

# ***A European Way of Security***

**The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group  
comprising a Proposal and Background Report**

**Madrid, 8<sup>th</sup> November, 2007**

## **Members of the Human Security Study Group**

Ulrich Albrecht  
Christine Chinkin  
Gemma Collantes Celador  
Stefanie Flechtner  
Marlies Glasius  
Mary Kaldor (Convenor)  
Kimmo Kiljunen  
Jan Klabbers  
Jenny Kuper  
Sonja Licht  
Flavio Lotti  
Klaus Reinhardt  
Genevieve Schmeder  
Pavel Seifter  
Narcis Serra  
Gert Weisskirchen

## **CFSP and ESDP: Promoting Human Security**

### **A Proposal for a Declaration or Protocol**

The European Union has crossed a rubicon in its development as a global security actor. Its willingness to intervene far beyond its natural backyard in difficult and dangerous locations, such as the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan, to support regional and international organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while pursuing its distinctive approach to crisis, and its preparedness to use coercive force where necessary, marks a change in the evolution of its external policies.

Since 2003, the EU has developed a wide range of both civilian and military security capabilities and has carried out 16 missions to crisis zones. It has met a growing demand for external intervention to bring stability and the rule of law to end violent conflict. The European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 provides the framework for this role and for a European security identity. It sets out the challenges the European Union faces and how Europeans can meet them, but not much more - it does not yet amount to an operating manual or even a set of design instructions.

There is now an opportunity and a need for Europeans to do more to fulfil their commitment to collective foreign and security policies for the past 15 years. In order to progress as a global actor, the European Union needs to give clear political direction to its ambitions and responsibilities on the world stage.

The ‘War on Terror’ and the period since 9/11 have focused public attention on the global nature of security, and the fact that instability in distant places can have a devastating effect on the streets of European capitals, whether it takes the form of suicide bombers on trains or the rioting and unrest of immigrant communities in city suburbs. Yet there is a growing realisation that waging ‘war’ on radicalised youth, disaffected citizens or hidden networks of terrorists is not working.

Europeans can neither sit back and ignore these problems, nor leave them to others to resolve. They have the opportunity and responsibility to provide the resources and creativity to finding alternative solutions. With 490 million citizens, a powerful economic and trading presence and its own experience of forging unity and peace out of a violent history, the European Union has much to contribute, not just in providing the capabilities to making a safer world, but in terms of ideas and approach.

In 2003, the Barcelona Report on European Security Capabilities proposed that Human Security was the most appropriate security strategy for the EU. Human Security is about the basic needs of individuals and communities in times of peril. It is about feeling safe on the street as well as about material survival and the exercise of free will. It recognises that ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ are both essential to people’s sense of wellbeing and their willingness to live in peace.

Human Security has the potential to operate as a dynamic organising frame, which could give new direction and coherence to European efforts to address the challenges set out in the European Security Strategy. It augments and does not displace national security, which remains the preserve of Member States. It draws on what the EU already does in terms of crisis management, civil-military cooperation, conflict prevention and reconstruction but takes

them further. It could offer greater clarity and purpose to the efforts of 27 Member States to use their collective voice effectively on the world stage and knit together the diverse fabric of the EU's external policies. It could help to mobilise European public opinion, and enhance the legitimacy of the EU as a global actor. It could also strengthen the links and relationships between the EU and its alliance partners in different regions of the world, establishing common principles and operating methods on which to base effective multilateralism.

The draft Reform Treaty spells out the general values and norms that guide the Union's external action (article 10a), it commits Member States to make available more military and civil assets to carry out the Foreign and Security Policy (article 17) and it proposes significant institutional changes which will increase the powers of the High Representative and establish an External Action Service. To make these reforms meaningful, what is needed in addition is a set of operational principles which will specify how these military and civil assets are to be used. We propose this could be done through a document (Protocol or Declaration) following the Treaty.

The six principles of a Human Security approach are as follows:

### **1. The Primacy of Human Rights**

The first principle is to ensure respect for human rights: to secure the safety, dignity and welfare of individuals and the communities in which they live. Respect for human rights is the main challenge – not military victory or the temporary suppression of violence. This implies that civilian and military initiatives should prioritise the protection of civilians over the defeat of an enemy. Protection refers to both physical and material protection, that is economic and social as well as civil and political rights.

### **2. Legitimate Political Authority**

A legitimate authority is trusted by the population and is responsible for law and order and respect of human rights. This principle means that any outside intervention must strive to create a legitimate political authority provided by a state, an international body or a local authority (a town or region). It must provide the conditions for a political process through which such an authority can be built and it must assist in the promotion of law and justice as well as the authority's ability to guarantee material wellbeing. The intervention must be viewed as legitimate locally and within the international community as a whole.

### **3. A Bottom-up Approach**

Intensive consultation with local people is required, not only to 'win hearts and minds' and in order to gain better understanding, although they are important, but to enable vulnerable communities to create the conditions for peace and stability themselves. This means involving civil society, women and young people, and not only political leaders or those who wield guns. Outsiders cannot deliver human security, they can only help.

### **4. Effective Multilateralism**

This is related to legitimacy and means a commitment to work in the framework of international law, alongside other international and regional agencies, individual states and non-state actors. Effective multilateralism is what distinguishes a Human Security approach

from neo-imperialism. It also means a better division of tasks and greater coherence, solving problems through rules and cooperation, and creating common policies and norms.

## **5. An Integrated Regional Approach**

There is a tendency to focus on particular countries when dealing with crisis. Yet insecurity spills over borders through refugees, transnational criminal networks and so on. Regional dialogues and action in neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into policies for crisis.

## **6. Clear and Transparent Strategic Direction**

When the European Union intervenes externally, it must do so with clear legal authorisation, transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. Where European security units are deployed there should be close linkage between policy makers and those on the ground, with the former having ultimate control over operations. All EU external engagements should be led by civilians.

## **Conclusion**

The success of Europe – as an integration project, rebuilding peace among its members, and as an economic and trading bloc - has been based on a commitment to principles, such as consensus ,co-operation, democracy and the rule of law. In order to realise its potential to contribute to a global peace, the European Union needs now to articulate such a clear set of principles to guide its initiatives, govern its operations and evaluate its effectiveness.

## Contents

<b>I</b>	<b>Executive summary</b>	7
<b>II</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	8
<b>III</b>	<b>Human Security</b>	8
	The concept of Human Security	8
	Answering the critics	10
<b>IV</b>	<b>From Barcelona to Madrid</b>	11
	The evolution of ESDP	11
	What we learned: Lessons from EU missions	15
	Conclusions	19
<b>V</b>	<b>Challenges for CFSP/ ESDP</b>	22
	Coherence	22
	Effectiveness	22
	Visibility	22
<b>VI</b>	<b>A European Way of Security</b>	23
	Key proposals	23

## I Executive Summary

*In the past five years the European Union has developed the capacity and willingness to intervene in difficult and dangerous locations, to deal with crises, to improve the chances of people to lead peaceful lives and to contribute to regional and international security. This Report is about how the EU has built this global security role so far, and where it should go next.*

*The Barcelona Report of 2004 declared that the most appropriate approach for Europe in the twenty-first century would be to promote human security. This Report spells out what a European Human Security approach means, and addresses the criticisms levelled at it. It looks at five cases where the EU has intervened to deal with political violence and to rebuild societies torn apart by civil war, and shows how a Human Security approach is relevant to those operations.*

*The Report concludes that in the wake of the Reform Treaty and the 'Global War on Terror' the EU should now define a distinctive European Way of Security, based on Human Security principles, which would enable it to intervene more effectively in crises, and take forward its foreign and security policies in a way which commands the support of its citizens and addresses the needs of vulnerable communities. Human Security should provide a new operating framework for European Union external action.*

*The Report proposes:*

- *That the Member States agree a public declaration of their commitment to principles which put Human Security at the heart of the European Union's external operations. This could be done in a document (Protocol or Declaration) following the Reform Treaty. Such a declaration would affirm their shared beliefs and values in contributing to peaceful coexistence among all peoples and regions of the world. It would provide clear guidance from the Member States to the institutions of the European Union when the EU acts on their behalf in crises. It would help to garner public support for the EU's global role. A public statement of principles is the starting point for codifying a 'European Way of Security' and for connecting the strategic will of Member States with actions on the ground.*
- *Ultimate and lasting solutions to crises require political processes, which foster Human Security. Every ESDP mission, including full military missions, should be placed within a new framework consisting of a comprehensive planning process under civilian leadership, which should be responsible for developing and implementing a sustained political strategy covering the deployment of EU resources.*
- *The European Union should take steps to operationalise a Human Security doctrine, which translates Human Security principles into concrete and practical actions on the ground. These steps include formulating Human Security mandates for external operations, issuing EU personnel with 'Human Security' cards setting out best practice guidelines, training in Human Security principles and an evaluation system for missions that uses the principles as benchmarks.*

## II Introduction

In this Report we outline a vision for a European Way of Security, based on a set of principles that should be clearly defined and articulated at every level of the EU, from Member States agreeing collective action to the soldier, judge, policeman or tax inspector on the ground. The Barcelona Report proposed that a Human Security Doctrine for Europe should consist of seven principles to govern interventions, a 15,000-strong Human Security Response Force and a new legal framework for Europe. Below we reiterate and refine what Human Security means in the context of the EU's external policies, and how the principles can be useful not just as a description or label, but as a set of operational instructions. We then describe recent developments in European Security and Defence Policy and our findings from five cases studies of EU interventions and how far they conform to what we define as a Human Security approach. In the final section, we put forward new proposals for taking forward the Human Security agenda, based on what we have learned.

## III Human Security

### The Concept of Human Security

A European Way of Security needs to show how it is distinctive. The defining characteristics of a European approach include the commitment to effective multilateralism and human rights as well as the way the European Union combines military and civil assets and has pioneered civilian crisis management. A European Way of Security should focus on the protection of individuals and communities as well as the interrelationship between 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. It is a hard security policy even though it stresses the civilian aspects of security.

The term we use is 'Human Security', as the one that best fits what Europe already does, what its ambitions are and the unique mix of its abilities to deliver this vision. 'Human Security' is a broad concept that encompasses many different definitions, ranging from the narrow Canadian usage linked to the 'responsibility to protect', to the broad UNDP version that tends to equate human security with human development. As a description of the European Way of Security, however, it is possible to specify what it means with much greater precision. As an operational concept, it is possible to link it to how the EU behaves on the ground in external missions.

Human Security is about the European Union helping to meet human need at moments of crisis, when people suffer not only because of wars but from natural and human-made disasters – famines, Tsunamis, hurricanes. Security is often viewed as the absence of physical violence and regarded as part of the political-military realm, while development tends to be considered part of the economic and social realm, and human rights are largely considered part of the civil/legal realm. Yet these distinctions are misleading. Development is more than material wellbeing, just as human rights must include economic and civil rights. Likewise, ensuring Human Security under circumstances of extreme vulnerability means a concern for both physical and material wellbeing. It is about helping people to feel safe in their homes and on the streets as well as ensuring they have what they need to live on. Human Security is at the sharp end of both human development and human rights.

For the European Union, Human Security is more than just another security concept or label. It can be seen as a narrative that encapsulates the goals and methods of a highly diverse foreign and security policy system, and which represents them in discussions of security to different audiences, both the public and professional sectors. In other words, it is about how Europeans describe their approach to external security. As such it is also the basis for a common security culture and identity. At the same time, Human Security is an organising frame that specifies how external intervention and engagement should be implemented. At the heart of a European Human Security approach is the set of



principles, developed by the Barcelona Report, which both give substance to the concept of Human Security as applied by the European Union and serve as an operational methodology to guide and evaluate EU international operations. In other words, it is about the goals of EU actions as well as the methods.

The six principles of a Human Security approach are listed below. There is no hierarchy of principles. They are all important, interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The primacy of human rights comes first because it is the core of Human Security and legitimate political authority comes second because it is needed to deliver Human Security. Clear and transparent strategic direction comes last because it encompasses all the other principles. Two of the original seven principles – the use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of force – permeated the other five, and are integral to the Human Security approach, so we have left them out as separate principles. On the other hand, we have added the principle of ‘clear and transparent strategic direction’. On the basis of our examination of EU missions, this was a significant omission that would improve the effects of intervention on ordinary people.

### **1. The Primacy of Human Rights**

The first principle is to ensure respect for human rights: to secure the safety, dignity and welfare of individuals and the communities in which they live. Respect for human rights is the main challenge – not military victory or the temporary suppression of violence. This implies that civilian and military initiatives should prioritise the protection of civilians over the defeat of an enemy. Protection refers to both physical and material protection, that is economic and social as well as civil and political rights.

### **2. Legitimate Political Authority**

A legitimate authority is trusted by the population and is responsible for law and order and respect of human rights. This principle means that any outside intervention must strive to create a legitimate political authority provided by a state, an international body or a local authority (a town or region). It must provide the conditions for a political process through which such an authority can be built and it must assist in the promotion of law and justice as well as the authority’s ability to guarantee material wellbeing. The intervention must be viewed as legitimate locally and within the international community as a whole.

### **3. A Bottom-up Approach**

Intensive consultation with local people is required, not only to ‘win hearts and minds’ and in order to gain better understanding, although they are important, but to enable vulnerable communities to create the conditions for peace and stability themselves. This means involving civil society, women and young people, and not only political leaders or those who wield guns. Outsiders cannot deliver human security, they can only help.

### **4. Effective Multilateralism**

This is related to legitimacy and means a commitment to work in the framework of international law, alongside other international and regional agencies, individual states and non-state actors. Effective multilateralism is what distinguishes a Human Security approach from neo-imperialism. It also means a better division of tasks and greater coherence, solving problems through rules and cooperation, and creating common policies and norms.

## 5. An Integrated Regional Approach

There is a tendency to focus on particular countries when dealing with crisis. Yet insecurity spills over borders through refugees, transnational criminal networks and so on. Regional dialogues and action in neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into policies for crisis.

## 6. Clear and Transparent Strategic Direction

When the European Union intervenes externally, it must do so with clear legal authorisation, transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. Where European security units are deployed there should be close linkage between policy makers and those on the ground, with the former having ultimate control over operations. All EU external engagements should be led by civilians.

## Answering the Critics

Since the publication of the Barcelona Report, two contradictory sets of criticisms have been raised in relation to the concept of Human Security. The first is about the concept itself, and can be found within the wider public and academic debate. Some critics worry that it is a new label for neo-imperialism and a way to justify liberal interventionism and a new European militarism. Others argue that far from being hawkish, the concept lacks teeth and is too ‘warm and fuzzy’ or ‘soft’.

A European Way of Security must be a hard security policy, which involves the use of military force. What distinguishes Human Security operations from neo-imperialist interventions is both the multilateral framework and the way that military force is used, which is distinct from either conventional war-fighting (defeating enemy combatants or insurgents) or peacekeeping (separating warring parties or monitoring ceasefires). Military force is used to protect individuals, to create the basis for a rule of law, and to arrest those who violate the law. Specifying the conditions under which military forces are used would help to assuage the fears of those who are concerned about EU ambitions to become a superpower.

The second set of criticisms is about the relevance of the Human Security concept for the European Union. This criticism comes mainly from official elites who claim either that ‘We’re doing Human Security; we just don’t call it that’, or that ‘Human Security is too lofty and ambitious; it is not practical or realistic’.

It is true that Human Security encompasses many of the concepts used by the EU in its missions; for example, crisis management, military-civil cooperation or conflict prevention. But it takes these concepts further. It draws on the debates generated by these concepts as well as other terms used more broadly in current global discourse such as ‘responsibility to protect’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘human development’.

Human Security is about *crisis management* but it is more than that because it offers a perspective on crises. Stability is often considered the obverse of crisis. But from a Human Security perspective, the aim is not just stability; stability tends to be about the absence of overt conflict or, in economic terms, about halting a downward spiral of GDP. In recent years, the international community does seem to have learned important lessons about how to stabilise conflicts. But it has not yet learned how to address the security of individuals and communities – how to deal with violent organised crime, widespread human rights violations, or joblessness, for example.

Reducing the risk of renewed crisis includes *conflict prevention*, which contains important aspects that are integral to a Human Security approach, for example, the need for a ‘bottom-up’ approach and for ‘effective multilateralism.’ There is a tendency for the international community to be preoccupied with phases and to assume that different tools and instruments are appropriate in different time periods. Yet the ‘vulnerabilities’ described above – joblessness, weak rule of law resulting in high

levels of crime and human rights violations, weak institutions and capacity to provide public services – can be treated as structural conditions that make crises more likely. They weaken society’s capacity to cope with crises and they are exacerbated both by conflict and by disasters. Thus in the aftermath of crises, the conditions for future crises are further aggravated.

Human Security capabilities also require *civil-military cooperation*. The Barcelona Report proposed a Human Security Response Force composed of both civil and military elements. Civil-military cooperation is more than just a matter of coordination, ‘integration’ or ‘synergies’, to borrow from current parlance. Human Security is about *how* and *why* civil and military capabilities are combined, rather than a reflex action to use them as part of a standard conflict toolkit.

In classic wars, civilian humanitarian agencies always insisted on their autonomy from the military. Their ability to operate depended on ‘humanitarian space’ – their neutrality and impartiality was important to allow them to help non-combatants, prisoners of war and the wounded on all sides. Many humanitarian and development agencies fear that association with the military will undermine their ability to work and, indeed this has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan where international institutions are perceived to be on the side of coalition forces. In contemporary wars, where civilians are targets, humanitarian space is disappearing. The job of the military is to protect and preserve that space rather than to fight an enemy. Human Security is not just about developing a culture of coordination and civil-military cooperation; it is about an entirely new way of functioning in crises.

In other words, a clear concept such as Human Security would allow the EU to refine and coordinate what it already does under multiple labels. In this sense it is not overly ambitious, it makes more sense of what is already being done and, as we shall argue, it would increase the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of European security policy.

Is it utopian to suggest that Human Security might provide a discursive and operational framework for what the EU is trying to do? The challenge is cognitive as much as practical. Human Security does require a transformation in ways of thinking. Traditional concepts of security are deeply embedded in Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence and any alternative appears utopian. Yet, from the research we have undertaken, it seems clear that a Human Security approach is actually more realistic as a way of tackling current crises and would be more effective than a traditional security approach that emphasises the classic use of military force, or simply adds civilian capabilities to military peacekeeping. That is why it is so important to spell out the parameters of a European Way of Security.

## **IV From Barcelona to Madrid**

### **The Evolution of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**

In 2003 the European Union set out a vision of a ‘secure Europe in a better world’. Since then, escalating conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan, terrorist attacks in European cities, concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of organised crime, and the misery and chaos wrought by natural disasters have made Europeans feel less safe, and their contribution to a better world harder to identify. Yet in the past four years the EU has passed important milestones in its efforts to become a global security actor and shoulder its responsibilities towards building a peaceful world. In the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, the (ESDP) has provided civilian experts and military forces to help protect and rebuild societies crippled by conflict. Since 2003, over 11,000 personnel have been deployed on 18 missions, involving policemen, judges, lawyers, and administrators as well as military personnel. A 19<sup>th</sup> mission has just been added. Ten of those operations were active last year alone. The EU has used coercive force where necessary, it has

ventured far beyond its own backyard and it has provided support at crucial moments for other international organisations, such as the United Nations and the African Union (See Table 1).

These missions have met an important and growing demand for peacebuilders in a troubled world, and they have helped project the EU's unique mix of capabilities, norms and values, and its image as a peaceful and prosperous zone of stability, itself forged from the ravages of war, onto a wider global canvas. These capabilities have provided an additional element beyond, and often alongside, the roles of individual member states in crisis zones. Some of these missions, as we point out in the next section of this Report, have incorporated novel features such as human rights advisors, an awareness of gender issues, and a combination of civilian and military instruments, which contribute to a growing accumulation of best practice. By intervening in these ways, in fragile peace processes from Congo to Aceh, the European Union has established an important 'acquis' in its external security policy, establishing significant precedents for how it exercises political power in the wider world. ESDP missions and flanking measures by the European Commission have made external relations the most active aspect of European integration during the past five years.

The experience of ESDP missions has been an important learning process. As a result of missions like Aceh or Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), practitioners have begun to develop a new self-belief and confidence about Europe's role in the world, even though it is, as yet, limited to policy makers and professionals whose job it is to implement European security policies.

Despite the paralysis that resulted from the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Member States have shown a willingness to act collectively in response to crisis, whether man-made through sectarian conflicts as was the case in Lebanon, and the DRC, or as a result of natural disasters such as the Asian tsunami. They have also participated in the progressive development of institutions and capabilities that give effect to the ambitions set out in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). European capabilities span the spectrum from full military forces to civilian personnel, with a growing hinterland of defence planning, resourcing and equipment, and training. The 13 European Battlegroups (BG) have been fully operational since the beginning of 2007, providing at any one time, two groups of up to 1500 troops available for rapid deployment within 10 days, and able to operate for up to four months. Each BG is associated with a Force Headquarters as well as transport and logistics capabilities.

From 2007 the EU has its own Operations Centre in Brussels to carry out autonomous planning and operations activities, further reinforcing its ability to respond quickly to demands for intervention and crisis management, independently of Member States and NATO.

Developments in civilian ESDP capabilities have also been rapid. In addition to over 700 personnel serving in civilian missions, the EU has developed Civilian Response Teams (CRTs), flexible in size and composition, which currently provide a pool of trained experts, deployable within five days, giving a civilian dimension to rapid response. A new chain of command for civilian operations includes a civilian operations commander. There is a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) to support missions. Coordination between civilian and military resources has benefited from the setting-up of the civ-mil cell, while there have been sustained efforts to improve cooperation between the Council and the Commission, particularly through the efforts of recent EU presidencies, although the meshing of different professional cultures into a common operating framework remains one of the toughest challenges for Europe's external policies. The capacity to act has also been strengthened by reforms to the financing of collective action under ESDP, with the aim of releasing funds more quickly – a lesson learned from the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia. The Athena Mechanism, under which Member States fund security initiatives will continue to be reviewed with each new mission, although the scale and methods for funding EU operations neither match the ambitions of ESDP, nor provide for a best or even use of resources between 27 member states.

recently, attention paid to the quality of EU interventions has directed efforts to promoting areas of best practice such as human rights and gender mainstreaming on ESDP missions.

All these developments have made a significant contribution towards fulfilling the EU's ambition to be a credible force, to move from reactive to pro-active security policies, and to maximise the distinctive characteristics of Europe as a contributor to global security. For over 20 years the European Union's foreign policy was perceived to be ineffective, as it struggled to make decisive contributions to international crises, whether in the Balkans, the Middle East or central Asia. In trying to overcome this weakness it has placed a premium on developing a material and institutional toolkit that improves its capacity to act, and to meet demands for its intervention. In the process of forging this capacity, the principle of collective responsibility and action, in a framework which is neither NATO nor the nation state, has been firmly established so that a common foreign and security policy now exists in more than just name and the formal texts of EU treaties.

However, at the heart of ESDP is an ambiguous idea of security. Although the majority of ESDP missions are civilian and capacity building has focussed on generating both civilian and military resources, it is the growing ability to use coercive force that has defined the development of ESDP and which has been its most radical achievement to date. The EU's military dimension raises questions about why and how military force will be used in ESDP. It also has consequences for the relationship between the EU and other actors, from NATO to other states. A European security policy seen through the lens of its potential to deploy armed force looks quite different to one which deploys judges, police, economists and border monitors. The commitment in the draft Reform Treaty to strengthen military capabilities as well as the technological and industrial base of the defence sector can be read in terms of traditional geo-political military aspirations.

Likewise, the European Defence Agency (EDA), established in 2004, is an important aspect of the Union's new military capabilities. Its goal is to develop procurement and defence industry capacity, including technology, intelligence and manpower, to match ESDP ambitions. The EDA's long-term vision document defines its future goals as supporting the synergy of military and civil resources, European agility in responding to crisis, the ability to draw on a wide range of capabilities and to support them for long-term engagements. Even though the long-term vision emphasises that European military forces will be used more to establish security and stability than 'victory', the operational parts of the vision tend to emphasise superiority over an adversary rather than the protection of civilians.

Military ESDP changes the nature of the EU as a civilian power, a concept that has been particularly important in some Member States and that has been the dominant framework for European external policy until now. But what sort of military power? This is why it is so important to specify how military forces are to be used. the operational principles that guide the use of military force need to be specified.

The civilian and military headline goals, which have framed much ESDP capacity building, are nearing their deadlines in 2008 and 2010, respectively. Over the next two years the European Union will have to address a new set of issues: in addition to its capacity to act, what should be the determinants of European security and the EU's willingness to intervene beyond its borders? What or whom is the Union's security policy for, and what are the principles that guide military and civil implementation? The development of the last four years has brought an abundance of experience, and incidental successes, but not yet a refined system for European intervention.

**Table 1 ESDP Missions**

**2003**

***Concordia*** -military operation, using NATO assets in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) .

***EUPOL- Proxima*** - Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), assisting the efforts of the Government of FYROM to move closer towards EU integration.

***ARTEMIS***, military mission, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 contributing to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo

***EUPM (BiH)*** Police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina ; monitoring, mentoring and inspection. Refocused in 2006 to support the police reform process, develop and consolidate local capacity and regional cooperation in the fight against major and organised crime.

**2004**

***Althea*** military mission to Bosnia Herzegovina

***EUJUST THEMIS*** 1<sup>st</sup> Rule of Law Mission, to Georgia to support Georgian government with reform to the criminal justice system

**2005**

***AMM*** Aceh (Indonesia) monitoring mission; to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement, set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) including decommissioning of GAM armaments and relocation of armed forces

***Eupol Copps*** Palestine; to provide enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.

***EUPAT*** former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ;police advisory team, successor to PROXIMA (qv), monitoring and mentoring local police on issues including border policing, public peace and order and accountability, the fight against corruption and organised crime.

***EUBam Rafah*** Palestine; to monitor operations of the Israeli border crossing point.

***EUJUST-Lex*** Iraq; to provide professional development opportunities to senior justice officials and demonstrate best practice in rule of law.

***EUPOL Kinshasa*** DR Congo. (now EUPOL RD Congo) To monitor, mentor and advise the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) and police reform

***EUSEC DR Congo*** advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security

***AMISS II*** Darfur, Sudan ; civilian and military components to ensure effective and timely EU assistance to support the AMIS II enhancement.

***EU Border Assistance Mission*** Moldova and Ukraine; training and advice to support capacity building for border management and customs, to prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud .

**2006**

***EUFOR RD Congo*** ; military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process

**2007**

***Eupol Afghanistan*** mentoring, advice and training for civilian police at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces.

***EUPT Kosovo*** planning to ensure a smooth transition between tasks of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and other areas

***EUFOR TCHAD/RCA*** military operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic

Source: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=fr&mode=g](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=fr&mode=g)

## Lessons from EU missions

The Study Group undertook five case studies of EU engagement in regions where it has intervened to help stabilise societies that have suffered violent conflict. They were Kosovo, Aceh in Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestine and the Lebanon. The case studies include both ESDP missions and Commission initiatives. Three of these places (Aceh, DRC, Palestine) were the subject of ESDP civilian or military missions. In Kosovo, the EU has been engaged through Community institutions (not ESDP), although the largest ever civilian ESDP mission is expected to be deployed to the province in 2008 and a planning team is currently on the ground there. In Lebanon, among EU member states, France Italy Germany and Spain participated in the UN Mission, UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) following the war of 2006, and the European Commission is the leading donor, especially for reconstruction. The case studies were based on interviews in Brussels, national capitals and in the field, and documentary evidence; throughout, the methodology embraced a bottom-up approach by investigating how civil society groups and individuals experienced security as well as their perception of the EU role.

The main findings from these studies can be summarised in relation to each of the principles.

### 1. The Primacy of Human Rights

Almost all the missions were sensitive to human rights, both civil and political and economic and social, although the extent to which they were pre-eminent or embedded in the EU missions we examined was patchy.

In cases such as the EUFOR military mission in DRC and Aceh there was a formal and specific attention to this principle, through the appointment of human rights advisers in DRC and provisions to support human rights initiatives such as a human rights court and a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation as part of the Aceh peace process. In the DRC case this attention was reinforced with the novel device of a 'Soldier's Card' which provided an aide memoire to troops on the ground about how to deal with gender issues and child soldiers from a human rights perspective. Human rights advisers were also incorporated into many patrols in Kinshasa to ensure that the military deployment paid more than lip service to human rights.

However, in Aceh and the DRC, there was no explicit monitoring of human rights abuses by third parties. Either the mission had no provision for sanctions, as in the case of Aceh, or no jurisdiction over abuses by key actors. Thus in Aceh the AMM had no jurisdiction over the Indonesian security forces, GAM (the Free Aceh Movement), or in the case of EUFOR, it had no control over abuses by the Congolese police. The AMM could also have used its role in drafting the Law on the Governance of Aceh (LoGA) to insist that local human rights protection was in line with international law – including the EU's own legal standards. Instead, a problematic form of Sharia was implemented by LoGA and the AMM decided to take a 'neutral' position in order not to jeopardize the overall mission.

In Palestine, the human rights situation is very grave. The European Union has attempted to ease the situation in a number of ways. The European Commission is the largest donor and it has tried to sustain economic assistance, despite the boycott on Hamas, through the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) whereby money has been paid directly to some 4000 beneficiaries and indeed overall assistance increased by 27% in 2006. EU BAM is an ESDP mission that was supposed to facilitate freedom of movement between Gaza and Egypt but it has been paralysed by Israeli decisions to keep the crossing closed for most of the time (all the time since the Hamas takeover of Gaza). EU COPPS was another ESDP mission whose role is to help the Palestinian civil police, historically an effective and relatively impartial force trusted by ordinary Palestinians, in contrast to the other Palestinian security forces established after Oslo, which were controlled by different

factions and often acted in predatory ways. However, EU COPPS was badly hit by the boycott on Hamas because the Minister of Interior was a Hamas appointment and, meanwhile, the other competing security forces, under the control of Fatah or Hamas, were strengthened through finance and other kinds of support from the United States and Iran and Syria respectively.

In Lebanon, the war with Israel in 2006 caused immense destruction and suffering. The use of cluster munitions by Israel caused many casualties, especially among children, and made large tracts of agricultural land unusable. European Union Member States contribute to UNIFIL, the UN mission on the border with Israel, which has an explicit mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. But since this is not a UN Charter Chapter VII resolution, UNIFIL can only act in self defence or to protect civilians at the discretion of the commander at the time. One commander has made it clear that UNIFIL will respond if UN forces, humanitarian NGOs or Lebanese civilians are directly attacked, although UNIFIL has no means to prevent air attacks at certain ranges. UNIFIL also carries out humanitarian tasks including the provision of emergency medical and veterinary services, and the destruction of munitions although it has no official certification for it.

The European Commission has provided large amounts of assistance for reconstruction often at the local level. However, the European Union could have reacted more firmly during the war to the use of forbidden weapons against civilians and to war crimes that were committed. It might have demanded that Israel contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon, especially since so much infrastructure financed by the European Union was destroyed in the war. The situation of Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon is extremely serious and not enough is being done to assist them.

In Kosovo it is less physical violence and more the lack of economic and social rights – in terms of unemployment, poor electricity supply and a lack of proper roads – which lie at the heart of a growing security problem. Politically, the emphasis is on status settlement rather than individual rights. A policy of ‘keeping the peace’ often meant appeasing ethnic extremists on both sides, which has allowed an abnormal political economy to develop, further aggravating social and economic human rights.

## **2. Legitimate Political Authority**

Most EU missions pay only indirect attention to this principle and as a result there is confusion about who the EU should deal with in order to deliver Human Security.

In Palestine and Lebanon, EU engagement bypassed the central authorities in handing out reconstruction or welfare assistance, but without being able to empower an alternative level of authority. Indeed, in both cases it can be argued that EU assistance may actually have undermined central authority. In Palestine, the TIM bypassed the Palestinian Authority and allowed the proliferation of funding to different factions, while the failure to continue support to the police was associated with the fragmentation and proliferation of competing security agencies. In Lebanon, the European Council and some Member States, notably France, have taken sides in the current confrontation between two dominant political factions and this has hampered political reconciliation. Direct reconstruction assistance to municipalities also meant that state authority has not been extended to the south of the country except through the presence of the Lebanese army.

In Kosovo, although the UN administration has formal – legal – legitimacy, it has shunned joint decision making, which could improve local capacity. As a result the current EU presence suffers a deficit of local ownership, with the risk that the proposed ESDP mission to Kosovo will inherit the same approach as has been adopted by the United Nations administration in the province (UNMIK). By ignoring local forms of authority, and assuming executive functions itself in the name of efficiency, the EU, like UNMIK, has also squeezed the space for the return of politics and the normalisation of Kosovo society.



In DRC, the ESDP missions were established as part of a European strategy to support the first free elections in over 40 years. The European Union as a whole, including bilateral member state assistance, was the largest funder of the election. However, this raised the concern that EU intervention had served to strengthen a regime that is dysfunctional in terms of good governance and is accused of human rights infringements (which increased during the electoral process). Elections, as a number of scholars point out, are not necessarily the same as constructing legitimate political authority.

### **3. A Bottom-up Approach**

All the case studies found a significant difference between economic and reconstruction issues where a bottom-up approach was more noticeable, and political concerns where the processes were predominantly top-down. More could be done in terms of freeing up individuals and civil society to be the architects and engineers of their own recovery, and in allowing them to arbitrate the results of external intervention. There are few effective accountability mechanisms governing outside actors, and consultation and cooperation are poorly institutionalised, so that people in places such as Kosovo feel they are powerless in the face of decisions made in Brussels, rather than equal partners. At worst, as the study on Kosovo showed, minority groups such as local Serbs see themselves as bargaining chips in a complicated negotiation between external and local actors. The EU has also circumvented many civil society structures, creating new ones modelled on Western concepts of NGOs, and ignoring village leaders and councils of elders that are more relevant to local mores.

The Aceh mission was also criticised by the local population for its top-down structure, which was designed to safeguard its own personnel in a hostile environment and allow for speedy evacuation. The structure was inefficient when it came to dealing with complex social issues such as the reintegration of combatants because it failed to take sufficient account of how policies were being received on the ground. In DRC, mission intelligence avoided engagement with locals in order not to compromise their tactics and the police mission EUPOL was focused initially on helping to protect VIPs, although it was later broadened to include police reform. In Palestine, the decision of EU BAM to remain in temporary headquarters in Israel instead of the military compound in Gaza seemed to Palestinians to show a lack of sensitivity to bottom-up concerns. Palestinians in Rafah whom we interviewed felt they could have benefited from an EU presence even if the crossing was closed; it would have increased their sense of security and the EU could have used the time for training Palestinian customs officers.

Where missions paid attention to the bottom-up principle, and to using local civil society structures, as in the DRC, there were noticeable benefits. The military mission there was more effective because its soldiers spoke French and patrolled the streets on foot. An outreach plan that was designed initially to ensure force acceptance held public meetings, recruited local journalists for radio spots and produced a mass circulation newspaper, all of which raised visibility and played a critical role in changing the perceptions of EUFOR as a 'foreign army' to a neutral but benign force.

In Palestine, there have been efforts by the Commission to consult and engage civil society, especially in reconciliation, and the police mission took a typically bottom-up approach. In Lebanon, EU support for the top-down imposition of economic reforms, though 'technically perfect', was not discussed through a broad political process, and this has contributed to the perception that the EU is trying to pursue its own 'neo-liberal' agenda. One constructive independent bottom-up initiative is the development of Lebanese-European municipality networks. Much more could be done to encourage transversal civil society initiatives that cross the deep political divide in Lebanon.

#### **4. Effective Multilateralism**

From the evidence of these missions, the EU is a reliable partner on the ground in conflict zones. It works with both other international and regional organisations and is successful in using and leveraging individual nation/Member State involvement. The case of the AMM in Aceh underlined the importance of effective multilateralism. The cooperation between the EU, Norway, Switzerland and five of the ASEAN countries gave the EU monitoring forces credibility on the ground and was thus critical to the success of the mission. In DRC the professionalism of EUFOR made it a valuable asset to MONUC, the UN peacekeeping force, supplying not only effective assistance but in being seen as a neutral force.

If anything there are grounds to suggest that the EU could be more bold in asserting its presence in multilateral engagements. In the Middle East the effectiveness of multilateralism was limited by a dominant US agenda of the global 'War on Terror', in which the interests of states take precedence over the every day experience of individuals. In Kosovo and DRC effectiveness was hampered by the lack of institutionalised coordination between different agencies, both EU and other actors.

#### **5. Regional Focus**

Only the Aceh mission took an explicit regional focus towards addressing its goals, and this was crucial to its success. Other missions tended to concentrate on the symptoms of insecurity present in the specific country where the mission occurred. Poor coordination with other EU agencies, and poor use of the regional fora available undermined the chances of a broader geographic perspective on the causes and possible solutions of conflicts. While some missions had technically a wider context (for example, the decision to send troops to DRC or to assist with security sector reform were part of the EU's Strategy for Africa), in practice this context got lost on the ground.

In the Middle East, a regional focus is urgently needed. Peace and reconciliation in Lebanon necessarily involves Lebanon's neighbours. There has to be both dialogue and pressure on Israel, Syria and Iran if any lasting peace is to be established. The same is true in Palestine where much more could be done to involve Israel's neighbours. Saudi Arabia played a critical role in the Mecca Agreement, which led to the unity government, which might have succeeded had it received more outside support. Likewise, the Arab League Peace Initiative could be a fruitful starting point for the current talks.

#### **6. Clear and Transparent Strategic Direction**

In all the missions except Aceh there was a problem of competing competences, with different approaches being pursued by the Council, the Commission, the various EU agencies and member states. In Palestine and Lebanon there is a serious gap between the political level (mainly the Council and member states) and what was happening on the ground (both Commission and ESDP missions and, in the case of Lebanon, UNIFIL). In Palestine, in particular, there have been real efforts to meet economic and social needs, and to support the police and freedom of movement, but these efforts are constrained by the policies pursued at a political level by the quartet framed by the War on Terror, which means that Israel's state security priorities come before the human security of Palestinians.

The same finding applies to the EUFOR mission in DRC. The EU engagement in DRC was compromised by a gap between the political/strategic direction of the mission and what was required practically on the ground. Efforts to engage with local opinion proved to be of critical importance for the success of the EU mission, but were thrown into jeopardy by the political decision to redeploy the force, and the appearance of 'cutting and running' when the electoral process was barely complete. EUFOR distributed 2007 calendars to local people as a way of maintaining EU 'presence' and visibility beyond the limited mandate after a hurried and unsatisfactory end to the mission, which

had more to do with German public opinion and wanting soldiers home by Christmas 2006 than the needs of the Congolese.

In most missions mandates were problematic, sometimes because they were overly restrictive. In DRC the mandate stipulated that the mission would have two headquarters, that at least half the troops should be based outside the country, their remit was to operate only in the area of Kinshasa, and that the duration of the mission should be restricted to four to five months. These restrictions compromised the effectiveness of the mission and its human security impact.

In Aceh, the mandate limited the competence of the AMM with regard to human rights. In other cases, mandates were – perhaps deliberately – opaque, so they gave no clear sense of purpose or goals to operations on the ground. In Kosovo and Palestine mandates were unclear partly because the EU operated through a number of different agencies, with no overall plan for their coordination

The decision to deploy a mission and the need to back this with a legal document to which all Member States agree, leads to a lack of specifics and/or a decision to compromise on the duration and nature of the mission in order to secure political backing. This might be difficult to avoid, but better provision for post-mission follow-through or smooth handovers, either to local parties or other EU agencies, could alleviate some of these problems.

### **What conclusions can we draw from this review of recent EU international operations?**

All the cases of EU engagement we examined contained at least some elements of Human Security, reinforcing the view that, far from being a radical leap in the dark, a Human Security approach could build on what is already being done in ESDP and increase its coherence and effectiveness. Indeed, the DRC and Aceh missions showed that a learning process is already underway, particularly in terms of the design of the mission, and especially in relation to human rights and the bottom-up principle. Yet, where elements of a Human Security approach exist, they are often haphazard, even accidental, and specific to one mission, or to the vision of one mission commander. If the standards and achievements of all EU missions are to improve, there should be a more systematic and integrated application of core principles and methods.

The principles are useful in providing a way to assess EU missions and their effect on the ground. They offer a set of criteria and tests about how these missions performed, and the effectiveness of their means as well as their objectives. This is helpful in not only defining what a Human Security approach should be on the ground, but in providing guidelines for how to implement it. The case studies also show how the Human Security principles are interlinked and why it is necessary to develop a comprehensive framework for Human Security. Each principle needs to be embedded within an overall approach because shortcomings in applying one principle have consequences for another, and so limit the overall success of missions. This failure to give primacy to human rights or to take a bottom-up approach can easily undermine the legitimacy of political authority and vice versa. In DRC during the critical attacks on the opposition candidate of August 2006, EUFOR was brought in to assist MONUC and this greatly increased the legitimacy and effectiveness of EUFOR as it was seen as both neutral and forceful.

At the same time, the studies showed that the principles may also raise certain dilemmas, in that they sometimes conflict. In DRC and Aceh, EU intervention aimed to provide support for an electoral process, which was seen as a route to the normalisation of societies emerging from violence. In DRC this strategy was criticised by local groups for encouraging human rights abuses as parties suppressed their opponents in order to win. Furthermore, the election outcome served to strengthen a government that is seen as a significant source of human rights violations, and therefore lacking in legitimacy.

Thirdly, all the case studies showed a lack of clear political direction. This was partly due to institutional incoherence between EU agencies, and different goals on the part of the Council, the Commission and the member states. In many cases, it also reflects a gap between what many courageous and committed members of European missions were trying to achieve on the ground, and what was happening at the level of high politics where considerations like the War on Terror, or the need for a rapid exit strategy to satisfy domestic constituencies, took precedence over human needs as identified through bottom-up consultations. There is also a problem translating high-level declarations, for example on the inclusion of women in peacebuilding operations, or the protection of the rights of young people, into action. This is why a Human Security approach, which would provide conceptual coherence, is so vital to the implementation of policy.

**Table 2: Summary of Findings from Case Studies**

Human Security Principles	Primacy of human rights (HR)	Legitimate political authority	Clear and transparent mandate	Bottom-up approach	Effective multilateralism	Integrated regional approach
Regions						
<b>DRC</b> (EUFOR; EUPOL-Kinshasa; EUSEC)	overall sensitive to HR; 'Soldier's Card' with instructions on use of force, gender issues and dealing with child soldiers; limited length and scope of mission; lack of clear legal mandate particularly regarding HR abuses by other actors.	mission helped to achieve fair elections; question of ability of elections to produce legitimate political authority; concerns that EU helped legitimise dysfunctional regime.	formal mandate less clear on the ground; lack of clarity in regard to HR; challenge to overcome suspicion by locals; problems caused by redeployment.	Partial bottom-up approach; dedicated outreach units within EUFOR; systematic and successful engagement with locals took into account local public opinion and grassroots views; soldiers spoke French; EUPOL focus on VIPs.	clearly multilateral but problems re effectiveness of multilateralism; no unity of command between EU and MONUC; lack of co-ordination between EUFOR and other EU initiatives.	mission situated within context of Strategy for Africa; lack of integrated regional approach due to limited geographical scope of mandate (restricted to Kinshasa); importance of South Africa and Angola for transition process not sufficiently taken into account at outset of EUPOL.
<b>Palestine</b> (EU BAM; EUCOPS)	generally sensitive to HR but constrained by boycott; ineffective role in Rafah regarding freedom of movement; concern for social and economic rights; emphasis on police.	lack of funds for police and direct payments to beneficiaries undermined the Palestinian Authority, with serious consequences.	impossibility of a clear mandate given the differing roles of different EU actors and the gap between EU involvement in the Quartet and EU activities on the ground.	partial bottom-up approach; EUCOPS mission constrained by boycott; shortcomings in EU BAM mission because not based in Gaza and because of Israeli pressure.	overall engagement shaped by US agenda and 'GWOT' paradigm.	shortcomings in regional integration (lack of attention to the Arab League Peace Plan).

<b>Lebanon</b>	sensitive to HR; significant concerns for social and economic rights by UN Mission, (with Italian and French involvement) and through local support for reconstruction.	support for government impeded between two dominant factions; reconstruction, assistance direct to local authorities aggravated weakness and invisibility (in the south) of Lebanese state.	confusion about different roles of EU; Commission support for HR; Council role to support the government.	economic assistance and UN Mission both bottom-up; participation by local communities in reconstruction; UN Mission engaged in various humanitarian activities and in regular consultations.	EU and UN cooperation; political engagement shaped by US agenda and the Global War on Terror.	lack of regional approach. Need for dialogue with Iran, Syria and Israel.
<b>Kosovo</b>	EU engagement officially embedded within HR rhetoric; on the ground: HR not prime concern of EU engagement; significant concerns for social and economic rights; key failure was jobs.	lack of local ownership and joint decision making in creating legislation; problem of accountability; lack of exit and handover strategy; distinction between development and political aims in mandates problematic.	lack of clear and transparent EU mandate, multiple EU agencies, no overarching portfolio and agenda; distinction between political and development goals.	lack of coherent bottom-up approach; no consultations with civil society in legislation and policy making; insufficient attempts at institutionalising consultation mechanisms to redirect ownership to Kosovars; minorities (e.g. Kosovo Serbs) not directly engaged; constrained by lack of civil society groups on the ground; poor standards of capacity, accountability, corruption mistrusted by other locals.	lack of coordination between six EU agencies; multilayered EU presence without central Kosovo-based coordinating body to streamline EU efforts, ensure coherency, significant lack of coordination between development and political efforts; bilateral engagement of MS without consultation and coherence regarding EU policy framework.	regional approach visible but lack of effective coordination systematic involvement of all minority groups essential but missing.
<b>Aceh (AMM)</b>	monitoring of HR abuses fell short; mission success put before more pro-active stand on HR; limited extent of HR mandate (e.g. no sanctioning power); poor coordination on HR; specific problem of <i>Sharia</i> .	free and fair elections possible in December 2006; questions of legitimate political authority overshadowed by HR problems.	debates between Commission and Council about deployment poor funding mechanisms and slow release of funds; legitimacy of EU forces improved through cooperation with ASEAN; clearer HR mandate would have been helpful.	focus on mission protection led to top-down structure; lack of language skills; lack of culturally-sensitive training; way <i>Sharia</i> was implemented in the Law on Governance (LoGA) constrained bottom-up efforts; concerns of local HR groups not implemented; civil society groups not included in peace negotiations.	EU worked with Finland, Sweden and UK to establish mission; with 5 ASEAN countries in implementation; cooperation with ASEAN provides model for future regional co-operation.	cooperation between EU and ASEAN forces was a crucial factor in the success of the peace monitoring mission.

## V Challenges for CFSP/ESDP

How should CFSP/ESDP develop in the next four years, in a changing international context which is likely to increase further ‘the demand for Europe’? The EU’s new capabilities face three interlinked challenges:

**1. Coherence:** although terms like coordination, synergy and integration have become the buzzwords of European security, they remain difficult – and frequently controversial – to achieve in practice. Incoherence is both institutional and functional. It spreads horizontally, between the different professional and institutional forms of EU security – between civilian and military resources, between the Commission and the Council, or between the EU and the member states. In large organisations, institutional coherence is almost impossible to achieve. As has been noted in Brussels, ‘everyone talks about coordination, but nobody wants to be coordinated.’ Coordination mechanisms can easily end up adding unnecessary layers of bureaucracy and introducing yet more ‘stove-piping’. What is needed is conceptual rather than institutional coherence, to be clear about shared goals and principles and to encourage notions of public service and commitment. Increasing attention is being paid to developing a European security culture. Equally, considerable efforts have gone into removing the institutional barriers between different parts of the EU’s security policy making. But without a clear and common understanding of the aims and the means of security policy, security initiatives will remain confused and unfocused.

**2. Effectiveness:** there has been considerable emphasis in recent years on the ‘activeness’ of the EU in global security. This has been seen in terms of the EU’s ability to respond quickly to crises, to preempt violent conflict and to make its presence count beyond economic and trading power. Effectiveness is more than just the capacity to act however. It requires a sense of what the EU is trying to achieve with its security policies, as well as the ability to measure their impact. For example, the expansion of the EU’s military dimension is one controversial aspect of its ability to be active. The option to use coercive force is a significant departure from the EU’s civilian or soft power profile, but there is little discussion about how and when it is to be used other than as a rapid reaction mechanism. Similarly the development of civilian and military instruments adds significantly to Europe’s value as an international security actor, capable of dealing with complex crises that require a full spectrum of types of assistance. But to be effective, the EU has to know how to combine these capabilities. Coherence is also part of effectiveness.

**3. Visibility:** despite the growth in capabilities and an increased presence in some of the most publicised conflicts around the globe, European missions go unnoticed by the majority of its citizens, while those on the receiving end of EU intervention are either unaware or dismissive of EU efforts. Visibility is also related to effectiveness. In DRC, the millions of Euros contributed by the European Commission, Member States and the EUFOR ESDP mission to make free elections possible were dwarfed by local perceptions that focused mainly on the UN presence in the country and saw a European contribution as less significant. In Kosovo the military presence of NATO – and in particular the Americans – counts for more among the population than the highly fragmented European presence. This lack of EU visibility is linked to the absence of a clear policy concept that would help to increase the public impact of EU missions, and address doubts about the reasons for such intervention. Better visibility would help both internal and external legitimacy. As shown by the fierce debates in the German parliament and media over the deployment of German troops as part of the EUFOR DRC mission in 2006, the EU needs to find ways to explain and justify external operations, not only in financial terms, but in terms of the human cost to EU personnel who may be placed in harm’s way.

In summary, the EU has developed a wide range of both civilian and military security capabilities since 2003, yet their integration within a framework that expresses a clear sense of purpose and security identity remains a work in progress. The European Security Strategy offers an outline framework for a European security ‘identity’ but it does not yet amount to an operating manual or even a set of design instructions. Such a framework will greatly contribute to the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of EU security policy.

## **VI A European Way of Security**

Security is bound up with political legitimacy. We feel safe if we trust our political institutions and we trust our political institutions if we see that they are acting effectively in crises. However, the debate about the ways in which we act in crises and particularly about the legitimacy of external intervention has been reshaped fundamentally by the events of 9/11 and the consequences of the ‘global war on terror’, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. While these events have focused public attention on the global nature of security, and the fact that instability in distant places can have a devastating effect on the streets of European capitals, there is also a growing realisation that waging ‘war’ to resolve these problems is not working.

In large parts of the world people fear being killed, robbed, raped, tortured, detained, or expelled from their homes and livelihoods. Wars, natural disasters, famines, new and old diseases, or financial crises are among the risks that contribute to a pervasive sense of insecurity. Yet current security arrangements, which largely consist of conventional military forces trained and equipped to defend borders and fight wars do not address these sources of insecurity. On the contrary, in places like the Middle East or Central Asia, interventions based on them have made things worse. Even with formal and legally sanctioned mandates, it has become harder to justify external intervention because from the Balkans to the Middle East and Asia, intervention has become tainted by the suffering of civilian populations on the ground. Far from helping to alleviate crisis and insecurity, the international community – and the ‘West’ in particular - is perceived as part of the problem. This security gap is also a legitimacy gap.

The drive to provide the Union with a more functional framework has already led to the Constitutional Treaty and now the proposed Reform Treaty. But the defeat of the Constitution has meant a defensive approach towards the Reform Treaty. If the European Union could adopt effective policies to increase our sense of security, this could mobilise public support and, in so doing, reinvigorate the process of European integration and support for the European project.

What we have sought to do in this Report is to define a European Way of Security in terms of the concept of Human Security. We have attempted to show how this concept is relevant to CFSP/ESDP and spell out how it can bring extra value to the European Union’s security policies. The European Union needs such a concept in order to formulate and implement the strategic and operational aspects of EU security policies and to be bold in promoting its distinctive vision.

### **Key Proposals**

In order to advance the Human Security agenda within the European Union, we propose:

- ***A Public Declaration of Human Security Principles***

This could take the form of a protocol or charter, agreed by the 27 EU members. It would affirm member states’ core beliefs and values in relation to international operations, and would provide clear guidance to EU institutions as to how to act collectively on behalf of member states. Alongside, or as

part of the European Security Strategy it would be a basis for determining when and where the EU intervenes in crises. The declaration would also be a starting point in helping to formulate rules of engagement and operating procedures, and as such would provide an important link between the political will of Member States and actions on the ground.

By setting out clear principles that are about both the goals and methods of EU security operations, a declaration would improve the transparency and therefore the domestic accountability of European foreign policy. It would help to address the democratic deficit within the European Union by creating a visible 'code' for security policies which defines – more explicitly than the ESS – the nature of EU foreign policy for the European Union's citizens.

European security policy also needs to be clear to those outside the Union, on the receiving end of security missions and of Commission initiatives. The current language of security reflects the cumbersome and complicated jargon of Brussels institutions, rather than helping to promote good communications and cooperative partnerships between the EU and local populations. A declaration of principles would help to simplify and clarify to the EU's partners the defining characteristics of its foreign policy. And it would provide a standard, which could be used by local populations to increase the accountability of intervening forces.

#### ▪ ***A New Strategic Framework for ESDP Missions***

By this we mean a comprehensive way of organising EU international operations which recognises that the ultimate goal of intervening in crises is to restore politics as normal, and not to create long term armies of occupation or international administrations. Every ESDP mission, including military missions, should be placed within a planning and operational framework headed by a civilian commander, who has the political skills to understand both local and international political complexities and who can provide the link between ordinary people on the ground and political leaders in Brussels, as well as sending countries. The commander would spearhead an intervention plan that would aim to assist the civilian population to establish a legitimate political authority and thereby provide an exit strategy.

This would go beyond current efforts to coordinate ESDP initiatives with Commission responsibilities towards conflict management. It would be a more effective way of ensuring that all the Union's crisis instruments are brought together at the earliest stage, of embedding the principles of respect for human rights and legitimate political authority, and ensuring that operations pay attention to the multilateral, regional and bottom-up aspects of intervention. The aim of such a framework would be to place even short term, rapid responses within a long- term time frame, and emphasise the importance of allowing communities time and space to build the conditions for peace themselves.

#### ▪ ***Concrete Steps to implement a Human Security Approach***

In addition to giving political backing at the level of Member States to the principles of Human Security, we propose that the EU adopts a number of practical measures to translate this commitment into ESDP operations.

These would include:

- The adoption of Human Security ESDP mandates that would give legal expression to the goals of Human Security, and would provide for and insist on follow-up and coordination procedures between ESDP missions and the work of other EU institutions such as the Commission.



- All mission personnel to be issued with 'Human Security' cards, a pocket-sized brochure setting out the six principles in order to make clear both the methods and the goals of external operations.
- The systematic use of assistance on the ground to troops and civilian experts in promoting human rights and ensuring the participation of women and young people in measures to promote stability and reconstruction.
- EU institutions including the Commission and the European Parliament should use Human Security principles as benchmarks for evaluating ESDP missions and Commission programmes, and as means to improve the accountability of EU forces, whether military or civilian for their actions during operations.
- The principles should also be incorporated into training programmes and military and civilian exercises as a way of developing a common operating culture, and to help develop quality standards among EU professionals. Currently, training for EU missions reflects some of the harsher truths about the EU as a security actor: it is a mosaic of different national and professional cultures and capabilities. Human Security training would promote better horizontal coordination of military and civilian functions, and an understanding of their respective roles, and it could become the basis for a quality 'kitemark' in mission training to which all Member States should be required to subscribe. Preparation for missions needs to reflect the distinctive goals and methodology of EU security policy and Human Security training would equip EU forces to put its principles at the heart of mission planning and execution.

This is the moment for Europeans to be clearer about how they will act collectively in foreign policy. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to be escalating and spreading, and as new anxieties about security undermine people's trust in our institutions, there is an urgent need for the European Union to take a lead in adopting an approach that could do more to make not only Europeans but also the rest of the world feel safer.

The EU is poised to become a significant global actor. In the next five years it must not only respond to a growing demand for crisis management, but also define and implement a foreign policy culture and approach that provide a role model for global security. Much has been done since 2003 to prepare for this role. As Javier Solana points out, there is a 'European model' of multilateralism, coherence and partnership emerging in foreign policy. However, this model is not fully codified at present and the EU has developed a limited common language to express what this model is and how it works.

The emerging European model is perhaps the only way that the global security needs of the twenty-first century can be fulfilled. A new phase of the European Security and Defence Policy is needed to spell out the philosophy and the operating methods that define a European Way of Security. For 50 years the European Union has applied its inventiveness to creating a peaceful community among its member states. Now it needs to show that it can be equally innovative and committed in addressing crises in the wider world.

## **Papers Commissioned by the Study Group**

### **The Concept of Human Security**

Human Security : a new Strategic Narrative

Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow

### **Case Studies**

A Human Security Assessment of EU Engagement in Kosovo

Senad Šabović

Case Study: Lebanon

Mary Kaldor and Genevieve Schmeder

Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The European Union as a force for good?

Mary Martin

Mission Not So Impossible: The AMM and the Transition from Conflict to Peace in Aceh, 2005-2006

Kirsten E. Schulze

Report on Human Security in Palestine

Mient Jan Faber and Mary Kaldor

### **Thematic Studies**

A Minor Matter? Young People in an EU Human Security Doctrine

Jenny Kuper

European Zones of Human Security: A Proposal for the European Union

Denisa Kostovicova, Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Pavel Seifter

Secure learning: the role of training in embedding a Human Security doctrine for Europe

Mary Martin

## Members of the Human Security Study Group

**Ulrich Albrecht** is an expert on armament processes, arms trade, arms technology and security issues. He has been Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Free University Berlin since 1972. After completing his studies in aeronautical engineering, political science and economics at the Aix-la-Chapelle and Stuttgart Technical Universities, he held a series of research posts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Research Unit of the Federation for German Scientists, and the Institute for Social Economics at Stuttgart University.

**Christine Chinkin** is a Professor of International Law at LSE. She specialises in dispute resolution, feminist legal issues, human rights law, and the law of international institutions. She is also an overseas affiliated faculty member of the University of Michigan Law School. She advises a number of non-governmental organisations on human rights issue.

**Gemma Collantes Celador** is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), an inter-university graduate teaching and research institution for the study of international relations. She is currently working on various projects related to human security; security sector reform in the Western Balkans; and police practices within peace operations.

**Stefanie Flechtner** is research associate at the International Policy Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin. Her research areas are German and European Foreign and Security Policy and European Integration.

**Marlies Glasius** is a lecturer in global politics at the Government Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. Her book *The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement* (2006) has recently been published in paperback. Other publications include Glasius, Marlies and Mary Kaldor, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, Principles, Practicalities* (2005). Her current research focuses on the socio-political effects of the International Criminal Court on the situations it investigates.

**Mary Kaldor (Convenor)** is Professor and Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science. She previously worked at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Science Policy Research Unit and the Sussex European Institute at the University of Sussex. Her books include *The Baroque Arsenal* (1982) *The Imaginary War* (1990) *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (1999)

Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (2003). She was a founder member of European Nuclear Disarmament (END), founder and Co-Chair of the Helsinki Citizen's Assembly, and a member of the International Independent Commission to investigate the Kosovo Crisis, established by the Swedish Prime Minister and chaired by Richard Goldstone, which published the Kosovo Report (Oxford: OUP) in autumn 2000. Mary Kaldor is convenor of the study group on European Security Capabilities established at the request of Javier Solana, which produced the Barcelona report, 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe.'

**Kimmo Kiljunen** is a member of the Finnish parliament. He is vice chair of the parliament's Grand Committee and member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. He was Director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Helsinki 1986-1995. In 1993-94 he worked as Transition Policy Coordinator for UNDP in New York and was consultant for UNICEF in their Kenya Country Office in Nairobi during 1989-1991. Dr Kiljunen has written several books on international politics and global development problems

**Jan Klabbers** is Professor of International Organisations Law and Deputy-director of the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights at the University of Helsinki. He has published widely on the law of treaties and the law of international organizations. The constitutionalization of international law, state succession, and theoretical work on the position of the individual and other non-state actors in international law are also among his research areas.

**Jenny Kuper** is a Research Fellow in the Law Department of the LSE, specialising in international human rights and humanitarian law, with a particular focus on issues affecting children and young people. She has also worked as a consultant for a number of international organisations. Her most recent publications include *Military Training and Children in Armed Conflict: Law, Policy and Practice* (2005), and a chapter in *International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children* (2006).

**Sonja Licht** is director of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence. She was previously president of the Fund for an Open Society Yugoslavia, Belgrade, from its inception. She was a long time member of the Yugoslav democratic opposition. From 1991 to 1995 she was one of the two co-chairs of the International Helsinki Citizens' Assembly. She also chairs the Task Force on the Future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, established by the East-West Institute, New York/Prague, with Yugoslav and international membership.

**Flavio Lotti** is the Coordinator of the Italian Peace Roundtable, the network which unites more than 1500 civil society organisations and Local Authorities since 1996. He is also the Director of the Italian Coordination of Local Authorities for Peace and Human Rights; Secretary of the World Committee on the Millennium Development Goals of the United Cities and Local Governments. Member of the International Council of the World Social Forum. Founder and member of the European Network of Local Authorities for Peace in the Middle East. Member of the Executive Committee of the Municipal Alliance for Peace which unites Palestinian, Israeli and European Local Authorities national associations.

**Klaus Reinhardt** was Commander of Joint HQ Centre, Heidelberg, from 1998 until his retirement. From 1999 to 2000 he was Commander of KFOR in Pristina. During his long military career, Dr Reinhardt held a variety of staff positions and commands in the German armed forces, including Senior Military Assistant to the Minister of Defence in 1983; Commander of the 23 (German) Mountain Infantry Brigade in Bad Reichenhall from 1986 to 1988; Chief of Staff Section IV “Planning” in the German Ministry of Defence; Commander of the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Hamburg from 1990 to 1993; and Commander of the Third (German) Corps, Koblenz, from 1993 to 1994. In 1994 he became Commander of the Armed Forces Command in Koblenz, where he was responsible for the German deployment in Somalia, as well as the contingents in UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR. Dr Reinhardt holds a doctorate in history and political science from the University of Freiburg.

**Genevieve Schmeder** is professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. She has previously worked at the Directorate of Science, Technology and Industry of the OECD, in the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex, and in the French Ministry of Industry. Her publications include 'The European Rupture, Restructuring the European Military Sectors in the Post Cold War World' (with Mary Kaldor) and 'The End of Military Fordism' (with Mary Kaldor and Ulrich Albrecht).

**Pavel Seifter** is a visiting research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE. He was Czech ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1997 until his retirement in 2003. A lecturer in labour and social history in Prague, he was forced to leave his post after the Soviet invasion. He then worked as a window cleaner for twenty years, before becoming a key member of the Civic Forum movement, which led to the return from totalitarianism to democratic values in Czechoslovakia. He subsequently served as deputy director of the Institute of Contemporary History

and then as the deputy director of the Institute of International Relations in Prague. He was appointed as Director of Foreign Policy to the President in 1993.

**Narcis Serra** was Minister of Public Works of the Catalan Government (1977-1979), Mayor of Barcelona (1979-1982), Minister of Defence (1982-1991), Vice-president of the Spanish Government (1991-1995) and Member of the Spanish Parliament. Since September 2000, he has been President of the CIDOB Foundation, a research, training and documentation centre on international relations and development studies.

**Gert Weisskirchen** is member of the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag). He is spokesman of the SPD parliamentary working group on foreign affairs and personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism. Since 1990 he has been member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Deputy-member of the Committee on European Relations of the German Bundestag. He is member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and since 1998 he serves as the President of the Commission on Human Rights, democracy and humanitarian questions within the OSCE. Professor Weisskirchen is Professor of Social Education at Wiesbaden University and honorary professor of Applied Cultural Sciences at Potsdam University, Germany.

## **Advisors to the Human Security Study Group**

**Robert Cooper**, Special advisor to EU Secretary General Javier Solana

**Ana Gomes**, Member of the European Parliament

**Andy Salmon**, Member Royal College of Defence Studies, UK

## **LSE Team**

**Mary Martin**, Coordinator

**Yahia Said**, Researcher

**Denisa Kostovicova**, Researcher

**Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic**, Researcher

**Sabine Selchow**, Assistant

**Joanna Stone, Harriet Gallagher**, Project administrators

## Acknowledgments

*The Study Group would like to acknowledge the financial support and encouragement it received in preparing this report. The Finnish Presidency of the European Union in 2006 reconvened the group and has been closely involved in its deliberations. We have also received support from the Crisis Management Center of Finland. We are grateful to the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for hosting two seminars in Berlin and Lisbon. The Spanish Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs kindly hosted the launch of the report. The CIDOB Foundation has also provided financial support and organisation in preparing and launching the report. In particular, thanks go to Laia Mestres and to Pol Morillas at CIDOB for all their logistical help and organisation; and to LSE Enterprise for their administrative assistance and cooperation in this regard. Thanks also to Fiona Holland for help in preparing the report.*