THE RISE OF POPULIST RHETORIC AND THE MAINSTREAMING OF A PARTY?

TESTING THE RHETORICAL SHIFTS BETWEEN FRONT NATIONAL'S

PRESIDENTS JEAN-MARIE LE PEN AND MARINE LE PEN

by

Muriel C. McGregor

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree

of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

Political Science

Approved:

_____   _____
Steffen Blings, Ph.D.   Jeannie Johnson, Ph.D.
Major Professor   Committee Member

_____   _____
Christa Jones, Ph.D.   Richard S. Inouye, Ph.D.
Committee Member   Vice Provost for Graduate Studies

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

2019

ABSTRACT

The Rise of Populist Rhetoric and the Mainstreaming of a Party?

Testing the Rhetorical Shifts Between Front National's Presidents Jean-Marie Le Pen and

Marine Le Pen

by

Muriel C. McGregor

Utah State University, 2019

Major Professor: Dr. Steffen Blings
Department: Political Science

In France, the far right-wing party, *Le Front National*, has experienced recent growth in electoral success. Scholars of the *Front National* have in part attributed the party's success to its increased use of populist rhetoric, that is anti-elite sentiments, anti-pluralist sentiments, and appeals to people. This thesis delineated a definition of populist rhetoric and examined its use between the *Front National*'s past president Jean-Marie Le Pen (JMLP) and current president Marine Le Pen (MLP) in order to test these scholarly claims. In particular, I tested three hypotheses: 1) the use of populist rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced either no change or an increase; 2) the use of xenophobic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced either no change or a decrease; and 3) the use of economic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced no change or an increase. Using an inductive mixed methods approach, I compiled a dictionary of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric. Then, using transcriptions of the party leaders' campaign speeches for the 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 French presidential elections, I conducted a quantitative dictionary-based analysis on

their use of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric. For added nuance and to validate my quantitative results, I sampled a selection of the speeches to use for a qualitative content-based analysis. My results showed that, contrary to scholarly claims, there has been only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP. This was due to MLP's 2012 campaign; however, my inclusion of MLP's 2017 exposed a return to levels of populist rhetoric use comparable to JMLP. Overall, I argue that the perceived increased use of populist rhetoric in the *Front National* has more to do with the saliency of populism than numerical fact.

(96 pages)

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

The Rise of Populist Rhetoric and the Mainstreaming of a Party?

Testing the Rhetorical Shifts Between Front National's Presidents Jean-Marie Le Pen and

Marine Le Pen

Muriel C. McGregor

Populist movements have been on the rise across Europe and the Americas. In France, the far right-wing party, *Le Front National*, has experienced recent growth in electoral success. Scholars of the *Front National* have in part attributed the party's success to its increased use of populist rhetoric. This thesis examines the populist rhetoric used between the *Front National*'s past president Jean-Marie Le Pen and current president Marine Le Pen in order to test these scholarly claims. Based on their campaign speeches for the 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 French presidential elections, I conducted a quantitative dictionary-based analysis on the difference in use of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. My results show that there has been only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between the two leaders. Consequently, I argue that the perceived increased use of populist rhetoric in the *Front National* has more to do with the saliency of populism than numerical fact.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Steffen Blings, for his dedication and feedback through the proposal and thesis process. I would like to thank my committee members, Drs. Jeannie Johnson and Christa Jones for their insight and patience.

I give special thanks to my family, friends, and colleagues for their belief in my abilities. I could not have completed this thesis without their encouragement.

Muriel C. McGregor

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

On April 21, 2002 Jean-Marie Le Pen - the President of the far right-wing party the *Front National* - won enough of the popular vote to boost him to the second round of the French presidential election. Meanwhile, France's establishment looked on aghast that extreme rhetoric intimating a right to difference, the return of the death penalty, and denial of the holocaust was apparently resonating with the French people.[1] Fast-forward to France's most recent presidential campaign in 2017 where the new president of the *Front National* - Marine Le Pen (daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen) - not only succeeded to the second round of voting, but emerged as a real contender to win.[2] Her platform of economic protectionism, welfare chauvinism, combating illegal immigration, and criticizing the European Union attracted voters from across the board.[3]

Part of the *Front National*'s rising success has been attributed to its use of populist rhetoric (see Gundogar 2013; Mondon 2016; Reynié 2011; Stockemer 2014; Wieviorka 2013; Williams 2011). Indeed, news sources and scholars alike have increasingly associated the party with the right-wing populist movements sweeping across Europe and the United States (Galston 2018; Mondon 2015; Wodak 2013, 2017). Marine Le Pen has accepted the party's rising affiliation with populism, casually

---

[1] "Le Pen vote shocks France." *The Guardian*. 22 April 2002.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/22/thefarright.france.
[2] "France's Le Pen turns far-right party into contender for power." *Reuters.* 14 April 2017.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-lepen-newsmaker/frances-le-pen-turns-far-right-party-into-contender-for-power-idUSKBN17G18J.
[3] "*Le programme de Marine Le Pen pour la présidentielle 2017*." *L'Express.* 11 April 2017.
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/programme-marine-le-pen-presidentielle-2017_1896717.html.

expressing that "*Populiste? Le mot ne me gêne pas*" [Populist? The word doesn't bother me].[4]

While the saliency of populism and its use among politicians has grown, the question emerges if the National Front has actually increased its populist rhetoric. Currently, no *Front National* scholar has systematically tested if this rhetorical shift actually exists. Several, however, argue that the populist repositioning of the party began under Jean-Marie Le Pen, prior to Marine Le Pen's leadership (Mondon 2014; Gundogar 2013) - henceforth abbreviated as JMLP and MLP respectively. In the 2007 presidential election these efforts were greatly aided when the right-wing republican party candidate - Nicholas Sarkozy - explicitly coopted the FN's stances on immigration and law and order as well as their burgeoning populist strategy (Mondon 2014). Indeed, this allowed for the National Front's viewpoints to enter the political mainstream. As a counter to this view, though, other scholars claim that the party's gradual move towards populism during the 2000's was catalyzed by the rising National Front leaders - which included MLP - not JMLP (Stockemer 2014).

In my thesis, I shed light on this debate by systematically measuring the populist rhetoric as well as the xenophobic and economic rhetoric in JMLP's and MLP's campaign speeches from the French 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 presidential elections. The *Front National* offers a unique case in that it has only had two leaders since its inception; this allows for more rhetorical consistency over time as well as for easier isolation of any rhetorical shifts. Indeed, as seen with the FN, far-right parties are

---

[4] Note, all French translations in this paper are my own. "Marine Le Pen « Populiste? Le mot ne me gêne pas »." *VSD*. 9 November 2011. http://vsd.fr/les-indiscrets/18681-marine-le-pen-populiste-le-mot-ne-me-gene-pas-4582.

often leader focused. Consequently, leaders, as the most visible part of a party, communicate frames of reference – that is norms, values, and beliefs – with potential voters, shaping their perception of reality (Druckman 2001). This is often done through the vehicle of campaign speeches. While political speeches are often multi-authored, it is the political speaker who owns their message and hence the impression they impart (Charteris-Black 2011).

Through my research, I developed three dictionaries: one that measures populist rhetoric, one for xenophobic rhetoric, and one for economic rhetoric. I utilized these dictionaries to analyze JMLP's and MLP's campaign speeches; this formed the basis for my quantitative results. My quantitative results give solid numbers on the use of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric between JMLP and MLP as well as elucidate the scholarly debate as to the extent of the leader's actual rhetorical differences. Moreover, I created a descriptive coding scheme for the categorization of all three types of rhetoric. I used this scheme to code a random selection of campaign speeches from both JMLP and MLP. This formed the basis for my qualitative analysis. My qualitative analysis not only validates my quantitative results and provides context, but draws out the nuances of current scholarly claims. The ultimate dataset I obtained on the populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric used by JMLP and MLP serves as the foundation for future analysis on the perception of the *Front National* and the use of populism. While the instruments I used and results I derived are specific to the FN, my methods stand as a model for other researchers to follow in analyzing other far right-wing populist parties and their leader's rhetoric.

In this thesis, I first define populism, followed by a discussion on far right-wing populist rhetoric, inclusionary and exclusionary populism, xenophobic rhetoric, and economic rhetoric. Next, I briefly describe the *Front National*'s origin and evolution under JMLP. Then, I review the current literature concerning the rhetorical shift between JMLP and MLP and propose three testable hypotheses. I subsequently outline the methodology for my research and provide the results of my initial dictionary and coding pilot tests. Next, I report the results of my quantitative and qualitative analyses. Lastly, I test my data against my hypotheses and discuss the implications of my findings with respect to the scholarly debate.

POPULISM: A DEFINITION

In order to form a basis for my dictionary on populist rhetoric, I first define populism. According to the frequently referenced definition by Mudde, populism is "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people" (2004, p. 23). This results in three foundational pillars of populism: 1) anti-elitism, 2) anti-pluralism, and 3) appeals to the people. Moreover, populism frequently involves a charismatic leader, although it is not a requirement (Muller 2017; Van der Burg & Mughan 2007). For the purposes of my research, I focus on and define the three pillars of populism. With respects to the claim that populism is an ideology, further discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Do note, however, scholars range on their categorization of populism as a "thin-centered" ideology, a strategy, or a discursive style (for ideology see Freeden 1996; Stanley 2008; for strategy see Canovan 1999; Giraudi 2018; Betz 2004; for discursive style see Moffit & Tormey 2014).

For the first pillar of populism, anti-elitism references a disdain for the power held by the political class and administrative bureaucracy (Betz & Immerfall 1998). Indeed, formal institutions and structures are seen as self-interested and unresponsive to public policy preferences (Galston 2017). In turn, the second pillar of anti-pluralism grounds itself on the belief that "the people" are homogeneous and that their culture needs to be protected (Betz 2004; Galston 2017). This connects with the ethnopluralist perspective which "considers different cultures to be equal, but distinct and thus incompatible" as well as nativist tendencies which perceive outsiders as a threat to the native culture

(Golder 2016, p. 480). As for the last pillar, appeals to the people, this encompasses the idea that ordinary citizens house inherent "common sense" which lends them authority to make governmental decisions, often via referendum (Ignazi 2003, Betz & Immerfall 1998, Mudde 2007). Moreover, such appeals include attempts by politicians to stir people's anger, fears, and resentments (Betz 1994; Mondon 2014; Wodak 2015). Do note that the literature defining appeals to the people is underdeveloped compared to the other two pillars of populism. As a result, this pillar retains a degree of ambiguity to be filled by future research.

For the purpose of my thesis, I chose to use Mudde's definition for its concise articulation on the widely agreed elements of populism, namely anti-elitist and anti-pluralist messages with the claim to be the voice of the silent majority. The concentration on these features points to the heart of populism in action via rhetoric, rather than digressing into a theoretical discussion of its structure. Moreover, both anti-elitism and anti-pluralism speak to the connection between populism and democracy. That is when a democratic system is not sufficiently responding to its citizens, a spoken critique of the political administration is necessary in order to correct this disconnected representation (Canovan 1999; Giraudi 2018). When people feel alienated - whether it be through ethnic competition, relative deprivation, or isolation[5] - this can lead to a demand for change. Parties can utilize their given political opportunity structure to address these concerns and increase electoral support (Eatwell & Mudde 2003; Rydgren 2007).

There are two main strains of populism: inclusive and exclusive. Inclusive and exclusive populism can be broken down into three dimensions: material, political, and

---

[5] For further discussion on why people support far right-wing parties (i.e. demand side theories) see: Betz 1994; Eatwell & Mudde 2003; Lucassen & Lubbers 2012; Kriesi et al 2006; and Rydgren 2007.

symbolic (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013). Along these dimensions, inclusive populism targets specific groups to receive more state benefits, increase political participation, and be part of "the people". Exclusive populism, on the other hand, aims to prevent specific groups from receiving state benefits, often calling for a national preference system (also known as welfare chauvinism) where natives get preference in receiving state benefits (Rydgren 2004). Moreover, exclusive populism attempts to stymie these same groups from engaging in the democratic process and from being considered part of "the people". The motivations beyond exclusionary populist policies often stem from ethnocentrism - that is a preference for one's in-group, a sense of in-group superiority, and a desire to preserve one's in-group cohesion (Bizumic & Duckitt 2012). As a result, these policies are often targeted at ethnic minorities and foreigners. Consequently, exclusive populism falls within the populist pillar of anti-pluralism.

The two distinct strains stem from differing historical factors, ideological foundations, and geographical locations; namely, Latin America with inclusive and Europe with exclusive (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013). In Europe populist parties are generally found exclusively on the far-right with ties to nativist and authoritarian ideologies. Due to the association between Europe and exclusive populism, I focus on exclusive populism in my research and exclude further discussion of inclusive populism. However, a more expansive research project would merit a lengthened analysis of inclusive populism.

FAR RIGHT-WING POPULIST RHETORIC

While Mudde's definition establishes the three pillars of populism, my research aims to hone in on populist rhetoric. Since scholars have traditionally categorized the Front National as a far-right wing party, I delineate out far right-wing populist rhetoric in particular. While the examination of scholarly debate surrounding what constitutes a far right-wing party is beyond the scope of this paper, I base my use of the word on the idea that a far right-wing party advocates for major societal changes – which veer from current policy consensus – through participation in democratic political institutions (Eatwell 2000; Powell 1986).

On its own, rhetoric is the "practical science and art of effective or efficient speaking and writing in public" (Abell et al. 2008). Rhetoric conjoined with populism manifests as anti-elite and anti-pluralist sentiments with the claim that these opinions are representative of the people. In particular, populist rhetoric distinguishes between the in-group and the out-group(s) and creates a list of enemies. These enemies include the political and economic elite as well as anything that threatens the in-group. With respects to far right-wing populist parties, other enemies are frequently the progressive left, the media, ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, Muslims and Jews, ex-patriots, international organizations, and foreign countries (Mudde 2007, Chapter 3).

Another feature of populist rhetoric is its various appeals grounded in the anti-elite and anti-pluralist framework where people should be the basis of governmental decisions. In far right-wing populism, these appeals manifest as an appeal to the common sense of the people against intellectual knowledge, an appeal to feelings of being exploited, an appeal to fears of disruption and insecurity, an appeal to the right to cultural

difference, and an appeal to national preference (Betz & Johnson 2016). Moreover, these appeals are often presented in black and white options and/or as part of a conspiracy theory with specific moral stances and historical myths used to justify predetermined conclusions (Wodak 2015).

Furthermore, far right-wing populist rhetoric is often used by a charismatic leader (Muller 2017; Van der Brug & Mughan 2007). This translates into the leader using everyday plain language as way to make their message clear and relatable. Indeed, charismatic populist politicians attempts to represent themselves as part of the people while at the same time claiming to be the solution. Overall this creates a "*double positioning* as both the savior *of the people* and representing *the* people; and as being *one of the people*" (Wodak 2015, p. 127). Savvy political leaders also use an element of performance when delivering populist rhetoric; however, analysis of this dimension is beyond the scope of this paper.

XENOPHOBIC & ECONOMIC RHETORIC

While my research's main concern is in regards to measuring populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP, the creation of dictionaries for both xenophobic and economic rhetoric provide additional insight into scholarly claims about the *Front National*. As a result, I separate out each type of rhetoric into its own dictionary – that is populist, xenophobic, and economic – and further delineate subcategories for each type of rhetoric in order to achieve more granular measurement.

Xenophobia is a "fear of individuals who are different or 'strange'" (Rydgren 2004, p. 158). Xenophobic rhetoric, then, encompasses negative references to other ethnic identities (Pérez 2015), sometimes to the point of fear, hatred, and hostility (Watts 1996), with a belief that people have an inherent right to live separately from these other ethnicities (Miles 1993). Overt xenophobic rhetoric can be couched in terms of biological racism and ethnopluralist sentiments – that is the maintenance and/or establishment of ethnically separated regions as well as the preservation of one's culture against homogenization (Betz 1994), called a right to difference or differentialism.

On the milder side, exclusionary populist rhetoric – which encompasses attempts to prevent certain groups from receiving benefits or participating in the political process - can be seen in calls against immigration, for ultra-security policies, and in favor of national preference (Hainsworth 2004). While the line between overt xenophobic rhetoric and exclusionary populist rhetoric is subjective, overt xenophobia is always a subset of exclusionary populist rhetoric while exclusionary populist rhetoric is always a subset of anti-pluralist rhetoric. For a diagram showing the relationship between anti-

pluralism, exclusionary populism, and xenophobic rhetoric, see Figure 1, Nested Anti-Pluralism.

**Figure 1**: **Nested Anti-Pluralism**

In my analysis I separate out anti-pluralist, exclusionary populist, and overt xenophobic rhetoric into three categories. I put words that are anti-pluralist only in a category under the umbrella of populist rhetoric. Under xenophobic rhetoric, I put words that reference exclusionary populism in their own category and words that represent overt xenophobia in their own category. Also of note, while exclusionary populist and overt xenophobia rhetoric are not limited to the far-right, far-right wing parties frequently utilize them (for further discussion on the link between xenophobia and far right-wing parties, see Betz 2003; Karapin 1998; and Kopeček 2007).

I define economic rhetoric in politics as including statements about the nation's growth, unemployment, wages, taxes, corporations, and trade. More precisely, however,

a politician's discussion of economics aims at appealing to voters by highlighting

responsible parties and how, in turn, they can offer congruency or change (Anderson

2000).

Paired with right-wing populism, economic rhetoric advocates anti-globalization,

protection of national businesses and native employment, and regulation of the financial

elite (Betz & Immerfall 1998; Mudde 2007). As a result, in my analysis, I separate out

economic rhetoric into two categories: general economics and right-wing populist

economics. Moreover, since right-wing populist economic rhetoric encompasses

regulation of the financial elite, it also overlaps with anti-elitism on this point.

Consequently, words that reference finance and banking fall under both categories. For

a diagram showing the relationship between anti-elitism and right-wing populist

economic rhetoric, see Figure 2, Venn Diagram Anti-Elitism & Right-Wing Populist

Economics.

Figure 2: **Venn Diagram Anti-Elitism & Right-Wing Populist Economics**

Overall, the relationship between populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric is complex. Scholars do not agree on definitions for each type of rhetoric, nor are they able to set definite outlines of what each rhetorical category encompasses. For my thesis, however, I have attempted to establish general boundaries for populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric in order to have a basis for quantitative measurement as well as to create a model for other researchers. To visualize the relationship between populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric, along with their subcategories of appeals to the people, anti-pluralism, anti-elite, exclusionary populism, overt xenophobia, far-right wing populist economics, and the general economy, see Figure 3: Rhetoric Categories & Hypotheses.[6]

Figure 3: **Rhetoric Categories & Hypotheses**

---

[6] For a presentation and explanation of my hypotheses and how each rhetorical category relates to each hypothesis, see my section "Rhetorical Shifts Between JMLP and MLP" pages 20-22.

THE *FRONT NATIONAL*: BEGINNINGS AND EVOLUTION UNDER JMLP

As detailed in the work of Delwit (2012), the *Front National* embodied a desire for radical right-wing politics to be seen as modern, forward-looking, and respectable. Founded in 1972 through a unification of several French neofascist/nationalist parties and with Jean-Marie Le Pen chosen to be its first president, the FN sought to democratically overthrow what it saw as a decadent regime under Georges Pompidou and protect against subversive communism.[7]

In the 1980s[8], as a "conservative revolution" began to take hold in Europe and the United States, the FN honed in on key issues like unemployment due to deindustrialization, the problems associated with immigrants, and the need to increase the French birth rate in order to maintain national identity. As the party found its footing in the political arena, it specialized its message further to promote *la préférence nationale* [national preference] and immigration policy reform. Moreover, during the 1988 presidential election, JMLP paid particular attention to his image as well as his platform, landing him 4th place in the first round of voting and contributing to the FN's success in the legislative elections that year. Gradually, a pattern began to emerge for the Front National's voter base: male, young to middle aged, non-practicing Catholic or non-religious, and blue-collar worker.[9]

---

[7] Delwit organizes FN history into four stages. This beginning phase - *la traversée du désert* - spans from 1972-1983 as outlined in pages 11-18

[8] Delwit titles this phase "*L'enracinement et la consolidation du Front National''*, which spans from 1983-1999, pages 18-29.

[9] While the *Front National* was originally associated with the Catholic Church – due to support from prominent Catholic conservatives, such as the archbishop Marcel Lefebvre –, the party's link to Christian values has more to do with France's history as a Catholic nation, nationalist sentiments being linked to that history, and the association of nationalism with the far-right. For further discussion on the development of the FN voter base, called *ouvriéro-lepensisme*, see pages 24-25.

However, the party received bad press throughout the early 1990s after JMLP made several anti-Semitic and racist statements.[10] The party became further stigmatized when it declared opposition to the Maastricht Treaty – the impetus for the creation of the EuroZone. The National Front feared that a merging of economies would destroy France's sovereignty, national identity, and overall patriotism. At the same time, the key enemy of the party – the Soviet Union – collapsed. Another setback came when the party's *délégue général* [executive officer] Bruno Mégret split to create his own party in 1998 after JMLP refused to "normalize" the party's rhetoric as well as to concede his position as the party's president.[11]

Despite voter polls showing that the *Front National* was viewed as "racist, sectarian, and incapable of governing" (Shields 2007, p. 247), the party experienced a resurgence in the mid-1990s. Unemployment was on the rise as were crime rates. Moreover, a large number of immigrants were moving into France creating new social tensions. In 1995, JMLP launched another presidential campaign. He ran on a platform calling for job creation, national preference, repatriation of certain immigrants, phasing out of income tax, and the reestablishment of the death penalty. In the subsequent presidential election of 2002, JMLP unexpectedly made it to the second round of voting, launching the party to greater visibility.[12]

---

[10] In particular, JMLP's mitigation of the Holocaust and Bruno Mégret's "immigration policy" which called for the repeal of anti-racist legislation, the expulsion of unemployed immigrants, and the ban on places of worship foreign to French identity.

[11] JMLP declared "The National Front was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, led by him for twenty-five years [...] there isn't any reason why this should stop." Meanwhile, Bruno Mégret first introduced the strategy of *dédiabolisation* - or dedemonization - for the party. The term was later rebirthed when MLP became party president.

[12] The next phase in FN history, *l'essoufflement* (constriction), encompasses 2000-2011. See Delwit 2012, p. 29-36.

Gradually, however, once loyal party voters drifted toward the center-right, in particular in the 2007 presidential election of Nicolas Sarkozy. Moreover, voting laws had changed in 2004 from a regional proportional representative system to majoritarian one, drastically decreasing FN seats in key areas of support. A growing sense emerged among party leadership that its image needed to become more mainstream. The radical element of its rhetoric needed to be eliminated and replaced with political correctness and modern values. In her 2010 bid to become the new President of the FN, Marine Le Pen promised to do just that with her *dédiabolisation* [de-demonization] strategy - compared to her competitor Bruno Gollnisch who remained steeped in historical negationism and ties to conservative Catholic stances. After winning the vote to become the party's new President, MLP boldly declared that the *Front National* was not a far right-wing party, but a party for France and the French people.[13]

---

[13] The last phase, *la renaissance possible*, gives an overview of the initial changes and potential obstacles for the party under MLP's leadership.

RHETORICAL SHIFTS BETWEEN JMLP AND MLP

Scholars of the *Front National* vary on when they claim that the party shifted its rhetoric toward populism; however, the claim that there has been a shift is widespread. Originally, the FN was considered to be a far-right political party under JMLP. Indeed, the party embraced the idea that it was an outsider with "*priorités radicalement différentes*" [radically different priorities] (Shields 2011). JMLP was seen as a charismatic politician; his stretch as party president, however, also included several *faux pas* which tarnished the FN's image (Williams 2011). While the National Front is still considered to be on the political right, MLP, as party president, has restructured its image around her professional and personal charisma (Gundogar 2013; Mayer 2013). Indeed, she has declared "*Je suis la candidate de la révolte populaire face au système, de la vérité face au mensonge*" [I am the representative of the popular revolt against the system, of the truth in the face of lies].[14]

Only one systematic analysis has been done comparing JMLP to MLP. Alduy and Wahnich (2015) looked at 500 texts – public speeches, editorials and radio and TV interviews – by Jean-Marie and Marine from 1987-2013. They used linguistic software to ascertain lexical frequency, concordance, semantic networks, word clouds, textual environment, key words, themes, proper names, neologisms, grammatical categories as well as to compare their findings with normative reference language. In the end, they conclude that "*Marine Le Pen n'a pas fondamentalement altéré le logiciel de pensée frontiste : sa version en actualise la présentation et le vocabulaire, non le fond*

---

[14] Marine Le Pen: 'Je suis la candidate de la révolte populaire.'" 17 February 2012. *Le Parisien*. http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-politique/marine-le-pen-je-suis-la-candidate-de-la-revolte-populaire-17-02-2

idéologique" [Marine Le Pen has not fundamentally altered the program of Frontist thought: her version only updates its presentation and its vocabulary, not its ideological foundation]. [15]

Three other authors have conducted qualitative analyses. Gundogar (2013) describes how JMLP used populist rhetoric, but came to represent outdated concerns and policy solutions – such as communism and repatriation of immigrants – as France's contextual factors changed. MLP, then, in turn, utilized her political abilities along with capitalizing on updated issues in order to rebrand the party. Mayer (2013) completed a structured case study of JMLP and MLP. She argues that MLP capitalized on the populist trend that was already underway during JMLP's leadership. Williams (2011) looked at both lateral and source factors behind recent FN success. She concludes that JMLP and MLP are both charismatic leaders who used catch-all strategies; however, while mistakes made by JMLP hindered the party, MLP does not have such baggage to weigh her down.

Several other scholars have honed in on MLP's rhetoric alone. Baider (2015) looked at MLP's rhetoric from 2011-2015. In particular, he looked at words that were specifically used by the FN as well as looked at the context surrounding the use of emotion words; he concluded that such words embodied a sense of protectionism. Bastow (2018) argues that overall the Front National under MLP is ideologically similar to that under JMLP's leadership. The only difference is that MLP has toned down controversial language and put more emphasis on the economy following similar European populist movements. Goodliffe (2016) discusses the party's reimaging

---

[15] Alduy & Wahnich 2012, p. 116.

of itself via *dédiabolisation* [de-demonization]. He notes MLP's increased economic and

republican rhetoric while toning down radical rhetoric. Stockemer (2014) claims that the

National Front has always used a degree of populist rhetoric; MLP just strove to bring it

to the forefront. Mondon (2014) acknowledges that much of what has led to MLP's

success was laid by her father. However, the crux to her rise was Sarkozy's cooptation of

FN stances which allowed them to enter the mainstream. Since then, MLP has been able

to jump on the populist resurgence.

Overall, FN scholars note that JMLP used xenophobic, exclusionist, and racist

rhetoric. Indeed, he appealed to conservative morality and harsh justice. On the other

side, MLP has toned down such language, instead focusing on her relatability to people

as well as appealing to their common sense. She sets herself up as the defender of French

sovereignty and values such as *laïcité* [secularism] – that is the separation of religion

from the civic sphere. She openly accepts abortion, homosexuality, and civil

unions. Moreover, MLP appeals to the sense of exploitation among people by the

establishment, in particular criticizing the European Union, corporatism, and

globalization. However, both JMLP and MLP capitalized on crises, creating lists of

enemies – most prominent being immigrants – that they argue threatened French security

and identity. Based on my review of the literature, I have combined various scholarly

claims concerning the rhetoric used by MLP compared to JMLP as well as where they

overlap into a chart (see the Appendix, p. 69).

Clearly, there has been a rhetorical shift between JMLP and MLP, in particular

with regards to the perception that MLP uses populist rhetoric. However, there has been

no systematic analysis of this claim, merely observations. While Alduy and Wahnich

(2015) conducted a comprehensive comparison of JMLP and MLP, they did not

specifically analyze populist rhetoric and only included MLP's rhetoric up to 2013. The

qualitative studies by Gundogar (2013), Mayer (2013), and Williams (2011) provide

insight into the reasons behind a populist rhetorical shift, but fail to quantitatively back

up their assumption that such a shift has occurred. Likewise, their research does not

include MLP's more recent rhetoric. More contemporary analyses of MLP's rhetoric

alone make pertinent observations; however, they lack structured analysis as well as fail

to provide solid comparison to JMLP. Ultimately, this gap merits a quantitative analysis

on the populist rhetoric of JMLP and MLP to establish first if a shift has occurred and

second if the shift hinged on a change in leadership or constitutes a linear trajectory.

From the literary debates, three broad camps emerge concerning the degree to

which JMLP used or did not use populist rhetoric as compared to MLP – that is the

semantic camp, the *dédiabolisation* camp, and the bandwagon camp. While these camps

overlap in many respects, I have divided them for a more thorough discussion. First, the

semantic camp claims that there has been no foundational change to MLP's populist

rhetoric as compared to JMLP, merely updating. Next, the *dédiabolisation* camp argues

that there has been a concentrated effort by MLP to decrease controversial ideas

promoted by JMLP and increase discussion of more mainstream issues. Lastly, the

bandwagon camp implies that MLP has jumped on board with populist rhetoric

movement in order to better appeal to voters but hasn't necessarily sought to deradicalize

its rhetoric. Moreover, several scholars add in the variables of xenophobic and economic

rhetoric, arguing that there has been a decrease in the former and an increase in the

latter. While the different FN scholars do not all directly address the question concerning

populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric and whether there has been a change or not, I have drawn on their articles to create three testable hypotheses.

For Hypothesis 1, the use of populist rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced either a) no change or b) an increase. Alduy & Wahnich, Mayer, Stochemer, Williams argue there has been no change. This perspective is linked to semantic camp as well as the *dédiabolisation* camp. Indeed, this stems from the idea that MLP uses similar populist rhetoric as JMLP but has sought to deradicalize the party by eliminating extreme rhetoric and mainstreaming the party by focusing on economic rhetoric. Bastow, Goodliffe, Gundogar, Mondon argue there has been an increase. This is founded on the bandwagon camp which argues that MLP is trying to expand the party base and consciously use the populist label.

For Hypothesis 2, the use of xenophobic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced either a) no change or b) a decrease. According to Alduy & Wahnich, there has been no change, merely word replacement. This falls into the semantic camp. Bastow, Gundogar, Goodliffe, Mayer, Mondon, Stockemer, and Williams argue there has been a decrease. This position originates in the *dédiabolisation* strategy of the party and desire to become more mainstream.

For Hypothesis 3, the use of economic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced either a) no change or b) an increase. Alduy & Wahnich, Bastow, Gundogar, Goodliffe, Mayer, and Williams argue there has been an increase. For Alduy & Wahnich, this stance comes from their quantitative analysis which found that MLP referenced economic terms more than JMLP. For those in the *dédiabolisation* camp, it

derives from MLP's attempt to mainstream. Mondon and Stockemer do not specifically comment on economic rhetoric.

I have organized these hypotheses in the Table 1 – Hypotheses:

Table 1 - Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 Populist Rhetoric	Hypothesis 2 Xenophobic Rhetoric	Hypothesis 3 Economic Rhetoric
The use of populist rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced: H1a) No change H1b) An increase	The use of xenophobic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced: H2a) No change H2b) A decrease	The use of economic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced: H3a) No change H3b) An increase

For my research I test these three hypotheses by quantifying the populist rhetoric as well as xenophobic and economic rhetoric used by JMLP and MLP in their campaign speeches. To do this, I break each type of rhetoric into subcategories with lists of words representative of each category. The quantitative data I obtain clarifies whether the use of populist rhetoric by the FN is genuinely new or if the populist rhetoric stands out due to the reduction in xenophobic rhetoric and the augmentation of economic rhetoric. Overall, this is a needed analysis not only to settle scholarly debate, but also to provide insight into the connection between the *Front National's* success and use of populist rhetoric. Moreover, my findings will be able to be applied to research on other far right-wing populist leaders and their appeal.

METHODOLOGY

In order to provide insight into the use of populist rhetoric under JMLP and MLP as well as its potential increase under MLP along with a decrease in xenophobic rhetoric and increase in economic rhetoric, I conducted an inductive mixed methods research project using a dictionary-based analysis on all campaign speeches and a content-based analysis on a random selection of campaign speeches. In comparison to the qualitative work done by several other *Front National* scholars (Almeida 2013; Bastow 2018; Goodliffe 2016; Gundogar 2013; Mayer 2013; Mondon 2014; Shields 2013 & 2014; Stockemer 2014; Williams 2011), a dictionary-based analysis provided for systematic review and tangible results on broader trends. A content-based analysis allowed me to validate my qualitative results. I was able to take into account context, catch false positives, as well as identify nuances other scholars have not yet addressed. These methods enabled me to test the assertion as to whether MLP has increased the use of populist rhetoric compared to JMLP and to lay the groundwork for future research on the connection between the use of populist rhetoric and mainstream electoral acceptance.

In the research conducted by Alduy and Wahnich, they compiled and organized the public speeches, editorials, radio, and TV interviews for both JMLP and MLP from 1987-2013.[16] For the purpose of my research, I used their list of the campaign speeches - found under *discours* - from 2002, 2007, and 2012. For MLP's 2017 campaign speeches, I found them on the FN's website - found under *discours de Marine Le Pen*. I define campaign speech as verbal rhetoric in which a candidate discusses their platform pertaining to the position they seek in an open forum in front of an electorate

---

[16] The complete list can be found at https://decodingmarinelepen.stanford.edu/corpus.

audience. First, this eliminates any written rhetoric. Second, it distinguishes different types of possible speech, in particular that presented in a press conference to the media and/or a one-on-one interview with a varied viewership. My definition of campaign speech provides an isolated connection between the political leader and the potential voter.

For each speech, I obtained videos and/or French transcriptions from the *Front National*'s website[17] (now the *Rassemblement National*), Youtube, and an open access public speech database compiled by the French Office of Legal and Administrative Information[18]. For the video speeches that did not have an accompanying transcription, I transcribed them. There were three speeches for JMLP and four for MLP, for a total of seven speeches, for which I was unable to find a video or a transcription. I excluded these speeches from my analysis. I do not believe this exclusion contains systematic bias, as they were completely random exclusions due merely to their lack of availability on the internet. There were three speeches entitled *voeux* or *voeux à la presse* [press conferences] – one from JMLP from 2002 and two from MLP from 2012 – listed under *discours* on the decodingmarinelepen.com website. I excluded these from my analysis as they are press greetings and do not fit my definition of campaign speech. From the speeches I obtained from the *Front National*'s website, there were five speeches which I excluded from my analysis. One was a video message, not a campaign speech. Two were actually press conferences. One was a questions and answer in a closed meeting. The last one was a speech given outside of France in Chad to the Chadian parliament. In the end, for JMLP from 2001-2002, there is a total of 13 speeches. For JMLP from 2006-

---

[17] See https://www.rassemblementnational.fr/.
[18] See and http://www.vie-publique.fr/.

2007 there is a total of 27 speeches. For MLP from 2011-2012 there is a total of 23

speeches. For MLP from 2016-2017 there is a total of 37 speeches. In all, there is a total

100 speeches. For a list of all speeches organized by campaign, see the Appendix, p. 70-

78.

Before beginning my analysis of the campaign speeches, I ran two pilot tests to

lay the groundwork for my dictionary-based and content-based analyses. I removed the

speeches used for my pilot tests from the final sampling. For the first test I randomly

selected one speech from each campaign, for a total of four speeches.[19] From each

speech, I compiled an n-gram dictionary of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric.

Here n represents the total number, while gram represents words. Thus, my n-gram

dictionary constitutes one, two, three, etc. word sequences. In the end, the largest portion

of my dictionary n-grams were one word with the largest n-gram being three words.

When determining what word phrases were populist, I based my selections on

Mudde's definition of populism – that is anti-elitism and anti-pluralism with an appeal to

the people. For anti-elite words, I selected words that represented political and elite

classes. For anti-pluralist words, I honed in on words that embody a unified people and

cultural protection. For appeals to the people words, I found words that represented

justified emotions and citizenry power. Examples of each category include words like

Bruxelles [Brussels] which is anti-elite because it is where the European Union

Headquarters are located, *société française* [French society] which falls under anti-

---

[19] Speeches Used:
JMLP: 1) March 3, 2002, Lille, *Discours de Lille Meeting* and 2) November 12, 2006, Le Bourget,
Discours du Bourget.
MLP: 1) February 26, 2012, Val-de-Loire, *Discours de Châteauroux* and 2) April 9, 2017, Ajaccio,
Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Ajaccio.

pluralism because of its idealization of a homogenous culture, and *colère du peuple* [anger of the people] which is an appeal to the people through its assumption that ordinary citizens are right in this feeling.

For xenophobic rhetoric, I created two categories: exclusionary populism and overt xenophobia. For exclusionary populism, I chose words that aimed to prevent groups from 1) receiving state benefits, 2) engaging in the democratic process, and 3) being considered part of "the people". This encompassed exclusionary measures such as *barrière* [barrier]. For overt xenophobia, I selected words that embodied a negative reference to other ethnic identities, at times inciting fear, hatred, and hostility, with a belief that people have an inherent right to live separately from these other ethnicities. This included ethnic words like *beur* [a child of North African immigrants] as well as inciting words like *invasion* [invasion]. For both my populist and xenophobic rhetoric words, I also utilized Alduy's (2017) breakdown of words used by major French politicians, in particular the chapter on MLP[20], in her most recent book just prior to the French 2017 presidential elections.

For economic rhetoric, I split into two categories: general economy and right-wing populist economic. For the general economy, I selected words like *chômage* [unemployment] as well as used the economic word dictionary already created by Alduy and Wahnich (2015)[21] in their analysis. For the right-wing populist economic category, I chose words that encompassed anti-global sentiments - such as *mondialism sauvage* [unbridled globalism] - and protectionist perspectives - like *patriotisme économique* [economic patriotism].

---

[20] See Alduy 2017, p. 115-162.
[21] See Alduy & Wahnich 2015, p. 34-41.

When necessary, I stemmed certain words - that is remove the word end to reduce it to its base root - in order to streamline searchability. As I went through the speeches, I adjusted my dictionary by removing outliers and overly general words so as to hone in on the desired speech to measure (Grimmer & Stewart 2013). In order to cross check and increase the robustness of my dictionary, I also used the *programmes des candidats á la présidentielles* [candidate platforms][22] from both JMLP and MLP from each election to derive more n-grams. I choose the *programmes présidentiels* in particular for their direct relation to the campaign speeches in my analysis and similar target audience as well as for their systematic and bulleted organization.

The results of my first test are as follows:

1) Populist Rhetoric
   a. Anti-elite total words: 57
   b. Anti-pluralist total words: 59
   c. Appeal to people total words: 10
2) Xenophobic Rhetoric
   a. Exclusionary populism total words: 29
   b. Overt xenophobia total words: 22
3) Economic Rhetoric
   a. General economy total words: 68
   b. Right-wing populist economics total words: 41

These results are the dictionary for my dictionary-based analysis. For a complete list, see the Appendix, Table 8 - Rhetoric Dictionary.

For the second test, I created a coding scheme using descriptive codes – a word or phrase that summarizes the overall concept of a short passage in a text (Saldaña

---

[22] *Programmes Présidentielles* (also see the Appendix, p. 70):
JMLP: 1) April 2002, *Programme de M. Jean-Marie Le Pen*, http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023001406.html and 2) March 2007, *Programme électoral de Jean-Marie Le Pen*, http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001250.html.
MLP: 1) January 2012, *Programme de Mme Marine Le Pen*, http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/123000632.html and 2) April 2017, *144 Engagements Présidentiels,* https://rassemblementnational.fr/pdf/144-engagements.pdf.

2015). The foundation for my descriptive codes comes from my research on populism, populist rhetoric, and far-right wing parties (Betz & Immerfall 1998, 2004, 2016; Golder 2016; Mudde 2007; Wodak 2015). On top of that, I drew from my readings of populist right-wing scholars (Mudde 2007; Wodak 2015) and the creation of my dictionary, such as the need for a far-right wing populist economics category. Next, I read through one randomly selected campaign speech in order to hand code the document according to my scheme. As I hand coded, I made any necessary adjustments to the scheme in order to better reflect key concepts. I also noted any encapsulating quotes.

Based on my reading, my initial coding scheme included the overarching categories of democracy, list of enemies, appeals, charismatic leader, economy, and phrasing. These categories included various subcategories like 1) the party represents the will/voice of the people, 2) political elite, 3) exploitation, 4) plain language, 5) anti-globalization, and 6) black and white options. After creating my dictionary, however, I realized that the larger categories did not address the focus of my hypotheses, namely populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric. Moreover, the analysis of a charismatic leader is currently beyond the scope of my research. As a result, I revised the categories to the following:

1) Anti-elitism
2) Anti-pluralism
3) Appeal to people
4) Exclusionary populism
5) Far-right wing populist economics
6) Phrasing

For the new categories I added, subcategories included concepts like 1) political elite, 2) French identity, 3) national preference, and 4) economic patriotism. I adjusted some of the subcategories while I was coding. For example, I delineated several more types of

appeals to the people. This coding scheme is the base for my content-based analysis. For the entire coding scheme, see the Appendix.

As I coded the speech, some rhetoric fit cleanly into a category and subcategory. For example, a reference against multiculturalism fell under anti-pluralism. Other rhetoric fit into the same category and multiple subcategories within that category, such as appeals that spoke to a sense of exploitation and a loss of control. A few sections fit into multiple categories like references that were anti-elite in nature while also critiquing their relation to France's economic situation. I did not find examples of all subcategories I listed in this particular speech. This most likely is not an issue because it is possible for a concept to not occur in every case example. Overall, my coding scheme adds value to my analysis by allowing me to better catch all relevant dimensions, in particular context. Having a better sense of the context around my dictionary words enables me to cross-check their validity. Moreover, a qualitative analysis provides insight into the attribute of a charismatic leader associated with populist rhetoric. While I am not testing this in my thesis, it may prove valuable for future research.

RESULTS

In my results section, I lay out the procedures used in my dictionary-based quantitative analysis and content-based qualitative analysis. Next, I provide the data obtained in my dictionary-based analysis of each set of campaign speeches, incorporating my content-based qualitative analysis to provide context. Then, I test my three hypotheses, comparing JMLP's sets of campaign speeches against MLP's. Lastly, I discuss and analyze my findings in terms of the broader scholarly debate.

Dictionary-based Quantitative Analysis & Content-based Qualitative Analysis

For my dictionary-based quantitative analysis, using the content analysis software *Yoshikoder*, I first uploaded my dictionary. Next, I uploaded a text document for each campaign which contained all the speeches. I ran a report for each category in my dictionary. This provided me with an overall count of how many times the words in that category were found in the speeches as well as the proportion of those words compared to other words not being measured. I then ran a concordance to obtain an alphabetical list of the words from my dictionary found in the speeches. This provided an exact count of the use of each word in each category as well as the passage around each word.

As I ran through my initial analysis I needed to refine broader stem words such as *mondial** [world/globe] and *nation** [nation] in order to refine results. In several categories, I pinpointed false positives. For example, in the anti-elite category, the stem *liber** resulted in the word *liberté* [liberty]. This was a word I specifically excluded from my dictionary due to its generalizability in French political parlance. As a result, I replaced the stem *liber** with the exact words I aimed to hit, such as *libéral* and *libéraux*

[liberal]. Another example is in the exclusionary populist category; the stem *ferm** resulted in the word *ferme* [farm]. Consequently, I narrowed the search to the specific words *fermer* [to close] and *fermeture* [closure]. In the category of general economy, the main results for the stem *libéralis** [to liberalize] resulted in right-wing populist economic contexts. Consequently, I moved that stem search from the general economy category to the right-wing populist economics category.

In the presentation of my results, I provide the percentage total for the use of each rhetorical category in relation to each set of campaign speeches. The percentage allows for a measurement of the number of times the rhetoric was used in relation to the whole. Then, I list the top three most frequently used words along with their percent usage for each category in order to hone in on the most prominent themes found in each set of campaign speeches.

For the content-based analysis, I randomly selected two speeches from each campaign, ensuring that the speeches were from diverse dates and locations.[23] I then read through each speech and coded passages according to my coding scheme. As I coded passages, most encompassed several sub-categories. For example, a passage by MLP referenced the category of anti-elitism with the sub-category of economic elite, the category of appeal to the people with the subcategories of sense of exploitation and patriotism/sovereignty, and the category of far-right wing populist economics with the subcategory of economic patriotism. For other passages, I had difficulty determining the exact subcategory they fell under. For example, a discussion about immigration

---

[23] See the Appendix, p. 70-78, for a list of speeches delineated out by campaign.

contained underlying tones of the subcategories fear of disruption and insecurity and loss of control. For such instances, I coded the phrase as containing both subcategories.

JMLP Campaign Speeches 2001-2002 Analysis Results

For JMLP's 2001-2002 campaign speeches, 42.37% of the rhetoric coded for this project was populist, with a breakdown of 11.86% anti-elite, 28.95% anti-pluralist, and 1.56% appeal to people. Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 197 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *finac** [such as *financier* (financial)] (18.7%), *socialis** [for example *socialiste* (socialist) and *socialisme* (socialism)] (15.2%), and a tie between *Bruxelles* [Brussels] and *américain* [American] (both 8.6%). JMLP's frequent reference to socialism falls in line with scholarly claims (see Hainsworth 2004) about his virulent anti-communism. According to my coding scheme, under the subcategory of foreign country, JMLP heavily emphasized and criticized American influence on Europe and France. For example, he states that:

> *Since France has renounced its national sovereignty, it no longer has control over its political or military policy, both of which have been conceded to the United States through the European Union which it controls through Germany, its closest ally.*[24]

Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 481 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *national** [for example *nationalisme* (nationalism)] (32.8%), *nationalité* [nationality]* (10.1%), and *souverain** [such as *souveraine* (sovereign) and *souveraineté* (sovereignty)] (9.9%). These results correspond to

---

[24] « *La France ayant renoncé à être une nation souveraine n'a plus de politique étrangère ni de politique militaire, l'une et l'autre, étant désormais concédées aux Etats-Unis, à travers l'Union Européenne qu'ils contrôlent par l'Allemagne, leur alliée la plus sûre ».* JMLP, 2001, 18 August, La Trinité-sur-mer, *Discours de La Trinité sur mer meeting*.

scholarly observations about JMLP's frequent references to the fatherland and traditionalism (see Hainsworth 2004). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of French identity, protection, and patriotism/sovereignty, JMLP proclaims that:

> *Here is the stigmatization technique used on patriots: it is the technique according to which any valorization of traditions and the Nation is immediately suspected of Hitlerian sympathy, which one will suggest directly, or more skillfully, by speaking for example about a speech about control of migratory flows as a discourse 'that brings us back to the darkest hours of our history'. [...] We must preserve the sovereignty of France.*[25]

Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 26 word count, there were only two words used: *responsabilité* [responsibility] (53.8%) and *référend** [referendum] (46%). While mentioned by some scholars, these results highlight that JMLP sought to utilize a method that is seen as key to populism: referendum. According to my coding scheme, under the sub-category of referendum, JMLP proposes that:

> *In order to loosen the grip and effectively respond to the shadow of tyranny, we must use targeted and intelligent mechanisms of direct democracy, such as referendum.*[26]

For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 26.54%. 15.71% of the rhetoric was in the exclusionary populist category. Out of a total 261 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *étrang** [such as *étranger* (foreign) and *étrangère* (foreigner)] (29.5%), *sécurité* [security] (18.7%), and *immigré* [immigrant] (9.1%). 10.83% of the rhetoric was in the overt xenophobia category. Out of a total 180 word

---

[25] *« Les techniques de stigmatisation des patriotes : c'est la technique selon laquelle toute valorisation des traditions et de la nation est immédiatement suspectée de sympathie hitlérienne, ce que l'on suggérera directement, ou plus habilement, en parlant par exemple d'un discours de contrôle des flux migratoires comme d'un discours 'qui nous ramène aux heures les plus sombres de notre histoire'. [...] Il faut préserver la souveraineté de la France. »* JMLP, 2002, 21 February, Paris, *Discours de Paris colloque*.

[26] *« Pour desserrer l'étau et répondre efficacement à cette tyrannie de l'ombre, il faut utiliser d'une manière ciblée et intelligente les mécanismes de démocratie directe tels que le référendum ».* Ibid.

count, the top three most frequently used words were *terror** [such as *terrorisme* (terrorism)] (30%), *fondamental** [like *fondamentalisme* (fundamentalism)] (12.7%), and *danger* [danger] (7.7%). However, the words *islam** [for example Islam and Islamic] and *musulman** [Muslim] were both close behind at 7.2%. This agrees with scholarly statements that JMLP used xenophobic rhetoric and, in particular, expressed anti-immigration views (see Goodliffe 2016, Hainsworth 2004, and Reynie 2011). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-category of immigration, JMLP points out that uncontrolled immigration leads to the disintegration of French Republican values, unemployment, urban ghettos, increased government spending, and insecurity. He declares that:

> *Today's immigration challenges our concept of the Republic (multiculturalism versus unity), our concept of education (the Islamic headscarf versus secularism), our concept of the family (polygamy versus monogamy), and our concept of women's rights (excision versus respect for women).*[27]

For economic rhetoric, there was 31.05% with a breakdown of 25.64% general economy and 5.41% right-wing populist economics. Within the general economy category, out of a total 426 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *économ** [for example *économie* (economy) and *économique* (economic)] (19.9%), a tie between *chôm** [for example *chômage* (unemployment) and *chômeur* (unemployed)] and *développ** [to develop] (both 7.9%), and *retraite* [retirement] (6.8%). Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a total of 90 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *agric** [such as *agricole* (agricultural), *agriculture*

---

[27] « *L'immigration d'aujourd'hui met donc notamment en cause notre conception de la République (multiculturalisme contre unité), notre conception de l'école (foulard islamique contre laïcité), notre conception de la famille (polygamie contre monogamie) et notre conception de la femme (excision contre respect de la femme) ».* JMLP, 2002, 21 February, Paris, *Discours de Paris colloque.*

(agriculture), and *agriculteurs* (farmers)] (48.8%), *rétabl** [to restore] (15.5%), and

mondialisation [globalization] (11.1%). While scholars agree that JMLP used economic

rhetoric – many do not mention it –, the use of anti-globalist and pro small business

sentiments are largely attributed to MLP (see Goodliffe 2016, Mondon 2015, and

Williams 2011). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of anti-

globalization and political/economic elite, JMLP vents that:

> *With the Euro, our economy, our agriculture, and our jobs will escape our
> control. We will become a people of helots, delivered defenseless to the New
> World Order, of which the federalist Europe is nothing but a stage and a cover.*[28]

Overall, JMLP's 2001-2002 campaign speeches largely focus on an anti-pluralist

message surrounding the preservation of the French nation, its culture, and its sovereignty

against globalization. Indeed, he emphasizes the need for increased security against

outsiders. He also calls for the development of France's economy as well as reduction of

the unemployment rate and preservation of retirement benefits. Figure 4 shows a

comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in JMLP's 2001-2002 campaign

speeches.[29]

---

[28] « *Par l'Euro, notre économie, notre agriculture, nos métiers échapperont à notre volonté. Nous
deviendrons un peuple d'ilotes, livré sans défense au Nouvel Ordre Mondial dont l'Europe fédérale n'est
qu'une étape et une couverture* ». JMLP, 2001, 18 August, La Trinité-sur-mer, *Discours de La Trinité sur
mer meeting*.

[29] For a list of top frequently used words by category in JMLP's campaign speeches from 2001-2002, see
the Appendix, p. 86.

Figure 4: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in JMLP Campaign Speeches 2001-2002

JMLP Campaign Speeches 2006-2007 Analysis Results

For JMLP's 2006-2007 campaign speeches, there was a total of 44.95% populist rhetoric with a breakdown of 17.28% anti-elite, 25.63% anti-pluralist, and 2.02% appeal to people. Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 555 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *finac** [finance] (20.1%), *Sarkozy* (14.9%), and *Bruxelles* [Brussels] (13.1%). The significant use of the word *Sarkozy* is to be expected, as Nicolas Sarkozy was the main opposing candidate in the election. According to my coding scheme, under the sub-category of international organization, JMLP bemoans the control that international organizations have over French sovereignty. He claims that:

For over twenty years, the French people have sacrificed their ability to decide, their political freedom, their sovereignty all for the benefit of Brussels, in the hope that they would obtain additional resources and services for the future, all without realizing that our powers, our freedoms, and our liberties entrusted to Brussels were immediately squandered by the European Commission for the benefit of the World Trade Organization, the United States, the free trade zones of the global market, in which we are politically, economically, and socially crushed.[30]

Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 823 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *national** [national] (28.9%), *justice* [justice] (9.5%), and *defend** [to defend] (5.46%). The word *femme** [women] was close behind at 5.3%. This corresponds with scholarly claims that JMLP frequently emphasized the need for law & order (see Mondon 2014 and Williams 2011), which was to be obtained via righteous justice such as the death penalty. According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of French identity, protection, patriotism/sovereignty, and historical myth, JMLP argues that:

In order to save our trusted values, because they alone allow for life and sometimes happiness, we must fight to save their foundations, solidified throughout our History, which have allowed us to preserve our liberties, our independence, our security, our culture and our identity through difficult struggles.[31]

Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 65 word count, there were only three words used: *responsabilité* [responsibility] (61.5%), *référend** [referendum]

---

[30] *« Les Français ont donc sacrifié, pendant vingt ans, leur pouvoir de décider, leur liberté politique, leur Etat au profit de Bruxelles, en espérant obtenir ainsi un supplément de force, de services, d'avenir, sans s'apercevoir que nos pouvoirs, nos libertés et notre argent ainsi confiés à Bruxelles étaient immédiatement dilapidés par la Commission européenne au profit de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce, des Etats-Unis, d'un marché commun planétaire construit à coup de zones de libre-échange emboîtées, dans lequel nous sommes politiquement, économiquement et socialement broyés ».* JMLP, 2007, 25 March, Toulouse, *Discours de Toulouse.*

[31] *« Pour sauver les valeurs auxquelles nous sommes attachés, parce qu'elles seules permettent la vie et parfois le bonheur, nous devons combattre pour sauver les structures, vérifiées par l'Histoire, qui ont permis au travers de douloureux combats, de préserver nos libertés, notre indépendance, notre sécurité, notre culture et notre identité ».* JMLP, 2006, 22 October, Vendée, *Discours aux Herbiers.*

(32.3%), and *populis** [populist; populism] (6.1%). This is the first explicit use of the

words *populisme* and *populist* by JMLP. This speaks to the arguments of few scholars

which claim that the populist trajectory of the *Front National* began under JMLP

(Gundogar 2013; Mondon 2014). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-

categories of common sense and referendum, JMLP declares that:

> *If I am elected, from here on, I solemnly commit to adding an article to the*
> *French Constitution which requires any modification of the European Treaties to*
> *be subject to compulsory consultation of the French people via a referendum.*[32]

For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 18.41%. 13.83% of the rhetoric was

exclusionary populist. Out of a total 444 word count, the top three most frequently used

words were *sécurité* [security] (19.5%), *étrang** [foreign] (14.6%), and *immigré**

[immigrant] (10.1%). The word *lutt** [to fight] was not far behind at 8.1%. For overt

xenophobia, there was a total 4.57%. Out of 147 words, the top three most frequently

used words were *fondamental** [fundamental] (22.44%), with a tie between *insécurité*

[insecurity] (10.8%), *musulman** [Muslim] (10.8%), and *terror** [terrorist; terrorism]

(10.8%), closely followed by *violence* [violence] (9.5%). These results uphold the

scholarly view that JMLP's message was anti-immigration with xenophobic undertones

(Hainsworth 2004; Williams 2011). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-

category of immigration, JMLP criticizes France's acceptance of large numbers of

immigrants. He rails that:

---

[32] *Je m'engage dès maintenant, solennellement, si je suis élu, à ajouter à la Constitution française un article disposant que toute modification des Traités européens fasse l'objet d'une consultation obligatoire du peuple français par la voie du référendum ».* JMLP, 2007, 25 March, Toulouse, *Discours de Toulouse*.

Meanwhile, the floodgates of mass immigration have been opened, the state has continued to spread its generosity to the benefit of people from around the globe.[33]

For economic rhetoric, there was a total 36.63% with a breakdown of 29.00% general economy and 7.63% right-wing populist economics. Within the general economy category, out of a total 931 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *économ** [economy] (16.4%), *entrepr** [business; entrepreneurs] (9.9%), and *chôm** [unemployment] (7.8%). Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a total of 245 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *agric** [agriculture] (42.8%), *rétabl** (to restore) (23.6%), and both a tie at 11.0% between *mondialisation* [globalization] and *global** [global]. These results do not drastically differ from JMLP's 2001-2002 campaign speeches which speak to relative scholarly silence on the matter. According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of anti-globalization and loss of control, JMLP asserts that:

> *To continue down this path that systematizes ultra-free trade, which is rooted in the suicidal overvalued euro, which contributes to the disappearance of our agricultural and industrial sectors and leaves us no choice but to raise taxes to hire new officials, continue on in this way, it's actually taking us on a one-way trip to the Middle Ages!*[34]

Overall, the focus of JMLP's 2006-2007 campaign speeches remain similar to that of his previous campaign - that is largely comprised of anti-pluralist sentiments and discussion of France's general economy. His use of anti-elite words increased by 5.42%. In particular, his criticism of the United-States decreases and is replaced by criticism

---

[33] « *Entre temps, les vannes de l'immigration de masse ont été ouvertes, l'Etat n'a cessé de répandre ses générosités au bénéfice de populations issues des quatre coins du globe* ». Ibid.

[34] « *Continuer dans une voie qui systématise l'ultra libre-échangisme, qui enracine le suicidaire euro surévalué, qui organise notre disparition agricole et industrielle et ne nous laisse d'autres choix que d'augmenter les impôts pour embaucher de nouveaux fonctionnaires, continuer dans cette voie, c'est effectivement, prendre un aller simple vers le Moyen-âge* ». Ibid.

against Nicolas Sarkozy. His use of various anti-pluralist words remains even, with the

exception of the word *justice* going from 4.7% in the 2001-2002 campaign to 9.5%

usage. Most notably, JMLP's overall xenophobic rhetoric decreases since his last

campaign, in particular his use of overt xenophobia drops by 6.2%. Figure 5 shows a

comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in JMLP's 2006-2007 campaign

speeches.[35]

Figure 5: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in JMLP Campaign Speeches

2006-2007

MLP Campaign Speeches 2011-2012 Analysis Results

---

[35] For a list of top frequently used words by category in the JMLP's campaign speeches from 2006-2007, see the Appendix, p. 86.

For MLP's 2011-2012 campaign speeches, there was a total of 52.41% populist

rhetoric with a breakdown of 24.86 % anti-elite, 26.36 % anti-pluralist, and 1.19% appeal

to people. Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 813 word count, the top three most

frequently used words were *Sarkozy* (20.4%), *finac** [finance] (18.5%), and

(*banq*/banc** [bank; banking] (11.8%). The use of Hollande was not far behind at 7.5%.

The high use of *Sarkozy* and *Hollande* corresponds to them being the main opposing

candidates in the election. It also speaks to the scholarly observation that MLP

frequently scapegoats – in this instance the blame falls on her opponents – and aims to

present herself as outside the box of the political elite (Mondon 2014; Shields 2013; and

Stockemer 2014). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of

economic elite and sense of exploitation, MLP directly criticizes those in the economic

sector who she sees as exploiting the French people. She argues:

> *Moreover, when you put a ballot in the ballot box, are you really choosing*
> *between several candidates or is the only choice for us that of our master? You*
> *have the choice: BNP Paribas, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs [...] this financial and*
> *banking oligarchy, which gives itself a permanent golden parachute, vacations*
> *and indecent bonuses, but it is from our pockets that it draws endless money*. [36]

Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 862 word count, the top three

most frequently used words were *national** [national] (22.0%), *defend** [to defend]

(9.1%), and *valeur** [value] (8.7%). The word *patriot** [patriot] was close behind at

8.0%. These results agree with scholarly claims that MLP emphasizes and seeks to

defend that traditional values of the French Republic (Bastow 2018; Goodliffe

---

[36] « *D'ailleurs, en mettant un bulletin dans l'urne, choisit-on vraiment encore entre plusieurs candidats ou nous reste-t-il comme seul choix celui de notre maître. Vous avez le choix : BNP Paribas, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs [...] cette oligarchie financière et bancaire, qui s'auto-attribue en permanence parachute doré, retrait de chapeau et bonus indécents, mais c'est dans notre poche qu'elle puise sans fin son argent »*. MLP, 2012, 7 April, Lyon, *Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Lyon*.

2016). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of French identity, patriotism/sovereignty, and economic patriotism, MLP declares that:

> *My friends, we no longer believe in their old utopias of a prosperous, powerful, united and fraternal European Union. We no longer believe in their evil European Soviet Union. We, my friends, believe in economic patriotism and social patriotism. We believe in our national identity. We believe in national solidarity. We believe in the genius of our civilization, courage, work, merit, talent, righteousness, honor, freedom. We, my friends, believe in France.*[37]

Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 39 word count, there were only three words used: *responsabilité* [responsibility] (53.8%), *référend** [referendum] (38.4%), and *populis** [populist; populism] (7.7%). This falls in line with scholarly observations that MLP seeks to appeal to the common sense of her base (Gundogar 2013; Mondon 2014). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of common sense and future vision, MLP calls the French people to action. She proclaims that:

> *With you, I will make decisions that will disrupt the establishment. With you I will make decisions on Europe, immigration, economic and social policy. With you I will take immediate and concrete measures to influence prices, improve the purchasing power of retirees, civil servants, employees, workers, and the unemployed.*[38]

For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total 17.79%. 12.72% of the rhetoric was exclusionary populist. Out of a total 348 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *étrang** [foreign] (18.6%), *immigration* [immigration] (16.9%), and *sécurité*

---

[37] « *Mes amis, nous ne croyons plus à leurs vieilles utopies d'une Union Européenne prospère, puissante, solidaire et fraternelle. Nous ne croyons plus à leurs méchante Union Soviétique européenne. Nous, mes amis, nous croyons au patriotisme économique, au patriotisme social. Nous croyons à notre identité nationale. Nous croyons à la solidarité nationale. Nous croyons au génie de notre civilisation, au courage, au travail, au mérite, au talent, à la droiture, à l'honneur, à la liberté. Nous, mes amis, nous croyons en la France* ». Ibid.

[38] « *Avec vous, je prendrai des décisions en rupture avec le désordre établi. Avec vous je prendrai des décisions sur l'Europe, l'immigration, la politique économique et sociale. Avec vous je prendrai des mesures immédiates et concrètes pour peser sur les prix, pour améliorer le pouvoir d'achat des retraités, des fonctionnaires, des salariés, des ouvriers, des chômeurs* ». Ibid.

[security] (15.8%). For overt xenophobia, there was a total 234 word count. The top

three most frequently used words were *insecurité* [insecurity] (17.0%), with a tie

between *islam** [Islam; Islamic] (15.3%) and *violence* [violence] (15.3%), followed by

fondamental* [fundamental] (7.7%). The increased use of Islam corresponds with

scholar assertions that MLP attacks it as incompatible with Republican values (Mondon

2015; Reynie 2011). Moreover, these results are consistent with the acknowledgment

that MLP calls for immigration control (Goodliffe 2016; Reynie 2011). According to

my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of immigration and loss of control, MLP

contends that:

> *The French have conquered the system of generous social protection in principle, but this system is threatened. It is threatened by immigration; it is threatened by social fraud; some will say the two are linked, they are partially right, but only partially. Admittedly, France does not welcome all the misery of the world, but it already welcomes way too much.[39]*

For economic rhetoric, there was a total 29.78% with a breakdown of 23.24%

general economy and 6.54% right-wing populist economics. Within the general economy

category, out of a total 760 word count, the top three most frequently used words were

économ* [economy] (14.2%), *entrepr** [business; entrepreneur] (12.7%), and *chôm**

[unemployment] (11.8%). Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a

total of 214 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *agric**

[agriculture] (36.9%), *mondialisation* [globalization] (18.6%), and *rétabl** [to restore]

(14.4%). These results agree with scholarly claims that MLP calls for financial

---

[39] « *Les français ont conquis un système de protection sociale généreux dans son principe, mais il est menacé. Il est menacé par l'immigration ; il est menacé par la fraude sociale ; les deux sont liés diront certains, pour une part ils ont raison, mais pour une part seulement. Certes, la France n'accueille pas toute la misère du monde, mais elle en accueille déjà beaucoup trop ».* Ibid.

regulation, opposes big banks, and focuses on small French businesses (Bastow 2018; Goodliffe 2016; and Shields 2013). However, they do not significantly differ from the economic rhetoric results for JMLP. According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of disaffected (small-medium businesses, working class, rural areas) and national industry, MLP advocates that:

> *At all times, in all places, I want to support audacity, I want to repair the injustice, I want to encourage the entrepreneurial spirit, I want to help job creation where it is, that is to say among our artisans, our young entrepreneurs, our very small businesses, our small and medium-sized businesses who fight to exist every day.*[40]

Overall, MLP's 2011-2012 campaign message emphasizes anti-elite and anti-pluralist sentiments along with a discussion of France's general economy. For instance, she rails against the political and economic elite, that is Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande, and big banks. Moreover, she envisions the restoration and preservation of French culture as well as national sovereignty. Indeed, she emphasizes the insecurity and violence caused by immigration and fundamental Islamism. Her discussion of the economy encompasses a desire to shrink the power of the financial/banking sector, support and grow small and medium-sized French businesses, and decrease unemployment. Figure 6 shows a comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in MLP's 2011-2012 campaign speeches.[41]

---

[40] « *En tout temps, en tous lieux, je veux soutenir l'audace, je veux réparer l'injustice, je veux encourager l'esprit d'entreprise, je veux aider la création d'emplois où elle se trouve c'est-à-dire chez nos artisans, nos jeunes entrepreneurs, nos très petites entreprises, nos PME [applaudissements] qui chaque jour se battent pour exister »*. Ibid.

[41] For a list of top frequently used words by category in MLP's campaign speeches from 2011-2012, see the Appendix, p. 86-87.

**Figure 6: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in MLP Campaign Speeches 2011-2012**

MLP Campaign Speeches 2016-2017 Analysis Results

For MLP's 2016-2017 campaign speeches, there was a total of 40.36% populist rhetoric with a breakdown of 11.29% anti-elite, 27.41% anti-pluralist, and 1.66% appeal to people. Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 557 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *financ** [finance] (24.2%), *banq*/banc** [bank; banking] (15.0%), and *administrat** [administration] (9.3%). The words *Hollande* (8.6%) and *Bruxelles* [Brussels] (8.0%) were close behind. The high use of *Hollande* corresponds to him being the incumbent president. Moreover, the frequency of references to banks corresponds to scholarly assertions that MLP has increased her economic discourse, in particular emphasizing her opposition to entities like the European Union and the

European Central Bank (Gundogar 2013; Shields 2013). Moreover, these results adhere

to MLP's appeals of exploitation by the establishment (Mondon 2014). According to my

coding scheme, under the sub-categories of political and economic elite, MLP makes

several comments as follows:

> *The power that ancients called* 'auctoritas'*, that is the power to issue rules, has been transferred to a foreign authority based in Brussels.*[42]

> *The powers of money have only won further power under François Hollande, perhaps advancing more slyly than before, but they are trying to take total power.*[43]

Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 1352 word count, the top three

most frequently used words were *national** [national] (20.2%), *patriot** [patriot;

patriotism] (9.7%), and *cultur** [culture] (7.7%). Words like *democrat** [democracy]

(7.3%), *defend** [to defend] (7.1%), and *souverain** [sovereignty] (7.1%) were not far

behind. These results are consistent with scholarly declarations that MLP presents

herself as the defender of France and its values (Goodliffe 2016; Mondon 2015), and that

she seeks to restore national sovereignty. According to my coding scheme, under the

sub-categories of immigration, border security, and fear of disruption and insecurity,

MLP emphasizes the need to restore national borders, stating that:

> *The mishandled management of migratory flows, both legal and illegal, have led to the flooding of our country and the destabilization of entire parts of our territory.*[44]

---

[42] « *Le pouvoir que les anciens dénommaient « * l'auctoritas *», c'est-à-dire le pouvoir d'édicter des règles a été transféré à une autorité étrangère basée à Bruxelles ».* MLP, 2017, 27 February, Nantes, *Discours de Marine Le Pen à Nantes*.

[43] « *Les forces de l'argent n'ont fait que gagner en puissance sous François Hollande, avançant peut-être plus sournoisement qu'auparavant, mais elles tentent de prendre un pouvoir total ».* Ibid.

[44] « *Le laisser-aller en matière de gestion des flux migratoires, légaux comme illégaux, aboutit à la submersion de notre pays et la déstabilisation de parties entières du territoire ».* MLP, 2017, 27 February, Nantes, *Discours de Marine Le Pen à Nantes*.

Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 82 word count, there were only two words used: *référend** [referendum] (76.8%) and *responsabilité* [responsibility] (23.1%). This represents a dramatic increase in the reference to *référendum* as compared to the previous sets of campaigns speeches, both from JMLP and MLP. While MLP does not explicitly use words like *populisme*, she highlights the need for the people of France to make their voice heard. These results align with scholarly assertions that MLP not only seeks to appeal to the common sense of the French people, but also that this is best done via direct democracy (Goodliffe 2016). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories common sense and referendum, MLP remarks that:

> *But in the end who will decide? It is you who will decide in the end on the occasion of the referendum that I will organize at the end of this discussion, at the end of this negotiation. Nothing will be done without you; nothing will be done against you.*[45]

For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 26.21%. 14.17% of the rhetoric was exclusionary populist. Out of a total 699 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *sécurité* [security] (20.6%), *immigr*ation [immigration] (19.1%), and *étrang** [foreign] (18.8%). For overt xenophobia, there was a 594 word count. The top three most frequently used words were *islam** [Islam; Islamic] (27.1%), *terror** [terrorism] (22.8%), and *fondamental** [fundamental] (17.0%). Compared to her 2011-2012 campaign, MLP greatly increased her use of *islam** words by 11.8%. These results further back scholarly claims that MLP attacks multiculturalism and Islam (Mondon 2015; Reynie 2011). However, they question the argument as to whether MLP has toned

---

[45] « *Mais au final qui déciderait ? C'est vous au final qui déciderez à l'occasion du référendum que j'organiserai au terme de cette discussion au terme de cette négociation. Rien ne se fera sans vous ; rien ne se fera contre vous* ». MLP, 2017, 28 April, Nice, *Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Nice*.

down anti-immigration and exclusionist sentiments or not. According to my coding

scheme, under the sub-categories of *laïcité* [secularism] and fear of disruption and

insecurity, she critiques that:

> *The permissiveness that allows the principle of secularism to be trampled on*
> *under the guise of pluralist religion allows the ideological provocations from*
> *Islamism to proliferate in canteens, in hospitals, in the streets, on the beach, and*
> *in companies.*[46]

For economic rhetoric, there was a total 33.41% with a breakdown of 27.93%

general economy and 5.47% right-wing populist economics. Within the general economy

category, out of a total 1378 word count, the top three most frequently used words were

econom* [economy] (24.8%), *entrepr** [business; entrepreneur] (16.6%), and *chôm**

[unemployment] (7.5%). Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a

total of 270 word count, the top three most frequently used words were *agric**

[agriculture] (25.5%), with a tie between *mondialisation* [globalization] and *rétabl** (to

restore) (24.8%), and followed by *global** [global] (11.4%). These results maintain that

MLP use economic discourse, in particular emphasizing anti-globalization sentiments,

economic patriotism, and pro small businesses (Goodliffe 2016; Mondon

2015). However, they disagree with scholarly claims that MLP has seen an increase in

economic rhetoric. According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of

patriotism/sovereignty, anti-globalization, and national industry, MLP declares that:

> *Monetary and economic sovereignty allows us to act directly in the service of our*
> *economy, serving our businesses, very small businesses and small and medium-*
> *sized businesses, without having permission to ask anyone. It gives us weapons*
> *again globalization, as all sovereign nations are doing; it permits us to adjust our*

---

[46] « *Le laxisme qui laisse bafouer le principe de laïcité sous couvert de religion multiplié laisse se*
multiplier les provocations idéologiques de la parte d'islamisme dans les cantines, dans les hôpitaux, dans
les rues, sur la plage, et dans les entreprises ». Ibid.

economy as needed rather than lowering wages or destroying our social protection system.[47]

Overall, MLP's 2016-2017 campaign speeches see the continuation of anti-pluralist and general economic rhetoric, with a significant decrease in anti-elite words (13.5%) followed by an increase in exclusionary populism (3.5%) and overt xenophobia (4.8%). For anti-elite sentiments, MLP continues to criticize the established political administration and the financial sector. While her percentage reference to finance increases by 5.7% as compared to her previous campaign, her references to political opponents decrease. With anti-pluralist rhetoric, she emphasizes the need to defend the French nation and its culture against globalization and the powers that wish to take away its economic and political sovereignty. In particular, with xenophobic rhetoric, she hones in on the dangers of Islamism and illegal immigration. In regards to the general economy, MLP's message remains the same as in her previous campaign; indeed, she persists in decrying globalization and calls for the restoration of France's control over its economy. Figure 7 shows a comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in MLP's 2016-2017 campaign speeches.[48]

---

[47] « *La souveraineté monétaire et économique qui nous permet d'agir directement au service de notre économie, au service de nos entreprises, TPE et PME, sans avoir de permission à demander à quiconque, qui nous donne des armes dans la mondialisation, comme le font tous les pays souverains, qui nous permet d'ajuster notre économie autrement que par la baisse des salaires ou la destruction de notre système de protection sociale* ». MLP, 2017, 27 February, Nantes, *Discours de Marine Le Pen à Nantes*.

[48] For a list of top frequently used words by category in MLP's campaign speeches from 2016-2017, see the Appendix, p. 87.

Figure 7: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in MLP Campaign Speeches 2016-2017

Hypotheses Test & Comparison of JMLP and MLP

In testing my three hypotheses[49] with my data for the four sets of campaign speeches, the overall results are seen below in Figure 8 which plots the change in the percentage usage of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric over time between JMLP's and MLP. The results of the categories contained within each kind of rhetoric are seen below in Figure 9. Figure 10 shows a comparison of the percentage of usage of each category of rhetoric between JMLP's and MLP's sets of campaign speeches. In my comparison of the difference between the three rhetorical categories between JMLP and

---

[49] See Table 1 – Hypotheses, p. 22.

MLP, I hold an increase or decrease of 5% as a notable shift. I chose this threshold due to the minimal instances of an increase or decrease greater than 5% between JMLP and MLP. For a less than 1% increase or decrease, I consider this as no change.

Figure 8: Change in Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric Between JMLP & MLP

Figure 9: Change in Anti-Elite, Anti-Pluralist, Appeals to People, Exclusionary, Overt Xenophobia, General Economy, & Right-Wing Populist Economic Rhetoric Between JMLP & MLP

Figure 10: Comparison of the Percentage of Anti-Elite, Anti-Pluralist, Appeals to People, Exclusionary, Overt Xenophobia, General Economy, & Right-Wing Populist Economic Rhetoric in JMLP & MLP Campaign Speeches

Hypothesis 1 expects that the use of populist rhetoric of JMLP compared to MLP has experienced either a) no change or b) an increase. In combining the results for both sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, there was a 7.01% *increase* in the use of anti-elite references by MLP. For anti-pluralist references, there was a 0.81% *no change* in the use of between JMLP and MLP. In terms of the use of appeals to people, there was a 0.73% *no change* between JMLP and MLP. Overall, with all categories combined, there was a 5.47% *increase* in the use of populist rhetoric by MLP.

Hypothesis 2 expects that the use of xenophobic rhetoric of JMLP compared to MLP has experienced either a) no change or b) a decrease.   In combining the results for both sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, there was 4.73% *decrease* in the use of exclusionary references by MLP. For overt xenophobia, there was 3.79% *increase* by MLP. Overall, with both categories combined, there was 0.95% *no change* between JMLP and MLP.

Hypothesis 3 expects that the use of economic rhetoric of JMLP compared to MLP has experienced either a) no change or b) an increase. In combining the results for both sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, for references to the general economy there was 3.47% *decrease* by MLP. For references to right-wing populist economics, there was a 1.03% *decrease* by MLP. Overall, with both categories combined, there was a 4.49% *decrease* in the use of economic rhetoric by MLP. Table 2 – Hypotheses Test represents a summary of my findings.

Table 2 – Hypotheses Test

Hypothesis 1 Populist Rhetoric	Hypothesis 2 Xenophobic Rhetoric	Hypothesis 3 Economic Rhetoric
5.47% *Increase*	0.95% *No Change*	4.29% *Decrease*

Using an increase or decrease of 5% as a notable shift, my findings show that for hypotheses 2 and 3 there was no significant change between JMLP and MLP. For hypothesis 1, the results were over 5% by .47%. This is unexpected. First, for Hypothesis 1, from my review of the literature, I anticipated there would be a visible increase in overall populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP. However, the results show the increase was relatively small in populist rhetoric. Between the different categories found under populist rhetoric, the initial increase in anti-elite rhetoric found in MLP's 2011-2012 campaign speeches corresponds to scholarly observations. However, the MLP's use of anti-pluralist sentiments and use of appeals to the people remains even to JMLP. The finding of a subsequent decline in populist rhetoric by MLP in her 2016-2017 campaign speeches can be accounted for in that no other scholar had included her most recent rhetoric in their research.

Second, for Hypothesis 2, again from my review of the literature, I expected there to be a decrease in xenophobic rhetoric between JMLP and MLP. Instead, there was a decrease in the use of exclusionary populism by MLP, but an increase in overt xenophobia. In order to account for this finding, I combined the results from the anti-pluralist category under populist rhetoric with the results from both the exclusionary populist and overt xenophobia categories, since both are a subset of anti-pluralism. From this comparison, there was a 1.76% decrease by MLP.

Lastly, for economic rhetoric, based on the literature I expected to see an increase between JMLP and MLP. However, there was a decrease in the use of economic references. For MLP's 2011-2012 campaign speeches, this can likely be explained by her anti-elite criticism, specifically of economic elite, overtaking her discussion of economics. Consequently, she hits two birds with one stone by referencing economic topics with a populist overtone. This lends to the perception of an increase in economic rhetoric while actually increasing her populist rhetoric. Then, in MLP's 2016-2017 campaign speeches, she replaces her anti-elite rhetoric with increased overt xenophobia.

In sum, the data suggests that while there may have appeared to be an increase in populist rhetoric under MLP's first campaign, her subsequent campaign shows that this is not a significant trend. Indeed, my results illustrate how there is only a marginal .47% increase in the percentage of populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP.

DISCUSSION

In my review of scholarly claims concerning the Front National's shift towards populist rhetoric, I outlined three different camps. The first is the semantic camp which argues that there has been no foundational change to MLP's rhetoric as compared to JMLP's, merely updating to the context of the time. The second is the *dédiabolisation* camp which argues that MLP has made a concentrated effort to decrease controversial ideas promoted by JMLP and increase discussion of more mainstream issues. The third is the bandwagon camp which claims that MLP has joined the populist rhetoric movement trend.

Due to there being only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP, I believe my results are most in line with the semantic camp. In particular, the systematic analysis conducted by Alduy and Wahnich (2015) which concluded that MLP has updated the *Front National's* style of presentation and has altered aspects of its vocabulary. Indeed, I argue that the perception of an increase in populist and economic rhetoric under MLP seems to do more with appearance than quantitative fact. This speaks to the idea that while there is a populist rhetoric movement occurring, it is the increased saliency of populist rhetoric which makes it appear that MLP has increased in populist rhetoric. This corresponds with Mayer's (2015) and Mondon's (2014) findings which state that the FN's move towards populism began under JMLP and that MLP has merely continued to capitalize on the current populist trend. Mondon (2014) in particular asserts that it was Nicolas Sarkozy's cooptation of *Front National* stances which have allowed for the party's message under MLP to appear more mainstream. While the details of the rise of the association between the *Front*

National and populism is beyond the scope of this paper, a future analysis that takes into account rhetoric from other French political party leaders could shed light on this.

A notable exception to my argument is the spike in anti-elite rhetoric used by MLP in her 2011-2012 campaign speeches and the increase in exclusionary rhetoric used in her 2016-2017 campaign speeches. These changes could be accounted for first by the idea that a change in leadership will result in some rhetorical differences. Moreover, these spikes could correspond with the MLP's rhetorical responsiveness to exogenous factors – such as the refugee wave sweeping across Europe and an increase in fundamentalist Islamic terrorist attacks in France – which happen to fall in line with those categories during those time periods. While an examination of contextual factors is beyond the scope of this paper, future research on the relation between current events and the rhetoric used by MLP would prove insightful. Indeed, an overall expansion of my research to include MLP's speeches between both her two campaigns would give structure to the shift from the increase in anti-elite rhetoric to the increase in exclusionary rhetoric.

As for *dédiabolisation* - or dedemonization - of FN rhetoric, my n-gram and qualitative results show that this comes from a decrease in the use of certain words/ideas - like anti-Americanism and the death penalty - by MLP. However, concepts that are no longer popular have been replaced with popular ones, like fear of Islamism and mass immigration. This falls in line with the argument made by Gundogar (2013) who holds that the FN has made a concentrated effort to normalize its rhetoric. However, the rhetoric of JMLP goes back much further than the two sets of campaign speeches I analyzed. Consequently, an expanded timeframe on the rhetoric of JMLP might show

that there has indeed been a more drastic decrease in controversial language and overt xenophobia. Alternatively, my results may speak to William's (2011) argument that, since MLP has not been president of the *Front National* as long as JMLP was and has been careful with her message, she has not made mistakes like he did to tarnish the party's image and label it as xenophobic and racist.

With respects to economic rhetoric, of the scholars that mention a change between JMLP and MLP (see Alduy & Wahnich 2015; Bastow 2018; Goodliffe 2016; Gundogar 2013; Mayer 2013; Williams 2011), they all argue there has been an increase under MLP. However, my results show there has been an overall decrease. The main possible reason for this difference of observation is that there was a spike in economic rhetoric by MLP in her 2011-2012 campaign speeches. This corresponds with permeation across Europe of the 2008 economic recession. This is the point to which most scholars base their observations on. Indeed, the most comprehensive by Alduy & Wahnich (2015) only went to the end of that campaign. In her 2016-2017 campaign speeches, though, MLP maintains an even discussion of the general economy, but replaces her criticism of economic elite – which comprised much of her economic rhetoric previously –, with an increased overt xenophobic message.

As for the National Front's increasing electoral success under MLP, my results suggest this is not due to an increase in populist rhetoric. Rather, the party's appeal to voters may have more to due with cooptation of traditionally far-right issues by mainstream French political parties[50], pertinent contextual factors which either align with the *Front National*'s message or which the FN molds their message around, and the

---

[50] During the 2017 French presidential elections, Alduy (2017) measured and compared the most frequently used words among the top candidates, including MLP.

saliency of these issues among voters. Overall, further analysis would be needed to

measure the impact of each of these possibilities on why the French people vote for the

FN. In particular, an analysis of the role that media has played in the presentation of

MLP, the party, and a possible connection with populism could further elucidate why

assertions about a populist rhetorical shift have been hypothesized.

CONCLUSION

Scholars of the Front National have postulated several arguments as to whether and when the party's rhetoric moved towards populism. Some claimed that the shift began under JMLP; others assert that the cooptation of FN issues by Nicolas Sarkozy launched its rhetoric into the mainstream; others argue that rising party leaders like MLP spearheaded the transition; lastly, some counter that the Front National's rhetoric has not shifted towards populism.

The quantitative analysis of my thesis gives concrete numbers to this debate. Namely that there has been a relatively small increase in the populist rhetoric used between JMLP and MLP. However, at a time when the saliency of populism increased, the FN experienced a leadership change. This provided the party the opportunity to change its image in many respects as well as update the context of key issues.

While my findings provide insight as to whether a populist rhetorical shift is actually occurring within the Front National, they contain several limitations. First, the creation of my dictionary was limited to a select sample size. In order to refine my results, I would need to increase the sample size used to create my dictionary. This would allow me to list out more possible n-grams. Moreover, my categorization of the n-grams under certain rhetorical categories was based on a limited literature review. Further study of the literature on populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric would enable me to narrow what falls under each category. In particular, I would be able to better distinguish between anti-pluralist and exclusionary rhetoric as well as anti-elite and right-wing populist economic rhetoric.

Nevertheless, the results of my findings should not be discounted. Of particular note is my addition of MLP's 2016-2017 campaign speeches. No other scholar had included her most recent rhetoric in their analyses. Moreover, no other scholar had specifically sought to measure the populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP. As a result, my findings provide unique insight into the debate as to whether the FN is actually increasing in populist rhetoric.

In relation to the definition of populism, my findings lend insight into the broader discussion as to whether populism is an ideology, a strategy, or a discursive style. In particular, the results that MLP initially increased the *Front National*'s anti-elite rhetoric in her 2011-2012 campaign, but then shifted her emphasis toward anti-pluralist exclusionary sentiments in her 2016-2017 campaign. This possibly represents a strategic shift in message to reflect the current issues of the time, rather than representing a foundational change in ideology. While my research did not delineate out the verbal structures of JMLP's and MLP's speeches and my sample size was limited to two speakers, the two did share common discursive styles – namely, the criticism of enemies, the use of black and white options, and emotional appeals. While the exact enemies, options, and appeals varied between them, the overall message did not seem to change. Consequently, it could be argued that the core ideology of the *Front National* is populist in nature.

In terms of xenophobic rhetoric, my analysis results create further questions regarding the line between anti-pluralism, exclusionary populism, and xenophobia. In particular, whereas the *Front National* was once seen as a xenophobic party, under MLP's leadership this view has been somewhat mitigated. However, MLP actually

increased the party's exclusionary rhetoric in her most recent campaign. As a result, the perception of certain rhetoric as xenophobic or not may have more to do with current contextual factors and political correctness than a well-refined definition. For the FN in particular this implies that its *dédiabolisation* efforts symbolized a shift towards addressing contemporary issues with more appealing rhetoric.

As for the *Front National*, overall, my thesis suggests that the party's current image and message under MLP plays to exogenous factors and the fears of voters. Indeed, the recent electoral success of FN candidates is linked to the saliency of pertinent issues and the party's rhetorical adjustment to correspond with them. Overall, the party continues to strive to shed its past image under JMLP. Indeed, after reiteration of controversial statements, MLP had JMLP expelled from the party.[51] Following the MLP's unsuccessful presidential bid in the 2017 election, the FN renamed itself to the *Rassemblement National*. Meanwhile, another key leader from the party – Florian Philipot – broke away to create a more conservative party, *Les Patriotes*. In the end, it remains to be seen as to whether these changes will signal further acceptance of the party by mainstream politics and continued electoral success.

In conclusion, my research contributes to the ongoing dialogue surrounding the rise of populist rhetoric and, in particular, its use with the *Front National* of France. While my findings contribute to the groundwork of establishing a dictionary for populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric, my results are limited to the FN. However, my methods can serve as a model for further analysis of the National Front as well as other parties considered to use populist rhetoric. Indeed, my research raises several

---

[51] "French National Front expels founder Jean-Marie Le Pen". *BBC News.* 20 August 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34009901

questions worth examining. Of note: 1) the connection between the perceived used of populist rhetoric and labeling a party as populist; 2) the foundational categorization of populism as an ideology, strategy, or discursive style; 3) the use of populist rhetoric by a political party and its perceived mainstreaming; 4) the role of the media in the saliency of populism and populist parties; and 5) the use of populist rhetoric by a political party contributing to voter appeal and electoral success.

WORKS CITED

Abell, J., Gruber, H., Mautner, G., & Myers, G. (2008). *Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences*. Macmillan International Higher Education.

Alduy, C. (2017). *Ce qu'ils disent vraiment. Les politiques pris aux mots*. Le Seuil.

Alduy, C., & Wahnich, S. (2015). *Marine Le Pen prise aux mots. Décryptage du nouveau discours frontiste*. Le Seuil.

Almeida, D. (2013). Towards a post-radical Front National? Patterns of ideological change and *dédiabolisation* on the French Radical right. *Nottingham French Studies*, 52(2), 167-176.

Anderson, C. J. (2000). Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspective. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2), 151-170.

Aslanidis, P. (2016). Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective. *Political Studies*, 64(1_suppl), 88-104.

Baider, F. (2015). La parole inversée ? Marine Le Pen et son identité-ressource langagière. *Nouvelles perspectives en sciences sociales : Revue internationale de systémique complexe et d'études relationnelles*, 11(1), 217-252.

Bastow, S. (2018). The Front national under Marine Le Pen: a mainstream political party?. *French Politics*, 16(1), 19-37.

Betz, H. G. (1994). *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. Springer.

Betz, H. G. (2004). The growing threat of the radical right. In *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century* (pp. 85-104). Routledge.

Betz, H. G., & Johnson, C. (2016). Against the current—stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right. In The Populist Radical Right (pp. 86-100). Routledge.

Betz, H. G., & Immerfall, S. (Eds.). (1998). *The new politics of the right: Neo-populist parties and movements in established democracies*. Macmillan.

Bizumic, B., & Duckitt, J. (2012). What is and is not ethnocentrism? A conceptual analysis and political implications. *Political Psychology*, *33*(6), 887-909.

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies,* 47 (1), 2-16

Charteris-Black, J. (2011). *Politicians and rhetoric: The persuasive power of metaphor*.

Springer.

Delwit, P. (2012). Le Front national. *Mutations de l'extrême droite française. Bruxelles : Editions de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles*.

Druckman, J. N. (2001). The implications of framing effects for citizen competence. *Political behavior*, *23*(3), 225-256.

Eatwell, R. (2000). The rebirth of the 'extreme right' in Western Europe?. *Parliamentary affairs*, 53(3), 407-425.

Eatwell, R., & Mudde, C. (Eds.). (2003). *Western democracies and the new extreme right challenge*. Routledge.

Freeden, M. (1996). *Ideologies and political theory: A conceptual approach*. Oxford University Press on Demand.

Galston, W. A. (2017). *Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy*. Yale University Press.

Galston, William A. (2018). Order from Chaos: The rise of European populism and the collapse of the center-left. *Brookings*. March 8, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/08/the-rise-of-european-populism-and-the-collapse-of-the-center-left/.

Giraudi, G. C. (2018). Populism: What Is and Why We Need A Multidimensional Approach to Understand it. *European Scientific Journal, ESJ*, *14*(8).

Golder, M. (2016). Far right parties in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *19*, 477-497.

Goodliffe, G. (2016). From Political Fringe to Political Mainstream: The Front National and the 2014 Municipal and European Elections in France. *French Politics, Culture & Society*, 126-147.

Grimmer, J., & Stewart, B. M. (2013). Text as data: The promise and pitfalls of automatic content analysis methods for political texts. *Political analysis*, *21*(3), 267-297.

Gundogar, M. (2013). Evolution of the "Front National" from Jean-Marie Le Pen to Marine Le Pen: From extreme right to populism?. *Sciences Po*, Final Paper.

Hainsworth, P. (2004). The extreme right in France: the rise and rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen's front national. *Representation*, *40*(2), 101-114.

Ignazi, P. (2003). *Extreme right parties in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press on Demand.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, *45*(6), 921-956.

Lucassen, G., & Lubbers, M. (2012). Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats. *Comparative Political Studies*, *45*(5), 547-574.

Mayer, N. (2013). From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: electoral change on the far right. *Parliamentary Affairs*, *66*(1), 160-178.

Mondon, A. (2016). The Irresistible rise of the Front National? Populism and the Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right. *The European Far Right: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, 35.

Mondon, A. (2015). Populism, the 'people' and the illusion of democracy–The Front National and UKIP in a comparative context. *French politics*, *13*(2), 141-156.

Mondon, A. (2014). The Front National in the twenty-first century: from Pariah to Republican Democratic contender?. *Modern & Contemporary France*, *22*(3), 301-320.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2013). Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: Comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government and Opposition*, *48*(2), 147-174.

Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and opposition*, *39*(4), 541-563.

Mudde, Cas. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe* (Vol. 22, No. 8). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pérez, E. O. (2015). Xenophobic Rhetoric and Its Political Effects on Immigrants and Their Co-Ethnics. *American Journal of Political Science*, *59*(3), 549-564.

Powell, G. B. (1987). The competitive consequences of polarized pluralism. In *The Logic of Multiparty Systems* (pp. 173-189). Springer, Dordrecht.

Reynié, D. (2011). Le tournant ethno-socialiste du Front National. *Études*, 415(11), 463-472.

Rydgren, J. (2004). *The populist challenge: Political protest and ethno-nationalist mobilization in France* (Vol. 1). Berghahn Books.

Rydgren, J. (2007). The sociology of the radical right. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.*, *33*, 241-262.

Saldaña, J. (2015). *The coding manual for qualitative researchers*. Sage.

Shields, J. (2011). Radical or not so radical? Tactical variation in core policy formation by the Front National. *French Politics, Culture & Society*, *29*(3), 78-100.

Shields, J. (2013). Marine Le Pen and the 'New' FN: A change of style or of substance?. *Parliamentary Affairs*, *66*(1), 179-196.

Shields, J. (2014). The Front National: From systematic opposition to systemic integration?. *Modern & Contemporary France*, *22*(4), 491-511.

Shields, James (2007). *The extreme right in France: from Pétain to Le Pen*. Routledge.

Stanley, B. (2008). The thin ideology of populism. *Journal of political ideologies*, *13*(1), 95-110.

Stockemer, D. (2014). The "new" ideology of the Front National (FN) under Marine Le Pen: A slight change with a big impact. *Abstract retrieved from* https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperPropo sal/6a3d620c-7826-4eec-8cb8-e9333892ef45. pdf.

Watts, M. W. (1996). Political xenophobia in the transition from socialism: Threat, racism and ideology among East German youth. *Political Psychology*, 97-126.

Wieviorka, M. (2013). *Le Front national: Entre extrémisme, populisme et démocratie*. Les Editions de la MSH.

Williams, M. H. (2011). A new era for French far right politics? Comparing the FN under two Le Pens. *Análise social*, 679-695.

Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M., & Mral, B. (Eds.). (2013). *Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse*. A&C Black.

Wodak, R., & Krzyżanowski, M. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe & USA. *Journal of Language and Politics*, *16*(4), 471-484.

Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. Sage.

Van der Brug, W., & Mughan, A. (2007). Charisma, leader effects and support for right-wing populist parties. *Party Politics*, *13*(1), 29-51.

APPENDIX

Table 3: Comparison of Rhetoric Used by JMLP, by MLP, and by JMLP and MLP

JMLP	BOTH JMLP & MLP	MLP
- Xenophobia - Anti-Semitism - Traditionalism - Naturalism – need for space, humans to follow the laws of nature - Appeal to Christian morality - Anti-homosexuality - Abrogation of civil unions - Anti-communism - Law & order a) Return of the death penalty - Reference to WWII and French colonial wars - Reference to fatherland	- Capitalize on crises - Renounce ideology - claim to be neither right nor left. - List of enemies - Nationalism - Anti-immigration - Focus on insecurity - Decry decline in French nationality/identity - Push for national preference. - Merit-based naturalization	- Offering of black and white choices - Frequent scapegoating - Reference to personal life - Use of vulgarity and opposition language. - Clear, short, and simple messages - Call for direct democracy via referendum - Appeal to common sense of electorate - Appeal to sense of exploitation by the establishment - Toning down of controversial statements, namely with: a) Racial mixing b) Anti-communism c) Anti-Americanism d) Christian morality e) Anti-Semitism f) Anti-immigrant g) Exclusionism h) Death penalty - Increased reference to *laïcité* - or secularism - Increased reference to democracy - Claim to be the defender of the traditional values of the French Republic - Call to restore national sovereignty - Attacks on multiculturalism and Islam with the argument that they are incompatible with Republican values - Call for controlled immigration - Acceptance of abortion, homosexuality, and civil unions

		• Increased economic discourse: a) Economy service for the people b) Opposition to EU, European Central Bank, and euro c) Attack capitalism without frontiers d) Anti-globalization e) Call for financial regulation f) Pro small business

Table 4: List of *Programmes Présidentiels*

Candidate	Year	Month	Platform Name	Transcription/Video Source
JMLP	2002	April	*Programme de M. Jean-Marie Le Pen*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023001406.html
JMLP	2007	March	*Programme électoral de Jean-Marie Le Pen*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001250.html
MLP	2012	January	*Programme de Mme Marine Le Pen*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/123000632.html
MLP	2017	April	*144 Engagements Présidentiels*	https://rassemblementnational.fr/pdf/144-engagements.pdf.

Table 5: List of JMLP Campaign Speeches 2001-2002

Number	Year	Day	Location	Speech Name	Transcription/Video Source
1	2001	1 May	Paris	*La Bataille de France*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/013002510.html
2	2001	18 August	La Trinité-sur-mer	*Discours de La Trinité sur mer meeting*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/013003201.html
3	2001	23 September	Paris	*Discours de Paris BBR, Une minute de silence*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/013003201.html
4	2001	1 December	Paris	*Discours de Paris colloque*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023000368.html

5	2002	19 January	Brest	*Discours de Brest Meeting*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023000868.html
6	2002	20 January	Nantes	*Discours de Nantes Meeting*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023000881.html
7	2002	26 January	Tours	*Discours de Tours*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023000909.html
8	2002	27 January	Paris	*Discours de Paris colloque*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023000912.html
N/A	2002	12 February	Bordeaux	*Discours de Bordeaux Meeting*	Unable to find video or transcript.
9	2002	17 February	Lyon	*Discours de Lyon convention Le Pen*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023001278.html
10	2002	21 February	Paris	*Discours de Paris colloque*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023001283.html
11	2002	3 March	Lille	*Discours de Lille meeting*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023001291.html
12	2002	1 May	Paris	*Discours de Paris*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023001628.html
13	2002	2 May	Marseille	*Discours de Marseille Meeting*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/023001684.html

Table 6: List of JMLP Campaign Speeches 2006-2007

Number	**Year**	**Day**	**Location**	**Speech Name**	**Transcription/Video Source**
1	2006	1 May	Paris	*Discours du 1er Mai*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063001580.html
2	2006	20 May	Paris	*Discours de Paris An*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063001831.html
3	2006	17 June	Paris	*Discours de Paris*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063002330.html
4	2006	20 September	Valmy	*Discours de Valmy*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063003354.html
5	2006	8 October	Palavas-les-Flots	*Discours de Palavas-les-Flots*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063003622.html
6	2006	22 October	Vendée	*Discours aux Herbiers*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063003740.html

7	2006	29 October	Parcay-Meslay	*Discours de Parcay-Meslay*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063003859.html
8	2006	5 November	Bordeaux	*Discours de Bordeaux*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063003929.html
9	2006	12 November	Le Bourget	*Discours du Bourget*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063004015.html
10	2006	19 November	Metz	*Discours de Metz*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063004114.html
11	2006	26 November	Dijon	*Discours de Dijon*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/063004223.html
N/A	2007	4 January	N/A	*Voeux (Greetings)*	Unable to find video or transcript.
12	2007	21 January	Paris	*Discours de la Plaine-Saint-Denis, Meeting à Paris*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073000254.html
13	2007	27 January	Yvetot	*Discours de Yvetot*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073000352.html
14	2007	11 February	Nantes	*Discours de Nantes*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073000566.html
15	2007	20 February	Paris	*Discours au forum Chasse et Ruralité*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073000679.html
16	2007	25 February	Lille	*Convention présidentielle de Lille*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073000758.html
17	2007	3 March	Marseille	*Discours de Marseille*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001305.html
18	2007	6 March	Paris	*Discours au Salon de l'agriculture*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001306.html
19	2007	11 March	Lyon	*Discours de Lyon*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073000944.html
20	2007	21 March	Paris	*Allocution devant la CGPME*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001150.html
21	2007	23 March	Paris	*Discours de Paris*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001151.html
22	2007	24 March	Nimes	*Discours devant l'USDIFRA de Nimes*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001181.html
23	2007	25 March	Toulouse	*Discours de Toulouse*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001152.html

24	2007	31 March	Paris	*Discours de Paris*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001280.html
25	2007	6 April	Argenteuil	*Discours de Argenteuil*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001384.html
26	2007	15 April	Paris	*Discours de Paris*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001490.html
27	2007	19 April	Nice	*Discours de Nice*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001547.html
N/A	2007	22 April	N/A	*Discours au soir du premier tour*	Unable to find video or transcript.

Table 7: List of MLP Campaign Speeches 2011-2012

Number	Year	Day	Location	Speech Name	Transcription/Video Source
1	2011	1 May	Paris	*Discours du 1er mai*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cu9MmDyEWiY
2	2011	11 September	Nice	*Discours de Nice*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30QXFayYaKk
3	2011	19 November	Paris	*Présentation du Projet Présidentiel/Programme présidentiel*	https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xmfz5u
4	2011	30 November	Pontoise	*Discours auprès des forains*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ApMG8iYWQY
N/A	2011	8 December	Paris	*Discours devant le Sénat contre le droit de vote des étrangers*	Unable to find video or transcript.
5	2011	11 December	Metz	*Discours de clôture*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EmqN5LMUCXE
6	2012	6 January	Saint-Denis	*Galette des rois*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNu1GKbF6DU
7	2012	15 January	Rouen	*Discours de Rouen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UhrNEjWMb4
8	2012	22 January	Bordeaux	*Discours de Palais des congrès de Bordeaux*	http://www.frontnational.com/videos/grand-meeting-de-marine-le-pen-a-bordeaux-le-22-janvier/

9	2012	30 January	Perpignan	*Grand Meeting Présidentiel à Perpignan*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1Dwe-pCXxs
10	2012	5 February	Toulouse	*Meeting à Toulouse*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Co2wg9PgWtU
N/A	2012	12 February	Paris	*Discours de Paris*	Unable to find video or transcript.
11	2012	12 February	Strasbourg	*Grand meeting de Marine Le Pen à Strasbourg*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FaJmzq_OA5g
12	2012	19 February	Lille	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Lille*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uZLJDNXh1sg
13	2012	26 February	Val-de-Loire	*Discours de Châteauroux*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s2tFg-I3r9M
14	2012	4 March	Marseille	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Marseille*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4PqW4ykP2Bk
15	2012	13 March	Henin-Beaumont	*Déclaration de candidature*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TGA6cyx-dY
16	2012	16 March	Palavas-Les-Flots	*Discours de Marine Le Pen à Palavas-Les-Flots*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hxkZ86NgL0
17	2012	17 March	Ajaccio	*Discours de Marine Le Pen en Corse à Ajaccio*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwjsJSO2UyY
18	2012	25 March	Nantes	*Déplacement à Nantes*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/123000721.html
19	2012	29 March	Montpellier	*Congrès de la FNSEA à Montpellier*	http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/123000722.html
20	2012	20 March	Nice	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Nice*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=loatjnSZtCk
21	2012	7 April	Lyon	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Lyon*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wyHKdGjq8YE
N/A	2012	11 April	Brachay	*Discours de Marine Le Pen à Brachay :*	Unable to find video or transcript.

				« Les campagnes d'abord ! »	
22	2012	17 April	Paris	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen au Zénith Paris*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPjB4vcsq3Y
23	2012	20 April	Merdrignac	*Discours de Merdrignac (Bretagne)*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q7zNPC9K3VM

Table 8: List of MLP Campaign Speeches 2016-2017

Number	Year	Day	Location	Speech Name	Transcription/Video Source
1	2016	2 May	Paris	*Discours de Marine Le Pen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O617QgkAVi4
2	2016	21 June	Vienne	*Printemps patriotique à Vienne: discours de Marine Le Pen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tuxZpPwpc3Q
N/A	~~2016~~	~~10 September~~	~~Reims~~	*~~Discours de Marine Le Pen aux Assises du Produire en France~~*	Unable to find video or transcript.
Coding Scheme	2016	18 September	Fréjus	*Discours de Marine Le Pen aux Estivales de Fréjus*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgAng1wIBtU
5	2016	23 September	Paris	*Discours de Marine Le Pen à la convention présidentielle sur l'Ecole*	http://www.voxfnredekker.com/archives/2016/09/22/34354981.html
6	2016	11 October	Cournon-d'Auvergne	*Convention sur la protection animale : discours de Marine Pen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=843&v=_Y3ctmSdWwk
Video Message - Excluded	2016	20 October	N/A	*Je soutiens la police!*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J0Pj1nYpaE0
7	2016	21 October	Paris	*Lancement du Collectif Seniors : discours de Marine Le Pen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS2sWEhNdrE
8	2016	9 November	Paris	*Discours de Marine Le Pen : « La*	http://www.frontnational.com/videos/discours-de-marine-le-pen-la-

				France, Civilisation mondiale au XXIème siècle »	france-civilisation-mondiale-au-xxieme-siecle/
Press Conference - Excluded	2016	9 November	N/A	*Réaction de Marine Le Pen aux résultats des élections américaines*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdhZ4TmV5Pc
10	2016	5 December	Paris	*Écologie et énergie de demain : discours de Marine Le Pen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enMJbVPmK-A
11	2016	9 December	Paris	*« Santé : protégeons les Français ! » : discours de Marine Le Pen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BkGJJJq2pis
Press Conference - Excluded	2017	4 January	N/A	*Marine Le Pen présente ses voeux à la presse*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHebt7wb5u4
12	2017	6 January	Paris	*« France, pays d'entrepreneurs, pays d'innovation » : discours de Marine Le Pen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ry9ao3wAbMI
European Parliament - Excluded	2017	23 January	Coblence	*Discours de Marine Le Pen au Congrès ENL de Coblence*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VUpx0MtHYT4
14	2017	5 February	Lyon	*Assises présidentielles de Lyon : Discours de Marine Le Pen*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHPOW91K-fM
15	2017	20 February	Clairvaux-les-lacs	*Réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à Clairvaux-les-Lacs*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2439&v=U5eDMKrUWT8
16	2017	24 February	Paris	*Conférence présidentielle n°2 : « La politique internationale de la France »*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2qm0nybjIY
17	2017	25 February	Pierrelatte	*Réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à Pierrelatte*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2742&v=sfnFMbwbGeE
18	2017	27 February	Nantes	*Discours de Marine Le Pen à Nantes*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CdtFEu5NB6U

19	2017	3 March	Paris	*Conférence présidentielle : « Le rôle de l'Etat dans l'économie »*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BoFYTCQz214
20	2017	11 March	Châteauroux	*Discours de Marine Le Pen à Châteauroux*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXIM5njpOSs
21	2017	11 March	Mirande	*Réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à Mirande*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2389&v=CQi8VwwXQ0w
22	2017	16 March	Saint-Raphael	*Réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à Saint-Raphaël*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=046tWgJBZGc
Outside France - Excluded	2017	23 March	N'Djamena (Chad)	*Discours de Marine Le Pen à N'Djaména*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVCWFA92OwE
23	2017	27 March	Lille	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Lille*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ffg7--qnEyE
24	2017	27 March	Sables d'Olonne	*Discours de Marine Le Pen aux Sables d'Olonne*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wV65ZP66gbE
Q & A Panel - Excluded	2017	28 March	N/A	*Marine Le Pen invitée de la matinale « Présidentielle 2017 » organisée par le MEDEF*	http://www.frontnational.com/videos/marine-le-pen-invitee-de-la-matinale-presidentielle-2017-organisee-par-le-medef/
25	2017	31 March	Trinite-Porhoet	*Réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à La Trinité-Porhoët*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yclqBOG_u2A
26	2017	2 April	Bordeaux	*Discours de Marine Le Pen au meeting à Bordeaux*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFsPBrprB1E
27	2017	4 April	Bazoche-Gouet	*Réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à La Bazoche-Gouet*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOARVmbZhuw
28	2017	6 April	Monswiller	*Réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à Monswiller en Alsace*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3313&v=nEFh_tM58YA
29	2017	9 April	Ajaccio	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Ajaccio*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Vv1_Kth9-s

30	2017	11 April	Paris	*Conférence présidentielle n°5 : « La France face au défi terroriste »*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uoFfFCsZ4WE
31	2017	11 April	Arcis-sur-Aube	*Réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à Arcis-sur-Aube*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCUU_E4vk6I
32	2017	15 April	Perpignan	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Perpignan*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4674&v=kJLo8-zGMIk
33	2017	17 April	Paris	*Grand meeting de Marine Le Pen au Zénith de Paris*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cwimaYTt68
34	2017	19 April	Marseille	*Discours de Marine Le Pen à Marseille*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcWk4S-82rI
35	2017	23 April	Henin-Beaumont	*Allocution de Marine Le Pen au soir du premier tour de l'élection présidentielle*	http://www.frontnational.com/videos/allocution-de-marine-le-pen-au-soir-du-premier-tour-de-lelection-presidentielle/
36	2017	28 April	Nice	*Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Nice*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MA6V2_t6wbY
37	2017	1 May	Villepinte	*Grande réunion publique de Marine Le Pen à Villepinte*	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHlrg4sX0xo

Table 9: Populist Rhetoric Dictionary

Anti-elite Disdain for the power held by the political class and administrative bureaucracy.	**Anti-pluralist** Belief that "the people" are homogeneous and that their culture needs to be protected.	**Appeal to people** Idea that ordinary citizens house inherent "common sense" which lends them authority.
1) *Administrat** • Administation 2) *Adversaire politique* • Political adversary 3) *Américain* • American 4) *Argent privé* • Private money 5) *Autorités supranationales* • Supranational authorities	1) *Assimil** • Assimilation 2) *Citoyenneté française* • French citizenship 3) *Civilisation française* • French civilization 4) *Cohésion sociale* • Social cohesion 5) *Collectivité* • Collectivity 6) *Communauté nationale* • National community	1) *Âme des peuples* • Soul of the people 2) *Colère du peuple* • Anger of the people 3) *Le peuple français* • The French people 4) *Légitime colère* • Justified anger 5) *Peuple de France* • People of France 6) Populis* • Populism

6) *Banq-; banc-*
   - Bank
7) *Banque Centrale Européenne*
   - Central European Bank
8) *Banque Mondiale*
   - World Bank
9) *Banques d'affaires*
   - Business banks
10) *Baron*
    - Baron
11) *Bobo*
    - Upper middle class
12) *Bourgeois*
    - Upper middle class
13) *Bruxelles*
    - Brussels
14) *Bureaucra**
    - Bureaucrat
15) *Centralise**
    - To centralize
16) *Classe politique*
    - Political class
17) *Classe populaire*
    - The underclass
18) *Clientélisme*
    - Cronyism
19) *Commission européenne*
    - European Commission
20) *Conseil européen*
    - European Council
21) *Convention européenne*
    - European Convention
22) *Corruption*
    - Corruption
23) *Décentralis**
    - To decentralize
24) *Détrui**
    - To destroy
25) *Élites*
    - Elite
26) *Ennemi*
    - Ennemy
27) *Étatisme*
    - Statism
28) *Euro-atlantique*
    - Euro-Atlantic
29) *Financ**
    - Finance
30) *FMI*
    - International Monetary Fund
31) *Groupes de pressions*

7) *Communautarisme*
   - Communitarianism
8) *Cultur**
   - Culture
9) *Défend**
   - To defend
10) *Démocrat**
    - Democracy
11) *Désintégration sociale*
    - Social disintegration
12) *Diversité*
    - Diversity
13) *Double nationalité*
    - Dual nationality
14) *Droit de la nationalité*
    - Nationality law
15) *Égalité*
    - Equality
16) *Équilibre démographique*
    - Demographic balance
17) *État de droit*
    - Rule of law; State of order
18) *Etre français*
    - To be French
19) *Familles françaises*
    - French families
20) *Femme**
    - Women
21) *Féodalités locales*
    - Local feudalities
22) *Fracture sociale*
    - Social fracture
23) *Française d'origine étrangère*
    - French of foreign origin
24) *France rurale*
    - Rural France
25) *Fraternité*
    - Brotherhood
26) *Ghett**
    - Ghetto
27) *Heritage*
    - Heritage
28) *Identité*
    - Identity
29) *Individualisme*
    - Individualism
30) *Injustice sociale*
    - Social injustice
31) *Intégration*

7) *Pouvoir aux citoyen*
   - Power of the citizen
8) *Référend**
   - Referendum
9) *Responsabilité*
   - Responsibility
10) *Sens moral*
    - Moral sense

- Pressure groups
32) *Hollande* (François)
33) *Libéral-social*
  - Liberal-social
34) *Libero-gaulliste*
  - Liberal-Gaullist
35) *Lobbies*
  - Lobbyists
36) *Média*
  - Media
37) *Multination**
  - Multination
38) *Monopol**
  - Monopoloy
39) *Oligarchie politico-économique*
  - Political-economic oligarchy
40) *OMC*
  - World Trade Organization
41) *ONU*
  - United Nations
42) *OTAN*
  - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
43) *PAC*
  - Civil solidarity pact
44) *Parlement européen*
  - European Parliament
45) Propagande
  - Propaganda
46) *PS*
  - Socialist Party
47) *Puissances d'argent*
  - Money powers
48) *Renégoci**
  - To renegotiate
49) *RGPP*
  - French General Review of Public Policies
50) *Royaume-Uni*
  - United Kingdom
51) *Sarkozy* (Nicolas)
52) *Schengen*
  - Schengen Treaty
53) *Socialis**
  - Socialist
54) *Syndica**
  - Union
55) *Technocrat**
  - Technocrat
56) *Théoriciens*

- Integration
32) *Jeanne d'Arc*
  - Joan of Arc
33) *Justice*
  - Justice
34) *Laïcité*
  - Secularism
35) *La Nation*
  - The Nation
36) *Langue française*
  - French language
37) *Loi française*
  - French law
38) *Multicult**
  - Multicultural
39) *Natalité française*
  - French birthrate
40) *National**
  - National
41) *Nationalité*
  - Nationality
42) *Naturalis**
  - To naturalize
43) *Née*
  - Born
44) *Nos campagnes*
  - Our land
45) *Normes*
  - Norms
46) *Notre langue*
  - Our language
47) *Pacte Républicain*
  - Republican Pact
48) *Patriot**
  - Patriot
49) *Patrimoine naturel*
  - Natural heritage
50) *Perte*
  - Loss
51) *Pléthor**
  - Plethoric
52) *Propre pays*
  - Our country
53) *Protection social*
  - Social protection
54) *Proteg**
  - To protect
55) *Républicaine**
  - Republican
56) *République française*
  - French Republic
57) *Séparation des églises et de l'État*

• Theorists	• Separation of Church and State	
57) Théorie du complot	*58) Société française*	
• Conspiracy theory	• French society	
58) Traités européens	*59) Solidarité nationale*	
• European treaties	• National solidarity	
59) *Ultra-libér**	*60) Souverain**	
• Ultra-liberal	• Sovereign	
60) UE/Unions Européens	*61) Structures morales*	
• European Union	• Moral structures	
61) *UMP*	*62) Terre de France*	
• Union for a Popular Movement	• Land of France	
	63) Territoire	
	• Territory	
	64) Valeurs	
	• Values	
	65) Zones de non-droit	
	• Areas of lawlessness	

Table 10: Xenophobic Rhetoric Dictionary

Note: All exclusionary populist rhetoric is a sub-category of anti-pluralist rhetoric. All xenophobic rhetoric is a sub-category of exclusionary populist rhetoric.

Exclusionary Populism	**Overt Xenophobia**
Aims to restrict certain groups from 1) receiving state benefits, 2) engaging in the democratic process, and 3) being considered part of "the people".	Negative reference to other ethnic identities, at times inciting fear, hatred, and hostility, with a belief that people have an inherent right to live separately from these other ethnicities.
1) *Apaisé* • Appeased 2) *Barrière* • Barrier 3) *Carte de séjour* • Residence card 4) *Clandestin* • Clandestin 5) *Combatt** • To fight 6) *Contrôl** • To control 7) *Criminel* • Criminal 8) *Délinquant* • Offender 9) *Discrimination positive* • Affirmative action 10) *Étrang** • Foreign 11) *Explus** • To expel	1) *Africain** • African 2) *Agression* • Aggression 3) *Antillais* • Person from the West Indies 4) *Arabe** • Arab 5) *Asiatique* • Asian 6) *Attentat** • Bombing 7) *Attaques organisées* • Organized attacks 8) *Barbar** • Barbarian 9) *Beur** • Child of a North African immigrant 10) *Danger* • Danger 11) *Differentialisme* • Differentialism

12) *Flots d'immigrant*
- Immigrant waves

13) *Flux migratoires*
- Migratory wave

14) *Frontière*
- Border

15) *Illégal*
- Illegal

16) *Immigré**
- Immigrant

17) *Immigration*
- Immigration

18) *Incontrôlé*
- Uncontrolled

19) *Indignité*
- Indignity

20) *Interdi**
- To prohibit

21) *Lutt**
- To Fight

22) *Massive*
- Mssive

23) *Migrant**
- Migrant

24) *Multi recidivist**
- Multi-recividist

25) *Pacifier*
- To pacify

26) *Population étrangère*
- Foreign Population

27) *Préférence*
- Preference

28) *Priorité*
- Priority

29) *Récidivist**
- Recidivist

30) *Regroupement familial*
- Family reunification

31) *Ressortissants étrangers*
- Foreign nationals

32) *Sécurité*
- Security

33) *Séjour illégal*
- Illegal stay

34) *Séquestriations*
- Sequestration

35) *Tolérance zero*
- Zero tolerance

12) *Droit à la difference*
- Right to difference

13) *Extremist**
- Extremist

14) *Fondamental**
- Fundamentalist

15) *Gitan**
- Gypsy

16) *Homosexuel**
- Homosexual

17) *Indo-pakistanais**
- Person from south Asia

18) *Insécurité*
- Insecurity

19) *Invasion*
- Invasion

20) *Islam**
- Islam

21) *Juif**
- Jew

22) *Maghreb*
- North Africa

23) *Mosqué**
- Mosque

24) *Musulman**
- Muslim

25) *Pied Noir**
- Person of French origin born in Algeria

26) *Pillage*
- Looting

27) *Saccage*
- Pillage

28) *Salafist**
- Salafist

29) *Soumission*
- Submission

30) *Terror**
- Terror

31) *Violence*
- Violence

32) *Viols**
- Rape

33) *Ultraviolent**
- Ultraviolent

Table 11: Economic Rhetoric Dictionary

General Economy Statements about the wealth and resources of a country, in particular production, consumption, and services.	**Right-wing Populist** Advocates anti-globalization, protection of national businesses and native employment, and regulation of the elite.

1. *Agence de notation*
   • Rating Agency
2. *Aide au logement*
   • Housing assistance
3. *Aide sociale*
   • Social assistance
4. *Argent public*
   • Public money
5. *Assurance maladie*
   • Health insurance
6. *Augmentation de salaire*
   • Salary increase
7. *Austérité*
   • Austerity
8. *Balance commerciale*
   • Trade balance
9. *Budget*
   • Budget
10. *CETA*
   • Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
11. *Chiffr**
   • Numbers
12. *Chôm**
   • Unemployment
13. *CMU (couverture maladie universelle)*
   • Universal health coverage
14. *Commerce*
   • Trade
15. *Concurrence*
   • Competition
16. *Consommation*
   • Consumption
17. *Contribution sociale*
   • Social contribution
18. *Cotisations*
   • Contribution
19. *Coûts de gestion*
   • Administrative costs
20. *Coût de logement*
   • Housing costs
21. *Crise financière*
   • Financial crisis
22. *Croissance*
	1. *Agric**
	   • Agriculture
	2. *AME (Aide médicale d'État)*
	   • State medical aid
	3. *Artisans*
	   • Artisans
	4. *Banq-; banc-*
	   • Bank
	5. *Barrières douanières*
	   • Custom barriers
	6. *CECA*
	   • European Coal and Steel Community
	7. *Chômage de masse*
	   • Mass unemployment
	8. *Contrat de stabilization*
	   • Stabilization contract
	9. *Délocalisation*
	   • Relocation
	10. *Dumping social*
	   • Social dumping
	11. *Élite**
	   • Elite
	12. *Évasion fiscale*
	   • Fiscal evasion
	13. *Financ**
	   • Finance
	14. *Global**
	   • Global
	15. *Grand* distribut**
	   • Mass distribution
	16. *Liberalis**
	   • To liberalize
	17. *Main d'oeuvre*
	   • Manual labor
	18. *MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France)*
	   • Movement of the Enterprises of France
	19. *Métier manuel*
	   • Manual occupation
	20. *Mondialisme*
	   • Globalism
	21. *Mondiale sauvage*
	   • Uncontrolled globalism
	22. *Mondialisation*

- Growth
23. *CSG (contribution sociale généralisée)*
    - General social contribution
24. *Dépenses*
    - Expenses
25. *Dette*
    - Debt
26. *Développ**
    - To develop
27. *Disparité*
    - Disparity
28. *Droit de douane*
    - Customs duty
29. *Économ**
    - Economy
30. *Emploi*
    - Work
31. *Endettement*
    - Debt
32. *Entrepr**
    - Business; entrepreneur
33. *Euro*
    - Euro
34. *Export**
    - Export
35. *Fisc**
    - Fiscal
36. *Gaspill**
    - To waste
37. *Grande distribution*
38. *Impôt*
    - Tax
39. *Industrie*
    - Industry
40. *Investissement*
    - Investment
41. *Laboureur*
    - Worker
42. *Marché*
    - Market
43. *Modernis**
    - To modernize
44. *Monnaie*
    - Currency
45. *Ouvrier*
    - Worker
46. *Patronat*
    - Employer
47. *Pauvreté*
    - Poverty
48. *PIB*
    - *GDP*
49. *Pouvoir d'achat*

- Globalization
23. *Moyennes entrepr**
    - Medium-sized business
24. *OMC (Organisation Mondiale du Commerce)*
    - World Trade Organiation
25. *PAC (Politique Agricole Commune)*
    - Common Agricultural Policy
26. *Patriotisme économique*
    - Economic patriotism
27. *Petites entrepr**
    - Small business
28. *Plan de renflouement*
    - Bailout plan
29. *PME (Petites et Moyennes Entreprises)*
    - Small and Medium Businesses
30. *PMI*
    - European Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index
31. *Quota d'importation*
    - Import quota
32. *Ravage*
    - Ravage
33. *Reconqu**
    - To reclaim
34. *Réindustrialisation*
    - Reindustrialization
35. *Rétabl**
    - To reestablish
36. *Souveraineté monétaire*
    - Monetary sovereignty
37. *Libre-échange**
    - Free trade
38. *Travail manuel*
    - Manual work
39. *Travail précaire*
    - Precarious work
40. *Zone euro*
    - Euro zone
41. *Zone rurale*
    - Rural areas

- Purchasing power

*50. Privatis**
- To privatize

51. Prospérité
- Prosperity

52. Protection sociale
- Social protection

*53. Réform**
- To reform

54. Règle
- Rule

55. Régulation
- Regulation

56. Retraite
- Retirement

57. RMI (revenu minimum d'insertion)
- Social welfare income

58. RSI (régime social des indépendants)
- Self-employed social security

59. Salaire
- Salary

60. Sécurité sociale
- Security social

61. Services publics
- Public services

62. Sous-payés
- Under-payed

63. Stagnation
- Stagnation

64. Système de protection
- System of protection

65. TAFTA
- Free trade agreement between EU and US

66. Tarif
- Tarif

67. Taux d'intérêt
- Interest rates

*68. Travail**
- Work

Table 12: List of Top Frequently Used Words by JMLP from 2001-2002 Campaign Speeches

Populist Rhetoric			Exclusionary Populist & Xenophobic Rhetoric		Economic Rhetoric	
Anti-Elite	Anti-Pluralist	Appeal to People	Exclusionary Populist	Xenophobic	General Economy	RWP Economic
1) Financ*	1) National*	1) Responsabilité	1) Étrang*	1) Terror*	1) Econom*	1) Agric*
2) Socialis*	2) Nationalité	2) Référend*	2) Sécurité	2) Fondamental*	2) Chôm*	2) Rétabl*
3) Bruxelles	3) Souverain*		3) Immigré*	3) Danger	3) Développ*	3) Mondialilsation
4) Américain	4) Valeur*		4) Interdi*	4) Islam*	4) Retraite	4) Global

Anti-Elite	Anti-Pluralist		Exclusionary Populist	Xenophobic	General Economy	RWP Economic
5) Banq*; banc*	5) Cultur*		5) Préférence	5) Musulman*	5) Entrepr*	5) Libéralis*
6) Corruption	6) Défend*		6) Lutt*	6) Insécurité	6) Fisc*	6) Reconqu*
7) Syndicat*	7) Démocrat*		7) Pacifi*	7) Attaque*	7) Croissance	
8) Bureaucra*	8) Femme*		8) Combatt*	8) Attentat*	8) Réform*	
9) Client*	9) Justice		9) Immigration	9) Violence	9) Concurrence	
10) Multination*	10) Patriot*		10) Priorité	10) Africain*	10) Chiffre*	

Table 13: List of Top Frequently Used Words by JMLP from 2006-2007 Campaign Speeches

Populist Rhetoric			Exclusionary Populist & Xenophobic Rhetoric		Economic Rhetoric	
Anti-Elite	Anti-Pluralist	Appeal to People	Exclusionary Populist	Xenophobic	General Economy	RWP Economic
1) Financ*	1) National*	1) Responsabilité	1) Étrang*	1) Fondamental*	1) Econom*	1) Agric*
2) Sarkozy	2) Valeur*	2) Référend*	2) Sécurité	2) Insécurité	2) Entrepr*	2) Mondialilsation
3) Bruxelles	3) Justice	3) Populis*	3) Immigré*	3) Musulman*	3) Chôm*	3) Rétabl*
4) Syndica*	4) Souverain*		4) Lutt*	4) Terror*	4) Retraite	4) Global*
5) Socialis*	5) Défend*		5) Préférence	5) Violence	5) Développ*	5) Artisans
6) Administrat*	6) Femme*		6) Combatt*	6) Danger	6) Fisc*	6) Libéralis*
7) Banc*/banq*	7) Patriot*		7) Interdi*	7) Arabe*	7) Réform*	7) Délocalisation
8) Monopol*	8) Nationalité		8) Immigration	8) Agression*	8) Chiffr*	8) Reconqu*
9) Multination*	9) Protection		9) Criminel	9) Juif*	9) Dette	
10) Américain	10) Cultur*		10) Pacifi*	10) Beur*	10) Dépenses	
11) Ultra-libér*	11) Démocrat*					

Table 14: List of Top Frequently Used Words by MLP from 2011-2012 Campaign Speeches

Populist Rhetoric			Exclusionary Populist & Xenophobic Rhetoric		Economic Rhetoric	
Anti-Elite	Anti-Pluralist	Appeal to People	Exclusionary Populist	Xenophobic	General Economy	RWP Economic
1) Sarkozy	1) National	1) Responsabilité	1) Etrang*	1) Insécurité	1) Econom*	1) Agricol*
2) Financ*	2) Défend*	2) Référend*	2) Immigration	2) Islam*	2) Entrepris*	2) Mondialisation
3) Banc*/banq*	3) Valeur*	3) Populis*	3) Sécurité	3) Violence	3) Chôm*	3) Rétabl*
4) Hollande	4) Patriot*		4) Lutt*	4) Fondamental*	4) Euro	4) Artisans
5) Syndicat*	5) Souverain*		5) Interd*	5) Musulman*	5) Concurrence	5) Liberalis*
6) Elite	6) Cultur*		6) Combatt*	6) Agression*	6) Dette	6) OMC
7) Socialis*	7) Justice		7) Priorité	7) Terror*	7) Monnaie	7) Reindustrialisation
8) PS	8) Identité		8) Immigré	8) Attaque	8) Fiscal*	8) Délocalisation
9) Bruxelles	9) Démocrat*		9) Criminal	9) Récidivist*	9) Règle	9) Global
10) UMP	10) Protection		10) Délinquant	10) Mosquée*	10) Développ*	10) Reconqu*
11) Administrat*						

Table 15: List of Top Frequently Used Words by MLP from 2016-2017 Campaign Speeches

Populist Rhetoric			Exclusionary Populist & Xenophobic Rhetoric		Economic Rhetoric	
Anti-Elite	Anti-Pluralist	Appeal to People	Exclusionary Populist	Xenophobic	General Economy	RWP Economic
1) Financ*	1) National*	1) Responsabilité	1) Sécurité	1) Islam*	1) Econom*	1) Agric*

2) Banc*/banq*	2) Patriot*	2) Référend*	2) Immigration	2) Terror*	2) Entrepr*	2) Mondialisation
3) Administrat*	3) Cultur*		3) Etrang*	3) Fondamental*	3) Chôm*	3) Retabl*
4) Hollande	4) Démocrat*		4) Lutt*	4) Insécurité	4) Developp*	4) Global*
5) Bruxelles	5) Défend*		5) Interd*	5) Attaque*	5) Emploi	5) Reconqu*
6) Multination*	6) Souverain*		6) Migrant*	6) Musulman*	6) Fiscal*	6) Artisans
7) Client*	7) Protection		7) Priorité	7) Attentat*	7) Euro	7) Liberalis*
8) Sarkozy	8) Identité		8) Apaisée	8) Mosqué*	8) Concurrence	8) Réindustrialisation
9) Ps	9) Communaut arisme		9) Combatt*	9) Violence	9) Impôt	9) Délocalisation
10) Socialis*	10) Justice		10) Frontière		10) Dette	

Table 16: Analysis Raw Numbers

Campaign	JMLP 2001-2002		JMLP 2006-2007		MLP 2011-2012		MLP 2016-2017	
Number & Percentage	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Populist Rhetoric	704	42.37%	1443	44.95%	1714	52.41%	1991	40.36%
Xenophobic Rhetoric	441	26.54%	591	18.41%	582	17.79%	1293	26.21%
Economic Rhetoric	516	31.05%	1176	36.63%	974	29.78%	1648	33.41%

Campaign	JMLP 2001-2002		JMLP 2006-2007		MLP 2011-2012		MLP 2016-2017	
Number & Percentage	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Anti-Elite	197	11.86%	555	17.28%	813	24.86%	557	11.29%
Anti-Pluralist	481	28.95%	823	25.63%	862	26.36%	1352	27.41%
Appeal to People	26	1.56%	65	2.02%	39	1.19%	82	1.66%
Exclusionary Populism	261	15.71%	444	13.81%	348	10.64%	699	14.17%
Overt Xenophobia	180	10.83%	147	4.57%	234	7.15%	594	12.04%
General Economy	426	25.64%	931	29.00%	760	23.24%	1378	27.93%
Far Right-Wing Populist	90	5.41%	245	7.63%	214	6.54%	270	5.47%