

Asia and World History : The State and the Intellectuals

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— The State and the Intellectuals —

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1 What are Social Realities ?

It is an interesting paradox that the truth long searched for often comes in the simplest form.

Early in 1920s an eminent German sociologist, Max Scheler raised a polemic to Max Weber's modernist view of society as well as of history; he posed a serious doubt how a man could at the same time be an atom voluntarily choosing from values, either rational or irrational, good or evil, and subsequently acting freely on the one hand, and be at the same time an atom studying society and history neurasthenically value-free, following the normative canon of a physicist studying planets or a chemist rocks, on the other hand. He argued that this cleavage between atomic voluntarism and scientific normativism is quite symptomatic of man's position in the contemporary world⁽¹⁾.

The alternative Scheler proposed was the perspective: “Lebensräumen (life-spheres)” . This perspective would, he expected, allow man to estimate properly the variety of cultures which naturally had ethnic and historical backgrounds lying deep in their own bases. Unfortunately, this Scheler’s hope was quickly swept away unfulfilled as the worldwide unrest arose, which was immediately followed by the outbreak of World War II. ; and after the war, no postwar sociologist showed interest to his criticism. Meanwhile, American sociology became, with its widest imaginable inventory of specialized and fragmentalized fields of research, as an ultimate currency in scholarly market as dollar did in economy.

Ever since that bizarre way of subjectivity oriented-, individual action based-, objectivist social theory making of Max Weber’s which Max Scheler called “normatif-voluntaristisch(normative-voluntaristic)” , together with the later Weber-made-easy version of Talcot Parsons’ theory of social system, have become something not to be seen without any scepticism, efforts are from time to time made to reexamine the ramparts which sociology has been at for nearly a century. Just for one instance, an Austria-born US scholar, Alfred Schutz, as early in 1950 s took courage to embark himself into a quest what the social reality was; he emphasized, with good reason, a common-sense human understanding of the daily lives; yet he was, probably as a result of his narrow focus limited too much on the modern western thoughts, caught up in a phenomenological labyrinth, and ended up just to point out the “multiplicity” of the target of his quest itself.

On the other hand Clifford Geertz, who successfully depicted an image of a state (negara⁽²⁾)alien to the western concept of it, reports an occasion when he happened to step dramatically upon an incident revealing what a social reality could really be like. His “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight⁽³⁾” describes his and his wife’s own experience in a Balinese village in 1958, where they were at first totally ignored by the villagers with stiff indifference as though they “were not there” , one day visited the central

square to watch cockfight, when the square melted into roaring enthusiasm was raid by a truck full of machinegun swinging policemen, ran as everyone there did following one of the fugitive villagers, and happened to duck into his place.

In this refuge, the fugitive villager's wife, "who had apparently been through this sort of thing before, whipped out a table, tablecloth, three chairs, and three cups of tea". He continues: "we all, without any explicit communication whatsoever, sat down, commenced to sip tea, and sought to compose ourselves". Just a few minutes later, at policemen's suspicious scrutiny what the devil they were doing, they, the three, miraculously concerted in improvising the two government cleared US scholars enthusiastically making questions and researches on the Balinese postwar economic reconstruction. Then the next morning, each Geertz awoke to find suddenly accepted by the villagers as one of them. This is an eloquent testimony that people do live in an "entity", no matter how it looks too less organized than to be called society in an ordinary sense; as well as that the state, with its laws and organized police forces to enforce them, is nothing to be counted on from the part of its people. It might better be said that perhaps the description of their, the Geertzs', experience itself was the most important and illuminating part; rather more so than Geertz's interpretation of it that: "the culture of a people is an ensemble of texts". This "culture as texts" metaphor of Geertz seems to add nothing to what his dramatic experience itself conveys to us⁶⁰.

One should not imagine that this instance of Balinese cockfight explicates merely a particularistic Asian deviation of the social reality, nonetheless the "backwardness" of the East. Philippe Ariès and others made a joint study of "les jeux(the plays)" like carnival, bullfight and love chant, in the European Renaissance era, and came up with the concept of the "sociability of civilized societies". Their concept of sociability is also a sort of "entity" which is not to be broken up into just a sum of individuals, but something that manifests itself whenever or wherever people feel, act or live together. Unlike the sociability of savages, they suggest, the sociabil-

ity of the civilized has tended to become something designable only as “what is not serious” , while “the serious” becoming interpreted in terms of productive labor or other economic activities. This transformation seems to have occurred, according to them, as early in the 17th century. Nevertheless, Ariès and others maintain that the sociability among people who live together, occasionally seen in “les jeux” just as the visible incarnation, secretes of itself, remains existent and manifests in one way or the other at any age and place thereafter⁶⁵.

One might well be reminded by these examples of “les morales (the morals)” or “la solidarité (the solidarity)” Èmile Durkheim once used to signify a sort of “entity” which any actually living group of people possessed. Yet we would rather prefer here to use the word “tradition” to signify the above described social “entity” , exactly because this is the most commonly used plain English word; and also because this word does not carry any implication, at least in English and unlike in the case of Durkheimian terminology, of anything that is transcendental to the people themselves. Tradition simply came from a Latin verb(trado), meaning just to transfer or to hand over something to somebody; and tradition is certainly nothing else than what has been handed over to people from generations after generations of their ancestral background.

About a century of the history of sociology up until very recent days has been a lamentable period during which most sociologists, whether they were aware or not, more or less strove in their studies somehow to get rid of this most rich and varied element in the social reality: tradition. The reason was quite obvious; it was because they could only think of tradition as something backwardly; as something which resists progress, in terms either of economy or politics; something which should deliberately be removed through “modernizing” or “rationalizing” a society. What left from this long lasted process is eventually the most popular, most prosperous, yet hopelessly futile trinity of the sociological concepts: “action” , “personality” , and “social system” ; the last concept being often a synonym of “organization” or more exactly “modern

organization" , like nuclear family, school, business corporation, government or even modern state. These are the main ingredients the concept of "society" is made of.

2 History and Society

What has happened, however, has not been limited to the scholarly field of sociological study. Society itself has grandually tended to become something that is apart from, and deprived of, history.

In 1985, Robert N. Bellah and coauthors of *Habits of the Heart* have achieved a remarkable break through from this long lasted tendency, ingeniously illustrating a deep gap which was discernible in the American people's mind; a gap between individualism as the ultimate value as they held on one hand, and organizations which they saw as the means either to satisfy their goals or to gratify their sense of meaning, on the other. Careful readers would find that the individualism they describe in this book typically makes the very counterpart of social action in the sense many scholars understand and make use of it. Also there could be found the counterpart of personality in the way individualistic actors recognize who they themselves are, or in other word, in the way they find their "identities" ; and that of organization in the way these actors explain, and resort to, the organs and functions of the outer world which surround them. It is frightfully symbolic that the authors find in therapists and managers the typical features of men in the contemporary social scene⁽⁶⁾.

Thus, one is suddenly brought to recognize a curious, reflexive sort of parity between theory and practice; a parity of what has happened in the habits of scholars in making so-called sociological theories, with the habits of people from whom those theories were exploited; or to speak in a different way, a parity of the concept of "society" as it was held equally by the scholars and people alike, with what happened to the idea of "history" in its acuality. The cost of this type of awkward parity is obvious; it is the deprivation from history of its proper meaning; reducing history to a hopelessly

inconsistent aggregate of satisfactions or frustrations, of benevolence or malevolence, each taking place just on its own. And still, in no way would it be unnecessary to remind that at the very moment when history seems to have dissolved, it insists itself to us in its own monstrous shapes: be it the breaking down of Berlin Wall, the dumping off of huge surplus of western weapons at Persian Gulf, or the corrosion of the Earth's ozon layer by economic activities.

In their succeeding work: *The Good Society*, the same authors raise the question: why do we have trouble understanding institutions? They successfully convince us that it is institution as the way of living together that is worthy of rethinking today. They argue, taking corporation, one of the most influential of organizations in our time as an example, that it is its institutional background as "a particular historical pattern of rights and duties, of powers and responsibilities, that make it a major force in our lives" ; they also stress the importance for us not to be caught up by the blindness which does see organizations yet does not see the whole context in which they, organizations, exist and operate; in other word, they stress the ultimate necessity to focus our attention on the institutions in order exactly to reexamine their "great possibilities for good and for evil^(?)". Clearly this constitutes their point of breaking away from the long undoubted dogma as well as their point of cutting through toward the social science as public philosophy; they maintain that "the idea that institutions are objective mechanisms that are essentially separate from the living of the individuals who inhabit them is an ideology that exacts a high moral and political price. The classical view that has elevated one virtue, autonomy, as almost the only good, but has failed to recognize that even autonomy depends on a particular kind of institutional structure and is not an escape altogether" .

What follows from this breaking away is an admirably rich and powerful expression of historical integrity and insight in studying American society, or one might as well say the western societies at large. American sociology has long been noticeable from its lack of the sense of history. There of course are some precious exceptions

like the works of Florian W. Znaniecki, Robert Lyndes, David Riesman or C.W. Mills, just to mention a few. And still, their works are left scattered rather to make the patchy greens of oases in the middle of a huge spread of thirsty sands. Thus, it would not be taken as an exaggeration to say that the appearance of *The Good Society* has made history by its own right and in its own virtue come back to the American intellectual scene with all its maturity and full bodiedness. Moreover it might not require further notice that, when one takes into account the fact that the very lack of sense of history was exactly that which made American sociology the center of influence to the entire intellectual scenes over the world, this phenomenal break from its past could mean even greater to the latter as a whole. In this and every other sense is it worthy and necessary to determine in various ways what sort of problems this Bellah and others' view poses.

History had been a great concern, almost an obsession, of the European scholars for centuries, roughly from the late 18th to the early 20th century. This fact certainly exercised considerable influence upon shaping of not only sociology but social sciences at large, if not to mention upon shaping of the minds of many peoples. Beginning from G.W.F. Hegel, through Karl Marx, up to Friedrich Meinecke, one of the closest colleague of Max Weber's, history or historicism was the haunting idea with which the scholars of the continental West had to cope whenever they attempted to say anything they thought worthwhile to do so. The much admirable pioneer works of Jacob Burckhart's or Ernst Tröltsch's were nonetheless the exception to this intellectual tradition. One might have better cut this frequently contested topic short by pointing out that the very idea of history that obsessed them, in the end, followed the two paths that could well tear a man apart. The one of these paths led to the ideal that it should be the "the state" as the ultimate height history was to be either designed or be studied; and the other on the contrary led to the natural apprehension that the state as the ultimate goal could destroy individual freedom. This awesome antinomy, whether the state or the individual, was exactly

that which gave the idea of history in those times a unique flavor, if not beauty, in the West until World War II. Japan, almost as the sole exception in the East, was in the position rather sensitive to this vehement intellectual tension at that time. It was from this antinomy and tension in the West that the very concept of "society" seen as the formal(sociological) element of the living together has grown, which tended gradually to be seen separable in theory, and in fact tended separate in reality, from "history" .

It might not be difficult to imagine that this antinomy could, though uneasy to disappear, be largely relieved if the state enjoyed economic prosperity allowing the standard of living on the part of the individual incessantly to continue rising. Although this somewhat common-place pseudo-solution, which occurred exactly after the War, was not at all possible before the War when the symptomatic awe of an overall warfare was always at hand; nonetheless during the War when all the people of every country had to suffer from actual military destruction and turmoil. In this context, the place of America was very peculiar in the sense that the country was supposedly remote from what was happening on the continent; and threatening shadows of totalitarianism either under the names of Adolf Hitler or Josef Stalin were at least relatively indirect. Its place remained still unchanged during the War, for the country immediately after Pearl Harbor was in the position to be able to identify itself as the Savior of the World. It is, however, more peculiar that America was continuously able to consider itself responsible to the entire salvation of the world by playing a champion fighting in the world's sake against communism, as well as a missionary teaching the evangelism of modernization and rationalization of economy and politics. On this peculiarity, especially the last aspect, *The Good Society* deals with overwhelming verity and strength; the book deals with its historical background, aspiration as well as desperation, contribution as well as destruction it costed. The whole picture from the very core of the American mind almost surmounts us with inevitable clarity and sincerity.

Along the way of argument, it would be worthy to make a short

notice that the left-over of that awesome antinomy between the state and the individual, or between the whole and the atom, is still there to sound its out of tune echo in some recent writings in sociology or in social sciences and humanities at large, especially of the post-war continental scholars. Although the essential element inherent in the once existent awe has not been removed at all, yet as it has radically changed its nature and historical context in the so-called affluent society, most of all these scholars' efforts naturally seem to lack the inevitable intellectual tension which was characteristic in those before the War⁽⁶⁾. Hence comes lousy piles of "society as texts" or "history as narratives" sort of scholarly dilettantism; that would also include those hopelessly eclectic "praxis vs. habitus" craps of Pièrre Bourdieu's. Take instead the example of Max Weber's, if not Karl Marx's, and it would be clear enough that though bizarre his view was, yet his was a headlong confrontation with the inevitable boiling oil ordeal of which he was aware. Although it is not certain whether Clifford Geertz is conscious of this historical background or not, it is because of this that his "culture as texts" metaphor, even if his monographs could be admirable, could no be recommended. It should be reminded any way that history is not in reading and guessing; it is in deciding; and thus comes the irresistible truth of Bellah and others' position: the social and humanity sciences as moral philosophy.

The intellectuals, once they come to make an echelon existing within a society in a particular time of history, do not make a mere aggregate of individuals, each like a drifting windowless atom, whimsically making studies or rearches on his / her own. Though the above described historical circumstances of the West have contributed in forcing a momentum unnecessarily further to the belief that to be an intellectual means to be someone only free of value, free not from the state or the organizations, but from the people the person lives with; it is definitely not the case. The stratum or group called the intellectuals is a historical element which makes, maintains, or changes institutions. Or, to put it better, it forms itself an institution.

3 Reality in Asia

Asia, like Europe, is not quite self-evident designation of an area geographically. Whether or not India is to be included, whether or not the areas, like Indonesia, historically strongly tied to the Islamic tradition are to be included, would immediately be open to reasonable controversy. In the present discussion, however, the term will be used to designate the particular area which bore a common historical background in the past: the area which is composed of China and the adjacent lands that historically formed more or less a specific unity under the powerful political and cultural influence of Imperial China. This unity had lasted nearly two millennia, somehow surviving into the middle of the 19th century.

(1) The State and the Intellectuals

Comparison between Asian and the Western societies has been attempted for more than centuries; indeed, when one considers those reports the Catholic missionaries sent to the Papacy among them, it would well exceed five centuries. And yet, the simplest fact that Asia, at least the far eastern part of it, was formed under the overwhelming influence of the Chinese Empire, whereas the Western societies under that of the Roman Empire, is sometimes elusive of sight. Although the historically provable dates of origin of both are not very different, these two Empires differ greatly in their characters. Scientific studies agree that the very establishment of the long lasting succession of the Chinese Empire had begun with the formation of Ch' in (秦) Dynasty in the early 3rd century B. C.. Even more than several centuries earlier than that, the Chinese society, the heartland of which was believed to be in the so-called central plane around the midstream of Huang-ho (黄河), had the enormous numbers of humanist philosophical schools, each stressing different aspect of human virtues, yet all of them, except perhaps Lao-tzu (老子) and Chuang-tzu (庄子), doing so for the immediate purpose of establishment and sophistication of political

reign; they were in other words almost unanimously the searchers of the ideal politics. Although they were, contrary to the Roman tradition, not nobilities nor war-lords, this particular fact of extremely early awakening and concentration of the intellectuals left considerable effect to the later era.

Ssu-ma Ch' ien(司馬遷), the author of that extinguished *Shih-chi* (史記), had left in it a legend of Confucius meeting Lao-tzu. It says: Confucius in his trip to Chou wanted to see Lao-tzu in the hope to be taught about *li* (禮, the ritual); to him the latter said, "Perished are all the names you speak. Words are alone in vain. I hear: the better a merchant is the more he conceals what he possesses. Man of virtue be the one determined to roam high only time makes him to, and to tumble like a tumble-weed if it does not. Be disposed of your arrogance and greed, of your pretension and ambition. That is all to you I tell". In a series of the scripts which are alleged to his writing, Lao-tzu also makes fiery attack against the Confucian virtues as hypocritic, and says that people would rather be at greater ease in their living without them. As it is widely known, in Chuang-tzu's case, who fortunately left considerably larger amount of writings confirmed to be authentic of his own, the same criticism or attack against the intellectuals of his day even increases intensity and consistency. Theirs was the most radical, the most determined total denial of the civilization itself ever existed in the history of philosophy, and the tenacious and elaborate beauty of their literature too were the most extinguished the world had ever experienced.

Almost at their opposite pole was a loose group of Tsung-heng-chia(縱橫家), whose activities as well as the intellectual inclinations are documented in a well known book *Chan-Ku-tse*(戰國策). Their specificity is very evident in the view that to them the state is nothing else than an apparatus to win, conquer and rule whatever it takes. The activities and advisory opinions this group manifested in the field of diplomacy and war on behalf of the kings of the dominant states of their times, so far as compiled in this book, could well compete, or some might say exceed, that of Niccolo Machia-

velli's writings on the same field two millennia later in the West. They could well be seen as the figures who exploited the most of the idea of "the state as an instrument / machinery", almost to the extent of an art.

Somewhere in between these two opposites were those much known to the West: the Confucians, whose main characteristic is in the way they combined somewhat eclectically, yet with grandiose literal beauty, the archaic virtues like filial piety into the ritual and ideological background of teleological, as well as ontological, "reason of the state"; the combination took its full shape some centuries later in Han Dynasty(漢), the immediate successor of Ch' in. What is most likely is, although historical evidences are naturally fragmentary, that, during waves after waves of cut-throat struggles of the major political powers, either Chinese or non-Chinese, in the middle and around the central plane during Ch' un Ch' iu / Chan Ku(春秋戰國)period, there had gradually been formed a unique echelon of the intellectuals who acquired, for better or worse, elsewhere uncomparably politically oriented spirit together with extremely high talent in learning, which could most probably have been the product of equally cut-throat sort of competition among themselves; and of this echelon Confucianism had finally proved the most dominant. It was upon this echelon that each Imperial Chinese Dynasty could depend as the ample source of recruitment to construct a meticulously and exquisitely designed bureaucracy which covered the whole state throughout, from the central court to the provincial magistracy.

Such were the literati of China; and whenever in the course of history any particular Dynasty felt the decomposition of this echelon possible, like in the case of Sui(隋)Dynasty in the 6th c. when the enduring tradition of this echelon had been shaken down most critically by the very dispersion and absence of the unified dynasty as well as by the transference to China of the spiritual yet in no way political culture of Buddhism during the proceeding era known as The Six Dynasties(六朝), the Dynasty for its part even resorted to the adoption of the Empire-run official examination system (科舉)

to reinforce the literati, and this system continued along the all successive Dynasties; or, like in the case of conquest Dynasty, especially in Yüan (元) and Ch'ing (清), the Dynasties deliberately established the Empire-sponsored academy whose main mission was to codify the orthodox history of Chinese Empire or to compile the authentic dictionary of the Chinese language, thus to a considerable degree succeeding to regain their royalty. It is also a well known fact that the member of the literati, in theory at least but also in practice to some extent, was held to be free to come from any social stratum.

It might be worthy to examine briefly some, basically two, of much disputed, yet not much solved, points of academic controversy in order to make this East-West comparison more fruitful.

First, was the Chinese Empire something that had been made along the line of family principle, as the Western theoretical trend often preferring to use the term "patrimonial" suggests? It might barely be true in the narrowest sense that the Emperors of a same Dynasty were required in principle to be hereditary. No matter how it was true that this hereditary principle forced the succession of Emperorship to culminate to the occasional political disturbances, it is vitally misleading to take the word "patrimonial" in the sense that the Empire itself had only a loose structure like in the case of Carolingian Dynasty in Europe.

During the successive efforts to unify the entire China under a well organized single Empire, which had been commenced as early in the 4th c. B. C. by Shang Yang (商鞅), the famous literate of the so-called legal school, and been pushed forward by the energetic Emperor of Ch'ing, Shin Huang Ti (始皇帝) with his able literate chancellor Li Ssu (李斯), until its actual completion by the time of Wu Ti (武帝) of Han in the late 2nd c. B. C., it always took a great deal to structurize the functions and the ministries as well as the legal, taxation and military system. There are even some evidences to show the Chinese idea of check and balance of powers, although not between people and the state, which is seen in some major functions being occupied by two officials, designated as "left and right",

at a time, or in the creation of the Censorate(御史)whose function, different from the counterpart of the Roman Empire, was in the inspection of the bureaucracy itself. T'ang(唐)and other Dynasties had followed or reinforced this line. And without this powerful state apparatus, the sedentary, mainly agricultural region with high productivity and thick population could have hardly been unified under a single Empire which proved almost unimaginably long life; Han Dynasty alone lasted more than four centuries, T'ang three.

Second, and more controversial question is whether Confucianism was a "religion" at all or not?⁽⁹⁾ The answer might depend largely on how one defines religion. It could, however, lead to a serious difficulty to frantically follow the precedence of Max Weber and presuppose that a one-to-one comparison between what is called Christianity and what is called Confucianism is just possible in terms of religion. The latter was never a religion in the sense the former was a set of beliefs held mostly by the lower strata, which has somehow managed to creep into the highest Roman nobility to succeed finally to form the establishment known as the Roman Catholicism; likewise, it was never a religion in the sense the Roman Catholicism, after the fall of the Roman Empire, had remained an established system outside, or in theory above, the ruling secular powers, until in the 17th c. under the French Bourbon Dynasty the theoretical figure like Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet gained a fragile and dubious success in uniting the sacred power with the secular; and lastly, it was never a religion in the sense that with the re-penetration of Christianity into the lower strata, small merchants, craftsmen or farmers, there broke out the various movements, religious as well as political, of Protestantism.

To sum up shortly, whereas Christianity was always something that remained outside of the political state, yet always had something to do with it either contending, cooperating or reconciling, Confucianism was, from the very start, something very different in the fact that it invariably found its reason of existence in the very deed of designing, maintaining or operating the political state. It

might also be beyond the conventional Western understanding, that Confucianism was rather a philosophy than a religion; and as such, it could have comprised political imagination as well as art ; political imagination exactly as much as, or sometimes more than, Dante Alighieri's *divina comedia* was a work of political imagination; art exactly or more than Niccolo Machiavelli's *il principe* was a work of art. If one is in the want to find something, outside the political state, a widely supported belief or cult among the Chinese people, Taoism should be the right one. To the question, however, whether Confucianism and Taoism put together make the counterpart of Christianity or not, the answer would again be quite negative. It might yield rather (relatively) better result to take the political ideas and Christianity in the 18th c. as a set of opposites which eventually had to find a way to move along in the West, to be contrasted to the set of Confucianism and Taoism in the Chinese culture throughout.

Exactly in the above stated meaning, Robert N. Bellah was right when he suggested in his book *Beyond Belief*, that the well known "Protestant ethics hypothesis" should better be taken advantage of in the study of politics⁽¹⁰⁾; and we recognize that this insight has been brought to one of its best in his and his coauthors' books mentioned earlier. Any scholar of comparison in any field, be it culture, anthropology, history, politics, ideas or else, even if they take precaution, is yet from time to time tempted to utilize a particular kind of theoretical model formulated in the culture to which each one belongs; and consequently, is sometimes induced to a conclusion which takes difficulty for one in a different culture to understand fully. In order for anyone to avoid it, it would be helpful to recognize the plain truth that, like Malinovski's maxim, it is often the ways things work that could be compared, and not necessarily the particular embodiments.

(2) Formation of Far East Asia

It would be a bit easier now to understand that the circumstances in the Far East could have been greatly affected by the rise of the

unified Chinese Empire as well as by its peculiar features of political culture. Asia in the far east, the region which acquired its formulation under the imminent influence of Imperial China, stayed one way or another under its reins in some cases, including Japan, until late 16th c., or in the other cases even until the middle of 19th c., shares at least one unique characteristic in common. Throughout the region, notwithstanding the variety of both ethnic, hence linguistic, backgrounds and the different historical processes after the 19th c. each part of the region underwent, variations of the Chinese language is, like Latin in Europe, more or less still present to form the particular lingua franca of each particular part; in some case, like in Japan, Chinese is utilized to the full extent as the literal means, in other case, like in Korea or Vietnam, to a limited extent both as phonetic and / or literal means. It would not be necessary to add thereupon the case of Indonesia which in fact has a considerable portion of Chinese population, nor Taiwan.

Yet, whereas the Roman Empire which lasted no longer than a single Dynasty of Han did, collapsed into chaos leaving a wide cultural tradition of republican classic Greece and Rome, together with a religious tradition of the Roman Catholicism around the Mediterranean and beyond Alps, at the same time left a wide territorial region, called Europe, to be the fertile political cradle to form finally a variety of several nation states roughly along the ethnic similarity, the case of Asia under the influence of the Chinese Empire followed a different line. Some Dynasties suffered from the aggression or penetration of the different ethnic elements mainly coming from the north or the northwest, and were also bothered by the coastal unrests caused by the acts of piracy mostly later in Ming times, however, the Chinese Empire itself lived an incredibly long life, thus leaving its basic characteristics as well as the regional order constructed around it almost unchanged.

Recently, an ambitious study is made by Ying-shih Yü(余英時)to examine wheter the literati of China, in close relation with the influential mercantile figures, were under the process of dawning by themselves toward the possible reform from within to the extent

that it could lead in the end to the entire upheaval of the long lasted status quo of Imperial China or not⁽¹¹⁾. Through the most comprehensive reexamination of historical sources, he seems to be in the impression that such case was fairly possible. Very stimulating and inspiring though his attempt is, the course of world history deprived the ultimate means of proof, as the European forces from outside changed the circumstances all of a sudden. If his view could be true, it could have changed the circumstances in Asia accordingly; there neither is a way of knowing to what results, unfortunately.

Interestingly, after the European appearance it was a Japanese foreign minister in 1880's, Shuzo Aoki(青木周蔵), who passionately heralded the urgent needs of the concerted efforts by both China, Ch'ing at that time, and Japan to form a united frontier in order to maintain Far Eastern Asian integrity against what Aoki said the European interference. Aoki's view was important for he apparently recognized that it was the people's conscious participation in the diplomatic as well as domestic matters in both countries that could bring to this union; his was, in other words, identical to the appreciation of the importance of the nation state in handling diplomatic affairs. This also did not come to reality.

By the same token as Yü's valuable effort shows, it is equally very important to reexamine whether K'ang Yu-wei(康有為), who seemed to stay in the main line of the Chinese intellectual tradition, yet in his efforts to re-interpret western ideas in terms of his own tradition in the 19th c. at the latest stage of Ch'ing, represented a burgeoning, or even an establishment, of a significantly new stage of Chinese political culture or not, together with reexamining the equally liberal tendency of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao(梁啟超) in the same sense. These problems are still left much to be challenged further. However, it was for better or worse finally the sole reality left to history that Asia continued as the region tied up under the influence of the Chinese Empire, when the whole region was rather abruptly brought into entirely different arena by the competing powers from Europe.

Formation of the above stated Empire of China itself made the

fierce melting pot, out of which the formation called Asia was wrought. Although there were flows and ebbs of China's influence on Asia, Han from 2nd c. B. C. to 3rd c. A. D. and T'ang from 7th to 10th c. A. D. and finally Ming from the 14th to 17th c. A. D. apparently being flows, the surrounding geographical territories were vehemently taken advantage of in the political and diplomatic fortification of this superpower of the older times. There seem to have existed, however, the two major types of approach on the part of the Chinese Empire toward the adjacent territories. The one is that of sinization, so to speak, of the neighbors; the other that of military and ideological containment, to use the 20th century expression of John Foster Dulles.

The former type of approach could not have taken place, had there not been the appalling necessity of the latter of course. Beginning immediately from the northwest part of China, all the way up to Turkish peninsula or the area surrounding Black Sea there spreads the long belt of Central Eurasian steppe, generally known as Turkestan; it was, as it still is in a sense, the homeland of the various nomadic tribal fractions with a certain cultural integrity at least, yet with occasional political alliance or unity as well. Moreover, there had been other elements like Manchurians to its northeast or Tibetans right across and beyond Szechwan (四川). Although the unifying process of China before Ch' in itself was that of colliding or melting together among the various Chinese or non-Chinese tribal units, after the establishment of Ch' in as the first political unity claiming itself to be the sole Empire of China, it was against the northern and northwestern nomadic elements, among which Hsiung-nu (匈奴), China's long standing antagonist, was the most famous, that the containment policy was mainly waged against it. Being essentially nomadic, they refused or resisted every measures the Dynasties of China adopted to sinize it, beginning from the intricate divide and rule diplomacy up to even the marriage of a Chinese princess to their leader; and remained principally hostile. Situations in the northwestern frontiers were taken as the matter of its concern not only from the view point of defense but also of trade, since Turke-

stan formed the well known inland corridor through which the Eurasian East and West were linked; its significance from this view point continued to increase, at least until and during the time of Ming Dynasty.

After the fall of Han, Sui resumed brisker offensive in all directions of the Chinese frontier, not only to the north but to the east and south as well. The widening of frontier interest was stimulated by the gradual southward shift of China's interest toward the wide spread of Yangtze(揚子江)delta as the rich background of agricultural and other wealth, as well as the shift and growth of its population. To Sui, which was widely known by its construction of the huge network of the canal system combining Huang-ho region to Yangtze, the coast line from East China Sea up to Yellow Sea was in the same sense of vital interest. These circumstances encouraged Sui's succeeding military campaigns against Korean peninsula and its immediate adjacency: Manchuria; and the interest increased more or less afterwards. The Imperial China's frontier activities, especially those in the east and the south, fiercely stirred up the far eastern territories, far more greatly than Han had done centuries before, radically changing the international relations, so to speak, in this area. Tribal communities or kingdoms existent by that time had been either driven out, destroyed or conquered. Among them, kingdoms in Korean peninsula, which already had experienced some degree of political development, were probably the most affected and suffered; but situations were not essentially different in the region to the south, which included a broad area roughly from what is today's Canton(Guang-tung)all the way down to Vietnam. Naturally, Japan was not the exception.

What resulted from this differ according either to the previous conditions or geographical positions, as well as the degree of military / strategical importance on the part of China at the times. Generally speaking, however, the territories, which formerly comprised various cultural or tribal backgrounds were taken into appanage, others into vassals or tributaries under China's suzerainty, to the effect that most of the vassals or tributaries adopted more or less

the resembling system of political regime as well as the Chinese culture more than often including the Chinese language and letters in official use. Sinization went further on in T'ang times.

One might be tempted to say that the waves of these brisk movements of the Imperial China in those days could have effected as the stimulus for the peripheries of far eastern Asia to awake to their national identity; and that was true in a limited sense. However, national identity or nationalism, to use the modern western vocabulary, is also nothing else than the historical concept. Tradition, in the very sense mentioned earlier in this argument, either cultural, moral or in any other form of people's living together, however vitally important, is never self-sufficient to take form in nationalism. Nor is it sufficient to have economic activities in the form of industrial production and commerce increase, thus resulting in the larger wealth of nations, for this nationalism in the political sense to come in shape. For it to take place in its genuine form needs a particular set of conditions in history; one of which was apparently the decay and / or disappearance of a once existed superpower. That decay / disappearance in the West formed the chaotic coexistence and conflict of various ethnic or cultural unities, from which the peoples developed their maturity in dealing with political matters by their own. Such was certainly not the state of things in Asia until the middle of the last century. This needs further consideration.

4 Pseudomorphosis in History

The western tradition in the study of ideas tends to draw a clear line across the spiritual and the material dichotomy. This is also well known in Japan, for the country has learned much from the West. In this dichotomy, ideas on religion, morality, philosophy, or literature and art are supposedly to belong to the spiritual, whereas aspects on polity, economy, nature, or science and technology are supposedly to the material.

However, the second thought would easily disclose that the line thus drawn is more often inadequate, though it is convenient in dai-

ly use. It changes easily into a burden, once the study comes to a particular subject to deal. Is religion solely the spiritual, when a church is seriously in need of fund to help the poor? Is economy solely the material, when it takes a lot of the people's moral concern to redeem its failure?

This difficulty was already apparent in the case of Max Weber, exactly because he tried to cross this line while leaving the dichotomy as it was. His attempt in sociology of religion aimed, in other word, to determine which aspect spiritual did lead to which aspect material. Although it could not be denied that this made him contribute a great deal to the later scholars, it seems that, with all his admirable confrontation with the eastern literature, it was finally impossible for him to get entirely through this difficulty. This way of thinking is, as the careful observation would tell, very particular to the West, in the sense that the line represents the once existent the church against the state counterpoint in the Christian tradition which goes far back to the times of the Roman Empire.

Every intellectual culture has necessarily its own character, but this tradition of the West requires some cautious reflexion for everybody, even for one in the western tradition, not carelessly to take it for granted. From the very moment when the establishment of the Christian church has come to exist, it accompanied a unique understanding that made people of the West think that there were two orders of things, especially two orders of polity; one of which was represented in the secular order of power and authority, and thus material, so to speak, and unreal; the other represented by the sacred order of right and duty, and thus spiritual and true, so to speak; this could be said in other word that *lex romana* represented the former, and *lex naturalis* represented the latter; this dual concept of the order even developed later into the *lex humana* or *jus humanum* vs. *lex naturalis* or *jus naturale*, still retaining the assumption that the former was false or unreal and the latter true and real. The Western echelon of literati, who from a certain period thereafter were mostly composed of the clergy, contributed greatly to elaborate as well as popularize this contrast; thus we are

endowed, among the various others, the works of Aurelius Augustinus or the Scholastic, Thomas Aquinas. To some degree, this was also the reason why it took so long a time, strange though it seems, for the West in general to rediscover what we previously called "tradition": namely *lex loci*.

As discussed earlier, the concept of order like this was non-existent in China of the past. There, people were almost invariably aware that the "concept of order", if not order itself, was a matter of the state and the literati; they chose to stick and remain to their own. If there was any dualism at all, it was in the order itself, so to speak, but certainly not in the concept or the ideas of the order.

This Western tradition was made more complex, after the virtual disappearance of the Roman Empire, as the various elements with their different traditions attempted to enter into the hollow shape the very disappearance of the Empire left in Europe. This reminds one the word: pseudomorphosis, an imaginative scholar once referred to in a study.

The author of that remarkable book on Gnostic Religion in Hellenistic times, Hans Jonas, paid attention, originally inspired by Oswald Spengler, to a phenomenon known in mineralogy as "pseudomorphosis"¹²⁾. Literally, this phenomenon occurs when, according to him, "a different crystalline substance happens to fill the hollow left in a geological layer by crystals that have disintegrated, it is forced by the mold to take on a crystal form not its own". In Jonas' object of study, it was disintegrating Greek philosophical ideas which made molding hollow and Eastern thought which was the different substance forced to fill the mold. Though his study is neither directly on polity or economy, nor the state or the people, this insight of his is very allusive of what happened to the West.

Although we have to shortcut the whole historical process and come across quickly to the dawning of the era we call modern times, one thing is necessary to be noticed: even though a strong alert was against the state already existing, or in other word against *lex*

romana, not alert but rather ingenious aspiration was usually held toward the order they hoped to come: *lex naturalis*, by the Western literanti; this was however considerably different between those of the continent and their counterpart in Britain, the former being more pessimistic, or precautions at least. John Locke's work on the law of nature¹³ for instance is definitely clear and convincing, but sometimes sounds too optimistic. Any way, it was in the name of the law of nature working as the mold, and the great hope and aspiration for true and real order as the crystalline element poured into it, until it finally formed the concept, upon the veritable realization of which now the dignity and well-being of all the peoples of the world depends: democracy. It is clear from this, that democracy would not work right, unless we stop to be ambivalent between the spiritual and the material; they are two sides of a coin: polity.

If this was what happened in the West, it is still noteworthy that there exist some major fields of study which are often difficult to comply to the above shown dichotomy: one of which certainly is the study of Asia which does not have the identical historical background separating the spiritual from the material in the western sense. When it concerns to the history of ideas, especially political ideas, of Asia, the difficulty increases more; and when it concerns even to the East-West comparison, the dichotomy could be even dangerous to rely upon.

It does not need much to say, that what we argued in the previous part is exactly related to the inadequacy of the dichotomy. We maintained that Confucianism is not a religion. This, however, does not imply that it is not spiritual. Although with all of its high qualities being at the same time philosophical, moral or aesthetic, it is no less spiritual than Christianity is. It concerned itself, so to speak, to *lex romana* and *lex naturalis* at the very same time. On the other hand, Taoism remained to be concerned mostly any time to *lex loci*; this does not mean that it was vulgar; it could be, for it usually concentrated on this worldly benefit and interest; but as such, it often served to provide precaution to any volatility that went beyond Chinese people's lives promised; it had its own advan-

tage as well as disadvantage.

The same measure seems to fit to the case of Japan. It experienced a considerable degree of the gradual self-development of ideas; the tendency increased especially after it shifted its focus rather away from China and to Asia at large, or even to Europe, in the 17th c. and afterward. To the close examination, however, the development of anything identical or similar to that of European *lex naturalis* described above, seemed virtually nonexistent; in Japan at that times, it occurred a great degree of refinement and expansion of a cluster of cultures especially related to *lex loci*, which is now collectively called Edo(江戸) culture of Japan.

In large, it is very worthy to know every tradition of every part of the world even better and clearer than we do. To know yesterday as clear in every detail certainly is the desideratum to live better together in tomorrow.

5 Economy, People and the State

Some sociologists seem to be often allured, in the course of their studies, to write on the topic: economy and society. Max Weber was apparently the one, who had his counterpart again in America in Talcot Parsons. By the same token, but fundamentally in different ways from this, Georg Simmel wrote his *Philosophie des Geldes* (philosophy of Money), and Vilfredo Pareto his *traité de sociologie générale* (Treatise of General Sociology). Although no one explained the exact reason of this curious tendency behind the curtains, it is not altogether unimaginable. Whereas economy, at least in its modern Western sense, is an activity which puts a person, by the very pursuit of his / her interest, in the position against other person or persons with the opposite intention or interest, society, in its Western sense too, is something which seems impossible to remain united, unless those persons share for one reason or the other a common concerted intention or interest. How, then, a particular society is actually possible, while cherishing the former attitude of a person as the central creed, especially to the concept of individual

freedom, at the same time to exist as a unified entity. Some post-war sociologists even took pride maintaining that this is what sociology is good at solving, while others busy in their researches became seemingly unable to notice it. This is, however, another antinomy which is equally serious as that of history and society, and is equally implanted deep in the modern society itself. It is far from easy to be solved by those scholarly attempts as the problematic: economy and society; except, for instance, in the case of Pareto, who, at the same time an extinguished economist himself, displayed noble courage to look straight into it and frankly to approve that this was the exact dilemma inherent in society itself.

This dilemma does not also evade the full examination in *The Good Society* of Robert N. Bellah and coauthors; in which they successfully disclose, calling the former attitude a commonplace version of Lockean / Hobbesian philosophy, which has even culminated to an overall acting principle deeply rooted in the mind of many of their fellow citizens; and they seriously warn that this tendency, now spreading throughout the world, is exactly what needs most profound rethinking. They certainly are aware that this is what happened within the boundary of that historical, political formation which is usually called the state, or the nation state. So, it is very thoughtful of them to note that attitude, which holds "*omnis omnium lupi*" way of thinking as a matter of fact, not only in the narrow field which is usually called economy, but in the much broader scope of human activities, ranging from places of employment to the public or private administration, business activities, or community and religious affairs. It is not merely an attitude confined in what is called economic relations but is typically an institution exactly in the sense Bellah and coauthors mean.

Any seeming coincidence in theory and practice is not possible without relevant historical background. For Hobbes to maintain that everyone was a wolf to everyone, it was, as is widely known, the basis of his departure to the argument of the necessity of the state, which was actually under way of sprouting out by that time in Europe. So, for John Locke too, although he seems more optimis-

tic than Hobbes, the concept of "contract" was a foundation of the supposedly free and neutral state; free because it was held to remain no taller than a person's own height; and neutral because it was supposed to be formed by no other than the consent of persons in concern. Although it seems not very far from a scene of a person making a contract of agreement with some other persons, it is far more serious a fact that this contract between free and voluntary persons might occasionally cause disagreement, thus necessitates a third party to settle that dispute.

It is important not because it is a free philosopher's contemplation but because it could have reflected the spirit already inherent in the mind of the people of the times. In short, no matter how it seems as if to be taken from the every day experience of the activities of those days, it is still nothing else than what concerns to the one grand issue which is historically called "la raison d' État (the reason of the state)". Unlike the Chinese literati of old days who from any point could not make their argument except for the sake of the state with ample degree of moral judgement, which of course was their disadvantage too, the intellectuals in the republican tradition are in danger whenever they think as if value-free; this is exactly what Robert N. Bellah and coauthor's view suggests; and it invariably deserves a notice. Although this idea of John Locke's is not identical to its continental counterpart, not even compared to that of "le contrat social" of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's, this is what finally proved dominant more or less in the course of the process which lead to the formation of the nation states.

It might be noteworthy, however, that it is in America, with its relatively insulated position from the European past, and with its even stronger republican tradition, that the idea of the nation state took almost an ideal form. As the illuminating quest into history made in *Habits of the Heart* and *The Good Society* shows, America is notable of its political culture, "tradition" in other word, of citizens' self-government in which Tocqueville found most hope and which exactly enabled the ideal of the state no higher than its citizens to exist once. It is this tradition and belief, which holds that

any political matters should and could be handled by the citizens themselves, that make American political culture most unique and notable. However, the same quest shows that America is also quite exemplar of all Western countries to prove the awkward fact that the ideal of self-government itself, if taken as the laissez-faire principle of individual's actions, and as the contract among persons who consequently oppose each other, is not immune at all from the uncurbed enlargement of the state; or even the embryonic ideal itself could have hatched to form, especially after World War I, a gigantic organizations, corporations in the private field and the state the in public, both in the name of the people but in reality making the people at stake.

What was the "economy" after all in the American sense in the past and present, is the question *The Good Society* examines with utmost clarity¹⁰. Contrary to the tradition once seen in earlier times, where it used to mean a concerted effort of people in a town community to produce and exchange goods just enough for living, it has become one large arena most remote from the people's participation, where uncurbed market and efficiency principle alone play money games, which in turn changed the handling of the concerted effort into the private corporations' business, and changed workers to employees, citizens to consumers. "The philosophy of money" was not limited in the philosophy of economy at all, but most seriously undermined the philosophy of American political democracy and its embodiment in reality.

What is more important, the economy was, and is, one of the two major powerful elements to spill over into the global arena; perhaps equally powerful as, or even more than the other one: war. People are easier to get conscious of the on-coming results in war, but far less in economic spillage. If the globalization of today's world is anything more or less, perhaps more, related to the self-expanding tendency of the market activities beyond the borders and boundaries, the passage from *The Good Society* urging people's participation in the "political economy" is the voice everyone has to listen to: while "the institutional order of the past half-century

has depended too much upon apparently expert, technical management, particularly in our private corporations and in government regulation", this was the most serious source of institutional failure itself; they further demand that "a more active citizenship is not a matter of consciousness alone. The new democratic transformation also requires the public will to reshape institutions. We are all — corporations, workers, consumers — citizens in our economic life. We need to make our economic institutions more responsive to this truth as well as to our capacities, as citizens, to take responsibility for developing our economy with the common good in mind⁽¹⁵⁾" ; the common good for all the peoples' sake, certainly. Thus it comes to everyone the idea that things are only redeemable by taking back the handling of the necessary concerted activities, which we call economy, within the reach of the people, in the hands of them. As the economy expands its range of scope into the global market and increases technologically complex interdependence, this effort would take higher intellectual quality as well as moral determination on the part of all the peoples of the world.

Singular as it might seem, historically speaking, America makes a good comparison to the ancient China not only they are super-powers present and past. In the former, it was people who enjoyed private activities freely and autonomously while the state was supposedly sitting aside just to watch smiling. This composition between the people and the state seemed to work well for a while, when that invisible force called free market has made this amiable little state grow to be a superpower both in the diplomatic and domestic field, until it could even exhaust the people's well-being. In the chapter dealing with the American legal institution, *The Good Society* shows that the "rights language", habits of people to argue only in terms of "rights" and leave everything else to the court to decide, does nothing but lead to the failure in recognizing that it is exactly the place contending rights come across where the public sphere begins to develop⁽¹⁶⁾. This recognition is perhaps equally important in Japan, for the same typical tendency is becoming stronger in its people's mind. When one turns the eyes to China in

the past, one finds the composition between the people and the state almost upside down. Here it was the state with its powerful organs that enjoyed greatest autonomy, while the people being taken under its solemnly decorated political canopy were allowed, smiling or not, either to comply or elude. As China has changed its political order recently, and the change is in various ways still going on, how this tradition is being dealt, is an important matter to see; and with the fact that, for better or worse the economy has become just the matter of worldwide interest, the people of every nation, whether America, Japan or China, deserve all the other peoples' concern.

To confine the topic to China in the past, history witnessed one notable exemplar when a Mongolian conqueror succeeded to establish Yüan Dynasty. Although China does not have a handy inland sea like the Mediterranean, burgeoning of commerce was very early, and China with large hinterland and ample population continued to grow as far to form some big rich merchants even earlier than Ch' in times whose names Ssu-ma Ch' ien kept record in his book also. In China, attempts were often made by Dynasty after Dynasty to monopolize profitable goods, especially salt, iron and silk. With big merchants acting as the state commissionaires, the attempts mostly proved successful, if one understands success to mean making the state even stronger, and merchants even richer. By the time of Yüan, the Islamic elements were driven either as far to Egypt or to coastal lines, and the East-West inland trade route fell in the hands of the Mongolian branches' control. The establishment of Yüan was phenomenal that it held not only the main trade route within its hands, but the largest place of consumption, market in today's word, of the world under the state control too; with the traditional monopoly of the state being mobilized to the full extent enabling the most powerful and the most wealthy state to last for a century. It was the Chinese state in principle, yet with other people's sovereignty; it was as if a plunder of the entire state apparatuses in the military and "economic" interest. Like the case in America in 1980 s, military interest and economic interest often go together; and in this sense, the economy is a very tricky element

than people imagine. And this again reminds us the word: pseudomorphosis, though in a different context. Indeed, history abounds in this phenomenon. Or rather, history itself was a succession of pseudomorphoses, if one sees in history just what happened. Gloomy though it is, it was always something taller than the people, be it the state or war, market or competition, that forced, and the people that was forced.

6 Institution to Come

Pessimism in history is not necessarily an evil thing. It possesses at least one single virtue of importance, that he / she needs to be at any moment clear sighted not to be tempted to any volatile idea that history is an easy matter to cope with.

However, if history is anything more to do with what to happen, than what happened, it could not be the final conclusion for humans to live along.

What then could be the alternative ? What we have dealt here is nothing else than the "entities " brought to reality by the simple fact that a person does not live alone. If it is the ultimate truth, what else can it be than taking back all entities within the sight of this truth ? What else can anything be dealt better than dealing it as a matter of the people's living together ? If this idea is what we call democracy, it is in enabling this idea to work fully, at any place small or large, simple or complicated, without moment's rest ; that can barely be the way out from this awkward thing we call civilization.

In other word, it is the hardheaded determination on the part of the people not to allow any organization to grow any taller than the people's height. Although the word democracy is no longer alien to any place in the world today, this hardheaded determination should be considered as the new *institution to come* right off, to which the intellectuals are equally responsible.

Besides the tallest organizations already dealt above, the peoples of the world are already undertaking some other sort of potential

field for tall organizations to appear, namely in the field of international relations and the global economic market. And also the so-called high-tech society has a danger of its own, in screening the real scene behind the smoky curtain of specialists. And still, it should be the people who are to get taller and not those organizations. Seen from this point of view, Robert N. Bellah and coauthors have good reason in undertaking a great deal of concern in the field of education: not endorsing professional training but enriching citizens' sense of what to think and how.

The determination as well as the insight on the part of the authors of *The Good Society* itself deserves to be cited at some length to reinforce the above arguments:⁽¹⁶⁾ "We must clearly draw from older traditions, but reconceive them in ways consonant with new conditions. Such a moral argument cannot alone produce significant institutional change. Power and profit are always involved. But where moral agreement is strong enough, it will find opportunities for breaking through, and power and profit will find it advantageous to go along. Such outcomes cannot occur without conflict, when power is pitted against power. But without the moral argument, there is no steady pressure to bring potentially destructive economic and political forces to the service of human ends".

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NOTES:

(1) See: Scheler, Max 1923 - 4.

(2) See: Geertz, Clifford 1980.

(3) See: Geertz, Clifford, Chapter 15, pp. 412 - 53.

(4) At least in Japan, this metaphor of Geertz, being mingled up with the jargons of the so-called semiologists, has regretfully helped to raise cumbersome pedantry upon the alleged "method of reading texts"; the "texts" being anything from theater pieces, TV shows to the vitally important events of politics.

(5) See: Ariès et Margolin ed. 1982; especially FOREWORD by Ariès.

(6) See: Bellah, Robert N. et. al. 1985; especially Chapter 2: "Culture and Character: The Historical Conversation"

(7) See: Bellah, Robert N. et. al. 1991; p. 11.

- (8) There are of course exceptions. Paul Ricoeur in France, in an examination of the individual's sense of time, memory, and its relation with the recitation, discloses what lies in the depth of the Western culture. See: Ricoeur, Paul; 1983 - 5. Ivan Illich's coming book, *In the Vineyard of the Text*, which deals Western history of reading far back in the middle ages, is another.
- (9) I discussed this topic at length through East-West comparison of the intellectual cultures in the following article: 平野秀秋; 「理性会通論——文化社会学的研究」; in 『社会労働研究』 第三八卷第一号, pp 1-96; 1991 法政大学社会学部.
- (10) See: Bellah, Robert N.; 1970, pp. 53 f..
- (11) See: Ying-shin Yü(余英時), Japanese Translation 1991. Although I feel in a slightly different position concerning the estimation of Max Weber's hypothesis, as well as in the definition of religion, I still believe his work is one of the best and most imaginative ever attempted throughout the study of East-West comparison.
- (12) See: Jonas, Hans; 1958, p. 36 f..
- (13) See: Locke, John; 1954. As stated above, he makes every argument with utmost clarity; which makes this the very important historical source.
- (14) Bellah, Robert N. et. al. 1991; especially p. 90. f..
- (15) *ibid.*; p. 109
- (16) *ibid.*; pp. 305 - 6.

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(A number of excellent studies on Asia written in Japanese, from which author learned much, are regretfully omitted.)