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Wallace, Carol Anne, Manning, Louise and Luning, Pieterneel

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Wallace, Carol Anne ORCID: 0000-0002-1402-2134, Manning, Louise and Luning, Pieterneel (2019) The Evolution and Cultural Framing of Food Safety Management Systems – Where from and Where next? Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety .

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from the work.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1541-4337.12484>

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1 **The Evolution and Cultural Framing of Food Safety Management Systems – Where from and**
2 **Where next?**

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4 **Louise Manning¹, Pieter A Luning², and Carol A Wallace³**

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6 **1. L Manning, Royal Agricultural University, Cirencester, Gloucestershire, GL7 6JS, UK. _**

7
8 **2. P. A. Luning, Food Quality & Design Group, Wageningen University, Bornse Weilanden 9, 6708**
9 **WG, Wageningen, The Netherlands**

10
11 **3. C.A. Wallace, International Institute of Nutritional Sciences and Applied Food Safety Studies,**
12 **University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2 HE, UK.**

13
14 **Contact information for corresponding author: louise.manning@rau.ac.uk**

15
16 **Word count of text 18,500 words**

17
18 **Short version of title:** Evolution and Cultural Framing of Food Safety

19
20 **Choice of journal/section:** *Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety*

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24 **ABSTRACT:**

25 The aim of this paper is to review the development of food safety management systems (FSMS)
26 from their origins in the 1950s to the present. The food safety challenges in modern food supply systems
27 are explored and it is argued that there is the need for a more holistic thinking approach to food safety
28 management. The narrative review highlights that whilst the transactional elements of how FSMS are
29 developed, validated, implemented, monitored and verified remains largely unchanged, how organizational
30 culture frames the operation and efficacy of FSMS is becoming more important. The evolution of a wider
31 academic and industry understanding of both the influence of food safety culture (FS-culture) and also how
32 such culture frames and enables, or conversely restricts the efficacy of the FSMS is crucial for consumer
33 wellbeing. Potential research gaps worthy of further study are identified as well as recommendations given
34 for the application of the research findings within the food industry.

35
36 **Keywords:** Food safety, HACCP; Food safety culture; risk assessment; Private food safety and quality
37 standards

40 **1. Introduction**

41 Individuals have the right to expect the food that they eat is safe and suitable for consumption
42 (Codex Alimentarius Commission CAC/RCP, 1969:3). Food safety is the concept that “food will not cause
43 harm to the consumer when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use” (BS EN ISO 22000
44 2005; Codex, 2003, British Retail Consortium BRC, 2015:112). An organization will develop a formal food
45 safety management system (FSMS) to ensure that food is safe for consumption and also to mitigate
46 foodborne illness, food poisoning or wider considerations of contamination that can cause harm and injury.
47 Therefore, FSMS must be developed, validated and then appropriately applied to ensure their efficacy at
48 all steps in the food supply chain from origin in primary production through to the final consumer. Global
49 distribution of food between multiple supply chain sectors relies upon a consistent understanding by all
50 those concerned as to what food safety is and how it is effectively managed to prevent harm. A universal
51 approach to address food safety hazard identification and assessment, and then FSMS development,
52 validation, implementation, monitoring and verification is the use of the hazard assessment tool Hazard
53 Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) based on Codex Alimentarius Principles (Codex, 2009). Indeed,
54 within the European Union (EU) the use of a HACCP-based FSMS is mandatory post-harvest and post
55 slaughter within the food supply chain (EU 852/2004). Moreover, in the last few decades, various consortia
56 of stakeholders have introduced multiple private standards in order to guide/direct the design,
57 implementation, and verification of FSMS. These include the British Retail Consortium (BRC) standard, BS
58 EN ISO22000, Safe Quality Food (SQF), and International Featured Standards (IFS-Food). However, an
59 organizational FSMS is not situated in isolation. People design, implement, monitor and verify the efficacy
60 of a FSMS so their personal interaction with the transactional (technical) elements of both the formal system
61 and other informal practices will impact on the ability of an organization to grow, process, distribute and/or
62 sell safe and wholesome food.

63

64 Food safety culture (FS-Culture) is the overarching organizational framework associated with food
65 safety formed by the interplay of actors within the organization (De Boeck, Jacxsens, Bollaerts, & Vlerick,
66 2015). FS-Culture develops through the interlinking of three theoretical perspectives: organizational culture,
67 food science and social cognitive science (Jespersen, Griffiths, Maclaurin, Chapman & Wallace 2016). An

68 An understanding how a FSMS is developed and implemented, is also influenced by internal and external
69 pressures and then interacts with the FS-Culture is critical to consistent achievement of food safety
70 requirements. In order to identify the direction and strategy of future empirical research, this narrative review
71 contextualizes the historical development of the theory associated with the development and adoption of
72 FSMS. The review then considers the evolution of a wider academic and industry understanding of the
73 influence of FS-Culture and how such culture frames and enables, or conversely restricts, the efficacy of
74 the FSMS. The systematic approaches to managing food safety using HACCP as a food safety hazard
75 assessment tool and the evolution of private safety and quality assurance standards are critiqued, with
76 particular emphasis on the underlying drive for benchmarking and isomorphism (i.e. reducing differentiation
77 to create increased uniformity in private standard requirements). Further, the food safety challenges in
78 modern food supply systems are explored and the potential requirement for a holistic approach to food
79 safety management and performance is examined. The review is then drawn together to identify potential
80 research gaps worthy of further study and provide direction for application in the food industry.

81 **2. Evolving definitions and the meaning of food safety**

82 A food hazard is defined in classic food safety vocabulary as “a biological, chemical, or physical agent in,
83 or condition of, food with the potential to cause an adverse health effect.” (CAC, 2003:5; BS EN ISO 22000;
84 2005; Wallace, Sperber & Mortimore, 2011:65; Manning, 2017a). The Campden BRI Guide G42 (Gaze,
85 2009; 2015) expands on this tri-categorization to include food allergens as a fourth category. Mortimore
86 and Wallace (1994; 1998; 2013) use the CAC (2003) categories, and include allergens within the category
87 of a chemical hazard (Luning & Marcelis, 2009; Manning, 2017a). Further to the above definitions, BRC
88 (2015:112) has an evolved definition for a hazard as being an agent of any type with the potential to cause
89 harm (usually, biological, chemical, physical or radiological), thus no longer differentiating allergens as a
90 separate category but including the new category of radiological hazards which is gaining wider industry
91 attention. Although Aladjadjiyan (2006) defines radiological agents as physical hazards, there is limited
92 guidance on how this group of hazards should be characterized. The Food and Agriculture Organization’s
93 Assuring Food Safety and Quality: Guidelines for Strengthening National Food Control Systems publication
94 (FAO, 2003:3) in their definition of food safety differentiate between chronic and acute food safety hazards
95 stating that: “food safety refers to all those hazards, whether chronic or acute, that may make food injurious

96 to the health of the consumer.” Further, food safety has also been described as ‘limiting the presence of
97 those hazards, whether chronic or acute, that may make food injurious to the health of the consumer’ (WHO,
98 2015). Thus, whilst contemporary thinking about food safety still revolves around the control of hazards in
99 food, the concept of acute and chronic illness that is related to those hazards is important. The term “acute”
100 suggests sudden or short term onset (Sprenger, 2014). Chronic hazards are those hazards that have
101 medium to long-term onset, examples being carcinogens, mutagens and teratogenic and
102 immunosuppressive agents (FAO, 1994) or sequelae of acute foodborne illness, e.g. irritable bowel
103 syndrome or Guillain Barre syndrome associated with Campylobacter infection (Ternhag, Törner,
104 Svensson, Ekdahl, & Giesecke, 2008; Kirkpatrick & Tribble, 2011). Therefore, depending on the toxic agent
105 of concern, the term food poisoning is considered as being either acute or chronic in terms of onset period
106 and duration of illness (Manning, 2017a). Commonly, the term food poisoning focuses on notions of toxicity
107 specifically i.e. the agent that causes food poisoning being a toxin of either a microbiological origin or other
108 source, whereas foodborne disease or foodborne illness are broader terms relating to infection and/or
109 toxicity. Manning (2017a) suggests that chronic non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as heart
110 disease, type 2 diabetes, obesity, cancers and illnesses associated with accumulative toxicity could be
111 revisited within organizational hazard assessment. Thus, based on Manning’s (2017a) definition, illness,
112 poisoning or intoxication associated with food can be redefined as being:

113 *“a health disorder with symptoms of either of short [acute] or long [chronic] term duration with a specific*
114 *onset period that is induced by consuming food that is contaminated by biological organisms or agents*
115 *that have the ability to invade host cells and/or produce toxins once ingested, or food that contains toxic*
116 *material at the time of consumption, or by consuming an unbalanced diet over a prolonged period of time,*
117 *leading to over and under nutrition.”*

118 Moreover, historical and current thinking limits the scope of FSMS to the control and management
119 of the aforementioned food hazards and does not included the wider consideration of prevention of NCDs.
120 Although it can be argued that NCDs may involve ‘conditions of food with the potential to cause an adverse
121 health effect’. Indeed, the advent of personalized medicine and personalized healthcare especially around
122 food allergy (Ferrando et al. 2017) means that organizations need to consider how these developments will
123 influence the categorization of food hazards and intoxication in the future (Manning & Soon, 2017) and the

124 impact on management approaches to food hazard control and management. The evolution of HACCP-
125 based FSMS for control of food hazards is now considered.

126 **3. Systematic approaches to food safety management using HACCP**

127 **3.1 Evolution of HACCP-based FSMS**

128 The adoption of HACCP as a means to develop FSMS evolved from the 1950s and the early days
129 of the United States (US) manned space program (Ross-Nazzal, 2007) (Figure 1). The HACCP approach
130 resulted from a need to identify a preventative assurance approach that could give a high degree of
131 confidence in the food safety program employed rather than a reactive, control-based end-product testing
132 approach. Despite having proved its utility in developing the processes for food production for the US space
133 program nearly sixty years ago, take-up of the HACCP innovation by the food industry was slow. Although
134 the philosophy of analyzing food safety hazards and identifying critical control points (CCPs) came out of
135 this initial National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) work, there was no clearly defined
136 requirement for teams to apply the principles employed. Indeed the term HACCP itself had not been
137 determined initially. Instead, the term was used later by the Pillsbury Company (La Chance, 2006; Wallace,
138 Holyoak, Powell, & Dykes, 2012). HACCP was not shared publicly in the food industry until 1971 when the
139 Pillsbury Company (part of the NASA space foods program team) presented the initial concept at the
140 Conference on Food Protection (Bauman, 1974; 1990; 1993; Mayes, 1992; Wallace et al. 2012). Further,
141 the technical approach of HACCP has evolved in terms of how to do it; when to do it; what products and
142 processes to cover; what food safety controls to implement at the process level; and lastly which food safety
143 hazards to manage at CCPs, as opposed to those hazards would be more effectively managed through
144 prerequisite programs such as good manufacturing practice (GMP) and good hygienic practice (GHP).

145 **Take in Figure 1**

146
147 Early HACCP had three principles equating to principles 1, 2 and 4 of the current seven principles
148 Codex Alimentarius Commission approach (CAC/RCP, 1969; rev. 4, 2003). Initially, the use of HACCP
149 focused on microbiological hazards, although the physical condition of food was considered in the space
150 program as a potential hazard to instrumentation failure (Ross-Nazzal, 2007; Wallace et al. 2011, Wallace,
151 Sperber & Mortimore, 2018). The Pillsbury Company expanded the use of HACCP more generally
152 throughout the 1970s in their consumer food manufacturing processes. The spread of HACCP more widely
153 within the food industry was promoted initially in the US by Pillsbury's training of Food and Drug

154 Administration (FDA) canned foods inspectors in 1972 followed by the publication of the US canned foods
155 regulations in 1973 (Wallace et al. 2011, 2018). International diffusion of the HACCP approach by US
156 bodies was promoted firstly by a focus in the microbiological area through the US National Research
157 Report, *An evaluation of the role of microbiological criteria for foods and food ingredients* (NRC, 1985).
158 Subsequently, 1988 saw the formation of the US National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria
159 for Foods (NACMCF) (Wallace et al. 2011, 2018), a body which remains important in international HACCP
160 to this day. The similarly named but independent international body, the International Commission on
161 Microbiological Specifications for Foods (ICMSF), which was established in 1962, also took on the HACCP
162 mantle and in 1988, published the first complete book devoted solely to HACCP (ICMSF, 1988; Wallace et
163 al. 2011). A third group, that began working around the same time, was the Codex Alimentarius
164 Commission's Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH). The CCFH and NACMCF groups both started working
165 on documents to define the HACCP system and provided guidelines on its application, resulting in the first
166 definitive HACCP reports: NACMCF in 1992 and CCFH, generally known as Codex, in 1993 (Wallace et al.
167 2011, 2018). There were a number of similarities between the two reports (NACMCF, 1992; Codex, 1993),
168 largely due to overlap between membership of the committees and the US serving as permanent chair of
169 CCFH (Wallace et al. 2011, 2018).

170 The adoption of the HACCP principles by the food industry as a common approach for managing
171 food safety follows the diffusion of innovation (DoI) theory (Rogers, 2003). Diffusion is 'the process by
172 which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social
173 system' (Rogers, 2003:11). The DoI theory explains the narrative of innovators, early adopters, majority
174 players and laggards. Existing regulatory bodies and industry food safety communication channels spread
175 the message about HACCP as an innovation in food safety hazard assessment and control, convincing
176 more people, companies and/or organizations to become adopters. A number of factors affect the rate of
177 diffusion of any innovation, including social structures and system norms, the presence and reaction of
178 opinion leaders, and the perceived consequences of the innovation (Rogers, 2003). With regard to the
179 HACCP approach specifically, the perceived consequences of safer food and protection of public health
180 remain the principal reasons for adoption.

181 Following the initial communication from Pillsbury to the wider US food industry (Bauman, 1993),
182 the flow of HACCP throughout the world was influenced by opinion leaders; initially Howard Bauman himself
183 and then groups of scientific experts who recognized the theoretical benefits of HACCP and/or were
184 involved in early adopter companies. This 'invisible college of HACCP experts' (Demortain, 2007, p9) acted
185 as change agents (Rogers, 2003), influencing the innovation adoption decisions of others via the national
186 (e.g. US NACMCF) and international (e.g. Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius) food safety committees
187 and conference platforms (e.g. the five Food Safety and HACCP Forums held between 1997 and 2002 in
188 Noordwijk, the Netherlands). These developments led to the publication and adoption of HACCP Principles
189 and guidelines (NACMCF, 1992, 1997; Codex, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2009). Positive views about HACCP and
190 its preventative advantages led to its adoption by many large food companies around the world. This led to
191 further diffusion of innovation to other and smaller companies, driven by continued communication and the
192 development of mandatory legislative frameworks (e.g. Regulation EC No. 852/2004) and private standards
193 (Kotsanopoulos & Arvanitoyannis, 2017). In addition, the global reach of HACCP, as the chosen approach
194 for developing a FSMS, was facilitated greatly by the status of Codex as an organization i.e. that it is jointly
195 chaired by the UN FAO and the World Health Organization (WHO). This means that between UN trading
196 partners, who are signatories to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Codex reports have the equivalence
197 of legal frameworks (Wallace et al. 2011, 2018).

198 From these early beginnings, HACCP was gradually accepted around the world, first in
199 manufacturing but later the approach was extended into catering, retail, food packaging and other
200 applications (Figure 1). Thus the seven Codex HACCP principles have become the cornerstone of the
201 systematic design of FSMS in all sectors. However, whilst perceptions of the benefits of the use of HACCP
202 principles are now universal, how HACCP is applied varies in practice. Initially, development of HACCP
203 based FSMS focused on product specific 'HACCP studies' (Mortimore & Wallace, 2013). Over time, a more
204 generic approach was used where products considered intrinsically to be highly similar to each other, and
205 as a result deemed to have the same inherent food safety hazards, were grouped e.g. meat or seafood
206 products. This *product-led approach* to HACCP, whether single products or generic groups of products,
207 was then joined by a *process-led HACCP approach* whereby the hazard assessment is undertaken based
208 on the specific process or processes that are employed in the manufacturing situation (Mortimore and

209 Wallace, 1998). The process-led approach considers food safety hazards associated with the ingredients
210 and the role of the process step itself in delivering food safety. The process-led approach assesses how
211 food safety hazards are managed effectively by process CCPs e.g. cooking, pasteurization, metal detection
212 etc. In complex processing operations, typically most manufacturing situations, individual products are
213 made via a combination of processes, e.g. a prepared meal may consist of components that undergo
214 different initial processes, sometimes in different manufacturing locations, and that are then combined
215 before undergoing further processes. This means that the process-led “modular” approach is applied either
216 to individual processes or alternatively to sets of processes that make up the overall product portfolio of an
217 operation (Mortimore & Wallace, 1998, 2013).

218 The challenge of trying to manage large numbers of individual HACCP plans and the associated
219 management records, meant the application of HACCP through the modular process-led approach started
220 to take root in the 1990s (Mortimore & Wallace, 1994; 1998; 2013; 2015; Wallace, 2006; Williams, 2010).
221 The operational challenge outlined here was also a road-block to the early application of HACCP in catering
222 businesses where early adopters wrestled with developing HACCP plans for every single menu item and
223 found that the system was unmanageable and unsustainable. Multiple authors have considered the barriers
224 to the adoption of HACCP especially for small businesses (Vela & Fernández, 2003; Baş, Yüksel &
225 Çavuşoğlu, 2007; Taylor, 2008). These barriers include technical barriers and a lack of pre-requisites and
226 operational plans (Panisello & Quantick, 2001; Galstyan & Harutyunyan, 2016); a lack of knowledge and
227 skills (Galstyan & Harutyunyan, 2016); a lack of motivation (Toropilová & Bystrický, 2015); concern over
228 the depth of change required to implement HACCP (Herath & Henson, 2010); associated perceptions of
229 bureaucracy (Taylor & Taylor, 2004; Lowe & Taylor, 2013); and concern over the associated costs,
230 investment requirements and financial impact (Panisello & Quantick, 2001; Nguyen, Wilcock & Aung, 2004;
231 Herath & Henson, 2010; Galstyan & Harutyunyan, 2016). However, a key driver to adopt HACCP is that it
232 is a retailer pre-requisite for market access to the food supply chain (Mortimore & Wallace, 1994, 1998,
233 2013; Herath & Henson, 2010; Lowe, & Taylor, 2013).

234 The commonly held belief amongst many organizations that the product-led approach was the only
235 “way to do HACCP”, i.e. the requirement for multiple specific HACCP plans for all individual recipes and
236 products, was a barrier that certainly did not help promulgate the system beyond the manufacturing stage

237 of the food supply chain. This barrier was gradually overcome by pressure from legislation and the need to
238 demonstrate compliance, market requirements and the development of more simplified 'HACCP-based'
239 approaches. Sector specific hygiene codes or self-checking guides were developed in some countries,
240 often aimed to help businesses meet their responsibilities under regulations such as EU No. 852/2004. For
241 example, *Safer Food Better Business* (FSA, 2017) was first launched in the UK in 2005, Belgium developed
242 self-checking systems for multiple sectors (Jacxsens et al. 2015), and in the Netherlands sector specific
243 HACCP hygiene codes were developed to support food businesses in designing their FSMS (Luning et al.
244 2002; Van der Spiegel et al. 2005).

245 Around the same time that modular HACCP systems started to evolve in manufacturing, a further
246 key development in FSMS design emerged, the concept of formalized prerequisite programs (PRPs). Food
247 businesses had previously understood the need for GHPs or GMPs and most applied these within their
248 operations, albeit with a lack of formality in terms of monitoring and verification. Early HACCP teams had a
249 tendency to identify repetitive general hygiene issues as the cause of potential food safety hazards and
250 this, combined with a lack of understanding of the hazard analysis process itself (Wallace, Holyoak, Powell,
251 & Dykes, 2014) led to identification of large numbers of CCPs, e.g. 600 CCPs in a dry goods mixing
252 operation (Wallace & Williams, 2001). Although there were critics in the early days (Wallace & Williams,
253 2001), the PRP concept is successful because it reduces the complexity of HACCP systems, and
254 recognizes the difference between process CCPs and PRPs (Escriche, Domenech & Baert, 2006;
255 Mortimore & Wallace, 1998, 2011). Several definitions of PRPs have been published such as the basic
256 conditions and activities that are necessary within the organization and throughout the food chain to
257 maintain food safety (ISO, 2018). Process CCPs, situated at a process step such as cooking, metal
258 detection, sieving etc., are specifically designed to reduce a food safety hazard to a safe level. Procedures
259 and protocols under the umbrella of a PRP reduce overall food safety risk e.g. cleaning and disinfection,
260 pest control, effective maintenance programs, etc. Therefore, PRPs address and mitigate the general food
261 hygiene issues in any food operation in a foundational way allowing the HACCP approach to focus on
262 specific process hazards that are significant for food safety (Figure 2).

263 **Take in Figure 2**

264

265 Further development of the PRP concept came with the understanding that some general hygiene
266 considerations required an additional, tighter or enhanced level of control, usually to prevent cross-
267 contamination risks that would lead to the ingress of significant hazards, for example allergen control where
268 special measures are required to prevent cross-contact (Manning & Soon, 2017). These types of food
269 safety issues cannot be managed as process CCPs; however, they require more focus than general PRPs
270 that are global rather than hazard specific in nature (Figure 2). This development led to the introduction of
271 the Operational Prerequisite Program (OPRP) concept within BS EN ISO 22000:2005 (Gaze, 2009, 2015).
272 Use of OPRPs tends to be in those organizations seeking certification to ISO 22000:2005 or similar
273 schemes, but there has been much debate among practitioners as to whether OPRPs are a useful addition
274 to FSMS or whether they lead to an extra level of confusion as to how food safety hazards are managed
275 (Mortimore & Wallace, 2013). The evolving definitions of OPRPs from being 'a PRP defined by the hazard
276 analysis as essential in order to control the likelihood of introducing food safety hazards to and/or the
277 contamination or proliferation of food safety hazards in the products or in the processing environment' (ISO,
278 2005) to a 'control measure or combination of control measures applied to prevent or reduce a significant
279 food safety hazard to an acceptable level, and where action criterion and measurement or observation
280 enable effective control of the process and/or product' (ISO, 2018) may not have helped to reduce
281 confusion.

282 For early adopters and other subsequent organizations, the application of HACCP principles came
283 as a form of retro-fit for existing products and processes, perhaps as a result of the need for compliance
284 with third party supply chain standards or as new legislation made the application of HACCP-based systems
285 mandatory, such as Regulation EU No. 852/2004. Applying HACCP to existing processes and products
286 requires a mindset to assess existing food safety hazards and develop strategies to manage them as well
287 as considering additional and emerging food safety hazards and the controls required to reduce the
288 likelihood of their occurrence. The application of HACCP in terms of managing hazards and food safety risk
289 is now considered.

290 **3.2 Application of HACCP – managing hazards and risk**

291 The determination of which hazards in a given situation are significant for food safety and,
292 therefore, need to be controlled at CCPs within the HACCP plan, or by operational PRPs, has historically

293 been addressed by the application of HACCP principle 1 (Codex, 2009). However, this area of HACCP
294 has been both poorly understood and poorly applied (Wallace et al. 2014). Often HACCP teams are able
295 to identify potential food safety hazards of interest, but then fail to analyze them effectively in terms of their
296 food safety significance in the context of the specific products produced and the processes employed and/or
297 their potential effect on consumers i.e. the assessment of risk is not adequately situated. This is an area
298 where further guidance was recommended by the Majvik Expert Colloquium on 'HACCP – the way ahead'
299 (Codex, 2014) for consideration in the next Codex review, which is currently at Step 3 of the Codex process
300 (Codex, 2017).

301 Whilst HACCP is commonly described as a risk management system, it is interesting that the term
302 'risk' is not used in the application of HACCP principles (Codex, 2009). In fact, 'risk' is not defined within
303 the HACCP principles at all and the word only appears once in the Codex HACCP Annex, in the preamble,
304 which states that 'implementation should be guided by scientific evidence of risks to human health' (Codex,
305 2009). This omission of the term 'risk' is considered surprising by some food safety practitioners and, whilst
306 many HACCP teams do use the term 'risk assessment' as part of HACCP, it too is not included in the Codex
307 international HACCP standard. This may lead to substantial confusion about the process of risk evaluation
308 regarding the responsibilities of food companies and those of national/regulatory agencies (Mortimore &
309 Wallace, 2013).

310 Sperber (2001) states that hazard analysis is a qualitative, local decision-making process
311 conducted by a manufacturing organization's HACCP team taking several weeks or months to complete.
312 In contrast, quantitative risk assessment is a decision-making process in which a numerical degree of risk
313 is calculated for a particular hazard. Usually, large consortia that include regulatory, public health,
314 academic, and industry partners conduct quantitative risk assessment activity typically requiring several
315 months or years for completion (Sperber, 2001). The clear distinction made by Sperber (2001) that hazard
316 analysis is qualitative whereas risk assessment is quantitative is of value. Despite the Codex HACCP
317 Guidelines requiring hazard analysis and the determination of significant hazards rather than risk
318 assessment, problems around understanding of the nuances of terminology have contributed to the
319 confusion about the appropriate application of HACCP principle 1 (Wallace et al. 2014). Monaghan,
320 Augustin, Bassett, Betts, Pourkomaillian and Zwietering (2017:726) report that risk assessment is a term

321 that can lead to confusion as it is applied to both “a scientific process consisting of formal components and
322 quantification of levels of risk as outlined by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC, 2003) and a more
323 general, qualitative approach based more on expert opinion.” In addition, Jacxsens et al. (2016) report that
324 risk assessment is hard to elaborate and to understand, and discuss the need for, and development of,
325 training approaches for (semi-) quantitative probabilistic risk assessment calculations or qualitative risk
326 rankings. Thus, the duality of use of the term risk assessment is a weakness in the evolution of FSMS.
327 Whilst food safety risk is described at the regulatory level as “a function of the probability of an adverse
328 health effect, and the severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard(s) in food” (EC, 1997), risk is not
329 always seen purely in this way (Manning & Soon, 2013). Therefore, qualitative assessment of food safety
330 risk can be influenced by scientific considerations, situational risk assessment, individual perceptions and
331 the propensity and willingness of the organization to eliminate, mitigate, accept or outsource risk as
332 highlighted in BS EN ISO 31000 (2018) and by Kleboth, Luning and Fogliano (2016).

333 Current approaches to hazard analysis and the identification of significant hazards involve the
334 consideration of likelihood of occurrence and severity of potential effect for each hazard. Codex HACCP
335 guidelines (2009) require the hazard analysis process to identify ‘hazards that are of such a nature that
336 their elimination or reduction to acceptable levels is essential to the production of a safe food’. Further, the
337 guidance for conducting hazard analysis states that ‘the likely occurrence of hazards and severity of their
338 adverse health effects’ should be included, and that ‘qualitative and/or quantitative evaluation’ of the
339 presence, survival, multiplication, production or persistence of hazards should be considered. Historically,
340 this has been difficult for organizations, in particular small businesses with limited or no technical resource.
341 More recently, semi-quantitative assessment matrices have been developed that allow for a weighting of
342 both the likelihood of the hazard or the severity of the hazard should it occur (Mortimore & Wallace, 2013,
343 Manning, 2013, Manning & Soon, 2013). This can lead to a more priority-focused HACCP approach, but
344 appropriate expertise and experience is still required to apply these matrices effectively (Wallace et al.
345 2014).

346 Following hazard analysis, CCPs are identified, either via HACCP team decisions and experience
347 or through use of the Codex HACCP decision tree, a binary questioning process with YES or NO answers
348 resulting in the control of food safety hazards at a given point where deemed critical. The remaining Codex

349 HACCP principles describe how to manage, validate and verify CCPs, and the operation and effectiveness
350 of the FSMS. The application of HACCP is just one element of a series of building blocks that underpin a
351 FSMS: namely application of HACCP, safe design, development of appropriate PRPs, and adoption of
352 essential management practices (Wallace et al. 2011) see Figure 3.

353 **Take in Figure 3**

354

355 The essential management practices that are elements of GMP and good agricultural practice
356 (GAP) include: senior management commitment to food safety in terms of overall mission right through all
357 layers of management within the organization; clear definition of roles and responsibilities with regards to
358 managing food safety; and appropriate training and education. Further, the consideration of the resources
359 required to develop and effectively implement the food safety program; the development of a documented
360 and formalized FSMS with associated process records; and a drive for continuous improvement in meeting
361 pre-defined food safety management goals and objectives are essential practices to adopt. Supplier–
362 customer protocols require a clear definition of the inputs and outputs for given processes within the internal
363 food manufacturing system and at interfaces between one organization and another. The clear
364 communication of food safety criteria at these interfaces e.g. between supplier and manufacturer and
365 manufacturer to distribution system is essential to ensure consistently safe food product and safe working
366 practices (Manning, Baines & Chadd, 2006).

367 Despite decades of encouragement and mandatory requirements to adopt HACCP approaches to
368 develop FSMS, the global food sector still experiences major acute and chronic food safety incidents.
369 Examples of product recalls in 2017 alone include for the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ninety
370 five recalls, market withdrawals or food safety alerts for *Listeria monocytogenes*, twenty three for
371 *Salmonella* spp. and, an emerging health hazard in 2017, eleven recalls for undeclared sildenafil (Viagra)
372 in dietary supplements (FDA, 2017a). In the EU, an emerging food safety hazard too was fipronil, a toxigenic
373 chemical. Globally, the 2017 European fipronil incident with direct and composite products affected 56
374 countries and led to 117 notifications on the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed database (RASFF,
375 2017). In 2018, the “needles in strawberries” incident in Australia brought concerns over deliberate

376 contamination of food (Manning, 2019). So does the HACCP hazard analysis approach deliver especially
377 when considering emerging food safety hazards?

378 **3.3 Challenges associated with the HACCP approach.**

379 Has HACCP as a management tool been oversold as a total solution; a silver bullet? Should
380 regulatory bodies and food manufacturers recognize that undertaking hazard analysis and developing an
381 associated FSMS does not deliver zero food safety risk in food supply chains? Should there be more focus
382 on FS-Culture, and its impact on how the FSMS is implemented and verified? These are all questions that
383 arise when considering the challenges associated with implementing the HACCP approach.

384 Food safety incidents have been associated with multiple weaknesses and factors of influence.
385 These include lack of knowledge, training and expertise (Wallace et al. 2005; Mensah & Julien, 2011;
386 Wallace et al. 2012, 2014); a lack of awareness and commitment and failures in management or leadership
387 (e.g. Peanut Corporation of America see Manning, Wallace & Soon, 2016; Manning 2017b); a breakdown
388 in the implementation of a PRP or process design or a lack of resources (see case study of Maple Leaf
389 Foods in Manning, 2017b), weak verification (Powell, Jacob & Chapman, 2011); or weak maintenance of
390 the FSMS (see case study of XL Foods Inc. in Manning, 2017b). Many of these factors reflect a failure in
391 organizational culture and conditions of control i.e. there is a cultural framing of a food safety program and
392 FSMS that requires consideration.

393 In addition, it is important to recognize that HACCP is a tool for assessment and management of
394 food safety hazards and is implemented effectively only if both the hazards and the means for their control
395 are clearly identified, understood and communicated within the organization. Emerging types of food safety
396 hazard, if unknown by those in the HACCP team tasked with developing, reviewing or re-validating a
397 HACCP Plan and associated food safety program, will simply go under the radar until there is an incident
398 associated with that hazard. Whilst pathogens may be recognized as potential food safety hazards,
399 emerging chemical hazards such as fipronil, sildenafil, or pieces of golf ball in frozen hash browns (FDA,
400 2017a) may not. Further, the HACCP approach is often difficult to apply at farm level and there is a growing
401 trend instead to develop risk-based preventive control processes (Monaghan et al. 2017).

402 A further contemporary challenge to the implementation of HACCP is the very definition of what a

403 food safety hazard is and what it is not especially in wider considerations of food safety, food quality, food
404 fraud, and food defense. Spink and Moyer (2011) in seeking to characterize food fraud and food safety,
405 and by inference the food safety hazards that need to be considered within hazard analysis as part of a
406 HACCP approach, state that food safety addresses only the unintentional actions that make food injurious
407 to health, whilst food fraud concerns intentional actions of adulteration, substitution and tampering. The
408 Global Food Safety Initiative (2013) describes food defense as “*the process to ensure the security of food*
409 *and drink and their supply chains from all forms of intentional malicious attack including ideologically*
410 *motivated attack leading to contamination or supply failure*”. BRC (2015) considers food defense as the
411 procedures adopted to assure the safety of raw materials and products from malicious contamination or
412 theft whilst FDA (2017b) defines it as “the effort to protect food from intentional acts of adulteration where
413 there is an intent to cause wide scale public health harm”. Recent literature has sought to create a typology
414 for food defense to aid its assessment and mitigation (Manning, 2019). Therefore, in theory food defense
415 concerns now sit outside the HACCP process, as these intentional contaminants are distinct from food
416 safety hazards (Manning & Soon, 2016a). However, in practice within food businesses, the identification of
417 areas that are vulnerable to food fraud and/or may require food defense countermeasures may involve the
418 same personnel as those who implement HACCP and thus there is potential for confusion for organizations
419 on where HACCP processes sits within wider aspects of food safety, food defence and food crime (Yoe &
420 Schwartz, 2010; Wiśniewska, 2015). This may be exacerbated by the use of similarly named systems of
421 control, e.g. threat analysis critical control point (TACCP) and vulnerability analysis critical control point
422 (VACCP) methodologies (Manning & Soon, 2016; Manning, 2019). Ultimately, as Kleboth et al. (2016)
423 summarize, in ever more complex food supply chains, scandals and incidents persist and concerns over
424 food safety, authenticity and wider aspects of food integrity mean that multi-layered private and public
425 standards have evolved and these interact with the HACCP approach in a transactional approach to ensure
426 food safety. These generic and often third party standards follow a risk reduction approach that seeks to
427 consistently deliver safe and legal food and prevent harm to individuals and prevent organizational or
428 reputational damage. Thus, regulatory bodies and food manufacturers recognize that undertaking hazard
429 analysis and developing an associated FSMS alone does not deliver zero food safety risk in food supply
430 chains and that additional, agile mechanisms need to be in place. The need to verify implementation of

431 FSMS means that there needs to be more focus on the associated FS-Culture. However what cultural
432 factors are of influence that drive compliance with such public and private standards?

433 **4. Compliance approaches to food safety using food supply chain standards**

434 **4.1 Evolution of food supply chain standards**

436 Increasingly, the impact of food safety failures on consumer health, reputation damage, confidence
437 loss, and future sales, and associated safety and quality standards have gained wider interest in the food
438 supply chain (Fulponi, 2006). Multiple terms about standards exist and for ease of differentiation these has
439 been synthesized (Table 1) so they can be referred to in the paper.

440 **Take in Table 1**

441 As required by their stakeholders (e.g. government, retailers, customers), and often as a pre-requisite to
442 either operating the business and/or as a means of accessing specific markets, companies use both public
443 and private product and process standards to provide the basis upon which to design their food safety
444 programs. In this context, the food safety program is considered to be the written document indicating how
445 a food business will assure that food safety hazards associated with food handling activities of the business
446 are effectively controlled (Luning et al. 2008, 2009; Jacxsens et al. 2015). Private standards are commonly
447 stricter in terms of requirements than the public standards established in local legal frameworks (Fulponi,
448 2006), i.e. they go beyond legislative compliance or 'safe to supply' and include the adoption of additional
449 requirements and standard elements. Compliance with these private standards by a potential supplier is
450 often a pre-requisite to market access i.e. if the organization cannot demonstrate compliance with these
451 food safety standards then they cannot supply. Therefore, food business operators (FBO) translate these
452 stakeholder requirements into their specific food safety programs and adapt the requirements of given
453 system standards to their particular food business context (Luning et al. 2009, 2011a; Kirezieva et al. 2013).
454 This strategy then frames, shapes and affects the actual FSMS that is adopted and its ongoing performance
455 (Herath, Hassan & Henson, 2007; Luning et al. 2011b; Luning et al. 2015; Kirezieva et al. 2015a). Since
456 the 1990s, the number of private third party standards has increased substantially (Table 2). This is due in
457 part as a reaction to multiple food safety incidents and a need to regain consumer trust, developments in

458 product liability law, and the limited capacity of public bodies (Fulponi, 2006; Schulze, Albersmeier, Gawron,
459 Spiller, & Theuvsen, 2008).

460 **Take in Table 2**

461
462 From a market perspective, imposed retailer requirements, reduction of transaction costs,
463 mitigation of supply chain risks, and to a lesser extent productivity and efficiency improvement have also
464 stimulated the adoption of private standards by food organizations (Fulponi, 2006; Schulze et al. 2008;
465 Spadoni, Lombardi, & Canavari, 2013; Latouche & Chevassus-Lozza, 2015). Indeed there are multiple
466 drivers for standards development and adoption and also barriers to their adoption too (Figure 4). Private
467 standards, such as the BRC Standard, IFS-Food, GLOBALG.A.P, SQF, and the Foundation for Food Safety
468 Certification, (FSCC2000), have been widely adopted by the European food industry (Schulze et al. 2008;
469 Herzfeld, Drescher, & Grebitus, 2011; Spadoni et al. 2013), and beyond at a global scale (Herzfeld et al.
470 2011). Particularly in emerging countries with poor institutions and legal frameworks (Henson & Humprey,
471 2010), private standards can support design and operation of FSMS and create access to global markets
472 (e.g. Kirezieva et al. 2015a, 2015b; Kussaga, Luning, Tiisekwa, & Jacxsens, 2015; Nanyunja et al. 2016)
473 or address the governance void for organizations seeking to extend their operation to those countries. The
474 interplay between regulation and private food standards with regulation evolving from a 'one size fits all' to
475 risk based-regulation is leading to a hybridization of food governance between public and private
476 instruments (Verbruggen & Havinga, 2017a), which impacts FSMS design and operation (Kirezieva &
477 Luning, 2017). Hybridization of food governance has occurred in two distinct dimensions: firstly the national
478 and international dimension with the interplay of public governance and institutions such as Codex or the
479 International Standards Organization (ISO); and secondly between government, producers and third-party
480 organizations (Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015; Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen & Havinga,
481 2017b; Zhu, Huang & Manning, 2019).

482 **Take in Figure 4**

483
484 The role of the state and the role of the market can often be fluid, which suggests that there is dynamic
485 coupling of societal and institutional risks, as described by the theory of risk colonization (Rothstein, Huber

486 & Gaskell, 2006). Prevalence of certification of private standards seems more likely in developed markets
487 and food economies especially in countries with established trade relations with other countries or trading
488 blocs, such as the EU where these standards have been developed and adopted for some time (Herzfeld
489 et al. 2011). Since 2005, most of the private standards previously described have evolved rapidly and,
490 through industry input and an iterative approach, new versions are launched on a regular basis (Table 2).
491 Development and modification of these standards sometimes reveal a mosaic approach where owners and
492 developers of private standards take elements from different standards such as CAC Standards or ISO
493 standards and integrate criteria with specific elements that address supply chain actors' concerns with
494 regard to a given food safety or other supply chain risk. Common tendencies observed in the evolution of
495 private standards are an increase in strictness and a more prescriptive character in the discourse that
496 surrounds the requirements, and the continuous addition of new clauses, sections, and modules (Table 2).
497 Examples of this are the requirement for the use of HACCP as a baseline and the increasing numbers of
498 additional risk assessments in the BRC Global Food Standard version 7, including that of the vulnerabilities
499 associated with food crime and the inclusion of a clause on FS-Culture in version 8. Furthermore, various
500 scheme owners (e.g. IFS, GLOBALG.A.P, and BRC) introduced multiple new system standards for other
501 (or upcoming) actors in the food supply chain, such as catering, packaging suppliers, food stores,
502 distribution centers, and global markets (Table 2).

503 Some standards (e.g. SFQ and GLOBALG.A.P) have modular approaches to enable "new entrants" to
504 third party certification to allow organizations to sequentially advance the depth and scope of their FSMS
505 i.e. the standard owners have a baseline "fit to supply" level standard as well as a higher level standards
506 within their overall portfolio. The first iterations of the BRC standard (e.g. 1997) also had two levels:
507 foundation and higher level and recommendations for good practice. For the same reason, in some
508 countries local versions of GLOBALG.A.P standards were developed, like JapanGap, ChinaGap, MyGaP
509 (Tey et al. 2016). Table 2 shows the increasing requirements of schemes with regards to verification
510 activities and, therefore, auditor competences have become more formalized and rigorous, which leaves
511 less room for nuanced interpretation and application of private standards in view of the specific business
512 context. There has also been increased focus on 'managerial' requirements, such as senior management
513 commitment, training, policy setting, and competence requirements, and recently attention is also given to

514 FS-Culture and unethical or illicit behavior. All these developments have contributed to a proliferation of
515 elements and requirements within a given system standard often leading to extensive “checklist-based”
516 approaches to product and system verification (Powell et al. 2011; Manning, 2018a).

517 **4.2 Challenges associated with third-party certification**

518 Whilst there are advantages to using a checklist type approach in terms of auditor consistency,
519 conversely this approach can cause “audit fatigue” (Petersen, 2009; Martz, 2010). Auditor fatigue will
520 decrease the reliability of the verification activity and due to the rigid application and non-reflective use of a
521 checklist can also drive “evaluation myopia”. This also may lead to an inability of the auditor to identify side
522 effects or side impacts during the audit i.e. they have a linear rather than a holistic auditing approach (Martz,
523 2010; Manning, 2013, Manning & Soon, 2014, Manning, 2018a). Even though checklist based auditing
524 might be technically correct, there may be no incentive for the auditor to identify wider material weaknesses
525 or deficiencies in the FSMS (Flores-Miyamoto, Reij & Velthuis, 2014). Indeed, the considerable resources
526 employed in developing manuals, guidebooks, protocols, and checklists for audits are wasted when the
527 contribution of such tools to audit efficiency and effectiveness is unclear (Leeuw, 2011, Läckö-Roto &
528 Nevas, 2014). Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn, & Spiller (2009) differentiated between what they described as
529 checklist governance and contrasted this with the concept of risk-based audit programs that ensure
530 optimum and cost effective utilization of verification resources (van Asseldonk & Velthuis, 2014). For micro
531 and small sized organizations, the costs of demonstrating compliance with private standards can be
532 challenging. Kleboth et al. (2016) proposed that complex systems risk-based auditing, rather than
533 considering and increasing the amount of audit criteria and the level of detail or depth of audit, should focus
534 on the identification, analysis and evaluation of evidence-based, actual, pressing and emerging systemic
535 risks. As a result, such verification is more effective in determining the current state of the FSMS.

536 In practice, food quality managers indicate that reactive, stricter and more specific requirements do not
537 necessary lead to better performance of the FSMS (Kleboth & Strasser, 2013). The multiplication of
538 certifications, the overlap in standards, the difficulty to integrate all standards in a given organization’s
539 FSMS, and the inconsistencies in food product standards mean that many food supply chain actors suffer
540 “audit fatigue” with regard to private standards resulting in the rising costs of assurance whilst retail prices
541 remain stable (Sonntag, Theuvsen, Kersting, & Otter, 2016). As previously described, the commonly used

542 private standards in the food supply chain, have a typical checklist compliance based structure and it can
543 be argued that due to the reactive nature of private standards' evolution, issues are often addressed in
544 multiple sections potentially leading to duplication and confusion. Moreover, the structure and elements
545 included in private standards are not necessarily based on scientific concepts or quantitative risk
546 assessment and as a result can seem arbitrary, especially where they are addressing an issue where the
547 food safety risk to consumers is deemed as negligible (see also Monaghan et al. 2017).

548 Other challenges that have been associated with private standards are the limited flexibility allowed in
549 the auditors' approach towards different situations that may arise within the organization, and the continued
550 requirement for retailer driven supplier auditing, even though the organization may hold current, valid third
551 party certification (Spadoni et al. 2014). If the private standard is very detailed with multiple clauses that
552 need verification during an audit this may result in lower auditing quality in the longer term due to time
553 pressure. Audits are only ever a 'snapshot' of actual performance (Powell et al. 2011) and third party
554 certification relies on the organizational integrity of the auditee organization to reflect their daily practices
555 during the audit. Moreover, the commercially driven limit on the time available to undertake the audit also
556 results in frustrated companies that may have to meet/fulfill system standard requirements that do not make
557 sense for their particular context or where, in their particular situation, the risk the standards are seeking to
558 mitigate is minimal (Albersmeier et al. 2009; Kleboth et al. 2016).

559 However, some organizations may be happy to comply with a prescriptive private standard because
560 they are simply willing to allow others to make decisions for them. This can result in reduced agency and
561 influence the degree of organizational engagement with the derived FSMS. The more prescriptive style of
562 standard, aimed at supporting small and medium sized enterprises (SME's) to facilitate the implementation
563 of private standards is a form of paternalism. Prescriptive paternalism shifts the sense of ownership of the
564 FSMS from having the full engagement of the organization's management and staff to develop appropriate
565 protocols to meet the needs of the organization, and instead accepting a FSMS development and
566 implementation approach that can be described as a "line of least friction" application or a cost-benefit
567 trade-off. Decisions in this context on how a FSMS is developed and implemented are affected by the
568 dynamic aspects of the given task environment such as multi-level trade-offs, time pressure, weak feedback
569 on the effect of management actions, the level of uncertainty, and perceived risk (Kerstholt, 1994).

4.3 Risk-based standards and transformational management

The only private standard that uses the widely acknowledged iterative “process approach” rather than the prescriptive-approach just described is ISO 9001. The process approach concept is clearly grounded in science-based management principles. The fully restructured 2015 revision (ISO9001: 2015) evolved into a high level structure of the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle (based on Deming, 1986) and allows for more tailored translation of requirements by explicitly acknowledging the business context with its typical internal and external challenges, focused on both risks and opportunities. Indeed an Annex of the ISO 22000: 2018 Standard for food safety management systems cross references between Codex HACCP principles (Codex 2009) and the requirements of the standard and includes the PDCA cycle approach and the interrelationship with HACCP. Panghal, Chhikara, Sindhu & Jaglan (2018) assert that ISO 22000 embeds HACCP in a form that leads to a more effective and auditable FSMS that includes the need for continuous improvement.

Prescriptive private standards, on the other hand, via their rigid structure and emphasis, may favor and/or create a reactive rather than a proactive mentality (culture) in those organizations seeking to implement the said standards. As the certificates (linked to the standards) are a form of “license to produce”, this then directly affects market access for individual organizations. This framing of third party certification may shift ownership of the need for compliance within the organization from being proactive and strategic to reactive and tactical. Across global supply chains, organizational motivation to gain certification may reflect a spectrum of cultural approaches to adopting the standards, systems and protocols required for regulatory compliance and to demonstrate compliance with procurement pre-requisites to supply.

Commonly, food industries tend to implement supply chain standards in a transactional rather than a transformational way (Manning, 2017b). The transactional approach is often simply a technical goal and compliance driven, demanding that staff work according to prescribed requirements such as specifications, work instructions and procedures and determines appropriateness through prescribed compliance audits and other verification activities (Manning, 2017b). Transformational management is more culturally orientated and reflects activities to empower staff to implement system requirements and to “feel” that compliance is important, in fact essential, as most private standards drive the visual, concrete formalization of FSMS through requiring protocols, procedures, and associated compliance documentation; the element

598 that is most often used for verification. A prescriptive approach to developing and implementing private
599 standards has been considered here, but a third approach is posited by the authors i.e. using a more holistic
600 and cultural framing of the FSMS. Whilst a move away from compliance (checklist) based system design
601 and verification to an outcomes based approach is of value, there are obvious concerns about bias being
602 introduced and a lack of consistency of how standards are verified across the food supply chain. In a more
603 risk-based, situational and targeted approach to verification, there is a drive for efficacy and efficiency and
604 for continuous improvement in both the design and implementation of FSMS and in the third party
605 certification process itself (Albersmeier et al. 2009). Developing third party verification approaches into the
606 future to become more outcomes-based or to use multiple sources of data is an emerging theme in the
607 literature. The use of triangulation allows for comparison between different sources of evidence, especially
608 in complex, socio-technical situations by counterbalancing the strengths and weaknesses of different
609 methodologies and approaches and in doing so increase the credibility and depth of audit processes
610 (Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012; Carugi, 2016; Jespersen & Wallace, 2017; Manning, 2018b; De Boeck, E.,
611 Jacxsens, L. Vanoverberghe, P. & Vlerick, P. 2018). This line of enquiry then gives rise to some questions.
612 Does this result in the organization simply honing its FSMS to meet a set of prescribed and specific
613 standard(s) rather than reflecting on the bespoke challenges associated with the food they produce and
614 developing an FSMS that is situationally appropriate and valid? If instead, the FSMS design is driven by
615 the need to comply with private standards that are specific, static/rigid, with strict/prescriptive requirements,
616 is there then a trade-off taking place? As a result of this trade-off does the organization lose staff buy-in, a
617 sense of ownership, and then as a result carry reduced operability and practicability within the resultant
618 FSMS they implement?

619 The argument put forward here is that the design of private standards should be flexible enough that
620 the organization can comply, and gain continued certification, through tailoring and allowing their FSMS to
621 continually evolve to meet the dynamic requirements of the product, process, and the internal and external
622 characteristics associated with the organization. Therefore, rather than simply a hazard-based transactional
623 approach to food safety management, should organizations follow a more transformational systems-led
624 and risk-based approach and as a result focus more on realizing the minimization of food safety risk in a
625 given situation and context? A more holistic approach to food safety is now presented.

626

627 **5. Holistic approaches to food safety and developing FSMS**

628 **5.1 Risk and Context**

629 Perceptions of risk, held collectively or individually by stakeholders and actors in the food supply chain,
630 including consumers, influence how FSMS are developed and implemented, as well as the degree of actor
631 engagement with the processes that are required to ensure food is consistently safe and wholesome
632 (Manning & Soon, 2016b). It is important to recognize that risk is being considered here and in the supply
633 chain context, as previously outlined, this largely determined in a qualitative, or semi-quantitative approach
634 that is framed by uncertainty, and ambiguity. Higher order systems driven by the interaction of regulation
635 and enforcement surveillance and the interaction between international and national policy and associated
636 market governance are interwoven and complex (Manning & Luning, 2018). Luning and Marcelis (2006)
637 describe these higher order systems as chaotic, having greater *ambiguity* i.e. lack of clarity about the
638 mechanisms of influence and *uncertainty* due to lack of information. As a result, such systems have less
639 linearity, rationality and stability. Vulnerability, uncertainty, and ambiguity are inherent attributes of internal
640 and external organizational context factors, such as product and production related characteristics of the
641 environment in which a FSMS operates (Luning & Marcelis, 2007, Luning et al. 2011a). Internal and external
642 context factors influence the degree of risk associated with food products, processes and the associated
643 public and private standards developed to mitigate such risk (Manning & Luning, 2018). In addition, context
644 factors can be *active* i.e. influencing the organisation on a continuous basis or alternatively *dormant*
645 awaiting a trigger factor that will then enact them. Luning et al. (2011 a) distinguish four main context factors,
646 which can affect control and assurance activities in a FSMS (Luning & Marcelis, 2007; Luning et al. 2011a;
647 Kirezieva et al. 2013; Manning & Luning, 2018):

- 648 • **Product characteristics** i.e. the *intrinsic* properties of initial materials and final products.
- 649 • **Production characteristics** i.e. the *extrinsic* conditions utilized during primary production,
650 processing, or handling.
- 651 • **Organisational characteristics** specific to the organisation itself. These can be further subdivided
652 into **individual** (people) characteristics, **group** characteristics (transformational characteristics

653 associated with food safety culture and quality culture), **organisational** structures (transactional
654 division of tasks, responsibilities, rules, procedures), and **information systems**, which affect
655 peoples' decision-making behavior (see De Boeck, Jacxsens, Mortier & Vlerick, 2018); and

656 • **Chain characteristics** i.e. the conditions during supply, and relationships within the supply chain.

657 Context factors are characteristics of a system environment that can affect its performance and cannot be
658 (easily) changed (Kirezieva et al. 2013:109). More specifically, FSMS context factors are situational,
659 structural elements in the FSMS that affect decision-making activities and as a result the output derived
660 (Luning et al, 2011), and can be further characterized as narrow and broad context factors, or internal and
661 external business characteristics (Table 3).

662 **Take in Table 3**

663 External context factors that exert influence from the broader context include supply chain, socio-
664 political, legal and national factors (Kirezieva et al. 2015b). These are also called macro factors by Nayak
665 and Waterson, (2016). Internal (or narrow) context factors include product, production, and organizational
666 characteristics (Luning et al. 2011a; Kirezieva et al. 2013), and from a systems viewpoint are termed meso
667 factors with the individual being the micro level (Nayak & Waterson, 2016). It is important to recognize that
668 the context in which the FSMS operates is narrower than the overall operating environment (broad context)
669 of the organization. The external environment can encompass wider context factors that can still affect
670 overall food safety output and delivery of safe food (Luning et al. 2011b, Kirezieva et al. 2015b). Using a
671 process (input-activity-output) approach, *triggers* can be described as the inputs/influence on an
672 organization that arise from the business environment, either internal or external to the organization.
673 Extrinsic triggers can be initiated and driven by a range of supply chain actors and wider stakeholders and
674 include changes in customer requirements that influences intrinsic and extrinsic product characteristics
675 which in turn may have an impact on food safety, for example reformulation of products to reduce salt and
676 sugar levels. Triggers can influence an organization singularly or in consort, harmoniously or in discord.
677 The impact of the combination of individual or concerted internal and/or external triggers is to create
678 organizational and wider supply chain uncertainty. It can be postulated that internal trigger factors include
679 changes such as new production systems, technology, and new individuals in key management positions.

680 Examples of potential internal and external triggers have been synthesized (Table 4).

681 **Take in Table 4**

682 The structure of the organization and the associated FSMS will be specific to the given business i.e. it can
683 have either a central focus of food safety control or a more decentralized hierarchy (Luning & Marcelis,
684 2009). The interactions of strategic, tactical, and operational decision-making are as a result, situationally
685 framed. Moreover, the hierarchy of decision-making and given determination of food safety “meaning” has
686 a strong influence on the culture that surrounds the FSMS and thus is worthy of consideration here
687 (Nyarugwe, Linnemann, Hofstede, Fogliano, & Luning, 2016).

688 **Take in Table 5**

689 Table 5 provides examples of the types of decision-making that occurs at these three levels within
690 an organization: strategic, tactical, and operational. Nayak and Waterson (2017) argue that management
691 and decision-making at levels of an organization matters in terms of FS-Culture stating that if senior
692 management is too focused on profit generation, and this combines with a dissonance between senior
693 management and employees then the result is a failure to set the example of a positive FS-Culture.
694 Furthermore, social networks affect the efficacy of the FSMS. The overall food safety climate (FS-Climate)
695 of an organization is the convergence of individual characteristics such as beliefs, values, and perceptions
696 into group characteristics (De Boeck et al. 2015). Thus the socio-technical interactions that frame the
697 development, validation and implementation of the FSMS are crucial to its efficacy and alternatively if there
698 is a negative socio-technical influence can underpin its vulnerability and potential failure too.

699 **5.2 Socio-technical systems**

700 Luning and Marcelis (2006) suggest that a techno-managerial approach with increased levels of
701 information reduces uncertainty; and if as a result greater knowledge is instilled into individuals also reduces
702 ambiguity. However, dynamic FSMS remain difficult to fully predict in terms of both human behavior and
703 also product and production failure (Luning & Marcelis, 2007). De Boeck et al. (2015) combine in their study,
704 the techno-managerial route (based on Luning & Marcelis, 2006, Luning et al. 2011a) to assess FSMS and

705 also the individual human factors, as they influence the implementation of the FSMS. People in
706 organizations interacting with the technological system create “socio-technical systems” (Bronfenbrenner,
707 1986; Bostrom & Heinen, 1977; Ghaffarian, 2011; Winter, Berente, Howison & Butler, 2014). It is important
708 to recognize that FSMS are not operating in isolation, instead they are an element within wider
709 organizational and supply chain socio-technical systems, and the influence of internal and external triggers
710 means that they operate in a situational business/environment context that can set boundaries on the
711 design, application and implementation of the FSMS i.e. the socio-technical system can be multi-level.
712 Further, effective FSMS require the embedding of systems thinking and a clear acknowledgement and
713 understanding of the complexity of the socio-technical systems that provide the context in which they
714 operate (Kirezieva et al. 2015a; 2015b). Nayak and Waterson (2016) analysed the causes of two foodborne
715 outbreaks rooted in six system levels, which together shape the socio-technical system in which an
716 organization and its FSMS operate:

- 717 1. **Government level:** Where regulation is developed to control food safety.
- 718 2. **Regulatory bodies and association level:** Where regulation is translated into industry rules and
719 standards designed to address food safety.
- 720 3. **Organizational level:** Where the industry rules and regulation are integrated into the organizational
721 and situational rules and policies.
- 722 4. **Management level:** Where the staff activities and roles are specified and overseen with reference
723 to the organizational level rules and policies.
- 724 5. **Staff level:** Where the staff or work force are required to follow the rules set by their managers,
725 and
- 726 6. **Equipment and surroundings level:** Where the organization’s situational rules and policies are
727 applied to ensure compliance with government regulations, industry rules and standards and
728 organizational rules and policies.

729 Further, using this approach means there needs to be a shift from hazard-orientated (particularly

730 microbiological hazard-oriented) food safety management approaches to a more holistic socio-technical
731 approach that address the causes of food safety issues that occur at each level (Nayak & Waterson, 2016)
732 and it could also be argued at the interfaces between different levels (Manning, 2017b; Jespersen et al.
733 2019). Indeed, perceptions of food safety risk at the organizational level are neither quantitative nor
734 necessarily a 'qualitative approach based on expert opinion' (Monaghan et al. 2017). In reality, food safety
735 risk assessment at the organizational and supply chain level is influenced by perceptions, social norms,
736 and constructs of meaning. Thus, the role of these cultural influences on FSMS design and application
737 cannot be ignored.

738 **5.3 influence of FS-Culture and FS-Climate**

739 Social representations drive collective meaning-making and common recognition produces social
740 bonds based on dialogues, discourse, emotions, attitudes, and judgments that unite organizations and
741 groups (Höijer, 2011). Thus, social representations bound the implementation of FSMS and the associated
742 decision-making that occurs. Worldviews are the social, psychological, and political factors that influence
743 an individual's risk judgments (Slovic, 1999) and thus are of importance when considering individual and
744 collective perceptions of food safety risk and its meaning both to consumers and to individuals that work
745 within food businesses throughout the supply chain. Worldviews are generalized attitudes towards the world
746 and its social organization (Peters, Burraston & Mertz, 2004); or the shared mental representations, values
747 and general social, cultural and political attitudes held by a group of individuals (Leiserowitz, 2003). Van
748 der Linden (2015) considers the concept of "values" as differing from worldviews in two ways: firstly, that
749 values precede worldviews and secondly that values are guiding principles with greater specificity and are
750 more stability than worldviews. These socio-cultural factors can influence the organization in terms of how
751 people interact with complex systems and context factor characteristics and the need, on occasions, to
752 make decisions based on limited information. In this circumstance, meaning is an important personal
753 construct that links people to their environments and as a result influences their perception of a given
754 function or activity (Rapoport, 1988; Coolen & Ozaki 2004) and potentially their perception of a given food
755 safety risk. Translating from their original subject area to consideration of food safety, Rapoport's (1988)
756 three levels of meaning suggests that: **high-level or macro meanings** are related to worldviews, heuristics

757 and philosophical systems for example consideration of the cost of implementing the FSMS versus the
758 benefit derived; **middle level or meso meanings** convey latent functions such as group identity, status,
759 wealth, power, and are represented via organizational structures and hierarchy within a given business;
760 and **lower-level or micro meanings** are everyday and instrumental meanings and identity as perceived
761 by the individual. In all organizations an informal, often invisible, system derived from these cultural aspects
762 operates alongside the formal visible processes of the FSMS (see the work of Schein, 1985; Griffith, 2014
763 and others). Interpreting the FS-Culture levels of Griffith (2014) suggests that each organization e.g. a food
764 manufacturing business, will be unique in terms of the exact combination and interaction of these levels of
765 organizational culture and as a result this will influence the effectiveness of the FSMS (Manning, 2017b).

766 Culture as a construct describes the emergent history and traditions that give meaning to the
767 underlying values and beliefs held by members of formal and informal social groupings (Buchann &
768 Huczynski, 2004; Griffith, Livesey & Clayton, 2010). For any given organization there will be a distinct set
769 of values and beliefs (Powell et al. 2011) that form a heterogeneous rather than singular framing (Griffiths
770 et al. 2010) that is described in the context of this paper, specifically as FS-Culture. FS-Culture is defined
771 as shared values, beliefs and norms that affect mindset and behavior toward food safety in, across and
772 throughout an organization (GFSI, 2018). Griffith (2014) described three levels of FS-Culture:

773 **Level 1 - Food safety climate (FS-Climate):** the outermost layer of food business culture that is considered
774 during verification, auditing and inspection activity and is observable (Griffith, 2014). This level of FS-Culture
775 can be modified depending on the situation and the internal and external conditions or constraints e.g. lack
776 of resources, people, or an event such as the presence of the auditor/inspector. De Boeck et al. (2015)
777 describe food safety climate as the relative priority or the “meaning” given to food safety in an organization
778 or work unit as perceived individually or collectively by employees.

779 **Level 2 - Underpinning culture:** the middle layer includes the organization’s espoused values (often
780 unspoken) and guides the employees’ behavior and attitudes to authority and legislation. Depending on the
781 depth of verification activity, this level of culture can be examined and measured.

782 **Level 3 – Core culture:** the innermost layer that contains all the beliefs and assumptions by staff as
783 individuals or groups about what the organization stands for. This level includes core values that are

784 invisible and often assumed. Depending on the depth and scope of any verification activity this level may
785 remain hidden.

786 Nayak and Waterson (2017) summarize the difference between FS-Culture and FS-Climate as FS-Culture
787 referring to behavioral aspects i.e. what people do; and also the situational aspects of the organization i.e.
788 what the company has in terms of products, processes and facilities; whilst FS-Climate refers to the
789 psychological characteristics of employees in an organization i.e. how people feel and the meanings they
790 derive with regard to food safety. FS-Climate is alternatively defined as the employees' (shared) perceptions
791 of leadership, communication, commitment, resources and risk awareness concerning food safety and
792 hygiene within their current work organization, however the construct is more temporal and subjective than
793 representing the individual employee's perception of an organization (De Boeck et al. 2015, 2018). Third
794 party verification activities can only ever capture a "brief glimpse" of the FS-Climate and, to date the third
795 party audit approach has not been developed to assess FS-Culture specifically. However, a requirement
796 for objective evidence of planning for the continual improvement of FS-Culture is being introduced into
797 private standards (BRC, 2018).

798 Sub-cultures are separate from the dominant, overarching culture and can be categorized
799 functionally (Hofstede, 1997), geographically (Hofstede, 2001), nationally (Hofstede, 2001; Jespersen &
800 Huffman, 2014) or by the collective identity or values that are shared by the members of the sub-culture
801 (Khatib, 1996). In addition, contingency situations, such as product failure, increased orders, or inadequate
802 training can influence the interfaces between sub-cultures, causing competitive interaction, barriers and
803 conflict to occur especially where primary values and worldviews within sub-cultures are not congruent
804 across the organization (Manning, 2017b). Functional interfaces such as those between quality and
805 production; production and engineering; production and finance; production and procurement all influence
806 both the formal and the informal aspects of an organization's FS-Culture. Indeed, Jespersen et al. (2019)
807 propose a dynamic model of food safety culture based on the building blocks a) organizational
808 effectiveness, b) organizational culture norms, c) working group learned and shared assumptions and
809 behaviors and d) individual intent and behaviors, and highlight the integration of and the interactions
810 between these building blocks as crucial to the necessary maturation of FS-Culture. Multi-level interactions
811 and interfaces may be visible during the monitoring and verification activities undertaken to measure the

812 FS-Culture maturity and effectiveness, but equally may also be translucent or invisible during formal
813 processes such as an external audit (Manning, 2017b). The formalization of food safety controls and
814 management systems evolve from the FS-Culture and FS-Climate in a given organization and thus the FS-
815 Culture frames and, depending on its level of maturity, enables the FSMS. Conversely a weak FS-Culture
816 would be expected to restrict the efficacy of the FSMS, but further empirical research is needed to support
817 this conclusion. The mechanisms of both formalization and informal drivers are considered in various
818 studies (e.g. Nyarugwe et al. 2016; Manning 2017b; Nyarugwe, Linnemann, Nyanga, Fogliano, & Luning,
819 2018). Therefore, developing FSMS in isolation without regard for the perceptions and meaning of food
820 safety, FS-Culture and FS-Climate, or sub-cultures within that organization is of limited value. Whilst FSMS
821 are formally developed to address the requirements of public or private standards and/or the context of a
822 specific business setting they may firstly be inappropriate for the FS-Culture or FS-Climate in the given
823 organization and secondly may not be effectively and consistently implemented throughout the
824 organization.

825 Moving from a static approach to food safety management (i.e. focused on system elements and
826 product and process compliance with prescribed standards) to a more dynamic, holistic and risk-based
827 approach with a focus on the interactions and dynamics of the organization itself requires new forms of
828 socio-technical systems thinking. The cultural and behavioral factors associated with the people employed
829 in the organization means that primarily the organization must truly understand itself in terms of structure,
830 and internal and external triggers, which are often specific to its activities. Most importantly, the meaning
831 of food safety within the organization, which is far more nuanced than simply undertaking hazard analysis,
832 and defining risk appetite, risk management and mitigation, must be defined and understood. This holistic
833 approach extends beyond the narrow use of HACCP principles and the development of a food safety plan;
834 is mediated by both internal and external triggers, which are constantly evolving and changing; and is
835 framed by contextual factors that are specific to the organization and its wider supply chain. A static FSMS
836 and associated FS-Culture will be limited with its modus operandi in terms of addressing and mediating the
837 uncertainty and ambiguity associated with ever changing food safety risk. Whilst seeking to measure and
838 determine FS-Culture is important (Emond & Taylor, 2018; Nayak & Taylor, 2018), there are however
839 challenges to assessing FS-Culture effectively in practice (Nayak & Waterson, 2015; Jespersen et al. 2017;

840 Jespersen & Wallace 2017; Nyarugwe et al., 2018; Kane, Taylor & Teare, 2018; Taylor, Caccamo, Daniel
841 & Bulatovic-Schumer, 2018; Taylor & Rostron, 2018). The conceptualization of a holistic view of the FSMS
842 is therefore much more multi-layered and nuanced than the simple development of PRPs, OPRPs, and
843 identifying and managing process CCPs for food safety. A failure to implement a systems based approach
844 means the use of private standards will continue to be a shallow, rather than a deep form of implementation
845 and verification with associated limitations in the ability to deliver in terms of reducing the likelihood of food
846 safety incidents. However, it is questionable what supply chain incentives exist for a more thorough
847 evaluation and adoption of the holistic approach, e.g. by deepening third party certification, supplier, and
848 internal audits and by augmenting these with valid FS-Culture measurement systems. The hybridization of
849 food governance and retreat of regulatory mechanisms in favor of private standards and earned recognition
850 should mean that private verification mechanisms will be driven to be deeper and more holistic in nature.
851 However, the exact combination and form that these mechanisms need to take is yet to be determined and
852 further research is needed both to establish the precise nature of this holistic culture-systems-practice
853 approach and how to assess maturity and effectiveness of the associated holistic FSMS and FS-Culture.

854 **6. The evolution of FSMS – where next?**

855

856 Food companies operate in an increasingly complex highly interdependent food supply chain network
857 and face multiple challenges associated with developing, implementing and verifying their FSMS in order
858 to effectively manage food safety. Varzakas and Jukes (1998) argued that globalization has driven global
859 integration and standardization of markets and complex interdependence that has then led to the
860 emergence of isomorphism in structures, attitudes, and norms especially within transnational corporations.
861 Manning, Soon, de Aguiar, Eastham and Higashi (2017) noted that the concept of supply chain pressure
862 has increasingly emerged within supply chain literature over the last decade especially the notion of
863 integration and greater isomorphic pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Delmas & Toffel, 2004; van
864 Plaggenhoef, 2007; Sarkis, Zhu & Lai, 2011; Gimenez, Sierra & Rodan, 2012; Esfahbodi, Zhang, Watson
865 & Zhang 2017; Manning, 2018c). In essence, homogenization, or isomorphism, creates and spreads a
866 common set of values, norms, and rules, which then results in similar practices and organizational
867 structures (Othman, Ahmad & Zailani, 2009) often driven by a need to conform not only to the external

868 environment, but also the context that the environment itself promotes (Czinkota, Kaufmann & Basile,
869 2014). Indeed, isomorphism occurred in the work to establish international HACCP guidance through the
870 'invisible college of HACCP experts (Demortain, 2007, p9) and can be seen as a natural effect of the
871 comments and critical review cycles that form the step procedure for elaborating Codex Standards (FAO,
872 no date a & b) and within the consensus approach of industry benchmarking of private standards, as
873 undertaken through both GLOBALG.A.P activities and the work of the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI).
874 The process of benchmarking itself can drive isomorphism as private standard owners seek to demonstrate
875 private standard equivalence. Therefore, both the resultant organizational FSMS and FS-Culture that are
876 informed by these standards are influenced a series of rational myths. Institutionalized rules, and norms,
877 and increasingly the structural similarity of private standards creates contiguous cultural myths, symbols,
878 rules and regulations (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) across the food industry.

879 Customer pressure for a supplying organization to use a certain third party private standard or the
880 customer's own standards requirements further complicates the picture. This supply chain pressure of
881 compliance can result in a transactional approach that seeks to develop an FSMS to meet the required
882 standards rather than because it is the right approach for the products manufactured and the processes
883 employed, and the right way to protect the consumer. Indeed the drive for compliance and to eliminate
884 deviance may weaken FSMS in the future. The deviance of employees from organizational norms can have
885 negative outcomes for the organization, but can also be a form of *constructive deviance* that is beneficial
886 and leads to positive change that drives innovation and entrepreneurship in food safety management as
887 products, systems and processes (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2003; Galperin & Burke, 2006). Questions
888 remain as to whether the current transactional industry approach to managing food safety is sufficient.
889 Nevertheless, further research is needed to establish what a more systems and risk-based holistic food
890 safety management framework would look like, how it would address both formal and informal aspects of
891 FSMS and FS-culture and how it would work in practice within food organizations. The reactive mindset of
892 managing as a result of external triggers is well established and further clarity is needed about the roadmap
893 to develop a more proactive mindset that is dynamic enough to meet the needs of a given organization and
894 wider supply chain.

895 Organizations are experiencing greater proliferation of private standards and the implementation of
896 ever more requirements, standards and additional protocols, but it is unknown whether this transactional,
897 compliance-driven supply chain approach can actually lead to better (predictable and consistent) product
898 safety; in fact it is proposed that a saturation point has been reached (Kleboth et al. 2016) and the food
899 sector may be facing a simple process of ever diminishing returns. Kleboth et al. (2016) describe this
900 approach as the 'reactive food control vicious cycle'. This situation is caused initially after a food incident
901 when the degree of mistrust in the food industry increases and then, depending on the degree of personal
902 and financial impact of the given food safety incident, there is pressure from food chain actors and
903 stakeholders to implement appropriate corrective actions. Consequently, to avoid incidents in the future,
904 more and/or stricter standards are required; and then the cycle starts over again when a new food scandal
905 occurs. This approach could also be called "protocolization", i.e. the formalization of organizational
906 operations as a response to minimizing issues of blame and liability (Hood & Rothstein, 2001); and
907 increasing bureaucratization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

908 Rothstein et al. (2006:97) assert that assessment of risk is "*a way of formalizing organizational*
909 *operations in order to provide bureaucratically rational 'due diligence' defenses in the face of increased*
910 *accountability pressures.*" Due diligence in itself drives the complexity and scale of risk elimination and risk
911 management approaches (Manning & Luning, 2018). As has been explored in this paper a risk assessment
912 is a much more in-depth and quantitative approach when compared with the process of hazard assessment.
913 Thus food safety risk assessment extends beyond the use of HACCP as a tool to develop, implement and
914 verify a FSMS. The construct of HACCP uses hazard analysis as a transactional tool to determine the
915 likelihood and severity of food safety hazards at the food business level and to identify the measures that
916 can be implemented to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or the severity should they occur. In wider
917 business literature, risk is described as a combination of the probability of an occurrence of a particular
918 threat and the possible subsequent impacts (Slovic, 2002); or as a measure of a hazard that can result in
919 'threat to people and what they value' (Kates & Kasperson, 1983). Whilst there are clear similarities between
920 these definitions, there are also differences in the way that risk is being expressed and this suggests there
921 is an inherent meaning to an individual or group associated with the qualitative determination of risk.
922 Therefore, risk is determined through a politicized process and contextualized as a social construct

923 (Masuda and Garvin, 2006) influencing at the supply chain level who manages, mitigates, reduces or
924 outsources any given risk. Managing risk in a holistic way is an integrative process where different actors
925 may bring their different interpretations of risk but the focus on the interactions and dynamics of the
926 organization and its environment is to consistently produce safe and legal food. Thus understanding the
927 cultural aspects that frame food safety risk assessment is crucial to ensuring that the systems used are
928 appropriate, valid and effective. The food industry is recognizing the importance of FS-Culture and the
929 necessity to consider at the food organization level how FS-Culture informs and frames the perceptions of
930 food safety risk and the implementation of FSMS and PRPs. Understanding the prevailing FS-Culture and
931 how, where it is necessary, to improve it remains a key challenge for every organization.

932

933 **7. Conclusion**

934 The concept and factors that influence the structure of FSMS in individual organizations has evolved over
935 the last 75 years. Key milestones include the international acceptance of HACCP principles and their
936 application in food businesses to develop appropriate, valid and effective FSMS. However the application
937 of HACCP principles is not without its challenges and retrospective investigation and analysis of foodborne
938 illness data demonstrates that HACCP systems are not always working effectively in practice. HACCP
939 principles have been one of the cornerstones of the development of private food safety standards, but these
940 standards have tended to evolve in a mosaic way, with new topics and requirements being added each
941 time they are revised. This can result in standards that are prescriptive and inflexible and drive the
942 development of a least cost FSMS rather than the development of an appropriate outcomes based food
943 safety system. This mindset has led not only to questions about where this trend will end but also has led
944 to a type of food safety management in food organizations that is more transactional and compliance driven
945 than transformational and having cultural maturity. The realization that FSMS cannot be stand-alone
946 technical systems but are part of and impacted by the social context within which they operate has been
947 an important driver for evolution. Research has led to the cultural framing of FSMS through better
948 understanding of the FS-Culture and FS-Climate constructs. As these academic approaches cascade down
949 to the development of private systems standards this should allow further enhancement of food safety
950 performance and also industry mechanisms for verification of FSMS.

951 The concept of socio-technical systems is now being used to inform food safety management
952 research, but further work is needed to establish how FSMS, practices and culture relate to and interact
953 with each other at multiple system levels, and at cultural interfaces in order to reveal a model of the risk-
954 based holistic approach to food safety management that can be widely adopted and inform better food
955 safety management in the future.

956

957 **8. Author Contributions (required for *JFS* original research manuscripts)**

958 All authors designed and contributed to all the sections in the review. Initially each author concentrated
959 their efforts in specific sections: L. Manning, sections 1, 2 and 5; P Luning, section 4; C Wallace, section
960 3. The review then progressed through an iterative development process involving all 3 authors in
961 critically reviewing, extending and developing the initial drafts.

962

963

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1665 **Table 1: Multiple definitions and descriptions associated with public and private standards**
 1666 **(Adapted from Meuwissen, Velthuis, Hogeveen & Huirne, 2003; Henson & Reardon 2005; Fulponi,**
 1667 **2006; Theuvsen & Spiller 2007; Schulze, Albersmeier, Gawron, Spiller, & Theuvsen, 2008;**
 1668 **Schaarschmidt, 2016)**

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Term	Description / definition
Certification	The (voluntary) assessment and approval by an accredited party on an accredited standard
Legally-mandated private standards	Standards developed by the private sector, which are then made mandatory by public bodies.
Private standard/ Optional laws	Public (voluntary) standards are created by public bodies and the adoption is voluntary, these standard are also called 'optional laws'. Standards developed and adopted by private bodies.
Process-oriented standards	Standards aimed at assuring that processes are designed, validated and verified in accordance to certain requirements on e.g. food safety, quality, environment-friendly, welfare etc.).
Product-oriented standards	Set requirements on particular products and or ingredients. Define specifications for individual products or product groups aimed at harmonizing product quality to facilitate trade and to avoid consumer fraud. Examples are: gluten free, ISO product standards with requirements on pesticides, mycotoxins, heavy metals, etc.
Public standard/regulations	Standards enacted in laws, also called regulations.
Quality standards	Quality standards refer to specific schemes for assurance of high quality line products usually associated with culinary products with particular gustative attributes.
Standard	Measures by which products, processes and producers are judged
Standard owner	Standard owners can be (local) governments (state-run systems e.g., organic farming in Denmark); international standardization organisations (e.g., ISO 9001 and 22000), specific stakeholders (e.g., Fairtrade); producer schemes (e.g., farmers' associations); private inspection bodies (e.g. Lloyds); retailer driven schemes (e.g., BRC Global Standard and IFS)
System-oriented standards	Standards setting requirements on (e.g. management) systems (like IFS, ISO9001:2015)

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Table 2: Evolution of internationally acknowledged private standards used in food supply chains- illustrations of changes in standards

Period	Introducti on standard	Time periods wherein major modifications of standards were launched			
		2000-2005	2006-2010	2011-2015	>2015
1985- 1994	1987- ISO9000 Series	2000-ISO9001 - structural change towards process model; - based on management principles -customer focus, consistency & traceability; - focus on leadership; - people involvement; - systems approach; - continual improvement; - factual decision-making; -mutual beneficial supplier relations	2008-ISO9001 clarification of requirements and consistency with ISO14.000	2015-ISO9001 - structural change to high level structure plan-do-check-act; -new clause structure based on management principles - context (e.g. know all stakeholders, process risks); -leadership (e.g. alignment quality policy with strategic decisions on risks); -focus on risks and opportunities; support (meet e.g. customer demands); -operation (e.g. contingency planning, control outsourced activities); - performance evaluation; -structured approach for continual improvement	
1995- 2000	1995- SQF1000/ SQF2000			2010-2013 - new safety fundamentals for animal production, animal conversion, feed, storage & distribution 2014-SQF -redesigned for all sectors (replaced SQF2000 and SQF1000 ; - new sections added ; -scored surveillance audits ; -new guidance documents	2016-SQF(vs8) - tighter practitioners requirements ; -unannounced audits; -recall tracking; - fraud GFSI tool; -revision technical elements
	1997- EUREP GAP		2007- GLOBALG.A.P renaming 2007-local GAPS e.g. Asian GAPS, China GAP, JapanGap, VietGap, MyGap_ national GAPS	-2013 GLOBALG.A.P + Add-on product. - introduction of GLOBALG.A.P Risk Assessment on Social Practice (GRASP), which includes a voluntary module for risk assessment on social practice , addressing specific aspects of workers' health, safety and welfare. 2014- GLOBALG.A.P - introduction new Harmonized Produce Safety Standard (HPSS) to serve need of US fruit & vegetable producers to align with FDA	2018 GLOBALG.A.P - addition Produce Handling Assurance Standard (PHAS) covering pre- process production after harvesting 2016- GLOBALG.A.P - modular approach with modules for all farm types; part I quality management rules, part II certification and accreditation rules 2015 GLOBALG.A.P -Revision of GRASP

	1997-BRC	2005-BRC -introduction additional BRC standards (packaging, consumer products, storage & distribution)	2007-BRC - emphasize senior management commitment; - new sections (allergens); - rigorous grading system for auditing ; - auditor competence requirements	2011-BRC -emphasize on GMP; - reduction multiple customer audits; - more detailed prescriptive requirements ; - unannounced audit scheme; - new auditor training 2015 BRC -audit process consistency; -requirement on system to reduce fraud exposure ; -supply chain transparency & traceability; - adoption for small sites; - new sections and clauses added ; - new voluntary modules : - trade goods, - management animal feed; - Global GAP chain of custody; - meat supply chain assurance, - gluten free products; - food safety culture, - BRC FSMA	2018 BRC (version 8) Some major changes - encouraging development food safety culture -expanding requirements for environmental monitoring - section on high risk, high care and ambient high care requirements - Requirements on traded goods -whistleblower system must be integrated to ensure all food safety concerns can be reported and handled confidentially -addition cyber security clause on how to handle cyber attacks or failures in internet security
2001-2005	2003-IFS food	Introduction other IFS standards logistics, global markets, food store, etc.	2008-IFS food - focus senior management	2012-IFS food - more weight to quality criteria; - packaging risks; - food defense requirements; - integrity program to monitor auditors ; - additional requirements on validation, verification and documentation	
	2005-ISO22000 FSMS		2007-ISO22005 - traceability in feed and food chain 2009-ISO22002 - specific prerequisites food manufacturing	2011-ISO22001 -prerequisites farming 2013-ISO22002 -prerequisites catering and packaging -ISO22003 guidelines for audit and certification bodies	2018-ISO22000 - structural revision based on revision ISO9001:2015; with the high level structure, plan-do-check-act; -focus on business context and interested parties -Strengthened emphasis on leadership and management commitment -Risk management (impact assessment positive and negative) -Strengthened focus on objectives as drivers of improvement - Extended requirements on communication

					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Less strict requirements on food safety manual -management facilitate understanding food safety policies by employees -establishing FSMS objectives - control externally provided processes, products or services
2006-2010	2009-FFSC2200			<p>2012-FFSC 22000 -adds new scope for food packaging manufacturers</p> <p>2014-FFSC 22000 -adds new scope for manufacturing animal feed</p> <p>2015-FFSC22000 -adds voluntary model based on ISO9001</p>	<p>2016-FFSC22000</p> <p>-new requirements;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -unannounced audits; - critical nonconformities; -standardized audit report; - prevention intentional product contamination; -requirements for transport & storage, food services, retail/wholesale

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1676 BRC (2015, 2018), <https://brc.org.uk/about-brc>; FSSC 22000, <http://www.fssc22000.com/documents/home>; GLOBALG.A.P
1677 <https://www.globalgap.org>; ISO 9000 (2015), <https://www.iso.org/>; ISO (2005, 2018); IFS (2018), [https://www.ifs-](https://www.ifs-certification.com/index.php/en/standards)
1678 [certification.com/index.php/en/standards](https://www.ifs-certification.com/index.php/en/standards); SQF <https://www.sqfi.com/standards>).

1679 **Table 3 – Characterization of context factors that frame the FSMS (Adapted from Luning et al. 2011a; Kirezieva et al. 2013, 2015b)**

Characteristics	Examples
External characteristics	
Legal context	Internal framing driven by enforcement philosophy and practices. Sufficiency of food safety authorities
National culture	National values, beliefs, norms related to food safety
Socio-political context	Corruption index, stability, economic situation
Supply chain context	Transparency in the supply chain network, power relations, domestic versus export markets, competitiveness, and interconnectedness. Severity and flexibility of stakeholder requirements. Information exchange and degree of asymmetry. Sophistication of logistic infrastructure. Degree of globalization of the supply chain and degree of interaction of national cultures and their approach to food safety.
Internal characteristics	
Business and Administrative	Communication - Vision, mission, policy, strategy on FS-culture and FSMS development - skills, different languages/culture, message consistency, along all channels, crucial role middle management. Leadership - moral engagement, enlightenment, reinforcement, employee involvement, truly involvement leaders, empower people. Training and learning - Both operator/management training, create FS-culture learning environment, respectful feedback, trust, connect information to action, learning from peers, tailored to users/company specific, knowing controls and consequences of failures, share experiences with other businesses, use various techniques (story telling, movies). Recruitment and employee development - effective interviewing and appointment, setting basic requirements, personal development, incentives/rewards, moral, feedback. Use of artefacts and symbols.
Group (Group, department or team)	Objective characteristics such as multidisciplinary, cross functional collaboration, type and size e.g. HACCP team, shift operators, group roles. Subjective or social interactions e.g. communication styles, group behaviour, conflicts, power relations, individual versus group decision behaviour and more individuals acting at the group level. Group and social norms e.g. normative standards, attitudes, perceived degree of behavioural control. Recognition and acceptance of group member differences in communication styles, in understanding, in culture. Engagement - common ownership, all group members being ambassadors of food safety in their work area
Individual	Demographics e.g. age, gender, seniority, education. Psychological e.g. attitude, beliefs, values, norms, habits, personality, personal perception of risks, safety, hazards, etc. Knowledge and understanding of food safety/risks, awareness, experience. Psycho-social wellbeing i.e. stress, job satisfaction, perceived reward, etc.
Organizational	Level of formalization (formal/informal) structured systems i.e. degree of adoption of manuals, procedures, work instructions. Level of information system: record keeping, data collection, archiving and retrieval. Organizational arrangements size & complexity, definition and division of tasks, responsibility, rules, authority. Structure i.e. central focus or decentralized, hierarchy, and the interaction of strategic, tactical and operational decision-making. Stability of workforce, competence level of workforce, staff turnover. Resource use – primarily financial, physical, human capital. Workforce composition and variability
Product	Intrinsic properties of raw materials, in-process material and finished products. Food safety risk associated with the initial materials and product (risk associated with allergenic, biological, chemical and physical hazards)
Production	Conditions during production including operational design, technical infrastructure. Food safety risk associated with the production site and the physical processes employed. Vulnerabilities and susceptibility to loss of control or contamination.
Technical	Technical resources e.g. facilities, equipment, personnel. Control activities including preventative measures, monitoring and verification systems in FSMS. Facility design e.g. hygienic zoning, lay-out, routing. Process design e.g. hygienic design, process capability. Equipment

	and tools e.g. hygienic design, tailored, availability. Cleaning and disinfection programmes. Maintenance of process and technical equipment. Traceability system design and implementation (see Chhikara, Jaglan, Sindhu, Veera, Charan, & Panghal, 2018).
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1682 **Table 4. Internal and external triggers that influence FSMS and FCS (Adapted from: Leat & Revoredo-Giha, 2003; Kleboth et al. 2016;**
 1683 **Manning & Soon, 2016a)**

Internal triggers	External triggers
Wake up call –internal incident/company recall New CEO Internal policy changes New products/product areas New brands/existing brands extension New technologies Audit results Changing customer requirements	Wake up call –incident in sector Negative media attention on an issue e.g. foof safety, food fraud Regulatory and legislative changes Industry or trade association drive new standards or criteria for compliance Lobby groups Changing consumer demands Market and pricing strategies; low operating margins Natural disasters, technological accidents, infectious disease (Leat &)

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
Table 5. Hierarchy in decision making within a food organization (adapted from Luning & Marcelis, 2007, 2009; Nyarugwe et al. 2016)

Strategic level CEO and executive board	Tactical level Middle management	Operational level Food handlers, operators
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Content vision mission, etc.; food safety focus;• Investment in technical & human resources;• Horizon scanning, risk anticipation; systemic risks• Investment in food safety research; benchmarking, projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Design, implementation & maintenance FSMS;• Dealing with audit & review findings;• Data analysis for continuous improvement;• Dealing with daily safety & hygiene issues;• Training, instruction, feedback operators	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Compliance to safety & hygiene procedures• Feedback to peers & supervisors• Communication observations (near misses) etc.

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
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
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1694 **Figure 1: Timeline for the adoption of HACCP based approaches to managing food safety (Wallace, 2014)**




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1696 **Figure 2. The relationship between HACCP, OPRPs and PRPs (adapted from Mortimore & Wallace, 2013)**



1699 **Figure 3. HACCP as a building block of a food safety management program (Source: Wallace, Sperber & Mortimore, 2011)**



1702 **Figure 4: Drivers and barriers for standard development and adoption, and their impact; model based on Luning & Marcelis (2009) and**
1703 **drivers, barriers and impact derived from academic reviews and empirical studies (Latouche & Chevassus-Lozza, 2015; Spadoni,**
1704 **Lambardi & Canavari, 2013; Herzfeld, Drescher & Grebitus, 2011; Henson & Humphrey, 2010; Schulze, Albersmeier, Gawron, Spiller &**
1705 **Theuvsen, 2008; Theuvsen & Spiller, 2007; Fulponi, 2006; Henson & Reardon, 2005)**

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