

Moosonee, Ontario: A Model of Cold War Change

By

Susan Heffernan

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Human Studies

Faculty of Graduate Studies
Laurentian University
Sudbury, Ontario

© Susan Elizabeth Heffernan, 2016

THESIS DEFENCE COMMITTEE/COMITÉ DE SOUTENANCE DE THÈSE
Laurentian Université/Université Laurentienne
Faculty of Graduate Studies/Faculté des études supérieures

Title of Thesis Titre de la thèse	Moosonee, Ontario: A Model of Cold War Change		
Name of Candidate Nom du candidat	Heffernan, Sue		
Degree Diplôme	Doctor of Philosophy		
Department/Program Département/Programme	Human Studies	Date of Defence Date de la soutenance	August 10, 2016

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

Thesis Examiners/Examineurs de thèse:

Dr. Linda Ambrose
(Supervisor/Directrice) de thèse)

Dr. Mark Kuhlberg
(Committee member/Membre du comité)

Dr. Anne-Marie Mawhiney
(Committee member/Membre du comité)

Dr. Steven High
(External Examiner/Examineur externe)

Dr. Stephen Meyer
(Internal Examiner/Examineur interne)

Approved for the Faculty of Graduate Studies
Approuvé pour la Faculté des études supérieures
Dr. Shelley Watson
Madame Shelley Watson
Acting Dean, Faculty of Graduate Studies
Doyenne intérimaire, Faculté des études
supérieures

ACCESSIBILITY CLAUSE AND PERMISSION TO USE

I, **Sue Heffernan**, hereby grant to Laurentian University and/or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or for the duration of my copyright ownership. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also reserve the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that this copy is being made available in this form by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.

Abstract

Considerable research has been conducted on the Canadian north over the past few decades. This research has focused on resource development (mining and forestry), on small resource towns, and on mega-projects such as the James Bay Hydro Project. To date, little work has been produced on the relationship between military activity in the north and the landscapes, communities and people affected by such activity.

This study examines the impact of the Cold War on the community of Moosonee, Ontario. By the mid-1950s Moosonee had become a shipping centre for northerly radar base developments. Further growth occurred as a result of the construction and operation of a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) radar base adjacent to Moosonee from 1961 to 1975. Moosonee adapted to two types of development: population growth generated by military construction and activity, and redevelopment initiated by the closure of the RCAF base. Community adaptation to growth included major changes to local infrastructure and the evolution of local government. Once the radar base closed, the town's residents seized the opportunity to use the housing and infrastructure on the RCAF base to fill local needs. Furthermore, local people worked with neighbouring communities to ensure that the RCAF base was transformed into a regional high school.

The initial purpose of this study was twofold: to understand the impact of military development by examining how Moosonee changed from 1955 to 1975, and to report back to the residents of Moosonee on research results. Near the conclusion of the interviews and data collection stage it became clear that the broader purpose of this study was to join the conversation on community development models and to develop a model which fit the Moosonee experience. The thesis concludes with an explanation of the stages of development in

Moosonee as compared to theoretical development stages, the impacts of the Cold War, and the way that impacts varied depending on the social status of individuals. It also demonstrates how Moosonee's residents transformed community planning from provincially driven to local citizen-driven planning.

Keywords: Cold War, interdisciplinary, Indigenous, community development, Northern Canada, Pinetree Line, radar bases.

Acknowledgements

The most important people that I need to acknowledge are the individuals who agreed to be part of the interview process. Their participation motivated and guided me throughout this study. To protect confidentiality, I do not name the interviewees; however, I dedicate this thesis to them.¹ In that way I hope they will see how valuable they have been to this study and to me personally.

The second group that I want to thank are my Committee members and in particular my thesis advisor Dr. Linda Ambrose. I was inspired to return to university after reading Linda's article "Our Last Frontier" and I have continued to be motivated by Linda's encouragement and assistance over the past six years.² In my opinion, Linda Ambrose was more than a thesis advisor; she was my mentor and coach. I would suggest that every graduate student needs a 'coach' if they are to survive the crises of confidence that are inherent in graduate work. My other Committee members, Dr. Anne-Marie Mawhiney and Dr. Mark Kuhlberg, provided assistance, particularly to broaden my bibliography and my perspective, but they also challenged me to do more throughout this process. This study and paper have a broader reach than initially envisioned due to all three members of the committee. I was fortunate to have two diligent external readers. Dr. Steven High, from Concordia University, provided critical but fair comments, and Dr. Stephen Meyer, from the School of Northern and Community Studies at Laurentian University, gave thoughtful and enthusiastic feedback.

A large number of individuals, both at Laurentian University and beyond, have provided critical assistance during the research on Moosonee. Léo Larivière, who is Laurentian's

¹ See Chapter Three on Methods and Ethics guidelines from Laurentian University.

² Linda M. Ambrose, "Our Last Frontier: Imperialism and Northern Canadian Rural Women's Organizations," *Canadian Historical Review* 86, no. 2(2005): 257-284.

cartography specialist, prepared four of the maps in this paper and guided me through the process of inserting air photos needed for the final dissertation. Léo's help was invaluable. Additionally, Ashley Thomson, one of Laurentian's librarians, listened patiently to my many questions about Refworks and Zotero and ensured that these tools worked when I needed them. Marthe Brown, Laurentian's Archivist, helped me find sources at the archives and in particular assisted my search for records on Moosonee and the disposition of the RCAF's chapel. In addition, Laurentian professors in the Human Studies Program assisted me, particularly in the early stages of my research. Specifically, I would like to thank Dr. Simon Laflamme, the Chair of Human Studies; Dr. Michael Yeo, and Dr. Cynthia Whissell. Professors at other universities also offered guidance. Dr. Matthew Farish at University of Toronto attended one of my first graduate presentations and recommended that I check the military files at the Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa. That advice proved invaluable for this project. In addition, Dr. Mary Jane Logan McCallum at University of Winnipeg provided guidance on Indigenous labour in the early stages of my research.

Laurentian University provided financial support in two areas. I received graduate teaching assistantships for three terms supplemented by graduate fellowships between September 2011 and December 2012. In addition, the Office of Graduate Studies and Research subsidized my travel costs for two conferences at which I presented my research results.

Archivists at several Ontario locations ensured that my document searches were successful. In particular I would like to thank Bethany Aitchison at the Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence for starting me on the Pinetree 'trail.' Warren Sinclair and Valerie Casbourn from the Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) also provided prompt and thorough assistance during my early archival research. In addition, Isabel Campbell, an historian

at DHH, gave me positive feedback and suggestions several times over the past two years. I also wish to thank Naomi Rupke, the Director/Curator of Discovery North-North Bay Museum and Sarah Aubertin, the Program Coordinator at Discovery North, for their assistance in helping me locate Moosonee files housed at their centre. In addition, Rebecca McGlynn and Agnes Legault of Ontario Northland (ONR) provided me with access to the remaining ONR archival files which they have retained. Staff at the Archives of Ontario must be congratulated for their professional and timely assistance with over seventy files accessed during the summer months of 2014. In particular I would like to thank Zoe Cliff and Jeffrey Mokler, who not only provided the files that I requested, but who patiently answered any questions I had—by email and phone, and in person at the Ontario Archives. The customer service at the Ontario Archives was outstanding and it was a key factor in my ability to complete the research phase of this study.

Kathy Perreault at the Ojibway and Cree Cultural Centre in Timmins searched early 1960s files for me and located an Ontario Cabinet report on Moosonee that Dr. John Long had recommended in 2014. For that I wish to thank Kathy and the late Dr. Long, whose presence in the field of James Bay's Cree history will be sorely missed. Paul Lantz provided early inspiration with his own beautiful photos of Moosonee and with his "Moosonee Postcards" website. This website displays vintage postcards of Moosonee, showing ground and air photos of the town during the Cold War. In addition I wish to thank Moosonee's Town Council for providing time on its busy agenda so that I could update them on this project.

I would also like to thank the other students in the Human Studies program. It would be accurate to state that we have cheered each other on over the past six years. My former colleagues at Ministry of Municipal Affairs have also shown interest and provided encouragement on this project. In particular, Lynn Buckham, my former Director, David King,

my former manager, Angela Pavlovic and Jane-Ann Schutt have always been there with positive and friendly encouragement. Other colleagues and friends that deserve my thanks are Cecelia McGuire, John Kalbfleisch, Louise Atkins, Duncan Bury, Lois Zelmer, Brian Hunsberger, and Margaret Klassen.

My family was the backbone of this project. My husband, Bruce Ralph, encouraged me from ‘day one.’ It meant a lot to me that, as a fellow child of the Cold War, Bruce could compare notes with me on a wide range of topics from Cold War politics to RCAF interceptors. My mother-in-law, Lois Ralph, helped me out by letting me browse and borrow from “Lois’s library.” My children, Joel Ralph and Alison Douglas, have also been constant supporters of this work and they were often available to help me stay positive when thesis research or writing seemed to slow down. My brothers and sisters have also been supportive during the past six years, but it was my eldest sister Kathleen Elie who was always the strongest cheerleader as time went by. She knew I would finish someday and she also knew that our parents, Ray and Mary Heffernan, would have been very proud. Thank you to all of my family.

Table of Contents

Abstract...	iii
Acknowledgements...	v
Table of Contents...	ix
List of Tables...	x
List of Figures...	xi
List of Maps...	xii
List of Appendices...	xiii
<u>Chapter One</u> : Introduction...	1
<u>Chapter Two</u> : Literature Review...	6
<u>Chapter Three</u> : Methods...	47
<u>Chapter Four</u> : Moosonee: Railway Town to Early Cold War Years...	63
<u>Chapter Five</u> : A Different Kind of Townsite: Planning and Construction of the Moosonee Radar Base...	78
<u>Chapter Six</u> : Occupation and Operation of the Moosonee Radar Base...	105
<u>Chapter Seven</u> : Water, Fire and Moosonee: The Development of Local Infrastructure and Services...	134
<u>Chapter Eight</u> : “We are willing to stand on our own two feet”: The Evolution of Local Government in Moosonee...	171
<u>Chapter Nine</u> : Not ‘the Beginning of the End’: The Closure of the Moosonee Base and Its Transformation...	204
<u>Chapter Ten</u> : Stages of Community Development, Impacts, and Change...	224
<u>Bibliography</u> ...	248
<u>Appendices</u> ...	263

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Cold War Radar Bases

Table 4.1: Population Records for Moosonee: 1911-1976

Table 6.1: Moosonee: Military Personnel, Civilian Employees and Radar Base Population

Table 8.1: Recommendations for Positions on the Moosonee Development Area Board.

Table 10.1: Moosonee Development Stages Compared to Bone and Lucas Models

List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Resource Town Cycle

Figure 2.2: Resource Town Development Stages

Figure 7.1: Growth in Moosonee Population and at Radar Base

Figure 10.1: Moosonee's Population, 1921-1986

Figure 10.2: Moosonee Model of Community Change

List of Maps

Map 1.1: Moosonee and Area

Map 2.1: CADIN/Pinetree Radar Bases

Map 4.1: Moosonee Townsite, the Village and the Proposed RCAF Base

Map 5.1: Moosonee Settlement Areas circa 1962

List of Appendices

Appendix One: Map of western James Bay communities

Appendix Two: Interview Questions and Interview Consent Forms

Appendix Three: Air photos of Moosonee 1960

Appendix Four: Moosonee RCAF Base: Air Photo, August 14, 1962.

Appendix Five: Construction Contracts in Moosonee: 1966-1969

Chapter One: Introduction

Considerable research has been conducted on the Canadian north over the past few decades. This research has focused on resource development (mining and forestry), small resource towns, and mega-projects such as the James Bay Hydro Project. To date, little work has been produced on the relationship between military activity in the north and the landscapes, communities and people affected by such activity. My research examines the impact of the Cold War on the community of Moosonee, Ontario.


Moosonee is a small northern Ontario Cree community located south of James Bay, directly across the Moose River from Moose Factory Island (see Map 1.1). Statistics Canada indicated the town's population was just over 2,000 in 2006, but the town itself records its population as closer to 3,200 people.¹ The town's website states that 85% of its residents are Cree, and that the languages spoken are English, Cree and French.² Moosonee is most commonly accessed by rail (Ontario Northland Railway) and by aircraft from Timmins. It is the only one of Ontario's 445 municipalities that cannot be accessed by road. Water transportation to and from the town is affected by the fact that the Moose River is a tidal river with two tides per day.³ Moosonee is within the Hudson's Bay Lowland geomorphic region and is surrounded by boreal forest (mostly black spruce, tamarack, and poplar) and wetlands.

¹ Statistics Canada showed 2006 people as the population in 2006 but it recorded only 1,725 people in 2011. The Town's own estimate of 3,200 is shown in the 2010 *Ontario Municipal Directory*, published by the Association of Municipal Managers Clerks and Treasurers of Ontario (AMCTO), Toronto. Note: this directory relies on municipal estimates from its member municipalities.

² The Town of Moosonee website indicates that the residents are about "85% Cree" and it is this site that provides the languages spoken by residents. <http://www.moosonee.ca>, accessed January 19, 2016. In this dissertation I use the terms Indigenous and mixed ancestry, in addition to Cree. This use of terms is guided by Sheila Coté-Meek's writing. See Sheila Coté-Meek, "Exploring the Impact of Ongoing Colonial Violence on Aboriginal Students in the Postsecondary Classroom," PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2010, 20-22. Chapter Three has further discussion on terminology.

³ Frederick Close, *All Aboard the Polar Bear Express: The Lure and Lore of the Land* (Simcoe: Morris Printing, 1966), 38.

Map 1.1: Moosonee and Area



Moosonee's closest neighbour is Moose Factory Island, which was the original Cree settlement in this area and the location of the first Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) fur trading post in northern Ontario (1673). Another key Moose Factory development was the building of the Bishop Horden Residential School, which housed Cree children from both northern Ontario

and Quebec from 1860 until the 1960s.⁴ Moose Factory is now commonly referred to as Moose Cree First Nation, which is a part of the Mushkegowok Council.

Unlike Moose Factory, Moosonee experienced little development until the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway (T. & N. O.) connected the town to Cochrane in 1932.⁵ By the mid-1950s Moosonee had become a shipping centre for northerly radar base developments. Further growth occurred as a result of the construction and operation of a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) radar base adjacent to Moosonee from 1961 to 1975. This study examines the ways that Moosonee adapted to two types of development: growth caused by military construction which began in 1955, and transformation initiated by the closure of the RCAF base in 1975.

What was the impact of the Cold War on the community of Moosonee?⁶ The Cold War decades from 1950 to 1990 represent the time when Canada, the United States, and other Western countries faced perceived and real threats of Communism and nuclear war with the Soviets. During the early years of the Cold War, three massive radar lines were constructed across the north: the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, the Mid-Canada line, and the Pinetree line. As noted above, Moosonee became the site for a Pinetree radar base.

⁴ See the Anglican Synod overview of the Horden residential school at <http://www.anglican.ca/relationships/files/2011>. This brief mention of the residential school is not meant to diminish the huge impact of the school on Indigenous people, but the full range of residential school development is beyond the scope of this project. The *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada* has one of the most comprehensive lists of resources on this topic at their website: <http://www.trc.ca>.

⁵ The Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway was renamed Ontario Northland Railway in 1946. The railway will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

⁶ The term ‘impact’ refers to the consequences for the community of Moosonee of hosting a radar base. See William Freudenburg. “Women and Men in an Energy Boomtown: Adjustment, Alienation, and Adaptation.” In *Rural Sociology* 46, no.2 (1981): 220. Freudenburg linked the terms impact and consequences in his work on small resource towns.

Land use planners describe human impacts as those that affect “individual people, groups, and social institutions.”⁷ Furthermore, they define the physical community as “buildings, streets, and open spaces,” or simply as “the built environment,” a term that includes infrastructure.⁸ My original goal had been to assess the human or personal impacts and the community or infrastructure impacts as separate elements, but my research has shown that human and structural changes are intertwined and interactive. The discussion of change will document this interaction throughout this dissertation. Kerry Abel has written that “The experience and symbolism of community ... [plays] a major role in the human experience.”⁹ I support her observation, but I also contend that a community is ultimately influenced and shaped by the condition and variety of its infrastructure and services. These in turn shape the human experience.

The initial purpose of this study was twofold: to understand the impact of military development by examining how Moosonee changed from 1955 to 1975 and to report back to the residents of Moosonee on research results. The latter approach is modelled on Indigenous community-based research that requires researchers to provide community members with findings that they have participated in and/or have an interest in because of where they live. My research is informed by both non-Indigenous and Indigenous research methods which will be explained in detail in Chapter Three.

This project joins the conversation on community development models and develops a model that describes the Moosonee experience. Normally the resource town literature would provide a sufficient model of growth and decline or ‘boom and bust’ for small resource towns. I

⁷ Gerald Hodge and David Gordon, *Planning Canadian Communities: An Introduction to the Principles, Practice, and Participants* (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008), 174.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Kerry Abel, *Changing Places: History, Community, and Identity in Northeastern Ontario* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s U. Press, 2006), xiv.

concluded, however, that Moosonee did not fit within resource town models and that a new model of development was needed.

Chapter Two of this study is a literature review which helps to place the Moosonee research in context. Chapter Three describes the methods that were used for this research. The evolution of personal, structural, and community change is described in the next six chapters. Chapter Four examines Moosonee as a railway town and looks at its early Cold War years. Chapter Five, “A Different Kind of Townsite,” describes the conflict between provincial planners, who wanted to integrate the town of Moosonee and its radar base, and officials from the Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) and RCAF who lobbied for a separate radar base. Chapter Six examines life on the radar base and demonstrates the ways that social and recreational activities linked the base and local people. Chapter Seven, “Water, Fire and Moosonee,” examines the development of local infrastructure. It shows how infrastructure and services, especially water distribution and fire protection services, created a symbiotic relationship between the town and the radar base. Chapter Eight examines the evolution of local government in Moosonee. This chapter documents how, initially, local governance had very little to do with local people. Chapter Nine closes the results section of this paper by demonstrating the ways that local people stepped forward and seized the opportunity to transform abandoned radar base facilities into town and regional assets. The thesis concludes with Chapter Ten, which proposes a new model of community development based on the stages observed in Moosonee.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

This chapter has two major components: a discussion of interdisciplinary research and a review of literature on the Cold War and radar bases. Both components are significant and interrelated. For this study, interdisciplinary research significantly shapes the understanding of the Cold War's impacts. The impacts of change are not limited to one field of research and therefore the assessment of such impacts needs to be examined from a variety of standpoints. The specific thesis topic – Moosonee as a Pinetree radar base – is part of the Cold War era and a major military build-up that occurred in Canada and elsewhere throughout much of the world. This chapter also includes a discussion of the impacts of military development on Indigenous peoples and it closes with a review of community development models.

Interdisciplinarity

Interdisciplinary research has been defined as “any form of dialogue or interaction between two or more disciplines.”¹⁰ Julie Thompson Klein, a frequent author on interdisciplinarity, has compared interdisciplinary work to multi-disciplinary projects which she argues combines disciplines so that they “speak as separate voices in an encyclopedic alignment.”¹¹ In other words, separate disciplines are dealt with in a linear fashion where they are “beside” each other, but there is a lack of interaction or integration among them. Klein has suggested that the concept of “integration of disciplines” is the “litmus test” of

¹⁰ Joe Moran, *Interdisciplinarity* (New York: Routledge, 2010). Also see Allen Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory* (Los Angeles: Sage Publishing, 2012), 14. Angeliqe Chettiparamb, *Interdisciplinarity: A Literature Review* (University of Southampton: The Interdisciplinary Teaching and Learning Group, 2007) suggests that the definition of interdisciplinarity includes the process of “...disciplines latching on to common elements.” (26).

¹¹ Julie Thompson Klein, *Humanities, Culture and Interdisciplinarity* (Albany: State University of New York, 2005), 55.

interdisciplinarity.¹² That is, without integration, any discussion of two or more disciplines is sufficiently multi-disciplinary but does not meet the definition of “interdisciplinary.”

Within the last decade, a group of research associates at Columbia University conducted an extensive literature review and interviews of interdisciplinary researchers in order to develop a new definition of interdisciplinarity. This group recommended the use of the following definition for interdisciplinary work:

Interdisciplinary research is any study or group of studies undertaken by scholars from two or more distinct scientific disciplines. The research is based upon a conceptual model that links or integrates theoretical frameworks from those disciplines, uses study design and methodology that is not limited to any one field, and requires the use of perspectives and skills of the involved disciplines throughout multiple phases of the research process.¹³

While this definition initially appears to be limited to the physical sciences, the Columbia researchers explained that their goal was to provide a clear term for use by scholars in health sciences, social sciences, business, and education. This definition is clear and is applicable to this dissertation. It is not as esoteric as some other definitions but it uses the terms “links” and “integrates,” two concepts which apply to interdisciplinary work.

Despite varying opinions on the strengths and weaknesses of disciplinary work, it is generally understood that interdisciplinary studies depend on disciplines for their base.¹⁴ William Newell, who edited *Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature*, emphasized that

¹² Julie Thompson Klein, “A Taxonomy of Interdisciplinarity” In *The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity*, eds Robert Frodeman, Julie Thompson Klein, and Carl Mitcham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 16-17. Also see Karen Messing, “Easier Said Than Done: Biologists, Ergonomists, and Sociologists Collaborate to Study Health Effects of the Sexual Division of Labour,” In Liora Salter and Alison Hearn, eds. *Outside the Lines: Issues in Interdisciplinary Research* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 95-102.

¹³ Sally Aboelela et al., “Defining Interdisciplinary Research: Conclusions from a Critical Review of the Literature, *Health Sciences Research* 42, (February 2007):341.

¹⁴ For writing that is particularly critical of mono-disciplinary research see Edgar Morin, *On Complexity* (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2008) and Allen Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory* (Los Angeles: Sage Publishing, 2012). For writing that emphasizes the positive aspects of interdisciplinary research layered with disciplinary research refer to the next footnote. For an insightful perspective on Canadian views on the positive and negative aspects of interdisciplinary research see Jill Vickers, “Thirty-five Years on the Beaver Patrol: Canadian Studies as a Collective Scholarly Activity,” in *Outside the Lines: Issues in Interdisciplinary Research*, eds. Liora Salter and Alison Hearn (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 78-84

“interdisciplinary courses depend on the disciplines for their perspectives as much as disciplinary courses depend on interdisciplinary ones to provide context.”¹⁵

This study seeks to integrate data and concepts from fields such as history, gender studies and land use planning in order to better understand the impact of the Cold War on Moosonee. Joe Moran has written that “interdisciplinarity is always transformative in some way, producing new forms of knowledge in its engagement with discrete disciplines.”¹⁶ To illustrate, gender studies examines the relationships between men and women, and within groups of men and women. Further it assists with an understanding of community power structures. Joan Wallach Scott writes that “gender” was ultimately about power and that “a scholarly understanding [of] the inequalities of power was organized along at least three axes (gender, race and class).”¹⁷ Joy Parr echoes this layered approach and indicates that an examination of gender, in particular, assists with our understanding of daily experiences.¹⁸ Because of the complexities of Moosonee during the Cold War, it is useful to examine the differences in the experiences of women and men who resided in Moosonee and those men and women who arrived to ‘populate’ the local Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) radar base. Everyday experiences differed depending on whether individuals were military personnel or civilian employees and whether they were Indigenous or non-Indigenous. Finally, it is important to examine community power structures that existed during the Cold War.

¹⁵ William Newell, “Academic Disciplines and Undergraduate Interdisciplinary Education,” In *Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature*, ed. W. Newell (New York: The College Board, 1998), 224. See also Tanya Augsborg and Stuart Henry, eds *The Politics of Interdisciplinary Studies*, (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2009), 251. These authors referred to interaction between mono-disciplinary academics and interdisciplinary researchers as “a symbiotic relationship.” They hypothesized that university interdisciplinary programs which did not interact with disciplinary programs risked dissolution.

¹⁶ Moran, *Interdisciplinarity*, 15.

¹⁷ Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 30.

¹⁸ Joy Parr, “Gender History and Historical Practice,” *Canadian Historical Review* 76, no. 3 (1995): 363.

Like gender studies, land use planning examines relationships, but the focus tends to be on land-based interaction. Jill Grant, the Director of the School of Planning at Dalhousie University, states that planning looks at the connections between “key elements,” such as:

- people, physical objects, and ecological processes;
- problems, subject matters, and specializations;
- jurisdictions (federal, provincial, regional, and municipal); (and)
- domains (social, economic, political, and physical).¹⁹

Allen Repko writes that land use problems are “highly appropriate for interdisciplinary inquiry and require drawing on insights from multiple disciplines to fully understand them.”²⁰ He cites Mathews and Jones’ work on systems theory and land use planning where these authors state that:

Problems associated with land use change include water-quality degradation created from developed landscapes, rising property values that lead to a lack of affordable housing, loss of aesthetic beauty ...and the uncertainties associated with new people, jobs, and ways of life invading an area.²¹

While employing land use planning methods to assess and map how the physical structure of Moosonee changed during the Cold War, this project also examined federal, provincial and local (quasi-municipal) jurisdictions that functioned ‘above’ and within Moosonee. Gender studies supported an understanding of “personal experience” in the community, and planning literature informed analysis of the “community experience”: that is, the way the town’s entire landscape and infrastructure changed as it was impacted by military

¹⁹ Jill Grant, “Planning Canadian Communities,” In *A Reader in Canadian Planning: Linking Theory and Practice* ed. Jill Grant, (Toronto: Nelson Publishing, 2008), 9.

²⁰ Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research*, 154. Planning is sometimes described as “urban studies” or as part of Environmental Studies. Augsburg and Henry use both urban studies and Environmental Studies as examples of “content-based” interdisciplinary programs (9).

²¹ L. G. Mathews and A. Jones, “Using Systems Thinking to Improve Interdisciplinary Learning Outcomes,” *Issues in Integrative Studies* 26 (2008): 75 quoted in Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research*, 154. Underline mine. The choice of the word “invading” is appropriate for thesis work which looks at military intervention in a community. However, it is startling to see this term in an example that is only intended to relate to “everyday” land use planning.

activity. As noted in the introduction, the two elements – personal and community experiences – tend to be integrated throughout this inquiry. The combination, in particular of history and planning, allowed for linked disciplinary perspectives, thus showing the potential for the “synergy of multiple perspectives” observed by Shailer.²²

One of the key steps in interdisciplinary research is the production of a literature review of “relevant” disciplines.²³ The initial literature search for research on Moosonee followed this approach by examining key thematic areas including the Cold War, radar bases, gender studies, Indigenous peoples, and land use planning. Thematic areas were not constructed to limit the range of disciplinary material reviewed. Rather these thematic groupings were intended to ensure a broad examination of material that could provide perspectives on the question of the Cold War and Moosonee. As another example of the interdisciplinarity, the broad literature review assisted with a comprehensive integration of insights on both personal relationships and community change in Cold War Moosonee.²⁴ While the initial approach had been to try to separate personal/human impacts from community or structural change, in analyzing the data from both archives and interviews, and by using an interdisciplinary lens, it became clear that personal and community impacts were inextricably linked.

Interdisciplinary research can facilitate the examination of the ways that communities change over time, and how localities respond to stressors like mega-projects (e.g. radar bases, hydro dams, opening of new mines/industries). Mannell and Ternoway used interdisciplinary

²² Kathryn Shailer, “Interdisciplinarity in a Disciplinary Universe: A Review of Key Issues,” (Council of Ontario Universities, 2005), 6. (Note: Synergy is generally understood as an interaction of two things/objects to produce more than the sum of the individual parts.)

²³ See Allen Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory* (Los Angeles: Sage Publishing, 2012) for some of the most recent writing on research steps in interdisciplinary research. Although parts of this writing appear somewhat dogmatic, my research was able to obtain guidance on basic research processes such as the literature review.

²⁴ As noted earlier in this chapter, “integration of disciplines” and “integration of insights” are both essential to interdisciplinary work. See Klein, “A Taxonomy of Interdisciplinarity,” 16-17 on integrating disciplines and Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research*, 154 on integrating insights.

language in their discussion of planning when they stated that “daily life is not constrained by departmental boundaries” and that a true understanding of a community requires “weaving separate parts together.”²⁵ The “separate parts” to which these planners referred were the environment, infrastructure, local government, housing, and socio-economic aspects of a community. Recent work by Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) researchers suggests that “an interdisciplinary survey of the [DEW] Line ... and [its] wider Arctic contexts is long overdue.”²⁶ The literature review on Moosonee has shown that neither an interdisciplinary survey, nor any comprehensive analysis, exists for Pinetree radar bases like Moosonee. This study of Moosonee benefits from an interdisciplinary approach because it places the town in its Cold War context and it meshes the “separate parts” noted by Mannell and Ternoway.

The Cold War

The central question of this study is “What was the impact of the Cold War on northern Canada, and specifically on the community of Moosonee?” Understanding the Cold War itself is critical to analyzing military impacts on the town. From 1955 to 1975 Moosonee was a shipping centre for more northerly Mid-Canada radar bases (mid-1950s) and it had a neighbouring Pinetree radar base (1961 to 1975).

Although the Cold War is considered to be the four decades from 1950 to 1990, it actually began for the Canadian government in September 1945 with the Gouzenko spy affair.²⁷

²⁵ Laura Mannell and Heather Ternoway, “The Need to Do More: Advancing Planning with First Nations Communities,” *Plan Canada* 48, no. 2 (2008) 22.

²⁶ P. Whitney Lackenbauer et al., *The Distant Early Warning Line: A Bibliography and Documentary Resource List*, (Arctic Institute of North America, 2005), 2.

²⁷ Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, defected and revealed to the RCMP that there was an elaborate Soviet spy ring operating in Canada. On Gouzenko, the Cold War and incidents, ranging from the Gerda Munsinger Affair to anti-Communist ‘witch hunts’, see Reginald Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, “Canada in a Cold War World,” in *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-57* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994); Reginald Whitaker and Steve Hewitt, *Canada and the Cold War* (Toronto:

It is important to examine two specific aspects of the Cold War in order to understand why three lines of radar bases were constructed on northern Canadian soil. These aspects are the fear of nuclear war, and the defence and sovereignty issues that forced Canada to accept American defence systems and to develop its own defence network.

Distrust and fear of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did not begin with the Gouzenko affair. Western powers were intensely skeptical of the Soviets as early as the signing of the Russo-Germany Non-Aggression pact in 1939.²⁸ Despite being Allies from 1941 to 1945, some members of the American military expected to defend North America from the USSR. During his tour of northern military megaprojects in 1943, Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner to Canada, wrote that some American officers felt that the infrastructure they were creating would help them “fight the Russians in the next world crisis.”²⁹ Also, during 1943, a war-time advisor to President Roosevelt described Canada’s “almost empty northland” as a “dangerous military vacuum” that the Soviets could fill.³⁰ Clearly, the image of an ‘empty’ north was problematic for some strategists.

Shortly after the Second World War ended, the Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) recommended that Canada and the United States reaffirm their goal to work together on the defence of North America.³¹ This recommendation was based on a subcommittee report which suggested that if a new war occurred, it would start with the Soviets

James Lorimer & Co., 2003); Matthew Farish, *The Contours of America’s Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); and Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987).

²⁸ Some government and military leaders likely dated their distrust from the Bolshevik revolution. (A history of communism and anti-communist sentiments is not part of this research).

²⁹ Shelagh Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988), 112. Malcolm MacDonald was the British High Commissioner to Canada during the Second World War, Grant, 110.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 95.

³¹ The PJBD was formed in August, 1940. See Shelagh Grant, *Sovereignty or Security*, 59. Also see Shelagh Grant, “World War II, 1939-1945,” In *Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America* (Vancouver, Douglas and McIntyre Inc., 2010) for a further discussion on Canadian/American defence operations during the Second World War.

launching atomic weaponry by air over Canada. Because of the potential for Soviet aggression, the subcommittee pushed for the massive development of airfields and radar bases. This recommendation for an accelerated military buildup in the Canadian north was one of the first of its kind and it was typical of the pressures generated by the fear of nuclear war.³² The Canadian government initially deferred construction plans for northern radar bases but it did publicly reaffirm its commitment to joint Canadian-American defence of North America during February 1947. Less than a month after this affirmation, the official newspaper of the Soviet Union, *Izvestia*, wrote: "the intensive efforts of the United States military circles to transform Canada into an advance United States base for imperialist expansion have at last been successful."³³

Kenneth Eyre has suggested that the "watchful eye" of the USSR was one of the reasons Canada initially hesitated to build northern radar bases. In his "Forty Years of Military Activity" article he wrote that both Mackenzie King and Lester Pearson (as then Minister for External Affairs) felt that northern Canadian bases could be used against North America if captured by the Soviets. Furthermore Eyre wrote that "Canada elected to develop forces with the capability of recapturing a Soviet-occupied airfield in the north."³⁴ Although the concept of Soviet troops capturing parts of northern Canada now seems difficult to believe, it is the type of late 1940s belief that permeated government discussions during the Cold War.

Three events ruptured the few years of peacetime after the Second World War and pushed Canada and Canadian politicians further into what Valerie Korinek has called the "Age

³² David Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 155.

³³ Grant, *Sovereignty*, 186.

³⁴ Kenneth Eyre, "Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-87," *Arctic* 40, no.4 (1987): 295. Also see J. Tuzo Wilson, "Winter Manoeuvres in Canada." *Canadian Geographical Journal* 32, no. 2 (1946): 88-100 for a fascinating description of 'Operation Muskox,' one of the lengthier military survival and defence field tests conducted in the Arctic.

of Anxiety.”³⁵ The three key events were the detonation by the USSR of its first atomic bomb in 1949, the testing in 1953 of its first hydrogen bomb, and the demonstration of a long-range bomber at the May Day parade in Moscow in 1954. Shortly after the 1949 test, Canada and the US started discussing building the Pinetree Radar Line, and after the H-bomb and demonstration of a long range bomber, two other lines were initiated -- the Mid-Canada Line and the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line).³⁶

Cold War jitters affected more than just government strategies. The general public was placed “on alert” by the extensive news coverage of defence strategies and by the fear of being “nuked.” Bryan Palmer discusses the wide range of Cold War advertisements, pamphlets and texts which advised the public broadly on defence strategies and specifically on the construction of bomb shelters. In “Shelter from the Storm,” Palmer writes that 1,328 air raid sirens were built across Canada and that Canadian officials distributed 10 million ‘survival’ booklets to the general public between 1959 and 1962.³⁷ He also notes that nuclear survival strategies differed in the US compared to Canada. For example, he writes that, “in Canada, it seems, school officials worried about communications, but in the United States the concern was with the more extreme scenario of problems of identification should masses of children be lost, wounded, or dead.”³⁸

³⁵ Valerie Korinek, “‘It’s a Tough Time to Be in Love’: The Darker Side of *Chatelaine* during the Cold War,” in *Love, Hate and Fear in Canada’s Cold War*, ed. Richard Cavell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 175.

³⁶ Grant, *Sovereignty*, 230. Shelagh Grant suggests that “plans were quickly put in motion” for the Pinetree Radar Line after the Soviet atom bomb test of 1949, but Bercuson writes that it took until February 1951 for the Canadian Cabinet to agree to its construction. See Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 223. Also see J.L. Granatstein, “The Defence D eb acle, 1957-1963,” in *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1986), 105 on the 1954 May Day parade. All three radar lines will be discussed in more detail in the next part of this chapter.

³⁷ Bryan Palmer, “Shelter from the Storm: The Cold War and the Making of Early 1960’s Canada,” in *Canada’s 1960’s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009): 67. Ten million survival booklets was substantial, especially considering that the population of Canada in 1951 was only fourteen million.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 68.

Although American articles about nuclear war focused on the horrors of “the bomb,” they usually concluded with the United States winning the war and doing so with survivors. For example, Matthew Farish’s discussion of ‘Anxious Urbanism’ shows young American students in the midst of an air raid drill, and describes American families reading about nuclear obliteration in *Life* magazine’s simulation of a nuclear attack on Washington, D.C.³⁹ However, the general message for the public was that survival was possible. Nuclear articles were supplemented by full-length texts which implied that Communism would proliferate if the Soviets won what seemed to be an inevitable nuclear war.⁴⁰

Canadian publications also discussed the possibility of nuclear war. For example, a *Maclean’s* article in 1951 suggested that nine nuclear bombs would hit key Canadian cities should nuclear war become a reality.⁴¹ Apparently emergency measures managers felt the public had to be truly frightened before it would actually believe in the value of building bomb shelters.⁴² Even *Chatelaine*, while providing thoughtful coverage on the banning of the hydrogen bomb in 1958 and on whether Canada should accept nuclear warheads on its missiles in 1961, still managed a few articles such as the 1962, “Can you Protect Your Family from the Bomb?”⁴³ Clearly, the Cold War fear of nuclear obliteration was a significant issue to

³⁹ Farish, “Anxious Urbanism” in *Contours of America’s Cold War*, 209-211. Farish also describes an August 5, 1950 article in *Colliers* magazine entitled “Hiroshima, U.S.A.” which shows a nuclear bomb detonating over part of New York City (211). Also see Whitaker and Hewitt, *Canada and the Cold War*, pp 126-128 for civil defence photos including a 1954 photo of Canadian kindergarten children covering their heads and crouching in a classroom corner to prepare for a nuclear blast. Note: This author (SH) took part in school air raid drills in the late 1950s.

⁴⁰ See for example, James Michener, *The Bridge at Andau* (New York: Random House, 1957) about the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviets. Also see John Gunther’s *Inside Russia Today* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958) for another (somewhat milder, but still apprehensive) viewpoint on Soviet Russia.

⁴¹ “If the Russians Attack Canada” *Maclean’s*, June 15, 1951, cited in Jockel, 42.

⁴² Both Farish and Palmer note that emergency measures officials were disappointed in the small number of bomb shelters built after nuclear articles were published. Estimates suggested that less than 1% of Americans had built shelters. (Palmer, 69) This seemed to suggest that the public was not convinced survival after nuclear war was a likely outcome—with any form of preparation. Also see Whitaker and Marcuse (130-131) on the deliberate ‘scaring’ of civilian populations.

⁴³ Korinek, 167-169.

Canadians. Korinek notes, in this regard, that *Chatelaine*, which had a readership of over 900,000 in 1969, saw its readers switch from women's health to international politics as one of the top topics requested.⁴⁴

At the core of public opinion in both Canada and the United States was the demand for protection from nuclear destruction. The fear of nuclear war fueled defence strategies and put pressure on politicians to erect defence infrastructure and systems. Whether or not there was a need to be afraid was not really the issue over time. Instead, an anxious public became less critical about the size of military budgets and more concerned about being forewarned of nuclear attack.

Canadian politicians and civil service mandarins spent most of the Cold War trying to reconcile the need for defence with the goal of retaining sovereignty particularly in the north. That is, each time prime ministers (from Mackenzie King to St. Laurent, and from Diefenbaker to Pearson) had to decide on specific structures (such as radar lines) or specific weaponry (such as nuclear warheads) they had to weigh the costs of submitting to the 'friendly invasion' of the Americans versus the failure to protect Canada from nuclear obliteration. The term 'friendly invasion' has been used most recently by Steven High in his discerning comparison of the impacts of American and Canadian servicemen in Newfoundland during the Second World War.⁴⁵ Morris Zaslow adds that even before the end of war, the arrival of huge numbers of American troops in the Canadian north caused political angst in Ottawa. He states that:

⁴⁴ Ibid., 161-162.

⁴⁵ Steven High, ed., *Occupied St. John's: A Social History of a City at War, 1939-1945* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010). High dispels the myth that Canadian servicemen were less popular than the Americans in Newfoundland during the Second World War in his extensive analysis of military impacts on this former British colony. See also Shelagh Grant's, *Sovereignty or Security?* for a discussion on the thousands of Americans who arrived in northwestern Canada during construction of the Alaska Highway (1942) and the Canol Pipeline (1942-1944).

Canadian military planners were expecting to maintain the defensive alliance in the North, as much to forestall steps by the United States on its own to safeguard its security as to avert any as yet perceived Soviet threat. The troubled international situation after 1945 quickly reversed the American withdrawal from northern Canada and soon American servicemen ...were back at some of the wartime bases in the Arctic...raising renewed concerns about maintaining Canada's authority and even its sovereignty.⁴⁶

To a certain extent, Canadian political advisors hoped that Canada's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would give it "some strength in numbers" as the US was only one of fourteen member countries. Additionally, Canada joined NATO hoping for an organization that would support social and economic interaction among non-Communist countries.⁴⁷ Unfortunately, Canada's participation in NATO meant that it was pressured to provide troops and aircraft to Europe while still maintaining its own defence system in northern Canada. Bercuson writes that NATO "would cover virtually all of the defence contingencies of its European members but would not protect North America from Soviet air attack."⁴⁸ Another writer, Edward Hull, indicated that Canada's role in Europe as part of NATO was critical and that, "its massive Northern wilderness is a vital element of North American defense."⁴⁹ Hull indicated that an "extensive radar network" was being built and that "on defense, the United States and Canada work together."⁵⁰ Unfortunately, Canada's hopes for a broad based coalition in the form of NATO ended up linking it even more closely with American military planning.

⁴⁶ Morris Zaslow, "The North in the Second World War," in *The Northward Expansion of Canada, 1914-1967* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 227.

⁴⁷ Whitaker and Hewitt, 62. Also see Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, "A New Cabinet and Its Foreign Policy," in *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 135-136.

⁴⁸ Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 204-220.

⁴⁹ Edward Hull, "A Steel Ring for the Iron Curtain: An Appraisal of Air Power in Other Nations." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 299, no. 1 (1955): 56. Hull also stated that "Canada is an air power out of all proportion to its population of 14 million. It has twelve squadrons (300 F86E Canadian-built Sabers) in Europe."

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* Note that the American spelling "defense" is used as part of American quotes, while the Canadian spelling – "defence" – is used for most writing in this paper.

The final pressure point for Canada was its participation in the Korean War (1950-53) at a time when its limited military resources were devoted primarily to NATO and Western Europe.⁵¹ Even more significantly, during the early stages of the Cold War, Canada was, in effect, seen as a de facto partner of the United States. One of the ways Canada tried to ‘push back’ against this partnership was to defer its participation in the DEW Line and to focus instead on its own radar line -- the Mid-Canada Line (also called the McGill Fence). But as Reginald Whitaker and Gary Marcuse point out, Canada was truly a junior partner in defence:

The Canadian government was never fully convinced that the DEW Line was in fact necessary, and it had hoped, by taking responsibility for the Mid-Canada Line, to avoid the vast expenditures projected [for] installations in the high Arctic. But in the end, a glum cabinet faced the reality that if the Americans ... wanted such an installation they would have it, one way or another.⁵²

As the Cold War progressed and radar line construction was completed, Canada became even more closely controlled by the US military through the creation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD).⁵³ Joseph Jockel has written a detailed outline of how Canada’s defence system came under the control of the United States.⁵⁴ He shows not only how the ratification of the NORAD program sidestepped senior civil servants and Members of Parliament, but also how Diefenbaker was ultimately publicly criticized for his rash approval of Canada’s participation. After this first ‘speedy’ defence decision, and the fairly abrupt cancelling

⁵¹ See Bercuson’s chapter “Korea and NATO” in *True Patriot*, for a more detailed discussion of how Brooke Claxton, as Minister of Defence, tried to initially defer Canada’s involvement in Korea. Also see Bothwell et al., pp 138-140 on Canada’s initial intention to provide aid rather than troops. Eventually Canada provided 6,670 troops and fighter aircraft. By the end of the Korean War, 312 Canadian troops had died.

⁵² Whitaker and Marcuse, 145.

⁵³ Robert Bothwell et al., “Bad Luck and Bad Management,” in *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 242. These authors indicate that Prime Minister John Diefenbaker approved NORAD only one month after winning the 1957 election and with “little thought and without cabinet scrutiny.”

⁵⁴ Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987).

of the Avro Arrow program in 1959, Diefenbaker's style changed to one of almost complete indecision.⁵⁵

J. L. Granatstein's "Defence D  b  cle" outlines this indecision in regard to two critical issues: the Cuban Missile Crisis and the use of nuclear warheads on Canadian BOMARC missiles. The Diefenbaker government had negotiated with the Americans in 1958 to establish two BOMARC missile sites in Canada and to allow the construction of seven additional Pinetree radar bases. Moosonee was the location of one of the new radar bases. As the BOMARC and Pinetree sites were being built between 1960 and 1962, Diefenbaker waffled about whether or not to fully arm BOMARC missiles.

The "Defence D  b  cle" expanded into a series of discussions in the early 1960s, which occurred as President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker played out their extreme dislike of each other on the international stage. Their personal animosities potentially risked the long term safety of both Canadian and American citizens.⁵⁶ The level of animosity between the Prime Minister and the President peaked with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Jockel writes that, despite being a partner in NORAD, Canada was not consulted regarding the American approach to Russia's construction of missile silos on Cuba.⁵⁷ Instead Kennedy phoned Diefenbaker only two hours prior to a public television broadcast on the crisis, and Diefenbaker responded by hesitating for two full days before going to full national defensive alert ("DEFCON 3" in American terms).⁵⁸

⁵⁵ See Granatstein, "Defence D  b  cle," on NORAD (102), on Avro Arrow (109), on Cuban Missile Crisis (112-114). Also see Bothwell et al. on BOMARCS (ground to air missiles), 246.

⁵⁶ See Patricia McMahon, *Essence of Indecision: Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy 1957-1963* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's U. Press, 2009) for a further discussion of how personal animosities risked the long term safety of both Canadian and American citizens.

⁵⁷ Jockel, 128.

⁵⁸ Granatstein, 113-116.

Ultimately the public felt that Diefenbaker's hesitation on nuclear warheads and Cuba was threatening its safety. 'Dief' was defeated in the April 1963 election by Lester B. Pearson, who immediately arranged for nuclear warheads to be installed on the BOMARCs. Granatstein writes that Diefenbaker was defeated due to his inability "to make decisions quickly — one way or the other — on the question of acquiring nuclear weapons [from the US] for the Canadian armed forces."⁵⁹ However, it did not help Diefenbaker in Parliament and in the 1963 election when he was publicly criticized by the US State Department for his indecision regarding defence matters. In fact, the American ambassador to Canada stated after the election that Diefenbaker's election loss should be a lesson to "future aspirants to political office in Canada."⁶⁰ Clearly the Cold War affected everyday citizens, defence strategists and those individuals who would govern Canada. Against this background of tension and nuclear anxiety, the Moosonee RCAF radar base became fully operational in October 1962.

Northern Canadian communities shared in the anxiety about nuclear war which pervaded North America. However, certain northern communities had an even stronger sense of military impacts because they were the sites for Cold War radar bases which were situated in three systems or lines as shown in Table 2.1.

Literature on radar lines describes some aspects of the construction and operation of radar bases across both the Arctic and sub-Arctic. It thus provides the context for the construction of a base in Moosonee. Unfortunately, most literature on Cold War Canada focuses on organizations, such as NATO and NORAD, and political struggles, rather than on defence infrastructure. Even when Canadian academics discuss defence systems they tend to describe defence weaponry (e.g. nuclear warheads) and aircraft rather than radar sites. For example, Bothwell et al provide

⁵⁹ Granatstein, 102.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 138.

considerable detail on strategic discussions related to aircraft such as the Avro Arrow, the Voodoo, and the Starfighter. However, these authors make no reference to radar lines or radar bases in their text *Canada Since 1945*.⁶¹

Name of Radar Line	Dates of Operation	Number of Stations	Cost Sharing
Pinetree Line	1954-1988	Initially 34 stations, with 7 more added in 1961	1/3 Canada, 2/3 paid by U.S.
Mid-Canada Line (also referred to as MCL and/or 'McGill Fence')	1957-1965	90 unstaffed stations with 8 large Section Control stations	\$200 million, paid by Canada
Distant Early Warning ('DEW Line')	1957-1988	22 Stations with 4 Main Bases	\$500 Million for construction, paid by U.S.

Three other examples of limited discussion on radar lines include Liza Piper's *The Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada*, Whitaker and Marcuse's "Canada in a Cold War World," and Palmer's "Shelter from the Storm."⁶³ Piper discusses the Second World War megaprojects such as the Canol Pipeline, but her four references to the Cold War do not mention that era's megaprojects. Whitaker and Marcuse's text is a detailed analysis of political aspects of

⁶¹ It would be difficult to interpret Cold War defence debates without having some knowledge of the various aircraft referred to in government and newspaper reports. See for example, Granatstein's discussion of the 'Defence D  b  cle.' Kenneth Weaver's article "Of Planes and Men" is also useful in this regard, particularly as it adds photos to the discussion and is one of the few texts to clearly explain what an "interceptor" is. Most authors assume that readers already know that an "interceptor" was an aircraft sent out by NORAD observers after unidentified images appear on radar screens. If contact could not confirm the identity of the radar image, then the interceptor's role was to destroy the image/aircraft with rocket power (330). See Kenneth F. Weaver, "Of Planes and Men: U.S. Air Force Wages Cold War and Hot." *National Geographic* 128, no.3 (1965) 298-349.

⁶² Roy Fletcher, "Military Radar Defence Lines of Northern North America: An Historical Geography." *Polar Record* 26, no. 159 (1990): 265-276. The terms "manned" and "unmanned" stations were common in radar base literature and will occasionally be used as they appear in sourced documents.

⁶³ See Palmer, *Canada's 1960's* and Whitaker and Marcuse in earlier footnotes. Also see Liza Piper, *Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2009).

the Cold War (they have three chapters on Gouzenko alone) but it has only one page referencing the radar lines.⁶⁴ Finally, Bryan Palmer's discussion of the Cold War has one sentence on radar bases that reads "three Arctic radar detection networks built on American initiative between 1954 and 1957 were the basis of growing tension."⁶⁵

In other sources, radar lines have been mentioned but the focus has been limited solely to the DEW Line, or only two of the three radar lines have been documented. For instance, Kenneth Eyre refers solely to the DEW radar line in his discussion of military development in northern Canada and Kenneth Rea writes that "two strings of radar stations were built across the arctic and subarctic."⁶⁶ Morris Zaslow provides one of the earlier Canadian descriptions of the three radar lines in his *Northward Expansion of Canada*, published in 1988.⁶⁷ He refers to the DEW Line as a "far grander system" than Canada's Mid-Canada Line.⁶⁸

Zaslow's discussion was sourced from a *National Geographic* article on the DEW Line. The article, by Howard La Fay, titled "DEW Line, Sentry of the Far North" includes both details on radar systems and information on working conditions.⁶⁹ La Fay refers to "minus 50-degree temperatures and blinding white-outs" and notes that 35 men were killed during its construction phase.⁷⁰ He also briefly describes the role of the two more southerly radar lines. La Fay writes that the Mid-Canada Line (he calls it "the radar fence") will confirm the "preliminary alert" by the DEW stations, and that the Pinetree Line stations will provide "data on height, speed, and

⁶⁴ Whitaker and Marcuse, 145

⁶⁵ Palmer, 54. Palmer does not indicate in his text what the source of tension was in relation to radar lines, although he was likely referring to the issue of an American presence on Canadian soil.

⁶⁶ Eyre, 293 and Kenneth J. Rea, *The Political Economy of Northern Development* (Ottawa, Science Council of Canada, 1976), 92. There were three radar lines, not two, as noted in Table 2.1.

⁶⁷ Zaslow, "The North in the Second World War," 325-330. Zaslow also briefly refers to the Mid-Canada Line and Pinetree Line in this discussion. Also see Rea (1968), 308-311. Rea mentions "defence ... stations comprising the 'fence' itself" but it appears he has no other information on the Mid-Canada Line or "McGill Fence."

⁶⁸ Zaslow, 326.

⁶⁹ Howard La Fay, "DEW Line, Sentry of the Far North," *National Geographic* 114, no. 1 (1958): 128-146.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 131. La Fay indicates that the DEW Line could not yet detect Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) but instead was intended to stop piloted bomber aircraft.

direction of enemy bombers.”⁷¹ La Fay never uses the term Soviet nor does he refer to the USSR, however his writing is similar to the fear of nuclear war articles noted earlier. For example, he writes:

In the event of an enemy attack across the polar ice, the DEW Line would flash instant warning... The time thus gained could spell the difference between national life and death for Canada and the United States... Enemy jets, traveling at the speed of sound, would require more than an hour to fly between the DEW Line and any major North American city. Warned of their approach, the civilian population could seek cover while interceptors took to the air. At the same time, retaliatory bombing could commence from bases around the world.⁷²

La Fay’s message is clear: Be afraid but know that the US government has spent millions to save you and that radar lines are not just there to detect bombers, but to ensure that there will be time for retaliation.⁷³

In contrast to La Fay’s dramatic article is Farley Mowat’s, *High Latitudes: A Northern Journey*, which is a narration of two trips to the Arctic in 1966.⁷⁴ Mowat describes workers at the Hall Beach DEW station as follows: “The inmates were not a happy lot. Their faces were pale and oily like those of people forced to sit up all night in a crowded airport ... Too many men cooped up in too confined a space for too long.”⁷⁵ Mowat’s writing is more realistic in describing the tedium suffered by isolated workers than La Fay’s adventurous prose.

Other articles from the 1950s and 1960s, dealing with the construction of both the DEW Line and the Mid-Canada line (MCL), used La Fay’s writing as a template. That is, they covered the difficulties inherent in northern construction and the need to protect the public with what La

⁷¹ Ibid., 136. This article also includes a generalized map of all three radar lines and it even shows Moosonee, and the railway leading to this community (136-137).

⁷² Ibid., 131 and 133. Emphasis mine.

⁷³ An earlier article (1955) in *Harper’s* magazine referred directly to ‘Russian’ bombers, and indicated that the DEW Line was a chance to “meet the Russians at the summit-the summit of the world.” See Leslie Roberts, “The Great Assault on the Arctic: Building the DEW Line” *Harper’s* (1955): 42.

⁷⁴ Farley Mowat, *High Latitudes: A Northern Journey* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2002).

⁷⁵ Ibid, 153.

Fay had called “an alarm system.”⁷⁶ As an example, one article used Knob Lake, Quebec as a case study of construction difficulties amidst Cold War urgency.⁷⁷ The Knob Lake radar base, directly beside Schefferville, a mining community, was one of the three control stations for the MCL. Later studies referred to Schefferville and Knob Lake as mine sites and did not discuss the military infrastructure or operations.⁷⁸ Similarly, a few articles referred to the role of Moosonee as a shipping centre for more northerly radar bases, but there are no references to Moosonee as a potential Pinetree radar base.⁷⁹ Recognition of the military history of small communities, like Schefferville and Moosonee, must be achieved if community dynamics are to be understood. The acknowledgement of military heritage is also an important first step in documenting physical or environmental impacts to communities.

It appears that part of the reason for the focus, in publicly available articles, on the DEW Line and Mid-Canada lines, rather than the Pinetree line, was the clear nationalistic aspects of

⁷⁶ La Fay called the DEW Line a “\$600 million dollar alarm system” (131). For other 1950s and 1960s articles on the DEW and Mid-Canada lines see: R.A. Currie, “Northward Ho! Our Special Contract Department Builds a Major Defence Installation,” *Bluebell* 34, no. 10 (November, 1955): 26-29 (note: *Bluebell* was a Canadian Bell Canada publication); Robert H. Spencer, “Record of a Record Year,” *Bluebell* 35, no. 3 (March, 1956): 1-33; R.A. Cheever, “Construction on the DEW Line,” *Engineering and Contract Record* (1957): 53-57 & 193-199; S. G. French, “The Mid-Canada Line: Air Defence of North America,” *The Roundel* (April, 1958): 2-5 & 31-32; S. G. French, “The Mid-Canada Line: Detailed Design and Specification,” *The Roundel* (May, 1958): 10-15; S. G. French, “The Mid-Canada Line: Operation Whirlybird,” (June/July, 1958): 12-18.; R. B. Wybou, “The DEW Line,” *The Roundel* (May, 1960): 2-6; and T. H. Collins, “The Mid-Canada Line Today,” *The Roundel* (May, 1960): 10-13. *The Roundel* was an RCAF publication primarily intended for members of the military, but still available to the public throughout the Cold War decades.

⁷⁷ Frank Reilly, “Mid-Canada Line,” *Engineering and Contract Record* 69, no.12 (1956): 77-81,154,156.

⁷⁸ On Knob Lake as an MCL control station see Roy Fletcher, “Military Radar Defence Lines of Northern North America: An Historical Geography.” *Polar Record* 26, no. 159 (1990): 269. Also see Ira Robinson, *New Industrial Towns on Canada’s Resource Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Robinson mentioned in his case study of Schefferville, Quebec, that the town was “hemmed in ... on the east by a defence installation,”(39) and he showed an “RCAF Area” on a town map (63) but Robinson’s discussion of “boom and bust” in Schefferville does include employment at the radar base. John H. Bradbury and Isabelle St. Martin also have no mention of the Knob Lake radar base in their study of Schefferville. See “Winding Down in a Quebec Mining Town: A Case Study of Schefferville,” *Canadian Geographer* 27, no. 2 (1983): 128-144.

⁷⁹ On Moosonee as a shipping centre for more northerly MCL radar bases see French’s May, 1958 and June/July 1958 articles; Margaret A. Carroll, “Defence Forces Operations in Hudson’s Bay,” in *Science, History and Hudson Bay*, ed. C.S.Beals. Vol. 2, 897-934 (Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1968); and Frank Reilly, “Mid-Canada Line,” *Engineering and Contract Record* 69, no.12 (1956): 79. The RCAF Systems Engineering Group report *A Digest on the Building of the Mid-Canada Line* (Ottawa, 1957) also refers to Moosonee as a shipping and supply center (pp.17, 19, 25).

projects funded solely by the Americans (DEW) or solely by Canada (Mid-Canada Line). This is particularly evident in the number of articles produced by the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF) writers on the Mid-Canada Line.⁸⁰ The main reason for the lack of literature on the Canadian-American Pinetree Line could also have been that the details (because they were bilaterally negotiated) tended to be buried in classified documents. In this regard, Joseph Jockel relied heavily on Freedom of Information requests (in both the U.S. and Canada) to help complete his study of the three radar lines.⁸¹ Jockel's *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, The United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958* was also one of the first texts to confirm the financial arrangements surrounding the Pinetree Line bases.⁸² He noted that Canada was required to pay one-third of costs for all Pinetree construction and operation and that there were 34 initial Pinetree radar bases -- 18 to be staffed by the United States Air Force (USAF) and 16 to be staffed by the RCAF. Jockel provided a complete list of these bases and indicated which country was in control of each base. For example, the bases in Sioux Lookout and Armstrong in Ontario were to be staffed by the USAF, and the Falconbridge, Ontario, base was to be managed by the RCAF.⁸³ These facts may seem straight forward but they had not been documented in any of the radar literature prior to Jockel's book.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ See footnote above on Roundel articles.

⁸¹ See Jockel's preface to his book (p. x) on Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. Note: I was advised by Library and Archives Canada on July 29th, 2011 that some of the materials I needed on the Pinetree Line would be subject to FOI analysis (or as the federal government refers to it 'Access to Information Policies'--ATIP).

⁸² As with the 50s and 60s, radar base materials from the early 1980s also tended to focus solely on the DEW Line. See John Harris, "National Defence and Northern Development: The Establishment of the DEW Line in the Canadian North," Master of Arts, Simon Fraser University, 1980; David F. Pelly, "The DEW Line: A Journalist's Visit to Military Isolation Posts," *North* 24, no. 1 (Spring, 1982): 18-23; D. Elliot Rodger, "A Week at Fox Bravo DEW Line Station," *North* 24, no.1 (Spring, 1982): 48-51; and Michael Stephenson, "The DEW Line," *The Beaver* (Winter, 1983): 14-19. Note: "*North*" was a publication of the Northern Administration Branch of the Department of Indian Affairs and National Resources, Ottawa. It appears to have been available to both employees and members of the public.

⁸³ Jockel, 45-46.

⁸⁴ Jockel's maps and lists of bases utilized material on the first round of Pinetree bases and the time period from 1945 to 1958. Moosonee's base was not planned until late in 1958 so it was not part of Jockel's maps.

Roy Fletcher's "Military Radar Defence Lines of Northern North America," completed the radar database initiated by Jockel.⁸⁵ Fletcher wrote that there was a second round of Pinetree radar bases constructed between 1957 and 1964, and although he did not list the locations, his maps showed Moosonee as one of the seven sites added during that time.⁸⁶ Fletcher's article was one of the few references to describe the number of people at the bases and how they were accommodated. He wrote that "in the early years each Pinetree station had 300-400 personnel ... one third [of the total] were civilians... Automation reduced personnel to 120-200 per station, including 50-70 civilians."⁸⁷ Fletcher also wrote that:

Domestic sites had two-storey barracks and a mobile home park accommodating 30-50 trailers for married personnel. Unless a large town was nearby, there was also an area of 30 to 50 transportable, double-width, single family homes. There were separate buildings for power, heating, administration, school, library, fire station, recreation centre, maintenance, sewage and water treatment. Some stations had a swimming pool and a golf course.⁸⁸

The reason for a second round of Pinetree bases is unclear. Fletcher suggested they were requested by the USAF to protect its bomber bases. However, other sources suggest that the second round of Pinetree bases was part of a broader defence arrangement which included the construction of Canadian BOMARC missile bases at North Bay, Ontario, and La Macaza, Quebec. Two key defence agreements were the *Continental Air Defence Integration North*

⁸⁵ Roy Fletcher, "Military Radar Defence Lines of Northern North America: An Historical Geography." *Polar Record* 26, no. 159 (1990): 265-276.

⁸⁶ Fletcher, 266.

⁸⁷ Ibid. The active dates for Canadian military bases are documented in two publications: Paul Ozorak, *Abandoned Military Installations of Canada, Volume 1: Ontario and Volume 2: Quebec* (Ottawa, self-published, 1991 and 1998) and Don Nicks, John Bradley and Chris Charland, *A History of Air Defence of Canada: 1948-1997*, (Ottawa, 72 Film Canada Inc., 1997). Because both publications cover a wide era (Second World War and Cold War) the amount of information on each base is limited. For example, Ozorak includes three short paragraphs on Moosonee and Don Nicks et al. include only a brief reference to the Moosonee site.

⁸⁸ Fletcher, 266. Fletcher's description finally provided, for thesis work, an image of a base site that seemed similar to what I had observed in Moosonee. No other academic articles provided even the limited material cited by Fletcher. Note: his reference to "double-width" homes likely meant "double-wide trailers" or homes like the prefabricated buildings that were transported in two sections to Moosonee's base.

Agreement (CADIN-1958) and the *Triangular* Agreement (1961).⁸⁹ These primary documents show that the USAF was transitioning out of day to day operations and staffing the Pinetree bases and that it was prepared to ‘trade’ interceptor jets to Canada for the right to have the RCAF take over certain stations.⁹⁰ The CADIN and *Triangular* agreements, which established Moosonee as a new Pinetree site, appear to be the same ones which eventually ‘brought down’ the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker through his reluctance to put nuclear warheads on the BOMARCs installed as part of these negotiations.

More recently there has been a renewed interest in studying the impacts of northern radar lines, as evidenced by a comprehensive DEW Line bibliography and by articles on the environmental impacts of bases.⁹¹ Within the last decade, two articles about the environment have documented specific types of damage resulting from the construction and operation of radar bases. Arthur Johnson’s “Cold War Cleanup” documented the huge number of abandoned fuel drums left at or near DEW Line sites and the expensive remediation efforts which are still underway in the north.⁹² Additionally, McCreanor et al. focused on chemical contamination of

⁸⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence. *Agreement between the Royal Canadian Air Force and the United States Air Force for Sharing of Costs of Communications Facilities*. CADIN File #2000.55.1. Ottawa, 1965. and Canada, DND, *A Summary of Canada-United States Agreements on Air Defence Ground Environment*. CADIN File #1999 24 163. Ottawa, 1968. These papers were accessed at the North Bay Aerospace Museum during 2011. The seven new “heavy radar sites” noted in these documents included three for Diefenbaker’s home province of Saskatchewan.

⁹⁰ The CADIN agreements show that in 1961, the USAF gave Canada sixty-six F101 Voodoo Interceptors (jets) in exchange for Canada taking over the staffing of USAF Pinetree sites such as Sioux Lookout and Armstrong in Ontario. (pp 13-14) The Americans also agreed as part of these arrangements that Canada would produce Starfighter interceptors (the F-104) for the U.S. This appears to be a possible trade-off for cancelling the Avro Arrow in 1959. Also see Bothwell et al. (243-246) on the maze connecting the Avro Arrow, Voodoo, Starfighter and BOMARCs. The only aspect missing from Bothwell et al. is the addition of 7 more Pinetree radar sites to the defence ‘mesh’.

⁹¹ P. WhitneyLackenbauer, Matthew J. Farish, and Jennifer Arthur-Lackenbauer. *The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line: A Bibliography and Documentary Resource List*, (Arctic Institute of North America, 2005).

⁹² Arthur Johnson, “Cold War Cleanup: Undoing the DEW Line,” *Canadian Geographic* (March/April, 2007): 62-72. Johnson quotes one of the remediation managers as stating that \$583 million has been spent so far on remediation of DEW sites (72).

water and soil in their research on former Mid-Canada Line radar sites, such as Site 050 which is adjacent to Fort Albany on James Bay.⁹³

There has been almost no scholarly work on the social and economic impacts of Canada's Pinetree bases. The single study that I accessed during preparation of this literature review was a paper called "Social and Economic Impacts of CADIN/Pinetree Radar Units upon their Host Communities."⁹⁴ While the title appears comprehensive, the paper itself focused almost entirely on anticipated local job losses when the federal government prepared to close radar bases in the mid-1980s. It did not refer to any social or economic impacts during the operation of the bases, and did not include any references to the dozens of bases (including Moosonee) which had already closed prior to 1984.⁹⁵

Two publications have added to the rather limited literature on Cold War military activity and land use planning. The first is Joy Parr's description of the construction of an army base at Gagetown, New Brunswick, during 1953.⁹⁶ Parr combined narratives of local residents with detailed mapping and aerial photos in order to examine both personal consequences and community devastation caused by the construction of defence infrastructure. She scrutinized the disorientation of local people as they experienced the expropriation of their properties and then witnessed (from nearby) the destruction of forests and farms.⁹⁷ Former residents described their

⁹³ McCreanor et al., "The Use of Leeches and Logit Log-Linear Contingency Models to Assess and Monitor Aquatic PCB Contamination Originating from Mid-Canada Radar Line Site 050," *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment* 140 (2008): 211-222.

⁹⁴ M. Lebreton and J. J. Conn, *Social and Economic Impacts of CADIN/Pinetree Radar Units upon their Host Communities*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984).

⁹⁵ Despite the lack of academic research, there are a few websites that include anecdotes from military personnel. These anecdotes tend to focus on DEW Line locations and therefore a review of these websites is beyond the scope of this project.

⁹⁶ Joy Parr, *Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the Everyday, 1953-2003* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2010).

⁹⁷ Expropriation of land was noted in only one Pinetree source. See P. C. Kvas, *Lobster, Lighthouse and Long-Range Radar* (Barrington, Canadian Forces Station Barrington, 1987), 14-15. For expropriation issues related to Second World War bases, see Steven High's detailed accounting of this process in Stephenville, Newfoundland

return “anniversary” tour of the Gagetown site as virtually “driving in the dark” because they recognized almost nothing of their former properties.⁹⁸

The second publication was Arn Keeling’s study of Uranium City.⁹⁹ Keeling used the term “cyclonic activity” to represent both the speed with which Uranium City was constructed in 1952, and the disorder that was created as people flocked to the town for work.¹⁰⁰ He also indicated that the opening of the uranium mines drew both prospectors and “large numbers of Cree, Dene and Métis people [who were] attracted to the new settlement by the prospects of seasonal work.”¹⁰¹ These prospective employees “tended to occupy summer camps at the fringes of the town.”¹⁰²

Keeling’s work includes two references that link his work to research on Moosonee. Firstly, he refers to “squatters” on the edge of Uranium City and he indicates that this was perceived as such a problem that the Saskatchewan government passed “anti-squatting” regulations.¹⁰³ He explains that the squatter issue was particularly galling as the province had hoped to make Uranium City a “model town.” Secondly, Keeling’s article is one of the few references sourced in this literature review which refers to the creation of a development area for managing housing and municipal services after rapid growth occurred.¹⁰⁴ Moosonee was also referred to as a development area, but this term was coined by local people when they formed the

prior to the building of American military facilities. Steven High, *Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940-1967* (New York: Palgrave-McMillan, 2009), 138-156.

⁹⁸ Joy Parr, *Sensing Changes*, 46.

⁹⁹ Arn Keeling. “Born in an Atomic Test Tube: Landscapes of Cyclonic Development at Uranium Lake, Saskatchewan,” *Canadian Geographer* 54, no. 2(2010): 228-252.

¹⁰⁰ Keeling cites Harold Innis as the originator of the term “cyclonic” activity, in regard to gold mining and resource ‘boom’ towns. See Keeling, 229.

¹⁰¹ Keeling, 241.

¹⁰² Ibid. Also see Robert Bone, “Resource Towns in the Mackenzie Basin,” *Cahiers de géographie du Québec* 42, no. 116 (1998): 249-259. Bone indicates that Uranium City shrank after its mine closure from a town of about 2,000 people to “a Native Settlement with about 150 persons.” (258).

¹⁰³ Keeling, 241.

¹⁰⁴ Keeling, 239.

first Citizens Committee in Moosonee in the early 1960s.¹⁰⁵ This topic is addressed in more detail in Chapter Eight as part of the description of the evolution of local government in Moosonee.

Uranium City was informally called the “first and only Cold War City in Canada” because its mines provided the key ingredient for nuclear weapons, but it is also an example of a Cold War resource town.¹⁰⁶ Although Elliot Lake was also developed for uranium mining and was in theory a Cold War town, it had few similarities to Uranium City due to the latter’s much smaller size (one-tenth the size of Elliot Lake) and more isolated location.

Several publications have described the intersection of military sites and Indigenous peoples and it is clear that some of this literature represents racist viewpoints. For example, Leslie Roberts, writing about the DEW Line in 1955, indicated that much of the north was “frozen, deadly wilderness where no white man has ever penetrated.”¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, in discussing the construction of a landing strip, Roberts noted that once it had been completed, the base superintendent could “turn his mind to small worries, such as straw and Eskimos.”¹⁰⁸ A Canadian government bulletin also described the north as empty except for small numbers of “Eskimos and Indians,” and it suggested that the few people living in the north would eventually be assimilated.¹⁰⁹ Other documents referred to northern “Indians” becoming, over time, “normal

¹⁰⁵ See Chapter Eight on the Evolution of Local Government.

¹⁰⁶ Also see Robert D. Nininger, “Hunting Uranium Around the World.” *National Geographic* 106, no. 4 (October, 1954): 533-558. Most of this article is about uranium mining outside of Canada but Nininger includes a photo of ‘downtown’ Uranium City depicting a muddy, narrow road, lined with downed trees which belies the title of ‘City.’

¹⁰⁷ Roberts, 37.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence. *Citizenship for the Canadian Forces: The Yukon and Northwest Territories*. Ottawa: Bureau of Current Affairs, Department of National Defence, 1955.

citizens of Canada,” and suggested that “Eskimos and northern Indians [would] eventually [be] brought into the Canadian community.”¹¹⁰

Linda Ambrose has referred to this type of writing, common in the 1950s and 1960s, as evidence of a “white settler colonialist mentality” in which “white hegemony was the order of the day.”¹¹¹ Additionally, Ambrose provided an example of white hegemony with her analysis of a federal government orientation handbook called “This is the Arctic.”¹¹² She described the 1958 handbook, designed for southerners heading to the north for business opportunities, as “replete with sarcasm, condescending racist remarks and sexist humour,” in particular in its descriptions of everyday Inuit life.¹¹³ Part of the hegemonic regime, noted by Ambrose, was the assumption that Indigenous people were only a temporary phenomenon and that they were being assimilated.¹¹⁴

Kerry Abel confirms that in northern Ontario during the 1930s and 1940s, images of Native people followed a disturbing pattern. She writes that, “when notice was made of Native people, it was either negative (as in a report on a measles epidemic or a comment about dire poverty) or a romanticized description of a lost history and culture.”¹¹⁵ The presence of Indigenous people tended to be acknowledged, however briefly, when government bureaucrats and southern entrepreneurs desired their natural resources. Ambrose records the common assumption that natural resources could be removed without consideration of the rights of

¹¹⁰ Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, *Peoples of the Northwest Territories*. 1957, 11 and Hugh L. Keenleyside, “Recent Developments in the Canadian North,” *Canadian Geographical Journal* 39, no. 4 (1949): 171-173. Keenleyside was the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources in 1949 but this article was published in a geography journal rather than as a federal government publication.

¹¹¹ Linda M. Ambrose, “Our Last Frontier: Imperialism and Northern Canadian Rural Women’s Organizations,” *Canadian Historical Review* 86, no. 2(2005): 266-268.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 263-264.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Also see Olive Dickason’s *A Concise History of Canada’s First Nations* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006) for an overview of assimilation of Amerindians (Dickason’s preferred term for Indigenous people).

¹¹⁵ Kerry Abel, *Changing Places: History, Community, and Identity in Northeastern Ontario* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s U. Press, 2006), 130.

Indigenous people. She writes about the existence of an “imperialist mindset, [where] the resources and peoples of the North were simply there for the taking.”¹¹⁶ Historians like Mark Kuhlberg and John Sandlos have provided specific examples of this mindset in their discussions on the exploitation of resources such as timber and wildlife.¹¹⁷ In both cases, Indigenous people themselves, although dependent on land and natural resources, were assumed to be less relevant in management schemes than the resources theoretically being protected.

Ken Coates writes that the early Cold War years (the 1950s and 1960s) were a period when “scholars of First Nations topics worked in splendid obscurity,” ignored by the public and other researchers.¹¹⁸ He hypothesizes that more recent interest has resulted from the numerous land claims and resource development disputes. Olive Dickason suggests that northern military development has also generated more attention for, and research on, Indigenous peoples, particularly those living in the far north. She writes that:

A turning point in [the] official evaluation of the Arctic was reached during and after World War II, when its strategic importance in world geopolitics became glaringly evident. The crucial roles of its weather stations and the Distant Early Warning radar line to military operations caused authorities to take another look at the land and its people.¹¹⁹

The impact of military development on Indigenous peoples during the Second World War is ably summarized by P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish.¹²⁰ These authors note that “the Second World War was a watershed in the militarization of the Canadian North,” and that it

¹¹⁶ Ambrose, 266.

¹¹⁷ Mark Kuhlberg, “‘Nothing it seems can be done about it’: Charlie Cox, Indian Affairs Timber Policy, and the Long Lac Reserve, 1924-1940,” *Canadian Historical Review* 84, no. 1 (March, 2003): 33-63. John Sandlos, *Hunters at the Margin: Native People and Wildlife Conservation in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).

¹¹⁸ Ken Coates, “Writing First Nations into Canadian History: A Review of Scholarly Works,” *Canadian Historical Review* 81, no. 1 (March, 2000): 99.

¹¹⁹ Dickason, 382.

¹²⁰ P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish. “The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern Environment.” *Environmental History* 12 (October, 2007), 920-950.

had a range of impacts on First Nations people, from displacement to disease.¹²¹ They also write that “thirty native families” were displaced during the construction of the Goose Bay airport in 1943, and in western Canada the construction of the Alaska Highway and Canol Pipeline meant that “workers brought diseases, from measles to VD, which devastated indigenous populations.”¹²² In that regard, R.A.J. Phillips observed that “in those war-time days, the Canadian government had little time, inclination, or knowledge to consider the effects of the impact of defence construction on the native population.”¹²³ He did acknowledge that certain communities, like Fort Chimo, Quebec, were particularly disrupted by the development of the air bases that dotted the north. Phillips stated that:

Fort Chimo probably created the most difficult problem of all because it was the center of a relatively populous Eskimo [*sic*] area ...the [USAF] base became a magnet for those who were finding the living on the land already thin... Fort Chimo became a community of great but transitory affluence. When the boom suddenly ended, the Eskimos could neither continue in the new life nor go back to the old. The results were painful.¹²⁴

In the Fort Chimo situation, the USAF located a major air base beside an existing community.

In other situations, new communities have evolved due to the migration of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people to the vicinity of military bases built where no previous communities existed. Lackenbauer and Farish noted that the clustering of Indigenous groups around military bases established during the Second World War, and the subsequent disruption of traditional subsistence activities, continued into the Cold War.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Ibid., 925.

¹²² Ibid. Also see William Morrison, “Uncle Sam’s Warpath,” *Horizon Canada* 7, no. 76 (August, 1986): 1820-1824 on epidemics related to the building of the Alaska Highway. Morrison noted that “...in less than one year (1942-43), successive epidemics of measles, German measles, dysentery, jaundice, whooping cough, mumps, tonsillitis and meningitis swept through (Teslin, Yukon). The diseases affected virtually all of the Natives, but had little impact on the Whites in the area.” (1822).

¹²³ R.A.J. Phillips, *Canada’s North* (Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1967), 152.

¹²⁴ Ibid. Also see Gabrielle Roy, *Windflower* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1970). This is a work of fiction based around interaction between an American airman and an Inuit woman.

¹²⁵ Lackenbauer and Farish, 932.

Anthropologists working in the James Bay and Hudson Bay areas also discussed the migration of Indigenous people to certain military bases in the Cold War period.¹²⁶ John Honigmann wrote briefly about the Eskimo and Cree of Great Whale Post and noted that in 1955 this community “became a military base and received a large influx of native people.”¹²⁷ The base he referred to, on the eastern shore of Hudson Bay, was one of the control stations in the Mid-Canada Line (MCL). Unfortunately, Honigmann did not provide much analysis of this community, but newspaper reports in late 1955 and 1956 indicated the existence of both tuberculosis and whooping cough epidemics at Great Whale Post and nearby locations at about the same time that the MCL base opened. One reporter noted that whooping cough “spread like wildfire through the population of 185 Eskimos (on the Belcher Islands). It was apparently caused by a germ carried to the islands by two families which had visited Great Whale River.”¹²⁸ There is no research on the potential links between this radar base and disease, however, these records are reminiscent of the literature on epidemics and Second World War megaprojects.¹²⁹

Honigmann also wrote about migration from Attawapiskat to Moosonee for employment related to military activity. He noted that, partly due to dropping productivity on trap lines:

A number of families and individuals have been induced to leave Attawapiskat and trapping to work at unskilled jobs on radar installations, air fields, and in the small harbour at Moosonee, the supply depot for the trading posts and military installations of James Bay. The regular remuneration that comes from such work exerts a strong pull for young men who are, however, often in conflict about leaving their homes.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Anthropologists have also written about community disruption due to the forced relocation of indigenous people from traditional communities like Fort George to “new towns” like Chisasibi due to the James Bay Hydro megaproject. See for example, Richard F. Salisbury, *A Homeland for the Cree: Regional Development in James Bay 1971-1981*. McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986.

¹²⁷ John Honigmann, “Social Integration in Five Northern Canadian Communities,” *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 2, no. 4 (1965): 207.

¹²⁸ Don Delaplante, “Whooping Cough Claims Lives of 8 Eskimos,” *Globe and Mail*, August 7, 1956. Also see Canadian Press (CP), “85 Sick, Stranded Eskimos Awaiting Airlift,” *Globe and Mail*, September 12, 1955. Note: The community of Great Whale River was also known as Great Whale Post.

¹²⁹ See Lackenbauer and Farish, and W. Morrison, “Uncle Sam” on epidemics.

¹³⁰ John Honigmann, “Attawapiskat—Blend of Traditions,” *Anthropologica* 6 (1958): 58. Honigmann’s reference to radar installations may have been to the Mid-Canada Line bases at Fort Albany and Winisk. Moosonee

Additionally, the anthropologist Georg Henriksen commented on migration to radar bases, but his work focused on the shores of Labrador rather than James Bay.¹³¹ In his study of the Naskapi Cree at Davis Inlet (1966-68), Henriksen indicated that the Davis Inlet Cree knew about Hopedale's Pinetree base but chose not to seek work there, unlike people from nearby communities, such as Nain. Henriksen's work is unusual in recording the decision of some of the Naskapi Cree to refrain from migrating to communities that offered wage labour. By comparison, as mentioned earlier about Uranium City and military bases from the Second World War, migration to resource towns and military bases was a common occurrence for Indigenous peoples.

Other literature by anthropologists continued to emphasize both migration aspects and disruptions caused by contact with military bases. Jean Trudeau, an anthropologist and Oblate missionary, observed both the transition from traditional occupations to radar base labour and the reverse process once radar bases at Winisk and Fort Albany closed.¹³² He wrote that, just as Indigenous people were adapting to wage labour, some radar bases closed, "forcing the Indians to go back to trapping or to migrate elsewhere in search of work. Several young men and young couples chose the latter and travelled to Moosonee."¹³³ Trudeau's earlier anthropological writing, with Elliot Liebow, had focused specifically on Winisk and its adjacent radar base.¹³⁴ Liebow

did not have a radar base until 1961 but Honigmann recognizes that it was a supply centre for "military installations of James Bay."

¹³¹ Georg Henriksen, *Hunters in the Barrens: The Naskapi on the Edge of the White Man's World* (St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University, 1973): 14. Henriksen did not indicate why Davis Inlet Cree differed from residents of other Labrador communities in terms of migration strategies.

¹³² Jean Trudeau, "The People of Hudson's Bay: The Cree Indians." In *Science, History and Hudson's Bay*, edited by C. S. Beals. Vol. 1, 127-141. (Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1968): 127-141. Note: Trudeau identified himself as "John" in his earlier papers. He changed this to "Jean" by 1968.

¹³³ *Ibid*, 139.

¹³⁴ Elliot Liebow and Jean (John) Trudeau. "A Preliminary Study of Acculturation among the Cree Indians of Winisk, Ontario." *Arctic* 15, (1962): 190-204.

and Trudeau studied Winisk in 1958 and they documented interaction between the Cree community (pop.150) and the radar base employees (200 white males, including Bell Canada technicians and RCAF servicemen).¹³⁵ The two anthropologists noted that the Winisk Cree had contact with whites, such as Hudson's Bay Company employees and missionaries, in the late 1800s and that this contact was limited compared to the Cold War, when "700 white labourers" constructed the radar base.¹³⁶

The comments of the two authors are striking in terms of issues ranging from segregated lunch rooms and scavenging for food to liaisons between Cree women and radar base personnel. With regard to segregated lunch rooms, Liebow and Trudeau wrote that "Indians [*sic*] brought their own lunches and ate them in their respective headquarters shacks. On exceptionally cold days those working for Bell went instead to a small, dark furnace room. All whites ate in the mess-hall."¹³⁷ On the latter issues, the anthropologists wrote,

The arrival of a trash or garbage truck brought most people running...Out of deference to the Indians, the mess-hall personnel tried to keep garbage separate from the useable left-overs,...and set the cans down rather than dump them over the side. The women, with sleeves rolled up, plunged their arms into the cans and began filling their boxes with food. ...men who worked at the Base frequently stopped off at the dump to load up with building materials or other salvage before making the return trip home. Girls and women (forbidden on the Base proper) who had come to the dump to make surreptitious contact with whites or to arrange for subsequent assignations were the last to leave...[On weekends] white men came over from the Base either singly or in small groups to rendezvous with girls from the village.¹³⁸

This description of food scavenging shows Third World conditions in Ontario at a time when many families were experiencing post-war boom conditions. Despite the detail provided, the authors do not indicate if pregnancies or venereal disease resulted from liaisons nor do they state if the men involved were Canadian military staff or civilians (e.g. radar technicians). This could

¹³⁵ Ibid., 192-193.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 193.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 196.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 197.

have shed some light on military policies and practices concerning interaction with local people. In their concluding remarks Liebow and Trudeau wrote that the Cree had “the constant awareness that only 5 miles away is an advanced entrenchment of white civilization, a large, all-male community that has at its command an awesome array of equipment and techniques and seemingly inexhaustible resources.”¹³⁹

As a follow-up to their initial Winisk research, Norman Chance and Jean Trudeau compared the personal experiences of Inuit people living near a DEW line radar site in Alaska with that of the Cree living beside the Winisk Mid-Canada site. Their study suggested that “the number of marriages between Indians (in Winisk) dropped sharply since the young women nourished the hope of marrying white men.”¹⁴⁰ These authors concluded that the Alaskan experience was less intrusive than the northern Ontario (Winisk) case, and they suggested two key factors for this difference. First, American government policy enabled the Inuit to restrict access of non-Natives to their communities, and secondly, the Inuit were considered as essential employees by DEW Line managers.¹⁴¹ P. Whitney Lackenbauer writes that the Canadian military did not consider the Cree of James Bay (including Winisk) as essential and in fact looked upon them with disdain during the post Second World War period. His discussion of the Canadian Rangers (a civilian defence group) includes a racist quotation from a Canadian major-general who disparaged the James Bay Cree.¹⁴²

Federal defence documents give some indication of the evolution of bilateral agreements on military interaction with Indigenous people. The initial Pinetree Line bilateral agreement

¹³⁹ Ibid., 199.

¹⁴⁰ Norman A. Chance and Jean (John) Trudeau, “Social Organization, Acculturation, and Integration Among the Eskimo and Cree: A Comparative Study.” *Anthropologica*, 5 no. 1 (1963): 54.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 50.

¹⁴² P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Canada's Northern Defenders: Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers, 1947-2005.” In *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives*, edited by P. W. Lackenbauer and C. L. Mantle, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 177.

made no reference to Indigenous peoples.¹⁴³ However, the 1955 agreement regarding the DEW line required the United States to deal with the Canadian government directly on any issues related to “Eskimos.” The issue of contact between Inuit and non-Inuit people is specifically addressed by wording such as “All contact with Eskimos, other than those whose employment on any aspect of the project is approved, is to be avoided except in cases of emergency.”¹⁴⁴ Despite the caution related to DEW bases, it appears, from the preceding review of anthropologists’ reports, that the federal government had little interest in the welfare of Indigenous people living near either Mid-Canada Line or Pinetree Line radar bases. This lack of interest increased the potential for impacts on Indigenous people who either lived in nearby communities or who migrated to radar bases seeking waged labour.

Theory on Development of Small Towns

Planners and geographers often group the study of impacts according to the stages of development observed in resource communities. Two formative authors, Robert Bone and Rex Lucas, have presented different templates for development stages.¹⁴⁵ Bone describes five stages of resource town development as illustrated in Figure 2.1.¹⁴⁶ Bone’s development steps demonstrate what he refers to as the “Classic boom and bust” cycle of resource development, namely rapid growth followed by collapse.¹⁴⁷ The Classic model is extreme because it

¹⁴³ Hume H. Wrong, *Exchange of Notes (August 1, 1951) between Canada and the United States Re: Extension and Co-Ordination of the Continental Radar Defence System*. Ottawa, 1951.

¹⁴⁴ Quoted in Lackenbauer et al, DEW Bibliography, 2005, 6. This is paragraph 13 in the conditions attached to the May 5, 1955 bilateral DEW agreement.

¹⁴⁵ Robert M. Bone, *The Canadian North: Issues and Challenges* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012) and Rex Lucas, *Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities of Single Industry* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2nd edition. (Note: Lucas’s text was first published in 1971.)

¹⁴⁶ Bone, 123. Bone described the resource town cycle in Table format. This author produced the model in Figure 2.1 based on Bone’s table and his description of the cycle.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

presupposes that resource communities are created on vacant or uninhabited sites and that after a mine closure “all buildings and housing are demolished.”¹⁴⁸

Figure 2.1: Resource Town Cycle



While the literature suggests that only a minority of resource communities become ‘ghost towns,’ Bone does provide a good example of one such community. Pine Point, Northwest Territories, was built by Cominco Mine in 1962, reached its peak population of 2,000 in 1976 and then was completely demolished in 1991.¹⁴⁹ This closure was particularly unexpected because planners anticipated, in 1980, that the town was going to continue to grow and were


¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Bone, 124. Also see H.J.F. Gerein, *Community Planning and Development in Canada’s Northwest Territories*. (Yellowknife: Government of the Northwest Territories (NWT), 1980). Gerein’s text shows the plans for expansion of Pine Point just one decade before it was completely obliterated from both the landscape and subsequent maps of the NWT.

planning for increased housing, a new school, and a medical clinic for residents.¹⁵⁰ Bone also uses Schefferville, Quebec and Uranium City, Saskatchewan as examples of resource towns that lost most of their population base after mine closures.¹⁵¹

Rex Lucas's development stages, outlined in his *Minetown, Milltown, Railtown*, collectively provide a template which is closer than Bone's model to the reality experienced by most resource communities. Lucas's four stages are shown in Figure 2.2 below.¹⁵² The construction, recruitment and maturity stages are self-explanatory, but the transition stage needs some explanation. This stage deals with a wide range of issues from working conditions (e.g. shift work) to interpersonal communications and even recreation programs. It is also worth noting that Lucas's text is one of the few sources which documents day to day life, particularly of males, in resource towns.¹⁵³

Figure 2.2 Resource Town Development Stages



¹⁵⁰ Gerein, 103.

¹⁵¹ Bone, 123.

¹⁵² Lucas, Chapters 2 to 5 cover the development stages in more detail. This author produced the model in Figure 2.2 based on Lucas' discussion.

¹⁵³ Also see Meg Luxton, *More Than a Labour of Love*, (Toronto: Women's Press, 2009) for a discussion of women's roles and experiences in growing resource towns, and in particular in Flin Flon, Manitoba. Luxton does not analyze the development stages of Flin Flon but she does a fascinating review of how resource towns affected several generations of women. Her book was originally published in 1980.

Surprisingly, neither Bone nor Lucas included in their development templates the most common stage for many resource towns. It is the “Adaptation Stage,” during which the resource industry closes and the community adapts to this dramatic change.¹⁵⁴ Bone shows the complete obliteration of the resource community as his final stage and Lucas suggests that the typical resource community remains in place and matures as a long term resource town.

More commonly in many resource communities, municipal infrastructure and private housing remain in place even if the mine or mill is permanently shut down. Accordingly, John Bradbury and Isabelle St. Martin suggest that the closure of resource operations requires the addition of two more stages to the Lucas model.¹⁵⁵ These stages, which the authors examined in a case study of Schefferville, Quebec, are the “winding down” phase and the “complete abandonment of a townsite.” Bradbury and St. Martin focused their work on the “winding down” stage and they suggested that this stage held a high degree of uncertainty for employees, especially as their jobs changed from permanent to seasonal to no jobs at all. The authors also described the withdrawal of company (Iron Ore Company of Canada) support for municipal budgets and infrastructure and the loss of social and recreational opportunities for lingering residents as former employees and their families left Schefferville. Bradbury and St. Martin note that “the term ‘community development’ infers development in a positive direction, [so] we have chosen the term ‘winding down’ to denote the disintegration of community life for residents.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Much of my work as a Municipal Advisor with the Ontario government (particularly between 1994 and 2010) involved working with municipalities to help them manage their financial situation after major employers had closed. We didn’t formally call this stage “Adaptation” but I suggest that this term applies to both resource town change and post radar base community evolution.

¹⁵⁵ John H. Bradbury and Isabelle St. Martin, “Winding Down in a Quebec Mining Town: A Case Study of Schefferville,” *Canadian Geographer* 27, no. 2 (1983): 128-144.

¹⁵⁶ Bradbury and St. Martin, 129.

Winding down occurred in Faro, Yukon, a community described by Bone in his resource development text.¹⁵⁷ Faro was built in 1969 by the Cyprus Anvil Mine Company. Its population peaked in 1981 at 1600 and it then endured several cycles of partial mine closures before final closure occurred in 1998. The community's housing and infrastructure still exist and residents hope to survive by creating a tourist haven.¹⁵⁸ This type of situation, in which the community remains in place after the resource industry closes, has been observed in numerous northern Ontario towns such as Cobalt, Elliot Lake, Manitouwadge, West Nipissing, White River, Wawa, and Ignace.¹⁵⁹

The development stages work of Bone and Lucas has encouraged other researchers to examine community evolution in resource towns. For example, Alison Gill examined what Lucas referred to as the 'Transition' stage in her study of Tumbler Ridge, a coal mining town in northern British Columbia.¹⁶⁰ Gill's research is particularly useful as she compared what was planned to what actually occurred. She also examined a specific piece of legislation, called the *Instant Towns Act*, which was passed by the British Columbia government in 1965. Gill's work

¹⁵⁷ Bone, 129-130. It is somewhat surprising that Bone didn't have two or three development stages templates given his work on a wide range of communities.

¹⁵⁸ The movie *Our Town Faro* documents the efforts of town residents to encourage new growth. See Mitch Miyagawa and David Oppenheim, *Our Town Faro* (Ottawa: National Film Board of Canada, 2004). The town is hoping to survive, not only by attracting tourist dollars from holiday travel, but by convincing tourists to stay and buy local homes.

¹⁵⁹ See the discussion on the early stages of former mining towns like Cobalt and Elliot Lake in Matt Bray and Ernie Epps, eds. *A Vast and Magnificent Land: An Illustrated History of Northern Ontario* (Thunder Bay and Sudbury: Lakehead University and Laurentian University, 1984). Also see Margaret E. Johnston, Brian Lorch, and Dave Challen. "Views of Community Sustainability After a Mine Closure: A Case Study of Manitouwadge, Ontario." *Environments* 32, no. 1 (2004): 15-29. References to West Nipissing, White River, and Wawa are derived primarily from my experience and memories of preparing briefing notes on resource industry closures. The reference to Ignace is based on my residence in this mining and logging community for five years of its 'boom' stage. Note that West Nipissing was formerly called Sturgeon Falls.

¹⁶⁰ Alison N. Gill. "An Evaluation of Socially Responsive Planning in a New Resource Town." *Social Indicators Research* 24, no. 2 (1991): 177-204. Also see James Lotz, "What IS the Real Problem of Northern Development?" *Canadian Mining Journal* 89, no. 7 (1968): 50-54. Although this paper was published a few years prior to Lucas's book it provides one of the more colourful descriptions of how to attract employees to resource towns and thus is a good example of the Recruitment Stage (Stage Two in Lucas's book). Punctuation (i.e. IS) is the author's-James Lotz.

is useful as it describes the construction of virtually “instant” resource towns which can be compared to the building of instant radar bases communities. Other researchers, such as John Parkins, Richard Stedmen and Thomas Beckley, have written about Lucas’s transition stage in their study of community well-being in forestry towns.¹⁶¹

Additionally, some researchers have focused on the Adaptation stage that was missing from the Bone and Lucas models. That is, they have examined the impacts of industrial plant closures and layoffs on northern municipalities which still exist after a resource company disappears. The community of Elliot Lake has been a focal point, and a model, for this type of research. Elliot Lake was built between 1955 and 1959 to serve as a residential community for uranium miners employed by Denison and Rio Algom Mines. The community’s population grew to 25,000 people within only a few years, but mining operations went through several boom and bust cycles until the last of the mine employees was laid off in 1996.¹⁶² The *Elliot Lake Tracking and Adjustment Study* (ELTAS) was an extensive review of the impacts of mining layoffs that took place over a ten year period starting in 1990.¹⁶³

One of the studies in the Elliot Lake project, “Life after Layoff: Women in a Remote Single-Industry Community,” adds a gender studies approach to research on mining employees

¹⁶¹ John R. Parkins, Richard Stedman, and Thomas Beckley. “Forest Sector Dependency and Community Well-Being: A Structural Equation Model for New Brunswick and British Columbia.” *Rural Sociology* 68, no.4 (2003): 554-572.

¹⁶² See Ken Coates and William Morrison, *The Forgotten North: A History of Canada’s Provincial Norths* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1992), 94-97 for an overview of Elliot Lake’s mining cycle. Also see Bray and Epps, (159) as they suggest that Elliot Lake was modeled after the community of Manitouwadge.

¹⁶³ Anne-Marie Mawhiney and Jane Pitblado, (eds), *Boom Town Blues -- Elliot Lake: Collapse and Revival in a Single Industry Community* (Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1999) combines the ELTAS studies. The Elliot Lake research, which was coordinated by Professors Derek Wilkinson, David Robinson, and David Leadbeater, of Laurentian University, included interviews of over 1,000 former employees of two Elliot Lake uranium mines.

and the lives of women in a resource town.¹⁶⁴ Monica Neitzert, Anne-Marie Mawhiney, and Elaine Porter emphasized in the conclusion to this study that resource layoffs affect more than just the individual workers and they recommended that adjustment policies take into account entire family units in order to be effective.¹⁶⁵ Research on Elliot Lake informs land use planning aspects of this project because it demonstrates how structural change in a community has wide-ranging personal impacts.

Within the last fifteen years, two major studies have examined downsizing in small northern towns both in Ontario and across Canada. The Intergovernmental Committee for Urban and Regional Research (ICURR) published an extensive report, in 2005, on resource communities. It examined plant closures in small, remote communities and it characterized the issues facing economically disadvantaged municipalities by providing sixteen case studies. The report's authors concluded that "rural communities, especially remote, rural communities — feel the impacts [of closures] most severely."¹⁶⁶ Some of the impacts described were job loss, reductions in local services, and a "sense of helplessness and a loss of hope in the community's future."¹⁶⁷ The second major research project was a report entitled, *Small, Rural and Remote Communities: The Anatomy of Risk*, which lists critical indicators of "Communities at Risk."¹⁶⁸ Some examples of these indicators are: small population size, physical isolation from other communities, high production and servicing costs, and lack of economic diversification.¹⁶⁹ This

¹⁶⁴ M. Neitzert, A-M. Mawhiney and E. Porter, "Life After Layoff: Women in a Remote Single-Industry Community," in *Boom Town Blues*, 53-74. These researchers interviewed Elliot Lake women who had been laid off from the local mines and assessed their personal experience and well-being.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 68-70.

¹⁶⁶ Halseth, Greg.(ed.) *Facing the Challenge of Industry Closure: Managing Transition in Rural Communities.*(Toronto: ICURR Press, 2005), 9.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.


¹⁶⁸ Enid Slack, Larry Bourne and Meric Gertler, *Small, Rural and Remote Communities: The Anatomy of Risk.* Toronto: Panel on the Role of Government, 2003.

¹⁶⁹ Slack et al., 6-8.

report is significant because, unlike other urban planning studies, it focuses on small communities that have little ability to deal with impacts.

While most studies focus on resource communities such as mining or forestry towns, I argue that theories on development stages also have direct application to military base communities. The development stages which occurred in Moosonee are described in subsequent chapters and compared to the Bone and Lucas development models in Chapter Ten. The tenth chapter concludes with a proposed development model for communities, like Moosonee, that were affected by military development.

Map 2.1: CADIN/Pinetree Line Radar Sites (Source: Nicks, Don, Bradley, John and Charland, Chris. "Online Air Defence Radar Museum: Air Defence Radar Stations." <http://www.radomes.org/museum> (accessed April/17, 2011).



Chapter Three: Methods

Julie Thompson Klein writes that an interdisciplinary approach combines both theories and methods from two or more disciplines.¹⁷⁰ The key methods that were utilized in this study were the review of archival materials, a history method, visualization or “visual thinking,” a land use planning method, and interviews combined with photo elicitation, a sociology method. This chapter describes these methods and then discusses how the research was also guided by Indigenous research principles. As one of the principles of Indigenous research is to situate researchers in their work, I also describe how I situate myself in this research.

Review of Archival Materials

Archival research involved the search for and reviews of files at five sites: Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Archives of Ontario (AO), the Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), the Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence in North Bay (CFMAD), and Discovery North -- the North Bay Museum. My initial assumption had been that LAC would be the most productive source because Moosonee’s radar base was a federal defence project. However, there were only twelve files at LAC that appeared to be useful for my research on Moosonee.¹⁷¹

The primary source for Moosonee files became the Archives of Ontario (AO), which had almost 400 files germane to Moosonee. I reviewed the list of files online prior to visiting the AO and it was reduced initially by pulling titles within this study’s time frame (i.e. 1955-1975). To

¹⁷⁰ Julie Thompson Klein, *Humanities, Culture and Interdisciplinarity: The Changing American Academy* (Albany: State University of New York, 2005), 55.

¹⁷¹ The first eight files were retrieved quickly but four of the files went through a lengthy process before they were declared ‘open.’ Three LAC files that were requested on September 3rd, 2013 were not declared as ‘open’ files until November 19th, 2013. Another file requested on September 3rd, 2013 was designated on November 19th as requiring an Access to Information and Privacy application which took a further month to process.

ensure that applicable documents were not missed, the time frame was considered flexible and some files were added from before 1955 and up to 1977. For example, files from 1976 and 1977, referred to the process of transforming the radar base after its closure in 1975. Files from the AO had three levels of access: 100 year Freedom of Information (FOI) files which required formal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy¹⁷² requests, other FOI files which were open after the initial 20 year time period,¹⁷³ and files with no restrictions. Four FOI requests were filed for 22 titles labelled as 100 year files and a further 16 titles labelled as 20 year FOI files were obtained. The staff of the AO was extremely helpful in the retrieval process and most of the 22 FOI titles were obtained in less than a month. In total, 56 titles, representing 71 files, were reviewed at the AO.¹⁷⁴ The Ontario files included some correspondence between the federal government and the province concerning the Moosonee radar base, and this helped bridge the gap created by the lack of material at LAC.

The Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence (CFMAD) had 16 files on Moosonee which were primarily the Annual Historical Reports (AHRs) of Moosonee Base Commanders for the period from 1961 to 1975. CFMAD staff also provided me with full access to documents on government agreements related to the Continental Air Defence Integration North (CADIN)/Pinetree line. These files were invaluable in understanding how Moosonee was awarded a military base some years after most of the Pinetree radar sites were in place.¹⁷⁵ The Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) is a little recognized federal department that provided

¹⁷² The correct acronym for Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy is FOIPOP but this is shortened to FOI for the purposes of this discussion.

¹⁷³ As an example of a 20 year FOI file, I could obtain 1975 files without filing a formal FOI request. Because my time period was 1955 to 1975 I had no difficulty in obtaining any of the 20 year FOI files.

¹⁷⁴ I ordered just over 1,000 paper copies of documents (from the 71 files) and several CDs of maps and photos from the Ontario Archives. These copies were often easier to read than the originals due to the care taken by the Reproductions Unit.

¹⁷⁵ This issue is discussed in Chapter Two as part of the Literature Review.

immediate and thorough assistance throughout my research work. DHH had only a few files on Moosonee but these included the full AHRs so that some pages missing from the CFMAD files could be obtained. In addition, DHH had a collection of aerial photos of the Moosonee base, both in its early stages of construction and at its completion. The last archival agency that was visited was Discovery North--the North Bay Museum, which now holds some of the Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) files. Staff from this Museum reviewed their electronic database with me and then went beyond that resource to recommend some files that had been initially catalogued as “Moose Factory Island.” These files yielded some of the earliest correspondence between the ONR and the Canadian military on the potential for a Moosonee radar base.¹⁷⁶

Visualization

Visual thinking or visualization is a land use planning and geography technique that was used to examine landscape and structural change in Moosonee. Andrea Frank, in her discussion of graphic communication, noted that “much of the data that planners use is spatial ...and Visual Thinking or visualization” is helpful in interpreting these data.¹⁷⁷ Visualization, or more simply put “the review of air photos and maps,” was a significant aid to understanding both structural and human changes which occurred in Moosonee.

In addition, some of the observations of anthropologists, missionaries, and journalists were sketched onto archival aerial photos and maps of Moosonee. These visual representations of narratives encouraged connections between observations recorded in everything from news clips and popular periodicals to scholarly journals and texts. For example, a description of a walking tour of Moosonee in 1951 by Soeur Paul-Émile and the description of the community in

¹⁷⁶ In summary, the assistance received from archivists at most locations was extremely helpful and ensured that I was able to locate the archival data that I needed for my research.

¹⁷⁷ Andrea Frank, “Graphic Communication” in *The Planner’s Use of Information*, ed. Hemalata Dandekar (Chicago: Planners Press, 2003), 300.

1955 by Don Delaplante, a *Globe and Mail* reporter, have been compared to aerial photos in order to decipher the settlement and infrastructure changes described by these writers.¹⁷⁸ Soeur Paul-Émile wrote about Moosonee as a sparsely developed, tidy community. Four years later Don Delaplante described part of Moosonee's downtown as a huge construction camp. A decade later, anthropologist R.G. Bucksar called the southern section of town a "Squatter's village."¹⁷⁹ Mapping the narratives of Paul-Émile, Delaplante and Bucksar was critical in terms of understanding how development activity resulted in migration and created serious servicing issues (e.g. water) in the town of Moosonee. The combination of narratives, aerial photos and maps was also merged with observations collected from interviews. A final aspect of visualization was the production of models showing the development stages of resource towns. Specifically, two models were developed based on the works of Robert Bone and Rex Lucas.¹⁸⁰ At a later stage in the research process, a conceptual model of Moosonee's development was also prepared and this will be discussed in Chapter Ten.

Interviews

To complement and add depth to the archival work and visual mapping, interviews were conducted with people who either lived or worked in Moosonee during the Cold War. The concept of using interviews to assess the impacts of military development on communities was inspired by Steven High's work on St. John's, Newfoundland, during the Second World War.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Paul-Émile, Soeur, *La Baie James: Trois Cents Ans d'Histoire: Militaire, Économique, Missionnaire* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1952), 218 and Don Delaplante, "Moosonee Booms with Construction of Airfield." *Globe and Mail*, December 22, 1955.

¹⁷⁹ R. G. Bucksar. "Moosonee and the Squatters." *Canadian Welfare* 44, no. 5 (1968): 15.

¹⁸⁰ The Bone and Lucas models are shown and discussed in Chapter Two.

¹⁸¹ Steven High, ed., *Occupied St. John's: A Social History of a City at War, 1939-1945* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).

High's research included 50 in-depth interviews with individuals who lived in St. John's during its 'friendly occupation' by American and Canadian military personnel.¹⁸²

Prior to any interviews, an ethics application was submitted to the Laurentian University Ethics Committee. The proposal to this committee was that a small group of individuals would be interviewed to develop an understanding of life in Cold War Moosonee. Ethics approval was obtained on 23 September 2012. Interviewees were recruited using a "snowball" or "referral" method: a person being interviewed would be requested to suggest names of other people who might be available and willing to talk about Cold War Moosonee.¹⁸³ Interviews included a limited number of open-ended questions, which included discussing visual documents (e.g. air photos) of Moosonee during the Cold War. The use of open-ended questions in interviews is documented in Creswell's *Research Design* where he notes that an advantage of interviews is the ability of individuals to add to historical information.¹⁸⁴ The questions that were used and my introductory information for interviewees are included in Appendix Two. All participants were asked to read through the background information on this study prior to any discussion. This was critical in order to ensure that the interviews were based on informed consent.¹⁸⁵ As part of this

¹⁸² Ibid., 13-15. Also see the Centre for Oral History and Digital Storytelling (COHDS) website <http://storytelling.concordia.ca>. This is a comprehensive and multi-faceted worksite for researchers conducting oral history projects.

¹⁸³ See Nancy Nishikawa, "Survey Methods for Planners," In *The Planner's Use of Information* (Chicago, Planner's Press, 2003), 64.

¹⁸⁴ See John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*, (Los Angeles, Sage Publications, 2003). Creswell discusses open-ended questions as a qualitative research method on p. 17 and the role of participants in providing historical information on p. 186. Also see the website for the Centre for Oral History and Digital Storytelling (COHDS) <http://storytelling.concordia.ca> for its comprehensive and multi-faceted worksite for researchers conducting oral history projects.

¹⁸⁵ Informed consent is one of the requirements of the Tri Council Policy Statement (TCPS) which governs research and ethics approvals at institutions such as Laurentian University. Furthermore, the TCPS includes a specific chapter (Chapter 9) which provides guidelines for research involving Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Chapter Nine was used a guiding text for aspects of this study such as informed consent and the protection of confidentiality. See <http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2>, accessed 14 June 2012.

process, interviewees were advised that they had the right to decline to participate and that even if they initially agreed to participate, they could stop the interview at any time.

Photos were also used as part of the interview process. This approach is ably discussed by Douglas Harper, who defines “photo elicitation” as “the simple idea of inserting a photograph into a research interview.”¹⁸⁶ He described his use of historical photos and aerial photographs in a study of farmers and agricultural change. Harper wrote that this use of photos helped interview participants recall the past and focus better on answering the questions being asked. He also noted that the use of photos motivated interviewees to explain to him how his understanding of an issue was incomplete, and that “previously taciturn farmers [suddenly] had a great deal to say.”¹⁸⁷ In concluding his discussion on photo elicitation Harper stated, “when two or more people discuss the meaning of photographs they try to figure out something together. That is, I believe, an ideal model for research.”¹⁸⁸

Photo elicitation has been a helpful addition to this research on Moosonee. Archival searches yielded aerial and ground photos of the community of Moosonee and the adjacent radar base, and these were presented to interviewees. These photos assisted interview participants with recalling the structure of the town during the Cold War, and encouraged them to talk about everyday life situations.¹⁸⁹ Early on in my interviews, I expanded the concept of photo elicitation to include sharing maps, photos, and some documents with my interviewees. Instead of simply

¹⁸⁶ Douglas Harper, “Talking About Pictures: A Case for Photo Elicitation,” *Visual Studies* 17, no. 1 (2002): 13. Harper has written about Photo Elicitation since the late 1980s and published a 2001 text *Changing Works: Visions of a Lost Agriculture* that utilized photo elicitation. See his discussion on this aspect of his book on page 20 of “Talking about Pictures.”

¹⁸⁷ Harper, 21.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 23.

¹⁸⁹ The word ‘elicit’ means “to draw out or evoke (an answer, response, etc.).” Further, the word “evoke” means “to inspire or bring to mind.” Source: Canadian Oxford Dictionary of Current English, (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 2005).

bringing items to an interview, I left participants with copies of materials so that they could keep these items as memories of Moosonee. In turn, people I interviewed shared photos and news articles with me.

The research conducted by Emily Faries and Sheila Coté-Meek inspired and assisted me in setting up my interviews. Like my research, Faries' work on education and Kashetchewan involved open-ended questions. As she said, "The interviews were open-ended and flexible but the researcher had a list of questions which was used as a guide during the interviews."¹⁹⁰ Faries interviewed 10 people who were nominated from the community to represent ten community groups (e.g. Band Council, high school students, younger and older elders). However, although the community itself suggested interviewees, Faries did not identify who the individuals were in her dissertation, thus preserving confidentiality as much as possible. Coté-Meek's doctoral research on colonialism and Aboriginal students involved 15 interviews including 8 Aboriginal students, 5 Aboriginal professors and two Elders.¹⁹¹ She provided some background on interviewees in order to set the context for comments and results, but her material was broad enough to protect the privacy of individuals. As with my research, Coté-Meek began her research with snowball sampling but she also utilized "Invitation to Participate" posters to enlarge her interview group. On the interviews specifically, Cote-Meek states that:

The face-to-face or personal approach is considered the most appropriate and respectful way to engage in conversations in many Aboriginal communities. Further, the notion of utilizing a conversational interview that was semi-structured offered the opportunity to engage in and encourage dialogue.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Emily Faries, "Language Education for Northern Native Children: A Case Study" PhD Thesis, 1991, University of Toronto, 61.

¹⁹¹ Sheila Coté-Meek, "Exploring the Impact of Ongoing Colonial Violence on Aboriginal Students in the Postsecondary Classroom," PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2010, 83.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 63.

Taima Moeke-Pickering et al. echo this approach in the paper “Keeping Our Fire Alive.” They state that, with Indigenous research, “Conversational methods are often the way of gathering information rather than ‘interviews.’”¹⁹³ Although half my interviewees were Indigenous people, I found that semi-informal, conversational interviews were the best approach for all participants. This style also suited my own natural interview style. I believe that this informal approach was the best approach with interviewees who had taken the time to tell me about Moosonee, and in effect guide me on my way. They deserved to be treated as full participants in the process rather than feeling as though they were at a job interview or a similarly formal event.

Interview Results

In total, 28 hours of interviews were conducted with 15 persons. Interviews took place between September 2012 and December 2014. Most interviews lasted about one hour although a few interviews took place over several dates and locations and represented several hours of conversation about Moosonee. Fewer than seven hours of these interviews were digitally recorded. This shows the preference of most people to converse informally and to avoid feeling constrained by knowing that recording was occurring. In all cases where interviews were taped the interviewees were provided with detailed typed notes so that they could edit, correct, or add to the interviews. In most cases where interviews were not taped, the interviewees were still provided with typed notes for their comments, additions and corrections.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Taima Moeke-Pickering et al., “Keeping our Fires Alive: Towards Decolonizing Research in the Academic Setting,” *World Indigenous Nations Higher Education Journal* (WINHEC), 2006, www.win-hec.org, (accessed 20 May 2013).

¹⁹⁴ Interview notes were not provided if the interviewee had not provided a mailing address or if I could not otherwise reach the interviewee to share my notes. The detailed typed notes were not transcriptions, even where interviews were taped.

In order to protect privacy and confidentiality the description of interviewees is aggregated or grouped. Fifteen people were interviewed either in Moosonee or in other parts of Ontario. Seven women and eight men were interviewed, sometimes alone and other times as couples, depending on the preference of the people being interviewed. Interviewees included Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. People were not asked to self-identify as Cree, mixed heritage, or non-Indigenous, however the material that people talked about indicated that they were from all three backgrounds. The age of interviewees ranged from about 60 to 90 and they either lived or still live in all three areas of Moosonee (the townsite, village and radar base). Most interviewees were civilians as opposed to military personnel. As indicated above, it is important to protect the confidentiality of all the individuals who were interviewed. For this reason more details about interviewees, such as birth places or occupations, have not been provided in this thesis.

Situating Myself in the Research

Several authors have recommended that researchers describe or identify themselves in order to provide some background for their work. Kathy Absolon and Cam Willett write that “Location of self in writing and research is integral to issues of accountability.”¹⁹⁵ Although Absolon and Willett were primarily directing their message towards Aboriginal researchers, Renee Pualani Louis writes that “positioning the researcher in the research” is important even when “research [is] done within an Indigenous context using Western methodologies.”¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ Kathy Absolon and Cam Willett, “Aboriginal Research: Berry Picking and Hunting in the 21st Century,” *First Peoples Child and Family Review*, 1, no. 1 (2004): 5. Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*, 2nd ed., (London: Zed Books, 2012). Tuhiwai Smith’s book was first published in 1999 and it is now commonly referred to as a critical reference guide to Indigenous research.

¹⁹⁶ Renee Pualani Louis, “Can You Hear Us Now? Voices from the Margin: Using Indigenous Methodologies in Geographic Research,” *Geographical Research*, 45, no.2 (2007):134-135.

Finally, as Sheila Coté-Meek stated, “It is important that I introduce and identify myself so that people may know and understand the context of which I come.”¹⁹⁷

I am a non-Indigenous Irish-Canadian woman. My philosophy of life, heading into this research, was shaped by my Irish heritage, by my experience of the Cold War, and by a lifelong fascination with small towns. Although my parents were born in Canada, my understanding of my heritage was essentially shaped by the Irish grandparents who shared our family home for more than a decade. As an example, while my mother struggled to keep up with the workload of six children, my Irish grandmother would help out by telling me Irish tales (and fables) as we walked for miles to find the best fishing sites near town. Through these walks I learned that my grandmother had been a maid for English families, but I did not realize until some years later that my Irish grandfather had been a batman to a British officer during the Boer War.¹⁹⁸ At some conferences over the past few years, I have heard speakers refer to themselves as “the settler class” and when I asked them about this they said that was the proper way to refer to yourself if you were a non-Indigenous researcher. I find it somewhat difficult to call myself a ‘settler’ when my grandparents were the servants of the settler class, however, I fully understand that the presence of all of us (the Europeans) in Canada was part of the process of colonialism.

My interest in the Cold War stems from the experience of living through most of that time period and of experiencing Cold War events. Some events were experienced via television, as in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when students, myself included, were sent home to listen to American President Kennedy and to wait for nuclear war. Other Cold War events were

¹⁹⁷ Cote-Meek, 8.

¹⁹⁸ My grandmother told me that “the English preferred Irish maids,” and I understood, to a certain extent, that being maids and servants was the role we Irish should play. My grandfather’s role as a ‘batman’ would have meant that he was a soldier who served as a servant or assistant to an officer.

experienced at school as we listened to the air raid siren and practised hiding under our school desks.

I have also had an interest in the Second World War since childhood because my father served in the Canadian Army Occupation Force (CAOF) in northwest Europe in 1945. Ray Heffernan would occasionally tell us about this experience, which occurred before most of his children were born. I have had only limited experience visiting an active military base, having worked as a babysitter for my brother, Gerry, when he served on the Picton Army Base in the early 1960s. At one point during this stint, most of my family celebrated Christmas on this base in my brother's Private Married Quarters (hereafter referred to as PMQs throughout this dissertation).¹⁹⁹

I have been interested in small towns ever since I hitchhiked with two friends through much of northern Ontario in the early 1970s. In particular I will never forget driving out of the boreal forest and looking down at the clear cut area known as Manitouwadge. Attending a Geco Mine dance and meeting the friendly residents of this town encouraged me to apply for my first job 'up north' after finishing my Master's degree. Working and living in the small community of Ignace (about the same size as Moosonee) made me understand that most of the textbook learning I had completed did not prepare me for the trials of living so far north in an isolated town.²⁰⁰ Trying to figure out how small towns grew and survived continued to be a focal point, especially when I began to travel throughout Parry Sound District after moving south to North Bay.

¹⁹⁹ Prior to serving at Picton army base my brother was a United Nations Peacekeeper on Cyprus.

²⁰⁰ By 'somewhat isolated' I mean, for example, that the closest hospital was almost an hour and a half from Ignace. Fortunately I got quite used to living away from larger communities and even learned to drive the Township ambulance in case anyone needed a back-up driver for a hospital run.

My interest in Moosonee began when I was transferred to Sudbury in 1993 after the North Bay office of Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH) closed. I was a Municipal Advisor (or “Field Advisor” as we were called for some years) for MMAH and after the move to North Bay I was told that my clients were now Moosonee, the Espanola area and Manitoulin Island. For most municipalities I was called the Municipal Advisor but for Moosonee -- because of its legislation (i.e. *The Moosonee Development Area Board Act*) -- I was also its supervisor. This meant that I was responsible for reviewing and approving all expenditures, bylaws and minutes. After only one visit to Moosonee I asked my manager why we were supervising Moosonee when the town seemed as capable as any other community. She agreed and we started a very lengthy process to withdraw supervision from the area.

In the twelve years that I worked with the town I often heard people refer to “the base.” I understood from this that Moosonee had once had a military base but I had little time to think about its origin. Instead I had to focus most of my energy on the grant and loan applications that were needed to replace the base and town water and sewer plants. Eventually I determined, incorrectly, that Moosonee had been a DEW line site. It was not until I started doing research for this dissertation that I realized Moosonee was part of a much lesser known line called “the Pinetree.” I also did not know the significance of the bridge across Store Creek to long term residents of Moosonee, nor did I understand that the numerous water and sewer pipe breaks in the base area of the community were likely due to the fact that these pipes were the oldest ones in town, having been constructed for the radar base in 1960. These issues will be further discussed in Chapter Seven.

Linda Tuhiwai Smith's writing has been informative and, to use her words, "humbling," and it has caused me to rethink my understanding of Moosonee and my own research.²⁰¹ In particular Smith's discussions of colonialism and academic research have helped me better understand the work of non-Indigenous researchers who preceded me in studying communities like Moosonee. I now question whether some of the earlier literature, particularly by anthropologists, approaches accurate descriptions of places like Moosonee and Winisk.²⁰² I also thought of Tuhiwai Smith's work when I interviewed participants. In almost every interview I was humbled by the life events that people described to me and I did as much as possible to put into practice Smith's recommendations about showing respect for participants and sharing results with them.

I also followed, to a certain extent, Smith's recommendation to involve the community in the research. This required finding a balance between involving the community while respecting Laurentian University's Ethics protocols that required me to maintain confidentiality of interviewees. Therefore, I could not tell Moosonee's Town Council whom I had interviewed and I could certainly not share any results that might indicate with whom I had spoken. Admittedly, in a small town like Moosonee, it is likely that Council and others could be aware of whom I had spoken with, but they still would not be able to determine what was said in the interviews. The key point was that I felt it was a courtesy to review what I was doing with the

²⁰¹ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*, 2nd ed., (London: Zed Books, 2012). Tuhiwai Smith's book was first published in 1999 and it is now commonly referred to in Indigenous research projects. One of the most valuable parts of her text, for me, was her thorough, but accessible, discussion of the relationship between Imperialism, Colonialism and academic research in her chapter on "Imperialism, History, Writing and Theory." Her reference to "humbling" is as follows "...indigenous research is a humble and humbling activity." (5)

²⁰² See Chapter Four for R. G. Bucksar. "Moosonee and the Squatters." *Canadian Welfare* 44, no. 5 (1968): 15. Bucksar's observations are based on his work in Moosonee during the summers of 1964-68 and the winter of 1967-68. Also see Chapter Two for Elliot Liebow and John Trudeau. "A Preliminary Study of Acculturation among the Cree Indians of Winisk, Ontario." *Arctic* 15, (1962): 190-204. I have included these sources in thesis work but I feel the need to exercise some caution in the use of written descriptions and I no longer use some of the data presented (e.g. Bucksar's population estimate is noted in Chapter Four but it is not used in population charts).

Town Council before I did the interviews so that it would not see me walking around town and not know what I was doing. To a certain extent I was still guided by the community as I listened carefully to interviewees and took their advice on people to contact for further interviews and on the material and issues of which I needed to be aware. Obtaining direction from the community is one of the research protocols Smith outlined.²⁰³ Because of ethics protocols, I am not able to include the names of the interviewees in my Acknowledgements section, and therefore cannot formally recognize how valuable they have been to me and to my research.

I intend to share my research results with the Town of Moosonee and its residents with the intention that some parts of this work might assist them in both understanding their Cold War past and in shaping the community's future. In fact, the people I interviewed already understand Moosonee's Cold War era much better than me but I hope that combining their insights with long hidden archival documents will help the entire community to see more dimensions of that past.

Terminology

While conducting my research and writing this dissertation I often struggled with both military and Indigenous terminology. This section is a brief summary of how I handled both areas of knowledge and language.

Conducting the research for this dissertation was often frustrating because of the need for a "Canadian Primer on Cold War Military Language." I could not locate such a resource, but instead searched in a variety of documents to help interpret some of the acronyms used in

²⁰³ See Tuhiwai Smith's chapter "Articulating an Indigenous Research Agenda," in *Decolonizing Methodologies*. I do not claim that my research is Community Action Research as discussed by Smith in parts of this chapter but her writing still gives guidance to my work.

archival memoranda and reports produced by the RCAF. Terms are discussed and footnoted throughout the dissertation as appropriate.

Sheila Coté-Meek's discussion of the use of words like "Indigenous, Aboriginal and Mixed Heritage" has helped me to determine the words to use in my own writing. Coté-Meek stated in her PhD dissertation that:

I have chosen to use Aboriginal peoples as an inclusive term to describe First Peoples of Canada including First Nations, Métis, and Inuit regardless of 'status' as defined by the Indian Act. This is not done to homogenize Aboriginal peoples; rather I utilize one term to recognize the shared impact that colonization has and continues to have. ... I also use the term Indigenous which has become a widely accepted term to refer to First Nations Peoples who occupy a country.²⁰⁴

Coté-Meek also uses the term 'mixed heritage'²⁰⁵ in her thesis and I have adopted "mixed heritage" and 'Indigenous' for my writing. I also use terms such as "Indian" where that term is used in quotations from archival literature. As Coté-Meek indicates "despite the fact that some terms are considered dated I use them because they are used in the literature that I draw from."²⁰⁶

The use of Indigenous terms in this dissertation is also informed by P. Whitney Lackenbauer and John Long. Lackenbauer writes: "Any research dealing with Aboriginal affairs must grapple with the contentious issue of language. As a general rule, [I adopt] language consistent with the contemporary documents, with prevailing bureaucratic and legal discourses, and with Aboriginal self-identification in correspondence and public statements at any given

²⁰⁴ Coté-Meek, 20-22.

²⁰⁵ Coté-Meek, 10.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 21. Also see Harold Cardinal, *The Unjust Society*, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1999) for a discussion on language and First Nations. For example, Cardinal states that "Most First Nations citizens now identify themselves more clearly as citizens of a particular First Nation rather than adopting the term "Indian."(xii). Also see Anne-Marie Mawhiney, *Towards Aboriginal Self-Government: Relations Between Status Indian Peoples and the Government of Canada: 1969-1984* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1994) for a discussion of changes in language, particularly during the 1970s (61).

time.”²⁰⁷ More specifically, in relation to the James Bay area, Long has described his use of the word “Cree.” He explains that “I use the term ‘Cree’ knowing that the self-designation *Ininiw* (Moose Cree, *Illiliw*) ... and (O)*mushkego* are also in use today.”²⁰⁸ To a certain extent, Long suggests that the word Cree is reasonable because there are different opinions on the use of Eastern Cree (Quebec) and Western Cree (Ontario) dialects in regard to more current terms (e.g. *Eeyou* versus *Ininiw*).²⁰⁹ Finally, to emphasize the importance of local input, I depended on the interviewees for guidance and they seemed comfortable with the use of “Cree” and did not suggest that I use other terms.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ P. W. Lackenbauer, *Battlefields: The Canadian Military and Aboriginal Lands* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), xii.

²⁰⁸ John Long, *Treaty No. 9: Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 390.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.* Long suggests that *Eeyou* is an eastern James Bay term and *Ininiw* is used more commonly in western James Bay.

²¹⁰ The Town of Moosonee website also uses the term ‘Cree’ and it indicates that the town is about “85% Cree.” <http://www.moosonee.ca>, accessed January 19, 2016.

Chapter Four: Early Moosonee: Railway Town, Meeting Place or Both?

Moosonee's evolution as a community was directed and influenced by the very event that created its first major development activity—the construction of the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario (T&NO) Railway. The railway ensured that the community acted as a shipping centre during the early stages of the Cold War and it was one of the reasons that Moosonee became a radar base in 1961. This chapter discusses Moosonee's early development as a fur trading post and railway town and then reviews its history during the early Cold War years before the Pinetree radar base was constructed. It is important to understand and visualize Moosonee prior to 1961 in order to understand the impacts of its radar base. Otherwise there is no starting point from which to measure change in both personal experience and physical environments.

Moosonee Before the Cold War

In 1903, a small company known as Revillon Frères constructed its first store on the shoreline of the Moose River at what would eventually become the settlement of Moosonee.²¹¹ Moosonee had a population of 99 people, in 23 households, by 1921. Eight of the 23 households showed a connection to Revillon Frères, either as management staff or as “servants,” that is, as employees.²¹² Revillon Frères was eventually taken over by the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) in 1936 and thus became the first HBC store in Moosonee, a facility that still dominates its main street under its current name The Northern Store.²¹³ Some interviewees indicated that Moosonee's residents with mixed ancestry could trace their heritage back to the fur trading days.

²¹¹ John S. Long, *Treaty No.9: Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 228. Long indicates that when treaty commissioners visited Moose Factory during 1905 they did not see the Moosonee side of the river. He writes: “H.B.C. transport officer T.C.Rae ensured that the 1905 commissioners did not visit the Revillon Frères posts.”

²¹² Canada, Statistics Canada, 1921 Census. (Courtesy of John Long).

²¹³ Close, *All Aboard the Polar Bear Express*, 14-15. Also see the *Canadian Encyclopedia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2000), 1522.

The English, French, Scottish, and even Norwegian employees of the Revillon Frères and Hudson Bay Company operations often married local Cree people in both Moosonee and Moose Factory.²¹⁴ What this meant for the time period for this study (1955-1975), is that fifty years after Revillon Frères set up shop in Moosonee, local Indigenous and non-Indigenous people were already quite accustomed to socializing and doing commerce with migrants to the community. The people who arrived to live and work on the RCAF base were a different kind of migrant – military rather than economic – but the situation for Cree, mixed ancestry, and white residents was something they had experienced before. Local people were not averse to newcomers. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, Moosonee’s residents “hoped the RCAF would not bring its own workers.”²¹⁵ Moosonee’s residents looked forward to the employment opportunities that newcomers and development provided. The following discussion on the construction of the railway to Moosonee demonstrates how employment opportunities also drew northern Cree to the town from communities along James Bay.

In 1932, the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario (T&NO) Railway completed its most northerly route which connected the town of Cochrane to Moosonee.²¹⁶ The T&NO boasted that “to the Sub-Arctic Circle, Ontario’s Northern frontier has been pushed back one hundred and eighty-five miles.”²¹⁷ Prior to the railway it appears that Moosonee was known only as the “Revillon or French side” of the river and that although the province picked the name “Moose Harbour” during the construction of the railway, the site never became a major harbour due to

²¹⁴ Reimer, Gwen and Jean-Phillippe Chartrand, *A Historical Profile of the James Bay Area’s Mixed European-Indian or Mixed European-Inuit Community*, Report prepared for Department of Justice Canada, 2005. <http://www.metisnation.org/media/141039/dojreport>. Retrieved online June 20, 2013.

²¹⁵ Interviews, 2013.

²¹⁶ Robert J. Surtees, *The Northern Connection: Ontario Northland since 1902* (North York: Captus Press, 1992), 190.

²¹⁷ Ontario, Sessional Papers, T. & N.O. Annual Report for Year End 1931, 6. (the boasting occurred a few months prior to the completion of the line.)

the shallow nature of the Moose River.²¹⁸ Once construction was complete, the T&NO surveyed building lots at Moosonee and, although it attempted to auction these off on 10 June 1932, there were no interested buyers.²¹⁹ The combined population of both Moosonee and Moose Factory at that time was only 475 people.²²⁰

Archival records show that in 1932 the T&NO built a bridge across Store Creek.²²¹ It appears that the bridge was constructed to provide access to the James Bay Inn, a railway facility that burned down in April 1939.²²² Over time, Store Creek Bridge became the link between the area south of Store Creek, known as the “Village” or “Indian Village,” and the more northerly area that was the main townsite of Moosonee. The distinction between these two areas will be discussed throughout this dissertation.²²³

Sister Paul-Émile, a Grey Nun who wrote about the James Bay area, indicated that the prospect of railway jobs encouraged Indigenous people to migrate to the Moosonee area as early as 1929. She wrote that Aboriginal people from Cree villages further north on James Bay were "attirés par le travail sur la ligne" [the railway].²²⁴ Paul-Émile also recorded the words of an Oblate priest, who blamed the railway for instilling “false hopes” in the James Bay Cree. She wrote that Père Saindon “voyait avec angoisse les Indiens d'Albany, d'Attawapiskat, et de Winisk

²¹⁸ Close, 2. Surtees also mentions that the rail line was designed so that it ended at “Revillon’s Post.” (174).

²¹⁹ Surtees, 191. The *Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway* (T. & N. O.) was renamed the *Ontario Northland Railway* in 1946 (Surtees, 206).

²²⁰ Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census for 1931. It is assumed that most of the population in the 1931 census total consisted of people from Moose Factory as two decades later (1951) the total population of both communities was still only 523 (124 people in Moosonee and 399 on Moose Factory).

²²¹ Archives of Ontario (hereafter AO), RG 19-77, B354517, Moosonee, 118.7, J.S. Cooper, Chief Engineer, ONTC to D.F. Taylor, Municipal Affairs, 9 May 1968.

²²² T & N. O. Annual Report for Year End 1939.

²²³ Most of thesis references will refer to the area as simply ‘the Village,’ except where archival documents use other designations.

²²⁴ Paul-Émile, Soeur, *La Baie James: Trois Cents Ans d’Histoire: Militaire, Économique, Missionnaire* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1952), 219.

descendre vers l'utopique Moosonee. Pendant deux ans et même trois, ils restent là, attendant la fortune facile qui doit venir avec les 'chars'. Déception. ”²²⁵ Although there was no exclamation point on the word “Déception,” the depressing tone of the priest’s comments are evident in this quotation. Father Saindon’s use of the word ‘chars’ refers to railway cars, or more generally, the construction of the new railway to Moosonee.

Sister Paul-Émile also wrote that the construction of the railway inspired the Oblates to establish a mission at Moosonee. She recorded that on 12 June 1932, only two days after the T&N.O.’s public auction of building lots, Father Saindon negotiated the purchase of lots, for mission buildings, along Moosonee’s main street, between the train station and the waterfront.²²⁶ The Catholic mission started in 1932 and by 1948 the community had a Catholic cathedral, and a 30 bed hospital on Moosonee’s main street. This work corresponded with the construction on Moose Factory Island of a 300 bed federal sanatorium for tuberculosis patients.²²⁷

Early Cold War Years in Moosonee

Moosonee experienced Cold War change in two phases: first, as a shipping centre for supplies to the Mid-Canada radar bases along the James Bay and Hudson Bay coastlines during the mid-1950s and second as the site of a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) radar base from 1961 to 1975. Several articles about the Mid-Canada Line (MCL) referred to Moosonee as a construction and shipping centre for MCL sites. Flying Officer S. G. French described the

²²⁵ Paul-Émile, 224. Also see Kerry Abel, *Changing Places: History, Community, and Identity in Northeastern Ontario* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006). Abel writes that some Cree, in the post WW2 era, chose to live in the Moosonee area in order to be closer to their children who were at the residential school (on Moose Factory Island), 112.

²²⁶ Paul-Émile, 223.

²²⁷ Close, 15, 34-35. Also see photos of Christ the King Cathedral and Assumption Hospital in Paul-Émile. The photo plates are not numbered but are between pages 256 and 257. They show facilities which must have dominated the town at that point in time (1951). The Assumption Hospital was constructed between 1948 and 1950, but it was destroyed by fire in July, 1969.

importance of establishing shipping routes for the MCL's construction materials. He noted that "the first step in the overall transportation planning... was to establish marshalling areas at ends-of-steel or on major roads running north."²²⁸ In Ontario, this meant Moosonee as the farthest north "end-of-steel." French then described how survey crews "slowly worked their way west through the James Bay region to Moosonee where a new main base of operations was set up under canvas. To expedite the operation, fuel caches had been established at a number of points by tractor train the preceding winter (1955)."²²⁹ French re-iterates the role of Moosonee as an operations base by noting that, when work was completed farther north, helicopters returned to Moosonee.²³⁰ He also identifies that Moosonee was an aircraft maintenance centre by noting that when a survey helicopter broke down in Winisk "a ground crew was rushed from Moosonee in an Otter."²³¹ This discussion is important as it verifies that Moosonee was part of Cold War activities long before it became a formal RCAF base, although French did not indicate the specific location of the "base of operations." In addition to helicopter activity, French described winter tractor train operations. He wrote that "during the winter of 1955-56 about 11,000 tons of materials were moved ...by tractor train. At their peak, these trains running out of Gillam, Manitoba and Moosonee, Ontario used over 400 sleds and over 40 heavy tractors."²³²

Other authors have confirmed the intensity of the MCL's shipping efforts during this period. Margaret Carroll's summary of defence operations in northern Ontario noted that "the movement of 9,000 tons [of material for the MCL's bases] out of Moosonee for distances of 300

²²⁸ S. G. French, "The Mid-Canada Line: Detailed Design and Specification," *The Roundel* (May, 1958), 12-13.

²²⁹ S. G. French, "The Mid-Canada Line: Operation Whirlybird." *The Roundel* (June/July, 1958): 13.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid. An 'Otter' is a small float plane, still commonly used in northern Ontario.

²³² French, (May, 1958), 12-13.

to 700 miles constituted a record in Canadian effort of this sort.”²³³ Carroll also wrote that “small 20-ton ships ... [from] Moosonee” were used to off load ocean steamers transporting materials to the Fort Severn, Winisk and Great Whale River radar bases.²³⁴ Robert Surtees reported that the Mid-Canada Line’s construction also caused a surge in employee hours at the Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) train station in Moosonee. He noted that “tons of supplies and equipment, all sent as express, flowed through the Moosonee station.”²³⁵

Some of the articles on the MCL’s shipping process help complete the picture of the new infrastructure constructed in Moosonee during this period. Don Delaplante’s article "Moosonee Booms with Construction of Airfield," describes an extensive clearing just to the west of the ONR train station.²³⁶ Delaplante’s description of the 1955 airstrip location is significant as it is one of the few early references which explains a huge clearing, still apparent on a 1989 air photo of the town. (The current airport is at a completely different location—just north of the former radar base). The 1955 airstrip continued to be used after defence installations were completed. When the ONR applied to the federal government for funding for an all-weather airstrip, its report included the following:

The basis for an all-weather strip already exists at Moosonee in the form of a winter landing strip ... This strip 7,000’ X 400’ was built by Austin Airways during the construction of the D.E.W. line in the mid 1950’s. It is still maintained and operated by

²³³ Margaret A. Carroll, “Defence Forces Operations in Hudson’s Bay,” in *Science, History and Hudson Bay*, ed. C.S.Beals. Vol. 2, 897-934 (Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1968), 926. Also see Frank Reilly, “Mid-Canada Line,” *Engineering and Contract Record* 69, no.12 (1956): 80. Reilly refers to Carter Construction Ltd of Toronto, a firm that was noted by Don Delaplante in a 1955 *Globe and Mail* article on Moosonee.

²³⁴ Carroll, 926.

²³⁵ Surtees, 299. As noted earlier in this chapter, the T&NO became ONR in 1946.

²³⁶ Don Delaplante, "Moosonee Booms with Construction of Airfield." *Globe and Mail*, December 22, 1955.

Austin Airways as a winter strip. ... [It] was completely cleared of tree growth and ditched with explosives to a depth of eight feet along three sides ...”²³⁷

Delaplante’s article also assisted with pinpointing the location of the main base of operations noted by Flying Officer French. The reporter described a large prefabricated construction camp set up by Carter Construction Ltd. on Moosonee’s main street “near the Moose River.”²³⁸ This camp was being used by workers constructing the airstrip and it appears that the second major Mid-Canada Line contractor, Bell Canada, also used this work camp.²³⁹ The construction camp would likely have dominated downtown Moosonee. It can be clearly seen on a 1960 air photo of Moosonee and appears to consist of at least a dozen huge, multi-person accommodation trailers and other buildings.²⁴⁰

The same year that the construction camp and airstrip were built (1955), Store Creek Bridge was “completely reconstructed.”²⁴¹ Interviewees stated that gravel for defence contracts was stockpiled just to the south of the bridge and transported across the bridge to construction sites. It is likely the bridge was upgraded in order to handle the weight of construction vehicles filled with aggregate. Interviewees also described how Store Creek Bridge became a common route for people who lived south of the creek to come into town for work or supplies. Store

²³⁷ North Bay and Area Museum Archives (hereafter NBM), Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) fonds, File A-24-6, Box #16, Moose Factory Stats. And Information, 6-7. Ontario Northland Transportation Commission (ONTC), Submission to Minister of Transport, Ottawa from ONTC, September 1966. Note One: The D.E.W. line reference was likely incorrect as operations through Moosonee tended to relate to the Mid-Canada Line. Note Two: NBM staff were extremely helpful in locating the late 1950s material on Moosonee. They indicated that two boxes of material, labelled “Moose Factory,” might hold Moosonee reports or papers. I searched both boxes and found the ONR fonds related to Moosonee and the RCAF at the bottom of a box under 6 or 7 studies of Moose Factory.

²³⁸ Deleplante, “Moosonee Booms.”

²³⁹ Interviewees mentioned that Bell Canada employees stayed at this camp. Also see R.A. Currie, “Northward Ho! Our Special Contract Department Builds a Major Defence Installation,” *Bluebell* 34, no. 10 (November, 1955): 26-29 (note: *Bluebell* was a Canadian Bell Canada publication). Currie’s 1955 article confirms that Bell Canada was the key technology contact for the Mid-Canada Line.

²⁴⁰ See Paul Lantz, “Old Postcards of Moosonee.” <http://paulantz.smugmug.com/Travel/postcards> for the 1961 Moosonee air photo. The site can also be viewed in Appendix 3 of this thesis as part of a set of three Moosonee air photos from 1960.

²⁴¹ AO, RG 19-77, B354517, Moosonee, 118.7, J.S. Cooper, Chief Engineer, ONTC to D.F. Taylor, Municipal Affairs, 9 May 1968.

Creek Bridge ultimately became a critical link for fire protection for residents of the Indian Village. This topic will be covered further in Chapter Seven in the discussion on infrastructure.

It is difficult to confirm the impact of the Mid-Canada Line's shipping activities on population levels. Delaplante had suggested that Moosonee "jumped" from 700 to 1700 people during airport construction in 1955.²⁴² However, the population boom may have been solely seasonal construction workers as the 1956 census showed the population of the community as only 247 persons (see Table 4.1).

Some archival materials suggest an element of segregation in Cold War Moosonee and they also indicate that sub-standard living conditions existed for some Indigenous people. This material is included as part of newspaper articles about Moosonee. For example, *Globe and Mail* reporter Don Delaplante provided a detailed narration of his trip in January 1956 on the first tractor train to travel from Moosonee to a more northerly, unnamed MCL site. He wrote that the Cree employees on the tractor train construction crews "worked like slaves" to fix a snow covered bridge in the middle of the night. He also noted that the Moosonee-based shipping superintendent, Alex Hennessey, "ordered the Indians to come back [to work] after supper at their camp."²⁴³ This seems to indicate that Indigenous workers did not live at the same work camp as other workers and likely illustrates segregation in living quarters.

²⁴² Delaplante, "Moosonee Booms," 1955. By 1961, Canada Census showed the population of Moosonee as 975, or almost four times the 1956 Canada Census level. It is assumed that this growth was due to migration to Moosonee for employment on projects such as the radar base. The base didn't formally open until late December 1961 so military personnel would not have been included in the 975 total. This discussion of population growth and the radar base itself will be covered in subsequent chapters in this thesis.

²⁴³ Don Delaplante, "Broad Albany Bridged in Darkness as Tractor Train Lumbers North." *Globe and Mail*, January 24, 1956.

Table 4.1: Population Records for Moosonee: 1911-1976

Census Year (Data is from Canada Census unless otherwise noted)	Moosonee (or Moose)	Moose Factory	Total Population of Moosonee and Moose Factory	Notes: Some Moose Factory numbers have been included in this chart, although the focus of thesis work is Moosonee.
1911			468	Population for “Moose Fort” (appears to be both communities-Moosonee and Moose Factory). Talled by adding census sheets.
1921	99	340	439	Population for “Moose River and Moose Factory.” Talled by adding census pages.
1931			475	
1941			949	
1951 ²⁴⁴	124	399	523	
1956 ²⁴⁵	247	447	694	Airstrip constructed.
1961 ²⁴⁶	975	689	1664	Moosonee radar base opened.
1966 ²⁴⁷	1,110	800	1,910	
1971 ²⁴⁸	1,325			
1976 ²⁴⁹	1,349			

²⁴⁴ Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics, The Northeastern Ontario Regional Development Program: A Progress Report, 1969 (Table 7 includes the source for 1951, 1961 and 1966 Census records as “Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada, Population, 1956, Special Bulletin 6009-582, and 1966, Special Bulletin 92-633”).

²⁴⁵ Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada, Population by Electoral Districts and Census Subdivisions, 1961 and 1956.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics, Table 7.

²⁴⁸ Statistics Canada provided a combined (town and base) 1971 total of 1,793 upon request in July 2015. In September 2015, Statistics Canada staff provided the breakdown for 1971 (1325 town and 470 radar base) under Contract EO2377.

²⁴⁹ Moosonee Data for 1976 did not appear in census records for District of Cochrane at Laurentian library so it was accessed directly from Statistics Canada staff in July 2015.

Fred Bruemmer, a geographer, also described two distinct areas in Moosonee in the mid-1950s. He wrote that “the poverty of the Indian village, standing somewhat apart from the white settlement, is in harsh contrast with the latter's prosperity. Most of the Indians still live in tents. Some of them have built crude little shacks.”²⁵⁰ As a further contrast, Bruemmer noted that Indigenous people on Moose Factory Island tended to have houses and “there are few tents.”²⁵¹ Bruemmer also wrote that there were approximately 460 people in Moosonee in 1957 -- “60 white people and 400 Indians,” although the accuracy of his population numbers cannot be verified.²⁵²

Bruemmer’s description of Moosonee is in stark contrast to the scenes narrated by Sister Paul-Émile in her walking tour of the town. Paul-Émile wrote that the houses of Indigenous people in the pre-Cold War town were located within “deux villages indiens.”²⁵³ Paul-Émile further described the two villages, located at the south end of town “vers le sud, de l’autre côté de Shore [Store] Creek” and suggested that the location and appearance of the dwellings differed depending on the owner’s religious upbringing. She wrote that “les protestants, métis et Indiens, sont groupés en direction de la rivière Moose. Les catholiques habitent plus à l’intérieur, la grande majorité de ces derniers viennent de la côte ouest.”²⁵⁴ Soeur Paul-Émile then commented that the Catholic Indians had built houses that were “très propres à l’extérieur comme à l’intérieur” and she implied that this clean and tidy condition was due to the fact the owners had received a good education from the Oblate missionaries who worked in the Cree communities

²⁵⁰ Fred Bruemmer, “Moosonee and Moose Factory,” *Canadian Geographical Journal* 55, no. 1 (1957): 24. Interviewees for thesis research emphasized that the reference to ‘tents’ should have been clearer. These were not ‘tipis’ but would have been the type of tents used by prospectors.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 24. Bruemmer’s population figures are not used in population charts since his source is not indicated.

²⁵³ Paul-Émile, 218.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

along the “côte ouest” of James Bay. The sole concern expressed by Paul-Émile in regard to Indigenous housing was that the “deux villages indiens” were located on ground that was “marécageaux” (marshy) and she suggested that the area needed “irrigation.”²⁵⁵ Clearly this terrain was not ideal for housing.

Paul-Émile provided only a brief description of the central area of Moosonee, with few references to Indigenous people and only a small comment that there were “quelque maisonnettes” (some small houses) in town for “des métis et des Indiens.”²⁵⁶ She also noted that the town had an HBC store, Imperial Oil warehouses at “des quais,” and some tourist cottages.²⁵⁷

Sister Paul-Émile’s narrative was produced as part of a volume designed to celebrate several anniversaries of Catholic missionary work in the James Bay area. For example it celebrated the 50th anniversary of the arrival of the Grey Nuns at James Bay (1902 in Fort Albany).²⁵⁸ Paul-Émile’s prose was therefore likely intended to promote, or publicize, the value of the education provided by both the Grey Nuns and the Oblates. Her writing thus appears to have been intended to encourage funding for Catholic missions over the nearby competition – the “protestants” -- such as the Anglican mission on Moose Factory. This was clearly the kind of publication that would focus on success, not failure.²⁵⁹

Despite the bias evident in Paul-Émile’s writing, her narrative still describes elements of settlement patterns that can be seen on an earlier, 1940 aerial photo of Moosonee. It is also

²⁵⁵ Paul-Émile, 219.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Other anniversaries are listed at the front of the book and include 60 years for the Oblate missionaries in James Bay and 225 years since the first Catholic mass was celebrated at Rupert’s House.

²⁵⁹ Paige Raibmon discusses the connection between the promotion of missionary work and funding in her “Living on Display: Colonial Visions of Aboriginal Domestic Spaces” in *Home, Work, and Play: Situating Canadian Social History, 1840-1980* eds. James Opp and John C. Walsh (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006). Raibmon also notes that missionaries would contrast their own parishioners with non-converts to emphasize the success of the missions. This comparison is evident in Paul-Émile’s discussion of Catholics vs protestants.

possible to map her observations on specific streets (e.g. First Street and Revillon Road), which still exist in the town of Moosonee.²⁶⁰ Many of the archival documents about Moosonee refer to it as including two communities, the main townsite and the area “south of Store Creek.” One of these descriptions reads as follows: “Moosonee Townsite is divided by Shore [*sic*] Creek, with the main townsite being on the northeast side and the Indian Village on the southwest side. The Indian Village is part of the townsite.”²⁶¹ Some interviewees have suggested that the Village was not formally a reserve and therefore should not be called an “Indian” Village. For that reason, this dissertation will refer to the two local areas simply as “The Village” and “The Town.” Map 4.1 shows these areas as they appeared in 1959. This map also includes sketches that were added during the planning phase for the RCAF radar base. This phase will be discussed in Chapter Five.

Several years after the opening of the Pinetree radar base, anthropologist R.G. Bucksar described the same area as Paul-Émile, south of Store Creek, as home to “nearly one thousand ...migrating Indians” living on the southern edge of Moosonee, in shacks, with outdoor privies and no water or sewage facilities.²⁶² He also noted that the adjacent Store Creek was “a narrow, slimy open sewer.”²⁶³ Bucksar’s “Moosonee and the Squatters,” also referred to “500 whites” living at the RCAF airbase and “350 whites and 45 Indians” in the town.²⁶⁴ Bucksar suggested that the Cree settlement was created due to earlier construction work. He wrote that “migrating Indians were attracted to the settlement by offers of high wages for temporary construction

²⁶⁰ See Paul Lantz, "Old Postcards of Moosonee." <http://paullantz.smugmug.com/Travel/postcards> for the 1940 Moosonee air photo.

²⁶¹ AO, RG 19-F-7, General Administration: Moosonee Development Board, Departmental Memorandum from R. Rivard, Department of Social and Family Services (DSFS) to C. J. Williams, DSFS, 24 November 1967.


²⁶² R. G. Bucksar. “Moosonee and the Squatters.” *Canadian Welfare* 44, no. 5 (1968): 15. Bucksar’s observations are based on his work in Moosonee during the summers of 1964-68 and the winter of 1967-68.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

work.”²⁶⁵ Bucksar does not specify when the migration and construction work started but Table 4.1 shows that Moosonee’s population grew during the Mid-Canada Line’s shipping phase, and continued with work on the Moosonee Pinetree base.

Map 4.1: Moosonee Townsite, the Village and the Proposed RCAF Base ²⁶⁶



²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Archives of Ontario, AO, RG 9-1, B113127, Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee, 1958-62. Map M68-1-1009-1, Department of National Defence (DND), “General Plan of Moosonee and Vicinity Showing Location of Lands, Areas and Access Roads,” 6 October 1959. Red lines had been added to the map sometime during the planning phase for the radar base, but the original legend for the map showed it as produced in 1959. (Note: Archives of Ontario indicated on 23 June 2016 that AO did not hold copyright for Map 4.1. The map is included here per DND’s copyright provisions at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/terms-conditions>.)

Other scholars have discussed the relationship of squatting to the ‘boom’ stages of resource towns. For example, Kerry Abel describes squatting adjacent to northern Ontario’s mining towns. Abel explains how the practice of squatting was relatively common to both Indigenous and European people who migrated to northern areas for work (e.g. Italians at South Porcupine).²⁶⁷ She suggests that, where employment was expected to be temporary, squatting was a relatively common practice that made sense to both temporary and seasonal workers. As noted previously in the literature review chapter, Arn Keeling discussed squatting issues at Uranium Lake, Saskatchewan. Keeling indicated that the opening of the uranium mines drew both prospectors and “large numbers of Cree, Dene and Métis people [who were] attracted to the new settlement by the prospects of seasonal work.” These prospective employees “tended to occupy summer camps at the fringes of the town.”²⁶⁸ R. G. Bucksar also wrote about squatters at the edge of Whitehorse. He stated that “the number of squatters in or around a community may...be important in determining policy...the greater the numbers the fewer the chances of assimilation (into the community) and the greater the possibility of *apartheid*.”²⁶⁹ It is unclear if Bucksar was promoting assimilation, but at least he suggested that there needed to be more discussion of the potential relationship of squatting to potential segregation. This issue will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.

By 1967, there was an indication that growth that began with the installation of defence infrastructure (e.g. the 1955 airstrip and the RCAF base) was continuing. R. Rivard, a provincial civil servant, wrote that:

²⁶⁷ Abel, *Changing Places*, 81.

²⁶⁸ Arn Keeling, “Born in an Atomic Test Tube: Landscapes of Cyclonic Development at Uranium Lake, Saskatchewan.” *Canadian Geographer* 54, no. 2(2010), 241.

²⁶⁹ R. G. Bucksar, “The Squatter on the Resource Frontier.” *Arctic* 23, no. 3 (September, 1970): 203. Italics are Bucksar’s.

Moosonee is a gathering point and Indians from around the [James Bay] coast come here because of the facilities available and, no doubt, hoping for an improvement in their way of life. There are presently Indians from the Weenusk [Winisk], Attawapiskat, Fort Albany, Moose and New Post Bands in Moosonee as well as a few from the East Coast of James and Hudson Bay.²⁷⁰

Work on Moosonee suggests that it was transformed through several key stages.

Migration from northern communities started during railway construction and continued because of the Mid-Canada Line's construction and shipping jobs. Subsequently, migration from both the south (military personnel) and the north (Cree people) increased as the town gained its own radar base. Development activities and issues will be discussed further in the following chapters.

²⁷⁰ AO, RG 19-F-7, General Administration: Moosonee Development Board, Departmental Memorandum from R. Rivard, Department of Social and Family Services (DSFS) to C. J. Williams, DSFS, 24 November 1967.

Chapter Five: A Different Kind of Townsite: Planning and Construction of the Moosonee Radar Base

The first part of this chapter focuses on the Cabinet Committee on Townsites (formed in 1954) and how it failed to convince the RCAF and the ONR to build a model community at Moosonee. It outlines the provincial planners' vision of an integrated townsite with new services and facilities constructed for the benefit of both current residents and incoming military personnel. Then it shows how the ONR and RCAF ignored planners in order to expedite the construction of a typical radar base. The second half of the chapter describes the construction process itself and the process of building in an isolated location within the peatlands of Northern Ontario. This is essential in order to understand the fragility of the natural environment in the Moosonee area and it helps explain the issues that arose, in particular with water pollution, in subsequent years.

Planning for the Radar Base

The Ontario Government of Premier Leslie Frost recognized the importance of long term planning throughout its term.²⁷¹ The Premier appointed a Minister of Planning and Development, William Griesinger, when he formed his first Cabinet in May 1949.²⁷² Five years later, in 1954, Frost formed a Cabinet Committee on Townsites. The goal of the committee was to deal with the potential growth of dozens of small towns related to resource development. Robert Robson has stated that the Townsites Committee “was the first provincial government

²⁷¹ Leslie Frost was Premier of Ontario from May 1949 to November 1961 (one month before the Moosonee RCAF base opened). See Roger Graham, *Old Man Ontario: Leslie M. Frost* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 421.

²⁷² *Ibid*, 422.

agency designed singularly to accommodate the unique settlement needs of the resource community.”²⁷³

Provincial planners working with the Townsite Committee had a vision of planned communities in the north. In referring to ‘community planning,’ a key provincial planning director, Don F. Taylor²⁷⁴, stated in 1959 that “My definition of Community Planning is the application of intelligent forethought to the physical development and redevelopment of a community.”²⁷⁵ Furthermore, Taylor indicated that:

The aim of community planning is the securing of a physical community whose parts are so related one to the other and so proportioned as to produce the highest degree of economy, efficiency, visual attractiveness, and stimulation, convenience and safety possible with the human and material resources available.²⁷⁶

Moosonee was the only Ontario townsite studied by the Townsites Committee which did not become a mining town. Instead, planners working for the committee identified issues related to Moosonee becoming a harbour and potentially a radar base town.

The potential for the impact of military development on Moosonee was identified as early as 1958, three years before the Moosonee Pinetree radar base opened. A director in the Ontario Department of Planning and Development, A.L.S. Nash, wrote to Acting Air Commodore Whiting of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) on 1 December 1958 to voice his concerns about potential development in Moosonee. He said:

²⁷³ Robert Robson, “Building Resource Towns: Government Intervention in Ontario in the 1950s,” in *At the End of the Shift: Mines and Single Industry Towns in Northern Ontario*, ed. Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson (Toronto: Dundurn Press Ltd., 1992), 98.

²⁷⁴ Hereafter referred to as Don Taylor (although he signed all memos as “DFT”)

²⁷⁵ Don Taylor, Director, Community Planning Branch, Department of Planning and Development, Speech to the Association of School Business Officials, Toronto, 3 February 1959. There are other definitions of planning, however Don Taylor’s definition is clear and it reflects the thinking of the late 1950s and 1960s. This speech was provided to the author by Don Taylor.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

You will recognize the fact that even though the military installations may be geographically separated from the existing community there can be a significant impact on the community in terms of population attracted to service the needs of the installation, retail sales, power and other utility requirements.

Any information which you are able to divulge on the number and type of personnel, both of a construction and operational nature, would be most helpful.²⁷⁷

Nash had not been directly contacted by the Canadian military regarding the potential for military activity at Moosonee. Instead his staff had heard about the RCAF plans from ONR in late November 1958 while in Moosonee to collect data for the Moosonee sea-port proposal. Don Taylor noted:

During the [November 24 and 25] meetings in Moosonee Col. Reynolds [ONR] advised us that the R.C.A.F. were considering the establishment of a military operation at Moosonee ... No indication was given at this time of the nature of the operation. Col. Reynolds did indicate that the R.C.A.F. wished to purchase land in the Moosonee townsite for housing purposes.²⁷⁸

Nash wrote in his letter to Whiting that Premier Frost had directed staff to look into the “expansion of Moosonee” and that once planners started to study the town they “learned that the R.C.A.F. have carried out certain topographical and soil surveys immediately to the north of the present community.”²⁷⁹ Nash indicated an interest in sharing data with the RCAF and he offered to be available for meetings on military development and on exploratory studies. In responding to Nash’s inquiry, the Deputy Minister of National Defence stated that as soon as topographical and soil surveys were completed he would arrange a preliminary meeting between provincial

²⁷⁷ AO, Premier Frost: General Correspondence 1958-59, RG 3-23, B292100. File: Ontario Northland Railway-Construction Airstrip-Moosonee. A.L.S. Nash, Director, Community Planning Branch, Department of Planning and Development to Acting Air Commodore R.B. Whiting, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), 1 December 1958.

²⁷⁸ AO, RG 19-77, B388332, File 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60, Taylor to Nash, “Moosonee Development,” 2 March 1959. C.E. (Colonel) Reynolds was Chairman of the ONTC from 1944-1962 (see Surtees, *Northern Connection*, 202 and 207).

²⁷⁹ AO, Premier Frost: General Correspondence, Nash to Whiting, DND, 1 December 1958.

planners and his office.²⁸⁰ The Deputy Minister did not indicate to Nash that the RCAF had been meeting with the ONR since October 1958. However, Nash copied Colonel Reynolds on his 19 December 1958 letter thanking National Defence and suggesting a meeting in early 1959.²⁸¹ Clearly Nash was a team player, not a builder of silos.

Meanwhile, Don Taylor, the Chief Planner in Nash's department, wrote to the ONR for more information. Colonel Reynolds responded:

We have not yet had the official application from the Department of National Defence for the R.C.A.F. station at Moosonee, but I know that it is not dead—they are asking for additional information nearly every daye [*sic*] and have promised to have the official application in shortly. As soon as it is received I will pass it along to you for your information.²⁸²

The words “for your information” at the end of Colonel Reynolds letter seem to emphasize that ONR was in charge when it came to the RCAF base and that provincial planners were welcome to be involved—as observers.

Furthermore, the ONR, or at least the Colonel, assumed the role of expediting development rather than considering planning options proposed by the Department of Planning and Development. By the time provincial planners heard about the radar base project, ONR staff had already met with the RCAF in North Bay (28 October 1958) and both parties had travelled to Moosonee in early November to view a potential site north of the town. Al Jardine, the ONR General Manager who accompanied the RCAF to Moosonee, forwarded a confidential report to the Colonel after the November trip. He enclosed “a rough draft of the proposed location of the

²⁸⁰ Ibid., Deputy Minister, DND to Nash, 15 December 1968. Note: the Deputy Minister's name is not provided in the correspondence files and his memos are signed “K.Kaynes for Deputy.”

²⁸¹ Ibid., Nash to Deputy Minister, DND, 19 December 1958.

²⁸² AO, File 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60, Colonel C. E. Reynolds, Chairman ONTC to Taylor, 3 December 1958.

apartment buildings, single men's quarters, administration building, etc.”²⁸³ Jardine also indicated that a major road extension would be needed from First Street (in downtown Moosonee) to the proposed air base.

Jardine's letter is the first indication that the ONR hoped for some placement of radar base facilities into the town. It is also the first record that mentions that the RCAF wanted a completely separate location for most of the infrastructure related to its radar base. Jardine wrote that at their first meeting, the ONR suggested that RCAF accommodation (e.g. apartments) be located on the town site, which Jardine refers to “our present town site.”²⁸⁴ He noted however that the RCAF was starting to push for an autonomous and separate location. By 1 December 1959 Colonel Reynolds was advising provincial planners that “the RCAF had decided not to locate their residential accommodation within the townsite as originally contemplated.”²⁸⁵ Don Taylor later wrote of this decision:

Both Col. Reynolds and the writer were disappointed with the decision as it would now be necessary to have two completely independent utility systems—one for the ‘civilian’ townsite and one for the ‘military’ and further this separation would not lead to a healthy social situation.²⁸⁶

Despite the Colonel's message about separation of the town and the radar base, the military, ONR and provincial government planners continued to meet to discuss the potential community structure that might integrate the town and the air force base. Three months after the Colonel said the base and town would be completely separate, his own General Manager, Al Jardine, was

²⁸³ North Bay and Area Museum Archives (hereafter NBM), Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) fonds, File A-24-6, Box #16, Moose Factory Stats. and Information. A. Jardine, General Manager, ONR to Colonel Reynolds, 11 November 1958. The ‘rough draft’ is not included with this memo.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, emphasis mine. Jardine's reference to “our” town site is the type of language once would expect mining companies of this era to use regarding their mine sites. See Rex Lucas, *Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities of Single Industry* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2nd edition, for further discussion of the dominance of single industries in small towns. (Note: Lucas's text was first published in 1971.)

²⁸⁵ File 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60, Taylor to Nash, “Moosonee Development” memo, 2 March 1959.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

indicating the opposite. Jardine wrote that RCAF representatives had “no objections to ... integrating the RCAF [residential] dwellings into the Townsite area, but ... time was a dominating factor.”²⁸⁷ The RCAF had indicated that construction estimates were already submitted to the federal government and as soon as these estimates were approved they would be subject to strict construction timelines. They also emphasized that they would be keeping their single men’s quarters [barracks], their power plant and other infrastructure within the base itself. They also had no inclination to get involved in the “installation of sewers, water and power supply” within the townsite.²⁸⁸

Provincial planners, on the other hand, saw the proposed military base as a potential part of an integrated community, which would share sewer, water, and power infrastructure, plus schools and recreational facilities. They also saw the proposed base as an opportunity to design an ideal or model new town. Early in 1959, the planners leapt into action, gathering data and drawing up development options for the area. On 9 January, F.H. Deeks, a Senior Design Planner, requested the following data for departmental plans: an existing land use survey (including schools and hospitals), a landscape contour survey, a soil survey, a list of existing services (e.g. water, power), and a description of the population “Native and White adults and school age.”²⁸⁹ Deeks said that all of this material would be needed “assuming a townsite of 3000 people.”²⁹⁰

Meanwhile, Don Taylor drew up sketches of the staging for the new townsite. He had an all-encompassing approach to development which he demonstrated by describing Moosonee as a

²⁸⁷ NBM, ONR fonds, File A-24-6, A. Jardine, General Manager, ONR to Colonel Reynolds, 20 February 1959.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ File 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60, F. H. Deeks, Planning Design Section, Department of Planning and Development, to Don Taylor, 9 January 1959.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

potential “trans-shipment centre,” a mineral processing site, and a military base.²⁹¹ The “trans-shipment centre” examined the potential for Moosonee to add a harbour and major airport to its railway shipping efforts. Taylor showed the industrial storage areas and mineral processing sites as being located between the military base and the Moose River. He focused community residential development in two stages: Stage One was the existing residential area including the downtown and areas to the north. Stage Two was the area south of Store Creek. In his 23 January notes, Taylor had assumed that the “housing and defence installation ... [would be] physically segregated from the remainder of the Moosonee townsite.”²⁹² Within a month he was back to the possibility of integration. Taylor also suggested that there would be “a population reaction on the Moosonee townsite itself” even if the base was built as a completely separate unit.²⁹³ By this he meant that there would be an increase in employment in retail, professional and construction jobs. Taylor also provided the first commentary on potential social impacts of new development:

Some considerable thought will have to be given to the provision of land for Indians moving into the area to partake of the new employment opportunities which will be offered. It is doubtful if the standards of housing and customs characteristics of the native Cree can be intermingled with the new white populations which will be attracted—great care will have to be taken in handling the problems which could arise through the rapid merging of the two quite dissimilar cultures. This will undoubtedly prove to be one of the most complex and challenging problems of the entire project.²⁹⁴

Although Taylor noted that Cree would be moving into the area in the future, he was also aware that some Indigenous people were already living in Moosonee. Shortly after he wrote his 23

²⁹¹ File 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60, Don Taylor, Memorandum to Moosonee file on ‘Land Use Requirements,’ 23 January 1959. The prospect of Moosonee as a harbour site and a mineral processing centre had been discussed by ONR for a dozen or more years. References to processing are to iron ore from the Belcher Islands and from the Great Whale area of northern Quebec. Trans-shipment means that ore would be shipped by barge to Moosonee and then to markets in the south by train.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

January 1959 memo, he added a handwritten label for an “Indian Village” south of downtown Moosonee.²⁹⁵ RCAF maps from 1959 (see Map 4.1) also recognize this settlement area, showing the “Moosonee Townsite” and the “Indian Village” as two distinct areas to the south of the proposed radar base.²⁹⁶

Several joint meetings (involving the ONR, RCAF, and Planners) were held during late February 1959 to finalize planning options for Moosonee. The result was the presentation of an integrated plan on 19 February 1959 which Don Taylor stated “met the approval of all agencies.”²⁹⁷ The plan included:

- a) The integration of both military and civilian housing
- b) Single sewage disposal plant
- c) Centralized primary and secondary school facilities
- d) Centralized recreational facilities and,
- e) Shopping centre²⁹⁸

All parties understood that the integrated plan relied on speedy budget approvals by both the federal and provincial governments in order to meet the military’s original construction schedules. On 23 February 1959 provincial planners met with Colonel Reynolds to discuss the integrated plan and to confirm his agreement. Taylor noted after this meeting “Col. Reynolds agreed with the plans presented.”²⁹⁹

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ AO, RG 9-1, B113127, Townsite Committee Studies 1958-62, Map M68-1-1009-1, Department of National Defence, “General Plan of Moosonee and Vicinity Showing Location of Lands Areas and Access Roads,”⁶ October 1959. This map is Map 4.1 in the preceding chapter.

²⁹⁷ File 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60, Taylor to Nash, “Moosonee Development” memo, 2 March 1959.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

A few days later Colonel Reynolds “made public the preliminary townsite plans” prepared by provincial planners.³⁰⁰ The *Globe and Mail* headline “Development Plan Disclosed for Moosonee” announced:

A preliminary plan to develop a townsite to accommodate 4,000 to 5,000 persons at Moosonee near James Bay at an estimated cost of \$1,500,000 was revealed today by Col. C. E. Reynolds, chairman of the Ontario Northern Transportation Commission... The plan for the townsite was ordered by Col. Reynolds ...to control growth of the town.³⁰¹

In effect, the Colonel claimed that all of the land use planning work that had been completed was his initiative. Things continued to go ‘downhill’ from there.

Unfortunately for the provincial planners’ vision of a new community structure, the potential for an integrated and planned community was cancelled shortly after the *Globe and Mail* article and without their input. In fact it was decided over lunch—a lunch attended by the Ministers of Municipal Affairs, Public Works, and Planning and Development, and Colonel Reynolds of the ONR. The Minister of Planning and Development, W.M. Nickle, wrote to Premier Frost later that day and indicated that the group was “unanimously of the opinion that the air force should be informed forthwith to make their own arrangements to establish in the area they have chosen... outside of the proposed townsite [of Moosonee].”³⁰² Colonel Reynolds’ version of the lunch was somewhat different than Nickle’s report. In a letter to Air Commodore Whiting of the RCAF, Reynolds wrote:

I had a meeting in Toronto on Monday [March 2nd] with the three Provincial Ministers concerned with the development of Moosonee; ... I convinced them that it was a mistake to delay this matter any further in an effort to try and integrate the R.C.A.F. with the Townsite, and we agreed that it should not be delayed further and I was instructed to

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ “Development Plan Disclosed for Moosonee,” *Globe and Mail*, 26 February 1959. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The *Globe and Mail* (1844-2011), accessed November 24, 2014.

³⁰² NBM, ONR fonds, W. M. Nickle, Minister of Planning and Development, to Premier Frost, 2 March 1959.

advise you that it was quite in order for you to proceed with the plan originally presented by your Department ... [on] February 12th.³⁰³

It is clear that the Colonel notified the RCAF the same day as the lunch meeting as Air Commodore Whiting wrote to thank Reynolds for his phone call of 2 March and for advising him that the provincial government would not be proceeding with a plan to “integrate the RCAF PMQs [Private Married Quarters] with the Townsite.”³⁰⁴ Whiting also said “That a quick decision has been given on this difficult question, of whether or not to integrate, is, I feel, directly attributable to your own positive actions.”³⁰⁵ It is not at all clear from the archival material why Reynolds would appear to agree with provincial planners and then would help to have their plans cancelled. All one can conclude is that he was not a typical ‘team’ member and that judging from the style of some of his correspondence, he also wanted to be completely in control of the town at all times.

Although the concept of integration was dismissed there was the potential to retain two infrastructure aspects from planners’ proposals. These were the construction of sewage treatment facilities and the proposed location of the main road connecting the RCAF base to downtown Moosonee. Air Commodore Whiting advised Reynolds on 11 March 1959 that “in deference to the wishes of the Department of Planning and Development and in order to avoid pollution of the future harbour, we now intend installing secondary sewage treatment.”³⁰⁶ Surprisingly, although Reynolds was not in favour of a fully integrated townsite, he was hoping for some sewage services from the RCAF. In fact, in one of his letters to Whiting, Reynolds wrote “It is still hoped however, that before construction is started on your sewage disposal plant

³⁰³ NBM, ONR fonds, Colonel Reynolds, ONR to Air Commodore R. B. Whiting, 4 March 1959.

³⁰⁴ NBM, ONR fonds, Whiting to Reynolds, 11 March 1959. Note: PMQs are Private Married Quarters or houses for military personnel and their families.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

we might be able to arrive at some arrangement whereby your requirements would be enlarged to accommodate the whole town.” Immediately backing down from this request, Reynolds wrote in his next sentence “This, of course, is not a condition of the deal at all but something that we might be able to arrive at.”³⁰⁷

On the second issue-- a connecting road for the base-- Reynolds backtracked even further from provincial proposals. Both Reynolds and RCAF understood that the Department of Planning and Development required only one condition to a non-integrated site.³⁰⁸ This condition was that the road connecting the base to downtown had to be Fourth Avenue (now Atim Road), a road allowance that closely paralleled the ONR train track, rather than Revillon road or Second Avenue (now Bay Road – See Map 5. 1). Building a road that paralleled the train tracks would have kept military traffic, such as loading of supplies and equipment, away from pedestrian pathways, residential areas, and local traffic. Less than a week after the RCAF acknowledged this planning requirement, Colonel Reynolds wrote to them stating “If, of course, you do not want to go ahead with putting your main entrance by Fourth Street at the start, it is quite in order to use the waterfront road [Revillon Road] .”³⁰⁹

By the end of March 1959 the ONR seems to have developed its own plans for Moosonee and completely ignored the provincial planners. Al Jardine, the General Manager for ONR wrote

we have prepared a plan ... It is our suggestion that the present roadways be used and the existing bridge over Store Creek be used instead of constructing a new bridge on an extension of Fourth Avenue ... If the RCAF feel that they cannot tolerate the possible


³⁰⁷ NBM, ONR fonds, Reynolds to Whiting, 4 March 1959. Colonel Reynolds began this letter with the salutation “My dear Air Commodore.”

³⁰⁸ NBM, ONR fonds, J. W. Griffith, Group Captain for Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence to Head Office, ONR, Re: RCAF Station Moosonee, 5 March 1959.

³⁰⁹ NBM, ONR fonds, Colonel Reynolds to E. A. Boys, DND, re: RCAF Station-Moosonee, 9 March 1959.

traffic interference along Revillon road, then it would be necessary for you to build a road...”³¹⁰

Map 5.1 Moosonee Settlement Areas (circa 1962)



The Department of Planning and Development had required that Fourth Avenue be extended to link the RCAF base to the town, while bypassing residential areas. This requirement had now been rejected.³¹¹ Furthermore, the ONR was ignoring local people by indicating there might be “possible traffic interference along Revillon Road.” Revillon road was the main waterfront thoroughfare for local residents. Their use of a traditional route was now labeled as “interference.”

It seems likely that the RCAF always intended to build a new road in whatever location was the most convenient for its operations. As noted above, the ONR encouraged the building of such a road. The route that was finally constructed, known as RCAF Road or Bay Road, can easily be seen on 1960 air photos as a straight white line from the RCAF base to the middle of

³¹⁰ NBM, ONR fonds, A. Jardine, ONR to Griffith, DND, 31 March 1959.

³¹¹ It is worth noting that the Fourth Street extension proposed by the planners in 1959 was not built until early in the next century. When the MDAB was dissolved and changed to a municipality in 2001 the provincial government provided funds for capital improvements. The new Town Council used part of these funds to build a road bypassing most of the residential area. I am aware of this project as I was still Moosonee’s advisor during this time (1993 to 2006).

Moosonee's main street (see Appendix 3 for the 1960 air photos). In effect, the road that the ONR casually allowed to proceed – Bay Road -- brought military traffic 'smack dab' into the middle of downtown Moosonee, right at the corner of the HBC store and the Catholic Mission.³¹²

Clearly, the needs of residents were secondary to those of the RCAF and the ONR. In addition to routing military traffic through the downtown area, the RCAF followed the ONR's suggestion (above) to use an existing bridge to cross Store Creek rather than building a new bridge at Fourth Avenue as recommended by provincial planners. The use of Store Creek Bridge would eventually interfere with fire protection services to residents living south of the bridge as the old wooden bridge could not hold the weight of fire tanker trucks. In summary, the RCAF and the ONR did not "stick to the plan." In particular, the ONR practised and encouraged incremental and disjointed decision-making, which caused difficulties in the town of Moosonee for decades. Chapter Seven includes a discussion of these difficulties, including the fire protection issues and Store Creek Bridge.

Planners were devastated when the integrated plan was shelved. Director Nash wrote to his Minister that "We regretted hearing of the decision made by the Prime Minister [the Premier] that no funds could be made available at this time for the establishment of joint facilities at Moosonee with the RCAF."³¹³ Nash indicated that the community would still be subject to development pressures related to the military base and he recommended that "we immediately take steps to finalize a detailed development plan for Moosonee."³¹⁴ In order to be ready for a

³¹² Correspondence between the ONR and the RCAF helped me understand why Second Avenue (Bay Road) was eventually constructed as the 'RCAF road' even though Fourth Avenue was the planned route. Otherwise it was difficult to comprehend how the two sets of maps (preliminary plans and final maps) were completely different.

³¹³ File: 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60. A. L. S. Nash, Director, Community Planning Branch to W.M. Nickle, Minister of Planning & Development, Re: Moosonee Townsite, 9 March 1959.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

potential sea-port and for commercial development related to the base, Nash stated that “it will be necessary to ... carry out detailed studies of the topography and soils and preliminary studies of water supply and sewage disposal” in the town. He concluded:

If these investigations are not carried out in the near future we may find ourselves in the same position as in Manitouwadge and Elliot Lake where the pace of activity was so swift that mistakes were made in the design of these townsites which could have been eliminated had additional time been available.³¹⁵

This demonstrates how planners may have been left out of parts of the first round of discussions, but they clearly tried to continue to place themselves as part of the decision-making group. Don Taylor wrote directly to Air Commodore Whiting in December 1959 requesting copies of soil and drainage surveys and asking to be advised “of any change...in the original time schedule which proposed residential occupancy of the R.C.A.F. site late in 1961.”³¹⁶

Some studies did occur over the next ten years or more, and very slowly issues related to roads, sewer and water were ultimately resolved. However, two incremental decisions by the ONR to reduce RCAF construction requirements (i.e. not requiring Fourth Avenue construction and not demanding sewage treatment for the entire community) had already set the tone for piecemeal, incomplete, and inadequate servicing decisions for Moosonee.

Ironically, when the RCAF undertook security tests in the mid-1960s it indicated that the entire RCAF base could be shut down by issues with communications infrastructure that was outside of its fence. The Vulnerability Test Report filed in August of 1966 indicated that “This unit does not have capability to defend Ontario Northland Communications microwave relay,

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ File: 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60, Don Taylor to Whiting, 18 December 1959.

and connecting longline on which all unit communications depend.”³¹⁷ This situation occurred because the base defence system had been premised on “protecting our restricted areas only.”³¹⁸ The restricted areas were the radar domes and power plant, which an interviewee indicated were protected by security guards at two layers of fences: one surrounded the entire base and a second internal fence surrounded the three domes and the power plant. The RCAF had succeeded in locating its principal connecting road on Second Avenue, which was a direct route to the ONR Communications building, but it had all other facilities within the fenced base. Although this demonstrates a vulnerable defence system, to be fair the integration of the town and base would not necessarily have improved this situation.

Federal air force planners needed an air base as quickly as possible. Archival memos indicate that the provincial government knew it could not come up with its share of funding to shape an integrated community with anything like the speed of the federal government defence initiatives. It also appears that the mediator between the air force and the province, Colonel Reynolds, although discussing the concept of an integrated and planned community, was not actually fully supporting it.

To a certain extent, the planners’ visions of shaping a brand new townsite were doomed from the beginning, even if the air force had not proposed an air base. The planners were not, understandably, totally familiar with the area and did not realize that Moosonee had been developing for over two decades by the time the radar base was proposed. Provincial planners (based in Toronto) were informed about the proposed air base at the end of October 1958 and had only a month or two to collect data and propose planning strategies for the community. As

³¹⁷ Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC) RG 24 Vol. 23533, Security Vulnerability, Vulnerability Test Report, 12 August 1966

³¹⁸ Ibid.

an example of a lack of information, the planners did not seem to be aware of two significant items. These were the existence of a construction camp on the main street of Moosonee, and the gradual development of the area known as ‘the Indian Village.’ This lack of realization between planning vision and reality is evident in a 23 January 1959 memo.³¹⁹ Don Taylor wrote about the integrated community and, as is common for planners, showed the proposed stages of community development (Stage One...Stage Two). At some point he would have gone on site or talked with local contacts, and he would have realized that the town was neither ‘pristine’ nor vacant and that there were already people living in two distinct areas. For example, one of Don Taylor’s drawings shows a handwritten notation “Indian Village!” in the area south of Store Creek.

The planners had wanted to get in at the very beginning of a new townsite and they hoped to make Moosonee a prototype of a planned community as opposed to a community which mushroomed without services for residents, due to the ‘cyclonic activity’ common to mining towns.³²⁰ Planners had a vision of development as staged and nodal or focused, as opposed to incremental and scattered.

Correspondence between the RCAF, ONR, and Ontario’s planners shows that initially the three groups worked in semi-isolation, or in government ‘silos’. That is, each party only revealed part of its goals and plans to the others. The three parties did share one commonality. That is, none of the three seemed to involve local people in decision making processes at the beginning of the planning process. These characteristics of the RCAF, ONR and Ontario

³¹⁹ File: 117.7, Moosonee 1958-60, Don Taylor, Memorandum to Moosonee File re: Land Use Requirements, 23 January 1959.

³²⁰ See Arn Keeling for a discussion of the term “cyclonic” in relation to rapid townsite development in Arn Keeling, “Born in an Atomic Test Tube: Landscapes of Cyclonic Development at Uranium Lake, Saskatchewan.” *Canadian Geographer* 54, no. 2(2010): 228-252.

planners: partially working in silos and not fully implementing public input, were to have long term impacts on the town of Moosonee. These impacts differed widely from the intensively planned area of the radar base to the partially planned Moosonee Townsite and finally to the initially ignored and transient area of the Village.

Construction of the Radar Base

The press first wrote about the potential for a Moosonee air force base in June 1959. A reporter for the *Globe and Mail* indicated that Premier Frost “guardedly confirmed that the federal government [was] considering Moosonee as a northern air defense base.” Furthermore, Frost was quoted as saying: “I don’t know if it is a missile base or an airfield ... Where there is smoke there is fire.”³²¹ He also noted that “defence service technicians have been studying this area for months.” It is possible that he believed the extensive surveys would only have been conducted if the base were going to proceed.

In fact, technical surveys for the potential air base had been ongoing since the fall of 1958.³²² Engineering consultants filed their initial survey results in January 1959. They indicated that the proposed RCAF site was “covered by approximately two feet of muskeg”³²³

³²¹ AO, RG 9-1, B113127, Townsite Committee Studies 1958-62, E. A. Ingraham, *Globe and Mail*, June 8, 1959, “Base for James Bay Reported by Premier on Northern Tour.” Note: Newspaper clippings are shown where they were located at the Ontario Archives; that is, as part of correspondence files, rather than just being cited by me as the newspaper itself. I believe this is important because it demonstrates the role of government in monitoring press coverage of local events, an important task that still occurs today. It also gives credit where it is due; that is, to the Archives rather than to my ability to search newspapers.

³²² AO, Premier Frost: General Correspondence 1958-59, RG 3-23, B292100. File: Ontario Northland Railway-Construction Airstrip-Moosonee. A.L.S. Nash, Director, Community Planning Branch, Department of Planning and Development to Acting Air Commodore R.B. Whiting, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), 1 December 1958.

³²³ Muskeg is defined as “bogland covered by sphagnum moss.” See Robert Bone, *The Canadian North: Issues and Challenges*, 4th edition, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012), 320. Muskeg is common throughout the Hudson’s Bay Lowlands (which includes the entire west side of James Bay and the Moosonee area), See Bone, 47.

but that it “was likely quite suitable...provided ... the muskeg is drained.”³²⁴ Site drawings prepared in 1960 further described the proposed building site as “semi-dense swamp” which was covered in black spruce and tamarack trees.³²⁵ In summary, although the engineers were optimistic, their reports from 1959-1960 demonstrated that the Moosonee site would need a lot of work. Issues with muskeg and drainage would plague Cold War era development in Moosonee and will be noted again in the chapter on Infrastructure. The site which the engineers were studying is shown on a 1959 RCAF map as the area north of the Moosonee townsite between Otter Creek and Butler Creek.³²⁶

Archival documents show that the Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC) provided advice for a dozen or more Pinetree sites. Specifically, in Moosonee’s case, early water studies needed by the RCAF were conducted by the OWRC and this provincial body monitored the site throughout its fourteen years. Water samples were taken by OWRC in December 1958 and in March and June 1959 from two locations: the Moose River between Otter and Butler Creeks and from Butler Creek “3000 feet above [the] mouth...Ice thickness 36 inches.”³²⁷

³²⁴ AO, File 119.3 Moosonee 1969. “Preliminary Report-Air Force Station, Moosonee.” Trow, Soderman and Associates, 10 January 1959. Although the Trow report was produced in 1959 it was located in a 1969 Moosonee file. It appeared to have been placed in that file because the Trow/RCAF report was used to help plan the Town’s water and sewer facilities in the late 1960s. The Ontario Northland Transportation Commission Annual Report for 1958 also referred to issues with muskeg in the Moosonee area. In a discussion about a proposed all-weather airstrip, it was noted that “It would be necessary to remove the top layer of muskeg, approximately two feet in depth, and replace it with gravel.” ONTC, Annual Report, December 31, 1958, 46. Issues with muskeg would have been anticipated in any construction within the Hudson’s Bay Lowlands. .

³²⁵ Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH), Joint Photographic Intelligence Centre (PLT) fonds, File 79/347, Box 39, “C-44, Moosonee (PLT).” Included with Moosonee air photos are a Site Record Drawing for DND, produced by Clarke, Lackstrom, Mackstead, North Bay, Ontario in May, 1960. This material includes sketches of test holes that had two feet of muskeg underlain by silt. The file also includes engineering notes on the type of pipes to be installed at the base: C-I or Cast Iron for water and Asbestos Cement pipes for sewage.

³²⁶ AO, RG 9-1, B113127, Townsite Committee Studies 1958-62, Map M68-1-1009-1, Department of National Defence, “General Plan of Moosonee and Vicinity Showing Location of Lands Areas and Access Roads,” 6 October 1959. This map shows Otter Creek, Butler Creek and Store Creek. Otter Creek is shown as “Sasakipao Creek” on a 1977 map of Moosonee. This creek was also called “Devil’s Creek” by interviewees.

³²⁷ AO, RG 84-22, B120655, Federal Government RCAF Station-Moosonee, 1958-65, Division of Sanitary Engineering, Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC), 27 January 1959 to 21 July 1959. Included in Box

Butler Creek would ultimately be dammed up to provide a water supply for the residents and workers on the base. The OWRC reported that the “Proposed RCAF supplies” were “Grade A” which meant “Satisfactory-No colon bacilli in all portions tested.” The only issues noted were a relatively high level of iron and the fact that the water was coloured rather than clear.³²⁸ The brown colour of Moosonee’s water supply has been observed for decades and is generally understood to be due to high levels of organic material. One interviewee noted that RCAF officers had issues with the colour of the water during their first exploratory visits to Moosonee during the mid-1950s. This person related:

The RCAF arrived in uniform-- there were quite a number of them. They told us that the colored water [brown water from the Moose River] was unacceptable for the RCAF staff and families who would be potentially moving to the community. The RCAF said “Our people won’t tolerate that. They have to have clear water.”³²⁹

Clearly, the RCAF would need to implement special water treatment systems in order to deal with this issue. By October 1961 the RCAF had put in place a system for “raw water conditioning, pressure filters and chlorination.”³³⁰ Archival materials show this as the only impediment to establishing the radar base. The brown water issue would have been a normal part of everyday life for most of the residents of Moosonee. Interviewees indicated that most people had no running water and they had to draw their drinking water directly out of the Moose River. Those who could hook up to the ONR’s water system would have been drinking chlorinated brown water.

B120655 with the Moosonee OWRC files were the OWRC records for 5 or 6 other Pinetree radar bases. This indicates that OWRC provided technical assistance for most Ontario Pinetree radar bases.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Interview notes, 2013. Note that Joseph Boyden referred to the brown colour of the water from the Moose River in the first paragraph of his semi-fictional book on Moosonee. See Joseph Boyden, *Through Black Spruce* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 1.

³³⁰ AO, File 117.8 “Moosonee 1960-63,” Report on Sanitary Conditions in Moosonee and Moose Factory, written by K.H. Sharpe, Assistant Director, Sanitary Engineering Division, OWRC, 16 October 1961, 4.

The Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC) was also involved in site planning for the RCAF's sewage system. The RCAF's engineering consultants wrote to the OWRC in June 1959 to indicate they were considering either Butler Creek or the Moose River for the sewage "outfall" from a proposed sewage plant. The engineers asked OWRC for direction as follows: "We would appreciate your advice as to the nature of sewage treatment facilities which you will require..."³³¹ The engineers from OWRC replied:

In view of the fact that there will be a harbour development in this area, it is thought desirable that secondary treatment be provided with discharge to either Butler's Creek or Moose River whichever you feel is the best location.³³²

It is encouraging to see the discussion on water and sewer services as a partnership or at least a careful series of requests in the OWRC's archives. What this signifies is that the style of planning and construction for federal Pinetree bases, or at least Moosonee's base, was one that factored in provincial regulations regarding environmental issues. In one sense, this was positive for the townsite as without environmentally appropriate services the community could have become more exposed to contaminated drinking water and to sewage outflows than it already was at the time.³³³ On the other hand, it is curious that the only reason the OWRC asked for sewage treatment was that it might affect harbour development, not because some of the townsite residents drew their drinking water from the Moose River. The radar base was, in theory, downstream from the town. However, the fact that the Moose River is a tidal river would have increased the potential for mixing of only partially treated sewage with drinking water supplies.

³³¹ AO, RG 84-22, B120655 "Federal Government: RCAF Station Moosonee, 1958-1965." A. G. Lamont (W. S. Atkins & Associates Ltd.) to G. Galimbert (OWRC), 26 June 1959.

³³² Ibid., Galimbert to Lamont, 2 July 1959.

³³³ Ibid. J.R. Barr, Assistant Director, Division of Sanitary Engineering, OWRC to R.A. Powell, Group Captain, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa, 1 March 1965. Powell had indicated to Barr that the RCAF wanted to continue to dump sludge from the sewage treatment plant into Butler Creek (which flowed into the Moose River). Barr indicated that "There is no other place in Ontario where sewage treatment is provided that sludge is wasted to a watercourse." Barr concluded his letter by indicating that this practice was "not satisfactory and should be terminated."

The OWRC gave final approval for the water and sewer plants in August 1960.³³⁴ Follow-up reports by the OWRC indicate that the final sewage outflow was upstream on Butler Creek (i.e. away from the Moose River).³³⁵ The guidance of the OWRC continued to moderate environmental issues over the next few years as the RCAF became more familiar with managing the sewage treatment plant. The final cost of the water and sewer systems for the RCAF base was just under \$1,000,000.³³⁶ Final expenditure totals for the construction of all the base facilities could not be located, however, one 1958 document estimated the construction of the site to be \$9.5 million.³³⁷

The 1959 Annual Report of the Ontario Northland Transportation Commission (ONTC) included a section called “Moosonee-a Progress Report: Progress made during 1959 for the ultimate establishment of an ocean port and city at Moosonee.” Although most of the report focused on engineering studies related to a potential port, it also provided details on construction activities at the RCAF base as follows:

The RCAF has purchased approximately 232 acres ... for the construction of a housing development in connection with a huge radar station ... The land for the RCAF townsite has already been cleared and drainage has been installed. Construction will begin in 1960. The townsite will include individual houses, some dormitory buildings for single men, schools, churches and a recreation centre. A dam will be constructed in Otter Creek³³⁸ to impound an ample supply of water for the [RCAF] community and a sewage treatment plant will also be provided. It is expected that ultimately the increase in

³³⁴ Ibid., L. E. Owers (OWRC) to Wing Commander N. C. Brown, Air Force Headquarters, DND, 22 August 1960.

³³⁵ OWRC Report “Sanitary conditions in Moosonee and Moose Factory,” 16 October 1961. To clarify, the sewage outflow was the liquid effluent that had been treated, not the sludge as indicated in footnote 333.

³³⁶ Ibid., R. B. Whiting, Air Commodore, DND to K. H. Sharpe, OWRC re: “Water and Sewage Construction Costs: RCAF Station Moosonee, Ontario,” 8 November 1965. The water and sewer plants and pipe systems totaled \$993,000.

³³⁷ “A Programme for Two Heavy Radars and Six Gap Filler Radars,” Cabinet Defence Committee report, October 14, 1958. This report was located at a Pinetree Line Website at <http://67.69.104.76:84/Pinetreeline>.

³³⁸ This is an incorrect reference to Butler Creek.

population due to the RCAF installation will amount to six or seven hundred persons. This, it is hoped, will be merely a foretaste of things to come in the Moosonee area.³³⁹

The 26 January 1960 throne speech noted this optimism, with the Lieutenant Governor reporting that construction in Moosonee “for 800 people,” and its future seaport would “shape the destiny of the north country.”³⁴⁰

The *Globe and Mail* picked up on both the harbour and the RCAF aspects of the throne speech and the ONTC’s annual reports. In June 1960, the *Globe* published an article called “Moosonee: A City of 25,000 in the Future” in which it outlined the pros and cons of harbour development.³⁴¹ Later in the year, the *Globe* provided an air photo of the developing base under the headlines “Millions for Pinetree Line Radar Make Moosonee Hum.” The air photo shows cleared building sites and includes in its caption “Site is outlined by construction road. Work is in progress on foundations.”³⁴² On the same page, *Globe* reporter Walter Gray penned an article titled “Radar Station Creates Boom at Moosonee.” Gray wrote that the federal government expected to spend \$7 million on Moosonee’s radar base. He also described how one of the first projects connected the existing townsite to the base:

One of the first big jobs was the laying of a highway of wooden planks running through muskeg from the town of Moosonee to the radar site in order to transport heavy equipment and material into the work area. Officials said the planks would eventually be replaced by a permanent gravel road.

The arrival of the construction crews has created an era of prosperity for Moosonee in the form of employment, merchandising sales and recreation and entertainment... By 1962 some 250 air force and civilian personnel will be assigned to the Moosonee station.³⁴³

³³⁹ Ontario, Sessional Papers, Annual Report of the ONTC, 1959, 21.

³⁴⁰ Ontario, Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Vol. 94, January 26, 1960, 12.

³⁴¹ AO, Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee, Ronald Anderson, “Moosonee: A City of 25,000 in the Future,” *Globe and Mail*, June 13, 1960.

³⁴² Ibid., “Millions for Pinetree Line Radar Make Moosonee Hum,” *Globe and Mail*, Nov.15, 1960, p.15.

³⁴³ Ibid., Walter Gray, “Radar Station Creates Boom at Moosonee,” *Globe and Mail*, November 15, 1960,

RCAF air photos taken during the same time period help with our image of the ongoing construction (See Appendix 3 for three air photos from 1960). One of the 4 October 1960 air photos shows the building sites for the three radar domes and the barracks, a partially constructed officer's mess, roads for the PMQ (private married quarters) sites, and some clearings for the maintenance and power plant buildings.³⁴⁴ Another air photo from the same day shows the Carter Construction camp on First Street in downtown Moosonee. There are approximately 15 trailers or General Purpose huts (known as "GP" huts) clustered on the south side of First Street close to the junction of Store Creek and the Moose River.³⁴⁵

By early 1961 the first homes were being shipped to Moosonee's base. The Minister of Economics and Development, Robert W. McCauley, reported in the legislature that "121 homes are being shipped from Fort William [now Thunder Bay] for erection in Moosonee."³⁴⁶ The ONTC report for 1961 showed several pictures of the homes being unloaded from railway cars at Moosonee. One caption read "A view of the railway siding at Moosonee, where pre-built homes were removed from railway cars and placed on floats for transportation to site." Another caption indicated that the homes would house personnel manning [the] adjacent RCAF base."³⁴⁷ The homes arrived in two parts which were fitted together to form complete homes or Private Married Quarters (PMQ's).

The debates in the Ontario Legislature for 22 November 1961 show that the Conservatives were being heavily criticized for their consideration of Moosonee as a harbour site. One MPP indicated during that day's debate that "You cannot blame us, in the opposition,

³⁴⁴ DHH files, Joint Photographic Intelligence Centre (PLT) fonds, File 79/347, Box 39, C-44, Moosonee (PLT), RCAF air photos, October 4, 1960.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., Also see the Wilf Holywell photos from the Moosonee 1961 section of the Pinetree Line Website at <http://67.69.104.76:84/Pinetreeline> as these show the GP huts on the main street of Moosonee.

³⁴⁶ Ontario, Legislature of Ontario Debates, Daily Edition, Nov. 22, 1961, p. 1168.

³⁴⁷ Ontario, Sessional Papers, ONTC Annual report 1961, p. 16.

for being a little bit skeptical about an area such as Moosonee.”³⁴⁸ The response of the Conservatives was to mention engineering studies on the Moosonee harbour, but also to keep on coming back to the RCAF base as an economic success story. Rene Brunelle, the member for Cochrane North, indicated “Moosonee is an area to which we can look with optimism.”³⁴⁹ He added that “At the present time there are air force personnel in the neighbourhood of around 500 and in a few months’ time, by this summer; we should have approximately 700 or 800 personnel of the air force.”³⁵⁰ Brunelle’s somewhat exaggerated account of 500 personnel in November 1961 may have been a correct number for all construction workers and air force personnel in the area rather than just air force personnel.

Archival documents do not indicate exactly how many contract or construction workers were in Moosonee, but they do show that there were only a small number of RCAF officers in Moosonee in December 1961.³⁵¹ Brunelle’s statements appear to have been intended to show that an air force base was a good economic prospect and that the government was supporting the financial future of Moosonee, even if work on a new harbour had not begun. In other words, discussion of the air base was just what the province needed to make it look good when all else was lagging behind schedule. One other saving grace of the Moosonee air base was that the Conservatives could show that its impact was broader than just the town, that is, homes were built in northwestern Ontario (Fort William), so jobs were also being created there.

³⁴⁸ Ontario, Debates, Nov. 22, 1961, p. 1171 (see MPP Whicher)

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 1172.

³⁵⁰ Ibid. Note that the Jan. 26, 1960 throne speech referred to “accommodation for 800 people” in Moosonee, not 800 air force personnel.

³⁵¹ DHH files, “CFS Moosonee, Ontario,” File 2365. Annual Historical Report (hereafter AHR) for December 1, 1961 to May 31, 1962. Note: The first page of this report was originally retrieved at the Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence (hereafter CFMAD) in North Bay, Ontario, as File: 2002-34-15).

Interviewees indicated that, in addition to construction crews, there were several technical firms engaged on the Moosonee project. Some of the Quonset huts and/or General Purpose (GP) huts at the Carter Construction site were also used by Universal Plumbing, a Toronto based company, and by Bell Canada contractors.³⁵²

Interviewees indicated that, at this point in the construction phase, they were hoping that the RCAF “would not bring its own workers.” *Globe and Mail* reporter Walter Gray had written in 1960 that military “and civilian” personnel would be assigned to Moosonee.³⁵³ Interviews and archival material indicate that this was not actually the case and that civilians were hired locally, first from the Carter Construction camp, and on an ongoing basis from throughout the town. Interviewees confirmed that it was not exactly a ‘recruitment’ process. Those who were working at the Carter camp knew their temporary jobs would be over as soon as the base was completed. They exercised agency in checking out civilian jobs at the base as soon as ‘the grapevine’ indicated there was any possibility of civilian jobs opening up.

Early RCAF reports indicate that the role of the military was not just to operate a radar base, but to establish its own community. The completed “base,” as it is still known locally, consisted of three radar domes, a power plant, maintenance and equipment buildings, a barracks, a combined Mess building, diesel fuel storage tanks, a housing subdivision, a grade school, a recreation centre (with a gymnasium, pool and bowling alley), and a complete sewer and water

³⁵² I had referred to ‘construction trailers’ in my interviews. Some interviewees indicated that the construction site had General Purpose (GP) huts made out of wood rather than trailers. The reference to Universal Plumbing was provided by interviewees who also noted that Bell had enough employees to use three of the GP huts (3 out of about 15). The role of Bell Canada in regard to radar base installations is noted in Chapter Two (Literature Review).

³⁵³ Walter Gray, “Radar Station Creates Boom at Moosonee,” *Globe and Mail*, November 15, 1960, p.15.

system.³⁵⁴ The Moosonee base was modelled after previous Pinetree bases, as best described by Fletcher:

Domestic sites had two-storey barracks and a mobile home park accommodating 30-50 trailers for married personnel. Unless a large town was nearby, there was also an area of 30 to 50 transportable, double-width, single family homes. There were separate buildings for power, heating, administration, school, library, fire station, recreation centre, maintenance, sewage and water treatment. Some stations had a swimming pool and a golf course.³⁵⁵

The best description of the homes in the base subdivision is contained, ironically, in the 1975 base closure report under the section “Married Quarters Facilities” as follows:

There are 114 “Transportable Homes” on the site. 108 of these are standard three bedroom layouts ... The remaining six units have had extensions added to provide a five bedroom floor plan. In addition to the bedrooms, each unit has a living/dining area, kitchen/laundry area and bathroom with bathtub and shower. Utilities include oil-fired furnaces, electricity, running water and sewage.³⁵⁶

Interviewees have indicated that these homes received electricity from the power plant on the base and that underground cables were used to carry power from the plant to the PMQs, and also to the larger buildings on the base (e.g. barracks).³⁵⁷ Most residents in the town at this time did not have electrical power, except for one or two streets which were supplied from the ONR’s generators. The level of infrastructure in the town will be discussed further in Chapter Seven as

³⁵⁴ See Appendix Four for a 1962 air photo of the Moosonee base. My work in Moosonee between 1994 and 2006 included a sufficient number of projects on the old base that I could identify about half of the base infrastructure on the 1962 photo. Interviewees were extremely helpful in describing for me the rest of the buildings and infrastructure.

³⁵⁵ Roy Fletcher, “Military Radar Defence Lines of Northern North America: An Historical Geography.” *Polar Record* 26, no. 159 (1990): 165-276. Fletcher’s description provided, for thesis work, an image of a base site that seemed similar to what I had observed in Moosonee. The only differences were that the Moosonee barracks were one storey buildings, and its base had 112 homes, not the smaller number noted by Fletcher.

³⁵⁶ DHH files, Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS. Department of National Defence, CFS Moosonee, January, 1975. Although the report is not labelled as a ‘closure study’ it was prepared the same month as the closure of the base was announced. The report also indicates that there were six “Mobile Homes” at the base, in addition to the 114 “Transportable Homes.”

³⁵⁷ DHH, AHR for 1965, “PMQs on Station Moosonee were without electrical power due to a break in underground cable – 14 to 17 April. Another cable shipped in by Ontario Northland Railway.”

will the changes in roads, water and sewer and power which were necessitated due to the construction and operation of the radar base.

This chapter has focused on the planning process for the RCAF base and on physical infrastructure. The next chapter discusses the human or personal aspects of both life on the radar base and within the town as local people and base residents interacted.

Chapter Six: Occupation and Operation of the Moosonee Radar Base

One of the goals of this study is to examine the human impacts of the radar base on Moosonee's residents. To do this it is necessary to describe the lives of people on the radar base, especially as they interacted with local Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. This chapter begins by describing military personnel and civilian employee numbers, and defence activities on the Moosonee base. The second part of this chapter discusses women and families who lived on the base. An understanding of military families is significant as women and children were part of the daily process of interaction with local residents. The third part of the chapter examines recreational activities at the base as these activities and events were focal points for interaction between military personnel, civilian employees, and their respective families. Furthermore, recreational activities at the base were mentioned frequently by interviewees as having a positive impact on their lives. Recreational activities are broken down into three types: sports activities, the Messes, and recreational or social events.

Military Personnel and Civilian Employees

The Annual Historical Reports (AHRs) of Commanding Officers from 1961 to 1975 give some details on the opening and early operation of the Moosonee base.³⁵⁸ As an example, the first AHR covered the period from November 1961 to January 1962 and gave a brief history of the arrival of the RCAF in Moosonee.³⁵⁹ The report indicated that on 8 November 1961, the first Detachment Commander, Flying Officer Beaupre, arrived with "a small group of airmen." The

³⁵⁸ Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence (CFMAD), North Bay, Ontario. *Annual Historical Reports* (hereafter AHRs) for *Moosonee RCAF Airbase, 1961-1975*. It is important to note that the years 1970-1972 are missing from these reports. Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) files also included the AHRs and they were helpful in filling in missing pages, but did not yield the 1970-72 reports.

³⁵⁹ DHH, "Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Moosonee, Ontario," AHR for 1 December 1961 to 31 May 1962. Entry for 8 November 1961. Note: DHH files do not show box numbers. The first page of this report was originally retrieved at CFMAD as Moosonee, 2002-34-15. The remainder of the report was accessed at DHH.

radar base was not yet ready so the airmen had to stay at the “RCAF/DCL [Defence Construction Limited] Moosonee transit camp, then on loan to Carter Construction Ltd.”³⁶⁰ By Christmas 1961 the “power, heating and water treatment plants were taken over” and the “Single Quarters [barracks]” were ready.³⁶¹

By 8 October 1962, the AHR reported that “Basic installations [were] completed and Operations handed over from the contractor to the RCAF. Limited operations commenced.”³⁶² This was just in time. On 24 October 1962 “RCAF Station Moosonee [was] placed on DEFCON 3,” due to the Cuban Missile Crisis.³⁶³ DEFCON 3, or Defence Readiness Condition Three, meant an increase in the RCAF’s readiness level so that it could mobilize within 15 minutes. The Moosonee base did not return to normal readiness (DEFCON 4) until 28 November 1962.³⁶⁴

The number of military staff in Moosonee peaked during the Cuban Missile crisis. The AHR indicated that there were 200 military personnel on the base in November 1962, including “18 Officers, 25 Warrant Officers and Non-commissioned officers, 43 Corporals, and 114 Airmen.”³⁶⁵ Clearly the RCAF took the required state of readiness seriously, even in Moosonee, which was one of the most northerly Pinetree radar bases. Normally, the average number of military personnel in Moosonee was only 145 with the average number of civilians employed on

³⁶⁰ Ibid. The reference to an RCAF ‘transit camp’ and Carter Construction Ltd corresponds to the earlier noted articles by French and Delaplante and also suggests -- since this was an RCAF camp -- that it would have been the location for the Mid-Canada Line operations—right on Moosonee’s main street.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² DHH, AHR for 1 June 1962 to 30 November 1962, Entry for 8 October 1962. Note: For the first two years (1961-62) the Moosonee AHRs covered parts of years, rather than January to December.

³⁶³ Ibid. The five stages of DEFCON were noted in a Moosonee Vulnerability and Security file as: “Five: Fadeout, Four: Doubletake, Three: Roundhouse, Two: Fastpace, One: Cocked Pistol” Level five or Fadeout (the lowest level) meant “Normal readiness” and Level One or Cocked Pistol meant “Maximum readiness” or “nuclear war is imminent.” The final level above level one was not numbered. Instead it was just known as “BIG NOISE: Air Defense Emergency.” See Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), “Moosonee-Plans, Operations, Readiness-General, 1968-1973,” RG24-G-16-1, File 3000-1, Part 2: Volume 23533 (Note: Despite the dates on the folder, this file included material from 1962 to 1973).

³⁶⁴ DHH, AHR for June 1, 1962 to Nov.30, 1962, Entry for 28 November 1962.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., Entry for 30 November 1962.

the base being 68 (see Table 6.1).³⁶⁶ The personnel level during the Cuban Missile Crisis was 35% higher than at any other time during the life of the base.

The AHRs provide some operational details about the military aspect of the base. Examples have been taken from these reports to show that military personnel focused on two goals: the use of radar to detect foreign aircraft and the defence of the radar base itself. For example, in 1964, the AHR listed detailed technical changes to radar equipment and noted that a perimeter fence had been constructed “ thus increasing the security of the unit.”³⁶⁷ The 1966 AHR noted the reconfiguration of the Operations Room to modify a raised area which had been utilized by the “Battle Commander, Raid Master and four intercept directors.”³⁶⁸ The 1967 AHR notes that all military personnel were briefed on “Nuclear Defence procedures during alerts,” that “Vulnerability Tests” were conducted, and that military personnel were provided with weapons training on Browning pistols and Sten submachine guns.³⁶⁹ These examples are provided as a very brief reminder that the Moosonee base, like other Pinetree radar bases, served a regular and daily role in the broader system of (North American Air Defence Command) NORAD systems. This role, although significant, is not the focus of this dissertation but it needs to be mentioned here as a reminder of what military personnel accomplished during their work days.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁶ DHH, AHRs from 1962 to 1975. Note: These reports on Moosonee CFS provided most of the data on military and civilian numbers. Other sources are shown on Table 6.1 with the data for each year.

³⁶⁷ DHH, AHR 1964, undated entry in Summary of Unit Activities section.

³⁶⁸ DHH, AHR 1966, December entry in Operations summary.

³⁶⁹ DHH, AHR 1967, undated entry in Training section. “36 personnel were trained on the 9mm Browning automatic pistol and 56 on the 8mm Sten [submachine] gun.”

³⁷⁰ For further reading on defence systems see the Literature Review section of this thesis.

Table 6.1 Moosonee: Military Personnel, Civilian Employees and Radar Base Population

Year	Military Personnel	Radar Base Population ³⁷¹	Civilian Employees	Note: Unless otherwise noted below, Military and Civilian numbers were obtained from DHH Annual Historical Reports for the Moosonee Base.
1961	10	10	0	
Mar-62	74	162	0	
Nov-62	200	440	72	
1963	141	440	78	
1964	154	440	67	
1965	136	440	69	
1966	129	454	65	Source for 1966 Base Population: Statistics Canada.
1967	138	440	68	
1968	137	440	67	
1969	135	440	54	
1970	145	425	65	Source: DHH ³⁷²
1971	n/a	470	n/a	Statistics Canada ³⁷³
1973	143	440	n/a	
1974	142	440	76	LAC 1974 ³⁷⁴
1975	141	440	60	Source: Timmins Daily Press ³⁷⁵
Average	145	442	68	Averages are based on figures in this table from November, 1962 to 1975

³⁷¹ This column includes military personnel and dependents, but not civilians. For most years the Base population was calculated by taking the average of 1966 (454) and 1970 (425), which equaled 440. This average was not used for 1966, 1970 and 1971. See footnotes for those years. The base population figure for March 1962 was derived by multiplying the military personnel number by 2.2 (the same ratio as later in the same year, i.e. November, 1962.).

³⁷² DHH File 72-345, "Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972," Report to file by E.R. Keirstead, Surgeon Commander, DND on October 1970 visit to Moosonee, 2 November 1970.

³⁷³ Statistics Canada provided a combined (town and base) 1971 total of 1,793 upon request in July 2015. In September 2015, Statistics Canada staff provided the breakdown for 1971 (1,325 town and 470 radar base) under Contract EO2377.

³⁷⁴ LAC, Establishment-General, Canadian Forces Station Moosonee, 1967/11-1975/03, RG24, Series G-16-1, Vol 23534, File 1920-1, part 1, 104. The 1974 figures in the table are for military and civilian employees only.

³⁷⁵ AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs Branch, Director's Files, *Moosonee Vol.3*, Len Gillis, "Defence Budget Cuts Killing CFS Moosonee," *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.18, 1975.

Moosonee's civilian population figures correspond closely to the average for other Pinetree bases across Canada.³⁷⁶ What these figures show is that civilian jobs, at Moosonee and at other Pinetree sites, made up one-third of all positions on radar bases and were an integral part of day to day operations on an RCAF radar base. Archival data emphasizes this fact as illustrated by organizational charts for the Moosonee base. These charts show that civilian employees held 60% of the positions in the construction and engineering group, 50% of positions in the personnel and administration cluster, and 25% of positions in the logistics (supply and transportation) group.³⁷⁷ The large number of jobs in the construction and engineering group was significant because it included civilians who learned to operate the power and heating plant and the water and sewer facilities. One of the two fire prevention positions in this group was also designated for civilians. The positions in the personnel and administration group may have been less rewarding because the majority of these civilian jobs (16 out of 23) were in the cleaning and food services groups. Not surprisingly, all the jobs in the high security radar and telecommunications areas were held by military personnel.³⁷⁸

The AHRs also show that almost all military personnel, and most of the civilian employees, were male. The only female military personnel were the base nurses, who were referred to as "Nursing Sisters." The AHRs generally showed one female in this position each

³⁷⁶ LAC, Organization General, 1965/02-1975/01, RG 24, Series, G-16-1, Vol. 23534. This file showed the number of military and civilian employees in 1970 for 23 Pinetree bases across Canada. Averages, calculated by the writer, showed a mean of 145 military and 68 civilian positions. Employee reports do not indicate if civilians were Indigenous or non-Indigenous.

³⁷⁷ LAC, "Establishment-General, Canadian Forces Station Moosonee," 1967/11-1975/03, RG24, Series G-16-1, Vol 23534, File 1920-1, part 1, pp 85-86. The percent of positions was calculated by adding up all civilian (CIV) jobs and dividing that number by all military jobs in the same group. Actual numbers included: 28 civilians out of 47 positions in Construction and Engineering, 23 civilians out of 47 in Personnel and Administration, and 9 civilians out of 37 in Logistics.

³⁷⁸ Interviewees who worked on the base indicated that the radar dome area was protected by a second level of fencing (in addition to the fence surrounding the entire base) and that they were checked twice by military guards before handing in reports or doing any deliveries to this area.

year and in 1965 the reports also showed a female doctor on staff.³⁷⁹ In regard to the gender of civilian positions, a 1975 Ontario Cabinet Submission indicated that, out of 56 civilian positions at the base, “32 are native, 16 are non-native and 8 are not heads of household.”³⁸⁰ It is likely that the 8 employees in the latter category (who were neither Native nor non-Native!) were women, although there is some possibility that this group may also have included single male civilians. The organizational chart, mentioned above, did include 9 positions that were shown as secretary, stenographer or typist. These positions, in 1974, would commonly have been held by women and this again suggests that eight of the 56 civilian employees on the base might have been women.

The 1975 Cabinet Submission also included a “Detailed Employment Profile,” although only 48 of the 56 civilian positions were listed in the profile. That is, the “not heads of household” jobs appear to have been excluded and we therefore cannot benefit from knowing more about this group. The 48 jobs that were listed in the Cabinet submission were categorized as follows:

Building Cleaners (7), Food Services (5), Labourers (5), Power Plant Operators (5), Carpenters (4), Water and Sewage Operators (4), Drivers (3), Storemen (3), Cooks (2), Electricians (2), Trade helpers/apprentices (2), Fire Officer (1), Grounds Maintenance Man (1), Heating Plant Operator (1), Heavy Equipment Operator (1), Painter(1), [and] Plumber (1).³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ The reference to the female doctor is discussed further in the ‘births’ section of this chapter.

³⁸⁰ AO, RG1-121, B207227, “Lands-Status Report to the CCRD [Cabinet Committee on Resources Development] on the Moosonee Area,” 25 June 1975. This Cabinet report makes it clear that the 8 employees who were not “heads of household” were in addition to the 48 shown as “native and non-native.” Also see Table 6.1 for sources for civilian numbers from 1962 to 1975. A 1967 Department of Social and Family Services report also included a reference to town residents working at the RCAF base. R. Rivard wrote that “27 male Indians” were employed at the Canadian Forces base. Source AO, “General Admin., Moosonee Development Board,” RG19-F-7, B350920, R. A. Rivard, Regional Administrator, DSFS to C. J. Williams, Executive Officer, DSFS, 24 November 1967.

³⁸¹ AO, RG1-121, B207227, “Lands-Status Report to the CCRD [Cabinet Committee on Resources Development] on the Moosonee Area,” 25 June 1975.

Clearly there was a wide range of civilian positions on the base, ranging from unskilled labourers to highly skilled workers. Interviewees indicated that they tended to move to jobs on the base after getting their early work experience at the Carter Construction camp on First Street in downtown Moosonee. They said that, as soon as “the word got around” in town that the RCAF was hiring, people employed at Carter started to apply for work with the RCAF. Similarly, as soon as the base started closure procedures, and often even before those procedures started, interviewees took the skills they had learned on the radar base and used them to get provincial government or municipal jobs.³⁸² Several interviewees said that they “learned their life-long careers” while at the radar base.

The AHRs included almost no references to Moosonee’s Indigenous heritage. In February 1964 one of the radar test operations was referred to as “Operation Cree Dance.”³⁸³ The word Cree was not used again until the closure of the base was announced eleven years later. A Department of National Defence (DND) report on the closure indicated that 80% of local people were “Cree Indian.”³⁸⁴ This was the only National Defence or military report, sourced for this dissertation, which referred to local people and civilian employees as Cree. It appears from the DND report and from the AHRs, that the only distinctions or categories that were important to the RCAF were not social (i.e. race or class) or economic, but whether employees were military or civilian.³⁸⁵

³⁸² The reference here to “municipal” jobs is to employment with the Moosonee Development Area Board or MDAB. A full discussion of the MDAB’s formation is included in Chapter 8.

³⁸³ DHH, AHR 1964, Entry for February 1964 in Operations Section.

³⁸⁴ DHH, “Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS, Report titled “Department of National Defence: CFS Moosonee,” 29 January 1975. An appendix to this report was titled “Moosonee/Moose Factory: Historical and Socio-Economic Development.” It indicated that the “total population of Moosonee/Moose Factory is approximately 3,000 of which about 80% are Cree Indian.”

³⁸⁵ It is also possible, and likely, that the turbulent early years of the 1970s, in terms of Indigenous activism, raised the profile of local Indigenous people for military writers. The issue of Indigenous activism will be discussed further in subsequent chapters.

Women and Families

Literature on the Pinetree Line indicates that it was the only radar line that provided family accommodation.³⁸⁶ Gil McElroy referred to the Pinetree Line sites as “family friendly.”³⁸⁷ He meant that Pinetree bases, unlike the more northerly sites (Mid-Canada Line and DEW Line), provided family accommodation and activities for military dependents. Gordon Wilson commented on the family aspect when he interviewed air force pilots and radar technicians for his book on NORAD.³⁸⁸ Wilson stressed the importance of the family-friendly Pinetree sites to military staff:

One of the main things that the interviewed Radar Technicians wanted emphasized was the tremendous positive effect of having the families together with the military personnel at the radar sites. The isolation, irregular hours and hardships imposed by a military life were made tolerable by the cohesion of the family unit. This was an effective decision made by the military and the Canadian government at the time to maintain morale. They opted for the extra expense of constructing a domestic site with the operations site based on the premise that a happier workforce is a more productive workforce.³⁸⁹

Wilson also indicated that “A few sites were lucky enough to be next to towns.”³⁹⁰ Both McElroy and Wilson mention the importance of family and community, and they indicate that base life was successful, or at least pleasant, if it involved both families and neighbouring towns.

Isabel Campbell has documented the ways the struggles of military personnel stationed in postwar Europe helped to raise the government’s awareness of the importance of allowing

³⁸⁶ As noted earlier in the discussion of the Cold War and radar bases, there were three radar lines that crossed Canada (the DEW line, Mid-Canada radar line and the Pinetree line).

³⁸⁷ Gil McElroy, *Cold Comfort: Growing up Cold War* (Vancouver, Talonbooks, 2012), 131.

³⁸⁸ Gordon L. L. Wilson, *NORAD and the Soviet Nuclear Threat: Canada’s Secret Electronic Air War* (Toronto, Dundurn, 2011).

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 116. Although PMQs were constructed on Pinetree bases, one radar base had to wait over a decade for its family housing. See P. C. Kvas, *Lobster, Lighthouse and Long-Range Radar* (Barrington: Canadian Forces Station Barrington, 1987), 115. Kvas indicates that between 1958 and 1971 married personnel at the Barrington, Nova Scotia radar base “were living 30 to 50 miles” north of this Pinetree base (49) due to the lack of Private Married Quarters (PMQs) on the base.

³⁹⁰ Gordon Wilson, *NORAD*, 104.

families to live on or near military sites.³⁹¹ When the Canadian government tried to prevent soldiers from bringing families with them to locations like West Germany, some soldiers brought their families anyway, at their own expense. Campbell also describes how Canadian military personnel compared themselves to American soldiers. Drawing upon American historian Franklin W. Davis's work about the American experience, she concludes that "The Americans had set a high standard: most had their families with them, and they had mixed bowling leagues, golf tournaments and swimming pools in their communities."³⁹² Campbell also indicates that, particularly where families were not present, the Canadian government had to deal with issues of morale and with more pressing and politically embarrassing consequences like prostitution, venereal disease and alcoholism. Getting along with neighbouring communities was a significant goal in Europe, partly because the local press highlighted instances in which the military caused local trouble. Campbell shows that the federal government ultimately supported military personnel by developing family accommodation at bases and removing the restriction on families overseas. This modification of Canadian defence policy in the early 1950s may have shaped the planning and development of Pinetree site environments, like Moosonee's base.

Although Moosonee's military and civilian numbers were relatively easy to verify, it was difficult to locate figures for the number of 'dependents' (wives and children)³⁹³ who lived on the base. One of the more reliable figures for the number of people on the base was a report of a medical tour carried out by E.R. Kierstead, the Surgeon Commander for the RCAF during 1970. Kierstead reported that the Moosonee base had "145 service personnel, 280 dependents and 65

³⁹¹ Isabel Campbell, *Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951-64*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).

³⁹² Franklin M. Davis Jr., *Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army's Occupation of Germany, 1945-49* (New York: MacMillan, 1967), 194-95, quoted in Isabel Campbell, *Unlikely Diplomats*, 98.

³⁹³ Annual Historical Reports (AHRs) use the word "dependents" to include both women and children who lived on the base.

civilians.”³⁹⁴ The combination of the 145 military personnel and 280 dependents was used for the 1970 base population total of 425 on Table 6.1. Base population figures had to be extrapolated for other years as indicated in this table.³⁹⁵

Although there were married quarters on the base, military spouses and women in general were rarely mentioned, except for initial reports on employment on the base. The 1962 AHR indicated that the base school was opened and that a “Miss M. Milne” was appointed as its first principal.³⁹⁶ There is no indication if the other teachers hired were women. Occasionally military wives were mentioned if they were employed on the base. For example, a Mrs. Wasylyshyn was hired as the base postmaster in 1962³⁹⁷ and a 1968 base inspection report showed that “5 wives [were] employed as attendants” at the base snack bar.³⁹⁸ Although the RCAF’s Annual Reports do not mention women working full-time, interviewees have indicated that some wives of military personnel had clerical and accounts positions on the base, working either in the base administration headquarters or at the construction/engineering building. One source also refers to “a shortage of skilled women (teachers, secretaries, etc.)” after the radar base closed because “service wives” had been employed “in the community.”³⁹⁹ It is not clear if the writer meant in the radar base community or in the town of Moosonee, but interviewees did not report that military spouses worked off the base. Interviewees also reported that the RCAF provided a daily bus to pick up civilians in the downtown area and bring them to the base for the day. The same

³⁹⁴ DHH, “Visits and Inspections,” Keirstead.

³⁹⁵ See the footnotes for Table 6.1 for detailed calculations.

³⁹⁶ DHH, AHR for 1 December 1961 to 31 May 1962, Entry for 2 March 1962: First principal and three teachers arrived on the base.

³⁹⁷ DHH, AHR for 1 June 1962 to 30 November 1962, Entry for 6 December 1962.

³⁹⁸ DHH File 72/345 “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972.” The dates for the snack bar inspection were Feb.8-9th, 1968.

³⁹⁹ AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs Branch, Director’s Files, *Moosonee Vol.3*, R.V.Scott, Director, Northern Affairs Branch to G. D. Spry, Executive Director, Finance and Administration Branch, Northern Affairs Branch re: Canadian Forces Station-Moosonee, 22 April 1975.

bus was used to take wives of military personnel to the downtown area for shopping once or twice a week.

The 1962 annual report was the only base report to include a reference to volunteer work undertaken by women living on the base. The report mentioned that a “Station Women’s Auxiliary” organized the distribution of food baskets by snowmobile to “poor Indian families.” Harrison and Laliberté put the volunteer work in context.⁴⁰⁰ They indicate that spouses of military personnel were expected to be part of “Wives’ Clubs” and that these clubs organized activities such as “fashion shows, Tupperware parties, cosmetic demonstrations, making cookbooks, and community benevolence [charitable] work.”⁴⁰¹ The main reason for the Wives’ Club was to provide peer support and activities to women who were isolated and likely felt lonely and out of place. A 1973 *North Bay Nugget* article provides some insight into this situation. Reporter Arnie Hakala quoted two military personnel on the topic of wives. Major Kilby, the CO, said that most problems occurred when the wives first arrived at Moosonee; “It’s a bit of a shock to come way up here but by the time Christmas and the winter carnival come around, it would be hard to get them to leave. They just love it.”⁴⁰² Captain Greg Milne, the base’s chaplain, told the reporter that urban women found it particularly difficult to move to remote locations as they were, “thrust into a totally different environment and that can cause a few problems. But most of them adapt.”⁴⁰³ While it is unfortunate that military spouses were not interviewed for this article, it is possible to gain some perspective from the book *We’re*

⁴⁰⁰ Deborah Harrison and Lucie Laliberté, *No Life Like It: Military Wives in Canada* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1994). Harrison and Laliberte write more about the Gulf War era than the Cold War but they indicate that their descriptions of military base activities include long standing practices.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴⁰² Arnie Hakala, “North Radar Base Modern Centre.” *North Bay Nugget*, March 7, 1973. Sourced in AO, File Moosonee Vol. 2, RG 68-9, B503347.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

*Moving Where? The Life of a Military Wife.*⁴⁰⁴ Jeanette Shetler Russell writes about her family's move to Moosonee when her husband was transferred there:

As we neared Moosonee, the trees became terribly scarce. My spirits sank further. How would I be able to trim my Christmas tree if there was none available ... Finally, after six hours aboard that hot, crowded and rattling railway car, we arrived. I could see the welcoming committee through the steamy window –a handful of native Canadians and a van with Military Police written on the side. ... After a few minutes my heart rate steadied and I managed to collect myself. I knew I had no other choice. I made my exit – depressed, full of tears and anger I wanted so badly to go back to North Bay, but that wouldn't happen. There was only one place to go and I was there. I had to make the best of it

We passed the recreation centre, the social hub of any base with its indoor pool, gymnasium, [and] bowling alley

We walked down a long wooden boardwalk and stepped into a screened-in porch attached to the front of the trailer ... I must admit I was surprised. The trailers were tastefully furnished, and the interior looked quite delightful. ... I could live with it. Can you imagine that?

Within a matter of days – hours for the kids – we had all adjusted.⁴⁰⁵

Shetler Russell subsequently admitted that her initial perspective towards Native Canadians changed as she interacted with local people. She wrote that she visited with local “Cree artists and artisans,” and sold their work to raise money for sports equipment for military and ‘native’ children. Shetler Russell concluded that “This mutual sharing of cultures ... created an understanding and respect for each other.”⁴⁰⁶

The irony of the *Nugget* article and Shetler Russell's book is that, in both cases, people spoke on behalf of ‘the other.’ Military men spoke about military spouses and later a military spouse (Shetler Russell) spoke about local ‘natives.’ Women's voices about women were silent

⁴⁰⁴ Jeanette Shetler Russell, *We're Moving Where? The Life of a Military Wife* (Renfrew: General Store Publishing House, 2003).

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 36-37.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 38.

and both the names and voices, of Indigenous people, were absent in describing their experiences.

Shetler Russell also wrote about the role of the wife of the base Commanding Officer (CO), Perry Kilby, and indicated that “without her engaging personality and untiring energy, days and nights in our small community would have been distressing for many.”⁴⁰⁷ The formal RCAF records (Moosonee’s AHRs) had only one reference to the spouse of a CO. The 1962 AHR noted that the CO’s wife, Mrs. L. L. Nault, arranged shipment of “6,000 lbs of used clothing” from RCAF Station Trenton for “needy families in the local and James Bay area through various religious organizations.”⁴⁰⁸ Although the AHRs lack more entries about the wives of COs, Harrison and Laliberté indicate that this woman had a significant role on most Canadian military bases.⁴⁰⁹ In particular the spouse of the Commanding Officer was expected to provide guidance to the spouses of other Officers and military personnel. A single archival memo provides insight into how this position would have worked in Moosonee. In a 1968 thank you note to Commanding Officer Misener, a recent visitor, Lieutenant-Colonel Futer, wrote, “I especially appreciated meeting your charming wife and was impressed with her sense of responsibility toward the dependant personnel on the station. I’m sure that this contributes materially to the good morale prevailing on the unit.”⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid. The Commanding Officer was John Kilby and his wife’s name was Perry Kilby.

⁴⁰⁸ DHH, AHR for 1 December 1962 to 31 May 1963, Entry for 19 December 1962. There were no other references to the Women’s Auxiliary in any of the annual reports reviewed for the time period from 1963 to 1975. The December 1963 report only notes “a shipment of clothing ... arrived Station Moosonee for distribution to needy children,” and it does not give credit to any particular group for this activity.

⁴⁰⁹ Harrison and Laliberte, 74.

⁴¹⁰ DHH File 72/345 “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972.” Memo from Lieutenant-Colonel Futer, DND to Major Misener, Commanding Officer, CFS Moosonee, Oct.23, 1968. See Harrison and Laliberte, *No Life Like It*, on spouses of Commanding Officers (74-75).

The next reference to women residents of the radar base was the 1964 AHR which noted that arrangements had been made for “dependent wives to make a tour of the Tower.”⁴¹¹ The Tower was the high security centre (the middle dome) for radar operations on the base and the reference to a tour for the spouses was reported in the “Public Relations” segment of the annual report. This suggests that wives were not part of the inner circle of military personnel but that the relationship between these women and the base was occasionally considered to be important.

The most frequent references to women on the base were as the mothers of new babies.⁴¹² Women were identified as “Mrs.,” not by their first name but by their husband’s, and their spouse’s rank was provided with each birth. For example, “Mrs. B___, wife of LAC J.M. B___, gave birth to a boy, the first baby born in the RCAF Stn [Station] Moosonee Hospital.”⁴¹³ The AHRs indicate that most births at the base hospital were to military families; however there was one reference in 1962 to a birth related to a civilian employee.⁴¹⁴ By the following year, births may have become too commonplace to report, as the only reference to a birth on the base was recorded in the AHR because “the snowmobile road to Moose Factory Hospital was impassable.”⁴¹⁵ Clearly life for pregnant spouses must have been precarious if a snowmobile ride across a frozen river was occasionally required in order to seek assistance with childbirth. By May 1962, it took the birth of twins to be newsworthy enough to make the AHR.⁴¹⁶

Furthermore, after this report of twins, there were no other references to babies being born on the

⁴¹¹ DHH, AHR 1964, Entry in “Public Relations” section.

⁴¹² DHH, Moosonee CFS, AHR for 1 June 1962 to 30 November 1962 and AHR for 1 December 1962 to 31 May 1963. Six babies were born from September to December 1962, two at the Moose Factory Hospital and four more at the radar base infirmary in the administration building. Two of the first six babies were stillborn (one at the Moose Factory Hospital and one at the RCAF base).

⁴¹³ DHH, AHR for 1 June 1962 to 30 November 1962. The last name and specific birthdate are not entered to protect privacy.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ DHH, AHR 1963, Entry for 2 April 1963.

⁴¹⁶ DHH, AHR 1965, Entry for 1 May 1965 “First set of twins born in the Station MIR (medical infirmary).”

base for the remaining ten years that the Moosonee base was open. It is likely that babies continued to be born on the base; they were just no longer newsworthy. It is also possible that base commanding officers wished to have less personal material in the annual reports.

There are only a few references to children of military personnel being born “out of wedlock.” These children were briefly referred to by interviewees as “Base babies,” but otherwise there was very little information on babies born to unmarried mothers. Wendy Thomas, a provincial social worker who reported on Moosonee in August 1963, indicated that there were some concerns about unmarried pregnancies caused by RCAF personnel. She wrote that:

The existence of the base seems to have created a greater problem of illegitimacy among the Indian women. There have been several Paternity Declarations made against airmen and there are apparently many others who have not been named by the girls. There is an attempt made by the base officials to control this type of behaviour.⁴¹⁷

Thomas did not indicate what she meant by “many others” nor did she indicate if there were any issues of violence against women. It is however, important to note that some local women had babies with military personnel and that, as Thomas indicated, “These children would appear to be acceptable to the community.”⁴¹⁸ Other than the Thomas report, there is no other information, or even mention, of “Base babies” in any of the documents reviewed as part of this study. One gap in the Thomas report is that she did not write about local women, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, who dated and married military personnel. Interviewees indicated that this type of interaction was common during the radar base time period. The Thomas report, on the other

⁴¹⁷ AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister’s Files, File: “Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66,” Report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963, 13. Thomas indicated that she “was able to interview a total of 123 households which included 750 persons” (p.4). She does not appear to have interviewed anyone who was non-Indigenous.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

hand, gives the impression that military personnel never married local women or acknowledged their children.

Although there is one reference in the AHRs to a civilian mother giving birth at the base (see above), interviewees indicated that most women from Moosonee had their children at the Moose Factory Hospital, or out of town, for example, at the hospital in Cochrane. Interviewees did give some impression, though, that they knew medical help could be available at the radar base if they needed emergency help.⁴¹⁹ This may have been reassuring during the years the base operated.

However treatment at a hospital, or nearby medical assistance, was not always successful. For example, archival documents refer to the death of a two year old child after the father “took his sick baby to the Moose Factory Hospital and to the clinic at Moosonee, received medical services and was returned home. The baby apparently died of pneumonia ... [the family] lives in a tent in Moosonee.”⁴²⁰ Social Services staff indicated that there were 12 families living in tents in Moosonee and Moose Factory during December 1969 when the baby’s death took place.⁴²¹ One interviewee recalled that people knew to avoid the village area because “babies died there.” This person implied that the village was an unsafe area, but it seems that it was the absence of adequate housing that was the true health and safety issue.

⁴¹⁹ Interviews, 2013. Wendy Thomas also noted in her 1963 report that “There is no doctor resident in Moosonee, except during ‘break up’ when the RCAF base brings in a Medical officer.” She implied in her report that this doctor could be available for local emergencies in the town itself, in addition to the base. (See page 3 of the Thomas report).

⁴²⁰ AO, RG 29-01-1481, B430939, Department of Social and Family Services, Deputy Minister’s Files, File: “Indians –Moosonee, 1967-70,” Departmental Memo from Peter Szego, Director, Indian Community Development Services Branch to Deputy Minister Borczak “Re-Tents in Moosonee,” 11 February 1970. There is no indication that the reference to a “clinic in Moosonee” is to the RCAF clinic, rather it was likely the clinic set up in the town after the Catholic Hospital burned down in 1969. This memo is provided to demonstrate the difficulty of dealing with health emergencies in Moosonee.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

In some cases a doctor was present at the radar base, for childbirth or for other medical issues but often the only reference was to a nursing sister. As noted earlier, nursing sisters were the only female military personnel on the base. This changed when a Dr. D. Grinnell was hired as Senior Medical Officer in 1965. The record entry for this doctor did not include a first name, but we know that the doctor was a woman because the records showed that the infirmary on the base was “under her control.”⁴²² The 1965 AHR also recorded that a part of the barracks had to be reconstructed “to allow former male Officer Quarters to be used by females of Officer Status.”⁴²³ This suggests that the original construction of the base had not anticipated female officers.

One of the first references to the number of school-age children was contained in a report in 1970 by Major R. W. Saxberg, who was Base Commander at Moosonee. The Major indicated that there were 100 school children attending the Henry Hudson base school, from Kindergarten to Grade eight.⁴²⁴ At the time of the base’s closure in 1975, the Department of National Defence (DND) reported that there were 130 students at the base school along with seven teachers, six of whom lived on the radar base.⁴²⁵ DND archival material also shows that the provision of grade schools on Canadian military bases was common practice, with 70 schools on bases across Canada and 28,253 students in attendance at these schools in January 1971.⁴²⁶ These records also tell us that the Moosonee radar base had its own school board that handled hiring of teachers for

⁴²² DHH, AHR 1965, under “Administration” section. Emphasis mine.

⁴²³ AHR 1965, under “Technical” section.

⁴²⁴ DHH File 72-345 “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972.” Air Defence Command: Unit Administrative Evaluation, Moosonee CFS,” 14 November 1970, 12.

⁴²⁵ DHH, “Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS, Report titled “Department of National Defence: CFS Moosonee,” 29 January 1975.

⁴²⁶ LAC, RG 24, Vol.22458, File 5300-1, “Canadian Forces Base-Moosonee, 1963-1971, “Annual Report -- Provision of Educational Facilities to Dependent Children by the Department of National Defence, 14 May, 1971.

the base.⁴²⁷ Federal policy documents on education also show that DND supported schools could offer education to children of civilian personnel if such employees lived in the vicinity of the base and if openings were available.⁴²⁸ Interviewees told me that local children attended the primary schools in the town, rather than on the base. It is likely that Moosonee's civilian employees preferred to have their grade school children closer to their homes, rather than seeing them bussed to the radar base.

However, there appears to have been some sharing of facilities between the base and the town. One report mentioned that "pupils from the station school obtain arts and crafts training in the town school."⁴²⁹ Additionally, Wendy Thomas's report (noted above) suggests that some local children would be taking Grade 9 courses on the base, starting in the fall of 1963.⁴³⁰ This was significant because interviewees indicated that most high school-aged children who were town residents had to travel by train to North Bay or Sudbury for their high school education. The lack of a high school also affected the base. Commanding Officer Kilby stressed that the lack of a high school even shaped the demographics of the military community. He said:

It [Moosonee] is a young base in two ways. It was built in 1962 and most of the people who come here are young. The reason for that is that there is no high school in Moosonee and we try to get people who have no children over the Grade 8 level.... There are a few exceptions but very few. In a way, I guess you can say the children have a lot to say about who comes here.⁴³¹

In fact, the lack of a high school impacted both town and base families and this absence of critical infrastructure eventually resulted in the transformation of the radar base. This issue,

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ DHH, "Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS, Jan.29, 1975 report titled "Department of National Defence: CFS Moosonee."

⁴³⁰ "Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66," Report by Wendy Thomas, 23 August 1963, 11. Thomas indicated: "Several [town] children will attend Gr. IX when it opens for the first time at the RCAF base this coming term."

⁴³¹ Arnie Hakala, North Bay Nugget, March 7, 1973 (cited previously in this chapter).

central to the impacts of the radar base on the community, will be discussed later in Chapter Nine.

In 1966, the RCAF Annual Reports began to differentiate between Moosonee and the radar base by referring to the base as “Sasakipao” in the title of all reports and by prefixing the radar base’s post office with the same label.⁴³² The name “Sasakipao,” chosen for the base and the post office, initially seemed to symbolize a distinct geographical place, and a physical separation, as it is the creek that completely separated the base from the town site.⁴³³ Initial research suggested that the use of the term Sasakipao was intended to separate the radar base from the town. However, information provided by interviewees indicates that the base and Moosonee itself were closely connected. This section on military personnel and their families and on civilian employees gives an initial indication of these connections. The next half of this chapter provides more connections between the two communities by examining the ways that recreational activities contributed to intermingling between the two groups.

Recreation

The RCAF’s annual reports were heavily laden with references to recreational and competitive sports activities. Two of the initial AHRs emphasize the increased importance of recreation on isolated bases. The 1963 AHR included the following commentary: “Although this station is well isolated, sports activities are numerous, perhaps in even greater numbers than on a

⁴³² DHH, AHR 1966. Interviewees indicated that Sasakipao is a Cree word. The meaning of this word was not explained, however, Sasakipao Creek in Moosonee is also called “Devil’s Creek” by interviewees.

⁴³³ Sasakipao Creek is not on most maps of Moosonee, but it does appear on a 1971 Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs map of the community. In twelve years of working with Moosonee I did not hear about this creek at any point (even though I frequently talked with town staff about other waterways, such as Store Creek and Butler Creek).

normal station.”⁴³⁴ The 1964 AHR noted “The sports program on Station Moosonee is quite extensive due primarily to its isolated position.”⁴³⁵ This emphasis on sports became important for the local residents during the radar base period, and interviewees indicated that this aspect of base existence influenced their lives for many years.

Recreation is divided in this section into three elements, all of which demonstrate the positive interaction(s) between the radar base and the town. These are: sports activities, the Messes, and social events. Some aspects of these elements are described below but there is no attempt to summarize every recreational event that occurred or that had a connection to the base.

The 1963 AHR gave a good overview of sports activities in the early years of the Moosonee site. It describes how

A curling rink was built out of volunteer labour and GP [General Purpose] Huts were the scene of several bonspiels, in addition to men’s and mixed leagues competitions. Softball was also very popular. The station team visited Moosonee, Moose Factory ... Bowling was active all year round ... Swimming, volleyball and trampoline facilities were widely used.⁴³⁶

Curling remained one of the most popular events at the base and interviewees have indicated that the base was where civilian employees and spouses tended to learn the sport. Interviewees also indicated that the curling bonspiels, and in particular, the “Moosonee End-of-the Rail Bonspiel” was an elaborate affair with huge prizes for winners.⁴³⁷

⁴³⁴ DHH, AHR 1963, Entry in Summary notes. See Map 2.1 at the end of Chapter Two which shows that Moosonee was one of the more isolated Pinetree bases. Presumably the reference to “normal” in this quote is to the non-isolated sites, as this theme is also noted with the words “isolated position” in the 1964 annual report.

⁴³⁵ DHH, AHR 1964, Entry in Recreation Section.

⁴³⁶ DHH, AHR 1963, Entry in Summary notes. The reference to ‘mixed league’ curling generally means teams composed of both men and women.

⁴³⁷ DHH, AHR 1965, Entry for 22-25 January 1965. The first “End of the Rail Bonspiel” was played over three days in January, 1965 and included teams from “Moose Factory, Moosonee, and Iroquois Falls.”

It is worth noting that the AHRs sometimes referred to Moosonee as a separate entity or community, and a competitor in terms of sports. This type of comment is evidenced by references to the military personnel playing against the Moosonee Bombardiers hockey team in January 1964. This hockey team had been in place since 1954 under the banner of the Moosonee Bombardiers (later the Two Bay Bombardiers). Members of the team, when interviewed, recalled that they did not always win against the RCAF, but they mentioned this was likely due to the fact that the radar base supplied the referees for the games.⁴³⁸ The 1966 AHR does not mention referees, but it does note that “the [RCAF] Squadron hockey team entered ... [the] local hockey league with Moosonee and Moose Factory” and “emerged as winners of the final playoffs.”⁴³⁹ Occasionally the distinction was not between the base and town residents but between military personnel on the base and civilian employees. This was evident in the description of softball playoffs: “A very successful season was enjoyed with the DND [Department of National Defence] civilian employees emerging as winners of the station league.”⁴⁴⁰

Initially sports references focused on activities for male military personnel. Later, they started to reference civilian sports activities and sports for children. Eventually, the reports included women’s sports activities as part of the annual reports. In that regard, a note in the 1965 AHR included a rather odd entry that “the distaff side with dependents share essentially equally in all recreational activities.”⁴⁴¹ The impression left is that the “distaff side” (i.e. the

⁴³⁸ For those who are not sports enthusiasts, it is important to note that conversation about referees in competitive sports often suggests some bias for home teams. This is not an academic notation, but a practical observation on sports tensions.

⁴³⁹ AHR 1966, Entry in Recreation section.

⁴⁴⁰ AHR 1965, Entry in Recreation section.

⁴⁴¹ DHH, AHR 1965, Entry in Introductory Notes section. The word ‘distaff’ is not explained in the Annual reports but the New Webster’s Dictionary defines it as “relating to a woman or women, female, as in the *distaff* side of the family.”

spouses of military staff) may have expressed some concerns about the adequacy of recreational opportunities for women. The following year the issue of recreation was highlighted on the first page of the AHR as follows: “Recreation for service personnel, their dependents [women and children] and DND employees [civilians] was varied to meet the needs of all individuals and was considered to be of a high standard.” Other reports, from 1964 to 1967, gave examples of sports for women and men such as bowling, curling, broomball, and softball.⁴⁴²

The AHRs also indicated that local residents were involved in sports activities.⁴⁴³ Interviewees added more information by stating that both military personnel and civilians would participate in, or compete with, the radar base leagues and that there were both men’s and women’s leagues in bowling and other sports. Also, some interviewees indicated that their best memories of the radar base were the ones associated with joining the men’s and women’s sports leagues and that they kept up their participation in the sports they played on the base throughout their lives.

Like most Pinetree radar bases, Moosonee had three messes or clubs combined in one building. The three messes were shown in the 1968 Inspection Report as the Officers’ Mess, Sergeants’ Mess and Airmens’ Institute (also known as the ‘Junior Ranks’ Mess or the Cariboo Club).⁴⁴⁴ Interviewees indicated that, depending on either their local circumstances or their employment at the base, they could join one of the messes and use all the recreational facilities at

⁴⁴² Ibid., Also see AHR 1964 “Bowling is another popular sport supported by two leagues; an intersection and a women’s league. “ “Intersection” likely means sports played between various radar base sections, such as the radar communications group and the Construction/Engineering section. This term is not frequently used in the radar base reports. DHH, AHR 1965, February 6-7, 1965: “First RCAF Station Moosonee Ladies’ Bonspiel. March 20, 1965: “Ladies’ Broomball Game between Moose Factory and dependent wives.” AHR 1967: “Mens, ladies and mixed curling league were organized.”

⁴⁴³ DHH, AHR 1967, Entry in Summary notes. “A ladies softball league was formed and enjoyed very much by dependents and local residents.”

⁴⁴⁴ DHH File 72/345, “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972,” Inspection Report dated Feb.8-9th, 1968.

the base. For example, they specified that business managers, local veterans, and school principals could join the Officers' Mess.

One archival source suggests that membership in the Messes may have been determined by race. Wendy Thomas, a welfare development officer, wrote that "Indian persons working at the RCAF base are permitted to apply for associate memberships at the Airman's [Airmen's] Mess."⁴⁴⁵ However, interviewees stated that many of the civilians who worked on the base joined the Airmen's Mess and they did not describe any separation of civilians by race in this regard. It is worth noting that at least one individual, who could have joined the Officers' Mess, chose to get a membership at a lower ranked mess. Interviewees indicated that Ed Butcher, a local business owner, could have joined the Officers' Mess but he preferred to be part of the Sergeants' Mess. It is worth noting that Mr. Butcher became the first Chair of the Moosonee Development Area Board (MDAB) in 1968.⁴⁴⁶

One of the closure reports for the base suggested that the messes made the radar base a focal point for the area:

Station personnel enjoy an excellent social relationship with the local townspeople and the station, because of its messes and recreational facilities, has become the social centre for the area. Although there is an LCBO store in the town there are no bars and consequently associate membership in all messes is high – 35-40 in the officers' mess, 50 in the NCO's [Non Commissioned Officers] mess and 100 in the other ranks [Airmen's Institute].⁴⁴⁷

Research by Harrison and Laliberté suggests that the cheery atmosphere and camaraderie of the messes was not always positive for families or communities and that messes contributed to

⁴⁴⁵ Ontario, Department of Public Welfare, report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, August 23, 1963. OA "Indians – Moosonee, 1963-66," page 13.

⁴⁴⁶ In 1968, Mr. Butcher became the first Chair of the Moosonee Development Area Board. Appointments to the MDAB are discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis.

⁴⁴⁷ DHH, "Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS, Jan.29, 1975 report titled "Department of National Defence: CFS Moosonee." The NCO's mess was often referred to as the Sergeants' Mess.

alcoholism on Canadian military bases.⁴⁴⁸ In that regard, a few interviewees noted that the custom of holding “TGIF” nights at the Moosonee Mess sometimes encouraged both military and civilian members of the mess to keep drinking long into the weekend. There is no other information on substance abuse at the base from the archival documents or from interviews conducted as part of this research.

Social events initiated by the RCAF demonstrate the level of interaction between the base and the broader community. That is, these events showed how military personnel and their families interacted not only with civilian employees and families, but with local people who, because of their employment status, were not connected to the radar base. Social events are grouped below into dances and carnivals, and children’s parties.

The first dance at the radar base was held on 30 March 1962 only a few months after the base became operational. There appeared to be no boundaries between military and civilian personnel as the annual report noted “The Stn [Station] Combined Mess was opened to all civilian personnel in the area. A dance followed at 2100 hours.”⁴⁴⁹ Other dances and banquets took place over the next decade from Hallowe’en dances, sports banquets, winter carnival and New Year’s Eve dances and these events appear to have been attended by people from the base and Moosonee. For example, the 1968 and 1969 AHRs specifically mention that “all ranks” were invited to the New Year’s Balls.⁴⁵⁰ Interviewees emphasized that local residents, who were civilian employees, or spouses of employees, were invited to all dances on the base.

⁴⁴⁸ Harrison and Laliberté’s book *No Life Like it* focuses on the Gulf War era (early 1990s) but their material suggests that “Thank God It’s Friday” (TGIF) nights at the Messes had been a long term practice at military bases. The term “TGIF” is now, of course, a common term in the average workplace.

⁴⁴⁹ DHH, AHR for November 1961 to Dec.1962. Entry in December events.

⁴⁵⁰ DHH, AHRs for 1968 and 1969, December sections in both reports.

Some events were open to both civilian employees and the general public. For example, in March 1964 the radar base “Played host to the Canadair Variety Show which arrived on the eve of this Station’s first Winter Carnival. This unit plus the local population enjoyed it immensely.”⁴⁵¹ The 1965 AHR gives one of the more detailed entries of the base Winter Carnival and describes “a successful day of skidoo races, dog races, broomball games, skating ... held with full participation from service personnel, PMQ residents and DND employees. The public was invited to attend and enjoyed the proceedings.”⁴⁵² Clearly, the RCAF tried to involve local residents in the social events that occurred on the base. This involvement extended to events that included children.

Radar base events included both PMQ children, as they were called, and local children. For example, the December 1962 AHR includes the following entry: “Service personnel sponsored a Christmas Party in the Stn Rec Centre for 185 Indian and white children from the Public and Mission [Catholic] Schools in Moosonee.”⁴⁵³ There is no reference to a party for children who lived on the radar base, but it is likely they would have had such an event. One year later, the children’s parties were clearly described as separate events.⁴⁵⁴ The separate parties continued until at least 1967 when the Annual Report indicated that the “children’s Christmas parties for both the Station and the town were again held this year and proved very successful.”⁴⁵⁵ Other than the first year for these parties, local children were never again referred to as “Indian or white.” Instead they were just children from the local grade schools.⁴⁵⁶

Interviewees indicated that the two local grade schools were attended by Cree, mixed ancestry

⁴⁵¹ DHH, AHR 1964, Recreation Section, emphasis mine.

⁴⁵² DHH, AHR 1965, Recreation section.

⁴⁵³ DHH, AHR for Dec.1, 1962 to May 31, 1963, Entry for Dec. 19, 1962.

⁴⁵⁴ DHH, AHR 1963. December 19, 1963: “Christmas party held in the Rec Centre for the Moosonee school children. Over 200 children were present. December 20, 1963: Christmas party held in the Rec Centre for the PMQ children.”

⁴⁵⁵ DHH, AHR 1967, Recreation Section.

⁴⁵⁶ DHH, AHR Dec.1, 1962 to May 31, 1963; AHRs 1963, 1964.

and non-Indigenous children and that these children came from both the town and the village. That is, the community schools were diverse. Interviewees gave no indication that children were excluded from Christmas parties based on where they lived or whether they were Indigenous or non-Indigenous.

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, interviewees often referred to recreational activities during the radar base time period. They also indicated that their involvement in recreational and social events was one of the most positive aspects of being situated beside the radar base. Interviewees indicated that they felt part of the Moosonee radar base, stating that they “were always visiting.” One interviewee specified “we used to visit on the base and people used to visit in town. I met so many people from the base that I can’t remember them all.”⁴⁵⁷ It is important to note, however, that the wide range of recreational and social activities was not an accident. Instead it appeared to be part of what the military referred to as good public relations. For example, a senior officer who visited the Moosonee base in 1968 wrote later that “It was also apparent that the base enjoys an admirable relationship with the townspeople of Moosonee and surrounding locality.”⁴⁵⁸ This comment shows that it was important to the local commanding officer, in this case Major Misener, to be able to demonstrate camaraderie or at least good local public relations. Good public relations were also broad enough to include both civilian employees and people who lived beyond the base.

The radar base was not always a safe place to live or work. For example, both base residents and civilian workers were exposed to environmental hazards. Two examples of environmental contaminants that were used on the base were DDT and creosote. It appears to

⁴⁵⁷ Interviews conducted in August, 2013.

⁴⁵⁸ DHH File 72/345, “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972.” Memo from Lieutenant-Colonel Futur, Department of National Defence to Major Misener, Commanding Officer, CFS Moosonee, 23 October 1968.

have been commonplace to spray the radar base area with DDT in order to reduce the number of black flies and mosquitoes, which one interviewee stated “were hated by the air force folks.”⁴⁵⁹ To illustrate, the 1968 AHR included the following entry: “June 23, 1968: Second Annual air spray for mosquitoes, black flies, etc. was carried out...spray was very successful.”⁴⁶⁰ Two interviewees indicated that they observed aerial spraying for black flies. In one case, it appears that civilian employees were not warned about the spray activity and that they were working outside when the planes dispersed chemicals. One interviewee mentioned that residents of the PMQs were marginally protected as they were generally advised to stay inside during aerial spraying. The same individual indicated that “PMQ kids were back out playing on the sprayed lawns within ten minutes of the plane leaving.” In addition to the recollections of interviewees, there are 1964 photos on a Pinetree Line website which show a DC3 airplane spraying near the radar base recreation centre.⁴⁶¹ One interviewee also indicated that it was common to see “fog-like clouds” on the radar base early in the morning, after pesticides had been manually applied to ditches using hand sprayers. It was not clear if such spraying was conducted by military personnel or civilians.

Furthermore, on the issue of exposure to harmful chemicals, one interviewee mentioned that civilian employees were responsible for coating wooden boards with creosote and that this

⁴⁵⁹ Interviews, Summer 2013. Interviewees indicated that they were told the spray was DDT. A supporting document in the Pagwa Pinetree files indicated in 1966 that “Mosquitoes [and] black flies ...are abundant ...However, they are not a problem on the station since it is sprayed daily with DDT.” See CFMAD, File 2002 35.1. Historical Files, Pagwa, Ontario radar base.

⁴⁶⁰ DHH, AHR 1968, Entry for 23 June 1968. See also Mark Kuhlberg, “Perfect co-operation”: Taking the Campaign against the Spruce Budworm in Ontario to New Heights, 1927-29,” *The Forestry Chronicle* 90, no. 3 (2014): 296-300. Kuhlberg notes that aerial spraying was an imperfect art in its early years. The Moosonee spraying may not have improved much from those first attempts to eradicate pests.

⁴⁶¹ Pinetree Line Website. <http://67.69.104.76:84/Pinetreeline/photos>. “RCAF DC-3 spraying for black flies –June, 1964[in Moosonee]. Courtesy of Wilf Holywell. Site accessed August 28, 2013. Also see Mark Briedenbaugh and Terry Carpenter “The Evolution of the Air Force Aerial Spray Capability” Paper presented 16 November 2008 at Symposium on Evolution of Military Medical Entomology, www.dtic.mil/ADA506261/ADPO23973, Accessed 8 August 2013. This report describes aerial spraying of American military bases from 1962-1973. The purpose of the spraying was to reduce insects.

work was generally done by Indigenous employees. The boards were then placed across ditches in front of PMQs and thus provided access to homes. The employees were outfitted in full rain suits and gloves but this was clearly not a preferred chore and it would have meant some exposure to chemicals. Military personnel, women and children would have also been exposed to creosote by virtue of using these walkways.

Environmental contamination continued at other radar base sites many years after they were closed. Recent accounts have documented such contamination at both DEW line bases and Mid-Canada radar sites. Arthur Johnson focused on the huge numbers of abandoned fuel drums left at or near DEW line sites and the very expensive remediation efforts which are still underway in the north.⁴⁶² McCreanor et al. documented chemical contamination of water and soil at former Mid-Canada line radar sites, including one site north of Moosonee on James Bay.⁴⁶³ It is beyond the scope of this study to describe environmental contamination issues more thoroughly but it is important to note that life on a radar base was not completely safe.

Discussion

The description in this chapter of people and activities on the base shows the generally positive impacts that the base had on local people. The most significant, positive impacts were the provision of employment and the access to recreational activities. This study suggests that the apparently family-friendly and employee-friendly Moosonee base reached out to the

⁴⁶² Arthur Johnson, "Cold War Cleanup: Undoing the DEW Line," *Canadian Geographic* (March/April, 2007): 62-72. Johnson quotes one of the remediation managers as stating that \$583 million has been spent so far on remediation of DEW sites (72).

⁴⁶³ McCreanor et al., "The Use of Leeches and Logit Log-Linear Contingency Models to Assess and Monitor Aquatic PCB Contamination Originating from Mid-Canada Radar Line Site 050," *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment* 140 (2008): 211-222.

neighbouring community, thereby broadening the concept of a positive radar base environment to a generally positive community environment.

There was, however, a dichotomy of lifestyles between the base and the town that was evident every single day that civilians from Moosonee came to work there. Civilian employees witnessed on a daily basis services and infrastructure that they did not have access to in their own parts of the town and village. Furthermore, they managed these services and the associated infrastructure for others. For example, civilians ran the power plant, and the water and sewer services. Additionally, some of the civilians cleaned the barracks and Messes and checked the PMQ homes for fire safety. Then they went home to houses that most often had no electricity, no potable drinking water and no sewage disposal system. Civilian employees, and other town residents, also had no paved roads in the residential areas in Moosonee. This last fact seemed to be particularly irksome to interviewees. Several people asked “Why should the only paved road in Moosonee in the 60s and 70s be the one leading to the base?”⁴⁶⁴ During the radar base’s years, grumbling about paved roads quickly expanded into intense inquiries about water and sewer facilities, fire protection services and other community requirements.

The next chapter deals with the disparity between the modern infrastructure on the radar base and the very limited services and infrastructure available within the town and the area south of town known as the village. It also describes the years of planning and construction needed to bring the town’s facilities and structures up to standards that approached those on the radar base.

⁴⁶⁴ Interviews, Summer 2013.

Chapter Seven: Water, Fire and Moosonee: The Development of Local Infrastructure and Services

This chapter focuses on infrastructure related to three community services: water supply and sewage treatment, fire protection, and garbage disposal.⁴⁶⁵ These services are useful in depicting the impacts of the RCAF radar base. The discussion of water and sewer services has a dual purpose. First, it shows the impact on the town of Moosonee of population growth due to military development. Second, the discussion of infrastructure shows how difficult it is to remediate an environmental infrastructure issue, rather than to plan for infrastructure before development occurs.

The relationship of water, sewer and population change is simple. As Paul and Anne Ehrlich explain:

If a few people per mile live along a large river, their sewage may be dumped directly into the river and natural purification will occur. But if the population increases, the waste-degrading ability of the river becomes overstrained, and either the sewage or the intake water must be treated if the river water is to be safe for drinking.⁴⁶⁶

In Moosonee's case, the water from the Moose River was declared "satisfactory" in 1959, two years before the radar base opened.⁴⁶⁷ However, by early 1961 -- even before the radar base officially opened -- the Department of Health began to report serious water quality and sanitation issues due to the increasing population and lack of sewer services. The RCAF was not responsible for Moosonee's water and sewer services, but the very presence of the base and its promise of potential employment caused environmental damage to the adjacent community. The

⁴⁶⁵ Water and Sewer are integrally connected and therefore they are discussed as one service group.

⁴⁶⁶ Ehrlich, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, *Population, Resources, Environment: Issues in Human Ecology*, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1970) ,128.

⁴⁶⁷ AO, RG 84-22, B120655, Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC), Division of Sanitary Engineering. File: Federal Government RCAF Station-Moosonee, Memos and reports, 27 January 1959 to 21 July 1959. These memos will be discussed further in this chapter.

connections between the radar base, population growth and water and sewer facilities will be discussed in this chapter. The operation of water and sewer facilities was also so integrally connected to the provision of electrical power by the RCAF that this topic is also covered in the first part of this chapter.

The second service discussed in this chapter – fire protection – is used as an example of how a community can develop a dependency on the provision of a service from another agency. In this case, Moosonee came to rely on fire protection services from the RCAF base. This dependency could not continue indefinitely, especially when the radar base cut back its own facilities and services.

The third service area examined in this chapter is garbage disposal. This service is an example of infrastructure that was shared by the town of Moosonee and the RCAF. In fact, the landfill was likely the only physical infrastructure that was not planned as part of the RCAF build up for the new radar base, and yet it was ultimately a quasi-integrated project.⁴⁶⁸

Water and Sewer Services

On 4 July 1966, J. W. Spooner, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, provided a list of recent municipal legislation to Premier John Robarts. On the list was the Moosonee Development Area Board (MDAB) Act, which had received third reading a few days earlier. Spooner indicated that:

This Act is to provide a corporate status for the Moosonee area and to provide a board which will have the powers of a municipality in certain limited matters without in fact being a municipality. It will permit contracts to be made for the installation of sewer and

⁴⁶⁸ See Chapter 5 on the concept of integrating town and base facilities.

water services which are necessary for the immediate development proposals in this area.⁴⁶⁹

Spoooner's description of creating a very limited board is likely one of the least enthusiastic municipal descriptions in the archives. Also, although Spoooner indicated the services were needed for development, everyone -- including the Premier -- likely knew that the real reason for water and sewer contracts was to prevent a community health crisis.

Issues of contaminated water, and inadequate sewage collection and treatment, had been ongoing in Moosonee for half a decade by the time Spoooner wrote to Premier Robarts. Only part of Moosonee had piped, treated water when the RCAF arrived in 1958 to start planning the air base. Water from Store Creek was chlorinated by the ONR and then stored in its water tower (located just west of the train station) before being distributed to a small area of town.⁴⁷⁰ The ONR's legal department showed water lines on only two streets in 1964; Henry Crescent (which followed the north side of Store Creek) and a small part of Ferguson Road (parallel to the Waterfront and crossing First Street).⁴⁷¹ A 1966 map showed a slightly larger distribution system, with another water pipe along Second Avenue (Bay Road) passing the Roman Catholic Hospital and HBC store before ending near Second Street.⁴⁷² See Map 5.1 in Chapter Five for the location of streets in the 1964 and 1966 maps.

⁴⁶⁹ AO, RG 19-4-5, B269701, Legislation Files of Minister Spoooner, Municipal Affairs, Legislative Program 1962-66, Minister Spoooner to Premier Robarts, 4 July 1966, 6. Although the MDAB Act was passed in 1966 it was not proclaimed until August 1968. It did however seem to give OWRC some comfort level in signing the first contracts for sewer and water work in the Fall of 1966.

⁴⁷⁰ Interviewees recalled the ONR's wooden water tower and the limited distribution pipes for water.

⁴⁷¹ AO, RG 19-77, B388332, File 118.1 Moosonee 1964. The 1964 map was attached to a memo from Ontario Northland Transportation Commission's (ONTC) legal department to Don Taylor, Department of Municipal Affairs, 3 December 1964. The map includes a handwritten notation to "4 inch water pipes." Note: correspondence between the ONTC and the provincial government is shown as either ONTC itself or Ontario Northland Railway (ONR). In most cases these memos are signed by the same people and will be referred to broadly as the "ONR."

⁴⁷² OA, RG19-77, B388332, File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. The 1966 map was attached to a March 3, 1966 from ONR's legal department to the Real Estate Branch of the Ontario Department of Public Works. The Department of Municipal Affairs paid ONR for a "Water line extension" during December 1964. Although ONR's

Interviewees have confirmed that the hospital and public school were connected to the water system and that some people carried water from these two locations to their homes. Others have said that they carried their drinking water, using a yoke, directly from the Moose River to their homes. People who lived south of Store Creek would have carried water from Store Creek, or possibly from the Moose River. None of the archival material shows sewage pipes or any form of community sewage treatment within Moosonee at the time of the opening of the RCAF base.

For most of the 1960s, various health departments and agencies wrote to provincial planners with health concerns related to water and sewer systems in Moosonee. These reports ranged from advising of unsanitary conditions to warning of the potential for epidemics in Moosonee. In August 1960, W.G. Cooke, an Assistant Chief Sanitary Inspector from the Ontario Department of Health, described the ongoing construction of the radar base and noted that the RCAF would have its own water and sewer systems. He then warned that:

The O. N. Railway supplies treated water and electricity to residents of the townsite. Conditions are unsuitable for private (water carried) sewage disposal systems. Since local labour is to be employed in the defence project, an influx of Indians and others can be anticipated, with resulting sanitation problems.⁴⁷³

In fact, the population of Moosonee had already grown considerably. In 1951 Moosonee had a population of 124 people. This number doubled by 1956, the year after defence construction started on the Moosonee airstrip. Between 1956 and 1961, the population quadrupled – from 237 people in 1956 to 975 in 1961 (see Table 4.1 in Chapter Four). A month after the Cooke report,

invoice did not specify the location of the extension, the timing would seem to indicate that this is the slightly larger area shown on the 1966 map. See File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66, R. A. Groves, Chief Accountant for Department of Municipal Affairs, memo to Minister Spooner. Subject: Moosonee Costs, 28 August 1965.

⁴⁷³ AO, RG 19-77, B388332, File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63. Memo from W. G. Cooke, Department of Health to Deputy Minister Cumming, Department of Municipal Affairs. 19 August 1960. Cooke's reference to private sewage disposal systems is likely to septic tanks and tile drainage beds. References to 'sanitation' throughout this chapter generally refer to sewage disposal.

A.L.S. Nash, from the Department of Municipal Affairs, briefed his Deputy Minister, and echoed Cooke's concerns:

Moosonee has generally been a creature of the Ontario Northland Railway in that the railway has, in the past, owned most of the land and has wielded what little degree of supervision of development there has existed. The Railway has attempted to provide a limited domestic water and electric power supply ... and has attempted to keep the townsite roads and drainage facilities in a 'just less than dangerous' condition.

If the population were to remain stable at about the 700 level the present primitive arrangements for meeting basic community needs might continue to work, particularly if a more appropriate method could be found for disposing of sewage wastes.

However, the population will not remain stable and in our view the present arrangements for the provision of services and general administration will be totally inadequate in a short time.⁴⁷⁴

Nash then elaborated on the reasons for population growth starting with the construction of the radar base. He indicated that the base would bring associated commercial and servicing employment and would "attract a further population to Moosonee."⁴⁷⁵ He also suggested that existing proposals for harbour development would enlarge the number of town residents.

During 1961 there were two reports on sanitary conditions in Moosonee and Moose Factory. W. H. Oerton, from the Ontario Department of Health, indicated in a report dated 23 June that "chlorinated river water [is] supplied by the ONR at Moosonee. [However], some Indians are certain to be using raw river water."⁴⁷⁶ Water studies conducted by the Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC) in 1958 and 1959 had shown that river water was free of

⁴⁷⁴ AO, RG 19-77, B388332, File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63, A. L. S. Nash, Director Community Planning to L.H. Cumming, Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs, 28 September 1960. This memo was actually written by Don Taylor. Per government protocol, the initials DFT show the writer of the memo but Taylor's director signed the memo and was formally shown as the writer. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid. The harbour development proposal was never realized. Issues related to harbour development are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

⁴⁷⁶ AO, RG 9-1, B113127. Townsite Committee Studies, W. H. Oerton, Provincial Sanitary Inspector, Department of Health to W. G. Cooke, Acting Chief Sanitary Inspector, Department of Health, Re: Sanitary Survey of Moosonee, 23 June 1961, 2.

bacteria.⁴⁷⁷ However, in 1961 Oerton indicated a potential problem with using water from the Moose River:

At Moosonee there are various types of pit privies, cesspools and septic tanks, the effluent from which discharges into ditches at the sides of the streets. This eventually finds its way into the Moose River....

The septic tanks and cesspools discharge into the road ditches due to the fact that tile disposal beds do not function in this ground, which consists of two feet of muskeg.⁴⁷⁸

Oerton also indicated that there were a few “privies” or outhouses in the area south of Store Creek. He laid the blame for poor conditions solely on the ONR by saying “Although the Ontario Northland Railway Commission own all the unsold lots ... they will accept little if any responsibility for conditions in the townsite [other than] occasional work on the roads and ditches but little else.”⁴⁷⁹ Oerton did mention, however; that the ONR had recently frozen land sales in Moosonee with the goal of ensuring orderly development. Like his colleague, W. G. Cooke, Oerton concluded that people were moving to Moosonee to look for work, and that this factor was responsible for sewage disposal issues. Specifically, he stated, “Indians have come to this area from reservations up both coasts of James Bay, mainly to obtain employment.”⁴⁸⁰ Figure 7.1 shows the quadrupling of Moosonee’s population between 1956 and 1961 even before the RCAF base opened.⁴⁸¹ The anticipation of employment at the radar base caused part of the population boom in the town even as environmental conditions worsened.


⁴⁷⁷ See Chapter 5 for a full discussion of the earlier water tests.

⁴⁷⁸ Townsite Committee Studies, Sanitary Survey of Moosonee, Oerton.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Data for Figure 7.1 is derived from Table 4.1 Moosonee’s Population and Table 6.1 Radar Base Population.



The freeze on land sales was noted by K. H. Sharpe of the OWRC towards the end of 1961. Sharpe wrote that some of the employment (and therefore population) growth in Moosonee was due to “contractors engaged in the construction of the RCAF Station.”⁴⁸² Furthermore, he echoed Oerton’s concerns about defective septic systems and warned that “A hazard to health exists in the Moosonee area due to inadequate sewage disposal facilities.”⁴⁸³

What this series of memos shows is that the radar base was affecting development in Moosonee at the most basic of local services: sewage disposal. In 1962, the *Globe and Mail* mentioned the local health issues in an article titled “Municipality Status Studied for Moosonee by Cabinet Committee.” *Globe* reporter John Miller noted that “With no sewerage and an

⁴⁸² AO, RG 19-77, B388332. File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63, Report on Sanitary Conditions in Moosonee and Moose Factory, written by K.H. Sharpe, Assistant Director, Sanitary Engineering Division, OWRC, 16 October 1961.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

inadequate water supply, there is danger of a serious health hazard.”⁴⁸⁴ OWRC’s Sharpe recommended a solution for Moosonee. He wrote that, “The Air Force Station under construction will have sewer and water services. Consideration should be given to servicing the built-up area of Moosonee into the RCAF Station sewage plans.”⁴⁸⁵ Sharpe did not just file his report. Instead he followed up with the ONR to ask it “if any action had been taken on these recommendations.”⁴⁸⁶ The ONR responded by requesting a cost estimate for a sewage system.⁴⁸⁷

The sewage system estimate was developed by the OWRC in March 1962 using engineering data from the firm that worked on the Moosonee RCAF station. The proposed sewage system costs of \$365,000 were thus based on the type of plant that was being constructed on the RCAF base.⁴⁸⁸ The OWRC’s estimate was comprehensive, covering both the Moosonee Townsite and the area south of Store Creek and assuming population growth from the current (1962) level of 1,000 people to about 3,200.⁴⁸⁹ The OWRC staff also explained in its estimates why Moosonee could not simply hook up to the RCAF sewage plant. They stated that the RCAF plant was much smaller than the OWRC realized (about a third of the size they had anticipated) so that “there is no reserve capacity.” OWRC also added “It was not considered economical to carry the sanitary wastes from Moosonee easterly 6,500 feet ... to the RCAF Station.”⁴⁹⁰ What the report seemed to be saying is that the earlier concept of integrating the town and the air base

⁴⁸⁴ Townsite Committee Studies, John Miller, “Municipality Status Studied By Cabinet Committee,” *Globe and Mail*, Sept. 8, 1962.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ AO, RG 19-43, B232755. Moosonee-Improvement District 1962-63. Sharpe to Al Jardine, General Manager, ONR, 19 February 1962. Sharpe indicated that Jardine had received the sanitary report in December 1961.

⁴⁸⁷ AO, RG 19-77, B388332. File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63. A.R. Townshend, OWRC, Report on Preliminary Cost Estimates of a Sewage System to Serve the Townsite of Moosonee, 26 March 1962. The ONR request for a cost estimate is noted in Townshend’s report.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid. This included having the sewer pipes excavated to an average depth of ten feet. So the \$365,000 included a sewage treatment plant and sewer lines throughout town.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid. The area south of Store Creek has been referred to as “the Village” earlier in this thesis. The report doesn’t indicate how long it would take for Moosonee to reach a population of 3,200; however, the engineers are suggesting that the sewage plant should be designed for growth.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

might not have worked anyway – even if the political leaders had been receptive to it. However, at least the extensive planning for the radar base helped save some time and money in terms of planning for Moosonee’s own system.

A few months later there had been no decision on building a sewage system but land sales continued to be frozen. In 1963 the OWRC delivered its most damning report about health risks in Moosonee. The District Engineer for OWRC, C.H. Kretch, indicated that “the sanitary conditions in Moosonee are very unsatisfactory and constitute a definite hazard to the public health.”⁴⁹¹ Kretch’s letter is important because it is one of the few that described how landscape, pollution, and disease were linked at Moosonee. Kretch explained this as follows:

The relatively level terrain and muskeg nature of the soil, combined with a high ground water table, make the operation of sub-surface drainage systems unsatisfactory. The result is that septic tank effluent, which is tantamount to raw sewage, is either lying or flowing in the ditches of almost all of the main streets in the townsite...eleven [town] drains were found to be discharging wastes directly to the Moose River. Some drains also discharge to Store Creek downstream from the water works intake.

All ...samples collected in Moosonee ...contained *Escherichia coli* [e-coli], some in concentrations of millions... The presence of these bacteria in large numbers indicates that ... diseases as typhoid fever and poliomyelitis could be present.

At the time of this investigation children and dogs were playing in the ditches. When it is remembered that ... liquid collected from these ditches ... [is] equivalent to raw sewage ... the seriousness of the sanitation problem in Moosonee can be appreciated. Such diseases as typhoid fever, paratyphoid fever, poliomyelitis, and dysentery, plus others, are transmitted by sewage... The possibility of an epidemic of a communicable disease, such as typhoid fever, [is] a very real one.⁴⁹²

Kretch also wrote that, during spring thaw, ice jams could back up in Store Creek and cause the polluted waters of the creek to flow back over the ONR’s dam – a dam that held back water

⁴⁹¹ AO, RG 84-12, B355820. File “Moosonee: Original Sanitary Engineering Report -- OWRC.” Report titled “Survey of Sanitary Conditions,” by C.H. Kretch, District Engineer, OWRC, 18-19 June 1963, 4-5.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*, 6-7. Samples were taken from ditches and drains, and more importantly, from “the water of Store Creek.” As indicated by Oerton earlier in this chapter, the residents living south of Store Creek were known to take their water from that Creek. It was also noted earlier in this chapter that townsite residents, who did not receive ONR water, took their drinking water directly from the Moose River.

intended for the townsite's piped drinking water supplies. Kretch concluded in his report that there was a "dire need" for sewage treatment facilities in Moosonee. It is ironic that the issues he outlined were more serious in the Moosonee townsite, rather than in the area south of Store Creek. Residents and business owners in the townsite were constructing standard sewage disposal systems—septic tanks and tile drainage beds—but these systems were failing. People who lived south of Store Creek were using outhouses or 'privies.' Moreover, the town's drains flowed into both the Moose River and Store Creek, and both of these waterways were used as drinking water supplies by the town and village residents.

There is no indication that an epidemic resulted from the poor water conditions, however, there are also no detailed records of stomach flu and other disorders for this time period. Epidemics were considered serious as demonstrated by the RCAF Annual Historical Reports, which show that station personnel and dependents were inoculated for typhoid in September 1966.⁴⁹³

Several provincial ministries would weigh in on sewage costs during the five year period after the 1962 cost estimate. The Cabinet Committee on Townsites received two such reports, from the Department of Economics and Development (DED), during 1962. The first, by H. F. Crown, indicated that Moosonee was critical "as a railhead and shipping centre to service defence establishments in the lower Hudson Bay/James Bay region."⁴⁹⁴ However, Crown's report also noted some problems with the town becoming a regional centre. For example, he

⁴⁹³ DHH, Moosonee AHR, 1966. An entry for September 14, 1966 (3 years after the Kretch report) recorded that "Typhoid inoculations [were administered] to Stn personnel and their dependents." The *Globe and Mail* reported the same month that three men from Fort Albany were treated for Typhoid at the Moose Factory Hospital. The title of the article implied that the epidemic was in Moosonee itself. See "Typhoid Outbreak Believed Stopped at Moosonee." *Globe and Mail*, September 29, 1966, 15.

⁴⁹⁴ AO, RG 9-1, B113127, Townsite Committee Studies, Report by H. F. Crown, "Considerations to be made by the Ontario Department of Economics and Development for the Development of Moosonee Townsite," 6 July 1962.

indicated that the ONR had fifty applications to purchase lots but that it could not sell any more lots until “sanitation and municipal services had been resolved.”⁴⁹⁵ Crown also indicated that there was a development and services quandary; the ONR, the party that owned almost all of Moosonee’s land, “has no authority, nor does it wish to provide these additional municipal services.”⁴⁹⁶

The Department of Economics and Development recognized that the province would likely need to install the required sewage treatment plant and pipes, since there was no municipal authority available to do this. However, DED recognized that there could be province-wide impacts if the province provided money in Moosonee and not elsewhere.⁴⁹⁷ Finally, the Crown report concluded that the province could have shared a sewage treatment system with the RCAF but had not taken advantage of this opportunity.⁴⁹⁸

Later in 1962, a second report from DED emphasized that development in Moosonee “has been virtually brought to a standstill because of the ban on selling any further lots [due to sewage issues].”⁴⁹⁹ This report reiterated the suggestion that the ONR did not consider servicing lots to be part of its role. The author, Al Etchen, added that the ONTC “is in poor financial shape [and] is not in position to finance either the installation of a sanitary sewage system... or any further extension of electricity or water services.”⁵⁰⁰ Etchen also described the extra-municipal role of the ONR and indicated that the ONR did not consider providing sewage

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid, one of the applications was for a new Roman Catholic elementary school.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid. Crown stated “this may create repercussions from other [communities] ... in Northern Ontario who would expect the same treatment.”

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid. This is a reference to the integration proposal developed by Department of Planning and Development –see Chapter Five in this thesis.

⁴⁹⁹ AO, RG19-77, B388332. File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-62. Report on “Proposed New Municipal Services for Moosonee Townsite,” by A. Etchen, Department of Economics and Development (DED). to Don Taylor, 16 November 1962.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid

services as “part of its function. The function of the Commission is to operate the Railway and its ancillary road and water services.”⁵⁰¹ At this point, one wonders why the ONR was ever allowed to sell land, because it appears that this was not part of its role either. Nevertheless, the ONR did engage an engineering firm in late 1963 to review Kretch’s report.⁵⁰² The ONR Commissioners agreed with the firm’s recommendations that construction of a sewage system be combined with the extension of existing water lines and the reconstruction of roads and ditches in Moosonee.⁵⁰³ In other words, although the ONR did not want to finance a costly sewage treatment system, it now wanted to see the expansion of the sewer works into a full water, sewer and roads reconstruction project.

By 1963, letters and reports shifted focus from the town to the area south of Store Creek. A Department of Public Welfare employee, Wendy Thomas, filed a 23 August 1963 report which noted serious concerns with both water and sewer services:

One of the biggest health hazards are the open ditches which breed all manner of insects as well as producing an unpleasant stanch [*sic*]. It is common to see the children playing in these. The Moose River is a favourite swimming spot of the Indian children and is unclean for that purpose.

Water for the village is carried – often by the children – in unclean pails from the creek or River. Both of these water bodies have shown high E coli counts ... Some walk long distances to the [Roman Catholic] Mission to get good drinking water.

There is only one privy to every 1.7 households. Most of these are filthy and not useable. There is no night soil or garbage collection. ... It is easy to understand, therefore, the high incidence of food poisoning, vomiting, diarrhea, skin infection, septic conditions and diseases of the upper respiratory tract.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰¹ Ibid

⁵⁰² AO, RG 19-77, B388332. File 117.9 Moosonee 1963-64, Internal ONTC Memorandum from John Kennedy, Commissioner, ONTC to W. A. (Allister) Johnston, Acting Chairman, ONTC, 14 October 1963.

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister’s Files, File: “Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66,” Report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963.

Thomas also noted good hygiene was prevented by “a good and readily available water supply.”⁵⁰⁵

A month after Thomas’ report, the Department of Health again warned of the danger of drinking water from Store Creek. This warning was ominous; especially as it does not appear that the residents who took water from the creek were aware of the hazardous condition of local drinking water.⁵⁰⁶ There are few records of comments from residents on the water and sewer issues. However a ‘fact finding tour’ organized by the Department of Education did record some community concerns including comments such as: “Ontario Northland sits on its fanny – afraid of sewer responsibility,” and “Septic tanks have a straight gut to the nearest ditch.”⁵⁰⁷

Although the ONR appeared to be refraining from taking action, its correspondence showed an increasing concern over sewage issues. For example, Allister Johnston, the Chair of the ONR, wrote to J.W.Spooner, Minister of Municipal Affairs, stating “I [have] had a discussion with the Prime Minister in connection with the extremely dangerous situation in Moosonee with respect to the sewerage system.”⁵⁰⁸ Johnston then explained that the ONR could not afford to fix the sewage problem due to recent, unspecified “heavy financial burdens.”⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ W. G. Cooke of the Department of Health sent an update to his earlier 1960 report to Municipal Affairs in September 1963. He wrote “The OWRC has pointed out that sewage effluents discharged into Store Creek endanger the public water supply.” AO, RG 19-77, B388332. File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63, W. G. Cooke, Department of Health to Don Taylor, Department of Municipal Affairs, 10 September 1963. Cooke also warned that new developments in Moosonee, like a Hudson’s Bay staff house, a new Legion Hall and a new separate school would add to sewage outflows

⁵⁰⁷ AO, RG 19-77, B388332. File 118.1 Moosonee 1964, Ministry of Education, “Report to William G. Davis, Minister of Education on A Visit to Moosonee,” September, 1964. Note: Bill Davis was the Premier of Ontario from 1971-1985 but for almost a decade prior to that he was the Minister of Education (starting in October, 1962). See A. K. McDougall, *John P. Robarts: His Life and Government* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), Appendix A: The Ontario Cabinet, 279-281.

⁵⁰⁸ AO, RG 19-77, B388332. File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63. A. Johnston, Acting Chairman, ONTC to J. W. Spooner, Minister of Municipal Affairs, 8 July 1963. Johnston’s reference to “the Prime Minister” is undoubtedly to the Premier of Ontario (much of the correspondence from the 1950s and 1960s used PM for Premier).

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

Johnston suggested that another branch of the bureaucracy – the Department of Economics and Development – construct a sewer system. Spooner responded that he hoped to take the issue to Cabinet soon but had deferred it to the Committee on Townsites for their recommendation.⁵¹⁰ No one seemed to have the authority or sole responsibility for this complex decision.

The sole goal of Cabinet seemed to be to ‘patch things up’ rather than to deal comprehensively with the situation. Specifically, the ONR was given funds for a “Moosonee maintenance” project, beginning at the end of 1963; essentially Cabinet paid the ONR to provide some limited services to Moosonee. For example, the ONR billed the Ontario government \$3500 for the construction of one water line and tap in the “Indian Village.”⁵¹¹ By the end of 1964, the ONR started to bill the province for the supply of water to the Indian Village.⁵¹² The use of a single water outlet for the Village continued for over five years, even as the rest of the community began to receive piped water and sewer systems to service individual homes. This quasi-municipal arrangement will be further discussed in the next Chapter.

The inadequacy of this system generated comments from both government staff and consultants. In 1964 the Department of Health recommended that there be at least three water outlets for the 900 people living south of Store Creek. W.G. Cooke indicated that, “Families that must carry water the maximum distance from the present outlet (half mile) will be discouraged from using water freely for personal hygiene and they may turn to readily available polluted

510 Spooner to Johnston, July 22, 1963.

511 File 117.9 Moosonee 1963-64. Ontario Northland Invoice 188220, Expenses Incurred at Moosonee, Ontario Sept-Dec.1963, Invoice dated December 1963. The total of the expenses incurred by ONR for that quarter were \$21,524 and they included the “Water Line and Tap-Indian Village: \$3,500.” Most of the expenses (\$15,380) were for the stockpiling of sand and gravel, presumably for future improvements to roads.

512 AO, RG 19-77 B388332. File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. R.A.Groves, Chief Accountant, Department of Municipal Affairs to J.W. Spooner, Minister of Municipal Affairs, 26 August 1965. Groves summarized payments to ONR from September 1963 to July 1965. These totaled \$41,414 for water and roads improvements.

supplies.⁵¹³ A planning report released in April 1964 confirmed Cooke's prediction that people would continue to use 'available polluted supplies'. Project Planning Associates described the situation in 'the village' as follows:

Fewer than half [of the houses] have latrines. Frequently toilet facilities are pails kept in a corner. ... There is no garbage removal or night soil collection and waste and refuse is either dumped in the bush or into the creek or river. Both water bodies [Store Creek and the Moose River] show high E coli counts and while the new communal water house [the water pipe outlet] now serves about 1/3 of the village, the remainder still draw their water from the creek or river.⁵¹⁴

The Project Planning Associates' report, which had been commissioned by the ONR, was immediately labeled as "strictly private" and "confidential" when it was received by Department of Municipal Affairs.⁵¹⁵

Meanwhile the press continued to spread the word about conditions in Moosonee. In February 1965, the Toronto *Telegram* interviewed Tom Archibald, whom it referred to as "the accepted leader of the Cree Indian community in Moosonee."⁵¹⁶ The *Telegram* reported that, although Archibald was a full-time employee at "the Air Force base in Moosonee," he lived "in a shack in ... the Indian Village [that] is liable to an epidemic through lack of any communal

513 AO, RG 19-77, B388332. File 118.1 Moosonee 1964. W. G. Cooke, Chief Public Health Inspector to W. M. Walkingshaw, Director, Environmental Sanitation Branch, Department of Health, 3 September 1964.

514 AO, RG19 F-7. B350920. General Admin. Moosonee Development Board . J.K.McAully, Senior Accounting Advisor, Department of Municipal Affairs to R.J. Watson, Director, Municipal Accounting Branch re: "Townsite of Moosonee: Proposed Water and Sewage Program," 30 May 1966.. Despite searches at LAC and Ontario Archives, and the North Bay Museum (for ONR fonds), the 1964 *Project Planning* report on Moosonee could not be located. McAully's memo contains the only clear references to the report that could be accessed. Emphasis mine.

515 AO, RG 19-77 B388332. File 117.9 Moosonee 1963-64. Don Taylor to Minister Spooner, Department of Municipal Affairs, 8 May 1964. In this memo Don Taylor asked for the Minister's permission to share the confidential Project Planning Associates report with an internal government Townsite Sub-Committee. That level of required permission for sharing was not noted elsewhere in any of the archived files.

516 AO, RG 19-77 B388332. File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Bob Pennington, "Why Indians Smash So Many Windows," *The Telegram*, Feb.15, 1965, p.8. Tom Archibald had been shown as the Chairman of the Moosonee Development Board, a local committee, since September, 1963. The role of this committee will be discussed further in the chapter on Local Government. Also see W.G.Cooke to Don Taylor, September 10, 1963, earlier in this chapter. Cooke's memo refers to Archibald as the Chairman of the local citizen's committee.

sewage system.” Archibald was quoted in the article that “[the construction of] a sewage system ... will end the illness that comes every summer.”⁵¹⁷

Later in 1965, the combination of memos, reports, and media coverage had results. As Don Taylor indicated in a briefing “A serious sanitation problem and an extremely bad press [in 1965]” had caused the government to start the Moosonee servicing program.⁵¹⁸ The Minister of Energy and Resources Management, J.R.Simonett, wrote to Premier Robarts on 8 September 1965 to initiate the process:

Last week while at Moosonee a group of the townspeople requested a meeting with Mr. Spooner and me. Among other things, the matter of water supply and sewage disposal for the townsite was discussed. I would like to recommend that the Ontario Water Resources Commission be asked to update [water and sewage] figures...and that the Ontario Government provide these services for the Moosonee townsite.⁵¹⁹

Clearly Simonett’s opinion counted. Less than a week later, Don Taylor was notified by Minister Spooner that “the P.M. [Premier] had instructed OWRC to get moving on providing sewers and water supply in Moosonee.”⁵²⁰ A month later, after meeting with the OWRC, Taylor confirmed that they were “being pushed into position where they must have plans for new water supply and sewage system for Moosonee soon.”⁵²¹

In order to expedite the process, the OWRC requested water and sewer construction costs for the Moosonee RCAF station from the Department of National Defence (DND). These costs,

517 Ibid., Pennington, *The Telegram*.

518 AO, RG19 F-7, B350920. General Admin. Moosonee Development Board. Don Taylor to Deputy Minister Palmer, 6 April 1967. This briefing material from a 1967 file referred to the 1965 decision to proceed with public works in Moosonee.

519 AO, RG 19-77 B388332. File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Minister Simonett, Department of Energy and Resources Management, to Premier Robarts, 8 September 1965. Simonett also recommended that ONR be removed as the manager of the area. This will be dealt with in the next chapter on Local Governance.

520 File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Don Taylor to Deputy Minister Palmer, Municipal Affairs, 20 September 1965. Taylor says in this memo that he was told about the Premier’s instructions on September 14th (only six days after Simonetti requested action from the Premier).

521 Don Taylor to Deputy Palmer, 18 October 1965.

based on work done in 1960 and 1961, totaled just under \$1 million for a dam, water distribution system, water treatment plant, sewage collection system and sewage treatment plant.⁵²² The ability to use the DND cost reports likely saved some time in what had become an urgent process. The OWRC developed an estimate of \$2.1 million for the first four contracts, possibly after considering that the area they would be servicing was about the same size as the base, but that it needed ditches, culverts and major roadwork.⁵²³ The contract was also designed to accommodate projected growth in Moosonee's population to 2,300.⁵²⁴

By 23 April 1966 the *Globe and Mail* announced that "The OWRC has let a contract for a sewer and water system for Moosonee." The *Globe* article, titled "Sewerage for Moosonee," indicated that the project would likely cost \$2 million and that, in terms of sewer and water facilities, "the town now has none." The *Globe and Mail* article also noted that the lack of sewer and water facilities was holding up the construction of a \$1 million school, the James Bay Education Centre (JBEC), which had already been announced by William Davis, the Minister of Education.⁵²⁵ He was one of the Ontario Cabinet members pushing for speedy sewer and water construction, as without it, his own project, the JBEC could not be operational.⁵²⁶ As Don Taylor

522 AO, RG84-22, B120655. Federal Government: RCAF Station-Moosonee. R. B. Whiting, DND to K. Sharpe, OWRC, 8 November 1965. Note that this was the second time in three years that OWRC had benefitted from RCAF cost estimates. In 1962, OWRC had obtained sewage system estimates from the RCAF. See Townshend, 26 March 1962 earlier in this chapter.

523 Ontario, Sessional Papers, OWRC Annual Report for Year End 1966, p. 13.

524 File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Minister Spooner to Premier Robarts, 11 March 1966.

525 John Dafoe, "Sewerage for Moosonee," *Globe and Mail*, April 23, 1966 The development of the school, known as the James Bay Education Centre is beyond the scope of this thesis, however it is worth noting that it was located within the first Contract, on First Street.

526 File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Meeting concerning Moosonee Development, 17 September 1965. Meeting minutes of OWRC and other ministries regarding "Moosonee Development" indicate staff were well aware that "the Minister of Education, the Hon. Mr. Davis [wanted] this project [to] proceed without delay."

reported, “[the] Education complex timing necessitated that Department of Municipal Affairs ... undertake [the] first stage of public services (along First Street).”⁵²⁷

Provincial staff and politicians had hoped that sewer and water tenders could be issued by the new Moosonee Development Area Board, but the MDAB Act did not receive third reading until the end of June 1966 and it was not enacted until August 1968. So the first round of tenders had to be issued by the province itself. Construction, however, did not begin until after the MDAB Act was passed in 1966 and the building of the JBEC was delayed until mid-1969.⁵²⁸

Most of Moosonee’s water and sewer system was constructed over the three year period from September 1966 to October 1969. The OWRC estimated, at the end of 1969, that the final costs would be in the area of \$2.5 million.⁵²⁹ Two areas were excluded from the initial contracts; the Village and the town’s industrial area. Department of Municipal Affairs hoped to gain federal funding for the Village’s work before proceeding because most of the residents south of the Creek were Indigenous, but the funding requests were not successful.⁵³⁰ The other area that was excluded was the industrial warehouse area along the Moose River shoreline between the town and the radar base. In August 1967 business owners in the warehouse area petitioned for water and sewer services and indicated that there was a fire hazard in their area since there were

527 AO, RG19 F-7. B350920. “General Admin. Moosonee Development Board.” Don Taylor to Deputy Minister Palmer, 6 April 1967.

528 Rudy Platiel, “Teachers, Indians picket Davis, Brunelle in Moosonee.” *Globe and Mail*, Toronto, page 9, June 16, 1969. MPP William Davis was the Minister of Education in 1969 and therefore he was in Moosonee in June, 1969 to open JBEC.

529 OWRC Annual Report, 1969. Construction timelines and specific costs for the major contracts are summarized in Appendix Five. These costs total just over \$2 million. It is possible that the 1969 OWRC estimate of \$2.5 million was higher than \$2 million because it could have included borrowing costs.

530 AO, RG 19-5, B269767. Cochrane-Moosonee Townsite General, OWRC meeting on January 18, 1967. Also see AO3, File 118.4 Moosonee 1967 for February 1967 meeting notes regarding joint session of ONTC, OWRC and Department of Municipal Affairs to discuss Moosonee construction issues.

no fire hydrants close to oil storage tanks and warehouses.⁵³¹ Planners reported that the warehouse area was deferred primarily because they wanted to focus the first construction contracts on areas in the core of the Moosonee townsite.⁵³²

By January 1968 people living south of Store Creek were demanding equal access to local services, particularly clean drinking water and sewage services. A petition sent to the Department of Municipal Affairs used language reminiscent of Wendy Thomas' welfare report in 1963. Petitioners stated, "Not only would the availability of running water ease the daily chores of the women [south of Store Creek], but [it] would be of great importance in improving the general hygiene of the community."⁵³³

Around the same time as local residents voiced their concerns to Municipal Affairs, Paul Wilkinson, a Community Development Worker from Department of Social and Family Services, started to write to his supervisors about the connections between the provision of water and sewer services and the high cost of building lots. Wilkinson indicated that some residents "would like to have running water so that their children might take a bath occasionally."⁵³⁴ Although he focused on living conditions such as water, sewer and housing, Wilkinson was also one of the few people to document the systems' dynamics related to provision of water and sewer services,

531 AO, RG 19-77 B354517. File 118.5 Moosonee 1967-68. E.R. Butcher, Imperial Oil Ltd and petitioners to Minister Spooner, 7 August 1967.

532 File 118.5 Moosonee 1967-68. Don Taylor to Minister Spooner, re: "Moosonee – Servicing," 30 August 1967. Also see Claudia Milne, Master's Thesis 1974. The maps in this thesis show that the Revillon Road industrial area received water services and hydrants by 1974, but not sewer services.

533 AO, RG 19-F-7, B350920. General Admin. Moosonee Development Board, Petition to Don Taylor, 17 January 1968.

534 AO, File 118.5 Moosonee 1967-68, P. Wilkinson, Department of Social and Family Services (DSFS) to E. V. Ralph, Indian Development Branch, DSFS, 15 December 1967. Over time, Wilkinson started to copy the local MPP Rene Brunelle and even opposition MPPs. It would have been, and still is, extremely uncommon for a provincial civil servant to write to, or to copy, an elected representative of the provincial government, but this practice shows the frustration Wilkinson had with the slow pace of change in the Village area of Moosonee.

housing and local employment. He described the high cost of lots within the Moosonee townsite due to the provision of sewer and water and how people felt about this situation:

Those who own lots on the south side of the creek ... feel they are being discriminated against since they are in effect being told that if they want services they must move across the creek and pay \$2,000 to \$3,000 for a lot which was worth no more than their own until a bureaucratic decision was made to service only the lots on the north side of the creek.⁵³⁵

Wilkinson also indicated that those local residents who were fully employed, including “men who worked for the RCAF base, Hudson’s Bay Company or the Ontario Northland Railway,” could buy vacant lots in town and receive financial assistance from the Indian Affairs Branch for the lot and for the cost of building a home. Wilkinson referred to the employed men as a “small but fortunate group.”⁵³⁶ In essence Wilkinson was showing the connection between employment opportunities, servicing of lots and inflated costs for building lots. He was demonstrating that the average vacant lot had been pushed out of the price range of many local residents because such lots were now fully serviced. A fifth contract was finally authorized later in 1968 to provide services south of Store Creek and in the industrial warehouse area, followed by a sixth contract to construct a new bridge across Store Creek.⁵³⁷ It is very doubtful if these last two contracts would have been signed without the lobbying done by local citizens and by individuals like Paul Wilkinson.

In particular, the Village area presented complex servicing and construction issues. The main problem was that the placement of sewer and water pipes required houses to be located on

535 File 118.5, Moosonee 1967-68, Wilkinson to Don Taylor, 29 December 1967.

536 Ibid. It is not clear if Wilkinson is referring to the provincial or federal “Indian Affairs Branch.”

⁵³⁷ AO, File 119.4 Moosonee 1969. Department of Municipal Affairs. “Report to the Treasury Board: Moosonee.” Also see File 119.1 Moosonee 1968. McKeough to Brunelle, 26 August 1968. The OWRC Annual Report for 1969 states “due to the failure of the banks of the creek as a result of the contractor’s operations, the project was not completed. Alternative means of crossing the creek are being investigated.” By July 1969 the existing old Store Creek bridge was temporarily replaced by a Bailey Bridge loaned by Department of Transport. See Hewson to McKeough, 14 July 1970 in AO, “Minister’s Tour-Moosonee 1970.”

standard lots and relatively straight roads, which was certainly not the case for a large number of these houses. This issue was actually addressed by the Moosonee Development Area Board (MDAB) shortly after it was formed in 1968. In order to move beyond a problem which seemed unsolvable, the MDAB's members indicated they would encourage Village residents to move their homes onto regular lots in order to speed up the construction of improvements to this area. The Board expressed these opinions within two days of taking office.⁵³⁸ Furthermore, the MDAB indicated that it would pay for the demolition of some shacks, provide compensation to owners, and also provide them with building lots where this was absolutely necessary.⁵³⁹

The problem of extending the infrastructure was exacerbated by the fact that the provision of water and sewer services required the installation of private plumbing within a large number of homes that did not yet have such facilities.⁵⁴⁰ In other words, contractors were constructing expensive pipes coming from the water plant, and other pipes leading to the sewage plant, but people could not afford to construct inside plumbing in their homes that could connect to these systems. The members of the MDAB recommended that, rather than waiting for people to renovate their homes with conventional plumbing and then extend pipes through neighbourhoods, it made sense to construct the water and sewer pipes first, thus encouraging residents to "improve their housing."⁵⁴¹ Provincial planners were initially aghast at the concept

⁵³⁸ AO, RG19-77 B354517. File 119.2 Moosonee 1968. F. A. Braybrook to Deputy Minister Palmer, re: "Report on the Organization of the Moosonee Development Area Board – Current Administrative and Other Matters Affecting the Board" 9 September 1968. Although the report was dated September 9th, Braybrook wrote that he toured the Village, with the new MDAB members, on August 30th, two days after their inaugural meeting. Board members told Braybrook they wanted immediate action on services for the Village.

⁵³⁹ File 119.2 Moosonee 1968. G. C. Hewson, Supervisor, Department of Municipal Affairs to F. A. Braybrook, 3 October 1968.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ AO, File 119.2 Moosonee 1968. M. Balas, Community Planner to M. H. Sinclair, Head, Research and Special Studies re: "Visit to Moosonee on August 28-29 and 30, 1968," 5 September 1968.

of using public money to move or replace shacks, but they eventually agreed to support the MDAB's more proactive approach.⁵⁴²

This interaction between the town's Board and provincial planners was one of the first times that the planners and the local infrastructure plans seem to have been informed by local people. Once started, this process of local input to influence policy implementation continued to be part of the MDAB's management role. To illustrate, in a "Moosonee Brief to Cabinet" document from 1975, the MDAB indicated that the province needed to assist with the completion of water and sewer servicing on certain streets south of Store Creek which had not been part of the initial infrastructure works. The MDAB also described the essence of this area and how population and services were linked:

The surveyed lots ... are presently without water and sewer services...The lack of sewage [pipes] require that there be out-houses. This situation was acceptable when the population was small but as families move in, the sanitation problem becomes more serious...Originally the idea of having a supply of low cost lots ...was thought to be good policy during the transition period from a shack situation to fully serviced modern homes. It now is considered to be wise to upgrade these lots [with services].⁵⁴³

This section of the MDAB's submission to Cabinet recognized that the area south of Store Creek had changed over the past dozen years, but that it had a long way to go before servicing issues would be fully corrected. It also demonstrated that Council fully understood the environmental and health changes that took place in Moosonee as the population grew.

The provision of electrical power was integrally related to the operation of water and sewer infrastructure. The town was assisted by the RCAF in terms of generating the electrical power needed to operate its sewage treatment plant. Ironically this affected the RCAF's ability to

⁵⁴² See handwritten notes on Hewson to Braybrook, Oct.3/68 (footnote above).

⁵⁴³ AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs files, Moosonee Vol.4, "Moosonee Brief to Cabinet," *Moosetalk*, October, 1975. The original brief was not in the Ontario Archives files, but it appears that the entire brief was printed in *Moosetalk*, the local monthly newspaper.

run its own operations as described in a 20 December 1968 internal memo. The OWRC reported that, “A complaint had been received from the RCAF station ... that voltage dips were being indicated at its generating station. This suggests that a heavy electrical load is being applied momentarily ... [at] the sewage treatment plant and the Indian trade school.⁵⁴⁴ Although the OWRC did not explain the “Indian trade school” reference, another source indicates that this was the James Bay Education Centre (JBEC) since it had been advised “not to use Arc Welders and to delay starting their welding course (already in operation at the time) until sufficient power is available.”⁵⁴⁵

It was ironic that a small town’s sewage plant and a single shop class could cause power fluctuations at a Canadian military base. The OWRC also confirmed that, whenever the RCAF’s power generating plant was down, there was no power to the OWRC’s sewage plant. In other words, the RCAF had become an integral service provider to the town. This situation was not to last. Shortly after its first memo on voltage dips in December 1968, the RCAF advised the ONR that it could not increase its supply of electricity, and furthermore that it wanted to “reduce this [supply] and eventually terminate the supply of power to Moosonee.”⁵⁴⁶ Clearly Moosonee

⁵⁴⁴ AO, File 118.2 Moosonee 1968. J. G. Crookston, OWRC to W.A. Marshall, OWRC, 20 December 1968. Crookston also explained why the ONR would get the complaint and not the town of Moosonee. He said “The ONR purchase power from the RCAF for distribution in Moosonee when the ONR generating plant cannot handle the load.”

⁵⁴⁵ AO, RG 19-77 B354517. File 119.4 Moosonee 1969. Dick Knowles, President, James Bay Chamber of Commerce to Robert Boyer, Vice-Chairman, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, 13 June 1969. Dick Knowles from the James Bay Chamber of Commerce indicated that the welding class at JBEC would have to be delayed due to the RCAF issues with power fluctuations.

⁵⁴⁶ A5, File 119.3 Moosonee 1969. J.G.Crookston, OWRC to K. Shattuck, OWRC, “Sewage and water works – Moosonee Power Generation,” 10 March 1969. In this internal memo, Crookston also indicated the amount of power being produced and the costs that were being charged. He said that “the RCAF supplied 325 KW (kilowatt) in [for] Moosonee and their own station, 200 KW.” He also said that the RCAF charged the ONR 5.0 cents per KWH (kilowatt hour) for the power and that the ONR then billed the OWRC 7.0 cents per KWH for power for the water and sewer plants. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this material further but it is important to note that the RCAF station appeared to have been generating well over the amount of electrical power that it needed and that the ONR was making a profit on the transfer of energy to another provincial government department (i.e. from ONR to OWRC).

would need another source of power in order to supply clean water, sewage treatment, and JBEC's training needs.

The provincial government approved the construction of an electrical transmission line from Cochrane to Moosonee and Moose Factory in 1974, the year before the closure of the radar base was announced.⁵⁴⁷ The *Globe and Mail* reported that the two communities were connected to the provincial power grid on 4 February 1976; however, the *Timmins Daily Press* indicated that there was an emergency connection to Moosonee by November 1975.⁵⁴⁸ The Timmins paper also reported that "Failure of diesel generators had created an urgency to supply Moosonee with electricity from the grid on Nov.12 [1975]." Although the news article did not mention the RCAF, the "failure of diesel generators" would have been a reference to the base's closure and to the fact that RCAF personnel no longer managed the production of electricity for the area from their generators.⁵⁴⁹ An Ontario Cabinet submission had emphasized Moosonee's potential energy crisis by stating that "the supply of power to the base and community must be ensured [after the radar base closes and] until Ontario Hydro's line supply is available in November."⁵⁵⁰ The discussion of the connection between electrical power and the base's closure will be discussed further in Chapter Nine.

547 AO, RG1-121, B207227. Cabinet Submission by Ministry of Energy, 2 August 1974. File "Lands-Status Report to the CCRD [Cabinet Committee on Resource Development] on the Moosonee Area."

548 AO, RG 68-9, B503347. Northern Affairs Files, Moosonee Vol.4., "New Source of Power for Moosonee Region," *Timmins Daily Press* January 10, 1976. "Moosonee Formally Linked With Hydro Grid," *Globe and Mail*, February 5, 1976. ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The Globe and Mail, accessed May 3, 2015.

549 LAC, RG 24-G-16-1, File 1090-1, Volume 23533. "Moosonee Board of Inquiry: 1969-1972." Several years before the closure of the base, an RCAF Board of Inquiry had recommended that the Moosonee diesel generators be replaced. This was due to a small explosion in the power plant during September 1972.

550 AO, RG1-121, B207227. "Lands-Status Report to the CCRD [Cabinet Committee on Resources Development] on the Moosonee Area, June 25, 1975.

Fire Protection Services

Fire protection was also directly connected to the provision of water services to the community, both in the village and in the main Moosonee townsite. In August 1960, a *Toronto Daily Star* reporter described the impact of a fire at Moosonee on a young Cree boy who was then at Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children. He said "Home would still be a tent but the tent that Walter lived in in January, in the middle of a James Bay winter, was destroyed by a sudden fire that killed his grandmother and burned the little boy."⁵⁵¹ The reporter was referring to a fire in the area known as the Indian Village. Three years later, a *Globe and Mail* article titled "2 Children Die at Shack Fire in Moosonee," highlighted the ongoing problems with firefighting, or lack thereof, in Moosonee.⁵⁵² In this case the article referred to a connection with the radar base, "The Royal Canadian Air Force fire department from the base a mile north of Moosonee rushed to the scene, but bystanders said the flames destroyed the shack in a few minutes, prior to the arrival of the firemen."⁵⁵³

The first mention of a technical issue related to fire protection in the Moosonee area was contained in an OWRC report from June 1963. C.H. Kretch described why the water system in Moosonee would be inadequate to fight fires. He said:

It is noted that the distribution system has been gradually extended as required resulting in pipe sizes ranging from 4 inches to 1 and a half inches in diameter. Normally a 6 inch diameter pipe is considered the minimum size to meet domestic and firefighting requirements. [Moosonee's] water system satisfies domestic requirements only.⁵⁵⁴

551 AO, RG9-1, B113127. Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee. "Place of Hidden Beauty: Moosonee's Worth Impresses Those With the Right Eyes," Nigel Dunn, *Toronto Daily Star*, August 11, 1960. This article describes the range of images of Moosonee; that is, the town as seen by tourists and by residents.

552 "2 Children Die in Shack Fire At Moosonee," *Globe and Mail*, December 12, 1963, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The Globe and Mail, accessed May 2, 2015

553 Ibid. The RCAF Annual Historical Report for 1963 does not report this incident, possibly because the firemen arrived too late to actually fight the fire.

554 See Kretch Report, OWRC, Kretch. June 19th, 1963 earlier in this chapter.

Possibly due to the severity of sewage pollution issues in Kretch's report, there seemed to be little attention paid to his comments on fire protection. An engineering report in 1966 by the Sutcliffe Company informed the understanding of fire issues by explaining that the amount of water in storage in the water tank was also a significant limiting factor in fighting fires. The report showed that the existing water tank held only 50,000 gallons of water for both domestic and firefighting purposes. The engineers indicated that 60,000 gallons of water could be used up by two fire hoses over a period of only two hours. As a result, they recommended almost doubling the town's water storage capacity.⁵⁵⁵ There is no indication that Moosonee's residents were aware of Sutcliffe's report or that they knew they were at risk of major fires.

Between 1964 and 1968, the townsite and village began to rely on the RCAF for fire protection and did not form its own fire department. The RCAF's AHRs have a number of references to assisting with fires in the adjacent community.⁵⁵⁶ These show that the RCAF's firemen responded to both residential and industrial fires, and that they fought fires in both the town itself and in the Indian Village. This demonstrates that the town had no ability to fight fires on its own and that it was developing a reliance on the RCAF for the protection of homes and commercial properties.

555 AO, File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Sutcliffe Company, "Townsite of Moosonee Supplementary Report for Water, Sewage, Storm Sewers and Road Construction," 7 March 1966, 6. The Sutcliffe engineers also noted that 31,000 gallons of water was needed every four hours for domestic purposes. Their report recommended adding underground storage of 41,000 gallons to supplement the ONR water tank stores of 50,000.

556 DHH, Annual Historical Report (AHR) 1964. September 22, 1964: "Firemen were called downtown for fire at David Wynne's General Store – Nil Casualties," and December 21, 1964: "Firemen were called at 1930 hrs to assist Austin Airways in putting out fire in Norseman Aircraft." And AHR 1965: July 30, 1965: "Firemen were called downtown to a house fire in the Indian Village – Building complete loss however no injuries. In this case it appears that the RCAF firefighters were in the Village even though they initially mention "downtown." August 4, 1965: "Firemen were called downtown to Moosonee to assist with a fire on a Hudson Bay Company Freighter." September 17, 1965: "Firemen were called to the town of Moosonee to assist in a fire in an unoccupied tar paper shack in the Indian Village. Building completely destroyed

Not all of the RCAF's firefighting efforts were successful. Petitioners, trying to get piped water for the Indian Village, had written that water was urgently needed for fire protection. They described the following incident related to a fire emergency:

Perhaps water is most desperately needed in connection with fire protection...we may illustrate the present lack of protection by citing an example from last winter [1967]. When the fire alarm was given, the fire truck from the RCAF Base rushed to the scene but became stuck in the deep snow of the unplowed street (Gardiner Road). In order to extricate the truck the whole 500 gallons of water had to be poured out on the ground. Consequently when the firemen reached the scene of the fire, nothing remained but ashes.⁵⁵⁷

Shortly after this incident, the RCAF started to reconsider fire coverage for the Indian Village. The main issue for withholding fire services was not the lack of snow plowing in the Village but the fact that concerns were growing about the apparent unstable nature of the bridge crossing Store Creek. Captain Smart of the RCAF described the situation:

While it is not a Department of National Defence responsibility to provide fire services south of Store Creek in the village at Moosonee, it has been the practice of the Fire Department at CFS Moosonee to answer fire calls in this area. ...Recently the question arose as to the structural adequacy of the bridge across Store Creek that the Fire Truck must use enroute to fire calls ...A structural analysis was carried out ... [and] It was concluded that there is no logical base for assuming the bridge is safe for the passage of the fire truck.⁵⁵⁸

Dick Knowles, the President of the James Bay Chamber of Commerce, sent letters in 1968 to Ministers Darcy McKeough and Rene Brunelle asking for action to fix the Store Creek bridge.⁵⁵⁹ Knowles also asked for an emergency water supply if the bridge could not be repaired.

⁵⁵⁷ AO, RG 19-F-7, B350920. General Admin. Moosonee Development Board, Petition to Don Taylor, Municipal Affairs, 17 January 1968.

⁵⁵⁸ AO, File 118.7 Moosonee 1968. Captain S. E. Smart, RCAF to P. Wilkinson, Dept. of Social and Family Services, 27 March 1968.

⁵⁵⁹ AO, RG 19-6-1, B269790. File: Cochrane District, Moosonee Townsite. Dick Knowles, President, James Bay Chamber of Commerce to Minister Darcy McKeough, 11 March 1968. Also see AO, File 118.7 Moosonee 1968. Knowles to Minister Rene Brunelle, 1 May 1968.

In one of his letters Knowles stated “It would be unfortunate if a major fire and tragedy developed and repairs to the bridge could have prevented it.”⁵⁶⁰

At the time of Knowles’ letters, the Moosonee Development Area Board Act (MDAB Act) had been passed (in June 1966), but not enacted. This Act included a provision authorizing the MDAB to provide fire protection services. A further withdrawal of fire services by the RCAF appears to have forced the proclamation of the MDAB Act. The RCAF indicated in June 1968 that starting in September its fire fighters would not be authorized to go beyond the perimeter of the base. Paul Wilkinson of Social and Family Services wrote for help to Department of Municipal Affairs and stated:

I have been recently informed of an impending cut-back of firefighters at the Canadian Forces radar base... townspeople have relied upon the base to provide emergency services. After September 1, 1968 the base ... [will] retain only a skeleton crew of professional firefighters who will not be allowed to leave the perimeter of the base.⁵⁶¹

The need for water and sewer services had caused the passage of the MDAB Act; now the RCAF’s withdrawal of fire services forced the proclamation of that Act. On 19 August 1968, the Moosonee Development Area Board Act was proclaimed and the inaugural meeting of the newly appointed board took place on 28 August.⁵⁶² The anticipated September withdrawal of RCAF fire services also seemed to provide the final impetus for construction of water and sewer services to the area south of Store Creek. Two contracts, initiated in the fall of 1968, finally dealt

560 AO, File Cochrane District, Moosonee Townsite. Knowles to McKeough, 17 April 1968.

561 AO, File 118.7 Moosonee 1968, Paul Wilkinson, Department of Social and Family Services to A. T. Butler, Department of Municipal Affairs, 7 June 1968.

562 AO, RG19-20-1, B233000, Microfiche 25.11, “Moosonee Incorporation History,” This file included the Proclamation of the MDAB Act (19 August 1968), published in *The Ontario Gazette*, 24 August 1968. Also see RG 19-47-1, B269789 “Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite Gen.” The agenda for the inaugural meeting was in this file.

with extending water to this area and the construction of a new crossing over Store Creek.⁵⁶³

Without these contracts, water to fight fires and a bridge for fire trucks made firefighting impossible.

Lobbying by local people forced the issues of clean water and fire protection to be heard, but it was the reliance on another body – the RCAF – which helped people become accustomed to some element of protection from fire. After this dependence began, people demanded that proper services be maintained and it is likely that the provincial government felt it could no longer hold back on creating a formal local government structure.

Although fire services had been achieved as a legislative right, the community did not immediately enjoy fire protection and in fact, provincial advisors continued to rely on the RCAF to help out in this area. In his summary of community projects in September 1968, F. A.

Braybrook wrote:

The present lack of adequate fire protection services is serious. We have advised the Board, and they have agree, to see a fire protection services survey from the Ontario Fire Marshal's Office immediately as a basis for the innovation of an adequate service. In the meantime we can only hope that no serious outbreaks occur and that whatever services might be made available by the Defence Establishment (R.C.A.F.) and Lands and Forests will suffice.⁵⁶⁴

Local people could not wait for a fire study to resolve their concerns. When Ministers William Davis and Rene Brunelle arrived in June 1969 to open the James Bay Education Centre (JBEC), they were met by picketers who demanded better fire protection for the Village. Protestors told Davis and Brunelle that “Moosonee firemen will not respond to fires” in the Village. A *Toronto*

⁵⁶³ Ontario, Sessional Papers, OWRC Annual Report, 1969. See Appendix Five for contracts 5 and 6 which included the extension of water and sewer to the Village area and the construction of a causeway to this area (so that fire trucks could cross the creek.)

⁵⁶⁴ AO, File 119.2 Moosonee 1968. F. A. Braybrook, Department of Municipal Affairs to Deputy Minister Palmer, 9 September 1968.

Star reporter recorded protestors stating that “no fire truck will cross the rickety wooden bridge” and that “three children have died in fires recently because of the lack of fire protection.”⁵⁶⁵ The response to the picketers was that “a new bridge is being built which will enable the Moosonee truck to cross the creek.”⁵⁶⁶ Ministers Davis and Brunelle, who had likely been looking forward to a celebration of government largesse, were left with problems to fix rather than enjoy a day of praise. Less than two years later Davis was the Premier of Ontario and he eventually was the person who oversaw the devolution of the RCAF base to the Moosonee Development Area Board.

The situation was urgent in the Indian Village, but it was likely the town’s largest fire which caught everyone’s attention. In July 1969 the *Timmins Daily Press* was about to publish an article on the history of Moosonee’s Catholic Hospital when it burned down. The article, entitled “Assumption Hospital is 27 Years Old” included a short sentence at the beginning which read, “As this edition was being prepared, fire destroyed the hospital.”⁵⁶⁷ Interviewees indicated that they ran out of water while trying to fight the blaze.⁵⁶⁸ They also mentioned that Lands and Forest staff tried to pump water from Store Creek to help fight the blaze but they were too late to save the totally engulfed wooden structure. Ironically, the Assumption Hospital had been hooked up to a new six inch water line by February 1969, some months before the fire.⁵⁶⁹ However, it is

565 AO, RG 29-01-1481, B430939. File: Indians-Moosonee, 1967-70. This file contained the following news clip: Anne Moon, “‘Keep Moosonee Clean’ but nobody collects the Indians’ garbage,” *Toronto Star*, June 16, 1969. The newspaper article focused on the lack of services south of Store Creek in the Village.

566 Rudy Platiel, “Teachers, Indians picket Davis, Brunelle in Moosonee,” *Globe and Mail*, page 9, June 16, 1969.

567 Tom Butkovich, “Assumption: Hospital is 27 Years Old,” *Timmins Daily Press*, July 17, 1969. (also printed in *Moosetalk*).

568 Interviews, 2013 and 2014.

569 AO, RG 19-77 B354517. File 119.3 Moosonee 1969. Report on “Properties Connected to Services in Moosonee, Feb.1969.” It is not clear who prepared this table but it was likely Sutcliffe Company, the engineering firm which supervised the water and sewer installations.

not clear if the water line was still connected to the inadequately sized ONR water tower or to the new water system, which had been operating since August 1968.

The RCAF also served a role as dramatic fires, likely caused by arson, continued to occur in Moosonee. Social Services staff reported that a week after the hospital blaze “the Moosonee Development office was destroyed by fire. Shortly after, on the same evening [July 16], the Lions Club Centre was also partially destroyed. Arson is suspected.”⁵⁷⁰ Minister Darcy McKeough wrote to Major Misener, the Commanding Officer at the base, on 10 September 1969 and thanked him for the assistance of his personnel during “recent unfortunate fires.”⁵⁷¹

In August 1969 Moosonee appointed its first Fire Chief – Joseph Crawford – who began to organize the volunteer fire department and to purchase firefighting vehicles and equipment.⁵⁷² Ironically, it was the closure of a northerly Pinetree radar site that helped the town supplement its equipment needs. G.C.Hewson’s summary in 1970 of Moosonee’s issues indicated that “Necessary firefighting equipment has either been purchased or acquired from the former military base at Pagwa.”⁵⁷³ Hewson also noted that the town’s fire department, made up of 20 volunteers by July 1970, purchased a used fire truck from the City of Kitchener.⁵⁷⁴

The town was beginning to create its own services, but it would be some time before it achieved recognition for its growing independence. A medical inspector for the RCAF

570 AO, RG 29-01-1481, B430939. File: Indians-Moosonee, 1967-70. W. Welldon to M. Borczak, Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Social and Family Services. 24 July 1969.

571 AO, RG 19-6-1, File 19-47-1, B269879. “Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite Gen.” Minister Darcy McKeough, Department of Municipal Affairs to Major Misener, RCAF, 10 September 1979.

572 Ontario, Sessional Paper, Department of Municipal Affairs Annual Report for 1969, p.36. and AO, RG 19-6-1, File 19-47-1, B269879. “Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite Gen.,” Darcy McKeough, Minister of Municipal Affairs to Rene Brunelle, Minister of Lands and Forests. 7 October 1969.

573 AO, RG19-6-5, B269883. File “Minister’s Tour-Moosonee 1970.” G. C. Hewson to McKeough, 14 July 1970. Note: The Pagwa Pinetree base, near Hearst, Ontario had closed in October, 1966 (source CFMAD file 2002.35.2, Historical Files-Pagwa).

574 Ibid.

commented on the level of cooperation shown during community fires in his inspection of the Moosonee base in November 1970. Surgeon Commander Kierstead implied that the fire department in the town was inadequate. He wrote that “ the [RCAF base] fire fighters are a very keen group who realize they cannot count on help from the village but, on the other hand, are usually called on to help them in an emergency.”⁵⁷⁵ It appears that Kierstead did not realize that some of the base’s fire fighters were civilians who lived in the adjacent town. This aspect of the situation was confirmed by interviewees who said that firefighting was part of the employment requirement for certain civilian jobs.⁵⁷⁶ What this means is that civilian employees at the base actually helped out in emergencies, however, they were not recognized as local townspeople. This demonstrates that, on occasion, Moosonee was seen as totally dependent on the RCAF, even as it was striving to provide its own services.

Garbage and Landfill Services

Garbage disposal was the only local service that was shared by the RCAF and Moosonee throughout the life of the base. The garbage and landfill situation, just prior to the radar base opening, was described by a Department of Health employee. W. H. Oerton noted in June 1961 that “At Moosonee there is an established dump but no collection. The dump is poorly located well within the townsite and with indifferent maintenance.”⁵⁷⁷ C. H. Kretch of OWRC elaborated on this situation in 1963 when he stated that, “The result was a large untidy refuse disposal area where dogs and wild animals could forage.”⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁵ DHH File 72-345, “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972,” Report to file by E .R. Keirstead, Surgeon Commander, DND on October 1970 visit to Moosonee, 2 November 1970.

⁵⁷⁶ Interviews 2013-14.

⁵⁷⁷ W.H.Oerton, Department of Health report, June 23, 1961. This report is also discussed earlier in this chapter.

⁵⁷⁸ Kretch, OWRC, June 18-19, 1963, page 4. This report is discussed earlier in this chapter.

Before the RCAF base was built, the garbage dump would have been considered on the “outskirts” of the Moosonee townsite because it was located at the northeast corner of the town. The RCAF base was built just north of the garbage dump such that the garbage dump was now in the centre of the community.⁵⁷⁹ Both local townsite property owners and the RCAF used the dump, making it in effect, the most integrated part of the townsite and the base. In 1963, Department of Public Welfare staff referred briefly to the dump and to a private system of garbage collection in a report on the town.⁵⁸⁰ This was the only reference to any system of garbage collection.

Once the radar base was fully established, the RCAF became involved in the operation of the landfill. W.G. Cooke, from the Department of Health, wrote to the ONR in September 1964 (three years after the base opened) requesting that the ONR and RCAF jointly care for the dump. He said:

The RCAF have used their heavy machinery to try to keep the site in an orderly condition but [they] lack a suitable plan. Control over scavenging and persons using the site is essential.

We have attached a rough plan for maintenance of the disposal site. This is based on the ONR constructing a short fence along two sides of the site and a gate at the entrance, the RCAF constructing a suitable access road in the centre of the site, burying refuse once a week ... and a caretaker ... to control dumping and burning and to prevent scavenging.⁵⁸¹

By 1970, local residents were complaining that the town dump needed to be fenced.⁵⁸² One person mentioned at a public meeting that some children were combining “tag-ends of liquor in bottles found in the dump” and further, that the bottles had been “thrown away from the (Air

⁵⁷⁹ AO, RG 19-77 B354517. File 119.3 Moosonee 1969. Don Taylor to S. Buszynski, OWRC. 12 February 1969. This file contains a map that shows the town dump just to the south of the RCAF base and north of the town.

⁵⁸⁰ Wendy Thomas report, 1963, p.9. This report is also discussed earlier in this chapter.

⁵⁸¹ AO, File 118.1 Moosonee 1964. W. G. Cooke, Department of Health to J. S. Cooper, Chief Engineer, ONR, 3 September 1964. The maintenance plan was not attached to this correspondence.

⁵⁸² AO, RG 8-5, B229086. “Indians-Moosonee Meetings 1966-1972, Memorandum from George Mortimore, Research Consultant, to Deputy Minister Warren, Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, Report on “Meetings in Moosonee,” 4 September 1970.

Force) base.”⁵⁸³ Later that same year the dump was closed and a new garbage dump was established “on land leased from the Crown outside the developed area.”⁵⁸⁴ Nine years after the base opened, the landfill shared by the town and the RCAF was finally relocated south of the town.

The planning for the radar base should have included the issue of garbage disposal. Instead, it appears that the RCAF base dealt with some public services but not with all of them. In Moosonee’s case, the base dealt with its own sewage treatment, and assisted with the care of the local dump, but there is no evidence of advance planning for waste management. However, the management of garbage was still better than what researchers have described for more northerly DEW line bases. To illustrate, R. A. Cheever, a construction superintendent at DEW sites, wrote “Sanitary and waste disposal was accomplished across DEW using oil drums hauled away to a dump or out on the ice to be lost in the breakup.”⁵⁸⁵ Arthur Johnson has suggested that “personnel at many [DEW] sites buried garbage all over the place” and that there were huge numbers of abandoned fuel drums left at or near radar bases.⁵⁸⁶ Johnson quoted one of the DEW remediation managers as stating that \$583 million had been spent by 2007 on remediation of DEW sites.⁵⁸⁷ Additionally, some scientists have focused on environmental contamination at former Mid-Canada Line radar sites.⁵⁸⁸ For example, McCreanor et al examined Polychlorinated

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ AO, “Minister’s Tour-Moosonee 1970,” Hewson to McKeough, 14 July 1970.

⁵⁸⁵ R.A. Cheever, “Construction on the DEW Line,” *Engineering and Contract Record* (1957), 197.

⁵⁸⁶ Arthur Johnson, “Cold War Cleanup: Undoing the DEW Line,” *Canadian Geographic* (March/April, 2007), 62 and 72.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ McCreanor et al., “The Use of Leeches and Logit Log-Linear Contingency Models to Assess and Monitor Aquatic PCB Contamination Originating from Mid-Canada Radar Line Site 050,” *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment* 140 (2008): 211-222. Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) staff were extensively involved in remediation of MCL sites. Mr. Mike Cartan, the MNR Manager of Mid-Canada Line remediation for Ontario, provided a thorough overview of this work at a Laurentian University lecture on 9 March 2011.

Biphenyl (PCB) levels at MCL's Site 050 which is adjacent to Fort Albany on James Bay.⁵⁸⁹

Comments from Cheever, Johnson, and McCreanor et al. show that waste disposal, particularly of hazardous products, was a missing element in the planning for Canadian radar bases.

Other sources demonstrate that this lack of concern for environmental and health issues was a continuance of practices initiated during the Second World War. That is, military construction in both Canada and Newfoundland caused serious water, sewage and garbage problems. Shelagh Grant writes that during the construction in 1942 of the Alaska Highway there were significant water, sewage and sanitation issues in both Whitehorse and Dawson Creek.⁵⁹⁰ Steven High describes polluted wells, tar paper shacks, and horrendous sewage and garbage circumstances in Stephenville, Newfoundland, during the Second World War. These health and environmental impacts were generated by the construction and operation of American Air Force facilities there between 1941 and 1946.⁵⁹¹ P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish refer to the environmental impact of both Second World War and Cold War military activity in the Canadian North as a "toxic legacy" which impacted both land and water.⁵⁹² Land use and environmental planning were missing in both Cold War and Second World War military projects and this lack of planning and due diligence caused damage to pre-existing communities.

⁵⁸⁹ See Appendix One for a map of western James Bay communities.

⁵⁹⁰ Shelagh Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1988), 80. Dawson Creek was the southerly starting point for the Alaska Highway and Whitehorse was a focal point due to its huge construction camps during 1942.

⁵⁹¹ Steven High, *Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940-1967* (New York: Palgrave-McMillan, 2009). The chapter titled "The American Occupation of Stephenville, Newfoundland" provides detailed descriptions of the clearing of neighbourhoods to make way for airport runways and the serious health hazards caused by lack of controls on water, sewage and garbage.

⁵⁹²P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish. "The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern Environment," *Environmental History* 12 (October, 2007), 941.

Conclusion and Comments

There were numerous complications throughout the construction phase of Moosonee's water and sewer systems. Most of the issues faced were not ones that had to be dealt with at the RCAF base. The radar base was built on a 'blank space', an undeveloped landscape and there was no question of who should pay for its services. There was no need to move houses or straighten roads in order to lay down water and sewer pipes. The base represented a planned community and the associated water and sewer services were constructed for slightly less than one million dollars. The one feature that was missing from military planning was the dump or landfill. Moosonee, on the other hand, exemplified the construction issues that need to be faced when there is an almost total lack of planning, or "intelligent forethought," as coined by Don Taylor in 1959.⁵⁹³ The agency in control of the Town of Moosonee and the Village—the ONR—was in the development and land sale business, not in the future vision and services business. This caused extensive problems for Moosonee as it grew due to the development of its military base. Issues included moving houses back from streets where they had encroached on roadways, deciding who should pay for services and how much should be charged, and dealing with spillage from existing septic tanks during installation of new water and sewer lines. Due to the huge expense of building the town's systems, the province had to provide special funding to Moosonee for its water and sewer operations and for other administrative costs from 1968 until the present.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹³See discussion on planning for the base in Chapter Five.

⁵⁹⁴I administered these funds from 1993 until 2006 as Moosonee's Municipal Advisor with Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH) in Sudbury, Ontario. Moosonee is the only Ontario municipality to receive its operating funds directly from MMAH. Other municipalities receive funding through set annual allocations from Ministry of Finance.

Many of the people who lobbied for the provision of proper local services were civilian employees of the RCAF or their spouses. These employees, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous workers, helped construct and maintain water and sewer services in Moosonee. They saw, on a daily basis, the running water, flush toilets, and water and sewer plants on the base. They knew that adequate services were achievable, and they insisted that such services be made available to them – whether they lived in the main townsite or south of Store Creek. Ultimately, after the radar base closed, local people who had been trained to operate the RCAF's water and sewer plants took them over and also operated the new Moosonee townsite's plants. The town thus gained trained environmental services workers because the RCAF had hired and trained local civilians on these systems.

In conclusion, the construction of the radar base caused population growth and created the dire need for the provision of environmental infrastructure. Local people demanded that this infrastructure be built for everyone. The next chapter will discuss how demands for better services and gradual local empowerment eventually led to local governance.

Chapter Eight: “We are willing to stand on our own two feet”: The Evolution of Local Government in Moosonee

This chapter describes how it took a full decade from the first mention in 1958 of turning Moosonee into a municipality to its proclamation as a Development Area Board in 1968. The chapter also discusses how local people influenced the development of local governance in their community. This is significant, because as R. G. Ironside states, “historically most [northern] settlement has been top-down in initiation and development.”⁵⁹⁵ This chapter describes the ways Moosonee’s residents pushed for a new approach – one that was grassroots or community-based. The new approach was resisted initially by those who preferred the more typical top-down or government-led process. However, Moosonee’s residents persisted in their demands for more involvement in local governance.

Early Requests for Municipal Organization

In March 1955, the Ontario Minister of Public Works, William Griesinger, stated that “the Townsite of Moosonee ... is owned by the [ONR] Commission.” He indicated that one of the ONR Commissioners, Reg Aubert, was paid an extra \$2,000 annually to perform services such as “looking after the Townsite ... and supervising the building of streets and tourist accommodation there.”⁵⁹⁶

Ontario’s provincial staff met as early as October 1958 to discuss the potential for converting Moosonee from a rail town into a municipality. However, staff memos indicate that the Department of Municipal Affairs was hesitant to proceed until after development, such as the

⁵⁹⁵ R. G. Ironside, “Canadian Northern Settlements: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences,” *Geografiska Annaler* (82), no. 2 (2000): 112.

⁵⁹⁶ Ontario, Journals of the Legislative Assembly, March 30, 1955, p.134. Underline mine.

RCAF base, occurred. Specifically, Deputy Minister J. Carter stated that “he would rather not see a municipality established until the initial development and servicing work had been finalized.”

⁵⁹⁷ Other notes show that staff initially focused on problems and issues rather than how to organize local government structure. For example, Director Nash of the Department of Planning and Development emphasized that “We are most interested in developing a satisfactory solution to the problems which will arise in the Moosonee area from the introduction of the military installation.”⁵⁹⁸

Despite the initial push back on municipality status, provincial staff and decision-makers seemed to gain momentum from the discussion of local issues to consideration of municipal governance. Colonel Reynolds of the ONR referred to a late February 1959 meeting with Department of Planning and Development staff at which the topic of Moosonee becoming an Improvement District had been discussed.⁵⁹⁹ The following week, Minister of Planning and Development, W. M. Nickle, wrote to Premier Frost that he and two other provincial ministers were planning to meet with Colonel Reynolds “concerning the municipal status of the [Moosonee] area.”⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁷ AO, RG19-77 B388332. File 117.7 Moosonee 1958-60. Don Taylor to A. L. S. Nash, 2 March 1959.

⁵⁹⁸ AO, RG3-23-211-G, B292100. Premier Frost General Correspondence, File: ONR Railway-Construction of Airstrip Moosonee.” A. L. S. Nash, Department of Planning and Development to Air Commodore Whiting, Department of National Defence, 1 December 1958.

⁵⁹⁹ North Bay and Area Museum Archives (hereafter NBM), Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) fonds, File A-24-6, Box #16, Moose Factory Stats. and Information. Colonel Reynolds, ONR to Minister J. W. Spooner, Min. of Lands and Forests, 5 March 1959. Correspondence seems to indicate that the late February meeting was held on February 23, 1959. Also see A.E.K. Bunnell and Don Taylor Memorandum to file in AO, File 117.7 Moosonee 1958-60, 23 February 1959. Bunnell and Taylor do not refer to an Improvement District but they do indicate that they met with Col. Reynolds on Feb.23/59.

⁶⁰⁰ NBM, Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) fonds, File A-24-6, Box #16, Moose Factory Stats. and Information. Minister Nickle to Premier Frost, 2 March 1959. The three Ministers were the Minister of Planning and Development (Nickle), the Minister of Public Works (Connell) and the Minister of Municipal Affairs (Warrender).

By June 1960, the *Globe and Mail* was suggesting that Moosonee could become a “City of 25,000.”⁶⁰¹ Although speculating that Moosonee might become a major city, *Globe* reporter Ronald Anderson provided no information about potential local government structures and instead wrote exclusively about the development of a harbour. By the fall of 1960, the provincial planners were again writing about Moosonee’s concerns, in hopes of getting someone to take action. A.L.S. Nash wrote to his Deputy Minister that “the unorganized community of Moosonee has generally been a creature of the Ontario Northland Railway in that the Railway has ... owned most of the land and has wielded what little degree of supervision of development there has existed.”⁶⁰² Nash then explained that Moosonee was growing, primarily because of its new RCAF base. He also said that there was the potential for Moosonee to have a major sea port and a new airport. Nash stated that, because of these actual and projected developments, “thought should also be given now as to the most appropriate form of municipal organization and the means of gaining acceptance for it.”⁶⁰³ A few weeks later, Nash wrote to Cumming about sanitation and health concerns and stated that “rapid action [was needed] ...to establish a logical form of government in the area.”⁶⁰⁴

The implication was that Moosonee and the provincial government could not resolve local health issues without some form of governance. It was common in Ontario during the 1950s and 1960s for the provincial government to establish Improvement Districts as the “logical

⁶⁰¹ AO, RG-19-1 B113127. Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee, Ronald Anderson, “Moosonee: City of 25,000 in the Future?” *Globe and Mail*, June 13, 1960.

⁶⁰² AO, RG 19-77 B388332. File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63. A. L. S. Nash to Deputy Minister Cumming, 28 September 1960. The reference to “unorganized” means that the community was not a municipality. The term “unorganized” still has the same meaning in northern Ontario and in the *Municipal Act*. See the *Municipal Act*, Section 1(1) Definitions: “Unorganized territory” means a geographic area without municipal organization.

⁶⁰³ Ibid, Nash to Cumming.

⁶⁰⁴ AO, Moosonee 1960-63, Nash to Cumming, 8 November 1960. Sanitation and health concerns were outlined in the previous chapter of this dissertation.

form of government” where small resource-based communities experienced rapid growth but had no local authority to manage basic services.⁶⁰⁵

By 1961, local residents were ready to step in and effect change in local governance.

W.H. Oerton, a Provincial Sanitary Inspector wrote:

On June 21 I found that a public meeting had been arranged ... This group included government officials and interested persons in the community.... Everyone presented their views on ways to improve conditions in the area but it was unanimously agreed that a type of municipal organization, probably an Improvement District, was the only effective means of affecting a permanent improvement.⁶⁰⁶

One year later, Moosonee’s residents filed an application to form a local government body – an Improvement District.⁶⁰⁷ The Cochrane Board of Trade submitted Moosonee’s application to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) on 19 June 1962. The Chairman of the Cochrane Board, Mr. Dorland, indicated in the covering letter, “It is very evident that the expansion of trade in the James Bay and east coast Hudson Bay area is seriously hampered by the lack of municipal facilities at Moosonee which are restricting the growth of this townsite.”⁶⁰⁸ Although commerce would appear to be the main reason for the support of the Cochrane Board of Trade, the application itself provided a broader rationale for change. It stated that Moosonee had experienced growth and that “the building of the RCAF Radar Base has had a tremendous impact. In fact Moosonee is beginning to bulge at the seams; not with middle aged spread but

⁶⁰⁵ The sessional papers of the Ontario Department of Municipal Affairs indicated that there were 18 Improvement Districts in Ontario in 1969 (p.33). The Ontario Municipal Management Institute (OMMI) described Improvement Districts as follows: “The improvement district is a relatively recent type of local government, first authorized in 1943. It is intended to meet the needs of rapidly developing areas such as mining or pulp based communities which have not had any existing community around which to establish municipal institutions. It provides a form of local authority in the early years of settlement when there may not be any ratepayers or only one, a private or public corporation. See “*You and Your Local Government*,” (Whitby: OMMI, 1993), 16. At the time of the OMMI report, 1993, there were three Improvement Districts; Cameron, Gauthier and Matachewan, out of 830 municipalities in Ontario (p.10).

⁶⁰⁶ AO, RG-19-1 B113127. Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee. W. H. Oerton to W.G. Cooke, 23 June 1961, “Sanitary Survey-Moosonee.”

⁶⁰⁷ AO, RG 19-43 B232755. Moosonee -- Improvement District, 1962-63, L.K.W.Dorland, President, Cochrane Board of Trade to J. A. Kennedy, Chairman, Ontario Municipal Board, 19 June 1962.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

with youthful vigour.”⁶⁰⁹ It is worth noting that the RCAF base in Moosonee opened in December 1961 only six months before the formal application for Improvement District status.

The Improvement District application also included references to local services such as water and roads, which the community had quickly outgrown. Further, the report indicated that “we find raw sewage running down our open ditches,” and that health authorities had warned of the potential for epidemics such as typhoid.⁶¹⁰ This indicates that some of the town’s residents were aware of the Department of Health’s concerns but it is not clear if Village residents were as well informed.⁶¹¹ The strongest statement by the petitioners was a sentence that read, “That we are willing to stand on our own two feet and do something for ourselves is best expressed in our petition to the Municipal Board to have this area made an improvement district.”⁶¹²

Several Ontario departments and/or ministers responded to the Improvement District application.⁶¹³ Minister Spooner of the Department of Lands and Forests indicated that “Personally, I think that Colonel Reynolds and the Ontario Northland Transportation Commission should not be in the Townsite business.”⁶¹⁴ Minister Macaulay of the Department of Economics and Development concurred with his colleague and wrote “I certainly agree that we do not want the O.N.R. in the townsite business, but since the Railway owns most of the land

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ Ibid. The petition enclosed with the Improvement District application listed 36 names of local residents. It appears that most of the people who signed were residents of the townsite of Moosonee rather than the village area. Nine of the signatories provided lot numbers for property located primarily on Ferguson and Revillon Roads north of Store Creek; that is, in the original townsite area. Lot numbers were searched as part of this research using ONR maps. The goal was to understand the general location of petitioners.

⁶¹² Ibid.

⁶¹³ This was appropriate as the OMB was the decision making body but it relied on government ministries to provide background information and advice on local governance issues.

⁶¹⁴ AO, RG-19-1 B113127. Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee, Minister Spooner to Minister Macaulay, 18 June 1962, Although Spooner’s letter was written just prior to formal receipt of the Improvement District application (20 June 1962) he would have been aware of the proposal. See Dorland to Butler, 26 May 1962 in the Improvement District 1962-63 file.

in this townsite, a policy decision must be made so that the O.N.R. Commission is removed from this awkward position.” Macaulay’s reference to ‘awkward’ included the issue of “septic tanks that are draining into the roadside ditches.”⁶¹⁵ Macaulay had been briefed by his staff a few days before his memo to Minister Spooner. The Department of Economics and Development (DED) staff listed three possible responses to the Improvement District application in their briefing note. These were:

1. Do not change the “status quo” of the townsite, in which case development of Moosonee and the large frontier region it influences will be retarded.
2. Install a sewage disposal plant at government expense ...
3. Permit the establishment of local government to share in the cost of providing essential services....⁶¹⁶

The DED’s staff also noted that Moosonee had a “strategic importance as a ... shipping centre to service defence establishments in the lower Hudson Bay/James Bay Region.”⁶¹⁷ In the midst of the Cold War the issue of defence was likely on the minds of senior provincial civil servants.

The provincial government continued to have difficulty deciding what type of governance structure would be best for Moosonee, possibly because it had focused throughout the 1950s and 1960s on resource towns not defence establishments.⁶¹⁸ By the fall of 1962, the

⁶¹⁵ AO, Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee, Macaulay to Spooner, 9 July 1962.

⁶¹⁶ AO, Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee “Considerations to be made by the Ontario Department of Economics and Development for the Development of Moosonee Townsite,” report by H. F. Crown, 6 July 1962. Crown does not specify what services are ‘essential’ but the first sentence of his briefing note refers to “septic tanks which drain into the street ditches.”

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

⁶¹⁸ Ira Robinson, *New Industrial Towns on Canada’s Resource Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), Table 1 in Robinson’s text lists 19 Ontario resource towns created between 1945 and 1958. All of these towns were based on forestry, mining, or hydro-electric generation. Also see Robert Robson, “Building Resource Towns: Government Intervention in Ontario in the 1950s,” in *At the End of the Shift: Mines and Single Industry Towns in Northern Ontario*, ed. Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson (Toronto: Dundurn Press Ltd., 1992) for a discussion of the Ontario government’s focus on resource towns.

Improvement District application had been referred to the Cabinet Committee on Townsites.⁶¹⁹ Premier Robarts provided an update during a dinner at Moosonee's RCAF base. He was quoted by the *Globe and Mail* as stating that he had appointed "a special cabinet committee to study the possibility of municipal organization in this northern outpost of civilization in Ontario."⁶²⁰ The *Timmins Press* added that this was "a step forward which cannot be longer delayed. Moosonee has passed the stage of a frontier post."⁶²¹

The referral to the Townsite Committee did not speed up the process of local governance as provincial staff continued to focus on issues related to sewage management. For example, a report by the DED elaborated on sewer issues and the potential to make Moosonee into a harbour. It only briefly mentioned the Improvement District application. DED staff noted that "The Ontario Northland Transportation Commission and the residents of Moosonee are both anxious to have the townsite designated as an improvement district."⁶²² Provincial staff were accurate about the opinion of the ONTC as evidenced in an internal memo by that agency's general manager. Al Jardine wrote that, "if an improvement district is formed ...this would end our problem" -- that is, the problem of managing services in Moosonee.⁶²³ Clearly the ONR wanted to get back to its normal business patterns as railway and tourism managers. The day after Jardine mentioned Moosonee as an Improvement District, his Public Relations Department issued a news release entitled "Plan 'City Square' at Moosonee: Commission to Build Hotel and

⁶¹⁹ AO, Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee. Fred M. Cass, Minister of Municipal Affairs to Minister Macaulay, 10 September 1962.

⁶²⁰ AO, Townsite Committee Studies. John Miller, "Municipality Status Studied for Moosonee by Cabinet Committee," *Globe and Mail*, September 8, 1962.

⁶²¹ AO, RG 19-77 B388332. File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63. "Future of Moosonee: Robarts Promises Action," *Timmins Daily Press*, September 11, 1962.

⁶²² AO, Moosonee 1960-63. A. Etchen, Department of Economics and Development to Don Taylor, Department of Municipal Affairs, 16 November 1962.

⁶²³ Townsite Committee Studies. Al Jardine, General Manager, ONR to Mr. W. A. Johnston, Acting Chairman, ONR. 7 December 1962.

Museum.”⁶²⁴ The news release suggested that a new ONR hotel was “this townsite’s version of Montreal’s Place Ville Marie or New York’s Rockefeller Centre.”⁶²⁵ It also mentioned that Moosonee “was bursting at the seams” but gave no indication of serious sanitation and health issues.⁶²⁶ This demonstrates that the ONR was already hoping local governance would result in efficient local services and thus allow room for corporate growth in the near future. However, its corporate goals were about to be put into abeyance.

The Ontario Cabinet’s Committee on Townsites ruled in January 1963 that Moosonee could not become a municipality until more study had been done on the potential for it to be a major harbour.⁶²⁷ Don Taylor recommended that the ONR continue to manage the town’s services until a harbour study could be completed and that it consider forming a local advisory committee to discuss services.⁶²⁸ There is no documentation that local residents were asked for their opinions on ONR continuance as a limited townsite manager. Instead the Improvement District petitioners were advised in January 1963 that “the Ontario Municipal Board [OMB] is awaiting a detailed study of the factors affecting incorporation.”⁶²⁹

The OMB’s response was the impetus for the formation of a local lobby group. In May 1963, four months after the OMB had indicated it needed more time to research local governance, a citizen’s committee arranged to meet with Minister Spooner and Don Taylor in

⁶²⁴ Townsite Committee Studies. Len Parker, ONR Public Relations Officer, Press Release published in North Bay *Daily Nugget*, December 8, 1962.

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ Ibid.

⁶²⁷ AO, File 117.8, Moosonee 1960-63, Don Taylor to Minister Spooner, January 2, 1963.

⁶²⁸ Ibid.

⁶²⁹ AO, Moosonee - Improvement District, 1962-63. Minister Spooner, Department of Municipal Affairs to Dorland, Cochrane Board of Trade, 21 January 1963.. This memo is only ‘signed’ as “Minister,” not Minister Spooner, however, since most of the memos in this file are from the Department of Municipal Affairs, it is assumed Spooner is the Minister who responded to Dorland.

Moosonee.⁶³⁰ Based on a report by Wendy Thomas, a Welfare Development Worker, it appears that the formation of this new Committee was encouraged, if not facilitated, by the Ontario Department of Public Welfare (DPW). Thomas noted that a public meeting had been held in May “which was well attended by both Indian and non-Indian.”⁶³¹ At that meeting, a Mr. Asbury of the DPW encouraged attendees to “organize and plan” in order to improve their community.⁶³² It appears that Asbury’s message was welcome. His staff noted that:

There followed the creation of the Moosonee Townsite Development Board [MTDB]. A Treaty Indian was elected chairman by the gathered representation of the community. One Indian and one non-Indian were elected to head each of six committees to deal with the specific problems of Moosonee: Employment, Housing, Law enforcement, Health and Sanitation, Education and Recreation. . . . These elected representatives would appear to have the potential necessary to get action.⁶³³

The formation of the MTDB demonstrated that local people, whether Indigenous or non-Indigenous, intended to work together to improve their community.⁶³⁴ Although the DPW facilitated the public meeting at which the new board was formed, the notes taken by Wendy Thomas indicate that local people elected their own representatives to act on their behalf. As described later in this chapter, it would take another decade before the provincial government acknowledged local elections as a legitimate process.

⁶³⁰ AO, Moosonee 1960-63. Don Taylor to Minister Spooner, 8 July 1963. Taylor mentions in this letter that he and the Minister had “a recent meeting in Moosonee with Mr. Archibald and his Citizen’s Committee.”

⁶³¹ AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister’s Files, File: “Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66,” Report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963. There is also a reference to a “Reverend Milne and his citizen’s committee,” having a May, 1963 public meeting, however, this specific citizen’s committee is undocumented after this date.

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ AO, Moosonee 1960-63. J. P. Howard, Department of Highways (DOH) to Don Taylor, Department of Municipal Affairs, 20 May 1963. There is also a reference to a May, 1963 public meeting being “arranged by Rev. Milne and his citizens committee.” It is not clear if this group was the same one as the Moosonee Townsite Development Committee. However, a DOH employee wrote that “nothing will satisfy them [this group] short of some form of Municipal Incorporation.”

Only a month after Moosonee's citizens started to lobby for change the Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC) issued its report indicating the potential for local epidemics due to sewage issues. This report has already been covered in the preceding chapter, but it is necessary to emphasize that the OWRC felt local problems were difficult to solve without local governance. As an OWRC engineer noted: "Because it is a company established townsite, the responsibility for services seems to fall to the Ontario Northland Railway ... Due to the seriousness of the problem, there is an urgent need for some type of municipal organization."⁶³⁵

As soon as the June OWRC report was released, the ONR demanded that the province construct a "sewerage system" in Moosonee. W. A. Johnston, Acting Chairman of the ONR, wrote a strongly worded letter to Minister Spooner on 8 July 1963 about "the extremely dangerous situation in Moosonee with respect to the sewerage system."⁶³⁶ Johnston suggested that the Department of Economics and Development should pay for a new sewage system for Moosonee. Spooner responded that he was waiting for a Townsite Committee recommendation on "townsite organization, services [and] administration" and that "it would be premature to discuss the particular matter of sewage disposal."⁶³⁷ So at this juncture, the OWRC recommended sewage treatment facilities and a local governance structure, the ONR demanded sewage services, but the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs felt a complete sewage system was "premature." Although the provincial government did not deal with the major issues at hand, it did allocate \$25,000 for a local "clean-up."⁶³⁸ These funds, provided through the ONR on 28 August 1963, were described by a Department of Economics and Development staffer as

⁶³⁵ AO, RG 84-12, B355820. File "Moosonee: Original Sanitary Engineering Report -- OWRC." Report titled "Survey of Sanitary Conditions," by C.H. Kretch, District Engineer, OWRC, 18-19 June, 1963.

⁶³⁶ AO, Moosonee 1960-63. Johnston to Spooner, 8 July 1963.

⁶³⁷ AO, Moosonee 1960-63. Spooner to Johnston, 22 July 1963.

⁶³⁸ AO, Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee . J. W. Ramsey, Department of Economics and Development to Allister Johnston, ONR, 28 August 1963.

designated for “clean-up of the garbage situation... control of dogs in the area, grading and gravelling of the roads, night soil collection ... and any other measures for a thorough clean-up of this area.”⁶³⁹

The provincially funded ‘clean-up’ activities were merely superficial rather than structural; inhabitants would still be susceptible to epidemics, but at least the town’s general appearance would improve. It would, in effect, be more pleasant to look at, but still dangerous to inhabit. Furthermore, a superficial clean-up was not sufficient for the local people. By September 1963, Ontario’s Ministry of Health reported that the local citizens committee or “Moosonee Development Board” had effected some improvement in the levels of garbage in the town but that sewage contamination was still a major concern.⁶⁴⁰ By October the membership of this lobby group had grown from eleven to fifteen residents and the group was becoming better known as the “Moosonee Townsite Development Board [MTDB].”⁶⁴¹ Eight of the fifteen members of this board were people who had signed the Improvement District petition the previous year.⁶⁴² Clearly these citizens were not prepared to wait for action by outside parties.

The records of the Department of Health are the only archival materials that shed light on the composition and activities of the MTDB’s board members. Its Chairman, Thomas Archibald, was noted as an employee of the RCAF. Other board members were referred to as business owners, “housewives,” and ONR employees. The Department of Health also categorized the fifteen Board members as follows: “There are 8 white status Indians, two of

⁶³⁹ Ibid. The reference to ‘night soil’ collection is presumed to be the collection of solid waste. It does not seem to imply the emptying of septic tanks.

⁶⁴⁰ AO, Moosonee 1960-63. Cooke, Department of Health to Don Taylor, 10 September 1963.

⁶⁴¹ AO, File 117.9 Moosonee 1963-64. Raiche, Department of Health to Cooke, 7 October 1963. Part of the reason for the growth in public participation may have been that the \$25,000 allocated for Moosonee in August 1963 was not actually transferred to ONR until October 10, 1963. See AO, Moosonee 1960-63. Minister Spooner to Minister James Allan, Acting Minister Department of Economic Development (DED).

⁶⁴² Note my earlier comment that not all of the names on the petition were legible. It is possible that other Improvement District petitioners were members of the Community Development Board.

which are women, 6 whites, [and] 1 Indian.”⁶⁴³ The term “white status Indian” was not defined in Department of Health correspondence.⁶⁴⁴ The most significant part of the categorization of local people was not what various terms meant but the fact that the Department of Health’s staff appeared comfortable with colonial ‘sorting’ of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. The Department of Health’s staff also indicated that “The Board meets twice every month to discuss problems relating to the Moosonee settlement.”⁶⁴⁵ What this demonstrates is that, pending a decision on Improvement District status, local residents chose to form a local, formal group to address their concerns. It also shows that the term “development board” was first used by residents themselves, five years before the provincial government appropriated the designation when it enacted the Moosonee Development Area Board Act.⁶⁴⁶

Even before local people formed the Moosonee Townsite Development Board, Don Taylor had recommended that a local advisory committee be elected by Moosonee’s residents. In briefing the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Taylor had suggested that a small group of local residents should be elected to act as a “sounding board” on development issues.⁶⁴⁷ Taylor was the first government advisor to recommend that local elected people be given a voice regarding local developments. This was not an improvement district or full local governance, however,

⁶⁴³ AO, File 117.9 Moosonee 1963-64. H. C. Raiche, Provincial Health Inspector to W. G. Cooke, Chief Health Inspector, Department of Health, 7 October 1963.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid. The term “white status Indian” was not defined in any of the documents that used this term, but it appears to mean “Non-Treaty Indians.” This term was used in Moosonee’s archival documents, but it was only clarified in one item. A list showing housing conditions was indexed as “T=Treaty Indian” and “N/T=White Status Indian.” See AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister’s Files, File: “Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66,” Report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963. The housing list was appended to the Thomas report. The term could also have meant Indian women who had married non-indigenous men and had lost Indian status, or it could also mean the children from such marriages. This is suggested by the fact that the term “white status Indian” is applied in Raiche (above) to both men and women. An examination of Bill C-31, changes to the Indian Act, is beyond the scope of thesis research. For an overview of women and Indian status, see Olive Dickason, *A Concise History of Canada’s First Nations* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006): 303-305.

⁶⁴⁵ AO, Moosonee 1960-63. Cooke to Don Taylor, 10 September 1963.

⁶⁴⁶ As noted on the previous page, residents called the citizen’s committee a “Development Board” in October, 1963 which was five years before the proclamation of the MDAB in 1968.

⁶⁴⁷ AO, Moosonee 1960-63. Don Taylor to Spooner, 8 July 1963.

because the elected representatives would only be advisory to an administrator employed by the ONR.

By the late summer and fall of 1963, Conservative MPPs began to badger each other about Moosonee in correspondence which seems more at home in opposition letters than between colleagues. Minister Spooner sent a terse letter to Minister MacCauley stating that, “The time has come when you must decide where we are going with Moosonee ... Rene Brunelle is also very anxious.”⁶⁴⁸ Rene Brunelle, the provincial member of the legislature for Moosonee and the James Bay area, wrote to Macauley requesting that he be advised, “what action the Government plans for the Municipal development of the town.”⁶⁴⁹ Macauley’s response was “About the only thing I can think of in connection with the Moosonee Town Site right now would be a large scale clean-up ...and our economic study of the area.”⁶⁵⁰ Nowhere in his short response did Macauley give an indication how the governance aspect of Moosonee was progressing.

The government of the day was not working together to expedite services in Moosonee, and the town’s residents seemed to be well aware of this. A DED fact-finding group documented the public’s observations on this topic in October 1963 as follows:

We found that many of the people to whom we talked were discouraged and confused by the stream of Government representatives who came to study various aspects of the economy without being able to effect improvements in either the economic or social sense. ... Until this summer when a committee was elected by the residents of Moosonee, there was no one to speak for them, and the only voice to be heard was that of the ONR.

⁶⁴⁸ AO, Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee. Minister Spooner to Minister R. W. Macauley, 13 August 1963.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid., Brunelle to Macauley, September 2, 1963.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid., Macauley to Brunelle, September 4, 1963.

The town development committee of 12, 6 whites and 6 Indians, elected an Indian [Tom Archibald] as its chairman.⁶⁵¹

One of its recommendations was that “Moosonee... [should] be termed a ‘development area.’”

At this time, the citizen’s committee mentioned by the DED was not actually being recognized as a true local advisory group. On 25 September 1963, Chairman Archibald wrote to Minister Spooner indicating that he had just heard on television “that \$25,000 had so far been allocated to Moosonee for local development.”⁶⁵² Archibald continued:

At this time we are seeking your advice as to the terms of reference on this money, the power of this board in connection with the use of this money and who the board should approach to gain access to the use of these funds? It is our understanding that this will come through the Ontario Northland Transportation Commission and that it will be used as directed by the Moosonee Townsite Development Board.⁶⁵³

It took over a month for Minister Spooner’s condescending response. Spooner wrote:

The expenditure of these funds is the direct responsibility of the O.N.T.C. [Ontario Northland Transportation Commission]. In such a situation they cannot be “directed” by another body as to the disposition of the funds. However ... the O.N.T.C. will lean heavily on the Citizens Committee in securing recommendations as to what work should be carried out, when it should be carried out and how it should be carried out (local labor, etc.).

I believe that you will be hearing very shortly from representatives of the O.N.T.C. as to their long-range intentions for Moosonee. The continued assistance of your Committee would be highly valued.⁶⁵⁴

Spoooner’s response had two opposing messages: “We value you” and “You have no power.”

What this meant is that the ONR still ran this town. It was almost a year and a half since local residents had applied for a local governance structure – an Improvement District. They had

⁶⁵¹ AO, File 117.9 Moosonee 1963-64. Department of Economics and Development, Special Research and Surveys Branch, “Memorandum re: the Development and Administration of the Townsite of Moosonee” 17 October 1963.

⁶⁵² AO File 117.9 Moosonee 1963-64. Chairman Thomas Archibald, to Minister Spooner, 25 September 1963.

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴ AO Moosonee, 1963-64. Spooner to Archibald, 4 November 1963. The reference to ONTC’s intentions appears to be the proposal for a Development Plan, or Land Use Plan for Moosonee. The terms ONR and ONTC are used interchangeably in archival documents.

received no response on their application, and they were being advised that the ONR was still deciding the future of their town. There is also no indication in archival documents that the ONR involved the citizen's group in any planning or development discussions after Spooner's November 1963 correspondence.

Minister Spooner's reference above to the ONTC's "long-range" intentions likely referred to the fact that it had commissioned a planning report from Project Planning Associates, a Toronto firm. The 1963 ONTC Annual Report refers to this report as follows:

A study of Moosonee townsite and environs has been arranged by the Commission on behalf of the Government ... to provide information to assist in formulating a policy in respect to land use and development, educational, cultural, social and economic aspects of the situation as well as the possible formation of a local government organization in the area.⁶⁵⁵

The ONTC report indicated that this consulting report was to be completed by April 1964. However, the Project Planning Associates' report, completed in 1964, was released neither to the citizen's committee nor to any party outside of the provincial government. Instead the provincial government formally labelled this report as "confidential" and "strictly private."⁶⁵⁶

One year later Ontario's Cabinet Committee for Indians (CCI) received a confidential report that purported to examine "the development of Indian communities in Ontario," but that paid "particular attention to Moosonee."⁶⁵⁷ The April 1965 report included a proposal to

⁶⁵⁵ Ontario, Sessional Papers, Ontario Northland Transportation Commission, 1963 Annual Report, p.6., Underline mine. Although the Annual Report refers to "the situation" in Moosonee, it does not explain what is meant by these words.

⁶⁵⁶ AO, Moosonee 1963-64. Don Taylor memorandum to file, 8 May 1964. Taylor records that he advised the Department of Public Welfare to keep the Project Planning Associates report "confidential" and "strictly private." I was not able to locate a copy of the report despite archival searches and an FOIPOP request for 1964 and 1965 ONR files at the Ontario Archives.

⁶⁵⁷ Ontario, Executive Committee for Indians, Report to the *Cabinet Committee for Indians*, April 1965. This report was sourced in November 2014 from the *Ojibway and Cree Cultural Centre* in Timmins, courtesy of Dr. John Long who indicated where the report was stored. The report indicated that it was prepared by staff from eight government departments.

establish an Improvement District for Moosonee. The authors of the report indicated that “ An Improvement District will give the residents of Moosonee an opportunity to gain experience in the processes of government through (a) membership of one or more appointed Moosonee residents on the Board; [and] (b) experience on the advisory committees to the board.”⁶⁵⁸

Furthermore, the report’s authors stated that there already existed a “Moosonee Advisory Board, with membership including local residents.”⁶⁵⁹ It is likely the mention of an “advisory” group was actually a reference to the Moosonee Townsite Development Board, given its prominence and advocacy activities.⁶⁶⁰

One of the members of the Cabinet Committee for Indians was Minister Spooner of Municipal Affairs, who was likely influenced by the Committee’s discussions to move ahead with local governance for Moosonee.⁶⁶¹ Minister Spooner and Minister Simonett, Energy and Resources Management, met with local townspeople in September 1965, at the request of the residents.⁶⁶² Simonett wrote to Premier Robarts after this trip stating that, “It is my strong recommendation that the administration of the townsite be removed from the supervision of the Ontario Northland Transportation Commission and placed in one of the departments of the Government.”⁶⁶³ Within ten days of Simonett’s letter to the Premier, government staff met to

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid., 48.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁰ The Toronto Telegram had interviewed Chairman Tom Archibald about the MTDB only two months before the Cabinet report noted above. The reporter noted that local government was needed in Moosonee. See AO, File 118.3, Moosonee 1966. Bob Pennington, “Why Indians Smash So Many Windows,” *The Telegram*, Feb.15, 1965.

⁶⁶¹ AO, File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Don Taylor to Deputy Minister Palmer, 15 July 15 1965. Taylor notes in his correspondence that Minister Spooner was on the Cabinet Committee for Indians, otherwise this membership would have been unclear in the archival documents.

⁶⁶² AO, Moosonee 1965-66. Minister Simonett to Premier Robarts, 8 September 1965. , This letter has also been referred to in the previous chapter on Local Services.

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

resolve both sewer and water issues, and the matter of local governance.”⁶⁶⁴ An examination of the minutes from staff meetings gives no indication that local people were to be involved in decision making and it also shows that local governance was a very minor part of the step forward to municipal status. The pressing issue for the staff was how to pay for the \$2,000,000 of engineering work needed to make Moosonee a safe place to live.

By November 1965, Department of Municipal Affairs’ staff were drafting legislation for “a Public Act covering the erection of the area known as Moosonee into a very ‘limited’ type of municipality, similar in concept to an improvement district.”⁶⁶⁵ It appears that the initial draft of the legislation did not include the RCAF base. Staff indicated in December 1965 that it “It is not felt that the RCAF Base, which has complete sewer and water facilities, paved roads, good schools, etc. ... should be included in the area to be defined.”⁶⁶⁶ This statement emphasizes how local services, rather than local voice, were the critical factor in drafting the Moosonee Development Area Board Act. Despite the comments of staff, by 15 March 1966, when the Moosonee “Development Area” was mapped by the Department of Municipal Affairs, the boundary of the new community included the RCAF base plus a further area just north of it that eventually became the community’s airport.⁶⁶⁷ Archival documents do not make it clear why the radar base was eventually combined with the townsite, but this decision made it easier to integrate the base and the town when the former closed in 1975.

⁶⁶⁴ AO, Moosonee 1965-66. Minutes of “Meeting concerning Moosonee Development,” 17 September 1965 and AO, Moosonee 1965-66. Minutes of “Meeting concerning Moosonee Development,” 8 October 1965.

⁶⁶⁵ AO, Moosonee 1965-66. A. T. Butler, Director, Municipal Organization and Administration Branch, Department of Municipal Affairs to Don Taylor, Chairman, Administrative Subcommittee on Townsites, 23 November 1965.

⁶⁶⁶ AO, RG 19 E-7-A, B444092. Moosonee Development Act, 1966 Legislation, 1965-66. A.T. Butler to Deputy Minister Palmer re: “Moosonee Development Act,” 8 December 1965.

⁶⁶⁷ Ontario, Department of Municipal Affairs, April 26, 1966. Plan Showing the Moosonee Development Area. 26 April 1966. I used this map as a working copy while I was with Ministry of Municipal Affairs and involved in infrastructure projects.

The *Moosonee Development Area Board Act* (Bill 175) received three readings in June 1966.⁶⁶⁸ The Act gave the Moosonee Development Area Board (MDAB) jurisdiction for local services including water, sewer, roads, garbage collection, fire protection and street lighting.⁶⁶⁹ On 4 July 1966, J. W. Spooner, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, summarized the purpose of the legislation for Premier Robarts:

This Act is to provide a corporate status for the Moosonee area and to provide a board which will have the powers of a municipality in certain limited matters without in fact being a municipality. It will permit contracts to be made for the installation of sewer and water services which are necessary for the immediate development proposals in this area.⁶⁷⁰

It was an important step for the provincial government to finally pass the MDAB Act, however, it was not proclaimed until 1968, two years after its passage.⁶⁷¹ Between the passage of the Act in June 1966 and proclamation in 1968 discussions within the provincial government became bogged down on the subject of how to pay for local services that were under construction. In other communities in Ontario, local people were expected to pay for part of the costs of installation of public services. However, many of the residents of Moosonee had insufficient incomes to pay for the construction and maintenance of the cluster of infrastructure and services that they needed.⁶⁷²

⁶⁶⁸ AO, RG 19-F-7, B350920. General Admin., Moosonee Development Board, Bill 175, *An Act to Provide for the Establishment of The Moosonee Development Area Board*. A copy of Bill 175 in this file shows First Reading 14 June 1966, Second Reading 23 June 1966 and Third Reading 29 June 1966.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid. Schedule B to Bill 175.

⁶⁷⁰ AO, RG 19-4-5, B269701. Legislative Program 1962-66, Moosonee Development Area Board, 1955. Minister Spooner to Premier Robarts. 4 July 1966, p. 6. Although the MDAB Act was passed in 1966 it was not proclaimed until August 1968. It did however seem to give OWRC some comfort level in signing the first contracts for sewer and water work in the Fall of 1966.

⁶⁷¹ AO, RG19-20-1, B233000, Microfiche 25.11, "Moosonee Incorporation History," This file included the Proclamation of the MDAB Act (19 August 1968), published in *The Ontario Gazette*, 24 August 1968. The MDAB Act is referred to as the *Moosonee Development Area Board Act*, Statutes of Ontario, Chapter 294, 1966. (Also see Revised Statutes of Ontario 1970, Chapter 277). Note: The Incorporation History microfiche file at the Ontario Archives consisted primarily of the MDAB Act and one page of the Ontario Gazette.

⁶⁷² AO, RG 19-F-7, B350920. General Admin., Moosonee Development Board, Don Taylor to Deputy Minister Palmer, Municipal Affairs, 6 April 1967.

By the end of 1967, almost a year and a half after the MDAB Act had been passed, Moosonee's residents started to ask the provincial government what had happened to their earlier demands for local governance. Dick Knowles, President of the James Bay Chamber of Commerce, wrote to the Minister of Municipal Affairs on 2 November 1967 indicating an appreciation for the ongoing construction of water, sewer and roads systems but also asking for more information about the creation of local government. He wrote:

On behalf of our residents we wish to express our thanks to your Government for helping us with steps designed to make Moosonee a self-respecting community. We wish to familiarize ourselves with your plans for a Municipal Governing body in Moosonee. We understand that it is to be similar to an Improvement District. So that our Chamber may be better informed on plans and time of implementation please advise what is proposed and when.⁶⁷³

It appears that local people had not been involved in the passage of the Act nor had they even been provided with copies of the legislation. The 29 November 1967 reply to Knowles' letter gives a clear indication that public involvement was an afterthought. The reply, which is in the form of a public notice rather than a letter, reads as follows:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 2 and it is regretted this was not replied to earlier. However, for your information, enclosed is a copy of The Moosonee Development Area Board Act, 1966, which at the present time has not been proclaimed by the Lieutenant Governor. In view of this I am unable to comment further as to possible implementation.⁶⁷⁴

Ten days after this notice, Minister Darcy McKeough formally replied to the James Bay Chamber of Commerce and indicated that proclamation was being delayed due to service costing studies (related to water and sewer installations) and to the need to assess local properties for

⁶⁷³ AO, RG 19-6-1, File 19-47-1, B269789. Cochrane District, Moosonee Townsite Gen (KF). Dick Knowles to the Minister of Municipal Affairs, 2 November 1967. (It is not clear what the initials "KF" meant in the title to this file. The entire file was reviewed but there were no staff with these initials, nor was there a file designation explaining this. It is possible it was the 'Knowles' file, although documents were not always specific to Knowles.)

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid. A notice dated 29 November 1967 was attached to the incoming correspondence from Dick Knowles. McKeough formally responded to the group on 11 December 1967. See McKeough to Rev. John Clarke in AO, RG 19-6-1, File 19-47-1, B269789. Cochrane District, Moosonee Townsite Gen (KF).

taxation. Over five years had passed since the Improvement District application had been sent to the OMB and over four years since the local Citizen's committee had been formed.⁶⁷⁵

However, one more group of residents tried to change governance structures while the province was studying how to implement the MDAB Act. In August 1967, a small group of local people from the Village filed a petition with the federal government to become a reserve.

⁶⁷⁶ The petitioners referred to themselves as “the Indians of the West Coast of James Bay” who were now residing in Moosonee. Eight of the nine people who signed the petition were members of the Attawapiskat and Fort Albany bands.⁶⁷⁷ The petitioners wrote that, “We, the Indians of Moosonee, want to draw the attention of the Canadians on the miserable condition of our community, our urgent need for public utilities such as housing, electricity, water, sewage and telephone. These things we need to develop a model reserve ... adjacent to the present town of Moosonee.”⁶⁷⁸

The timing of the reserve petition may have been influenced by the release in 1966 of the *Hawthorn Report*. Anne-Marie Mawhiney states that this federally commissioned study revealed “the deplorable circumstances in which Canada’s status Indians were living.”⁶⁷⁹ Additionally,

⁶⁷⁵ There is no indication that the OMB ever formally responded to the community on the Improvement District application. It is also unclear if the citizen's committee, later the Moosonee Townsite Development Board, continued to meet after 1963.

⁶⁷⁶ AO, RG 29-01-1481, B430939. Indians-Moosonee, 1967-70. J. M. Dufour, Department of Public Welfare (DPW) to J. S. Band, Deputy Minister, Department of Social and Family Services, 18 December 1967. The August 3, 1967 petition for a reserve is attached to this correspondence.

⁶⁷⁷ AO, RG 19-F-7, General Administration: Moosonee Development Board, Departmental Memorandum from R. Rivard, Department of Social and Family Services (DSFS) to C. J. Williams, DSFS, 24 November 1967. Attawapiskat and Fort Albany are now referred to as First Nations.

⁶⁷⁸ AO, RG 29-01-1481, B430939. Indians-Moosonee, 1967-70. J. M. Dufour, Department of Public Welfare (DPW) to J. S. Band, Deputy Minister, Department of Social and Family Services, 18 December 1967. Emphasis mine. The petitioners also indicated that their home reserves (Attawapiskat and Fort Albany) had not been adequately compensated by Treaty Number 9. However, their main concern was the inadequate services noted above.

⁶⁷⁹ Anne-Marie Mawhiney, *Towards Aboriginal Self-Government: Relations Between Status Indian Peoples and the Government of Canada: 1969-1984* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1994): 42. Mawhiney

the petitioners may have been encouraged by media reaction to Expo 67's "Indians of Canada" Pavilion. Both Bryan Palmer and Olive Dickason write that the displays at this pavilion emphasized the poor living conditions for Indigenous peoples across Canada.⁶⁸⁰ It is possible that the petitioners hoped to build on the public's reaction to the *Hawthorn Report* and the Expo displays and thus draw the attention of Canadians to their plight. However, the petition for a reserve was rejected by the federal government. Federal representatives suggested that the real issue was provision of better services and housing by the province, rather than the establishment of a new reserve.⁶⁸¹

It is likely that correspondence both from the James Bay Chamber of Commerce and from the reserve petitioners pushed the provincial government closer to proclamation of the MDAB Act. However, before the MDAB Act could be proclaimed, it would need the appointment of members. The MDAB Act did not provide an independent structure for the town's residents, but it did put in place a quasi-municipal structure. The Act specified that the Lieutenant Governor would appoint a Chairman and four other members to the MDAB. From the end of 1966 until proclamation of the Act occurred, several individuals and groups recommended people who should be appointed to the new board. The first to supply a list of recommendations was Rene Brunelle, the MPP for the area that included Moosonee. His recommendations, and later ones, are compiled in Table 8.1. Brunelle listed twelve people as potential MDAB

should also be consulted for the key reports that followed Hawthorn (i.e. the 1969 'White Paper' and 'Citizens Plus'). A fullsome discussion of these reports is beyond the scope of this thesis.

⁶⁸⁰ Bryan Palmer, *Canada's 1960's: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009): 391 and Olive Dickason, *A Concise History of Canada's First Nations* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006): 370.

⁶⁸¹ AO, Indians-Moosonee 1967-70. Minister Rene Brunelle to Minister John Yaremko, Minister of Social and Family Services, 22 December 1967. Also see undated letter from Minister Arthur Laing, Indian and Northern Affairs to Raphael Wabano, Moosonee. This letter is attached to correspondence from Paul Wilkinson, Department of Social and Family Services (DSFS) to E.V. Ralph, Head, Indian Development Branch, DSFS, 6 February 1968, in AO, File 118.6 Moosonee 1968. Wilkinson seems to indicate that Laing's letter rejecting the Reserve proposal was received by Mr. Wabano on February 5th, 1968.

nominees in a document he provided to the Department of Municipal Affairs in the fall of 1966.⁶⁸² He received a guarded response from Minister Spooner, who thanked him for his “recommendations” but indicated “we are not quite ready to proclaim the Moosonee Development Area Board Act and, until such time as the Act is proclaimed, it will not be possible to name any members to the Board.”⁶⁸³

The second list of suggested names was sent in by the James Bay Chamber of Commerce in February 1968.⁶⁸⁴ The Chamber had been part of information meetings on the MDAB Act which had occurred in Moosonee on 29 January 1968. Three meetings had been held that day: one with the Chamber of Commerce, one with the Lions Club and “interested citizens” and one “by far the largest, was held in the evening and was open to the general public although the majority of the people present were from the South Side of Store Creek.”⁶⁸⁵ The person who recorded the issues and presentations at these meetings was Paul Wilkinson, a Community Development Worker with the provincial government. Wilkinson wrote that Department of Municipal Affairs staff “explained the powers that an appointed development board would have in Moosonee [and] ... outlined the need for advice from the people of Moosonee in order that good representatives might be selected to serve on the board.”⁶⁸⁶

Two local women were likely the organizers of the evening meeting (the third meeting noted above). Mrs. Kenneth Wynne and Mrs. Ellen Morrison had written to Don Taylor as soon as they heard he might be in town to meet with the Chamber of Commerce. They asked Taylor to

⁶⁸² AO, File 118.3, Moosonee 1966. “Moosonee Municipal Board,” Handwritten notes, with no cover letter, provided by MPP Rene Brunelle to Minister Spooner. Stamped as received 23 November 1966 by Department of Municipal Affairs.

⁶⁸³ Ibid. Spooner to Brunelle, 28 November 1966.

⁶⁸⁴ AO, RG 19-6-1, B269790. File 19-46-1 Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite. Knowles to McKeough, 21 February 1968.

⁶⁸⁵ AO, File 118.6 Moosonee 1968. Paul Wilkinson, DSFS to E.V.Ralph, Head, Indian Development Branch, DSFS, 1 February 1968.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid.

meet with them, and presumably others, on the evening of 29 January to discuss servicing issues (e.g. water) and “the question of representation in any proposed municipal council.”⁶⁸⁷ The impression from Wilkinson’s notes is that the evening meeting garnered the most discussion and the highest attendance of the information sessions held that day.⁶⁸⁸

Correspondence from the Chamber indicates that members were encouraged by provincial staff to recommend nominees to the new Board. It appears, however, that the Chamber wanted to take a more inclusive approach to this process. Dick Knowles of the Chamber wrote to Rene Brunelle stating that “We prefer to have the residents suggest their nominees.”⁶⁸⁹ Knowles later wrote that “we held an open public nomination meeting in Moosonee on February 20th, and despite strong opposition from the weather, there was a good representative turn-out, with a full hall.”⁶⁹⁰ The list prepared from this meeting included only two of the names submitted by Brunelle in 1966.⁶⁹¹ These were Ed Butcher and Bert Trapper. The other difference between Brunelle’s list and the one prepared by the Chamber of Commerce is that the latter list included women. Two women, Maude Tyrer and Dorothy Wynne, had been a part of the 14 people nominated at the 20 February 1968 public meeting. Both women had been

⁶⁸⁷ AO, File 118.5 Moosonee 1967-68, Mrs. Kenneth Wynne and Mrs. Ellen Morrison, to Don Taylor, Community Planning Branch, Department of Municipal Affairs, 17 January 1968. Mrs. Kenneth Wynne had also signed a petition on that same date as part of a group of “property owners on the south side of Store Creek.” This petition is discussed in more detail in the chapter on Infrastructure. See AO, RG 19 F-7, B350920. Petition dated 17 January 1968.

⁶⁸⁸ Wilkinson’s meeting notes do not provide the names of people who attended the three meetings on January 29, 1968 so it cannot be confirmed if Mrs. Kenneth Wynne and Mrs. Ellen Morrison attended the meeting and /or spoke at the gathering. However, it is likely that they both attended and voiced their opinions. Rene Brunelle may also have met with the two women the following year as he wrote in July, 1969 that he met “with a group of ladies from the Store Creek area.” He did not provide names or indicate the details of this meeting but he wrote to Darcy McKeough as a follow-up and requested “improvements in the Store Creek area.” These improvements included the installation of water taps. See AO, RG19-6-1 B269819. Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite, Gen. Rene Brunelle, Minister, Department of Lands and Forests to Darcy McKeough, Minister of Municipal Affairs, 16 July 1969.

⁶⁸⁹ AO Moosonee 1968, Knowles to Brunelle, 9 February 1968.

⁶⁹⁰ AO, RG 19-6-1, B269790. File 19-46-1 Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite. Knowles to McKeough, 21 February 1968.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

noted firstly as “housewives” and following that, as local employees. Neither of these women was appointed to the first Moosonee Development Area Board.⁶⁹²

Three of the 12 names submitted by MPP Brunelle were either former or current RCAF employees or members of the RCAF messes. Furthermore, 9 of the 14 names nominated by local residents had an RCAF connection (employees and/or members of the RCAF messes). In effect, the public was demonstrating that the community had a strong connection to the radar base. Additionally, six of the nominees had been involved in the original Moosonee Townsite Development Board (MTDB).⁶⁹³

The five individuals appointed to the MDAB by the Lieutenant Governor on 13 August 1968 were: Ed Butcher, as Chairman; David Wynne, Vice-Chairman; and Pat Gray, Arthur (Archie) Michel, and Xavier Wesley as members.⁶⁹⁴ None of the people appointed to the MDAB were RCAF employees. The province did, however, appoint a retired RCAF officer (Pat Gray) and a member of the RCAF Sergeant’s Mess (Ed Butcher).⁶⁹⁵ The provincial government’s staff who prepared the list for the Lieutenant Governor did not seem concerned that they had excluded

⁶⁹² Claudia Milne “Access and Services in Local Government: A Case Study of Moosonee, Ontario.” Master’s Thesis, July, 1974. University of Waterloo, 111. Milne notes that Maude Tyrer was appointed for a two year term on the MDAB in December, 1973. I am personally aware of Maude Tyrer’s long service to the MDAB (31 years) and the Town of Moosonee because of my former employment with Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Dorothy Wynne (Mrs. Kenneth Wynne in the January 17, 1968 correspondence above) also had a long term on the MDAB and she served on a wide range of local boards in both Moosonee and the James Bay region.

⁶⁹³ These nominees were Ed Butcher, Tom Archibald, David Wynne, Velko Novakovich, Xavier Wesley and James Morrison. Equally important, Dick Knowles, the person who mailed in the Chamber of Commerce list of nominees, had been the Treasurer of the MTDB.

⁶⁹⁴ AO, RG 19-6-1, B269789. File 19-47-1 Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite Gen. KF. “Appointment of Officials of the Moosonee Development Area Board,” 13 August 1968. As recorded in Table 8.1, four of the five new Board members -- Ed Butcher, David Wynne, Pat Gray, and Archie Michel had been on the list of suggested appointees provided by Rene Brunelle. Only Ed Butcher and Xavier Wesley had been on the list of 14 nominees from the February, 1968, public meeting.

⁶⁹⁵ DHH, Annual Historical Report 1963 for Moosonee CFS. This indicates that Flying Officer P. F. Gray started at the Moosonee base in January, 1963. A map of the base housing also shows that he lived on the base in one of the Private Married Quarters homes (PMQs) so Gray would have been very familiar with the operation of the base and its connection to the town. See Discovery North/ North Bay Museum, Moosonee Master Site Plan RCAF, Map 1987.1.198, Rolled Plans, Cabinet 22, Unit 5, circa 1969. Although labelled as a “Master Site Plan,” the map is not a planning document. Instead it is a map indicating staff housing and phone numbers.

women from the first Moosonee Development Area Board but some of the correspondence indicates that they were aware there should be representation from local Indigenous residents. A Municipal Affairs' Director wrote, "I understand that the Indian population in Moosonee [and Moose Factory] is roughly 1550 – 1056 treaty Indians and 494 non-treaty. In view of this, should not the treaty Indians be represented on the Board by one of their number?"⁶⁹⁶ Perhaps because of this memo, two Indigenous residents -- David Wynne and Xavier Wesley -- were recommended for appointment to the Board.⁶⁹⁷

Table 8.1 Recommendations for Positions on the Moosonee Development Area Board.

Name	Background and/or Occupation ⁶⁹⁸	Recommended By	
John Clarke	Anglican Minister	Brunelle, 1966	
Pat Gray	Retired RCAF Officer ⁶⁹⁹ Administrator, RC Mission	Brunelle, 1966	Appointed to the MDAB Board
Steve Preweda	Manager, Hudson's Bay Store	Brunelle, 1966	
Ed Butcher * ⁷⁰⁰	Manager, Imperial Oil President, Moosonee Lion's Club Member, Sgts Mess, RCAF	Brunelle, 1966 Public Mtg	Appointed as Chairman to the MDAB Board
Bert Trapper	RCAF employee Member, Lion's Club Stationary Engineer, RCAF	Brunelle, 1966 Public Mtg	
Tom Archibald*	"Former Chairman, Moosonee Townsite Development Board," on Board of Governors, JBEC.	Brunelle, 1966	

⁶⁹⁶ AO, RG 19-5 B269767. . File 19-47-1, Cochrane-Moosonee Townsite General. A. T. Butler, Municipal Affairs to V. Bozzer, Municipal Affairs, 13 March 1967. There is no indication in this correspondence where the population figures were derived, however the population data sourced for this dissertation shows that Butler's numbers are a combination of Moosonee and Moose Factory. See Table 4.1.

⁶⁹⁷ AO, RG 19-6-1, B269789. File 19-47-1 Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite General KF. Briefing Note for Darcy McKeough, 18 August 1968. David Wynne had been on Brunelle's list and Xavier Wesley had been nominated by the public at the February, 1968 public meeting.

⁶⁹⁸ AO, RG 19-6-1, B269790. File 19-46-1 Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite. Knowles to McKeough, 21 February 1968 and AO, File 118.3, Moosonee 1966. "Moosonee Municipal Board," MPP Rene Brunelle to Minister Spooner, 23 November 1966.

⁶⁹⁹ Connections to the RCAF base are **highlighted** on the electronic copy of this thesis.

⁷⁰⁰ An asterisk (*) indicates that the nominee was part of the 1963 Moosonee Townsite Development Board (MTDB).

David Wynne*	Proprietor of Small Store Member of Public School Board	Brunelle, 1966	Appointed as Vice-Chairman to the MDAB Board
Marc Laframboise	ONR Employee Member of Separate School Bd	Brunelle, 1966	
Percy Tozer	Minister-Episcopal Church, Member of Public School Board	Brunelle, 1966	
Harley Winter	Manager, ONR Lodge	Brunelle, 1966	
Eddie Arpin	Proprietor of Wonder Snack Bar	Brunelle, 1966	
Archie Michel	Retired, Member of Public School Board and JBEC Board (former ONR lodge manager)	Brunelle, 1966	Appointed to the MDAB Board
Bill Hunter	Water/Sewage Plant Operator, RCAF	Public Mtg	
Velko Novakovich*	Member, Sgts Mess, RCAF Member, Chamber of Commerce	Public Mtg	
Xavier Wesley*	Employee, Esso Part time court clerk for OPP	Public Mtg	Appointed to the MDAB Board
Fred Close	Member, Officers Mess, RCAF and Lions Club, School Principal	Public Mtg	
Ernest Beaudoin	Priest, RC Mission	Public Mtg	
Maude Tyrer	Housewife and Clerk, Hudsons Bay Co., Member of Legion, Ladies Guild	Public Mtg	
Dorothy Wynne	Housewife and employee snack bar, Member of Legion	Public Mtg	
Dennis Eitzen	Member, Officers Mess, RCAF Member, Chamber of Commerce, Dept of Transport employee	Public Mtg	
James Morrison*	Carpenter, Employee of RCAF	Public Mtg	
Jack Ryder	Steamfitter, Plumber, Employee of RCAF	Public Mtg	
Bob Iserhoff	RCAF employee, Member of Airmens' Club [Mess]	Public Mtg	
Jim Jackasum	Clerk-Hudson's Bay	Public Mtg	

The first meeting of the newly formed MDAB was held on 28 August 1968. Ten days before that meeting, Premier John Robarts and Minister Darcy McKeough were in Moosonee to meet the new Board members and to announce that the MDAB Act had been proclaimed. The *Globe and Mail* captured the Premier's reason for promoting the creation of the MDAB:

Mr. Robarts announced that the Cabinet had proclaimed the Moosonee Development Area Board Act, which, at the outset and in fundamental terms, means this community of 1,500 persons will have a sewer system and indoor plumbing instead of outhouses, and a board, like a council, to raise realty [property] taxes to pay a little of the \$2 million cost.⁷⁰¹

Robarts also indicated publicly that on a visit to Moosonee in 1965 he had been appalled at “the raw sewage running from the shacks and open ditches” and he left with “the feeling that more should be done.”⁷⁰² MPP Rene Brunelle emphasized to local residents that the Board appointees would help ensure that improvements were completed. He said “These [MDAB members] are local people who know the needs of the area and will see that it is upgraded.”⁷⁰³

The handwritten notes from Darcy McKeough’s file give a more detailed outline of the reasons for the MDAB. McKeough, the Minister of Municipal Affairs in 1968, had written some personal speaking points for the MDAB announcement which included the following:

Population grew – realization something else needed – local participation – community involvement – something more than the leadership in the area provided by C of C [Chamber of Commerce] and other organizations...immediate attention –fire protection...something new will be added by the Board: local involvement, local planning, local initiative,[and] local control.⁷⁰⁴

It had taken ten years of lobbying, from 1958 to 1968, for the town to witness some form of local governance. Yet despite McKeough’s assertions of “local control,” the MDAB was not yet a form of local government controlled by local people.⁷⁰⁵

⁷⁰¹ Terrance Wills, “Now have privilege of paying realty tax’: Cabinet in church to bless new Moosonee government,” *Globe and Mail*, August 19, 1968, page 10.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ Ibid. Rene Brunelle was the MPP for Cochrane North, an electoral riding which included Moosonee.

⁷⁰⁴ AO, RG 19-6-1, File 19-47-1, B269789. “Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite” Gen. KF. McKeough’s notes were not in sentence format. They are copied ‘as is,’ including his underlines.

⁷⁰⁵ The MDAB was supervised by the Provincial government from its inception in 1968 until 2003. It was not until the mid-1970s that MDAB members were elected by the community through an informal election process and successful candidates were then appointed by the provincial government.

In January, 2001 the MDAB Act was repealed and replaced by the *Town of Moosonee Act*. The Town changed from a board of the Province to a municipality. Supervision of the Town by the province was lifted in January 2003.

The town did, however, have an essential element of local democracy through the creation of its own ratepayers group. The group, called the Moosonee Community Council Steering Committee, included some of the people who had been nominated, but not appointed to, the MDAB. For example, Mrs. K. [Dorothy] Wynne and Mrs. J. [Ellen] Morrison were on this Steering Committee. There is only one specific source for the Steering Committee, but it suggests that local citizens intended to exercise voice, whether they were appointed to the MDAB or not.⁷⁰⁶

In addition, one of the members of the Steering Committee, Ellen Morrison, began to lobby for better living conditions and services as President of the Moosonee Homemakers Club.

⁷⁰⁷ One provincial planner suggested that the Homemakers Club, a group of “vocal Indian women,” should be included in all the community’s planning discussions.⁷⁰⁸ Linda Ambrose and Lianne Leddy have studied local women’s organizations and concluded that these groups might have appeared to be “Home Economics Plus” but that they often got involved in local governance and community improvement initiatives. Ambrose has provided examples of northern Women’s Institutes members who got involved in local activism and community projects.⁷⁰⁹ She has also demonstrated that even a century ago in rural Ontario, Women’s

⁷⁰⁶ AO, File 119.4 Moosonee 1964. Homer Brooks, Chairman, Moosonee Community Council Steering Committee to Ed Butcher, Chairman, MDAB, 22 May 1969. Brooks wrote that the Steering Committee wanted the MDAB to deal with two hazardous situations involving water filled holes and roaming dogs.

⁷⁰⁷ The Homemakers Club was known for sponsoring sales of local handicrafts plus acting as a local voice for improved living conditions. See AO, File 119.5 Moosonee 1969, Mrs. Ellen Morrison, Homemakers Club to Minister J. Yaremko, Department of Social and Family Services, 19 June 1969.

⁷⁰⁸ AO, File 119.4, Moosonee 1969, A. J. Elie, Senior Planner, Community Planning Branch, Department of Municipal Affairs to Don Taylor, Director and Supervisor, Official Plans Section, Community Planning Branch, 6 June 1969.

⁷⁰⁹ Linda M. Ambrose, ““What are the Good of Those Meetings Anyway?” Early Popularity of the Ontario Women’s Institutes,” *Ontario History* 87, no. 1 (Spring, 1995), 1-19. Also see Linda M. Ambrose, “Our Last Frontier: Imperialism and Northern Canadian Rural Women’s Organizations,” *Canadian Historical Review* 86, no. 2(2005): 257-284. Ambrose writes about the Fort Simpson Women’s Institute (W.I.) and its efforts to effect improvements to sanitation and garbage collections. She also describes the efforts of W.I. President Mary Firth, a “Gwich’in Dene woman from Fort McPherson,” who lobbied for social and political change in the north (280).

Institutes helped women to develop “their expertise in working with other women, and in exercising leadership.”⁷¹⁰ Women focused on projects, such as municipal infrastructure, including streetlights and hydro service, and as they did they gained confidence in their abilities to be part of the voice of the community.⁷¹¹ Leddy has also written about Homemakers Clubs and has concluded that they were much more than cooking and sewing groups and furthermore that women became politically active through such groups.⁷¹² A full analysis of the Moosonee Homemakers Club is not part of this thesis but it is apparent that this group was as active and powerful as it could be in a small community like Moosonee.

Local residents continued to submit names for appointment to the MDAB from 1968 to 1973, when they intensified efforts for local elections. A public meeting held on 26 March 1973 included three hours of discussion with “most of the discussion focused on ‘Local Representation’ and ‘Communications.’”⁷¹³ The meeting was attended by 75 local residents who discussed “local problems in both English and Cree.”⁷¹⁴ It concluded with a unanimously adopted resolution emphasizing that any vacancies on the MDAB should be filled by elections, not appointments.⁷¹⁵

⁷¹⁰ Ambrose, Meetings, 10.

⁷¹¹ Ambrose, Meetings, 12.

⁷¹² Lianne Leddy, “Mostly Just a Social Gathering: Anishnabe-Kwewak and The Indian Homemakers Club, 1945-1960,” in *Aboriginal History, A Reader*, ed. Kristen Burnett and Geoff Read (Toronto: Oxford University Publishing, 2016), 356. Also see: Select Committee on Indian Affairs, *Civil Liberties and Rights of Indians in Ontario*. Toronto: Ontario Legislative Assembly, 1954, 10. This report indicated that there were “45 Homemakers’ Clubs on Indian Reserves” in 1954. Moosonee was not a reserve so it is likely its local Homemakers Club was not included in this total.

⁷¹³ AO, RG 68-9 B503347. Northern Affairs Files, Vol. 1. Kevin Scully, Supervisor, Northern Affairs Branch (Northern Region) to R. V. Scott, Director, Northern Affairs Branch, Ministry of Natural Resources, 11 April 1973. Attached to the Scully memo were Minutes from a *Man and Resources* meeting held in Moosonee on March 5th 1973. The file did not contain a Terms of Reference for this program however it was noted as federally sponsored.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid. Also see Claudia Milne “Access and Services in Local Government: A Case Study of Moosonee, Ontario.” Master’s Thesis, July, 1974. University of Waterloo. Milne indicated that “D. Wynne passed away in

The need for voicing local opinion about representation continued through 1973 and 1974. Claudia Milne described the 1973 nomination process and indicated that it involved people from throughout the community:

A “candidates meeting” open to the public was publicized in both Cree and English, and held on Nov.6, 1973. ... Eleven nominations were filed at the Board office and four more received from the floor. Of a total of 15 nominations, 4 were Indian status and one was Indian-white. The meeting was attended by over 100 adults ... at least one-half were residents of the area south of Store Creek which is almost 100% Indian or Metis. 78 ballots were cast. The top six candidates were A. Wesley (Indian), E. Butcher (white), Mrs. Maude Tyrer (Metis), Velko Novakovich (white), Peter Paulmartin (Indian) and Jack Ryder (white). The top three were appointed officially [by the provincial government] in Dec.1973.⁷¹⁶

One year later the first election for positions on the MDAB occurred.⁷¹⁷ The local newspaper, *Moosetalk*, reported that “253 Cast Ballots” and that the highest tally of votes – 152 – was garnered by Velko Novakovich, a local resident who had been nominated by the public for the first (1968) MDAB.⁷¹⁸ This election was a step up from a public meeting, but it was not a regular municipal election (i.e. one fully governed by the *Municipal Elections Act*).⁷¹⁹ The names of the people who garnered the top votes still had to go the provincial government for appointment

January, 1973,” (108). The public meeting to fill Wynne’s position ended with a motion which emphasized that positions should be elected.

⁷¹⁶ Claudia Milne, “Access and Services,” 109. Comments on ethnicity in brackets are directly copied from Milne’s thesis.

⁷¹⁷ The *Moosetalk* article implied that the election was for only three positions as Maude Tyrer and Andrew Wesley “will remain on the Board for second term.” Tyrer and Wesley had been appointed by the province in December, 1973, after obtaining the highest number of votes at the November 6, 1973 public meeting.

⁷¹⁸ AO, RG 68-9 B503347. Northern Affairs Director’s Files. Moosonee Vol. 2. “253 Cast Ballots,” *Moosetalk*, November, 1974. Also See Table 8.1 for names nominated at the February, 1968 public meeting. Novakovich had been nominated at that time but he was not one of the people appointed by the province in August 1968 to the first MDAB. Novakovich had actually been appointed by the province to the MDAB in March 1974 to fill a vacancy created when the original Chair of the MDAB, Ed Butcher, passed away (see Claudia Milne, 109). The other successful candidates included Jane Moore and Nina Hunter with 113 and 111 votes. One of the people who ran unsuccessfully for office in the 1974 Moosonee elections was Tom Archibald who had chaired the 1963 Moosonee Townsite Development Board.

⁷¹⁹ See Ontario, Bill C32, The Municipal Election Amendment Act, 1974, which indicated that Tuesday, November 12th would be the date for nominations for all municipal positions in the province (Section 19 referred to this date as Nomination Date). The November 12, 1974 election appears to be the first time that the Moosonee election partially corresponded to municipal elections in Ontario. That is, the Moosonee election occurred on Nomination Day.

to the MDAB. Nevertheless, this process, which became known as an “informal election,” was a step in the right direction.⁷²⁰

The MDAB would not have been in the position to be effective in transforming the radar base, after its closure, had it not been for the long struggle for recognition by local people and the development of local voice demonstrated by the MDAB and local citizens. For example, Velko Novakovich, who became the Chair of the MDAB in January 1975, was also the Chair for the Joint Closure Committee, which represented Moosonee and the local area in determining the future use of the radar base.⁷²¹ Less than a decade after the Board was created, and only two years after its first formal elections, the MDAB became the body that took over the RCAF radar base and made it a significant part of both the town and the region.

As has been suggested throughout this chapter, local people had been ignored or dismissed in planning and development studies, particularly in the early 1960s. One report indicated that, “until this summer [1963] when a committee was elected by the residents of Moosonee, there was no one to speak for them, and the only voice to be heard was that of the ONR.”⁷²² Planners have recognized, particularly in more recent years, that residents of local areas should be involved in local planning and development, particularly when a resource company (a mine or forest industry mill) becomes the sole industry for a community. This should also have applied when an entity like the ONR or the RCAF controlled land sales and developments, as was the case in Moosonee. Without a town council, the ONR was the sole contact for development discussions with the federal and provincial governments. However the

⁷²⁰ The first regular elections in Moosonee, governed by the *Municipal Elections Act*, did not take place until November 2000 when a Mayor and Councillors were elected for the new Town of Moosonee.

⁷²¹ Closure of the base and the role of the local Closure Committee is discussed in the next chapter.

⁷²² AO, Moosonee 1963-64, File 117.9, Report by Special Research and Surveys Branch, Department of Economics and Development, October 17, 1963 (no specific author noted), 2.

railway did not demonstrate any need for local public participation. Don Taylor commented in a speech he gave in the late 1950s that people often felt they were “being planned” rather than directing planning. He said that he recognized local councils and staff had to deal with the “outrageous cries of the persons who are being planned.”⁷²³ What Taylor likely meant was that, although the job of provincial planners was to provide land use planning options, they were often removed from direct and, sometimes critical, local feedback. In Moosonee’s case, both provincial staff and provincial politicians were removed from local participants and their ideas.

By 1975 the Town spoke for itself. The demand for local input and representation had started within months of the radar base opening. As documented earlier a public meeting was organized in mid-1962 to discuss issues in the community and to determine how to improve them. This meeting, held on 21 June 1962, occurred only 6 months after the RCAF base opened.⁷²⁴ It took another six years before the Moosonee Development Area Board Act was proclaimed and a further six years – 1974 – before the people of Moosonee could vote for their own local representatives.⁷²⁵

The next chapter, Chapter Nine, demonstrates how the evolution of local government placed Moosonee’s residents in the position of taking over and transforming the RCAF’s base when it closed in 1975. Furthermore, Chapter Nine describes the ways both local citizens and the MDAB worked within the community, with the town’s regional neighbours, and with the provincial and federal governments, to transform the radar base to meet local needs. Chapter Ten

⁷²³ Don Taylor, Director, Community Planning Branch, Ontario Department of Planning and Development, Speech to Association of School Business Officials, Toronto, Feb.3,1959. This speech was provided to me by Don Taylor.

⁷²⁴ AO, RG-19-1 B113127. Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee. W. H. Oerton to W.G. Cooke, 23 June 1961, “Sanitary Survey-Moosonee.”

⁷²⁵ It is worth noting that First Nations people could not vote in Ontario until 1954 and that the vote was not extended federally until 1960. Even in 1974, when Moosonee residents could vote for local representatives, the election winners were still appointed by the provincial government.

then returns to a further discussion of local governance and voice as an aspect of change and as part of a proposed new model of community development.

Chapter Nine: Not the “Beginning of the End” : The Closure of the Moosonee Base and Its Transformation

This chapter provides details on the federal closure announcement for the Moosonee radar base and on local objections to the announcement. It then outlines the ways that the community’s residents insisted on being part of the discussions about the closure and the strategies they used to examine closure options. The chapter closes with a discussion of the transformation of the radar base into a regional high school.

The closure of the radar base affected local people personally and the community physically. It is essential to an understanding of today’s Moosonee to know how the base closure impacted employment, local activities, and infrastructure. It is very likely that local residents who lived through this stage of the community’s development were not privy to all of the bureaucratic discussions involved in the base’s closure. In that regard, one of the goals of this dissertation is to provide the community with a detailed description of both what happened and how Moosonee’s people took control of their future.

The Announcement

The closure of the Moosonee radar base was a potent reminder that the defence of North America was controlled by NORAD, and ultimately by the Americans. Bothwell et al. described NORAD as “the North American defence plan by which Canadian and American officers would jointly administer an integrated defence force under supreme American command.”⁷²⁶ What this meant in practice was that, although the Moosonee base was operated by the RCAF, its closure was only divulged to local military personnel after a meeting with the United States Air Force (USAF). This meeting, attended by three officers from the USAF, occurred on 14 January

⁷²⁶ Robert Bothwell , Ian Drummond and John English, “Bad Luck and Bad Management,” in *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 242.

1975.⁷²⁷ The 1975 AHR has only a brief reference to the meeting, as the “Deputy Commanders Visit.” There is no indication of the purpose of the meeting, or whether any high ranking Canadian officers were included other than the CO, Major Conn. Two days later, the closure of Moosonee’s radar base was formally announced by the Department of National Defence.⁷²⁸

Excerpts from the announcement included the following:

Defence Minister James Richardson today announced a government decision regarding military operations at two Canadian Forces Stations, Val Dor, Quebec and Moosonee, Ontario. Canadian Forces personnel will be withdrawn from the airfield at Valdor [sic] and the Radar Site at Moosonee will be closed. The process at both locations will be gradual, extending through late 1975...

Several Government departments such as Regional Economic Expansion and Manpower and Immigration, will be working with the Department of National Defence and local authorities to minimize the disruptive effect on the communities concerned and to assist civilian employees to find other employment. Armed Forces personnel at the stations will be posted to vacant positions at other units.

Qualified civilian employees at both bases, who are offered and accept a position at another defence establishment or elsewhere in the public service which requires a new place of employment, will be reimbursed for reasonable expenses involved in the move ...

Efforts to find suitable employment for civilian personnel are being supported by the Public Service Commission and Canada Manpower Center; which will be requested to provide assistance for employees who do not remain with the Department of National Defence.⁷²⁹

The announcement consisted of six paragraphs, three of which dealt with the impacts on civilian employees. Clearly the impact on local employees was expected to be a powerful one.

⁷²⁷ Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence (CFMAD), File 2002-34-5, Annual Historical Report (AHR) for Moosonee Canadian Forces Station (CFS), Jan.1, 1974 to August 1, 1975, Entry for 14 January 1975.

⁷²⁸ DHH, Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS, Statement by the Minister of National Defence, 16 January 1975.

⁷²⁹ LAC, RG24, Series G-16-1, Vol.23534, File 1901-1, part 1. “Moosonee: Organization-General, 1965/02-1975/01,” Telex from Ottawa to CFS Val Dor and CFS Moosonee, 16 January 1975. The telex was marked “Priority, Confidential, and Exclusive.” This confidential telex included parts of the Minister’s closure announcement.

It appears that civilian and military personnel on the radar base were formally notified on 17 January.⁷³⁰ The Premier of Ontario, Bill Davis, also found out about the base closure on that day.⁷³¹ Press coverage started immediately and for the first half of the year concerns about closure were highlighted in newspaper articles with headings such as: “Defence Budget Cuts Killing CFS Moosonee,”⁷³² “Moosonee Base Closing Opposed by Civilians,”⁷³³ “Moosonee Troubles Spotlighted,”⁷³⁴ “Moosonee ‘coming to a stop’ with loss of radar base jobs,”⁷³⁵ and “Moosonee military base winds down to a ghostly stillness.”⁷³⁶

In the first newspaper article on the base’s closure, dated 18 January 1975, Major Conn confirmed that armed forces personnel would be transferred to other bases and that Department of National Defence (DND) was working to “relocate as many of the civilian employees as possible.”⁷³⁷ Conn noted that there were 141 armed forces personnel and 60 civilians employed at the Moosonee site.

⁷³⁰ CFMAD, Annual Report Jan.1, 1974 to August 1, 1975. Entry for 17 January 1975.

⁷³¹ AO, RG 64-8, B217371, Provincial Secretariat for Justice Files, File: “The North: Moosonee Base Closure,” Stef Donev, *Toronto Star*, March 13, 1975, C3. The reporter wrote in this article that Premier Davis was not pleased to hear about the Moosonee closure by a telegram (Jan.17/75) from federal Minister Richardson. In other words, Davis received no prior notification of the closure.

⁷³² AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs Branch, Director’s Files, *Moosonee Vol.3*. Len Gillis, “Defence Budget Cuts Killing CFS Moosonee,” *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.18, 1975. Although the material is from the Timmins Daily Press, it was located in Northern Affairs files. The presence of numerous newspaper clips in provincial files shows the role of the local Northern Affairs office, which was to monitor local and regional issues in the press.

⁷³³ AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs Branch, Director’s Files, *Moosonee Vol.2*, “Moosonee Base Closing Opposed By Civilians,” *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.21, 1975. (Note: Newspaper articles were not found in chronological order in the files, hence the later date-Jan.21st in an earlier volume-volume 2).

⁷³⁴ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.3*, “Moosonee Troubles Spotlighted,” *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.28, 1975.

⁷³⁵ Provincial Secretariat for Justice, “The North: Moosonee Base Closure,” Stef Donev, “Moosonee ‘coming to a stop’ with loss of radar base jobs,” *Toronto Star*, March 13, 1975.

⁷³⁶ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.3*. Don Gauthier, “Moosonee military base winds down to a ghostly stillness,” *North Bay Nugget*, June 20, 1975.

⁷³⁷ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.3*, Len Gillis, “Defence Budget Cuts Killing CFS Moosonee,” *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.18, 1975.

Local Objections to Closure

Two days after the first news article appeared, the union representing civilian employees rallied and started to voice objections. Ken Sweigard, the President of Local 628 of the Union of National Defence Employees and an electrician on the Moosonee base, told the *Timmins Daily Press* that the civilian employees would be pushing to reverse the federal government's decision.⁷³⁸ Sweigard stated that "closing the base would be a 'slap in the face' to the Indian and Metis who learned a trade to work at the base."⁷³⁹ He also said that 40 of the 60 civilians employed on the base were Cree and they, like all of the employees, "were really shocked and pretty perturbed by the whole thing."⁷⁴⁰ It is worth noting that interviewees tended to describe their training as "on the job, at the base" rather than prior to being hired as Sweigard suggested in the news article. However, Sweigard's key point was nevertheless correct, which was that the radar base jobs were significant for civilians. Sweigard sounded "union tough" at the beginning of the news article, but by the end, he was proposing that the radar base be given to the Moosonee Development Area Board (MDAB) if the federal government did not back down.⁷⁴¹

The MDAB sprang into action as quickly as the union. The Board held two special board meetings within hours of the announcement and they sent telegrams to their MP, Ralph Stewart,

⁷³⁸ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.2*. "Moosonee Base Closing Opposed By Civilians," *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.21, 1975. The press described Sweigard as both the Union President and the Pentecostal Minister for Moosonee. Claudia Milne notes that Sweigard was a member of the MDAB from March, 1973 to the end of 1974. See Claudia Milne, "Access and Services in Local Government: A Case Study of Moosonee, Ontario," Master's Thesis, July, 1974, University of Waterloo, 111.

⁷³⁹ Ibid., *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.21, 1975.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid. Sweigard also wrote to the local Moosonee newspaper *Moosetalk* about the option of taking over the radar base if the closure decision was not reversed. See AO, Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.2*. *Moosetalk*, Letter to the Editor by Ken Sweigard, January, 1975. (Note: *Moosetalk* editions are dated solely by month, not by specific dates as the paper was only published every month or two.)

and to Defence Minister Richardson.⁷⁴² The Secretary-Treasurer of the MDAB, John Pringle, told the press that the telegrams were intended to highlight Moosonee's concerns and to establish Moosonee as a priority bidder on the sale of base assets. He said "We're asking that we be given the opportunity to participate at all levels in the disposition of the base and that we be given some priority in it [in sales]." Pringle also indicated that it would be "madness" to sell the assets to outside parties.⁷⁴³ Finally, he noted that the Board was concerned there might be temporary power failures when the base's power plant was shut down because the town was not expecting to hook up to the new Ontario Hydro transmission line until November 1975.⁷⁴⁴

After the initial flurry of special board meetings, the MDAB called a public meeting for 28 January 1975, to discuss the closure and, as Secretary-Treasurer Pringle told the press, to "gather ideas and receive local input."⁷⁴⁵ Despite what Pringle indicated, the real purpose of the public meeting appears to have been the Board's wish to assess its public support; the Board wanted to hear from local people if it was truly a representative body for local residents. This was because the MDAB had been structured by the province and its members, although informally selected by local people, were still appointed by the province.⁷⁴⁶

While there is no indication how many people attended the public meeting, or if there was a vote taken on the Board's role, the Board heard enough from local people to feel

⁷⁴²Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.2*. "MDAB To Discuss Effects," *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.21, 1975.

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Hydro power has been discussed earlier in this thesis. Note: In the Jan.21/75 news article, Pringle indicated that the radar base supplied one-fifth of the total hydro-electric supply to Moosonee (ONR supplied the remainder).

⁷⁴⁵ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.3*, "Moosonee Troubles Spotlighted," *Timmins Daily Press*, Jan.28, 1975.

⁷⁴⁶ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.3*, "M.D.A.B. Report," *Moosetalk*, February, 1975. The local newspaper *Moosetalk* indicated that the MDAB, "recognized that it had a responsibility to assume a leadership role in looking after the Community's best interests It called a public meeting on January 28th at which the Board was, in effect, given a mandate to represent the people in Moosonee."

comfortable moving forward; it had been given a community mandate to proceed. The public meeting also likely ensured that the MDAB had half the seats on a closure committee that was formed a few days later by the provincial government.⁷⁴⁷ The Chairman and Secretary of the Joint Closure Committee for the radar base became Velko Novakovich, who was also Chairman of the MDAB, and John Pringle, Secretary of the MDAB. The Closure Committee also included five more members of the MDAB, three members of the Moose Factory Fire Prevention and Roads Committee, and three members of Moose Band Council. At its second meeting, the Closure Committee invited Grand Council Treaty Number Nine and a final member, Ed Faries Jr., joined the group.⁷⁴⁸ Although the Committee's report does not discuss if members were Indigenous or non-Indigenous, a Cabinet submission on the Joint Closure Committee's report indicates that the members of the committee were "Treaty and Non-Treaty Indians, Metis and whites."⁷⁴⁹

Closure Committee Activities

One of the first activities of the group was to ensure that it received further comments from the public. The committee instructed its secretary "to write each business and social group in both communities [Moosonee and Moose Factory] to this end."⁷⁵⁰ The Joint Committee

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid. The Joint Closure Committee (hereafter the Closure Committee) was formed on February 3, 1975.

⁷⁴⁸ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.3*, "Base Committee takes proposals to Queen's Park," *Moosetalk*, March, 1975. MDAB members Velko Novakovich and Andrew Wesley had been re-appointed for a second term on the MDAB in November, 1974. The other four MDAB members on the Closure Committee were Mrs. Jane Moore, Bert Trapper, Mrs. Nina Hunter, and Homer Brooks who had all been elected, and later appointed by the Provincial government to the MDAB, in November, 1974. For these election results see Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.2*, "253 Cast Ballots," *Moosetalk*, November 1974.

⁷⁴⁹ AO, RG 1-121, B207227, Ministry of Natural Resources, File: "Lands-Status Report to the Cabinet Committee on Resources Development (CCRD) on the Moosonee Area, 1975," Cabinet Submission on Moosonee Area, 25 June 1975, 5.

⁷⁵⁰ AO, RG 12-45, 762-2, B126157, Correspondence of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Environment, File: "Moosonee 1975," G.H.U. Bayly, Secretariat for Resources Development to all Ontario Deputy Ministers re: Canadian Forces Station-Moosonee, 9 April 1975. *The Report of [the] Joint Committee re: Closure of Canadian Forces Station -- Moosonee* (hereafter the Closure Report) was included as an attachment to Bayly's letter and dated March 1975. The reference above to "instructing their secretary, etc." is on page 2 of the Closure Report. The

considered a wide variety of ideas for how the radar base and its assets could be used. Two ideas were generated at the 28 January public meeting; these were a high school and an industrial park.⁷⁵¹ Interviewees have indicated that the high school concept was considered a top priority by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents, especially since all high school age children, in Moosonee and Moose Factory, and indeed the entire James Bay area, had to travel south to complete Grades 9 to 13. In fact, interviewees said that this was one of the local issues on which everyone agreed on the potential solution. The *Timmins Daily Press* had also supported the high school concept, indicating that “The entire James Bay area could be facilitated by the station [high school].”⁷⁵² By March, even the *Toronto Star* was recording support for a high school:

Although residents have numerous ideas about what they’d like to see replace the base – ranging from a minimum security prison to a technical school – officials say most people agree that part of the facilities should be used as a high school...Currently the 300 or so high school age children from the area have to live in North Bay, Timmins or other cities to go to school.⁷⁵³

The high school became the top priority in *The Report of [the] Joint Committee re: Closure of Canadian Forces Station -- Moosonee* (hereafter referred to as the *Closure Report*), which was submitted to the provincial government in March 1975.⁷⁵⁴

The goal of the *Closure Report* was clearly laid out by the Joint Committee:

Purpose of Report: To set forth the ideas coming from the people of Moosonee, Moose Factory and surrounding area regarding the utilization of the Canadian Forces Station Moosonee such that the people living in these communities might reap the maximum

Closure Report was located in an MOE file because the Deputy Minister of MOE was a recipient of the report, not because it was circulated by that Ministry.

⁷⁵¹ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.2*, “Moosonee Station: School is Perfect Idea,” *Timmins Daily Press*, Feb.1, 1975.

⁷⁵² Ibid.

⁷⁵³ Stef Doney, “Moosonee ‘coming to a stop’ with loss of radar base jobs,” *Toronto Star*, March 13, 1975,

⁷⁵⁴ AO, RG 12-45, 762-2, B126157, Correspondence of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Environment, File: “Moosonee 1975,” Closure Report.

benefit from them both from the standpoint of employment of the residents, the economic welfare of the area, and improvement of social amenities.⁷⁵⁵

It is significant that the Closure Committee referred to “ideas coming from the people.” The incorporation of public opinions had been absent from most prior activities in Moosonee as documented in preceding chapters of this thesis.⁷⁵⁶ The true intent of the report however, was an even more powerful statement, which was labelled as ‘Miscellaneous’ and subtly placed in a section at the end of the report’s preamble:

Miscellaneous: ...Throughout the period there has been much communication with the Provincial Government and to a more limited degree with the Federal Government. It appears clear that this committee must take the initiative in the project by exploring the best way to handle things then use its influence with both Provincial and Federal bodies to give assistance in attaining these goals.⁷⁵⁷

Clearly, the Closure Committee was a team; that is, it was “taking the initiative” and working together to benefit everyone in the area. Furthermore, it was exercising agency together by assuming that it had charge of the future use of the base. Finally, the Committee was prepared to stand either with or against governments to achieve what was needed.

The Closure Committee’s report laid out 8 recommended uses for the base. These were, in order of priority: secondary school complex, utilization of housing from the base, use of the base recreation complex, local Native craft industries, community and social facilities (e.g. nursing home), tourist facilities, facilities for government (e.g. air sea rescue station), and ‘Other’ (e.g. garage and storage facilities for Ontario Hydro). This discussion will focus on the leading two suggestions: a high school and housing, primarily because those were the ones that seemed the most urgent to the Committee. A secondary reason for focusing on these two items is that

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid, 1.

⁷⁵⁶ See in particular the lack of public input to infrastructure projects and to formation of the MDAB in Chapters 7 and 8.

⁷⁵⁷ Closure Report, 2.

they were the changes that were eventually implemented and that influenced the lives of local people.

The creation of a regional high school had been highlighted by the press as an appropriate use of the base facilities. The Closure Committee emphasized that the area needed not only a local high school, but accommodation for students from outside Moosonee, and the base recreation facilities in order to be effective. The committee wrote that “the pleas for local high school facilities are very strong particularly from the Indian population in Moosonee and Moose Factory.”⁷⁵⁸ They also stated “This is by far the most definite and substantial proposal and its implementation would go a long way towards meeting the objectives of this committee.”⁷⁵⁹ At the end of its report, the committee reiterated:

The Committee recommends first and foremost the establishment of grades 9 and 10 High School classes ... The strong bid for a High School by the Indian population of Moosonee and Moose Factory was impressive. The authorities should perhaps look upon the base closure as the ‘incident’ that brought the need for a high school to the fore rather than simply a suggestion for the use of the base.⁷⁶⁰

Although the *Closure Report* emphasized the support of local Indigenous people, interviewees said that the high school concept was strongly supported by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, all of whom were tired of sending their children away for high school. Even those persons whose children were quite young at the time of the base closure said they were dreading the day that they would need to put their teenagers on the train south, to board with strangers in North Bay or Sudbury.⁷⁶¹

⁷⁵⁸ Closure Report, 3.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁷⁶¹ Also see *Moosetalk* articles, “A High School Now!” and “Let’s Give It Some Thought,” and *Moosetalk* Editorial, “Dribs and Drabs.” In AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs Branch, Director’s Files, *Moosonee: Vol. One*. April, 1975.

The Ministry of Education also supported the regional high school concept, which it indicated would serve “Moosonee and Moose Factory, as well as [students] from Fort Albany, Kashechewan, Attiwapiskat, Fort Severn and Winisk, on a boarding school basis.”⁷⁶² It indicated that a high school would need most of the facilities on the radar base, including:

The school [Henry Hudson School], the recreation centre, the church and social hall, the combined officers’ mess, the single barracks block, the administrative building, the skating rink and ice arena, the mechanical and civil engineering workshops and twenty of the houses [for teachers].⁷⁶³

The assumption by the Ministry of Education seemed to be that students would be housed in the RCAF’s former single barracks and that all other structures would be needed for high school programs.⁷⁶⁴

While the high school request was the community’s top priority, the use of houses from the base was a close second in the closure report. The report’s authors described the base subdivision and its housing as follows:

Permanent married quarters (P.M.Q.s) – it seems generally agreed that the housing at the base is too crowded and that thinning to perhaps 50% would still leave 57 houses at the base. People from Moosonee, Moose Factory both on the Reserve and elsewhere – have expressed an interest. Some see a demand for them from places like Albany and Kashechewan. These buildings are movable having come in on wheels and fastened together to make a 20’ wide building ... Thirty-eight applications for houses either to be occupied at the base or to be moved to sites elsewhere have currently been received by the committee.⁷⁶⁵

As this study progresses the feasibility of using the base as [a] subdivision of Moosonee becomes more and more practical. The lack of serviced lots [in town] and the high cost of servicing them contributes greatly to this position.⁷⁶⁶

⁷⁶² Lands-Status Report to the Cabinet Committee on Resources Development (CCRD) on the Moosonee Area, 1975, 7.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁴ Closure report, 4. Part of the Closure Report suggested that the teachers be the ones who would travel, rather than students, for example from Moosonee to Moose Factory. However, this was not implemented.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid., 9.

The reference to high servicing costs would have referred primarily to water and sewer service costs in the townsite of Moosonee and in the area south of Store Creek.

Although the Joint Committee did not highlight the base water and sewer plants within its recommendations, it referred to these facilities at the end of the report. The Committee indicated that the base's sewage disposal plant was a "definite asset," but suggested that

Water supply from the base water treatment plant is considered at this point to be economically impractical because of high labour and material costs. Some who are knowledgeable on the subject feel that extensions of the Moosonee water mains to the base would be a sound move. This would seem to be a key to the utilization of the base.⁷⁶⁷

Ontario's Minister of the Environment, William Newman, concurred with the Closure Committee's observations on infrastructure. In his initial review of the *Closure Report*, the Minister wrote that "Many of the proposals contained in the Brief of the Joint Committee are contingent on the existing sewage and water facilities on the base and in the town."⁷⁶⁸ Newman recommended that a consultant be retained to determine if "it would be more practical to continue operating the base and townsite services as separate units, or to expand the town services to serve the base and close the CFS water and sewage treatment facilities."⁷⁶⁹ The integration of sewer and water infrastructure had been recommended by provincial staff during the original planning for the construction of the radar base.⁷⁷⁰ Now the concept of integrated services had come full circle and the province would be faced with a much more expensive

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁸ AO, RG 12-45, 762-2, B126157, Correspondence of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Environment, , File: Moosonee 1975, W.G. Newman, Minister of Environment to Allan Grossman, Provincial Secretary for Resources Development re: Closure of Canadian Forces Station-Moosonee, 3 June 1975.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰ See Chapter Five discussion on planning of the base.

project: integrating the older base facilities, constructed in 1960, with the newer town structures and pipes, completed in 1969.⁷⁷¹

Even as early as 1968, provincial government staff had been told that the radar base could possibly close by 1975.⁷⁷² Staff had, at that point, noted that there were potential assets on the base that could be used locally if closure occurred. As one planner noted, “There are permanent, large buildings, used presently for offices, recreation centre, church, etc., the future use of which might be considered... [and] 114 housing units [which] are transportable aluminum homes – mobile homes.”⁷⁷³ This illustrates how both government representatives and local people had been scrutinizing radar base’s assets for years before its closure.

As the closure report was being deliberated by Cabinet, Commanding Officer Major Conn provided more detail in a guest editorial printed in *Moosetalk* in April 1975. Conn used the opportunity to both describe the dismantling of the base and to say farewell to local people:

During the last couple of weeks there has been a considerable amount of activity occurring at the base; helicopters flying over, many strangers arriving and leaving and perhaps most significantly, the change in the skyline with the dismantling of the radomes... On 1 April, 1975, as planned the radar stopped functioning and the air navigation beacon (TACAN) ceased, ending the operational role of this station... On 10 April, 1975 a crew of technicians arrived from USAF to dismantle the radomes and ... which will be returned to the U.S. ... [This] is an immense task, especially when combined with the one hundred and twenty families which are leaving at the same time. As people depart, buildings have to be closed and prepared for whatever future the station may have.

⁷⁷¹ See Chapter Seven for a full discussion of town infrastructure and Appendix Five for a table that summarizes the sewer and water contracts.

⁷⁷² AO, RG 19-77, B354517, File 119.1, Moosonee 1968. M. Balas, Community Planner, Department of Municipal Affairs (DMA) to M. H. Sinclair, Head, Research and Special Studies, Community Planning Branch, DMA. “Visit to Moosonee on August 28-29 and 30, 1968,” Report dated 5 September 1968. Ms Balas indicated that provincial staff met with Major Misener, the Commanding Officer of the RCAF base, and asked him about the future of the base. Misener reported that the NORAD agreement would expire in 1975 but he indicated that this did not mean the definite closure of the base.

⁷⁷³ *Ibid.*, 5.

As plans stand now, the station will be closed by 1 Aug.75 ... Although many rumours are circulating, concerning the future, we at the station have had no news and we are just as concerned as the townspeople.

Since the opening of the station in 1961, several hundred people have been posted here and many more have visited the area on business. All of these people will regret the closing of CFS Moosonee; since we have enjoyed the area and particularly the hospitality the townspeople have shown the station. The present members, all wish the Moosonee area well, in the future.⁷⁷⁴

There is no indication in archival files that Major Conn was required to give this update to local people and it seemed to be a heartfelt parting message.

By June 1975 provincial government staff had reviewed the Joint Closure report, circulated it to twelve government ministries, and prepared a Cabinet submission. Generally, provincial ministries were supportive of the recommendations by the Joint Closure Committee. The focus of the province shifted to implementation issues and to collaboration with the federal government to transfer the radar base to either the province or the town.

Part of ensuring a good future for Moosonee was taking care of the radar base's structures so that they would not deteriorate while the provincial and federal government deliberated on options for the base. In this regard, the Department of National Defence (DND) prepared a thorough report by April 1975 on "the requirements for the continued preservation of all useable buildings at CFS Moosonee after the 1 Aug 75 closure date."⁷⁷⁵ The DND stated that it would be necessary to operate the heating and power plant, the water and sewage plants, and the MQ [likely PMQ] furnaces in order to avoid freezing the infrastructure. It also indicated that approximately 20 personnel, either civilians or military, would be needed to manage utilities, maintenance and security on the former base. The estimated monthly cost of preserving the

⁷⁷⁴ Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee: Vol. One*. Editorial, "Dribs and Drabs", *Moosetalk*, April, 1975.

⁷⁷⁵ LAC, "Moosonee: Organization-General, 1965/02-1975/01," RG24, Series G-16-1, Vol.23534, File 1901-1, part 1, CFS Moosonee Contingency Plan, 1 April 1975.

condition of the base was \$45,250, but the more pressing issue was that the DND expected there would be no military personnel and “few qualified civilians” available once the base closed.⁷⁷⁶ In addition, the DND report stated that “the present fuel contract terminates 1 Aug 75 [and] a new contract would have to be negotiated prior to that date.”⁷⁷⁷ The time for decisions was very tight but, other than the DND, the provincial and federal governments did not seem to realize the need to protect the base’s assets before they were divested.

By June 1975 more facilities were closing on the base and people were moving away.

The *North Bay Nugget* provided a description of the situation:

The first of the regular facilities to close was the base Chapel ... The next to close were mess facilities for the Officers and Junior Ranks. These were moved to a combined operation with the sergeants and became an All Ranks Mess...on June 1st. The next major closure of facilities came when the Canex (the base shopping centre), the Post Office and the Snack Bars closed.

Personnel started leaving the Base at the end of March and the exodus continued. Each evening now the lighted windows of the married quarters get fewer and fewer. Personnel board the train daily with their families and head for new postings....

As of August 1, the Canadian Forces Station that was built in 1960 will be patrolled by two or three Commissionaires, a couple of Military Police and a whole bunch of blackflies and mosquitoes. They won’t be fogging the grounds anymore to keep the bugs down.⁷⁷⁸

This *North Bay Nugget* article is one of the few archival records to give any indication of the status of buildings as the base neared its closure date. The only other document to refer to progress (or lack thereof) on the Joint Closure Committee report was a provincial staff memo

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁸ AO, Northern Affairs Branch, *Moosonee Vol.3*. Don Gauthier, “Moosonee military base winds down to a ghostly stillness,” *North Bay Nugget*, June 20, 1975. Note that the reporter’s reference to the Canex as the base shopping centre was somewhat exaggerated. Interviewees indicated that the Canex was a grocery store. The reporter also noted that the chapel had closed. It was dismantled and moved to Kashatchewan during the winter of 1975/75. Information on the chapel was supplied by retired Archbishop John R. Clarke. Reverend Clarke was not interviewed as part of this dissertation, however he provided information on the chapel in response to my blog post on Moosonee (see <http://niche-canada.org/2013/11/03/the-cold-war-in-the-near-north-moosonee-and-the-pinetree-radar-line>.)

that indicated the high school proposal would likely proceed: “Understand Minister of Education and School Board have discussed. General agreement on need. Good possibility of utilizing C.F.B. facilities.”⁷⁷⁹

By early 1976, Moosonee’s residents must have been getting concerned about the slow pace of asset transition at the base. The CBC picked up on this subject and broadcast a show on *The Fifth Estate* on 24 February 1976, which showed empty housing on the base, while some residents of Moosonee were living in shacks.⁷⁸⁰ The show generated a flurry of letters to Premier Bill Davis.⁷⁸¹ All the writers were adamant that the province immediately deal with housing and other issues in Moosonee, as the following excerpts show:

Yesterday I saw the program “The Fifth Estate” and I was appalled to hear about the closed base at Moosonee. The base is being heated without anyone benefitting, while the native population is spending huge sums of money to heat their primitive huts.⁷⁸²

After watching ...Fifth Estate...and their report on the living conditions of the people of Moosonee and Moose Factory area, the government red tape in trying to decide to sell them empty, government housing that my tax dollars are paying for, I am as a citizen of this province asking for your resignation. You are not man enough for the position you hold.⁷⁸³

Do what you can to see that the ‘Liberal’ red tape and the ‘Conservative’ indecision in Ontario is circumvented so that the native people of the Moosonee district of Ontario are enabled to use NOW the abandoned C.F.B. Moosonee which is their right and our responsibility.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁷⁹ D. F. Taylor, Executive Director, Local Government Services Division, Ministry of Municipal Affairs to A. G. Careless, Director, Policy Liaison, 11 August 1975. Memo provided by Don Taylor.

⁷⁸⁰ AO, Premier W. Davis Correspondence, RG 3-57, B239657, File: Moosonee Base Closing, 1976. D. F. Taylor, Executive Director, Local Government Services Division, Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs to Rose O’Regan, Executive Officer, Office of the Premier, re: Fifth Estate-CBC-Moosonee, 15 March 1976.

⁷⁸¹ Premier W. Davis Correspondence, File: Moosonee Base Closing, 1976. This file contains 17 letters written to the Premier, mainly by residents living outside of Moosonee. The names and addresses of writers have been redacted (blacked out) as part of FOI procedures, but writers generally explained where they were writing from (e.g. southern Ontario). At least half of the letters were written on the same day as the *Fifth Estate* program (24 February 1976). Some dates had also been redacted.

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid.

The 114 houses, the school and the recreational facilities that are standing idle in this community while the residents are living in very substandard dwellings is a national disgrace.⁷⁸⁵

Tonight I learned about what goes on at Moosonee and I'm appalled. ... How your government can allow those poor Indian and Metis to live in such squalor with all that housing standing there vacant is past all understanding. It is a provincial and national disgrace.⁷⁸⁶

LET THE TOWN IN NOW – work out your usual RED TAPE LATER.⁷⁸⁷

Is this [Moosonee] an example of how democracy works? ... Taxpayers are keeping 114 empty houses heated while children grow up resentful and bitter toward their country. Old people suffer and deteriorate in mind and body. ... If Democracy can't work ... then let's have Castro come up and straighten us out and teach us how to share our blessings.⁷⁸⁸

These excerpts from letters written to Premier Davis are fairly representative of the complaints to the Ontario government. Some letters were also sent to Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. These letters may have been the impetus needed to get the province and federal governments to transfer the base to the MDAB.

In the wake of this criticism Premier Davis responded. He agreed with some of the accusations but he also clarified that the province had been building infrastructure for some years, and housing more recently. Specifically Davis responded in his form letter:

I admit that it has taken considerable time to make arrangements for the use of the housing and other components of the abandoned armed forces base. The determination of the best solution has involved complex discussions between several provincial agencies, the municipality, the Treaty Nine organization, several Indian bands, the Metis Association, the Indian community on Moose Factory Island and several federal agencies....

The Ontario Government has now authorized the Moosonee Area Development Board to negotiate with the Federal Government as to the disposition of the [housing] units. ...

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

The Ontario Housing Corporation has built approximately 68 new housing units for Indians and Metis in Moosonee over the past few years. ... The Province has spent a great deal of money over the past 10 years ... [on infrastructure].⁷⁸⁹

One month after the premier's reply, the Provincial Secretary confirmed that all federal and provincial documents had been finalized "clearing the way for the final transfer of the assets of the former CFS Moosonee to the MDAB."⁷⁹⁰ That same week, negotiations were underway with "the Indian Band [Moose Band] and the Métis and Non-Status Indian Association to purchase fifty houses from the D.N.D. Radar Base – 25 each."⁷⁹¹ Interviewees indicated that the sale of these houses benefitted everyone. People who purchased homes on the base knew they would have more yard space since every second home had been removed, while people who purchased homes from the Métis and Non-Status Association could either live in those homes on the base or could move their new homes onto a site in the town. Homes that were sold to Moose Factory Island's residents were moved "over the ice" during the winter of 1976-77 helping fill the demand for housing on the island.⁷⁹²

Progress also occurred on the fledgling high school. By June 1976 a principal had been appointed for the James Bay Lowlands District Secondary School, and plans had been made to hire ten teachers, "three of which are native."⁷⁹³ James Auld, the Chair of Management Board of Cabinet, had visited with the new principal and had observed "extensive repainting and

⁷⁸⁹ Premier Davis Correspondence, Moosonee Base Closing, 1976. Form letter from Premier Davis responding to individuals re: "The Fifth Estate" program, 31 March 1976.

⁷⁹⁰ Premier Davis Correspondence, Moosonee Base Closing, 1976, D. R. Irving, Provincial Secretary to W. Darcy McKeough, Treasurer of Ontario, 29 April 1976.

⁷⁹¹ AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs Branch, Director's Files, Moosonee: Vol.4, K.J. Scully, Supervisor, Northern Affairs Branch, Northern Regional Office, Ministry of Natural Resources to R.V. Scott, Director, Northern Affairs Branch, 27 April 1976.

⁷⁹² Ibid.

⁷⁹³ AO, RG 2-152, B202730, Minister of Education Correspondence Files. File: Minister's Meeting re: Moosonee Education Facilities, 1976. James Auld, Management Board of Cabinet to Tom Wells, Minister of Education, July 19, 1976.

refurbishing ... to the gymnasium/swimming pool complex and the school buildings.”⁷⁹⁴ Auld also indicated that the Principal was anticipating 100 to 150 students to start at the school in September 1976. Additionally he mentioned that students from Moose Factory Island would need to be transported to and from the high school by helicopter during freeze-up and thaw periods.⁷⁹⁵

Although a cursory sketch was attached to Auld’s memos, information from interviewees provides a much clearer picture of the amount of transformation that was occurring for the high school. One interviewee described the changes as follows:

Twenty-one homes on the base were kept for teachers’ houses. These houses were scattered throughout the former base property.

The barracks were kept for student housing. Students from Moose Factory came over on Monday morning and returned home on Friday. They travelled by boat or helicopter depending on the season.

The Junior Ranks Mess became the high school library and the Sergeants’ Mess became the Home Economics room. The Officers’ Mess became the Art room and the combined mess cafeteria was retained as a high school cafeteria.

The Henry Hudson School [now called H-block apartments] was used for high school classrooms.

The ME building (Mobile Equipment & Supply building) was used for Automotive Shop, the Carpentry Shop, Drafting room and Electrical Shop.

The Administration/Base Headquarters building was used for School Board offices. This was a brand new School Board since there had never been a high school in the James Bay area.

The Recreation Centre on the base originally included a 94 seat theatre and a bowling alley. The students were still able to use the bowling alley. The seats were removed from the theatre and it was turned into a music room. The snack bar room was turned into offices. The base pool was maintained and is still the same pool that is in the current high school, although the pool closed about four years ago [2009] due to lack of funds for major upgrades. The gym in the current high school is the original gym that was

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid.

constructed on the base and that formed part of the Recreation Centre. This was the gym where the RCAF held its dances and balls.⁷⁹⁶

The transformation of the radar base's buildings into a high school campus was so comprehensive that it can only be described as impressive. Furthermore, what started as the exercise of agency by the town and regional representatives resulted in a full service high school and in new housing for Moosonee and Moose Factory. Both of these initiatives demonstrated how people from the town and the entire region seized the opportunity that the base closure represented. Additionally, the Closure Committee was unique because it was one of the few groups formed in this region, and in this era, which represented both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. That is, the committee was locally empowered and it was representative. It was also not developed by the provincial or federal governments and the appointees were not government selected and approved individuals. Rather, all the appointees to the committee were selected by the communities that chose to be involved in the base's transformation. This ability to choose its own representatives and partners added to the momentum, enthusiasm, and determination shown by the closure committee.

Researchers who study community initiatives suggest that one of the components for community development is “finding a group that is passionate about the initiative.”⁷⁹⁷ Wayne Caldwell et al. suggest that a passionate “community-based group is able to provide motivation, credibility, people power, and the resources to make change in a community.”⁷⁹⁸ Moosonee demonstrated all the criteria for a successful community-based group. The MDAB ensured that it had the support of the community before it acted; it ensured that it had a mandate to proceed.

⁷⁹⁶ Interviews, 2013.

⁷⁹⁷ Wayne Caldwell, Paul Kraehling, and Suzanna Kaptur, “A Healthy Rural Community Tool Kit,” in *Municipal World* 125, no. 9 (2015): 30.

⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Next, it sought the opinions of local residents and presented them to the Closure Committee. The Closure Committee itself prepared a comprehensive report on options for the radar base and then it ensured that the report was implemented. The Closure Committee represents a valuable example of change that reached both within and beyond the community of Moosonee, bringing together Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. The next chapter outlines the concepts of community development that were evident in Moosonee, not only during the transformation of the radar base, but from the first time the town experienced the Cold War's impact.

Chapter Ten: Stages of Community Development, Impacts, and Change

Change in Moosonee was not random. Rather, it was part of a system, or a series of interconnected changes. Some of the critical system elements or changes were population growth, environmental contamination of water and soil, employment, infrastructure development, and the evolution of local government. Change occurred in a system, but it was also a spatial, temporal and social process. This chapter starts by examining the stages of development in Moosonee and comparing these stages to the resource town development models discussed in Chapter Two. The second part of the chapter is an outline of the Cold War's impacts on Moosonee and a discussion of the ways change was experienced differently depending on the social status of individuals and groups. Essentially, Chapter Ten describes the convergence of community development theory and personal experience as evidenced in Moosonee during the Cold War.

The key development stages or activities in Moosonee for the time period covered by this dissertation were: the railway and early 1950s construction phase (related to the Mid-Canada Line), construction and operation of the Pinetree radar base, the development of local infrastructure, the evolution of local government, and the closure of the radar base.

The railway development stage was touted by the ONR as an important element of northern economic growth, but this research suggests that the railway was most significant for setting the stage for development during the Cold War, rather than as a separate development activity. Without the railway it is doubtful that the community would have been chosen as a

shipping centre for Mid-Canada radar bases. It is also impossible to imagine that Moosonee would have been chosen as a radar base site without the existence of the railway.

The planning and construction of Moosonee's radar base was a significant stage for two reasons. The planning of the base demonstrated a failed opportunity to integrate the town and base's infrastructure and services. However, the construction process provided training opportunities, at the Carter construction camp, for local people to be hired subsequently on the radar base itself. The operation of the radar base was similar to the operation of a mine or forest industry mill near a resource community. Local people were not only hired to work on the Base but they further developed career skills there and interviewees emphasized that they picked up skills through recreational activities that stayed with them throughout their lives and shaped the culture of Moosonee.

The development of new infrastructure in Moosonee was mandated due to the increase in its population and subsequent environmental degradation generated by the construction of the railway and the Mid-Canada shipping area, and by the construction and operation of the radar base. Infrastructure installation served two purposes: providing clean water, sewage treatment, and roads – services that were vital to the growth of the town; and fostering a climate of public participation, or at least public demand for ongoing improvements to services. The infrastructure development phase was the ultimate basis for the evolution of local government in the community.


The final local stage – development of voice and local government -- placed Moosonee's citizens in the position to exercise agency in developing proposals for the future use of the radar base when it closed. Had local people not been voicing their opinions during the infrastructure

and local government phases, it is doubtful they would have reacted so quickly to the opportunity to control the future of both the assets and the land occupied by the base. This was particularly important because gaining the authority to use a former radar base was not something that occurred in all locations.⁷⁹⁹

The dramatic increase or ‘boom’ phase in Moosonee, to use Robert Bone’s terminology, is demonstrated by Figure 10.1. The population growth in this figure shows only the change for the town itself, and so does not represent the residents of the radar base.⁸⁰⁰ Figure 10.1 illustrates that the population of Moosonee quadrupled in the early stages of military development (i.e. 1956-1961). The figure also demonstrates that in 1976, the year after the radar base closed, the town did not experience any decrease in population. This shows that the town adapted to the base closure even though employees were laid off after the radar base closed. To be clear, approximately 450 residents of the radar base moved away but the town’s own population in 1976 was 1,349 compared to 1,325 before the site closed. Ten years after the base closed, the town’s population was still over 1,300.

⁷⁹⁹ As an example, the Lowther Pinetree site, near Hearst, Ontario, was completely demolished after closure in 1987 (Public Works Superintendent, Town of Kapuskasing, personal conversation, May, 2010).

⁸⁰⁰ See Figure 7.1 in Chapter Seven for a comparison of the town’s population and the radar base population.



Note to Figure 10.1: All population data are from Statistics Canada, except for 1963 and 1967.⁸⁰¹

The stability of Moosonee's population does not match what Robert Bone refers to as the "Classic Boom and Bust" cycle of resource towns.⁸⁰² In resource town communities, when the resource company shuts down, be it a mine or a mill, there is generally a "bust" stage that occurs and this stage includes a sharp decrease in population in the adjacent local community. Bone states that towns like Pine Point, Northwest Territories and Uranium City, Saskatchewan are classic examples of "boom and bust" because populations returned to pre-development levels

⁸⁰¹ This figure does not include the radar base's population. Population statistics for 1963 were sourced from AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister's Files, File: "Indians – Moosonee, 1963-66," Report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963. The 1967 population figures were located in AO, "General Admin., Moosonee Development Board," RG19-F-7, B350920, 24 November 1967, R. A. Rivard, Regional Administrator, DSFS to C. J. Williams, Executive Officer, DSFS.

⁸⁰² R. M. Bone, *The Canadian North: Issues and Challenges* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012), 123.

after mine closures.⁸⁰³ Despite the contrast in population change compared to resource towns, Moosonee's development stages still have some, but not all, of the model elements outlined by Robert Bone and Rex Lucas.⁸⁰⁴ The Bone and Lucas models are compared to Moosonee's development stages in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1: Moosonee's Development Stages Compared to Bone and Lucas's Models

Bone Model	Lucas Model	Moosonee Development Stages
Vacant Site		Early development includes fur trade (Revillon Freres-1905) and Railway (1932).
	Construction	<u>First Phase of Cold War Construction:</u> Mid-Canada Line shipping and construction of airstrip, 1955-56.
Sudden Growth	Recruitment of Citizens	<u>First Phase of Migration:</u> Construction Workers and Northern Cree travel to Moosonee. ⁸⁰⁵
		<u>Second Phase of Cold War Construction:</u> Pinetree Base, 1960-61.
		<u>Second phase of Migration:</u> RCAF start to occupy radar base at Dec.1961
Peak of Resource Production		RCAF military personnel numbers peak at Oct/Nov 1962; civilian employee numbers peak in 1963. RCAF and civilians interact (employment, sports and social activities) Settlement south of Store Creek grows from a dozen homes to 114 houses. The majority of the properties (74) are occupied by Cree families from Attawapiskat and Fort Albany, seeking employment. ⁸⁰⁶

⁸⁰³ Bone, *The Canadian North* and Rex Lucas, *Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities of Single Industry* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2nd edition.

⁸⁰⁴ Bone, 123-124. See Chapter Two for further discussion on the Bone and Lucas models and on sustainable resource towns like Elliot Lake, Ontario.

⁸⁰⁵ Don Delaplante, "Moosonee Booms with Construction of Airfield." *Globe and Mail*, December 22, 1955.

⁸⁰⁶ AO, RG19 F-7, General Admin. Moosonee Development Board. J. S. J. S. Band, Deputy Minister, Department of Social and Family Services to W. H. Palmer, Deputy Minister, Department of Municipal Affairs, 29 November 1967.

	Transition: Local services are developed and interaction occurs between resource industries and local government	<u>Transition or Adaptation to Growth:</u> Major infrastructure (water/sewer) concerns in town and warnings of health hazards (1961-63). Housing south of Store Creek is described as ranging from “adequate to unfit for human habitation” ⁸⁰⁷ (1963) Construction of sewer and water begins (1966). Local Government begins to evolve.
	Maturity	MDAB Act proclaimed (1968) Major part of infrastructure construction is completed by 1968, but the area south of Store Creek is not fully serviced for several more years. ⁸⁰⁸
Mine Downsizes ⁸⁰⁹		The number of military personnel and civilian employees remained stable throughout the life of the base, right up until the closure announcement. Downsizing of the radar base was a rapid process focusing on the Spring of 1975.
Mine Closes		RCAF base closes (1975)
Area reverts to Vacant Site		<u>Adaptation to Closure:</u> The RCAF site did not revert to a vacant site. Instead it was transformed into a high school campus and housing was completely utilized.

Unlike the Bone and Lucas models, the Moosonee model has two construction stages and two stages of transition or adaptation. Moosonee experienced and partially adapted to rapid growth. This adaptation is best demonstrated by the town’s recovery from infrastructure crises and by the evolution of local government. Moosonee also experienced adaptation in the

⁸⁰⁷ AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister’s Files, File: “Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66,” Report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963. Thomas indicates that 41 houses south of Store Creek are “unfit for habitation,” pp 7-8.


⁸⁰⁸ Claudia Milne “Access and Services in Local Government: A Case Study of Moosonee, Ontario.” Master’s Thesis, July, 1974. University of Waterloo. Maps appended to Milne’s thesis show water and sewer lines and fire hydrants on some streets south of Store Creek at 1973.

⁸⁰⁹ This phase can also be compared to Bradbury/St. Martin’s ‘downsizing’ phase. See the discussion in Chapter Two on resource towns and downsizing in Schefferville, Quebec. John H. Bradbury and Isabelle St. Martin, “Winding Down in a Quebec Mining Town: A Case Study of Schefferville,” *Canadian Geographer* 27, no. 2 (1983): 128-144.

transition phase when the radar base closed. I would argue that the first phase of adaptation, the adjustment to growth, was the most difficult for Moosonee residents, not only because of the immense issues involved in constructing water and sewer facilities after development had already occurred, but also because the construction of much needed works was initially restricted to the area north of Store Creek. This staging of infrastructure caused animosity within the community and between the community and the provincial government, as demonstrated in Chapter Eight. The second phase of adaptation, adjusting to the base's closure, was almost a welcome challenge to the residents of Moosonee who were, by 1975, savvy participants in local governance processes.

Figure 10.2 shows Moosonee's key development stages as a new model of change. The figure begins with the two phases of construction and migration which occurred in Moosonee. The first phase, initiated in 1955, was the building of an airstrip to supply the Mid-Canada line's radar bases located north of Moosonee. As discussed in Chapter Four, this phase generated migration to Moosonee from Cree communities on the western shore of James Bay. The second phase of construction and migration was the 1960-61 construction of Moosonee's radar base, followed by the migration of 200 military personnel and their families. This phase is described in Chapter Five and is supplemented by Chapter Six's discussion of life on the base.

Figure 10.2: Moosonee's Model of Community Change



The middle circle in Figure 10.2 highlights the Infrastructure and Services development stage. Chapter Seven describes the degradation of Moosonee's environment and how the town required major infrastructure and services improvements in order to survive. The fourth circle in Figure 10.2 represents the development of local government, a process spurred on by local people who had become discouraged and angry by the slow pace of desperately needed community improvements. This stage demonstrates how local people adapted to the two phases of construction and migration. They demanded more, not just in physical improvements to the community, but in the quality of local governance. In fact, the residents of Moosonee claimed their entitlement to governance and a real voice in their future, as discussed in Chapter Eight.

Once local government was in place, the town's residents were positioned to be able to seize the moment when the radar base closed. Thus the top circle in Figure 10.2, described in Chapter Nine, represents adaptation to closure and the transformation of the radar base.

The arrow in Figure 10.2 sweeps upward, partly to represent positive change in Moosonee over time, but also to illustrate the power of what Stalwick et al. refer to as “community based action.”⁸¹⁰ These authors describe community based action as a way to understand community conditions, to be “in dialogue” within a community, and to become involved in change.⁸¹¹ As an example of being “in dialogue” Stalwick et al. conducted study circles with Indigenous people in the early 1980s. At these sessions community residents indicated that they were the best people to identify community priorities and people also noted that “citizens will name their own service needs.”⁸¹² Additionally, participants indicated that it was only possible to understand change if “the relationship to land use” was incorporated in solutions.⁸¹³ Moosonee's residents fully understood what made their community function well and what did not, and as daily observers of change, they certainly understood their evolving landscape.

What happened in Moosonee was community based action, not community ‘placed’ activity, which allows only limited public participation.⁸¹⁴ Community placed development had

⁸¹⁰ Harvey Stalwick et al., “Reform as the Creation of New Usages: 1982-85 Synopsis of the Taking Control Project,” in *Perspectives on Social Services and Social Issues*, Conference Proceedings, ed. J. Ismael and R. J. Tomlinson (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1987), 224. This article focused on participatory action research design, but it also referred to community based action.

⁸¹¹ Ibid., 227.

⁸¹² Ibid., 232.

⁸¹³ Ibid.

⁸¹⁴ See Collaborative Center for Health Equity, “Community Based Participatory Research (CBPR).” This paper describes the difference between ‘community placed’ activity, which simply occurs within a community and is not initiated by local residents and ‘community based activity’ which is directed by local residents. The paper was prepared by the University of Wisconsin Institute for Clinical and Translational Research, 2008. This paper was provided courtesy of Professor Heather Jessup-Falcioni, School of Nursing, Laurentian University.

been attempted, unsuccessfully, in federal government initiatives on First Nations' lands between 1954 and 1968.⁸¹⁵ Hugh Shewell writes that, "despite the democratic principles inherent in community development, Indians were not consulted or involved in the development of [the program]."⁸¹⁶ Furthermore, he indicates that community economic development failed due to a lack of community control.⁸¹⁷ Essentially, federal programs were not community based.

Moosonee's processes were the epitome of community based participatory activity, not as a research process, but as an ongoing implementation of the goals of local residents. There were four components of community based activity which occurred in Moosonee. The first component was physical change, specifically the deterioration in Moosonee's environment. The second was social change, the creation of jobs and recreational activities. One component was negative, while the other represented positive opportunities. These two components generated local feedback and community action, because in both cases there was an inequity, recognized locally, between the two settlement areas. People living in the town were able to access clean water and sewage facilities several years prior to people situated in the village. Similarly, a higher number of residents of the town, as opposed to the village, were employed on the base and were subsequently privy to recreational opportunities linked to civilian positions.

Public participation represented the third component in community based activity. This component included the action of the town's residents to demand services for others. These demands took the form of public participation in citizen's groups and culminated in the eventual creation of local government in the community. Furthermore, residents not only voiced concerns locally, but they also became experienced at ensuring their voices were heard by media outlets,

⁸¹⁵ Hugh Shewell, "'Bitterness behind every Smiling Face': Community Development and Canada's First Nations, 1954-1968," *Canadian Historical Review* 83, no.1 (2002): 57-84.

⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁸¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 81.

and therefore by other residents of the province. The best examples of this connection to the media were the protests of local people when Minister Bill Davis arrived to open the JBEC complex (see Chapter Seven) and the Fifth Estate program on the delays in transformation of the radar base (Chapter Nine). These incidents of media reporting were not accidental and Moosonee's residents likely requested, or at least hoped for, exposure in the media.⁸¹⁸ Local residents were fully aware that their concerns would not be met unless the general public was aware of their situation. Eventually the expressions of concern and demands for change resulted in the improvements to infrastructure, the creation of a regional high school and the ability to conduct local elections. Thus the third component of community based activity, public participation, included the powerful expression of community voices through local governance.

The fourth component of community based action was the formation of a passionate group that crossed the boundaries of gender, race, and class. Local people demonstrated what Caldwell et al. refer to as "passion" when they formed the Closure committee and developed solutions to deal with the closure of the radar base.⁸¹⁹ Although Figure 10.2 illustrates development stages it does not pinpoint how development affected individuals. The next part of this chapter helps to remedy this situation by discussing how the impacts of Cold War growth and change affected different groups of people.

Interviewees indicated that the Cold War's impacts were primarily positive. These impacts included the employment and training opportunities provided at the radar base, the ability to participate in social and recreational activities, and the opportunity to utilize the

⁸¹⁸ Hugh Shewell, "Bitterness behind every Smiling Face," documents how, during the 1960s, Indigenous groups in British Columbia deliberately involved the media in housing issues in order to "embarrass Indian Affairs locally and nationally," (77).

⁸¹⁹ Wayne Caldwell, Paul Kraehling, and Suzanna Kaptur, "A Healthy Rural Community Tool Kit," in *Municipal World* 125, no. 9 (2015): 30.

infrastructure and buildings left in the community after the base closed. On the latter point, as discussed in Chapter Nine, the radar base's facilities provided a huge benefit both to housing stock and to the ability to form a local high school complex. The high school complex did not just mean that classrooms and workshops were available. Rather it meant that high school aged children no longer had to move away for five years to complete their education.⁸²⁰

Although interviewees indicated that the Cold War's impacts were positive, change in Moosonee was experienced differently depending on the social status of residents. Impacts varied depending on where people lived, in the townsite or in the village, and their social status. The term "social status," is used here in a broad sense meaning the combination of gender, race, and class.⁸²¹

The first element of social status that demonstrates differing impacts is gender. Joy Parr explains that, when historians examine gender along with race and class, they assume that "in important ways, the experience of women was not like the experience of men, the experience of First Nations was not like the experience of colonizers [and] the experience of workers was not like that of bosses."⁸²² Parr has specifically examined how men and women experience local government differently. In her study of two Ontario factory towns, Parr observed that, when it came to local decision making, for men "their assent was required if a community consensus was

⁸²⁰ In terms of negative impacts that were a few interviewees who mentioned that they wondered what had happened to diesel fuel drums and to generators, which would have contained PCBs. This study did not yield any files indicating if burial of hazardous wastes occurred when the Moosonee base closed. The federal government did, however clean up the diesel fuel site at the base in the early 1990s. I toured the diesel fuel site with federal government staff in the 1990s and they showed me the observation points that remained at the diesel fuel site for monitoring the cleanup that had occurred.

⁸²¹ Joan Wallach Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 44.

⁸²² Joy Parr, "Gender History and Historical Practice," *Canadian Historical Review* 76, no. 3 (1995): 363. Also see Beverly Leipter and Linda Reutter, "Women's Health in Northern British Columbia: The Role of Geography and Gender," *Canadian Journal of Rural Medicine* 10 (2005): 241-153 on the role of women in northern resource towns.

to be formed.”⁸²³ However, she found, that in comparison, women were “neither functionally nor ideologically...fully citizens of the town. They were more considered than consulted in the public affairs of the municipality.”⁸²⁴

Parr’s research on gender and local government is applicable to the situation in Moosonee. During the period studied here (1955-1975) women were, to borrow Parr’s words, barely “considered” by outside agencies. Furthermore, women were merely “noted,” and they were not consulted regarding infrastructure, local government and development issues. Provincial reports on public meetings show women as having been present, but they are generally dismissed as “only housewives” even though some of the women who pushed to have their voices heard were employees of local businesses. The dismissal of women’s roles inside and outside of the home was commonplace during the 1950s and 1960s as documented by Ruth Roach Pierson and Doug Owram.⁸²⁵ These authors illustrate how women were encouraged to leave the workplace after the Second World War and to devote themselves to marriage and family.⁸²⁶ As Owram states “Women remained in the home. Men worked. At mid-century this ideal was pervasive.”⁸²⁷ Women were certainly not encouraged, during the postwar era, to become involved in the public sphere, particularly in politics.⁸²⁸

Possibly due to the dire local circumstances, Moosonee’s women did not conform to the prevailing norms noted by Roach Pierson and Owram. Instead, women in Moosonee participated

⁸²³ Joy Parr, *The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1930* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 230.

⁸²⁴ Ibid.

⁸²⁵ Ruth Roach Pierson, *They’re Still Women After All’: The Second World and Canadian Womanhood* (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1986). Doug Owram, *Born At the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996) .

⁸²⁶ Ruth Roach Pierson, 215-220.

⁸²⁷ Doug Owram, 22.

⁸²⁸ Ruth Roach Pierson, 215. Pierson indicates that postwar Canada was an era of “male primacy” both in the economic sphere and in decision making roles.

in citizen's committees such as the Moosonee Townsite Development Board and the Moosonee Community Council Steering Committee.⁸²⁹ They were also leaders of community groups such as the Homemakers' Club in which they gained experience in organizational roles.⁸³⁰ However, women were not considered for the initial appointments to the MDAB in 1968. As discussed in Chapter 8, women such as Ellen Morrison and Dorothy Wynne had been actively involved in lobbying for services for local people, particularly those who lived south of Store Creek.⁸³¹ Women also worked both in the town and on the radar base.⁸³² The lack of recognition of their work and their value to the community, which would have been remedied by appointment to the MDAB, must have irked women and the community at large. After all, it was the community that had nominated women for those initial positions. In effect, women were elected by the community but rejected by the province.

The activity at the radar base did not encourage or enable women's voices. As noted in Chapter Six, military documents recorded women if they had babies, and if they were involved in sports teams. References to women were also often combined with children, to form the group called "dependents." Women were referred to as "the distaff side," or the 'other.' There was, however, still a positive impact of having women on the base. Although not present until several

⁸²⁹ See Chapter Eight for further discussion on the Moosonee Townsite Development Board (1963) and the Moosonee Community Council Steering Committee (1964).

⁸³⁰ Chapter Eight reviews the role of the Homemaker's Clubs in Ontario and in Moosonee.

⁸³¹ File 118.5 Moosonee 1967-68, Mrs. Kenneth Wynne and Mrs. Ellen Morrison, to Don Taylor, Community Planning Branch, Department of Municipal Affairs, 17 January 1968.

⁸³² However, as noted in Chapter Six, it is difficult to tell how many women benefitted from civilian jobs or what type of work they did at the radar base. Also see Jennifer Blythe and Peggy Martin-McGuire, "Changing Employment of Cree Women in Moosonee and Moose Factory." In *Women of the First Nations: Power, Wisdom and Strength*, edited by Christine Miller and Patricia Chuchryk. (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1996), 134. The authors interviewed 246 women as part of a research project on women and work in 1984 in Moosonee and Moose Factory. The only reference to employment on Moosonee radar base was "In the 1950's, work associated with a Canadian Forces base and the DEWLine early-warning radar system became available for Cree men in Moosonee. A few of their wives also found employment as the town grew." P.134. Also see Jennifer M. Blythe, Peggy Martin Brizinski, and Sarah Preston. *'I was Never Idle': Women and Work in Moosonee and Moose Factory*. TASO Report No. 21. (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1985).

years after the base opened, women's sports teams were formed and were active. This meant that women who were spouses of civilian employees could participate in a range of sports, including curling, bowling and baseball, and that single women who were civilian employees could join teams and benefit from the social and physical aspects of sport.

The second element of social status that demonstrates variation in impacts is race. Provincial government reports from departments such as Welfare and Social and Family Services tended to categorize Moosonee's residents as "White, Status Indian, Non-Status Indian, Metis, and White-Status Indian."⁸³³ These reports also indicated that almost all the residents who lived south of Store Creek were Indigenous peoples.⁸³⁴ This is the area that had to wait longer than the town for water, sewer and fire services. It would be simplistic to attribute the lack of services solely to race. The most expensive properties in Moosonee, the industrial lots, were also denied water and sewer services despite lobbying by their owners to the provincial government. Provincial planners indicated that both the Village (south of Store Creek) and the industrial area were outside Moosonee's main downtown area, and that the focus of Stage One of water and sewer construction was the original built-up area of Moosonee (i.e. the original townsite). Despite the planning rationale, the delay in services for the Village was dangerous for Indigenous people. As indicated in Chapters Six and Seven, it was Indigenous people who returned to inadequate shacks, or even tents after receiving health services, and it was Indigenous

⁸³³ See in particular the Wendy Thomas and Rivard reports noted in Chapters 6 and 7. Sources: AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister's Files, File: "Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66," Report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963. AO, "General Admin., Moosonee Development Board," RG19-F-7, B350920, R. A. Rivard, Regional Administrator, DSFS to C. J. Williams, Executive Officer, DSFS, 24 November 1967. See Chapter Eight for further discussion on terms used by civil servants (e.g. White Status Indians).

⁸³⁴ Ibid. Also see Claudia Milne's comments on the November 1973 public meeting discussed in Chapter Eight (Evolution of Local Government). Claudia Milne "Access and Services in Local Government: A Case Study of Moosonee, Ontario," Master's Thesis, July, 1974. University of Waterloo, 109.

people who were more likely to experience house fires.⁸³⁵ In effect, the consequences of lack of services were dire in the village compared to other areas of town. As indicated in Chapter Eight, it was these dreadful impacts which inspired Indigenous residents like Tom Archibald, Ellen Morrison, and Dorothy Wynne to constantly lobby for improvements.⁸³⁶

Race was not overtly noted in any archival materials on military or civilian positions within the radar base's archival records. The RCAF used only two categories – military and civilian – in their annual historical reports. Initially, I considered that this represented an effort to ignore the heritage of Indigenous employees. However, further reading of the RCAF's records determined that, to the military, there were only two distinctions that were important. The RCAF was in the town solely to defend Canada from nuclear attack. Base Commanders and other officers only cared whether someone had completed military training and could handle radar or other equipment; or whether the person could handle the essential civilian employee functions. Interviewees did note, however, one digression from the RCAF's records. They indicated that the distasteful, and potentially dangerous, job of applying creosote for walkways fell to the Indigenous civilian employees.⁸³⁷ What this indicates is that further research, and

⁸³⁵ AO, RG 29-01-1481, B430939, Department of Social and Family Services, Deputy Minister's Files, File: "Indians –Moosonee, 1967-70," Departmental Memo from Peter Szego, Director, Indian Community Development Services Branch to Deputy Minister Borczak "Re-Tents in Moosonee," 11 February 1970. This file also contained the following news clip: Anne Moon, "'Keep Moosonee Clean' but nobody collects the Indians' garbage," *Toronto Star*, June 16, 1969. See also: AO, RG9-1, B113127. Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee. "Place of Hidden Beauty: Moosonee's Worth Impresses Those With the Right Eyes," Nigel Dunn, *Toronto Daily Star*, August 11, 1960 and "2 Children Die in Shack Fire At Moosonee," *Globe and Mail*, December 12, 1963.

⁸³⁶ Chapter Eight provides further information on the role of Tom Archibald as Chairman of the Moosonee Townsite Development Board and Ellen Morrison and Dorothy Wynne as members of the Homemakers Club. See in particular: AO, File 119.5 Moosonee 1969, Mrs. Ellen Morrison, Homemakers Club to Minister J. Yaremko, Department of Social and Family Services, 19 June 1969. AO, File 119.4, Moosonee 1969, A. J. Elie, Senior Planner, Community Planning Branch, Department of Municipal Affairs to Don Taylor, Director and Supervisor, Official Plans Section, Community Planning Branch, 6 June 1969. Elie stated that the "homemaker club" was "composed of many vocal Indian women in the community." Chapter Eight also includes a discussion on Maude Tyrer, an Indigenous resident, who was the first woman appointed to the MDAB.

⁸³⁷ Interviews, 2013. The discussion on creosote is covered in Chapter Six.

particularly interviews, might provide a more enhanced picture of racial aspects of employment on the base.

Race and class are closely entwined and that is why it is imperative to examine class as a third element of social status that demonstrates different impacts. Class can be a difficult aspect to measure or categorize, especially for a dissertation that does not include an analysis of income. However, in Moosonee as in other communities, the type of housing that people lived in was an indicator of class. The following description of housing demonstrates the class distinctions that existed in Moosonee. Wendy Thomas, a Department of Welfare worker, assessed housing in Moosonee during 1963.⁸³⁸ She indicated that the town's homes tended to be "well-built and spacious," but that two-thirds of the village's homes, which were occupied by Indigenous people, were either "inadequate" or "unfit for human habitation."⁸³⁹ A few years after the Thomas report, another provincial employee, J. K. McAully, provided housing excerpts from a land use planning report on Moosonee which described the town's housing as "average" and the village's housing as "sub-minimal."⁸⁴⁰ The combination of the Thomas and McAully reports provide a use beyond structural assessments. That is, the reports provide a picture of a divided community – Moosonee's townsite versus the village. Residents of the town were

⁸³⁸ AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister's Files, File: "Indians – Moosonee, 1963-66," Report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963.

⁸³⁹ Ibid. Thomas indicated that "inadequate" meant that houses were too small or had "unstable construction." The "unfit for human habitation" structures were shacks with tarpaper or canvas roofing and they were uninsulated. Another report, issued in 1967 by Department of Social and Family Services (DSFS), indicated that eleven homes south of Store Creek were "tent shacks, having wood frame walls and a canvas roof." See R. A. Rivard, Regional Administrator, DSFS to C. J. Williams, Executive Officer, DSFS, in AO, "General Admin., Moosonee Development Board," RG19-F-7, B350920, 24 November 1967.

⁸⁴⁰ AO, RG19 F-7, General Admin. Moosonee Development Board. J. K. McAully, Senior Accounting Advisor, Department of Municipal Affairs to R. J. Watson, Director, Municipal Accounting Branch, re: Townsite of Moosonee Proposed Water and Sewage Program, 30 May 1966. McAully's housing material was extracted from *Moosonee, A Community Development Plan*, April, 1964, by Project Planning Associates, a Toronto planning firm. As noted earlier in this thesis, the original report could not be accessed from the Ontario Archives, despite repeated searches.

perceived as primarily white and of a class that could afford reasonable housing while residents of the village were described as primarily Indigenous people who did not have decent housing.

Despite housing conditions, employment at the radar base crossed the boundary between the townsite and the village. For example, Tom Archibald, the first chairman of the Moosonee Townsite Development Board, told the press in 1965 that he was a full-time employee at the radar base but that he lived in a ‘shack’ in the village.⁸⁴¹ For civilian employees of the base, seeing a modern community (the base) every day, on the job, meant that they knew change was possible, and they were not going to be content with living a substandard life. Most of the civilian employees hired at the radar base lived in town, but there were at least seven people employed from the village area.⁸⁴² Interviewees emphasized that civilian employees, from both the village and the town, wanted more of what they saw daily at the base, especially clean water, better roads and adequate housing.

Both residents of the town and the village crossed social boundaries and worked together to effect change in Moosonee. The best example of the mix of men and women, Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, and residents of the town and village was the initial Moosonee Townsite Development Board described in Chapter 8. Provincial health inspectors had described this group of 15 residents as “8 white status Indians, two of which are women, 6 whites, [and] 1 Indian.”⁸⁴³ As noted in Chapter 8, while this labelling of individuals would be unacceptable

⁸⁴¹ AO, File 118.3, Moosonee 1966. Bob Pennington, “Why Indians Smash So Many Windows”, *The Telegram*, Feb.15, 1965. p.8.

⁸⁴² R. A. Rivard, Regional Administrator, DSFS to C. J. Williams, Executive Officer, DSFS, in AO, “General Admin., Moosonee Development Board,” RG19-F-7, B350920, 24 November 1967. The RCAF employment number for south of Store Creek was derived from charts and a map attached to this correspondence. There was no map for the area north of Store Creek.

⁸⁴³ AO, File 117.9 Moosonee 1963-64. H. C. Raiche, Department of Health to W. G. Cooke, 7 October 1963.

today, it is recorded here to indicate how provincial staff at the time identified the diversity of citizens involved in forcing changes in Moosonee.

Also, although Moosonee's residents experienced change in different ways, they sometimes spoke as "one voice" when it came to demanding improvements. First, the Moosonee Townsite Development Board has already been mentioned above as one example of the shared purposes of people who were from different backgrounds. A second example of demanding change was the action sought by the first members of the MDAB in 1968. This new board was made up solely of provincial appointees who were male and primarily white (3 out of 5 members were non-Indigenous). Three days after their first meeting, the MDAB told their provincial advisor that their top priority was to get clean water for people living south of Store Creek.⁸⁴⁴ The members understood that people living south of the creek had not benefitted as much as town residents from employment and recreation at the radar base and from plans for sewer and water construction.

Thirdly, the formation of the Joint Closure Committee, which formulated the recommendations for transforming the radar base, bridged social differences in order to effect change. This Committee was made up of both men and women who lived not only in various areas of Moosonee but also in other neighbouring communities, and who were "Treaty and Non-

⁸⁴⁴ See Chapter 7 for further discussion on this topic. Also see AO, RG19-77 B354517. File 119.2 Moosonee 1968. F. A. Braybrook to Deputy Minister Palmer, re: "Report on the Organization of the Moosonee Development Area Board – Current Administrative and Other Matters Affecting the Board" 9 September 1968. Although the report was dated September 9th, Braybrook wrote that he toured the Village, with the new MDAB members, on August 30th, two days after their inaugural meeting. Board members told Braybrook they wanted immediate action on services for the Village.

Treaty Indians, Metis and whites.”⁸⁴⁵ This demonstrates that, not only did Moosonee’s citizens bridge gender, race and class differences, but they also crossed geographic boundaries.

The development that occurred in Moosonee provides a new model of multiple stages of community change and adaptation. It also shows that change and adaptation were socially complex. Additionally, the model demonstrates how even small changes in Moosonee caused both structural (infrastructure) issues and personal changes, for example losing access to clean water. Furthermore this model adds to our knowledge about the ways that small, northern communities have been impacted by rapid military or resource development. As indicated earlier, only one planning text, by Ira Robinson, mentioned that military towns were being developed throughout the north.⁸⁴⁶ Resource planners that published after Robinson, like Bradbury and St. Martin, failed to continue his discussion on military communities.⁸⁴⁷ Initially the goal of this research was to examine and discuss physical or community change separately from human or personal impacts. However, this study shows the way that physical and human changes are completely entwined and how it is not useful to artificially separate the physical environment from the bodies that occupy it.

This case study has not solved a specific problem for the community of Moosonee, but it adds to our knowledge about the ways that small northern communities adapt to adjacent development. Furthermore, research on Moosonee increases our understanding of what makes a

⁸⁴⁵ AO, RG 1-121, B207227, Ministry of Natural Resources, File: “Lands-Status Report to the Cabinet Committee on Resources Development (CCRD) on the Moosonee Area, 1975,” Cabinet Submission on Moosonee Area, 25 June 1975, 5. Note that the Joint Closure Committee was formed on February 3, 1975.

⁸⁴⁶ Ira Robinson, *New Industrial Towns on Canada’s Resource Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 39. See Robinson’s discussion of Schefferville in Chapter Two--Literature Review.

⁸⁴⁷ John H. Bradbury and Isabelle St. Martin also have no mention of the Knob Lake radar base in their study of Schefferville. See “Winding Down in a Quebec Mining Town: A Case Study of Schefferville,” *Canadian Geographer* 27, no. 2 (1983): 128-144.

better community, that is, a community based on quality of life, adequate services, and positive personal experiences. Such an understanding could inform development not only in new towns but also existing communities, particularly in northern Ontario as we approach the “Ring of Fire” era and consider questions of resource claims and local control.

The ‘Ring of Fire’ is a multi-billion dollar mining development north of Longlac, Ontario (and west of Attawapiskat) that encompasses a huge geographic area. Some researchers are already discussing the potential for the construction of a new resource town in this area.⁸⁴⁸ The nine First Nations in the Ring of Fire area have jointly signed, as the Matawa First Nations, a framework agreement with the Province of Ontario. This agreement is intended to ensure that local peoples are part of decision making throughout the environmental assessment and development stages of mines in their area. A provincial news release from March 2014 indicated that part of the framework would include “regional and community infrastructure.”⁸⁴⁹ However, the Moosonee model demonstrates that it is the use of infrastructure after closure which can also be a very beneficial result of a development process. As is common in resource town discussions, there is little thought about closure because there is an assumption that a mine will last forever. This research has shown that it is not appropriate to assume longevity, no matter how large the mineral supply or how imminent the threat at a military base.

Three development components need to be addressed. First, Indigenous peoples must be asked for their input about a ‘New Town’ in the Ring of Fire area. Their voice will be essential in discussions about new development and infrastructure. Indigenous peoples will want to comment on how closely their communities are integrated with a new town. Integration, in this instance,

⁸⁴⁸ The potential for a new settlement and the anticipated impacts on existing indigenous communities, were discussion points at a Ring of Fire symposium held at Laurentian in February 2012.

⁸⁴⁹ Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, news release, “Ontario, First Nations to Work Together on Ring of Fire,” 26 March 2014.

does not mean of peoples, but of infrastructure and services. For example, there has been no discussion on the sharing of local education facilities with a new town. As the model developed here demonstrated, any discussion on education, health, recreation, or other facilities must include First Nations' knowledge. The issue of integration of facilities was a major aspect of early planning for Moosonee, but Cold War urgency took precedence. This was unacceptable.

Secondly, although environmental assessment is now a legislated process in Ontario, the First Nations will require assurance of meticulous planning for waste management, and for disposal of hazardous materials, should the mines close. This study shows that military planners ignored waste management during the heady days of the Cold War. This gap caused environmental issues for decades after closure of bases in two of the radar lines (DEW and Mid-Canada Line), and only further research will show the environmental issues that linger for the third line, the Pinetree. My study shows that this environmental degradation needs to be explored and remedied to deal with the health and social consequences that it causes. Finally, people migrate to development sites. Therefore, contingency planning and funds to deal with population growth are necessary. Despite the current isolation of communities like Webequie and Marten Falls, the development plans for the Ring of Fire include the construction of a road and/or railway system. People who come as job-seekers will need housing, health care, educational facilities, and recreation. They will demand these services whether or not they are hired at the chromite mine. The Moosonee model demonstrates how population growth, caused by migration for employment, disrupts existing communities and results in demands for local improvements and governance. The Moosonee model illustrates these realities. We should learn from it.

This study shows that the creation of the Moosonee Development Area Board was not an orderly or staged transition. Moosonee needed structural and legislative change because it was a

migration centre and because people, who had hoped to find work on military construction projects and later at the radar base, were living in slums or squatter camps. Provincial involvement, through infrastructure funds and legislation, was a reaction, not an action in itself. It was a reaction to vigorous lobbying of local citizens and to serious health and environmental issues. Furthermore, the issues that Moosonee faced and overcame are still relevant to small northern communities, even those that are not facing proposed development. There are daily concerns expressed by northern Indigenous residents across Canada, particularly those who have limited or no access to clean drinking water or fire protection services.⁸⁵⁰ Fifty years after Moosonee lobbied for changes, it is difficult to comprehend why basic services are something that must still be demanded, rather than provided outright.

Returning to the question about why an interdisciplinary approach was the best way to conduct research on a specific theme, I contend that reversing the question sheds as much, or more light on the value of interdisciplinary work. That is, the question could be rephrased as: Would a land use planning approach have provided the necessary research sources to fully examine Cold War change in Moosonee? While the field of planning can be quite broad and is appropriate for problem-solving and investigation in a number of fields, had I used solely a planning approach I would have missed inquiry into fields and topics such as anthropology, indigenous studies, gender studies and history as explained in Chapter Two and throughout this dissertation.

⁸⁵⁰ For examples of recent service issues see CBC radio “Up North” for 2016 commentary on a major fire in Pikangikum due primarily to the lack of firefighting services, the cycles of flooding in Attawapiskat, and the student suicides in Thunder Bay which have occurred as high school students from northern reserves spend their teenage years away from home. Also see Health Canada’s website (www.hc-sc.gc.ca) for the high number of boil water advisories on First Nations lands.

Planning literature on the stages of resource town development that trace the “boom and bust” stages of both resource towns and military towns prove inadequate to explain the case of Moosonee. A new model is required to depict adaptation or change in communities that remain in place after the key resource (in this case, the radar base) closes, particularly where local governance is proposed. My work included the development of such a model within the context of an interdisciplinary approach in order to link both community and personal change.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archives

Canada, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH)

*Annual Historical Reports for Moosonee RCAF Airbase, 1961-1969 and 1973-1975.*⁸⁵¹

Permanent Reference File (PRF) *Moosonee Canadian Forces Station (CFS)*.

Joint Photographic Intelligence Centre (PLT) fonds, File 79/347, Box 39, *C-44, Moosonee (PLT)*. This file consisted of Air Photos of Moosonee RCAF Base site from 1955 to 1962.

File 72-345, *Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972*.

Canada, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).

RG24-G-16-1 (now R112-85-3-E) Department of National Defence, Moosonee RCAF base.

Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence, Canadian Forces Base North Bay, Ontario.

*Annual Historical Reports for Moosonee RCAF Airbase, 1961-1969 and 1973-1975.*⁸⁵²

Agreement between the Royal Canadian Air Force and the United States Air Force for Sharing of Costs of Communications Facilities. Continental Air Defence Integration North (CADIN) Files (File #2000.55.1), 1965.

Wrong, Hume H., *Exchange of Notes (August 1, 1951) between Canada and the United States Re: Extension and Co-Ordination of the Continental Radar Defence System*. CADIN Files. Internal Memo, Washington (Canadian Embassy), 1951.

⁸⁵¹ Annual Historical Reports for the Moosonee RCAF Base were sourced from both the Directorate of History and Heritage and from the Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence in order to compile a complete set of these papers. Neither site had AHRs for 1970-72.

⁸⁵² Ibid.

A Summary of Canada-United States Agreements on Air Defence Ground Environment. CADIN Files, (File #1999 24 163), 1968.

A Digest on the Building of the Mid-Canada Line. RCAF Systems Engineering Group, 1957.

Photos of Moosonee RCAF Base, 1962. (includes aerial photos of the base and ground photos of radar domes).

Ontario Archives

RG1-Ontario Department of Lands and Forests/Ministry of Natural Resources

RG2-Ontario Department of Education

RG3-Premiers' Papers (Premier Frost, Premier Robarts, Premier Davis)

RG6-Ontario Treasury Department

RG8-Ontario Department of the Provincial Secretary

RG9-Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Trade

RG10-Ontario Department of Health/Ministry of Health

RG12-Ministry of the Environment

RG19-Ontario Department of Planning and Development/ Department of Municipal Affairs

RG29-Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services

RG34-Ontario Economic Council

RG68-Northern Affairs Branch (later Ministry of Northern Development)

RG75-Cabinet Office (Cabinet Committee on Townsites)

RG84-Ontario Water Resources Commission

Discovery North/ North Bay Museum Archives

Moosonee Master Site Plan RCAF, circa 1969. Map, Rolled Plans, Cabinet 22, Unit 5,

Accession Number 1987.1.198.

Moose Factory Stats and Info, Ontario Northland Railway file A-24-6, Box 16.

Government Documents

Canada, Department of National Defence. "Citizenship for the Canadian Forces: The Yukon and Northwest Territories." Ottawa: Bureau of Current Affairs, 1955.

Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics/Statistics Canada. *Census of Canada: Moosonee Population: 1931, 1941, 1956, 1961, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986*, Queen's Printer, Ottawa.

Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics. "The Northeastern Ontario Regional Development Program: A Progress Report." Toronto: Department of Treasury and Economics, 1969.

Ontario. Legislative Assembly. "Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario," 1954-77, www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/ser23347, accessed April 12, 2014.

_____. Select Committee on Indian Affairs, *Civil Liberties and Rights of Indians in Ontario*. Toronto: Ontario Legislative Assembly, 1954.

_____. Executive Committee for Indians, *Report to the Cabinet Committee for Indians*. Toronto, Ontario Legislative Assembly, April 1965.

Ontario, Annual Reports

Annual Reports of the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway Commission/Ontario Northland Transportation Commission, 1923-1976.

Annual Reports of the Ontario Water Resources Commission, 1956-1971.

Annual Reports of the Department of Planning and Development/Department of Municipal Affairs, 1959-1976.

Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing:

Moosonee Development Area Board Act, 1966, Chapter 27, Statutes of Ontario.

Air Photo of Moosonee, 1989.

Primary Articles and Texts

- Bruemmer, Fred. "Moosonee and Moose Factory." *Canadian Geographical Journal* 55, no. 1 (1957): 24–29.
- Bucksar, R. G. "Moosonee and the Squatters." *Canadian Welfare* 44, no. 5 (1968): 15–16.
———. "The Squatter on the Resource Frontier." *Arctic* 23, no. 3 (1970): 201–4.
- Carroll, Margaret A. "Defence Forces Operations in Hudson's Bay." In *Science, History and Hudson Bay*, edited by C. S. Beals, 2:897–934. Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1968.
- Chance, Norman A., and John Trudeau. "Social Organization, Acculturation, and Integration Among the Eskimo and the Cree: A Comparative Study." *Anthropologica* 5, no. 1 (1963): 47–56.
- Cheever, R. A. "Construction on the DEW Line." *Engineering and Contract Record*, 1957, 53–57 and 193–99.
- Close, Frederick. *All Aboard the Polar Bear Express: The Lure and Lore of the Land*. Simcoe: Morris Printing, 1966.
- Collins, T. H. "The Mid-Canada Line Today." *The Roundel*, May 1960, 10–13.
- Cottrell, Alvin. "The Role of NATO's Air Forces." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 299, no. 1 (1955): 102–8.
- Currie, R. A. "Northward Ho! Our Special Contract Department Builds a Major Defence Installation." *Bluebell* 34, no. 10 (1955): 26–29.
- Delaplante, Don. "Broad Albany Bridged in Darkness As Tractor Train Lumbers North." *Globe and Mail*, January 24, 1956.
- . "Moosonee Booms With Construction of Airfield." *Globe and Mail*, December 22, 1955.
- . "Whooping Cough Claims Lives of 8 Eskimos." *Globe and Mail*, August 7, 1956.
- French, S. G. "The Mid-Canada Line: Air Defence of North America." *The Roundel*, April 1958, 2–5, 31–32.
- . "The Mid-Canada Line: Detailed Design and Specification." *The Roundel*, May 1958, 10–15.
- . "The Mid-Canada Line: Operation Whirlybird." *The Roundel*, June/July 1958, 12–18.

- Gunther, John. *Inside Russia Today*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958.
- Honigmann, John. "Attawapiskat--Blend of Traditions." *Anthropologica* 6 (1958): 57–67.
- . "Social Integration in Five Northern Canadian Communities." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 2, no. 4 (1965): 199–214.
- Hull, Edward. "A Steel Ring for the Iron Curtain: An Appraisal of Air Power in Other Nations." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 299, no. 1 (1955): 49–57.
- Keenleyside, Hugh L. "Recent Developments in the Canadian North." *Canadian Geographical Journal* 39, no. 4 (1949): 156–76.
- La Fay, Howard. "DEW Line, Sentry of the Far North." *National Geographic* 114, no. 1 (1958): 128–46.
- Liebow, Elliot, and Jean (John) Trudeau. "A Preliminary Study of Acculturation Among the Cree Indians of Winisk, Ontario." *Arctic* 15 (1962): 190–204.
- Lotz, James. "What IS the Real Problem of Northern Development?" *Canadian Mining Journal* 89, no. 7 (1968): 50–54.
- Michener, James A. *The Bridge at Andau*. New York: Random House, 1957.
- Nininger, Robert D. "Hunting Uranium Around the World." *National Geographic* 106, no. 4 (1954): 533–58.
- Pain, S. A. *The Way North: Men, Mines and Minerals*. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1964.
- Paul-Emile, Soeur. *La Baie James: Trois Cents Ans D'Histoire: Militaire, Economique, Missionnaire*. Ottawa.: University of Ottawa Press., 1952.
- Phillips, R. A. J. *Canada's North*. Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1967.
- Reilly, Frank. "Mid-Canada Line." *Engineering and Contract Record* 69, no. 12 (1956): 77–81, 154, 156.
- Roberts, Leslie. "The Great Assault on the Arctic--Building the DEW Line." *Harper's*, 1955, 37–42.
- Spencer, Robert H. "Record of a Record Year." *Bluebell* 35, no. 3 (1956): 1–33.
- Trudeau, Jean. "The People of Hudson's Bay: The Cree Indians." In *Science, History and Hudson's Bay*, edited by C. S. Beals, 1:127–41. Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines

and Resources, 1968.

Weaver, Kenneth F. "Of Planes and Men: U.S. Air Force Wages Cold War and Hot." *National Geographic* 128, no. 3 (1965): 298–349.

Wilson, J. Tuzo. "Winter Manoeuvres in Canada." *Canadian Geographical Journal* 32, no. 2 (1946): 88–100.

Wybou, R. B. "The DEW Line." *The Roundel*, May 1960, 2–6.

Newspapers:

Timmins Daily Press

Toronto Daily Star

Toronto Globe and Mail

Toronto Telegram

Winnipeg Free Press

Moosonee Moosetalk

Secondary Articles and Texts

Abel, Kerry. *Changing Places: History, Community, and Identity in Northeastern Ontario*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006.

Aboelela, Sally W., Elaine Larson, Suzanne Bakken, Olveen Carrasquillo, Allan Formicola, Sherry A. Glied, Janet Haas, and Kristine M. Gebbie. "Defining Interdisciplinary Research: Conclusions from a Critical Review of the Literature." *Health Services Research* 42 (2007): 329–46.

Absolon, Kathy, and Cam Willett. "Aboriginal Research: Berry Picking and Hunting in the 21st Century." *First Peoples Child and Family Review* 1, no. 1 (2004): 5–17.

Ambrose, Linda M. "Our Last Frontier: Imperialism and Northern Canadian Rural Women's Organizations." *Canadian Historical Review* 86, no. 2 (2005): 257–84.

———. "What Are the Good of Those Meetings Anyway? Explaining the Early Popularity of the Ontario Women's Institutes." *Ontario History* 87, no. 1 (1995): 1–18.

- Augsburg, Tanya, and Stuart Henry. *The Politics of Interdisciplinary Studies: Essays on Transformations in American Undergraduate Programs*. Jefferson: McFarland and Company, 2009.
- Bercuson, David Jay. *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton 1898-1960*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993.
- Blythe, Jennifer, and Peggy Martin-McGuire. "Changing Employment of Cree Women in Moosonee and Moose Factory." In *Women of the First Nations: Power, Wisdom and Strength*, edited by Christine Miller and Patricia Chuchryk. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1996.
- Blythe, Jennifer M., Peggy Martin Brizinski, and Sarah Preston. "'I Was Never Idle': Women and Work in Moosonee and Moose Factory" TASO Report No. 21 (1985).
- Bone, Robert M. *The Canadian North: Issues and Challenges*. 4th ed. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- _____. "Resource Towns in the Mackenzie Basin," *Cahiers de géographie du Québec* 42, no. 116 (1998): 249-259.
- Bothwell, Robert, Ian Drummond, and John English. *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.
- Boyden, Joseph. *Through Black Spruce*. Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008.
- Bradbury, John H., and Isabelle St. Martin. "Winding Down in a Quebec Mining Town: A Case Study of Schefferville." *Canadian Geographer* 27, no. 2 (1983): 128-44.
- Bray, Matt, and Ernie Epp. *A Vast and Magnificent Land: An Illustrated History of Northern Ontario*. Thunder Bay and Sudbury: Lakehead University and Laurentian University, 1984.
- Caldwell, Wayne, Paul Kraehling, and Suzanna Kaptur. "A Healthy Rural Community Tool Kit." *Municipal World* 125, no. 9 (2015): 27-30.
- Campbell, Isabel. *Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951-64*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013.
- Cardinal, Harold. *The Unjust Society*. 2nd ed. Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre Inc., 1999.
- Chettiparamb, Angelique. "Interdisciplinarity: A Literature Review." University of Southampton: The Interdisciplinary Teaching and Learning Group, 2007.
www.llas.ac.uk/resourcedownloads.
- Coates, Ken. "Writing First Nations Into Canadian History: A Review of Scholarly Works."

- Canadian Historical Review* 81, no. 1 (2000): 99–114.
- Coates, Ken, and William Morrison. *The Forgotten North: A History of Canada's Provincial Norths*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1992.
- Collaborative Center for Health Equity, "Community Based Participatory Research (CBPR)." Discussion Paper prepared by the University of Wisconsin Institute for Clinical and Translational Research, 2008.
- Cote-Meek, Sheila. "Exploring the Impact of Ongoing Colonial Violence on Aboriginal Students in the Postsecondary Classroom." PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2010.
- Creswell, John W. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2003.
- Dickason, Olive P. *A Concise History of Canada's First Nations*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Eyre, Kenneth C. "Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-87." *Arctic* 40, no. 4 (1987): 292–99.
- Faries, Emily. "Language Education for Northern Native Children: A Case Study." PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1991.
- Farish, Matthew. *The Contours of America's Cold War*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
- Fletcher, Roy J. "Military Radar Defence Lines of Northern North America: An Historical Geography." *The Polar Record* 26, no. 159 (1990): 265–76.
- Frank, Andrea. "Graphic Communication." In *The Planner's Use of Information*, edited by Hemalata C. Dandekar, 295–339. Chicago: Planners Press, 2003.
- Freudenburg, W. "Women and Men in an Energy Boomtown: Adjustment, Alienation, and Adaptation." *Rural Sociology* 46, no. 2 (1981): 220–44.
- Gerein, H. J. F. *Community Planning and Development in Canada's Northwest Territories*. Government of the Northwest Territories, 1980.
- Gill, Alison N. "An Evaluation of Socially Responsive Planning in a New Resource Town." *Social Indicators Research* 24, no. 2 (1991): 177–204.
- Graham, Roger. *Old Man Ontario: Leslie Frost*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

- Granatstein, J. L. "The Defence D  b  cle, 1957-1963." In *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1986.
- Grant, Jill. "Planning Canadian Communities." In *A Reader in Canadian Planning: Linking Theory and Practice*, edited by Jill Grant, 3–20. Toronto: Nelson Publishing, 2008.
- Grant, Shelagh D. *Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America*. Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre Inc., 2010.
- . *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988.
- Halseth, Greg. *Facing the Challenge of Industry Closure: Managing Transition in Rural Communities*. Toronto: Intergovernmental Committee for Urban and Regional Research Press, 2005.
- Harper, Douglas. "Talking About Pictures: A Case for Photo Elicitation." *Visual Studies* 17, no. 1 (2002): 13–26.
- Harris, John N. "National Defence and Northern Development: The Establishment of the Dewline in the Canadian North." Master's Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1980.
- Harrison, Deborah, and Lucie Laliberte. *No Life Like It: Military Wives in Canada*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1994.
- Heffernan, Sue. "The Cold War in the Near North: Moosonee and the Pinetree Radar Line." *Network in Canadian History and the Environment*, November 11, 2013. <http://niche-canada.org/2013/11/03/the-cold-war-in-the-near-north-moosonee>.
- Henriksen, Georg. *Hunters in the Barrens: The Naskapi on the Edge of the White Man's World*. St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University, 1973.
- High, Steven. *Base Colonies of the Western Hemisphere, 1940-1967*. New York: Palgrave-McMillan, 2009.
- . *Occupied St. John's: A Social History of a City at War, 1939-1945*. Edited by Steven High. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010.
- Hodge, Gerald, and Gordon, David. *Planning Canadian Communities*. 5th ed. Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008.
- Ironside, R. G. "Canadian Northern Settlements: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences." *Geografiska Annaler* 82, no. 2 (2000): 103–14.
- Jockel, Joseph T. *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North*

- American Air Defense, 1945-1958*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987.
- Johnson, Arthur. "Cold War Cleanup: Undoing the DEW Line." *Canadian Geographic* 127, no. 2 (2007): 62–72.
- Johnston, Margaret E., Brian Lorch, and Dave Challen. "Views of Community Sustainability after a Mine Closure: A Case Study of Manitouwadge, Ontario." *Environments* 32, no. 1 (2004): 15–29.
- Keeling, Arn. "'Born in an Atomic Test Tube': Landscapes of Cyclonic Development at Uranium City, Saskatchewan." *Canadian Geographer* 54, no. 2 (2010): 228–52.
- Klein, Julie Thompson. "A Taxonomy of Interdisciplinarity." In *The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity*, edited by Robert Frodeman, Julie Thompson Klein, and Carl Mitcham, 15–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- . *Humanities, Culture, and Interdisciplinarity: The Changing American Academy*. Albany: State University of New York, 2005.
- Korinek, Valerie J. "'It's a Tough Time to Be in Love': The Darker Side of Chatelaine during the Cold War." In *Love, Hate and Fear in Canada's Cold War*, edited by Richard Cavell, 159–82. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.
- Kuhlberg, Mark. "'Nothing It Seems Can Be Done about It': Charlie Cox, Indian Affairs Timber Policy, and the Long Lac Reserve, 1924-40." *Canadian Historical Review* 84, no. 1 (2003): 33–63.
- . "'Perfect Cooperation': Taking the Campaign against the Spruce Budworm in Ontario to New Heights, 1927-29." *The Forestry Chronicle* 90, no. 3 (2014): 296–300.
- Kvas, P. C., *Lobster, Lighthouse and Long-Range Radar*. Barrington, Canadian Forces Station Barrington, 1987.
- Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. *Battle Grounds: The Canadian Military and Aboriginal Lands*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007.
- . "Canada's Northern Defenders: Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers, 1947-2005." In *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives*, edited by P. W. Lackenbauer and C. L. Mantle, 171–208. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007.
- Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Matthew J. Farish, and Jennifer Arthur-Lackenbauer. "The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line: A Bibliography and Documentary Resource List." Arctic Institute of North America, 2005.

- Lackenbauer, P. Whitney P., and Matthew Farish. "The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern Environment." *Environmental History* 12, no. 4 (2007): 920–50.
- Lebreton, M., and J. J. Conn. "Social and Economic Impacts of CADIN/Pinetree Radar Units Upon Their Host Communities." Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984.
- Leddy, Lianne. "Mostly Just a Social Gathering: Anishnabe-Kwewak and the Indian Homemakers Club, 1945-1960," in *Aboriginal History, A Reader*, ed. Kristen Burnett and Geoff Read, 352-362. Toronto: Oxford University Publishing, 2016.
- Leipert, B. D., and L. Reutter. "Women's Health in Northern British Columbia: The Role of Geography and Gender." *Canadian Journal of Rural Medicine* 10, no. 4 (2005): 241–53.
- Long, John. *Treaty No. 9: Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010.
- Lucas, Rex. *Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities of Single Industry*. 2nd Edition. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Luxton, Meg. *More Than a Labour of Love: Three Generations of Women's Work in The Home*. Toronto: Women's Press, 1980.
- Mannell, Laura, and Heather Ternoway. "The Need to Do More: Advancing Planning with First Nations Communities." *Plan Canada* 48, no. 2 (2008): 21–23.
- Mathews, L. G., and A. Jones. "Using Systems Theory to Improve Interdisciplinary Learning Outcomes." *Issues in Integrative Studies* 26 (2008): 73–104.
- Mawhiney, Anne-Marie. *Towards Aboriginal Self-Government: Relations Between Status Indian Peoples and the Government of Canada: 1969-1984*. New York: Garland Publishing, 1994.
- Mawhiney, Anne-Marie, and Jane Pitblado, (eds), *Boom Town Blues -- Elliot Lake: Collapse and Revival in a Single Industry Community*. Toronto: Dundern Press, 1999.
- McCreaner, L., L. J. Tsuji, B. C. Wainman, I. D. Martin, and J. P. Weber. "The Use of Leeches and Logit Log-Linear Contingency Models to Assess and Monitor Aquatic PCB Contamination Originating from Mid-Canada Radar Line Site 050." *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment* 140 (2008): 211–22.
- McDougall, A. *John P. Robarts: His Life and Government*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.
- McElroy, Gil. *Cold Comfort: Growing up Cold War*. Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2012.
- McMahon, Patricia, I. *Essence of Indecision: Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009.

- Messing, Karen. "Easier Said Than Done: Biologists, Ergonomists, and Sociologists Collaborate to Study Health Effects of the Sexual Division of Labour." In *Outside the Lines: Issues in Interdisciplinary Research*, edited by Liora Salter and Alison Hearn, 95–102. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996.
- Milne, Claudia. "Access and Services in Local Government: A Case Study of Moosonee, Ontario." Master's Thesis, July, 1974. University of Waterloo.
- Moeke-Pickering, Taima, Sheila Hardy, Susan Maniowabi, Anne-Marie Mawhiney, Emily Faries, Kelly Gibson-van Marrewijk, Nancy Tobias, and Mikaere Taitoko. "Keeping Our Fire Alive: Towards Decolonising Research in the Academic Setting." *World Indigenous Nations Higher Education Consortium*, 2006, 1–7.
- Moran, Joe. *Interdisciplinarity*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Morin, Edgar. *On Complexity*. Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2008.
- Morrison, William. "Uncle Sam's Warpath." *Horizon Canada* 7, no. 76 (1986): 1820–24.
- Mowat, Farley. *High Latitudes: A Northern Journey*. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2002.
- Neitzert, M., A-M. Mawhiney, and E. Porter. "Life after Layoff: Women in a Remote Single-Industry Community." In *Boom Town Blues -- Elliot Lake: Collapse and Revival in a Single Industry Community*, edited by Anne-Marie Mawhiney and Jane Pitblado, 53-74. Toronto:Dundurn Press, 1999.
- Newell, William H. "Academic Disciplines and Undergraduate Interdisciplinary Education." In *Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature*, edited by William H. Newell, 213–24. New York: The College Board, 1998.
- Nicks, Don, John Bradley and Chris Charland, *A History of Air Defence of Canada: 1948-1997*. Ottawa: 72 Film Canada Inc., 1997.
- Nishikawa, Nancy. "Survey Methods for Planners." In *The Planner's Use of Information*, edited by Hemalata C. Dandekar, 49–78. Chicago: Planners Press, 2003.
- Ontario Municipal Management Institute. *You and Your Local Government*, 3rd ed., Toronto: Golding Graphics Limited, 1993.
- Owram, Doug. *Born At the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996.
- Ozorak, Paul. *Abandoned Military Installations of Canada, Volume 1: Ontario and Volume 2: Quebec*. Ottawa: self-published, 1991 and 1998.

- Palmer, Bryan D. *Canada's 1960's: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.
- Parkins, John R., Richard C. Stedman, and Thomas M. Beckley. "Forest Sector Dependence and Community Well-Being: A Structural Equation Model for New Brunswick and British Columbia." *Rural Sociology* 68, no. 4 (2003): 554–72.
- Parr, Joy. "Gender History and Historical Practice." *Canadian Historical Review* 76, no. 3 (1995): 354–76.
- . *Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the Everyday, 1953-2003*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010.
- . *The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1930*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
- Pelly, David F. "The DEW Line: A Journalist's Visit to Military Isolation Posts." *North* 24, no. 1 (1982): 18–23.
- Piper, Liza. *Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009.
- Pualani Louis, Renee. "Can You Hear Us Now? Voices from the Margin: Using Indigenous Methodologies in Geographic Research." *Geographical Research* 45, no. 2 (2007): 130–39.
- Raibmon, Paige. "Living on Display: Colonial Visions of Aboriginal Domestic Spaces." In *Home, Work, and Play: Situating Canadian Social History, 1840-1980*, edited by James Opp and John C. Walsh, 18–32. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Rea, Kenneth J. "The Political Economy of Northern Development." Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1976.
- Reimer, Gwen, and Jean-Phillippe Chartrand. "A Historical Profile of the James Bay Area's Mixed European-Indian or Mixed European-Inuit Community." Department of Justice, 2005. <http://www.metisnation.org/media/141039/dojreport>.
- Repko, Allen F. *Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory*. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: Sage Publishing, 2012.
- Roach Pierson, Ruth. *'They're Still Women After All': The Second World and Canadian Womanhood*. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1986.
- Robinson, Ira. *New Industrial Towns on Canada's Resource Frontier*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

- Robson, Robert. "Building Resource Towns: Government Intervention in Ontario in the 1950's." In *At the End of the Shift: Mines and Single Industry Towns in Northern Ontario*, edited by Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson, 97–119. Toronto: Dundurn, 1992.
- Rodger, D. Elliot. "A Week at Fox Bravo DEW Line Station: A Derelict May Be Recycled." *North* 24, no. 1 (1982): 48–51.
- Roy, Gabrielle. *Windflower*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 1970.
- Salisbury, Richard F. *A Homeland for the Cree: Regional Development in James Bay 1971-1981*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986.
- Salter, Liora, and Alison Hearn. *Outside the Lines: Issues in Interdisciplinary Research*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996.
- Sandlos, John. *Hunters at the Margin: Native People and Wildlife Conservation in the Northwest Territories*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007.
- Scott, Joan W. "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis." *American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 28–50.
- Shailer, Kathryn. "Interdisciplinarity in a Disciplinary Universe: A Review of Key Issues," 2005. <http://www.cou.on.ca/issues-resources/student-resources/publications/papers-by-academic-colleagues/pdfs/interdisciplinarity-in-a-disciplinary-universe--a-.aspx>. (accessed September 14, 2011).
- Shetler-Russell, Jeanette. *We're Moving Where? The Life of a Military Wife*. Renfrew: General Store Publishing house, 2003.
- Shewell, Hugh "'Bitterness behind every Smiling Face': Community Development and Canada's First Nations, 1954-1968." *Canadian Historical Review* 83, no.1 (2002): 57-84.
- Slack, Enid, Larry S. Bourne, and Meric S. Gertler. "Small, Rural, and Remote Communities: The Anatomy of Risk," Toronto: Panel on the Role of Government, 2003.
- Stalwick, Harvey, Lavina Bitternose, Yvonne Howse Thomas and Peter Brook, "Reform as the Creation of New Usages: 1982-85 Synopsis of the Taking Control Project," in *Perspectives on Social Services and Social Issues*, Conference Proceedings, edited by J. Ismael and R. J. Tomlinson, 223-235, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1987.
- Stephenson, Michael. "The DEW Line." *The Beaver*, Winter 1983, 14–19.
- Surtees, Robert J. *The Northern Connection: Ontario Northland since 1902*. North York: Captus Press, 1992.

- Tuhiwai-Smith, Linda. *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. 2nd ed. London: Zed Books, 2012.
- Vickers, Jill. "Thirty-Five Years on the Beaver Patrol: Canadian Studies as a Collective Scholarly Activity." In *Outside the Lines: Issues in Interdisciplinary Research*, edited by Liora Salter and Alison Hearn, 78–84. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996.
- Whitaker, Reginald, and Steve Hewitt. *Canada and the Cold War*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 2003.
- Whitaker, Reginald, and Gary Marcuse. "Canada in a Cold War World." In *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-57*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.
- Wilson, Gordon. *NORAD and the Soviet Nuclear Threat: Canada's Secret Electronic Air War*. Toronto: Dundurn, 2011.
- Zaslow, Morris. *The Northward Expansion of Canada 1914-1967*. Vol. 17. Canadian Centenary Series. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart, 1988.

Websites

- General Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada. "Bishop Horden Memorial School, Moose Factory Island, Ontario," <http://www.anglican.ca/relationships/files/2011>. Accessed September 23, 2008.
- Lantz, Paul. "Old Postcards of Moosonee." <http://paullantz.smugmug.com/Travel/postcards> Accessed August 9, 2011.
- Nicks, Don, Bradley, John and Charland, Chris. "Online Air Defense Radar Museum: Air Defense Radar Stations." <http://www.radomes.org/museum> . Accessed April/17, 2011.
- The Pinetree Line. <http://67.69.104.76:84/Pinetreeline/homepage.html>, Accessed May/18, 2011. See <http://67.69.104.76:84/Pinetreeline/site28.html> for the Moosonee site. This website can be intermittent. On May 28th, 2016 the Pinetree line website was reached at: <http://lswilson.dewlineadventures.com>, a site which has links to material on all three radar lines.
- Centre for Oral History and Digital Storytelling (COHDS) <http://storytelling.concordia.ca>. Accessed July 20, 2015.
- Town of Moosonee Municipal Website. <http://www.moosonee.ca>. Accessed January 20, 2016.
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. www.trc.ca. Accessed January 30, 2016.

Appendices

Appendix One: Map of western James Bay communities


Appendix Two: Interview Questions and Interview Consent Forms

Appendix Three: Air photos of Moosonee 1960

Appendix Four: Moosonee RCAF Base: Air Photo, August 14, 1962.

Appendix Five: Construction Contracts in Moosonee: 1966-69

APPENDIX ONE: MAP OF WESTERN JAMES BAY COMMUNITIES



APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS, AND INTERVIEW CONSENT FORMS



APPROVAL FOR CONDUCTING RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

Research Ethics Board – Laurentian University

This letter confirms that the research project identified below has successfully passed the ethics review by the Laurentian University Research Ethics Board (REB). Your ethics approval date, other milestone dates, and any special conditions for your project are indicated below.

TYPE OF APPROVAL / New X / Modifications to project / Time extension

Name of Principal Investigator and school/department

Sue Heffernan

Title of Project The Impact of the Cold War on Moosonee: A Case Study of a Northern Ontario Radar Base

REB file number

2012-08-11

Date of original approval of project: September 23, 2012

Final/Interim report due on September 23, 2013

Conditions placed on project Final report due on October 30, 2014.

During the course of your research, no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol, recruitment or consent forms may be initiated without prior written approval from the REB. If you wish to modify your research project, please refer to the Research Ethics website to complete the appropriate [REB form](#).

All projects must submit a report to REB at least once per year. If involvement with human participants continues for longer than one year (e.g. you have not completed the objectives of the study and have not yet terminated contact with the participants, except for feedback of final results to participants), you must request an extension using the appropriate [REB form](#). In all cases, please ensure that your research complies with [Tri-Council Policy Statement \(TCPS\)](#).

Also please quote your REB file number on all future correspondence with the REB office. Congratulations and best of luck in conducting your research.

Susan James, Acting chair
Laurentian University Research Ethics Board

APPENDIX TWO (continued): INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. When did you live in, or visit, Moosonee? Where did you live? (Please describe all locations/moves within the town and/or the airbase).
2. What was it like to live in the town: before, during and after the radar base stage? Please describe an average day.
3. Here are air photos of Moosonee from 1940, 1962 and 1989. Can you tell me what you notice in the photos. (Discuss the air photos together).
4. How do you think life in Moosonee changed over the years?
5. Please describe what kind of employment was available to town residents during the Cold War (especially between 1955 and 1975).
6. Can you describe access by town residents to everyday necessities, such as clean drinking water, food supplies, and medical services?
7. Were local people able to visit all areas of the town? (That is, if someone lived on the base, did they ever visit in town and vice versa?)

APPENDIX TWO (continued): INTERVIEW CONSENT FORMS

Study Title: The Impact of the Cold War on Moosonee: A Case Study of a Northern Ontario Radar Base

Researcher: Sue Heffernan

I am a graduate student in the Human Studies Department at Laurentian University in Sudbury. I am studying the Town of Moosonee during the Cold War era (mainly 1950's to 1970's) and the construction and operation of a radar base (Royal Canadian Air Force base) in the town during the years 1961 to 1975. This research is intended to help provide a clearer picture of how Moosonee changed during the Cold War. For example, part of the research will look at the way the land itself was modified by structures such as the radar domes and the construction of an entire community north of the townsite of Moosonee. Another part of the research hopes to shed light on what everyday life was like both for people who lived in town and for people who worked or lived at the radar base.

Moosonee Town Council has been consulted prior to any interviews in the Town and will be provided with a summary of findings at the end of this research. However, Town Council will not be provided with a list of interviewees or with any material which might affect your confidentiality.

The study will take about an hour of your time and will involve general questions about your time in Moosonee and what you observed. As part of the interview, you will be asked to comment on air photos of Moosonee from the time before, during and after the radar base existed.

Your participation is strictly voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any time. Also, if you would rather not discuss a particular topic that arises during the interview, please feel free to say so. This consent form includes in the Appendix a list of confidential counselling agencies which you can contact if you wish to seek counselling at anytime after this interview.

Your identity will not be revealed at any time during the research or as part of the writing of the final paper, unless you wish to be identified (see Addendum). You will be provided with transcripts of any material containing potentially identifiable information (e.g. quotes from your interview which might affect your confidentiality). This material will be provided to you in writing prior to any use in the thesis or in published material. Such material will only be used if you provide an additional consent. Any confidential identifiable information you provide about other individuals (i.e. third party information) will not be included in the thesis or in publications in order to protect the privacy of both yourself and third party individuals.

Appendix One to Consent Form: **CONSENT FORM: Addendum** (Primarily for Technical or Government Staff).

To Participants: If you decide that you wish to have your quotes attributed to you, then please sign both the main Consent form and this Addendum.

Study Title: The Impact of the Cold War on Moosonee: A Case Study of a Northern Ontario Radar Base

Researcher: Sue Heffernan

I agree to participate in this study and I have received and signed a copy of the consent form and of this Addendum.

_____ Participant's Signature _____ Date

_____ Researcher's Signature _____ Date

I give permission to the researcher to reveal my identity in the written report.

_____ Participant's Signature _____ Date

_____ Researcher's Signature _____ Date

Appendix Two to Consent Form: List of Counselling Contact Numbers for Interviewees who wish to contact a Counsellor.

For Residents of Moosonee:

James Bay Community Mental Health Program: Weeneebayko Area Health Authority:

1. 705-336-2164 or
2. Telemedicine: call 705-658-4544 (ext. 2248 or 2360) to book an appointment.

OR call the Moosonee Health Clinic at 705-336-2341 and talk with the duty nurse about booking you an appointment with a counsellor.

For all Interviewees (whether residents or non-residents of Moosonee) who wish to contact a counsellor :

Call the Provincial Mental Health Helpline at 1-866-531-2600 or

Check the Mental Health Helpline website at:

<http://www.mentalhealthhelpline.ca> for other options (e.g. email service).

APPENDIX THREE: AIR PHOTOS OF MOOSONEE, 1960

Sources:

1. Map 5.1: Moosonee Settlement Areas (circa 1962) is included with this Appendix to facilitate the comparison of the three air photos that follow (also see Chapter Five for discussion of this map).
2. Three air photos follow Map 5.1 in sequence from south to north. These photos were sourced from Directorate of History and Heritage, Joint Photographic Intelligence Centre (PLT) fonds, File 79/347, Box 39, C-44, Moosonee (PLT), RCAF air photos, October 4, 1960.⁸⁵³

Description of Photos: the photos are numbered as Air Photo 3.1, Air Photo 3.2 and Air Photo 3.3. The horizontal white line that is shown through the middle of each of the photos was Second Avenue (now Bay Road). This road was constructed by the RCAF in 1960 from the radar base to the centre of the Town of Moosonee, as discussed in Chapter Five. Other features shown on the air photos are as follows:


Air Photo 3.1: This photo shows the south end of Moosonee that is, the Village and the Town. The white area at the far left of the map was identified by interviewees as a storage site for sand and gravel used in construction of the radar base. Near the top of the photo can be seen the ONR train station and directly above that the air strip constructed in 1955, as discussed in Chapter Four. The construction camp on Moosonee's main street can be seen at the bottom of the photo, just to the right of Store Creek. (Note: As indicated above, please view Map 5.1 for the location of settlement areas and Store Creek).

Air Photo 3.2: This photo shows the continuation of Second Avenue (Bay Road) between the Town and the radar base.

Air Photo 3.3: This photo shows initial clearing for the construction of the radar base. The three dome sites can be seen at the far right of the photo. The rectangular site in the middle of the radar base became the barracks. The light lines on the curved road at the bottom end of the radar base became the streets for the PMQ subdivision. The creek to the right, or north, is Butler Creek. The creek to the immediate left, or south, of the radar base is Sasakipao Creek.

⁸⁵³ The air photos in Appendices Three and Four are included here per Department of National Defence copyright guidelines at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/terms-conditions>.

Map 5.1: Moosonee Settlement Areas (circa 1962)



L.L. Larivière - Laurentian University, 06/2016


Air Photo 3.1: South End of Moosonee, October 1960



Air Photo 3.2: Area Between Moosonee Townsite and Radar Base, October 1960



Air Photo 3.3: Radar Base, October 1960.



2

S(30) RR212 100(R)RCAF 400100Z
1750FT 61M MOOSUNG ONT

APPENDIX FOUR: MOOSONEE RCAF BASE, Air Photo dated August 14, 1962.

Source: Directorate of History and Heritage, Joint Photographic Intelligence Centre (PLT) fonds, File 79/347, Box 39, C-44, Moosonee (PLT), RCAF air photos.

This photo shows the radar domes at the bottom left of the image. The water plant is directly to the left of the domes beside a dam constructed by the RCAF on Butler Creek. The power plant is directly to the right of the domes and the diesel fuel storage area is at the far right of the image. The two large buildings between the power plant and the diesel storage are maintenance and equipment structures.

The Private Married Quarters' (PMQ's) subdivision is at the top of the image. The building to the top left of the PMQ's is the sewage treatment plant. The grade school is the "H" shaped building on the right hand side (Henry Hudson School). Below the grade school is the recreation building and to the right of the recreation building (across the road on a diagonal) is the chapel. The barracks appear in the image as three joined rectangles. To the right of the barracks is the joint Messes building. To the right of the Messes is the administration building (see the "L" shaped building). The gatehouse is a small structure between the administration building and the chapel.



APPENDIX FIVE: CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS IN MOOSONEE: 1966-69

Start of Construction and Completion*	Location	Cost	Construction Details
1. Sept.1966 to July 1967	First Street (downtown Moosonee)	\$164,000	Sanitary sewers, storm sewers, watermains and road restoration.
2. 1966 to March 1967	n/a	\$167,000	Stockpiling granular material [gravel] for construction
3. 1967 to September 1968	Remainder of streets in main townsite	\$643,500	Sanitary sewers, storm sewers, watermains and road restoration
4. Fall 1967 to July 1968	Various locations in townsite (sewage treatment plant placed south of Store Creek)	\$763,000	Water treatment plant and dam, sewage treatment plant. ** Note: both plants were prefabricated.
5. Nov. 1968 to October 1969	Extension of services	\$ 245,000	Sanitary sewers, watermains and roadways
6. 1968	Store Creek crossing	\$46,000 (estimated)	Roadway and culverts crossing Store Creek

*Key completion dates are **bolded**.

** This chart was developed from the Annual Reports of OWRC for the years 1967 to 1969. The OWRC reports indicate that the plants were finished in July, 1968. The Ontario Housing Corporation reported that the sewage plant was completed and the water plant was in operation by August, 1968.⁸⁵⁴

⁸⁵⁴ AO, RG 19-77, B354517, File 119.6 Moosonee 1969. H. Pullen, Ontario Housing Corporation to Martin Sinclair, Department of Municipal Affairs, Re: "Moosonee-Possible Additional Family Units," 6 November, 1969. Also see AO, RG 19-77, B354517. File 119.4, Moosonee 1969 and AO, RG19-6-5, B269883. File "Minister's Tour-Moosonee 1970." G. C. Hewson to McKeough, 14 July 1970.