

KONTRA I PELIGRU, NA'FANSÅFO' HAM: THE PRODUCTION OF
MILITARY (IN)SECURITY IN GUÅHAN

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DEDICATION

*Este i tinige'-hu para si Inina Concepcion Naputi Kuper yan si Matatnga Gregorio
Naputi Kuper, i patgon-hu siha. Put siha na ni ngai'an na bai hu pãra tumachu
para este na tãno' iya Guãhan.*

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ABSTRACT

Guåhan, more commonly known as Guam, is an unincorporated territory of the United States where the U.S. military currently occupies 27% of the island. Despite such heavy occupation and political inferiority, the hegemonic discourse surrounding the military presence in the island is that they keep the island “secure.” In this dissertation, I critically investigate this claim and show that rather than keep the island secure, that the military through forced powerlessness and a continuum of slow, steady, and eventless violence, produces a condition of rampant insecurity in Guåhan. Furthermore, I articulate the phenomenon of sustainable insecurity, whereby this insecurity is made sustainable as opposed to being raised to the urgency of a crisis through mitigation, dependency, and discursive formations. Throughout, I demonstrate how Guåhan’s form-of-life is produced via the entanglement of Guåhan’s militarization and unincorporated territory status. Through archival research, interviews, discursive analysis, and historical detail, this dissertation traverses the political, land, economic, and environmental realms of Guåhan to excavate the genealogy of insecurity and the operationalization of violence in the island and argue heavily against the hegemonic belief that the U.S. military is the provider of Guåhan’s security.

Keywords: *Guåhan, security, sustainable insecurity, continuum of violences, militarization*

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I Tinituhon: Introduction

“The military is a 12-foot giant in our house. He is bound to step on some of your children.”¹ -Dr. Robert Underwood

(NON?)FICTION, The Journals of a Shape-Shifter Hunter Entry #1: *It’s been five long, humid nights since the fight against the giant began. I open my blood-caked eyelids, look out into the starless night sky into the void, and shiver with fear thinking about seeing it for the first time in that form. My mind is scarred with the image of the giant, standing 12 stories high, pillaging our village with its hatchet and poisonous, rabid saliva. Growing up, I never thought the giant would ever harm us. Mother always told us the giant was there to protect us, and that his stay in the village would always keep us safe. Nobody was prepared for this. Nobody knew the giant’s saliva was the origin of the poison in our waters, that his poisonous saliva was the killer of our crops, the malicious thief of our vitality. Nobody ever thought the giant would turn his back on us; his most ardent servants; his most obedient subjects. Yet, five days ago, the giant unleashed his fury and showed his true face. It was a mask this entire time. Beneath the beautiful anthropomorphic prosthetic he wore, laid the most horrific face. Or should I say faces. The giant’s face is a mere oscillation of forms, never settling on one. Who ever knew that the giant in our midst was also a shapeshifter? How does one ever fight against something that can change shape on command? Step One: Record the oscillation of faces and isolate them one by one. Step Two: Examine this anatomy. Learn its different faces. Step Three: Fight back.*

My home island of Guåhan’s² anthem is entitled, “Fanohge Chamorro.” The song was originally written in English by the first CHamoru³ doctor, Ramon Manalisay Sablan, and was titled “Stand Ye Chamorros.” Llagrimas Untalan, one of the first women elected to the local legislature, translated the song into the indigenous CHamoru language, and titled it “Fanohge Chamorro.” Growing up in the island, school mornings always began with the Fanohge Chamorro being sung right after the Star-Spangled Banner, as Guåhan is an unincorporated territory of the United States and its inhabitants are American citizens as of 1950. One of the most infectiously catchy parts of the song is found in the chorus, “Kontra i Peligru, Na’fansåfo’ Ham, Yu’os Prutehi i Islan Guam,” which can be translated to “Against All Danger, Keep Us Safe, God Protect the

¹ Laurel Monnig, “Proving CHamoru: Indigenous Narratives of Race, Identity, and Decolonization on Guam” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007), 345.

² The island is commonly known as “Guam.” However, in this dissertation, I use the indigenous Chamorro (who are the indigenous people of the island) name for the island, Guåhan, which roughly translates to “we have.”

³ CHamoru is the official spelling of the word. I will use the spelling “Chamorro” only when quoting. This spelling is rather new and this explains the prevalence of “Chamorro” over “CHamoru” in many of the sources I utilize.

Island of Guam.” One night as I was putting my daughter to sleep, I thought about her future and her safety, and found myself thinking back to this particular line of the song. Something seemed off about it—rather, it felt incomplete.

Returning to this thought the next day, I realized what was missing about this line: the American military. The people of Guåhan pray for security by kneeling on the altar of two separate gods: the Christian God and the American military. The famous chorus of “Fanohge Chamorro” is only half of the praisal hymn of Guåhan’s security and safety. The people rely on both to keep the island out of harm’s way, by either divine intervention or raw military power. To more accurately reflect Guåhan’s reality, the song should be edited to “Kontra i Peligru, Na’fansåfo’ Ham, Yu’os yan i Militat, Prutehi i Islan Guam,” or “Against All Danger, Keep Us Safe, God and the Military, Protect the Island of Guam.” Although not found yet in the actual song, one hears this revised chorus being sung in other ways.

For example, in her 2017 Congressional Address, Guåhan’s former delegate to the United States House of Representative, Madeleine Bordallo, embodied this bent knee of reliance saying, “History cannot repeat itself, and I want to assure our people that we remain safe, and the United States will protect Guam from threats that may arise. We are an important part of the American family, and I continue to work with DoD and all our federal partners to keep our island secure.”⁴ Echoing this hymn of praise, in response to a North Korea missile threat to the island in 2017, Guåhan resident, Virgie Matson, told the Associated Press, “I feel that the presence of the military on Guam will help us a lot. They are here to protect the island, just in case something happens.”⁵ Regarding the same North Korea nuclear threat, Guåhan’s highest elected official at the time,

⁴ Madeleine Bordallo, 2017 Congressional Address, April 19, 2017, accessed at <http://www.kuam.com/story/35183680/2017/04/Wednesday/delegate-madeleine-bordallo-2017-congressional-address>

⁵ Grace Garces Bordallo and Cathy Bussewitz, “Guam’s worries grow as tensions rise between U.S., North Korea,” *The Denver Post*, August 9, 2017, <https://www.denverpost.com/2017/08/09/guam-worried-tensions-rise-north-korea/>

Governor Eddie Baza Calvo, expressed full faith in the U.S. military once again, saying, “This isn’t the first time that we’ve had threats lobbed against our island, but this time, knowing that we have a president (referring to Trump), and a White House and a military that is watching out for us gives me a great deal of comfort.”⁶ The military has noticed this devotion and has responded quite positively. Upon visiting the island in 2017, Lt. Gen. L. Scott Rice, the director of the Air National Guard, exclaimed, “As Americans, if you really want to see where the muscle of what the word patriotism means, go no other place than Guam to say, ‘Wow this is real patriotism at its core, at its heart.’”⁷ From elected officials to the average citizen to U.S. military officers, the lyrics of “the American military keeps the island safe,” is rather ubiquitous.

In this dissertation, I write a different song with different lyrics. Put another way, in this dissertation, I challenge this hegemonic thought of the military as a security provider for the island. Rather, I argue that the U.S. military creates conditions of insecurity for the island due to the creation and sustaining of a continuum of entangled manifestations of violence. In describing these various manifestations of violence, I use the trope of the shape-shifting giant, reflecting Glen Coulthard’s analysis of colonialism as a shape-shifter. Furthermore, I articulate how this continuum of insecurity and violence can sustain itself through the introduction of a “permanent state of mitigation,” in which actions taken by the military that may create resistance or pushback are consistently “mitigated” via unequal exchanges, dependency, or discursive formations. I dub this phenomenon “sustainable insecurity” and utilize each chapter as a thematic historical and contemporary analysis of how insecurity has been made sustainable here in Guåhan. The heavy emphasis on history throughout the chapters is vastly important to understanding sustainable security which I dub as the material and discursive process(es) in which insecurity is made

⁶ Phil Helsel, “Guam Governor Says Trump Called, Assured Island Is Safe,” *NBC News*, August 12, 2017, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/guam-governor-says-trump-called-assured-island-safe-n792011>

⁷ Chris Wong, “General notes Guam’s ‘over the top’ patriotism,” *The Guam Daily Post*, January 25, 2017, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/general-notes-guam-s-over-the-top-patriotism/article_b60a6144-e152-11e6-a219-df8aca136f95.html

sustainable as opposed to becoming a crisis. Through the historical analysis of events and quasi-events, I explore the conditions of possibility for this sustainable insecurity. Lastly, I argue that the condition of possibility for these insecurities and violences is our forced powerlessness due to our current form-of-life as a heavily militarized, unincorporated territory of the United States. In other words, I show how Guåhan is subject to a continuum of violence and insecurities as a result of our status as a militarized, unincorporated territory, and how this is made sustainable due to the military's shape-shifting power and its creation of a permanent state of mitigation. Marion Levy once wrote, "In the science game, it is important to be prepared to define one's concepts because the querulous answer to questions about definitions which one so often hears from social scientists, namely, 'You know what I mean,' is almost always precisely false."⁸ Heeding this advice, I use a significant remainder of the introduction to clarify the conceptual and theoretical frameworks I am in conversation with or are operating through.

UNINCORPORATED TERRITORY: THE DNA OF MILITARIZATION

In thinking about the 12-foot giant of militarization, I argue that its DNA, the possibility for its unique manifestation in the island lies in Guåhan's ambiguous political status of being an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States. Here, I provide the history and definition of unincorporated territory status, and in Chapter Two detail the story of the entanglement of militarization and unincorporated territory status. In 1898, the United States waged war against Spain, in what is commonly known now as the Spanish-American War. This war was initiated when the U.S.S. *Maine* exploded on February 15, 1898 in Havana Harbor, Cuba with the Americans blaming the Spanish for its explosion. The conclusion of this short war resulted in the Treaty of Paris, which stipulated that control of the Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam be turned over to the United States, while Cuba became a U.S.

⁸ Marion Levy, "Does It Matter if He's Naked? Bawled the Child," in *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, eds. Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 99.

protectorate.⁹ The acquisition of these territories caused great debate in the United States; the primary question being “Does the Constitution follow the flag?” Americans were debating whether or not the Constitution applies to these new territories which are technically under American control. The culmination of these debates resulted in the controversial “Insular Cases.”

The “Insular Cases” are a series of legal cases ruled upon from 1901 to 1922 that developed and legitimized the idea of unincorporated territory status “in order to enable the United States to acquire and govern its new ‘possessions’ without promising them either statehood or independence.”¹⁰ The Insular Cases saw the development of the “doctrine of incorporation,” which holds “that the inhabitants of territory acquired by the United States are not entitled to the benefits, privileges and immunities of the Constitution until Congress sees fit to extend these rights.”¹¹ This logic derives from Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which says “Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.”¹² It is important to note that these rulings were heavily tinged with the colonial languages of race and civilization. In one of the core Insular Cases, *Downes v. Bidwell*, it was argued that these territories were inhabited by “alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought”¹³ and because of this, “the administration of government and justice according to Anglo-Saxon principles may for a time be impossible.”¹⁴

⁹ Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall, *Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution* (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2001).

¹⁰ Burnett and Marshall, *Foreign in a Domestic Sense*, 2.

¹¹ Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam 1899-1950* (Saipan: CNMI Division of Historic Preservation, 2001), 34.

¹² United States Congress, Providing a Civil Government for Guam, *Senate Report No. 2109 to accompany H.R. 7273*, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, 13.

¹³ *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244, 1901, accessed at <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/182/244/case.html>.

¹⁴ *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244, 1901, accessed at <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/182/244/case.html>.

Another factor in these legal decisions was found in the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Spanish-American War. Article IX of the treaty reads “The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.”¹⁵ As a result of the Insular Cases, the court ruled that unincorporated territories would only receive “unspecified fundamental” constitutional protections such as individual and personal rights (court procedures for example), but were not considered members of the body politic. To put it more clearly, the Insular Cases established that unincorporated territories were not an integral “part of” the United States, but rather belonged to the United States. In the clearest language possible, the Insular Cases designated these new territories as “foreign in a domestic sense” and “domestic in a foreign sense” leaving us perpetually stuck in a political limbo leveraged differently over the strategic history of the United States as it rose from regional to global power.¹⁶

The legacy of these Insular Cases more than one hundred years later in 2019 are deeply felt by those who live in the territories. In Guåhan, it is common to hear the sentiment that we are second-class citizens.¹⁷ As an unincorporated territory, we have no representation whatsoever in the U.S. Senate or Electoral College and only non-voting representation in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, as a result of the Territorial Clause, the territories are under the “plenary power” of the United States Congress. The hypocrisy of this predicament is that we, in Guåhan, have no voting rights in the one government body (the United States Congress) that has complete control or “plenary power” over our affairs, which seems very contradictory to the foundations of democracy that the United States preaches to the world. In the *University of Hawai’i Law Review*, Jon Van Dyke argues,

¹⁵ Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, accessed at http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html.

¹⁶ Bartholomew H. Sparrow, *The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

¹⁷ It should be pointed out that many of us do not aspire to be citizens of the united states as we believe in independence or free association for Guåhan’s political status.

The United States has always governed its territories and possessions separately from its states. During the past two centuries, the legal regime applicable to the territories has evolved in a patchwork ad hoc fashion, with Congress responding to the unique and individual needs of each territory, sometimes with sensitivity and sometimes with indifference or insensitivity. Each of these island communities have demonstrated the ability to exercise local self-government. They each have a mature and lively political structure in which the basic values of fairness and full opportunities for participation are maintained at the local level. They each have unique cultures that should be allowed to develop in ways that are true to their traditions. In terms of their subservience to the Congress and the federal agencies, however, they are still colonies.¹⁸

Former Director of Policy Development in Guåhan, Tyrone Taitano, illustrates this hypocrisy, writing, “The relationship of Guam to the States is very similar to the relationship of the 13 colonies to King George. That’s very disturbing to us.”¹⁹ Reinforcing this sentiment of outrage at the anathema of the Insular Cases today, former governor of Guåhan, Joseph Ada, exclaims, “Guam is governed exclusively under rules designed at the height of imperial fever, at a time when some legal fiction was needed to justify the maintenance of war booty, to justify the rule of people in a condition similar to serfdom.”²⁰

Now that Guåhan’s disturbing political portrait has been painted on the canvas of this academic endeavor, the next question is “Why Guam? Why would the United States care so much to control this tiny island in the Pacific Ocean?” Our former governor, Eddie Baza Calvo, hits the nail right on the head of this question when he exclaims that Guåhan’s importance to the United States is all about “location, location, location!”²¹ Former historian at the University of Guam, Robert F. Rogers, titled his important work on the history of Guam, *Destiny’s Landfall*. In his introduction, Rogers writes, “If fate is preordained but destiny is not, then much of humankind’s loss of innocence on this island called earth is mirrored in the often tragic, but inspiring history of

¹⁸ Jon M. Van Dyke, “The Evolving Legal Relationship Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands,” *University of Hawai’i Law Review*, Vol. 14: 445, 1992.

¹⁹ Nicholas D. Kristof, “Guam, a Spoil of War, Seeks More Autonomy,” *The New York Times*, November 10, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/10/us/guam-a-spoil-of-war-seeks-more-autonomy.html?pagewanted=all>.

²⁰ Joseph Ada, *Statement to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs*, December 11, 1989 in Honolulu, Hawai’i.

²¹ Adam Ashton, “Quietly, Guam is slated to become massive in U.S. military base,” *McClatchy DC*, November 22, 2015, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article45241053.html>.

the island of Guam since Magellan's landfall."²² By this, he articulates that "Guam, in short, was destined after Magellan to be a pawn in the realpolitik of foreign powers."²³ In discussions of Guåhan's usage as a pawn, all roads lead back to geographical location and the subsequent role of geopolitics. Guåhan lies in the expanse of the Western Pacific and is the largest island between Hawai'i and the Philippines with a major harbor and the largest between Japan and Papua New Guinea with the capability for hosting major runways.

The island, which is a mere 212 square miles, hosts two large American military bases. There is Andersen Air Force Base which occupies the northern-tip of the island and Naval Base Guam which sits on one of the former most populated villages on the island, Sumay.²⁴ Regarding our proximity to Asia, we also have the 7/7 advantage over Hawai'i. We are seven hours closer by plane to Asia and 7 days closer by sea. From a strategic military perspective, Guåhan seems truly as Rogers describes, "Destiny's Landfall." The strategic importance of Guåhan has led to various nicknames for the island including "The Tip of the Spear," "Fortress Guam," and "America's Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier in the Pacific."

At this point, the reader may be wondering if Guåhan has actually ever been used to protect American security interests? The simple answer is yes. In Guåhan, the words, "the war," is synonymous with none other than World War II. If you ask someone from the United States to describe the effects of the war on their homeland, they may ask you what war? In Guåhan, World War II is guaranteed to be the first answer to enter one's mind. On December 8, 1941, the Japanese bombed Guåhan four hours after they bombed Pearl Harbor in O'ahu.²⁵ From 1941 to 1944, CHamorus were under brutal Japanese occupation that involved intense manual labor, rapes,

²² Robert Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam, Revised Edition* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 5.

²³ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 2.

²⁴ The former residents of Sumay were not allowed to return to their land and now live in the geologically inferior village of Santa Rita.

²⁵ To prevent any confusion, Guåhan is one day ahead of Hawai'i thus resulting in the differing date of bombing.

beheadings, concentration camps, and massacres.²⁶ It is important to point out that the Japanese were only able to take over Guåhan because the Americans, suspecting possible hostility from the Japanese, removed most of their personnel and their dependents, leaving the CHamorus without any defense against the Japanese invasion.²⁷ In 1944, three years into the Japanese occupation, the Americans returned with a massive reoccupation campaign for the island, eventually defeating the Japanese and re-establishing their colonial rule under the guise of “liberation.”

This reoccupation campaign and its consequences helped complete the physical transformation of the island into our current status as a giant military base. It was after the war that Guåhan truly became militarized. Before the war, Guåhan was used as a naval coaling station, but was not heavily occupied by the military. The island was run as a naval ship with the highest-ranking naval officer acting as the “naval governor” of the island. These naval governors usually served for two-year terms before being replaced. Regarding these naval governors, historian and now local senator Kelly Marsh Taitano, writes,

These naval governors had virtually absolute rule (answering only to the Secretary of the Navy) and governed based on their personal philosophies and individual sets of skills and abilities rather than the consent of the governed and without full application of the US Constitution. Naval governors had no training in civil government nor much, if any, prior experience in this field before being assigned as governor to Guam.²⁸

This meant that CHamorus during this time were forced to follow the laws imposed by the naval governor even if the laws were outrageous and idiosyncratic. For example, the first naval Governor, Richard Leary, passed executive orders, which mandated that dog owners obtain a license, banned cockfighting, and demanded that the Carolinian residents of Guåhan wear clothes.²⁹ In a similar vein, Governor William Gilmer who served in Guåhan from 1918 to 1920,

²⁶ Wakako Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam, 1941-1944: A Study of Occupation and Integration Policies with Japanese Oral Histories* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2013).

²⁷ Rodgers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 161-162.

²⁸ Kelly Marsh, “US Naval Era Governors: Contributions and Controversies,” *Guampedia*, July 2014, accessed at <http://www.guampedia.com/us-naval-era-governors-contributions-and-controversies/>.

²⁹ “Richard P. Leary, General Order Nos. 1-21,” *Guampedia*, September 2015, accessed July 2018, <http://www.guampedia.com/leary-general-orders/>

passed executive orders which banned dancing after 10 p.m., whistling, and interracial marriages, and also required males to turn in five dead rat heads a month to their district commissioner.³⁰ It is important to remember that CHamorus at this time were not citizens, nor aliens, but rather the ambiguous step cousin of the American political family.

Currently, the U.S. military still occupies 27% of the island and our status as a forward operating base currently swings at full force. Guåhan has shifted from a coaling station for U.S. naval ships to lily pads used to fight against the Japanese during World War II, to housing Vietnamese refugees during the Vietnam War, to being used as a launching pad and aircraft storage location during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. Most recently, our use can be seen in the military buildup proposed for the island. In 2006, the governments of Japan and the United States discussed relocating 8,000 marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guåhan. This move, in part, was made in response to heavy local, Okinawan resistance to the immense marine presence in their homeland, with grievances against the U.S. military that included rape of children, environmental pollution, and military aircraft accidents, to name a few. The U.S.'s plans were not only the relocation of marines to Guåhan but also included the dredging of acres of reef for an aircraft carrier berth, installing anti-missile defense systems in the northern part of the island, and taking an ancestral CHamoru village (Pågat) for a firing range. The environmental impacts included a 45% population growth over a 4-year period, a 6.1 million gallon per day shortfall of water for the civilian community, and in accommodating the nuclear aircraft carrier, the destruction of over 70 acres of coral reef.³¹

Many of Guåhan's people actively opposed this effort. One of the main factors was a lawsuit filed by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Guam Preservation Trust, and We Are Guåhan, in which they argued that the Department of Defense failed to consider another

³⁰ Marsh, "Naval Era Governors."

³¹ Joint Guam Program Office. 2015. *Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Military Relocation (2012 Roadmap Adjustments)*. Prepared by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific. Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

alternative for building the firing range complex on existing DoD property.³² Yet, like a lizard growing a tail, the military backed off from taking Pāgat and came back with a renewed plan to reduce the amount of marines to 5,000 and move the site of the firing range to their existing footprint in Northwest Field. However, this Live Fire Training Range Complex would have detrimental impacts on the adjacent ancient village of Litekyan (where some of the oldest CHamoru archaeological remains were found) and threaten the island's only aquifer in the northern half of the island.³³ With this understanding of unincorporated territory status and Guåhan's use as a strategic location for the United States military, I now move to clarify my usage of the concepts of "militarization" and "militarism."

THE BLACK MAGIC OF MILITARIZATION, MILITARISM, AND WAR AS FORM-OF-LIFE

In *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*, Catherine Lutz describes the global reach of the United States military, which encompasses more than 800 military facilities in 46 countries and territories. She then adds that, "the U.S. military owns or rents 795,000 acres of land, and 26,000 buildings and structures valued at \$146 billion."³⁴ In her analysis, bases are the most powerful symbol of America's military presence in the world and "to understand where those bases are and how they are being used is essential for understanding the United States' relationship with the rest of the world, the role of coercion in it, and its political economic complexion."³⁵ This expansive reach is the result of militarization.

In this dissertation, I base my operational usage of "militarization" on Cynthia Enloe's concept of militarization. In her article, "Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization

³² Joseph Ax, "Republican Pennsylvania leaders submit plan for redrawing congressional map," *Reuters*, February 9, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-pennsylvania/republican-pennsylvania-leaders-submit-plan-for-redrawing-congressional-map-idUSKBN1FT1FM>.

³³ Clynt Ridgell, "Prutehi Litekyan continues to push to stop firing range above Ritidian Wildlife Refuge," *Pacific News Center*, September 7, 2017, <https://pacificnewscenter.com/prutehi-litekyan-continues-to-push-to-stop-firing-range-above-ritidian-wildlife-refuge/>.

³⁴ Catherine Lutz, "Introduction: Bases, Empire, and Global Response," in *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts*, ed. Catherine Lutz (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 1.

³⁵ Lutz, "Bases", 6.

and the Current Crisis,” Enloe defines militarization as “the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.”³⁶ Militarization, as a process, involves an intensification of labor and resources allocated to military purposes and involves a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force.³⁷ Enloe also discusses the concept of militarism, which she defines as the societal emphasis on martial values. Militarism is an ideology, while militarization is a both a discursive and material process, and in this dissertation, I demonstrate the current effectiveness of both concepts in Guåhan.

Enloe writes that militarization is “intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies . . . but also the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action.”³⁸ Revealing the ubiquitous nature of militarization, Barbara Sutton and Julie Novkov write, “Militarization currently permeates mundane activities, shapes cultural values, and filters into paramount institutions such as the media and the education system.”³⁹ To this extent, militarization acts a structuring force of society that produces the erasure and/or inferior positioning of populations like Pacific Islanders and places like islands. This societal structuring is necessary to the smooth functioning of militarization because at the core of militarization and militarism is the mobilization of various social forces. According to Martin Shaw, “Militarism depends, first, on the typical social forces mobilized in military power. Armed actors always mobilize social resources and social constituencies.”⁴⁰

³⁶ Catherine Lutz, “Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis,” *American Anthropologist*, 104, no.3 (2002): 723.

³⁷ Lutz “Making War,” 723.

³⁸ Lutz, “Making War,” 723.

³⁹ Barbara Sutton and Julie Novkov, “Rethinking Security, Confronting Inequality: An Introduction, *In Security Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race, and Militarization*, eds. Barbara Sutton, Sandra Morgen, and Julie Novkov (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 20.

⁴⁰ Martin Shaw, “Twenty-first century militarism: A historical-sociological framework,” *In Militarism and International Relations: Political economy, security, and theory*, eds. Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby (New York: Routledge, 2012), 23.

In understanding the social fabric in which militarization is produced and subsequently justified, it is important to understand the role of modern technology and the new face of justifying warfare. Shaw writes that, “Western militarism centres on the ideological nexus between governments and electorates/media audiences who are mobilized through a combination of patriotism lite and a nationalist emphasis on force-protection.”⁴¹ Militarization inherently relies on this nexus and partnership of government and media. Governments are the primary producers of this new militarism, according to Shaw, but can never produce it independently. This analysis of operationalization of militarization provides a theoretical background to understanding that militarization is not a monolith that can be solved simply, if at all. Rather, I relate this analysis to the Foucauldian concept of the “dispositif.”

According to Foucault, the dispositif is a complex ensemble of discourses, agencies, and apparatuses of implementation. Michael Shapiro elaborates this concept in his book, *The Global Justice Dispositif*, describing the dispositif as “a thoroughly heterogenous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions...the said as much as the unsaid...the elements of the apparatus.”⁴² In another of his works, “What Does A Weapon See?,” Shapiro provides the example of the weapon dispositif. In his description of the development of a weapon, he describes how a weapon is not just part of the operation of a killing force, but in order to truly understand what goes into making that weapon, we need to understand the societal forces that collaborate in its production. Jairus Grove illuminates this well writing,

Shifting our interests from events and acts to processes and habits directs our attention to how the outbreak of war may be subterranean in habitual activities that are not seemingly warlike. We should not be fooled by the common sense that because things are not always at the fever-pitch of war, war is not working behind the scenes in our imaginative,

⁴¹ Shaw, “Twenty-First Century,” 29-30.

⁴² Michael J. Shapiro, *War Crimes, Atrocity and Justice* (Malden: Polity Press, 2015), 14.

judging, and bodily faculties as well as our ports, freeways, internet connections, satellite feed, and toxic runoff, emotional and molecular.⁴³

Throughout this dissertation, I attempt to dissect the various entanglements and intertwining of militarization's dispositif here in Guåhan and its tendency towards invisibility and normalcy. Kanaka Maoli activist, Kaleikoa Kaeo, uses the metaphor of the he'e or octopus in 'Ōlelo Hawai'i, in understanding the U.S. military's reach in the Pacific. He metaphorizes the Pacific Command (which has recently been renamed to the Indo-Pacific Command) in O'ahu as the core of an octopus which spreads its tentacles to places such as Guåhan, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and Okinawa. In a similar vein, I use the metaphor of the shape-shifting 12-foot giant as a way to describe the militarized manifestations of colonial violence, insecurity, and power in the island.

Moving beyond militarization and militarism, I argue in this dissertation that it is the combination of militarization and our status as an unincorporated territory of the United States and our status as an island that creates this form-of-life which oozes of sustainable insecurity. My usage of form-of-life is taken from Giorgio Agamben who argued, "A life that cannot be separated from its form is a life for which what is at stake in its way of living is living itself. It defines a life—human life— in which the single ways, acts, and processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life."⁴⁴ I aim to understand our lives here in Guåhan and the entire fabric of society as a creation with a genealogy in forced powerlessness and violence, resulting from the larger social fabric of war. Jairus Grove invites us to think about war on a deeper level, writing, "I want to consider the possibility of war and warlike relations as processes of making a form-of-life in which warfare is normal. And what I mean by normal is much more than what we mean when we use concepts like ideology or legitimacy of discipline. By normal, I mean the very fabric of relations that makes a form-of-life and a world: a war body, a war assemblage,

⁴³ Jairus Grove, *Savage Ecology: Geopolitics at the End of the world* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2019), 106.

⁴⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *Means Without End: Notes on Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 4.

a war ecology.”⁴⁵ Furthermore, Grove argues, “So to say that we live in a global state of war, and that the making of the Eurocene was that making of a global state or war is to say that war intensifies the field of relations that make the world what is it right now not that it exhausts the possibility of what the world can become.”⁴⁶ Similarly, I aim to excavate the genealogy of militarization and unincorporated territory as the fabrics that have attempted to mold our current form-of-life, destroy old forms-of-life that we had, and argue, similarly to Grove, that there are other forms-of-life again possible for us here in Guåhan. I privilege the usage of form-of-life over ontology for this reason as well. Ontology is too static and totalizing, and it tends to depoliticize and dehistoricize, connoting perpetuity. In using form-of-life, I am arguing that our livelihoods are not static, and I draw attention to how CHamoru and Guåhan forms-of-life are not completely eradicated, and that it is not too late to resurge to a more genuine form-of-life not rooted in our dispossession and oppression.

POWER IS EVERYWHERE

I argue that in order to understand Guåhan and its militarized form-of-life, it is necessary to understand geopolitics and the larger discipline of International Relations (IR), and thus my usages of the terms “power” and “security” come directly from theoretical developments in IR. Within the field of IR, there are three dominant schools of thought: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Realism, traditionally, is the school most associated with the theorization of power, although, as I will show, each school of thought is ultimately rooted in understanding the role of power in international politics. Power is core to the discipline of politics. For example, Hans Morgenthau writes, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power ... Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”⁴⁷ In this project, I demonstrate how the United States creates powerlessness for Guåhan, and that it is through this

⁴⁵ Grove, *Savage Ecology*, 76.

⁴⁶ Grove, *Savage Ecology*, 78.

⁴⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 4.

exercise of power that powerlessness for the island is teleologically sought. To be stripped of power is an end in itself for the sustenance of military presence here.

Perhaps the most widely used definitions of power come in the form of a theoretical battle between the national power approach and the relational power approach. The national power approach is most commonly used by neorealists, who argue that the anarchy of the international system is the permissive cause of war. Since the world is composed of a multitude of sovereigns with no overarching world government or enforcer, states can never know the intentions of other states, and thus must always, as rational actors, maximize either their security or power.⁴⁸ According to the national power approach, the power of states is determined through a lump sum quantification of a country's resources, particularly, the level of military expenditure, size of the armed forces, gross national product, territory, and population. Critics of the national power approach argue that a lump sum quantity of material resources does not accurately provide an indicator of the aggregate power of a state. Brian Schmidt argues, for example, "At the end of the day, it is not the mere possession of power resources that matters, but the ability to convert these into actual influence."⁴⁹ The second critique of the national power approach deals with the fungibility of resources and power. David Baldwin defines fungibility as "the ease with which power resources useful in one issue-area can be used in other issue-areas."⁵⁰ For example, does a state's possession of nuclear weapons guarantee that these weapons can be used in areas such as trade? Critics argue that this is not the case and that a lump sum approach to power as resources assumes fungibility.

⁴⁸ I use "either security or power" because there is a dichotomy within Realism between offensive realists and defensive realists. Defensive realists, such as neorealist Kenneth Waltz, argue that states need to maximize their security, but not accumulate any power beyond that, as it may make the state less secure. Contrasting this, offensive realists, such as John Mearshimer, argue that states need to maximize their power, and not just stop at a maximum point of security as power and force is the *ultima ratio* of international politics.

⁴⁹ Brian C. Schmidt, "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33, no. 3. (2005): 529.

⁵⁰ David A. Baldwin, *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 180.

Contrasted to the national power approach is the relational power approach, which can be traced to famed political scientist Robert Dahl. Dahl explained power as the following: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”⁵¹ Schmidt fleshes out this definition further, “Power is a process of interaction whereby a state is able to exercise influence over the actions of another state. Power as a set of resources is deemed to be less important than the actual ability of actor A to change the behavior of actor B.”⁵² Unlike the national power approach, the relational power approach does not need to take fungibility into account because it does see power as a lump sum. Rather, proponents of the national power approach disaggregate power into various components. What is more important than the possession of resources is the effect on another’s behavior.

In this dissertation, I argue that this dichotomy, while theoretically engaging and informing, does not accurately account for the saturation of U.S. military power here in the island. Rather, I argue that power is a polymorphous character giving rise to the shape-shifting violences of the military. Further guiding my approach to the operation of power in Guåhan, I turn to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s article, “Power in International Politics.” Barnett and Duvall argue that the problem with International Relations is the discipline’s privileging of one particular form of power. Viewing this as theoretical myopia, they encourage scholars of IR to rather, “employ multiple conceptions of power and develop a conceptual framework that encourages rigorous attention to power in its different forms.”⁵³

From this, they theorize a taxonomy of power with four varieties: compulsory power, institutional power, structural power, and productive power. Compulsory power is characterized by relations of interaction of direct control by one actor over another. This power type is most closely related to Dahl’s definition and has an “emphasis on control by identifiable actors over the

⁵¹ Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science*, 2 (1957): 202.

⁵² Schmidt, “Competing Realist,” 530.

⁵³ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” *International Organization*, 59, (2005): 39.

objections of other actors through development (even if only symbolically) of resources.”⁵⁴ With compulsory power, there is an identifiable actor and the exercise of direct control. An example found in this dissertation is the military’s land takings, in which a clear actor (the military), outright stole/continues to steal CHamoru land. Institutional power’s emphasis is on the “formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or nonactions) and conditions of existence of others.”⁵⁵ With institutional power, A does not necessarily possess the institution which constrains and shapes B. Rather, because A has a particular relationship with relevant institutions, its actions exercise power over B. As Barnett and Duvall explain it, “Long-standing institutions represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias that can continue to shape the future choices of actors.”⁵⁶ The prime example I examine in this project is the treatment of Guåhan by the United Nations and on the world stage.

The final two types of power, productive and structural power, are concerned with constitutive social processes. Debates on power include whether power is something that one possesses and then uses or whether power is created and constituted through interactions and various processes. Differentiating themselves from compulsory power, productive and structural power can exist even in situations where there is no visible existence of expressed conflict. Productive power is “the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope.”⁵⁷ Productive power’s usage of discourse is Foucauldian, referring to the microfields that “define the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal, and what counts as a problem.”⁵⁸ For example, the discursive processes and subjectivity created from classifications like “civilized,”

⁵⁴ Barnett and Duvall, “Power,” 50.

⁵⁵ Barnett and Duvall, “Power,” 51.

⁵⁶ Barnett and Duvall, “Power,” 52.

⁵⁷ Barnett and Duvall, “Power,” 55.

⁵⁸ Clarissa Rile Hayward, *De-Facing Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 35.

“rogue,” “Western,” or “democratic,” are all forms of the productive power of discourse. The last chapter regarding the liberation discourse and World War II commemoration demonstrates the power of imaginative violence and the CHamoru subjectivity produced in a particular postbellum ordering of their world.

The fourth and final type of power is structural power, which I argue Guåhan, along with compulsory power, is saturated with to the greatest capacity. Structural power concerns the determination of social capacities and interests and can be seen as a constitutive process. Structural power is a core component of the mechanization of colonialism as the structural position of A is enabled via the structural position of B. Examples of structural constitutive processes include the master-slave dialectic or the capital-labor structure. In the most obvious way, our status as both an unincorporated territory and a military base is demonstrative of the sheer intensity of structural power exercised over the island. They are both rooted in colonialism, which is in itself a structure and structuring force, the metropole-periphery, or more relevantly, metropole-island constitutive process.

This constitutive U.S.-Guåhan relationship and structural power is the theoretical lynchpin of Michael Lujan Bevacqua’s dissertation, “Chamorros, Ghosts, Non-voting Delegates: GUAM! Where the Production of America’s Sovereignty Begins.” Bevacqua argues that rather than accept that Guåhan is irrelevant or inherently powerless, one needs to look at Guåhan’s ambiguous political status as sitting at the center of constituting American power and empire. He writes, “The decolonizing of the space between Guam and the United States and sovereignty means showing the structure by which Guam potentially sits at the center of American power, and that there are a litany of ways in which its banality, its geography, its coloniality all intersect....to constitute the United States, its power, its authority, its might.”⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “Chamorros, Ghosts, Non-voting Delegates: GUAM! Where the Production of America’s Sovereignty Begins,” (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2010), 8.

Bevacqua's work helps to clarify an important point regarding my usage of power in this project. As mentioned, I treat power as a polymorphous character and argue that privileging one is insufficient to completely understand Guåhan's situation. Barnett and Duvall utilize these multiple concepts of power to "capture the different and interrelated ways in which actors are enabled and constrained in determining their circumstances."⁶⁰ I analyze how the United States military and federal government exercises various forms of power over the island leading to a continuum of violences. However, I am not arguing that Guåhan is inherently powerless in any shape or form. Genealogically linking my work to Bevacqua's, my purpose is to show how political, economic, land, or environmental issues or concerns are consistently subservient to U.S. national security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, which I argue is a state of insecurity and violence. This is not a demonstration of Guåhan's inherent powerlessness, but rather an examination of the methods by which Guåhan is forcefully made powerless because of its strategic importance. This powerlessness, as a result of our unincorporated territory status, allows the U.S. to decide what their role is in our nation here in Guåhan. To return to the giant metaphor, the military becomes a 12-foot giant where it would only be a 5-foot giant in other political entities such as states of the U.S. or other nation-states for example.

SECURITY: DO WE HAVE IT OR NOT?

Directly related to power is the way that "security" is utilized here in Guåhan. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary's definition of security is "the quality or state of being secure such as a. freedom from danger, b. freedom from fear or anxiety, and c. freedom from the prospect of being laid off."⁶¹ In this dissertation, I invoke this rudimentary definition of security. However, to show how Guåhan is a political anomaly which International Relations as a field cannot accurately engage with, I also challenge the conventional IR definition of security. According to the security

⁶⁰ Barnett and Duvall, "Power,"⁶⁷.

⁶¹ *Merriam-Webster Dictionaries*, s.v., "security," accessed August 2018, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/security>

studies canon, security is defined as “the identification of threats to a particular referent object and the formulation of policy responses to those threats.”⁶² David Mutimer continues this definition of security by establishing its traditional parameters: threats are military, referent object is the state, and the responses are strategic policies.” As will be further detailed and theorized in the following chapter, as an unincorporated territory, Guåhan is not part of the referent object of American national security concerns, but is rather used as a response to threats.

Beyond this traditional IR definition of security as military, I also invoke the genealogy of critical security studies and expand the scope of security to include alternative securities such as political, environmental, human, and economic security to see if the military keeps Guåhan “secure” in these ways. It is for this reason that I intend this work be in conversation with critical security studies. It is important to note that there is no clear definition fixing the meaning of the word “critical” within critical security studies. In their introduction to the subject, Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, write, “we take the boundaries of critical security studies to be defined by those who frame their work using the label.”⁶³ Similarly, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams in their volume, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, help illuminate what is meant by “critical.” They write, “Our appending of the term critical to security studies is meant to imply more an orientation toward the discipline of security studies than a precise theoretical label.”⁶⁴

In attempting to provide a unifying theme for critical security studies, Richard Wyn Jones, writes that CSS is an approach that “eschews statism, recognizes that non-military issues have a place on the security agenda as well as military issues, and anchors the theory and practice of

⁶² Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, (New York: Routledge, 2011), Location 1940, Kindle.

⁶³ Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.

⁶⁴ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts And Strategies* (New York: Routledge, 1997), xii.

security in a broader concern with human emancipation.”⁶⁵ In his key text, *Theory of World Security*, Ken Booth reinforces this, arguing that unlike traditional security studies, critical security studies should be used for the purpose of emancipation. Emancipation as described by Booth is “freeing individuals from war, the threat of war, poverty, poor education, and political oppression.”⁶⁶ Thus, for Booth and others in the Aberystwyth School, security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Booth writes that, “Emancipation is the only permanent hope of becoming. Security is required, and not just survival. In this sense, security is equivalent to survival-plus (the plus being some freedom from life determining threats and therefore space to make choices).”⁶⁷

In this dissertation, I demonstrate how the invocation of American “national security” in Guåhan and the island’s use in the defense of this national security has been quite contrary to forms of emancipation. Rather, using these definitions of security within CSS, I strongly argue that the United States has made the island and its people insecure. As this dissertation shows, the island and its people must feel insecure in order to ensure a need for someone to “secure” the island, thus enabling military presence and a situation of sustainable insecurity. Some of the key concepts of critical security studies include deepening and broadening. Deepening security means moving beyond the state as the referent object of security, and broadening security means to move beyond the military sector of analysis to include other sectors of a referent object such as the environment.⁶⁸ I justify situating this dissertation within critical security studies as I move beyond and critique the traditional military-defined, state-centered approach to security and muddy the conceptual waters to allow an analysis of Guåhan security to take center-stage in various manifestations.

⁶⁵ Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 5.

⁶⁶ Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁶⁷ Booth, *Theory*.

⁶⁸ Peoples and Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*

Barbara Sutton and Julie Novkov ask the question, “What are the gaps between dominant conceptions of security and the interests of ordinary citizens, especially those in marginalized positions?”⁶⁹ In many ways, this dissertation attempts to answer this question in the uniquely colonial and hypermilitarized case of Guåhan. Theoretically taking from the security studies literature, I argue that in the application of all definitions of security, the United States makes us more insecure than they do secure, and furthermore, related to my power argument, that any side effect of security is a demonstration of forced powerlessness rather than an ontology. Sutton and Novkov argue that “The dominant conception of national security rests on the assumption that security, through the enforcement of militarized policies, surveillance, and state secrecy, will eventually trickle down to the majority of the population.”⁷⁰ This dissertation is a direct challenge to this dominant conception and to use an industrial metaphor, if the production of American national security produces the electricity for the United States to continue running, what trickles down to Guåhan is unreliable electricity, shutting on and off frequently, so that we always know that their power is better and more reliable, which makes us more dependent. Similar to Bevacqua’s notion of Guåhan sitting at the center of American power, I argue similarly that Guåhan is where American security is produced specifically in Asia and Oceania, but to the expense of the genuine security of the people of the island. As representatives at the International Women’s Summit to Redefine Security argued in 2000, “National security policies have done little for women and children but instead have promoted increased global militarization and bred insecurity as economic and environmental vulnerability of local communities worsened.”⁷¹

By genuine security, I invoke a long line of demilitarization, feminist activists, who have done some of the most important thinking about security and its implication for the marginalized, particularly, Women for Genuine Security. Women for Genuine Security is a group promoting

⁶⁹ Sutton and Novkov, *Security Disarmed*, 3, Kindle.

⁷⁰ Sutton and Novkov, *Security Disarmed*, Loc 306, Kindle.

⁷¹ Sutton and Novkov, *Security Disarmed*, Loc 344, Kindle.

security based on justice and respect across national boundaries, a world free of militarism, violence, and all forms of sexual exploitation. In their advocacy of genuine security, they invoke the United Nations Development Program Report of 1994, which advocates for a human security paradigm, in which the bases of security are that: (1) The physical environment must be able to sustain human and natural life, (2) People's basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education must be guaranteed, (3) People's fundamental human dignity should be honored and cultural identities respected, and (4) People and the natural environment should be protected from avoidable harm.⁷² Furthermore, their positive conception of security is related to Booth's notion of security as emancipation. They assert that working for genuine security includes, "ending all forms of colonialism and occupation, valuing the complex ecological web that sustains human beings and of which we are all a part, eliminating oppressions based on gender, race, class, heterosexuality, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, able body-ism, and other significant differences, and redefining manhood."⁷³ I share an affinity with many of their goals, and in the conclusion, provide possibilities for genuine Guåhan security. However, a core component of this dissertation is that genuine Guåhan security cannot ever be actualized as long as our form-of-life as a militarized, unincorporated territory of the United States continues, with each chapter demonstrating a different component of insecurity and violence. It is also important to note that these goals of genuine security are normative, but as I argue in the conclusion, the real-life predators lurking in the international system still require an answer that may conflict with the goals of genuine security. However, I argue that these normative goals should still remain the goals of security policy.

Thus, I am careful in my engagement with critical security studies to never forget Guåhan's militarized reality. Within security studies, there is a debate regarding security and militarism with

⁷² "What is Genuine Security?" Women For Genuine Security, accessed October 2018, <http://www.genuinesecurity.org/aboutus/whatisGS.html>

⁷³ Women For Genuine Security, "What is GS."

the most recent turn in the field tending to erase militarism. As explained by Anna Stavrianakis and Maria Stern,

Yet, as security seeps into spaces previously unfamiliar to international relations, we lost sight of its limits in relation to other critical concepts and practices that also lie at the heart of the discipline. In particular, militarism...has never received the widespread and sustained focus it warrants in either traditional variants of security studies. The prevalent emphasis on security has taken precedence over the study of the ways in which war and militarism continue to permeate societies the world over, in different forms and different degrees.⁷⁴

This turn away from militarism in security studies stems from the post-Cold War intellectual trajectory away from great power politics and the rise of liberalism as well as an emphasis on this new human security. This project critiques an intellectual diminution of the role of security problems and sees them as co-constitutive in the case of Guåhan. My normative analysis of what may be considered human security issues is not made with a conceptual turn away from militarism as an ideology or militarization as a process. Rather, I see the connection between the two concepts as Stavrianakis and Stern do, “War and militarism have generated insecurity in a variety of forms—physical, gendered, food and health insecurity—through direct physical violence and the attendant strategies thereof that have effects that are then labelled as security problems.”⁷⁵ This project attempts to further emphasize the continuing importance of war, militarism, and militarization as the origin of many security problems around the world, particularly in regions such as Micronesia and in islands like Guåhan.

VIOLENCE IN GUÅHAN: SLOW, EVENTLESS, AND STEADY

Forging the previous sections together, I argue that because of the exercise of polymorphous American military power and Guåhan’s political status as an unincorporated territory, our consequent exclusion from American security concerns has led to multiple forms of

⁷⁴ Anna Stavrianakis and Maria Stern, “Militarism and security: Dialogue, possibilities, and limits,” *Security Dialogue*, 49 (2018), 4.

⁷⁵ Stavrianakis and Stern, “Militarism,” 5.

violence committed against the island and its people. Because the trend in security studies turns away from militarization and militarism, framing this dissertation simply as human security problems hurts my emphasis on the 12-foot giant's effect on my homeland. Furthermore, using security alone as my conceptual framework would not be sufficient to critique the actions taken in the name of national security that have harmed Guåhan and its people.

To assist in understanding this argument, it is important to theorize my notion of violence. For this dissertation, I argue that the violence committed against Guåhan and its people is slow, eventless, and steady, thus challenging dominant notions of what violence is supposed to do or what shape it is supposed to have. Keeping with the shape-shifting giant metaphor, I compare the seeming invisibility of violence as slow, steady, and eventless as one of the giant's most excellent camouflages amongst its arsenal of control. I argue that these shapes form a "continuum of violence" as described by many feminists.

Feminists have long been noting and interrogating the continuum of violence and the inadequacy of the categories that distinguish between different forms of violence, thus problematizing the lines of distinction between war and peace, the public and private, domestic and political violence, and so on. Feminist insight has shown us that for people living in war zones, war is relational and systemic, a continuum in which it is not quite so easy to set aside ordinary aggression, force or violence as not war.⁷⁶

I similarly argue that the bombing during World War II, post-war land taking, and economic limiting due to obscure policy in the interest of national security are not ontologically different categories, but rather all lie in the continuum of violence produced via our militarized, unincorporated territory status. In Guåhan, neatly delineating between violences during World War II and violences after World War II conducted by the military produces an unnecessary differentiation that does not accurately reflect the structural nature of militarization, insecurity, power, and violence in Guåhan. The military acts as the take-it-for-granted giant. It doesn't necessarily need to bite or blatantly exercise power, so it seems like a non-actor or non-event.

⁷⁶ Stavrianakis and Stern, "Militarism," 10.

To begin, I challenge the temporality of conventional violence. For most, violence is a quick and highly visible act (if not the act itself, then its aftermath). Slovenian philosopher and critical theorist, Slavoj Žižek, describes this as subjective violence, which is the type most people are describing when they use the word. With subjective violence, there is a clearly identifiable agent performing the act. Everyday examples include rape, murder, robberies, assault, and other forms of violent “crime” one sees on the nightly news. While I agree that these acts are violent, what I attempt to show in this dissertation is that the violences of the U.S. military in Guāhan have not traditionally taken this stereotypical form. Rather, the more accurate description in Guāhan is slow violence as theorized by Rob Nixon. Nixon, in *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*, writes,

By slow violence, I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales.⁷⁷

In providing an example of slow violence, Nixon invites the reader to a thought experiment. He asks what is more violent? The bombing of a country in Africa or using that country as a dump site for toxic waste? For most, the former would clearly be the winner of this thought experiment as it fits the stereotypical conditions for violence: immediate in time, explosive, spectacular in space, and erupting into sensational visibility. Using a country as a dump site, however, does not fit these characteristics and thus for many, may not be seen as an act of violence. One may view it as unjust or wrong, but not necessarily violent.

Nixon argues, however, “We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions—from domestic

⁷⁷ Rob Nixon, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2013), 2.

abuse to post-traumatic stress and in particular environmental calamities.”⁷⁸ He then asks the reader, “How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?”⁷⁹ Nixon writes that one of the most effective and nefarious characteristics of slow violence is its ability to become disconnected from collective memory or escape the forensics of resistance movements. Slow violence literally becomes decoupled from its original causes with the sludge of time’s passing. In this dissertation, I attempt to tell this story and give justice to the story of slow violence in Guåhan and uncover the forensic evidence that has been hiding in plain sight.

Related to the “slow” aspect of slow violence is eventless violence. By eventless, I mean a violence devoid of any sensationalism, devoid of the characteristics that would traditionally constitute an “event.” Not all forms of violence in this dissertation such as bombing during World War II are eventless or fit within the chronology and story of history. Examples of eventless violence examined in this dissertation include unmatched federal funding, avoidance of contamination cleanup due to “geographical distance,” and the conversion of land into wildlife refuges. None of these, from a surface analysis, constitute violent events, but I try to show that violence can occur in the most desensationalized, eventless manner. In *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism*, Elizabeth Povinelli argues that suffering can be ordinary, chronic, and cruddy, never reaching the level of an event or a crisis. She writes that she is interested in “quasi-events that saturate potential worlds and their social projects.”⁸⁰ Explaining this further, “If events are things that we can say happened such that they have a certain objective being, then quasi-events never quite achieve the status of having occurred

⁷⁸ Nixon, *Slow Violence*, 3.

⁷⁹ Nixon, *Slow Violence*, 3.

⁸⁰ Elizabeth Povinelli, *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2011), 13.

or taken place. They neither happen nor not happen.”⁸¹ Throughout the dissertation, each chapter focuses on a historical analysis of a realm of society such as the environment or the economy to try to better understand this process of sustainable insecurity.

Chris Cuomo makes a similar argument in his discussion on “everyday violence,” which is a form of violence that I argue never gets politicized to the level of an event or a crisis, due to its normalization within a society. To put it simply, if you grow up in a room with a putrid smell, you never realize that it probably should not smell that way, and thus are not conscious of the need to open a window and let some fresh air in. Cuomo argues, “Everyday military practices are actually more destructive than most other human activities. They are directly enacted by state power, and because they functioned as unquestioned ‘givens,’ they enjoy a unique near-immunity to enactments of moral reproach.”⁸² Everyday violence can be the slow, eventless violence that is also rooted in a structure that gives it a sturdy and steady foundation.

The third characteristic of violence in Guåhan is that it is steady, and by steady, I primarily situate this everyday, eventless violence as a result of being structural. In theorizing steady violence, I return to Zizek’s description of objective and systemic violence. Objective violence is the inherent violence forming the “state of affairs.” As Zizek writes, “Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent.”⁸³ Furthermore, he describes it as the “catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.”⁸⁴ I saw a stark example of this in a History of Guam class I taught a couple of years ago. I used a portion of the class to discuss the events occurring in Ferguson, Missouri after the fatal shooting of a young black man named Michael Brown. After the shooting, which many in the community in Ferguson viewed as another

⁸¹ Povinelli, *Economies*, 13.

⁸² Chris J. Cuomo, “War Is Not Just An Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence,” *Hypatia*, 11, no. 4, (1996): 42.

⁸³ Slavoj Zizek, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections* (New York: Picador, 2008), 2.

⁸⁴ Zizek, *Violence*, 2.

example of racialized police brutality, many protested and rioted in the streets. In the class discussion, my students were confused and asked why the community would react in such a violent way. For them, the system was smoothly functioning, with Darren Wilson (the officer who shot Michael Brown) making a horrible mistake, but not a mistake that should be reciprocated with more violence. This was one of the most illuminating teaching experiences I had regarding the way that systemic or structural violence is operationalized and normalized.

In understanding steady violence as structural, I also utilize the work of Johan Galtung, particularly his article, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” In the article, Galtung defines violence as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual. Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decreasing of this distance.”⁸⁵ He provides the example of someone dying from tuberculosis. If this death happened as a result of natural transmission in the 1800s, he does not see this as violence. However, with the modern technology of today, someone dying from tuberculosis is a form of violence. While acknowledging that Galtung was involved in peace research, not International Relations or security studies, and acknowledging that this definition may stretch too far in particular circumstances, I find it useful in discussing a system of violence and insecurity which, absolutely produces a chasm between the potential and the actual. It is a way of discussing violence outside of not only its dominant temporal thinking, but also in accommodating militarized actions in a colony such as Guåhan.

MITIGATION: DON’T WORRY, IT WON’T HURT THAT BAD

Guåhan and its people are affected by US exertions of power, in the several ways I outline above. These are routinely cushioned, I argue, via a permanent state of mitigation. In its most basic sense, mitigation is “the process or result of making something less severe, dangerous, painful,

⁸⁵ Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 6, no. 3 (1969): 168.

harsh, or damaging.”⁸⁶ Mitigation has a long history in environmental literature. Mitigation refers to “any deliberate action that is taken to alleviate adverse effects, whether by controlling the sources of impacts or the exposure of receptors to them.”⁸⁷ I argue that control of the island is maintained, and processes of militarization and colonialism are made more palatable via consistent mitigation. Throughout the chapters, with each form of violence and insecurity, I also discuss the mitigation measures that allow these forms of violence to smoothly function, which all contribute to sustainable insecurity.

I relate mitigation to David Kilcullen’s theory of competitive control. Kilcullen, writing on irregular warfare and megatrends in the future conflict ecosystem, describes this as “In irregular conflict, the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population and its residential area.”⁸⁸ He writes regarding competitive control, “it creates a control structure that’s easy and attractive for people to enter, but then locks into a system of persuasion and coercion: a set of incentives and disincentives from which they find it extremely difficult to break out.”⁸⁹ Kilcullen’s theory of competitive control provides an analytical tool for understanding the workings of a permanent state of mitigation. Using irregular warfare as a case study, he shows how in communities throughout the world, stability is one of the keys to the sustenance of a control system. For example, although communities in Colombia may not agree with the drug cartels’ objectives or methods, if they are able to bring a sense of stability, predictability, and order, communities will accept this normative system of control. Now, it may seem odd to the reader to use Kilcullen’s work since it deals with irregular warfare and not, continuous military occupation as is the case in Guåhan. However, his theory of competitive

⁸⁶ Merriam-Webster Dictionaries, s.v. “mitigation, accessed August 2018, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mitigation>

⁸⁷ Jo Treweek, *Ecological Impact Assessment* (Bristol: Blackwell Science, 1999), 11.

⁸⁸ David Kilcullen, *Out Of The Mountains: The Coming Age Of The Urban Guerilla* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 126.

⁸⁹ Kilcullen, *Mountains*, 117.

control has ramifications for all communities dealing with armed actors, and in this case, the U.S. military. The meat of Kilcullen's work is in showing that predictability and consistency are what make people accept control from a particular group. Happiness or success is not necessary for control to be exerted over a population, as consistency provides some pattern to life. Kilcullen's discussion of being locked into a particular system of incentives as a result of control is also directly relevant to this dissertation. For example, in Guåhan, money and social mobility will be shown to be an incentive for military enlistment and federal contracts as the incentive for supporting the military buildup. Many in Guåhan have become accustomed to this system of incentives and subsequent actions and efforts to change them are very difficult. This makes mitigation particularly useful; the hopeless argument that things could be worse. In a similar manner, I argue that it is through the predictability and consistency of the military presence in Guåhan, that helps enable hegemonic control over the island. In this dissertation, I show a permanent state of mitigation in different forms of violence have allowed militarization and colonialism to become more palatable.

Informing this permanent state of mitigation is the 665 analogy as discussed by Eyal Weizman. Weizman writes regarding the violence inherent in mitigation, "This number, one less than the number of the beast—that of the devil and total evil—might capture the essence of our humanitarian present obsessed with the calculations and calibrations that seek to moderate, ever so slightly, the evils that it has largely caused itself."⁹⁰ The 665 analogy can be summarized as doing as much bad as one can do before being considered evil. This is not about striving to do good, but rather striving to preserve one's image. While I am not concerned with these theological or philosophical issues of good or evil, the 665 analogy helps demonstrate that a permanent state of mitigation is meant to quell resistance and never appear as something to whole-heartedly resist. Weizman articulates further,

⁹⁰ Eyal Weizman, *The Least Of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence From Arendt To Gaza* (London: Verso Books, 2011), 6.

The principle of lesser evil is often presented as a dilemma between two or more bad choices in situations where available options are, or seem to be, limited. The choice made justifies the pursuit of harmful actions that would be otherwise deemed unacceptable in the hope of averting even greater suffering...Both aspects of the principle are understood as taking place within a closed system in which those posing the dilemma, the options available for choice, the factors to be calculated and the very parameters of calculation are unchallenged.⁹¹

A 665-permanent state of mitigation allows one to respond to violent acts by the American military with, “Yes, but...” The option of not having the military in Guåhan are seen as categorically worse than any harm or inconvenience they may cause, and each of the chapters of this dissertation demonstrate the formulation and operationalization of this thought process. I argue that the closed system is Guåhan’s militarized, unincorporated territory form-of-life and that changing this closed system necessitates a change in political status, which will be discussed in the conclusion. With this concluding a detailed description of my conceptual use of unincorporated territory, militarization, power, security, violence, and mitigation, I now move on to discussing CHamoru agency as well as the methods I used to write and complete this dissertation.

A NOTE ON CHAMORU AGENCY

Admittedly, the material of this dissertation can get overwhelming, examining the various violences and forms of insecurity crafted and sustained by the U.S. military here in the island. I excavate these genealogies and examine the manifestations of these phenomena. Here, I want to make clear that I do not position my people, the indigenous CHamoru, as simple victims or passive recipients of these violences, powerlessness, and conditions of insecurity. Guåhan’s history is rich in resistance to colonialism, imperialism, and militarization from the earliest contact to present day. Indigenous studies is filled with scholarship on the importance of not overlooking indigenous agency and to represent indigenous peoples in a more decolonized manner. The canonical historiography of indigenous peoples throughout the world has viewed us as passive recipients of a more powerful oppressive force and as either noble or ignoble savages. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth

⁹¹ Weizman, *The Least Of*, 6.

Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, writes in *The Empire Writes Back*, “In order to maintain authority over the Other in a colonial situation, imperial discourse strives to delineate the Other as radically different from the self, yet at the same time it must maintain sufficient identity with the Other to valorize control over it.”⁹² Furthermore, Regis Stella writes, “The process of representing has never been neutral; it has always been politicized and contested. Its meaning has always been culturally defined, mediated through a set of cultural assumptions, beliefs, and truths.”⁹³ In many instances, indigenous peoples have been represented as multiple adjectives including: uncivilized, weak, savage, evil, barbaric, primitive, powerless, etc.

I do not aim to replicate that here. A possible critique of this dissertation is that I delve deeply into the role the U.S. military has played in creating a continuum of violences and a condition of sustainable insecurity in the island, and spend little time in the chapters discussing CHamoru resistance to these various economic, environmental, land, and political acts of violence. The genealogy of CHamoru resistance is documented in various works by CHamoru and other scholars such as Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider’s *A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam 1899-1950*, the poetry of Craig Santos Perez, “Speaking the Language of Peace: Chamoru Resistance and Rhetoric in Guåhan’s Self-Determination Movement,” by Tiara R. Na’puti, “Histories of Wonder, Futures of Wonder: Chamorro Activist Identity, Community, and Leadership in ‘The Legend of Gadao’ and ‘The Women Who Saved Guåhan from a Giant Fish’,” by Michael Lujan Bevacqua and Isa Kelley Bowman, “Resisting Political Colonization and American Militarization in the Marianas Archipelago,” by Sylvia C. Frain, “Chamorro Women, Self-Determination, and the Politics of Abortion in Guam,” by Vivian Loyola Dames, “Kustumbre, Modernity and Resistance: The Subaltern Narrative in Chamorro Language Music,” by Michael Clement, “Simply Chamorro: Telling Tales of Demise and Survival in Guam,” by Vicente M.

⁹² Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 103.

⁹³ Regis Tove Stella, *Imagining The Other: The Representation of the Papua New Guinean Subject* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 20-21.

Diaz, “Other Arms: The Power of a Dual Rights Legal Strategy for the Chamoru People of Guam Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts,” by Julian Aguon, and the multiple writings of the father of CHamoru Studies, Robert A. Underwood. These mentioned works collectively form only a sample of the works dedicated to either displaying the history of CHamoru resistance or in imagining new methods of resistance forward. In excavating the anatomy of the giant of the U.S. military, I argue that I am also contributing to CHamoru resistance, and not erasing CHamorus.

As demonstrated, there are works already in existence that trace resistance and demonstrate in a more obvious way, the intricacies and complexities of CHamoru resistance. This work does not include detailed descriptions of CHamoru resistance and thus may give the appearance that it eludes CHamoru agency. However, I want to continue using the giant metaphor. To fight against the giant, one of the most important things to do is to learn its anatomy and physiology and create a manual understanding of its habitat, mannerisms, weaknesses, likes and dislikes as it can be extremely helpful in sustaining the fight. This is what this work aims to do. It aims to understand the different faces of the shape-shifting giant of the U.S. military and its presence in Guåhan. I view this work as a complete act of CHamoru agency. The giant does not want a manual written about it. The giant does not want to be completely understood. I fight against the giant through understanding it more thoroughly and thus view a dissertation aimed at understanding the various operations of the U.S. military in Guåhan and the subsequent effect on CHamoru livelihoods as a complete act of CHamoru agency, even if along the way, we have to admit that we have lost many battles. May the future generations read this as a manual, and use it accordingly to help plan their resistance more thoroughly.

METHODS

In any surgery, the surgeon needs tools, and in this surgical dissection of militarization in Guåhan, these tools are equivalent to methods. In this dissertation, the primary methods I use to

most effectively analyze military security are discursive analysis, interviews, and archival research which are all detailed below. I tie all of these methods together in a decolonial methodology. In her groundbreaking book, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*, Linda Tuhiwai Smith identifies various strategies for decolonizing research. I situate my dissertation in the decolonial methodology of “self-determination and social justice” and see it as # 7 and #21 in her list of “Twenty-Five Indigenous Projects:” Intervening and Protecting.

Smith describes intervening: “Intervening takes action research to mean literally the process of being proactive and of becoming involved as an interested worker for change. Intervention-based projects are usually designed around making structural and cultural changes.”⁹⁴ My project is committed to intervening in the militarized status quo of the island and seeks to inspire structural changes. Through challenging the seemingly settled ontology of the military as a benevolent, beneficial presence of the island, this dissertation dismantles and hopes to make a structural change of moving away from militarization and unincorporated territory status. Smith then goes on to describe protecting: “The need to protect a way of life, a language and the right to make our own history is a deep need linked to the survival of indigenous peoples.”⁹⁵ This project is protection. This project aims to expose the threats to come from the continuing military presence in the island in the hopes of investigating ways to protect us from these threats. I view this dissertation as a shield against security and benefit arguments regarding the military in Guåhan.

With these decolonizing projects at the center of my approach, I consider myself to be an activist researcher. Bagele Chilisa describes some of the questions that an activist-researcher asks about their projects: “Does this research have a clear stance against the political imperialism of its time?” “Does this research have a clear stance against marginalization and exploitation of the colonized that comes through either the research agenda pursued or the relationship of the

⁹⁴ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research And Indigenous Peoples* (London: Zed Books, 2012), 148.

⁹⁵ Smith, *Decolonizing*, 159.

researcher with the researched?” and lastly, “Does the research address power struggles, oppression, and social differences such as race, gender, age, and class?”⁹⁶ These questions guide my ethics and methodology. The following is a detailed description of my methods.

1. Discursive Analysis:

At the core of critical security studies is the understanding of security as a practice and not as an object to be studied, thus the analytical emphasis in CSS is on processes. In line with CSS, this dissertation looks to understand the processes enabling this insecurity, power, violence, and mitigation. I argue that an understanding of these processes requires a discursive analysis. Stuart Hall discusses the Foucauldian concept of discourse as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—a way of representing the knowledge about—a particular topic at a particular moment. Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language.”⁹⁷ He explains that just as discourse produces a knowledge of things, it also “limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about it.”⁹⁸ I see this reflected in the ways that being critical of the military in Guåhan can lead to one being called ungrateful, crazy, or some other derogatory term. The military seems to be elevated to the level of the Catholic god, who also seems to be exempt from criticism here. I attempt to more fully understand the strategic discursive moves that led to the acquisition and continual production of this status.

However, a goal of mine is to show that the sustainability of military insecurity does not occur through discursive and securitizing moves alone, but is also rooted in a material genealogy, and that discourse is not emphasized or prioritized more than materiality. In order to address the discursive aspects, I analyze news stories from local media outlets such as the *Pacific Daily News*, the *Guam Daily Post*, KUAM, and the Pacific News Center as well as social media outlets in

⁹⁶ Bagele Chilisa, *Indigenous Research Methodologies* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publishings, 2011), 236.

⁹⁷ Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London: Sage Publication and Open University, 1997), 44.

⁹⁸ Hall, *Representation*, 45.

response to stories written by these news outlets. I also examine the documents surrounding the military buildup such as the Environmental Impact Statements and Records of Decision to see the way the military attempts to justify their expansion. Lastly, I also look to the historical commemorations of World War II which, many argue, serve as an origin for the rampant patriotism in the island. I do this through examining the historical accounts of the war, documentaries, oral stories of survivors, and the liberation day festivities. All of these help to form a more complete story regarding sustainable insecurity in Guåhan.

2. Interviews:

I conducted interviews for this dissertation for one primary purpose: to gain specialized knowledge that only those with expertise would know. There are experts in certain fields such as the economy, military logistics, and Guåhan history that I greatly benefited from interviewing. I do not use the interviews to generalize or make correlations, but rather to obtain information not public or in text, or to get a more detailed understanding of particular issues. For this purpose, I interviewed Chief Economist of the Bank of Guam, Joe Bradley; Senator and community organizer, Sabina Perez; Attorney General and lawyer representing activist groups in Guåhan, Leevin Camacho; Professor of Guåhan History, Anne Perez Hattori; Assistant Professor of Groundwater Hydrology, Nathan Habana; former Senator Fernando Esteves; Associate Professor of Social Work, Lisa Natividad; and Former Congressman and President of the University of Guam, Robert Underwood.

All of these individuals possess a high level of knowledge on particular issues and also live their lives in Guåhan. This aligns with my decolonial methodology by ensuring that local voices are not left out of the counter-narrative I am presenting. These interviews were done in person, and each interview lasted from 1-2 hours and were held at a place of their choosing. All participants were asked whether their interview could be recorded and whether or not I could use their names directly in the dissertation. Before the completion of this dissertation and its final submission, all

participants were shown the quotes and asked again whether they approve of my use of their words. With this research ethic, I aim to be accountable to those who took their time to talk to me, and I want to ensure that that I am giving their words proper contextualization and that they are comfortable with my usage of their interview.

3. Archival Research:

Tracing genealogies of military, strategic thought can be done in various ways. I chose to engage the works of security and strategic studies scholars who work with institutes and think tanks such as the Center for Security Studies, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and the Center for New American Security. For other official positions of the Federal Government, I searched EPA databases and reports from the Government Accountability Office. These think tanks produce countless reports on American security and thus serve as a perfect archive for tracing this genealogy. I also accessed the local media's news stories to trace the chronology of events occurring. I also spent many days in the MARC archive. MARC stands for the Micronesian Area Research Center, located at the University of Guam, and it is the premier research center in Micronesia for issues of politics, history, and current events. As I am currently an instructor at the university, I have direct access to these archives, including the portions that are limited to students. In addition to these archives, a large part of this research was done through the reading of secondary materials such as books published by academic presses that deal with issues of security, power, violence, or militarization.

I use these formal reports from these institutions, think tanks, and research centers for one primary purpose. These reports help illuminate the strategic thought of the military, strategic research centers, and the federal government regarding Guåhan. It helps fight against claims that I may be exaggerating or conflating the points and arguments I make throughout this dissertation. In my usage of primary sources, I aim to express these viewpoints to the reader that they may not have read previously due to the rather obscure and difficult access to these particular primary

source documents. I also do not just take what is written in these reports and utilize them, rather I critically investigate and analyze these primary sources. In his book, *Culture and Imperialism*, Edward Said, writes,

To ignore or otherwise discount the overlapping experience of Westerners and Orientals, the interdependence of cultural terrains in which colonizer and colonized co-existed and battled each other through projections as well as rival geographies, narratives, and histories, is to miss what is essential about the world in the past century.⁹⁹

Inspired by Said, I engage in the military's geographies, narratives, and histories, and illuminate and subsequently challenge them in this dissertation. I aim to show through a reading of their texts the CHamoru overlapping experience to their colonial and imperial manifestations in the island.

POSITIONALITY

I remember being a sophomore in college and having to do a book review in my Cognitive Psychology class. I chose to review a book named, *The Neuro Revolution: How Brain Science is Changing Our World* by Zack Lynch. From marketing, finance, medicine, interpersonal relationships, art, religion, to warfare, Lynch proclaimed that neuroscience will change these fields drastically forming a “neurosociety.”¹⁰⁰ Needless to say, I was drawn in and uncritically agreeing with everything that he said. Discussing my draft with my professor during class, he told me the Neuro revolution sounded good, but he asked me one important question that changed forever how I read books. He said, “But who is Zack Lynch?” The heavy hammer of historiography came swinging down, and I sadly responded, “I have no idea.” It turns out that Zack Lynch was the founder of the Neurotechnology Industry Organization, a global trade association involved in neuroscience, neurotechnology, and brain research institutes, and NeuroInsights, which is a marketing research firm used to advise organizations on the impact neurotechnology will have. This does not invalidate everything he wrote, but that information helped me to become a more

⁹⁹ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), Loc 298, Kindle.

¹⁰⁰ Zack Lynch and Byron Laursen, *The Neuro Revolution: How Brain Science Is Changing Our World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010).

critical reader. I learned of the importance of positionality from this experience. In respect of this experience, I provide my positionality here while at the same time acknowledging both “reflexivity and positionality as processes evolving over space and time.”¹⁰¹

To be straightforward, I am a CHamoru man born and raised in Guåhan, who comes from a middle-class family. My father is a Navy veteran, but unlike most, did not have base access growing up, which believe it or not, does matter regarding the subject matter of this dissertation. There is a firm belief in Guåhan that everything is much better within the fence, so having access to go inside the fence, certainly affects a person’s relationship with the military and their role in the island. Like most CHamoru families, multiple members of my family are either currently or formerly in the military, and this has led to some interesting family discussions. I am currently an instructor of Political Science at the University of Guam, a member of the Independence advocacy group, Independent Guåhan, and am a CHamoru language revitalization activist.

This positionality is important for the purposes of this project. Guåhan is my home and each decision made or each use of the island by the military affects my life and the lives of my grandparents, parents, and children. Konai Helu Thaman writes, “As a teacher who is still a learner, I think decolonizing Pacific studies is about reclaiming indigenous Oceania perspectives, knowledge, and wisdom that have been devalued or suppressed because they were or are not considered important or worthwhile.”¹⁰² Thaman’s quote resonates with my approach to this project. I aim to dig up a suppressed indigenous CHamoru perspective to Guåhan’s colonialism and militarization. I do not pretend to represent or speak for all CHamorus or argue that this is the perspective of all, what Albert Memmi calls the colonial “mark of the plural.”¹⁰³ However, I argue

¹⁰¹ Richa Nagar, *Muddying the Waters: Coauthoring Feminisms across Scholarship and Activism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 85.

¹⁰² Konai Helu Thaman, “Decolonizing Pacific Studies: Indigenous Perspectives, Knowledge, and Wisdom in Higher Education,” *The Contemporary Pacific*, 15, no. 1 (2003): 2.

¹⁰³ Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), 85.

that my positionality matters especially when it comes to my critique of International Relations in this dissertation, in which indigenous Oceanic perspectives have been subdued and buried.

As an instructor of International Relations at the University of Guam, my intervention in IR stems from my attempt to make it matter to my students. Coming from Guåhan, IR should end at the acceptance of our position as a U.S. territory and our role in the protection of the United States. However, I find this unsatisfactory, and thus I also aim to dissect IR and notions of security. In this dissertation, my positionality informs my decision to take the good from IR theory, while also throwing away what does not work in helping to understand or help Guåhan and the CHamoru people. Those most affected by IR and the geopolitical game need to speak back, and I find my unique positionality being important to the critical task of writing and speaking back to the fundamental assumptions, theories, and critiques of International Relations as a discipline. With my positionality out on the table, I now turn to the chapter outlines of this dissertation as a guide for the reader moving forward.

CHAPTER OUTLINES

The core of this dissertation aims at demonstrating three things: (1) That the U.S. military produces a state of insecurity in Guåhan via a continuum of violences and forced powerlessness, (2) That this insecurity is a result of our form-of-life as a militarized, unincorporated territory of the United States, and (3) That this insecurity is made sustainable via a permanent system of mitigation leading to the phenomenon of “sustainable insecurity”. To demonstrate these three things, each chapter is historically detailed and necessarily so. In understanding the conditions of possibility for sustainable insecurity, a historical analysis is required to help the reader understand how we got here and how can things change. I do not emphasize historical and contemporary description and analysis as a method of listing wrongs done by the U.S. military. Rather, the historical emphasis helps understand the genealogy of these various forms of insecurities. I imagine each chapter transporting the reader to a particular realm of Guåhan’s militarized form-

of-life, and through the reading of each chapter, the reader comes to see the assemblages and structures of violence, power, militarization, and colonialism that has been forcefully crafted as well as CHamoru and Guåhan's resistance to this form-of-life. The U.S. military may be winning, but they have not won, and through reading each chapter, one can help come up with solutions to these rampant violences Guåhan faces.

In Chapter 1, I demonstrate the entanglement of Guåhan's militarization and its political status as an unincorporated territory as creating a situation of political insecurity. Using historical analysis of political events, I show how Guåhan's fight for a change in political status has always been pushed aside in the name of U.S. national security. In doing this, I theorize the concept of "realism in between," in which I argue that Guåhan's form-of-life is crafted as a result of a realist power analysis in international politics and via unincorporated territory status. I engage in IR theory to show how a true analysis of Guåhan security is not feasible in IR due to the political anomaly we are and will remain if our political status is not changed. In making this larger IR argument, I give material evidence of "realism in between" through a discussion of China's rise both economically and militarily and Guåhan's place in buffering China from the United States.

In Chapter 2, I examine the structure of land dispossession that was perpetuated throughout Guåhan's colonial history and which modern life in Guåhan is based. Using Patrick Wolfe's argument that "invasion is a structure, not an event," as well as his emphasis on the colonial hunger for territoriality, I situate land dispossession as the condition of possibility for the manifestations of this continuum of violences. In this analysis, I traverse the continuum showing physical violence in the form of bombing the island, economic violence in the economic potential loss as a result of land theft, as well as arguing land dispossession by the military as the origin story of environmental contamination of the island. I detail how the loss of CHamoru land from CHamoru hands has led to a state of insecurity and forced powerlessness.

In Chapter 3, I fully engage with the issue of economic insecurity. In this chapter, I detail the multiple ways that our status as a militarized unincorporated territory has led to a diminishment of Guåhan's economic potential. I address how a lack of sovereignty or representation in law-making bodies has led to arrangements such as the Government of Guåhan having to pay a substantial amount due to the Compacts of Free Association made between the United States and other Micronesian countries. I address how the militarization of the island and the subsequent basing has led to military service as a meal ticket and base access as a desirable goal. Lastly, I describe the various forms of economic mitigation the United States gives to the island such as federal welfare programs and block grants to quell possible resistance to militarized, colonial status. I argue that this amounts to an economic form of slow, steady, and uneventful violence.

Chapter 4 tackles the issue of environmental violence and outlines the forms of contamination caused by military activities in Guåhan. From PCBs to TCE to DDT, I detail this toxic history to counter the mythology of the military as environmental stewards of the island. I geographically cover most of the terrain of the island from Andersen Air Force Base in the North, Ibanez/Guerrero Properties in the Central, and lastly, Dãno' Island in the South. This shows that almost every region of the island has been poisoned with military toxins. In this chapter, I also analyze the contamination story of potential Agent Orange (AO) storage and spraying in the island. I use these stories to show how our forced powerlessness has seeped down to an epistemological level in which official scientific results, particularly through "inconclusivity," has left Guåhan in a current state of unknowing regarding the extent of contamination in the island. For example, despite a massive amount of testimony from servicemen stationed in Guåhan during the Vietnam War who testify that they sprayed Agent Orange, the Department of Defense refuses to acknowledge the use of AO in the island. Lastly, I discuss the forms of mitigation through examining documents for the military buildup and military "wildlife refuge" conservation discourse.

In the final chapter, Chapter 5, I attempt to answer a question posed by Robert Underwood in an article he wrote for the *Micronesian Educator*, “Why are there not 10,000 people protesting in the street?” If the chapters of the dissertation up to the final chapter have all shown that contrary to hegemonic belief, the military does not keep Guåhan secure, then why are there not massive protests countering such rampant military presence and fighting for political status change? Each chapter gives a piece of this answer in the form of “a permanent state of mitigation” leading to “sustainable insecurity.” However, I argue that this does not tell the full story of an admittedly successful colonial and militarist project in the island. Rather, using Ngũgĩ Wa Thiongo’s cultural bomb theory, Frantz Fanon’s psychoanalysis in *Black Skin, White Masks*, and Keith Camacho’s discussion of post-war commemorations, I show how the post-World War II period, particularly through a “liberation” discourse, hammered the head of colonialism’s nail in the island, making colonial attachment and feelings of patriotism run rampant in Guåhan.

Lastly, in the conclusion, I take the opportunity to examine alternative futures for Guåhan that provide a better opportunity at achieving genuine security and in making Guåhan powerful in every sense of the word, as described in this introduction. I examine the benefits of Guåhan being an independent nation-state, while fully acknowledging the critiques of the state as a form of political organization and the many risks of becoming a state. Despite these valid critiques, I argue that due to Guåhan’s unique political status and our subsequent listing on the United Nations’ list of non self-governing territories, the possibility of being our own nation-state does exist. Thus, I argue it is in Guåhan’s best interest to take this opportunity. From here, I also examine the possibilities of regionalism. Inspired by the work of Epeli Hau’ofa, I introduce a theory of “Hau’ofian Realism,” as a possible route of achieving genuine security. The final part of the conclusion argues that despite a bleak-looking future, that the people of Guåhan need to continue to resist and fight for a better future. I end the dissertation with a letter to my newborn son,

Matatnga Gregorio Naputi Kuper. His name translated from Fino' CHamoru, means "fearless or brave." It is in his spirit that I complete this dissertation.

Chapter 1: When the U.S. Sneezes, Guåhan Catches Pneumonia: Political Violence and (In)security in Guåhan

“North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen... he has been very threatening beyond a normal state. They will be met with fire, fury and frankly power the likes of which this world has never seen before.”- Donald Trump

¹

I was at a lavender farm in Maui when my mother called me crying. It was April of 2013. Between exasperated cries, my mom yelped and pleaded, “Son, please pray. They’re going to bomb us.” At the time, I had no idea what she was talking about. I frantically tried to reach her beneath the tears and asked, “Mom, what are you talking about?” She cried, “North Korea. They said they are going to bomb the island.” She was referring to a threat made by North Korea declaring that their missiles could reach the military bases in the American territory of Guam. A spokesperson for the Supreme Command of the North Korean People’s Army told the media, “The U.S. should not forget that the Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, where B-52s take off, and naval bases in Japan proper and Okinawa, where nuclear-powered submarines are launched, are within the striking range of D.P.R.K.s precision strikes means.”² Needless to say, I was extremely worried and felt powerless not being home, telling myself how unfair it would be for my island and family to vanish in the blink of an eye while I was on spring break enjoying myself. Yet, as unfortunate and frightening as this was for my mother, this is not even the latest instance of Guåhan being threatened by the hermit kingdom.

In August of 2017, the island became the object of the international media spotlight as it was the center of back-and-forth aggressive rhetoric between U.S. president Donald Trump and North Korea leader Kim Jong Un. From BBC and Al Jazeera to Vice News, the streets flowed with

¹Jim Sciutto, Barbara Starr, and Zachary Cohen, “Trump promises North Korea ‘fire and fury’ over nuke threat,” *CNN*, August 9, 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/08/politics/north-korea-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons/index.html>.

²Choe Sang-Hun and Steven Erlanger, “North Korea Threatens U.S. Military Bases in Pacific,” *New York Times*, March 21, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/world/asia/north-korea-threatens-us-military-bases-in-the-pacific.html>.

journalists all attempting to examine this small island in the Pacific Ocean that had become the target of discussions of North Korean nuclear potential and reach. While it was confusing for a large majority of the world as to why Guåhan was the focal point of this fiery rhetoric, most residents of Guåhan were either concerned by or already desensitized to the event. Despite these optimistic or pessimistic views of potential conflict, one thing that Guåhan residents were not, is hysterical. When hearing this news, the people of Guåhan were relatively calm over this event. We are used to our island's role in war. The effects of war seep heavily into the soil of our genealogies, watering the roots of our experiences, with the most pertinent example being our role in World War II. Guåhan has consistently been a pivotal pawn in the geopolitical chess game of foreign powers, and the North Korea-United States rhetorical duel is simply another match played upon the island and its people.

In this chapter, I examine the role of Guåhan's political status and relationship with the United States in making the stories above possible. More specifically, I argue that our current political status as a strategically located unincorporated territory, a.k.a. colony, is the grounds by which the United States can gamble with Guåhan for the pursuit of their national interest in the Asia-Pacific region, and thus it is in U.S. interests for Guåhan to remain a colony. Whether it is the geopolitical game played over Chinese development in the South China Sea or the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the vulnerability and strategic significance of Guåhan is often reduced to a rung on the escalation ladder rather than a national territory to be protected. The population and the island itself are leveraged for power projection certainly, but also used as a kind of redline or trip wire for disputes in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, this chapter examines these two spear tips bleeding Guåhan out: (1) Our location as the reason for continued colonial status thus inhibiting political advancement and causing political insecurity, and (2) Due to our location and ambiguous political status, we are sacrificial lambs waiting to be gutted on the altar of American national security, which belies the myth that the American military "protects" the island. To put it

simply, the United States military presence not only puts us in harm's way from a traditional defense perspective but also keeps us politically insecure as a colony.

To make this argument, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section looks at the geography of Guåhan and the importance of its strategic location for other powers. In this section, I then discuss the role of Guåhan's political status in this duet of location and sovereignty. I also theoretically engage with the notion of islands' roles in geopolitics and their designation on the map from a "violent cartographies"³ perspective. Building on this, in the second section, I outline International Relations' foundational racism and argue that as an unincorporated territory, International Relations as an academic discipline does not properly allow for an analysis of Guåhan security. I then attempt to squeeze the violences wrought onto Guåhan and its people from the U.S. military into a realist perspective, as opposed to a human security perspective. The third section shows the political history of the U.S. military's attempt to keep Guåhan an unincorporated territory and their opposition to the CHamoru citizenship and self-determination/decolonization movement. In this section, I argue the ways in which this political violence continues to affect Guåhan. The last section turns to current U.S. geopolitical and security concerns in the region to investigate Guåhan's future role in national security and the prospects for decolonization. I show how the hegemonic argument that the military keeps the island "safe and secure" is a lot more nuanced and complex.

I. THE LAY OF THE (IS)LAND: MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, EXERCISES, AND AMERICAN HISTORY

For many, one of the best parts of a flight is the landing. As soon as the flight attendant announces that the plane is about to land, most people start to look at the geographical landscape right outside their windows. When coming into Guåhan, one peculiarity of this landscape

³ Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

admiration is a large open space of land in the north of the island with a long tarmac runway. This is Andersen Air Force Base, one of the two main military installations in the island.

As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, 27% of the island is currently occupied by the U.S. military (roughly 40,000 acres) with Andersen Air Force Base encompassing the northern part of the island and Naval Base Guam bifurcating the southern half of the island, with other minor military installations scattered around. Andersen Air Force occupies the most northern tip of the island, which is blockaded with securitized sentry guards and barbed wire fences. Andersen, as it is called in Guåhan, was named after Brigadier General James Roy Andersen, a former chief of staff for the Army Air Force Pacific, who is believed to have died in 1945 in an aircraft accident in the Pacific, when the aircraft he was travelling in disappeared near the Marshall Islands.⁴ Brigadier General Gentry W. Boswell and Colonel Matthew J. Nicholson currently lead the base as Commander and Vice Commander. The base currently hosts the 36th wing of the Pacific Air Forces Eleventh Air force which is divided into various groups: the 36th Operations Group, 36th Mission Support Group, 36th Maintenance Group, and the 36th Contingency Response Group. They are a non-flying wing whose mission is to provide support to deployed air and space forces of the United States Air Force and foreign air forces as well as support tenant units assigned to the bases. Supplementing this, their mission as described in the official Andersen Air Force Base website is in,

executing Pacific Command's Continuous Bomber Presence, Theater Security Packages, Contingency Response Operations, and peacetime and combat operations in the Indo Pacific Region. The Wing is also tasked to ensure the successful deployment, employment, and integration of air and space forces from the most forward sovereign U.S. Air Force Base in the Indo Pacific Region.⁵

⁴ "James Roy Andersen," Newspapers, accessed September 2018, https://www.newspapers.com/clip/2465217/james_roy_andersen_19041945/

⁵ "About Us," Andersen Air Force Base, accessed October 2018, <https://www.andersen.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/1553801/brigadier-general-gentry-w-boswell/>

Andersen is also home to the 734th Air Mobility Support Squadron, and the HSC-25 (Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Twenty-Five). It is one of only four forward operating locations in the U.S. Air Force, and has hosted B-1, B-2, and B-52 military aircraft, most recently as a show of force against North Korean power projection. At Andersen Air Force Base, there is also an area named Hayes Igloos which is a half-mile stretch of munitions storage, hosting 15 million pounds of net explosive conventional munitions.⁶

Primarily in the southern half of the island, with interspersed installations in other areas of the island, lies Naval Base Guam. Naval Base Guam is located in Orote Point, utilizing Apra Harbor, which is a deep-sea harbor with the potential to host various U.S. naval seacraft. It is home to Commander Naval Forces Marianas, Commander Submarine Squadron Fifteen, Coast Guard Sector Guam and Naval Special Warfare Unit one along with 28 other tenant commands. It is also the home base of three Los Angeles class submarines and supports units of US Pacific Command, US Pacific Fleet, Seventh Fleet, and Fifth Fleet.⁷ It is currently led by Capt. Jeffrey Grimes as Commanding Officer and Commander Jason A. Wilkerson as Executive Officer. Naval Base Guam consist of various installations including: Naval Base Guam Barrigada, North Finegayan Telecommunications Site, Ordnance Annex, Polaris Point, Tenjo & Sasa Valley, and Orote Point (Big Navy).

Naval Base Guam Barrigada holds transmission antennas necessary for military communications. The North Finegayan Telecommunications Site is home to the Naval Telecommunications Station Guam, also known as NCTAMS by the local population. Located in the village of Dededo, its strategic mission is to “provide communications support for the command and control of operating forces afloat and ashore in the Western Pacific including the

⁶ CBS News, “U.S. Air Force base in Guam: An up-close look,” CBS News, accessed October 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/andersen-air-force-base-guam-on-the-tarmac-cbsn-on-assignment/>.

⁷ “About Naval Base Guam,” CNIC Naval Military Base, accessed October 2018, https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/jrm/installations/navbase_guam/about/installations.html.

Indian Ocean.”⁸ It was established in 1945 as the primary receiving station for Guam. In the 1960s, the navy built the Circularly Disposed Antenna Array in order to establish a worldwide intelligence gathering and Guam was heavily used for this purpose until it was decommissioned in the 1990s with the ending of the Cold War.⁹

The Ordnance Annex, formerly known as Naval Magazine Guam, is located in southern Guam and is the largest munitions storage area on U.S. soil outside of the continental United States. With construction of the annex beginning in 1944, the Korean War reinforced the need for this ordnance storage facility. In 1954, a total of 18,513 tons of ammunition was stored at this installation.¹⁰ The Polaris Point installation is used to support submarines that were homeported in the island, and the Tenjo & Sasa Valley installation is used as defense fuel support that operates the storage, transfer, and pumping capacity for various fuels.¹¹ Lastly, “Big Navy,” as it is called, is the main naval installation in the island. The origin of the base traces back to World War II when the Navy constructed a skeleton of the current base to continue their fight against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater. According to the official Navy Base Guam website,

Navy Seabees molded jungle and mangrove swamp into a self-contained Navy supply base housing 50,000 personnel and complete with an expanded harbor and repaired and expanded airfield, new docks, ship repair facility, submarine base, 3,000 Quonset huts and more than 1,000 major structures.¹²

They officially named this new base, “Naval Operating Base” and nicknamed it, “The Pacific Supermarket” in October 1944. It “was the largest single element of WWII Fleet support in the Pacific.”¹³ Formerly run as separate commands, both Naval Base Guam and Andersen Air Force

⁸ “Mission Statement,” U.S. Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, accessed October 2018, www.ncts.guam.navy.mil.

⁹ Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program, “Installations in Guam During the Cold War,” *Department of Defense*, <https://www.denix.osd.mil/cr/cultural-resources-program-management/historic-buildings-structures/uploads/installations-in-guam-during-the-cold-war-legacy-09-454/>

¹⁰ DoD, “Installations”

¹¹ DoD, “Installations”

¹² DoD, “Installations”

¹³ “About Naval Base Guam,” CNIC Naval Military Base,

Base are now consolidated under the new command, Joint Region Marianas, symbolizing the partnership between the Navy and Air Force in the island, with Admiral Shoshanna Chatfield as its current commander. In her role, she also acts as the U.S. defense representative to other U.S. affiliated political entities in Micronesia: the CNMI, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

In addition to this heavy military infrastructure and weaponization of the island, Guåhan also hosts multiple joint military exercises such as Valiant Shield, COPE North, and Malabar. This perfectly shows Guåhan's use not only as a U.S. base, but also as an island site utilized by various sovereign governments to further their national interests and protect their national securities. Perhaps the largest and most commonly held military exercise in the island, there have been seven Valiant Shield exercises since 2006. The first of these exercises, held in Guåhan and the surrounding waters, featured more than 20,000 sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen. According to the USS Ronald Reagan Public Affairs Officer, Shane Tuck, the exercise "focuses on real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces and detecting, tracking, and engaging units at sea, in the air and on land in response to a wide range of missions."¹⁴ Commander Michael H. Miller wrote that "exercises such as Valiant Shield give us an opportunity to ensure joint command, control, and communication procedures are seamless."¹⁵ It included 28 ships and 290 aircraft, and most importantly, allowed multiple countries to observe, including China. More recently, the 2018 Valiant Shield exercise just finished with 160 military aircraft, 15 ships, and 15,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel with this being the first time the Army has participated.¹⁶

Another annual military exercise held in the island is COPE North, which is a multilateral exercise with the Royal Australian Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force meant to enhance

¹⁴ Shane Tuck, "Valiant Shield Provides Valuable Joint Training Among U.S. Military Forces," *Navy newsstand*, June 20, 2006,

https://web.archive.org/web/20061125063038/http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=24224

¹⁵ Tuck, "Valiant Shield"

¹⁶ Dana Williams, "15,000 troops on Guam, Northern Mariana Islands for Valiant Shield exercise," *Pacific Daily News*, September 16, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/09/16/15-000-troops-here-valiant-shield-exercise/1324243002/>

multilateral air operations between the respective countries. The exercise featured more than 800 Japanese and Australian military members. The COPE North exercise has been held annually in Guåhan since 1999, when it moved from Japan to the island. Indo-Pacific Command describes the COPE North exercises as “a keystone event to promote stability and security throughout the Indo-Pacific by enabling regional forces to hone vital readiness skills to maintaining regional stability.”¹⁷ Although Australia, Japan, and the United States have participated annually, other countries such as the Philippines and New Zealand participated the past two years, showing the U.S. working with its allies against possible threats to their hegemony guised in the name of “security.”

Formerly known as the Pacific Command, the Trump administration changed the command’s name to the Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018. It is headquartered in Aiea, O’ahu, Hawai‘i, which has been the home to the Pacific Command since 1947. On May 31, 2018, at a ceremony, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis addressed the crowd saying, “Relationships with our Pacific and Indian Ocean allies and partners have proven critical to maintaining regional stability. In recognition of the increasing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, today we rename the US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command.”¹⁸ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Alex Wong, echoes the importance of this name change, telling reporters that the new term “acknowledges the historical reality and the current day reality that South Asia, and in particular, India plays a key role in the Pacific, in East Asia and Southeast Asia.”¹⁹ This change in military nomenclature and strategic emphasis was made highly visible in Guåhan. In June of 2018, the Malabar military exercise was held off the coast of the island as naval

¹⁷ Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs, “Cope NORTH 2018 Set to Strengthen Multilateral Partnerships in Pacific,” *U.S. Indo-Pacific Command*, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1439373/cope-north-2018-set-to-strengthen-multilateral-partnerships-in-pacific/>

¹⁸ Scott Neuman, “In Military Name Change, U.S. Pacific Command Becomes U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,” NPR, May 31, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/31/615722120/in-military-name-change-u-s-pacific-command-becomes-u-s-indo-pacific-command>

¹⁹ Neuman, “In Military Name Change”

ships and aircraft from Japan, the United States, and now India, engaged in anti-submarine warfare operations to prepare for a variety of shared threats to maritime security.²⁰ More particularly, this exercise with India is being held because of Chinese engagement and island-building in the South China Sea.

This outline of military installations and military exercises in Guåhan provides a necessary historical context and account of the post-World War II history that led to the permanence of military installations in the island. Only with this historical context can we move on to the next section of “Why Guåhan?” After World War II, the U.S. emerged victorious as the strongest economy in the world, with an economy larger than all of Europe’s combined, and one of the world’s largest superpowers. Julian Go describes this as the period of the U.S.’s hegemonic maturity, simply economically unmatched.²¹ During this period, the U.S. turned away from more overtly colonial modalities, and instead primarily turned to modalities of informal imperialism such as maintaining influence throughout the world, with measures short of war and annexation, although not less violent such as assassination and regime change. During this post-WWII era, the U.S. focus in the Asia-Pacific was to ensure control via bilateral agreements with Asian countries and to ensure strategic denial in Micronesia via the TTPI (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) and the eventual Compacts of Free Association.

In this first method of control in Asian countries, the U.S. developed a “hub and spokes” foreign policy architecture developing bilateral alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The strategy here was akin to that of a bicycle wheel. As described by Victor Cha, “each of these allies and partners constituted ‘spokes’ connected with a central hub (the United

²⁰ Guam Daily Post, “International military drill to be set off Guam shores,” Guam Daily Post, June 5, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/international-military-drill-to-be-set-off-guam-shores/article_71b1f1b6-67d8-11e8-bc99-cf3fb227ceaa.html

²¹ Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

States), but with few connections between the spokes.”²² Cha argues that this architectural design in Asia was produced to control these countries’ agenda in a massive powerplay. This was created to exert political, military, and economic control over key countries in the region. For example, regarding Japan, he writes that the “powerplay rationale was to create a tight, exclusive hold over the defeated imperial power to ensure that the region’s one major power would evolve in a direction that suited US interests.”²³ The result of this architecture was that the United States was able to exercise “near-total control over foreign and domestic affairs of its allies, and it created an asymmetry of power that rendered inconceivable counterbalancing by these smaller countries.”²⁴ We can see the lasting effects of these alliances with Japan and South Korea hosting large a U.S. military presence and being close allies with the United States.

In Micronesia, the U.S. held the now CNMI, Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) as one strategic trusteeship. After the trusteeship ended, the Northern Mariana Islands became a Commonwealth of the United States (with what was supposed to be more power and fewer restrictions than an unincorporated territory like Guåhan), and the remaining islands formed three countries (Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the FSM) which all entered into Compacts of Free Association. Per these treaties, the United States provides a substantial amount of financial aid to these countries, allows their citizens to enter the U.S. visa-free under the status of non-immigrant, and handles foreign defense. In return, these countries provide exclusive military access to their land and waters to the United States providing a form of strategic denial to other countries with interests in the region.²⁵

It is important to point out that despite these moves in Asia and Micronesia, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations immediately after World War II treated the region as merely a

²² Victor Cha, *Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 3.

²³ Cha, *Powerplay*, 3

²⁴ Cha, *Powerplay*, 4.

²⁵ Arnold H. Leibowitz, *Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of U.S. Territorial Policy*. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014).

“strategic periphery” rather than the core of interests. The primary theater of foreign policy was in Europe. Former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell writes regarding the Asia-Pacific, “The region has been considered a ‘secondary theater’, with an American legacy of engagement that has often been reactive, episodic, and ambiguous, leaving behind a sense of uncertainty and a job half-finished.”²⁶ This is reinforced in the words of Robert Blum, who writes that Washington had a “half-hearted commitment and indifference” to one region (Asia-Pacific) while it dove into a “forceful policy” seeking enduring peace in the other (Europe).²⁷ America’s treatment of the Asia-Pacific region has also been described as an accordion with cycles of surge and retreat, just as an accordion moves together and subsequently retracts. Despite these surges and retreats, Guåhan’s role in maintaining American policing power in this region has remained constant, and this is important to understand Guåhan’s place in the world. No matter the United States’ emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, Guåhan will always remain a militarized base ready, just in case another military surge is needed. Guåhan is the constant.

II. THE MACABRE DUET: LOCATION AND SOVEREIGNTY=OPPRESSION

The next logical question is “Why Guåhan?” Why is Guåhan the constant? Why would the U.S. military establish themselves so intensely in this 212-square mile island? When thinking of the answer to these questions, I invite the reader to picture a macabre duet: a dark room with two masked, white ghouls dancing together to truly bring life to the waltz of oppression. In this section, I demonstrate that the two ghouls dancing in the dark are the manipulation of Guåhan’s location and U.S. sovereignty over the island. These two factors hold each other dearly to ensure the staying power of the United States military in the Asia-Pacific region, all at the expense of Guåhan and its people. In this section, I show how the entangled steps of these two ghouls ensure insecurity in various manifestations.

²⁶ Kurt Campbell, *The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia* (New York: Twelve, Hachette Book Group, Inc., 2016), 83.

²⁷ Cha, *Powerplay*, 8.

Location, Island, Location

Beginning with Ghoul #1, I turn to former historian at the University of Guam, Robert F. Rogers, who wrote the comprehensive canonical work on the history of Guåhan, *Destiny's Landfall*. In his introduction, Rogers writes, "If fate is preordained but destiny is not, then much of humankind's loss of innocence on this island called earth is mirrored in the often tragic, but inspiring history of the island of Guam since Magellan's landfall."²⁸ By this, he articulates that "Guam, in short, was destined after Magellan to be a pawn in the realpolitik of foreign powers."²⁹ Guåhan, situated in the Western Pacific, is the largest island between Hawai'i and the Philippines with a major harbor, and the largest island between Japan and Papua New Guinea with the capability for hosting major runways.

To quote Andrew S. Erickson, a founding member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College, and Lt. Justin Mikolay in their book chapter, "Guam and American Security in the Pacific," regarding Guåhan,

It is closer by fourteen hours' flight time and five to seven days' sea-transit time to East Asia than is any other U.S.-based facility. It offers the region's only live-fire bombing range; an excellent deep-water port with significant room for wharf expansion; ample facilities for the U.S. Air Force, including its largest aviation fuel storage depots (66 million gallons) and its largest Pacific weaponry storage (100,000 bombs); and a naval magazine capable of holding considerable amounts of conventional and nuclear munitions.³⁰

Perhaps one of the most important people to write on Guåhan's strategic importance is Alfred Thayer Mahan, who served as the president of the esteemed Naval War College. In his influential text, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, published in 1890, Mahan argued that if the United States wished to join the scramble for the world's wealth, it would have to build warships and dispatch them to take distant islands, port, peninsulas, and strong places where a

²⁸ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 5.

²⁹ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 2.

³⁰ Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, "Guam and American Security in the Pacific," in *Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific*, eds. Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 17.

navy can be protected and refurbished.³¹ He argued that permanent naval bases and coaling stations were essential to safeguarding the prosperity and national security of the United States and advocated for shaping a “healthy regional balance of power through forward basing, a strong navy and alignment among the maritime powers.”³² Regarding these forward bases, Mahan writes,

Bases of operations; which be their natural advantages, susceptibility of defense, and nearness to the central strategic issue, will enable her fleets to remain as near the scene as any opponent... With such an outpost in her hands, the preponderance of the United States on this field follows, from her geographical position and her power, with mathematical certainty.³³

Thus, by controlling a network of bases, the United States can ensure its ubiquitous nature in the international system. Bringing this closer to home, Mahan’s most relevant comment regarding Guåhan is “No situation in our possession equals Guam for protecting every security interest in the Pacific.”³⁴ Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, 7th Fleet Commander in Guåhan, reiterates the power of Guåhan’s geography writing, “Guam is a hub, Guam has geography and that will be enduring...it is now becoming very important to us again. Guam will always be strategically important because of its geography alone.”³⁵ Geographical location does not change and thus will always be a reliable factor unlike economic strength and technological advancements or disparities.

Guåhan’s treatment by the U.S. is not only due to its geographical location, but also due to its geographical ontology as an island. The dominant geographical imagination of islands usually encompasses two primary components. The first is that the island is small, isolated, and empty. The second is that the island is strategically important for foreign militaries. This leaves islands ripe for exploitation, colonialism, and militarization. Like an imperial magic trick, islands are

³¹ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2004), 23.

³² Mahan, *Influence*, 614.

³³ Mahan, *Influence*, 34.

³⁴ Mahan, *Influence*, 615.

³⁵ David Scott, “US Strategy in the Pacific-Geopolitical Positioning for the Twenty-First Century.” *Geopolitics*, 17 (2012): 620.

simultaneously important and disposable, places of exploitation and places of nothingness. They are not either/or, but rather both. To truly understand how Guåhan's geography has been utilized for U.S. national security purposes, both location and its "islandness" need to be examined.

The islands live in the perpetual, paradoxical shadow of hypermilitarization and laid-back, hospitable native lifestyle stereotypes. Islands are where one escapes or starts a new life (either as a soldier being stationed or someone wanting to craft a new identity). Islands are where one goes to get away, isolated from the rest of the world. "Islands evoke infinite imaginaries, from dreams of development, escape, and exoticism to exploitation and imprisonment."³⁶ As Adam Nicolson writes, "the island is a place defined by its otherness, thriving on nothing more than its distance and difference from the mainland to which it is opposed."³⁷ Distance, difference, and this feeling of being stuck in place are deemed the island's unique properties, which subsequently evoke a sense of geographical and political inferiority.

However, islands, peninsulas, and other seemingly small geographic spaces play an important, yet possibly invisible role in international relations and geopolitics, and consequently this means Guåhan does as well."³⁸ Political geographer Alison Mountz, discussing the geopolitical imaginaries surrounding islands writes that, "More than mere physical form, islands occupy a prominent place in the geographical imagination of politics. They frequently become sites of territorial conflict for their occupation of interstitial zones where power struggles unfold."³⁹ As Ann Laura Stoler writes, "Some of the most favored concepts of political theory acquire their critical force precisely because they are not considered political concepts at all, or because they have so long been considered benign and removed from the domain of contemporary politics."⁴⁰

³⁶ Alison Mountz, Political Geography II: Islands and Archipelagos, *Progress in Human Geography*, 39, no. 5 (2015): 636.

³⁷ Adam Nicolson, "The Islands," *Geographical Review*, 97, no. 2 (April 2007): 153.

³⁸ Mountz, "Political geography II"

³⁹ Mountz, "Political geography II," 637.

⁴⁰ Ann Laura Stoler, "Colony," *Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon*, <http://www.politicalconcepts.org/issue1/colony/>

Islands are places that have always been used politically and strategically, while at the same time been invisibilized from the mainstream political discourse. This invisibility is enduring and persistent, as Rachel Oldenziel argues in her essay, “Islands: The United States as a Networked Empire.” She contends that when it comes to islands, there is no such thing as obsolescence. She describes the changing logics in the utilization of islands ranging from coaling stations to lily pads (easy launch points for military missions) to holders of technology. She writes, “Even though in each instance the technical and geographic logics changed, the political rationales for keeping islands within the US orbit remained remarkably stable over the course of a century or so. Technical obsolescence rarely resulted in abandonment or restoration of sovereignty.”⁴¹ The shape-shifting nature of island use in geopolitics contributes to the paradox of their being important and disposable all at the same time. Islands receive the short end of the stick and are treated as if on the bottom of the geographical hierarchy, yet the bottom of this hierarchy is where U.S. power is produced.

Furthering this explanation of inferiority, Pacific Islands studies scholar and former Director of the Center for Pacific Islands Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, Terence Wesley-Smith, shows how large powers think about islands. In his article, “Rethinking Pacific Islands Studies,” Wesley-Smith describes three rationales for studying the Pacific Islands: the Pragmatic Rationale, the Laboratory Rationale, and the Empowerment Rationale. The first two rationales have been used by larger powers and in most cases, colonial powers. The Pragmatic Rationale refers to the “pragmatic need to know about the Pacific Islands places with which the metropolitan countries have to deal.”⁴² He cites Ainslee T. Embree, writing, “Without this pragmatic rationale, characterized by Embree as ‘the need to know one’s enemies and one’s friends, it is unlikely that whole programs would have been constructed around geographic areas.”

⁴¹ Ruth Oldenziel, “Islands: U.S. as Networked Empire,” in *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*, ed. Gabrielle Hecht, 13-42 (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2011), 31.

⁴² Terence Wesley-Smith, “Rethinking Pacific Islands Studies,” *Pacific Studies* 18, no. 2 (1995): 117.

The second rationale, the Laboratory rationale, is described by Pacific historian Douglas Oliver. “I suggest that because of their wide diversities, small-scale dimensions and relative isolation, the Pacific Islands can provide excellent—in some ways unique—laboratory-like opportunities for gaining deeper understandings of Human Biology, Political Science, etc.”⁴³ Wesley-Smith argues that the pragmatic and laboratory rationales have colonial implications and undertones. He writes, “In the pragmatic frame, on the one hand, the ultimate purpose has been influence rather than understanding. The laboratory mode, on the other hand, can easily reduce Pacific Islanders to mere objects of study.”⁴⁴ From our utilization to the epistemology of learning about the islands, the ultimate reasons have always been strategic and/or doing things that would not be accepted in larger landmasses with massive populations. One only needs to look at the continuing effects of radiation in the Marshall Islands for a perfect example of the island as a strategic laboratory.

The strategic thought surrounding islands regards them as the perfect locations for military bases. Because of their size, small populations, and perceived isolation, these islands fit outside legal and political norms of their times. Admiral Rich Byrd argues that U.S. occupation of islands should not be considered territorial expansion because “none of the islands in question possesses natural features of value other than the military standpoint and therefore cannot constitute territorial aggrandizement.”⁴⁵ Once again, our distance and smallness renders us invisible as political entities legitimizing exploitation. U.S. president Harry Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, wrote in 1945 regarding their island possessions that they “are not colonies: they are outposts, and their acquisition are appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense.”⁴⁶ Oldenziel argues that this was a defensive and discursive move aimed at allowing the United States to continue to represent itself as the defender of democracy in the world while at the same time satisfying its imperial needs. I am tempted to ask the same question William Jennings Bryan asked

⁴³ Wesley-Smith, “Rethinking,” 121

⁴⁴ Wesley-Smith, “Rethinking,” 124.

⁴⁵ Oldenziel, “Islands,” 19.

⁴⁶ Oldenziel, “Islands,” 19.

the American people back in the 1890s, “Is our national character so weak that we cannot withstand the temptation to appropriate the first piece of land that comes within our reach?”⁴⁷ Reflecting on my home island and our lack of sovereignty, I feel the American answer remains Yes!

Mother, May I: The Lack of Sovereignty

CHamoru activist and poet Melvin Won-Pat Borja, who is an ardent supporter of independence for the island, once described his primary reason for supporting independence as the best political status for the island in a metaphor. He exclaimed, “I am tired of being on the menu, I want to sit at the table.” In many ways, his sentence perfectly explicates the second ghoul of the macabre duet: our lack of sovereignty. As shown in the section above, the United States did not consider annexing islands to be acts of imperialism and thus had an easier time militarizing them. The Department of Defense argued that obtaining “remote colonial islands with small colonial populations would be the easiest to acquire and would entail the least political headaches.”⁴⁸ Our lack of sovereignty allows the United States to only experience minor headaches rather than the migraines that may ensue when dealing with other nations’ sovereignty. Yet, this is done at the expense of Guåhan where we have suffered from the drawn-out colonial gangrene for over 100 years now. David Vine writes, “island bases insulated from local population problems and decolonization pressures were the key to maintaining U.S. global dominance for decades to come.”⁴⁹

Before moving forward in this analysis, it is imperative to operationally define my use of sovereignty in this section, as it is a word that connotes multiple meanings. Sovereignty, in one of its usages, is directly related to the nation-state. This usage is rooted in the work of Jean Bodin. Bodin, writing in the late 16th century, argued that competing power structures often lead to war

⁴⁷ Stephen Kinzer, *The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, and the Birth of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2017), 15.

⁴⁸ Kinzer, *The True Flag*, 20.

⁴⁹ David Vine, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015), 65.

and chaos, thus there must be a single sovereign who exercises absolute power, and whose sovereignty must be perpetual in time. This sovereign, who was usually a king or monarch, derived his legitimacy from the divine right of kings. Bodin defines sovereignty as “absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth.”⁵⁰ Furthermore, “It is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete law.”⁵¹ After the Peace of Westphalia, this idea became applicable to the world of nation-states where the sovereign is supreme internally, but equal to other sovereign rulers externally. Sovereign states are supposed to have supreme rule internally as they are the “legitimate” users of violence in their territorial boundaries, but equal to each other externally. The state has become the sovereign. According to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933, the state has four characteristics today: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Once a political entity is said to have possessed these qualifications and is recognized as a state⁵², it is given status as a sovereign state, in most cases.

Confusing this notion of sovereignty as being equally external, but internally supreme is the usage of sovereignty within indigenous nations, and the tribal usage of the word. Sovereignty, as used when discussing tribes in the United States, for example, refers to this internal sense of sovereignty. In 1831, Justice John Marshall, in *Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia*, defined the political status of tribes as “domestic dependent nations.” According to Bruyneel, “For Marshall, this meant that indigenous tribes were recognized as sovereign governments that did not have the same legal standing as foreign nations, and in fact to him they were more like “wards” of the

⁵⁰ Jean Bodin, *Six Books on the Commonwealth* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 25.

⁵¹ Bodin, *Commonwealth*, 28.

⁵² Although the Montevideo Convention actually says that the political existence of a state exists independently of recognition, modern examples such as Catalonia show us that recognition is a significant factor in becoming a sovereign state and member of the United Nations (which is common practice for the world’s existing sovereign nation-states).

federal government.⁵³ In a similar argument, Julian Aguon references the difference between internal and external self-determination. He writes, “Internal self-determination is generally understood as the right of a people within a state to authentic self-government in its community affairs. External self-determination, in contrast, is understood as the right to reject alien subjugation in totality, usually in the contexts of colonization or military occupation.”⁵⁴ He calls this attempt to parse self-determination, and I would argue sovereignty, into these two components as fundamentally colonial, for internal sovereignty is akin to having the ability to make decisions in your room, but not in your house.

In this dissertation, I argue, even if the parsing is colonial, it is telling that Guåhan lacks both internal and external sovereignty. As an unincorporated territory, we neither have the sovereignty offered to states in the world today nor do we have the internal sovereignty given to tribes in the United States. In Guåhan, sovereignty is not exercised by us, but rather is a fleeting concept as described by Michael Lujan Bevacqua. He writes of Guåhan’s unique position in the world,

Any potential critiques that Guam might represent the world as it is today—its family of nation-states, the concepts which underpin its development—are merely exceptional and can be dismissed through a footnote or the invocation of an intermediary category of political being such as “unincorporated territory or non self-governing territory. Again, Guam appears here as a specter more than anything else.”⁵⁵

In this dissertation, I am arguing that on all fronts Guåhan lacks sovereignty. With this operational definition complete, I now turn to further outlining the argument of how our lack of sovereignty is a significant factor in our current militarized form-of-life.

Guåhan has consistently been the reliable default for placing military installations due to our status as an unincorporated territory, and ultimately stemming from this, we are technically

⁵³ Kevin Bruyneel, *The Third Space Of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of U.S.-Indigenous Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 3.

⁵⁴ Julian Aguon, “On Loving the Maps Our Hands Cannot Hold: Self-Determination of Colonized and Indigenous Peoples in International Law,” *UCLA Asian Pacific American Law Journal*, 47, (2010-2011): 51.

⁵⁵ Bevacqua, “GUAM”, 45.

“American soil.” Our status, disputed or not, as American soil serves as the condition of possibility for our geographical location and islandness to consistently be exploited for U.S. security concerns. As the prolific Brazilian metal band Sepultura yells in a song, “War For Territory!”⁵⁶ U.S. security is best kept secure by securing the sovereignty of small islands. One of the most telling examples of this is when the United States was looking to put a new base in the Asia-Pacific region to challenge China’s possible hegemony. To spoil the end of the story, Guåhan was chosen as the site leading to the controversial “military buildup of the island” which will be discussed later in this chapter. However, before deciding on Guåhan, the U.S. military tried to make arrangements with Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia for a new base. When all four countries responded negatively to the proposition, Guåhan was left because as Brigadier General John Doucette says, “Since Guam is part of the United States, potential operations from here are not subject to foreign government approval or international agreements.”⁵⁷

Robert Underwood captures this thought process perfectly saying that military activities in Guåhan do not require a “Mother, May I?” routine as the United States would have to negotiate in other sovereign states.⁵⁸ Our status as sovereign American soil is very useful and important for U.S. military purposes, and military officials have consistently referred to the political nature of Guåhan as the most reliable factor in using the island, besides our location. In his book, *GUAM USA: America’s Forward Fortress in Asia-Pacific*, Colonel Jerry Rivera argues that in the possible case of a united Korea, which wanted to end U.S. military basing in their country, the U.S. military could always plan to move personnel, weapons, aircraft, and equipment to Guåhan. Rivera’s argument is that no matter what happens in Asia, Guåhan will always be a place to project presence and power. At length, he writes,

⁵⁶ Andreas Kisser, “Territory,” performed by the band Sepultura, September 2, 1993, accessed at <https://genius.com/Sepultura-territory-lyrics>

⁵⁷ Max Cacas, “Small Island Has a Big Role,” *Signal Magazine*, October 2011, <https://www.afcea.org/content/small-island-has-big-role>

⁵⁸ Interview with Robert Underwood, September 26, 2018.

Withdrawing to the Marianas is not abandoning our friends and allies in the region. They will know that we are nearby on U.S. soil, where the U.S. has an inherent right to be, keeping an eye out for them just several hours away by air and several days by sea. As part of that strategy, U.S. military forces will constantly be flying and sailing from Guam and visiting all our Asian friends and allies, just to let them know we are in the neighborhood.⁵⁹

Rivera's wording perfectly tells the story of Guåhan's lack of sovereignty, particularly in his argument that the U.S. has an inherent right to be in the island. Statements such as these are depoliticized, dehistoricized, and take Guåhan's "Americanness" for granted, leading to a normalized militarization of the island. Reinforcing this line of thought, Captain Robert A. McNaught wrote that because Guåhan was sovereign U.S. territory, U.S. forces could operate unconstrained from the political requirements of host countries either in training or during actual conflicts.⁶⁰ Similarly, Erickson and Mikolay write, "Guam has the advantage of being American territory, reducing the political difficulty of building and operating assets there. Furthermore, Guam with its pro-military population and 7.7 percent unemployment is unlikely to offer local opposition to increased military infrastructure."⁶¹ Also in this litany of "Guam's lack of sovereignty is awesome!" comes the words of U.S. Major General Dennis Larsen who told reporters in Guåhan, "This is American soil in the midst of the Pacific. Guam is a US territory. We can do what we want here and make huge investments without fear of being thrown out."⁶² Erickson and Mikolay encapsulate all of this into one short sentence: "Clearly, the U.S. military can depend on Guam."⁶³ And depend on us they have.

One of the ways the United States has depended on our lack of sovereignty as an unincorporated territory is in ensuring the U.S.A. military mission of what Sasha Davis calls operational unilateralism. In his article, "The US Military Base Network," Davis argues that the

⁵⁹ Jerry Rivera, *Guam USA: America's Forward Fortress in Asia-Pacific* (Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014), Loc 526, Kindle.

⁶⁰ Sasha Davis, *The Empire's Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2015), 221.

⁶¹ Erickson and Mikolay, "Guam," 22.

⁶² Vine, *Base Nation*, 84.

⁶³ Vine, *Base Nation*, 84.

military desires to operate unilaterally without the consent of allied governments and because of this, they have come to rely more heavily on colonial overseas territories for projecting military power. He defines operational unilateralism as the “ability of the military to strike quickly without any need for consultation with anyone—even the government of the territory from which they are launching the strike.”⁶⁴ This all stems from the U.S. military concern that their ability to act with post-Fordist efficiency will be complicated by restrictions, host nation sensitivities, or domestic politics of foreign countries. The military, to avoid these obstacles, looks for base sites with pre-arranged permissions to train and deploy without negotiation, and Guåhan, as a territory, is one of these ideal places. As Stephan Yates writes about Guåhan, “When God gives you a gift, it’s good to use it.”⁶⁵ Guåhan is a gift to the United States wrapped in the sweet paper of sovereignty and the more we are used by the military, the less genuinely secure Guåhan becomes.

III. GUÅHAN, THE MISFIT: VIOLENT GEOGRAPHIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In *From A Native Daughter*, Kanaka Maoli wahine and ea warrior, Haunani-Kay Trask writes, “When viewed through island rather than continental eyes, Pacific peoples live in the largest danger zone in the world.”⁶⁶ In this section, I examine this notion of danger zones and violent geographies as well as International Relations’ failure to account for Guåhan as an island and as an unincorporated territory. I argue that the macabre duet of our lack of sovereignty and geographical location leaves Guåhan permanently weaved into the fabric of the violent cartography of the world. Sasha Davis argues that “it is not possible to understand the global geography of the US military without looking more closely at the local sites where the global apparatus touches the ground.”⁶⁷ Violence is not just what the dominant eye sees, as violence can

⁶⁴ Davis, *Empire’s Edge*, 20

⁶⁵ Davis, *Empire’s Edge*, 86.

⁶⁶ Haunani-Kay Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 45.

⁶⁷ Davis, *Empire’s Edge*, 215.

disguise or normalize itself within the fabric of society or the functioning of the international system.

This leads to the discipline of International Relations. Here I problematize the traditional scope of security and argue that canonical IR does not leave much analytical space for a true examination of Guåhan security due to its political status as an unincorporated territory. Guåhan is not an integral part of the United States because it simply belongs to it. We are neither a state, nor an international organization or norm entrepreneur, and thus it is as if the scope of traditional IR theory leaves us out of the equation of having agency in international politics. To make space, or to be more honest, to force space for a Guåhan-centered approach to be taken seriously in IR, I take this opportunity to flesh out my theoretical intervention of “decolonial realism” or “realism in between.”

To put it somewhat bluntly, Guåhan’s legal and strategic significance is a result of a realist international order in which the complex interaction of sovereignty, anarchy, and competition create the demand for peripheral spaces between empires where geopolitics can play out without directly threatening the heartlands of the major players. Therefore, realism is essential to understanding how we became the tip of the spear. However, realism’s implicit bias towards great powers analytically and normatively requires that we consider the positionality of realist theorization— ‘in between’—when we theorize about Guåhan lest we occlude the distinctive security environment of those who have to make a life on the tip of the spear. In this theorization, I utilize “in between” rather than “from below” because Guåhan is placed in a unique position amongst the power struggles in the Asia and Pacific Islands region. From a geopolitical standpoint, Guåhan acts as a redline.

The red line refers to “an unequivocal threat, a line in the sand that if crossed, the target would incur the full fury of the state that issued the threat in the first place.”⁶⁸ Similarly, I use

⁶⁸ Albert Wolf, “Backing Down: Why Red Lines Matter In Geopolitics,” *Modern War Institute*, August 17, 2016, <https://mwi.usma.edu/geopolitical-costs-red-lines/>

Bruno Tertrais' more concise definition as "The manipulation of an adversary's intent through (mostly public) statements for deterrence purposes, referring to the deliberate crossing of a certain threshold by an adversary, and relevant counteraction if this threshold is crossed."⁶⁹ Red lines are a public declaration of deterrence through threat of punishment or retaliation. A recent example of a red line is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's red line over Iran providing weapons for pro-regime forces in Syria. Netanyahu warned that Israel's red line was weapons transfers to enemies that pose an immediate threat, and that Iran crossed it in March 2018. This led to an Israeli airstrike targeting an Iranian plane in Damascus loaded with weapons. Netanyahu said, "Israel is constantly working to prevent our enemies from arming themselves with advanced weaponry. Our red lines are as sharp as ever and our determination to enforce them is stronger than ever."⁷⁰

The geometry of the world is typically divided into nation-states, non-state actors such as terrorist groups, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. In this geometry, the red line has no geometry of its own. It is a response, a statement of intent. However, what I argue, is that Guåhan challenges this geometry and ontologically acts as a red line in the Asia and Pacific Islands region. Any red line crossing in this area of the world is met by American force or threat of force, and Guåhan is the geometrical, red line for which this force is generated. One only needs to consider that the North Korea tension in this region is met with B-52s flying to Guåhan, only to take off for war exercises in the Korean Peninsula. As an unincorporated territory with no sense of sovereignty, our whole existence is to serve as the physical embodiment of deterrence and counter-retaliation in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, in any potential struggle or conflict between the United States and North Korea or the United States and China, Guåhan is the physical red line in-between. Thus, this dissertation displays the ultimately violent method of maintaining Guåhan as the red line in-between in the power politics struggle, and that any

⁶⁹ Bruno Tertrais, "The Diplomacy of Red Lines," *Fondation pour la recherche strategique*, February 2016, 6.

⁷⁰ Times of Israel Staff, "Hours after Syria strike, Netanyahu says Israel," *The Times of Israel*, September 16, 2018, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hours-after-syria-strike-netanyahu-says-israel-enforcing-red-lines/>

examination of genuine security for the island and its people, needs to examine the unique security environment of being a red line.

In multiple trips to the United States, I have been faced with the ubiquitous question of “Where are you from?” Every time I answer with Guam, I get one of two responses. It is either that they have no idea what or where Guam is (sometimes I am asked “What is a Guam?”) or their brains dig deep and excavate the one chapter in their high school history class where they learned that Guam had some affiliation with the U.S. during World War II. It is then that I tell them that Guam is an unincorporated territory of the United States. Yet, they are generally still confused and ask what being a U.S. territory means. This is oftentimes the case even for those who live here as well. Unincorporated territories live in the shadow of anomalous forms of political organization and thus I argue are heavily understudied as a focal point of research in IR. As Michael Lujan Bevacqua writes regarding Guåhan, “My island is one big American footnote, sitting black/brown as day on the bottom of every red, whitewashed, and blue page.”⁷¹

I argue in a similar fashion that Guåhan lies as one big footnote in the field of International Relations and security studies due to our anomalous political status. The Realist international order, particularly in the Neo-Realist account, presumes isomorphism between units. To put it another way, all states are equally sovereign, defined by borders, and seek security even if not primacy. Underlying this isomorphism is a presumption that the inside of the box of the state looks Weberian. The state commands its people as the rational monopoly holder of legitimate violence. The presumption of such a state structure, what John Herz calls the “hard shell” of the territorial state, is one in which internal order is premised on the Hobbesian security of the population out of anarchy before the nation-state enters the international anarchy.⁷² Guåhan’s unincorporated-ness makes it neither isomorphic with other states internally nor externally. Guåhan has divergent

⁷¹ Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “My Island Is One Big American Footnote,” in *The Space Between: Negotiating Culture, Place, and Identity in the Pacific*, edited by A. Marata Tamaira, 120-122 (Honolulu: Center for Pacific Islands Studies, 2009).

⁷² J.H. Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” *World Politics* ,9, (1957): 473–493.

security concerns from the U.S. and is not guaranteed the same level of Herzian protection as it is not inside the so-called “hard shell.” Unlike a traditional border zone of a territorial state that may be more prone to violence such as the border between North and South Sudan, Guåhan is marked legally and territorially as somehow inside U.S. jurisdiction and yet not quite wholly included in the geographic and moral body politic. I argue that the in-between legal character and neither/nor geographic character of Guåhan requires significantly revising Realism while still retaining the emphasis on material power, self-interest, and international anarchy. While this may seem like a limited or exceptional case not worthy of revising theory to the larger community of International Relations in the U.S. or other great powers like Russia or China, the misfit between strategic thinking from a great power perspective and the security of CHamorus could not be more vital.

To support how Guåhan and especially CHamorus live in the abyss of IR, we must look at the racist origins of the discipline. To begin, I look at the work of Robert Vitalis in his book, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations*.⁷³ Vitalis describes how the first decades of International Relations in the United States were coterminous with racial hierarchy and that imperialism and racism had a constitutive role in bringing forward this new discipline. He gives the example of IR’s first specialized journal being the *Journal of Race Development* which only eventually became renamed the *Journal of International Relations* and quotes prominent realist, E.H. Carr, who writes, “There was no science of International Relations...The subject so-called was an ideology of control masking as a proper academic discipline.”⁷⁴ Vitalis argues that “the central challenge that defined the new field called international relations was how to ensure the efficient political administration and race development of subject peoples, from the domestic dependencies and backward races at home to the complex race formations found in the new overseas territories and dependencies.”⁷⁵

⁷³ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2015).

⁷⁴ E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

⁷⁵ Vitalis, *White World Order*, 25.

At the core of International Relations, Vitalis writes,

The white social scientists who offered their expertise to the new imperial state and the handful of critics of the new expansionist wave all assumed that hierarchy was natural, that it was biologically rooted, and that it could be made sense of best by drawing on concepts such as higher and lower races, natural and historic races, savagery, and civilization, and the like.⁷⁶

The same foundations of international relations can also be seen in the Insular Cases, which created the new status of “unincorporated territory” and in the naval government found here in Guåhan. As the Navy wrote regarding the CHamoru people, “There is every indication that these people have not yet reached a state of development commensurate with the personal independence, obligations, and responsibilities of United States citizenship. It is believed that such a change of status at this time would be most harmful to the native people.”⁷⁷ This is eerily similar to the logics used in the foundational Insular Case *Downes v. Bidwell*, which legitimized unincorporated territories by arguing that these territories are inhabited by “alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought”⁷⁸ and because of this, “the administration of government and justice according to Anglo-Saxon principles may for a time be impossible.”⁷⁹

In a special edition of *Alternatives*, entitled “Race in International Relations”, Randolph B. Persuad and R. B. J. Walker argue similarly to Vitalis regarding the role of race in the development of International Relations. In their introduction to the issue, they argue that despite having its origins in racist thought, International Relations as a discipline has been silent on issues of race. They define silence as an epistemological stance premised on removing race from the field of inquiry. Despite this, Persuad and Walker argue, “Race has been a fundamental force in the very making of the modern world system and in the representations and explanation of how that system

⁷⁶ Vitalis, *White World Order*, 46.

⁷⁷ Vitalis, *White World Order*, 46.

⁷⁸ *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Justia, accessed February 15, 2018, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/182/244/case.html>.

⁷⁹ *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).

emerged and how it works. This can only be understood, however, if we look at race as an interrelated set of material, ideological, and epistemological practices.”⁸⁰ One primary example was during the Balance of Power, pre-World War I era, in which large-scale violence was delayed because of these large powers engaging in the conquest of imperialism where they were able to compete through the exercise of power amongst marginalized places.

Sankaran Krishna similarly argues that IR is predicated on a systematic amnesia on the question of race. He writes, “The emergence of a modern, territorially sovereign state system in Europe was coterminous with, and indissociable from, the genocide of the indigenous peoples of the ‘new world,’ the enslavement of the natives of the African continent, and the colonization of the societies of Asia.”⁸¹ In a brilliant discursive shift, Krishna argues that IR invisibilizes this history through an emphasis on abstraction and theory-building, rather than historical analysis and description. He writes, “By encouraging students to display their virtuosity in abstraction, the discipline brackets questions of theft of land, violence, and slavery—the three processes that have historically underlain the unequal global order we now find ourselves in.”⁸² I position this dissertation as pushing against this epistemological silencing of race, theft of land, violence, and slavery, and privilege a Guåhan perspective of International Relations, hence my heavy emphasis on history throughout the chapters of the dissertation. As Krishna writes, “By deftly defining international as the encounter between sovereign states, much of a violent world history is instantly sanitized.”⁸³ Where does this leave us? Do we put our hands up in the air and argue that international relations is useless and of no relevance to our existence here in Guåhan? I argue just the opposite, i.e., that understanding IR’s origins and manifestations is incredibly important to our quest for liberation for the CHamoru people. In the same article, Krishna writes, “To understand

⁸⁰ Randolph Persuad and R.B.J. Walker, “Apertura: Race in International Relations,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 26, no. 4 (October-December 2001): 374.

⁸¹ Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 26, no. 4 (October-December 2001): 401.

⁸² Krishna, “Race, Amnesia,” 401.

⁸³ Krishna, “Race, Amnesia,” 406.

international relations, then, seek out that which IR discourse represses, hides, elides, conceals, and prematurely closes off as avenues for inquiry.”⁸⁴

To provide further evidence on our status in the abyss of IR, I turn to Kenneth Waltz. In his 1959 book, *Man, the State, and War*, the father of structural realism, Kenneth Waltz, established three images of analysis to explain the causes of war and conflict in the international system: the individual, the state, and the international system. Waltz argues in the first image that the beliefs and personalities of individuals like state leaders are a factor in explaining war. He argues, “War results from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity...If these are the primary causes of war, then the elimination of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social adjustment.”⁸⁵ Waltz argues that even if human nature is important to understanding war, it is not sufficient enough to explain war and must be supplemented by an analysis of social and political institutions.

This is when he moves to the second image level of analysis in his description of the internal organization of states. He explores whether domestic organization, democracy vs. autocracy, capitalism vs. state-run economies, for example, needs to be considered when examining causes of conflict. Ultimately, Waltz concludes that the second-image analysis becomes messy when trying to distinguish between “good” and “bad” states and what the qualifying characteristics of each are. He argues that even if we collectively developed these operational definitions of “good” and “bad,” it still would not be enough to understand why wars occur. He poses the question, “If bad states make war, what will change bad states to good states?”⁸⁶

It is here that he moves to developing his primary argument in his future work that international anarchy is the permissive cause of war. Waltz argues that due to the anarchic nature of the international system, states will do what they need to do to survive and that “a state will use

⁸⁴ Krishna, “Race, Amnesia,” 408.

⁸⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 16.

⁸⁶ Waltz, *Man, State, and War*, 114.

force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace.”⁸⁷ There is no supreme authority or international/world government that can prevent wars, thus “war occurs because there is nothing to prevent it.”⁸⁸ Bringing the three images together, Waltz ultimately concludes that all three images need to be examined in tandem to truly understand the causes of war. He argues that “if individuals and states do not pursue war-like policies or do not pursue selfish interests...then even though the third image of international anarchy permits the occurrence of war, there would be no war.”⁸⁹

While Waltz would go on in his subsequent book, *Theory of International Politics*, to forego the first and second image levels of analysis in favor of the third-image structural approach, his theoretical contribution leaves my work without a foundation. So, where does Guåhan fit within Waltz’s levels of analysis? In a first-image level of analysis, those born in Guåhan are not eligible to hold the highest office of the American government, the Presidency. With the lack of even an opportunity for this office and the power it holds, a first-image level of analysis becomes rather useless. In the second-image level of analysis of looking at the make-up of the domestic state, we are also not relevant actors as we have no influence in American foreign policy decisions due to our lack of power in the form of voting representation in the House of Representatives, Senate, or Electoral College. This was seen in the military relocation map, an arrangement made between the governments of Japan and the United States to relocate American troops from Okinawa to Guåhan. Guåhan was not seated at the metaphorical or literal table when these decisions were made. The last image of analysis looking at the international system also has no place for us and deems us powerless. We are not a sovereign state, neither are we an influential corporation or NGO.

This is where I see my work intervening in traditional IR literature. I aim to carve a place in IR to examine security and violence from the perspective of an unincorporated territory. Now,

⁸⁷ Waltz, *Man, State, and War*, 116.

⁸⁸ Waltz, *Man, State, and War*, 188.

⁸⁹ Waltz, *Man, State, and War*, 238.

one possible rebuttal of my project would be to simply argue that Guåhan is a part of the United States and thus my entire argument is flawed. However, I argue that this is a rather dehistoricized analysis of Guåhan's political and colonial history and is an analytical lens that does not center around Guåhan. From this Waltzian analysis, Guåhan's agency is usurped into the U.S. context while the priority of Guåhan's security is subordinated to the mainland American polity. I move rather to center the scope of security from a Guåhan perspective and not simply as a footnote. I focus on how the misfit between unincorporation and Realist international politics leaves Guåhan uniquely vulnerable to being gambled with and even outright sacrificed in the pursuit of the fully incorporated territory of the U.S. polity, while at the same time arguing, that incorporation into the U.S. polity is not the answer. In the conclusion, I argue for further separation from the United States as opposed to this dissertation being a call to simply being included into the American political family.

In all three images of analysis, we are seemingly deemed powerless. This lack of power leaves us in a precarious position of being a pawn in American conflicts, strategic interests, and wars. Yet, it is in my focus on power, powerlessness, and the material where I fundamentally agree with realists. Like realists, I also argue that power is the international currency of the international system, and that a concentrated analysis of power is necessary to understand the changes in the international system. However, I aim to broaden the epistemological scope of realism and argue against its state-centrism. This is not to say that I deny the important and significant ontology of the state as a primary actor in International Relations. Jairus Grove writes in "War in the Age of Late Globalization," that realists see the international system as a desert ecosystem characterized by one dominant species with lots of space in between encounters. Grove argues instead that in the 21st century, the state "is one amongst a veritable rainforest of species."⁹⁰ He argues that "there

⁹⁰ Jauris Grove, "War in the Age of Late Globalization," in *The Oxford Handbook of Global Studies*, eds. Saskia Sassen, Mark Juergensmeyer, Manfred Steger, and Victor Faessel (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018), 12.

is no equilibrium nor Archimedean point on which a state gains total authority or an order breaks entirely from the state.”⁹¹ In similar fashion, my argument here is not to diminish the importance of the state, but to repopulate the world of IR and realism with the other contending forms of political organization that complicate the story.

I take a power-based approach I deem “realism in between,” which aims to examine how the exercise of power in the international system and the role of geopolitics has affected the security of Guåhan from a Guåhan-centered perspective. International Relations may leave Guåhan powerless in their analysis, but it certainly has not left Guåhan unaffected by the touch of power. This lack of power I argue is demonstrated most obviously in our role in U.S. national security. I argue that our incomplete inclusion into the American nation-state as an unincorporated territory leaves us on the margins of American security concerns, thus making us simultaneously important and disposable. Perhaps more important than exclusion, is our utilization as a red-line and power projection hub.

As a militarized American colony, we are spun into a circular logic of irrationality: we have not even a semblance of influence in the operations of the U.S. government while we bear the burden of their strategic militarization. Former Guåhan Congressman Ben Blaz once wrote regarding Guåhan’s relationship with the United States that we are “equal in war, but not in peace.”⁹² In line with Blaz, I argue that our status as a colony along with the subsequent incomplete inclusion into the American nation-state means that we are also not included in the scope of the referent object of U.S. security concerns (and neither do we argue that we necessarily should be, but for very different reasons that will be illuminated more as this dissertation moves forward). Rather, we are utilized as part of a strategic policy response, and this is a result of continuing American imperialism and colonialism in the island.

⁹¹ Grove, “War,” 13.

⁹² Ben Blaz, “Guam: Equal in War, but Not in Peace,” *New York Times*, October 19, 1981, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/19/opinion/1-guam-equal-in-war-but-not-in-peace-399191.html?mcubz=0>

In what may not seem as directly obvious, there is possibility for realism and my anti-imperial oriented project to work together in my analysis of critiquing security. In his article, “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” Kavi Joseph Abraham argues that “certain lines of realist and postcolonial thought may be drawn together, knotting threads around shared critiques of liberal ways of violence.”⁹³ Abraham describes the importance of realizing that the current imperial machine is a conjunction of racist imaginaries, national interest, and liberal universalism, and that concepts such as racial hierarchies, slavery, temporary occupations, and exploitation of workers, while seemingly illiberal, are methods of the liberal order. Long before Abraham, E. H. Carr argued that ideologies of peace and cooperation tend to act more as a veil obscuring the interests of power. Yet, liberal thought is not only a veil for national interests and power politics, but is actually generative of war.⁹⁴ Morgenthau similarly argues that liberal political theory may seem to limit violence, but it does not limit domination in any way.⁹⁵ He suggests that, “violence is a part of the arsenal of liberalism and that power relations still subsist under domestic legal regimes.”⁹⁶ If Guåhan were to change its political status, or become independent for example, International Relations as a field would have to analytically fit Guåhan in (even if independence in no way solves all of Guåhan’s problems). In the next section, I examine Guåhan history to show how the United States has interfered with political status change thus continuing the slow violence of epistemological silencing outlined in this section.

⁹³ Kavi Joseph Abraham, Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought, *International Political Sociology*, 11, (2017): 221.

⁹⁴ Carr, *Twenty-Years Crisis*.

⁹⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*.

⁹⁶ Abraham, “Making Machines,” 228.

IV. UNINCORPORATED TERRITORY FOREVER MORE: SECURITY>SELF-DETERMINATION

A possible critique of this chapter thus far is that the basis of this argument lies only in showing how the military has used our political status as a vantage point for permanence in the island. One may argue that there are no clear examples of the military creating a sense of political insecurity by deliberately trying to quell the CHamoru quest for self-determination. This section addresses this, and to begin, I turn to the pivotal events of 1937. After multiple petitions by CHamorus to be granted American citizenship, CHamorus decided to raise money to send representatives to plead their case to the United States Congress, which via the Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War, was supposed to determine the political belonging for the people of the newly acquired territory. Article IX of the treaty reads, “The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.”⁹⁷ So, beginning in 1936, CHamorus raised money to send prominent leaders, Baltazar Bordallo and Francisco B. Leon Guerrero, to Washington D.C. to make their case for citizenship.

In order to offset some of the costs of the Guam Congress representatives’ trip, the Executive-Congressional Committee of the Guam Congress asked naval governor, Benjamin V. McCandish, to provide \$5,000 of local tax revenues to help. Although originally seeming to support this, he and his aides eventually denied this request arguing that appropriating these funds for the two men to lobby for citizenship in Washington D.C. would be a breach of faith on the part of the Naval government with the Federal government.⁹⁸ In essence, the naval government argued that helping to send representatives who were fighting for full inclusion into the American political family would be a breach of faith against the very government they were aiming to be a part of.

⁹⁷ Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, accessed at http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html.

⁹⁸ Hofschneider, *Political Rights*, 90.

This denial did not kill the movement, however, and Bordallo and Leon Guerrero left Guåhan on November 17, 1936.

Upon their arrival, the two leaders testified before Congress and to their surprise, encountered resistance from the Department of the Navy. In a letter from the Navy Secretary Claude Swanson, the Navy outlined their opposition to granting CHamorus citizenship. Their letter hums the tune of the macabre duet, with selections reading,

The geographical location of Guam in the midst of foreign territory, with foreign commercial and colonizing interests to be considered, together with the racial problems of that locality, combine to provide a fertile field for international disputes. It is believed that the change provided for in the proposed legislation would aggravate the danger to peaceful international situations...

There is every indication that these people have not yet reached a state of development and commensurate with the personal independence, obligations, and responsibilities of United States citizenship. It is believed that such a change of status at this time would be most harmful to the native people.⁹⁹

This line of argumentation was reinforced by Commander R.O. Davis of the Naval Office of Island Governments, who refused to allow Bordallo and Leon Guerrero to sit in for his full testimony due to the security implications of what he was going to disclose to Congress in opposing citizenship for CHamorus. What was made known however, was Commander Davis' opinion that granting U.S. citizenship may lead to an organic act which would subsequently change the form of government and possibly lead to the Navy having to withdraw from the island. He said, "it was the position of the Department that the granting of United States citizenship to the Chamorro would immediately affect their administration inasmuch as United States citizens have a part in their government which extends far beyond the present provisions for the administration of Guam."¹⁰⁰ Based on these testimonies, one could argue that the Navy's attitude went against many of the ideals that Americans have historically espoused. The whole idea of power coming from the people was disposed of in the name of U.S. security concerns. Before moving forward, it is important to

⁹⁹ Hofschneider, *Political Rights*, 93.

¹⁰⁰ Hofschneider, *Political Rights*, 97.

clarify that I am not presenting the entire U.S. government as a monolith of opposition to CHamoru citizenship. There were multiple members of Congress who supported the measure as well as executive fact-finding missions investigating naval abuses in the islands. It is important here not to make dangerous generalizations of the American character.

World War II interrupted this CHamoru push for citizenship as the island was brutally occupied by the Japanese for nearly three years. As I will elaborate in the last chapter of this dissertation, the CHamoru war experience would alter CHamoru identity and sense of political subjectivity. Even after the war, the CHamoru push for citizenship would continue to be resisted by the Navy, once again in the name of national security. In May 1946, two years after the war ended, Acting Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan described the military plans for the island now that the war had concluded. In this letter he wrote,

It is planned to maintain the island of Guam as a permanent full-scale Navy activity. Present plans encompass the operation of airfields and necessary work areas, the maintenance of receiving and transmitting communication facilities.¹⁰¹

This would necessitate a substantial amount of land-taking which will be outlined in the following chapter, but the overall effect of taking nearly 60% of the island for military use would fuel the fires of CHamorus fighting for both citizenship and for some, an end to naval government as summed up in the words of Councilman Antonio S. N. Duenas who exclaimed, “Our present system of government in Guam is dictatorial. The governor is an absolute monarch. He is vested with all the absolute powers...and at will can amend, change and make new laws that will affect the entire island.”¹⁰²

Expressing their frustrations with their limited power, the Guam Congress publicly walked out of session in 1949. When news of the protest went “viral” via major news media, the federal government crafted the Organic Act of 1950 officially granting CHamorus and some others in

¹⁰¹ Laura Thompson. *Guam and its People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 118.

¹⁰² Hofschneider, *Political Rights*, 152.

Guåhan citizenship, officially making Guåhan an unincorporated territory of the United States, introducing a civilian government, and placing the administration of Guåhan under the Department of the Interior, although Congress still had plenary power over the island via the territorial clause. This fight for citizenship, resisted by the Navy, would eventually turn into various acts of political status improvement, change, and now, decolonization. After the granting of citizenship and the Organic Act of 1950, the U.S. remained, as it does today, sovereign over the island, thus allowing for further militarization of the island, even if the island was no longer under a naval dictatorship. The bottom line became as Rodgers noted earlier, that America “had an inherent right to be here.” Unincorporated territory status and American citizenship afforded some political power to CHamorus, as long as the federal-territorial relationship remained unchanged at its core. The Organic Act of 1950 was a unilateral act of Congress and was not a document crafted with negotiations with CHamorus, thus keeping the locus of power with the federal government.

This is explicated in CHamoru scholar Laura Torres Souder’s book chapter, “A Not So Perfect Union: Federal-Territorial Relations Between the United States and Guam.” In the chapter, Souder argues that “hierarchical, military rule from the top downwards, defined the federal-territorial relationship at the onset” and from this has created an “imbalance of power favoring the U.S. federal interests often to the extreme disadvantage to the people of Guam.”¹⁰³ Most importantly, Souder demonstrates the shift from citizenship to a larger concern with political status. She recognizes that the Organic Act of 1950 was not an act of self-determination, nor did it change the relationship between the island and the Federal government. She writes, “Although certain roles had been shuffled and new faces in civilian garb replaced the uniformed administrators of pre-war days, the basic vertical, unilateral relationship between the U.S. and

¹⁰³ Laura Torres Souder, “A Not So Perfect Union: Federal-Territorial Relations Between the United States and Guam,” in *Chamorro Self-Determination*, eds. Robert Underwood and Laura Torres Souder, 5-22, (Mangilao: Micronesian Area Research Center, 1987), 9.

Guam did not change with the institution of civilian government.”¹⁰⁴ Power shifts and takes different forms, but what is new in form is not necessarily new in content.

Soon after the passing of the Organic Act of 1950, CHamorus expressed dissatisfaction with their system of government and organized a Constitutional Convention in 1969, led by Senator Richard Taitano, to address how to alter the Organic Act to reflect the island’s needs. After roughly a year of deliberation, the Convention came up with recommendations to amend the Organic Act such as removing the island from the control of the Department of the Interior, just compensation for landowners whose land was taken by the military, and even the regulation of marijuana. In total, however, only the request to have some representation in the nation’s capital was approved. No substantive changes were made in the federal-territorial relationship. A decade later, Guåhan Congressman Antonio Won Pat introduced a bill to create a constitution for the island. The federal government reacted by introducing an edited version of the bill, which would ensure American sovereignty over the island. The enabling act for this Constitutional Convention had to, “First, recognize and be consistent with the sovereignty of the United States over Guam, and the supremacy of the provisions of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States applicable to Guam.”¹⁰⁵ The Constitution was overwhelmingly rejected by CHamorus because it put the “cart before the carabao.” It refused to address the political status of the island. The rules put forward by the federal government during this act kept this federal-territorial relationship intact, and in no way challenged it or allowed Guåhan to choose another political status, which would challenge or complicate the sovereignty over the island.

In 1975, the United States signed a covenant with the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI) who were administered under the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to form the CNMI or Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. As per the covenant, the people of the NMI were given local self-government over land tenure, immigration, labor, and taxes. In addition, the United

¹⁰⁴ Souder, “A Not So Perfect,” 12.

¹⁰⁵ Hofschneider, *Political Rights*, 177.

States provided a substantial financial assistance package including \$420 million in federal subsidies as well as food stamps and welfare benefits. This angered CHamorus in Guåhan because “it seemed ironic and unfair to many that they, who had obediently and patriotically served the United States for seventy-five years, should have less self-government than their neighbors.”¹⁰⁶ Just as they were outraged after U.S. Virgin Islanders were given citizenship in 1917, CHamorus in Guåhan felt they were being duped once again and thought they deserved a similar political agreement with the United States allowing for more local control. This led to the “Guam Study.”

Kept hidden until 2004, in the early 1970s the Nixon administration conducted a study on Guåhan’s political status. Led by the Department of the Interior as a multiagency group, the Nixon administration appointed Fred M. Zeder to head the study. From 1973-1974 during the study’s deliberations, the Department of State and Department of Defense recommended giving Guåhan a similar deal to the Northern Mariana Islands, making the island a Commonwealth as well. The departments argued that this would eventually lead the two island political entities to unite as one commonwealth and guarantee U.S. control of the entire Mariana island chain.¹⁰⁷ Nixon would eventually be replaced by Gerald Ford and during the Ford administration, the president approved making Guåhan a commonwealth. However, Zeder and others from the Department of the Interior did not agree with this decision and through bureaucratic means, left the study to die.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, during the Ford Administration, wrote a memo with the report, which instructed the committee to meet a few objectives:

1. Retain US sovereignty over Guam, and in particular, to maintain US control over Guam’s foreign affairs and defense and preserve US military basing rights to Guam.
2. Enable Guam to move toward complete self-government in internal affairs under a self-drafted constitution consistent with the US Constitution in order to enhance prospects for Guam’s continued close relationship with the federal government, and for long-term stability of the island.

¹⁰⁶ Rodgers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 324.

¹⁰⁷ Rodgers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 324.

3. Help promote the material well-being of Guamanians in order to maintain stability on Guam.
4. Enhance the prospects for the ultimate integration of Guam with the Northern Marianas if this accorded with the desires of the majority of Guamanians.

Although the study ultimately died, what is important here is that the United States federal government was willing at some level to renegotiate Guåhan's political status to appease the population of the island. However, as seen in Kissinger's memo, sovereignty would not be affected. Any renegotiation of political status or increasing autonomy once again had to keep the federal-territorial hierarchy intact. Since the late 1990s and the creation of the Commission of Decolonization in 1997, established by Public Law 23-147, there has been an expansion in the push for political status change, as seen through the increasing use of international law and appearances at the United Nations. The military has utilized the language of loyalty and partnership in fighting against any potential change in political status. One of the best examples can be seen in the beginning of CHamoru scholar James Viernes' dissertation.¹⁰⁸ In his introduction, Viernes tells the story of Rear Admiral Paul J. Bushong. On July 27, 2012, Bushong was being relieved, and a Change of Command ceremony was held in which many regional leaders, federal officials, and members of Guåhan's community were present. During his address, Bushong challenged any notion of self-determination for the native inhabitants saying,

Any of the current talk of the US colonization of Guam or meetings of the Decolonization Committee is insulting to those of us who serve in the United States military. It puzzles me when I hear current talk of self-determination since, by my reading of history, that self-determination was made sixty-five years ago with the 1950 signing of the Organic Act of Guam by the US Congress.¹⁰⁹

This section has hopefully proven how flawed Bushong's argument is. The Organic Act of 1950 was not an act of self-determination as it preserved the federal-territorial hierarchy. However, this leads one to wonder what the United States would do if the current push for decolonization results

¹⁰⁸ James Perez Viernes, "Negotiating Manhood: Chamorro Masculinities and US Military Colonialism In Guam, 1898-1941," PhD diss., University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 2015.

¹⁰⁹ Bushong, Paul. "Joint Region Marianas Change of Command" and "Command Change." YouTube, accessed September 20, 2013). <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lir6alHS5gs>.

in a status that erodes American sovereignty over the island. Is the United States thinking of ways to ensure control over Guåhan in the event of a political status change, such as Free Association or Independence, which relinquishes their sovereignty over Guåhan?

In the chance that the native inhabitants of Guåhan exercise self-determination and the United States accepts the results, the reality of our geographical location will not change. The facts of location are stable (barring climate change or nuclear catastrophe, of course). Yet, this does not stop military strategists from planning for the parameters of that future, and to that end, I end this section with a discussion of the words of Guåhan's very own Robert Crisostomo. In his strategy research project for the U.S. Army War College, Lieutenant Colonel of the Army National Guard, Robert Crisostomo argues that "The United States' Asia Pacific regional policy has the potential of being derailed by the island's nascent desire to pursue its right of self-determination."¹¹⁰ Crisostomo goes on to examine the possibilities of U.S. control of the island in all three option scenarios (Statehood, Free Association, and Independence), ultimately concluding that independence would be the worst for the United States as it could lead to a partnership with Beijing. He advocates for the United States to keep Guåhan either as a state or as a territory, but ultimately argues, rightfully I believe, that the likelihood of statehood for such a small island is near impossible. He then argues that the United States should sweeten our status as an unincorporated territory by giving us voting members in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and ultimately allow us to have representation in the Electoral College. The poison beneath this sweetness is that we will still be under the plenary power of Congress. Crisostomo concludes his project writing, "If the U.S. considers Guam's strategic location as a valuable national security asset, it must persuade Guam, through its pursuit of self-determination, to remain a valued member of the American family and a beacon of U.S. strategic strength in the Asia-Pacific region."¹¹¹ No

¹¹⁰ Robert Crisostomo, "Strategic Guam: Past, Present and Future," (Masters Manuscript, United States Army War College, 2013), Abstract.

¹¹¹ Crisostomo, "Strategic Guam," 17.

matter what status the native inhabitants of Guåhan choose, Crisostomo argues that the United States needs to find methods to ensure Guåhan's loyalty.

This section of the chapter has shown how Guåhan's political status has always been an important factor for the United States to maintain their military interests here in the island. Through deliberate attempts at impeding our self-determination process and push for decolonization or more autonomy, those desires have always played second fiddle to U.S. security interests. In the next section, I look at the contemporary security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on China's challenge to U.S. hegemony. This helps in critically analyzing the future of political insecurity as an unincorporated territory.

V. VIOLENT FUTURES: CHINA AND THE CHALLENGING OF HEGEMONY

“One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.”¹¹²

The quote above was taken from Hillary Clinton's pivotal 2011 piece in *Foreign Policy*, “America's Pacific Century,” where she argues that the core of American foreign policy moving forward should be the Asia-Pacific region. She justifies this shift in the geopolitical pendulum of power swinging towards the region writing that “The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics.” Clinton argues similarly to William Wohlforth, John Ikenberry and Stephen Brooks' article in *Foreign Affairs*, that the U.S. needs to continue “leaning forward”¹¹³ in world affairs and maintain its role as the leader. Countering calls for retrenchment, Clinton writes, “From opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home.”¹¹⁴

¹¹² Hillary Clinton, “America's Pacific Century,” *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2011.

¹¹³ Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth, “Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement,” *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2013.

¹¹⁴ Clinton, “Pacific Century.”

Yet, foreign policy does not hinge on declaratory policy alone; a course of action must be designed. This is where she argues for the continuation of “forward-deployed diplomacy,” a network of strengthened security alliances, relationships with emerging powers (China), engagement with multilateral institutions, the expansion of trade and investment, advancement of democracy, and lastly, the forging of a broad-based military presence. The root of this strategic thinking about the Asia-Pacific region, although heavily coated in the liberal language of democracy promotion and neoliberal language of mutually beneficial international institutions, I argue is still in the realist emphasis of power, particularly stemming from U.S. fears of the loss of unipolarity, with countries like China looming on the hegemon horizon. To examine the root of this worry and shift to the region, we will focus first on China and look at two factors: (1) The growth of Chinese hard power and deterrence capabilities, and (2) China’s economy and soft power growth, which challenges U.S. hegemony.

China’s hard power and military capabilities have grown immensely in the past 30 years and in such a way that the U.S. must ponder and respond to. Barry Posen writes that the United States has long enjoyed a “command of the commons” meaning “worldwide freedom and movement on and under the seas and in the air above 15,000 feet with the ability to deny this same freedom to enemies.”¹¹⁵ Yet, in the past decade or so, China has developed military technology that challenges this command of the commons and has adopted the A2/AD strategy. A2/AD stands for “Area Access/Area Denial” and is a military strategy aimed at “restricting enemy access to a certain strategic location, while it exerts forceful control over a territorial asset like Taiwan or a disputed maritime claim”¹¹⁶ as can be seen in the conflicts surrounding the islands in the South China Sea. At its core, the strategy is aimed at the three Ds: deterring, dissuading, or defeating the

¹¹⁵ Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” *International Security* 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7

¹¹⁶ Anthony Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, “How China Plans to Utilize Space for A2/AD in the Pacific,” *The National Interest: The Buzz*, August 17, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-china-plans-utilize-space-a2-ad-the-pacific-17383>.

involvement of a third power in any confrontation or conflict China may have regarding its territorial assets or maritime claims. A report to Congress from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, stated that a Chinese A2/AD capability reaching anywhere near the “Second Island Chain,” which connects Guam, Japan, and Papua New Guinea, would pose major challenges to U.S. security policy.¹¹⁷ Reinforcing this, in a Congressional Research Service article, Ronald O’Rourke writes, “More broadly, these observers view China’s naval capabilities as a key element of a broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific.”¹¹⁸

The implementation of A2/AD necessitates technological development. This modernization and technological development of China’s military began in the late 1980s when China started designing a new ship class, and this development has continued to the present. In 2008, China had only one ballistic missile submarine and in 2016, it had four. China now has two aircraft carriers with plans to eventually create two to four more in the future. American strategists believe that these aircraft carriers are being used to demonstrate China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power.¹¹⁹ More particularly, the technology required for A2/AD capabilities include: anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), air-independent propulsion boats (AIP), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), missile boats, and even mines, and it is here that we can see the direction China’s technological development is heading.¹²⁰

China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, primarily the DF-21D missiles, can, when combined with targeting systems and maritime surveillance, give China the ability to attack aircraft carriers or other foreign navy ships. Andrew S. Erickson writes, “The U.S. Navy has not previously faced

¹¹⁷ Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific,” 7.

¹¹⁸ Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress”, *Congressional Research Service*, December 13, 2017.

¹¹⁹ Bryan McGrath and Seth Cropsey, “The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft Carriers”, *Hudson Institute*, April 16, 2014, <https://www.hudson.org/research/10238-the-real-reason-china-wants-aircraft-carriers->.

¹²⁰ Alex Hempel, “A Guide to Chinese Naval Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD),” *WhiteFleet.net*, August 21, 2016, <https://whitefleet.net/2016/08/21/a-pocket-guide-to-chinese-naval-anti-accessarea-denial-a2ad/>.

a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to ASBMs as a ‘game-changing’ weapon.”¹²¹ It is also important to point out that the DF-26, an intermediate-range ballistic missile may also be capable of anti-ship capability, and closer to home, this missile has been dubbed the “Guam Killer.”¹²² The DF-26 has a range of around 2,500 miles, making it capable of more than twice the range of DF-21D. Another part of the A2/AD strategy is anti-ship cruise missiles. These include those obtained from Russia such as the SS-N-22 (which is carried on ships China obtained from Russia) and perhaps the most widespread of the ASCMs are the YJ-83 series, which China carries on most of their ships and even in some of their aircraft. These technological and weapon advancements show that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is increasing their potential for anti-surface warfare.

Another core component of China’s deterrence strategy is their submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). According to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, China not only has 12 Russian-made attack submarines, but has also invented their own submarines such as the Jin class (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine) and the Shang class (nuclear-powered attack submarine) seacraft. Furthermore, O’Rourke reported that China is testing underwater drones in the South China Sea with real-time data transmission technology, and that this will help reveal and track the location of foreign submarines.¹²³

While this is in no way a comprehensive examination of PLAN’s modernization or inventory of their analysis, the point is that U.S. strategists and military analysts are taking notice and debating how much they should worry about this modernization and growing arsenal. Some examples of military responses to China’s military modernization include the Defense Innovation

¹²¹ Andrew Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” *Jane’s Navy International*, March 16, 2016, <https://my.ihs.com/Janes?th=janes&callingurl=http%3A%2F%2Fjanes.ihs.com%2FJanes%2FDisplay%2F1765057#A2/AD%20capability>.

¹²² Brad Lendon, “U.S. must beware China’s ‘Guam Killer’ missile,” *CNN*, May 15, 2016, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/12/politics/china-guam-killer-missile/index.html>.

¹²³ O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization,” 19.

Initiative and the Long-Range Research and Development Plan, both meant to ensure a technological edge over any opposing military.¹²⁴ The increasing deterrence potential of China brings worries of possible decline of U.S. hegemony. While A2/AD as a strategy is primarily aimed at deterrence, scholars such as John Mearsheimer argue that China needs to be in the scope of U.S. foreign policy simply due to the “tragedy of great power politics.” Mearsheimer argues that “if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony.”¹²⁵ If one takes this analysis seriously, then China’s military growth, modernization, and diversification is something that will inevitably affect Guåhan as Guåhan is an important power projection hub for the United States in the region.

China’s hard power, deterrence capabilities, and military modernization are not the only factors in China’s growth. Another primary factor worrying U.S. strategists, analysts, and politicians are China’s economic and soft power growth as well as their more active foreign policy. From 1981-2011, China’s economy grew 10% per year, overtaking Germany and Japan’s economy rather swiftly. China is now the second largest economy, the world’s largest exporter, second largest importer, and is also now the world’s largest trading nation.¹²⁶ Between 2007 and 2015, the Chinese economy more than tripled in size, while the American economy only grew by about 20%,¹²⁷ and in 2017, China’s economy grew by 6.5% making it roughly 2/3 the size of the U.S. economy. Many economists argue that the Chinese economy is set to overtake the U.S. economy as the largest in the world within the next decade.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Cheryl Pellerin, “Hagel Announces New Defense Innovation, Reform Efforts,” *DOD News*, November 15, 2014, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603658/>.

¹²⁵ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 361.

¹²⁶ Jude Woodward, *The US vs China: Asia’s new Cold War?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).

¹²⁷ “World Economic Outlook Database, 2016, GDP 2007-15, Current US\$,” International Monetary Fund, January 16, 2017, accessed September 2018, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx>

¹²⁸ Woodward, *The US vs China*, 17.

Yet, even if China is not the largest economy in the world just yet, their economic rise has already resulted in policies and actions that strategists deem to be against the U.S.'s national interest. One prime example is their creation of alternatives to the economic development institutions created after Breton-Woods, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These neoliberal institutions were created after World War II and were meant to ensure that American economic interests were maintained through the granting of money under the condition of a country's acceptance of free trade and privatization. Many countries in Oceania and Africa such as Fiji are turning rather happily towards China for financial assistance since China does not attach the same neoliberal conditions in the acceptance of a loan. This was made clear by African Trade Minister Rob Davies in 2010 when he said, "China's expanding presence in Africa can only be a good thing because it means that we don't have to sign on the dotted line whatever is shoved under our noses any longer. We now have alternatives and that's to our benefit."¹²⁹

Another example is the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was created in 2015 and was an initiative aimed at boosting the region's economy with Beijing as the center of development. This was seen as a diplomatic victory for China because despite the United States' objection, U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Australia all signed the articles of association for the AIIB.¹³⁰ China's Finance Minister Lou Jiwei said that the establishment of AIIB was a "first step in an epic journey meant to deepen regional cooperation, boost Asia's infrastructure and support the global economic recovery."¹³¹ Due to the United States' resistance to increasing the resources of the International Monetary Fund giving emerging market nations a greater share in the decision-making of the institution, China created the AIIB.¹³²

¹²⁹ Woodward, *The US vs China*, 17.

¹³⁰ Simon Denyer, "China launches development bank for Asia, calls it first step in 'epic journey'," *The Washington Post*, June 29, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-launches-infrastructure-bank-first-step-in-an-epic-journey/2015/06/29/e7d8bd7a-ca11-46fa-9bad-15ba856f958c_story.html?utm_term=.4becafbe9b68.

¹³¹ Denyer, "China Launches Development Bank"

¹³² Denyer, "China Launches Development Bank"

During AIIB's founding, some U.S. analysts such as David Dollar said that while AIIB was a diplomatic success for China, the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) could re-establish U.S. importance to the Asia-Pacific economy.¹³³ Ali Velshi, a MSNBC business correspondent also wrote on the importance of the TPP, "The TPP's largest goal was to maintain U.S. trade dominance in Asia, bringing the various trading partners under America's wing as a way to ward off China's growing economic influence."¹³⁴ Yet, as soon as entering the presidency, his first day to be exact, Donald Trump pulled the United States out of this economic deal. His reasoning was that he wanted to move away from multilateral trade and instead negotiate trade deals with individual allies.¹³⁵ In showing decreasing American hegemony, the other 11 countries involved in the TPP have moved forward with the deal despite the U.S. being absent.¹³⁶ It is important that at the time of this writing, it is speculated that Trump may start supporting the U.S. once again joining the TPP. At the world Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, he said, "I would do TPP if we were able to make a substantially better deal. The deal was terrible, the way it was structured was terrible. If we did a substantially better deal, I would be open to TPP."¹³⁷

Another initiative sought by China in further Asian integration is their "One Belt, One Road Initiative." This initiative by President Xi Jinping is aimed at creating an "economic belt" which would link China with Mongolia, Russia, Iran, Turkey, the Balkans, and even central and Eastern Europe. His maritime silk road component is aimed at linking south-east China with south-east Asia, Bangladesh, India, and the Mediterranean. The core of this project would be to invest

¹³³ Denyer, "China Launches Development Bank"

¹³⁴ Ben Popken, "Why Trump Killed TPP- And Why It Matter," *NBC News*, January 23, 2017, <https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/why-trump-killed-tpp-why-it-matters-you-n710781>.

¹³⁵ Mireya Solis, "Trump withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership," *Brookings Institute*, March 24, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/03/24/trump-withdrawing-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/>.

¹³⁶ Mie Oba, "What now for economic integration in the Asia-Pacific?" *Japan Times*, February 12, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/02/12/commentary/japan-commentary/now-economic-integration-asia-pacific/#.WoGcCJP1VE4>.

¹³⁷ Jacob Pramuk, "Trump: I would reconsider a massive Pacific trade deal if it were substantially better," *CNBC*, January 25, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/25/trump-says-he-would-reconsider-trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal.html>.

heavily in infrastructure such as transcontinental railway routes, highways, port facilities, and energy pipelines. The economic cost of this initiative is quite large, and China has invested nearly \$1 trillion. This initiative has geopolitical implications that challenge U.S. hegemony, and not just in the Asia-Pacific region.¹³⁸ As Peter Ferdinand writes, “But in the shorter term, even if the United States continues to be extremely important in China’s outlook, it means that Chinese leaders may not always be so preoccupied with the United States.”¹³⁹ China’s vision in its role in the world moves beyond keeping its eye on the United States.

In Oceania, some of the most visible signs of Chinese policies that threaten U.S. hegemony can be found in the soft power (financial aid) they are providing Pacific Island nations such as the Federated States of Micronesia. One root of Chinese aid to Pacific Island nations has been the battle for diplomatic recognition where China and Taiwan both sought various Pacific Island states to recognize their respective governments as the legitimate “Chinese” government. The result of this has been the opening of the region to Chinese investment. According to Dean Cheng who runs the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, “Chinese trade with Pacific Island countries rose by 60 percent between 2014 and 2015, reaching \$8.1 billion.”¹⁴⁰

These factors collectively demonstrate how America’s hegemonic status and influence is relatively declining, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They no longer have the same degree of operational freedom and unilateralism as once exercised either militarily or economically. Jude Woodward perfectly describes this, writing, “The US’s fear is not that countries are going to do what China wants, but simply that they will no longer feel obliged to do what the US wants. The goal of the US defense and foreign policy establishment is to stop this.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Peter Ferdinand, “Westward ho- the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping,” *International Affairs* 92, no. 4 (July 2016), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/westward-ho-china-dream-and-one-belt-one-road-chinese-foreign-policy-under-xi-jinping>.

¹³⁹ Ferdinand, “Westward ho,” 954.

¹⁴⁰ Dean Cheng, “Countering Chinese Inroads into Micronesia,” The Heritage Foundation, October 27, 2016, accessed at <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/countering-chinese-inroads-micronesia>.

¹⁴¹ Woodward, *The US vs China*, Loc 7122, Kindle.

It is at this juncture that Julian Go's analysis of empires is rather useful. In his book, *Patterns of Empire*, Julian Go compares the empires of the United States and Britain and looks at their foreign policy through the lens of three phases of empire: hegemonic ascendancy, hegemonic maturity, and hegemonic decline. In describing these patterns of empire, he writes how during the phases of hegemonic ascendancy and hegemonic decline, empires are more aggressive and turn towards military means of power and economic maintenance. As author Jude Woodward writes,

The US may be by far the most militarily powerful state on the planet and China cannot match that, but the US is no longer the most dynamic major economy. And while military power can achieve some objectives, it cannot compensate for lack of economic power. The US still wears the giant's robe, but it hangs increasingly loose as its economic capacities shrink.¹⁴²

By this, she argues that "The U.S.'s declining economic leverage means it is forced to rely more openly on military means to achieve many of its objectives."¹⁴³ This comprehensive analysis of China's ability to counter American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region is meant to show that similar to Rachel Oldenziel's argument, it does not seem that Guåhan will become obsolete anytime soon.

VI. I FINAKPO' (CONCLUSION)

My partner and I travelled to Aotearoa (New Zealand) for a conference in March of 2017. During one of the lighter days of the conference, we decided to drive down to Auckland and spontaneously take a 40-minute boat ride to Waiheke island, a 35-square mile island with a permanent population of 7,700 people, which is best known for its enormous number of vineyards. After a long day of visiting vineyards, we stopped for lunch at a fish-n-chips shop near the ocean. In polite small talk, the hostess asked my partner and I where we were from. When we said "Guam," she looked confused, and had no idea what or where Guam was. She then turned to the cook behind her and asked if he knew where Guam was. Amidst the tantalizing smell of frying

¹⁴² Woodward, *The US vs China*, Loc 7162, Kindle.

¹⁴³ Woodward, *The US vs China* Loc 277, Kindle.

fish, he looked over at us, and asked, “Hey isn’t that the giant military base or something?” This is one of the most palpable effects of our militarized, colonial political status. From the stories in the beginning to this story now, the overall effect is that my island home, where I was born, where I had my first kiss, witnessed the birth of my children, and learned to be who I am today is either internationally forgotten or simply known for war. We have never had a chance to determine our own international image. We have never been given the chance for our side of the story to be the most dominant. In this chapter, I have attempted to show why this is the case. This chapter set the stage for understanding Guåhan’s role in U.S. national security and power projection. The following chapters, then build on this chapter, by engaging in detailed histories of life in Guåhan being formed via unincorporated territory status and militarization. Furthermore, through these histories, I demonstrate the effects of the “why” examined in this chapter from land dispossession, to the economy, to the environment, to the entire discursive process of CHamoru identity and political subjectivity as a result of war and basing in the island. If this chapter provided the “why” as well as “how” our political status is important for the U.S. military, the following chapters illustrate how such acts have been able to sustain themselves despite forced powerlessness, a continuum of violences, and insecurity.

Chapter 2: Economic Violence Step #1: Land Dispossession as the Root of Economic Insecurity

The economic development and administration of relatively few native inhabitants should be subordinate to the real purpose for which those islands are held. Military control of these islands is essential as their military value far outweighs their economic value.

¹ -Vice Admiral G.D. Murray

Beginning in 1993, CHamoru activist, Angel Santos began to “illegally occupy” his grandfather’s land in Mogfog, Dededo, which the U.S. Navy stole after World War II. He was subsequently arrested for trespassing, yet a federal judge ordered the Navy to leave Santos undisturbed on the land, where Santos built a wood and tin structure. A typhoon was set to hit the island but changed direction at the last minute. When Santos returned to the land, he found his structures completely destroyed. The military destroyed the structure thinking they could just blame it on the typhoon that was supposed to hit. Santos then started to rebuild his structures, but lost in another court battle, where District Court Judge John Unpingco ordered Santos to vacate the property. He would continue to return to this land despite the judge’s orders and was ultimately arrested in 1999 when Unpingco sentenced him to six months in federal prison. Santos died at the age of 44 from Parkinson’s Disease, although many have rumored that he was poisoned in federal prison. This is the story of one of Guåhan’s strongest fighters; serving prison time for reclaiming ancestral land which had been outright stolen by the military after World War II. In this chapter, I show how Santos’ story while unique in its conclusion, is very common in its origin: the dispossession of CHamorus of their land. Santos’ family lost their land, like many CHamorus did, taking away the foundation of their livelihoods; the foundation of their homes.

In CHamoru society of the past, the foundation of our houses were built on large stone pillars called latte. The latte is one of the strongest symbols of CHamoru culture today because of its function. Usually, these houses were held up via two rows of latte with four to six latte pillars per row. The result was a sturdy house held up by eight or twelve strong latte insulating the house

¹ Mar-Vic Cagurangan, “1945 secret memo reveals US real intention for Guam,” *Marianas Variety*, June 18, 2007.

against harsh weather conditions and other natural disasters. I inquire what would have happened to these houses if there were only two latte holding them up. Through common sense and the most rudimentary understanding of physics, surely, the house is doomed to fall with such a weak foundation. Analogizing a latte house, Guåhan's economy is a house with only two pillars: (1) federal funding including military projects and basing and (2) tourism. In a similar fashion, I worry about Guåhan's economy similarly sustaining itself on such a weak and imbalanced foundation of two pillars.

In this chapter, I argue that the current economic two-pillar foundation has its origin in the rampant land dispossession of CHamorus, and I use land dispossession to tell the larger story of the process of economic violence in the island. This chapter acts as Part one in a two-chapter analysis of economic violence. While this chapter centers land and history, the following chapter shows the modern manifestations of economic violence that can be traced to the history outlined here. Collectively, these two chapters aim to address the following: (1) how the history of CHamoru land dispossession has not only provided the condition of possibility for our militarized form-of-life, but has also severely harmed our economic development potential (2) why tourism and military spending became the most dominant pillars (3) why other pillars have not been built to hold up the house of our economy and (4) how our political status as a militarized, unincorporated territory is intertwined with the creation, impediment, or destruction of other economic latte pillars. When interviewing chief economist of the Bank of Guam, Joseph Bradley, about the entanglement of the military with the economy, he told me that "there are layers upon layers to the onion(s), schemes within schemes."² These next two chapters are my attempt at peeling these layers, but as a caution to the reader, like cutting any onion, please beware that the layers of military entanglement with Guåhan's economy, may cause one to tear up. With this analytical knife in hand, I peel the layers of this onion with various chronological cuts. In the first

² Joseph Bradley, Interview, August 31, 2018.

section of this chapter, I examine economic development and stagnation in the Spanish period, U.S. Naval period, and Japanese occupation during World War II. The second section then engages with the critical transformation of the island after World War II when the people of Guåhan recovering from war were forced to adapt to a wage economy. Concurrently, I examine the ways in which economic flourishing and development in Guåhan has been dictated or affected by U.S. national security initiatives or our status as an American military base. David Hanlon, in his book, *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944-1982*, argues that economic development has consistently been a strategy of domination. He writes,

A seemingly more benevolent, well-intentioned program of rule, the promotion of economic development presented a process of change no less disruptive and destructive than other colonial initiatives in its effects upon the peoples, places, and cultures of the area for Micronesia. If successful, the many and varied plans for development would have resulted in a total remaking of Micronesia.³

In this chapter, I follow in Hanlon's footsteps and look at the effects of an economy in service of a militarized form-of-life.

I. EARLY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LIMITATIONS: LET THEM SERVE US!

Spanish Period

Before and during the period of Spanish colonization, CHamorus primarily engaged in subsistence farming and fishing. There was no wage economy, and people subsisted either on their own catch and crops or on the system of reciprocity with shared resources among members of a clan, a core CHamoru value called *chenchule'*. Although first contact with Europeans occurred in 1521 with Ferdinand Magellan, it would not be until 1565 when Miguel Lopez de Legaspi planted the cross on the beach of the village of Humåtak, that Spain would officially claim Guåhan as their possession, and not until 1668 with the events spurred on by Diego Luis de San Vitores that the

³ David Hanlon, *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944-1982* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 3

island would experience the throes of colonization. From 1565 to 1815, the Spanish used Guåhan as a reprovisioning pit stop in their Acapulco-Manila galleon trade. At the height of their empire, Spain had colonial possessions in Asia and in the Americas, primarily in the Philippines and in Mexico. To ensure Spanish access to Asian goods, the Spanish used their ships, called galleons, to ensure a trading route of continued access to this Asian market. In the route from Acapulco to Manila (which took roughly two months) and vice versa from Manila to Acapulco (one month), these Spanish galleons would stop by Guåhan to replenish themselves and to provide for the Spanish governor of the island. “A royal order in 1668 required that the Acapulco galleons made Guam a port of call...The galleons carried supplies and the subsidy from Mexico for the governor, Jesuit mission, and colonial management.”⁴ Many CHamorus traded with those on the Spanish galleons providing them with water, fresh fruits, and woven baskets in exchange for metal goods like nails and knives as well as cloth. Although the CHamorus were introduced to new goods, this was still a barter system.

Looking at the economic picture like a forensic archaeologist would, one begins to see the roots of economic hindering slowly spreading in the way that the Spanish treated CHamoru land. After the Spanish and their loyal CHamoru allies subdued the “CHamoru rebels,” with the ending of the Chamorro-Spanish War, the fabric of CHamoru life began to change, not only with religion, but with the treatment of land. The Spanish introduced the concept of land ownership, and eventually transferred much of former Chamorri (who were the higher caste in CHamoru society that primarily fought against the Spanish) land to those that were loyal to them (who became the new high class). This was considered Crown Land, which would play an important role during the Naval Period land takings.

⁴ “Stops Along the Manila Galleon Trade Route,” Guampedia, accessed September 2018, <https://www.guampedia.com/stops-along-the-manila-galleon-trade-route/>

American Naval Period (1898-1941)

When the American naval government set itself up in 1899, Captain Richard Leary was appointed as the first naval governor of the island. The naval government's primary method in managing their newly acquired Pacific possession was that of "benevolent assimilation" to ensure the continuation of their presence in the region. Through education and health practices, the Naval government, although having most power vested in one individual, aimed to follow McKinley's instructions to show the inhabitants of the island that the United States presence was one of benevolence.⁵ To accomplish this, the Americans set up an education system, a bank, healthcare facilities, and improved infrastructure. During the Naval period,

Basic sanitation facilities, utilities, and other public services were modernized in Guam. There was a power plant in Agaña to supply power to naval government offices; water wells were drilled and water systems were installed; a hospital was built and staffed for the Chamorro population. Coral was laid for the main roads. The naval government was concerned about public health from the beginning, making certain that nothing threatened to harm Navy personnel. As a side effect of this, though, the general health of the people of Guam improved; this, too, is a set forward in economic development.⁶

In many ways, the U.S. presence in the island pushed infrastructural developments that were very beneficial to the people of Guåhan. The early Naval period's economy was based on agricultural production and small-scale retailing and trade in copra (dried coconut meat used to produce coconut oil). In 1914, Atkins Kroll bought a coconut plantation and began shipping out 100-pound sacks of copra to various locations. Some local CHamorus, such as Joseph Ada and Pedro Martinez, also found success during this time of early economic development running a local soap factory and ice plant respectively. Pedro Martinez's company, for example, ran an ice plant, mini-supermarket, wholesale business, construction company (which built the first hotel in Guåhan),

⁵ Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Disease: U.S. Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).

⁶ Anthony Leon Guerrero, "The Economic Development of Guam," in *Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Hagåtña: Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 1996).

automobile agency, and two large farms.⁷ Tun Pedro's story however, was not indicative of the majority of the CHamoru population.

Besides these few successful locally-owned businesses, most forms of employment were through the Naval government and rules were implemented that these jobs would go to English speakers, thus disqualifying many CHamorus who were not yet fluent in the colonizing language.⁸ Most CHamorus stuck to subsistence living and did not engage in these early emergences of a wage economy. It is important to note that the U.S. priority in developing the island and its economy was not necessarily to better the lives of the CHamoru people, but rather to produce an economy that would help sustain the military presence and provide the goods and services that servicemen would need during their stay in the island. As former President of the Bank of Guam Anthony Leon Guerrero writes, "Although the economic development associated with colonization did benefit the people of Guam, this was a side-effect, and not the principal intent of the colonizers."⁹ For the purposes of this dissertation, I am not too concerned with intent. If our economic development was merely a side effect in the colonial governance of the island, without this being the intent of the U.S. Navy, then so it was. I quote Leon Guerrero not to produce a particular affect within the reader, but rather because it is important information when looking at the subsequent development and economic policies pursued and its connection to the continuation of colonial governance of the island.

Like the Spanish, the U.S. Navy wanted to produce an agricultural economy to ensure the production of goods to keep the military fed. In her article, "Navy Blues: US Naval Rule on Guam And The Rough Road to Assimilation, 1898-1941," CHamoru historian Anne Perez Hattori describes the Naval motto to rehabilitate, organize, administer, and make productive the

⁷ "Pedro Pangelinan Martinez," Guampedia, accessed September 2018, <https://www.guampedia.com/pedro-pangelinan-martinez/>

⁸ Michael Clement, "English and Chamorro Language Policies," *Guampedia*, <https://www.guampedia.com/us-naval-era-language-policies/>

⁹ Anthony Leon Guerrero, "The Economic Development of Guam," in *Hale'-Ta*, 84-85.

CHamorus of the island.¹⁰ This benevolent assimilation was touted in the name of progress and “not only to better the material circumstances...but to achieve a transformation in the bodies and minds of the people.”¹¹ Echoing Leon Guerrero’s argument that development and betterment of the CHamoru livelihood was a side effect, not an intention, Naval Governor Dyer, who ruled over Guåhan in 1904, proclaimed,

It is therefore incumbent on us for our self-protection and efficiency to give the natives such care as they are unable to get for themselves, to see that they are kept healthy and free from contagion, are afforded practical instruction in their sole pursuit, agriculture, and to educate some of them to occupy some positions as clerks, mechanics, and intelligent laborers in the Naval Station...These people must be taught, at once, to help themselves in ways to make themselves useful to us.¹²

When it came to development and the economy, the message was clear: make the CHamorus healthy and relatively well-off so that they may be useful to the Naval government. Like Dyer, Hattori also cites a 1906 study by Charles H. Forbes-Lindsay, in which he wrote,

It is distinctly to the interests of the American Government to give the Chamorros ample educational facilities without delay. At no very distant date the requirements of the naval station on the island will demand a number of men to fill clerical positions and to perform intelligent work as mechanics and laborers. If, when that demand arises, the island can not furnish a large proportion of the needed working force, the positions can only be filled by the Government at comparatively great cost and inconvenience.¹³

Through these measures, the Naval government could produce clerks, mechanics, and laborers to help keep their presence comfortable in the island and keep them from engaging in the types of labor that would make them go native.

The Americans were disappointed with the subsistence lifestyle of the CHamorus because they only caught or produced enough to feed their families and clan members and did not produce extra. The CHamoru ambiguity towards any form of surplus was portrayed by the Naval

¹⁰ Anne Perez Hattori, “Navy Blues: US Naval Rule on Guam And The Rough Road to Assimilation, 1898-1941,” *Pacific Asia Inquiry*, 5, no. 1 (Fall 2014): 13-30.

¹¹ US Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *US Navy Report on Guam, 1899-1950*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951.

¹² Naval Government of Guam. *Annual Report of the Naval Governor of Guam* (Hagåtña, GU: 1904), 4.

¹³ Charles H. Forbes-Lindsay, *America’s Insular Possessions* (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1906).

government as an obstacle to economic development. As Captain Frederick Nelson wrote, “Unfortunately, these people failed to see the benefit of a surplus which they did not store but which through exchange, they could turn into money or an indestructible surplus...In fact, the unwillingness of CHamorus to work for any wages was another indication of their ignorance.”¹⁴ The Navy was frustrated by this because of their fear of running out of food for the military personnel to eat in the island, thus leading to their obsession with getting CHamorus to become agricultural laborers. From the traditional island imaginary, these military men were essentially isolated on a small rock in the middle of nowhere and were afraid of this isolation and seeming finiteness of resources and sustenance. As Henry Beers writes,

The state of agriculture on the island became a serious matter to the administration within a few weeks after the arrival of the expedition, for it became difficult to procure eggs, chickens, meat, and vegetables for the garrison and the men on the station ship. To keep up their health, fresh vegetables were essential, so a means was sought to ensure their production.¹⁵

This desire to turn CHamorus into laborers and clerks to help with menial tasks and most importantly with Naval nourishment did not just live in the writings of Naval governor reports but was enacted via policy. Hattori describes the General Orders given by Governor Leary that impacted the development of Guåhan’s economy. General Order No. 6, for example, ordered that “the exportation of cattle, hogs, fowl, eggs, rice, corn, and sweet potatoes from the island is hereby forbidden.”¹⁶ Hattori explains, “this essentially restricted the practice of trade between CHamorus and trading vessels during port-of-call visits in order to conserve the island’s available fresh food

¹⁴ Anne Perez Hattori, “Colonialism, Capitalism and Nationalism in the US Navy’s Expulsion of Guam’s Spanish Catholic Priests, 1898-1900,” *The Journal of Pacific History*, 44, no. 3 (2009): 293.

¹⁵ Henry P. Beers, *American Naval Occupation and Government of Guam, 1898-1902* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Records Administration, Navy Department, 1944), 28.

¹⁶ Hattori, “Colonialism, Capitalism,” 293.

for Navy consumption.”¹⁷ The U.S. Office of Strategic Services wrote that Guåhan’s prewar economy was thrown off by the presence of the U.S. naval station work projects.”¹⁸

Training this work force also took place in the educational system that was set up during the early Naval period. In 1900, Governor Richard Leary passed General Order No. 12, which created a public education system for children 8-14 years of age. The intent of the school system was twofold: the first was as a method of American assimilation, and the second was to teach CHamorus the necessary skills to produce the Navy’s desired laborers and clerks. The second Naval governor Seaton Schroeder, wrote that through education, CHamoru children would “attain the standards of civilization and morality that rule in the more enlightened parts of the world.”¹⁹ However, realistically, the implementation of education in Guåhan fit more with the insurance of a developed labor force. Governor George R. Salisbury wrote, “It is the desire of the Governor to encourage the people of the island to live on the ranches, cultivate the soil, raise stock, poultry, etc. and it is requested that the Teachers, Priests, Clergymen and all Civil and Military Officials interest themselves in attaining these results.”²⁰ To this end, Salisbury changed the attendance age requirement of 8-14 years of age to 6-12 years of age. He also made an exception for students who lived more than two miles from school and thus encouraged them to live on their farms. The Department of Agriculture of the United States also helped start boys’ and girls’ agricultural clubs as well as school farms to help foster the CHamoru agricultural capability for surplus. Robert Underwood writes that Naval officials did not want education to get in the way of the agricultural spirit and that officials wanted to prevent a situation in which the island was burdened with “a semi-educated class of parasites who deem it beneath their dignity to engage in manual labor and aspire only to clerical and storekeeper jobs.”²¹

¹⁷ Hattori, “The Navy Blues,” 25.

¹⁸ Office of Strategic Services, “Guam: A Social-Political-Economic Survey,” (Washington D.C.: Office of Strategic Services, National Archives, 1942), 85.

¹⁹ Underwood, “Education During the US Naval Era.”

²⁰ Underwood, “Education During the US Naval Era.”

²¹ Underwood, “Education During the US Naval Era.”

This paternalistic attitude and colonial desire for labor is a common feature of colonial projects throughout history. In *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race*, Patrick Wolfe points out the traditional difference between colonialism and slavery, writing, “The role that colonialism has assigned to Indigenous people is to disappear. By contrast, though slavery meant the giving up of Africa, Black Americans were primarily colonized for their labour, rather than their land.”²² In Guåhan, both logics of dispossession and labor were employed forcing CHamorus to simultaneously give up their land, as will be described later in this chapter, and work to maintain militarization’s smooth operations in the island. Unlike more physically brutal campaigns of extermination such as the British invocation of terra nullius in Australia or the Philippine-American War, the U.S. military was not killing or beheading CHamorus. They were not separating children from their families or subjecting CHamorus to painful medical experimentation. Yet, their rule was anything but benign.

Wolfe points out that “Colonised populations continue to be racialized in specific ways that mark out and reproduce the unequal relationships into which Europeans have co-opted these populations.”²³ Through the racialization of CHamorus as primitive and in need of saving by Uncle Sam, the Americans wanted to make the CHamorus obedient and useful to them. The Americans did not physically exterminate the CHamorus, but rather had to find a way to cohabit the island and hierarchize social and economic relationships. As Wolfe argues, “racialization represents a response to the crisis occasioned when colonisers are threatened with the requirement to share social space with the colonised.”²⁴

As proof of this unfair treatment and racialization of CHamorus as lesser, I turn to a report made by Baltazar Bordallo to the Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson in 1937. Bordallo bluntly outlines the ways that the military personnel were treated better than the CHamorus and that

²² Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso, 2016), 2.

²³ Wolfe, *Traces of History*, 2.

²⁴ Wolfe, *Traces of History*, 14.

CHamorus were being inferiorized and unjustly treated. Bordallo not only points to practices he views as unjust, but along the way, he frames these practices as economically unfair. Bordallo writes,

That the Service Club in Agana be required by the Naval government to pay the full liquor license fee of \$200.00 per annum instead of the \$25.00 annual fee which it now pays... This works a distinct hardship on merchants who operate like establishments and have to pay the full fee of \$200.00 per annum.²⁵

That the license fees for motor vehicles be made applicable to the Service personnel who are now paying a flat license fee of \$5.00 irrespectively of the make of cars they operate. Such discriminatory fees, now in effect in Guam, are considered unfair and inequitable, and would tend to promote a feeling of antipathy and animosity among our native population toward the Naval Administration. Attention is called to the fact that the service personnel enjoy the same road privileges we do, and there seems to be no logical reason why this especially low license fee be extended to them only.²⁶

Bordallo's report shows the cumulative economic effects of Naval treatment of CHamorus in this early Naval period. More particularly, through racialization and a desire to make CHamorus laborers, there were discriminatory economic practices. This report helps make the point that colonialism needs to refashion the human terrain and in an economic sense, this was done through the deliberate attempt to make CHamorus useful enough for labor, but not too educated as to lose their "agricultural spirit" as well as the implementation of discriminatory economic practices. The U.S. military wanted to produce a narrow band of social mobility in which CHamorus would not fall below or rise above. Falling below or rising above the band makes the CHamoru no longer useful to the Naval government's colonial experiment and makes CHamoru presence in the island problematic. As Anne Perez Hattori said,

Your self-worth is now coming in this tiny paycheck rather than in the produce that you used to have. I think that, that kind of breaking of the spirit in a sense, it doesn't surprise me. After so many decades of this, so many CHamorus have this sense "What can we do?"

²⁵ B.J. Bordallo, "Report of B.J. Bordallo to Secretary of Navy Claude Swanson (June 15, 1937)," in *Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective*, (Hagåtña: Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 1996), 46.

²⁶ Bordallo, "Report of B.J. Bordallo to Secretary of Navy Claude Swanson," 48.

We can't do anything. If the military goes, we're going to starve. We are going to die. It's so many decades of that kind of independent spirit being broken.²⁷

Tâno'

Labor, education, and racialization were not the only methods of economic control implemented by the Americans. Furthering the work of the Spanish, the Navy exploited land as a method of control through taxation. The first Naval governor, Richard Leary, instituted a new tax system that changed the old Spanish land taxation method of taxing money one earned from the use of their property to a system based on the size and geological type of land one owned. This made it difficult for CHamorus to hold onto their land without finding ways to “cheat” this unfair tax system. CHamorus began to understate the size of their land to avoid having to pay a larger tax and lose their land. Leary passed General Order No. 15, which gave CHamorus a few months to register their land or else their ownership of that land would not be recognized. The order reads, “all owners of claimants of land are hereby warned that in order that their ownership be recognized, they must acquire legal titles to the said land and have it registered according to law by May 15, 1900.”²⁸ The Naval government told CHamorus that any land that was not registered by this date would be considered Spanish Crown land which the United States dictated was now theirs as they were the new sovereign. The Naval government upon assuming control of the island automatically claimed all “Spanish Crown lands” to use for their purposes.²⁹

This was the conundrum for CHamorus at the time: pay the tax or lose their land. The system was set up for many CHamorus to lose their land and subsequently, their livelihoods and subsistence. As CHamoru attorney Mike Phillips writes, “General Order No. 15 forced the Chamorros to make a choice: either register their properties accurately and lose them because they

²⁷ Anne Perez Hattori, interview, October 16, 2018.

²⁸ “Richard P. Leary General Order Nos. 1-21,” Guampedia, accessed September 2018, <https://www.guampedia.com/leary-general-orders/>

²⁹ Mike Phillips, “Land,” in *Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective*, (Hagåtña: Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 1996).

could not pay the taxes, or not register their lands and lose them because they were not properly registered.”³⁰ Phillips also mentions that whenever the Naval government had reason to believe that someone was understating the size of their land, they considered this cheating the system and would subsequently claim that land as Spanish Crown land. According to Guåhan historian Robert Rodgers, “Every year, four to six titles, usually to poor land, reverted to the naval government.”³¹

In these blatantly colonial times, dispossession of indigenous land was the name of the game. From Africa to Turtle Island to Australia and New Zealand, colonial governments inherently relied on the dispossession of the native of their land for strategic, economic, and political purposes. The economic unfair treatment and racialization discussed above are all just methods of continued dispossession. Glen Coulthard writes regarding forms of domination,

It is a relationship where power—in this case, interrelated discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power—has been structured into a relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to facilitate the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority.³²

In his book, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting The Colonial Politics of Recognition*, Coulthard analyzes the applicability of Marxist thought to indigenous struggles. This is useful in understanding the Naval government’s treatment of the island. Through his definition of colonialism as structured dispossession, Coulthard describes the Marxist notion of primitive accumulation, which Marx used to excavate the violent origins of capitalism. Coulthard writes,

In *Capital*, these formative acts of violent dispossession set the stage for the emergence of capitalist accumulation and the reproduction of capitalist relations of production by tearing Indigenous societies, peasants, and other small-scale, self-sufficient agricultural producers from the source of their livelihood—the land.³³

Marx, in *Capital*, argues that the birth of capitalism can be traced to this violent process of dispossession, which would open up resources and the land to privatization, but also through this

³⁰ Mike Phillips, “Land,” in *Issues in Guam’s Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective*, (Hagåtña: Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 1996), 5.

³¹ Rodgers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 121.

³² Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 7.

³³ Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 7.

dispossession of land, over time, a “class” of workers are produced. This class of workers, who come from those who lost their land, are forced into entering the exploitative wage economy.³⁴ In this early Naval period, we saw the social engineering of grooming agricultural laborers with the simultaneous obstacles to CHamorus being able to hold on to their land. Power is structured through ownership and the Navy made many attempts to own CHamoru lands and livelihoods.

Although there are problems with Marx, considering he viewed capitalism as a progressive stage to socialism and a classless society, and did not necessarily care about indigenous peoples or colonies, the argument is still very useful. So far, in this dissertation, I have pointed to the strategic location of the island for military purposes. However, it is important to note that from an economic perspective, Guåhan is also in a prime geographical location. In *The Empire’s Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific*, Sasha Davis expands on Stephen Collier’s and Andrew Lakoff’s argument that states deploy power for three reasons: biopower, state sovereignty, and vital systems security. In reference to state sovereignty and biopower, states were originally concerned with defending territory and then managing/surveilling their populations.³⁵ The latter, vital systems security, is pertinent to understanding the military presence in Guåhan.

According to Davis, vital systems are “systems or processes the state views as vital to its continued functioning and its ability to provide for its population. Examples include electrical power generation and transmission, fuel distribution, and most relevant to this discussion, the movement of goods or “trade.” Davis describes the western Pacific as a “critical space of a transnational economic system the American state feels it must protect.”³⁶ Since trade is viewed as a vital system the U.S. is completely invested in, the consequences of trade disruption shifts

³⁴ Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (London: Penguin Books, 2004).

³⁵ Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff, “Vital Systems Security: Reflexive Biopolitics and the Government of Emergency,” *Theory Culture & Society*, 32, no. 2, (March 2014): 19-51.

³⁶ Davis, *The Empires’ Edge*, 6.

from an “economic cost” into a “security threat.”³⁷ Essentially, Davis writes, “the reason many of these islands are still denied full sovereignty and subjected to intense militarization is because they are deemed to be critical for American ‘national security’ (which in this region is essentially synonymous with American dominion over the vital system of trade).”³⁸ Thus, although our location has been deemed from a military perspective, this does not mean that it is free of the temptations or machinery of capitalist accumulation.

With Guåhan as strategically important land for militaries and inherently, the capitalist system, other tools are needed to understand land dispossession, and this is where the academic field of Indigenous Politics provides a vast array of theoretical tools. Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred emphasizes the critical importance of land to indigenous peoples writing, “colonialism is best conceptualized as an irresistible outcome of a multigenerational and multifaceted process of forced dispossession and attempted acculturation—a disconnection from land, culture, and community—that has resulted in political and social discord.”³⁹ The root of colonialism is land. Through Indigenous Politics, one can see how dispossessing people of their land is not simply the taking of “property,” but is the loss of so much more. Indigenous Politics turns away from the notion to view space as “the dead, the fixed, and the undialectical.”⁴⁰ Instead, for indigenous peoples, land is a set of relations. Mishuana Goeman writes, “I begin with land as meaning-making place because that is at the heart of indigenous identity, longing, and belonging. Indigenous peoples make place by relating both personal and communal experiences and histories to certain locations and landscapes.”⁴¹ Emphasizing this same thought, Alfred writes in his book, *Peace,*

³⁷ Deborah Cowen, A Geography of Logistics: Market authority and security of supply chains, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 100, no. 3 (2010): 3.

³⁸ Davis, *The Empires' Edge*, 9.

³⁹ Taiaiake Alfred, *Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 52.

⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Harvester, 1980), 70.

⁴¹ Mishuana Goeman, “Land as Life,” in *Native Studies Keywords*, eds. Stephanie Nohelani Teves Andrea Smith, and Michelle Raheja (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2015), 73.

Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto, “Land, culture, and government are inseparable in traditional philosophies; each depends on the other, and this means that the denial of one aspect precludes recovery as a whole.”⁴² Alfred argues that for indigenous peoples, losing one’s land is essentially depriving them of not only their physical vitality, but also of their epistemological spring. For CHamorus, land was everything. Robert Underwood once wrote that “land is the one issue that can turn any Chamorro into an activist.”⁴³

Land as a core issue in indigenous struggles is also reflected in the words of Haunani-Kay Trask, who wrote,

No one knows how better to care for our island home, than those of us who have lived here for thousands of years...The secrets of the land die with the people of the land. This is the bitter lesson of the modern age...The land cannot live without the people of the land who, in turn, care for their heritage, their mother.⁴⁴

In the CHamoru creation story, the island was created by two siblings named Puntan yan Fu’una. Upon Puntan’s death, his sister Fu’una took his body and created the universe. She took his eyes and made it the sun and the moon. His eyebrows became the rainbow and his back became the land. When she completed this, she turned herself into a gigantic, majestic rock out of which the first CHamorus emerged. From a CHamoru epistemological perspective, the land is imbued with spiritual qualities that has survived despite heavy Catholicization. Many CHamorus still ask permission from the ancestral spirits before entering the jungle. This shows the persistence of a metaphysical, spiritual nature to the land in Guåhan. Overall, in this dissertation on insecurity and slow violence, Indigenous Politics as a field helps to show how the dispossession of land is not only an economic issue, as being primarily concentrated on in this chapter, but rather, a whole dissertation could be written on the psychological and spiritual ramifications of massive land dispossession. It also helps to show how colonialism as a process has effects beyond the material.

⁴² Alfred, *Peace, Power, Righteousness*, 26-27.

⁴³ Underwood, “Afterword,” in *A Campaign for Political Rights*, 211.

⁴⁴ Haunani-Kay Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 80-82.

With this engagement in Indigenous Politics literature, we can now move into the Japanese Occupation period and the post-war period where we begin to see land take a larger place for the military with a smaller share in CHamoru hands.

Tiempon Gera: Japanese Occupation (1941-1944)

The development of the island and further CHamoru inclusion into the labor force under the U.S. Navy was interrupted by the Japanese occupation of the island from December 1941-August 1944. After the invasion by the Japanese on December 10, 1941, two days after they bombed the island, the Japanese took over the island and began implanting their ways. It is important to note that the Japanese had their plan of survival in the island since the 1930s when they tried to strike a deal with the U.S. government to lease the southern part of the island to the Japanese for agricultural production. They wrote regarding Guåhan land,

Guam could produce more and better sugar than Saipan and is also well suited to growing coffee, cacao, tobacco, cotton, pineapple, and in the rich lowlands, maize and rice. There is fine timber in the hills of the south. The northern plateau, or those parts of it not needed for airfields, could readily be laid out for sugarcane or coconut plantations. There are no better fishing-grounds in the Pacific than the waters around Guam.⁴⁵

The island's economic potential was later acted upon when Guåhan became integrated into Japan's war economy. Wakako Higuchi writes regarding Guåhan's role in relation to the Northern Mariana islands of Saipan and Tinian, "Supporting these islands was the first task given to Guam, to be achieved as soon as possible, according to the navy's policy for proper place of the island for establishing "organic" industrial relations and permanent integration of Guam into the Mariana Islands as part of Japan."⁴⁶ Higuchi argues that Japan took the island to serve as a rear supply base to help the survival of the Mariana Islands as a whole.

⁴⁵ Wakako Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam, 1941-1944: A Study of Occupation and Integration Policies, with Japanese Oral Histories* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc., 2013), 92.

⁴⁶ Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam*, 83.

The Japanese once again, like the Americans, used CHamorus as labor in the completion of this goal. “A characteristic point of Guam’s planned development was complete dependence on CHamoru laborers, who lacked industrial skills and resources.”⁴⁷ During the Japanese occupation, many CHamorus returned to their lanchos, or ranches, to escape being in the sight of Japanese soldiers. These ranch lands provided CHamorus their sustenance as they grew their crops and cared for the animals they would eventually kill for food. The Japanese, knowing this, began to force CHamorus to turn over their produce to the Japanese. They imposed a quota system on CHamoru agricultural production that was to be turned over to feed their troops. Many survivors of the war recall hiding some crops so that they would have enough to feed their families. To instill this mindset in CHamorus, the Japanese argued that “CHamorus should awaken from their colonized mentality and dependence on imports, and work to achieve food self-sufficiency and other local food.”⁴⁸ Thinly veiled, the argument here was once again, become useful to us and feed us through your labor, even if it means you cannot feed your own families.

One of the most prominent examples of this was the Japanese policy of providing 2.75 acres to CHamoru families to cultivate their own crops, while the Japanese were simultaneously taking land from CHamorus for rice paddies. Private land ownership was not recognized by the Japanese, and they flat out stole CHamoru lands to use for these rice paddies. One of the Japanese priorities in Guåhan was the production of rice, and they forced CHamorus to cultivate and irrigate land to make it suitable for the planting and harvesting of rice. The Japanese hoped to turn Guåhan into the rice-production center of the Marianas, and thus provide for the Japanese colonial administration. In just two years, the agricultural use of Guåhan’s land jumped from 2.8% before the war to 7.6%.⁴⁹ So, despite taking land and then allotting land to CHamorus, this did not greatly alleviate CHamoru suffering. Higuchi describes how the Japanese system “distributed food first to

⁴⁷ Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam*, 109.

⁴⁸ Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam*, 95.

⁴⁹ Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam*, 98.

the military, then to Japanese civilians, and only then to the CHamorus. The distribution of provisions to CHamorus was always dependent on the number of Japanese military personnel on the island.”⁵⁰

During their occupation of the island, the Japanese enforced the use of a new currency, issued rationing coupons, and only resupplied Japanese-operated stores.⁵¹ CHamorus had to exchange their American dollars for yen during this period to facilitate economic integration with Saipan, which was already under the Japanese administration. Unfortunately, during this time, a 2 for 1 rate was imposed and CHamorus saw their money lose half of its value. They also took over the only bank in the island and took all CHamoru savings, causing the few that had money in the bank to lose it.⁵² In every way, the Japanese stayed true to this plan and CHamorus suffered as a result.

As the end of the war grew closer, the Japanese began to worry about losing. Therefore, CHamoru labor was not only utilized for agriculture, but also for the fortification of the island. In October of 1943, the Japanese sent their Navy Construction Corps to begin construction at both the Sumay and Tiyan airfields. This work was extremely difficult, under the scorching sun, and CHamorus were usually compensated with only a tiny bag of rice. It is very important to point out that the Japanese were significantly more physically violent in getting CHamorus to engage in grueling manual labor. CHamorus who did not work fast enough on labor projects were beaten. For example, war survivor Vicente Taisipic participated in an oral history project of the World War II experience. In his interview, it was reported,

Vicente Taisipic of Yona said people were rounded up and taken to a compound near the school to be indoctrinated by the Japanese. Every 15 minutes they were made to face north toward Japan and bow. Deprived of his childhood, at six years old he was given two jobs. One job was to pull the teacher’s son around the compound in a wagon for half an hour first thing in the morning. After that, it was classes until noon. Then the children

⁵⁰ Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam*, 98.

⁵¹ Leon Guerrero, “Economic Development of Guam,” 88.

⁵² Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam*.

planted and harvested fruits and vegetables. Taisipic's other job was to collect manure around Yona—human or animal. If he did not fill six buckets with manure, he was beaten. At the end of the day he would walk back to his family ranch to take care of the animals and bathe in the river with no soap. He felt like a living maggot.⁵³

Another story of the physical violence of forced labor can be found in the story of Joe Aguon,

In late 1942, Aguon was forced to work at Tiyan, digging and bringing water to the Japanese soldiers. At the end of the day, he and the other assigned workers got a handful of rice as payment. Later in the year, Aguon was assigned to work in Cañada, Barrigada as a mess boy and later, he was transferred to work in Ordot digging tunnels. If the Japanese were not satisfied with the laborers' work, they were told to line up face-to-face and slap one another. When Aguon's turn came, he refused to slap the old man facing him and he was hit by the Japanese guard with a stick. The old man whispered, "Go ahead and slap me, I will understand."⁵⁴

These stories are only a couple amongst many stories that illustrate the brutality and harsh treatment the Japanese exercised towards CHamorus and the absolute horrid conditions of this time period. Just like the Americans, the Japanese utilized the CHamoru people to ensure their own survival, usually at the expense of the CHamorus. During the Japanese occupation, Guåhan's economy as well as CHamoru land and livelihoods were devastated, and many CHamorus hoped that the return of the Americans would free them from the darkest two and a half years of their lives. CHamorus were used for another power's survival and economic stability, not their own. Neither the Spanish colonial period, nor the American naval period or the Japanese period saw a sense of true economic development for the island. CHamoru labor and land was exploited, never nurtured. CHamorus were not in charge of their developmental or economic present or futures. In the next section, I cut into the next chronological layer and show how post-war economic development by the Americans inhibited true economic success for the island and its people all in the name of security.

⁵³ Shannon J. Murphy, "WWII: Oral War Histories Of The Chamorro People," *Guampedia*, <https://www.guampedia.com/wwii-oral-war-histories-of-the-chamorro-people/>

⁵⁴ Murphy, "WWII: Oral War Histories Of The Chamorro People."

II. POST-WORLD WAR II ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: CLOGGED ECONOMIC ARTERIES

Vice Admiral G.D. Murray wrote in a military memo, “The characteristics and nature of the majority of inhabitants on these islands are such that the artificial or forced raising of their standard of living to one approaching that of the United States would be detrimental to their best interest and would contribute little to the safety and welfare of the United States.⁵⁵” This quote from Murray embodies not only the thought of particular Naval officials, but also the subsequent actions by the U.S. military in their post-war treatment of the island. After World War II ended and the military secured the island from the Japanese military, they began their large-scale transformation of the island into a permanent forward operating base, as discussed in the last chapter. Naomi Klein’s groundbreaking book, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, delves deep into the phenomenon of disaster capitalism. Disaster capitalism, according to Klein, operates in the following manner: wait for a major crisis, sell off pieces of the state to private players while everyone is still recovering, and then make these reforms permanent.⁵⁶ Deriving from the thought of neoliberal capitalist Milton Friedman, the core of change comes from crisis. Friedman writes, “only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.”⁵⁷ The goal is to use moments of intense collective trauma that shocks the political community to engage in radical social and economic engineering. Friedman would not write his neoliberal capitalist manifesto until 1962, twenty years after the end of World War II. However, this core idea of using the aftermath of disasters to christen a new economic and social order was seen in Guåhan, primarily, in what I deem a “destroy and replace” campaign utilizing what Wolfe describes as “logics of elimination.”

⁵⁵ Cagurangan, “1945 secret memo reveals US real intention for Guam.”

⁵⁶ Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (New York: Picador, 2010).

⁵⁷ Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*, ix.

In “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Wolfe argues that territoriality is the driving force of settler colonialism and that “settler society required the practical elimination of the natives in order to establish itself on their territory” thus making settler colonialism inherently eliminatory. Finally, Wolfe argues that “invasion is a structure not an event.”⁵⁸ I argue that the U.S. invasion to reoccupy the island set up an economic structure that lingers today, and that although masked in the language of liberation, as will be discussed in the last chapter, the economy of Guåhan can best be understood by looking at the reconstruction of the island directly after the war. There is a direct connection between the island’s ontological transformation into a permanent military base and the parameters of Guåhan’s economy. Even if Wolfe’s argument is dealing directly with settler colonialism, similar colonial logics run through what Rachel Oldenziel calls “transport hubs” such as Guåhan, the Azores, and Hawai‘i.⁵⁹ Access to land is the priority and elimination of the natives is a prerequisite of this. Some colonizers directly exterminated the natives, and others, as argued, used racialization as a form of hierarchization. World War II was the United States’ opportunity to cement hierarchization and hopefully achieve an uninhabited strategically located island. Unfortunately for them, this did not happen and manlåla’la’ i CHamoru (The CHamoru still lives).

Destroy and Replace

U.S. victory and reoccupation of the island came largely at the expense of a massive bombing campaign. Beginning on July 8th, 1944, the United States military started bombing the island for 13 days straight before they would make landing in the island. In addition to aerial bombings, the U.S. Navy also began blowing up reef and lagoon obstacles off of beaches in Asan and Hågat (Agat). During these days of bombing, about 80% of the island’s permanent structures were destroyed and the capital of Agaña (now Hagåtña) was almost completely bombarded into

⁵⁸ Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8, no. 4, (2006): 387.

⁵⁹ Oldenziel, “Islands: U.S. as Networked Empire.”

concrete rubble and by 1950, the village's population decreased from 10,000 before the war to a mere 760.⁶⁰ The village was completely destroyed. CHamoru historian Pedro Sanchez wrote of the bombardment, "Not a single dwelling remained in Asan, Piti, Agat, and Sumay, the pre-war hometowns of over 4,000 CHamorus."⁶¹ During the reoccupation campaign, one group of CHamorus tried to contact the Americans so they paddled out into the ocean to board an American ship. When the group of men finally boarded, they thanked the Americans for "liberating" the island. The captain of the ship then responded, "Liberate? We are here to flatten the rock."⁶²

The captain's short remark is ripe with the logics of elimination the U.S. deployed along with their bombs. The United States' return was not with the intention of helping the CHamorus, but rather the war provided everything they needed to actualize the terra nullius dream to "destroy and replace" they could not achieve before the war. This is evident in the fact that many more CHamorus could have died if they were not forced to march by the Japanese to designated concentration camps. As the Japanese believed an inevitable American invasion was near, they began to worry that CHamorus would help signal the Americans and thus forced CHamorus to concentration camps such as the one in Manenggon, Yona. These marches were once again physically brutal as CHamorus were told in a moment's notice to leave their households and make their way down to the camps. Without much food or water, many CHamorus starved, were physically exhausted, or suffered heat strokes as they marched. My great-grandfather, for example, suffered a heat stroke while working in the field and the Japanese soldiers told my family to throw him away because he was useless. However, his brothers-in-law decided to hide him in a cave and take care of him, but ultimately, he died. Thus, my grandmother lost her father when she was only

⁶⁰ Political Status Education Coordination Commission, *Hale'-ta: I Ma Gobetna-ña Guam* (Mangilao: Political Status Education Coordination Commission, 1994), 109.

⁶¹ Pedro C. Sanchez, *Guahan Guam: The History of Our Island* (Agaña: Sanchez Publishing House, 1988), 254.

⁶² Vicente Diaz, "Simply Chamorro: Telling Tales of Demise and Survival in Guam," in *Voyaging Through the Contemporary Pacific*, eds. David Hanlon and Geoffrey White, (New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 152.

nine years old. Other stories of the war illustrate this harsh period such as the stories of Hannah Chance Torres and Juan Unpingco.

Hannah Chance Torres, after having been beaten and berated by Japanese soldiers, died while she and others were en route to the Manenggon concentration camp. She had stopped to feed her baby and refused the soldiers' order to move on. Her body was left on the side of the path.

Juan Unpingco remembered the march and not being allowed to stop, no matter what. He heard babies and children crying and some old people moaning in pain. Anyone who tried to rest, he said, would be whipped and beaten. His father was beaten while on the march, even though he had done nothing wrong.⁶³

It was not only this deprivation and exhaustion that led to CHamoru deaths, but also the sheer amount of American firepower. This was a war that CHamorus had nothing to do with, yet they became collateral damage during both the war and its aftermath.

The reason why I trace this history of forced marching to concentration camps is because “Despite these hardships, however, incarceration proved to be a blessing in disguise. Had they not been moved, many CHamorus would have been killed by the American pre-invasion bombardment and Japanese crossfire.”⁶⁴ Many CHamoru deaths were averted at the price of intense suffering both physically and psychologically, echoing our current predicament of a “sense of security” provided at the expense of genuine CHamoru security in Guåhan. Destroying and replacing may not have been deliberate, but it was a consequential effect of this massive and sustained bombing campaign of the island. This destruction of the island made the face of the capital village of Hagåtña unrecognizable, as many other aspects of Guåhan and CHamoru livelihood would be after the war, rather unrecognizable.

After the U.S. successfully subdued the Japanese and reoccupied the island, they quickly began reconstructing and ultimately transforming the island to fit their security interests. In looking at the development of the island after the war, I turn to critical development theory to help make

⁶³ Murphy, “WWII: Oral Histories.”

⁶⁴ Murphy, “WWII: Oral Histories.”

sense of it all. Large scale development projects in the aftermath of World War II were not unique to Guåhan because World War II heavily changed the international system and made the U.S. a great power. Destruction is creative, the shock of war leads to new worlds, and for many indigenous peoples, it was not a good world that was created. Following World War II, modernizing the world became the dominant development discourse. Vincent Tucker, in his article, “The Myth of Development: A Critique of Eurocentric Discourse,” defines development as the “process whereby other peoples are dominated and their destinies are shaped according to an essentially Western way of conceiving and perceiving the world.”⁶⁵ Furthermore, he argues that,

It is an essential part of the process whereby the developed countries manage, control, and even create the Third World economically, politically, sociologically, and culturally. It is a process whereby the lives of some peoples, their plans, their hopes, their imaginations, are shaped by others who frequently share neither their lifestyles, nor their hopes nor their values. The real nature of this process is disguised by a discourse that portrays development as a necessary and desirable process, as human destiny itself.⁶⁶

Even if Guåhan, due to its status as an unincorporated territory, is not the traditional analytical referent in critical development theory, the theoretical meat remains relevant to the post-war transformation of the island. Guåhan’s infrastructural and economic development would be shaped by the United States military.

Immediately after the war ended in Guåhan, the U.S. military needed to finish fighting the Japanese in the rest of the Pacific, including Okinawa, Palau, and the Philippines. To this end, they utilized Guåhan as a forward naval base and an airbase for B-29s to bomb the Japanese mainland. General Walter H. Frank proposed that B-29 air bases would be constructed in the island after a pre-invasion aerial survey was conducted in May of 1944. The plan was for each air base to have two 8,500-foot asphalt runways and house 100 B-29s.⁶⁷ To ensure absolute control over the island

⁶⁵ Vincent Tucker, “The myth of development: A critique of a Eurocentric discourse,” in *Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a new paradigm*, eds. Ronnie Munck and Denis O’Hearn (London: Zed Books, 1999), 1.

⁶⁶ Tucker, “The myth of development,” 1.

⁶⁷ Rodgers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 181.

and to achieve their war objectives, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander and Chief Pacific and Commander in Chief Pacific Area, declared

All powers of government and jurisdiction in Guam and adjacent waters, and over the inhabitants thereof, and final administrative responsibility are vested in me as Admiral, United States Navy, commanding the forces of occupation and as Military Governor, and will be exercised through subordinate commanders by my direction...No political activity will be permitted other than that authorized by me or under my authority.⁶⁸

His declaration of authority showed that the old authoritarian Naval ways were going to remain, especially in a time of war.

This post-war transformation of the island was deliberately planned out. In May 1946, Acting Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives outlining the military's operations in Guåhan, writing,

the installation of a fleet marine base, and the continued operation of the advance base construction depot, the naval operating base, the submarine base, the fleet hospital, the naval ammunition depot, and the naval repair base. To carry out the contemplated plans, specialized installations will be required for aids to navigation, radar installations, tank farms, and anti-aircraft. To man and operate the activities, housing facilities of a permanent nature are planned.⁶⁹

The military plans outlined in this letter show that the complete overall transformation of the island would require a large amount of land to be taken. Adding to this, Vice Admiral Forest P. Sherman, wrote, "When we recaptured Guam, we proceeded with the development of the island without regard to ownership for the most effective and rapid prosecution of the war."⁷⁰ The next section discusses the extensive amount of land taken from CHamorus immediately after the war to actualize this vision of turning Guåhan into this "permanent full-scale Navy activity."

⁶⁸ Rodgers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 82.

⁶⁹ Thompson, *Guam and its People*, 118.

⁷⁰ United States Congress, Hearings before the House Comm. on Naval Affairs on H.R. 6547 to Authorize the Secretary of the Navy to Acquire in Fee or Otherwise Certain Lands and Rights in Land on the Island of Guam, 79th Cong. 2nd. Session, 1950.

Ma Chule' Ha' i Tano': Stolen Lands Out of CHamoru Hands

Before the war, the Naval government already acquired CHamoru land via an impossible taxation system and the lumping of “unregistered land” into Spanish Crown lands which they argued was theirs due to the shift in sovereign control over the island. However, this postwar transformation into a forward operating base saw the largest land-taking by the military in Guåhan to date. Their quest to finish the war in the Pacific inevitably meant they were going to further dispossess CHamorus of their lands. CHamoru historian Anthony Palomo, published a memoir of his war experience titled *An Island in Agony*, and in his book, Palomo describes this ontological transformation of lands and the hands that own the land. He writes, “Farmlands were converted into airfields and villages which had escaped destruction during the actual fighting were moved elsewhere....And with the massive military buildup, thoughts of reverting Guam to its prewar agricultural economy were wishful thinking.”⁷¹ In the two largest villages before the war, Agaña and Sumay, 11,000 of the island’s 20,000 inhabitants were displaced as a result of the war and the American transformative war effort. By 1947, a total of 1,350 families had lost their land and homes due to military actions.⁷² While many CHamorus of this time understood temporary land taking to help the Americans finish the war, they did not expect permanent dispossession of their land.

During this immediate post-war period, the military controlled close to 60% of the island totaling near 52,000 acres of privately held land, and a total of 85,000 acres overall with the old “Spanish Crown lands.” To handle the newly landless CHamoru population, the military began to construct “small dwellings and tent-frame structures” in the new villages of Dededo, Barrigada, Sinajana, Yona, Asan, Santa Rita, and Agat. Most of these structures were only made to last around 6 months, were built with salvaged war materials, and it was once again CHamoru labor hired by

⁷¹ Anthony Palomo, *An Island in Agony* (Self-Published, 1984), 248-249.

⁷² Timothy P. Maga, *Defending Paradise: The United States and Guam: 1898-1950* (New York: Garland, 1988), 197.

the government to build these temporary dwellings. By mid-1945, it was estimated that nearly 5,000 CHamorus remained homeless in these refugee camps because they were not allowed to return to the villages of Agaña and Sumay yet. Many CHamorus despised being kept in these refugee camps and in late August 1944, a group of CHamorus led by Simon A. Sanchez and others decided to leave the camp and settle on land in Dededo. What is important to note here is the military's response to this group of people. Instead of letting them move back, the military tried to move them back into the camps and even cut off all their food rations.

Another confusing aspect of this temporary refugee housing situation was that “in almost every case, the land on which the houses stood were privately owned. Thus, in effect, the displaced persons were trespassing on private property with the government's permission.”⁷³ Not only were CHamorus dispossessed of their land, but the military also unilaterally dictated the use of land that they did not take. In one example, the military told the residents of the village of Tamuning that their land was going to be used for Naval installations. They were told that the area from a beach road to an area near a cliff was the new officially designated land for civilian use, and that they could build their new homes there. These lots, however, belonged to particular families before the war, and now 80 new families were building homes on their land. This caused a conflict between the original landowners and these new families, and the new families petitioned Congress to help them figure out their standing on this land. Governor Pownall, Naval governor of Guåhan, displaced the responsibility for settling this conflict and told the CHamorus to solve it amongst themselves. Even if these landowners were happy to help the landless of the time (many eventually became frustrated by the situation), this does not excuse the dictatorial actions being exercised by the United States military.

Analyzing the two most populous villages in Guåhan before the war, Agaña and Sumay, where people were denied returning at the time, we can see how transformations in the name of

⁷³ Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights*, 134.

U.S. national security were detrimental to the CHamoru people. There are people in Guåhan who were born and raised here, but throughout their entire lives, have never stepped foot into Sumay. In order to visit Sumay, you need a military identification card or be “let in” with someone who does. A majority of the pre-war village lies inside barbed wire fences and a manned security gate. After the war, the U.S. took the village of Sumay and transformed it into what is now known as Naval Base Guam. Taotao Sumay, or people from Sumay, are now scattered throughout other parts of the island or living in the geologically inferior new village of Santa Rita, where the military relocated many of the former inhabitants of Sumay. In his thesis, CHamoru scholar James Perez Viernes, whose family was one of those dispossessed of their land, describes the closing off of Sumay. Sumay was located near Orote Point which holds the coveted Apra Harbor, Guåhan’s deep-water harbor with excellent docking capabilities. After the war, Admiral Nimitz requested for not only “those lands directly employed by the military forces, but additional land adjacent to the used areas to insure control of the total areas for defense and security reasons and to provide for future needs, installations, and possible expansion.”⁷⁴

After the war, many of the people of Sumay returned to see their homes, only to be told they could not return at the time. One elder remembers returning to the village where she was told by a military official that she was not to come back yet. “I told the captain of the army or the marines that’s our house, we can still live there. And he said (while waving his finger up in the air) ‘oh no, you can’t live there’.”⁷⁵ To justify keeping CHamorus away, the American military told them that there were still Japanese bodies rotting in the streets, and the Americans then barricaded Sumay. CHamoru war survivor and former resident of Sumay, Juan Quintanilla Guzman, blames the Americans for destroying his village. He said in an interview with the *Pacific Daily News*, “You know, Japanese didn’t bomb the village. They only bombed the Marine barracks

⁷⁴ Rodgers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 215.

⁷⁵ James Perez Viernes, “Fanhasso I Taotao Sumay: Displacement, Dispossession, and Survival in Guam,” (M.A. thesis., University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, 2008), 56.

and the cable station, which is far away from the village. The one who destroyed Sumay is the bombardment of the Americans, not the Japanese.”⁷⁶

While many manaotao Sumay were waiting to return to their homes and living in these refugee camps, they were called to a meeting in April 1945 by the military government and were told they would never be able to return back to their village. They were given the option of either relocating to the village of Agat or moving to another developed site. When people refused to move to Agat, the military created a new developed village on the slopes of Mount Alifan which was named Santa Rita. Beginning in 1945, “the U.S. military began construction of temporary wood and thatched-roof duplex homes and began moving families at Apla (where their temporary refugee camp was) one by one into the area as homes became available.” This land was surely not the fertile, thriving land that the people of Sumay remembered. As a news article reported in 1972, “the Navy could not have chosen a worse site [to relocate the Sumay people] as most of the home sites were on a 45-degree slope and the land was for the most part untillable and mosquito infested.”⁷⁷ Today, this new village of Santa Rita has murals that read “Taotao Sumay.” They surely have not forgotten where they come from. As CHamoru elder Juan Wesley said regarding Santa Rita, “We try to farm and ranch but it’s not that good. We try to plant a few vegetables, but it’s not the same as in Sumay.”⁷⁸

Residents similarly were not allowed to return to the village of Hagåtña, or Agaña as it was known at the time, because of U.S. construction and architectural plans. Unlike Sumay, people still live in Hagåtña today, although it is important to note that before the war, it was one of the most populous villages in the island, and now it is one of the least populated. After the war, the military had plans to Americanize the former capitol of the island and turn it into “New Agana.”

⁷⁶ Chloe B. Babauta, “Remembering Sumay, a village lost in war,” *Pacific Daily News*, August 5, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/08/05/remembering-sumay-village-lost-war/861377002/>

⁷⁷ Sunday News Magazine, “Sumay: Annihilated Village,” *Sunday News Magazine*, November 12, 1972, 2A.

⁷⁸ Viernes, “Fanhasso I Taotao Sumay,” 72.

CHamorus became visibly upset and resistant to land-takings when the military started to take land almost exclusively for recreational purposes. “In Agaña, roughly five hundred people were displaced when eighty-two lots were condemned for a park, and in Tamuning, sixty hectares of Tumon Beach were condemned for a military recreational center.”⁷⁹ In the village of Tumon, a CHamoru man named John Unpingco stood in front of American soldiers and their bulldozers with a shotgun refusing to leave his family land.⁸⁰ In the southern villages, the Navy erected fences around prime beaches and forbade anyone from swimming or entering the beach area unless they were officers, enlisted men, or their dependents. The Eighth Guam Congress argued against these land takings, demanding, “all beaches and seas be declared public property and that rights-of-way be established leading to these beaches and seas, and that any person, organization, unit, or group of persons shall have free access to any beach or sea either for recreation or fishing.”⁸¹

To defend the military’s stance of acquiring private CHamoru land for these recreational centers, Governor Charles Pownall argued that “to provide adequate athletic facilities for the personnel of the Armed Forces of Guam is of direct concern to the local Government in effecting law and order, harmony, and morale.”⁸² Here, Pownall seems to be arguing that condemning land was important for the overall well-being of American soldiers and that without these facilities, these soldiers could become disorderly and interrupt the order and harmony of the island. The message seemed to be, “Who knows what soldiers will do to you if they are not allowed to blow off some steam?” Critique within the military came from General LeMay who wrote,

They had built tennis courts for the Island Commander; they had built fleet recreation centers, a Marine rehabilitation center, dockage facilities for inter-island surface craft, and every other damn thing in the world except subscribing to the original purpose in the occupation of those islands.⁸³

⁷⁹ Guam Echo, “Condemnation,” Guam Echo (Washington DC: Institute of Ethnic Affairs), August 31, 1948, 3.

⁸⁰ Phillips, “Land,” 67.

⁸¹ Guam Congress, *Congressional Record*, 1 May 1948, Appendix, 16.

⁸² Charles A. Pownall, *Memorandum to the Guam Congress*, (Subject: Status of Tumon Bay Area), April 26, 1948.

⁸³ Rodgers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 184.

All of this land taking was justified and, in a sense, legalized via Public Law 594, also known as the Guam Acquisition of Lands Act passed by the 79th U.S. Congress in 1946. The legislation reads,

The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to acquire in the name, and for the use, of the United States, by purchase or otherwise, land and rights pertaining thereto situated on or within the island of Quam (sic), including interests in fee, leasehold interests with or without option to purchase interests in fee, and rights-of-way and easements both temporary and perpetual for highways, drainage systems, water supply and communication distribution facilities, upon conveyance of title acceptable to him or to such other officer as he may designate.⁸⁴

The phrasing in this legislation of “by purchase or otherwise” would have lasting ramifications as “it would not be long before otherwise would translate to an outright taking of land in the name of military interests.”⁸⁵

Security Clearance (1941-1962): Strategic Isolation

Before the Japanese occupation of the island, the United States was already preparing for a possible attack by the Japanese. They noticed the Japanese building up of forces in the surrounding Pacific Islands. In October of 1941, the military began to evacuate their dependents off the island. It is important to note that they did not evacuate nor inform the CHamorus of their suspicions of a Japanese attack. To prepare for this possible attack, the Secretary of the Navy passed Executive Order 8693 in 1941 which established the “Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea Area” and the “Guam Island Airspace Reservation.” This order was passed with the supposed intent to “preserve the security of the island as war with Japan loomed on the horizon and Japanese air and naval bases in the Northern Marianas menaced Guam.”⁸⁶ As a result of the Executive Order, the Secretary of the Navy was delegated the power to authorize entry into the island. The security

⁸⁴ Laws of the 79th Congress, United States Code Congressional Service (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1946), 768-769.

⁸⁵ Viernes, “Fanhasso I Taotao Sumay,” 64.

⁸⁶ Frank Quimby, “Security Clearance on Guam,” *Guampedia*, <https://www.guampedia.com/security-clearance-on-guam/>

clearance was interrupted for roughly three years due to the Japanese occupation of the island and then a few years after while the military rebuilt the island. The security clearance was eventually reinstated in 1950, three months after the Organic Act became effective.

As a result of the security clearance,

All persons desiring to come to Guam who are not within certain excluded categories are required to obtain a security clearance from the Secretary of the Navy or his subordinates before they are permitted to enter. A person coming to Guam for the first time files the application directly or indirectly with the Chief of Naval Operations. In the case of a citizen of the United States who is a resident of Guam and who desires to leave Guam temporarily with intent to return, an application for a re-entry permit must be made to the Commander, Naval Forces Mariana Islands.⁸⁷

W. Scott Barrett and Walter S. Ferenz, in their article, “Peacetime Martial Law in Guam,” argued that it was not difficult for the military to enforce the security clearance as the Navy controlled the only two ways to get into the island: through ship or by plane. In the former instance, one would have to enter via Apra Harbor, which was under the control of the Navy. At the time, all operations of the port were under the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas. In the latter instance, if one wanted to arrive to Guåhan via plane, they would have to land at Naval Air Station, where the current civilian airport of Guåhan is located today, but which was formerly under the complete control of the military. This was troublesome for many CHamorus who wanted to return home, as in the case of former Speaker of the Guåhan Legislature, Joe San Agustin. In the late 1940s, San Agustin went to attend George Washington University in Washington D.C. He had to request permission from the Navy to leave the island, and after he graduated, asked permission from the Navy to return to Guåhan. He said in an interview with *Pacific Daily News*, “When I graduated in 1950, I wanted to come home. I had to write to the admiral, ‘Can I come to Guam?’ That’s the only way they would allow me to buy a ticket to Guam.”⁸⁸

⁸⁷ W. Scott Barrett and Walter S. Ferenz, “Peacetime Martial Law in Guam,” *California Law Review*, 48, no. 1 (March 1960): 4-5.

⁸⁸ Chloe B. Babauta, “For Chamorus, lifting security clearance was like getting out of prison,” *Pacific Daily News*, September 16, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/09/16/years-guam-travelers-needed-navy-approval/1199596002/>

When asked to justify the continuation of the security clearance policy, the Navy gave various positions found in different memos and letters. A review of these letters and memos reveals the specific seven reasons;

1. The clearance is necessary so long as the Korean War continues.
2. Because of the huge expenditure of appropriated funds on defense projects, Guam draws from nearly every walk of life civilians whose purpose is making as much money as possible, directly or indirectly, from the salaries of military and government employees.
3. Many aliens are excluded because their long-term presence would be detrimental to the effective use of Guam for its primary mission of defense.
4. The island of Guam is an important United States naval and military base, and its protection fully warrants those measures authorized by Executive Order No. 8683.
5. The Navy is required by Executive Order No. 8683 to enforce the order.
6. The clearance is necessary to enable the Navy to assist the local government in keeping the “riff-raff” out of Guam.
7. Entry into Guam is limited to persons who contribute to its “strategic development.”⁸⁹

From these collective reasons, the theme of this dissertation echoes loudly: security, security, and more security. From our use for the Korean War to our “strategic development,” the military kept this security clearance policy in place even after administration of the island switched to the Department of the Interior, and this infuriated many CHamorus. Returning to Joe San Agustin, he said, “Think of it: you’re put in a cage, you’re born on Guam, and you have to ask an admiral, ‘Can I leave Guam?’ And then I leave Guam, and I have to ask can I come to Guam. It’s like asking, ‘Can I go to the bathroom?’”⁹⁰

From an economic perspective, the security clearance hurt the island’s chances of development. The island was essentially a closed port for twenty years after the war, with the Navy dictating who comes in and who goes out. Anthony Leon Guerrero, former President of the Bank

⁸⁹ Barrett and Ferenz, “Peacetime Martial Law in Guam,” 6-7.

⁹⁰ Babauta, “For Chamorus, lifting security clearance.”

of Guam, writes regarding the security clearance requirement, “Consequently, it became an obstacle to the development of business here, for not only was it impossible to attract civilian investment to Guam, it also severely hindered the attempts of local businessmen to find off-island suppliers or to meet with them when needed”⁹¹ unlike the military and off-island contractors rebuilding the island who could hire “alien workers.” The economy of the island at this time was completely dependent on military construction projects and federal funding, and improved after the war (although that is not a hard thing to argue considering that there was no economic development during the war). There simply was no other economic engine at the time, as no alternative was allowed under the security clearance over the island. As legal scholar and expert on U.S. territorial relations Arnold Leibowitz writes, “By limiting the availability of skilled personnel, especially in the civilian construction market, just when Guam was attempting to rebuild from the destruction of World War II, the Executive Order effectively prevented economic development on Guam.”⁹² He continues, “In short, employers were forced to comply with the Navy’s wishes because it had the power to cut off any future importation of labor by refusing security clearances.”⁹³ Anne Perez Hattori describes the security clearance as “the closing of Guam’s vision.” She continues saying,

I think in that period of time, Guam becomes so insulated that we didn’t even see the other islands. We didn’t see anything except this path... the only ways out of Guam are where the bases are; it’s in California, Washington. It’s our vision of the world. It’s Guam, California, Hawaii...it’s not anything near us. It becomes this very controlled, narrow vision of the world outside of Guam and it’s defined by the path of the bases, which is where CHamorus went.⁹⁴

It would not be until 1962 that President John F. Kennedy would lift the security clearance and allow Guåhan to open up to the rest of the world.

⁹¹ Leon Guerrero, “The Economic Development of Guam,” 92.

⁹² Rodgers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 212.

⁹³ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 337.

⁹⁴ Anne Perez Hattori, interview, October 16, 2018.

This was largely the result of one of the last appointed civilian governors, Bill Daniels, who is notorious for importing an armadillo into the island, only to lose the armadillo somewhere in the Guåhan jungles. During his tenure as Governor of Guåhan, Daniels fought against the security clearance arguing that, “we have neglected these industrious and ambitious people and it’s going to be hard to build up Guam with industry, new business, and tourism...with this wall around the island.”⁹⁵ This initiative, due to Daniels’ close relationship with key Democrats in the U.S. Congress, ultimately was successful, and the lifting of the security clearance ushered in a new era of economic development in the island.

The elephant in the room is that for many in Guåhan today who fight for CHamoru rights and the preservation of our people, culture, and language, aspects of the security clearance are quite agreeable. There are CHamoru activists today who would like nothing more than to restrict the amount of people coming into the island and settling or the number of outside investors who are able to buy land and start their own businesses. However, one must return to Anthony Leon Guerrero’s insight that this happened not with CHamorus in mind, it was just a side effect of their original plan to keep the island under their rule. As Barrett and Ferenz argue,

Although one can only speculate, the real reason seems to be that the Navy hesitates to relinquish power which it has exercised for many years over the populace of Guam. The Navy once ruled Guam with an iron hand, and the enforcement of Executive Order No. 8683 may be an attempt to retain as much of that rule as possible.⁹⁶

The security clearance was not meant to protect CHamoru land or livelihoods, but rather to ensure a way for the Navy to keep control over the island after the passing of the Organic Act of 1950. It is hard to believe the Navy’s argument that the security clearance was meant to keep Guam for Guamanians, when they spent the years immediately before reinstating the security clearance dispossessing CHamorus of their lands and transforming the island into a large military base. The underlying issue here is also that CHamorus never asked for the security clearance and once again

⁹⁵ Quimby, “Security Clearance on Guam.”

⁹⁶ Barrett and Ferenz, “Peacetime Martial Law in Guam,” 6-7.

were not able to make their own decisions even after the supposed transition to a civilian form of government. As a result, the CHamorus became dependent on the federal government for the economy and were held off for 12 years after the Organic Act from responsibly taking charge of the economic development of the island. So, even if one today looks back at the security clearance and agrees with some of the provisions, the first thing is to question why we could not make this decision ourselves.

III. I FINAKPO': CONCLUSION

Earlier this year, I received news that my grandmother and her siblings were having an intense controversy over their family land. My grandmother's sister wanted to sell the land for a substantial amount of money, while the rest of her siblings refused to agree to this. Although my grandmother's land is located in the northern island of Saipan, not in Guåhan, I became empathetic to the situations of many families in Guåhan and the predicaments they may be put in. On one hand, there were the countless individuals and families who flat out had their land stolen. Yet, on the other hand, there are those who have land and want to sell the land to receive a substantial payment and become economically more prosperous. These are not predicaments that are easy to solve, and this chapter has hopefully shown all the complexity and muddiness that goes into these situations.

In this chapter, I outlined the history of economic violence centering land dispossession as its condition of possibility. The story of the development of Guåhan's economy cannot be told by arguing that Guåhan is a small, isolated island, and thus is deterministically economically challenged. Rather, I have shown that excluding land from this narrative is inherently flawed. The desire for land in the service of a militarized form-of-life has fundamentally transformed the island physically, economically, and as I will argue, environmentally. The following chapter builds on the history outlined in this chapter and provides multiple examples of the ramifications of this history. Furthermore, the following chapter provides reinforcement to the argument that

colonialism is a structure, not an event. The land taking after World War II was not a chronologically frozen event in the 1940s. Rather, the next chapter analyzes the structural consequences of this land taking from an economic perspective and demonstrates how these massive-land takings became naturalized, contributing to the system of sustainable insecurity in Guåhan today.

Chapter 3: Economic Violence Step #2: Modern Manifestations of Economic Sludge

“Just victims of the in-house driveby. They say Jump, you say ‘How High?’”- “Bullet In The Head” by Rage Against The Machine

¹

I am an avid *Magic: The Gathering* player, a trading card game created in 1993 that combines fantasy and strategy with the goal to get your opponent’s “life points” down to zero. When I find some free time on Fridays, I usually go down to the only shop in Guåhan that hosts tournaments for the game. One Friday, a few months ago, I stopped by the shop and had a chat with the shop owner. I asked him how his day was and with a smile on his face, he said it was a great day. Inquiring further, he mentioned that a bunch of military guys just came in and nearly bought his inventory out. He exclaimed, “There must be a ship in!” This anecdotal story is a small, but powerful example of the dominant discourse surrounding the economy of the island: that the military presence and consequently the federal government are economic gifts that the people of Guåhan should be grateful for. This is a multiscalar belief here in Guåhan. From small businesses to the economy overall, one sees this sentiment throughout the island. On a larger scale, I turn to the words of former Guåhan senator and FBI Special Agent Frank Ishizaki who wrote regarding the pending military buildup,

We are apprehensive about negative impact potential that the military buildup will bring; however, the short-term and long-term benefits will likely outweigh the difficulties. The economic benefits will be positive. The sense of security from attacks by foreign adversaries will be enhanced. The long history of the presence of American forces will be maintained. Our appreciation for its protective umbrella far outweighs the risk.²

¹ Genius. *Bullet in the Head*, *Rage Against the Machine* (Los Angeles, California: Rage Against the Machine, 1991), <https://genius.com/Rage-against-the-machine-bullet-in-the-head-lyrics>.

² Frank Ishizaki, “Ishizaki: Benefits of military buildup outweigh risks,” *Pacific Daily News*, November 8, 2017, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/opinion/columnists/2017/11/07/ishizaki-benefits-military-buildup-outweigh-risks/838714001/>

Ishizaki calls on the people of Guåhan to realize that the economic benefits of the buildup along with the security provided is worth the cost. In another example, chairwoman of the Guam Chamber of Commerce Catherine Castro told the local legislature, “We believe the short-term issues, concerns and inconveniences will be far outweighed by the long-term benefits to our community, its economy and its defense.”³ In Guåhan, the military not only provides defense, but it also provides a sense of economic security. Through federal funds due to military projects, military personnel visiting the island, and the cheaper goods found within the fence, the economic benefits of military presence are touted loud on the bullhorn.

In the preceding chapter, I provided a detailed history and analysis of how rampant land dispossession by the U.S. government and military served as the condition of possibility for economic insecurity and violence. This chapter acts as a part II to the previous chapter and demonstrates the modern manifestations of the process of land dispossession and subsequent economic stage set as a result. The first section provides various examples of economic violence in Guåhan, which show the intertwining of militarization and unincorporated territory status and lays out how bureaucracy and dependency theory are useful in understanding Guåhan’s economic violence situation. The second section then addresses the question of tourism, which is the only other economic pillar in Guåhan today besides the military, and critically examines its possible intersection with militarization. The third section then analyzes the proposed military buildup of the island focusing on the purported economic benefits. In this section, I use the proposed buildup as an example of “military Keynesianism” being exercised in Guåhan. The final section then

³ John I. Borja, “Guam Chamber of Commerce: Buildup will give much-needed economic boost.” *Pacific Daily News*, October 6, 2017, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2017/10/06/guam-chamber-commerce-buildup-give-much-needed-economic-boost/738295001/>

returns to the history of land dispossession. While the previous chapter provided a detailed history of the process and its structural economic ramifications, this section shows the unfair buying practices of this land that leads to the loss of CHamoru livelihoods.

I. Clogged Economic Arteries: Case Studies in Bureaucratic Sludge

*In a fully developed bureaucracy, there is nobody left with whom one could argue, to whom one could present grievances, on whom the pressures of power could be exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless we have a tyranny without a tyrant.*⁴- Hannah Arendt

In the quote above, famed political thinker Hannah Arendt argues that bureaucracy leads a situation in which blame is easily displaced and people are no longer able to properly identify the source of their rage or hardship. In his book, *The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy*, anthropologist David Graeber argues that the world we live in now is an “age of total bureaucratization” and that bureaucracy is an instrument “through which the human imagination is smashed and shattered.”⁵ Furthermore, Graeber argues, “the bureaucratization of daily life means the imposition of impersonal rules and regulations; impersonal rules and regulations, in turn, can only operate if they are backed up by the threat of force.”⁶ While Graeber, in this instance, is particularly discussing the police, surveillance, and other forms of mechanized control, I argue that his analysis of the bureaucratization of life and the imposition of impersonal rules and regulations is extremely relevant when analyzing the current economic sludge in Guåhan. He gives credence to this, writing,

What I would like to argue is that situations created by violence—particularly structural violence, by which I mean forms of pervasive social inequality that are ultimately backed

⁴ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 82.

⁵ Tomas Hachard, “Please Fill In This Form In Triplicate Before You Read Utopia Of Rules,” *NPR*, February 26, 2015, <https://www.npr.org/2015/02/26/387252732/please-fill-in-this-form-in-triplicate-before-you-read-utopia-of-rules>

⁶ David Graeber, *The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy* (Brooklyn: Melville House Publishing, 2015), 32.

up by the threat of physical harm—invariably tend to create the kinds of willful blindness we normally associate with bureaucratic procedures.⁷

In line with Graeber's argument above, this section outlines the modern manifestations of this economic sludge. More particularly, through an analysis of federal policies that hinder Guåhan's economic potential and decisions made in the name of national security, I aim to remind the people of Guåhan that what we deem to be the tough economic conditions of the island may not be entirely our fault. The bureaucracy and normalization of "government operations" are facets of the structure of militarized, unincorporated territory.

This bureaucracy and normalization of "government operations" leads many to believe that this is just the way it is, and I argue that this is an example of a forced dependency on the United States federal government to ensure continued access to Guåhan's land and location. Stemming from critiques of capitalism as well as development theory, dependency theory addresses unequal development that leads to the eventual dependence of a colony or weaker state on a metropole or larger power. Dependency theory was developed in the late 1950s by the Director of the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Latin America, Raul Prebisch. Prebisch and others noted that economic growth in more advanced countries did not necessarily lead to growth in poorer countries, but rather that, economic activity in the richer countries often leads to dire economic problems in these poorer countries. He argued that by exporting their primary commodities to richer countries who manufactured these commodities and sold them back to poorer countries, these smaller countries were being taken advantage of.⁸ According to Theotonio Dos Santos, dependency is,

An historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected.⁹

⁷ Graeber, *The Utopia of Rules*, 57.

⁸ Vincent Ferraro, "Dependency Theory: An Introduction," in *The Development Economics Reader*, ed. Giorgio Secondi, 58-64 (London: Routledge, 2008).

⁹ Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*, eds. K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hoges (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), 226.

Dependency theorists argue that the international system comprises two sets of states, the dominant with the dependent, the center with the periphery, and the metropolitan and satellite states. In their definition, the dominant states are the advanced industrial nations and the dependent states are found in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. What is key to dependency theory is their analysis that what dependent states have in common is that external forces are of singular importance to the economic activities within the dependent states. These forces include “multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign assistance, communications, and any other means by which the advanced industrialized countries can represent their economic interests abroad.”¹⁰ I find these tenets of dependency theory very useful in examining the economic relationship between Guåhan and the United States today. In this section, there is nothing spectacular, nothing worthy of a documentary film, but this ordinariness is what Graeber is warning his readers about. The bureaucracy of policy is itself structural violence, and in Guåhan’s case, has absolutely structured the limits of our economic development and potential. In the following sections, I trace this history and present state of dependency and undertake an analysis that only begins to make sense when looking at these various components as a whole.

Jones Act

In 1920, Senator Wesley Jones introduced the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 intended to promote the merchant marines. The act comprehensively regulates maritime commerce between U.S. ports and in U.S. waters. To accomplish this, the act reserves domestic shipping for vessels that are built, owned, crewed, and flagged in the United States. More particularly, the act requires that “the ships must be owned by U.S. companies that are controlled by U.S. citizens with at least 75% U.S. ownership, at least 75% crewed by U.S. citizens, and registered in the United States.”¹¹ Furthermore, “the steel used in any foreign repair work on a Jones Act vessel must be less than ten

¹⁰ Ferraro, “Dependency Theory.”

¹¹ “Jones Act,” Transportation Institute, Accessed October 2018, <https://transportationinstitute.org/jones-act/>

10% of the ship's total weight.”¹² This affects Guåhan and the prices of good that come to the island as the Jones Act shipping restrictions greatly drives up the cost of imports. As a Guåhan senator said, “The Jones Act has been hurting us for so long. We have every day struggles because of the Jones Act—the high cost of food, of everything. We have to bring everything in.”¹³

Besides the strict rules for domestic shipping, another factor driving up the price of imports into Guåhan is that the number of Jones-Act eligible ships is quite small. As of February 2016, there were only 91 large Jones-Act eligible vessels, and since 2010, 89% of commercial vessels produced in U.S. shipyards were smaller vessels like tugboats. By 2015, U.S. flagged ships only carried 1% of U.S. trade. Shipbuilding as an industry has declined immensely, and today, China, South Korea, and Japan account for 91.4% of new ship production, and there are only three domestic builders of large commercial ships left in the United States.¹⁴ Lastly, Guåhan's geography as an island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean makes it extremely distant from the United States (and this also applies to Alaska and Hawai'i, which have joined Guåhan in seeking Jones Act exemptions). “These regions are most severely affected by the act because of their long shipping distances from the contiguous US and because geography prevents them from using substitute modes of transportation such as trucks, trains, and pipelines.”¹⁵

These three factors collectively form a spear tip hurting Guåhan's economy and the ability for people in the island to afford basic goods. This goes back to comparative advantage. Excluding foreign ships from supplying services on domestic routes denies American businesses access to the best shipping, imposing large amount of loss on the American consumer, who has to make up the cost. In the case of Puerto Rico, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that the

¹² Ted Loch-Temzelides, “The Jones Act: Friend or Foe?,” *Forbes*, September 28, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2017/09/28/the-jones-act-friend-or-foe/#ef2d0da4faaf>

¹³ Louella Losinio, “Business, political leaders push for lifting of Jones Act,” *Guam Daily Post*, October 16, 2017, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/business-political-leaders-push-for-lifting-of-jones-act/article_fa0b3be2-aff7-11e7-97bd-2f7281249fcc.html

¹⁴ Thomas Greenes, “An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act,” *Mercatus Center*, 2017, accessed at <https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-grennes-jones-act-v2.pdf>

¹⁵ Greenes, “An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act.”

“shipping cost for a twenty-foot container from the mainland United States to Puerto Rico was \$3,063, but only \$1,503 for the same container from the mainland United States to the Dominican Republic.”¹⁶ Regarding gasoline, one estimate mentions that the Jones Act raises the price of gas by as much as 15 cents per gallon because of the higher cost due to the U.S.-flagged ships.¹⁷ In Hawai‘i, State Senator Sam Slom wrote, “It is now known that the Hawaiian cost of living, primarily because of our additional shipping cost and because of the Jones Act, are now 49% higher than the U.S. mainland. And this is becoming unbearable. It’s difficult for individuals. It’s difficult for families.”¹⁸

Joseph Bradley, chief economist of the Bank of Guam, writes regarding the impact of the Jones Act in Guåhan;

The costs of goods shipped to Guam from the States is artificially inflated by the requirement that cargo, baggage and passengers shipped between two successive U.S. ports must be carried about U.S.-flag vessels...In addition to these costs, the veritable monopoly granted to U.S. shipping lines in the Guam trade allows the imposition of monopoly prices on goods shipped to Guam from the U.S. raising the landed cost of goods on the island. The best estimate of the impact of the Jones Act on the cost of goods from the United States sold in Guam in 1994 was \$32.5 million.¹⁹

Bradley shows how Guåhan is affected similarly to Puerto Rico and Hawai‘i by the Jones Act. However, when it comes to Guåhan, the picture gets a little more distorted. Unlike the others, Guåhan is exempt from the U.S.-built component of the Jones Act requirements. Foreign-built ships can enter Guåhan, as long as they meet the remaining qualifications of ships being U.S. owned, crewed, and flagged. Yet, legislators in Guåhan have realized that this makes no sense as we are only de jure exempt, not de facto exempt. Former Senator Frank Blas Jr. argued;

¹⁶ Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Report on the Competitiveness of Puerto Rico’s Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 29, 2012, accessed at

<https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/regional/PuertoRico/report.pdf>

¹⁷ Patrick Holland, “Help Puerto Rico by Repealing the Jones Act,” *Economics 21*, July 15, 2015,

<https://economics21.org/html/help-puerto-rico-repealing-jones-act-1403.html>

¹⁸ “Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis: Why There’s No Quick Fix,” Knowledge at Wharton, Accessed October 2018,

<http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/puerto-ricos-debt-crisis-why-theres-no-quick-fix/>

¹⁹ Joseph Bradley, “Analysis of Economic Options,” Guam Commission on Decolonization, June 12, 2000, 84.

Since it only makes sense for shippers bringing goods here to first stop in Hawaii, the exemption is useless—unless it is extended to all other noncontiguous parts of the United States as well. It has very little effect on our shipping costs because other non-contiguous U.S. ports that shippers would need to connect thru to make a shipping route sustainable are subject to all the restrictions.²⁰

We are still “functionally shackled” to the U.S. built requirement because the natural trade line from the West Coast to Guam passes through Hawai‘i, which is not exempt from the built requirement, and shipping lines have to mount at both Hawai‘i and Guam to make it worth the trip from a financial perspective.²¹

The rationale for the Jones Act is a familiar one: security. At the time of its passing, it was to ensure that the United States maintained a strong Navy, based off the views of Alfred Thayer Mahan discussed in Chapter 1. The act was passed after World War I and was to insure that the United States was “not forced at some future date to have our Navy’s ships built or repaired by foreign nations.”²² It was meant to avoid repeating the shipping shortage that occurred in World War I, when “lack of access to foreign shippers left America’s military without adequate means for moving men and material to the war zone.”²³ Supporters of the Jones Act maintain that eliminating the act would be a detriment to U.S. national security. For example, Loren Thompson of *Forbes Magazine*, argues that without the Jones Act, the Navy would have to spend billions of dollars on new vessels.

The U.S. Navy maintains a reserve fleet of military sealift vessels, but its war plans assume the availability of a sizable U.S. commercial fleet that can supplement the reserve ships...However, 90% of U.S.-flagged tankers and 36% of the U.S. flagged container ships are used on routes protected by the Jones Act. If the Act were repealed, these

²⁰ American Shipper, “Guam legislator seeks changes to Jones Act,” *American Shipper*, April 10, 2012, https://www.americanshipper.com/Main/News/Guam_legislator_seeks_changes_to_Jones_Act_49386.aspx?taxonomy=Markets

²¹ Michael Hansen, “Guam Legislature passes Jones Act reform resolution,” *Hawai‘i Free Press*, April 17, 2014, <http://www.hawaiifreepress.com/ArticlesMain/tabid/56/ID/12429/Guam-Legislature-passes-Jones-Act-reform-resolution.aspx>

²² George Landrith, “The Jones Act is a tremendous benefit to America,” *The Hill*, October 22, 2018, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/412470-the-jones-act-is-a-tremendous-benefit-to-america>

²³ Loren Thompson, “Why Repealing The Jones Act Could Be A Disaster For The U.S.,” *Forbes*, October 17, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2017/10/17/maritime-security-five-reasons-the-jones-act-is-a-bargain/#4f13cccd3d96>

vessels would either cease operation or be registered elsewhere. The Navy would have to greatly expand its organic sealift assets.²⁴

Echoing this, Representative John Garamendi of California, who was appointed by President Bill Clinton to negotiate the Commonwealth Act for Guam, wrote regarding the importance of the Jones Act,

Our military has had to turn to foreign-flagged vessels for sustainment in times of war, and experience shows that can have dangerous consequences. In the 1991 Gulf War, our armed forces relied on 192 foreign-flagged ships to carry cargo to the war zone. The foreign crews of thirteen vessels mutinied, forcing those ships to abandon their military mission. Would foreign flag carriers be any more reliable today, especially for a long-term deployment into active war zones?²⁵

To end his passionate argument, he warns, “As we look to the future, if we want to keep the United States as a great maritime power, we would be wise to preserve and protect this flexible, durable, and valuable maritime policy.”²⁶ The Jones Act is just another example of Guam’s economy being affected by U.S. national security concerns. The United States’ need for a strong military and a strong Navy not only led to our acquisition, but also currently affects our economy.

Social Warfare Programs

With her Master’s in Public Health, my partner applied for a job at the Guam Department of Public Health and Social Services. Upon her hiring, she was told she would be a supervisor for the local welfare programs. From time to time, I would visit her at work and upon entering her workspace, I was immediately greeted with a line of people waiting to see their case worker. This is dependence in its purest form. People are literally depending on these social welfare programs to buy food for their children or receive any form of healthcare. Shifting the scale of dependency theory down to the community and individual level, it is these welfare programs that I argue are the most affectively persuasive methods in framing the military presence and the subsequent

²⁴ Thompson, “Why Repealing The Jones Act Could Be A Disaster For The U.S.”

²⁵ John Garamendi, “The Jones Act is needed for our economy, national security and our war fighting capacity,” *The Hill*, October 18, 2018, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/412121-the-jones-act-is-a-needed-for-our-economy-national-security-and>

²⁶ Garamendi, “The Jones Act is needed for our economy.”

federal funding that comes with our status as a military base/unincorporated territory as absolutely necessary. I dare to say these are forms of social warfare. Forced dependency disguised as the hand that feeds.

I invite the reader to metaphorically close their eyes and imagine this scenario. Imagine that the only sustenance you get throughout the day are cans of the soda, Mountain Dew, which I provide to you. There is not a single person who would argue that Mountain Dew is good or healthy for you. However, it is the only thing that is provided to quench your thirst. You become extremely attached to the sweet yellow nectar, even seeing it as a source of life. If I suddenly stopped giving you Mountain Dew every day, you would probably beg me to come back and give you the yellow bottle because it is all you are familiar with. However, in this scenario, unknown to you, the recipients of the Mountain Dew, there have been cases of water in the back corner of the room waiting to be opened. I use this metaphor to help us understand dependency as a result of colonialism in its various forms. However, in the case of social welfare programs, sometimes there is literal Mountain Dew involved.

Guåhan, as an unincorporated territory, is eligible for certain federal social welfare programs, and disqualified from others. We are eligible for the following Federal-State programs: Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; Child Support Enforcement; Foster Care and Adoption Assistance; Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF); Material and Child Health Block Grant; Medicaid; State Children's Health Insurance Program; Child Care and Development Block Grant; Older Americans Act; Social Service Block Grant; Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); and others, but not eligible for the Nutrition Assistance Program Grant. Regarding programs that provide direct payments to individuals, Guåhan is eligible for Pell Grants, Medicare, and Social Security Retirement, but is not eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The extensive number of programs that the federal government allows us to participate in is viewed by

many as generous gifts handed to an otherwise suffering people, and many people rely on these forms of social welfare.

In his article, “Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and Development to Prevent Welfare Colonialism,” Erik Reinert uses the work of Robert Paine to discuss how to develop without creating a sense of dependency. Paine defines welfare colonialism as

the vehicle for stable governing at a distance through exercise of a particularly subtle, non-demonstrative, and dependency-generating form of neocolonial social control that pre-empts local autonomy through well-intentioned and generous, but ultimately morally wrong policies. Welfare colonialism creates paralyzing dependencies on the centre in a peripheral population, a centre exerting control through incentives that create total economic dependency, thereby preventing political mobilization and autonomy.²⁷

Reinert sees welfare colonialism operating in three steps: The first is a reversal of the colonial drain of the old days, the net flow going to the colony rather than to the mother country. The second is the integration of the native population in ways that radically undermine their previous livelihoods, and the third is the placing of the native population on unemployment benefits.²⁸

Our neighbors in Micronesia experienced a deliberate attempt at welfare colonialism. During their transition to free associated states, the United States wanted to find ways to ensure the islands’ continued dependence on U.S. money. In 1963, the Solomon Report was completed, a report primarily written by Harvard professor of business administration, Anthony Solomon, which argued that moving these islands into a permanent relationship with the United States should be the American objective. The planners knew that this more permanent relationship would have to be determined in a plebiscite, and they had to ensure the results of the plebiscite went their way. In the introduction to the Solomon Report, the authors ask, “What should be the content and cost of the minimum capital investment and operating program needed to insure a favorable vote in the

²⁷ Erik Reinert, “Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and Development to Prevent Welfare Colonialism,” *U.N. Economic Social and Economic Affairs Draft Paper*, 2006, https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/wp14_2006.pdf

²⁸ Reinert, “Development and Social Goals.”

plebiscite, and what should be the content and cost of the maximum program that could be effectively mounted to develop the Trust Territory most rapidly?”²⁹

To achieve this, Solomon and others advocated for the United States to endorse a major capital improvements program, an expansion of general employment opportunities, and the implementation of a social security system. The strategic importance of the islands was too important to simply give up. As David Hanlon writes, “The authors of the Solomon Report worried that while the American administration risked becoming simply custodial, increasingly assertive anticolonial forces within a less malleable United Nations were attempting to promote the development of an independent Micronesia.”³⁰ In another report, the Nathan Plan, it was argued that free markets and unregulated, unfettered capitalism would be the best serving system for improving the lives of Micronesians. As part of the plan, it even went as far as to propose relocating all the islanders to urban centers of the islands to promote labor.

Both the Solomon Report and the Nathan Plan point to a consistent ploy by the United States government to ensure continued access and “strategic denial” in the Micronesian islands via economic incentives. This is reflected in the amount of funding the U.S. provided to the Micronesian Islands before and after the Solomon Report. In 1962, the year before the report was published, U.S. aid to the area was \$6.1 million. However, one year later and the year the report was written, U.S. spending jumped to \$15 million. Even more telling of this trend is that in 1976, U.S. assistance jumped all the way to \$75.1 million. More directly relevant to this section, the islands also saw funding for social welfare programs in the early 1970s. From 1974-1979, the U.S. provided the Trust Territory government \$120 million, equaling roughly \$20 million per year. “By March 1979, 90 federal offices were operating within the islands.”³¹ This story from Guåhan’s

²⁹ Friends of Micronesia and Micronesian Independent, *Solomon Report: America’s Ruthless Blueprint for the Assimilation of Micronesia*, 1971.

³⁰ Hanlon, *Remaking Micronesia*, 92.

³¹ Hanlon, *Remaking Micronesia*, 170.

neighboring islands helps to show the role of economic development, and in particular, social welfare in creating a sense of dependency on the United States.

In Guåhan, I argue that this sense of dependency is a reason for the continuous federal grants-in-aid and for the strong discourse of U.S. presence as necessary in the island. The numbers for social welfare are telling. In 2015, Guåhan's Department of Public Health Division of Public Welfare issued a total of \$109.6 million in SNAP benefits for 56,169 people. They also spent \$81.6 million in Medicaid for an eligible 44,366 people, and \$11.07 million for an eligible 12,157 people for the locally funded Medically Indigent Program (MIP). Overall, the Division of Public Welfare which oversees SNAP and TANF served 124,657 clients.³² Statistics show that in 1994, only 1 in every 8.4 Guåhan residents received food stamps, while in 2015, 1 in every 3.4 residents received them. Overall, in 2015, the local government spent \$294.8 million in federal grants. When looking at a political entity like Guåhan, with roughly only 160,000 people, 1 in every 3.4 residents looks very significant as a statistic.

When analyzing the three steps of welfare colonialism as described by Reinart, one can see its completion through a dependency on social welfare programs. Guåhan's influx of federal money is extremely important to the economy. The landscape changed and forced CHamorus to participate in the wage economy after the war, and now the statistics above show a heavy dependency on social welfare programs that make Uncle Sam look extremely generous, rather than someone who has created the condition of possibility for this economic condition of dependence. From the Solomon Report regarding the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to the 1 in every 3.4 residents in Guåhan, welfare colonialism is alive and well in Micronesia, and any future attempts at sovereignty in Guåhan need to be wary of similar tactics that may be used against us.

³² Louella Losinio, "DPHSS: Fewer people on welfare," *Guam Daily Post*, August 10, 2016, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/dphss-fewer-people-on-welfare/article_984daad6-5dfd-11e6-8be5-535e86be8fba.html

COFA: Bearing the Burden of Security in Micronesia

In a recent legislative forum for the aspiring senators of the island, one candidate proposed a moratorium on allowing citizens from the Freely Associated States (Palau, the Marshall Islands, and most relevant to Guåhan's case, the Federated States of Micronesia) to enter Guåhan. At this event, the candidate said, "I am calling for a moratorium on the COFA treaty because of the economic and cultural crisis that is happening in Guam." In providing his reason for calling for the moratorium, he responded,

Do you know that 25% of the kids that are enrolled in the Guam Public School System are from the [FAS] islands? And it's put a drain in our school system and the federal government is not reimbursing us the money that is owed to us. In 2016, there were 4,217 people arrested on Guam, 1,297 of them were citizens from FAS—38%—and they make up 17% of our population and I blame the U.S. Congress for not implementing programs that will vet the immigrants coming into Guam.³³

The candidate was frustrated with what he saw as congressional ignorance when it came to the impacts of the various Compacts of Free Association on the Government of Guam. I argue that the unfunded federal mandates the Government of Guam is burdened with is another prime example of Guåhan's economy being affected by U.S. national security concerns. The economic impacts of the Compacts of Free Association squeeze the purse pocket of GovGuam.

Before moving forward with this argument, I must say that this is a very sensitive issue especially in the current American political climate of Trump and anti-immigrant rhetoric dividing their country.³⁴ By articulating this argument, I am not engaging in xenophobic thought, nor the stereotypical racism that does occur in the island against those from the Federated States of Micronesia, in particular. I am not pushing Trumpian racism, but rather, argue that these problems

³³ Janela Carrera, "Senatorial forum gets heated as one candidate proposes banning FAS migrants," *Pacific New Center*, September 26, 2018, <https://pacificnewscenter.com/senatorial-forum-gets-heated-as-one-candidate-proposes-banning-fas-migrants/>

³⁴ I am deliberately using "their country" because even if we technically belong to the United States, we had no say in this process and it is my personal stance to refer to myself as a part of their nation-state, considering our strategically important and sacrificial role in their nation-state.

were created as a result of our status as an unincorporated territory in this part of the world and because of U.S. security interests in this region of Micronesia.

The Micronesian islands that comprised the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands all made various agreements with the United States regarding their respective future political statuses. The Northern Mariana Islands wanted a closer relationship with the United States, fighting for commonwealth status, which is akin to being an unincorporated territory with a slightly increased degree of autonomy. The rest of the islands wanted to maintain a relationship with the United States, but not at the expense of giving up complete sovereignty. This led to the Compacts of Free Association, which gave birth to the new countries of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Per these agreements, the United States handles these countries' national defense, provides them with federal funding assistance, and allows visa-free travel to and from the United States. In exchange, these countries agree to deny any other military from entering their waters or setting up bases in their land and allow the United States to use some of their land base for military purposes. In essence, the United States provides a sense of economic opportunity to the citizens of these countries in exchange for exclusive access to Micronesia for national security and regional hegemony purposes.³⁵ These Compacts of Free Association, signed in 1986 for the FSM and the Marshall Islands, and in 1994 for Palau, were strategic agreements.

As part of these agreements, the citizens of these countries are unrestricted to travel to, lawfully hold jobs, and establish residence as non-immigrant aliens. Per the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, a nonimmigrant is “an alien who seeks temporary entry to the United States for a specific purpose.”³⁶ However, in the case of citizens of COFA states, their stay does not need to be temporary, and many have set up new lives, particularly in Guåhan and Hawai‘i. Due to the

³⁵ David Hanlon, *Making Micronesia: The Political Biography of Tosiwo Nakayama* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015).

³⁶ “Nonimmigrant,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Accessed October 2018, <https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/nonimmigrant>.

perceived costs and burdens on the local government, the United States Congress “promised to appropriate sums to cover costs incurred by Guam resulting from any increased demands placed on educational and social services by immigrants from FSM, RMI, and the Republic of Palau.”³⁷ In a report from the Governor of Guåhan’s office regarding the effects of the Compacts of Free Association on the local government from 2003-2015, they demonstrate the impacts in the different social sectors. Beginning with education, they demonstrate that in 2015, FAS citizens comprised 25.8% or a quarter of the total student membership of the island; a significant rise from less than 5,000 students in School Year (SY) 2003-2004. Financially, in SY 2003-2004, it cost the Department of Education \$17,224,876 when considering the \$4,912 per student per school year cost. In SY 2014-2015, it cost the local government \$61,888,284.00, and the total costs from 2004-2015 was \$446,461,624.00³⁸

Moving to public safety, the report outlines that in 2010, there were 873 FAS citizens who were incarcerated in Guåhan jails for a total of 58,775 client-days. The government argues it costs \$98.00 per day to house an individual person, so this amounts to a total of \$5,757,990 for the housing of FAS citizens in the jails. In FY2015, the number of client intakes of FAS citizens increased to 1,119 intakes. Total client days increased 11% between FY 2014 to FY 2015, with 70,753 client days in FY 2015 amounting to a total of \$8,385,646.³⁹

Lastly, in the realm of health and welfare, the numbers are also staggeringly high. In FY 2015, the Division of Public Health spent \$2,126,138 for services to FAS citizens, the Division of Public Welfare expended \$21,126,850, and the Bureau of Health Care under the Medically Indigent Program (MIP) and Medicaid (dual citizens), spent a total of \$5,958,026. This combined

³⁷ Office of the Governor: Government of Guam, “Impact of the Compacts of Free Association on Guam: FY 2004 to FY 2015,” *Department of the Interior*, January 2016, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/guam-fy-2015_compact-impact-report.pdf, 3.

³⁸ Office of the Governor: Government of Guam, “Impact of the Compacts of Free Association on Guam.”

³⁹ Office of the Governor: Government of Guam, “Impact of the Compacts of Free Association on Guam.”

spending from the Department of Public Health and Social Services from FY 2004 to FY 2015 was \$153,704,648.⁴⁰

The largest problem here is that the United States Congress has consistently failed to help alleviate the costs associated with large-scale immigration they allow into the island without the consent of the people of the island. Immigration control, economy, and sovereignty all collide when it comes to the issue of the impact of the Compacts of Free Association here in Guåhan. In 2003, the COFA Amendments Act began appropriating \$30 million annually in funding “to aid in defraying costs incurred by affected jurisdictions of qualified nonimmigrants from the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau,”⁴¹ with the affected jurisdictions being American Samoa, the CNMI, Guåhan, and Hawai‘i. To show this lopsidedness through numbers, for FY 2017, the Government of Guåhan argued that compact-impact costs in all sectors for the year totaled \$147 million dollars.⁴² However, Guåhan’s share of the \$30 million was only \$14.9 million for FY 2017. This difference between GovGuam’s reported amount and the amount given by the federal government is a staggering \$132.1 million.

Furthermore, FAS citizens are not allowed to attend the military’s DODEA school system and are not treated, except for absolute emergencies, at the Naval Hospital. They attend school in Guåhan’s Department of Education, utilize civilian clinics, and get treated at the two civilian hospitals: Guam Memorial Hospital and the Guam Regional Medical City. FAS citizens (who are not U.S. citizens) are entitled to the Medically Indigent Program (MIP), but are not entitled to Medicaid, SNAP, or TANF otherwise known as welfare. MIP is 100% locally funded, while

⁴⁰ Office of the Governor: Government of Guam, “Impact of the Compacts of Free Association on Guam.”

⁴¹ U.S. Census Bureau, “Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; 2018 Estimates of Compact of Free Association (COFA) Migrants,” *Federal Register*, October 25, 2017, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/25/2017-23147/proposed-information-collection-comment-request-2018-estimates-of-compact-of-free-association-cofa>

⁴² Haidee V. Eugenio, “Senators: Tax credits should be added as migrant compact costs,” *Pacific Daily News*, August 30, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/08/30/senators-tax-credits-should-added-migrant-impact-costs/1140757002/>

Medicaid, SNAP, and TANF are fully federally funded. The message seems to be, if the Government of Guåhan funds it, make them eligible, but if fully federal funded, disqualify them.

To alleviate this strong compact impact, former Guåhan delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives Madeleine Bordallo co-sponsored H.R. 4761, also known as the Compact Impact Relief Act. Co-sponsored by Hawai‘i representatives Colleen Hanabusa and Tulsi Gabbard, as well as CNMI delegate, Gregorio “Kilili” Sablan, the act aimed at accomplishing the following: increasing FMAP funding for hospitals and clinics, increasing ESSA funding for public schools and reclassifying FAS citizens as “federally connected,” making Compact migrants eligible for federally funded community service programs like AmeriCorps and Youth Conservation Corps, and allowing Compact migrants to be eligible for SNAP and TANF.⁴³ This bill was introduced in January 2018, and at the time of writing, has still not been passed. In her reasoning, Bordallo writes, “I continue to believe that the Compacts are an important national security and economic agreement between the U.S. and the Freely Associated States, but the federal government must do more to help the affected jurisdictions’ governments with the costs they bear to provide services to these migrants.”⁴⁴

Now, a whole dissertation could be written on the possibly racist origins of such a large number of FAS citizens being imprisoned. A whole dissertation could be written on the socio-economic conditions that lead Pacific Islanders to suffer so disproportionately from particular illnesses, and a whole dissertation could be written on the racist origins of what is designated as a “crime.” However, for the sake of the economic argument being made here, I only hope to show how the Government of Guåhan is tasked with lopsidedly handling the associated costs of such unrestricted immigration into the island. I also hope to show how the costs of U.S. national security interests in this region consistently end up hindering the economy in a form of economic violence.

⁴³ Marianas Variety, “Bordallo, Hanabusa, Gabbard, Sablan reintroduce Compact Impact Relief Act,” *Marianas Variety*, January 12, 2018, <http://www.mvariety.com/cnmi/cnmi-news/local/101431-bordallo-hanabusa-gabbard-sablan-reintroduce-compact-impact-relief-act>

⁴⁴ Marianas Variety, “Bordallo, Hanabusa, Gabbard, Sablan reintroduce Compact Impact Relief Act,”

Guåhan had nothing to do with the Compacts of Free Association, yet we bear the burden of ensuring this strategic agreement with these three Micronesian countries remains strong. CNMI delegate Gregorio Kilili Sablan put it best when explaining his reason for co-sponsoring the Compact Impact Relief Act, saying, “The U.S. Pacific insular areas should not be saddled with an unfair share of our nation’s foreign policy cost.” In one short sentence, Sablan captures much of the essence of this dissertation.

Bifurcated Benefits and Military Enlistment

In an interview, Guåhan’s Attorney General Leevin Camacho, who worked to fight against the military buildup of the island, said that the greatest economic effect of the military in the island has been the creation of a dual economy, one economy inside the fence and one outside the fence.⁴⁵ In Guåhan’s case, fences not only demarcate physical spaces, but also prices, opportunities, and healthcare. U.S. Senator John Edwards, once spoke before the Democratic National Convention, passionately saying, “We shouldn’t have two different economies in America: one for people who are set for life, they know their kids and their grand-kids are going to be just fine; and then one for most Americans, people who live paycheck to paycheck.”⁴⁶ Both Camacho and Edwards capture Guåhan’s bifurcated economic situation with a clear hierarchy, once again with the military situated in the fenceline sitting rather comfortably at the top.

For those with “base access,” meaning that they can get onto base via a military identification card, it is viewed as a benefit and a privilege. For many, it is the material embodiment of dependency and “greener grass” on the other side (of the fence). The first aspect of this greener grass is being able to shop on base via the Navy Exchange, the AAFES (Army and Air Force Air Exchange Service), and the commissary. According to *Military Times*, “Exchanges are on-base stores (with an online component) that sell a variety of items ranging from clothing and shoes to

⁴⁵ Leevin Camacho, interview, October 16, 2018.

⁴⁶ “Sen. John Edwards Speech to DNC,” Washington Post, accessed October 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22230-2004Jul28.html>

toys, furniture, home appliances, and electronics. They have on-base gas stations and stores that sell alcoholic beverages.”⁴⁷ In addition to exchanges, commissaries are “on-base stores that sell discounted groceries to authorized customers.”⁴⁸ Headquartered in Fort Lee, Virginia, there is a worldwide chain of commissaries (which reflects the American global basing network) operated by the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA).

The commissary benefit stems back centuries to 1825, when Army officers at particular posts could purchase goods paying at-cost prices, although now commissaries sell goods at cost with a 5% surcharge to help maintain commissary functioning. This was extended to enlisted men in 1867. According to the official commissary website, “From the start, commissaries were meant to take on-post retail functions out of the hands of civilian vendors and post traders and allow the Army to take care of its own.”⁴⁹ Although originally intended for the Army, as of today, all branches of the Armed Services including the Coast Guard, and most relevant to Guåhan’s case, even the National Guard are allowed access. More importantly, immediate family members of these service personnel are considered eligible commissary shoppers. Through DeCA, the Federal government can “provide a sense of community for military personnel and families, enhance readiness by enabling troops to focus on the mission while deployed and not worry about their families’ well-being, provide considerable savings as compared to commercial grocery stores.”⁵⁰

To achieve the considerable savings portion of this mission, the Federal government via the Department of Defense subsidizes these commissaries. DeCA is given direct appropriations from the Department of Defense, and this is significant considering Trump increased the military

⁴⁷ Karen Jowers, “Benefits basics: Commissaries and exchanges,” *Military Times*, May 1, 2018, <https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/military-benefits/2018/05/01/benefits-basics-commissaries-and-exchanges/>

⁴⁸ Jowers, “Benefits basics: Commissaries and exchanges.”

⁴⁹ “Commissary History,” Commissary, Accessed October 2018, <https://www.commissaries.com/our-agency/commissary-history>

⁵⁰ Defense Commissary Agency, “Fiscal 2018 President’s Budget,” *Defense Commissary Agency*, May 2017, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2018/budget_justification/pdfs/06_Defense_Working_Capital_Fund/DeCA_FY2018_PB.pdf

spending budget to more than \$700 billion for FY 2018-2019.⁵¹ These funds for DeCA operations come from a Department of Defense Working Capital Fund or WCF, which is “a type of revolving fund used to finance operations that function like commercial business activities.”⁵² Congress provides this direct appropriation to the fund and fund managers use these funds to buy parts or supplies or to contract for services. DeCA’s WCF includes resale stocks, commissary operation, and the Surcharge Collections Trust Revolving Fund (taken from the 5% surcharge). In H.R. 5515, known as the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which became law on August 13th, 2018,⁵³ DeCA’s Working Capital Fund was appropriated \$1,266,200,000 which would go to “allowing patron access to fully-stocked shelves of high-quality products in a clean and safe facility that offers exceptional customer service each and every day.”⁵⁴

Unlike commissaries, post exchanges do not receive much federal appropriation, but rather, each “funds 97 percent of its operating budget through the sale of goods and services.”⁵⁵ However, the remaining 3% of their funding does come from appropriated funds, which is expended to transport “goods overseas per the legal requirement to make American goods available to those serving abroad.”⁵⁶ In FY 2015, for example, the exchanges were appropriated \$0.2 billion to help fund transportation costs to overseas and remote locations.⁵⁷ These exchanges are an instrumentality of the U.S. government, and as such, are “entitled to the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the Federal Government under the Constitution, federal statutes, federal legal

⁵¹ Ryan Browne, “Trump commits to \$750 billion defense budget,” *CNN politics*, December 9, 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/09/politics/trump-mattis-defense-spending/index.html>

⁵² Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Defense Working Capital Funds,” *Congressional Research Service*, March 23, 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10852.pdf>

⁵³ US Congress. House. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019. HR 115-676, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, daily ed. (August 13, 2018): HR5515.

⁵⁴ Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Defense Working Capital Funds.”

⁵⁵ “Exchange Quick Facts,” AAFES, Accessed October 2018, <https://www.aafes.com/about-exchange/exchange-quick-facts/>

⁵⁶ “Exchange Quick Facts,” AAFES.

⁵⁷ Government Accountability Office, “Plan and Additional Information Needed on Cost Savings and Metric for DOD Efforts to Achieve Budget Neutrality,” *Government Accountability Office*, November 2016, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680925.pdf>

precedents, established principles of international law, and international treaties and agreements.”⁵⁸ As non-appropriated fund instrumentalities, they were established primarily for the purpose of providing for Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs in the military, which also provide for daycares, movie theaters, bowling alleys, and fitness centers.

As a result of this, according to the Army and Air Force Exchange website, the prices charged for goods in these exchanges will not include any amount for taxes that are not applicable “because of the Exchange’s immunity from direct state or local taxation and because of federal, state, or local tax exemptions for sales to the federal government.” Thus, the goods at the Exchanges are tax-free and do not acquire added costs in Guåhan. Even if Guåhan is also considered a duty-free port outside of the U.S. Customs zone, Guåhan goods do not have Federal government subsidized shipping of goods like the exchanges do.

Because of the harsh price increase on goods outside the fence due to the Jones Act and Guåhan’s heavy dependence on imports for necessities such as food, commissary access is extremely coveted. It is common when someone is having a party, to give a list to someone who has “base privileges” to purchase for them. Civilian stores in Guåhan simply cannot compete with commissary prices, and thus consumers in the island with commissary access consistently choose to shop on base, thus further reinforcing our feeling of dependency on the military’s presence here.

This notion of bifurcated benefits and privileges, between outside the fence and inside the fence is a large factor in why many CHamorus continue to join the military. Although there are strong discursive and patriotic elements to their military service, I argue that the economic benefits provided through military enlistment is by far the strongest factor in Guåhan’s high enlistment rate per capita. In 1973, the United States Armed Services switched to an all-volunteer force primarily due to the Vietnam quagmire, where the military became disappointed with undisciplined draftees. Other factors included a bipartisan emphasis against the conscripted nature of the military at the

⁵⁸ Army and Air Force Exchange Service Operations, Army Regulation 215-8, AFI 34-211 (I), accessed at https://www.ala-national.org/assets/research_center/r215_8.pdf

time as well as the fact that obtaining enough volunteers became possible at acceptable budget levels of the time.⁵⁹ This meant that the Armed Services needed to begin enticing people to fill their numbers, as they could no longer just draft their members. This is when we begin to see the development of what Jennifer Mittelstadt calls the “military welfare state.”⁶⁰ She argues that the social welfare programs for soldiers and their families became a strong incentive for people to enlist in the military. Joining the military gives one access to what has been called the most socialist institution in the United States.⁶¹ For example, the commissary benefit, “is an integral part of the military compensation package and a top retention factor for staying in the military.” In Guåhan, we see this economic retention factor in full force.

In 2018, 29 soldiers received \$20,000 enlistment bonuses just for signing with the Guam National Guard. Four others got \$17,500, another a \$12,500 bonus for enlisting. For families with little to no prospect for bettering their financial situation, these enlistment bonuses are a strong reason to join the military. Public Information Officer for the Guam National Guard, Major Josephine Blas, said this herself, “These incentives are one way to increase the size of the Army as a whole—active, Guard and reserve.”⁶² On the National Guard website, in big letters, it reads “What You Get: A Support Structure For Your Life.”⁶³ This support structure can be seen in numerous ways. In addition to access to the shopping centers and discounted grocery stores mentioned above, being either in the military or the dependent of a military member comes with a whole list of benefits. As Jennifer Mittelstadt writes,

For the more than 10 million Americans who volunteered for active duty after 1973—and their tens of millions of family members—the military provided an elaborate social and

⁵⁹ Bernard Rostker, “The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force,” *RAND Corporation Research Brief*, 2006, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9195.html

⁶⁰ Jennifer Mittelstadt, *The Rise of the Military Welfare State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

⁶¹ Mittelstadt, *The Rise*.

⁶² Meghan Swartz, “29 gets \$20k enlistment bonus from Guard,” *Guam Daily Post*, May 14, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/get-k-enlistment-bonus-from-guard/article_f8ba4666-5420-11e8-8370-c79faaa90d79.html

⁶³ “Benefits: What You Get,” National Guard, Accessed October 2018, <https://www.nationalguard.com/benefits?cid=tw100823>

economic safety net: medical and dental programs, housing assistance, subsistence payments, commissary and post exchange privileges, tax advantages, education and training, dozens of family welfare programs, child care, and social services ranging from financial counseling to legal aid.⁶⁴

The free medical and dental care through the Department of Defense's health care program, TRICARE, are among the most attractive benefits. Almost boasting the socialist nature of the institution, the Navy's website reads, "Rising medical costs and skyrocketing insurance premiums can make it difficult to afford quality medical care. In America's Navy, we pride ourselves on providing world-class health insurance to Sailors and their families."⁶⁵ In Guåhan, this means access to the Naval Hospital, which only those with military and base privileges can utilize, unless there is a serious emergency such as car crash victims, in which case the hospital will see civilians without benefits.

Enlisting in the military also provides for up to \$400,000 in life insurance, and some branches such as the Navy extend life insurance benefits to spouses and dependent children of servicemen. In addition, there are good retirement benefits: (1) Receive \$30,000 after 15 years and then receive a retirement fund after 20 years that equals about 40% of his or her highest pay, and (2) Receive no cash bonus at 15 years but receive a retirement fund after 20 years of service that equals about 50% of his or her highest pay.⁶⁶

In the realm of education, servicemembers are eligible for the Tuition Assistance Program (which pays for up to 100% of the cost of tuition or expenses, a maximum of \$250 per credit and a personal maximum of \$4,500 per fiscal year per student), the Post-9/11 GI Bill (which now pays all public school in-state tuition and fees, provides for a living stipend and an allowance of books, and is also available to military spouses and children), as well as the Loan Repayment Program.

⁶⁴ Mittelstadt, *The Rise of the Military Welfare State*, Loc 125, Kindle.

⁶⁵ "Navy Benefits, Compensation, & Pay," U.S. Navy, Accessed October 2018, <https://www.navy.com/what-to-expect/navy-benefits-compensation-and-pay>

⁶⁶ "Insurance and Retirement Benefits," Today's Military, Accessed October 2018, <https://www.todaysmilitary.com/living/insurance-and-retirement-benefits>

If moving to an overseas base, the military provides soldiers who are authorized to live in private housing with Overseas Housing Allowance. This allowance covers rent, utility/maintenance expenses, as well as a move-in housing allowance. This has led the real estate market near military bases to skyrocket in price, to the detriment of the local population. The nature of the housing allowance also means that renters do not need to worry about military personnel skipping payments, because the Department of Defense pays servicemembers regularly to cover the cost of housing and utilities.⁶⁷ As Director of Guåhan's Section 8 program, which helps provide housing to low-income families wrote, "We're finding that more people are opting to rent their properties to military service members, because they get housing allowances...Landowners aren't coming out and saying, 'I'll only rent to the military,' but that's exactly what's happening."⁶⁸ With the exception of the upper echelons of a community, locals cannot compete with the security of payment that landlords get by renting to those whose housing is subsidized by the Federal Government. With all this subsidized funding in the form of health care, education, and housing, servicemembers also receive a Cost of Living Allowance, on top of other benefits such as military discounts at stores, movie theaters, and restaurants.

This chapter has pointed to the various ways that our status as a military base and unincorporated territory has hindered the economic development and flourishing of the island and has subsequently produced a sense of dependency on the United States military and federal government. The lack of economic alternatives is the core factor that makes military service so attractive. It is guaranteed personal security: housing, healthcare, and food, all automatically taken care of. This is a guarantee that an economy like Guåhan's cannot promise everyone. This helps to explain both why the local community in Guåhan thinks military projects and federal spending are breadbaskets of money, and also helps to explain a high enlistment rate amongst CHamorus. I

⁶⁷ Eric Pape, "Living Hawaii: How Military Policies Drive Up Rents on Oahu," *Honolulu Civil Beat*, June 17, 2015, <https://www.civilbeat.org/2015/06/living-hawaii-how-military-policies-drive-up-rents-on-oahu/>

⁶⁸ Manny Cruz, "Military, tourism limit affordable housing on Guam," *Pacific Daily News*, May 26, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/05/26/military-tourism-limit-affordable-housing-guam/639792002/>

argue that it is economically and epistemologically violent to limit the imagination of an entire people's economic success to "join the military." This is a slow, sludgy process of violence, an extremely effective form.

II. (MILI)TOURISM?: THE ALTERNATIVE

It is quite an experience writing about Japanese economic and physical violence during World War II while being surrounded by Japanese tourists in a coffee shop. Every sentence I write on the horrors of CHamoru laborers being beat by Japanese soldiers feels as if it is reverberating off the walls of this coffee shop being entangled with the massive amount of Japanese language surrounding me. Yet, this is Guåhan's new reality. In 72 years since the war, we went from a brutally suppressed Japanese occupied territory to a haven for Japanese tourists to enjoy a taste of sun and sand "Where America's Day Begins." In this section, I outline the complexities of the tourism pillar of Guåhan's economy as it is simultaneously intertwined with militarization. I argue that the tourism industry in Guåhan is important in developing economic alternatives to counter our sole dependence on federal funding, while at the same time, argue that a critical analysis of militourism is needed to see the underlying militarist logics of the industry. I begin by briefly looking at the history of the tourism industry in Guåhan.

In 1952, Public Law 67 was passed, which was meant to plan for establishing a travel industry in Guåhan. However, due to the security clearance, nothing could be done to implement these plans. It would not be until the security clearance was lifted in 1962 when Guåhan opened its doors to the outside world, that the development of the tourism industry begins. The following year, 1963, the Government of Guam created the Guam Tourist Commission, which started with an initial budget of \$15,000. According to the Guam Visitors Bureau, "the Guam Tourist Commission immediately began aggressive travel trade promotions in Japan and Southeast Asia. Additionally, the Commission worked diligently on the development of a Guåhan tourism plan

and lobbied air carriers to increase flight service to Guåhan for potential market areas.⁶⁹ From this, Guåhan had 6,600 visitor arrivals in 1967 when Pan American World Airways first established their round-trip Guåhan-Tokyo route. This set a precedent for the tourism industry as Japan has been the number one source for the tourism market in recent (although this seems to be changing at the time of writing in 2018 as Japan arrivals are decreasing with Korea arrivals significantly increasing).

By 1972, the Guam Hotel Association was formed, and by this time, six hotels took part (Guam Hilton Hotel, The Cliff Hotel, Guam Dai-Ichi Hotel, Fujita Guam Tumon Beach Hotel and the Reef Hotel). These would be the first of many hotels currently located in the district of Tumon, which is the center of tourism in the island today and has been described as Guåhan's Waikiki. By 1980, it was reported that there were 2,435 hotel rooms and 300,763 annual visitor arrivals, and by 1990, this rose to 4,955 rooms and 780,404 visitors.⁷⁰ The present numbers are quite impressive as Guåhan received 1.4 million visitors in 2015, 1.53 million arrivals in 2016, and 1.54 million arrivals in 2017.⁷¹ Tourism grew from less than 10 hotels and 6,600 visitors in 1967 to over a million visitors per year since the industry's inception. It has consistently been a significant pillar of the island's economy. In the Guam Visitors Bureau's 2017 report, it was published that the total tourism economy sales for FY2016 equated to \$1.8 billion, contributing 12.1% of the island's GDP in 2016. The report reads,

In other words, tourism supports around 34% (1 in every 3 jobs) of all employment on Guam. The TSA (Tourism Satellite Account) report stated that visitor spending directly supported 100% of employment in hotel lodging, 50% of retail employment and about

⁶⁹ "History and Mission," Guam Visitors Bureau, Accessed October 2018, <https://www.guamvisitorsbureau.com/about/history-and-mission>

⁷⁰ Guam Visitors' Bureau, Tourism 2020, *Guam Visitors' Bureau*, <https://www.guamvisitorsbureau.com/docs/research-and-reports/reports/guam-tourism-2020-plan/guam-tourism-2020-plan.pdf>

⁷¹ Pacific Daily News, "Guam tourism sets new record in 2017," *Pacific Daily News*, February 12, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/02/12/guam-tourism-sets-new-record-2017/328249002/>

42% of employment in the food and beverage industry. This equates to around \$617 million in the form of tourism labor income or the compensation to our workforce.⁷²

As Guåhan's former governor Eddie Baza Calvo proclaims, "Tourism remains Guam's primary industry, and we must encourage its growth with strong resolve. We will do this by improving Product Guam as a destination that is not only attractive for our visitors, but a better home for Guam residents to live."⁷³

The tourism industry is seemingly positive and beneficial for the island. However, a more critical analysis of tourism aims to address whether the tourism industry and the militarized nature of the island are intertwined. I also explore how Guåhan's status as a military base affects the tourism industry. In investigating the former, I turn to the theoretical tool of "militourism." Banaban scholar Teresia Teaiwa defines militourism as "a phenomenon by which military or paramilitary forces ensures the smooth running of a tourist industry, and that same tourist industry masks the military force behind it."⁷⁴ Clarifying this definition, she writes,

It goes beyond the simple presence of military bases and tourist resorts on the same islands or in the same archipelagoes. Often, the tourist industry capitalizes on the military histories of islands... Altogether, tourism is able to flatten, tame, and render benign the culture of militarism. The military, in turn, endorses the industry by patronizing hotels and related facilities during R&R leaves... This collaboration between militarism and tourism effects complex processes of displacement and social mobility for Islanders, affecting the physical, mental, and emotional health of island bodies.⁷⁵

In her book, *Holidays in the Danger Zone: Entanglements of War and Tourism*, Debbie Lisle argues that both war and tourism share the same production of difference, which reinforces a colonial hierarchy. She writes,

⁷² "2017 Annual Report," Guam Visitors' Bureau, accessed October 2018, <https://www.guamvisitorsbureau.com/docs/research-and-reports/reports/annual-reports/2018/2017-annual-report-20180620.pdf>

⁷³ GVB, Tourism 2020.

⁷⁴ Teresia Teaiwa, "Reading Gauguin's Noa Noa with Hau'ofa's Kisses in the Nederends," in *Inside Out: Literature, Cultural Politics, and Identity in the New Pacific*, eds. Vilsoni Hereniko and Rob Wilson (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 251.

⁷⁵ Teaiwa, "Reading Gauguin's Noa Noa with Hau'ofa's Kisses in the Nederends," 252.

Though the purposes of war and tourism seem unrelated and even antithetical (one oriented toward political violence, the other toward leisure), they both produce foreignness within a global order that must be either conquered through military combat (i.e., vanquishing the enemy) or consumed through tourism (i.e., commodifying the Other) ...Both practices are structured in advance by shared productions of difference.⁷⁶

Critics of militourism show the methodology through which the tourism industry and the militarization of countries or places mutually constitute one another.

One classic example of militourism and their shared production of difference is Hawai‘i. In her classic essay on tourism in Hawai‘i, “Lovely Hula Hands: Corporate Tourism and the Prostitution of Hawaiian Culture,” Haunani-Kay Trask argues how the tourist industry in Hawai‘i, including its infrastructure and desire for land, has come at the expense of Hawaiian lands and people. Furthermore, she argues that the tourism industry reinforces tropes of Kanaka Maoli culture that have been utilized to portray the island as hospitable, and beneath all that rhetoric, penetrable. She writes, “The point of course, is that everything in Hawai‘i can be yours, that is, you the tourists, the Non-natives, the visitors. The place, the people, the culture, even our identity as a ‘Native’ people is for sale.”⁷⁷ It is not a coincidence that this touristic image of Hawai‘i as penetrable fits perfectly with a place where nearly a quarter of the land is occupied by the U.S. military.

On a discursive level, we can see similar connections here in Guåhan. Hospitality has been one of the core images canonically crafted to depict the CHamoru people and the island, and one sees it in both tourism ads and military public relations campaign. For example, on the front page of the website for Visit Guam, it reads, “Known for our warm, hospitable people, Guam is a destination like no other.”⁷⁸ Similarly, on the website “Paradises: Asian and Pacific Resorts,” Sarah Moon writes, “Guam boasts a rich culture, gorgeous beaches, year-round tropical weather conditions and some of the most hospitable inhabitants in the world...Guam’s indigenous

⁷⁶ Debbie Lisle, *Holidays In The Danger Zone: Entanglements of War and Tourism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 4.

⁷⁷ Trask, *From A Native Daughter*, 144.

⁷⁸ “Visit Guam,” accessed October 2018, www.visitguam.com

Chamorro people are warm and welcoming, keen to share the gift of their island with visitors.”⁷⁹ Now, compare this to similar words by the military. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates reflected on a visit to Guåhan, saying, “The people of Guam have been hospitable to our military forces for a very long time, and we want to keep that relationship strong as we go forward and deal with issues associated with the growth.”⁸⁰ Lastly, in a description of Naval Base Guam, the Commander of the Navy Installations Command writes, “Friendliness and giving are the spirit of Guam and the Chamorro people. A great place to see that are in the fiesta celebrations held across the island...Those who join are welcomed, fed delicious food, and made to feel a part of the community and family.”⁸¹ Clearly, both the military and the tourism industry thrive on the image of Guåhan and its people as being very hospitable and welcoming.

Another connection between militarism and tourism in the island is the tourism industry’s appeal towards the “Americanness” of the island. On “Visit Guam,” one finds, “A trip to Guam is like visiting the four exotic corners of the globe. Guam is considered the hub of the western Pacific and undeniably Micronesia’s most cosmopolitan destination—a true example of the great American melting pot.”⁸² The Guam Economic Development Authority, which is set up to find ways to bring investment into the island, invites investors, writing, “As a member of the American family, Guam is able to offer visitors a stable and secure environment. Federal law provides local self-government on Guam, U.S. citizenship for her people, and application of the U.S. Constitution to the island.”⁸³ The military and U.S. jurisdiction over the island is a selling point in attracting both tourists and investors. Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez writes, “The same logics that rationalize the

⁷⁹ “Introducing Guam,” *Paradises*, accessed October 2018,

<https://www.paradises.com/destinations/pacific/micronesia/guam/introducing-guam/>

⁸⁰ Donna Miles, “Gates Views Massive Growth Under Way in Guam,” *DoD News*, May 30, 2008, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50042>

⁸¹ “Installation Guide,” CNIC Naval Base Guam, accessed October 2018, https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/jrm/installations/navbase_guam/about/installation_guide.html

⁸² Visit Guam Website.

⁸³ “About Guam,” Guam Economic Development Authority, accessed October 2018, <http://www.investguam.com/economic-resources/about-guam/>

uneven economic and cultural landscapes resulting from unregulated tourism also justify the continuing presence of the American military in the Pacific: jobs, stability, protection, and foreign exchange.”⁸⁴ In many ways, the stability of the tourism industry is purported to be related to the stability of the military presence.

The interesting position that the tourism industry presents in Guåhan is that while arguably being intertwined with the militarization of the island, it is also the only current plausible economic alternative that Guåhan has to full reliance on the military. In this section, I do not attempt to resolve this contradiction, but rather to illuminate tourism’s peculiar place in the island. Rather, I caution those who completely demonize tourism, as it is a glimpse of an economy that, although related, is not fully a side effect of militarization. I also caution against those who view tourism as the innocent economic engine. I have provided evidence to the contrary and have shown that many of the logics which drive tourism are derived from Guåhan’s “Americanness” and present usage as a military base.

III. GUÅHAN’S LOPSIDED MILITARY KEYNESIANISM: BLURRING THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE MILITARY (BUILDUP)

At the height of the military buildup fervor in Guåhan from 2010-2012, one could not drive a day around the island without seeing trucks belonging to construction companies bearing stickers that read “I Support the Military Buildup!” Upon hearing the news of the military buildup, construction companies rallied around its success touting the vast economic benefits and opportunities the buildup would bring. Returning to Guåhan’s Chamber of Commerce president, Catherine Castro, she argued that “the military buildup will be a major boost for growing our economy. To date, no other alternatives for creating jobs has even been suggested or can come

⁸⁴ Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai’i and the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 5.

close.”⁸⁵ Former Guåhan senator and current delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, Michael San Nicolas, said in a public forum regarding the military buildup, “It’s necessary for us to support it because it’s going to create the opportunities to allow our people to stay here on Guam and find jobs and not have to leave.”⁸⁶

I argue that the buildup is the latest manifestation of a form of military Keynesianism in Guåhan. Military Keynesianism is described as the belief that military expenditure represents a useful way to stimulate the economy. From a military Keynesianism standpoint, the more the military spends, the better the economy is. The roots of military Keynesianism are found in political economist John Maynard Keynes’s works on employment, interest, and money, where he argued governments should spend money and be the primary consumer to jumpstart the economy. The military twist of Keynesianism is primarily found in the United States with its large military-industrial complex. To quote Peter Custers, “Whereas European governments were seen as relying on social spending to promote the regulation of their business cycles, US governments in the second half of the twentieth century frequently relied on expanded military allocations to ensure an adequate level of aggregate demand for commodities.”⁸⁷ Keynesian economics is rooted in the presumption that government spending creates an addition to the economy’s demand thus subsequently giving life to labor and resources that would have been idle otherwise. Military spending creates a multiplier effect for the military.⁸⁸

The policy itself is rooted in the infamous document, NSC-68, drafted in 1950 by the U.S. National Security Council, where the authors argued, regarding military spending,

⁸⁵ John I. Borja, “Guam Chamber of Commerce: Buildup will give much-needed economic boost,” *Pacific Daily News*, October 6, 2017, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2017/10/06/guam-chamber-commerce-buildup-give-much-needed-economic-boost/738295001/>

⁸⁶ Kevin Kerrigan, “Delegate contenders both support military buildup,” *Guam Daily Post*, September 27, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/delegate-contenders-both-support-military-buildup/article_0e0408a8-c15a-11e8-9011-17102f039fc1.html

⁸⁷ Peter Custers, “Military Keynesianism today: an innovative discourse,” *Race & Class*, 51, no. 4 (2010): 80.

⁸⁸ Robert Higgs, “Military Keynesianism to the Rescue?,” *Independent Institute*, January 2, 2009, <http://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=2399>

From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while providing for a high standard of living.⁸⁹

This was a response to World War II and the fear of its aftermath. In 1940, military spending rose 600% in 12 months and reached 42% of the gross domestic product of the United States in 1943-1944. “Factories operated seven days a week; U.S. labor productivity quickly rose to levels that were multiples of those of Germany and Japan...the economy expanded at its highest rate ever—real GDP was up by 52.4% and unemployment fell from 14.6% in 1940 to only 1.2% in 1944.”⁹⁰ While a significant positive boost for the American people, many leaders began to worry what would happen after the war ended. From these worries and subsequent actions taken, the permanent war economy in the United States was born, a reliance on military spending for the economy itself became a way to avoid economic regression. Military Keynesianism effectively thrived under various administrations with the combination of military contractors, military personnel, and policy makers working together to ensure continued military spending.

Worries of decreasing military spending have sprouted answers from various defense-related occupations. Professor of Industrial Engineering Seymour Melman warned, “if the U.S. military received less funding it would not employ 20-30% of all research scientists and engineers, nor would it absorb up to two-thirds of all U.S. research and development outlays.”⁹¹ Martin Feldstein, in the *Wall Street Journal*, argued that any cuts to the Department of Defense’s budget would be a mistake. He writes, “the US government recognized the need for increasing government to offset the decline in consumer demand in the economy and argued that a rise in

⁸⁹ The Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs For National Security, “A Report To The National Security Council,” NSC 68, April 14, 1950.

⁹⁰ James M. Cypher, “The Origins and Evolution of military Keynesianism in the United States,” *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, 38, (2015): 451.

⁹¹ Cypher, “The Origins and Evolution of military Keynesianism in the United States,” 465.

military spending would be the best way to provide this stimulus.”⁹² Controversial American defense official George Kennan wrote in 1987, “Were the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the ocean, the American military-industrial complex would have to remain, substantially unchanged, until some other adversary could be invented. Anything else would be an unacceptable shock to the American economy.”⁹³ Unfortunately, Kennan is right, because “military spending is higher than it was at the height of the Cold War, despite the absence of any comparable enemy investment.”⁹⁴

For Guåhan, military Keynesianism is evident in the current buildup. Stephen Nygard, publisher of the *Guam Business Journal*, supported the military buildup arguing that it would be a great boost to the construction industry. He writes on economic recovery, “The leading edge of any recovery is usually behind the construction industry, and they’ve been really busy with military projects.”⁹⁵ In carrying out the military buildup, construction companies have already seen some cashflow. Black Construction Corporation, in September of 2018, was awarded a \$82 million contract to design an aircraft maintenance facility. In addition to them, Fargo Pacific Inc., Modern International Inc., Pacific Rim Constructors, Reliable Builders Inc., and Serrano Construction and Development Corp. are all being awarded construction contracts that total \$240 million to renovate, build, modernize, and repair various federal and military facilities and installations.⁹⁶

⁹² John Paul Dunne, “Military Keynesianism: An Assessment,” *Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development*, January 2011, 2, <https://ideas.repec.org/p/uwe/wpaper/1106.html>

⁹³ George Kennan, *At Century’s Ending: Reflections, 1982-1995* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 118.

⁹⁴ Rebecca U. Thorpe, *The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), Loc 232, Kindle.

⁹⁵ Allan Golombek, “No Keynesians, Military Spending Doesn’t Boost the Economy,” *Real Clear Markets*, October 23, 2018, https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2018/10/23/no_keynesians_military_spending_doesnt_boost_the_economy_103459.html

⁹⁶ Gaynor D. Daleno, “\$240M military construction contract awarded to 5 Guam small businesses,” *Guam Daily Post*, July 13, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/m-military-construction-contract-awarded-to-guam-small-businesses/article_dd158328-865a-11e8-ad71-a38fcfc13376.html

Besides construction, the Socioeconomic Impact Assessment Study on the Guam and CNMI Military Relocation outlines the various economic benefits the buildup would bring. The authors divide these benefits into direct impacts, indirect impacts, and induced impacts. Direct impacts are those associated with project-related construction and operations, indirect impacts come from the expenditures to businesses that supply goods and services for construction and/or operational activities that would be associated with the proposed action, and induced impacts are the result of spending from wages and salaries derived from jobs generated by the proposed action. Breaking down these economic impacts they argue the following:

Civilian labor force demand is expected to increase by a maximum of 7,031 full-time jobs in 2021 (6,150 related to construction and 881 related to operations); of the 7,031 jobs, 3,058 are estimated to be taken by Guam residents. At steady-state, by 2028, labor force demand is expected to increase by 1,438 full-time jobs, 762 of the jobs are estimated to be taken by Guam residents.

Civilian labor force income is expected to increase by a maximum of \$296 million in 2021 and reach a steady-state level of \$67 million in 2028. The estimated average salaries for jobs related to the construction phase (\$38,600) and the military operational phase (\$46,000) would be considerable higher than the 2012 Guam median salary of \$28,074.

Gross Island Product (GIP) is expected to increase by a maximum of \$635 million in 2021 and decline to a steady-state level of \$75 million by 2028. The primary driver of GIP impacts in 2021 would be DoD construction activity. During the steady-state period, GIP impacts would be primarily driven by expenditures related to Marine Corps operations.⁹⁷

For many in Guåhan, these statistics above help to show how the military buildup is a meal ticket for the island's economy. Former Lieutenant Governor of Guåhan, Ray Tenorio, said at a forum for the construction industry in Guåhan, "We all recognize the economic benefits, the number of jobs that come from it. We also understand the economic long term implications of additional

⁹⁷ Joint Guam Program Office. 2015. *Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Relocation (2012 Roadmap Adjustments) Appendix D Socioeconomic Impact Assessment Study*. Prepared by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific. Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

personnel, and the military apparatus that brings the civilian higher paying jobs. We all understand the construction industry and the implications of being able to do this military buildup.”⁹⁸

Many opponents of the military buildup have argued that the economic benefits of the military buildup are not worth the environmental damage, which will be discussed in the next chapter. They argue that we used to be rich in land, and that the military buildup is a further desecration of land that was taken away from CHamoru families immediately after the war. However, in this section, my purpose is to show how a sense of dependency and military Keynesianism in Guåhan has produced the conditions of possibility for the people of Guåhan to react so positively and strongly to this proposed buildup. The continuum of violences made palatable through economic forms of mitigation. When one has little to eat, anything starts to look good, even if it isn’t good for you. I argue that the military buildup is simply the most obvious manifestation of a crafted dependency on the military, both material and discursive.

IV. ITANO’-TA, ILINA’LÅ’-TA: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LOST LAND

Once a year during the annual July “liberation” festivities, Naval Base Guam allows CHamorus to enter their gates and visit the graves of their loved ones in Sumay village. In the 2015 memorial mass, Naval Commander Captain Andy Anderson addressed the crowd, saying, “Today’s event is a commemoration of what people endured and sacrificed during WWII, the reason that it’s important is so that we allow families access to the installation, back to their territorial lands if you will, to pay homage to the sacrifices that their families endured.”⁹⁹ His statement is ripe for political analysis, especially the words, “if you will.” Saying “if you will,” invites the listener to accept the premise of the statement. Earlier I discussed land dispossession as a critical component to the remaking of the life and economy of the island. In this section, I analyze

⁹⁸ Nestor Licanto, “Lou Leon Guerrero, Ray Tenorio appear at Guam Contractors Association Forum,” *KUAM*, October 17, 2018, <http://www.kuam.com/story/39299857/2018/10/Wednesday/leon-guerrero-tenorio-appear-at-guam-contractors-association-forum>

⁹⁹ *KUAM*, “Annual memorial held in Sumay,” *KUAM*, July 20, 2015, <http://www.kuam.com/story/29583773/2015/07/Monday/annual-memorial-held-in-sumay>

the actual economic effects of this land loss, not just as a necessary condition for economic change, but as an actual loss in terms of dollars. So, I invite the reader to imagine, if you will, the amount of cash in CHamoru hands if we were allowed to keep our lands.

Pacific historian Douglas Oliver once said, “If a single criterion were to be used to test the survival of any native community it would be: To what extent have they retained their lands?”¹⁰⁰ In Guåhan, the answer to this question is that the military currently occupies 27% of the island’s land. I reiterate that “invasion is a structure, not an event” and the current occupation of CHamoru land cannot be viewed as events in our history, but as a structure and as a very real and very present form of “slow violence,” creeping further and further along in our economic arteries, clogging potential flow. In his report, “An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Guam’s Political Status Options,” Joseph Bradley discusses the economic potential of the three political statuses available to the native inhabitants of Guåhan: statehood, free association, or independence. A large section of his report focuses on the role of land.

Bradley is honest in writing that Guåhan’s small land base of 212 square miles limits the potential for economic development, and this is the nature of our geography, geology, and smaller population size. However, he follows this up, writing,

The ‘best’ land in Guam for development purposes is in the northern half of the island, but a substantial portion of this land is held by the U.S. federal government, and therefore unavailable for civilian economic use. Further, much of the land owned by the U.S. Air Force in the northern half of the island is left idle, including that which restricts access to the prime private beach areas of Urunao. The sprawling air base also covers much of the Northern Aquifer, and ground water pollution from military activities there have forced the closing of several wells in recent years. In this regard, a substantial portion of Guam’s most economically valuable land goes unused because of land tenure restrictions.¹⁰¹

Bradley argues that the effects of massive land-taking after the war has resulted in a situation where, even if the square mile area of the island is small, CHamorus miss out on being able to use 27% of the land mass, whether for agriculture, housing, or development on our terms. This report

¹⁰⁰ Douglas Oliver, *The Pacific Islands: Third Edition* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989).

¹⁰¹ Bradley, “An Analysis of the Economic Development of Guam,” 4-5.

was written in 2000 and Bradley gives the numbers of revenue loss in the value of (FY2000) dollars.

It was estimated in 1992 that the holdings of idle land by the federal government in Guam cost the local government as much as \$69 million annually in foregone government revenues alone. In addition to the northern U.S. Air Force landholdings, U.S. military lands in Guam include the former political and economic capital of Sumay, which is part of the extensive southern holdings by the U.S. Navy. The contribution that excess land held by the U.S. military would make to Guam's Gross Island Product (Gross Domestic Product) in 2000 is estimated to be \$1.1 billion annually, if it were available for civilian use. This is more than one third of Guam's GIP.¹⁰²

Adjusting to 2018 dollars, the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index writes that prices in 2018 are 46.60% higher than prices in 2000. With this adjustment, \$1.1 billion in 2000 is worth \$1,612,560,394.89 today in 2018.¹⁰³ In an October 2017 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on territorial debt, they write that Guåhan's debt increased from \$1 billion in FY 2005 to \$2.5 billion in FY 2015, where debt grew 13% on average per year.¹⁰⁴ One wonders how much the island would be in debt if it was able to use even 15% more of the land that the military occupies.

To further show the continuum of violence and insecurity regarding the land and economy, I turn to the "compensation" process held by the military after the rampant land takings. Beginning in 1947, three years after the war's end, the Naval government created the Land and Claims Commission and the Superior Court of Guam to determine a "fair" price for the land they stole during and after the war. According to Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider on the unfair nature of this process,

These Americans determined the value of each parcel of land and then apprised the owner of the government's offer. If the offer was accepted, a purchase was made on the spot. If not, the land was taken by the Government anyway, by condemnation, and the case was referred to the Superior Court. Here, a single judge, an American and employee

¹⁰² Bradley, "An Analysis of the Economic Development of Guam," 5-6.

¹⁰³ "2000 Dollars in 2018," CPI Inflation Calculator, accessed November 2018, <http://www.in2013dollars.com/2000-dollars-in-2018>

¹⁰⁴ Government Accountability Office, "U.S. Territories: Public Debt Outlook."

of the Naval government, decided whether or not the government's offer was fair compensation. The only appeal available to a native landowner was located 10,000 miles away in Washington D.C., in the office of the Secretary of the Navy.¹⁰⁵

CHamoru congressman Joaquin Perez commented on this process, writing,

The Secretary of the Navy maintains his office, shall we say, nine thousand miles away, and it is very obvious that a party desiring to appeal cannot economically be present at a hearing...A man is entitled to present his case in the best possible manner. A man is entitled to present his case face-to-face. Robbing a man of that privilege is certainly robbing him of a portion of the justice due him.¹⁰⁶

Many CHamorus denied the offer, and the prices being offered were also economically manipulative. The Navy decided that the price of all the lands in the compensation process were to be set at their 1941 values, despite CHamoru rebuttals that the value of the land had increased during the Japanese occupation as it was brought into more large-scale cultivation.

However, the Naval government refused to acknowledge this and kept their prices to the 1941 values. When asked about the value of land in Guåhan, Commander L.J. Watson of the Navy said, "astonishingly low." He reasons, "It has never been freely sold, and an analysis of recorded instruments show that practically all exchanges of land or sales of land have been between relatives and so on."¹⁰⁷ The result of this is quite saddening. For example, for the 15-acre site of the current officers' housing in Guåhan, Libugon, which was renamed Nimitz Hill, the Naval government offered \$14.10 total. In Tumon, the military offered a CHamoru landowner \$34.00 for 32 months of rent, and one Guåhan congressman of the time mentioned that a sixty hectare piece of prime farm land which could yield \$1,000 a month, would only be worth \$3,000 according to the 1941 prices being utilized by the Navy.¹⁰⁸ CHamorus understood that they were getting ripped off, and that their land was worth way more than what was being offered by the Navy. B.J. Bordallo wrote, "We had an artificially depressed land market resulting from the military's deliberate policy of isolating Guam from the rest of the world... Since this artificial depression was caused by the

¹⁰⁵ Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights*, 130.

¹⁰⁶ Hattori, "Guardians Of Our Soil," 195.

¹⁰⁷ Phillips, "Land," 9.

¹⁰⁸ Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights*, 131.

Navy's deliberate closed-door policy, is it fair that just compensation be measured by 1941 Guam values?"¹⁰⁹

It was not just the price devaluations that were problematic for CHamorus, it was also the nature of the process. Because the Naval government did not receive the \$1,630,000 appropriated by the U.S. Congress until three years after the war, the process of compensation took a while to commence. However, during this time, the military took the land anyway and did not return it to the original landowners. Essentially, for three years, CHamorus were confused as to what was going on with their land, and much of this land was productive. At the Public Lands Committee Hearings, many raged against the fact that the military condemned "half or more of the most arable land on the Island of Guam, suitable for agriculture and the raising of livestock."¹¹⁰ Hofschneider argues,

Consequently, the future economic recovery of the island, which was basically self-sufficient in production of food before the war, was seriously threatened. In the opinion of various witnesses, the Navy's current policy of leasing idle government property to farmers for a maximum period of twelve months was stifling the island economy. No reasonably intelligent farmer was willing to invest in and cultivate a piece of property that might be taken away from him the next year.¹¹¹

The entire handling of the land compensation (and condemnation) process was a slap in the face to CHamorus who passed down these lands from generation to generation. In 1977, an organization named the Guam Landowners Association filed a class action lawsuit against the U.S. government demanding monetary compensation for their condemned lands. This lawsuit represented 1,377 land claims for 3,525 parcels of condemned land. Unfortunately, "On 25 May 1983, the U.S. Justice Department offered to settle all the claims out of court for a total payment of \$39.5 million,

¹⁰⁹ Phillips, "Land," 10.

¹¹⁰ United States Congress, House, Committee on Public Lands, Hearings on H.R. 4499 et. A.; bills to provide a civil government for Guam, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 21-23 November 1949, 151

¹¹¹ Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights*, 154.

a figure far below the \$500 million estimate by then-Guam delegate to the U.S. Congress, Antonio B. Won Pat.”¹¹²

Lastly, I end this section with the largest effect of this whole situation. For the first time in CHamoru history, the compensation hearings placed CHamorus in a culturally taboo place: the valuation of land in dollar amounts. Land was CHamoru livelihood, where they grew their crops, what they passed down to their kids, and called their own. Yet, after the war, they had the choice of having the land merely condemned or accepting low monetary offers. Even more, with the lawsuit, many CHamorus argued that their land was worth a lot more than what was offered. Even though the military has returned a massive amount of land from occupying 63% after the war to 27% today, it almost seems as if the cultural damage is done. Families in Guåhan today consistently fight over land or sell their land to move to the states. For some CHamorus today, their connection to the land is severed as the traumatic history of land dispossession not only had material consequences, but also these Ngugian cultural bomb effects.

Being forced into the wage economy changed CHamoru lives and this is noted by U.S. officials as well. For example, in a report to the United Nations in 1947, the Navy reported,

The war-time and post-war development of Guam as a major military base has firmly established a wage economy, and it is extremely doubtful if the island will ever return to the basically agricultural economy it possessed before the war. On the other hand, the island government believes that the complete rehabilitation and extension of the agricultural potentialities of the island will be to the best interest of the Guamanian population.¹¹³

Adding to this, Robert Cootes of the Division of Land Utilization of the Department of the Interior, wrote of agriculture in Guåhan,

A considerable acreage of good agricultural land has been taken for military use. Most will remain within military reserves. Much of that which may be returned to private ownership has been rendered unfit for crop production. The loss of this agricultural land

¹¹² Hattori, “Guardians Of Our Soil,” 199.

¹¹³ Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc. 1983. *Guam: The Determinants of Economic Growth*. Prepared by the Land and Natural Resources Division United States Department of Justice. Washington D.C, 22.

has necessitated the use of poorer land in its stead or has forced the former operators to abandon farming and accept wage employment.¹¹⁴

CHamorus in a matter of a couple of decades were forced to radically reformulate their relationship to land, and this is extremely damaging to an indigenous people who called themselves “i taotao tåno,” or “the people of the land.” For what are CHamorus without their land? This is something many CHamorus are still trying to figure out today as we look around at military fences, foreign-owned acres of land, and houseless members of our people lying in the streets. With the taking of land, came the violent taking of livelihood and sustenance, in whatever form that may have been, creating a condition of insecurity prevalent throughout the island.

V. I FINAKPO’: CONCLUSION

Authors of the comedy blog “U might B from Guam...,” write, “U might B from Guam if you feel that Guam stands for Give Us American Money.”¹¹⁵ Through the peeling of chronological layers, this chapter argued that despite the hegemonic discourse that Guåhan would not survive without U.S. military presence, the military’s presence here and our subsequent treatment in the name of U.S. security interests has hindered Guåhan’s economic development and produced dependency on the American nation-state. Throughout the chapter, we saw how an assortment of tools for economic hindering was used, intentionally or unintentionally, by the United States, and that some of these like dramatic land transformations were spectacular, while others such as the Jones Act, are just the result of bureaucratic policies.

Robert Underwood recently described how the most fundamental result of this hundred-year hindrance was rather epistemological. He said, “In Guåhan, there is no blank slate. One always begins with the presumption that the military is a key factor in whatever one is doing.”¹¹⁶ For the economy today in Guåhan, this is the reality. All attempts at something new, especially the

¹¹⁴ Robert Cooke, *A Report of the Land Use-Conditions and Land Problems on Guam*, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1950, 3.

¹¹⁵ “Jokes,” U might B from Guam, accessed November 2018, <http://umightbfromguam.tripod.com/jokes.html>

¹¹⁶ Robert Underwood, interview, October 16, 2018.

development of a new industry needs to clear itself with the U.S. military needs of the island. With every step, the question that needs to be asked is, “Will this interfere with U.S. security interests for the island?” History has shown that U.S. national security interests will always supersede Guåhan’s economic development. Underwood once wrote, “The policies in the past have been so beset with injustices to individual families and have been so disruptive to land ownership by the CHamoru people, that land has been the only issue in Guam which radicalizes even the most mild mannered CHamoru.”¹¹⁷ Anthony Leon Guerrero writes, “If we are to develop our economy, we will have to do it ourselves. The colonizers not only do not help in economic development, they discourage it, either through direct actions or by setting up systems that make us dependent on their continuing activities.”¹¹⁸

This chapter, acting as a part II to the previous chapter has demonstrated the shape-shifting forms of power and violence operating from land dispossession and trickling down as a condition of possibility for economic violence. In this detailed history, I have attempted to show the reader just how our form-of-life here in Guåhån was crafted in various ways because of U.S. military and national security concerns and initiatives. I also showed that this forced dependence has made these economic and land violences more palatable creating sustainable insecurity. In the following chapter, I move on to discuss environmental violence, insecurity, and mitigation efforts contributing to sustainable insecurity. In the end of the same piece above, Leon Guerrero concludes, “We must continue this effort until the colonizers are actually compensating the people of Guam for the full value of the benefits that they receive from using our land and our location, the two principal resources with which our people are blessed.”¹¹⁹ I can find no better way to end

¹¹⁷ Robert Underwood, “Afterword,” in *A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam 1899-1950* by Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider (Saipan: CNMI Division of Historic Preservation, 2001), 211.

¹¹⁸ Leon Guerrero, “The Economic Development of Guam,” 101.

¹¹⁹ Leon Guerrero, “The Economic Development of Guam,” 101.

this chapter. The battle for economic prosperity is directly tied to the military, and we must continue the effort. Sigi mo'na!

Chapter 4: The Poison of The Spear's Tip: Environmental Violence and Insecurity in Guåhan

Growing up, my family and I made frequent trips to California. My mom's brother lived in Redwood City, California and thus we would take vacations to visit him during the summers. I loved it out there. The weather was cool, there was so much to do, and it seemed like a whole new world to me. Yet, there was one thing I could never get on board with: drinking the tap water. I vividly remember being offered water straight from the faucet to drink and looking at the glass with a mixture of disgust and confusion. I wondered why my family offered me something so gross to consume. Being raised in Guåhan, it was an unwritten rule that one was not supposed to drink the tap water. Before the age of home appliance water filters, most people in Guåhan such as my family, resorted to buying multiple 5-gallon bottles of water that they would refill at a store that had its own filtration system. When I asked my grandma why we could not just drink the water from the faucet, she would warn me that the water was dirty and contaminated. This has stuck with me to this day and I honestly still do not drink the tap water. If one were to just move to the island, they may think this to be just a local folktale rooted in untrue stories passed on culturally. They may find it to be the musings of a population still rooted in "mythology."

¹ This chapter demonstrates how this fear of drinking tap water is not rooted in unjustified beliefs, but rather, is the societal vestige of a history of contamination of the soil and water here, with the U.S. military as the main offender, but certainly not the only one. In this chapter, I show the material roots of this local fear of Guåhan tap water through examining the larger problem of environmental contamination caused by military activities and basing here, and subsequently how

¹ My use of "mythology" here needs to be further explained. I argue against considering this story simply a form of "mythology" as perceived by Western epistemologies, because it usually associated with falsity. However, I also acknowledge that this is a typical Western view of mythology, and that mythology, throughout history, has not been the antithesis of empiricism as many "myths" have carried truth. For example, the story of the Walking Statues in Rapa Nui may have been considered "myth" by Western scientists, however, even "Science" has proven this ancient story to be true in their view. I also do not argue that something is only true when deemed true by "Science."

despite massive evidence of contamination, the U.S. military is still viewed by many as good environmental stewards of the land.

To examine this phenomenon of large-scale contamination caused by the military presence here in Guåhan, this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section delves into the literature on environmental security, environmental racism, and environmental violence to further reinforce the argument that Guåhan security is put at major risk via the environmental insecurity caused by military activity. The second section introduces the geological makeup of the island as well as its water distribution systems. The third section discusses the facts of and history of military contamination in the northern part of the island due to Andersen Air Force Base, as well as facts of and history of contamination due to military activity and presence in the central and southern parts of the island, with emphasis on Superfund sites and Naval Base Guam. The fourth section examines the controversy surrounding the spraying of Agent Orange in the island. Using the proposed military realignment as a focal point, the fifth section discursively analyzes the attempts at justification the military gives in justifying possibly harmful environmental actions.

I. TOXIC VIOLENCE

To begin, I want to restate Robert Nixon's definition of slow violence. Nixon describes slow violence as a "violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all."² In the last chapter, I demonstrated the slow-moving nature of economic violence. In this chapter, I demonstrate how numerous acts of slow violence have been committed against Guåhan's environment. Before throwing ourselves into the toxic abyss of contamination, it is necessary to engage in the literature on environmental racism, justice, violence, and security to give us a framework for moving forward. As this dissertation is concerned with and attempts to problematize security, I begin with environmental security.

² Nixon, *Slow Violence*, 2.

Environmental security, as a mainstream concept in security, sticks to the traditional nation-state referent, where since the 1980s, resource scarcity and environmental degradation came under the rubric of states' security concerns. This move of placing the environment under the security rubric has caused great debates amongst policymakers and academics. Some environmentalists argue that this is a beneficial move for the environment as it forces the state to take these issues seriously. Others, however, such as the authors in the anthology, *The Secure and The Dispossessed: How the Military and Corporations are Shaping a Climate-Changed World*, argue that securitizing the environment simply leads to the state adopting Malthusian policies akin to an "armed lifeboat," in which the powerful arm themselves and work towards keeping anyone else from accessing their resources. Ben Hayes explicates this problem of securitization this way, "In this model, poverty, injustice and the protests and resistance this causes are seen not as fundamental social-policy failures, but as a source of potential social unrest to be predicted, managed and countered."³

One of the first works to really popularize environmental issues as part of the security agenda was Robert Kaplan's piece, "The Coming Anarchy," in which he argues that environmental degradation would lead to an exacerbation of the effects of disease, conflict, and civil instability, which would eventually affect the global North.⁴ Similarly, Michael Klare argues that increased resource scarcity and rising population levels will lead to further ethnic and religious violence. He argues that states' security depends on things like oilfield protection, the defense of maritime trade routes, and the ability to export energy products, and furthermore, that a change in the environment may affect these vital systems necessary to state security. Thus, the ability of a state to secure these

³ Ben Hayes, "Colonising The Future: Climate Change and International Security Strategies," in *The Secure and the Dispossessed: How the Military and Corporations are Shaping a Climate-Changed World*, eds. Nick Buxton and Ben Hayes, (London: Pluto Books, 2016), 41.

⁴ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001).

vital systems will determine its survival.⁵ Compounding these issues is climate change. The U.S. military takes the threat of climate change quite seriously, arguing that climate change is a “threat multiplier.” As the 2010 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review reads, “Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration.”⁶ Supplementing this view of climate change as a threat multiplier, military strategists argue, “In national security planning, it generally can take about 30 years to design a weapons system and bring it to the battlefield, so it is important to anticipate future threat environments. It is not less important to anticipate and prepare for the challenges we may face in the future as a result of climate change.”⁷

I argue that environmental security from a U.S. perspective is not the way for Guåhan to ensure the health of our environment. As previous chapters have shown, Guåhan is not within the referent object of United States security concerns, but is rather a simultaneously important and disposable tool and means to ensuring the continuation of U.S. national security, which creates our form-of-life here in Guåhan. Our environment has been the one harmed in the name of national security. As Rachel Woodward argues, even U.S. military presence in the island affects the environment. “The vast majority of military activities, whether conflict-related or not, have some sort of impact on the natural environment. Maintaining military forces is itself an act with environmental repercussions. Armed forces demand the use of natural resources, to keep them equipped, supplied, and trained.”⁸ To be clear, I am arguing that the military does not keep Guåhan secure, especially from an environmental perspective, and concurrently, that the dominant paradigm of “environmental security,” is not the best theoretical framework to alleviating this problem.

⁵ Michael Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001).

⁶ “2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Department of Defense, accessed October 2018, <http://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf>, 85.

⁷ Hayes and Buxton, *Secure and the Dispossessed*, 3.

⁸ Rachel Woodward, *Military Geographies* (Malden: Blackwell Publishings, 2004), Loc 1778, Kindle.

The literature on environmental racism and violence becomes more useful in understanding the military's effect on the environment of Guåhan and the entanglement of various colonial forces in using the environment as a tool of sustaining empire. Environmental racism can be defined as "racial discrimination in environmental policy-making and the enforcement of regulations and laws, the deliberate targeting of people of color communities for toxic waste facilities, the official sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in our communities, and the history of excluding people of color from leadership in the environmental movement."⁹ In the United States, this is extremely evident. Researchers at the National Center for Environmental Assessment, in February 2018, reported that people of color are significantly more likely to breathe polluted air. The authors concluded, "results at national, state, and county scales all indicate that non-Whites tend to be burdened disproportionately to Whites."¹⁰

In Guåhan's case, an understanding of environmental racism needs to be linked to the military effects on the environment as I argue both logics (environmental racism and militarization) entangle their operations here. First, for many, military effects on the environment come as a result of war. However, it is important to note that a significant proportion of military contamination, destruction, or alteration of the environment comes from "peacetime" military preparation. As Rachel Woodward argues, "Militarism and military activities in non-conflict situations exert control over space in ways and through means which frequently render this control invisible, exerted by military forces during and following armed conflicts."¹¹ Similarly, Brandon C. Davis argues, "Nearly all aspects of America's condition of permanent war are predicated on

⁹ Carl A. Zimring, *Clean and White: A History of Environmental Racism in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 2.

¹⁰ Vann R. Newkirk II, "Trump's EPA Concludes Environmental Racism Is Real," *The Atlantic*, February 28, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-trump-administration-finds-that-environmental-racism-is-real/554315/>

¹¹ Woodward, *Military Geographies*, Loc 301.

the military's ongoing occupation of public land."¹² Both of these quotes show that in a state of permanent war where "non-conflict situations" are still used to prepare for war, the military will hold onto land for this preparation, and consequently alter the land and environment of the locale.

Militarization and basing themselves have established patterns of environmental effects, culminating in environmental violence, a slow toxicity that manifests itself with the passing of time. As John W. Hamilton writes in the *Stanford Law Journal*, "Too often... however, the mere act of living on or near a military base results in exposure to dangerous toxins that slowly poison military service members, their families, and nearby communities. Pollution at military bases is so widespread and endemic that more than two-thirds of all Superfund sites listed by the EPA—nearly 900 sites in all—are military affiliated."¹³ Furthermore, environmental violence can be seen in two forms: (1) The environmental process of creating the base and (2) The operations of the base once it is established. In articulating these two forms of environmental violence, we see its various manifestations.

This is the peculiarity of Guåhan's position. There is no wave of relief for our environment in regard to militarization. We were not only a war zone in the 1940s, but we have been subject to the effects of war continuously since then. Toxicity is a cancer, literally and metaphorically, and we live in a state of permanent mitigation. In the following sections, I show the extent of environmental contamination on and surrounding the island. In addition, I argue that the environmental contamination of the island has epistemological implications due to the politics of doubt surrounding the inconclusivity of particular accounts of contamination. I begin with an analysis of the geology and geography of Guåhan.

¹² Brandon C. Davis, "Emergency Powers and the Militarization of American Public Lands," in *Proving Grounds: Militarized Landscapes, Weapons Testing, and the Environmental Impact of U.S. Bases* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015), Loc 511, Kindle.

¹³ John W. Hamilton, "Contamination at U.S. Military Bases: Profiles and Responses," *Stanford Environmental Law Journal*, 35, no. 2 (2016): 224.

II. AQUIFERS AND LIMESTONE: GEOLOGY AND GEOGRAPHY OF GUÅHAN

Guåhan's geology is divided into two halves. The northern half of the island is composed of a limestone plateau bordered by steep cliffs, while the southern half of the island is composed of dissected volcanic upland with a discontinuous ridge of mountains paralleling the west coast of the island. The island is split in half via a fault zone between Adelup Point and Pago Bay. This difference in geological formation has substantial impacts for a discussion on environmental contamination. Two of the core physical properties of limestone is its porosity and its permeability. The porosity of a rock refers to the proportion of the rock that is made up of spaces or cracks between the grains, while the permeability of a rock is its ability to allow fluids to "pass from one pore space to another by capillary action or along cracks and fissures."¹⁴ Porosity and permeability are directly connected. The porosity of a rock helps determines the extent to which liquids can permeate and move through the rock. According to the Guam Geological Survey, the northern part of the island is so permeable that there are no permanent streams on the limestone plateau.¹⁵

This permeability becomes a problem because it is in the northern half of the island where one finds the only aquifer in the island: the Northern Guam Lens Aquifer (NGLA). The Northern Guam Lens Aquifer is "the limestone bedrock that underlies the entire northern half of Guam and contains a large and permanent body of fresh groundwater. This body is approximately lens-shaped, being the thickest in the island's interior and thinnest along the island's perimeter."¹⁶ John Jenson, director of the Water Environmental Research Institute of the Western Pacific or WERI, argues that Guåhan has the best aquifer in the world. Speaking before the Rotary Club of Guam, Jenson said, "Guam is fortunate to have a limestone aquifer separating layers of infiltrated

¹⁴ "The movement of water through limestone," British Geological Survey, accessed November 2018, <http://www.bgs.ac.uk/discoveringGeology/geologyOfBritain/limestoneLandscapes/whatIsLimestone/waterMovement.html>

¹⁵ Joshua I. Tracey, Seymour O. Schlanger, John T. Stark, David B. Doan, and Harold G. May, "General Geology of Guam, Geological Survey Professional Paper 403-A," (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964), accessed at <https://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/0403a/report.pdf>

¹⁶ "Digital Atlas of Northern Guam," Water and Environmental Research Institute of the Western Pacific, accessed November 2018, <http://north.hydroguam.net/background-NGLA.php>

rainwater, a natural fresh water lens and a limestone bedrock, which all play a role in maintaining clean water.”¹⁷ He continued, “We have one of the world’s best aquifers in terms of the amount of water that’s available per capita, the ease at which you can get it out and the natural aspects that help keep it clean, you couldn’t have designed a better aquifer, but the things that make it good, make it complex, which makes it interesting.”¹⁸ Nathan Habana, groundwater hydrologist at WERI, discusses this complexity,

The aquifer’s limestone surface is very permeable. Storm waters easily infiltrate, ephemeral runoff move into surface depressions and sinkholes that provide conduits in the bedrock that contribute to much of the fast recharge to the lens...Dissolved chemical species may be carried by storm runoff and infiltrate, drain, percolate, or channel through conduits in the vadose zone and enter the freshwater lens as it is recharged...These vulnerabilities mean development over the aquifer requires careful planning as it expands and increased civic development, especially in managing wastewater and contaminant disposal.¹⁹

This permeability reflects the geology of the aquifer. Contrary to what one may imagine the aquifer looking like, it is not a giant pool of water floating underneath the surface. Rather, the water is held within the porous rocks.

The mere porosity and permeability of the rocks that comprise the aquifer is not the scariest part of this story. Rather, it is the sheer amount of people in Guåhan who depend on the aquifer as a water source. About 80% of the island’s utility water comes from the NGLA. Deep wells penetrate the lens to pump or extract fresh water. The Guam Water Authority has two main types of wells they use to get water from NGLA: vertical production wells and one tunnel well (Tumon Maui well). The remaining 20% of the island’s water comes from one spring reservoir (the Santa Rita Spring), a river water treatment facility (Ugum River) and the Fena Lake Reservoir (which is controlled by the United States Navy).²⁰ The health of the aquifer affects roughly 80% of the

¹⁷ Pacific Daily News, “John Jenson: Guam has world’s best aquifer,” *Pacific Daily News*, April 18, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/money/2018/04/18/jim-jenson-guam-has-worlds-best-aquifer/527234002/>

¹⁸ Gia Righetti, “Guam’s Northern aquifer, One of the world’s best,” *Pacific News Center*, April 20, 2018, <https://pacificnewscenter.com/guams-northern-aquifer-one-of-the-worlds-best/>

¹⁹ Nathan Habana, interview, October 8, 2018.

²⁰ Nathan Habana, interview, October 8, 2018.

island's population, thus making it imperative to consistently monitor the health of the well and control other sources of contamination, of which there are many. Habana also notes, "Another potential source of contaminant is via wastewater disposal, septic tanks, cesspits, or leaky sewer lines. Then there is the illegal dumping of chemicals or spills over the surface that may be transported to the lens through the hydrologic process."²¹ Among the diverse sources of contamination into the aquifer, the military is a major factor that needs to be illuminated. With this understanding of the basic geology and geography of the island complete, the next section outlines the various methods of contamination caused by the military.

III. DRIP, DRIP, POISONOUS DRIP: MILITARY CONTAMINATION

On March 1, 2018, a contractor for the Department of Defense was fined \$100,000 by Guåhan's Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for leaking over 110 gallons of jet fuel and contaminated water in the villages of Harmon and Agaña Heights. The company, NOVA-UCCo was hired by DoD to construct a fuel pipeline from the Sasa Valley fuel farm in the south all the way to Andersen Air Force Base in the north part of the island. Even worse, the leak lasted for five months from May to October 2017 without NOVA ever reporting it to the proper authorities until November 2017. Although originally charged \$350,000 in fines by EPA, NOVA, a part of a company worth \$7 billion, negotiated the price down to a mere \$100,000. In this section, I illuminate more examples of military or military-related neglect in regard to the environment. Rachel Carson famously wrote, "Herbicides and insecticides should be unmasked as biocides: those supposedly precise weapons in the 'war' on pests targeted nothing more precise than life itself."²² In this section, I outline the history and continuing presence of military contamination in Guåhan including herbicides, pesticides, fuel, PCBs, and other dangerous chemicals, and most especially, their attack on Guåhan's life itself.

²¹ Nathan Habana, interview, October 8, 2018.

²² Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 32.

Before moving forward however, it needs to be clear what I am arguing in regard to contamination and its resolution. Contamination tends to be viewed in terms of a binary: pure/contaminated or clean/dirty and that the fix is to make what was once contaminated, clean again. This becomes all too tempting for readers of this dissertation to postulate that my solution is for the United States military to simply clean up what they have contaminated. This, however, is not the solution I propose. Making what was once contaminated, pure or clean again, is definitely not a bad thing, but these “purification” or “remedial” actions taken without changing the very nature of our relationship with the United States does very little. The chapters thus far have detailed the processes by which Guåhan and her people’s form-of-life has been crafted from forced powerlessness, a continuum of violences, and sustainable insecurity. I have demonstrated the entanglement of militarization, unincorporated territory status, and its constitutive effects on Guåhan’s economy and political ontology. Purifying and cleaning up contaminated sites acts as a band aid to a much larger issue: Guåhan’s relationship to and usage by the U.S. military. Colonial, militarized rule can still exist in a world where the military has reversed their past contamination of water and soil. It is simply not enough for the military to argue “Your argument is that we have contaminated the land and water. We have fixed this. Things can go back to normal.” This dissertation is a genealogy of the sustainable insecurity that has become normalized, and I argue that is until we can change the definition of “normal” here in Guåhan that we can more accurately solve problems as a result of our colonization and militarization. With this clarification, I now proceed with a historical analysis of military contamination in the island.

Formerly Used Defense sites, IRP sites, and SuperFund sites: The Politics of Site Choosing

The sites that I discuss in this section are all considered Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS), Installation Restoration Program sites (IRP), or Superfund sites. The Department of Defense is responsible for the cleanup of properties that were formerly owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by the United States and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense

prior to October 1986 as well as active sites. The cleanup program is called the Formerly Used Defense Sites program and the Department of Defense has placed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in charge of carrying out the program on behalf of DoD and the Army. On their website, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers state, “The U.S. Army and DoD are dedicated to protecting human health and the environment by investigating and, if required, cleaning up potential contamination or munitions that may remain on these properties from past DoD activities.”²³ The origin of being granted this responsibility can be traced back to the 1980s.

In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), more commonly known as Superfund, was passed by Congress providing federal authority to directly respond to reports of threatened releases of potentially hazardous substances into the environment. Through taxing chemical and petroleum industries, a trust fund was created to help clean up hazardous waste sites. The act did various things including: (1) Establishing prohibitions and requirements concerning closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites, (2) Providing for liability of persons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at these sites, and (3) Establishing a trust fund to provide for cleanup when no responsible party could be identified.²⁴

In 1986, CERCLA was amended via the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act or SARA. Through this amended act, seven things were changed or added to the original act including increasing the size of the trust fund to \$8.5 billion, increasing state involvement in every phase of the Superfund program, stressing the importance of permanent remedies and innovative treatment technologies in cleaning up hazardous waste sites, as well as providing new enforcement authorities and settlement tools. Most importantly, section 211 of SARA established the Department of Defense Environmental Restoration Program, or DERP, which mandated that the Department of Defense follow the same cleanup regulations that private entities had to follow

²³ “Formerly Used Defense Sites,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineering, accessed November 1028, <https://www.usace.army.mil/missions/environmental/formerly-used-defense-sites/>

²⁴ U.S. Code, Title 42, Chapter 103, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability. Accessed at <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-103>

under CERCLA. Prior to SERA and the establishment of DERP, Superfund did not apply to military installations, rather DoD adopted similar provisions for its own environmental cleanups. As part of the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, cleanup activities at FUDS and active sites come from the environmental restoration accounts while the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) accounts fund cleanup activities at certain closing or realigning installations. DERP is also divided amongst the Installation Restoration Program, which handles contaminants at FUDS or active sites, and the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP), which was established in 2001 to address munitions such as unexploded ordnances. Furthermore, the Air Force administers its program through its Environmental Restoration Branch while the Navy administers theirs through the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. It is important to note that 900 of the 1200 Superfund sites are either “abandoned military sites or facilities that produced materials for the military, were used to landfill military waste, or otherwise supported war efforts.”²⁵

The military uses a specific process when identifying potentially contaminated sites, and that alone is problematic. As U.S. House Representatives of the time, Joel Hefley, Gene Taylor, and Robert Underwood, write in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, “The location of such waste may not be known because, until the 1970s, disposal of contaminated waste and debris was not subject to stringent environmental laws, and DoD did not maintain comprehensive records on its disposal practices.”²⁶ This report indicates a change in the military’s identification process from the 1980s to the 1990s. In the 1980s, the Department of Defense was more meticulous in their identification, actively searching records and maps. When first identifying potentially contaminated sites, the DoD would hire contractors, review archival records and maps, inspect properties, interview individuals, and analyze photographs. However, in the mid-1990s, they

²⁵ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Reducing Environmental Cancer Risk: What We Can Do Now,” April 2010, https://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory/pcp/annualreports/pcp08-09rpt/pcp_report_08-09_508.pdf

²⁶ Government Accountability Office, “Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing with Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam,” *Government Accountability Office*, April 11, 2002. <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-423>, 1.

began to simply rely on referrals from Guåhan's EPA or discovery during construction projects or other activities.

According to the GAO report, "Under the current approach, DoD generally limits its efforts to search for potentially contaminated locations, instead concentrating on cleaning up locations already identified."²⁷ Prior to the shift, the DoD identified 202 potentially contaminated sites. After the shift, the number of additional locations added to the list was only five, four active installations and one formerly used defense site. This shows that there is an uncertainty regarding other potentially contaminated sites, and that it will take further community effort and local government action to identify them. However, the military has their own number of sites they have identified in the island. John J. Jackson, director of the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), which was charged with the responsibility of handling the requirements associated with the rebasing of Marines from Okinawa to Guåhan, in a letter to Associate Professor of Social Work at the University of Guam, Lisa Natividad, writes,

Of the 95 Air Force and Navy IRP sites, 41 have been cleaned up and the actions associated with those sites are complete; 22 sites have had all clean-up actions completed and are awaiting final administrative actions to be finalized before they are declared complete; 16 sites are in a long-term management status; 7 sites are undergoing clean-up; and 9 sites are undergoing feasibility studies or investigation to determine what future actions, if any, or required at those sites.²⁸

This is just a brief glimpse of identified sites, but what this section has shown is that we truly do not know the full extent of contamination here in Guåhan due to the politics of site choosing. I now move to focus on some of the actual identified sites that can be directly traced back to military activities in Guåhan.

²⁷ Government Accountability Office, "Better Communication Needed," 6.

²⁸ John Jackson, "Letter to Lisa Natividad from John Jackson of Joint Guam Program Office," February 8, 2010, 2.

Andersen Air Force Base: Northern Guåhan

I begin this excavation of contamination in the northern part of the island due to the prevalence of contamination and proximity to Guåhan's only aquifer. In the north, one finds Andersen Air Force Base, which, as described in Chapter 1, is primarily a support squadron, but also has one of the largest stores of ammunition amongst Air Force bases. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, there are many hazardous substances at AAFB with sources such as "unlined landfills, drum storage and disposal areas, chemical storage areas, fire training areas, waste storage areas, a laundry, and industrial and flight line operations"²⁹ contributing to the contamination of the land and water there. The Andersen Air Force Base has various components, including the main portion of the base which consists of North Field and Northwest Field, the latter of which is an inactive airfield; and MARBO annex and Harmon Annex, which are detached components. Among these various locations, there are 38 disposal sites where different chemicals were disposed of.

In a GAO report entitled, "DoD Installations in Guam Having Difficulty Complying With Regulations," the authors reiterate, "According to Guam's EPA records, Andersen Air Force Base and the Guam Naval Complex are the major hazardous waste generators in Guam."³⁰ The report documents that between the years 1985-1986, AAFB had a total of 23 violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, which regulates management of hazardous waste. These violations include the following: not taking adequate steps to keep waste from entering the ground in the event of a leak, not storing waste on an impermeable floor, having no raised edges or dikes to contain a spill, and no protection from the weather conditions of the island. At the time of the GAO report, they found that of the nine base maintenance shops and facilities, eight were still discharging pollutants such as antifreeze and cleaning solutions into storm drains or directly on

²⁹ "NPL Site Narrative for Andersen Air Force Base, National Priorities List," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed November 2018, <https://semspub.epa.gov/work/09/2400181.pdf>

³⁰ Government Accountability Office, "DOD Installations in Guam Having Difficulty Complying With Regulations," *Government Accountability Office*, April 1987, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/145441.pdf>, 8.

the ground. When GAO interviewed Andersen Air Force Base officials regarding these violations, their answers were quite shocking. They stated that “the constant turnover of maintenance personnel and the lack of staff to adequately inspect the hazardous waste generators were major causes of the improper handling.”³¹

An ubiquitous chemical found throughout many of these sites is TCE or trichloroethylene, a colorless liquid with a sweet, chloroform-like odor. In 1978, officials at Andersen Air Force Base discovered that the drinking water was contaminated with TCE, and the suspected source was the landfills discussed above. “Tests of samples taken over the years from the 11 Andersen AFB wells revealed that TCE was present at concentration levels that, according to EPA, pose an unacceptable health risk to those who consistently drink the water.”³² One of these wells, located in MARBO (Marianas-Bonin Command) off of the main base in Yigo, indicated concentrations of TCE as high as 29.9 parts per billion, well above the EPA safety guideline. As articulated in the Installation Restoration Program Phase I Records Search for Andersen Air Force Base,

The remaining Marbo wells and the Tumon Maui well have all shown traces of TCE contamination. One possible source of contamination is a historical landfill site which was operated between 1945 and 1962. This landfill was used for disposal of waste dry-cleaning fluids; waste petroleum, oils, and lubricants; and waste degreasing solvents—all possible contaminant sources. Hydrologically, Marbo Wells No. 1 and 2 are directly downgradient of the former disposal site.³³

Toxicity flows and TCE flowed down from the contamination sites to wells further south.

TCE is a solvent and was often used on military bases to degrease and clean mechanical equipment or remove paint and debris. Many planes were washed down with a TCE and water solution and subsequently used at many Air Force bases. In addition, the Air Force also used TCE to clean computer circuit boards in equipment such as tanks and fixed wing aircraft. It has been

³¹ Government Accountability Office, “DOD Installations in Guam.” 21.

³² Government Accountability Office, “Hazardous Waste: Abandoned Disposal Sites May Be Affecting Guam’s Water Supply,” May 1987, <https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-87-88BR>, 2.

³³ Reynolds, Smith and Hills Inc., “Installation Restoration Program Phase I Records Search for Andersen Air Force Base,” March 1985, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a163667.pdf>, 3-17.

identified in soil or groundwater at more than 700 Superfund sites.³⁴ TCE is known for being extremely dangerous to human health, and the EPA has described it as one of the most volatile organic compounds to be regulated in drinking water as well as one of the priorities for regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act.³⁵ TCE is very dangerous due to the ease in which one can be exposed to it. A chemical property of TCE, as a solvent, is its ability to change from a liquid to a gas at normal outdoor and indoor temperatures, and solvents in water can move into the air in homes where the water is being used. For example, heating water contaminated with TCE for cooking or bathing can release the TCE into the air, causing an additional means of exposure.

In a 2013 study in *Environmental Health Perspectives*, researchers concluded that “TCE is carcinogenic to humans by all routes of exposure and poses a potential human health hazard for noncancer toxicity to the central nervous system, kidney, liver, immune system, male reproductive system, and the developing embryo/fetus.”³⁶ In describing its carcinogenicity, the authors find that there is a causal link between TCE and kidney/liver tumors and Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma. Furthermore, the noncancer toxic effects listed above are quite serious. There is strong evidence that TCE causes changes in trigeminal nerve function, nephrotoxicity (toxic kidneys), autoimmune diseases and hypersensitivity disorders, male reproductive toxicity (due to its effect on sperm and hormone levels), and fetal cardiac malformations.³⁷

In the MARBO Annex of Andersen Air Force Base referenced above, Waste Pile 6, Waste Pile 7, and Landfill 29, were all identified as having soil exceeding acceptable risk levels. Waste Pile 7, for example, was an abandoned quarry filled with waste and then covered with soil. Not only was TCE found here, but lead, DDT, and PCEs were also found. Waste Pile 6 was another quarry used as a dump. The site is said to have an area containing six car battery casings, one with

³⁴ Weihsueh A. Chiu, Jennifer Jinot, Cheryl Siegel Scott, et al., “Human Health Effects of Trichloroethylene: Key Findings and Scientific Issues,” *Environmental Health Perspectives*, 121, no. 3 (March 2013): 303.

³⁵ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Trichloroethylene (Interagency Science Consultation Draft), 2009, http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris_drafts/recordisplay.cfm?deid=22536.

³⁶ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Trichloroethylene

³⁷ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Trichloroethylene

nine alkaline radio batteries, one with three unknown batteries, a pile of roofing material, an area containing subsurface metal debris, an area with empty drums in the subsurface, and lastly a drum pile of 108 deteriorated drums of asphalt, which many have leaked into the ground. Contaminants found at the site include metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and lead. Lastly, Landfill 29, also located at MARBO, includes a 2.44 acre landfill that contained municipal waste as well as copper metal debris and deteriorated drums. The site contained antimony and lead.

Antimony is a metal that is used in flameproofing textiles, vulcanizing rubber, manufacturing paint pigments, electronic semiconductors, fireworks, as well as in bullet casings. Antimony, chemically and biologically, resembles arsenic and can affect the heart, gastrointestinal tract, respiratory tract, skin, and liver. It can affect heart beat and blood pressure, irritate mucous membranes, and cause anorexia, diarrhea, and vomiting.³⁸ Similarly, arsenic is another contaminant of concern found in the MARBO area. Arsenic is a naturally occurring element that is found in the Earth's crust, but also found in water, air, food, and soil. Arsenic can be found organically and inorganically, with inorganic arsenic being highly toxic. Inorganic arsenic can be found in soil, sediment, and groundwater, as opposed to organic arsenic, which is found in fish and shellfish. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), arsenic is a confirmed carcinogen with acute and long-term effects. Acute effects include vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, muscle cramping, and even death, while the long-term effects are skin cancer, bladder and lung cancer, diabetes, pulmonary diseases, and cardiovascular disease. Arsenic contamination in groundwater is unfortunately found in many places around the world, with countries like Bangladesh, having roughly around 39 million people being exposed to arsenic above their national standard of exposure.³⁹

³⁸ Safe Drinking Water Committee, *Drinking Water and Health Volume 3* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1980), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK216593/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK216593.pdf

³⁹ "Arsenic," World Health Organization, Accessed November 2018, <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/arsenic>

This is just a selection of contaminants found in Guåhan, and there are those who argue that these contaminants are a source of plaguing medical problems in the island. Guåhan's first Territorial Epidemiologist, Robert Haddock, reported that the incidence of cancer in Guåhan is high and that it may be increasing, particularly cancer of the buccal cavity, liver, gallbladder, and the pancreas.⁴⁰ Lisa Natividad, who works with breast cancer victims and survivors, writes, "Findings reveal that the villages of Yigo and Santa Rita had the highest incidence rates. These two villages have the largest military populations and are home to the island's two largest U.S. military bases."⁴¹ Furthermore, she argues that, "The high manifestation of cancer in these two villages may be related to their close proximity to radiation and toxins such as agent-orange and other contaminants from the military's dumping practices."⁴² This argument for the relationship between Guåhan cancer incidence rates and military contamination suffers from extraneous variables and insufficient proof of causation, leading to a state of inconclusivity and a politics of doubt which I discuss at length later in this chapter.

Dåno' (Cocos Island) and PCBs

The tiny island of Dåno', known today as Cocos Island, is located off the coast of Malesso', the island's most southern village. There are daily ferries to the island, but one could also reach the island via jet ski or by participating in an annual swim competition from the coast of Malesso' to the island. The island is used for two purposes. 2/3 of the island is run as a tourist destination, Cocos Island Resort, where tourists can scuba dive, parasail, or even ride dune buggies. The remaining 1/3 of the island is run by the Department of Parks and Recreation as a wildlife conservation area, since it is free of the brown tree snake, which has decimated most of Guåhan's endemic bird species. Before this current use, the island was used by the U.S. Coast Guard as a

⁴⁰ Robert L. Haddock, Rebecca J Talon, Helen JD Whippy, "Ethnic Disparities in Cancer Mortality Among Residents of Guam," *Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention*, 7, (2006): 411-414.

⁴¹ LisaLinda S. Natividad, "Social Support Use By Chamorro Women on Guam Diagnosed With Breast Cancer," (PhD diss., Capella University, 2007), 54.

⁴² Natividad, "Social Support Use."

Long-Range Navigation Station (LORAN), where the Coast Guard utilized the hyperbolic radio navigation system from 1944-1965.

Around 1965, it was discovered that large concentrations of PCBs were being found in the fish and sediment in and around the island. PCB is an acronym for polychlorinated biphenyl, an organic chlorine compound that is non-flammable, chemically stable, has a high boiling point and electrical insulating properties. It is due to these physical and chemical properties that PCBs were used for electrical, heat transfer, and hydraulic equipment, plasticizers, or as pigments.⁴³ The Coast Guard used PCBs in their electrical equipment such as transformers and capacitors. More particularly, they used electrical transformers at the station to convert the power supplied by diesel generators to run the LORAN equipment necessary for their military operations.⁴⁴

The health effects of PCBs include cancer, and what is most telling for Guåhan, is that according to the EPA,

The types of PCBs that tend to bioaccumulate in fish and other animals and bind to sediments happen to be the most carcinogenic components of PCB mixtures. As a result, people who ingest PCB-contaminated fish or other animal products and contact PCB-contaminated sediment may be exposed to PCB mixtures that are even more toxic than the PCB mixtures contacted by workers and released into the environment.⁴⁵

The primary targets for cancer as a result of the carcinogenicity of PCBs include the liver, gallbladder, and biliary tract. In addition to cancer, PCBs have other adverse health effects such as dermal lesions, reproductive and developmental effects, endocrine effects, and hepatic effects. Regarding reproductive and developmental effects, the Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry cites a Michigan Maternal Infant Cohort Study published in 1984 in which pregnant women who consumed PCB-contaminated fish saw a significant decrease in the gestational age,

⁴³ “Learn about Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” Environmental Protection Agency, accessed October 2018, <https://www.epa.gov/pcbs/learn-about-polychlorinated-biphenyls-pcbs>.

⁴⁴ S. Ian Hartwell, Dennis A. Apeti, Anthony S. Pait, Andrew L. Mason, Char’mane Robinson, “An Analysis of Chemical Contaminants in Sediments and Fish from Cocos Lagoon, Guam,” *NOAA National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science Stressor Detection and Impacts Division*, December 2017.

⁴⁵ “Learn about Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” Environmental Protection Agency

birth weight, and head circumference of their babies. In addition, these children were shown to still be deficit in weight gain, responsiveness, and reduced performance on the visual recognition-memory test. At 11 years of age, these children were three times more likely to have low full-scale verbal IQ scores, more difficulty in paying attention, and twice as likely to lag behind in reading comprehension.⁴⁶

The issue, as seen in the previous examples of contamination, is disposal. According to a report by the National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science, “It is thought that contamination in the lagoon is the result of PCB-contaminated equipment being discarded on the land and in the water, along with the transport of PCBs in runoff from the island as might occur during a heavy rainfall event.”⁴⁷ Anecdotal information from those who served at the LORAN station told researchers that there were multiple occasions in which the debris was taken to a side of the island to be carried away by the next large typhoon or debris was simply buried in dump pits. The former plan for disposal proved quite effective as Typhoon Allyn removed a substantial portion of the Coast Guard machinery in 1949.⁴⁸ From these disposal practices in conjunction with Guåhan’s geographical position in the Pacific’s Typhoon Alley, contamination has become a problem, particularly surrounding the fish near Cocos.

A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) sampling of fish surrounding Cocos Island revealed that PCB levels were in the hundreds of micrograms per kilogram, which is beyond the advisory level for consumption. In 2005, surveys were conducted on Cocos Island by Coast Guard contractors to remove remaining debris and perform a toxicological report of the island. The report indicated elevated levels of PCBs in the soil and in fish in the waters adjacent to Cocos. As Civil Engineering Unit Lieutenant Commander Todd

⁴⁶ “PCB Toxicity,” Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, accessed October 2018, <https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/csem/csem.asp?csem=30&po=10>

⁴⁷ Tony Paitisa, “Studying Contaminants in Cocos Lagoon, Guam,” *National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science*, May 19, 2015, <https://coastalscience.noaa.gov/news/studying-contaminants-in-cocos-lagoon-guam-blog-post-1/>

⁴⁸ Hartwell, “An Analysis of Chemical Contaminants from Cocos Lagoon, Guam.”

Wimmer said to local media, “In 2005, we actually removed 400 cubic yards of soil finding a landfill site on the island which we thought was contributing to polychlorinated biphenyls contamination.”⁴⁹ However, in a 2017 report of contamination, researchers found that there were spikes in the level of PCB contamination in fish. Wimmer said he was surprised at these spikes considering their 2005 cleanup of the island. According to this scientific report, “Nine of the thirteen fish samples or approximately 70% of the fish samples collected from around Cocos Island were also above USEPA recreational SV of 20 ng/g for total PCBs.”⁵⁰ SV or surface value refers to a threshold concentration of concern for a chemical contaminant in fish that may have a critical toxic or carcinogenic effect on humans. This report shows that for recreational fishers, nine of the fish samples exceeded the surface value of 20 nanograms per grams for total PCBs. In tracing this continued source of contamination, the report offers some possible sources: “One possibility is that PCBs are being transported via water from Cocos Island (through surface water runoff or groundwater) and then subsequently taken up by fish. It is also possible that the fish may be accumulating contaminants through the food chain, sediments, or perhaps a combination.”⁵¹

One shocking discovery from this 2017 report was finding DDT contamination amongst these fish as well. Once again, 70% of the fish samples from around the island were above the USEPA subsistence SV for total DDT of 14.4 ng/g. DDT is an acronym for dichlorophenyltrichloroethane, which was once used as a pesticide to control insects like mosquitoes who may carry malaria, typhus, or other insect-borne human diseases. It was also useful for insect control in livestock production as well as home gardens. However, DDT was banned in 1972 due to its potential for environmental damage. According to the EPA, DDT is very persistent in the environment, can travel long distances in the upper atmosphere, and accumulates

⁴⁹ KUAM, “Coast Guard looking into PCB contamination on Cocos Island Lagoon,” *KUAM*, October 6, 2016, <http://www.kuam.com/story/33275549/2016/09/Thursday/coast-guard-looking-into-pcb-contamination-on-cocos-island-lagoon>

⁵⁰ Hartwell, “An Analysis of Chemical Contaminants from Cocos Lagoon, Guam,” 22.

⁵¹ Hartwell, “An Analysis of Chemical Contaminants from Cocos Lagoon, Guam,” 26.

in fatty tissues. These factors account for DDT's concentration in the environment still being present despite it being banned 46 years ago. This contamination "seems to reflect usage and perhaps storage or disposal of DDT on the island. DDT at the LORAN station may have been used specifically to help prevent outbreaks of malaria in USCG personnel, as there have been several outbreaks of malaria on Guam in the past."⁵²

These sources of contamination led to a health advisory, issued in 2006 and still in effect today, warning people to limit or avoid eating fish caught in and around Cocos Lagoon because of contamination. This is problematic for a community such as Malesso', in which many rely on fishing as a source of sustenance. CHamoru fisherman and Malesso' resident John Champaco expressed his frustration at the lack of communication saying, "No one's talking to us about these things. We're still fishing out there. What else can we do? We have to provide for our families."⁵³ Regarding the extent to which Malesso' rely on fishing, Champaco told local media that five to six boats go out each day to fish around the area and during atulai season (a very popular fish in Guåhan cuisine), he and his crew regularly bring in six to seven boatloads of atulai a day. Former mayor of Malesso', Ernest Chargualaf, echoed Champaco's calls for clarification, exclaiming, "We need a toxicologist and other experts to tell us what these latest results mean to our health... There is only a fish consumption advisory, not an order to stop eating fish from the area."⁵⁴ Following this, 87-year old cancer survivor, Bernabe Barcinas, expressed a grim reality saying, "When I was young, I would go out fishing day and night. It's been so long. What can people actually do now—it's too late."⁵⁵ The continued clean-up of Cocos Island is ongoing, yet in the

⁵² Hartwell, "An Analysis of Chemical Contaminants from Cocos Lagoon, Guam," 28.

⁵³ Manny Cruz, "Fishermen lack details on Cocos contamination," *Guam Daily Post*, September 4, 2017, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/fishermen-lack-details-on-cocos-contamination/article_fc143350-8958-11e7-8432-578e250cb6a8.html

⁵⁴ Haidee V Eugenio, "Cocos study draws questions from Merizo residents," *Pacific Daily News*, July 20, 2016, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2016/07/20/cocos-study-draws-questions-merizo-residents/87329946/>

⁵⁵ Eugenio, "Cocos study draws questions from Merizo residents."

meantime, I hope that the fishermen and fisherwomen of Malesso' find solace, and if not that, at least clarification.

Ibanez/Guerrero Properties

In the small, central village of Toto lie the family lands of the Ibanez and Guerrero families. One property, approximately 5 acres, is owned by Vicente Ibanez and his wife and consists of six structures located throughout portions of the property. Domingo B. Guerrero owns the remaining one acre. These sites were known as the "Fifth Field," due to their use by the U.S. 5th Marine Supply Depot. In an interview, Vicente Ibanez said his "property was initially used as a limestone quarry at the conclusion of World War II and then as a landfill when American forces departed Fifth Field at the beginning of the Korean conflict."⁵⁶ The landowners argue that excess military supplies and vehicle parts were dumped into their lands, burned, and then backfilled.

An interview with Mr. Guerrero revealed that his land was the site of "military supply warehouses, a military vehicle baseyard, and a shooting range."⁵⁷ The year after this interview, in 1987, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers identified the site as eligible for mediation actions under DERP-FUDS. In the inventory report, it was reported, "Unidentifiable metal debris and glass ampules of calcium hypochlorite powder were subsequently discovered in a septic tank excavation on the Ibanez property. Various kinds of metal debris including gun oil, containers, ammunition containers, helmets, and gun cartridges were found along with other debris at the Guerrero property."⁵⁸ The ampules of calcium hypochlorite are a bleaching agent to treat water but have adverse health effects including chemical burns as well as irritation to the respiratory tract. Ibanez told local media, "When I was a kid all you have to do is pick it up and throw it and it sparks and there's an odor coming out of it; we don't know also if that's a potential hazard for us or our

⁵⁶ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Final Proposed Plan, Ibanez/Guerrero Properties, Toto, Guam, <http://pacificnewscenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/ibanezguerreroiplan.pdf>, 5.

⁵⁷ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Final Proposed Plan, 5.

⁵⁸ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Final Proposed Plan, 6.

children among this compound.”⁵⁹ In 2009, soil tests were conducted and researchers discovered oil, benzo(a)pyrene, arsenic, lead, mercury, pesticides and PCBs in the surface soil, as well as metals and pesticides in subsurface soil.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineering eventually settled on a remediation plan of excavation and off-site disposal. By this, they were to excavate the top two feet of soil and then backfill the area with clean soil. They wrote that proceeding with this excavation and off-site disposal plan would not destroy but rather transfer contamination to a landfill, and that this was the most realistic option due to low cost. However, this did not satisfy the landowners, and I demonstrate the interesting dynamic between the affected families and the military contractors in charge of the clean-up in an exchange in a KUAM article regarding the Ibanez/Guerrero properties. Linda Ibanez explains, “It takes years to do sample testing, to do all the assessment and tell us you are at risk, you’re a human threat but we can’t do anything yet until funding?”⁶⁰ Replying to this, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers program manager, Helene Takamoto, told local media, “For us to enact and start the debris removal project it has to be qualified as an immediate danger to life and safety because if it’s just buried in the ground that doesn’t really qualify to being an immediate danger to life and safety.” Victoria Leon Guerrero, whose family land is in the property, then argued, “There’s a bad connection between PCBs and pesticides and miscarriages and birth defects and that’s been proven in our family, we’ve lost children living in this property.” Ending the exchange, Takamoto simply retorted, “That’s why we are stepping in taking a responsibility to clean this up—the only other way that you can do that is you turn around and plan to get compensation for any kind of clean up that you’ve done through litigation.”⁶¹ Seven years after

⁵⁹ Nick Delgado, “Former military dump in Toto,” *KUAM*, April 23, 2011, <http://www.kuam.com/story/14495374/2011/04/22/former-military-dump-in-toto>

⁶⁰ Nick Delgado, “Chemicals found at former military dump,” *KUAM*, April 28, 2011, <http://www.kuam.com/story/14529703/2011/04/Thursday/chemicals-found-at-former-military-dump>

⁶¹ Delgado, “Chemicals found at former military dump.”

this exchange, I interviewed Victoria Lola Leon Guerrero and asked her if there was any progress on the cleanup. She unfortunately responded, “No progress.”

The Ambiguity of Cleanup

In this section, I examine the multiple political and economic factors dealing with the cleanup process to demonstrate the intersectionality of these issues. For Guåhan and its treatment by the military, an environmental and scientific analysis and proposed solution alone is not nearly enough. Cleaning up formerly used defense sites is a political process with economic implications and to analyze the contamination problem without addressing these factors is akin to placing a band-aid on an infected wound and calling it a day. The scientific solution may not be in the best interests of the colonial power, and thus, the cost of cleanup outweighs the actual cleanup, leading to a politics of worth for the people of Guåhan. The stench of contamination weighed against the undesirable emptying of the treasury.

In the case of the Ibanez/Guerrero properties, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers chose the most cost-efficient and cheapest option. I argue that that for a Department of Defense who is consistently appropriated billions of dollars per year, that cost-efficiency when it comes to cleaning up FUDS in Guåhan is not an indication of economic decline, but rather is a revelation of our (lack of) importance to the American nation-state. However, I also argue that military cleanup is not a priority of the military’s and that shows how environmental violence, even if not intentional, is a byproduct of military activities. In a 2001 GA report entitled, “Environmental Contamination: Cleanup Actions at Formerly Used Defense Sites,” the authors write, “According to the Corps’ database, 2,382 of these projects were considered complete as of the end of fiscal year 2000. However, over 57% of the projects reported as complete were completed as a result of a study or administrative action without performing any actual cleanup action.”⁶² Additionally, between 1984

⁶² Government Accountability Office, “Environmental Contamination, Cleanup Actions at Formerly Used Defense Sites,” July 2001, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-557>.

and 2000, only 4% of the total expected cost of cleaning up these locations had been funded in Guåhan, as opposed to 16% nationwide.

This is where our islandness and our status as an unincorporated territory comes to the forefront. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineering responded to the statistic above, writing,

Even though contaminated locations in Guam pose risks to human health and the environment that are similar to risks posed by such locations nationally, unfunded projects in Guam have ranked lower when the work is sequenced. When sequencing work, the Corps considers not only a contaminated location's risk but also such factors as opportunities to group projects together, especially in remote areas where logistics are difficult and transportation costs are high, and concerns expressed by affected stakeholders.⁶³

Because of our cartographic and geographical distance to the US government, it simply does not make sense to fund remaining cleanup projects. One can argue that this inaction is not malicious, but rather simply technical and most efficient. I would argue that technicality and efficiency can be tools of violence and that malicious intentions are not the only ones that produce violent results. In his book, *Identify and Sort: How Digital Power Changed World Politics*, Josef Teboho Ansong argues precisely that it is the mask of technicality which the sovereign hides behind to ensure control over its population. Ansong argues regarding technology, "Marked by rationalizing impulses—stemming from proto-scientific capitalist practices—it depoliticizes social and political issues and privileges a centralized, uniform, and standardized sovereign knowledge that marginalizes other habits of thought."⁶⁴ Technology and bureaucracy act as tools of depoliticization, marking what Ian Shaw calls a "rule by nobody."⁶⁵ This technical answer of prioritization of work sites, efficiency, and simply not enough funding all appear to be bureaucratic or technical problems/obstacles, and not a clear demonstration of power and hierarchy. However, a deeper analysis shows how these facts are the byproduct of a colonial relationship. The military

⁶³ Government Accountability Office, "Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed," 3.

⁶⁴ Josef Teboho Ansong, *Identify & Sort: How Digital Power Changed World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 107.

⁶⁵ Ian G.R. Shaw, *Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).

is responsible for cleaning up these sites, and yet, due to the “efficiency” argument, is foregoing this responsibility. However, I argue that this efficiency argument masks the larger picture here: a colonial picture. Quite simply, they do not clean these sites because they do not have to. It is environmental racism and colonialism alive and well, shape-shifted to a mask of “efficiency.”

There is also a direct connection between remediation efforts and rampant land dispossession. In the reports of site remediation in Guåhan, a common phrase one will find is “Access to _____ is restricted; therefore, past, current, and future exposures to the general public are not expected.” For example, in an analysis of contaminated sites in Andersen Air Force Base regarding Landfill No. 6, the evaluation of public health hazards in the soil section reads, “Access to LF-6 is restricted; therefore, past, current, and future exposures to the general public are not expected.” This is the case for other sites such as Landfill Nos. 8, 12, 13, and 14. The logic is violently twisted. DoD argues they do not need to remediate sites in the island because public access is not expected. This is heavily compounded with a majority of the population of the island not being able to walk on the sites of contaminated soil. Land dispossession, in the end, helps bear some responsibilities of remediation due to multiplied restrictions.

IV. MANUFACTURING DOUBT AND BUREAUCRATIC POWERLESSNESS: AGENT ORANGE IN GUÅHAN?

As I write this in November of 2018, it would have only been three weeks since the passing of Leroy Foster, a retired Air Force veteran, who spent a majority of his life urging Congress to recognize that Agent Orange was sprayed in Guåhan. During the Vietnam War, Foster was stationed in Guåhan and reported that he sprayed tens of thousands of gallons of Agent Orange in and around the base and along fuel lines running across the island. Throughout his life after being stationed in Guåhan, he was diagnosed with five types of cancer along with a tragic twenty-eight autoimmune diseases which he attributed to the Agent Orange he sprayed in the island. The reader may feel sorry for Foster, and simply ask what the federal government did in response to

compensate him for this exposure. This is where the problem lies. The Federal Government denies ever spraying Agent Orange in the island, and this has led to an unfortunate and interesting predicament of “he said, they said,” because there are multiple veterans of the U.S. military who admit to spraying Agent Orange in the island, despite the official DoD narrative. In this section, I examine the official DoD denial and the testimonies of veterans who admit to spraying Agent Orange during their stationing in Guåhan. Following this analysis, I turn to the politics of doubt and unincorporated powerlessness as a byproduct of colonialism and militarism in Guåhan, and demonstrate how this leaves Guåhan in environmental uncertainty which in turns heavily contributes to sustainable insecurity.

Agent Orange is a dioxin herbicide mixture, in the same family as Agent Purple, making up the family nomenclature of “rainbow herbicides.” It was primarily sprayed from 1962 to 1971 during the Vietnam War to remove vegetation that was providing cover to the Vietcong forces. With Vietnam as the primary battleground, it was also sprayed near its borders with Laos and Cambodia. Agent Orange is composed of two different chemical components: 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid that together comprise the herbicide. Agent Orange is extremely toxic and is linked to various diseases and health conditions such as cancer, including chronic b-cell leukemias, Hodgkin’s lymphoma, multiple myeloma, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, prostate cancer, respiratory cancers, and soft tissue sarcomas. Beyond cancer, it is linked to amyloidosis, ischemic heart disease, Parkinson’s disease, peripheral neuropathy, and porphyria cutanea tarda.⁶⁶

More than ten years after the war, the Federal government realized the adverse health effects due to exposure to Agent Orange and passed the Agent Orange Act of 1991, where veterans who served anywhere in Vietnam between January 9, 1962 and May 7, 1971 are presumed to have been exposed to herbicides such as Agent Orange. As a result of the law, these veterans were made

⁶⁶ “10 things every Veteran should know about Agent Orange,” U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, accessed October 2018, <https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/17744/10-things-every-veteran-know-agent-orange/>.

eligible for compensation if they fit this criterion and were suffering from the various diseases listed above. Furthermore, the Office of Veterans' Affairs realized that there were birth defects associated with a parents' exposure to Agent Orange such as Spina Bifida, and thus a veteran parent who conceived a child after they entered Vietnam was eligible to file for benefits to help support their child.⁶⁷ Nowhere is Guåhan covered under this act, despite a significant number of veterans coming out to tell their stories of spraying the herbicide in the island.

I now turn to the testimonies of these various veterans. Leroy Foster, the outspoken advocate of allowing veterans who served in Guåhan during this period to be covered under Agent Orange exposure contamination legislation, served in the Air Force and was stationed in the island during the Vietnam War. In his testimony to the Office of Veterans' Affairs, he describes how he prepared, mixed, and sprayed Agent Orange and Agent Blue herbicide in Guåhan between 1969-1971. He was assigned to the 43rd Supply Squadron Fuels Division and was tasked with controlling vegetation overgrowth. Foster writes, "I often would have to spray entire pipe lines, hydrant pump stations on the flight line, the Quonset huts storing the packaged oil for the B52 bombers, the fuel valve pits, the security fences surrounding the flight line, the fuel storage facilities...Tumon Tank farm, and the entire Cross country pipeline."⁶⁸ Furthermore, he testifies, "I mixed diesel fuel with Agent Orange then I sprayed it by truck all over the base to kill the jungle overgrowth. None of the older service members wanted to do the work so because I was the low man on the totem pole, it was left to me."⁶⁹

Ralph Stanton, a fellow Air Force veteran, also submitted testimony to the Office of Veterans' Affairs supporting LeRoy Foster's testimony. Stanton served in the 43rd CES Fuels Maintenance Station. He wrote how he crossed paths with Foster often and would see him spray

⁶⁷ "10 things every Veteran should know about Agent Orange," U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs

⁶⁸ Leroy Foster, "Testimony," *Guam Daily Post*, September 14, 2009, https://www.postguam.com/leroy-foster-testimony/pdf_b9eb538a-fccd-11e7-9688-d7c38c23ac79.html.

⁶⁹ Jon Mitchell, "Poisons in the Pacific: Guam, Okinawa, and Agent Orange," *The Japan Times*, August 7, 2012, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2012/08/07/issues/poisons-in-the-pacific-guam-okinawa-and-agent-orange/#.XDMGuM8zZE6>.

the herbicides frequently. So frequently, in fact, that Stanton described being incredibly bothered by seeing Foster around. “The spray made me sick at my stomach, so I hated to see him coming our way. My words are still stuck in my mind after all this time, Here Comes That Little Bastard Spraying Again.”⁷⁰ Foster developed boils all over his body just days after starting this assignment, and later was afflicted with Parkinson’s disease and ischemic heart disease. Unfortunately, Foster’s daughter developed cancer as a teenager and his grandchild was born with 12 fingers, 12 toes, and a heart murmur.⁷¹ Next is the testimony of Edward Jackson, a sergeant with the 43rd Transportation Squadron who served in Guåhan in the 1970s. He writes, “Andersen Air Force Base had a huge stockpile of Agent Orange and other herbicides. There were many, many thousands of drums. I used to make trips with them to the navy base for shipment by sea.”⁷² Regarding disposal, Jackson writes, “I would back my truck up a small cliff that sloped away towards the Pacific Ocean. I personally threw away about 25 drums. Each individual drum was anywhere from almost empty to almost full.”⁷³

Collectively, these testimonies have helped respark the Government of Guam’s interest in settling the truth of whether or not Agent Orange was sprayed in the island. To this end, a task force was led by then Senator Fernando Esteves, vice-chairman of the Committee on Health, was convened to “review and record reports from the community” on the use of PCB, DDT, and Agent Orange in Guåhan. Esteves describes the task force’s work as analyzing these records, reports, and research data and correlating them with the congenital health problems that are prevalent in the island.⁷⁴ In addition to the local task force, Guåhan’s former delegate to the US Congress,

⁷⁰ Ralph A. Stanton, “Testimony,” *Guam Daily Post*, September 14, 2009, <https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/postguam.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/c/06/c06343d0-fccd-11e7-85ff-97a70ccc4c78/5a616e246ae0b.pdf.pdf>

⁷¹ Mitchell, “Poisons in the Pacific.”

⁷² Mitchell, “Poisons in the Pacific.”

⁷³ Mitchell, “Poisons in the Pacific.”

⁷⁴ Kyla P Mora, “Task force will investigate reports of Agent Orange use on Guam,” *Pacific Daily News*, January 10, 2017, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2017/01/10/task-force-investigate-agent-orange-use-guam/96381364/>

Madeleine Bordallo, wrote a letter to the Government Accountability Office asking them to review all the documentation related to the handling and transporting of Agent Orange in order to hold DoD accountable.⁷⁵

At the time, former Governor of Guåhan Eddie Baza Calvo issued a directive to Guåhan's EPA to conduct an analysis on soil samples. AECOM, a private contractor selected by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Marianas, was tasked to develop the quality assurance procedures, and they were the ones who performed the soil sampling. The samples were collected from April 23-26th of 2018 and were taken from "areas surrounding former fuel pipelines, airfield perimeter fence lines, and a fenceline surrounding the aboveground storage tanks within Andersen Air Force in Yigo."⁷⁶ It is important to note that no other locations were chosen for soil samples. Procedurally, it was agreed that the two laboratories were to test the soil samples separately, and the results differed. AECOM's lab, the military contractor, found no traces of Agent Orange, while the EPA lab found traces of Agent Orange, albeit at a non-toxic level. Ultimately, these tests were deemed "inconclusive."

Former Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo then requested that the Government Accountability Office investigate the issue of Agent Orange in the island. However, this became a very controversial issue due to the GAO indicating that it would not conduct any of its own testing but would use the samples collected by the two agencies. Fortunately, however, the U.S. EPA and Guåhan EPA agreed to conduct tests for AO presence at non-military sites across Guåhan. Bordallo argues, "The EPA should always have tested for Agent Orange island-wide and not just on military installations. I am encouraged that they will examine off-base and non-military sites

⁷⁵ Guam Daily Post, "Bordallo seeks GAO review of Agent Orange on Guam," *Guam Daily Post*, April 9, 2017, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/bordallo-seeks-gao-review-of-agent-orange-on-guam/article_f6ca5c62-1b7b-11e7-bae5-3b6de9f8909b.html

⁷⁶ Haidee V. Eugenio, "Guam awaits Agent Orange soil testing results," *Pacific Daily News*, June 25, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/06/25/guam-awaits-agent-orange-soil-testing-results/729729002/>

for potential traces of Agent Orange.”⁷⁷ On November 15, 2018, the results of the GAO were released and once again, the people of Guåhan were left in a state of inconclusivity. According to the report, which examined shipping logs of Agent Orange to see if vessels carrying Agent Orange stopped in Guåhan, “While the logbooks GAO reviewed identify when vessels left various ports as they traveled to and from Vietnam, they do not show whether and how much cargo was loaded or unloaded at those ports.”⁷⁸ Furthermore, they report that, “Without a reliable list with complete and accurate information and a formal process for DoD and the VA to coordinate on communicating this information, veterans and the public do not have quality information about the full extent of locations where Agent Orange was present and where exposure could potentially have occurred.”⁷⁹

I return to the counternarrative of the veterans, who argue that the testing procedures are inherently flawed. John Wells, an attorney for the group, Military Veterans Advocacy, articulates two problems with the testing. The first is that the initial soil samples were only taken from one site which may have already been remediated, and the second is that the passage of time makes it more difficult to see traces of the herbicide. Wells suggests that the Guåhan EPA invite veterans who either sprayed or witnessed the spraying of the herbicide to physically identify the locations of these sprayings. Moyer writes to Madeleine Bordallo, “We hope your office can assist us so we can get the justice we all so richly deserve for all the Chamoru/Guamanian population and the veterans who served on Guam and have disease rates that are parallel to those ‘Boots on the Ground’ Vietnam veterans.”⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Haidee V. Eugenio, “Veterans offer to help find samples for Agent Orange testing,” *Pacific Daily News*, July 25, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/07/25/veterans-offer-help-find-samples-agent-orange-testing/831100002/>

⁷⁸ Government Accountability Office, “Agent Orange: Actions Needed to Improve Accuracy and Communication of Information on Testing and Storage Locations,” November 15, 2018, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-24>

⁷⁹ Government Accountability Office, “Agent Orange.”

⁸⁰ Eugenio, “Veterans offer to help find samples for Agent Orange testing,”

Testing sites are not the only problem, but also the chemical properties of Agent Orange. The n-butyl which forms both the 2,4-D and the 2,4,5-T components of Agent Orange break down rapidly into acid forms, and the acid forms' half-lives can range from several days to many months. Also, after Agent Orange is sprayed, it can be washed out by rain, degraded by sunlight, or turned into a vapor.⁸¹ Lastly, the carcinogenic component of Agent Orange can also come from the burning of materials such as wood or waste thus possibly confounding results that Agent Orange was sprayed in the island. These scientific factors make it very difficult for conclusive results to be produced or for this question to ever be settled. The Agent Orange issue is one filled with doubt, ambiguity, narrative/counternarratives, and it is not only the veterans, but also the people of the island who have to live within the liminal zone of "Did they or did they not?" An uncertainty that if never answered, will lead to business as usual: potentially toxic.

Doubt and Power: More Than Five-Letter Words

This predicament Guåhan is placed in, "Did they or did they not?" is not unique in any way to the island, and the manufacturing of doubt has been exposed as a common tool by governments and corporations in shielding past actions. Through doubt, government regulation or disciplinary action against a corporation can be thwarted. Doubt becomes the product of these corporations. In their book, *Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming*, Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway describe the weaponization of doubt to keep controversy alive.⁸² By this, they refer to corporate and at times, state interests to never settle the science of an issue. Through the production of doubt, or as we saw in the Agent Orange example, the permanent inconclusivity of an issue, an obstacle to the implementation of major change and redress is presented. They dub this the "Tobacco Strategy,"

⁸¹ Government Accountability Office, "Agent Orange," 46.

⁸² Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, *Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010).

and trace it back to the deliberate attempts by some scientists to keep cigarettes safe from indisputable medical evidence that would hinder sales.

In the 1970s, cigarettes were under public scrutiny for their correlation with various diseases such as cancer and heart disease. In May 1979, a group of tobacco executives gathered in a room and discussed a new program in which biomedical funding would be given to various universities to study degenerative diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. When asked why tobacco money was being used to fund these various research projects, the lead scientist told the group of tobacco executives, to develop “an extensive body of scientifically, well-grounded data useful in defending the industry against attacks.”⁸³ Oreskes and Conway describe this goal as “to fight science against science—or at least with the gaps and uncertainties in existing science, and with scientific research that could be used to deflect attention from the main event. Like the magician who waves his right hand to distract attention from what he is doing with this left, the tobacco industry would fund distracting research.”⁸⁴

One particular example of the Tobacco Strategy in Guåhan is the article, “The Agents Orange and Purple Controversy on the Island of Guam,” by Alvin L. Young and Kristian L. Young. In the article, the Youngs argue “from the submitted documentation, all identified historical records and studies by the United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and Environmental Protection Agency is that no plausible scenarios of exposure to Agents Orange or Purple occurred at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.”⁸⁵ To provide evidence for their conclusion, they quote military documents such as a letter from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense to Congressman Lane Evans, where they argue, “The presence of dioxin contamination at a site does not necessarily indicate Herbicide Orange was used or stored at that site, i.e. the dioxins at

⁸³ William D. Hobbs to J. Paul Sticht, BN: 504480340, Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, May 1979,

⁸⁴ Naomi Oreskes, *Merchants of Doubt*, 13.

⁸⁵ Alvin L. Young and Kristian L. Young, “The Agents Orange and Purple Controversy on the Island of Guam,” *Environmental Pollution and Protection*, 2, no. 3 (September 2017):110.

sites referenced in the Public Health Assessment were associated with burning material.”⁸⁶ The Youngs argue that it is highly implausible that Agents Orange and Purple were used in Guam as there are multiple alternative explanations for veteran testimonies.

What makes this more fitting in the Tobacco Strategy is another core investigative journalism tool: researching the authors of articles. Alvin Young is referred to as Dr. Orange, due to his long work with Agent Orange cases as a purported expert on herbicides. According to ProPublica, a Pulitzer-prize winning investigative journalism nonprofit, Young has helped to shape the opinion of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs regarding how to treat cases of Agent Orange exposure made by veterans. Young is ardently of the opinion that few veterans were exposed to Agent Orange and that those that were, were only exposed to small doses, and thus were not harmed. “Some vets, he wrote in a 2011 email, were simply freeloaders, making up ailments to cash in on the VA’s compensation system.”⁸⁷ In Young’s 2006 article, “The Agent Orange Fiasco,” he and his co-author write, “Many lessons can be learned from the history of the Agent Orange panic. One is that when a government offers presumptive compensation for diseases (as by the Agent Orange Act of 1991), many persons will show up to collect. Some will not even have any disease.”⁸⁸ Commenting on Young’s long history of denial, Linda Birnbaum, director of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, said, “Most of the stuff he talks about is in no way accurate. He’s been paid a hell of a lot of money by the VA over the years, and I think they don’t want to admit that maybe he isn’t the end all and be all.”⁸⁹

It is not in the scope of this dissertation nor in my expertise to scientifically solve this issue once and for all. Rather, as a political scientist interested in security, power, and violence, I find

⁸⁶ P.W. Grone, Letter from the Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to Congressman Lane Evans, RE: No records on Guam, Summary of 28 locations on the use of Vietnam-era herbicides, September 23, 2003.

⁸⁷ Charles Ornstein, ProPublica, and Mike Hixenbaugh, “Dr. Orange: The Secret Nemesis of Sick Vets,” *ProPublica*, October 26, 2016, <https://www.propublica.org/article/alvin-young-agent-orange-va-military-benefits>

⁸⁸ Michael Newton and Alvin Young, “The Agent Orange Fiasco,” *AEI*, April 1, 2006, <https://www.aei.org/publication/the-agent-orange-fiasco/>

⁸⁹ Ornstein, “Dr. Orange: The Secret Nemesis of Sick Vets.”

the cloud of doubt surrounding the Agent Orange issue in Guåhan as demonstrative of the political process at work. More particularly, the mechanisms of the political process made thousands of miles away from Guåhan directly affect us and our ability to clearly move forward in planning the future of our environment. Not solving the Agent Orange issue is leaving a large part of our environmental story up in the air. How, for example, would an Independent Guåhan plan its environmental policies with the issue of whether or not Agent Orange is still afflicting us, left to linger as mere smoke in the clouds of doubt? To end this section on the production of doubt and the entanglement of power with science, I turn to a quote by Bruno Latour, who wrote, “If geologists themselves, rather serious and solid types, see humanity as a force of the same amplitude as volcanoes or even of plate tectonics, one thing is now certain; we have no hope whatsoever—no more hope in the future than we had in the past—of seeing a definitive distinction between Science and Politics.”⁹⁰ The politics of doubt creates a violence of epistemology sustaining insecurity from being whole-heartedly challenged.

V. CARCERAL CONSERVATIONISM: WILDLIFE REFUGES AND FALSE STEWARDSHIP

In the northern part of the island lies one of the three annexes of the Guam National Wildlife Refuge run by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service: The Ritidian Unit. It was established in 1993 and encompasses 1,217 acres, including 385 terrestrial acres and 832 acres of submerged areas offshore. When it was established, it was meant to protect three endangered species: the Mariana fruit bat, the Micronesian Kingfisher, and the Mariana Crow. On the surface, this appears to be a good thing, a positive environmental effect. The wildlife refuge provides a place for these species to recover in numbers and hopefully be introduced at a healthy population back into the island. Yet, wildlife refuges have an uneasy relationship with indigenous peoples and as I argue, can be seen in the case of Guåhan, this relationship is heavily entangled with the U.S. military

⁹⁰ Bruno Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns* (Cambridge :Harvard University Press, 2013), 9.

presence in the island. In this section, I articulate the processes of “military environmentalism” and “greenwashing” operating in the island.

Military environmentalism refers to the “greenwashing” of the American military. The contention and seemingly paradox of military environmentalism can be traced back to a quote by military historian John Keegan who wrote, “War is wholly unlike diplomacy or politics because it must be fought by men whose values and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it...The culture of the warrior can never be that of civilization itself.”⁹¹ The “greenwashing” of the American military has been seen as a move away from analyses like Keegan’s. The essential component of greenwashing and military environmentalism is the argument that military activities are compatible with environmental goals such as conservation. In its most extreme version, “ecological militarization points not just to the compatibility of militarism and conservation, but claims that conservation successes could only be accomplished thanks to the exclusionary policies of military activity.”⁹²

Similarly, an article in *Bioscience*, reports that “The densities of ESA status species and imperiled species are at least three times higher on military lands...These findings highlight the continued importance of public lands for the survival of America’s plant and animal species.”⁹³ Before moving forward, it is important to note that the previous statement is not entirely untrue. The exclusionary policy of military activity has produced a side effect of particular species being conserved and can lead to biodiversity. For example, the Korean Demilitarized zone is home to 3,514 species, equaling roughly 67% of the total species of the Korean peninsula. 50% of the total

⁹¹ John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1993), xvi.

⁹² David G. Havlick, *Bombs Away: Militarization, Conservation, and Ecological Restoration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 116.

⁹³ Bruce A. Stein, Cameron Scott, and Nancy Benton, “Federal Lands and Endangered Species: The role of military and other federal lands in sustaining biodiversity,” *Bioscience*, 54, no. 4 (April 2008): 339-347.

population of the White-Naped Crane, which is one of the most endangered birds in the world, also thrives in the DMZ.

However, before celebrating the success of military environmentalism and conservation, it is mandatory to examine why this is the case. Quite simply, the answer is lack of access. Conservation is only effective because humans are not allowed in. In an article entitled, “The effects of modern war and military activities on biodiversity and the environment,” the authors describe how the Marshall Islands, subject to nuclear testing, has a recovering reef with some species of coral thriving. Postulating the reason for this, they write, “Because of the area having large degrees of residual radioactivity, human exclusion from many of the test site islands has generated a marine protected area of sorts alleviating anthropogenic stress.”⁹⁴ This demonstrates that the connection between wildlife refuges and militarization is traced back to the Patrick Wolfe argument that territoriality (land) is the driving force of colonialism. Peter Harris articulates this writing, “I argue that military environmentalism has the effect—likely intentional—of securing the Pentagon’s long term access to island bases.”⁹⁵

Harris makes the point that we need to be more critical of conservation and wildlife initiatives initiated by the federal government in areas they deem as “strategically important.” Harris argues that these initiatives are public-relations friendly ways to actually ensure future access to these areas in case they deem it necessary for “security purposes.” The core of his argument lies in the impossibility of reconciling the two objectives of military access and environmental protection. He argues, “Environmental regimes premised upon military custodianship of the natural environment are unsustainable because they are entirely dependent upon the continued acquiescence of a military establishment whose objective is to fight and win

⁹⁴ Michael J. Lawrence, Holly L.J. Stemberger, Aaron J. Zolderdo, Daniel P. Struthers, and Steven J. Cooke, “The effects of modern war activities on biodiversity and the environment,” *Environmental Reviews*, 23, no.4 (2015): 447.

⁹⁵ Peter Harris, “Environmental protection as international security: Conserving the Pentagon’s island bases in the Asia-Pacific,” *International Journal*, 69, no. 3 (2014): 378.

wars, not protect the environment.”⁹⁶ I agree with Harris’ analysis that these two objectives are irreconcilable. Connecting it directly to the situation in Guåhan, Harris writes, “Quite simply, overlay land can be reclaimed for military use whenever the DoD chooses. This would not be the case if, for example, all federally controlled areas of Guam were transferred to local Guamanian jurisdiction. Military stewardship of the natural environment is thus a convenient measure to ensure the Pentagon’s access to Guam in perpetuity.”⁹⁷

Laurel Mei-Singh terms this method of control “carceral conservationism,” which she defines as “the territorial compromise between grassroots efforts for environmental self-determination and state imperatives to control land and natural resources.”⁹⁸ With Harris’s justification of military creation of wildlife refuges, the picture becomes clear that the carceral aspect of conservationism is in keeping indigenous peoples (in our case, CHamorus) out of land they may need to use in the future. From a Gramscian perspective, the hegemony of conservation is in its benign face. It becomes extremely difficult to argue against federal control of wildlife refuges because to do so makes one seem “anti-conservation.” On a discursive level, wildlife refuges become a sufficient target for a Lakoffian framing analysis. Linguist George Lakoff argues the importance of framing in politics. He gives the example of “tax relief.” Conservatives utilize this frame of “tax relief” to make taxes appear as a burden or at worse, a disease. Lakoff argues that invoking the frame and saying one is against “tax relief” makes it seem as if one is opposed to helping lift a burden.⁹⁹ Lakoff encourages us to change the frame, not negate the frame. In a similar fashion, the creation of the “conservation” frame makes resistance more difficult.

From an environmental perspective, however, the latest fight over the military buildup in the island reveals how the “conservation” aspect of the wildlife refuge is expendable in the name

⁹⁶ Harris, “Environmental protection as international security,” 392.

⁹⁷ Harris, “Environmental protection as international security,” 387.

⁹⁸ Laurel Mei-Singh, “Carceral Conservationism: Contested Landscapes and Technologies of Dispossession at Ka‘ena Point, Hawai‘i, *American Quarterly*, 68, no. 3(September 2016): 696

⁹⁹ George Lakoff, *Don’t Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate—The Essential Guide for Progressives* (White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2001).

of military interests and “national security.” With the revised plans for the buildup outlined in the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS), the Ritidian Unit of the Guam Wildlife Refuge is set to be affected. To quote at length the effects of the Live Fire Range Training Complex (LFTRC) on terrestrial biological resources,

The primary impact from these projects would be the potential loss of native inhabitant and the increased potential for the spread of invasive species. All five resource areas would be significantly impacted by the direct and indirect impacts of the LFTRC and cantonment combinations, except there would be a less than significant impact on native vegetation for all combinations. The adverse impacts would occur during construction and operations phases. Most of the projects require ground disturbance, and the assumption is that terrestrial biological resources would be affected. The terrestrial biological resource health on Guam would continue to decline and threatened and endangered species would continue to be vulnerable to natural and anthropogenic stressors.¹⁰⁰

In the SEIS, with the LFTRC being located at Northwest Field, the Department of the Navy writes that parts of the wildlife refuge would be disturbed because of surface danger zones and development of land. Constructing this live fire range training complex at Northwest Field would have the following effects: significant impact to vegetation due to the conversion of 219 acres of limestone forest to developed area, conversion of 298 acres of Overlay Refuge lands to developed area, impacts to 215 acres of Mariana fruit bat recovery habitat, 215 acres of Mariana crow recovery habitat, and lastly, 215 acres of Guam Micronesian kingfisher recovery habitat.

The military plans outlined in the SEIS here show the truth behind Harris’ argument. This land was taken and touted as a refuge for endangered species, limestone forests, and particular species of tree. However, as soon as the military prepares for missions to “protect” national security, the conservation objective gets subjugated to the periphery demonstrating that the long-term goal of genuine security and conservation will never come first. So, when scholars such as anthropologist Lisa Meierotto write, “Militarization and conservation may have different motives,

¹⁰⁰ Joint Guam Program Office. 2014. *Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Relocation (2012 Roadmap Adjustments)*. Prepared by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific. Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 38.

but they both aim to protect the nation and its resources,” places like Guåhan dig the grave of her argument and throw it six feet deep. She is half right in that the military does aim to protect the nation’s resources, but in our case we have two complications: first, our place within the American nation-state and second, the securitization of protection of the “nation’s” resources usually means the destruction of Guåhan’s environment to secure U.S. national resources. Former Guåhan Senator, Fernando Esteves, describes the scenario in Guåhan well regarding “military environmentalism,” saying

The military has come off as environmentally friendly but consider green ammo. It was supposed to be environmentally friendly, but it was carcinogenic. They knew for years, for like four years, but they only stopped using it when they ran out of stock. It’s going to come out that you are being anti-patriotic; anti-military, but it’s not that. Justice is justice. Justice sought against our own should be fought just as hard because there is something bigger at stake.¹⁰¹

Mitigation and False Stewardship: The More Subtle Performance of Death

And to here we return. The subtle performance of death, the horseman of the apocalypse in slow violence’s name: mitigation. In this subsection, I analyze the mitigation efforts included in the SEIS by the Department of the Defense to “mitigate” the effects to their conservation effort. Put differently, I analyze the ways they have tried to justify their disregard for their military environmentalism. I also examine the discourse of “partnership” utilized by the military to keep up the appearance of environmentalism. I argue that the military invokes a “partnership” in order to mask the serious power hierarchy exercised in these military activity decisions.

In the SEIS, to mitigate the conversion of 780 acres of limestone forest, they outline their plan to enhance another 780 acres located elsewhere. Regarding the conservation of the animals in the wildlife refuge, the Navy agreed to designate approximately 5,234 acres under the custody and control of the DoD to a “status that will provide durable habitat protection needed to support

¹⁰¹ Fernando Esteves, interview, November 21, 2018.

native habitat restoration and land management for the survival and recovery of the kingfisher.”¹⁰² A critical analysis of this potential mitigation leads one to be skeptical. Placing the habitat under the custody and control of the DoD is handing control to an entity whose primary objective in Guåhan is to maintain military preparedness. As is evident in this dissertation thus far, national security becomes the epistemological baseline for all military activities, and the conservation of an endangered species is not the highest on a national security priority list, unless the species’ decimation would incite public outrage causing a potential threat to the smooth functioning of national security. However, even at that, protest does not stop the war machine. As Guåhan senator Sabina Perez said in an interview, “Mitigation is a farce. It is not an equal and fair process. If you are not allowed in the decision making. A lot of these environmental laws privilege the federal projects because it says they will consider, not necessarily avoid the impacts. They can still go forward with the project. The federal government has an upper hand.”¹⁰³ Continuing, she says, “The whole cumulative mitigations have led us to this point where our environment is damaged. It is a constant degradation of our land because they aren’t really protecting, they’re destroying and then compensating us for something less than what they destroyed.”¹⁰⁴

To get a glimpse of the biodiversity argument, the same section of the SEIS argues that, “The Department of the Navy (DON) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) recognize the designation of the 5,234 acres may also provide a conservation benefit to other ESA-listed species with similar habitat requirements (e.g. Mariana Crow, Mariana Fruit Bat).”¹⁰⁵ In building cantonment facilities for the new troops, “there would be a loss of 765 acres of occupied moth skink and Pacific slender-toed gecko habitat.”¹⁰⁶ To lessen this, the military argues that the mitigation they are planning for vegetation will also benefit the moth skink and Pacific slender-

¹⁰² Final SEIS, 26.

¹⁰³ Sabina Perez, interview, November 30, 2018.

¹⁰⁴ Perez, interview.

¹⁰⁵ Final SEIS, 26.

¹⁰⁶ Final SEIS., 61.

toed gecko, and that no additional mitigation is needed beyond this. To alleviate the effects of family housing activities on terrestrial conservation areas, the only potential mitigation is fencing the area, educational signage, monitoring of visitor use, and educational materials regarding sensitive biological resources.

I now turn to a presentation given by Lisa Fiedler named “DoD Environmental Stewardship in the Marianas: Now and in the Future,” in which DoD representatives display their history and plans for military environmentalism to its fullest extent. To begin the presentation, Fiedler argues that DoD is a sound steward of the environment and that the Navy has an impressive track record of stewardship, thus the military buildup will produce the same benefits. The first project described was the Cycad collaboration with the University of Guam (UOG), in which DoD and UOG helped eliminate some of the pests harming the cycad trees in the island. The presentation then goes on to show the military’s investment in helping to fight erosion of lands on their federal footprint as well as the planting of acacia trees to produce a shade to stop wildfires. At the end of this presentation, Fiedler proclaims that the results of their environmental work will benefit everyone, not just DoD. This leads to the following discussion on the military’s attempt at displaying themselves as being in partnership with Guåhan in the protection of the environment.¹⁰⁷

Despite the SEIS showing the contradictions between military activities and contradictions, the military has tried to maintain the appearance of environmental stewards. They have done this primarily through the invocation of a “partnership” discourse relationship and the “One Guam” approach. The “One Guam” and the subsequent “Green Guam” approach was first proclaimed by Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work during a visit to Guam on January 20, 2011. In his statement, Work fully describes the “mitigation” mission at the heart of the Department of Defense-Guåhan colonial and hierarchical relationship. He writes on the “One Guam” approach,

¹⁰⁷ Lisa Fiedler. “DoD Environmental Stewardship in the Marianas: Now and in the Future.” Presentation, Guam, 2017.

DoD recognized the added strain that additional Marines and their family members will place on Guam's infrastructure. We are committed to improving the quality of life for both the proud people who call Guam their home and the military personnel based on the island. Improvements in the quality of life will result from direct investments in projects to improve and upgrade Guam infrastructure. These projects will reflect a combination of requests by the government of Guam and those identified by the environmental impact study, performed by DoD to study the effects of the build-up.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, his "Green Guam" approach is described as,

DoD understands and supports the great emphasis the people of Guam place on protecting the island's environmental resources. We have projects underway with the Guam Power Authority, Guam Waterworks Authority, University of Guam, Department of Energy and other federal agencies to bring public and private funds to Guam for sustainable projects...In addition, DoD is committed to developing the most energy efficient infrastructure possible, with a goal of converting all DoD bases on Guam into "net zero" energy users over time.¹⁰⁹

Lastly, Work calls for the creation of a Civilian-Military Coordination Council which will help ensure that the buildup moves forward based on mutual agreement. However, I argue that this simply cannot be the case due to Guåhan's status as an unincorporated territory under the "plenary power" of Congress. The most that can be achieved here is a cushioning of the blow, a band-aid to the possible environmental infection. This is yet another manifestation of the hierarchical Federal-Territorial relationship Guåhan experiences with the United States.

After this "One Guam" and "Green Guam" approach, the military has continuously invoked this mutual partnership approach in how it proceeds with the military buildup of the island. For example, in her letter to the *Pacific Daily News*, former Commander of Joint Region Marianas Bette Bolivar writes, "The strong partnership between the military and local communities in Guam is an indicator of the many great things to come in the next few years. As we move forward, I am confident that we will continue to foster our relationships."¹¹⁰ Supplementing this, in her outgoing speech to the people of Guåhan, Bolivar passionately addressed the crowd, exclaiming, "Put

¹⁰⁸ "Under SECNAV Releases Statement Following Visit to Guam," Department of the Navy, Accessed October 2018, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=58119

¹⁰⁹ "Under SECNAV Releases Statement Following Visit to Guam," Department of the Navy.

¹¹⁰ Bette Bolivar, "Navy committed to One Guam," *Pacific Daily News*, January 1, 2016, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/opinion/2015/12/31/navy-committed-one-guam/78116194/>

simply, that means while some of us wear a military uniform to work every day and some of us don't, we are similar people with similar life goals and I truly believe that we can all work together.”¹¹¹ Lastly, the new Commander, Shoshanna Chatfield, said, “We are grateful to our partners from the government of Guam for their continued partnership.”¹¹² Unfortunately, some in the community have bought into this belief of the military as a green and excellent environmental steward. In a hearing regarding the military buildup, a columnist of the *Pacific Daily News*, Paul Zerzan, testified before the legislature, saying that the military does a better job of taking care of the land than the people of the community. Furthermore, he says, “I have every doubt that the people here would be good stewards of the land.”¹¹³

This emphasis on partnership is a ruse, meant to induce complacency in the population of the island. Michael Lujan Bevacqua analyzes the problematics of partnership in Guåhan, writing,

The military routinely promotes the idea of its actions being taken though a partnership with Guam's community. Local leaders invoke the same ideas, when they want to put a positive spin on things that are actually out of their control... On Monday, they may pay to play the partnership game. But this may not be the case from Tuesday to Sunday. The rest of the week, their interests are their own.¹¹⁴

So, truly analyzing the power held over the island by the United States, one can see how they have the ability to call the shots day-by-day, without any consistency except that they exercise an immense amount of power over the island. Overall, we can see the connections between this chapter and the last. The destruction of the environment leads to the military forming a “One Guam” approach that provides infrastructure improvement to an island that faces economic

¹¹¹ Chris Wong, “Never a dull moment: Rear admiral ends Guam tour,” *Guam Daily Post*, January 29, 2017, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/never-a-dull-moment/article_97a8a9ae-e459-11e6-b6f7-a3c2bf68df84.html

¹¹² Guam Daily Post, “Civil-Military Coordination Council meetings revived,” *Guam Daily Post*, February 9, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/civil-military-coordination-council-meetings-revived/article_b5dc84de-0c64-11e8-a0bb-83f2b2a838d6.html

¹¹³ John I. Borja, “Overwhelming support for resolution against firing range complex,” *Pacific Daily News*, September 28, 2017, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2017/09/23/overwhelming-support-resolution-against-firing-range-complex/692130001/>

¹¹⁴ Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “Attend peaceful demonstration in response to clearing of cultural site,” *Pacific Daily News*, November 1, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/opinion/columnists/2018/11/01/attend-peaceful-demonstration-response-cultural-site-bevacqua/1842470002/>

shortfalls. Economic dependency is also fueled by a history of stolen land and environmental contamination. The pieces of the colonial and militarized puzzle all fit well with one another.

VI. I FINAKPO' (CONCLUSION)

In a conversation, Robert Underwood discussed the idea of keeping a balance sheet that would keep track of all the mitigation efforts and initiatives taken on by the military contrasted against the extent of contamination their activities in the island have caused. Throughout the chapter, I have made clear that the environmental issue is not an isolated one, but rather a metastasized manifestation of our status as a militarized unincorporated territory. Economy, land dispossession, and environmental contamination are not separate issues, but rather highly entangled realities of life in everyday Guåhan. When taken together as a collective, the balance sheet becomes quite complicated with various twists and turns as well as secondary and tertiary effects. However, what this chapter has made clear in conjunction with the previous chapters is that the military has clearly had a more negative impact on the environment, than they have a positive impact here. This chapter also shows that Paul Zerzan's notion that the military is a better environmental steward of the land than the local people here is not empirically supportable, as they have been one of the largest contaminators of the environment here. Demonstrating the falsity of Zerzan's notion for academic purposes is not the goal of this chapter. The stakes are much higher than this. What I hope this chapter can do is help show the rest of Guåhan the danger of buying into notions as Zerzan's. When people believe that the military is a good environmental steward or that their mitigation efforts are enough, the livelihoods of our children are at stake. The literal land and water source they will depend on is threatened as long as ideas such as his are prevalent in the discursive sphere of the island.

From PCBs to TCE to a permanent state of environmental mitigation, the DoD's treatment of Guåhan's environment, I argue, constitutes environmental violence and insecurity. Through an examination of the politics of doubt regarding the Agent Orange issue, I argued that political power

manifests itself not only in visible oppression, but also in the clouds of doubt in a state of epistemological violence. Power, along with the passing of time, is what prolongs resolution of these controversial issues. Power is also what constitutes the delay in cleanup as the power of technicality and bureaucracy plays a large role. Another important concluding point is that in this chapter, I only scratched the surface of Guåhan's contaminated sites and the clean-up actions taken to mitigate the impact. However, what I hope the reader has gained is at least a rudimentary understanding of the variety and simultaneous commonality of contamination in Guåhan due to military activities and operations, as well as the methods by which this insecurity is made sustainable via purported mitigation efforts.

With geopolitics, land dispossession, economy, and now environmental contamination examined as part of the form-of-life of a militarized, unincorporated territory, the next chapter deals specifically with the question, "Why are there not 10,000 people protesting in the streets?" This chapter and the previous chapter have helped to show the material manifestation of power in producing a state of sustainable insecurity in the island and amongst its people. The next chapter outlines World War II and the "liberation" framework as it is important to understanding the lack of widespread resistance in the island. Without an understanding of World War II, one simply cannot understand the contemporary picture of life in Guåhan. The next chapter examines the discursive glue sustainable insecurity needs to keep itself together.

Chapter 5: Frosted Boundaries: The Crisis of Imaginative Insecurity

"It's all real in Outside, everything there is, because I saw an airplane in the blue between the clouds. Ma and me can't go there because we don't know the secret code, but it's real all the same."

1

In Emma Donaghue's national bestselling novel and academy-award nominated motion picture, *Room*, 7-year old Jack and his "Ma" live their entire lives in an eleven by eleven-foot enclosed space. Ma was kidnapped as a teenager and imprisoned within this room where she was raped and impregnated with Jack, giving birth to him in Room. Room is Jack's entire world. It is the limit of his experiences and understanding of the world. Jack has never played with other children, never ran through a field with the wind in his face or swam in the deep blue of the ocean. Outside of his eleven by eleven existence, his only exposure to the Outside is through what he can see out of the narrow window of Room or through the television provided to him and Ma by the mysterious "Old Nick," Ma's kidnapper and Jack's biological father. For Jack, "Old Nick" is the one that provides for them. He buys them their food, clothes, and other necessary items for their livelihood.

Up until the middle of the book, Jack is not cognizant of the violence Old Nick inflicts on his mother, his health, and his ability to experience the world. Only later in the book does Jack realize that he and Ma have the potential to escape Room and drastically expand their horizons and quality of life. For many living in Guåhan, they wake only to see Jack as their reflection in the mirror hoping Old Nick (the U.S. military in Guåhan's case) gives us something better with each passing week.² As the quote opening this chapter describes, CHamorus see the metaphorical airplane of a life not dependent on the U.S. military, but they truly believe that they do not know the secret code of existing on our own. From statements like Guåhan businessman Carl Petersen's,

¹ Emma Donaghue, *Room* (New York: Hatchette Book Group, 2011), pg. 102.

² It is important to point out that I do not compare Jack to Chamorros in the attempt to infantilize Chamorros. Rather, the colonial subjectivities produced through colonialism have resulted in a situation in which we are like Jack who is trapped inside a room he has never seen out of. The analogy would hold regardless of Jack's age.

“If the U.S. left, it wouldn’t be long before China would run everything in Guam,”³ to Guam resident Virgie Matson, responding to the North Korea threat saying, “I feel that the presence of the military on Guam will help us a lot, they are here to protect the islands, just in case something happens,”⁴ we seem to be psychologically trapped in the eleven-by-eleven colonial cage of a militarized, unincorporated territory.

In the beginning of the book, Jack and Ma use recycled cereal boxes to make a ruler. After measuring Ma’s nose and feet, Jack asks Ma to measure the dimensions of Room. They begin by measuring the various dimensions of Room such as “Door Wall, Roof, and Bed Wall.” This small portion of the book makes it known to the reader that Jack is starting to become curious about the composition of Room and its dimensions. What makes Room, Room? With equal curiosity, this chapter acts as a measuring tape exploring and analyzing the crevices of our form-of-life here in Guåhan as a militarized, unincorporated territory. The prior chapters aimed, through evidence and analysis, to shatter the illusion that the U.S. military makes Guåhan “secure” either in a traditional sense or in broader definitions of security such as environmental and economic security and has demonstrated how these insecurities have been made sustainable through mitigations or dependency. I reiterate Robert Underwood’s burning question, “Why are there not 10,000 people protesting in the streets?”⁵ This chapter is in no shape or form a perfect answer to Underwood’s question, but is rather an attempt to examine the discursive, cultural, and psychological forms of control used to legitimate military presence in the island and to sustain insecurity. With the shards of security hanging, this chapter explores the crevices and aims to find the glue holding the military’s structure of insecurity together.

³ Jon Letman, “Guam: Where the US Military Is Revered and Reviled,” *The Diplomat*, August 29, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/guam-where-the-us-military-is-revered-and-reviled/>

⁴ Bordallo, “Guam Worries”

⁵ Robert Underwood, “Dies Mit: The Origin and End of Chamorro Self-Determination,” *Micronesian Educator*, no. 22 (November 2015): 110.

The decision to dedicate an entire chapter to look at the discursive, cultural, and psychological factors of Guåhan's dependence, embrace, acceptance, or even acquiescence to the current militarized circumstance is an attempt to provide a stronger foundation in my excavation of sustainable insecurity. Why do CHamorus hold on to the myths that either a) the military keeps Guåhan secure (or, is this a byproduct of their presence or the reason for their presence?) or b) we could not provide this security for ourselves as an autonomous political entity. It is insufficient to provide an analysis of the material factors of (in)security without engaging in the immaterial, as they are intimately intertwined. In his groundbreaking book, *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon analyzes and excavates these psychological components of colonialism. In chapter four, "The So-Called Dependency Complex Of The Colonized," Fanon argues that the problem of colonization does not only consist of looking at the historical and objective conditions of a people and place, but also includes a person's attitude toward these conditions.⁶ Glen Coulthard further describes Fanon's argument, writing,

In actual contexts of domination (such as colonialism), not only are the terms of recognition usually determined by and in the interests of the master, but also over time slave populations (the colonized) tend to develop what he called "psycho-affective" attachments to these master-sanctioned forms of recognition, and that this attachment is essential in maintaining the economic and political structure.⁷

Thus, colonialism is perpetuated and sustained through both the subjective and objective factors, and not one of these alone or by itself. Building on this, Fanon writes, "the black man must wage the struggle on two levels, whereas historically these levels are mutually dependent, any unilateral liberation is flawed, and the worst mistake would be to believe their mutual dependence automatic."⁸ Thus, while the subjective, psychological factors of colonialism and the colonial, objective infrastructure together make up the foundation for colonial exploitation, they also can

⁶ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 1962), 65.

⁷ Glen Coulthard, *Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 26.

⁸ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 4.

operate outside of each other. This is important in looking at Guåhan's present. Despite the material conditions telling a different story of security, the subjective factors and perceptions of militarization continue to help legitimize this sustainable insecurity.

This chapter is divided into two sections, each dedicated to examining a piece of the discursive puzzle in invisibilizing or diminishing the violences wrought onto the people of Guåhan. The first section takes a deeper look at World War II and, in particular, how the "cultures of commemoration"⁹ surrounding the war were used to instill a "liberation" framework into the Guåhan collective psyche. From this, I argue, the United States created the conditions of possibility to ensure hegemony and continued military access to CHamoru land. I highlight World War II and its aftermath as the discursive fulcrum for Guåhan's present militarization. Building on this history of war's creative transformation, the second section analyzes the normalization of militarization in Guåhan via military service and the use of the CHamoru family structure as a method of sustainable enlistment. In this analysis, I examine the ways that patriotism and support of the troops gets utilized in the name of empire. Through these collective analyses, I hope to offer a better understanding of the various psychological and discursive forces that keep the masses off the streets despite evidence that the military does not make the island "secure."

I. UNCLE SAM, MY DEAR UNCLE SAM, WON'T YOU PLEASE COME BACK TO GUAM?

Early Monday morning the action came to Guam
Eighth of December, 1941
Oh Uncle Sam, Sam, My Dear Uncle Sam
Won't You Please Come Back to Guam?¹⁰

The lyrics above are the chorus of a popular song sung by the CHamoru people during the Japanese occupation of the island from 1941-1944 where CHamorus, near the end of the war, pleaded for the U.S. military to return and defeat the Japanese occupiers of the island. This period

⁹ Keith L. Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011).

¹⁰ Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "Hafa Na Liberasion #8: I Kantan I Gera," *No Rest For The Awake*, August 18, 2007, <http://minagahet.blogspot.com/2007/08/hafa-na-liberasion-8-i-kantan-i-gera.html>

of Guåhan history is particularly brutal with beheadings, rapes, and massacres occurring in multiplicity. In the southern village of Malesso', the Japanese gathered those they believed to be the most intimidating or pro-American. Teachers, parents with sons in the military, and those who showed a semblance of resistance to the Japanese were led to a cave in Tinta where they were bayoneted and killed, with only a few survivors.¹¹ Not long after, they gathered thirty of the strongest men in the same village and massacred them once again in a cave near Fåha. Unfortunately, there were no survivors of this atrocity. One of the saddest events of this Japanese period were the Fena Cave Massacres, where multiple young women were raped by Japanese soldiers and subsequently killed. Many CHamorus remember the war as being the most difficult part of their lives. My grandmother, Estella Meno Gofigan, was six years old when the war started and nine years old when the war ended. During this time, her older sisters were beaten, she was forced to march to a concentration camp in Manenggon, lost her father due to a heat stroke, and had a bullet graze her arm just a few inches from her chest. Although young during the war, it stays with her today; a dark passenger accompanying her every journey. She still flinches at any unexpected sound whether it be a car backfiring or a plastic cup dropping on our kitchen floor.

On July 21, 1944, the U.S. military returned to the island to fight the Japanese and reoccupy this strategically located piece of real estate that would help ensure hegemony in the region. Through a bombing campaign that flattened much of the island and a subsequent ground invasion, the Americans were able to reoccupy the island and push the Japanese out. They would then use the island as a basing station to finish the war in the Pacific. While a purely military analysis of this retaking and reoccupation may be labeled as simply that: a retaking, the survivors of World War II remember it quite differently. My grandma remembers how the Marines who came to the island gave her food and candy. She remembers the joy of the other people in the camp at seeing the Americans, who were tall and white, and looked like giants who freed them from the camp and

¹¹ Rodgers, *Destiny's Landfall*.

provided for them. Most importantly, my grandmother remembers this event as one of liberation. She views the U.S. military as heroes and liberators. She thanks them for saving her life and her family's life and is very grateful for their deeds. In this section, I argue that the dominant commemoration of World War II and its aftermath served as the condition of possibility for the transformation of the island into a giant military base that is hegemonically viewed as beneficial to the island. As Michael Lujan Bevacqua writes, "World War II thus becomes 'the war' and can be invoked as a single word reply to answering any number of Guam history questions related to land, military service, military bases, the Chamorro social calendar, Chamorro identity and the identity of Guam itself."¹²

I identify World War II as this fulcrum point of transformation because only after the war do CHamorus start truly assimilating and identifying as Americans. During the naval administration of the island beginning in 1898, CHamorus did not have strong desires to assimilate to American culture or to learn English, despite them using the rhetoric of patriotism to achieve political rights, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Before the war, there was an organized attempt by the navy to assimilate and discipline CHamorus. From hygiene to recreation to education, the social realm of the CHamoru became a zone of contestation and infiltration for the American navy to exploit. As Anne Perez Hattori argues, "The Navy saw it their duty to transform the Chamorro populace into a modern American society, into a people who would be ... productive, disciplined, and educated."¹³ Yet, this American project failed. As Robert Underwood writes of CHamoru subjectivity before the war, "The Chamorro people were not Americans, did not see themselves as American-in-waiting, and probably did not care much about being American."¹⁴ Yet, this all changes after the war, and to demonstrate this, I turn to language. One

¹² Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "The Scene of Liberation." Paper presented at the 1st Marianas History Conference, June 14-16, 2012. Accessed at <http://www.guampedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/6-World-War-II.pdf>

¹³ Anne Perez Hattori, "Navy Blues: US Naval Rule on Guam And The Rough Road to Assimilation, 1898-1941," *Pacific Asia Inquiry*, 5, no.1, (Fall 2014): 85.

¹⁴ Robert Underwood, "Teaching Guam's History in Guam High Schools," in *Guam History Perspectives*, ed. Lee Carter, Rosa Carter, William Wuerch (University of Guam, Mangilao, Guam, 1997), 7.

can analyze the difference in CHamoru acceptance of the United States of America through the change in intergenerational transmission of the indigenous CHamoru language, Fino' CHamoru. I qualify that studying language shift before and after the war is telling of a larger psychological transformation because languages act as a memory bank and storage place of a worldview. Language is epistemology and a zone of sovereignty. The language one speaks reflects a wider cultural picture, and in a colonial context, demonstrates the effectiveness of hierarchical power relations. Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong'o, writes in *Decolonising The Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature*, "The choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to a people's definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment, indeed in relation to the entire universe."¹⁵ Language was a powerful tool of colonization because language does not simply include words, but rather has a suggestive power beyond the surface meaning of words. When one learns a language, one learns to view the world in that language's cultural lens, and thus is a good indicator of cultural change.

As soon as the first naval governor of the island, Richard Leary, assumed his position, acculturating CHamorus became integral to the transition from Spanish control to American control. Some of the first general orders of the governor included banning the large village parties called fiestas (since they each had a patron saint and reinforced Catholic beliefs), prohibiting religious processions, and most pertinent, ensuring that CHamorus were instructed in the English language via General Order No. 12.¹⁶ As stated in the order, it was expected that "the present force of native teachers will cheerfully and harmoniously cooperate with the teachers of English that the greatest benefits may be derived by both scholars and preceptors."¹⁷ Seventeen years later, General Order No. 243 banned the speaking of Fino' CHamoru by "designating English as the only official language of Guam and ordered that Chamorro must not be spoken except for official

¹⁵ Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind: the Politics of Language in African Literature* (New Hampshire: Heinemann, 1986), 4.

¹⁶ "Richard P. Leary, General Order Nos. 1-21," Guampedia.

¹⁷ Clement, "English and Chamorro"

interpreting.”¹⁸ To encourage the public use of English, the naval government also forbade the speaking of Fino’ CHamoru on baseball fields, so that any child who wanted to play this new and exciting sport introduced to the island had to learn this new language. In the school system, corporal punishment and monetary fines were implemented if a child spoke CHamoru during class time. My grandmother, who grew up in a poor family, only had a nickel a day to buy her lunch, and often had this nickel taken away from her because she spoke CHamoru in school. She vividly remembers the hunger pangs she experienced while watching her classmates eat lunch in the cafeteria.¹⁹

Yet, despite all of this, CHamorus were still not using English as their primary language in their homes, and this greatly frustrated the Americans. In 1916, Governor Smith wrote, “They do not learn English as rapidly as they should ... Appointments and promotions under the island and Federal governments are now subject to requirements in English.”²⁰ Yet, even the enticements of jobs and promotions did not cause language shift. In a 1921 report, naval governor Wettengel, wrote of the stagnation of English, “The defects of the schools are emphasized by the small number of school children who can speak English with any degree of efficiency.”²¹ This concern was repeated years later by naval governor Adelbert Althouse. During his time in Guåhan, he was equally as frustrated at the lack of progress of English fluency. He argued that the problem was that schoolchildren had “no background of home assistance either in the matter of English or knowledge of the parent,”²² thus demonstrating that English had not yet become the language of the CHamoru home. In his frustration, Althouse ordered the burning of CHamoru dictionaries, which is quite comedic, considering that it was the navy that commissioned the creation of that

¹⁸ Clement, “English and Chamorro”

¹⁹ Estella Meno Gofigan, interview, September 14, 2018.

²⁰ Hattori, “Navy Blues,” 113.

²¹ Robert Anacletus Underwood, “American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros of Guam” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1987), 150.

²² Underwood, “American Education,” 150.

dictionary in the first place.²³ Even after this event, CHamorus still did not switch to English. In 1934, Governor Alexander wrote, “After 36 years of American occupation it is discouraging that the language of the United States is not in more general use among the native people.”²⁴ This analysis of the language situation before the war is meant to show that many CHamorus before the war did not have a strong desire to acculturate into the American culture and English language, and thus did not have a strong American identity or subjectivity.²⁵

Fast forward to the present, and the language is in a dire state. In the 2010 census, only 16% of the population reported to have spoken Fino’ CHamoru, roughly 25,827 speakers.²⁶ It was also reported that 44% of households in Guåhan use English as the only language of communication.²⁷ The language’s reach has also quite diminished. In teaching CHamoru language classes in the past at the University of Guam, there is one question I asked my students on the first day of class. I asked them to tell me where we can find the CHamoru language here in Guåhan. Their answers thus far have been the same throughout; one can find it the southern part of the island, in the rosaries said after someone dies, and most especially, amongst the elders. This is the truth as 70% of the total CHamoru speakers are over the age of 55 with only 4% of speakers being 30 years of age or younger.²⁸ Mathematically, this means that those who are 55 and younger were born in 1963, making them the children of those who survived the war. The linguistic demography provided here helps to show that something changes after the war. In the life of a roughly 3,000-year old language, the only glaring trend of language decline and intergenerational transmission of English over the CHamoru language occurs after World War II, not before the war despite

²³ Clement, “Chamorro and English,”

²⁴ Hattori, “Navy Blues,” 114.

²⁵ Talk about Chamorro desires for citizenship here and how this still doesn’t prove a strong American subjectivity.

²⁶ US Bureau of the Census. 2012. “2010 Census Guam Demographic Profile Summary File. Prepared by the Guam State Data Center Bureau of Statistics and Plans.” http://cnas-re.uog.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/KGI_2010-Guam-Demographic-Profile-Study.pdf (accessed November 25, 2018).

²⁷ US Bureau of the Census, “2010 Census Guam.”

²⁸ Pa’a Taotao Tāno’. “Pa’a Taotao Tano’ Chamorro Language Assessment Survey (CLAS) Project Report.” Presentation, Guam, 2010.

attempts at elevating English at the expense of Fino' CHamoru. This helps to show that it was only after the war, that giving up one's language, as a sign of Americanization and assimilation becomes effective. Through this, CHamorus accept their new political subjectivities as aspiring Americans.

This telling sign of a sociocultural shift in identity and political subjectivity does not come in a vacuum. Something happened during and after the war that set the stage for this shift, and we can forensically catch this colonial culprit in the form of the dominant narratives of the commemorations of World War II. Camacho argues that CHamoru survivors of the war internalized the "liberation" of Guåhan into their ways of thinking, receiving, and sharing. If one were forced to choose one word to describe the CHamoru relationship with the United States, "liberation" may be the most pertinent.

Michael Lujan Bevacqua illustrates this in his article, "The Scene of Liberation." He argues that in the scene of Manenggon, which is the camp where my grandmother was forced by the Japanese to stay near the end of the war, we see a physical performance of the current hierarchical relationship between the CHamoru and the U.S. military. All the elements of the relationship can be found in this one scene: the brutal Japanese soldier, the starving and weak CHamoru, and the brave American soldier.²⁹ The brave American soldier kills the Japanese soldier and saves the CHamorus who are emaciated, sick, and starving. The soldiers then provide for the weak CHamoru through candy, cigarettes, and canned goods like Spam. CHamorus are the perpetual damsel in distress, in need of saving, and the military is the knight in camouflaged armor. After World War II, it seems as if this archetype has remained the same, with only the villain (the Japanese soldier) shape-shifting³⁰ to other characters such as China, North Korea, poverty, economic stagnation, and many others. Bevacqua describes World War II as a scene, explaining "A scene is not a literal moment, but rather the way in which a certain particular historical moment achieves a certain

²⁹ Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "The Scene of Liberation."

³⁰ I am borrowing from Glen Coulthard's metaphor of colonialism as a shape-shifter in his book *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting The Colonial Politics of Recognition*

valorized character and can end up feeling more real than the reality of the history it is meant to represent.”³¹ Guåhan seems to be hierarchically frozen in time, and this dominant narrative of liberation is the freezer keeping us loyal to the United States, despite the passage of 72 years since the war.

This creation of a pacified population is not only done through material means, but requires a discursive and psychological medium as well. In Guåhan, this commemoration of World War II proved to be a strong medium which the U.S. military helped craft and subsequently capitalized on. Camacho writes that, “The rhetoric of loyalty has been invented as a form of social control.”³² A loyal, colonized society implies an obedient, pacified population. The politics of war and memory are entangled with one another, and in regions such as the Pacific Islands, which have been stuck in the middle of geopolitical conflicts, understanding this entanglement is of paramount importance. The mixture of trauma, adrenaline, and historiography all converge to muddy the waters of clarity surrounding the war.

In their anthology, *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, T Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama write,

Memory production concerning imagined collectivities is never simply about the politically disinterested recovery of a pure and undiluted past...There is no one-to-one correspondence between a discrete experience and a particular memory, for even experience itself might come to us through mediation. Experience and memory, in other words, are already mediated and this mediation in turn is always shaped by relations of power.³³

The words of George Orwell never get old in this regard, especially when presented as a rap lyric in the popular Rage Against The Machine song ‘Bulls on Parade’: “He who controls the past, controls the future. He who controls the present now, controls the past.”³⁴ Power is essential in

³¹ Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “The Scene of Liberation.”

³² Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “The Scene of Liberation,” 20.

³³ T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama, *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)* (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2000), 1.

³⁴ George Orwell, *1984* (New York: Random House, 1992).

understanding which narratives get passed down to future generations. Writing on the role of power, Yoneyama argues that, “the production of knowledge about the past is always enmeshed in the exercise of power and is always accompanied by elements of repression.”³⁵ Narratives of the past consistently compete with one another to claim the status of truth, and power is the method in which one narrative can bury another. Native scholar Thomas King writes, “The truth about stories is that that’s all we are.”³⁶ This is an incredibly powerful technique of control. Controlling stories is controlling what people believe about themselves, their potential, and their imaginations. Power is a discursive shovel digging the graves of alternative narratives of the war.

I argue that World War II made it possible for the creation of power necessary to hammer the head of the nail of colonialism and its subsequent ramifications on memory and commemoration. This scene of liberation culminating after the war is obviously rooted in the war, and a better understanding of the psychological effects of war in itself is useful in understanding the creation of the discursive power of loyalty. Michael Waller and Andrew Linklater write, “new loyalties lack strong emotional attachment until they survive real tests and have been hallowed by time—or have been sealed by a compact, formal or informal.”³⁷ World War II served as the compact cementing CHamoru loyalty to the United States of America. Camacho discusses the similarities between the Japanese and American colonial governments, writing, “They separately concurred that the processes involving the colonization of Chamorros could not be fully implemented without first securing and guaranteeing their loyalty to the nation in power.”³⁸ Our perpetual scene of liberation is loyalty, patriotism, and dependence all rolled into one, and all solidified through war. War has a phenomenological and psychologically unique niche in the realm

³⁵ Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 27.

³⁶ Thomas King, *The Truth About Stories: A Native Narrative*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 2.

³⁷ Michael Waller and Andrew Linklater, *Political Loyalty and the Nation-State* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 13.

³⁸ Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration*, 36.

of human experience, and tends to haunt those it visits. As William James writes, war is the “gory nurse that trained societies to cohesiveness...martial values are the enduring cement.”³⁹

Middle East war reporter Chris Hedges spent most of his life in war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan and has experienced everything from being kidnapped to almost being killed. In his semi-memoir, *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning*, Hedges describes the range of emotions and transformational experience of war. In describing his experience, he argues that war forms its own culture. He writes that war “dominates culture, distorts memory, corrupts language, and infects everything, even humor, which becomes preoccupied with the perversities of smut and death.”⁴⁰ Even more brutally honest, Hedges argues that war “can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent.”⁴¹ Although calling war a rational instrument for state interests, even war theorist Clausewitz understood how emotions are closely entangled with war. Emotions and passion compose one of the three components of the Clausewitzian trinity of war along with reason and chance/probability.⁴² Wars are not just violent, they are pavers of roads.

Hedges begins his book by describing his time in Sarajevo in 1995, which was part of the now-dissolved Yugoslavia. He remembers literally slipping in the blood and entrails of the dead and hearing the bloodcurdling screams of the maimed and disfigured. When the war ended, he recollects sitting with a group of friends who survived the Yugoslavian Civil War. As they sat, they recalled fearing for their lives, being emaciated, having no water and no electricity, yet they also distinctly remembered what the war had given them. It gave them meaning. In a seemingly illogical spin, the brutality of war gave them a reason to live. He writes,

Peace had again exposed the void that the rush of war, of battle, had filled. Once again they were, as perhaps as we all are, alone, no longer bound by that common sense of

³⁹ William James, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” delivered at Stanford University (1906), in *International Conciliation* 27, no. 6 (February 1910): 15.

⁴⁰ Chris Hedges, *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 3.

⁴¹ Hedges, *War Is a Force*, 3.

⁴² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

struggle, no longer given the opportunity to be noble, heroic, no longer sure what life was about or what it meant.⁴³

War leaves a psychological void. I am not arguing that CHamorus missed the war or felt as if the war became their reason to live, but rather I aim to show how war can be a metaphorical paver of roads. War is not only a destroyer of worlds, but also a creator of worlds, both inside our heads and outside. The conclusion of the Revolutionary War was a condition of possibility for the creation of the United States just as some argue the War on Terror led to the creation of the powerful terrorist group, ISIS or that World War I led to the creation of the modern Middle East with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. War has the ability to make possible what was not possible before.

In her book, *The Shock Doctrine, The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, Naomi Klein describes the effects that large natural disasters, wars, and other large-scale events can have on political landscapes and controversial legislation. The example she opens her book with is Hurricane Katrina, which pummeled Louisiana in 2005, killing around 1,245 people. Richard Baker, a congressman from Louisiana, seemed to be thankful for the hurricane, writing, “We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn’t do it, but God did.”⁴⁴ Sharing his sentiment, New Orleans developer, Joseph Canizaro, said, “I think we have a clean sheet to start again. And with that clean sheet, we have some very big opportunities.”⁴⁵ The idea behind these statements is that these large-scale events can shock a population and allow for a clean slate for those in power to pave their preferred realities. One waits for a crisis and then when the population is still distracted, one can make permanent reforms. Milton Friedman, one of the fathers of neoliberal capitalism, observed,

⁴³ Hedges, *War Is A Force*, 7.

⁴⁴ John Harwood, “Washington Wire: A Special Weekly Report from The Wall Street Journal’s Capital Bureau,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 26, 1954.

⁴⁵ Gary Rivlin, “A Mogul Who Would Rebuild New Orleans” *New York Times*, September 29, 2005, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/business/a-mogul-who-would-rebuild-new-orleans.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=2DACE1DD085EAE1794CEED14E331A75F&gwt=pay>

Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.⁴⁶

Crises, such as war, produce the condition of possibility for forms of social, political, and economic engineering. The previous chapters showed the material manifestations of Guåhan's militarization, and a significant portion of sustainable insecurity lies in the CHamoru relationship to the U.S. military after the war. This loyalty, I argue, is a form of social engineering crafting the colonial hierarchy and sense of American superiority in the CHamoru psyche.

Through the creation of this new frame of commemoration, “liberation,” American acculturation and CHamoru feelings of loyalty to the United States, spawned as a response to the war, served as the lubricant to Guåhan's transformation as an important military base. As Albert Memmi writes in *The Colonizer and The Colonized*, “The manner in which the colonialist wants to see himself plays a considerable role in the emergence of his final portrait.”⁴⁷ Liberation or reoccupation? What portrait is painted? On the power of loyalty and liberation in Guåhan, Vicente Diaz writes, “I have memories of a war that took place before I was born. They come from stories told by my parents, who survived the war in the Philippines, and by CHamoru survivors of the Japanese occupation of Guam, where I was born. These stories inhabit my mind and body.”⁴⁸ We are taught that we are American citizens and should be grateful to the military for saving us. I have witnessed loyalty's power in my life growing up in Guåhan. I was taught this in the stories of my grandparents. I was taught this through the daily flag-raising and Pledge of Allegiance of my school's morning assembly. I was taught this through the ubiquitous American flags around the island. Vicente Diaz describes this as “everyday rituals” of liberation. In addition to these everyday

⁴⁶ Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), ix.

⁴⁷ Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, 55.

⁴⁸ Vicente Diaz, “Deliberating Liberation Day,” in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, eds. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama, (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2000), 155.

rituals, there was also one event per year that would force one to remember the liberation framework: The Liberation Day Parade.

Liberation Day is celebrated every year on July 21st and consists of a giant parade, with road closures, amazing barbeque, and family tents. Growing up, I remember camping out on the side of the road the night before the event. I played my Gameboy all night, chatted with my cousins, and all around had a blast. As a kid, experiencing the parade was extremely exciting. Every village had its float, businesses advertised and passed out candy, and the island's dignitaries and local organizations all marched down the main road, Marine Corps Drive. Perhaps one of my fondest and most vivid memories of these parades is the marching of the various military units and ROTC troops. With their rifles, drums, and unitary cadence, it was a sight to see as a child. Even with the village and business floats, the patriotic message of these parades was to not be forgotten. Whether it be through banners, the parade emcees and announcers, or plethora of American flags, the day was a celebration of CHamorus, the United States, and the beautiful relationship the island has with the greatest country on earth.

Now, it may be tempting to misconstrue the sentence above as my attempt to victimize CHamorus and make it appear as if CHamorus were simply duped and that the aftermath of the war led to a massive brainwashing. This is not the case. Guåhan history is filled with many examples of CHamorus resisting colonialism, land-takings, and political mistreatment. From the petitions for American citizenship (which also may seem as acquiescence to power, a position I disagree with) to the group Nasion Chamoru who fought for CHamoru landowners who had their land stolen by the military, the CHamoru people are not lazy and passive. Robert Underwood helps to demonstrate this in his article, "Red, Whitewash, and Blue," writing,

On Liberation Day, when the Chamorros wave the flag and thank the Marines (and appear to be patriotic beyond belief), they are in reality celebrating themselves and their own experiences. As a group, the Chamorros were heroic during the Japanese occupation

and, if they expressed it through Reoccupation (excuse me, Liberation) Day, it is because these are the symbols which are made available to them.⁴⁹

It is too easy to call “victim” and seep agency away from the CHamoru people, and I hope this argument does not get construed in that manner. However, Underwood wrote this news article in 1977, and 41 years later, we have seen the evolution of just how often “liberation” as a sacred frame of reference is invoked to justify continuing U.S. colonialism. If the CHamorus were celebrating themselves through these American symbols after the war, has this aspect of commemoration become lost today in 2018? Do a majority of our young adults and the middle-aged demographic still view the celebration of “Liberation Day” primarily as a way to celebrate ourselves as CHamoru people? What I am trying to clarify here is that the nuances of CHamoru identity are complex and any attempt to elide the interactions of CHamoru agency, dispossession, and narrativization, is simplifying a complex issue.

While the answer to the questions above deserve a chapter on its own, but in a rather different dissertation, Underwood’s point that there have historically been multiple methods at attaching American patriotism as the defining characteristic of the post-war CHamoru to our commemorations is extremely relevant. Wars produce loyalties and commemoration is used to cement loyalty as can be captured in the words of Felix Torres Pangelinan, a CHamoru man from Guåhan. In a press release, he wrote, “Chamorros owe an everlasting debt to these gallant American men; a debt that we can never repay, but that we can show, in our humble gratitude, by being loyal, faithful, and patriotic to the United States of America.”⁵⁰ Invoking the values of loyalty, patriotism, and faithfulness is used as a method of social control. It is much easier to turn an island with indigenous inhabitants into a giant military base if you get the acceptance of the people; a classic Gramscian concept of hegemony. When Gramsci writes, “If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer ‘leading’, but only ‘dominant,’ exercising coercive force alone,

⁴⁹ Robert Underwood, “Red, Whitewash And Blue...Painting Over The Chamorro Experience,” *Pacific Daily News*, July 17, 1977.

⁵⁰ National Archives. Press release number 238-46, 23 July 1946. RG 313.

this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe,”⁵¹ one can only think of how powerful the archetype of savior being attributed to a colonizer can be. In the next section, I look at the ramifications of this loyalty and liberation framework in the present through the various forms of military normalization.

II. A MILITARY METAPHYSICS: THE OTHER FACES OF LIBERATION

For the past three semesters, I have been teaching the class, “State and Territorial Government.” My focus in this class is to help students understand Guåhan’s status as an unincorporated territory. I begin every semester with a discussion of colonialism and its various modalities. To demonstrate this, I take a piece of paper, hold it up in the air and ask them what I have in my hands. Obviously, the students say paper. I then fold the paper in half and ask the same question, “What do I have in my hands?” At this point, they look at me with a funny look on their faces and respond “paper.” I move on to crumble the paper and ask the same question. Once again, with an even more confused look, they respond “paper.” Through this visual exercise, I teach them that colonialism comes in various forms, but at its core, it is still colonialism, reflecting Glen Coulthard’s idea of shape-shifting colonialism.

Coulthard argues that colonialism is adaptive and changes shape to fit the current circumstances. He argues that in order to maintain its dominance temporally and spatially, colonial power has shape-shifted from primarily being exclusive and assimilationist in structure to becoming accommodating and engaging, but ultimately still hierarchical and violent.⁵² Mohawk scholar, Taiaiake Alfred, puts it best when he likens this shape-shifting as moving from being trapped in a rusty cage to being restrained by a brand-new chain. “The chain may offer more room

⁵¹ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London: Elecbook, 1999), 556.

⁵² Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.

for us to move, but the colonial system is still the one in control.”⁵³ We have seen this throughout history. Slavery becomes institutionalized racism. Institutionalized racism becomes color-blind views of society. Banning languages becomes celebrating cultural diversity as long as access to indigenous land is not impeded.

In this section, I traverse the discursive jungles, caves, and crevices of the military’s legitimizing factors here in Guåhan to find the shapes of military legitimation today. The previous section argued that World War II and the subsequent liberation narrative attached to the war created the condition of possibility for the sustenance of the island into a giant military base today. In traversing the discursive moves in Guåhan, I am primarily analyzing the various manifestations of normalized militarization in Guåhan. For this, I borrow heavily from authors such as Cynthia Enloe, Catherine Lutz, and Chris Cuomo, who write on the seeping of militarization into the everyday lives of a community. Ann Laura Stoler argues that the vestiges of colonialism seem obvious, but rather manifest in the most unusual and inconspicuous of societal crevices. She writes,

Colonial pasts, the narratives recounted about them, the unspoken distinctions they continue to ‘cue,’ the affective charges they reactivate, and the implicit ‘lessons’ they are mobilized to impart are so ineffably threaded through the fabric of contemporary life forms they seem indiscernible as distinct effects, as if everywhere and nowhere at all.⁵⁴

In a similar fashion, I look for the progeny of liberation and militarization here in Guåhan today. The seen and unseen, the heard and unheard, the felt and unfelt, are all important in this analysis of militarized normalization.

To begin, it is important to look at Cynthia Enloe’s notion of normalization found in *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*. In chapter three of the book, Enloe tells the story of Okinawan children playing baseball in a field, when all of a sudden U.S. military planes boom across the skyline nearly scaring her to death. Yet, she said the kids remained calm and it seemed like they

⁵³ Taiaiake Alfred, *Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 34.

⁵⁴ Stoler, *Duress*, 5.

did not even notice the giant aircraft above them. There is nothing alarming about the normal, it is the deviation from the normal that causes the concern. The normal may be inconvenient, but inconveniences are not equivalent to extraordinary events worthy of our attention. One person's crisis may be another person's normal, which is essentially the main argument of this dissertation and my focus on forced powerlessness, continuum of violences, and sustainable insecurity. Many of us in Guåhan took our first breath of militarization upon exiting the nurturing wombs of our mothers. Enloe writes,

Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A military base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can become politically invisible if its ways of doing business and seeing the world insinuate themselves into a community's schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children's games, adults' friendship, jobs, and gossip. On any given day, therefore, only a handful of these scores of bases scattered around the world are the objects of dispute. Most have draped themselves with the camouflage of normalcy.⁵⁵

In analytical harmony with this book, Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, in their book, *Oh, Say, Can You See?: The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai'i*, write, "The narratives of naturalization imbricate military institutions and discourses into daily life so that they become just the way things are. The narratives of reassurance kick in with a more prescriptive tone, marking the military presence in Hawai'i as necessary, productive, heroic, desirable, good."⁵⁶ This is the core of sustainable insecurity: the normalization of insecurity where others may view it as crises. This normalization of militarization and insecurity helps determine our form-of-life here in Guåhan, limiting the scope of our imaginations, the water we dare to drink, and the economic dreams we want to have. One of the core methods of normalization of militarization in Guåhan's history is the soldiering of the CHamoru.

⁵⁵ Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 66.

⁵⁶ Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See?: The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai'i* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xiii

Manmetgot Siha: The Soldiering of the CHamoru

Guåhan has one of the highest enlistment rates per capita, which is common amongst Pacific Island territories. It is rare for a CHamoru family to not have multiple members who are either serving or are veterans of the U.S. military. One of every 8 people from Guåhan has served in the American Armed Forces.⁵⁷ While the previous chapter on economic insecurity discussed the economic incentives one has to join the military and receive benefits, I look at the discursive ramifications of soldiering, particularly in reinforcing the liberation framework and helping to produce new subjectivities. Even if one argues that soldiering is purely because of the economic benefits of recruitment and that CHamorus are not necessarily joining because they are patriotic, this does not mean that the U.S. agenda of continued control of the island is not reinforced through this soldiering. Although the material factor of poverty is key here, the soldiering of the CHamoru becomes narrativized differently here in Guåhan.

To demonstrate his pride in the success of recruitment here in Guåhan, General Joseph Lengyel, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, told the Guam National Guard, “Guam is unbelievably successful. Whatever it is they’re drinking, I need to pass it around to the rest.”⁵⁸ I wish I was there when he said this because I would have said the secret ingredients to make this magical drink of soldiering is “economic limiting, political inferiority, contaminated land, and heavy dependency.” Of course, at that point, he probably would have just asked me for a cup of coffee instead! Yet, that is our reality. Guåhan: the recruiter’s dream. Guåhan: not only where America’s day begins, but where CHamoru land and brown CHamoru bodies fuse together to form the tip of the spear. What is most telling is the narrative Lengyel gives in explaining such successful recruitment. Instead of saying that the economic benefits of joining the military with relatively few

⁵⁷ Josh Hicks, “Guam: A high concentration of veterans, but rock-bottom funding VA funding,” *The Washington Post*, October 29, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2014/10/29/guam-a-high-concentration-of-veterans-with-little-va-funding/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4b56815eb5b9

⁵⁸ Tihu Lujan, “Guard chief commends recruitment on Guam,” *The Guam Daily Post*, February 6, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/guard-chief-commends-recruitment-on-guam/article_98cb314c-0895-11e8-81ee-478a6d4dd21f.html

other options is almost too good to pass up, as many other poor communities have turned towards the military as a meal ticket, Lengyel says, “It speaks to that sense of service. The high morale of the organization is something that people want to be a part of—to serve the nation, serve the territory, and be here for the people of Guam. They’ve been very successful at doing it.”⁵⁹

This narrative is rather ubiquitous. In the chapter, “Uncomfortable Fatigues: Chamorro Soldiers, Gendered Identities, and the Question of Decolonization in Guam,” Keith Camacho provides a quote from U.S. Army recruiter Olympio Magofña regarding the superior status of the CHamoru soldier. Magofña says,

Let me tell you something about Chamorros ... they are one of the most decorated, motivated, sophisticated soldiers in the world, man. When they join any of the armed forces, they are there to prove themselves...so when we go into the military we tend to be the best of the best. And I hear this from everybody else...from generals, sergeant majors.⁶⁰

The bottom line seems to be that CHamorus are superior soldiers who prove themselves and who are eager to serve their territory and country. Upon the deployment of Guåhan troops, then Guåhan governor Eddie Baza Calvo said, “it’s a tragic irony that so many from Guam laid down their lives and thousands more fought and bled on foreign shores in the service of America’s most cherished ideal of defending democracy, yet they cannot vote for their commander-in-chief.”⁶¹ While definitely using the fact of CHamoru military service to push the political cause of voting representation in the Electoral College for the territories, the narrative of the CHamoru as a great defender of democracy is the discursive capital needed to prove the case. Robert Underwood has pointed out the irony of this narrative. He discusses how in situations in districts where African-Americans make up a majority of recruits, the narrativization of African-Americans as “more”

⁵⁹ Lujan, “Guard Chief.”

⁶⁰ Keith L. Camacho, “Uncomfortable Fatigues,” in *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, eds. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 147.

⁶¹ Haidee V. Eugenio, “Presidential voting rights for veterans on Guam, other territories sought,” *Pacific Daily News*, August 11, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/08/09/presidential-voting-rights-veterans-guam-territories-sought/944268002/>

patriotic does not occur. Underwood says, “Nobody calls African-Americans more patriotic, we only see this in the case of Chamorros.”⁶² This is evident in Governor Calvo’s interview in the documentary *Island of Warriors*, saying, “We are the most patriotic Americans you will find anywhere.”⁶³ In Guåhan, the hyper-patriot and super-soldier narrativization of CHamorus is something that many CHamorus have bought into.

In Guåhan, the military seems to offer so much more than just military protection. For many CHamorus, the opportunity to become a soldier allows them to also become the provider, and is an opportunity for not only economic, but also social mobility. As Michael Lujan Bevacqua writes, “It is in the uniform that so much that is otherwise difficult or unattainable can be easily grasped or attained.”⁶⁴ While CHamorus historically could only join the U.S. military as mess attendants in the Navy, there are now CHamorus who have occupied the high ranks of the military such as Marine Corps Brigadier General Ben Blaz and Major General Benny Meno Paulino. Military service is held in the highest regard and is often seen as a status elevator. There is a ubiquitous joke amongst women in Guåhan, “I.D., I Do,” meaning that if a man is in the military and has base access, they will definitely say yes to marrying him. CHamoru men have used military service for many purposes, but this all gets enmeshed into a narrative of the hyperpatriot CHamoru.

CHamoru service in the military did not begin after the war, but in the late 1930s, years before the Japanese occupation and World War II. Joining as mess attendants in the Navy, many CHamorus enlisted in the military out of a sense of adventure and travel. In his dissertation, James Viernes interviewed many of these men who joined before the war. One of his interviewees, Manuel Cruz Diaz, said he joined the navy because of opportunity. “I wanted to travel and see the

⁶² Personal Communication with Robert Underwood.

⁶³ PBS Guam, “Island of Warriors,” directed by Ross Tuttle, 10/11/2014, documentary, 26:46, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/america-by-the-numbers/episodes/episode-102/>.

⁶⁴ Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “The Exceptional Life and Death of a Chamorro Soldier: Tracing the Militarization of Desire in Guam, USA,” in *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, eds. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 44.

world. I see Hawaii. I see the west coast. All over the east coast. I really enjoy myself.”⁶⁵ In another instance, Viernes interviews Antonio Borja Perez, who recalls his military enlistment as expanding his horizons. He says, “You join the Navy and see the world! That was the main thing. Get out of Guam and really explore what’s out there.”⁶⁶ Up until the start of World War II, 625 CHamoru men were in the Navy as mess attendants.⁶⁷ As shown in the previous chapter, the military created the economic conditions that pushed CHamoru men, and later, women towards enlisting in the armed services. However, after the war, we begin to see service narrativized to fit the “liberation” framework.

After World War II and the cementing of CHamoru loyalty to the United States, military service took on a nuanced face. Even if being pushed towards joining the military due to socio-economic factors, CHamoru military service itself becomes supplemented to fit nicely into the “scene of liberation.” This is also the point of emergence of military service being intertwined with CHamoru cultural values, and most importantly, as a proud family tradition. No longer do we see the intergenerational transmission of the CHamoru language, but rather we see the honor of military service being portrayed as an admirable life decision. After the war, CHamorus continued to join the military in larger numbers, and by 1971, around 3,270 men from the island were enlisted in the U.S. military.⁶⁸ I argue that the post-WWII soldiering of the CHamoru, despite economic factors, were ways that CHamorus could express gratitude for the liberation of the island and provide a way for them to prove their “Americanness.”

For many soldiers, hyperpatriotism and military service as a method of proving “Americanness,” required assimilating to the dominant ideals and attitudes of the American military man. This ultimately resulted in the hypermasculinization of the CHamoru male. Proving

⁶⁵ Viernes, “Negotiating Manhood,” 136.

⁶⁶ Viernes, “Negotiating Manhood,” 136.

⁶⁷ Camacho, “Uncomfortable Fatigues,” 156.

⁶⁸ Robert Underwood, “Excursions into Authenticity: The Chamorros of Guam,” *Pacific Viewpoint*, 26, no.1, (1985): 167.

“Americanness” in this manner meant proving masculinity. In Guåhan, this can be seen not only in military service, but also in the concept of the modern CHamoru warrior. The American military as an institution invokes the tropes of strength and valor as hypermasculine to ensure soldiers’ willingness to give their lives for the cause. As John Hopton writes, military leaders “have used ideologies of idealized masculinity that valorize the notion of strong active males collectively risking their personal safety for the greater good of the wider community.”⁶⁹ Furthermore, he writes, “states have a vested interest in maintaining strong ideological links between militarism and masculinity.”⁷⁰ The military as a hypermasculine space aims to reinforce tropes of what it means to be a man, thus defining masculinity for those who serve. Keith Camacho argues that the military was one of the few institutions after the war where CHamoru men could “achieve a masculinity based on notions of family, leadership, providing, and strength.”⁷¹ The military helps CHamoru men to prove masculinity, thus reinforcing the “warrior” image valorized in many communities, including indigenous communities. This is not the only sense in which military service has intertwined with or utilized CHamoru culture and norms to its advantage.

The Perversion of Kustumbren CHamoru

A core concept of CHamoru culture is chenchule’. CHenchule’ refers to a system of reciprocity, which in a small island, helps to maintain societal ties and relationships. One primary example of chenchule’ can be found in the gifting custom amongst CHamorus. After parties, CHamoru families usually sit together and write down who gave presents or money, and how much people gave. For example, if Juan Castro went to your child’s birthday party and gave your child \$30, you would record this information for future use. A year later, Juan Castro’s child is having a birthday party and invites you. This is when you would look at how much Juan gave you and

⁶⁹ John Hopton, “The State and Military Masculinity,” in *Military Masculinities: Identity and the State*, ed. Paul R. Higate (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 113.

⁷⁰ Hopton, “The State and Masculinity,” 115.

⁷¹ Camacho, “Uncomfortable Fatigues,” 161.

either match that amount or increase it. So, you would give Juan Castro's child either \$30 or more for their party. In a CHamoru worldview, one remembers what another has done for them, so that they may return the favor in the future. "Chamorros gain a sense of social esteem through fulfilling such obligations...Part of one's Chamorro identity rests on the particular system of which one's family is a part."⁷² Despite cultural shifts amongst the CHamoru culture, *chenchule'* has remained strong, and I argue that it is now invoked in the name of military service. When asked why he joined the military, a major in the Reserve Officers Training Corps program at the University of Guam, said, "My service is a payment for a debt. I was taught since I was young about how we were liberated, and this is the least I can do."⁷³ Gonzalo Fernandez, a CHamoru recruiter for the Guam National Guard who won the National Guard's Recruiter of the Year award three years in a row said regarding his success rate, "The success I have here, I probably couldn't duplicate anywhere else because I'm not sure the people of those places are as patriotic."⁷⁴ For many CHamorus, this military service is a form of repayment and an expression of gratitude for the role the U.S. military had in "liberating" the island.

Surely, the ancestors did not intend *chenchule'* to be used as a method of forever chaining CHamorus to the bottom of a hierarchical power relationship. How far does *chenchule'* and gratitude have to go? For the sake of argument, I invite the reader to put themselves into a hypothetical situation. It is a dark, rainy night, and you hear your doorbell ringing. You open the door and a masked robber crashes into your door and physically restrains you with rope to your recliner, completely inhibiting you from moving. A man happens to be walking by and sees this masked person robbing your house. He runs into your house, puts this person into a chokehold, and waits for the police to arrive to take them away. As the police leave, you express gratitude and thanks to the man for coming in to help you. At the end of your speech of gratitude, he argues that

⁷² "Chenchule'," Guampedia, accessed September 2018, <https://www.guampedia.com/chenchule/>

⁷³ Bevacqua, "The Exceptional Life," 36.

⁷⁴ Tuttle, *"Island of Warriors."*

since he saved you, he should be able to use one of the rooms and one of the bathrooms in your three-bed, two-bath house (so roughly 1/3 of your home). Naturally, you would find this to be an irrational request. A more rational response would be for the two of you to become life-long friends and help each other out in times of need, not for him to claim ownership of parts of your house.

This distorted form of *chenchule'* is clearly a perversion. CHamoru scholar Laura Souder writes, "These memories have become inscribed within the Chamorro tradition: obligations being a sacred duty, the Chamorros have since been caught in a never-ending cycle of paying back...and so our people gave precious land and continue to offer their sons and daughters to show their appreciation to Uncle Sam."⁷⁵ CHenchule' is not meant to be this way. CHenchule' is meant to maintain and give life to communities, not to dispossess them. The entire system of *chenchule'* breaks down if it is abused for hierarchical purposes, as it has been invoked in the name of liberation, a debt to forever remain unpaid. To restate my argument thus far, I am not arguing that a sense of *chenchule'* completely explains military legitimization in Guåhan, but rather that *chenchule'* as narrativized has been perverted and used to maintain control. This form of control of utilizing cultural values to obtain one's interests is a powerful method because from a Gramscian perspective, it helps to quell resistance and provides legitimacy to that control. The U.S. military's sheer might allows them, if they desire, to destroy all CHamorus and completely dominate us in the most visible, violent manner. However, one can argue, in order to keep their image as the model nation and defender of democracy, the U.S. resorted to other means of control such as this cultural appropriation of values and the forging of CHamoru culture with soldiering.

CHamerican Soldiers: An Identity Merged and Proven To Death

After years and generations of military service, CHamoru identities as soldiers, while ultimately complex, seem to be comfortable. Veteran Maggie Aguon, who suffers from PTSD and

⁷⁵ Laura Torres Souder, "Psyche Under Siege: Uncle Sam, Look What You've Done to Us," Paper presented at the twenty-seventh Pacific Science Congress, Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 1991, 194.

has expressed her psychological battles from her memories of war, said that she would re-enlist tomorrow if called upon. When asked why she should re-enlist, she said she wanted to represent her island and “put it on the map...For my country, for my island. I’m not trying to prove anything. It’s called pride.”⁷⁶ Ronni Alexander, in her article on identity and militarism in Guåhan, asks, “Can American concepts of the self as an independent individual co-exist with Chamoru understandings of the self as part of an interconnected and interdependent web of extended family?”⁷⁷ In this section, I argue that there is little tension between being an American soldier and a proud CHamoru from Guam, and that modern military service has acted as an amalgam at proving CHamoru identity, Guåhan pride, and American political subjectivity all at the same time. Keith Camacho and Laurel Monnig interviewed former American military members whose military service opened their eyes to the contradictions of democracy and colonialism in their homeland in Guåhan. Some veterans like Angel Santos, for example, became leaders of significant CHamoru activist organizations. In their chapter, they conclude, “What many of these male Chamorro soldiers had disclosed was the fact that their fatigues never fit so snugly in the first place—a discomfort that has helped some of them to think about the contradictions and the problems of militarism.”⁷⁸ While I fully acknowledge that there have been veterans whose military service opened the pathways to their critical attitude towards military occupation in Guåhan, this section investigates the narratives of those other CHamoru members and veterans of the military: those who argue their fatigues fit quite comfortably today.

Laurel Monnig’s dissertation, “Proving Chamorro,” investigates the various venues of “identity proving” done by CHamoru activists who have to interact with multiple forces such as race and colonialism in order to verify their rights as a people. She argues that the United States

⁷⁶ Souder, “Psyche Under Siege,” 194.

⁷⁷ Ronni Alexander, “Militarization and Identity on Guåhan/Guam: Exploring Intersections of indigeneity, gender, and security,” *Journal of International Cooperation Studies*, 21, no.1, (2013): 4.

⁷⁸ Camacho, “Uncomfortable Fatigues”, 170.

has moved CHamoru identity within “the realm of the provable.”⁷⁹ Identity is a tricky concept to ever pin down and is always in flux. Stuart Hall argues that identity is a “moveable feast: formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us.”⁸⁰ Identity is historically defined and individuals are capable of having different identities at different times, according to Hall. He argues that the notion of a stable identity is a mere illusion held up through a “narrative of the self.”⁸¹ The post-war transformation of the island and the dominance of the liberation narrative created a cultural system which the CHamoru ultimately found themselves in, and soldiering became a way to exist within this new cultural system in order to *prove* both their American and CHamoru identities.

As discussed in Chapter 1, CHamorus had a long struggle to become American citizens in order to obtain more rights and resist the dictatorship of the naval government. Using the cultural system of American patriotism made available to them prior to the war, CHamoru leaders and politicians argued they should be granted citizenship because of their assimilation and respect for American culture and political values. In the first petition to the U.S. Congress for citizenship in 1901 signed by 32 community leaders and members, the authors wrote,

The change of sovereignty was welcomed by the inhabitants of Guam, and the American government has never been hampered by disaffection or opposition on their part, but, on the contrary, they have been loyal, law-abiding, and patient, supporting the government morally and materially, as opportunity offered, frequently at considerable personal sacrifice.⁸²

The language of loyalty and acceptance was utilized in the attempt for political rights. Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider argues, “the Chamorro leaders understood that as long as they were subjected to military rule, they would never have the guarantees of civil liberty and property rights

⁷⁹ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro.”

⁸⁰ Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity,” in *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, eds. Stuart Hall, David Held, Dan Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson, 595-634. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1996).

⁸¹ Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity.”

⁸² Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights*, 48-50.

which they associated with civil government.”⁸³ CHamorus were displaying obedience and loyalty as a tool of empowerment and civil rights, and not necessarily as a duped populace. This framing of the CHamoru civil rights movement would continue for decades.

In September 1926, the Congress of the Philippines, which was on its way to becoming an independent country, heard a resolution which petitioned the U.S. president to cede Guåhan to the Philippines government. When the Guam Congress was made aware of this resolution, there was absolute outrage and on September 25th, they held a special session to craft a response to this resolution. Finally, on October 12th, the Guam Congress adopted a resolution, which illuminates how the Guam Congress used “proving” Americanness to obtain their civil rights.

Whereas, the people of Guam have been peaceful and law-abiding citizens since the American occupation in 1899, and have not given the slightest sign of rebellion, insurrection, or trouble to the United States government; and

Whereas, for twenty-seven years the Chamorros as people of Guam, alone, have continued, to be peaceful and law-abiding and have given, at all times, their fidelity, loyalty, and affection to the United States of America; and

*Whereas, they have formed the strongest ties of love to the American flag and have developed a whole-hearted and deep-seated desire to have no other flag than Old Glory wave over their heads.*⁸⁴

Proving that they were Americans at heart and deeply loyal to the American flag was not just meant to convince the United States to not cede Guåhan to the Philippines, but was a method of legitimization. Despite these attempts at proving their loyalty or proving their Americanness, CHamorus were still not granted citizenship before the war. They would not become American citizens until 1950, nine years after the outbreak of the war. The push for citizenship after the war was heavily motivated by the immense land-takings, as outlined in Chapter 2, and CHamoru leadership used their survival during the war as another tool to obtain political rights and just treatment. For the CHamoru push for citizenship after the war, liberation became the new cultural

⁸³ Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights*, 51.

⁸⁴ Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights*, 48-50.

system of symbols to prove their worthiness. As Vince Diaz writes, this became “the only political language available to the CHamorus that could be heard and understood by the Americans.”⁸⁵

This leads us back to CHamoru military service and enlistment, where CHamorus found another tool for proving their worth, a language that strongly resonated with the heavily militarized and national security state America maintained, especially after World War II. When American recollections of the war argue that “Agana was liberated by the blood of young Americans,”⁸⁶ CHamorus were shown the potential of becoming soldiers economically, socially, and most importantly, nationally. For 52 years, CHamorus were governed by a country that treated them as orphans, neither citizen nor alien. For 52 years, CHamorus did not know their place within a nation whose geopolitical conflicts destroyed their home. There was nothing more American, especially in the Cold War militarism prevalent after the war, than to be a soldier who puts their life on the line for their nation.

Military service as a method of proving Americanness or fighting for political rights and inclusion is not unique to CHamorus or Guåhan and can be seen with minority and other indigenous peoples. Political thinkers throughout history have seen the military as an institution capable of producing national identity as well as to transmit a country’s social values.⁸⁷ Max Weber understood the importance of military service in an individual’s transformation, commenting that the discipline in military service changes someone from an ordinary citizen to having a more heroic status more in line with the wants and desires of the nation-state to which one belongs.⁸⁸ Ronald R. Krebs argues, “Groups seeking first-class citizenship may deploy their military record as a rhetorical device, framing their demands as the just reward for their people’s sacrifice. This effort

⁸⁵ Vicente Diaz, “Deliberating ‘Liberation Day:’ Identity, History, Memory, and War in Guam,” in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2000), 165.

⁸⁶ The History Channel, “Victory at Sea: The Turkey Shoot,” directed by M. Clay Adams, 02/23/1953, documentary, 26:29, <http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=uK-UjS4ntao>.

⁸⁷ David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

⁸⁸ Max Weber, “The Meaning of Discipline,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 253-261.

to exploit a widely recognized norm has at times cornered state leaders, leaving them without room for rhetorical maneuver.”⁸⁹ This is reminiscent of CHamorus appealing to American ideals and governmental values in their fight for citizenship. They were rhetorical maneuvers meant to trap the United States to either give CHamorus citizenship or be viewed as hypocrites. Unfortunately, the race and development card of CHamorus not being ready overtook these attempts at cornering the United States government.

Krebs aims to explore the relationship between the military service and the way that citizenship is renegotiated. Military service has been viewed as the ultimate form of citizenship and belonging to a nation or supplementing this, proving that one is worthy of being made a citizen. Krebs writes, “The leaders of communal groups relegated to second-class citizenship have time and again contrasted the reality of entrenched political and social inequity to their people’s unassailable record of loyalty and sacrifice.”⁹⁰ As CHamorus did, African-Americans have used their history of military service as a rhetorical tool for rights. During the Civil War, many Blacks served in the military fighting for the Union, making up 10% of their total army. As a result of the war, roughly 40,000 blacks died.⁹¹ Just like CHamorus who in the Iraq War suffered the most deaths per capita in the nation, blacks after the war appealed to their bloodshed and death as proof once again that they are worthy of being treated as equal. Frederick Douglass exclaimed, “If the black man knows enough to shoulder a musket and to fight for the flag, fight for the government, he knows enough to vote... Shall we be citizens in war and aliens in peace.”⁹² A black member of the 1868 Arkansas Constitutional Convention argues similarly to Douglass, “Has not the man who conquers upon the field of battle, gained any rights? Have we gained none by the sacrifice of our

⁸⁹ Ronald R. Krebs, *Fighting For Rights: Military Service And The Politics of Citizenship* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2006), 3.

⁹⁰ Krebs, *Fighting For Rights*, 18.

⁹¹ “Black Soldiers in the U.S. Military During the Civil War,” *National Archives*, Accessed October 2018, <https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/blacks-civil-war>

⁹² Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 95-96.

brethren?”⁹³ Through service and through death, both CHamorus and African-Americans proved they were worthy of full inclusion into the American nation-state and body politic. From an intergenerational perspective, we can see the interplay between the CHamoru push for citizenship, family tradition of military service, and hyperpatriotism. If the push for citizenship was facilitated through service and a hyperpatriotic attitude, it is easy to see how these sentiments of generational discourse gets passed down. Returning to Underwood’s and Diaz’s arguments that CHamorus used the language and political symbols available to them, I reiterate that hyperpatriotism for a cause has become hyperpatriotism as a learned behavior.

The other core point to be made in this section is how military service for CHamorus were not just ways to prove their Americanness as discussed, but also, CHamorus have indigenized their military service and have used it to prove their CHamoru and Guåhan roots as well. In a proud story on the Air National Guard website, Staff Sgt. Alexander W. Riedel, labels CHamoru soldiers as Island Defenders. He praises their ability to patrol and guard the fencelines and facilities of the 407th Air Expeditionary Group. In the story, Riedel interviews soldiers from Guåhan, Ricky Meno and Melquiadez Racho. Racho speaks to this indigenization of service, saying,

We bring our pride out because a lot of people don’t know where Guam is. It’s a small island right in the middle of the Pacific. People look at it on a map and there is nothing but a speck. But that is home. I believe people from Guam have a very strong sense of honor. Especially being from a small island, we always want to try to be with the best and represent that pride. That’s the driving force we have.⁹⁴

Further on in the interview, Racho says, “We want to represent, so when we come home our families can have that pride saying one of ours represented and did well. Our families are our inspiration. We can’t fail them.”⁹⁵ Not once in this interview did Racho mention “America” or “patriotism.” His reasons were to represent his island, make his family proud, and demonstrate

⁹³ Foner, *Reconstruction*, 204-205.

⁹⁴ Alexander Riedel, “Island Defenders: Guam guardsmen protect expeditionary base, coalition mission,” *Air National Guard*, June 5, 2017, <https://www.ang.af.mil/Media/Article-Display/Article/1208964/island-defenders-guam-guardsmen-protect-expeditionary-base-coalition-mission/>

⁹⁵ Riedel, “Island Defenders.”

Guåhan pride. For a people who were dispossessed of their land, made politically ambiguous within the American nation-state, swiftly transitioned to a cash economy, and stripped of many traditional roles and practices, being a good soldier was a method of demonstrating one's pride in their island and of being a modern CHamoru and Guåhan warrior.

Meno explained how watching the gate guards in Guåhan at Andersen Air Force Base and the Naval Base inspired him to join the military. "I used to see them out there at the gate. I wanted to be a part of that. I joined the military to defend my country as well as my island. And I kind of fell in love with it. And here I am now."⁹⁶ Racho's and Meno's answers together help to show that military service for many CHamorus and Guåhan soldiers has become a multipurpose Swiss Army knife of proving. On one hand, becoming a soldier helps prove one is a true American, and on the other hand, becoming a soldier helps to represent Guåhan and prove one's worth as a contributing member to Guåhan's security and safety. This comfortability and amalgamation of the identities of soldier, American, and CHamoru, I argue, helps to bring militarization and militarism within the realm of the natural for the CHamoru, and even scarier, into the realm of the desirable. When military service, which helps to solidify the liberation narrative and subsequent positive orientation towards the military in general, becomes a family tradition or a way of representing one's home or proving one's identity, it becomes difficult to argue against. Thus, hyperpatriotism and military service becomes an amalgam of island pride, love for nation, remnants of past rhetorical discourses, and proving self-worth.

III. I Finakpo': Conclusion

This leads to the culminating key question: "What is the end goal?" CHamorus fought for citizenship using the rhetoric of patriotism only to be given second-class statutory citizenship via a unilateral act of Congress in 1950. CHamorus joined the military as a way of proving themselves, climbing the social ladder, expanding the realms of their opportunities, and economically securing

⁹⁶ Riedel, "Island Defenders."

themselves. The contradiction of these two struggles is that CHamorus in Guåhan are not allowed to be represented in the Electoral College which elects the Commander-in-Chief of the military they overwhelmingly serve in or voting representation in the legislative body which could send them to war. The post-war transformation and the liberation narrative helped to create the dominant and hegemonic cultural systems of CHamoru expression. I am not arguing that all CHamorus discursively bought into this dominant cultural system which strengthens the legitimization of military activity and presence in Guåhan. However, I am arguing that as long as this remains the dominant cultural system for us to operate within, we will never truly be liberated. As Julian Aguon writes regarding CHamorus, “We are kept under lock and key. Cleverly invisible in the international community so that no one sees as we slip quietly into the sea. Not marching, but being marched, to the drums of our own disempowerment.”⁹⁷

For CHamorus to truly be liberated, they must not continue marching to someone else’s drumbeat, especially when the end of the march leads further and further into the cages of our oppression. Taiaiake Alfred writes in *Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto*,

The final steps to decolonization can be truly frightening as Native people are jarred from that familiar reality and forced into a new one—even if it is of their own making. The post-colonial reality is fearsome in its demands, responsibilities, and burdens. There is no one to turn to except ourselves. There is no else to blame.⁹⁸

The material conditions of insecurity and dependence discussed in the prior chapters have heavily restricted not only the economic, environmental, or political spheres in which CHamorus live, but has also restricted the cultural systems available to the CHamoru to express their pride in themselves and represent their island. Service in the American military and the never-ending cycle of gratitude of the liberation framework has become the small 11 by 11 room, we are stuck inside of. This discursive and psychological room valorizes military service and legitimizes military

⁹⁷ Julian Aguon, *Just Left of the Setting Sun*, (Tokyo: Blue Ocean Press, 2006), 13.

⁹⁸ Taiaiake Alfred, *Peace, Power, and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 104.

presence, which I argue ultimately leaves us in a perpetual state of insecurity. May we one day open the windows of our small room and realize that the smell of militarization which we have lived with for more than century, is truly a stench. The scent of demilitarization is surely a breath of fresh air.

I Finakpo': Conclusion

(NON?)FICTION, The Journals of a Shape-Shifter Hunter Entry #666: For a while, I had no idea if we were going to make it. We were going on years of endless shivering, intense fear acting as harsh frost in this tropical weather. Some nights, it would get so bad, I genuflected on the torn flesh of my weak knees to a god I knew wasn't real, just for the comfort of false hope. Today, however, false hope is dead. We have defeated the giant. Perseverance and effective intelligence became the blood running through the veins of our once-defeated bodies. A slow process, indeed, but we began to train our people to notice the different faces and appearances of the giant. We learned the language of its oscillation, and became fluent in his disguise. The giant no longer confuses us, we are intimate with its violence, no longer disillusioned with the shifting of its poisonous modes. The battle against the giant is surely not won. There are still many of our people who have not learned to decipher its shapes. Yet, we have a shot. There is real hope, not the fake hope of times past. And for this, and this alone, we must not give up. We will continue to hold off the giant's encroachments into our homes. He will step on no more of our children. He is no longer welcome in our house.

In this dissertation, I have argued against the hegemonic belief that the U.S. military keeps the island of Guåhan secure. To make this argument, I examined political, land, economic, environmental, and discursive acts in a continuum of violences that led to various states of current insecurity. Furthermore, I have shown how the military need for the island in the name of U.S. national security has marginalized genuine examples of thriving and growth in Guåhan, and that it is this forced powerlessness of a militarized, unincorporated territory status that is the condition of possibility for our current form-of-life here in the island. Lastly, I demonstrated through the history that mitigation, dependency, and discursive formations formed the blob of sustainable insecurity, a situation in which despite empirically shown violences and insecurities, these events and quasi-events have been able to remain from becoming crises.

I use this conclusion to articulate a patchwork of thoughts and ideas regarding futures for the island of Guåhan and its people, which may read like an overview of future research projects. Each section introduces an idea for future books and articles, or ideas about the future in general for the island. I am comfortable with this conclusion as seeming incomplete, as each of these sections requires their own respective research projects dedicated to them. However, I find it

helpful, and I could argue, even necessary, to have these intellectual discussions about possible futures in this section. To do any less would be to leave the reader in a state of despair, numbness, or defeat. This dissertation, admittedly, may read as a dismal description of powerlessness. However, I don't want to leave it on this melancholy note, despite how gloomy the future may appear. So, before outlining the parameters of the conclusion, I find it necessary to discuss the lurking issue for this dissertation: Hope.

Last semester, I taught a class entitled "The Future of Global Violence." In the class, I had my students read a range of texts from Timothy Mitchell's *Carbon Democracy* to David Kilcullen's, *Out of the Mountains*, as well as Ian Shaw's *Predator Empire*. Halfway through the semester, I entered the classroom to begin our seminar and noticed this defeated look on one of my students' faces. I began the class by asking him what was wrong. His response was that the books we have been reading are so real and make the future look bleak and hopeless. He said the books made him question why he was even continuing to get his degree. It was such an intimately honest moment, and one that I knew I had to address. So, in the following weeks, I had them read *Hope In The Dark: Untold Histories, Wild Possibilities*, by Rebecca Solnit, and it really changed the tone of the course.

Solnit powerfully and lyrically dismantles the pretentiousness in which hope may stand, that unusual feeling in which hope is just an ameliorative term for eminent death. Rather than sticking to this falsity, Solnit writes, "It's important to say what hope is not: it is not the belief that everything was, is, or will be fine."

¹ The hope that I invoke through this dissertation is in uncertainty, not in a belief that all is well and will remain that way. Solnit continues, "Hope locates itself in the premises that we don't know what will happen and that in the spaciousness of uncertainty is room to act. When you recognize uncertainty, you recognize that you may be able to influence the outcomes."²

¹ Rebecca Solnit, *Hope in the Dark: Untold Histories, Wild Possibilities*, (Chicago: Hayward Books, 2016), pg. xiii.

² Solnit, *Hope*, xiv.

Uncertainty is certainly not traditionally thought of as comforting, but this dissertation shows a different picture. Through this analysis of forced powerlessness and the continuum of violence, it should be abundantly clear that actions were taken to get Guåhan to this point. What exists now is not a permanent, inherent form-of-life, or to put it differently, what exists now is not the way it has or had to be. This structure of sustainable insecurity in Guåhan has a genealogy and this dissertation has aimed at illuminating this dark genealogy, which for many, has been hiding beneath our feet this entire time. The chapters of this dissertation, while thematically different, all come together to show the picture of how Guåhan came to be, but most importantly, this dissertation acts as affirmative uncertainty. Through examining the processes that created a situation of sustainable insecurity, maybe the reader can look around them with a more critical eye and help identify the beginnings or operations of insecurities in their respective homelands. What was made evident throughout this dissertation is that the genealogy of violence, forced powerlessness, and sustainable insecurity in Guåhan did not make itself known at every corner, but often grew where the eye isn't likely to look. May the reader's eye have a more critical lens after reading this. This dissertation does not claim to know the future, but rather affirmatively embraces the uncertainty ahead. The uncertainty of it all makes fighting, resisting, and creating new structures and forms of life worth it, and it is in this spirit that I write this dissertation.

Resurging to Power: Independence for Guåhan (The Best Solution *For Now*)

This dissertation has shown how power is the name of the game when it comes to Guåhan's current political situation. It is the exercise of U.S. power and the mechanistic forced powerlessness of Guåhan that enables this. In this section, I articulate my argument against efforts to depict Guåhan as *inherently* powerless, through a rethinking of Guåhan's ability to be powerful in a traditional International Relations sense and in an indigenous resurgence of the word. This dissertation has shown that violence, sustainable insecurity, and an imposed political status have produced this state of powerlessness. I argue that the island becoming its own independent nation-

state would be the best path for the island (for now) to eliminate further violences and the conditions of insecurity, even if it will not solve all problems, and even if it may be problematic in itself.

CHamoru rights activist Carlos Taitano, one of the key figures in the push for American citizenship for the CHamoru people, once analogized his push for citizenship to a desert scenario. Taitano said, “If one is dead thirsty in the desert and is offered water, surely they are bound to take it.”³ As explained by Taitano’s son, Tyrone Taitano, his father knew that citizenship bestowed upon the CHamoru people would not give us the best political future, but it was a step forward. I argue that the next step is Guåhan fully becoming its own independent nation-state. Per Guam Law 23-147, the following question would be asked on a self-determination plebiscite, “In recognition of your right to self-determination, which of the following political status options do you favor? 1. Independence, 2. Free Association with the United States of America, 3. Statehood.”⁴

I argue that a shift of the island’s status to an independent nation-state will help solve some of the problems of violence and insecurity. This dissertation has shown that Guåhan’s unincorporated territory status is a key condition of possibility for this violence, thus transitioning to an independent country gives the island a chance at changing the circumstances of our lives here. Becoming an independent country *could* usher Guåhan into the family of nations and at the very least, provide the sovereignty (even if one argues it a ruse) granted to current nation-states. With independence on a nation-state level, the United States would have a much more difficult time getting their way here in the island because we would no longer be part of their political family, nor be under the Territorial Clause of their Constitution, nor be considered American soil to freely and unilaterally put their military bases. Rather, Guåhan would have the right to establish its own defense, handle its own economy, and choose its own interdependencies.

³ Tyrone Taitano. “Carlos Taitano.” General Assembly Meeting, Independent Guåhan, Hagåtña, Guam, November 2018.

⁴ Guam Law P.L. 23-147

In Chapter 1, I demonstrated how Guåhan's unique location along with its unincorporated territory status produced the conditions of possibility for Guåhan to become the militarized "tip of the spear" for U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The reality is that geography doesn't change and returning to Robert Roger's nickname of Guåhan as "Destiny's Landfall," the question being asked is "Does our geography need to remain our curse?" The unchanging nature of geography should not make one fear that our militarization will simply continue no matter what the circumstances of the future hold. Rather, it should stand out as a giant opportunity for the people of the island to take advantage of. When looking at the possibilities of independence for the island, our geography will act as one of the core components of our power. We have a long history of being told of the sheer importance of our geography, and as a country, we can use this for an advantageous defense position, stop on a trade route, and in crafting regional relationships in this vast ocean. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that our political status and use as a military base has led to rampant land, economic, and environmental violences and insecurities. As an independent nation-state, Guåhan will craft its own land, economic, and environmental policies, choose its trade partners, establish who can own land and how it can be used, and apply CHamoru values and epistemology in our thinking about the environment. All this fits into the typology of power presented in the introduction of this dissertation.

Drawing from the main educational resource of the group Independent Guåhan, an advocacy group for independence for the island, in which I co-chair the Educational Development and Research Committee, I provide an analysis of the power of independence.

Independence is the political status which will allow us to exercise self-governance over our territory and population, have sovereignty, participate on the world stage as equals, and engage in foreign relations on our terms. We will be internationally recognized and respected as an independent country with the right and power to regulate our internal and external affairs without foreign dictation. Being an independent country means taking responsibility for both our failures and successes, and ultimately having democratic control over both our political system and our social, cultural, and economic lives. This is why Hita La'mon is one of Independent Guåhan's foundational CHamoru phrases. It

means, “it is up to us.” Independence will allow our island to be the place we (and nobody else) decide it is going to be.⁵

I argue that this turn towards an independent nation-state and the power that may come with it, will not only help Guåhan to craft its own destiny, but is also a form of resurgence, a theory that has been circulating in Indigenous Politics literature. Within Indigenous Politics, there is a substantial body of criticism of the state, particularly efforts to revitalize indigenous cultures, languages, and livelihoods via state-centric frameworks. Identified as recognition, rights, and responsibilities, many indigenous scholars describe pursuing these ends alone as a “politics of distraction.” According to Graham Smith, the politics of distraction are efforts that divert “energies away from decolonizing and regenerating communities and [frame] community relationships in state-centric terms.”⁶ The core of the argument is that state-centric frameworks for revitalization or sustenance of indigenous nations will ultimately fail due to the systemic violence and forgotten histories of dispossession upon which the state is built. Rather, indigenous scholars argue for indigenous nations to focus on resurgence.

Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel describes resurgence as “taking the emphasis away from state frameworks of forgive and forget back to re-localized community-centered actions premised on reconnecting with land, culture and community.”⁷ Taiaiake Alfred comes up with these components for resurgence efforts: restoration of indigenous presence on the land, increased reliance on traditional diets among Indigenous people, the transmission of indigenous teachings between Elders and the youth, along with the strengthening of familial activities and sustainable land-based economies.⁸ It is through these everyday acts of resurgence and decolonization, as dubbed by Corntassel, that indigenous communities and nations can thrive once again. In summing up their stance on resurgence, Alfred and Corntassel write, “We do not need to wait for the

⁵ Independent Guåhan, “Faninåyan,” 2019.

⁶ Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism,” *Government and Opposition*, 2005, pg. 600.

⁷ Jeff Corntassel, “Re-envisioning resurgence: Indigenous pathways to decolonization and sustainable self-determination,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society*, 1, no. 1 (2012): 91-92.

⁸ Taiaie Alfred, “Colonialism and state dependency,” *Journal of Aboriginal Health*, 5, 42-60 (2009): 56.

colonizer to provide us with money or to validate our vision of a free future; we only need to start to use our Indigenous languages to frame our thoughts, the ethical framework of our philosophies to make decisions and to use our laws and institutions to govern ourselves.”⁹

It may read as quite odd then, especially to readers versed in Indigenous Politics, for this conclusion to invest so heavily in advocating for Guåhan to become its own nation-state. For many, the nation-state model of political governance itself is the problem and the deficiencies within International Relations stem from this form or organization. For example, Glen Coulthard argues, “In our efforts to interpolate the legal and political discourses of the state to secure recognition of our rights to land and self-determination we have too often found ourselves interpellated as subjects of settler-colonial rule.”¹⁰ Alfred argues regarding the values of harmony, balance, and peaceful co-existence, “It is not possible to reach these goals in the context of Western institutions at all, because those institutions were designed within the framework of a very different belief system, to achieve very different objectives.”¹¹ My advocacy of wanting our own nation-state may thus seem quite antithetical to the resurgence agenda. However, just as indigenous peoples are intimately concerned with genealogy, I argue that one needs to look at the genealogy of resurgence to understand its particular historical and geographical positioning. Resurgence as a theory was bred amongst a political landscape of Native American nations, First Nations, and aboriginal peoples petitioning the settler governments of the United States, Canada, and Australia for redress for past wrongs, federal recognition of tribes which would provide them with access to certain rights, or more federal funding for indigenous issues. Blanketly applying resurgence to the indigenous situation in the Pacific Islands is an intellectual error, and resurgence needs to be rethought for our unique circumstances in the region.

⁹ Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism,” *Government and Opposition*, 2005, pg. 614.

¹⁰ Glen Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting The Colonial Politics of Recognition*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), pg. 179.

¹¹ Taiaiake Alfred, *Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pg. 65.

Primarily, I argue that the ease of state critique dominant in Indigenous Politics literature, while important and in many ways relevant to the Pacific Islands, is not as straightforward in the region. Many indigenous peoples in the Pacific Islands have existing nation-states, many of which are newer and were formed at the peak of decolonization after World War II, including the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Nauru. None of the tribes or First Nations, from who many of the authors in Indigenous Politics are peoples who have their own existing nation-state today, but rather live within settler occupied lands with little to no chance of attaining a nation-state of their own. This ontological difference is fundamentally important in picking and choosing our theoretical tools. Rather than simply sticking to the literature already existing on indigenous resurgence, a Pacific Islands version of resurgence is needed; one that treats the nation-state differently.

To begin this reformulation, it is important to look at works such as Terence Wesley-Smith's "The Limits of Self-Determination in Oceania." In his article, Wesley-Smith argues that the optimism of decolonization and self-determination in Oceania has now morphed into discourses of state failure, crisis, and collapse. He argues regarding self-determination, "Significant as it was, that initiative could not represent a definitive break from the colonial past, since the traces of that past were too deeply etched into the economic, political, cultural, and even physical landscapes of Oceania. Indeed, the process was not designed to achieve such a rupture."¹² For Wesley-Smith, decolonization's result in nation-state status did not vanquish colonialism, and arguments that decolonization was a clean break from the past are inherently flawed. Wesley-Smith calls on the reader to have a more realistic understanding of the limits of self-determination and the problems associated with the formation of nation-states in Oceania. Summing it up perfectly, he writes of his argument,

¹² Terence Wesley-Smith, "The Limits of Self-Determination in Oceania," *Social and Economic Studies*, 56, no. 1/2 (March/June 2007): 183.

This is not necessarily to deride the intrinsic value of sovereign independence, and certainly not to provide support for those in the region who express nostalgia for the colonial era. It is simply to suggest that the problems associated with making states and nations capable of reconciling local and global needs and expectations, and with the development project generally, can easily serve to frustrate expectations of hope and a new future.¹³

Works such as Wesley-Smith's provide a more sobering analysis of the problems and limits of nation-states in Oceania today. It is from works like these that a Pacific Islands resurgence can derive its questions such as "What can indigenous peoples who already have their nation-state, with the multiple examples in this region, do to further push the notion of resurgence in eliminating some of the limits of self-determination?" In Guåhan's example, "How do we fight to become our own nation-state (which is a feasibility for the island), while at the same time acknowledging the critiques of the state present in the resurgence literature?" These are questions that a Pacific-Island indigenous theory of resurgence needs to address. Questions not rooted in pure critique, but also not rooted in revolutionary fervor and romanticized views of becoming an independent nation-state.

This dissertation fits perfectly into the Indigenous Politics literature. What I hoped to have shown is how political status, particularly as used in Guåhan with a militarized essence, fundamentally thwarts the livelihoods of the CHamoru people of the island. The macabre duet of unincorporated territory and strategic location for militarization use is a very difficult framework to exist within and successfully engage in a resurgence campaign. I am not arguing that this means that resurgence projects should be avoided, however, that we, in this region, need to critically engage with the nation-state in a different way. It is incredibly difficult for CHamoru resurgence projects and true CHamoru thriving to occur in our current political status. Thus, if the CHamoru people have the opportunity to create a new condition of possibility for thriving, they must take that step, even with the potentialities for problems. I argue that by becoming our own nation-state, CHamorus can better thrive and resurge to power.

¹³ Wesley-Smith, "The Limits of Self-Determination in Oceania", 203.

In the dissertation, I demonstrated the multiple harms of U.S. military presence in Guåhan, from economic dependency to ontological threats to our existence because of established military bases to environmental contamination. It is important to understand that in an independent Guåhan, these problems may or may not linger. There is definitely a chance, but as the beginning of this conclusion mentions, the future is uncertain, and I refuse to submit to defeat. At the same time, however, I do not romanticize independence and acknowledge that we, as a people, will have an immense amount of work to do even if independence is achieved. In an American militarized, independent Guåhan, our international image will still be that of a giant target. Our economy will begin to once again revolve around the military and environmental contamination may be further exacerbated. This is the trap of sovereignty. There is no doubt that our lack of sovereignty is a gigantic problem and this consequent lack of power brings much harm to the island. However, in a self-help anarchic international system, if we make decisions on our supposedly own accord, we are responsible for those decisions. This is not to say that the situation is unchangeable, as demilitarization activists in South Korea and Okinawa have shown. There is honorable work being done there. However, an independent Guåhan, at the end of the day is responsible for its policies per the granting of sovereignty.

Furthermore, independence should not be demonized as a pure reversion to the past of grass skirts and no electricity nor should it be saturated with romanticized ideas of harmony, inafa'maolek, and utopia. An independent Guåhan is not a cure for all our problems, but is the path of self-determination to the largest extent. Independence does not automatically equate to being freed from the problems of colonialism, militarization, patriarchy, or environmental contamination. It is a tool that can be utilized towards these goals, providing they become collective. As my good Kanaka Maoli friend and staunch Hawaiian independence activist 'Ilima Long always says, "Give me back my government so I can fight against it."¹⁴ I whole-heartedly

¹⁴ 'Ilima Long, personal communication to author, March 6, 2017.

accept that there will be challenges, birth pains, and failure along the way in this pursuit of independence. However, I still hold onto this goal as the best path forward, *for now*, in eliminating the continuum of violences and sustainable insecurity Guåhan experiences today.

Islands and Hau'ofian Realism

I now want to turn to an idea of defense for an independent Guåhan that is predicated upon alliances with other countries in Oceania, which I call stonefish geopolitics. The nufo' (stonefish in CHamoru) is considered one of the most venomous fish in the entire world. The PADI (Professional Association of Diving Instructors) website warns, "In the underwater world, you don't have to be the largest creature to be the biggest threat. The stonefish, which reaches an average length of 30 to 40 centimeters and up to 2 kg/5 lbs in weight, is *the most venomous fish in the world* having venomous sacs on each one of its 13 spines."¹⁵ According to the medical website, Medline Plus, the effects of a stonefish sting include intense pain, difficulty breathing, bleeding, low blood pressure, vomiting, delirium, headache, seizure, diarrhea, paralysis, and in some instances, death if one is punctured in their chest or abdomen.¹⁶

My fascination with the nufo' here is not purely biochemical nor autobiographical. I have a geopolitical curiosity with the fish and its behavior, physiology, and environment. Particularly, I argue that the most secure, beneficial defense arrangement for an independent Guåhan would require an alliance with other Oceanic countries counterbalancing the great powers that threaten the Pacific and the development of small-state, maritime, and cyber defense capabilities. This idea is the genealogical descendant of Epeli Hau'ofa's pivotal essay, "Our Sea of Islands." In challenging the colonial, geographical determinism that represents the islands as small and scattered throughout the ocean, Hau'ofa argues for a paradigmatic shift to a "sea of islands"

¹⁵ Andrew Jenkins, "Stonefish: The Most Venomous Fish in the World," *Professional Association of Diving Instructors*, October 7, 2014, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www2.padi.com/blog/2014/10/07/stonefish-the-most-venomous-fish-in-the-world/>.

¹⁶ "Stonefish Sting," Medline Plus, last updated February 7, 2018, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002854.htm>.

connected via the ocean. He calls for a resurgence of Oceania and a reliance on ourselves.¹⁷

Hau'ofa ends his essay,

Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, Oceania is humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper still, Oceania is us. We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this ancient truth and together use it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us again, physically and psychologically, in the tiny spaces that we have resisted accepting as our sole appointed places and from which we have recently liberated ourselves. We must not allow anyone to belittle us again, and take away our freedom.¹⁸

After reading this, one starts to ponder how to utilize Hau'ofa's words. It is incredibly insufficient for us here in the region to just develop an Oceanian identity, and leave it at that. We can just hold the Festival of Pacific Arts every four years, write songs about the greatness of our ocean, and chant to our shared Austronesian ancestors. I am not calling this useless, but rather insufficient in the development of meaningful implementation of Hau'ofa's words.

This is where the nufo' defense model can be a possible utilization of this Oceania paradigm shift. I advocate for a Hau'ofian alliance approach rooted in defensive realism. In international relations terms, I agree with realists that power is the currency of the international system. While I critique the realist state-centrism and do wish to expand the epistemological scope of international relations, I argue that the liberal emphasis on cooperation through international organizations and institutions is a mask for hegemonic agendas and that while the constructivist critique of IR is useful, there is still a dynamic of power in who gets to change the norms that shape the game. Being on the receiving end of the stick of great power politics, I recognize the role that power has in shaping the world and have demonstrated so in this dissertation. I also realize that in this anarchic (or rather hierarchical) international system, states (and others) need to do what they can to survive, and that many times what states view as necessary for survival, is simply imperialism and colonialism.

¹⁷ Epeli Hau'ofa, *We Are the Ocean: Selected Works* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008).

¹⁸ Hau'ofa, *We Are the Ocean*, 39.

In a non-imperial, defensive realist approach using the metaphor of the nufo', I envision an alliance system of neutrality. Like the nufo', we wait in our waters with 13 spines ready to poison those who attempt to step on or bite us. To understand this better, it is important to go through some of the core concepts of defensive realism. Defensive realism finds its roots in Kenneth Waltz's 1979 book, *Theory of International Politics*. At its core, defensive realists argue that the primary purpose of a military is to maintain security (I diverge slightly from this perspective because of my epistemological broadening of what security means) by having the capacity for defending against aggressors. Defensive capabilities are emphasized over offensive capabilities. Thus, defensive realists are security-maximizers.¹⁹ Another key component of the nufo' model I am proposing is the defensive realist perspective of mistrust. Offensive realists argue that "mistrust in the international system is constant, but defensive realists argue that mistrust is variable and amenable to change through international cooperation, primarily through mutual security agreements."²⁰

These two components of a defensive realist perspective fit perfectly into what Oceania can become from a Hau'ofian perspective. First, most of Oceania, especially the islands in Micronesia, have been used for military purposes and have experienced the harmful effects of rampant militarization. I argue that an Oceanian defensive realist approach has the potential to not simply reproduce an imperial-tinged military presence that disregards indigenous peoples, places "national security" ahead of protecting the land, water, and sea, and is built on a cyclical military-industrial complex. This is where I envision the fusing of a decolonial politics in this Hau'ofian defensive realism. For this, I turn to Sankaran Krishna's description of steps needed to decolonize international relations. Krishna begins with asking a few self-reflective questions IR scholars need to ask themselves. He writes,

¹⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press, Inc., 1979).

²⁰ Haroun Alfarsi, "Comparison: Defensive realism vs. Offensive realism," *Profolus*, October 23, 2017, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://www.profolus.com/topics/differences-between-defensive-realism-and-offensive-realism/>.

What is the relationship between our techniques of abstraction (the fetish for placeless and context-less theory) and the disappearance of issues of race, genocide and colonialism from our field of study? Must international relations always reduce to *international* relations, that is, relations between sovereign entities called nation-states? Can we not counter IR's statist discourse, the prose of counter-insurgency, with the poetry of non-national ways of being?²¹

He then goes on to propose some methods of “doing” decolonial IR which include: (1) Emplacing every contemporary context and issue in IR in a genealogical context, (2) Listening to the voices, stories, and narratives of people from outside the mainstream, (3) Teaching IR in ways that do not revere a canon but rather present that canon for contestation and deconstruction, (4) Choosing topics to research and work that are truly global in their purview, and (5) Recognizing the world becomes legible to us through a variety of modes of understanding.²²

In my attempt to “do” decolonial IR, I also begin to envision a CHamoru conception of security and argue that bringing in CHamoru values for a renewed vision of security is extremely important not only as a nation-building endeavor, but also for the formulation of an IR that speaks back to the mainstream. If the defensive realist approach argues that a military is meant to provide security and ward off aggressors, then including a broadened CHamoru concept of security is also very important. While a more detailed CHamoru concept of security is the focus of my future work, I do want to articulate some aspects of my vision of genuine CHamoru security. First, methodologically, this dissertation did not engage in deep ethnographic research and community participation, which I argue is the most proper method for developing a CHamoru concept of security. For my future work on theorizing CHamoru security, I plan on engaging in this more community-based research as opposed to unilaterally laying out my vision of security. In the meantime, here is a glimpse of this vision.

In an independent Guåhan, I envision the CHamoru values of na'la'la' and inafa'matatnga as being the core of security policy development. Lina'la' in CHamoru means “life” and la'la'

²¹ Sankaran Krishna, “Decolonizing International Relations,” *E-International Relations*, October 8, 2012, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/08/decolonizing-international-relations/>.

²² Krishna, “Decolonizing International Relations.”

means “living.” The na’ in na’lâ’la’ is a causative prefix meaning “to make one or to cause one to,” so collectively “na’lâ’la’” translates to “to give life” which is embodied in the CHamoru language revitalization quote, “Na’lâ’la’ i Fino’-ta!,” meaning “Give Life To Our Language!” As argued in this dissertation, slow death, violence, and purposeful limitation have been the effects of U.S. national security interests and power projection in Guåhan. A genuine CHamoru security will be rooted in the understanding that security has been a scary word for our lives in the past and that future security policy should not take part in this agenda of slow death. I envision the main questions of future security policy being, “Does this give life or take it away? If it does take life away, how so?” For example, if future lawmakers in an independent Guåhan ever proposed building a wharf for naval vessels, and subsequently proposed dredging a reef for military purposes, a CHamoru-rooted approach to security would consider this dredging a security threat to the island and its people. Another example is that in an independent Guåhan, military and technological innovation research would not overpower the ability of the government’s budget to provide food for its school children via budget allocations, as this would also be a security threat to our national self-interest of na’lâ’la’.

Na’lâ’la’ as a guiding principle of security policy will not just be used as a litmus test for proposals, but will also be utilized for the development of new policies, programs, and initiatives. To put it differently, na’lâ’la’ will not just be invoked as a gatekeeper for the passing of policies, but also as an inspiration for creation. This fits well with the genuine security definition provided in the introduction from the group, Women For Genuine Security. To reiterate, they describe genuine security, “We work toward the creation of a society free of militarism, violence, and all forms of sexual exploitation, and for the safety, well-being, and long-term sustainability of our communities.”²³ Na’lâ’la’ can help to truly develop a security policy rooted in a sustainable self-determination. For example, I envision na’lâ’la’ being invoked to create coding classes for

²³ Women For Genuine Security, <http://www.genuinesecurity.org/index.html>

Guåhan's youth as a way to prepare them for the cyberfuture, to help get them into higher education programs, and to help develop cyberdefense strategies for protecting Guåhan's assets. Furthermore, na'lå'la' could also be invoked to support the creation of community gardens in the name of food security or the creation of arts programs for mental health purposes.

The second core concept of genuine CHamoru security that I envision is inafa'matatnga. There is a core value in CHamoru, inafa'maolek. The etymology of the word is as follows: maolek means "good," fa'maolek includes the addition of the fa' prefix which can be translated to "to make it appear as," or "to make it so," thus fa'maolek meaning "to make it good." Afa'maolek is the next step, the "a" prefix acts as a reciprocal marker in the CHamoru language, thus afa'maolek translates to "making good for one another." Lastly, inafa'maolek includes the -in- infix which nominalizes a word, thus inafa'maolek translates to "the process of making good for one another." Taking from this core value, I advocate for a modification of this value: inafa'matatnga. Matatnga translates to "brave, fearless, and valiant," with inafa'matatnga meaning "the process of making one another brave and valiant." This modification comes from my disillusionment with the commodification and abuse of inafa'maolek. Inafa'maolek in Guåhan has been utilized as an interchangeable word for hospitality and open-armed natives ready to embrace what comes their way. Haunani-Kay Trask puts this perfectly in the context of Hawai'i and the word Aloha, writing,

The point, of course, is that everything in Hawai'i can be yours, that is, you the tourists, the non-Natives, the visitors. The place, the people, the culture, even our identity as a "Native" people is for sale. Thus the word "Aloha" is employed as an aid in the constant hawking of everything Hawaiian. In truth, this use of aloha is so far removed from any Hawaiian cultural context that is, literally, meaningless.²⁴

In a similar fashion, inafa'maolek has been stripped by the mainstream of its deep cultural meaning and has instead been used to represent CHamorus as generous, friendly, and welcoming. Thus, the invocation of inafa'matatnga is rather important in establishing another core value that is more

²⁴ Trask, *From A Native Daughter*, 144.

difficult to co-opt and that can help CHamorus move forward in challenging colonialism and imperialism.

I envision inafa'matatnga being used as a criterion for security policy with the two primary questions being, "Does this policy replicate the colonialism and insecurity of the past?" and "Does this policy or plan help to protect from outside colonialism and imperialism?" For example, the development of a cyberdefense program will fit the inafa'matatnga criterion of helping to prevent outside imperialism and take over by a foreign international actor. The development of naval vessels and technology could fit the inafa'matatnga criterion, but this is why the invocation of na'la'la' as the other core guiding principle of security policy in an independent Guåhan is so important. Passing one criterion alone does not qualify something as sound security policy as it will need to pass both criteria of na'la'la' and inafa'matatnga. Returning to the naval vessel example, if it was determined that building naval vessels and technology capacity can help defend against outside interference and imperialism, an independent Guåhan would then ask whether the development of those naval vessels would take too much of the fiscal budget away from schools and social programs or whether the port where they would be stationed would require a substantive amount of environmental degradation. Overall, these two values can act as guiding principles of a CHamoru-rooted and centered conception of security.

It is important to point out that this CHamoru-centered, Hau'ofian vision of security is not antithetical to defensive realism, but in many ways, can fit into the model. In his article, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," Jeffrey Taliaferro writes that, "The defensive variant of neoclassical realism posits a role for domestic politics in shaping states' foreign policies. Furthermore, defensive neoclassical realism specifies the conditions under which domestic politics matters in foreign policy."²⁵ This helps to show the complete compatibility of creating CHamoru-centered domestic policies that can spill over to an independent Guåhan's foreign policy as well.

²⁵ Jeffery Taliaferro, "Seeking Security under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000-2001): 142.

The next question one could ask is “What models of defense would be good to take after?” To begin, I look at the small state of Estonia. Estonia is a Baltic state bordered by Latvia, and of primary importance to Estonia, Russia. A former part of the USSR, when Estonia achieved independence in 1991, they ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territory and turned to NATO for security guarantees rather than Russia. This, along with many other factors and history, has made the Russia-Estonia relationship tense with Estonians wondering how they would defend themselves against immediate Russian attack or invasion. The Estonians take this potential threat seriously and have engaged in various activities aimed at defending their territory, sovereignty, and ensuring the survival of their people. I argue that an independent Guåhan, in conjunction with other countries of Oceania, can adapt these tactics.

“Her face puffy from lack of sleep, Vivika Barnabas peered down at the springs, rods and other parts of a disassembled assault rifle spread before her. Already, she and her three teammates had put out a fire, ridden a horse, identified medicinal herbs from the forest and played hide-and-seek with gun-wielding ‘enemies’ in the woods at night.”²⁶ This news story is referring to the activities of the Estonian Defense League (EDL), an organization of more than 25,000 Estonian volunteers dedicated to training themselves to be prepared for a possible Russian invasion. The EDL teaches their members insurgency tactics such as making improvised explosive devices and keeping firearms in their homes as well as survival skills like identifying edible and medicinal herbs and moving wounded people by horseback.²⁷ They hold “military games” almost every weekend and take their role very seriously, with members saying they are engaging in their “everyday contribution to security.”²⁸ Estonian Brigadier General Meelis Killi, who is the head of

²⁶ Andrew Kramer, “Spooked by Russia, Tiny Estonia Trains a Nation of Insurgents,” *New York Times*, October 31, 2016, accessed February 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/europe/spooked-by-russia-tiny-estonia-trains-a-nation-of-insurgents.html?_r=0.

²⁷ Kramer, “Spooked by Russia.”

²⁸ Vice News, “The Russians Are Coming: Estonia’s National Militia,” *YouTube*, December 2, 2015, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nhQS48vUye0>.

the Estonian Defense League, believes that “the best deterrent is not only armed soldiers, but armed citizens, too.”²⁹

The military doctrine behind this strategy can be summed up in the words of Madis Milling, MP and Lieutenant of the Estonian Defence League who said in an interview with *VICE News*, “If Russia knows that Estonia is not a walk in the park, maybe they will think twice.”³⁰ In military doctrine terminology, this strategy is referred to as porcupining. As Bernard FW Loo writes regarding porcupining and the island nation of Singapore: “The idea was that, like the porcupine rustling its quills and preventing hostile actors from causing harm to its body, the Singapore Armed Forces could defeat a hostile opponent even before this hostile opponent got close enough to direct deadly forces against the island.”³¹ To put it another way, the idea behind porcupining is becoming a pill too hard to swallow and thus providing a deterrence factor and making more powerful countries second guess possible aggression towards your country.

However powerful Estonia’s example may be for a nufu’ defense model, they are located in a completely different part of the world and are not an island. To supplement this model, it would be helpful to look at how this porcupine strategy works in island nations located in the Pacific Ocean. First, we will examine the defense strategy and military philosophy of Singapore. On January 9, 1982, Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong at the National University of Singapore outlined his vision of porcupining. In this speech, he said,

If someone threatens to step on us, and our only alternatives are suicide or surrender, then there will be a very strong argument for surrender. So, we need a policy which says: If you come I’ll whack you, and I’ll survive. This is a workable strategy. I may not

²⁹ Russ Read, “This Tiny European Country is Teaching Citizens How to Make IEDs in Case of a Russian Invasion,” *The Daily Caller News Foundation*, October 3, 2016, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://dailycaller.com/2016/10/31/this-tiny-european-country-is-teaching-citizens-how-to-make-ieds-in-case-of-a-russian-invasion/>.

³⁰ Vice News, “The Russians Are Coming.”

³¹ Bernard Loo, “Zoological Analogies and Military Strategy,” *Military Studies at RSIS*, August 4, 2012, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://rsismilitarystudies.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/zoological-analogies-and-military-strategy/>.

completely destroy you, but you will have to pay a high price for trying to subdue me, and you may still not succeed.³²

This evolved from Singapore's previous defense analogy of a poisonous shrimp. In the poisonous shrimp strategy, Singapore would be "easy to swallow, but impossible to digest."³³ In other words, "while Singapore could not resist a determined invader, the cost of any victory to an invader would be so high as to be an effective deterrent."³⁴ In explaining the reason for shifting from the "Poisonous Shrimp" strategy to the "Porcupine" strategy, Bernard Loo writes that the "Poisonous Shrimp" strategy was not satisfactory because it was "essentially defeatist; it envisaged the eventual defeat of Singapore and its disappearance. Its deterrent value was in the promise of great pain that the potential aggressor would suffer in the process of defeating the SAF, but that defeat was virtually guaranteed."³⁵

In switching their defense strategy to porcupining, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have developed some new tactics for national defense and have increased their material capabilities. Advocates of the porcupining strategy argue for "hardening key facilities and using mobile short-range defensive weapons to deny airspace, repel an invasion, and defy a blockade."³⁶ One of the first moves that Singapore made was adopting the system of national conscription where every 18-year old male who was able bodied was eligible for military service. Now, the Singapore Armed Forces has roughly 60,500 active military members and 213,800 reservists.³⁷ In addition to the building of their military, Singapore has also engaged in security cooperation initiatives with other countries to enhance their national interests. For example, they engage in border cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia, intelligence sharing with other Association of Southeast Asian Nation

³² "A Conversation with BG (Reservist) Lee Hsien Loong," *ASEAN Forecast* 4, no. 10, (October 1984).

³³ Michael Raska, *Military Innovation in Small States: Creating a Reverse Asymmetry* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 141.

³⁴ Raska, *Military Innovation*, 141.

³⁵ Raska, *Military Innovation*, 141.

³⁶ Jennifer Turner, "The Cost of Credible Deterrence in Taiwan," *War on the Rocks*, January 13, 2016, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-cost-of-credible-deterrence-in-taiwan/>.

³⁷ Bilveer Singh, "The Military and Small States: the role of hard power in Singapore's domestic and foreign policy," (paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference, Turin, Italy, September 2007).

(ASEAN) states, sharing training facilities with other countries due to their lack of physical space available in Singapore, multiple joint military exercises, and bilateral defense agreements with countries such as Australia and Israel.³⁸

The reason for studying Singapore's hard power and defense arrangements is that, like Guåhan, they are also potential victims of geography. Singapore is located near the southern end of the Straits of Malacca, which are by one of the busiest sea-lanes of the world. Because of this geography, they are the world's leading telecommunications hub and gateway to the region for air travelers.³⁹ Singapore is also located at the juncture of the Indian and the Pacific oceans, and this was a primary reason that Britain made Singapore its chief naval port in the region to safeguard its interests. It is also the only place in Southeast Asia that can service aircraft carriers and where these same aircraft carriers can dock onshore.⁴⁰ Yet, they have developed a deterrence capability and philosophy that does not just accept typical geographical determinism that characterizes them as small and important only as strategically exploitable by larger countries.

Like Estonia or Singapore, I argue that an independent Guåhan in the nufo' model can follow similar steps of small-state defense strategies and military doctrine. Some guiding principles of small-state defense can be found in a report entitled, "Vulnerability: Small States in the Globalised Society." In this report, the authors describe a number of measures to reduce the vulnerabilities of small states, including: "a. strengthening national defense capability, b. entering into defense arrangements with other states either on a bilateral, special multilateral or regional basis, c. underpinning security through economic growth by adopting sound national policies as well as advancing regional cooperation, d. promoting internal cohesion, and e. adopting a sound

³⁸ Bilveer Singh, "Singapore's Management of its Security Problems," *Asia-Pacific Community*, no. 29 (Summer 1985).

³⁹ Bilveer Singh, "The Military and Small States."

⁴⁰ Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story- 1965-2000* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2000).

diplomacy at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.”⁴¹ In my vision, an independent Guåhan, in adopting a Hau’ofian, defensive realist approach towards security can work with other Oceanic countries in collective military technology development, create large multilateral defense and security alliances with these same countries, utilize our strategic, geographical location for our benefit rather than the benefit of larger powers, create sound domestic policies that reflect a widened view of security inclusive of respect for i guinaha-ta (what we have), and lastly, be a primarily neutral country that does not fall into the liberal trap of invading countries to promote democracy or human rights. Instead of being the “tip of the spear,” I envision us being the “spines of the stonefish.” If the facts of geography are never-changing, then we need to use them to our advantage.

In envisioning this concept of the nufo’, I took a step back and wondered whether or not all I was doing was replacing one form of militarization with another. This is a very tempting argument, especially by certain peace activists who disdain any martial characteristics. In a conversation with Jairus Grove, I told him about this dilemma and he provided me with some wise words. He told me, “a martial life is not necessarily a militarized life and that the problem is that we think that everything that looks like a military acts like the American military.”⁴² Military capability does not have to equate to invading others or forcing our moral views on other states or peoples. Demilitarization should not be equated with helplessness or being defenseless. In choosing to model Guåhan foreign policy after defensive realism, it is the defensive capability that is emphasized. Defensive realism and stonefish geopolitics inspires us to understand that not every defense capability is offensive. Warriors or militaries of the West do not have the monopoly on protection. It would be naïve to believe that Guåhan should remain completely defenseless because weapons, martial characters, and national defense are the exclusive characteristics of the West.

⁴¹ Commonwealth Consultative Group, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat: 1985).

⁴² Jairus Grove, interview, April 16, 2017.

There will be some who argue that we should not have our own military or prioritize security alliances or military technology. They will look at the world and point out states like Costa Rica or Tuvalu and argue that a country without a military is not new, experimental, or unique, and that it is the route we should take. I heavily caution against such an idealist view of the world, particularly in the northern, western Pacific. Being situated in the region that is purported to be the region of the future, great power politics, neocolonialism, and imperialism will all be factors of the future. Having our own alliances and military capabilities does not mean that we will simply reinvent the wheel of oppressive militarization, but rather create a protected Oceania. There is still a lot of research to be done such as the promises and perils of alliances, the particulars of maritime and cyber defense technologies, the history of movements like the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific and the Non-Aligned Movement, and even how to move other countries to engage with this idea of the nufo', as they may be resistant to such a seemingly large shift from the bandwagoning with larger countries that this region is sorely used to.

I also want to point out that one of the most realistic options for defense could be a "Bilateral agreement with the United States." I could have written how the gaining of our sovereignty means we will be able to control their presence in Guåhan much more easily. I could have argued that we can just be like the FSM with the United States or like Papua New Guinea with Australia. Yet, I do not find this to be a satisfactory answer, and truly believe it is the epitome of putting a band-aid on an infected wound. I wanted to explore an answer that can be achievable one day even if that day is not today. I completely understand that neither I or my daughter may be alive when this vision comes into fruition. I also understand that this writing may end up in a published book that sits on dusty bookshelves for years. Yet, maybe one day, someone will pick it up and bring it to life.

This conclusion has not tackled every single issue presented in the dissertation nor has it provided solutions to every problem. I, quite honestly, do not know all the answers and do not

pretend to know. What I have presented in this conclusion is a patchwork of ideas, theories, hopes, and concerns about Guåhan's future paths. May you, the reader, pick up where I left off, correct me where I am wrong, or at least, just be inspired to keep fighting the good fight for a better Guåhan! Through this conclusion, what I hope to inspire in you, the reader, is that we need more of us at the forefront of the fight over how we know who we are. In this dissertation, I have provided countless examples of quotes justifying violence and the use of power due to indigenous inferiority, island isolation and diminutive size, or our complete erasure. These quotes reflect a dominant frame of mind that legitimizes violence, colonialism, and militarization of our lands, waters, ways of life, and cultures. In providing a genealogy of sustainable insecurity in Guåhan, I challenge the reader to take up the mantle of excavating insecurity in their communities and to create new knowledges, narratives, and forms-of-life for our peoples. Our grandchildren may thank us one day for it.

I Ettimo Na Finiho' Siha: A Final Story, A Final Plea, A New Letter

One warm Guåhan weekend, my daughter Inina and I were playing outside in my backyard. It was around 5:00 p.m. and it was a beautiful day with the wind blowing and the hot sun preparing for its rest. Then, as I pushed my daughter on the swing we bought her, a loud noise came overhead, and we saw a large, black plane breaking the sound barrier and flying above us. My daughter immediately got scared and wanted me to carry her. Seeping past the piercing decibels of B-52s taking off with the weight of 15 million pounds of munitions lies the CHamoru voice waiting to be heard. Beneath the curse of our lack of sovereignty and the manipulation of our geographical size and location, true genuine security for the CHamoru people is waiting. Truly, Guåhan deserves a future in which geography is our blessing and not our curse. Guåhan deserves a future where we take the cartographic pens away from the Pentagon and map our own policies and paths. My daughter deserves a future where all she can hear is the sweet wind blowing in her face as she swings in her childhood backyard. To that end, we cannot stop fighting for our right to self-

determination, even in the face of the increasing strategic importance of the island in American strategic thought regarding the Asia-Pacific region. To do any less, feels too much like giving into the self-fulfilling prophecy that we are just “Destiny’s Landfall.” Let us not forget that the “tip of the spear” is always the bloodiest.

I lahi-hu as Matatnga Gregorio,

Annai hu cho'gue iyo-ku thesis gi 2012, hu na'funhåyan ayu taiguini lokkue'. Hu tuge'i i che'lu-mu as Inina ya hu sangåni gui' na put guiya na hu tutuge' ayu na tinige'. Para este na dissertation, hu tutuge' este para hamyo na dos i patgon-hu siha. Gi minagåhet, annai hu sodda' na mapotge si nanå-mu, magof yu' yan triste yu' gi mismo tiempo. Magof yu' sa' kumekeilek-ña na u guaha otro patgon-hu yan gof na'magof enao, lao triste yu' lokkue' sa' chathinanasso yu' put håfa na klåssen mundo para un hålumi. Hu hasso un diha annai sumåsaga ham yan si nanå-hu giya Hawai'i, tumåtanges yu' annai hu hassuyi i tiempon mo'na para i tano'-ta yan i mundo lokkue'. Hu faisen maisa yu' kao maolek na para u guaha otro påtgon-hu pat kao bâba este para i patgon-hu? Håfa na klåsen tåno' para un hålumi? Håfa i chinatsaga ni para un fåna' gi lina'lå'-mu ni tåya' na hu hasso pat hu tungo' gi lina'lå'-hu. Gi finakpo' i diha, ti siña hu tulaika todū i malago' hu tulaika, lao ginen este na tinige'-hu, hu fa'nunu'i hao na hu chachagi tumulaika håfa siña hu cho'gue nu i todū i nina'siña-hu. Un diha, siempre para un taitai este, yan yanggen låla'la' yu' guihi na tiempo, pudi mohon na un sangåni yu' na guaha adilåntu yan gof magof hao na in na'i hao lina'la'. Yanggen un taitai este, yan bâbaba ha' i tano' ni un sagågayi, pues dispensa' yu' låhi-hu, put fåbot, asi'i yu' ya tungo' na hu gof guaiya hamyo yan i che'lu-mu. Sungon ha' sa' gof matatnga hao.

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