University of Tartu

Faculty of Social Sciences

Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies

Thesis Prospectus

Anastasiia Turusinova

Takeover of the memory field: changing commemorative practises regarding Stalinist repressions in Russia.

Supervisor: Heiko Pääbo, PhD

Tartu 2019

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

....

/ signature of author /

The defence will take place on .... / *date* / at .... / *time* / .... / *address* / in auditorium number .... / *number* /

Opponent .... / *name* / (............... / *academic degree* /), ... / *position* /

I, Anastasiia Turusinova (personal code 49501260030),

herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to:

Takeover of the memory field: changing commemorative practises regarding Stalinist repressions in Russia,

supervised by Heiko Pääbo, PhD,

1. To reproduce, for the purpose of preservation and making available to the public, including for addition to the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity of the copyright.

2. To make available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity of the copyright.

3. I am aware that the rights stated in point 1 also remain with the author.

4. I confirm that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe the intellectual property rights or rights arising from the Personal Data Protection Act.

Tartu, 17.05.2019

Anastasiia Turusinova

TAKEOVER OF THE MEMORY FIELD: CHANGING COMMEMORATIVE PRACTISES REGARDING STALINIST REPRESSIONS IN RUSSIA

Anastasiia Turusinova

Abstract

Current paper primarily focuses on the analyses of Russian memory regime on the issue of Stalinist repressions. Over the recent years, Russian government established a monopoly of commemoration of the past events by oppressing existing independent memory agent in the field. Current empirically driven case study aims to define modern memory regime in Russia and main reasons behind the takeover happened. With the help of framing analysis, the comparison of narratives used by state and non-state memory agents is done in order to distinguish key differences in how same commemorative events are framed by different actors. According to the analysis, in authoritarian settings independent memory agent Memorial is considered as a threat, as it emphasizes the connection between Soviet repressions and the ongoing ones in modern Russia. New state-controlled actor Memory Fund was introduced to the field in order to promote legitimacy of the incumbent regime and establish the monopoly of commemoration.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Within the recent years in academia the concept of politics of memory gained popularity as a truly interdisciplinary subject. It became appealing for scientists from history, sociology, cultural studies and etc. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 7) However, within the political science the concept remains to be not fully developed and loosely defined. (Wertsch & Roediger III, 2008, p. 318) Moreover, almost all existing studies refer to situation only in consolidated democracies. For instance, the most outstanding attempt to make a generalized theoretical framework *'Theory of the Politics of Memory'* was done by Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard with the assumption that it could not be applied to non-democratic states. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014) In this sense Russia as an example of authoritarian rule of law remains to be understudied. It especially concerns the sensitive issue of the recognition of Soviet crimes happened during the 1930-1940s under Stalin's totalitarian regime. Repressions affected many Russian families that had to keep silence on the topic during the whole soviet era.

Nevertheless, in 1987 within the Soviet Republics the bottom-driven process of commemoration of victims of political crimes began. Public association 'Memorial' has united different soviet regions in a movement aimed to investigate and spread out the information about the victims in camps.[1] The organization continued its activity in unstable political situation in the 1990s and in 2000s under Putin's growing autocracy. However, starting from 2007 Memorials' activists began to face problems. After few arrests, searches by the police, forced emigration, lawsuits and scandals Memorial in 2016 was listed as a "non-profit organizations performing the function of a foreign agent" by the Ministry of justice of the Russian Federation.[2] After 2013 many independent NGOs

---

[1] Chronology of establishment of Memorials' centres: **1987** – Moscow; **1988** – Krasnoyarsk, Khibiny, Novosibirsk, Kharkiv, Omsk, Voronezh, Ukhta, Tomsk, Perm, Kazakhstan, Chistopol, Yagodninsk; **1989** – Pskov, Nizhnetagilsk, Donetsk, Khabarovsk, Syktyvkar, Mariupol, Abez, Lviv, Pechora, Magadan, Odessa, Astrakhan, Tula, Chelyabinsk, Inta, Norilsk, Bratsk, Biysk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Crimea, Riga, Ryazan. (Source official website of 'Memorial' URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/history/).

[2] By the problems I mainly mean the following cases: **24 Nov 2007** – Attack in Ingushetia on a member of the human Rights center "Memorial" Oleg Orlov and journalists; **4 Dec 2008** – Search in 'Memorial' (St. Petersburg); **July 15 2009** – The murder of an employee of Memorial in Grozny Natalia Estemirova. Forced

started being oppressed by the regime and Memorial was not exception to the rule. This verdict is crucial as it creates many obstacles for the further organization's functioning.

Meanwhile in 2015 Dmitry Medvedev signed an official *'Concept of state policy to perpetuate the memory of victims of political repression'* that was approved by the government.[3] It claims the following:

> *"Russia cannot fully become a state governed by the rule of law and take a leading role in the international community without perpetuating the memory of many millions of its citizens who have become victims of political repression."* [4]

Within the framework of the Concept in 2016 the organization 'Memory fund' was established. Same as Memorial it aims to commemorate victims of political repression under the Soviet rule. Memory Fund does that by supporting educational and research activities in the field, creating memorials and museums all over the country.[5] According to articles of association the financial sources are private and corporate donations.[6] If one looks at its board that actually manages the Fund, it becomes clear that the board consists of people somehow connected to current government. For instance, the

---

emigration of several employees of the Grozny Memorial. The office has been suspended for six months; **2009-2011** – Trial of Oleg Orlov & Ramzan Kadyrov; **9 January 2018** – On trumped up charges arrested the head of the office of the human Rights center 'Memorial' in Grozny Oyub Titiev; **17 Jan. 2018** – The Ingush office of the human Rights center 'Memorial' was set on fire in Nazran. (Source official website of 'Memorial' URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/history/); Official website of International historical, educational, charitable and human rights society 'Memorial': "Proceedings on the status of a foreign agent are ongoing" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/22.

[3] Official website of 'The presidential Council of the Russian Federation on civil society and human rights development' URL: http://www.president-sovet.ru/documents/read/393/.

[4] «Россия не может в полной мере стать правовым государством и занять ведущую роль в мировом сообществе, не увековечив память многих миллионов своих граждан, ставших жертвами политических репрессий.» (Sourse: Official website of 'The presidential Council of the Russian Federation on civil society and human rights development').

[5] Official website of Fund "Perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression", or Memory Fond URL: http://memoryfund.ru/о-фонде/.

[6] Official articles of association of the Fund "Perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/wp-content/uploads/Устав%20Фонда%20памяти.pdf.

chairman of the board is Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation Mikhail Fedotov.[7]

The first project of the Memorial Fund was the creation of a national memorial of the victims of political repressions *"Wall of Sorrow" ("Стена Скорби")* in Moscow. The project was implemented in accordance with the decree of Vladimir Putin on public funds and national donations. In 2017 the president took part in opening ceremony of the memorial and gave a speech that contained the following:

> *"[…] Yes, we and our descendants need to remember the tragedy of repression, the reasons that gave rise to them. But that does not mean 'settling scores'. It is impossible to push society back to the dangerous line of confrontation. It is now important for all of us to build on the values of trust and stability. […]"* [8]

The use of the 'stability' narrative by Vladimir Putin that emphasizes the main advantage of current regime brought my interest to an issue. Within last ten years, Russian government managed to establish a monopoly of the commemoration by oppressing one of the key actors in the field – independent NGO Memorial. Although both newly established Memory Fund and old Memorial have the same aims and activities, one is being persecuted when another receives the government support. Why the takeover of mnemonic space happened in Russia and what are the reasons behind that?

Therefore, the **research problem** this study addresses comes from empirical case: one independent memory agent was replaced by a government controlled one. The **aim** of this study is to give a characteristic of current memory regime in Russia concerning the Stalinist repressions by mapping out the differences between memory agents in the field. I suggest that mentioned memory agents tend to use different narrative concerning

---

[7] Other participants of the Fund's board: **Vladimir Lukin**, a member of the Federation Council; **Sergey Karaganov**, honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council for foreign and defense policy. (Source: Official website of Memory Fond URL: http://memoryfund.ru/о-фонде/).

[8] "[…] Да, нам и нашим потомкам надо помнить о трагедии репрессий, о тех причинах, которые их породили. Но это не значит – призывать к сведению счетов. Нельзя снова подталкивать общество к опасной черте противостояния. Сейчас важно для всех нас опираться на ценности доверия и стабильности.[…]";

Official website of the administration of the President of Russia: 'Opening of the memorial to victims of political repression "Wall of Sorrow" ' URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55948.

the commemoration of repressions and one of them is in a way undermining Putin's regime. In order to identify possible differences in the narratives produced by two organisations in order to shape particular collective memory, the framing analysis is going to be used.

In order to define the notion of *collective memory*, I'm using one of the most common approaches established by Aleida Assmann, who differentiated four types of memory. According to her, on the one hand there is individual memory that reflects one's personal experience and knowledge, but on the other – there also is a collective memory. This type of memory refers to common understanding of different historical events that is shared within a nation/society. There are different channels within which it could be formed: literature, art, films, media and etc. As a result, citizens of one or another country usually share same opinion on the events that took place in the past and are related to their state's history. (Assmann, 2002)

Aleida Assmann also introduced the definition of *political memory*, according to her this is a socially constructed collective memory that is 'emplotted in a narrative that is emotionally charged and conveys a clear and invigorating message'. It is also important that political memory tend to have material and visual signs, e.g. monuments or sites, as well as some kind of performative action that implies collective participation. This is the way the political memory has a chance to be 'transmitted from generation to generation'. (Assmann, 2002, p. 11) Heiko Pääbo defines political memory as "the collective memory that is functioning according to the needs and demands of power relations", as political memory tends to serve particular political aims and interests of political elites. (Pääbo, 2011, p. 24)

Another relevant to current study theoretical concept is *memory regime*. This notion combines two previous components and refers to them on a national level. In other words, it is a combination of political memory practices in the country that could be defined as a general line of common discourse and state's behavior. Memory regime defines what is 'allowed' to be said, by whom and to what extent.

Concerning the **structure of current study**, in the first chapter the literature review will be done. As the concept of memory politics remains debatable in academia as well as common theoretical framework, my study will generalize existing arguments

of the main authors in the field. For instance: Aleida Assmann, Jeffrey K. Olick, James V. Wertsch & Henry L. Roediger III, Christoffer Leiding Kølvraa, Jan Kubik & Michael Bernhard, Jay Winter, Barbara A. Misztal and others. This chapter aims to come up with clear theoretical argument that will be proved later in empirical part of the study.

The second chapter will introduce the analysis of current situation in the case of modern Russia. There are two NGOs active in the field of memory politics in Russia.[9] Within this research I will have a look on what are the key activities of the existing NGOs in the field, what is the history of their development and what is the nature of the narratives that they use.

In the next third chapter of the current study I outline used methodology and provide practical steps on how analysis will be implemented. **Framing analysis** will help me to distinguish main messages and narratives that are used by both actors in the mnemonic field. This comparison enables to understand why the government has shown interest to take control over the mnemonic space. The chapter also elaborates on selection of data for the analysis and timeframe of the current research. **Materials for the analysis** could be found on the open sources: websites of the mentioned NGOs where they share their key events and activities, as well as other news portals that did publications concerning selected commemorative events.[10] Two important events in Russian memory politics concerning Stalinist repressions are used for the analysis: Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki (August 4-5) and National day of remembrance for victims of political repression (October 29-30). Memorial and Memory Fund have different commemorative activities on that days, which will be analysed within last two years (2016-2018), since Memory Fund was founded.

Last chapter of the research paper focuses on the empirical analysis and explains the results by giving a characteristic of the features of frames produced by both actors. It proceeds with the discussion on nature of establishment of the monopoly on

---

[9] (1) Fund "Perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression", or Memory Fond URL: http://memoryfund.ru/о-фонде/; and (2) 'Memorial' - International historical, educational, charitable and human rights society URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/memorial-international-aims/.

[10] Memory Fond URL: http://memoryfund.ru/все-новости/; Memorial – URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar#list.

commemoration that took place in Russian mnemonic field within the Putin's presidency. All in all, current study aims to give characteristic of current Russian memory regime concerning the Stalinist repressions and map out main differences in the narrative that memory agents have.

1. Theory of Politics of Memory

The current chapter of the research is mainly a theoretical background with the literature review in the field of memory regimes and non-democratic political environment. It aims to structure and collect main arguments and theoretical developments that currently exist in academia. By the end of the chapter a clear theoretical framework and argument is developed to be further tested in empirical part of the current study.

1.1 The concept of memory regime

Current subchapter is fully dedicated to the understanding of the notion of memory regime. It aims to highlight the key components that define the regime. Starting with the theoretical framework *'Theory of the Politics of Memory'* by Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard and ending up with arguments of other authors and critics to the theory, which would help to provide a new definition that is going to be used within the study.

In order to understand the notion of memory regime, it is important to firstly define what is a *collective memory*. When we think about the concept of collective memory, it is always crucial to keep in mind that memories never exist in a vacuum. In order to define the notion of collective memory, I'm using one of the most common approaches established by Aleida Assmann, who differentiated four types of memory. According to her, on the one hand there is individual memory that reflects one's personal experience and knowledge, but on the other – there also is a collective memory. This type of memory refers to common understanding of different historical events that is shared within a nation/society. There are different channels within which it could be formed: literature, art, films, media and etc. As a result, citizens of one or another country usually share same opinion on the events that took place in the past and are related to their state's history. (Assmann, 2002)

The process of collective memory formation is a complex one, involving many actors, experiences, narratives and discourses that eventually lead to a certain outcome. The environment in which the memories are being formed is one of the key components in the process. In academia there were many attempts to approach the study of this environment. Researchers tried to address the questions of how the environment shapes the collective memories, who is involved in this process and how does the formation

happen. Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard have become the ones to provide a generalized theory to answer mentioned questions.

So how do authors define the concept of memory regime within the framework? They describe it as "a set of cultural and institutional practices that are designed to publicly commemorate and/or remember a single event or set of events, or a distinguishable past process". (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 14) Authors also introduce different regime types. The first one received a name *fractured.* According to authors, it has a specific 'memory issue' and a sharp line that actors intend to make. Thus, in fractured regimes there usually is a division in a mnemonic field, when there are authors of 'true' version of the past and a simply 'false' one that tend to be in opposition. Another regime type is called *pillarized,* according to which actors accept the existence of different opinions over the past, but stock to one of them on the official level. In other words, this regime type allows actors to have different interpretations of the past, resulting in disagreements and memory conflicts between the actors. The third regime type is called *unified* and it tends to exist without politicized past and is free of mnemonic based conflicts. Actors in current regime understand the danger of politicizing the past and try to escape it or simply do not see any point in bringing up issues from the past. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, pp. 17-19)

One important limitation of the framework that one should take into account if applying the model over empirical case studies is that it works only with democratic political regimes. It was a conscious choice authors made as they argue that 'dynamics of mnemonic contests' are expected to be different in non-democratic regimes. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 19) Thus, the framework could not be fully applied to the Russian case, as according to recent developments in academia, Russia did not complete a successful democratic transit and is currently considered as an electoral authoritarianism. (Gel'man, 2015)

Another important restriction of the theory concerns the fact that each memory regime assumes only one collective memory on a certain issue within a given moment or period. In other words, the model cannot be used to give a characteristic to a certain state in general, but for a given timeframe and one particular issue. Authors also introduce the notion of *'mnemonic field'*, or *'the field of memory'* that is considered to be an ensemble of memory regimes. Current restriction seems to be fair, as same actors can have different

positions over the different issues and as well as there could be a varying degree of salience over the issues and both of them could change over time. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, pp. 17-18)

However, the term of memory regime picked up by authors could be a bit confusing. Eva-Clarita Pettai sees a clear problem with using it, as the notion 'regime' is considered to represent "a set of principles, norms and rules that fundamentally regulate the interaction of actors in a given field of activity (usually of government)". (Pettai, 2016, p. 175) Thus, within Kubik's and Bernhard's theory the term seems to lack some expected degree of institutionalization, authors on the contrary emphasize its fluidity that happens due to always changing composition of actors and/or 'dynamics of their preferences'. This leads to the situation when different memory regimes can co-exist at the same period of time referring to different historical events. As Eva-Clarita Pettai argues, that gives a theory not actor-centered, but the *event-centered focus,* which could distort the whole picture. (Pettai, 2016, p. 175)

Hungarian researcher Iván Z. Dénes in his study agrees with Eva-Clarita in a way that he defines regimes of memory as an "institutionalized ways of setting and managing the supply and demand of remembrance in historical contexts". Thus, his concept supposes governance of the historical remembrance issues, when the discourse about the past is mainly produced by the state, its institutions and other political actors. However, the discourses are supposed to be recognized and accepted by the general public, the same way as it is in Jan Kubik's and Michael Bernhard's theory. Iván Z. Dénes even gives this process a classical economic term *'the supply and demand' of memory*. (Dénes, 2013, p. 466) Mark A. Wolfgram goes further and introduces the notion of *'the memory-market'*, which he understands as an arena for competing collective memories, that is more open in democratic societies, but more governmentally regulated under authoritarian rule of law. (Wolfgram, 2014, pp. 19-20)

Thus, interesting aspect that I noticed doing the literature review is that there is a lack of agreement on the definition of memory regime within academia. Authors actively use the term but define it differently and not according to the Jan Kubik's and Michael Bernhard's framework. For instance, Evelyn Goh studies memory discourses in Post-Cold War East Asia and uses memory regime definition from the Eric Langenbacher's works. It is defined as "a structure of social meaning that surrounds collective memory,

constituted by discursive and power relationships, and which develops over time institutionalized practices". According to Goh and Langenbacher, a collective memory regime is an outcome of political actor's negotiations that is later translated to the public. (Goh, 2013, p. 165) In Eric Langenbacher's article dedicated to the changing memory regimes in contemporary Germany, the notion of memory regime is used more in a sense of competing memory. Author reasons the appearance of the 'Holocaust-centered memory' and actors that were representing this collective memory and refer to that as 'establishment of new memory regime' that was competing with the 'dominant memory regime' that was already existing in the country. (Langenbacher, 2003) If one looks at the situation through the prism of Jan Kubik's and Michael Bernhard's theory, it will become clear that those are not regimes, but mnemonic warriors that are competing within one memory regime in Germany at that time.

Another example of different memory regime typology that seems to be more suitable for our case was introduced by Jay Winter. He considers memory regime to be more substantial and durable, as he defines it as "ways groups of people frame their understanding of the past". (Winter, War beyond Words, 2017, p. 122) He tends to connect them with Aleida Assmann's concept of *cultural memory*, as in this understanding of memory regime, it goes beyond direct experience that people lived through. In other words, it is an imagined experience that was part of the life of older generations. According to Jan Assmann, cultural memory is especially important for the process of identity formation as it maintains and preserves particular cultural meanings for one or another society. They are objectivised and institutionalised to be transformed to the future generations. (Pääbo, 2011, p. 23) A memory regime in this case is set of narratives that is used to characterise the past and put it into the present. (Winter, 2019, p. 256) Author suggests his own framework of typology of the regimes which is based on who is responsible for the 'hurtful' historical events. For example, in case when "narratives disclose sacred presence in history", the memory regime is called *sacred*. When particular group (e.g. Jews, freemasons, gypsies and etc.) is targeted as powerful and responsible for the suffering, the regime is *demonic*. The *secular memory regime*, on the contrary, does not blame anyone or any power for initiating the course of events. (Winter, 2016, pp. 221-222) I would like to develop this thought further and include identification of the 'victim', or in other words who was oppressed as a result of particular historical events. To my understanding, this identification of the roles helps to view the

full picture and to dot the i's and cross the t's. As a result, if one wants to define a memory regime within the framework of Winter's approach, special focus on who is responsible for the historical events is needed and who is viewed as a victim.

In the light of competing understandings of the concept of memory regime, a logical question that arise is which definition to use and how to define memory regime in the research? For the purpose of current study, the decision was done not to focus on the framework of Kubik and Bernhard as it is not suitable for non-democratic regimes. This limitation does not allow to fully apply the framework over the Russian case, as it simply could not be put under one of the defined by authors regime's categories. Due to that within the current paper, the concept of memory regime was taken from Jay Winter's theory and developed further, taking into account developments of other authors.

However, one important theoretical development from the model provided by Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard will be used to conceptualize memory regime for the purposes of my study. The model provides an actor-centered approach, assuming that it is actor who is able to shape the regime. I will continue moving in the same paradigm of thinking, focusing on main actors in the mnemonic field to characterise Russian case. However, the emphasis would be also done on the institutionalised practices related to the topic, or in other words, what commemorative acts and events exist in the field. This aspect comes from Evelyn Goh's and Eric Langenbacher's understanding of memory regime and also correlates with works of other authors. The last element of the developed definition comes from Jay Winter and focuses on popular narrative and who is viewed as the one responsible for the crimes and as an oppressed victim. Thus, I define a memory regime as a set of institutionalised practises that are initiated by memory actors to commemorate particular history through a certain narrative (where there are particular victims and responsible for the crimes perpetrators). Taking into account arguments of scholars it could be said that in order to give a characteristic of a given memory regime, one has to pay attention to not only memory actors in the field, but existing institutionalised practises and narrative that is used by actors.

In the case of current study, through the analysis of and special focus on mentioned elements, it will be possible to give a full characteristic of the Russian memory regime. The next subchapter has an emphasis on one of the crucial components of the

memory regime – memory agent. The precise definition that is used within the current study will be outlined, as well as existing typology of the actors.

1.2 Memory agent as a key notion in a memory regime

This subchapter has a clear focus on the notion of memory agent and its place in the concept of memory regime. In addition to characterization of the notion it aims to highlight difference between *state* and *non-state memory agents.*

Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard provide us with an actor-centred, or instrumentalist view on how the historical memory is developed. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 10) This approach assumes that actor is a key figure in the memory formation process. Within the framework of the theory, authors call them *mnemonic actors*, or *entrepreneurs* and characterize as family members, teachers, professors, artists, intellectuals, journalists, priests and etc. In other words, those are people that may have a certain influence on a person's life in its different stages. Actors use various instruments to approach the 'history' – which is considered to be a set of discourses about the past that is produced by actors and is validated by public. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 10) However, authors make it clear that they take into account mostly politically motivated actors that are involved in power struggle and seek legitimization for their efforts. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 17) This theoretical aspect reminds me another theory that focuses on explanation of any political changes that happen in a given state. I refer to *Multiple Streams Framework* proposed by John Kingdon (Kingdon, 2003) and later developed by Nikolaos Zahariadis (Zahariadis, 2007), according to which 'political entrepreneurs' are the ones who have power to set a political agenda. In a same way as it is in Kubik's and Bernhard's theory, entrepreneurs are able to pay public's attention to given issues, that for some reasons serve their political interests. Mnemonic actors in a same as political entrepreneur's way could be represented not only by individuals, but also by institutions, political parties, NGOs, groups of people and etc.

If we refer to other studies in academia, the concept of memory agent is defined as internal and external to state actors that aim to establish the 'truth' on what happened during traumatic periods in the past. Agents "seek to honour victims and identify perpetrators" and are usually involved in *'memory battles'* with each other. Competing agents tend to propose different narratives or silencing certain discussions about the past.

Thus, memory agents want to set up a relationship between the understanding of the past that they consider as the 'right' one and nation-building process taking place within a state. (Budryte, 2010, p. 331)

Agents of memory tend to relate themselves to socially and politically active groups, who could be opposing to incumbent regime or supporting it. Actors usually promote their own version of the past and are especially active in the field in case their position differs from the one supported by a state. The main reason behind agents being involved in social and political activism is considered to be their aim to "obtain greater currency for their version of memory". (Budryte, 2010, p. 334) However, it is important to keep in mind that author here is thinking in a paradigm of democratic political regimes, when political life and freedom within a state are usually not limited. For the purposes of this study, provided definition of memory agent is going to be adjusted according to the realities of Russian state.

Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard have also introduced different types of mnemonic actors, according to strategies they tend to use. Each mnemonic entrepreneur tends to choose particular behavioural *strategy*, or in other words, "engages in specific practices". (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 12) The first type is called *mnemonic warriors* and represents actors who tend to emphasize a sharp distinction between their own 'correct' narrative and the one that 'others' have that is considered to be a wrong one. Current actors usually base social and political life on a 'non-negotiable historical truth'. The next type of entrepreneurs is on the contrary acknowledging the existence of alternative opinions concerning the past events and is called *mnemonic pluralists*. Although, they are open for a dialog, the 'right' opinion anyway belongs to them. Following type of *mnemonic abnegators* represent actors that are fully aware of the past but made a conscious choice to avoid it. They take off the questions of political memory from the agenda, due to not seeing any benefits for bringing it up. The last type of *mnemonic prospectives* includes actors that do not usually use collective memory as an instrument in power struggle. As well as mnemonic abnegators, prospectives are fully aware about the past, but see no ground for putting it into the agenda. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, pp. 13-15)

Within Jan Kubik's and Michael Bernhard's framework, mnemonic actors define a memory regime themselves that exists in three types that were explained in previous

subchapter: fractured, pillarized or unified regime. It is easy to make a conclusion that first regime type is filled with mnemonic warriors as the main actors. And other types of regimes are without warriors and are usually either pillarized or unified which depends on the balance between abnegators and pluralists.

Authors mention that types are *ideal* emphasizing that they are theoretical and most likely differ while applied to empirical cases. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 12) In the case of current study, this limitation is especially relevant, as non-democratic nature of Russian politics does not allow to fully use existing theoretical developments. Due to the fact that typology of the memory regimes provided by the authors is not fully applicable to Russian case, Jan Kubik's and Michael Bernhard's understanding of memory agents could not be completely used as well. I aim to emphasize the importance of non-democratic political environment and develop a concept that is applicable and relevant for Russian case. In order to do that, arguments and theoretical developments of other authors will be used to produce a more precise conceptualization.

For instance, Eva-Clarita Pettai has found confusing the narrow focus of the theory on those mnemonic actors that are in power, or in other words, "authorities and major political actors as parties". According to author, given term can be too narrow if one studies public commemorative events that by its definition engages with wider community. (Pettai, 2016, p. 176) In this light, to give a full characteristic of a memory regime, it is important to look outside the frames of actors in power.

Matthew Cook and Micheline van Riemsdijk in their study on Holocaust memoralization process in Berlin also emphasize the importance of paying attention not only to state-driven initiatives. Authors argue that state-centric view on remembering of certain events in the past is outdated and encourage scholars to pay attention to independent 'memorialization agents': political actors, NGOs, tourists and heritage institutions. (Cook & van Riemsdijk, 2014, p. 141)

Thus, it is important to consider the difference between state and non-state memory agents. The agents might have different aims and behavioral strategies according to their origin. For instance, state agents might be more involved in nation-building process, which aim to legitimize the incumbent regime. When non-state actor, on the opposite might invest in finding the 'truth' behind historical events. Within the current

research, the emphasis will be done on both of them. State-driven agents might have more resources and support compared to non-state memory actors. The influence of last ones could be also limited in non-democratic regimes, especially in case of disapproval of official governmental position on a past. That is why the focus of the following subchapter is done on features of non-democratic political regimes. This theoretical background will allow us to proceed with conceptualisation of the term of memory agent relevant for the context of non-democratic settings.

1.3 Limited political life in non-democracies

Current subchapter aims to point out differences that memory agents in democratic regimes and memory actors in non-democratic ones might have. The subchapter firstly provides an overview of the notions of democratic and non-democratic regimes.

In general, democracy as a concept has many issues. The term is broad and there is lack of agreement among the scholars on its definition. It is also impossible to determine each country on the globe either to be 'white' or 'black', democratic or non-democratic. That is why today scholars define wide range of different non-democratic rules of law: *authoritarian regimes, electoral authoritarianisms, failed states and etc*.

Authoritarian regimes are considered to be those who made a transition attempt to the democratic rule, but for some reason had stocked in so-called 'grey zone' on their way. (Carothers, 2002, p. 5) Countries under authoritarian rule simulate democratic regime by facade institutions, while in fact that is incumbent government who controls the freedoms and allowable plurality in the country. According to Paul Brooker, all non-democratic regimes share common characteristic which refers to broad use of "censorship and repression to maintain authority and to implement unpopular policies". (Brooker, 2008, p. 133)

Nevertheless, within Russian political academia there have been made an attempt to find out whether it was comparatively easy for Kremlin to implement unpopular social policy reforms at the beginning of the 2000s within authoritarian rule. According to Vladimir Gel'man and Andrey Starodubtsev the answer to the question is more of a 'no' – reforms proved themselves to be unsuccessful and lead authors to the conclusion that

even within authoritarian regime government seeks legitimization and is not able to implement whatever it wants without looking back on citizen's opinion. (Gel'man & Starodubtsev, 2016) The same point is made by Andreas Schedler in his "The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism", arguing that in fact authoritarian rulers can never afford themselves to "lean back and relax". (Schedler, 2013, p. 22)

Paul Brooker argues that authoritarian regime concept lacks in precision and provides us with his own view on classification within authority rule. Based on Aristotle's ideas of rule by 'one, few or many' that helps to follow the paths of power distribution, Brooker adds it up with three additional questions: why the incumbent rules; how he rules; what happens to him, in other words, what the probable pathways of democratization are. Answering them one by one, researcher would be able to define more precise type of authoritarian rule in one particular country. (Brooker, 2008)

For instance, *electoral authoritarianism*, which is slightly different to the existing authoritarian regimes concept. The main difference is hidden behind the 'electoral' word in its name, as incumbent regime tends to hold elections as a key instrument of regime's legitimization and every time make sure to maintain its own victory. As a result, the symbol of freedom and democracy is used against its own values causing *the paradox of elections*. Here comes the main question: could elections still be considered as a facilitator of democratic rule? Yonatan L. Morse claim that elections in this case are not simply symbolic or facade, they still delegate some responsiveness to an electorate testing the regime's mobilization capacity. (Morse, 2012, p. 165)

One of the main tricky features of electoral authoritarian regime is that on paper it seems to represent the whole "set of representative institutions that define modern democracy", while in the reality it is more of "the institutional manipulation". (Schedler, 2013, p. 55) This way, although political actors have a full capacity and freedom on paper, they do not enjoy it in reality. Political parties, for instance, are usually state-controlled and could not be considered as a real opposition or limitation of power of the ruling regime.

In this light, Kubik's and Bernhard's definition of memory agents, which mainly includes political actors that are involved in power struggle, could not be fully applied to

authoritarian regimes. Although it might seem that actors are participating in the mnemonic field, in fact they have no real impact on a situation as it is fully state-controlled. If actors would be able to make a difference, they would not be allowed to enter the political arena from the very beginning. This is especially relevant for the Russian case, as one of the most prominent scholars on Russian politics Vladimir Gel'man characterises the situation in the country as "anything but opposition". (Gel'man, 2005, p. 25) He argues that Kremlin's policy is quite evident example of using a politics of fear to maintain the status quo and handle the opposition movements. (Gel'man, 2015)

Although memory agents are usually not directly involved in the questions of power struggle and are mainly focused on commemoration politics, according to Kubik and Bernhard, they deal with *political memory*. Heiko Pääbo defines it as "the collective memory that is functioning according to the needs and demands of power relations", as political memory tends to serve particular political aims and interests of political elites. (Pääbo, 2011, p. 24) In this understanding, memory agents follow certain political interests, when in authoritarian settings their capabilities are limited. Thus, conceptualization of memory actors in non-democratic regimes does not allow us to include political parties and politicians, as they tend to be part of state-controlled facade institutions. For the purposes of the current study, I find it relevant to consider as memory agents only NGOs that aim to commemorate certain historical events. Even in authoritarian environment NGOs usually enjoy some degree of independence and room for maneuver that worse being studied.

However, in non-democratic settings some NGOs could have support from the government and could be established as an initiation from above. This is especially the case in electoral authoritarianisms when state is creating an artificial network of civil society institutions that are, in fact, partly or fully state-controlled. It could be NGOs that partly exist on government funding and have to implement requests from above in order to exist and receive support. Nonetheless, if one compares them to fully financially independent NGOs, the second ones could enjoy freedom but have much less resources in general. And by resources, I mean not only financial component, but human resources, connections, access to media, ability to rent a place for the event or office in general. It could especially get problematic if activities of this independent NGOs could be in any way considered as undermining the incumbent regime, as in this case authoritarian

government would tend to cut all of the available resources of this particular NGO. (Spires, 2011, p. 12) In this regard, within the framework of current study, organizations who receive government support and were established as the initiative from above are considered as state-driven actors. On the other hand, organizations who do not receive government's support and were established as a part of the 'grassroot' process and civil society initiatives are considered to be bottom-driven non-state actors.

Mentioned distinction on state and non-state actors is important within authoritarian environment, as there is a clear *asymmetry* between the actors with government support and without it. Independent NGOs could be easily oppressed by the regime if they express any attempts to criticize the government or start to be politically involved. When on the opposite, state actors are mostly fully dependent on the regime and controlled by it. Thus, mentioned asymmetry does not allow healthy competition in the field, as state actors tend to have an advantage.

Moreover, as I mentioned in previous subchapter, memory agents with different institutional origin might have different aims and behavioral strategies. State controlled memory agents could be used to legitimize the regime and silence particular issues, when non-state agents might try to do the opposite. Within the next subchapter, I am going to focus on how in particular memory agents can make a difference and influence the mnemonic field on a given issue.

1.4 Framing as an instrument of the memory regime's formation

As government and state actors are privileged in establishing a remembrance policy that would correlate with their interests, it is important to consider what instruments could be used for a successful formation of a memory regime. What tools are available for actors in a mnemonic field and how do they help to promote particular commemorative strategy?

One of the most powerful instruments that is especially relevant for the authoritarian countries with the lack of free and independent media is *framing*. The history of this notion starts from Erving Goffman introducing concepts of frames and the process of framing. (Goffman, 1974) He suggested a new way of organizing peoples' experiences and characterized a frame as "a structure of individual's perception of

society". (Malinova, 2017, p. 58) In general, framing allows people to investigate interactions from everyday experience and construct social worlds and meanings. (Gordon, 2018, p. 324) Adam Simon and Michael Xenos note that people in the process of reflecting on messages tend to organize them in a certain order in their mind and put some labels. The frame itself is defined as a template to structure a data to put in order various pieces of information. (Simon & Xenos, 2000, p. 366) Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki identify two popular dimensions of understanding the notion of frame within academia: sociological and psychological conceptions (individual cognitive process). Combinations of both of them allow us to have a deeper understanding of how frames function: not only as "internal structures of the mind", but as "devices embedded in political discourse". (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 57) This feature of the frames allows to use the concept within different disciplines of science.

Within political science, framing became one of the major theories in research on political communication. (Brugman & Burgers, 2018, p. 1) Frames become a subject of study when one considers key messages that are being translated by political actors. According to Martin Wettstein, through the process of emphasizing and selecting particular aspects in accord particular position on a given issue political actors promote their frames in media and through other channels. Actor's aim is to make their interests to be the most appealing ones to the public and shape the way people think about a given issue. (Wettstein, 2012, p. 319) Indeed, in studies of communication in politics or media, framing is considered as an instrument that is actively used by speakers to address an audience with the aim to promote a certain interpretation of one or another issue. According to it, speakers make a conscious choice to point out particular aspects, interpretations or meanings of a given historical event. Within the factors that could potentially define their position on a subject are political agenda or political interests of elites. (Malinova, 2017, p. 58)

But why public buys imposed messages and ready-made frames? The studies have shown that framing actually helps individuals to process the received information and reduce the complexity of political issues on agenda. If we look at frames' specifics and mechanisms of work, there are various stages of data framing. Firstly, starts the process of messages building by political elite and actors (who tend to be entrepreneurs), then reception of frames by the public and further effect of frames at different levels of

cognitive response. (Wettstein, 2012, p. 319) I would put this thought further and suggest adding another step - receiving a feedback from public that goes back to entrepreneurs. Without accessing a feedback, political actors cannot understand efficiency of the produced frames. Moreover, to my understanding, from the theoretical perspective framing process should be viewed not as a linear process with an end, but as a cycle. This approach allows to view a framing process as an endless process of formation of messages and narratives from entrepreneurs on one side, and their reception, reflection and feedback production from the other. Thus, framing would remind a concept of policy cycle, or a process of formation of policies within a state by political elite. Initially introduced by Harry Lasswell, the concept suggests understanding the development of new policies on the governmental level as a process that starts from agenda setting and choice of appropriate alternatives by political elite and further implementation of one of the options. Policy's realization is essentially followed by receiving a feedback from citizens through media and public discussions, which evolves into new policies that take into account the feedback. (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 13) To my mind, the process of framing has a similar logic as in some way it is a dialog between political actors that develop narratives and public that either accepts them either not. In case they are not accepted, entrepreneurs produce new frames that would be tolerated by public. However, the framing production is a rather complex process as frames have different functions.

Scholars define four functions of frames which include the following: definition of the problem (or agenda setting – paying public attention to a given issue), causal interpretation ("identification of underlying forces of the problem"), moral evaluation (how the problem is being implicated) and treatment recommendation (solutions that are proposed to solve the issue). (Zhou & Moy, 2007, p. 80) Thus, in some cases framing of a given issue not only suggest a particular way of perception, but also assumes a specific solution to solve it.

According to Entman, the process of framing also essentially involves the notions of selection and silencing. According to the author, actors tend to pick up particular parts of the narrative and silence them on purpose. (Entman R. M., 1993, p. 52) This is especially relevant for a historical narrative as silencing of some parts of collective memories tends to be a common process.

Within academia the framing approach is most actively used in studies under the disciplines of political science and communication. (Brugman & Burgers, 2018, p. 4) The framing analysis is also actively used in memory studies. Thus, for example, Lucy Bond has studied the frames of memory within which 9/11 was commemorated. (Bond, 2015) Author identifies that the tragic event is mainly commemorated through values of patriotism and freedom, as those are the key messages that are being translated. (Clark, 2016, p. 229) Another study examines how extremist movements in Czech Republic frame issues related to Moslem migration. Authors seek to explain growing popularity of radical right movement in the country by demonstrating how politicians connect "dangerous" radical Islam and groups of migrants and refugees. (Strapáčová & Hloušek, 2018) Another example of Cillian McGrattan's study shows how different nations after the Second World War started to use framing to reposition particular historical events and represent them in different light. (McGrattan, 2014)

Olga Malinova has used framing to analyse Russian memory politics. In her study she evaluated official presidents' speeches on the occasion of Victory Day in Russia – 9 May, to identify framing of the Great Patriotic War. In total seventeen speeches were examined delivered by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev from 2000 till 2016. Author distinguished sixteen different frames and discovered which of them were used more frequently throughout the studied period. According to the results, there are four frames that have been used on an annual basis and all of them repeat Soviet rhetoric of commemoration of the victims. However, Olga Malinova has also identified a recent tendency towards 'nationalization' of the war memory. It is reflected within a frequent use of the frames of victory as a uniting symbol and manifestation of national character. (Malinova, 2017, pp. 59-61) Thus, framing allows to discover character of changes that took place over time in a given study period.

For the purposes of the current study, framing could be a beneficial concept that can help to identify possible differences in the discourse that actors have. Moreover, it allows not only to track differences, but to give a certain qualitative characteristic to their nature. This feature could be very useful if there is a need to explain what stood behind the establishment of the monopoly of commemoration that was initiated by the state.

To sum up, within the framework of this research, Russian memory regime is going to be studied through the analysis of discourses produced by memory agents. The

aim is to map up the differences that two organizations in the field of commemoration of Stalinist repressions have. According to the definitions of memory regime and memory agent that were outlined within the current chapter, I suggest that the nature of the differences will be expressed through the narrative that actors use in the commemorative practices. With the help of framing analysis, the narrative will be studied and compared.

From the theoretical background it could be concluded, that state in authoritarian settings is especially sensitive towards the potential sources of instability. Organisations that are in any way undermining the incumbent regime are considered as a possible threat. I argue that this rule applies to non-state memory agents and they could be oppressed by the government in case they are critical towards the regime. While state memory agents, on the contrary, would benefit from governmental support that they receive in return to loyalty and regime's legitimization practices. In this light, clear asymmetry between state and non-state memory agents could be expected, when actors have not only different resources and capabilities, but aims and behaviors.

In order to identify those differences, the framing analysis will be undertaken to test this theoretical argument on the case of commemorative practices in Russian field. Discourse of two memory agents with different origins that aim to commemorate Stalinist repressions will be analysed in order to define the possible differences. The following chapter proceeds with the general characteristic of Russian memory politics on the issue of Soviet crimes. The chapter also introduces main actors in the field and their activities.

2. Introduction to Russian memory politics

This is a background chapter that provides an empirical literature review. The analysis of the existing literature on Russian case will give a characteristic of current memory regime and demonstrate recent developments.

Stalinist repressions are considered to be part of Soviet crimes. Soviet historians and party leaders had put sophisticated amount of effort to create a myth of Soviet 'Great Patriotic War' and other events that took place over this period of time behind which it could be quite hard to distinguish truthful facts. The pre-war and war periods are considered to be the richest in terms of crimes that have been committed. Most of the archives are still kept under the secret so it is hard to estimate number of victims as there is no evidence that even the numbers promulgated by Russian authorities are final. (Nuzov, 2014, p. 275)

Due to lack of proven facts and silenced nature of Soviet history, some of the crimes were admitted by a Soviet or Russian side only after quite some time. For instance, only in 1989 during the more liberal period of *Perestroika* that was followed by a Soviet Union collapse, USSR admitted the existence of secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939. In a context of Baltic Sea states, the most important Soviet crimes are considered to be Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and arrests and deportations of citizens of those countries to Siberia. For instance, during first mass deportation from Baltic States took place in 1941, when around 45,000 persons were deported. (Rahi-Tamm, 2007, p. 17) However, Soviet military occupation that took place in Baltic states is still not recognized, as official Russian position remains to be the voluntary will of the states to join USSR. This and many other violations of human rights remains to be silenced in Russian official discourse. Even if the Soviet participation was at some point admitted, it is usually trivialized by Russian authorities. (Nuzov, 2014, p. 273) For example, the way it happened with Katyn massacre in 1940, when over 20,000 Polish prisoners were murdered by Soviet officers: Soviet authority recognized their role only 50 years after – in 1990. (Etkind, et al., 2012, p. 101) However, nowadays Russian authorities emphasize that it is considered to be 'an ordinary crime' that was not outstanding in the context of warfare of that time. (Guryanov, 2013, p. 695)

There is no lack in controversial events in Soviet history that tend to be viewed differently from victim's and perpetrator's sides. Can *Red Terror* that took place as a part of Russian Civil war in 1917-1922 be considered as one of the Soviet crimes? Or forced *collectivization* of the peasantry in Soviet republics that started from 1928 and *Holodomor* in Ukraine in 1932-1933? Or deportations of entire ethnic groups to Siberia? (Andrieu, 2011, p. 199) Scholars in academia seem not have a clear agreement on a certain definition. Most of them focus either on specifically war crimes (that are done during the WWII and have Red Army involved) (Heisey, 2018) (Nuzov, 2014) (Guryanov, 2013) or Stalin's *Great Terror* in late 1930s with further GULAG imprisoning. (Paperno, 2001) (Khapaeva, 2016) Kora Andrieu argue that if we take a popular within scientific community path of comparing two confronting totalitarian regimes, it becomes clear that in case of Holocaust it was a "coherent, organized project". While Soviet terror combined various heterogeneous actions: political repressions, ethnic crimes, war crimes and etc. Author states that coherent narrative of all the mentioned elements is yet to be written. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 207)

Within current paper the focus is done on Stalin's repressions and deportations. This conscious choice was done, due to the fact that this aspect of Soviet crimes is fully admitted by Russian authorities. Rehabilitation process has started in November 1989, when Stalin's deportations of the repressed peoples were declared as "illegal and criminal" by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Later, few laws dealing with legacy of Stalinism were released, including the law "On the Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples" of April 1991, that admitted that Stalin's deportations of entire peoples were acts of genocide.[11] Another law introduced later, has defined a notion of political repressions and established procedures for rehabilitating victims.[12] (Koposov, 2018, p. 222) Moreover, victims of political repressions were immortalized in the monument that is located in the centre of Moscow since 2017. "Wall of Sorrow" is the 'first nationwide monument' dedicated to the issue of Soviet crimes that is established in the capital of Russia.[13]

---

[11] Law of the RSFSR No. 1107-I of April 26, 1991 "O reabilitatsii repressirovannykh narodov".

[12] Law of the RSFSR No. 1761-I of October 18, 1991 "O reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh repressiy".

[13] Official website of Memory Fund "Opening of the monument "Wall of Sorrow" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/открытие-монумента-стена-скорби/.

As state authorities have admitted the existence of the crimes and are involved in institutionalisation of commemoration by establishing the monument in the downtown of Russian capital, we can conclude that the issue of political repressions is not silenced by Russian authorities. In fact, it somehow involves different state and non-state actors. That is why this topic seems to be a perfect fit for the current research: Stalin's repressions is a field where various actors actually cross and interact. To my mind, this is a rare case, taking into account authoritarian origin of Russian state which tends to oppress any dissident activities. In current research I plan to analyse this interaction and emphasize key messages translated from both sides. In the following subchapter Russian memory politics and changes that took place after period of Perestroika are explained.

2.1 Transformation of memory discourse after collapse of USSR

Current subchapter is dedicated to the literature review on how the discourse on Soviet crimes has changed over the 1990s and give a general characteristic to the current Vladimir Putin's policy on the issue.

Mentioned above introduction of new laws that on a state level criticizes actions done by a previous regime in a given country received a name of *transitional justice*. In more broad sense, it refers to incumbents' actions and perceptions of past historical events concerning the repressions or crimes against state's population done by previous regime. (Pettai & Pettai, 2015, p. 6) The laws released by Soviet and Russian authorities that I mentioned above have marked a change in official state narrative about the past. Developed and protected by Soviet propaganda myth of 'Great Patriotic War' started to be reintegrated during short period of democratization that took place throughout Perestroika and 1990s under Yeltsin's presidency. (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 68) According to Nikolay Koposov, Yeltsin's politics of memory were focused on 'rejecting the communist past', however, his government and Russian liberals did not manage to develop and implement a 'Western-style democratic culture of memory'. As one of the pillars of this culture would be Holocaust remembrance. (Koposov, 2018, p. 220) According to Soviet propaganda that is still strongly existing in the discourse, Russians, not Jews, were main Hitler's victims. Thus, Holocaust is simply not part of the myth of the war. (Koposov, 2018, p. 250)

Scholars tend to agree that the process of transitional justice in Russia over the Stalinist repressions is not taking place. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 198) (Nuzov, 2014, p. 275) (Koposov, 2018, p. 238) Putin's memory politics are defined as "selective historical amnesia that is focused on rehabilitation of Stalinism", that is characterized by unwillingness to admit the criminal nature of Soviet regime. (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 63) Olga Malinova seems to notice the same tendency and admits that governing political elite tries to selectively adopt Soviet legacy, while "avoiding its critical reassessment". (Malinova, 2017, p. 44) Mariëlle Wijermars refer to Russian history as a 'rhetorical toolbox' that is used by Putin to frame and justify his policy decisions. She agrees that Russian authorities support certain historical narratives that meant to establish political legitimacy in the present. The myth of 'Great Patriotic War' and Stalin's strong leadership create a useful historical foundation for the current regime that tries to promote a continuous narrative of 'a strong state' and 'centralized leadership'. (Wijermars, 2016, p. 84) Ilya Nuzov develops this argument further and conclude that Stalin's rehabilitation and continuous violations of human rights prevent Russia from successful implementation of transitional justice. (Nuzov, 2014, p. 275) (Andrieu, 2011, p. 214) Nikolay Koposov seems to agree, as while doing the analysis of Memory Laws in Putin's Russia he argues that Moscow is not ready to fully admit the communist crimes. While complete recognition assumes the same approach as Nazi crimes were assessed by the Nuremberg Tribunal, for Russian authorities it would undermine the myth of the war. And myth is crucial to be maintained as according to it, Red Army did not occupy East Europe, but liberated it from Nazi Germany. (Koposov, 2018, p. 254)

When previous presidents used to distance themselves from Soviet regime, Vladimir Putin has used Soviet past to rebuild the nation's pride. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 211) The period of 1990s was especially hard for Russian population due to the economic transition which resulted in dramatic shortages in people's income. Thus, already since 1993 public surveys started to illustrate that the majority of Russian population rate Soviet political and economic systems higher than the new democratic ones. (Nuzov, 2014, p. 312) Vladimir Putin noticed this trend and effectively mastered the narratives of 'stability' and 'pride' in order to satisfy electorate that was disappointed by the democratic transition. He has also learnt the importance of historical narratives during the 'self-deprecating' Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's eras and instead started to rehabilitate the glory of Stalinist past. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 211)

The case of memorial museum Perm-36 proves the trend of silencing of Stalinist crimes under the Putin's presidency. Perm-36 used to be one of Soviet GULAG camps and during Perestroika period with the joint support of Russian-wide human rights activism it became a museum, which aimed to commemorate the memory of victims of Soviet terror. However, in 2015, the museum was taken over by local authorities and closed. After its reopening, all mention of Stalin's crimes was removed, and it became a museum dedicated to "the employers and personnel of the Soviet camps". (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 68) This is one of the examples of state takeover of local initiatives that demonstrates the establishment of the monopoly on commemoration. James V. Wertsch while studying the transformation of Russian collective memory concerning the World War II, came to the conclusion that the country illustrates strong state control of memory. However, author also admits that it is not unique and could be found anywhere in the world. (Wertsch J. V., 2008, p. 124)

In general, Russian citizens are not fully aware of scale of Soviet crimes and their consequences for other nations. According to data from surveys that were held in 2017, every fourth Russian citizen has not heard anything about Stalin's repressions. However, the awareness of Russians depends on their age: among citizens over 60 years 86% know about repressions, but in the youngest group (18-24 years) the number is already 54%.[14] Current data fully reflects Russian memory politics within recent years under Putin's rule, when the issue of Stalinist crimes tends to be silenced.

To sum up, Russian government tends to use the narrative of Soviet glory in the nation building process. Stalinist repressions are either silenced either seem to be used as an opportunity to promote the necessity of internal stability and danger of possible confrontation. There also tends to be a strong monopoly over the commemoration that suppresses independent initiatives coming from below with their own understanding of historical truth. According to the definition of memory regime developed in the theoretical part of current paper, the full characteristic of Russian case could be given after the analyses of memory agents, commemorative events and used narratives. Within the next subchapter I continue the analysis by focusing on main actors in Russian mnemonic field concerning Stalin's repressions and Soviet crimes.

---

[14] Official website of international information group Interfax "Every fourth Russian has not heard anything about Stalin's repressions" URL: https://www.interfax.ru/russia/581465.

2.2 Existing mnemonic actors

This subchapter has a clear focus on characteristic of existing state and non-state actors in the Russian mnemonic field. The provided description will include organizations' main activities, structure and funding.

2.2.1 Memorial

Memorial is respected and well-known public association that was founded in 1987 as a public group initiative to "perpetuate the memory of repressed victims". The initiative received support in other Soviet republics and later became a fully international historical, educational, charitable and human rights society.[15]

Organization started its first initiative during Perestroika, when its activists collected 30,000 signatures as a campaign for a support of a monument to the victims of Stalin's repressions. During the 1990s the research center was established in Moscow aimed to collect and archive existing information about the victims, later a small museum with a public library opened their doors as well. Already by 1998 there were more than 50,000 files on victims in the Memorial's archives. The files included not only names of GULAG prisoners, but letters, camp memories, rehabilitation documents and etc. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 215) In 1990 the first monument was established, it was an uncut stone from one of the first GULAG camps in Russia – Solovetsky labor camp. (Applebaum, 2003)

Nowadays they have clear aims that include the following:
- assistance in developing a civil society and democratic state governed by the rule of law, that excludes the possibility of a totalitarianism rehabilitation;
- promotion of democratic values based on rule of law, overcoming totalitarian stereotypes and asserting individual rights in political practice and public life;
- participation in restoration of historical truth and remembrance politically repressed victims in totalitarian regimes.[16]

---

[15] Official website of Memorial Society "What is International Memorial" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/memorial-international-aims/.

[16] Ibid.

In order to achieve mentioned goals, Memorial is involved in the activities including:

- identifying and publishing information about crimes and mass violations of human rights committed by totalitarian regimes in the past;
- participating in the rehabilitation of historical truth concerning the crimes of totalitarian regimes, studying its causes and consequences; promoting access to sources of information (archives, libraries, Museum funds and etc.);
- promoting full moral and legal rehabilitation of politically repressed persons, helps to seek for support and social benefits to compensate caused damage;
- promoting the remembrance of victims of totalitarianism, the creation of memorial complexes, as well as academic, informational and educational centers, public archives, museums and libraries;
- providing assistance to the former repressed and their families, provides legal protection of the interests of the repressed and their families;
- identifying, publishing and analyzing information about human rights violations today;
- participating in the development and implementation of projects and programs aimed to create solid bases against rehabilitation of totalitarianism;
- carrying out peacekeeping activities in the resolution of ethnic and religious conflicts;
- contributing to the establishment of a free, open, legal, democratic society in those States where the offices of the International Memorial have been established.[17]

Mentioned activities are implemented not only in post-Soviet space, however this is the initial geographic base for the Memorial movement. Now there are more than 50 organizations in Russia, 6 in Ukraine, one in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and the Czech Republic.[18] Memorial is an NGO that does not receive governmental support, but private contributions as well as officially registered income as a legal entity. According

---

[17] Ibid.

[18] Official website of Memorial Society "Structure and Organisations" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/#map.

to articles of association, Memorial can earn money from its activities, for instance, revenue from sales of goods or services.[19]

Activities of the organization are well-known within academia as well. Most of the studies mention Memorial's input in Russian memory politics and rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist repressions. (Sniegon, 2019, p. 107) (Guryanov, 2013, p. 696) (Andrieu, 2011) (Paperno, 2001, p. 89) (Koposov, 2018) (Etkind, et al., 2012, p. 107) According to Kora Andrieu, Memorial's outstanding activity is a confirmation that nonstate actors can in fact initiate and advance the process of transitional justice. The absence of required truth initiatives on a state level does not mean that the past will not be addressed. In case when there is a lack of confirmation from a state and it refuses not only to make public apologies, but to build monuments or provide the access to archives, it is up to civil society to deal with this issue. When bottom-driven initiatives happen, civil society has a chance to become "a substitute for the state, compensating for its inaction". (Andrieu, 2011, p. 215)

At the beginning of its activity, Memorial "enjoyed some support from the higher echelons of the Soviet hierarchy". For instance, mentioned above laws on rehabilitation of repressed victims that were signed in 1991, were drafted with the active involvement of Memorial. (Koposov, 2018, pp. 222-223) However, not every regime is ready to tolerate local initiatives, especially if they somehow undermine legitimacy of an incumbent. Growing Russian authoritarianism could not afford Memorial and many other independent NGOs investigating actual democratization and liberalization levels in a state. Thus, in 2006 Russian authorities released a law against Russian NGOs with a financial support from abroad. According to a new law every NGO in a country was asked to re-register with a submission of detailed financial report. (Wijermars, 2016, p. 88) In case there was even a small part of foreign financial support, the organization receive a status of 'foreign agent' and its activities in Russia become illegible. Historians note, that the notion of 'foreign agent' was firstly used by Stalin in 1930s to characterize spies or other 'enemies of the people'. (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 68) This is a second charismatic adoption of narratives from a Soviet past that allow us to make certain parallels with old

---

[19] Articles of Association, official website of Memorial Society, P. 11. URL: https://www.memo.ru/media/filer_public/b7/55/b755c2b8-e394-42ce-87aa-ddf242f49247/ustav_mm-opt_1.pdf.

totalitarian regime and a new one. Memorial did not become an exception and also received a status of "non-profit organization performing the function of a foreign agent" by the Ministry of justice of the Russian Federation.[20]

In fact, already starting from 2007 Memorials' activists began to face problems. In November 2007, member of Memorial Oleg Orlov and other journalists were attacked in Ingushetia. In December 2008, Memorial's St. Petersburg office experienced a paramilitary raid. (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 68) As Nikolay Koposov notes, the raid coincided with the opening of the International Conference on Stalinism that was organized by Memorial. (Koposov, 2018, p. 260) Police has confiscated their entire archive that was worth more than 20 years of work. It included memoirs, interviews, photographs and other documents that provided details of the GULAG's history and names of the victims. (Andrieu, 2011, pp. 216-217) Later, in 2009, Memorial's Grozny office started to face issues: one of their member Natalia Estemirova was murdered and her colleagues were forced to emigrate. In 2018, new head of Grozny's office Oyub Titiev was arrested. In the same year Memorial's Ingush office in Nazran was set on fire.[21] Nowadays, Memorial is trying to challenge the decision on its 'foreign agent' status in a court. Organization argues that they act exclusively according to Russian interests, as they help to protect human right. Memorial considers the "forced entry" into the register of 'foreign agents' as an attempt to prevent their activity.[22]

It is indeed true that Memorial is active in collecting facts about present violations of human rights in Russia, for example in Chechnya or Dagestan. Activists believe that the fact that violations continue to take place in modern Russia is directly connected to "unaddressed past legacies". (Andrieu, 2011, p. 215) The approach of Memorial to highlight not only violations of human rights in the past, but current ones as well, might be considered as a threat to a glory of Putin's regime. In this light, all the difficulties with which Memorial has to face nowadays make sense, as Russian authorities are not interested in promotion of their nondemocratic activities. In this light, Memorial is

---

[20] Official website of Memorial: "Proceedings on the status of a foreign agent are ongoing" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/22.

[21] Official website of Memorial "Memorial's history" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/history/.

[22] Old Memorial's website "About Memorial's enty in the register of foreign agents" URL: http://old.memo.ru/d/204002.html.

considered as an organization conducting anti-governmental activities. (Kolesnikov, 2017, p. 4)

To sum up, in current research Memorial is analysed as a non-state actor in the authoritarian mnemonic filed. Its recourses are limited due to oppression coming from above as a result of establishment of monopoly on commemoration over Stalinist repressions in Russia. In the next part of the current paper I move from independent non-state mnemonic actor to the one newly introduced to the field. It deals with the same issue of remembrance of victims of political repression under the Soviet rule, however it is considered as a state actor.

2.2.2 Memory Fund

In 2015 Dmitry Medvedev signed the State Policy Concept for Perpetuating the Memory of Victims of Political Repression, enacted by the Government of the Russian Federation. The Fund "Perpetuating the Memory of Victims of Political Repression", abbreviated as the Memory Fund, was registered in 2016 as part of the Concept's implementation. Remembrance of the victims of political repression is considered as the main mission of the Fund. It does so through support of educational programs, research and events that aim to perpetuate the memory of victims of repression. The sources of financial support consist of private and corporate donations in the form of cash and other property. [23]

Key activities of the Fund include the following:
- "support of the GULAG History State Museum;
- support victims of political repression;
- museumification of objects related to the history of repression;
- creation, development and support of memory museums and memorial centers;
- production of educational content, including documentaries and feature films, performances and exhibitions;
- support research and educational projects and events;

---

[23] Official website of GULAG History Museum "Memory Fund" URL: https://gmig.ru/en/support/memory-fund/.

- development and implementation of multimedia projects, collection of historical data;
- publishing activities".[24]

The State Museum of GULAG history that is mentioned as part of Memory Fund's activities was founded in 2001. It was an initiative of Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, who once was a prisoner in one of the Stalin's labor camps himself. The initial museum building was located in the center of Moscow, not far from Bolshoi Theater and Russian Parliament. However, in 2015 the museum was closed and moved to a new geographical location, outside the Moscow city center. The moving process took place with the help of the City of Moscow authorities. (Sniegon, 2019, pp. 124-128) Nowadays, the museum is officially supported by Moscow Department of Culture and new head of the organization Roman Romanov is in the Council of Memory Fund.[25]

Concerning other participants of the Council of the Fund, there could be found people in one or another way connected to Russian authorities. For example, Mikhail Fedotov is Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation or Vladimir Lukin, who is a Member of Federation Council, or Sergey Karaganov (Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Russian Foreign and Defense Policy).[26] To my understanding, this could prove the top-driven nature of the Memory Fund and their activities, as sufficient part of the Fund's Council is in a way connected to Putin's government. Moreover, the whole organization was established in order to implement the Policy Concept.

However, according to Olga Malinova, the establishment of a new Medvedev's Conceptof State Policy on Commemorating the Memory of Victims of Political Repression indicates about certain progress. In her research, Malinova has analysed main stages in evolution of the official memory policy in Russia over the last 25 years. She considers the new policy as a 'window of opportunity' for local actors of memory politics who want

---

[24] Ibid.

[25] Official website of GULAG History Museum "History and Mission" URL: https://gmig.ru/en/museum/history-and-mission/.

[26] Official website of GULAG History Museum "Memory Fund" URL: https://gmig.ru/en/support/memory-fund/.

to contribute into the process of victim's commemoration. However, she admits the ambiguity of the situation, as Russian authorities' actions demonstrate the aim to keep control over the field of memory politics. "It invests resources into the consolidation and promotion of the state-centered historical narrative focused on the theme of national glory." (Malinova, 2019, p. 100)

The first project of the Fund was the erection of "first nationwide monument" to the victims of political repression "The Wall of Sorrow". The founders use the phrase according to which the monument is "first", while they seem to not admit the 1990's stone from Solovetski island that was erected by Memorial. The Wall was opened in the downtown of Moscow on 30 October 2017. It was done in accordance with the special decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the construction of a memorial to victims of political repression" signed by Putin two years earlier. The monument was created with the help of state funds and public donations based on the project of sculptor G.V. Frangulyan. It is a 30 meters wall with several arches, composed of the outlines of numerous figures, symbolizing the victims of repression.[27]

Another project implemented within the framework of Medvedev's policy Concept was realized with the support of Memory Fund and was aimed at creating association of Russian museums of memory. In 2015, the State Museum of GULAG history initiated the establishment of the Association that would become a network of Russian museums. The purpose of association was not only to launch the process of remembrance of historical injustice, but to promote public dialogue on the issues of terror and political repressions.[28] Nowadays, there are 32 museums all over Russia that joined the Association.[29] They serve as a platform for different open lectures and public talks. Museums' staff and researchers also participates in seminars in Moscow that are organized by the Association on the yearly bases. For example, last one took place in November 2017, when more than 30 researchers from 21 Russian cities arrived in

---

[27] Ibid.

[28] Official website of Memory Fund "Projects" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/проекты/.

[29] Official website of Association of Russian Museums of Memory "About Association" URL: http://memorymuseums.ru/#about.

Moscow to share their experience in research.[30] The process of creation of the centralized network of museums could be indeed useful for best practices exchange, however it is a familiar scheme used in Putin's Russia. Centralization helps to establish a better control over the regions to make sure there is no diversity of opinions.

Memory Fund is also involved in a project that received a government support of the Presidential Grants Fund, which provides funding for Russian civil society development. The project is called «My Gulag» and is implemented by Visual anthropology studio of the State Museum of GULAG history. It was created to record video memories of people, who faced mass repressions themselves or were influenced by them.[31]

It is important to emphasise that the main perception of activities of the organization is done based only on the publications on its webpage. Since it was established only recently, there is lack of existing research on its impact on Russian mnemonic field in academia. Due to that fact, critical assessment of the Fund's activities is limited. If in the case of Memorial, almost every relevant piece of research on Russian memory politics refers to the activities of this organization, with Memory Fund the situation is different. The organization itself and nature of its establishment has not been studied yet. Nevertheless, multiple connections to the state's authorities and the fact that organization was established after Dmitri Medvedev's initiative, allow us to characterize Memory Fund as a state actor in the current mnemonic field. The growing presence of state in the field demonstrates the establishment of monopoly on commemoration. State memory agents enjoy financial support and do not lack resources that could be used to promote particular view on historical events. Thus, it could be concluded that Russian memory regime has clear asymmetry in power struggle where state actor Memory Fund has an advantage over the non-state agent Memorial. In order to conclude the analyses of Russian memory regime, we have to proceed with analyses of existing commemorative activities and narratives that are produced by both actors. This will be done within the following chapter of the current study.

---

[30] Official website of Association of Russian Museums of Memory "The third annual seminar "From Solovki to Kolyma" URL: http://memorymuseums.ru/seminar/2017.

[31] Official website of My Gulag project "About the project" URL: https://mygulag.ru/about.

3. Methodology

The main aim of current chapter comes down to outlining used methodology, selection of material and description of the analysis. It firstly explains the choice of material including used criteria, then proceeds with description of the steps of analysis.

For the purposes of the current study, framing analysis was picked up as a method of choice. In theoretical chapter the concept of frames was already introduced, as well as some of the existing research in academia. Framing analysis is actively used in studies within the field of political communication and memory politics. Within advantages of the method its narrow focus could be outlined. Work with specific historical events always assumes qualitative examination that allows to demonstrate a deep understanding of an issue. Framing analysis helps to track even smallest changes in discursive practices that could be crucial for identifying reasons for a transformation. Due to the specifics of my research question that aims to explain changes in Russian memory regime, current method seems to be the best fit. Based on successful use of framing analysis within studies on memory politics in academia, this method will allow me to provide the most precise answer to the research question within the framework of current work. Understanding of the changes in the frames that are promoted from the government on one side, and frames from non-state actor on the other side, will allow me to track down the reasons for regime transformation.

3.1. Materials used for the analysis

Current subchapter focuses on description of materials used for this study and the logic of choice behind it. In order to proceed with characteristic of Russian memory regime, there is a need to analyse commemorative activities and institutionalized practises of two actors in the mnemonic field on an issue of Stalinist repressions. Activities of Memorial and Memory Fund assume public lectures, public statements, speeches of their activists and supporters and opening of monuments that are usually connected to certain *commemorative events*. Those events were indicated by both actors as important for the process of remembrance of repressed victims. Thus, within the framework of this research I focused on identification of commemorative events that touch upon the Stalinist

repressions. After creation of a map of particular events relevant for the analysis, I proceeded with working with the existing materials on a topic.

Events were selected by the various criteria. Firstly, they had to be present in the agenda of both Memorial and Memory Fund organisations so that comparison of both discourses would be possible. Some of the events were relevant only for one and not for another organization, for example, Day of memory of Alexander Solzhenitsyn on 3 August. It is date of death of well-known writer and soviet dissident who shared with his honest experience of living in one of the GULAG camps in the famous book "The Gulag Archipelago". Activists of Memory Fund participated in special memory service in the necropolis of the Don's monastery in 2017, when Memorial did not have any activity on this date.[32] Or some public actions are not attached to any particular events, for instance public initiative supported by Memorial "Last address". This action was established to commemorate victims of repressions and put a small sign on a wall of house where a person was arrested. After 6 years since the launch of the project, more than 800 signs with names have been installed in more than 40 cities and villages of Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.[33] This project does not have analogies that would be initiated by Memory Fund, due to that it is not included in the analysis.

Another important selection criterion is closely related to the previous one. It is a time framework. As Memory Fund is a newly established mnemonic actor in the field, it was not present before 2016. Thus, within current research I compare activities of actors that took place only after year of 2016. Although this timeframe dramatically limits amount of available content, it reflects the recent changes of Russian memory regime and demonstrates the recent trend that is important to be studied.

Third, as this work interacts with events and actions that happened in the past, the information about them have to be available on the organizations' webpages. Both of them have archives of their publications and statements: it is https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar#list for Memorial and http://memoryfund.ru/все-новости/ for

---

[32] Official website of Memory Fund "Day of memory of Alexander Solzhenitsyn" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/день-памяти-александра-солженицына/.

[33] Official website of Memorial "Exhibition "Last address/5 years" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/453#list.

Memory Fund. Those pages became my primarily source of data as they represent main activities of the organizations. I have also taken into account interviews with organizations' activists and news about organizations' activities that were published on other media. Links to those materials are also published on the organizations' websites: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/press/ (for Memorial) and http://memoryfund.ru/новости/ (for Memory Fund). Thus, the materials used for the analysis have to be publicly available.

Based on the listed selection criteria, mentioned websites were analysed to find list of events which assumed public actions organized by both mnemonic actors within last two years (2016-2018) with publicly available information on them. Information usually presumed public speeches or statements done by organizations' activists, representatives or supporters. In total, two events satisfied all mentioned criteria: series of days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki (August 4-5) and National day of remembrance for victims of political repression (October 29-30).

First unit of analysis - Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh and Krasny Bor. They were established and since then annually organized by the St. Petersburg branch of Memorial. August 5 is the date of entry into force of the order of the NKVD № 00447, which launched a machine of mass repression in August 1937. The memorial action in Sandarmokh annually brings together thousands of people: relatives and friends, delegations of public organizations from Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Tatarstan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and etc. The tradition has existed for more than 20 years. August 4th is a memory day for another mass burial of the executed in Krasny Bor.[34] Days of remembrance in Solovki are jointly organized by Solovki museum-reserve, Memorial and local administration since 1989. In the same year the country's first permanent exhibition about GULAG was opened in the Solovki museum-reserve.[35] Series of those days of remembrance have different geographical locations and different number of victims, however they have one common aspect. They are considered to be the launch of "Big

---

[34] Official website of Memorial "Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/373#list.

[35] Official website of Memorial "Days of remembrance in Solovki" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/375#list.

terror" that started being implemented in August 1937 and was followed by mass murders and repressions.

Second unit of analysis - National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression. The date was chosen in a memory of the hunger strike, which prisoners of Mordovian and Perm camps initiated on 30 October 1974. Political prisoners declared that this is an action against political repressions in the USSR. Officially this day was established by the resolution of the Supreme Council of RSFSR of 18 October 1991 "About establishment of Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression".[36] In 2017 Memory Fund opened a monument "The Wall of Sorrow" and launched the action "Bell of Memory". Public action suggests to everyone who is interested to lay flowers, light candles and honor the memory of the victims of repression by hitting the bell.[37] On the day before, at the eve of Russia's Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression, Memorial holds another public action "Return of the Names", where activists of the organization gather at Lubyanka Square around the Solovetsky Stone to read aloud the names of Soviet citizens who were shot in Moscow as part of Stalin's Great Terror.[38] In 2018 Memorial faced issues when Moscow authorities at some point refused to allow to hold annual action "Return of the Names" at Lubyanka Square next to Solovetsky Stone, but suggested activists to go and implement the action next to the new monument of commemoration "Wall of Sorrow".[39] The action, however, eventually took place at the traditional spot. As a researcher I am interested in why Moscow authorities started to oppress the action, although it had the same goal as the "Bell of Memory" organized by Memory Fund on the 30 October. In the next chapter with the help of framing analysis this case, as well as another one selected for the analysis, will be examined.

---

[36] Official website of The presidential Council of the Russian Federation on development of civil society and human rights "October 30, Russia celebrates the day of memory of victims of political repression" URL: http://president-sovet.ru/presscenter/news/read/4221/.

[37] Official website of Memory Fund "Action "Bell of Memory" on the Day of memory of victims of political repression" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/акция-колокол-памяти-в-день-памяти-ж/.

[38] Official website of Return of the Names "About return of the names" URL: http://october29.ru/return-of-the-names/.

[39] Official website of Memorial "Moscow authorities withdrew the approval of the "Return of names" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/200.

I suggest, that Memorial and Memory Fund as two organizations with different origin might have different narrative concerning the same commemorative events that take place in the country. The framing analysis that is done within the next chapter of current research allow me to identify small differences in the narrative used by both sides. In the following subchapter I focus on practical steps that were done in order to implement the analysis.

3.2 Steps of the framing analysis

Current subchapter explains how the framing analysis was undertaken within current study. It reflects how the frames were defined and what are the elements they consist of. This is the last subchapter that concludes the methodology section and is followed by empirical analysis done within the following fourth chapter.

Firstly, it is important to define understanding of a frame that would be relevant for the current study. In the theoretical part I have already outlined the history of the concept's development and existing approaches to understanding of the framing. However, for this research I find the definition of Entman to be the best fit as he classifies frame as narrative which results in the process of silencing and selecting particular parts of the situation to provide specific interpretation. Author indicates that the objects of frames are not only events, but issues and actors, including particular individuals or groups of people and organizations. (Entman R. , 2008, p. 90) Thus, this approach suits for the purposes of current research, as in the characteristic of Russian memory politics above there were references to many scholars who argued that Russian authorities actively use silencing of particular aspects of Stalinist repressions. By focusing on specific events and doing a comparative analysis of two actors, it is possible to compare which narratives receive more attention and which are silenced by one of the actors.

According to Jim A. Kuypers, in some cases comparative framing analysis is especially fruitful as helps to detect differences in the frames that are promoted by different actors. The frames are usually composed of some key words, metaphors or concepts. Within the framing theory they are considered to be "cues of how language choices push our thinking in particular directions". (Kuypers, 2009, pp. 185-186) Thus, in order to proceed with the analysis, I plan to focus on those cues and look how objects of frames are characterized by different actors.

Table 1. Frames identified in current research.

Objects	Memorial	Memory Fund
Remembrance days in Sandarmakh, Krasny Bor & Solovki	Frame I	Frame II
National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression	Frame III	Frame IV

Within the framework of current research, there are two *objects* of frames, which are commemorative events that were selected for the analysis. Remembrance days in Sandarmakh, Krasny Bor, Solovki and National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression are central objects as narratives produced by two actors are shaped around those events. Therefore, in the following chapter, two frames coming from two different actors dedicated to each of the event are analysed, which means four frames overall (as it is shown in Table 1).

Each frame dedicating to a certain object consists of different *elements*. Those elements shape the general narrative that is being produced. Within academia, the most frequently used framework of elements is the one brought in by Entman's definition of frames. He outlined four elements that in a way define functions of the frame itself: problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation. (David, Atun, Fille, & Monterola, 2011, p. 332) For the current study mentioned elements were adopted for our case. It was necessary due to the fact that most of the research with the framing analysis tend to focus on assessment of different media channels. News articles traditionally have different content, which is based on a news and tend to identify a certain problem that needs attention and solution. Due to the fact that case of current research is different and there is a focus mainly on analysis of NGOs activities, there was a need to develop new elements and adopt the ones used in academia.

List of used elements is demonstrated in the Table 2 of the current paper. The main aim of pre-defined elements is to guide further analysis so that it will be clear in which direction to look for the variables. Theme/topic refers to the name of the online publication, it is an adopted version of 'problem definition'. As most of the used sources do not emphasize any particular issue, but rather inform about organization's activity, I found 'problem definition' irrelevant for the study. 'Causal interpretation' covers

"attribution of failure or success regarding a specific outcome", or in other words it consists of key message of the publication which reflects on a given situation. (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 264) Elements 'victim' and 'perpetrator' were also added instead of 'moral evaluation', as for the purposes of current analysis identification of 'victim' and 'perpetrator' is more relevant. Due to the ongoing debate in Russian memory politics, those roles are not clearly assigned to particular actors or groups or people. Thus, Memorial and Memory Fund might actually have different understanding of the situation. 'Treatment recommendation' could include "a call for or against a certain action", or to put it in another way, suggests particular steps or actions to solve the issue. (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 264) The last element 'connection with present' tend to explain how this issue is relevant today.

Table 2. Frames elements and variables explained.

Frame elements	Variables
Theme/topic	Name of the article/publication
Causal interpretation	Key message
Victim	Who is viewed as a victim
Perpetrator	Who is responsible
Treatment recommendation	What needs to be undertaken
Connection with present	Why this issue is relevant today

In order to not get lost in the analysis and frames' elements, guiding element was developed, or the main questions that needs to be answered within this part of the research: (1) how do Memorial and Memory Fund frame the selected commemorative events? (2) are there any differences in the way how same events are framed by both organizations? (3) if there are, in which elements of the frames do they occur? Those questions are important to keep in mind while giving a general overview of the frames.

Thus, within the next chapter of the study I will elaborate a bit more on the chosen commemorative events to provide some context and explain the results of the analysis. Selected material from Memorial's and Memory Fund's websites would be manually analysed in order to define how each of the commemorative events is framed by actors.

The frame will be characterized based on defined elements, which consist of different variables that will be outlined as a result of the analysis. Identified variables will be messages from the texts that fall under one of the frame's elements. On the bases of categorized variables, the general characteristic of each element will be given and elaborated. This step-by-step process will allow to conclude on whether there are differences in the frames' elements and what is their value in the key message of each frame overall.

4. Analysis of Russian mnemonic field

4.1 Map of important commemorative acts

Current subchapter provides a clear map of events with different locations over Russia. The characteristic of each event is provided as well as description of activities (public actions) of Memorial and Memory fund that took place over those dates.

In previous chapter I explained the logic behind the selection of commemorative events for the analysis. Selected events take place in different geographical locations that are shown on the map (Figure 1). Although National day of remembrance for victims of political repression is relevant within the context of the whole country, public actions organized by Memorial and Memory Fund took place in Moscow, Moscow and Leningrad regions, Krasnodar, Yekaterinburg and Magadan that are highlightened on the Figure 1.[40] In the following subchapters the commemorative actions dedicated to each of the event are discussed in a more detail and followed by a framing analysis with elaboration on frames' elements.

Figure 1. Map of Commemorative events.

---

[40] Official website of Memory Fund "Action "Bell of Memory" on the Day of memory of victims of political repression" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/акция-колокол-памяти-в-день-памяти-ж/.

4.1.1 Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki (August 4-5)

Initially days of remembrance were established and annually organized by Memorial on Solovki Icelands since 1989. At the beginning this initiative was supported by Solovki museum and local organization. In the first years, days of remembrance were attended by former Solovki prisoners, including Pavel Evensen, Leo Marthin, Sergey Schegolkov, Alexander Tabor, Irina Levitskaia, Victor Vasiliev, Vladimir Bowl, Igor Vikentiev, Nicholay Racin. At that time the country's first permanent exhibition about GULAG "Solovki Special Purpose Camp" was opened in the Museum (authors – A. V. Bazhenov, A. V. Miller, J. A. Brodsky, A. A. Soshina). Then on the site of the former camp cemetery, which is now a memory lane on the street Paul Florensky, a monument 'Solovki stone' was established. After the opening of the monument, the first Orthodox service took place in the Monastery after a 60-year break that happened under a Soviet rule. Until 2014 Days of remembrance were supported by the Museum and local administration, however from 2015 it is only Memorial who is organizing them. They are attended by activists of Memorial from St. Petersburg and Moscow branches, relatives of Solovki prisoners, historians, civil society activists, journalists and bloggers. In 2018 for the first time Memory Fund helped to organise days of remembrance in Solovki.[41]

Every year next to the Solovki stone during the days of remembrance there are mourning ceremonies that include church services and laying of flowers. Days of remembrance used to be held in June, before the mass burials in Sandarmokh and Krasny Bor were discovered in 1997. Nowadays the joint commemoration process is established that unites Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki. Days of remembrance start on August 4th with the funeral ceremony that takes place at the memorial cemetery in Krasny Bor and on the next day – in Sandarmokh. August 5 is considered to be the date of entry into force of the order of the NKVD № 00447, which launched a machine of mass repression in August 1937. The memorial action in Sandarmokh annually brings together thousands of people: relatives and friends of the victims, delegations of public organizations from

---

[41] Memorial official website "Days of remembrance in Solovki" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/375#list.

Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Tatarstan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and etc. The tradition has existed for more than 20 years.[42]

Analysis of the Frame I that was produced by Memorial on a topic could be seen in Appendix 1 of the current study. In total three articles were selected for the framing analysis.[43] One of them is not located on Memorial's website, however it was linked to the article dedicated to Days of remembrance in Solovki. Two of the articles give a background on a history behind the commemoration activities and explain how Memorial is involved in them. The third article is a reportage done by one of the journalists that participated on the Days of remembrance in Solovki with the Memorial's activists.

All of the selected articles briefly reflect on historical events that took place in the areas and what commemorative activities are organized today in the element of causal interpretation. As victims are viewed not only people who were imprisoned or/and killed, but their relatives who seek justice for what has happened. Moreover, local activists and supporters of Memorial do also face issues. For example, article on Days of remembrance in Krasny Bor emphasize that in 2018 commemoration activities would have special meaning due to resumed prosecution of Karelian historian Yuri Dmitriev. Memorial supports the activist and emphasize that it is an unjustified persecution from authorities. Yuri Dmitriev dedicated his life to collect the information about people who were killed in the polygons of death and released books with the list of the victims' names. This narrative of continuing unjustified persecutions of activists who are trying to find out the hidden truth could be clearly seen in all the text samples. In the third article, author refers to police officers who arrived to Solovki to talk to Memorial's activists to make sure the commemoration activities were authorized and that they could not be considered as protest actions. Thus, victims of the situation are not only repressed people during Soviet era, but activists that are involved in the investigations and commemoration. In this light,

---

[42] Memorial official website "Days of remembrance in Krasny Bor" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/373#list.

[43] (1) Markelov S., 7x7 website "Stone Elephant: How to Erase the Memory of the Camp Past in Solovki" URL: https://semnasem.ru/daysofmemory/; (2) Memorial official website "Days of remembrance in Solovki" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/375#list; (3) Memorial official website "Days of remembrance in Krasny Bor" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/373#list.

the perpetrator is not only Soviet authorities that launched mass repressions back at that time, but Russian authorities that prevent and suppress investigation processes.

As a treatment recommendation Memorial encourage continue investing in awareness raising campaigns and support local activists who try to seek justice. Another important element of the frame which is 'connection with present' emphasize the fact that current regime not only does not support Memorial's activities, but in fact tries to suppress them. Local authorities in Solovki encourage silencing process of truthful facts about the Solovki Camp and try to prevent commemorative activities.

To sum up the overview of the analysis of the first frame, Memorial applies the label of victims over its own activists and relatives of repressed/killed people. Their narrative emphasizes the unjustified persecutions and attempt to silence the historical events that comes from Russian authorities.

In the second frame on the same historical events that is produced by Memory Fund slightly different picture could be seen. (Appendix 2) Two articles were selected for the analysis and both of them are located on the Memory Fund's website.[44] Articles mainly reflect on what the organization is currently active on and how the Concept of State Policy of Perpetuating the Memory of Victims of Political Repression is start being implemented. In the 'victim' element of the frame mostly people that were directly affected by the repressions are mentioned. Possible perpetrator is not present in the narrative in the same way as connection with present is not mentioned. One of the articles refer to historical facts and emphasize how big the number of killed people in Karelia was, however it could be seen that the articles have a nature of report on Memory Fund's activities and do not encourage to do anything.

The comparison of two frames concerning the Days of commemoration in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki could be seen in Appendix 3 of the current study. The main differences in the elements of frames concern 'victim', 'perpetrator' and 'connection with present'. Memorial tends to consider itself as part of the victim of the situation, as their commemorative activities are trying to be prevented and activists are

---

[44] (1) Memory Fund official website "Meeting of the Interdepartmental working group in Karelia" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/заседание-межведомственной-рабочей-2/; (2) Memory Fund official website "Days of Remembrance in Sandarmokh" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/дни-памяти-на-сандармохе/.

oppressed. While Memory Fund defines victims as people who were repressed under the Soviet rule. The 'perpetrator' element is also different in the two frames, as Memorial makes Soviet and Russian authorities responsible for the crimes and continuing persecutions, when Memory Fund does not emphasize who is in charge of historical events. In this regard, Memorial encourage to participate in commemorative activities and support their activists who faced some issues dealing with Russian authorities. Memory Fund, on the contrary, does not make clear connection with nowadays explaining why the issue of mass repressions and murders in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki is relevant today. Within the following part of the current study frames dedicated to National day of remembrance for victims of political repression are going to be analysed.

4.1.2 National day of remembrance for victims of political repression (October 29-30)

National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression was established in 1991 by the resolution of the Supreme Council of RSFSR.[45]. The date was chosen in a memory of the hunger strike, which prisoners of Mordovian and Perm camps initiated on 30 October 1974. Political prisoners declared that this is an action against political repressions in the USSR. Since 2007, at the eve of Russia's Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression – the day before (29 October) Memorial annually holds public action "Return of the Names". On that day activists of the organization gather at Lubyanka Square around the Solovetsky Stone to read aloud the names of Soviet citizens who were shot in Moscow as part of Stalin's Great Terror.[46] Public action lasts for the whole day – 12 hours, when everyone who wants can come over, light a candle and read the names of the victims out loud.

In 2017 Memory Fund opened a "first nationwide monument" to the victims of political repression "The Wall of Sorrow". The founders use the phrase according to which the monument is "first", while they seem to not admit the monument erected by

---

[45] Official website of The presidential Council of the Russian Federation on development of civil society and human rights "October 30, Russia celebrates the day of memory of victims of political repression" URL: http://president-sovet.ru/presscenter/news/read/4221/.

[46] Official website of Return of the Names "About return of the names" URL: http://october29.ru/return-of-the-names/.

Memorial on Lubyanka Square. The new monument was done in accordance with the special decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the construction of a memorial to victims of political repression" signed by Vladimir Putin. It was created with the help of state funds and public donations based on the project of sculptor G.V. Frangulyan.[47] A year later, on 30 October 2018, a new public action was organized by Memory Fund and Moscow authorities next to "Wall of Sorrow". It is called "Bell of Memory" and suggests to everyone who is interested to lay flowers, light candles and honour the memory of the victims of repression by hitting the bell.[48] Next to the monument a symbolic bell in the form of a rail was installed. Everyone could take part and ring in the memory of those who were killed in the years of Stalin's terror. The public action takes place not only in Moscow, but in other regions of Russia as well: Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Magadan and Krasnodar regions.

In 2018, Memorial faced issues when Moscow authorities at some point refused to allow to hold annual action "Return of the Names" at Lubyanka Square next to Solovetsky Stone, but suggested activists to go and implement the action next to the new monument of commemoration "Wall of Sorrow".[49] The action, however, eventually took place at the traditional spot. One of the articles I used for the analysis of the third frame explains the situation in detail. (Appendix 4) In total, there were four articles used for the frame: three of which were published on the websites of the liberal media and one on Memorial's webpage.[50] While doing the analysis, I have done an interesting observation:

---

[47] Ibid.

[48] Official website of Memory Fund "Action "Bell of Memory" on the Day of memory of victims of political repression" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/акция-колокол-памяти-в-день-памяти-ж/.

[49] Official website of Memorial "Moscow authorities withdrew the approval of the "Return of names" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/200.

[50] (1) DW official website "Wall of sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims" URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/стена-скорби-в-москве-напоминание-о-жертвах-репрессий/a-41139891; (2) "Radio Freedom" official website "Soviet dissidents are against the installation of the memorial "Wall of sorrow" URL: https://www.svoboda.org/a/28823404.html; (3) BBC Russia official website "Monument to Stalin's victims: why "Memorial" is in doubt?" URL: https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2015/03/150319_stalin_victims_monument_debates; (4) Official website of Memorial "Moscow authorities withdrew the approval of the "Return of names" URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/200.

there are no articles mentioning opening of the new monument in Moscow on Memorial's website. That is the main reason behind the fact that most of the articles for the analysis of the third frame were taken from external websites. It seems that Memorial made a conscious choice to ignore the establishment of a new competing monument and does not want to attract any additional attention to it on their website. In one of the articles Memorial's historian Sergei Bondarenko explains that: "The Solovetsky stone and the action "Return of the names" is a spontaneous, national initiative from below. A monument on Sakharov Avenue is a great event, which we have been waiting for a long time, but at the same time it is an official initiative approved from above".[51] Thus, Memorial has its own reasons not to support the new initiative that is coming from Kremlin, although technically new big monument in Moscow is what the organization was promoting for in a long time.

In general, elements of the first frame correlate with the ones in the third frame – both of them are produced by Memorial. Although two of those frames are dedicated to different events, they follow the same logic. Memorial argues that Russian authorities are involved in ongoing violations of human rights and repressions that are taking place today. One of the articles explains the current situation the following way: "the government uses one hand to put people into jail and another one – to put the monument [to the victims of repressions]".[52] According to another article, this dual situation does not give Vladimir Putin "a moral right to install the monument" as he is an embodiment of injustice in modern Russia.[53] Third article cite the open letter of Soviet dissidents who encourage not to support the installation of the monument: "You cannot divide victims of political repressions into those who deserve a monument, and those who yet can stay

---

[51] "Соловецкий камень и акция "Возвращение имен" – это стихийная, народная инициативу снизу. А памятник на проспекте Сахарова – это большое событие, которого мы долго ждали, но в то же время это официальное начинание, утвержденное сверху" citation from DW official website "Wall of sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims" URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/стена-скорби-в-москве-напоминание-о-жертвах-репрессий/а-41139891.

[52] "[…] одной рукой государство сажает, а другой ставит памятник" citation from ibid.

[53] "[…] Владимир Путин не имеет морального права устанавливать такой монумент […]" citation from BBC Russia official website "Monument to Stalin's victims: why "Memorial" is in doubt?" URL: https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2015/03/150319_stalin_victims_monument_debates;

unnoticed".[54] This narrative puts Russian government in the 'perpetrator' section of the frame and politically repressed people in modern (and not Soviet) Russia in the 'victim' one. All of the analysed articles make sure to emphasize that there is no clear line between Soviet repressions that took place in the past and the ones that are ongoing in modern Russian state: "you can see 'past' in the 'present' almost in every step".[55] This connection with the present that is done by Memorial is very important for the comparative analysis, as it tends to be not present at all in the last fourth frame of the current study.

The fourth frame is dedicated to narrative produced by Memory Fund (Appendix 5). All together seven articles were analysed: six from the official organization's webpage and one is from Official website of the administration of the President of Russia. [56] Most of them simply refer to the activities that have been implemented from the Memory Fund's side to commemorate the victims. Many of the articles mention people from Russian government that participated in one or another event. For instance, one of the articles refer to the full list of participants: "a member of the Federation Council, Chairman of the Board of Fund of Memory of Vladimir Lukin, the Deputy Mayor of Moscow in Government of Moscow on issues of social development Leonid Pechatnikov,

---

[54] "Нельзя разделять жертв политических репрессий на тех, кому уже можно ставить памятники, и тех, кого можно пока не замечать […]" citation from "Radio Freedom" official website "Soviet dissidents are against the installation of the memorial "Wall of sorrow" URL: https://www.svoboda.org/a/28823404.html.

[55] "Прошлое в настоящем видится чуть ли не на каждом шагу" citation from DW official website "Wall of sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims" URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/стена-скорби-в-москве-напоминание-о-жертвах-репрессий/a-41139891.

[56] (1) Memory Fund official website "Press-conference in TASS" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/1259-2/; (2) Memory Fund official website "The action "Bell of memory" on the National day of remembrance for victims of political repression took place in Moscow" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/акция-колокол-памяти-в-честь-дня-пам/; (3) Memory Fund official website "The collection of stones from memorable places is finished" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/завершился-сбор-камней-из-памятных-ме/; (4) Memory Fund official website "The installation of the monument "Wall of sorrow" has started in Moscow" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/в-москве-началась-установка-монумент/; (5) Memory Fund official website "The exhibition "Wall of sorrow" was opened in Magadan" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/выставка-стена-скорби-открылась-в-ма/; (6) Official website of the administration of the President of Russia: 'Opening of the memorial to victims of political repression "Wall of Sorrow" URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55948; (7) Memory Fund official website "Muscovite has donated coins from 50's and 90's" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/москвичка-пожертвовала-монеты-50-х-и-90-х-г/.

the adviser of the President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Council under RF President on development of civil society, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Fund of Memory of Mikhail Fedotov, the Chairman Emeritus of the Presidium of the Council on foreign and defense policy, member of the Board of Fund of Memory of Sergey Karaganov".[57] In this way, Memory Fund emphasizes that government authorities are also involved and interested in the issue of commemoration.

Another interesting aspect of the fourth frame is focus on the fact that installation of the monument is widely supported by Russian citizens in different regions of the country. For instance, one of the articles is dedicated to the story of elderly woman who decided to donate her personal savings of coins from Soviet time to the new monument. "The head of Memory Fund Roman Romanov invited Varvara Ivanovna to the construction of the monument, so that she could personally participate in the process of melting of the coins".[58] In other articles Memory Fund refer to the nation-wide fundraising process: "We have received funding from the government, but we believe that it is fundamentally important that everyone contributes to the creation of the memorial. By giving a very small contribution, we join the memory of the innocent victims".[59] This focus seems to be done in order to highlight that although the initiative comes from the state, it is supported from below and Russian citizens recognize its importance. It, however, contradicts to what Memorial is saying – according to another agent, their initiatives are truly driven from below and are the result of joint actions of civil society, historians and activists all over Russian regions. Competition for the 'bottom-up nation-wide' status between the two memory agents is in fact not surprising, as existing request from citizens to commemorate the victims is the best legitimization of agents' actions. When organization does some particular actions not because state encourage them to do that, but due to popular requests from population. This message

---

[57] Memory Fund official website "Press-conference in TASS" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/1259-2/.

[58] Memory Fund official website "Muscovite has donated coins from 50's and 90's" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/москвичка-пожертвовала-монеты-50-х-и-90-х-г/.

[59] "Государство выделило средства, но мы считаем, что принципиально важно, чтобы каждый человек внес свою лепту в создание мемориала. Отдавая совсем небольшой взнос, мы приобщаемся к памяти невинных жертв" citation from Memory Fund official website "The exhibition "Wall of sorrow" was opened in Magadan" URL: http://memoryfund.ru/выставка-стена-скорби-открылась-в-ма/.

could be seen in the 'causal interpretation' element of the fourth frame pretty often (in five out of seven articles).

Another important aspect that characterize the fourth frame is that in most of the cases only Soviet people that were repressed are viewed as 'victims' and the 'perpetrator' element is not mentioned. This narrative is similar to the second frame that was also produced by Memory Fund on the previous commemorative event. The memory agent seems not to emphasize who is responsible for all the crimes and violations that took place. Thus, the important connection that Memorial makes in this regard that violations of human rights are still continued in Russia, is simply absent in the narrative of another memory agent. Due to that the last element of the fourth frame 'connection with present' refer to abstract importance of commemorative activities for modern Russia. In the speech of Vladimir Putin dedicated to the opening of new memorial that was also analysed within the fourth frame, the president mention that remembering the tragedy of repression will help to build a new society on values of trust and stability. He emphasizes how important this memory of repressions is for young generations that are responsible for the future of the country. The president also mentioned that "this terrifying past cannot be deleted from national memory or […] justified".[60] I find it interesting that he outlines the importance of acceptance of the past events and highlight that justification is impossible, when nowadays there is a clear tendency of rehabilitation of Stalin. Indeed, Vladimir Putin does not mention Stalin's name in the whole speech and does not outline who is responsible for "this terrifying past".[61] In this way, the president condemns Soviet repressions yet not blaming anyone particular for them.

This approach is completely opposite to the one suggested by Memorial. In Appendix 6 the comparative table of third and fourth frames could be seen. The main difference concerns the 'victim' and 'perpetrator' elements of the frame. Memorial tends to shift focus from people repressed under the Soviet rule to politically repressed people in modern Russia, which makes Russian authorities the main perpetrator. While general narrative of the fourth frame does not imply the same logic: Soviet people remain to be the ones who actually suffered, and the perpetrator tends to be not covered. In this light,

---

[60] Official website of the administration of the President of Russia: 'Opening of the memorial to victims of political repression "Wall of Sorrow" URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55948.
[61] Ibid.

in the third frame produced by Memorial the connection with present is done in a way that violations of human rights are being continued. While Memory Fund in the fourth frame concludes that commemoration is important for the future of Russia as it brings stability and trust.

Those contradicting narratives that are provided by two actors in the mnemonic field seem to define the reasons behind asymmetry in their relations. In the following subchapter the focus is done on the discussion of the nature of Memorial and Memory Fund and meaning behind differences in their narratives.

4.2 Establishment of a monopoly of commemoration

Current subchapter is concluding the empirical part of the paper. It aims to connect the analysis that was done in previous subchapter with the theoretical expectation that was outlined in the theoretical part of the current study.

In one of the articles used for the analysis if the third frame Memorial's historian Sergei Bondarenko while referring to the current situation in Russian mnemonic field mention the monopoly on memory. He emphasizes that this is very important and relevant discussion for today's Russia as there are attempts to establish "who should remember the repressions and what is the right way to do that".[62]

Indeed, Russian government by using state-controlled agent tries to establish monopoly over the commemoration of Soviet crimes and Stalinist repressions in Russia. Establishment of the new monument in Moscow dedicated to the victims of Soviet repressions, when there was one already initiated by another memory agent, illustrates state's take over of the commemoration. It does not only touch upon the monuments themselves, but more importantly commemorative activities which always come along the memorials. Within the framework of this research two commemorative events were analysed and in case of National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression there is clear competition on commemoration that two actors have demonstrated. Both Memorial and Memory Fund have commemorative activities – "Return of the Names"

---

[62] "[…] кто и как должен помнить о репрессиях […]" citation from DW official website "Wall of sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims" URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/стена-скорби-в-москве-напоминание-о-жертвах-репрессий/a-41139891.

and "The Bell of Memory" that aim to involve citizens and broader audience in the process of remembering. Two mentioned institutionalized activities have not only different geographical locations, but slightly different narratives that were distinguished within the subchapter above.

Non-state memory agent Memorial tries to emphasize the connection of repressions happened in the past under the Soviet rule to the ones that take place nowadays in Russia. In this light, not only Soviet authorities are responsible for the crimes of the past, but Russian government that continues acting in the same line. This narrative is not supported by authoritarian regime for simple reason – it undermines the legitimacy of the current government. Before, the narrative translated by Memorial was somehow tolerated by the regime, but within recent years it became stricter and less free and demonstrated the need to oppress the critics. Establishment of the monopoly over commemoration became one of the solutions to the issue that was implemented with the help of involvement of state-controlled memory agent.

Memory Fund does not have any 'uncomfortable' truth in their narrative. This memory agent seems to have the exact same purposes as independent Memorial – to commemorate victims of repressions. However, the narrative of both organizations differs. Memory Fund emphasizes – repressions are part of the far past and not present. Through this key message state actor legitimizes the regime, demonstrating government's involvement in censure of the past and direct participation in commemorative activities that aim to prevent the same violations happening today. However, the censure is done in the indirect way, when actual transitional justice is not taking place: there are no political actions to bring the past crimes to justice and no trials of persons who have committed these crimes. Moreover, the name of the most responsible person in repressions Stalin is not even mentioned. If we go back to Jay Winter's typology introduced in the theoretical chapter of the current study, it becomes clear that this is a perfect example of secular memory regime, when no one in particular is blamed for the certain historical events. In Russian state memory discourse, the responsible person or regime or institution for the Soviet repressions is being silenced. This, in fact, is not surprising in light of recent rehabilitation of Soviet glory and positive image of Stalin that takes place under Vladimir Putin's rule. The president has mastered those narratives to use them in nation-building process after Soviet Union's collapse and now they are part of instruments that are used

to legitimize the incumbent regime. State-controlled Memory Fund seems to become one of those instruments that can promote the 'right' narrative in the indirect way.

Analysis of memory agents active in Russian memory field has proved the existence of asymmetry, when state actor is more powerful and non-state memory agent experiences lack of resources. Mentioned asymmetry in their relations is explained by differences in the translated narratives by the both sides. Thus, Russian memory regime could be characterized as the monopolized one, where clear asymmetry of state and non-state actors could be seen. The institutionalized commemorative practices regarding Stalinist repressions tend to silence particular aspects of collective memory, for instance, the responsible actor for the violations of the past. The process of silencing is done through the narrative that is translated by state-controlled memory agent. I argue, that behind the process of silencing there is a need to legitimize authoritarian government that uses façade institutions in order to do so.

To sum up, within the current chapter, the empirical part of the study was implemented. Framing analysis as the method of choice allowed to identify differences in narratives that are present in the Russian memory discourse over the issue of Stalinist repressions. Distinguished differences contributed to the analysis of Russian memory regime and helped me to conclude on reasons behind the establishment of the monopoly on commemoration. As a result, it turned out that two memory agents were established with different aims: one was initiated from below to seek justice and find pieces of historical truth, when the other was introduced from above to legitimize the current regime and establish a monopoly over commemoration. Authoritarian environment has helped to build an asymmetry in relations of two memory agents in the field.

Summary

Current part of the study aims to sum up what has been done within the framework of the current work. This section reflects on correlation between outlined goals of the study and its outcomes. It highlights briefly all the achieved results and provides a general evaluation of the current study.

The aim of this study was to give a characteristic of current memory regime in Russia concerning the Stalinist repressions by mapping out the differences between memory agents in the field. The research problem addressed by the study came from empirical case: one independent memory agent was replaced by a government controlled one. The research aimed to define Russian memory regime and explain the reasons behind the takeover happened.

In the developed theoretical framework, memory regime was defined as a set of institutionalised practises that are initiated by memory actors to commemorate particular history through a certain narrative (where there are particular victims and responsible for the crimes perpetrators). Thus, in order to provide a full characteristic of the regime there were had to be outlined (1) memory agents, (2) commemorative events and (3) narratives used by actors with a special focus on who is viewed as a victim and a perpetrator. This defined the further structure of the current work as all mentioned aspects were supposed to be covered.

In order to conceptualize the notion of memory agent that would be suitable for Russian case, theoretical background on non-democratic political regimes was introduced. This helped to bring the importance of state and non-state actors, as non-state ones have limited resources in authoritarian settings. Mentioned distinction is crucial, as there is a clear asymmetry between the actors with government support and without it. Moreover, memory agents with different institutional origin might have different aims and behavioral strategies. State controlled memory agents could be used to legitimize the regime and silence particular issues, when non-state agents might try to do the opposite.

From the theoretical background it was concluded, that non-state memory agents could be oppressed by the government in case they are critical towards the regime. While state memory agents, on the contrary, would benefit from governmental support that they

receive in return to loyalty and regime's legitimization practices. In this light, clear asymmetry between state and non-state memory agents was expected, when actors have not only different resources and capabilities, but aims and behaviors. In order to identify those differences, the framing analysis was undertaken to test this theoretical argument on the case of commemorative practices in Russian field. Discourse of two memory agents with different origins that aim to commemorate Stalinist repressions was analysed in order to define the possible differences.

The next part of the study proceeded with the general characteristic of Russian memory politics on the issue of Soviet crimes. Legal background was introduced all together with theoretical developments on the topic that exist in academia. Main actors in the field were characterised and introduced: Memorial and Memory Fund. It was concluded that Russian memory regime has clear asymmetry in power struggle where state actor Memory Fund has an advantage over the non-state agent Memorial.

The following part of the current study had introduced the elements of the frames that were used for the further empirical analysis. The main questions that were answered within the analyses were the following: (1) how do Memorial and Memory Fund frame the selected commemorative events? (2) are there any differences in the way how same events are framed by both organizations? (3) if there are, in which elements of the frames do they occur?

Two important events in Russian memory politics concerning Stalinist repressions were used for the analysis: Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki (August 4-5) and National day of remembrance for victims of political repression (October 29-30). Both events met the selecting criteria that were introduced in the methodology chapter. Memorial and Memory Fund have different commemorative activities on that days, which were analysed within last two years (2016-2018), since Memory Fund was introduced into the field.

Materials for the analysis were selected with another set of criteria and were had to be located on the open sources: websites of the mentioned NGOs where they share their key events and activities, as well as other news portals that did publications concerning selected commemorative events. In total, seventeen articles were selected, and four frames identified for the analysis.

Analysis has demonstrated that non-state memory agent Memorial tries to emphasize the connection of repressions happened in the past under the Soviet rule to the ones that take place nowadays in Russia. In this light, not only Soviet authorities are responsible for the crimes of the past, but Russian government that continues acting in the same line. State actor Memory Fund, on the contrary emphasizes that repressions are part of the far past and not present. Through this key message state actor legitimizes the regime, demonstrating government's involvement in censure of the past and direct participation in commemorative activities that aim to prevent the same violations happening today. However, the censure is done in the indirect way, when actual transitional justice is not taking place and the name of the most responsible person in repressions Stalin is not even mentioned.

Analysis of memory agents active in Russian memory field has proved the existence of asymmetry, when state actor is more powerful and non-state memory agent experiences lack of resources. Mentioned asymmetry in their relations is explained by differences in the translated narratives by the both sides. Thus, Russian memory regime could be characterized as the monopolized one, where clear asymmetry of state and non-state actors could be seen. The institutionalized commemorative practices regarding Stalinist repressions tend to silence particular aspects of collective memory, for instance, the responsible actor for the violations of the past. The process of silencing is done through the narrative that is translated by state-controlled memory agent.

Thus, the study has reached its goal to give a characteristic of the Russian memory regime and explain changes in commemorative practises that happened with introduction of the new agent. Current research is a unique example of analysis of Russian mnemonic field including the newly emerged state actor Memory Fund. Discourses of Memorial and Memory Fund were also firstly compared to each other. As there is a clear lack of those kind of studies in academia this filed seems to be potentially promising to me, so in order to develop my work further, other methods could be applied, for instance, including interviews with the organizations' activists.

List of sources

Andrieu, K. (2011). An Unfinished Business: Transitional Justice and Democratization in Post-Soviet Russia. *The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5*, 198-220.

Applebaum, A. (2003). *GULAG: A History.* Penguin Books.

Assmann, A. (2002). Four Formats of Memory: From Individual to Collective Constructions of the Past . In D. M. C. Emdem, *Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness in the German-speaking World Since 1500* (pp. 19-37).

Bond, L. (2015). *Frames of Memory after 9/11: Culture, Criticism, Politics, and Law.* NY: Springer.

Brooker, P. (2008). Authoritarian Regimes. In D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics* (pp. 133-156). Oxford University Press.

Brugman, B., & Burgers, C. (2018, April-June). Political framing across disciplines: Evidence from 21st-century experiments. *Research and Politics*, 1-7.

Budryte, D. (2010, September). Experiences of Collective Trauma and Political Activism: a Study of Women 'Agents of Memory' in Post-Soviet Lithuania. *Journal of Baltic Studies, 41*(3), 331-350.

Carothers, T. (2002, 1). The End of the Transition Paradigm. *Journal of Democracy, 13*, pp. 5-21.

Clark, C. W. (2016, September). Frames of Memory After 9/11: Culture, Criticism, Politics & Law. *European Journal of American Culture, 35*(3), 229-231.

Cook, M., & van Riemsdijk, M. (2014). Agents of Memoralization: Gunter Demnig's Stolpersteine and the Individual (re-)creation of a Holocaust Landscape in Berlin. *Journal of Historical Geography, 43*, 138-147.

David, C., Atun, J., Fille, E., & Monterola, C. (2011). Finding Frames: Comparing Two Methods of Frame Analysis. *Communication Methods and Measures, 5*(4), 329-351.

Dénes, I. Z. (2013). Focus: Regimes of Memory. Interpreting Regimes of Memory. *European Review, 21*(4), 465-469.

Emmer, P. (2013). Regimes of Memory: the Case of the Netherlands. *European Review, 21*(4), 470-479.

Entman, R. (2008). Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*(13), 87-102.

Entman, R. M. (1993, Autumn). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication, 43*(4), 51-58.

Etkind, A., Finnin, R., Blacker, U., Fedor, J., Lewis, S., Mälksoo, M., & Mroz, M. (2012). *Remembering Katyn.* Polity.

Gel'man, V. (2005, May-June). Political Opposition in Russia: Is It Becoming Extinct? *Russian Politics and Law, 43*(3), 25-50.

Gel'man, V. (2015). *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes.* University of Pittsburgh Press.

Gel'man, V. (2015). The Politics of Fear. *Russian Politics and Law, 53*, 6-26.

Gel'man, V., & Starodubtsev, A. (2016, 1). Opportunities and Constraints of Authoritarian Modernisation: Russian Policy Reforms in the 2000s. *Europe-Asia Studies, 68*, pp. 97-117.

Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience.* Harvard University Press.

Goh, E. (2013). Order and Justice: Contesting the Collective Memory Regime. In E. Goh, *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia* (pp. 160-201). Oxford University Press.

Gordon, C. (2018). Framing and Positioning. In D. Tannen, H. Hamilton, & D. Schiffrin, *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis.* John Wiley & Sons.

Guryanov, A. (2013). Current Status of the "Katyn Case" in Russia. *CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law, 45*, 695-702.

Heisey, W. (2018). Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial: Scenes from the Great Terror in Soviet Ukraine. *Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 55*(2), 607-613.

Howlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (2003). *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems.* Oxford University Press.

Khapaeva, D. (2016). Triumphant memory of the perpetrators: Putin's politics of re-Stalinization. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49*, 61-73.

Khapaeva, D. (2016). Triumphant memory of the perpetrators: Putin's politics of re-Stalinization. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49*, 61-73.

Kingdon, J. W. (2003). *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (2nd Edition ed.). New York: Longman.

Kolesnikov, A. (2017, October). *A Past That Divides: Russia's New Official History.* Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.

Koposov, N. (2018). *Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia.* Cambridge University Press.

Kubik, J., & Bernhard, M. (2014). A Theory of the Politics of Memory. In J. Kubik, & M. Bernhard, *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration* (pp. 8-31). Oxford University Press.

Kubik, J., & Bernhard, M. (2014). Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration. In *A Theory of the Politics of Memory* (pp. 7-34). NY: Oxford University Press.

Kuypers, J. A. (2009). Framing Analysis. In J. A. Kuypers, *Rhetorical Criticism: Perspectives in Action* (pp. 181-203). Lexington Books .

Langenbacher, E. (2003, September). Changing Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany? *German Politics and Society, 21*(67), 46-68.

Langenbacher, E. (2008, Winter). Twenty-first Century Memory Regimes in Germany and Poland: An Analysis of Elite Discourses and Public Opinion. *German Politics and Society, 26*(89), 50-81.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy, 13*(2), 51-65.

Malinova, O. (2017). Political Uses of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Soviet Russia from Yeltsin to Putin. In J. Fedor, M. Kangaspuro, J. Lassila, & T. Zhurzhenko, *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.* Palgrave macmillan.

Malinova, O. (2019). Constructing the "Usable Past": the Evolution of the Official Historical Narrative in Post-Soviet Russia. In N. Bernsand, & B. Törnquist-Plewa, *Cultural and Political Imaginaries in Putin's Russia.* Brill.

Matthes, J., & Kohring, M. (2008). The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Toward Improving Reliability and Validity. *Journal of Communication*(58), 258–279.

McGrattan, C. (2014). Policing politics: framing the past in post-conflict divided societies. *Democratization, 21*(3), 389-410.

Morse, Y. L. (2012, 1). The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism. *World Politics, 64*, pp. 161-198.

Nuzov, I. (2014, Spring). The Role of Political Elite in Transitional Justice in Russia: From False Nurembergs to Failed Desovietization. *U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, 20*(2), 273-322.

Pääbo, H. (2011). *Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space. Comparison of Russian Master Narrative with Estonian, Ukranian and Georgian Master Narratives.* Tartu: Tartu University Press.

Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. (1993). Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse. *Political Communication, 10*, 55-75.

Paperno, I. (2001, Summer). Exhuming the Bodies of Soviet Terror. *Representations, 75*(1), 89-118.

Petrov, N., Lipman, M., & Hale, H. (2014). Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin. *Post-Soviet Affairs, 30*(1), 1-26.

Pettai, E.-C. (2016). Debating Baltic memory regimes. *Journal of Baltic Studies, 47*(2), 165-178.

Pettai, E.-C., & Pettai, V. (2015). *Transitional and Retrospective Justice in the Baltic States.* Cambridge University Press.

Rahi-Tamm, A. (2007). Deportations in Estonia, 1941-1951. In K. Kukk, & T. Raun, *Soviet Deportations in Estonia: Impact and Legacy* (pp. 9-54). Tartu University Press.

Schedler, A. (2013). *The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism.*

Simon, A., & Xenos, M. (2000). Media Framing and Effective Public Deliberation. *Political Communication, 17*(4), 363-376.

Sniegon, T. (2019). Dying in the Soviet Gulag for the Future Glory of Mother Russia? Making "Patriotic" Sense of the Gulag in Present-Day Russia. In N. Bernsand, & B. Törnquist-Plewa, *Cultural and Political Imaginaries in Putin's Russia.* Brill.

Spires, A. J. (2011, July). Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State: Understanding the Survival of China's Grassroots NGOs. *American Journal of Sociology, 117*(1), 1-45.

Strapáčová, M., & Hloušek, V. (2018). Anti-Islamism without Moslems: Cognitive Frames of Czech Antimigrant Politics. *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics, 12*(1), 1-30.

Wertsch, J. V. (2008). The Narrative Organization of Collective Memory. *ETHOS, 36*(1), 120–135.

Wertsch, J., & Roediger III, H. (2008). Collective memory: Conceptual foundations and theoretical approaches . *Memory, 16*(3), 318-326.

Wettstein, M. (2012). Frame Adoption in Referendum Campaigns: The Effect of News Coverage on the Public Salience of Issue Interpretations. *American Behavioral Scientist, 56*(3), 318–333.

Wijermars, M. (2016). Memory Politics Beyond the Political Domain: Historical Legitimation of the Power Vertical in Contemporary Russian Television. *Problems of Post-Communism, 63*, 84–93.

Winter, J. (2016). War and Martyrdom in the Twentieth Century and After. *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, 1*(2), 217-257.

Winter, J. (2017). *War beyond Words.* Cambridge University Press.

Winter, J. (2019). The Memory Boom and the Sacred. In J. Echternkamp, & S. Jaeger, *Views of Violence: Representing the Second World War in German and European Museums and Memorials.* Berghahn Books.

Wolfgram, M. A. (2014). A Model for Comparative Collective Memory Studies: Regime Types, Cultural Traditions, and Difficult Histories. *Croatian Political Science Review, 51*(5), 13-35.

Zahariadis, N. (2007). The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects. In P. Sabatier, *Theories of Policy Process* (2nd Edition ed., pp. 65–92). Westview Press.

Zhou, Y., & Moy, P. (2007). Parsing Framing Processes: The Interplay Between Online Public Opinion and Media Coverage. *Journal of Communication*(57), 79–98.

Appendices

Materials selected and used for the analysis:

a) Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki (August 4-5)

Frame I (Part 1)

Elements of the frame	Text 1	Text 2
Theme/topic	Days of Remembrance in Krasny Bor	Days of Remembrance in Solovki
Causal interpretation	Days of remembrance takes place this year. They are publically available & free of charge	Mourning ceremonies annually take place since 1987
Victim	Repressed & killed people in "Big terror" and their relatives. Include victims from different countries: Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Tatarstan, Chechnya, Ingushetia & etc. + Yuri Dmitriev, who is the Karelian historian who was subjected to unreasonable persecution by Russian authorities	prisoners of the camp & their relatives
Perpetrator	NKVD & Russian authorities	-
Treatment recommendation	support of Yuri Dmitriev who heavily invested in restoring the memories of those who were shot in Sandarmokh & Krasny Bor	continue remembrance & awareness raising compaignes
Connection with nowadays	historians who try to raise awareness are being presecuted	Memorial stopped receiving support from local administration & Museum to organize the event

Frame I (Part 2)

Elements of the frame	Text 3	Text 4
Theme/topic	Stone Elephant: how the Memory of the Camp is erasing in Solovki	"Memorial" on how Russia is trying to forget about GULAG
Causal interpretation	History & signs of the camp in Solovki is being destroyed & silenced. It is done by local authority & Solovki monastery	Local administration in Solovki is trying to prevent commemorative activities
Victim	repressed people, their relatives that seek for justice, activists of Memorial	Memorial & civil society activists
Perpetrator	Soviet authorities, local authorities & representatives of Solovki monastery	Solovki local administration & museum's authorities
Treatment recommendation	continue argue for justice & truthful memories about victims	-
Connection with nowadays	local authorities encourage silencing process & try to prevent commemorative activities	particular parts of the history are being silenced

Frame II

Elements of the frame	Text 5	Text 6
Theme/topic	Meeting of the Interdepartmental working group in Karelia	Days of Remembrance in Sandarmokh
Causal interpretation	Concept of State Policy of Perpetuating the Memory of Victims of Political Repression is start being implemented	Memory Fund takes part in the annual Days of remembrance of the victims of Soviet terror
Victim	politically repressed people in Krasny Bor	residents of Karelia & prisoners of the White Sea-Baltic camp & Solovki camp
Perpetrator	-	-
Treatment recommendation	implementation of the Concept	to be involved in commemoration activities
Connection with present	-	-

Comparison of the Frames I & II.

Elements of the frame	Frame I	Frame II
Theme/topic	Days of Remembrance	Days of Remembrance
Causal interpretation	Days of remembrance takes place this year, however it is getting harder to organize them	Memory Fund is active in implementing Medvedev's Concept
Victim	represed people, their relatives that seek for justice, activists of Memorial	repressed people
Perpetrator	Soviet & Russian authorities	-
Treatment recommendation	continue remembrance & awareness raising compaignes, arguments for justice	implementation of the Concept
Connection with present	historians who try to raise awareness are being presecuted, Russian authorities encourage silencing process & try to prevent commemorative activities	-

Frame III (Part 1)		
Elements of the frame	Text 7	Text 8
Theme/topic	"Wall of sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims	Soviet dissidents are against the installation of the memorial "Wall of sorrow"
Causal interpretation	In modern Russia people are continued being repressed by Stalin's methods, thus the new monument is hypocrisy	Soviet dissidents do not support Kremlin's commemorative actions & establishment of the monument
Victim	politically repressed people in modern Russia	politically repressed people in Putin's regime
Perpetrator	Russian government	Putin's government
Treatment recommendation	Stalinist repressions should be studied, names of victims should be published	do not support government's commemorative actions
Connection with present	Soviet repressions in the past are part of the present	human rights & freedoms are continued being violated

Frame III (Part 2)

Elements of the frame	Text 9	Text 10
Theme/topic	Monument to Stalin's victims: why "Memorial" is in doubt?	Moscow authorities had withdrawn the approval of the "Return of the names"
Causal interpretation	Activists are not sure whether the monument to repressed victims established by Putin's regime should be supported, as repressions in a way are being continued	Moscow authorities try to stop the annual tradition of commemorative activities organized by Memorial
Victim	Russian liberals who believed in good motives behind the Kremlin's actions	Memorial & participants of the action
Perpetrator	Russian authorities	Moscow authorities
Treatment recommendation	do not support the initiative	-
Connection with present	Putin's government does not have a moral right to establish the monument as violations of human rights are still ongoing	Commemorative activities on repressed victims are being prevented by current government

Elements of the Frame IV.

Frame IV (Part 1)		
Elements of the frame	Text 11	Text 12
Theme/topic	Press-conference in TASS	The action "Bell of memory" on the National day of remembrance for victims of political repression took place in Moscow
Causal interpretation	Russian citizens support Memory Fund's initiative & recognise the importance of commemoration	Memory Fund's commemorative activities are supported by different people all over Russia
Victim	Soviet politically repressed people	Soviet citizens who were killed during Stalin's Terror
Perpetrator	-	Stalin & Soviet authorities
Treatment recommendation	continue investing in commemorative activities	remember about the victims
Connection with present	commemoration is for the better present & future of Russia	-

Frame IV (Part 2)

Elements of the frame	Text 13	Text 14
Theme/topic	The collection of stones from memorable places is finished	The installation of the monument "Wall of sorrow" has started in Moscow
Causal interpretation	Monument is collected from stones from different regions of Russia	the monument has been being separated in parts in order to be installed
Victim	repressed people	-
Perpetrator	-	-
Treatment recommendation	-	-
Connection with present	-	-

Frame IV (Part 3)

Elements of the frame	Text 15	Text 16	Text 17
Theme/topic	The exhibition "Wall of sorrow" was opened in Magadan	Opening of Wall of Sorrow memorial to victims of political repression	Muscovite has donated coins from 50's and 90's
Causal interpretation	the new exhibition in Magadan is important as the first monument to victims of repressions was opened here	commemoration of repressed victims is very important for the future generations	the instalation of the monument is widely supported by people
Victim	innocent people that were repressed	whole country	repressed people
Perpetrator	-	-	-
Treatment recommendation	funding of the new monument	remember and be aware of what happened in the past, but not "settling scores"	-
Connection with present	by helping to fund the monument, everyone can share the memory of innocent people that were affected by repressions	remembering the tragedy of repression will help to build a new society on values of trust & stability	there is a popular request that comes from below to commemorate the victims

Comparison of the Frames III & IV.

Elements of the frame	Frame III	Frame IV
Theme/topic	new monument is not supported by everyone	Opening of Wall of Sorrow memorial to victims of political repression
Causal interpretation	In modern Russia people are continued being repressed, thus the new monument is hypocrisy	Russian citizens support the monument & recognise the importance of commemoration
Victim	politically repressed people in modern Russia & Memorial	Soviet politically repressed people
Perpetrator	Russian authorities	-
Treatment recommendation	do not support government's commemorative actions	commemorate the victims
Connection with present	human rights & freedoms are continued being violated	commemoration is for the better present & future of Russia