiences of hostility such as, for instance,

If my professional colleagues knew that I am moderately right-wing then half of them would call me a 'subhuman pig' and treat me accordingly. The other half would keep silent for fear of being next. (1)

Several respondents also noted that right-leaning subjects were the preferred targets of jokes in academic philosophy:

Comments and jokes about those on the right are frequent, and this makes it difficult to gauge the true balance of opinion as any right-leaning individual is likely to remain quiet. (210; see also 60 and 231).

Another respondent wrote,

I have seen large-scale organised walk-outs by students at visiting lectures by senior academics who are known to be politically right-leaning. [...] [A] fairly large number of students and academics in philosophy tend to give the least charitable/most extreme interpretation of right-leaning claims made by others in their field. (182)

Many left-leaning respondents were in fact open about their WTD against, for instance, far right-leaning individuals and views, though they tended to suggest a different attitude toward moderately right-leaning ones and sometimes distinguished between right-leaning views on social as opposed to economic issues:

I would not invite a far right speaker for a conference, but I don't think this tells us anything about my inclinations to invite people from the center right. (73)

I would loathe to hire a colleague who had views that had classist, racist, sexist, or nationalist implications, due to workplace issues. Economic views seem less directly relevant to the workplace environment. (132; see also 131, 23)

Libertarian ideas about minimum wages and social welfare seem to be more tolerated than conservative arguments that challenge left-leaning views on social or ethical issues:

I suspect that men and women are predisposed to have different interests, and that this accounts for the disparities in gender ratios across disciplines/professions. Yet this view is not one I am able to voice openly [...]. I don't know what reaction people would have if I were to make this view public, but I suspect it 'hostile' would be an understatement. (12)

It is worth noting too that when right-leaning participants reported experiences of hostility in the free responses, there was no comment to the effect that the hostility was coming from individuals

from their own side of the political spectrum (either more radical or more moderate subjects). This contrasts with the free responses by left-leaning subjects about their left-leaning colleagues.

5.4 *Doubts about ideological bias/discrimination/hostility*

34 responses fell into this category. Some claimed that ideological bias and discrimination in philosophy are rare, if not non-existent,

I have seen no evidence of systematic bias on the basis of political affiliation in 15 years of involvement in professional philosophy. (40; see also 180)

My field (at least in Europe) is dominated by left-leaning individuals, such as myself. I don't think this is the product of discrimination or anything sinister however. (179)

In some responses, a subfield was taken to be free from discrimination because the decision makers lack knowledge of the ideology of the individuals they decide on (29) or ideology is irrelevant (122, 200), and many respondents thought

the quality of arguments matters more than the orientation of political beliefs. I feel that both right-wing and left-wing beliefs are respected in my field as long as they are well-supported. (91; see also 57, 86, 139, 162, 164, 226).

Relatedly, a number of respondents claimed that right-wing ideas in general tend not to survive philosophical scrutiny,

conservative ideas tend to lose in fair competition in the marketplace of ideas. They are given their chance, and are generally shown to be bad. People who accept many of them tend to be bad philosophers. (25; see also 85, 120)

I'd be inclined to negatively review a right-leaning paper for the simple fact that I believe, given the arguments, that the political right get things **wrong**. We're talking about matters of objective truth here. (85; see also 120)

Neither the widespread endorsement of leftist positions nor the widespread rejection of conservative positions is a matter of ideological bias, any more so than there is a bias against Creationist among biologists. (146; see also 7, 103, 126, 128, 146, 149, 151, 203)

While many philosophers claimed right-leaning views are in general, that is, not only the extreme positions, 'wrong' or 'bad' philosophy, we found no corresponding claim in the free responses with respect to left-leaning views. This was another significant difference in the free responses when left-leaning participants' comments were compared to those by right-leaning individuals.

6. GENERAL DISCUSSION

The qualitative and quantitative data introduced provide intriguing insights into the political dynamics in the field of philosophy. To begin with, participants in our survey clearly leaned left (74.8%; with 20.2% ‘very left-leaning’) while right-leaning subjects and moderates were minorities. This coheres with and extends research in other fields such as, for instance, sociology or social psychology that found a majority of liberals and an underrepresentation of conservatives in these disciplines (Yancey 2011; Inbar and Lammers 2012; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017). While the overall distribution of left- vs. right-leaning individuals that we found in philosophy might be expected, one of the more surprising results is that there were in fact fewer moderates (11%) in our sample than right-leaning individuals (14%).

One factor contributing to the imbalance in representation of ideological viewpoints might be an aversion and discrimination against right-leaning and moderate individuals. Our study doesn’t directly show that they do contribute to it. It does, however, provide evidence that ideological hostility and a readiness to discriminate on the basis of ideology are not only *real* in philosophy but also directed at *various* ideologies, including a moderate stance (moderate participants reported experiencing more hostility than left-leaning participants, but less than right-leaning participants). Our findings thus suggest that *across the political spectrum*, from very left-leaning to very right-leaning individuals, philosophers sometimes experience politically motivated hostility in the field which, in some cases, prevents them from expressing their viewpoints, from being taken seriously, and from contributing to debates. This is striking, because given the pervasiveness of explicit commitments to open-mindedness, and inclusiveness among philosophers (Riggs 2010; Kidd 2017; Kings 2019), philosophy departments,³³ and organizations,³⁴ one would expect the opposite.

Equally surprisingly, our qualitative data, combined with the quantitative findings, reveal a significant discrepancy between many philosophers’ beliefs that ideological bias and discrimination are either rare or non-existent in the field and many more other philosophers’ reports of having actually experienced or witnessed them first hand, or *being willing to engage in it themselves*. Starting with the political right, the more right-leaning the participant was, the more hostility they reported personally experiencing from colleagues, and the stronger their impression that they and their political ideology would be negatively viewed in judgment- and decision-making in the field. The validity of this subjective impression was partly confirmed by the fact that the more left-leaning the participant was, the more frequent their WTD against right-leaning individuals and contents in judgment- and decision-making. Similarly, while left-leaning participants didn’t report more experiences of hostility the more left-leaning they were, the more left-leaning the participant was, the stronger their impression that they themselves and their ideology would be negatively assessed in the mentioned contexts. This subjective impression too was partly confirmed by the fact that the

³³ See, e.g., the websites of the Department of Philosophy at NYU (<http://as.nyu.edu/philosophy/climate.html>) or Rutgers University (<https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/about-us/discourse>)

³⁴ <https://www.apaonline.org/page/nondiscrimination>

more right-leaning the participant was, the more frequent their WTD against left-leaning individuals or contents in application/paper reviewing, conference invitations, and hiring.

These results provide support for the “ideological-conflict hypothesis” (Brandt et al. 2014) in suggesting that left-leaning individuals and right-leaning individuals are similarly intolerant against groups holding values inconsistent with their own. There were, however, also left-right asymmetries that are noteworthy in the context of the ideological-conflict hypothesis. For instance, right-leaning individuals’ WTD against left-leaning contents/individuals was less pronounced than left-leaning individuals’ WTD against right-leaning contents/individuals. Additionally, *both* groups of participants tended to be more reluctant to defend arguments with right-leaning conclusions than those with left-leaning ones – an interesting finding suggesting ideological self-censoring among participants (Bar Tal 2017; Maroja 2019). Moreover, while we found that within the left-leaning side of the political spectrum, factions are sometimes hostile against *each other* too, we couldn’t detect a similar phenomenon among right-leaning subjects. Since moderately left-leaning individuals (e.g., liberals) and very left-leaning individuals share important features (e.g., an emphasis on equality; Arneson 2015) that make them, despite their differences, fall on the same left side of the spectrum, we shall call this phenomenon *intra-ideological hostility*. In providing evidence of intra-ideological hostility, our study offers a new contribution to extant research on ideological hostility in academia, which has so far only revealed *cross-ideological* (liberals vs. conservatives and *vice versa*) hostility (Brandt et al. 2014; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017). It is an interesting question for future research whether intra-ideological hostility might in fact be stronger than cross-ideological hostility.

Independently of their strength, it is worth noting that hostility and discrimination against a particular ideology in philosophy or any other academic discipline needn’t be problematic. An aversion against creationists in biology or against flat-earthers in geology seems unobjectionable. The same might hold for individuals with certain ideologies in philosophy. If so, then one would expect members of the field to take discrimination against some subjects on the basis of their ideology to be justified. And indeed we did find that the more left-leaning the participant was, the more justified they believed discrimination against right-leaning contents/individuals in the field to be, while the reverse didn’t hold. Yet, importantly, we also found that about half of the participants took discrimination against either left- or right-leaning contents/individuals in the field to be not justified at all, which starkly contrasts with the fact that many participants on both the left and the right in fact openly acknowledged they would discriminate³⁵ against contents/individuals of the opposite ideology.

³⁵ A reviewer notes that, for instance, subjects’ radically right-leaning beliefs may lead them to utterances about individuals (e.g., women, members of ethnic minorities, etc.) that don’t just express the beliefs but also indirectly address the individuals concerned, where this interlocutory dimension of the expressions creates harm the envisaging of which may have driven the discriminatory responses in some of our participants. We agree that this interlocutory dimension of the expression of ideological beliefs is important to acknowledge and to further analyze to arrive at an adequate account of the justificatory basis of the discrimination we tracked.

Of course, even if the majority thought that acting in these ways isn't justified, it might still be justified. We don't want to commit to any strong view on whether this is the case with respect to individuals or contents of either ideology. That is, we are open to the possibility that ideological bias, hostility, and discrimination are frequently justified.³⁶ We do, however, believe that they are also often costly enough for the field of philosophy to consider taking steps to counteract them.³⁷ There are two kinds of costs: *epistemic* costs and *ethical* ones.

6.1 *Epistemic costs*

These are negative effects on the reliability of belief formation and knowledge acquisition in the field. A bias against and lack of, say, feminist, moderate, or conservative (right-leaning) scholars in philosophy might be detrimental in this sense in that they reduce the scope of critical questions being asked, which increases researchers' susceptibility to reasoning errors due to confirmation bias and group polarization, possibly impeding a convergence on truths (Longino 2002: 132; Draper and Nichols 2013; Peters 2019). The problem is particularly pressing in philosophy because philosophical claims are frequently affected by philosophers' political values, which emphasize some aspects of an issue while obscuring others. And different ideological convictions incline philosophers toward different conclusions in debates on, for instance, equality (Cohen 2006: 416f), immigration (Hidalgo and Freiman 2016), social welfare (Rajczi 2014), abortion (McLachlan 1977), implicit bias (Allen-Hermanson 2017b), affirmative action (Shield and Dunn 2016: 196f), the heritability of intelligence (Sesardic 2010), cognitive-difference research (Kourany 2016), values in science (Hicks 2011), and more. Since claims in these areas of philosophical inquiry are often based on political values and can't be easily empirically tested, social criticism is important for philosophers to avoid blind spots and errors in their reasoning.

A study by Gampa et al. (2019) suggests that these errors aren't just possible but likely. Gampa et al. asked liberals and conservatives to evaluate the logical soundness of classically structured logical syllogisms supporting liberal or conservative beliefs, and found that both "liberals and conservatives frequently evaluated the logical structure of entire arguments based on the believability of arguments' conclusions, leading to predictable patterns of logical errors. As a result, liberals were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting conservative beliefs and conservatives were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting liberal beliefs" (2019: 1). These findings highlight the importance of ideological opponents in value-laden debates, which are particularly common in philosophy, to correct for reasoning biases and possibly harness opposing individuals' ideologies for epistemic group-level benefits (a 'Mandevillian' effect, Peters forthcoming).

But a lack or swift dismissal of, for instance, very left-leaning, moderate, or right-leaning minority beliefs in philosophy wouldn't only weaken the reliability of philosophical belief formation. It could

³⁶ Thanks here to James Robert Brown for prompting us to be more specific about our claims. See also footnote 7.

³⁷ For a more detailed argument for this view, see Peters (2019: 403f).

also lead scholars to overlook meaningful research questions (Richardson 2010; Jussim et al. 2018), and might, given the reduced social checking of reasoning, cause scholars inside and outside philosophy as well as the public to distrust philosophical research (Rolin 2002: 100f; Kornblith 1999: 190f).

Some ‘Free Responses’ suggested that an aversion and discrimination against *right-leaning* individuals and views, in particular, is in fact epistemically warranted because such individuals are less likely to reason correctly, and their views tend to be misguided. However, any claim to the effect that right-leaning individuals are *in general* less intelligent and philosophically capable than left-leaning subjects is most likely false due to its broad scope and the diverse distribution of intellectual capacities (Duarte et al. 2015: 9). Moreover, even advocates of misguided minority views might be epistemically beneficial in challenging and/or motivating those holding the accurate views to articulate and keep in sight the *reasons* for their views (Longino 2002: 131f). An absence of and/or discrimination against misguided minority positions increase the probability that subjects come to hold widely shared correct views without being able to properly defend them (Maroja 2019).

6.2 Ethical costs

These are effects of ideological bias and a lack of ideological diversity related to a violation of what subjects take to be morally valuable such as, for instance, fairness, equality, or social justice. The ideological hostility and discrimination we found create ethical costs in violating moral principles that many philosophers (e.g., Riggs 2010; Kidd 2017; Kings 2019) and philosophical institutions commit themselves to. For example, in Europe, the “Faculty of Philosophy” at Cambridge University stresses that it is “committed to equality, diversity, and inclusion”.³⁸ Oxford University too has a “commitment to fostering an inclusive culture which promotes equality, values diversity and maintains a working, learning and social environment in which the rights and dignity of all its staff and students are respected.”³⁹ Turning to the US, the Department of Philosophy at New York University emphasizes: “We do not tolerate [...] discrimination, and we strongly support efforts to remove barriers to inclusiveness in philosophy as a discipline.”⁴⁰ In the same vein, the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University writes: “Philosophy both requires and fosters norms of civil, inclusive discourse. [...] No topic or claim is too obvious or controversial to be discussed.”⁴¹ Similarly, the *American Philosophical Association* “acknowledges that in all their professional interactions and relations, philosophers are responsible for: Treating others fairly, equitably, and

³⁸ https://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/prosp-students/copy2_of_GraduateProspectus1920_FINAL.pdf/at_download/file

³⁹ <https://edu.admin.ox.ac.uk/home>

⁴⁰ <http://as.nyu.edu/philosophy/climate.html>

⁴¹ <https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/about-us/discourse>

with dignity” and “[r]especting the philosophical opinions and traditions of others, without disparaging those who hold positions at odds with one’s own”.⁴²

It may be untenable to hold that ‘all are welcome’, because, as Popper (1945) suggests, if “we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them” (360). But many political philosophers have convincingly argued that it is usually morally and politically wise to ‘tolerate the intolerant’ as long as nobody’s safety is in danger (Rawls 1971; Walzer 1997). And while it isn’t always easy to draw the lines between what is a dangerous ideological view and what isn’t (Simpson and Srinivasan 2018: 191f), it seems reasonable to assume that most left-leaning and right-leaning philosophers aren’t putting people’s safety at risk.

7. LIMITATIONS

(1) *Low response rate.* When the survey was sent out via the PHILOS-L list server, the server had 11,388 subscribers. Initial response rate was 9.39%. After data exclusions, the final response rate was 6.97%. This is low⁴³ and introduces the risk that the people who didn’t respond display characteristics that are different to those of the people who did.

However, low response rates in online surveys are common, and several studies found in fact no direct correlation between response rate and validity (Visser et al. 1996). Recent evaluations of surveys with response rates ranging from 5% to 54% concluded that studies with a lower response were frequently only marginally less accurate than those with much higher rates (Holbrook et al. 2007). So a low response rate doesn’t automatically mean the study results have low validity, especially not when the absolute numbers are high, as in our case (Templeton et al. 1997). Moreover, when respondent characteristics are representative of those of non-respondents, low response rates aren’t problematic at all (Sax et al. 2003). We can’t verify whether respondent characteristics in our sample were representative of the field of philosophy as a whole. But our sample is similar to samples of related studies. Our participants, just as those of these other studies, were mostly male, white, liberal/left, and analytic philosophers⁴⁴ (Paxton et al. 2012; Botts et al. 2014; Yancey 2011; Bourget and Chalmers 2014), suggesting that our sample isn’t especially unrepresentative of the field. The generalizability and validity of our results is also supported by the fact that key trends in our data (e.g., an underrepresentation of right-leaning subjects, hostility against them but also against, e.g., feminists) aren’t outliers but consistent with those from related

⁴² <https://www.apaonline.org/page/codeofconduct>; see also the *American Philosophical Association* “rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on [...] political convictions”: <https://www.apaonline.org/page/nondiscrimination>.

⁴³ The low response rate might have been due to the fact that the survey was sent out in June-July (2018), which is when many faculty are occupied with end-of-term activities, marking etc. Notice too that many subscribers to PHILOS-L are administrative staff and as such won’t respond to surveys of the kind at issue.

⁴⁴ While our sample consisted of 43,2% students and 49.7% faculty members, even if most participants had been students, our findings would still be valuable in revealing insights into the ideological climate for students in the field.

surveys of the field (e.g., Yancey 2011; Weinberg 2016; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017) and personal reports by philosophers (see Section 1).

(2) *Lack of gradients.* When assessing participants' WTD against left/right-leaning individuals and viewpoints, we didn't provide the three gradients 'somewhat left/right-leaning', 'left/right-leaning', and 'very left/right-leaning', but only used 'left/right-leaning'. This is a limitation because the responses don't allow us to tell whether participants would act differently toward 'somewhat' and 'very left/right-leaning' individuals, and it might be that some interpreted our questions as referring to 'very' left/right-leaning individuals whereas others took them to refer only to 'somewhat' left/right-leaning individuals.

However, in the relevant place in the survey, we did remind participants that the questions at issue referred to the middle position of each ideology only. Moreover, even if some participants interpreted them as referring to extreme positions when others interpreted them as referring to moderate ones, our results are still interesting. For in the absence of any ideological bias, each participant should apply the same (extreme or moderate) reading of the gradients to both left-leaning and right-leaning individuals alike, treating them both equally negatively/positively. But this isn't what we found.

(3) *Ambiguous concepts.* Another criticism of the survey might be that the terms (politically) 'left' and 'right' are too vague, and their meanings differ internationally too much, making the informativeness of the survey results doubtful. If the origin point of the moderate position varies across individuals or groups, etc., the responses won't be commensurable.

We grant that the relative vagueness of 'left' and 'right' is a limitation of our survey. But the results remain informative and important, because as we noted earlier (section 2.1), there is a significant overlap in the meaning of the terms internationally, which has been independently confirmed by empirical research in political psychology (Noel and Therien 2008; Caprara and Vecchione 2018). This overlap ensures that the results are informative even if not every respondent interprets the intervals we used in exactly the same way.⁴⁵ The informative value is further supported by the overall coherence of our key results with the results of related studies using the Democrat vs. Republican or liberal vs. conservative distinctions (Yancey 2011; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017). More generally, while a detailed investigation of the regional differences in ideological leanings and biases, and of philosophers' views on specific policy issues would be an interesting complement to our study, the phenomenon of ideological diversity is, just as ideology itself, a multi-dimensional phenomenon that is usefully explored by pursuing a variety of methods, including the

⁴⁵ The referents of political 'left' and 'right' that participants in international surveys are likely to have in mind might be construed as Wittengsteinian "family resemblance" concepts; see Cochrane (2015) for a development of this idea, which is congenial to our view here.

approach we adopted here that deploys a standard tool from the political sciences (i.e., the left/right spectrum; Caprara and Vecchione 2018).⁴⁶

8. CONCLUSION

The survey we conducted suggests that the field of philosophy is heavily ideologically skewed toward the left, and both right-leaning individuals and moderates are underrepresented. The data we gathered also suggest that *across the political spectrum*, participants sometimes experience ideological bias and hostility in the field, occasionally coming from their own side of the political spectrum. In fact, a significant minority in the survey exhibited an explicit willingness to discriminate against individuals with the opposite ideology, while about half of the participants indicated that discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals is not justified. These findings add new insights to the social psychological research on ideology, and have implications for philosophers interested in meta-philosophical, ethical, and epistemological questions. For they pertain to the issue as to whether judgment- and decision-making in philosophy is as reliable and morally responsible as it should be. The specific distribution of bias and hostility against political viewpoints that we found cast doubts on the view that it is, because these ideology-related factors undermine social criticism, and are at odds with tolerance and open dialogue. It thus seems to us that the results of the study provide reasons for concern no matter where one stands on the political spectrum.

Acknowledgements

This research was partially supported by the Research Council of KU Leuven/grant agreement n° 3H160214. For very helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper, we would like to thank Alexander Krauss, Jenny Saul, Edouard Machery, and Albert Newen. For interesting discussions on the topic, survey design, and data analysis, many thanks to Lorenz Demey, Massimiliano Simons, Leander Vignero, Jan Heylen, and Olivier Lemeire. Many thanks also to Kirk Ludwig and Justin Weinberg for critical feedback on the survey.

⁴⁶ The policy/issue-based elements of ideology are distinct from its social-identity elements, which are broader, and need to be explored separately (for details, see Mason 2018).

APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES

Region	Count	Percent
Europe	533	67.13%
North America	175	22.04%
Middle East	22	2.77%
Australia/New Zealand	20	2.52%
South America	10	1.26%
East Asia	9	1.13%
Africa	5	0.63%
No Response	20	2.52%

	Overall, count (percent)	Social/ethical issues, count (percent)	Economic issues, count (percent)
Very left-leaning	160 (20.2%)	210 (26.5%)	170 (21.4%)
Left-leaning	309 (38.9%)	305 (38.5%)	289 (36.4%)
Somewhat left-leaning	125 (15.7%)	105 (13.2%)	118 (14.9%)
Moderate	87 (11.0%)	60 (7.6%)	75 (9.5%)
Somewhat right-leaning	59 (7.4%)	55 (6.9%)	69 (8.7%)
Right-leaning	41 (5.2%)	37 (4.7%)	53 (6.7%)
Very right-leaning	13 (1.6%)	21 (2.6%)	19 (2.4%)

Table 3: Overall ideology of participants by rank

	Full professor	Associate professor	Assistant professor	Assistant lecturer/ teaching assistant	Post-doctoral researcher	Graduate student	Undergraduate student	Other
Very left-leaning	15 (21.4%)	11 (15.9%)	24 (27.6%)	16 (30.2%)	23 (20.2%)	60 (20%)	5 (12.2%)	5 (9.1%)
Left-leaning	24 (34.3%)	30 (43.5%)	38 (43.7%)	22 (41.5%)	49 (43%)	121 (40.3%)	11 (26.8%)	14 (25.5%)
Somewhat left-leaning	12 (17.1%)	13 (18.8%)	5 (5.7%)	6 (11.3%)	24 (21.1%)	44 (14.7%)	8 (19.5%)	12 (21.8%)
Moderate	11 (15.7%)	3 (4.3%)	9 (10.3%)	4 (7.5%)	8 (7%)	33 (11%)	7 (17.1%)	12 (21.8%)
Somewhat right-leaning	4 (5.7%)	8 (11.6%)	6 (6.9%)	2 (3.8%)	5 (4.4%)	25 (8.3%)	4 (9.8%)	4 (7.3%)
Right-leaning	3 (4.3%)	4 (5.8%)	4 (4.6%)	3 (5.7%)	5 (4.4%)	11 (3.7%)	3 (7.3%)	6 (10.9%)
Very right-leaning	1 (1.4%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	6 (2%)	3 (7.3%)	2 (3.6%)

Figure 2. Percentages of participants by rank and ideology




Table 4: Overall ideology of participants by tradition			
	Continental philosophy	Analytic philosophy	Other
Very left-leaning	53 (24.2%)	74 (16.2%)	31 (29.2%)
Left-leaning	91 (41.6%)	189 (41.3%)	27 (25.5%)
Somewhat left-leaning	33 (15.1%)	69 (15.1%)	20 (18.9%)
Moderate	18 (8.2%)	51 (11.1%)	18 (17%)
Somewhat right-leaning	10 (4.6%)	44 (9.6%)	3 (2.8%)
Right-leaning	12 (5.5%)	22 (4.8%)	6 (5.7%)
Very right-leaning	2 (0.9%)	9 (2%)	1 (0.9%)

Figure 3. Percentages of participants by tradition and ideology




Table 5: Overall ideology of participants by area

	Epistemology	Ethics	History of philosophy	Logic	Metaphysics	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Philosophy of science	Political philosophy
Very left-leaning	27 (16.8%)	58 (20.7%)	36 (21.2%)	4 (7.3%)	28 (20%)	23 (16.5%)	5 (8.2%)	31 (18%)	77 (26.3%)
Left-leaning	65 (40.4%)	107 (38.2%)	65 (38.2%)	14 (25.5%)	50 (35.7%)	57 (41%)	12 (19.7%)	74 (43%)	114 (38.9%)
Somewhat left-leaning	27 (16.8%)	52 (18.6%)	20 (11.8%)	11 (20%)	24 (17.1%)	20 (14.4%)	11 (18%)	32 (18.6%)	44 (15%)
Moderate	16 (9.9%)	24 (8.6%)	26 (15.3%)	9 (16.4%)	21 (15%)	19 (13.7%)	8 (13.1%)	16 (9.3%)	28 (9.6%)
Somewhat right-leaning	13 (8.1%)	18 (6.4%)	10 (5.9%)	8 (14.5%)	10 (7.1%)	14 (10.1%)	10 (16.4%)	8 (4.7%)	14 (4.8%)
Right-leaning	10 (6.2%)	14 (5%)	11 (6.5%)	6 (10.9%)	7 (5%)	6 (4.3%)	11 (18%)	8 (4.7%)	8 (2.7%)
Very right-leaning	3 (1.9%)	7 (2.5%)	2 (1.2%)	3 (5.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (6.6%)	3 (1.7%)	8 (2.7%)

Figure 4. Percentages of participants by area and ideology




Table 6: Correlations of ideology with variables and items, and variable and item means (sds)

	Political ideology	<i>M</i> (sd)
Political ideology	—	2.69 (1.49)
Hostility (personal) composite variable	.47***	2.21 (1.02)
WTD Right-leaning paper	-.31***	1.99 (.95)
WTD Right-leaning grant	-.37***	2.18 (.98)
WTD Right-leaning symposia guest	-.28***	2.10 (1.08)
WTD Right-leaning hire	-.36***	2.44 (1.20)
WTD Left-leaning paper	.15***	1.60 (.73)
WTD Left-leaning grant	.21***	1.68 (.73)
WTD Left-leaning symposia guest	.08*	1.42 (.64)
WTD Left-leaning hire	.39***	1.85 (.89)
Colleagues WTD Right-leaning paper	.36***	2.62 (.96)
Colleagues WTD Right-leaning grant	.39***	2.73 (.94)
Colleagues WTD Right-leaning symposia guest	.31***	2.73 (.99)
Colleagues WTD Right-leaning hire	.34***	2.89 (.99)
Colleagues WTD Left-leaning paper	-.27***	1.95 (.79)
Colleagues WTD Left-leaning grant	-.26***	2.01 (.81)
Colleagues WTD Left-leaning symposia guest	-.31***	1.88 (.82)
Colleagues WTD Left-leaning hire	-.27***	2.08 (.83)
Justified discrimination—right-leaning individual	-.37***	1.90 (1.21)
Justified discrimination--left-leaning individual	.000	1.64 (.95)
Fit—right-leaning individual	-.05	2.65 (.85)
Fit—left-leaning individual	.05	3.67 (.81)
How often should right-leaning ideas, theories, critiques be discussed	.13**	3.91 (.72)
How often should left-leaning ideas, theories, critiques be discussed	-.07	4.02 (.61)
Defend right-leaning conclusion to argument	-.09*	2.61 (1.16)
Defend left-leaning conclusion to argument	.06	1.94 (1.02)
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$		

Figure 5. Percentages of participants answering 3-5 on the “willingness to discriminate” items




Figure 6. Percentages of participants by rank answering 3-5 on the “willingness to discriminate” items





Figure 7. Percentage of participants (overall) answering 3-5 on the “willingness to discriminate” items



References

- Allen-Hermanson, S. (2017a). Leaky pipeline myths: In search of gender effects on the job market and early career publishing in philosophy. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 8, 953, 1–10.
- Allen-Hermanson, S. (2017b). Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and political correctness in philosophy. *Philosophies*, 2(2), 12. <https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies2020012>
- Antony, L. (2016). Bias: friend or foe? Reflections of Saulish skepticism. In: Brownstein, M., and Saul, J. (eds.), *Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology*. Oxford: OUP, pp. 157-190.
- Arneson, R. (2015). Liberalism and Equality. In: Wall, S. (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Liberalism*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 212-236.
- Bar Tal, D. (2017). Self-Censorship as a socio-political-psychological phenomenon: Conception and research. *Political Psychology*, 38, S1, 37-65
- Bobbio, N. (1996). *Left and right: The significance of a political distinction*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Botts, T., Bright, L., Cherry, M., Mallarangeng, G., & Spencer, Q. (2014). What Is the State of Blacks in Philosophy? *Critical Philosophy of Race*, 2, 2: 224-242. Project MUSE, muse.jhu.edu/article/552772.
- Bourget, D., and Chalmers, D. (2014). What Do Philosophers Believe? *Philosophical Studies*, 170: 465-500.
- Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T. & Wetherell, G. (2014). The ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and conservatives. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 23(1): 27–34.
- Brownstein, M. & Saul, J. (2016). *Implicit Bias and Philosophy*. Oxford: OUP.
- Carl, N. (2015). Does intelligence have a U-shaped relationship with leftism? *Intelligence*, 49, 159-170.
- Caprara, G. V., & Vecchione, M. (2018). On the left and right ideological divide: Historical accounts and contemporary perspectives. *Political Psychology*, 39, 49–83.
- Case, S. (2015). Political Bias in Philosophy and Why it Matters. *National Association of Scholars*. URL: https://www.nas.org/articles/political_bias_in_philosophy_and_why_it_matters

- Cochrane, C. (2015). *Left and Right: The Small World of Political Ideas*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Cohen, G.A. (2006). Are freedom and equality compatible? In: Goodin, R., and Pettit, P. (eds.), *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*. Blackwell Publishing, pp. 416-425.
- Crawford, J. T., Brandt, M. J., Inbar, Y., Chambers, J. R., & Motyl, M. (2017). Social and economic ideologies differentially predict prejudice across the political spectrum, but social issues are most divisive. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 112, 383-412.
- Draper, P., & Nichols, R. (2013). Diagnosing bias in philosophy of religion. *The Monist*, 96: 420–446.
- Duarte J., Crawford J., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock P. (2015). Political diversity will improve social psychological science. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 38: 1–13.
- Erikson, R., & Tedin, K. (2003). *American public opinion*. NY: Longman.
- Fantl, J. (2018). *The Limitations of the Open Mind*. Oxford: OUP.
- Gampa, A., Wojcik, S., Motyl, M., Nosek, B. A., and Ditto, P. (2019). (Ideo)logical reasoning: ideology impairs sound reasoning. *Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci.* 1-9 DOI: 10.1177/1948550619829059
- Goldfarb, M. (2010). Liberal? Are we talking about the same thing? *BBC News*. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-10658070>
- Gross, N. (2013). *Why are professors liberal and why do conservatives care?* Harvard University Press.
- Haidt, J. (2011). The bright future of post-partisan social psychology. Talk given at the *Annual Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, San Antonio, TX, January 27, 2011. Transcript available at: <http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhaidt/postpartisan.html>
- Haslanger, S. (2008). Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone). *Hypatia* 23 (2): 210–23.
- Heywood, A. (2015). *Key Concepts in Politics and International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hicks, D. (2011). Is Longino's conception of objectivity feminist? *Hypatia* 26 (2): 333–51.
- Hidalgo, J., and Freiman, C. (2016). Liberalism or Immigration Restrictions, But Not Both. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 10 (2): 1–22.

Holbrook A., Krosnick J., & Pfent A. (2007). The causes and consequences of response rates in surveys by the news media and government contractor survey research firms. In: Lepkowski JM, Tucker NC, Brick JM, De Leeuw ED, Japac L, Lavrakas PJ, et al, editors. *Advances in Telephone Survey Methodology*. New York (NY): Wiley; 2007.

Honeycutt, N., & Freberg, L. (2017). The Liberal and Conservative Experience Across Academic Disciplines. *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 8 (2): 115–123.

Inbar, Y., & Lammers, J. (2012). Political diversity in social and personality psychology. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 7 (5): 496–503.

Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarisation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59: 690–707.

Iyengar, S. and Massey, D.S. (2019). Scientific communication in a post-truth society. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 116, 16, 7656-7661.

Jost, J., Federico, C., & Napier, J. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology* 60: 307–37.

Jussim L., Crawford J., Anglin S., & Stevens, S. (2015). Ideological bias in social psychological research. In: Forgas, P., Fiedler, K., Crano, W. (eds.), *Social Psychology and Politics*. NY: Taylor and Francis, pp. 91–109.

Jussim, L., Stevens, S. T., & Honeycutt, N. (2018). Unasked questions about stereotype accuracy. *Archives of Scientific Psychology*, 6(1), 214-229.

Keltner, D., & Robinson, R. J. (1993). Imagined ideological differences in conflict escalation and resolution. *International Journal of Conflict Management*. 4, 249-262.

Kidd, I.J. (2017). Resisters, Diversity in Philosophy, and the Demographic Problem. *Rivista di Estetica*, 64, 118–134.

Kings, A.M. (2019). Philosophy's Diversity Problem. *Metaphilosophy*, 50 (3): 212-230.

Klein, D., & Stern, C. (2009). By the numbers: The ideological profile of professors. In: Maranto, R., Redding, R., and Hess, F. (eds.), *The politically correct university: Problems, scope, and reforms*, AEI Press, pp. 15–38.

Knobe, J., and Nichols, S. (2017). Experimental Philosophy. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/experimental-philosophy/>>.

- Kornblith, H. (1999). Distrusting reason. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 23: 181-196.
- Kourany, J. (2016). Should some knowledge be forbidden? The case of cognitive differences research. *Philosophy of Science*, 83 (5): 779–790.
- Longino, H. (2002). *Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lukes, S. (2003). Epilogue: The grand dichotomy of the twentieth century. In: Ball, T., and Bellamy, R. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 602-626.
- Maher, P. J., Igou, E. R., & van Tilburg, W. A. P. (2018). Brexit, Trump, and the Polarizing Effect of Disillusionment. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 9(2), 205–213.
- Mair, P. (2009). Left–Right Orientations. In: Dalton, R.J. and Klingemann, H.D. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*. Oxford: OUP.
- Maroja, L. (2019). Self-Censorship on Campus Is Bad for Science. *The Atlantic*. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/self-censorship-campus-bad-science/589969/>
- Mason, L. (2018). Ideologues without issues: the polarizing consequences of ideological identities. *Publ. Opin. Q.*, 82, 280-301.
- McLachlan, H. (1977). Must We Accept Either the Conservative or the Liberal View on Abortion? *Analysis* 37 (4): 197–204.
- McMahan, J. (2019). I was no-platformed. Here’s why it’s counterproductive. *NewStatesman*. URL: <https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/01/i-was-no-platformed-here-s-why-it-s-counterproductive>
- Morton S., Bandara D., & Robinson E., (2012). In the 21st century, what is an acceptable response rate? *Aust N Z J Public Health*, 36: 106, 8. doi:10.1111/j.1753-6405.2012.00854.x
- Noel, A. and Therien, J. (2008), *Left and Right in Global Politics*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Paxton, M., Figdor, C., and Tiberius, V. (2012). Quantifying the gender gap: An empirical study of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. *Hypatia*, 27 (4): 949–957.
- Peters, U. (2019). Implicit bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy. *Mind & Language*, 34, 393–419

- Peters, U. (forthcoming). Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science. *British Journal for Philosophy of Science*.
- Popper, K. (1945). *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Routledge.
- Priest, G. (2006). What is philosophy? *Philosophy* 81 (2): 189–207.
- Rajczi, A. (2014). What Is the Conservative Point of View about Distributive Justice? *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 28(4): 341–373.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Redding, R. (2001). Sociopolitical diversity in psychology: The case for pluralism. *American Psychologist*, 56, 205–217.
- Richardson, R. (1984). Biology and Ideology: The Interpenetration of Science and Values. *Philosophy of Science* 51: 396-420.
- Richardson, S. (2010). Feminist Philosophy of Science: History, Contributions and Challenges. *Synthese* 177:337–62.
- Riggs, W. (2010). Open-mindedness. *Metaphilosophy*, 41(1/2), 172–188.
- Rockey, J. (2014). Who is left-wing and who just thinks they are? *University of Leicester Working Paper No. 09/23*. URL: <https://www.le.ac.uk/ec/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp09-23.pdf>
- Rolin, K. (2002). Gender and Trust in Science. *Hypatia* 17 (4): 95–118.
- Rosas, J., and Ferreira, A. (2013). *Left and Right: The Great Dichotomy Revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Rothman, S., Lichter, S., & Nevitte, N. (2005) Politics and professional advancement. *Academic Questions* 18(2): 71–84.
- Rothman, S., & Lichter, R. (2009). The vanishing conservative: Is there a glass ceiling? In: Maranto, R., Redding, R., and Hess, F. (eds.), *The politically correct university: Problems, scope, and reforms*, AEI Press, pp. 60–76.
- Saul, J. (2013). Skepticism and implicit bias. *Disputatio* 5 (37): 243–63.
- Saul, J. (2015). Let's discuss rejections of feminist philosophy. *Feminist Philosophers*. URL: <https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/?s=ideological+bias>
- Saul, J. (2017). Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump. *Philosophical Topics*, 45(2), 97–116.

- Sax, L., Gilmartin, S., & Bryant, A. (2003). Assessing Response Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Web and Paper Surveys. *Research in Higher Education*, 44, 4: 409-432.
- Schwitzgebel, E. (2008). Political Affiliations of American Philosophers, Political Scientists, and Other Academics. *The Splintered Mind*. URL:
<http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.be/2008/06/political-affiliations-of-american.html>
- Schwitzgebel, E., & Ellis, J. (2017). Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical Thought. In: Bonnefon, J.F., and Trémolière, B. (eds.), *Moral Inferences*, New York: Routledge, pp. 170-182.
- Schwitzgebel, E. & Hassoun, N. (2018). Tell Us How to Fix the Lack of Diversity in Philosophy Journals. *Blog of the APA*. URL <https://blog.apaonline.org/2018/03/26/tell-us-how-to-fix-the-lack-of-diversity-in-philosophy-journals/>
- Scruton, R. (2014). *How to be conservative*. Bloomsbury Continuum.
- Sesardic, N. (2010). Nature, nurture, and politics. *Biology & Philosophy*, 25(3), 433–436.
- Sesardic, N. (2016). *When Reason Goes on Holiday: Philosophers in Politics*. Encounter.
- Shields, J., & Dunn, J. (2016). *Passing on the Right: Conservative Professors in the Progressive University*. NY: OUP.
- Simpson, R., and Srinivasan, A. (2018). No-platforming. In *Academic Freedom*, (ed.) Jennifer Lackey. Oxford: OUP.
- Skitka, L. J. (2012). Multifaceted problems: Liberal bias and the need for scientific rigor in self-critical research. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 7, 508–511. doi:10.1177/1745691612454135
- Stanley, J. (2015). *How Propaganda works*. Princeton University Press
- Stevens, S. T., Jussim, L., Anglin, S. M., & Honeycutt, N. (2018). Direct and indirect influences of political ideology on perceptions of scientific findings. In B. T. Rutjens & M. J. Brandt (Eds.), *Belief systems and perceptions of reality* (pp. 108–124). New York: Routledge.
- Templeton, L. et al. (1997). Surveying general practitioners: does a low response rate matter? *British Journal of General Practice*, 47: 91–4.
- Visser P., Krosnick J., Marquette J., Curtin M. (1996). Mail surveys for election forecasting? An evaluation of the Colombia Dispatch Poll. *Public Opin Q.*, 60:181-227.

Walzer, M. (1997). *On Toleration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Weinberg, J. (2016). Which ideas are students protected from? Which are faculty fearful to defend? *Daily Nous*. Retrieved from <http://dailynous.com/2016/08/30/ideas-studentsprotected-from-faculty-fearful-to-defend/>

Westwood, J. S., Iyengar, S., Walgrave, S., Leonisio, R. Miller, & L. Strijbis O. (2018). The tie that divides: cross-national evidence of the primacy of partyism. *Eur. J. Political Res.*, 57 (2), 333-354.

Yancey, G. (2011). *Compromising Scholarship: Religious and Political Bias in American Higher Education*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.