

Towards Consciousness Representation: Thought Representation Paradigm Revisited

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0. Introduction

The study of consciousness representation is concerned with two critical issues. On the one hand, it confronts the problematic concept of consciousness. On the other hand, it needs to look into the ways consciousness is linguistically represented. The classical approach to consciousness representation has placed much weight on the latter aspect, that is, the linguistic forms and narrative techniques for representing consciousness in fictional texts. Ever since Charles Bally first identified the mixture of direct and indirect discourse as a distinctive linguistic form and named it “le style indirect libre”, free indirect style¹ has won its place as the most influential technique for representing fictional consciousness. This unequal focus on the forms and techniques for representing consciousness, especially on free indirect discourse, raised serious questions for some postclassical narratologists. Alan Palmer (2002, 2004, 2010), for example, suggests discarding what he calls the “*speech* category approach”, or I would rather say *thought* category approach, to fictional consciousness and applying cognitive theories for a better understanding of the way fictional consciousness is constructed as in real life. While departure from the category approach to consciousness representation means that postclassical narratological scholarship would put aside linguistically important significations which stylistic forms imply, remaining within the category approach does not seem to involve integrating it with the crucial and beneficial cognitive initiatives.²

This paper aims to explore classical views on consciousness representation which have been discussed in terms of thought representation categories, and postclassical views on consciousness representation which are based on the cognitive paradigm, and to propose some ways to integrate the linguistic constructs of fictional consciousness with the cognitive science-based paradigm. Section 1 explores still-influential scholarship on consciousness representation in terms of the category approach. Section 2 reviews postclassical criticisms of the category approach and some responses to the postclassical view. Section 3 turns to the concept *consciousness* with particular focus on the levels of consciousness discussed in the disciplines of, for example, cognitive science and psychology. The concluding section proposes ways to expand the study of consciousness representation on the basis of classical and postclassical approaches.

¹ Free indirect style or free indirect mode is used as an umbrella term to cover a variety of representation modes in speech, thought, perception, etc. which reflect the mingling of the points of view of the narrator and a character.

² The importance of the cognitive turn is also discussed in Rundquist (2014). I will discuss the relationship between the classical and postclassical approaches more in detail in Section 3.

1. The “Thought” Representation Paradigm

1.1. Thought Representation Categories

Thought representation has been the central narrative framework for the analysis of fictional consciousness. One of the most influential studies of thought representation is Dorrit Cohn’s insightful book, *Transparent Minds* (1978). She distinguished three modes of thought representation: psycho-narration (“the narrator’s discourse about a character’s consciousness”), quoted monologue (“a character’s mental discourse”), and narrated monologue (“a character’s mental discourse in the guise of the narrator’s discourse”) (1978: 14). Her terminology is based on the distinction between the narrator’s language (narration) and the character’s language (monologue). The mixture of these two, therefore, becomes “narrated” “monologue”. Her equal devotion to the three modes as well as to both third- and first-person narratives has been very beneficial to the later study of thought representation. Cohn’s tripartite categories are still used in the field of narratology.³

Thought representation has often been discussed together with speech representation under the heading of “speech and thought representation” or “discourse representation” due to their formal similarities. In stylistics, the clinal model of speech and thought representation originally suggested by Geoffrey Leech and Mick Short (1981) has been regarded as “the first stylistic treatment to bring a fully analytical approach to the topic, introducing a model that has proved influential over the three decades” (Bray, 2014: 222). In their model, the speech and thought representation categories are arranged in a linear continuum according to the degree of the narrator’s control over report as in Figure 1:

[N]	NRSA	IS	FIS	DS	FDS
[N]	NRTA	IT	FIT	DT	FDT

Figure 1. Leech and Short’s original continuum of speech and thought representation⁴

³ See, for example, the introductory books on narratology by Fludernik (2009), Keen (2015), etc.

⁴ N: Narration, NRSA: Narrator’s Report of Speech Acts, IS: Indirect Speech, FIS: Free Indirect Speech, DS: Direct Speech, FDS: Free Direct Speech, NRTA: Narrator’s Report of Thought Acts, IT: Indirect Thought, FIT: Free Indirect Thought, DT: Direct Thought, FDT: Free Direct Thought.

NRSA and NRTA stand for “Narrative Report of Speech/Thought Acts” in Leech and Short (1981), or “Narrator’s Representation of Speech/Thought Acts” in Short (1996) and Semino and Short (2004). However, I will use the label “Narrator’s Report of Speech/Thought Acts”, because “Narrator’s” clarifies the representing subject, and “report” suggests the way in which the narrator represents what he/she has to inform the narratee about. *Reporting* does not necessarily have a connotation of “anterior discourse” as Semino and Short (2004: 3) explains: by the act of *reporting*, the representing subject can convey an account of either something that actually happened (not only discourse but also actions, events, happenings, facts, etc.) or something that did not happen (for example, something imaginary) *in his/her own words*, or in other words, from his/her point of view. Reporting is thus a part of narrating acts (see *OED*, s.v. *report*, v. 1. a., in which *report* is defined as “to relate, narrate, tell, give an account of (a fact, event, etc.)”). The term *representation* is used instead to cover all sorts of speech and thought categories in this paper. I also replaced

The narrator’s control is the greatest for the categories at the left side of the scale, and diminishes towards the right side of the scale and becomes more character-centred. In other words, the distance between the narrator and the character is gradually shortened for the categories towards the right end. The Leech and Short model was expanded in Semino and Short (2004), in which more narrator-centred categories than narrator’s report of speech acts (NRSA) and narrator’s report of thought acts (NRTA) were suggested:

[N]	NV	NRSA	IS	FIS	(F)DS
[N]	NI	NRTA	IT	FIT	(F)DT

Figure 2. Leech and Short’s continuum of speech and thought representation revised by Semino and Short (2004)⁵

Cohn’s psycho-narration roughly corresponds to indirect thought (IT), NRTA, and Internal narration (NI), narrated monologue to free indirect thought (FIT), and quoted monologue to (free) direct thought ((F)DT).

Before I turn to the problematic relationship between speech and thought, it will be helpful to look at a passage containing the above-mentioned varying categories in Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*. My examples given in this paper will mainly be taken from Defoe’s first-person narratives for two reasons. 1) Literary critics have usually analysed passages of what are called third-person narratives. As a consequence, attention to first-person narratives has been considerably limited.⁶ Although the narrator and one of the characters share the same pronoun “I” in first-person narratives, this “I” has different functions as two selves: the narrating self who tells a story and the experiencing self who experiences things in the story world. The narrating self’s relationship to the experiencing self corresponds to the narrator’s relationship to the character in third-person narratives (Cohn, 1978: 143). The fluctuating distance between the narrator and the character represented through the varying categories can be applied to the relationship between the narrating self and the experiencing self in first-person narratives. 2) Literary critics have also concentrated on what are called consciousness

Leech and Short’s NRA (narrator’s report of action) with N because it is the more commonly-used term in stylistics and narratology. N is put in square brackets because although it is an important part of representation, it is not a speech and thought representation category in a strict sense.

⁵ NV: Narrator’s Report of Voice, NI: Narration of Internal states, (F)DS: (Free) Direct Speech, (F)DT: (Free) Direct Thought.

The same discussion applies to the label “Narrator’s Report of Voice” as explained in Note 4 (Semino and Short’s original label for NV is “Narrator’s Representation of Voice”). FDS and FDT are better regarded as subcategories of DS and DT respectively because the distinction between the direct and the free direct does not seem to involve significant differences in effects as the distinction between the indirect and the free indirect does (see Semino and Short, 2004: 49; Short, 1989: 70-71; Short 2007: 228-233). DS and FDS, therefore, are abbreviated as (F)DS, DT and FDT as (F)DT in Figure 2.

⁶ But see, for example, Adamson (1995), Chafe (1994), Cohn (1978), etc.

novels after Jane Austen and consequently the novels before Austen, especially those in the early eighteenth-century, have not yet been analysed extensively.⁷

Defoe's first-person narratives contain varying narrative techniques for representing consciousness. One of the leading literary critics of Defoe, Maximillian Novak, remarks that "Defoe was surely interested in rendering the social and political milieu in which his characters moved, but he was always more interested in what went on in his characters' minds" (2000: 248). Defoe not only creates the illusion of reality on the basis of the social, political and economic realities of the time, but also intentionally uses revolutionary narrative techniques for representing individual psychology to capture realistic images both objectively and subjectively.⁸ In the following passage, the younger Crusoe (the experiencing self) begins to have positive thoughts about his solitary condition on the isolated island after two years have passed since his arrival there:

- (1) (a) But now I began to exercise my self with new Thoughts; (b) I daily read the Word of God, and apply'd all the Comforts of it to my present State: (c) One Morning being very sad, I open'd the Bible upon these Words, *I will never, never leave thee, nor forsake thee*; (d) immediately it occur'd, That these Words were to me, (e) Why else should they be directed in such a Manner, just at the Moment when I was mourning over my Condition, as one forsaken of God and Man? (f) Well then, said I, if God does not forsake me, of what ill Consequence can it be, or what matters it, though the World should all forsake me, seeing on the other Hand, if I had all the World, and should lose the Favour and Blessing of God, there wou'd be no Comparison in the Loss. (*Robinson Crusoe*: 97)

All Crusoe does for two years after his arrival is to lament his misfortune in having no means to escape from the island. This passage represents the younger Crusoe's mind, and perfectly captures the cognitive process in which he changes the way he thinks. It is represented through various thought representation categories. First of all, (a) is NRTA, in which the cognitive act of the past self is represented ("exercise my self with new Thoughts"). Secondly, (b) and the latter part of (c) are narration (N).⁹ The actions of the experiencing self are narrated in them ("I daily read ...," "I open'd ...," etc.). The earlier part of (c) contains NI which represents the state of mind of the younger Crusoe ("being very sad"). Thirdly, (d) consists of a reporting clause ("it occur'd") and a subordinated reported clause ("That these Words were to me"), and thus it is categorized as IT, in which the younger Crusoe's cognition is represented. Subsequently, the co-occurrence of the interrogative mood with the narrative past tense suggests that (e) is FIT. The interrogative mood implies that it is reflective and most likely to be articulated thought. Finally, highly articulated thought is represented in the last

⁷ But see, for example, Bray (2003), McDowell (1973), Neumann (1992), etc.

⁸ See Kawasaki (2007: 73-76), Konigsberg (1985: 1-16) and Novak (2000: 248-250).

⁹ Note that (c) contains writing representation ("I open'd the Bible upon these Words, *I will never, never leave thee, nor forsake thee*;"), which will be briefly discussed in 1.2.

sentence (f) through direct thought (DT). It has a reporting clause (“said I”, here used to mean “I said inwardly”) and a juxtaposed reported clause in the present tense (“does not forsake,” “can ... be,” etc.). It is easily recognized that the passage shows the movement from the left end to the right end of Leech and Short’s model. As such, change in thought representation categories displays the younger Crusoe’s cognitive process, and therefore the climax of his cognitive process is effectively represented in the passage.

1.2. Problematic Parallelism between Speech Representation and Thought Representation

While most critics agree that speech and thought are formally very similar, they have also identified differences between them in terms of their effects. Leech and Short (1981) systematically distinguished the contextually independent but formally parallel scales of speech and thought representation for the first time, which has been helpful to analysts in investigating their different effects (Bray, 2014: 222-223; Fludernik, 2011: 40; Semino and Short, 2004: 9-16). Even before their systematic distinction between speech and thought, Cohn had pointed out the arguable parallelism between “spoken discourse” and “silent thought” (1978: 11):

Speech is, by definition, always verbal. Whether thought is always verbal is to this day a matter of definition and dispute among psychologists. Most people, including most novelists, certainly conceive of consciousness as including “other mind stuff” (as William James called it), in addition to language. This “stuff” cannot be quoted – directly or indirectly; it can only be narrated. One of the drawbacks of this linguistic approach is therefore that it tends to leave out of account the entire nonverbal realm of consciousness, as well as the entire problematic relationship between thought and speech. (Cohn, 1978: 11)

Despite this critical insight into the speech-thought relationship, this issue has not been explored in depth in the disciplines of classical narratology and stylistics.¹⁰ Semino and Short expanded the realm of the study by adding writing representation to their revised framework of the Leech and Short model, because, while writing representation “is not usually very central (except for the epistolary novel)” in fictional texts, it “occurs quite regularly in news reports and (auto)biography” (Semino and Short, 2004: 47-48). It seems that they have expanded the framework in that direction either due to their interest in the formal similarities between the representation of speech and writing or due to their engagement in *discourse* representation. In terms of *consciousness* representation, paralleling writing representation with speech representation, and even with thought representation does not seem to lead

¹⁰ Cohn (1978) hinted at the problem, but did not delve into the realms of what she calls “the entire nonverbal realm of consciousness” (1978: 11). McHale points out that Cohn deliberately neglected the representation of perception: “Cohn is at pains to mark off the boundary between the representation of consciousness as such [and] the more general phenomena of point of view or perspective or *vision*” (1981: 187, McHale’s *Italics*).

us to a better understanding of fictional consciousness. I will discuss the concept of consciousness, expanding the discussion about the problematic relationship between speech and thought in Section 3. It is sufficient to point out here that the term *thought* is unquestionably regarded as synonymous with the term *consciousness*, and consciousness is used in contrast to speech or utterance.

1.3. Free Indirect Thought

Free indirect style has been of great scholarly interest to linguists, stylisticians and narratologists because of its curious mixture of indirect discourse and direct discourse. It maintains linguistic features of the narrator's subjectivity in terms of tense and person, yet it also exhibits a character's subjectivity through elements such as proximal deictics, expressive constructs and lexis, and so on. It was first identified as an independent stylistic device by a French school, and named "le style indirect libre" (literally "free indirect style") by Charles Bally (1912) as mentioned above. The equivalent term in German is "erlebte Rede" (literary "experienced speech") which was suggested by Etienne Lorck (1921).¹¹ In English, critics have suggested a variety of names: substitutionary speech (Fehr, 1938), narrated monologue (Cohn, 1978), represented speech and thought (Banfield, 1982; Brinton, 1980; Ehrlich, 1990), verbatim indirect speech and thought (Chafe, 1994), and empathetic narrative (Adamson, 1995). But free indirect speech and thought (or discourse) is the term in English used by most critics.¹² Being aware of these varieties of terminology, I also use the term free indirect speech and thought, not only because it is the most commonly used term, but also because it captures its peculiar features in terms of both linguistic constructs and semantic significations. According to Pascal, "free" in Bally's terminology ("libre") originally "indicate[s] freedom from conjunctions and from introductory verb" (1977: 31). But it also has the implication of "other and astonishing liberties" "in the relation of the statement to the fictional character and narrator, in the tense-system, in the language, in the word-order" (Pascal, 1977: 31). "Indirect" may lead to a misunderstanding that the free indirect mode is a variant of the indirect mode, but an advantage of using "indirect" is that, in Pascal's words, "it indicates that both a narrator and a character are involved" (1977: 32). Although "indirect" does not convey "the mingling, even fusion" of two different points of view (the narrator's and a character's) (Pascal, 1977: 32), this peculiar aspect of duality can be captured when it is combined with the other term "free".

FIT is a stylistic device of particular importance in relation to the representation of consciousness.

¹¹ See Pascal (1977: 2-32) for the full history of the style in the French, German and English disciplines.

¹² See, for example, Bray (2003; 2014), Fludernik (1993), Leech and Short (2007 [1981]), McHale (1978), Page (1988 [1973]), Pascal (1977), Semino and Short (2004), Sotirova (2013), Toolan (2001 [1988]), Vandelanotte (2009), etc. Free indirect style has also attracted great attention in functional grammar (see Thompson (1996), etc.), cognitive linguistics (see Sanders and Redeker (1996), Vandelanotte (2009), etc.) and semantics (see Maier (2015), Eckardt (2015), etc.).

Joe Bray points out the importance of FIT in terms of the development of the novel, claiming that “the access it allows to consciousness results, in Louise Flavin’s words, ‘in a greater psychological depth of character’ (1987: 137)” (2003: 21). According to Cohn, “[b]y leaving the relationship between words and thoughts latent, the narrated monologue [FIT] casts a peculiarly penumbral light on the figural consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation” (1978: 103), and, in sum, it is “a more complex and a more flexible technique for rendering consciousness than the rival techniques [psycho-narration and quoted monologue]” (Cohn, 1978: 107).

It is widely known that Jane Austen was the first to use FIT extensively in novels written in English, although representing characters’ consciousness has actually been one of the central concerns for writers since the Middle English period¹³ and its techniques including FIT have gradually developed over the centuries.¹⁴ The following is a prototypical example of FIT from Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park*:

(2) To be acting! After all his objections — objections so just and so public! After all that she had heard him say, and seen him look, and known him to be feeling. Could it be possible? Edmund so inconsistent. Was he not deceiving himself? Was he not wrong? (*Mansfield Park*: 123)

This passage has many typical markers of FIT. It expresses Fanny’s subjective consciousness with syntactic properties of DT, such as the exclamatory mood (“To be acting!”, “After all his objections – objections so just and so public!”), the interrogative mood (“Could it be possible?”, “Was he not deceiving himself?”, “Was he not wrong?”), and incomplete sentences (“Edmund so inconsistent”). The expressive elements, such as the progressive (“be feeling”; “was ... deceiving”) and epistemic adverbs (“so just”; “so public”; “so inconsistent”) also help to promote Fanny’s subjectivity. On the other hand, Fanny’s subjective language is combined with that of the narrator: the third-person pronoun ‘she’ to designate Fanny and the past and pluperfect tenses corresponding to the surrounding narration (“had heard”; “could”; “was”) are used as in IT.

It is true that Defoe’s use of FIT is not as extensive as Austen’s, but his FIT has the same stylistic power to represent the experiencing self’s subjective consciousness:

¹³ See Fludernik’s detailed investigation into Middle English texts (1996a; 1996b: 129-177, 2011). Her diachronic approach to consciousness representation is very beneficial.

¹⁴ See Bray (2003: 22) and Bakhtin (1984: 36). Bakhtin observes that “[n]ew forms of artistic visualization prepare themselves slowly, over centuries; a given epoch can do no more than create optimal conditions for the final ripening and realization of a new form” (1984: 36).

- (3) (a) Sometimes I fancy'd it must be the Devil; and Reason joyn'd in with me in this Supposition: (b) For how should any other Thing in human Shape come into the Place? (c) Where was the Vessel that brought them? (d) What Marks were there of any other Footsteps? (e) And how was it possible a Man should come there? (f) But then, to think that *Satan* should take human shape upon him in such a Place where there could be no manner of Occasion for it, but to leave the Print of his Foot behind him, and that even for no Purpose too, for he could not be sure I should see it; (*Robinson Crusoe*: 131)¹⁵

The context is that the younger Crusoe was perplexed by the human footprint he found on the shore of the isolated island, and the passage shows the inner struggling of the younger Crusoe. The first half of (a) is a representation of thought through IT, in which the point of view of the younger Crusoe seems to be mingled. This is indicated by the use of “must”. The modal auxiliary *must* is one of the “speaker/hearer-oriented modals” and invokes the presence of the represented subject in his/her temporal domain (Davidse and Vandelanotte, 2011: 243). The use of “must” shows, therefore, the subjective mood of the represented subject, here the younger Crusoe. This subtle blend of point of view between the older and the younger Crusoe is a sign that the narrating self is gradually empathizing with the experiencing self. The latter half of (a) is a representation of mental action, and the reason for this mental action is represented through the interrogative sentences from (b) to (e). These sentences are easily recognized as FIT by the combination of interrogative mood with the past tense. These examples show that the linguistic features of Defoe’s FIT are very similar to those of Austen’s above. In these FIT sentences, the younger Crusoe is trying to overcome his fright by asking questions which rationalize his supposition that the footprint is the Devil’s. Because this rationalizing process is represented through a FIT question form, the sentences (b) to (e) are reflective and probably articulated consciousness, but the last sentence (f) seems to be on what Cohn calls “the threshold of verbalization” (1978: 103). The younger Crusoe de-rationalizes his former supposition, expressing himself by the interjectional expression “to think that ...”, in which the subjective consciousness of the younger Crusoe is linguistically represented (for example, the frequent use of the modal auxiliaries “should” and “could”). The passage shows the potential of FIT to represent varying ways in which the character thinks according to the content and context of a represented scene.

2. Criticism of the Category Approach

Alan Palmer calls the framework of speech and thought representation in classical narratology the “*speech* category approach”, because “the narratological analysis of characters’ thought process is based on the assumption that the categories that are applied to fictional speech can be

¹⁵ For convenience of explanation, I have alphabetically numbered the sentences or clauses in this paper where necessary.

unproblematically applied to fictional thought” (Palmer, 2004: 13, 53). He criticizes the “speech category approach” because “it is concerned primarily with the part of mind known as *inner speech*, the highly verbalized flow of self-conscious thought” (Palmer, 2004: 53, Palmer’s Italics).¹⁶ According to Palmer, there are at least five problems with this approach: 1) “[t]he privileging of the apparently mimetic and rather glamorous categories of free indirect thought and direct thought over the diegetic and seemingly uninteresting category of thought report [Cohn’s psycho-narration, Leech and Short’s IT, NRTA and NI]”; 2) “[t]he overestimation of the verbal component in thought”; 3) “[t]he resulting neglect of the thought report of characters’ states of mind”; 4) [t]he privileging of some novels over others, and some scenes in novels over others”; and 5) [t]he tendency to give the impression that characters’ minds really only consist of a private passive flow of consciousness” (Palmer, 2004: 57-59). Palmer, like other postclassical narratologists such as David Herman (2011a), explains that “narrative theory should be regarded as a branch of cognitive science” (2004: 45). He believes that “the parallel discourses of cognitive science, psycholinguistics, and philosophy have a lot in common with the mind pictures of both readers and narrators” in narratology (2004: 75). Ultimately, his theory of fictional minds is a theory about “characters’ minds, not just in terms of passive, private inner speech in the modes of direct or free indirect thought, but in terms of the narrator’s positive linking role in presenting characters’ socially engaged mental functioning, particularly in the mode of thought report” (Palmer, 2004: 16). He lists nine key semantics of thought report (I give an example from Defoe’s narratives for each attribute):

- 1) Presentation of variety of mental events: “What to do I knew not, nor to whom to have recourse; to keep in the House where I was, I could not, the Rent being too great; and to leave it without his Order, if my Husband should return, I could not think of that neither; so that I continued extremely perplex’d, melancholy, and discourage’d, to the last Degree.” (*Roxana*: 13)
- 2) Presentation of latent states of mind: “... and as I knew that the first Storm that blew must necessarily break her all in Pieces, ...” (*Robinson Crusoe*: 47)
- 3) Presentation of mental action: “This baulk’d me a little, and I resolv’d to push at something or other, for I was not us’d to come back so often without Purchase;” (*Moll Flanders*: 214)

¹⁶ Palmer uses the term “mind” in preference to “consciousness”, because the latter term has the implication of “inner speech” and “self-consciousness” (2004: 19). He argues that the term “mind” can refer to broader areas than the term “consciousness”, such as “non-consciousness and latent states of mind” (2004: 19). It is generally said in cognitive science that “mind” can refer to more, but on the other hand, “consciousness” can mean much more than Palmer assumes. I use the term “consciousness” in this paper, because it better suits the purpose of the present discussion. I will discuss the concept of consciousness in Section 3.

- 4) Presentation of character and personality: “I was ... sharp as a Hawk in Matters of common Knowledge; quick and smart in Discourse; apt to be Satyrical; full of Repartee, and a little too forward in Conversation; or, as we call it in English, BOLD, tho’ perfectly Modest in my behaviour.” (*Roxana*: 6)
- 5) Summary: “However, I preserv’d the Youth of my Temper; was always bright, pleasant in Company, and agreeable to every-body, or else every-body flatter’d me;” (*Roxana*: 182)
- 6) Presentation of background information: “I had alas! no divine Knowledge;” (*Robinson Crusoe*: 76)
- 7) Presentation of intermental thinking: “While we were thus preparing our Designs, ...” (*Robinson Crusoe*: 218)
- 8) Expression of consensus: “... it began to be publick, that *Roxana* was, in short, a meer *Roxana*, neither better nor worse; and not that Woman of Honour and Virtue that was at first supos’d.” (*Roxana*: 182)
- 9) Interpretation, analysis, and judgment: “... yet the young Cats were the same Kind of House breed like the old one; and both my Cats being Females, I thought it very strange:” (*Robinson Crusoe*: 88)

Palmer then discusses how the mind functions in fictional texts as in real life, using cognitive science-based methodology in preference to the category approach. His focus is not on the *representation* of consciousness but on the “fictional mental *functioning*” (2004: 97, my Italics). Indeed, he makes the basis of his analysis of fictional consciousness perfectly clear in the sequel to *Fictional Minds* (2004):

I argue that this issue [social minds in the novel] looms large as a technique and as a subject matter in all of the novels that I discuss, *but techniques and subject matters are parts of novels, not purposes of them. They are means rather than ends. What matters, ultimately, is the purpose to which a particular sort of consciousness representation is put.* So my concern in the chapters that follow is with the purposes of presentations of social minds. (Palmer, 2010: 63, my Italics)

Palmer’s work, though very influential in narratology and stylistics, received due counter-criticisms from some literary critics and stylisticians. Joe Bray (2014) and Eric Rundquist (2014), for example, question Palmer’s de-prioritization of the category approach. Particularly, Bray counter-attacks Palmer’s severe treatment of FIT, claiming that “it [FIT] is capable of representing more than simply the private, passive, solitary individual consciousness with which he associates it” (2014: 226). This is not a recent claim in stylistics and narratology. The extensive usage of FIT has in

fact been pointed out by many stylisticians and narratologists. Remember Cohn's observation about the style's potential ability to represent "the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation" (1978: 103), for example. Contrary to Palmer's de-prioritization of the category approach, a great importance is attached to the linguistic constructs of each category, because they are "semantically relevant for how texts are read and interpreted and how fictional consciousnesses and narrative worlds are constructed" (Rundquist, 2014: 161). Another counterattack on Palmer's work is Brian McHale's article "Transparent Minds Revisited" (2012), in which he claims that the effects of "Palmer's "whole mind" argument ... is to turn nearly everything into a manifestation of fictional mind," and consequently "the enlargement of fictional mind threatens to overwhelm the capacity to make the kind of fine-grained discriminations among levels and dosages of consciousness" (2012: 119).

As Rundquist argues, although "[t]he paradigm shift to cognitive science methodology" by postclassical narratologists is an important step to the thorough investigation of fictional consciousness, "textual foundations of literary discourse" should not be disregarded (2014: 161). The future studies of fictional consciousness should find ways to "integrate [linguistic constructs employed in consciousness representation] with the cognitive paradigm" (Rundquist, 2014: 161). In the following³, I suggest that the first step to do this is to break the parallelism between speech and thought by delving into the levels of consciousness.

3. From "Thought" Representation to "Consciousness" Representation

As shown by my quotation in the previous section, Palmer emphasizes the importance of ends at the expense of the means.¹⁷ Means and ends work together, however. Means, or the linguistic forms and the narrative techniques, are important and always relevant to the signification they represent, and the investigation into means consequently contributes to the understanding of ends, the purposes of the represented matters. In Wallace Chafe's words, "[i]f the linguistic evidence were missing, the enterprise would be nothing more than a commentary on my own mental processes, which might or might not be of interest to anyone else" (1994: 27). On the one hand, it is undoubtedly true that the cognitive approach to fictional consciousness is an important and influential turn in narratology. The investigation into consciousness itself seems to be lacking in the classical narratological or stylistic

¹⁷ But note that some cognitive scientists, for example Gilles Fauconnier (1997), do not disregard the importance of linguistic constructs as Palmer does. Fauconnier stresses the importance of linguistic evidence: "we must apply our scientific imagination and rational deduction to language signals in the same way that astrophysicists exploit the information they glean from infrared radiation or gamma rays" (1997: 3). Indeed, his theories (mental spaces, conceptual blending, etc.) are based on cognitive methodology, but he shows linguistic evidence as much as other situational evidence such as "highly structured background knowledge, various kinds of reasoning, on-line meaning construction, and negotiation of meaning" (1994: 8) in proving his theories.

approach, and “the purposes to which a particular sort of consciousness representation is put” (Palmer, 2010: 63) therefore seem to have been less discussed in the consciousness representation framework. On the other hand, Palmer’s assertion that “[w]hat is required is not to try to modify the speech category account, but to step outside its limitations altogether” (2004: 75) does not seem to be going in the right direction.¹⁸ This section delves into the left-out “problematic relationship between thought and speech” (Cohn, 1978: 11) in the linguistic approach in terms of the levels of consciousness, referring to some important science-based paradigms, as a first step towards integrating them with insights into linguistic representations of consciousness. Note that I make a clear distinction between the terms consciousness and thought. I do not use the term thought synonymously with consciousness, simply because consciousness is more than thought and this very synonymous use of the two terms seem to be one of the factors which hinder further explorations into fictional consciousness in the previous studies of consciousness representation. Consciousness representation, therefore, should not be regarded as the same as thought representation. I will give further explanations of this topic after discussing the problematic relationship between speech and thought.

3.1. Perception, Conception, and Language

The fact that thought and speech are similar in their linguistic constructs implies that linguistic realization of thought assumes inner speech. Put differently, because thought has a potentiality for verbalization, its representation in language can take similar forms to representation of speech. However, it is scientifically proved that “thought is possible without inner speech” (Palmer, 2004: 93). A well-known case is aphasia. Patients with aphasia cannot comprehend language, but they have “a wordless thought process” (Damasio, 1999: 109). According to Chafe, “[r]epresentations of speech always go back to distal language, but representations of thought are less committed in that respect”, and that thought could be both verbal and nonverbal (1994: 219). The narrotologist Monika Fludernik also observes that “not all consciousness is necessarily verbal; a parallelism between forms of speech representation and the representation of consciousness is therefore misleading” (2011: 40).¹⁹

¹⁸ Surprisingly, while Palmer disregards means of consciousness representation in *Social Minds in the Novel* (2010: 63) as quoted above, he focuses on means, emphasizing their interdependent relationship with ends in the article published the following year (2011: 274). In spite of his focus on means in the article, linguistic evidence for explaining the ways in which consciousness is represented is lacking. See also the commentary by Sotirova (2013: 31) on the fact that another postclassical narratologist, David Herman (2011b), does not give sufficient linguistic evidence in his analysis of consciousness representation either, even though he emphasizes the interdependency between *how* (means) and *what* (ends) (2011a).

¹⁹ Fludernik seems to use the term consciousness inconsistently. Despite the fact that she defines consciousness in a broader way (see 3.2), her use of the term in her discussion about discourse representation often indicates “thought” (see Fludernik, 1993; Fludernik, 1996b).

Fludernik’s use of the term consciousness in my quotation seems to be synonymous with “thought” in my terminology: the frameworks which have been paralleled are speech representation and thought representation and not speech representation and consciousness representation. As discussed later, the

According to the anatomist Takeshi Yoro, there are a perceptual world, a conceptual world, and an overlapping area in which language functions (2005: 120-123). Language takes only a small part of the world as Figure 3 shows: things that are represented through language (speech) are small compared to those represented through conception (thought) or perception.




Figure 3. Conceptual world and perceptual world and language²⁰

From a different point of view, what language does is to “[make] it possible to transcend immediate perceptions, actions, and evaluations and [allow] a person to experience secondhand what others experienced firsthand” (Chafe, 1994: 237). Speech, therefore, could of course be a representation of experienced events, but could also be an articulation of experienced thought, perception or other sorts of consciousness which are nonverbal (see the arrows in Figure 3). Speech is primarily a matter of discourse, but thought is a matter of consciousness. In this sense, speech and thought work on a different plane. Speech sometimes functions as a mere action (to speak, to utter) or event (that the speech act is made), although change in varying forms of speech representation can indeed reflect nonverbal aspects of consciousness such as the mental attitudes of a character.

3.2. Levels of Consciousness

I have elsewhere implied that consciousness means much more than thought. It is not so easy to make a universally acceptable definition of consciousness. Many scientists, psychologists, linguists and other scholars have focused on the problems of consciousness, endeavouring to answer the question “what is consciousness?” According to the linguist Wallace Chafe, consciousness is “what we experience” (1994: 27). It consists of “experiences of perceptions and actions”, “evaluations” which “cover[s] all aspects of conscious experience that involve emotions, opinions, attitudes, desires, and the like”, and “introspections” (1994: 31). The narratologist Monika Fludernik similarly

linguistic constructs of other levels of consciousness like perception have not been investigated in depth, and therefore we do not know whether the formal differentiae between speech and thought can also be found in the representations of other sorts of consciousness.

²⁰ Partly reproduced from Yoro (2005: 121)

remarks that “[c]onsciousness comprises both lived experientiality and intellectual attempts to deal with experience, and it includes the comprehension of actancy just as it necessarily embraces an understanding of mental processes” (1996: 49-50). The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio puts it more simply, suggesting that “[f]rom its most humble beginnings, consciousness is knowledge” (1999: 26). We have consciousness by the knowledge of perceiving, acting, evaluating and introspecting experiences in the external and internal world.

In her discussion about the thought representation scale, Fludernik explains the difficulty in incorporating the verbal-nonverbal distinction into the continuum based on the formal categories:

When it comes to content, this formal tripartite categorization on a scale from directness to indirectness is undermined by the distinction between verbal and non-verbal mind content. This provides for an alternative sliding scale that does not completely coincide with the formal scale from narrator language to characters’ internal discourse. (Fludernik, 2009: 82-83)

The “alternative sliding scale” which Fludernik feels is necessary is, as I believe, concerned with the levels of consciousness. If consciousness is indeed what we experience, it also has both conceptual world and perceptual world as Yoro argues (see Figure 3). In other words, consciousness at least has two levels: conceptual and perceptual. This is schematized as follows:




Figure 4. Conceptual and perceptual levels of consciousness²¹

The psychologist Irvin Rock views perception as intelligent. His view on perception is that “[perception] is based on such thoughtlike mental processes as description, inference, and problem-solving, although these processes are rapid-fire, unconscious, and nonverbal” (1984: 234, quoted in Searle, 1992: 231). Another psychologist, Nicholas Humphrey, also insists on the thought-like nature of perception (1992: 24-23). He further distinguishes perception from another,

²¹ Partly reproduced from Nakao (2016: 4).

perceptual, level of consciousness, that is, sensation (1992: 24-30), but I will discuss the distinction between conceptual and perceptual levels of consciousness, which is of prime importance, and will not try to delve into the distinction between perception and sensation in the following discussion.

The perceptual level of consciousness has been little investigated by literary critics. As far as I know, Chafe's approach to consciousness is the only attempt to explain how language representation works in terms of two different levels of consciousness. His aim was to "suggest a more comprehensive understanding of immediate [extroverted, that is, perceptual] and displaced [introverted, that is, conceptual] consciousness and their relation to language" (Chafe, 1994: 196).²² The importance of giving due attention to, in Brinton's words, "the range and depth of a character's consciousness" (1980: 364) should be revisited in terms of levels of consciousness. This will consequently provide "an alternative sliding scale" (Fludernik, 2009: 82) which makes consciousness representation a more profound cognitive-science-related linguistic paradigm. In the discussion below, I will focus on the narrative technique for representing perception known as "narrated perception".

3.3. Narrated Perception

"Narrated perception" (Cohn, 1978; Fludernik, 1993; Pallarés-García, 2012) is a narrative technique for rendering a character's perceptions of his/her external world as they are experienced by the character (Brinton, 1980: 370; Cohn, 1978: 33-144; Fehr, 1938: 98; Fludernik, 1993: 306; Pallarés-García, 2012: 171; 2014: 20; Palmer, 2004: 49; Schmid, 2010: 162). This technique has also been called "substitutionary perception" (Fehr, 1938; Hernadi, 1972; McHale, 1978), "represented perception" (Banfield, 1982; Brinton, 1980; Rundquist, 2014) or "free indirect perception" (Chatman, 1978; Palmer, 2004; Schmid, 2010). As will be clear in the course of the discussion below, the term "narrated perception" is preferred to other terms, because, as Pallarés-García (2012: 184 (Note 1); 2014: 21) suggests, it implies the close relationship between narration and perception. Fehr gives the following example to explain this unique linguistic device:

(4) "Look!" Fred turned around. Jack was coming across the street towards him. (Fehr, 1938: 98)

The second sentence ("Jack was coming across the street towards him") is narrated perception. The first sentence ("Look!" Fred turned around") functions as what Fehr calls "perception indicator" (1938: 98), by which Fred is presented as a person who saw Jack coming across the street. As such, the surrounding context helps the reader to interpret the second sentence not as a mere narrator's description of an event, but as a visual perception of Jack. The narrated perception sentence also

²² See Part Three/ Displacement in Chafe (1994) for full-length discussion on this subject.

contains one of the most typical linguistic features, the past progressive. It is often used in sentences of narrated perception because it “can be taken to reflect the simultaneity of the act of perception and the perceived reality” (Pallarés-García, 2012: 171). Narrated perception has often been confused with FIT, or regarded as a mere aspect of free indirect discourse or a sub-category of free indirect style by some literary critics who do not delve into the depth of consciousness.²³ According to Pallarés-García (2012), however, it has a formal, semantic and functional significance which distinguish it from FIT. Formally, it shares with FIT such features as the absence of an introductory clause, and the subjective use of the past progressive, proximal deictic adverbs, incomplete sentences, inversions and evaluative and epistemic expressions, but unlike FIT it does not typically contain parentheticals, questions and exclamations (Brinton, 1980; Pallarés-García, 2012). Semantically, narrated perception captures what Chafe (1994: 195-211) calls “extroverted consciousness” (immediate mode), whereas FIT portrays “introverted consciousness” (displaced mode) (Pallarés-García, 2012: 175). In terms of narrative function, narrated perception has two major functions (representation of a character’s consciousness and description of events in the external world), but FIT can only represent a character’s consciousness (Pallarés-García, 2012: 175).

Despite their devoting studies to narrated perception, critics have not yet explored the way this technique was employed in early-eighteenth-century novels, or in first-person narratives. My research suggests that Defoe uses this style effectively, though not as elaborately or extensively as the writers in later periods, such as Austen, do. Especially, narrated perception is effectively used in the robbery scenes in *Moll Flanders*. The following passage is Moll’s first adventure as a thief, in which her visual perceptions are represented through narrated perception:

(5) (a) Wandering thus about I knew not whither, (b) I pass’d by an Apothecary’s Shop in *Leadenhall-street*, (c) where I saw lye on a Stool just before the Counter a little Bundle wrapt in a white Cloth; (d) beyond it, stood a Maid Servant with her Back to it, looking up towards the top of the Shop, where the Apothecary’s Apprentice, as I suppose, was standing up on the Counter, with his Back also to the Door, and a Candle in his Hand, looking and reaching up to the upper Shelf for something he wanted, so that both were engag’d mightily earnestly, (e) and no Body else was in the Shop. (*Moll Flanders*: 160)

In *Moll Flanders*, narrated perception frequently occurs after narration. In (a), the word “wandering” implies that the younger Moll’s mental state is that she is walking without any purpose and she does not know where she is going. Thus, her action in (b) (“I pass’d by”) seems to be her recognized action: the younger Moll must have seen the shop and recognized that she was passing by it. She also

²³ See, for example, Chatman (1978), Ikeo (2007), Leech and Short (2007 [1981]), McHale (1978), Pascal (1977), Rundquist (2014), Semino and Short (2004), Sotirova (2004), etc.

perceives (probably visually) the kind of shop it was and the name of the street (“an Apothecary’s Shop in *Leadenhall-street*”). At the same time, (b) has a narrative function of giving background information (that is, the kind of shop it was and the name of the street) so that the reader is able to know where the younger Moll is. It does not have any linguistic indices for subjectivity, but (a) helps us to read (b) as the younger Moll’s perception of her outer world. This is a good example to show the closeness between narrated perception and narration in formal terms.

In the relative clause (c), the younger Moll’s visual perception is explicitly represented (“I saw”). This is a narrator’s report of perception, which I shall call “perception report”. The verb “saw” functions as what Fehr calls “perception indicator”, and thus the following clause (d) is likely to be narrated perception rather than N. The preposition “beyond” in the first clause of (d) clearly represents the younger Moll’s visual perception: she moves her eyes upwards from the bundle to the maid. Note also that the word order is inverted (“beyond it, stood a Maid Servant”) in the clause. It can be explained by the fact that the subject-verb inversion is required in a sentence in which there is any preceding adverbial in eighteenth-century grammar, but it can also be explained in terms of representation of consciousness. In Fludernik’s words, “the order of words traces the order of perception on the part of the character [here, the younger Moll]” (1993: 306): the younger Moll looks up, sees someone standing, and then recognizes that she is a maid servant, that the bundle is behind her, and that she is looking up towards the top of the shop. Another narrated perception follows it in the relative clause (“where the Apothecary’s Apprentice, as I suppose, was standing up on the Counter”), which is formally indicated by the use of the past progressive (“was standing”). The younger Moll’s ongoing perception is represented through this linguistic construct. The order of the remaining parts of the clause mirrors the order of perception as in the main clause before. Finally, in the last subordinate clause in (d), which is also a narrated perception clause, figural perception is indicated by the use of the epistemic expression “mighty earnestly”. It conveys a sense of the subjective consciousness of the younger Moll. She then visually perceives that there is nobody else in the shop. At the same time, the sentence is a crucial one in terms of narrative function because this situation eventually leads the younger Moll to steal the bundle.

These examples of narrated perception explicitly show that they describe what is happening in the external world as well as the character’s consciousness. Especially, visual perception is important in the robbery scenes in *Moll Flanders*, because the younger Moll’s perceptions of the outer world are the stimuli to take the intended action. Those passages represented through narrated perception show the reader directly from the point of view of the experiencing self why Moll is so dexterous in stealing things. As such, narrated perception is a formally, semantically, and functionally unique and important narrative technique for representing the perceptual level of consciousness. While narrated perception has attracted some attention from stylisticians and narratologists, other types of perception

representation have not been investigated. I have briefly mentioned “perception report”, but it is sometimes categorized as narration or psycho-narration, in spite of the fact that it is actually representation of perception by the narrator, not a mere narration. If we attempt to approach consciousness representation in terms of levels of consciousness to enhance the deep understanding of fictional consciousness, we should delve into the ways in which perception is represented as we do in thought representation. Put another way, the fact that narrated perception is often discussed as a sub-category of a broader free indirect style implies that perception has not yet been fully recognized as a possible constituent of “an alternative sliding scale” (Fludernik, 2009: 82) of consciousness representation. Do we have other categories, for example, “indirect perception” or “direct perception”, as with thought representation categories? If so, do these categories make up a similar continuum to that which thought representation categories do? More investigation into the ways in which perception is linguistically realized in a fictional text seems necessary.

4. Digging It out from the Old and the New

What areas should the study of consciousness representation explore in greater depth for the better understanding of fictional consciousness? An integration of the approaches in classical narratology with those in postclassical narratology is certainly required, but how should this be done? I hope this paper has shown some possible directions for doing this. More investigation into first-person narratives and diachronic perspectives are required. We need to disregard the parallelism between speech and thought for the sake of reconstructing the thought representation framework as a consciousness representation framework. We also need to delve into the levels of consciousness with the help of a cognitive paradigm. I have discussed the perceptual level of consciousness, focusing on narrated perception, but we also need to look into other categories of perception representation as well as the ways in which other levels of consciousness, for example sensation and emotion, are represented.

Pallarés-García, for example, has pointed out the close relationship between thought, perception and emotion. This has been noted in psychology and science. For example, Damasio argues that “consciousness begins as the feeling of what happens when we see or hear or touch ... it is a feeling that accompanies the making of any kind of image – visual, auditory, tactile, visceral – within our living organisms” (1999: 26). Note that Chafe defines consciousness as what we experience, which is made up of perception, action, evaluation (emotion is included in it) and introspection (1994: 31, see also 4.2). These studies imply that representation of emotion can be explored as one of the levels of consciousness. Note also that Chafe includes action as a part of consciousness. Palmer (2004) similarly suggests that action is also important for the construction of fictional consciousness. Action has been central to the philosophical discipline. An action is not a mere doing. In order for an action to be an

action, “mental notions such as awareness, knowledge, belief, desires, intention, and purposes are necessary” in addition to “bodily movement” (Palmer, 2004: 119). Ludwig Wittgenstein thinks it is difficult to disentangle mental behaviour from physical behaviour: if there is a statement “I noticed that he was out of humour”, “is this a report about his behavior or his state of mind?” (1958: 179, quoted in Palmer, 2004: 120). On the basis of the philosophy of action, Palmer proposes “the thought-action continuum”, demonstrating that it is difficult to draw a clear line between thought and action (2004: 212-214). One example that falls on the fuzzy borderline area of the thought-action continuum is a reporting clause with a modifying adverb (e.g. “said I desperately”). The thought-action continuum could also be located somewhere on “an alternative sliding scale”. In the same vein, there most likely exist perception-action, perception-emotion, thought-emotion, and emotion-action continua in addition to thought-perception and thought-action continua. If there were, these continua on the levels of consciousness might help to complete the alternative scale for consciousness representation, but more work seems to be required to apply them to the scale for levels of consciousness.

Another important point is that we should always bear in mind that fictional texts have two represented subjects: the narrator and the character (third-person narratives), or the narrating self and the experiencing self (first-person narratives). Chafe supposes that “the narrator’s consciousness as he produces the language is irrelevant” in the displaced mode except for *a few* cases of “brief excursions in the ordinary immediate mode” (1994: 234). However, especially in the authorial first-person narrative situation, the consciousness of the narrating self as well as that of the experiencing self is very frequently represented as in (6), and curiously, they are sometimes mingled as in (7):

(6) Nothing cou’d please me better than that; and when *Amy* repeated it, I was so fond of it, that I ask’d my QUAKER, (I won’t call her Landlady, ’tis indeed, too course a Word for her, and she deserv’d a much better) I say, I ask’d her if she wou’d sell it; (*Roxna*: 211-212)

(7) ... so these three poor desolate Men knew nothing how certain of Deliverance and Supply they were, how near it was to them, and how effectually and really they were in a Condition of Safety, at the same Time that they thought themselves lost, and their Case desperate.

So little do we see before us in the World, and so much reason have we to depend cheerfully upon the great Maker of the World, that he does not leave his Creatures so absolutely destitute, but that in the worst Circumstances they have always something to be thankful for, and sometimes are nearer their Deliverance than they imagine; nay, are even brought to their Deliverance by the Means by which they seem to be brought to their Destruction.

It was just at the Top of High-Water when these People came on Shore, ... (*Robinson Crusoe*: 212)

The consciousness of the narrating self is represented in the parenthetical sentence (“(I won’t call her Landlady, ’tis indeed, too coarse a Word for her, and she deserv’d a much better)”) and the following idiomatic phrase (“I say”) in (6). The second paragraph of (7) could be interpreted either as the experiencing self’s continuing consciousness, or as the consciousness of the narrating self inserted between that of the experiencing self.²⁴ These examples show the importance of looking into the subtleties and complexity in the relationship between the consciousness of the two represented subjects.

In sum, for the better understanding of fictional consciousness, we should expand the consciousness representation paradigm with more attentive investigation into 1) the ways in which fictional consciousness is represented in first-person narratives, 2) the ways in which fictional consciousness is represented in the narratives before Austen, 3) the levels of consciousness and their linguistic realization, and 4) the relationship between two represented subjects, the narrator (the narrating self) and the character (the experiencing self).

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²⁴ See Shigematsu (2016b: 3-5) for more detailed discussion of the duality in (7).

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