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THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY ON PUBLIC PERCEPTION IN ASIA

by

Joseph R. Johnson

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree

of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

Political Science

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2018

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ABSTRACT

The Effects of Cultural Diplomacy on Public Perception in Asia

by

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Utah State University, 2018

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How does exposure to foreign cultures affect public opinion? Many states rely on cultural diplomacy programs to improve their national image abroad. Some scholars, however, argue that cultural exports can lead to nationalist backlashes of negative opinion that outweigh their positive effects. In this paper, I use survey data from Asia to compare the effects of cultural product exports and cultural centers on international opinion. I find that cultural product exports from Japan, South Korea, and China have a negative effect on international opinion in all three cases. I then use the same survey data to compare this with the effects of Confucius Institutes (Chinese cultural centers that offer language training) and find that they are associated with an increase in positive views of China. These findings demonstrate that different cultural diplomacy strategies can have different effects on foreign public opinion, something that future research on cultural diplomacy should take into account.

(61 pages)

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

The Effects of Cultural Diplomacy on Public Perception in Asia

Joseph R. Johnson

Many states use their cultures to promote a positive image of themselves abroad. Some scholars argue that this can provide states with international benefits. However, other scholars point to cases where a foreign state's cultural influence has led to nationalist backlashes and negative public reactions. In this paper, I examine how two common types of cultural diplomacy programs can influence how states are perceived abroad.

I first look at the promotion of pop culture products, such as books, movies, and music. Using survey data from 12 Asian countries, I find that an increase in cultural product imports from Japan, South Korea, and China has a negative effect on how respondents view the cultural exporter. I then look at cultural centers, using China's Confucius Institute program. I find that the presence of Confucius Institutes is associated with an increase in positive opinions of China. These results provide some empirical evidence that cultural products can be detrimental to a state's international image. As a result, states interested in the international benefits of cultural diplomacy should be wary of promoting cultural products abroad. Additionally, while previous studies do not distinguish between the effects that different types of cultural diplomacy programs can have, these findings demonstrate that different cultural diplomacy strategies can have widely different effects on foreign public opinion.

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Chapter I

Research Question

How does exposure to foreign cultures affect how individuals perceive the cultural producer? This question is important because cultural diplomacy—the use of a state's national culture in order to advance its foreign policy goals or foster mutual understanding—has become a key part of many foreign policy strategies in recent years. Cultural diplomacy strategies include promoting distinctive cultural products (like music, books, and television programs), establishing cultural centers in foreign states, organizing or providing funding for festivals and cultural celebrations abroad, and sponsoring artist exhibitions or performances (Mark, 2009; Melissen, 2005; Gilboa, 2008). During the 1950s and 60s, for example, the State Department and the CIA sent contemporary art from American artists like Jackson Pollack, alongside jazz musicians like Duke Ellington and Loius Armstrong, around the world as cultural ambassadors. Prevots (2001) writes that "modern art reinforced an image of the United States as the new leader of the avant-garde, and was said to embody the American spirit of enterprise and individual freedom" (p. 3). The United States also developed cultural centers during the Cold War in countries like Austria and Pakistan, and "the value these American Centers [had] on instilling positive perceptions of the United States abroad cannot be exaggerated" (Finn, 2003, p. 17). Programs like these are seen today as examples of successful cultural diplomacy strategies that can advance a state's foreign policy objectives.

States engage in cultural diplomacy with the expectation that it will benefit their national image, which is seen as increasingly important by policy-makers. One of the main purposes of cultural diplomacy is to improve a state's national image abroad. Gilboa (2008) writes that "favorable image and reputation around the world, achieved through attraction and

persuasion, have become more important than territory, access, and raw materials, traditionally acquired through military and economic measures" (p. 56). Many policy-makers and academics argue that a positive national image can help states advance their foreign policy agendas and encourage foreign investment. A good national image can be used to help build coalitions and alliances (Nye, 2004), influence perceptions and decisions in interstate negotiations (Jeffe and Nebenzahl, 2001), and attract foreign investment and inbound tourism (Kotler and Gertner, 2002; Tapachai and Waryszak, 2000). As a 2005 US State Department report reads,

> "Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is in cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented. And cultural diplomacy can enhance our national security in subtle, wide-ranging, and sustainable ways. Indeed history may record that America's cultural riches played no less a role than military action in shaping our international leadership, including the war on terror" (p. 1).

This passage underscores the growing importance policy-makers have come to place on the role of culture in building relationships around the globe.

There is, however, a disagreement in the literature about the efficacy of cultural diplomacy strategies. While some scholars argue that improving a state's national reputation and image can provide the state with tangible benefits, other scholars argue that cultural diplomacy does not actually have a positive effect on national image and can therefore be counterproductive. This is because a major increase in the cultural presence of a foreign state can lead to nationalist backlashes against the perceived cultural intrusion (Chua, 2012; Hall and Smith, 2013).

Critics of cultural diplomacy point to several examples of these backlashes occurring in Asia in recent years. For instance, in 2005—following a region-wide surge in popularity of

Korean cultural products like pop music and television dramas—Taiwanese rock star Wu Bai held a concert that featured songs "laced with obscenities against Korean culture" (Chua, 2012, p. 147). The same year saw the emergence of Manga Kankanryu, Japanese comics that decried South Korea as a "thoroughly depraved nation" and an enemy of Japan (Liscutin, 2009, p.172). In 2004, Chinese students protested a sold-out concert being held by popular Taiwanese singer Chang Huimei—who had become politicized in mainland China after her performance at the 2000 inaugural ceremony of the Taiwanese president—leading local police to shut down the concert (Chua, 2012). Examples like these demonstrate that while greater exposure to foreign cultures might generate positive reactions within one facet of the population, it might simultaneously prompt a negative reaction within a different, larger segment.

Despite the disagreement over the merits of cultural diplomacy strategies, there remains a lack of cross-national empirical evidence testing their effectiveness. Chua (2012) writes that the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy "can only be verified and substantiated by empirical evidence of audience behavior subsequent to reception; there should be evidence of changes in attitude in the audience towards the exporting nation" (p. 136). This research aims to contribute to this evidence by looking at how individual perceptions are influenced by changes in the foreign cultural programs they are exposed to.

Literature Review and Theory

The literature pertaining to cultural diplomacy is divided on whether or not cultural diplomacy is effective. States engage in cultural diplomacy with the expectation that outsiders will associate their cultural products and ideas with their national cultural identity and that this will improve how they are perceived abroad. Having a positive national image will in turn help states advance their political agendas and make themselves more attractive to foreign investment. While the link between national image and political/economic benefits is fairly well established in the literature, the link between cultural diplomacy and a more positive national image is much more tenuous. This has led to conflicting empirical predictions regarding the effects of cultural diplomacy.

Many scholars agree that improving a state's national image can provide that state with tangible benefits. Thanks to advances in communication technology—which have resulted in the spread of global communication networks and increasingly activist civil societies—public opinion at home and abroad has become an important factor in international relations (Melissen, 2005). Foreign public opinion has a tangible impact on states because it can affect what policy choices are politically feasible for other governments. The perspectives of foreign publics form a climate of opinion that can broaden or limit the selection of policy choices that foreign policy-makers can realistically pursue (Wang, 2006). If a foreign public has a largely positive view of one country's influence, their government will be more willing to cooperate with that country (Bound et al., 2007). Foreign citizens will also be more likely to invest in and travel to that country, resulting in direct economic benefits. States compete with one another to attract foreign investment and skilled migrants, and an attractive national image helps them compete successfully (Mark, 2009; Tapachai and Waryszak, 2000).

Proponents of cultural diplomacy argue that culture can benefit national image because culture can emphasize attractive national values and ideals and help combat stereotypes and ethnocentrism (Mulcahy, 1999). Additionally, Mark (2009) writes that "In presenting a national image abroad, cultural diplomacy can overcome audience suspicion of official messages and serve to provide substance to national reputation" (p. 1). There are also domestic benefits to cultural diplomacy. Culture is a key part of national identity, and a strong sense of common national identity provides governments with legitimacy and domestic political support (Huang, 2011; Barr, 2012). Strong cultural industries can also bring economic benefits through cultural exports and increased tourism. States generally engage in cultural diplomacy with both these international benefits and domestic benefits in mind.

Some scholars, however, contend that cultural diplomacy does not actually have a positive effect on national image and can therefore be counterproductive for states trying to achieve these international benefits. This is because a noticeable increase in the cultural presence of a foreign state can lead to nationalist backlashes against the foreign culture (Chua, 2012). No matter how popular or widespread a particular foreign cultural program or product might be in a country, the people who engage directly with that product are outnumbered by those who do not. When faced with a growing foreign cultural influence, this larger population "could be readily mobilized, firstly, against its importation and, secondly, to confront the audience of imported products, in the name of protecting the domestic, national culture, with the tacit or explicit support of local culture producers and the state" (Chua, 2012, p. 158). These backlashes can serve to undermine the positive effects of cultural diplomacy and potentially result in cultural diplomacy having an ultimately negative impact on national image.

The difference between the advocates and skeptics of cultural diplomacy comes down to the link between exposure to foreign cultural programs and foreign public opinion. If a cultural diplomacy strategy is correlated with an overall positive effect on how states are perceived abroad, we would expect it to result in the political and economic benefits outlined in the literature. However, based on the literature and examples of nationalist backlashes against cultural exporters, there is reason to believe that cultural diplomacy does not always achieve its international purpose of positively influencing public opinion abroad. If cultural diplomacy does not encourage more positive views of a country among foreign populations, then it will fail to bring about the international benefits states are trying to achieve. Despite the conflicting empirical predictions, previous studies do not empirically examine the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. The goal of this paper is to look at whether or not cultural diplomacy has a positive influence on a state's national image in other countries. To do this, I test whether increased exposure to foreign cultural programs has a positive effect on individual views of the cultural producer.

There is also very little discussion on how different strategies can affect the outcome of cultural diplomacy. One way this research aims to contribute to the literature is by examining the different effects of two cultural diplomacy strategies: the promotion of pop culture exports and the development of cultural centers. The nationalist backlashes referenced in the literature have occurred in response to influential pop cultures, which could mean that cultural diplomacy strategies relying on pop culture exports do not actually have a positive effect on foreign perception. Cultural centers, on the other hand, focus on language learning and traditional cultural celebrations. Traditional culture is seen as less threatening than pop culture, and previous research has found a correlation between second language learning and more

sympathetic views of a foreign culture. As a result, cultural centers might be more effective at improving international public opinion than strategies that focus on increased pop culture exports.

Overview of Cases

I focus on cultural diplomacy in Asia because the region has become a hot spot for active cultural diplomacy since the turn of the century. Governments in Asia spend more money on these strategies than in anywhere else in the world (Anholt, 2008). China alone spends nearly $9 billion a year on efforts to improve its international image, including significant investments in cultural development and its Confucius Institute program (Hall and Smith, 2013). This research focuses on the three most influential cultural producers within Asia: Japan, South Korea, and China. While all three states have invested significantly in cultural diplomacy, each of them has different motivations and has employed different approaches.

The Japanese government engages in cultural diplomacy as a way to offset its declining economic influence relative to China. Compared to China and South Korea, Japan takes a hands-off, bottom-up approach to cultural diplomacy by offering support to private organizations already promoting Japanese cultural products abroad. For example, the Japan Foundation provides institutional support for foreign *anime* production companies and limited funding for privately run *anime* fan conventions outside of Japan (Heng, 2010). They do not, however, directly support the Japanese animation industry.

The South Korean government, meanwhile, uses cultural diplomacy as a way to grow their international influence through expanding media markets. Like Japan, the South Korean approach also relies on private organizations, but it uses tax breaks and other incentives to encourage large Korean corporations to invest in cultural production. Thanks to these incentives, major corporations ranging from Samsung to Hyundai own and produce nearly all South Korean entertainment media and other cultural products.

As China is rapidly becoming a regional and global power, Chinese leaders depend on cultural diplomacy to demonstrate good intentions and support the idea of China's peaceful rise (Ding and Saunders, 2006). Chinese policy-makers employ a relatively top-down approach, using direct government investment in their cultural industry and government programs overseen by the state itself (Heng, 2010). For example, the Chinese government covers up to 40% of any production costs incurred by animation studios in order to encourage cultural production and cultural product exports.

China also has an ambitious cultural center program at the heart of its cultural diplomacy strategy. Cultural centers generally serve as language training facilities and also host traditional cultural celebrations. This sets cultural centers apart from pop culture products because these functions are not associated with the same kind of protests and nationalism abroad. As a result, cultural centers might be a way for cultural diplomacy strategies to avoid the backlashes we have seen in response to pop culture products. This gives me the opportunity to compare how different kinds of cultural diplomacy programs influence foreign public opinion.

Outline of Chapters

The main purpose of this paper is to test the effects of cultural diplomacy on foreign public opinion. In order to provide a more nuanced understanding of this process, I also differentiate between the effects of pop culture development and promotion versus cultural centers and language training. To do this, I conduct two empirical tests.

In Chapter II I focus on the pop culture aspect of cultural diplomacy, using the AsiaBarometer survey series (Inoguchi, 2003-2007). I compare the effects of cultural product imports from Japan, South Korea, and China on how these countries are viewed throughout the region. I find that an increase in cultural product imports to the respondent's country is associated with a statistically significant decrease in positive views of the cultural producer. This suggests that promoting pop culture products abroad can actually hurt a country's national image. This effect is greatest for Japanese cultural products, still fairly large for South Korean cultural products, and relatively small for Chinese cultural products. I cover some explanations for this difference in magnitude and talk about its implications for cultural diplomacy policy. For example, if governments perceive the domestic benefits of pop culture development as being greater than the negative effect these programs can have on international public opinion, they might still view the programs as worthwhile investments.

In Chapter III, I examine the effects of cultural centers using China's Confucius Institute program. Using the same methods as in Chapter II, I find that Confucius Institutes are associated with an increase in positive views of China in other Asian countries. This finding suggests that cultural centers could be a way for governments to gain both the domestic and the international benefits of cultural diplomacy. It also demonstrates that different types of cultural diplomacy programs can have different effects on international perception. Language training

and traditional cultural celebrations are viewed as less political and less threatening than pop culture products, and as a result it seems they are less likely to be met with nationalist backlashes. Nevertheless, the lack of emotional attachment people have to traditional cultures would also suggest the domestic benefits of cultural centers are significantly less than the the domestic benefits of pop culture development. If so, the domestic benefits alone would be enough incentive to keep these programs running. As a result, it seems likely that China and other states engaging in cultural diplomacy will continue to employ both types of programs.

Chapter IV covers some of the implications these results have on cultural diplomacy policy in general and areas for further research. Other countries have recently begun investing in branding campaigns and cultural diplomacy programs, including New Zealand, India, and Australia. This research can help better inform states about the costs and benefits of different cultural diplomacy programs. Cultural centers can lead to both domestic and international benefits, while pop culture development and promotion can lead to potentially greater domestic benefits while simultaneously undermining cultural diplomacy's international objectives. These findings are also interesting because they highlight the different effects of pop culture versus traditional culture on national image abroad.

Going forward, this research opens up several avenues for further research on cultural diplomacy and cultural development. Because pop culture diplomacy does not provide states with international benefits, without any domestic benefits these kinds of cultural diplomacy strategy would be counterproductive. As a result, one area in need of further research would be the different roles and significance of pop culture compared to traditional culture in the development of national identities. Similarly, another area would be the economic benefits of larger pop culture industries. Finally, further research is needed on the effects of other cultural

diplomacy programs not covered in this paper, such as educational exchanges and sporting events.

Chapter II

Pop Culture and Cultural Diplomacy in Asia

While the use of pop culture as a means of cultural diplomacy is often considered a relatively new development, it has been around for nearly as long as the concept of cultural diplomacy itself. Two of the earliest cultural diplomacy programs were those of France and the United Kingdom, both of which rely on traditional culture and the influence of their colonial pasts. The French cultural relations program goes all the way back to the late 1800s, and focused on promoting French culture in its colonies in Africa and the Middle East. British cultural diplomacy formally began in 1934 with the creation of the British Council, whose goal was to "render available abroad current British contributions to literature, science, and the fine arts" (Mulcahy, 1999, p. 9). Not long afterwards, however, the United States turned to its growing pop culture influence around the world as a sort of Cold War weapon. By the 1970s the United States had begun to send actors, artists, and jazz musicians around the world as "cultural ambassadors." The goal of this program was to use pop culture in order to emphasize the attractiveness of American values and ideals such as equality and the freedom of expression (Cull, 2009). After the Cold War ended, the United States' emphasis on cultural diplomacy began to wane. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, pop culture diplomacy made its debut in East Asia.

The first Asian state to experience a modern wave of cultural popularity outside its own borders—and subsequently one of the first to make pop culture a key part of its cultural diplomacy strategy—was Japan. Japan's humiliating defeat in World War II led to an era of nationwide soul-searching, and "the Japanese route to modernization was thus accompanied by the pursuit of identity" (Huang, 2011, p.5). This resulted in a rediscovery of Japanese traditional

culture and the development of unique popular culture during the 1960s and 70s. Shortly after, Japanese culture began to spread outside Japan's borders and become hugely popular throughout Asia during the 1980s and 90s. Especially popular were Japanese television dramas like *Oshin* (1983-84) and *Tokyo Love Story* (1992). The success of these programs demonstrated to Japanese leaders that lingering animosity over Japanese colonialism and war crimes would not prevent Japanese cultural products from being eagerly consumed by Japan's neighbors (Iwabuchi, 2015).

Nevertheless, it was not until the early 2000s that the Japanese government first made a concerted effort to capitalize on the international success of Japanese pop culture products. The Japanese government passed a series of laws between 2001 and 2004 aimed at offering support for media organizations promoting cultural products, including the Fundamental Law for the Promotion of Culture and the Arts in 2001, the Plan for Promoting Japanese Film and Image in 2002, and the Content Promotion Law in 2004 (Chua, 2012). A number of government committees were established with the goal of advancing the Japanese cultural industry, including the Head Office for Intellectual Property Strategy (2002), the Research Committee for Content Business (2005), and the Council for the Promotion of International Exchange (2006) (Iwabuchi, 2015). By 2006, the government had committed itself to “ensuring that Japanese content creators and providers—*anime*, J-Pop, film studios, game developers, toy producers, and virtually any other entertainment industry capable of catching global attention—remain competitive over the long term” (Leheny, 2006, p. 228).

Similarly to Japan's experience following World War II, South Korea went through a search for identity during the last decades of the 20th century. The Korean cultural industry was nearly destroyed by an influx of cultural products from the United States and Japan in the late

1980s and early 1990s. This stimulated the rise of nationalism and brought about a national discourse on Korean identity (Huang, 2011). The Korean government acted on this growing movement by establishing the Cultural Industry Bureau in 1994 and beginning to provide financial support for Korean cultural producers. In 1995, the government passed the Motion Picture Promotion Law, which offered incentives such as major tax breaks for *chaebols* (large family-owned businesses like Samsung, LG, and Hyundai) to invest in South Korea's film industry (Kang, 2015). The law also deregulated aspects of the film industry, making it easier to fund and export Korean media productions.

These efforts seemed to pay off, and in the early 2000s South Korea experienced its own wave of cultural penetration throughout Asia. Copying the same genre of trendy television drama that proved to be such a success for the Japanese cultural industry, South Korean television programs like *Autumn in My Heart* (2000) and *Winter Sonata* (2002) swept across East and Southeast Asia. By 2005, propelled by the success of these television dramas and a number of internationally recognized pop stars, South Korea had begun to replace Japan as the predominant cultural force in the region (Chua, 2012).

Unlike Japan, the South Korean government began to cultivate its cultural industry and incorporate Korean pop culture as a part of its cultural diplomacy strategy before Korean cultural products began to experience international success. Korean leaders quickly understood that Korea “cannot compete with other advanced industrialized countries in the area of hard power” and instead turned to cultural diplomacy “as Korea’s political and economic instruments of high significance” (Geun, 2009, p. 124). While the Korean strategy can easily be categorized as a more “top-down” approach to cultural diplomacy than Japan's—which relies on private groups and individuals to take the initiative and simply offers them support—it nevertheless

“continues to be fragmented and ambiguous” (Ang et al, 2015). In addition to relying on private actors in the cultural industry to promote content abroad, much like the Japanese strategy, the Korean cultural diplomacy strategy is relatively decentralized. Programs and activities are divided between a number of different committees and organizations, often with overlapping goals and responsibilities.

Like Japan and South Korea, China has also begun to seriously invest in cultural diplomacy since the turn of the century. While most of China's efforts at cultural diplomacy utilize China's historically influential traditional culture, they have increasingly begun to participate in the regional pop culture competition. One reason China has a great interest in pop culture is that its massive population makes it by far the biggest market for cultural products in the region. While it still lags behind its neighbors in the exportation of cultural products, scholars have documented China’s growing interest in pop culture as a tool of cultural diplomacy (Garrison, 2005; Heng, 2010; Chua, 2012). By 2008, for example, China had taken significant steps to commercialize its entertainment industry and become a competitive source of pop culture media. These steps included making it easier for individuals and foreign corporations to invest in state-owned media companies, offering tax breaks to cultural producers, and direct investment in the production and dissemination of cultural products abroad (Goh, 2005).

There is a clear trend within Japan, South Korea, and China towards the use of pop culture products as a cultural diplomacy strategy. These states clearly expect that increased exposure to their unique cultural products will increase positive views within foreign populations. However, recent examples of nationalist backlashes against the popularity of Japanese and South Korean pop cultures—such as the ones covered in Chapter 1—could mean

that increased exposure to foreign cultural products could actually increase *negative* attitudes of the cultural producer. Given these conflicting empirical predictions, what kind of effect does pop culture diplomacy actually have on international perception in Asia?

China, Japan, and South Korea all have programs in place to aid in the production of cultural products and to increase their cultural product exports. There are differences, however. The Japanese government is the most hands-off of the three in its approach to cultural diplomacy, and relies on partnerships between the government and outside actors. For example, the Japan Foundation offers funding for *anime* production companies that gain significant traction outside of Japan, but their support is retroactive and limited in nature compared to China's or South Korea's (Heng, 2010). The government of South Korea, meanwhile, has provided its film industry with some direct financial support in the form of a $125 million fund from 1999 to 2003, but this amount was small enough that it was more symbolic than financially significant (Kang, 2015). In fact, since the Motion Picture Promotion Law, Korean cinema is funded almost entirely by *chaebols*. While the tax breaks and other incentives offered by the government proactively support of the production of Korean cultural products, this support is indirect unlike the direct investments from the Chinese government. Finally, China's pop culture strategy is more top-down and centrally directed in nature. For example, the Chinese government directly pays for 30-40% of production fees incurred by its animation studios (Lent and Ying, 2013). Additionally, many of the organizations involved in Chinese cultural relations are state-owned enterprises or answer to the Chinese government.

The variance in the approaches employed by China, Japan, and South Korea allows me to test not only the efficacy of pop cultural diplomacy in general, but also to compare the relative merits of their different approach. The Chinese approach is characterized by direct and

proactive government investment in the development and international dissemination of Chinese pop culture. The South Korean approach provides proactive support to its pop culture industries, but the actual funding and investments comes from the private sector. The Japanese approach is the most indirect and relies largely on providing retroactive support for companies and non-governmental organizations who promote Japanese pop culture abroad. Do these different approaches affect the success of pop culture diplomacy? If so, how?

Data and Research Design

In order to test how cultural products can influence public opinion abroad, I run three models: one each for China, Japan, and South Korea. The dependent variable represents individual perception of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean influence. I measure each respondent's perception using the AsiaBarometer survey series, conducted across East, Southeast, and South Asia from 2003-2008. I limit the countries I look at to those with observations for multiple years, leaving 11 importing countries per case: Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam (with the cultural exporter excluded in each case).

Table 1

Frequency of Responses

	China	Japan	South Korea
Positive view	11,706 (52.09%)	13,512 (57.25%)	9,231 (42.89%)
Negative/neutral view	10.765 (47.91%)	10,089 (42.72%)	12,231 (57.11%)

Each variable represents the response to the AsiaBarometer survey question, "Does [China/Japan/South Korea] have a good or bad influence on [your country]?" This variable is equal to one if the respondent answered "good" or "mostly good," and equal to zero if the respondent answered "bad," "mostly bad," or "neither good or bad." Table 1 shows the overall distribution of responses. The independent variable in this test is exposure to cultural products from China, Japan, and South Korea. I measure this variable using the total dollar value of cultural product imports from each cultural exporter to the respondent's country. The list of

what constitutes a cultural product is taken from UNESCO's *Framework for Cultural Statistics* (2009) and data for cultural product imports is taken from the UN Comtrade database (see Appendix A).

I also control for both individual level and state level variables that might have an effect on perceptions of the cultural producer. These control variables are all listed in Table 2. At the individual level, I use questions from the AsiaBarometer survey to control for several characteristics that may differentiate some audiences. These questions include the respondent's self-professed level of patriotism and whether they self-identify as Asian. I generate a set of dummy variables to control for other avenues of exposure to foreign cultures, such as whether the respondent travels abroad frequently, whether they have friends or family who live abroad, and whether they work with foreign people and organizations. I also control for the respondent's view of the United States. Thanks to the close alliances between the United States and Japan/South Korea, along with their similar political and economic systems, it is reasonable to assume that individuals who approve of US influence will be more likely to have positive views of Japanese and Korean influence. Finally, I include control variables for demographic characteristics like gender, age, and education because they are also likely to affect individual views.

At the state level, I control for the (weighted) distance between the cultural exporter and the respondent's country. Data for distances is taken from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) data set and is based on the distance between each country's largest city and weighted by the proportion of the total national population residing in the largest city. I also include a variable indicating whether the respondent's country has been colonized by or had military conflicts with the cultural exporter. This is intended to help control

for the lingering animosity in East Asia towards Japanese occupation during World War II and for different Cold War-era disputes. The variable is equal to one if the respondent's country has had a military conflict with the cultural exporter either during World War II or anytime after, and is equal to two if the respondent's country has ever been colonized by the cultural exporter.

For empirical modeling, I use logistic regression to test the relationship between exposure to cultural products and how individuals in Asia view the cultural exporter. I use Huber-White robust standard errors by clustering responses according to country to account for heteroskedasticity. The independent variables are time-lagged in order to rule out reversed causality. I also include year fixed effects in order to address possible heterogeneity and eliminate potential omitted variable bias.

Results and Analysis

The results of the regression are presented in Table 2 as predicted probabilities. In each case, an increase in the value of cultural product imports is associated with a statistically significant decrease in positive perceptions of the cultural exporter. In other words, respondents from countries that import more cultural products are more likely to have negative views of the cultural producer. For Japan, an increase of $100,000 in cultural product imports decreases the likelihood of a “good” or “mostly good” response by 0.35%, and the same increase in South Korean cultural product imports decreases the likelihood of a positive response by 0.23%. The effect for China, while statistically significant, has a smaller substantive effect, decreasing the likelihood of a positive response by 0.04%.

While these values might appear small, the large volume of trade in cultural products means that the effect is not insignificant. For example, Vietnam imported $2.1 million in cultural products from Japan in 2002. An increase in Japanese cultural products to the level imported by Thailand that same year—$5.3 million—would decrease the likelihood of a positive response by an average of 11.5%. An increase in the same amount—$3.2 million—in South Korean cultural products would decrease the likelihood of a positive response by 7.4%. The effect for China is less pronounced; a $3.2 million increase in Chinese cultural products would decrease the likelihood of a positive response by 1.3%.

Table 2

Predicted Probabilities for Models 1-3

Variable	Model 1: China	Model 2: Japan	Model 3: South Korea
Cultural product imports	-0.0004***	-0.0035**	-0.0023**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
National pride	-0.0225	-0.006	0.0226
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Pan-Asian identity	0.0001	0.0296**	0.0347**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Foreign relative	-0.0167	0.0238**	0.0088
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Foreign travel	0.0079	0.0399***	-0.0191
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Foreign friend	0.0264*	0.0204	-0.0008
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Foreign correspondence	0.0018	0.0132	0.0015
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Foreign job	-0.0161	-0.0068	-0.0256
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
US influence	0.0869***	0.0935***	0.062***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.0010	-0.0011**	-0.0017***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.0303***	-0.0455***	-0.0373***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University+	0.0096	-0.0003	0.0166*
	(0.16)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Distance (in 1000 km)	0.0264	0.0662**	-0.0062
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Conflict and Colonization	-0.1996***	-0.0056	0.1394***
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	18479	18455	16769

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$.

The effects of the control variables are also interesting. At the individual level, the best predictor of how respondents perceive the cultural exporter is how they perceive the United

States. A more positive view of US influence was associated with an increase in how the exporter was perceived by between 6.2% and 9.35% in each case. Female was also statistically significant in each model, with women being between 3.03% and 4.55% more likely to have a negative view of the cultural exporter's influence. At the state level, conflict and colonization has a negative effect for China, no significant effect for Japan, and a positive effect for South Korea. The only countries to have had a military conflict with South Korea since World War II are Japan and China, but this is still unexpected.

It is also important to note that UNESCO's measurements of cultural products do not include digital sales, which are becoming an ever larger part of the transnational consumption of media products. Unfortunately, accurate numbers for these transactions are not readily available. Being able to account for the spread of cultural products online would provide a more accurate representation of exposure to foreign pop cultures, and it would be worthwhile to include digital media in future analyses of pop culture products. As it stands, however, these findings are likely conservative. Thanks to digital sales and online streaming sources, exposure to foreign cultural products is undoubtedly more widespread than physical media sales numbers would indicate.

I conduct several robustness checks, which are listed in Appendix C. Using a five-point dependent variable—where the responses range from “Very bad” to “Very good”—rather than a binary dependent variable still yields statistically significant results with a confidence interval of 99% in each model. These results are also in the same direction of effect. I also run each model separately for all countries, and most of the results fit with the main findings. One exception is Malaysia, which is the only country where cultural imports are associated with more positive views in all three models. The biggest exception, however, is the different effects

of Chinese cultural products. Chinese cultural imports have a statistically significant positive effect on responses in four countries (Cambodia, India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka) and a negative effect in four others (Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand).

One explanation for the difference in effect between China and Japan/South Korea is the relatively small cultural impact Chinese products have had on other Asian countries. Japanese and South Korean cultural products have become an everyday part of life for many Asians. Some cultural products from Japan and South Korea have large fan communities built around them and these are a source of identity and self-expression for many people. Japanese *manga* and *anime* have fan bases spread throughout the world, and trendy television dramas from Japan and South Korea have dedicated fans throughout East and Southeast Asia. The same is true for Japanese and South Korean pop stars and boy bands. Chinese cultural products, on the other hand, have not yet had that kind of cultural impact. While the Chinese government has begun to invest in promoting Chinese pop culture abroad, China still lacks the entrenched media infrastructure and widespread influence of the Japanese and South Korean cultural industries. As a result, it is not all that surprising that the negative backlashes against Chinese cultural products aren't of the same magnitude as the ones against cultural products from Japan and South Korea.

In support of this, the two countries with the largest positive effect for Chinese cultural product imports—Sri Lanka and Cambodia—also imported the fewest cultural products from China by a large margin (less than $10,000 in each case). This would imply that smaller foreign cultural presences are not as likely to be met with a corresponding increase in nationalism. This makes sense as people are not going to feel as if their domestic

culture is being threatened by a foreign culture they are not exposed to in their daily lives.

Overall, these results are noteworthy because they suggest that cultural product imports can generate negative sentiment against foreign cultural producers that outweighs their positive impact. If pop culture products are inherently more likely to lead to nationalist backlashes, cultural diplomacy strategies that rely on them are automatically at a disadvantage when it comes to improving a state's national image abroad. This could be because the cultural products that are the most successful in the market are not necessarily the products most likely to increase support and sympathy within foreign populations. If this is the case, then policy-makers should note that investing in these industries can wind up being counterproductive.

However, governments may have other motives for engaging in this type of cultural diplomacy other than its stated goal of improving public opinion abroad. A number of scholars have noted that successfully exporting cultural products can provide states with domestic benefits by aiding in the process of “nation-building through nation-branding” (Huang, 2011; Chua, 2012; Barr, 2012). The most obvious benefits are economic, resulting from greater export levels and a corresponding increase in tourism. For one example of this in practice, the annual number of Taiwanese tourists visiting Japan increased from 498,595 to 1,309,847 as the popularity of Japanese television shows grew in Taiwan between 1995 and 2008 (Huang, 2011). Cultural development and the promotion of a national culture also “encourages citizens to feel confident in their homeland and promotes a sense of belonging, among self, nation and state,” which is an important part of state legitimacy (Barr, 2012, p. 83). This means that even if cultural diplomacy leads to negative backlashes abroad, states may value the domestic

economic and political benefits of cultural development enough to invest in these programs.

Conclusions

In summary, foreign cultural products are associated with a significant decrease in positive views of the cultural exporter. These results suggest that if governments are promoting cultural products internationally with the sole goal of improving their national image abroad, they would be better off reevaluating their strategies. However, there are also domestic benefits—both economic and political—to cultural diplomacy. If states are more concerned about the economic benefits of nation-building or cultivating a stronger sense of national identity, investing in pop culture industries might still be worth the negative effects these strategies can have on foreign public opinion. Nevertheless, other cultural diplomacy strategies that do not employ pop culture might be able to provide states with both domestic and international benefits. Pop culture diplomacy might be unique in that increases in foreign pop culture products are associated with corresponding increases in nationalism. In the next chapter, I test whether another cultural diplomacy strategy—cultural centers—also has a negative effect on national image.

Chapter III

Confucius Institutes and Chinese Cultural Diplomacy

In addition to supporting the development and spread of pop culture products, another frequently used cultural diplomacy strategy is the deployment of cultural centers abroad. Cultural centers can serve to educate foreigners about different aspects of national culture, organize cultural celebrations and festivals, and provide language education resources. While both methods are intended to positively influence a country's national image, cultural centers might have a different impact on foreign public opinion than pop culture products. This is because people form stronger emotional attachments to pop culture than to the presence of cultural centers and the functions they perform (Jenkins, 2007). Cultural centers also tend to focus on traditional rather than popular culture, which is seen as inherently more apolitical (d'Hooghe, 2007). As a result, cultural centers might not lead to the sort of nationalist backlashes that occur in response to pop culture imports. While there are recent examples of protests and boycotts in response to the popularity of Japanese and South Korean pop culture in Asia, cultural centers have not resulted in this same kind of response. In this chapter, I test how Chinese cultural centers—developed as a part of the Confucius Institute program—influence public opinion in Asia and see how this compares with the effects of pop culture diplomacy.

China has the most expansive, coordinated, and ambitious cultural center program in East Asia, and possibly in the world. The Confucius Institute project began in late 2004, and by October 2008 the Chinese government had established 326 Confucius Institutes in 81 different countries (Paradise, 2009). The Institutes are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language Center International, usually referred to as *Hanban*. According to *Hanban*'s director, two of the program's main objectives are to facilitate Chinese language learning and to promote cultural

awareness and exchange (Paradise, 2009). To this end, *Hanban* uses the Confucius Institute program to train and send teachers from China to other countries, offer Chinese language proficiency tests, provide teachers with language learning materials, and host cultural celebrations during traditional Chinese holidays (Paradise, 2009; Heng, 2010). Confucius Institutes have become a key part of China's "systematic effort to increase China's attractiveness and influence through language and culture" (Lampton, 2008, p. 157).

China's foreign policy is especially reliant on cultural diplomacy strategies. As China is rapidly becoming a regional and global power, Chinese leaders rely on cultural diplomacy to demonstrate good intentions and support the idea of China's peaceful rise. Critics of China fear that China's newfound military strength is a threat to peace in the region (Gill and Huang, 2006). There is also concern that China's economic growth is a threat to people's jobs (Sieren, 2005). Chinese decision-makers have therefore turned to cultural diplomacy as a way to counter these fears and promote a more positive image of China abroad (Hartig, 2011). The belief that culture can be used by the state to advance the national interest abroad is widespread among Chinese political leaders. In 2007, the chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference argued that "cultural development, a main theme in building a country's soft power, plays a significant role in enhancing comprehensive national power" (Paradise, 2009, p. 658).

China has specifically invested in the Confucius Institute program because language learning is viewed as way to shape international preferences and attitudes of China. Learning the Chinese language has undoubtedly become increasingly popular as China's influence has grown. The number of foreigners taking the *Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi* (the Chinese language proficiency test) increased by an impressive 26% from 2004 to 2005 (Paradise, 2009). One of

the main purposes of the Confucius Institute project is to cultivate this growing interest by providing opportunities for foreigners to learn Chinese and making Chinese language education more accessible. Research on second language learning has demonstrated that learning a foreign language tends to increase "appreciation and empathy for the speakers of the language and their society as a result of the learning process" (Gil, 2009, p. 66).

In addition to increasing international support and sympathy, cultural diplomacy strategies can also serve a domestic purpose. By developing aspects of national culture—whether popular or traditional—governments can accomplish "nation-building through nation-branding." In other words, promoting the idea of a common national culture can help unite people behind a sense of national identity. While it lacks the pop culture presence of Japan and South Korea, China has turned to its traditional culture in order to fill a similar role. In addition to improving its image abroad, part of the motivation behind Chinese cultural diplomacy is "to instill cultural pride, consolidate internal coherence against economic inequality, promote regime legitimacy through moral example, and create a 'harmonious society' to resist foreign cultural encroachment" (Heng, 2010, p. 286).

The use of Chinese traditional culture and the references to Confucius demonstrate a dramatic shift in the Chinese government's approach to traditional culture. In the 1960s and 70s during the Cultural Revolution, China sought to destroy or suppress any references to Confucius and China's "old" culture in general. By the early 21st century, however, Chinese leaders had opted to use Chinese traditional culture as the basis of its growing cultural diplomacy program. While China has tried to encourage the growth of its pop culture industry—as explained in the previous chapter—it lacks the massive media presence and infrastructure that have made Japanese and South Korean cultural products so commercially successful. On

the other hand, China's long history as the cultural and economic center of Asia means that it does have a highly developed and widely recognized traditional culture. Aspects of Chinese traditional culture—including art, food, and language—have infiltrated and shaped traditional cultures throughout East and Southeast Asia. There are also sizable Han Chinese populations living across the region. As a result, Chinese leaders have tried to take advantage of this legacy by emphasizing traditional Chinese culture in its cultural diplomacy strategy.

So how do the effects of cultural centers compare with the effects of pop culture imports? As demonstrated in the previous chapter, an increase in cultural product imports is associated with more negative views of the cultural producer. There are examples of nationalist backlashes against successful pop culture industries, such as the appearance of Japanese anti-Korean *manga* following the Korean Wave. However, some of the benefits of cultural diplomacy are domestic rather than international. These benefits include the economic benefits of tourism and building larger and more successful cultural industries, alongside the political and social benefits of developing a sense of national identity. If states value these domestic benefits highly enough, they may still employ cultural diplomacy strategies even if they lead to a net decrease in national image abroad.

Cultural centers, on the other hand, are an interesting case because they could be a way for states to gain the domestic benefits of cultural diplomacy without the negative consequences abroad. This is because traditional cultures and language learning are not associated with the same kind of defensive emotional attachment as pop culture exports. As a result, they might not have the same negative effect on foreign public opinion. In fact, the links between second language learning and more sympathetic perspectives could mean that cultural centers have a positive rather than a negative effect on national image. This could also lead to

economic benefits through increases in tourism and even greater business opportunities (Paradise, 2009). In addition, by emphasizing unique and desirable traits from a society's traditional culture, they could help the state promote a sense of common identity.

In this chapter, I test whether or not cultural centers—like cultural products—also have a negative effect on foreign public opinion. As Paradise (2009) points out, polls from the BBC World Service and Pew Research both found that China's image deteriorated internationally between 2005 and 2007. However, he notes that this global trend does not take into account the effects that different cultural diplomacy strategies might have on China's image in specific countries. In order to measure how cultural centers influence foreign public opinion, I directly test the relationship between the presence of Confucius Institutes and perception of Chinese influence in Asia.

Research Design and Data

I use the same research design as in the previous chapter. The dependent variable is perception of Chinese influence in Asia, which I measure using the AsiaBarometer survey series. The independent variable in this case, however, is the presence of Confucius Institutes in the respondent's country. The variable is equal to one if there was at least one Confucius Institute operational in the respondent's country the previous year, and equal to zero if there were none. For the data on Institute locations, I use *Hanban*'s annual reports on the Confucius Institute program. I use the presence rather than the number of Confucius Institutes because it provides us with more clear-cut results. Because the difference between zero Confucius Institutes in a country and one Confucius Institute is greater than the difference between one and two, this accounts for the diminishing marginal returns on accumulated cultural centers. I also run this test using the total number of Institutes, and the results can be found in Appendix C.

I include all of the individual and state level control variables used in Chapter 2. All of the independent variables are listed in Appendix A. At the individual level, I control for the respondent's self-professed level of patriotism, whether they self-identify as Asian, whether the respondent travels abroad frequently, whether they have friends or family who live abroad, whether they work with foreign people and organizations, and the respondent's view of the United States. I also include control variables for gender, age, and education. At the state level, I control for the distance between China and the respondent's country, weighted by population, and whether the respondent's country has had military conflicts with China since World War II. Finally, I include a new control variable representing the total value of imports from China to the respondent's country. I do this because economic ties might have an influence on how individuals view Chinese influence.

I again use logistic regression to test the relationship between Confucius Institutes and perception of Chinese influence. I use Huber-White robust standard errors by clustering responses according to countries to account for heteroskedasticity. The independent variables are time-lagged in order to rule out reversed causality. I include year fixed effects in order to address possible heterogeneity and eliminate potential omitted variable bias.

Results and Analysis

The results are presented in Table 3. The first column lists the coefficients and the second column lists the predicted probabilities. The presence of Confucius Institutes in the respondent's country does, in fact, seem to have a positive effect on how individuals in Asia view Chinese influence. Having at least one active Confucius Institute in the country is correlated with an 11.2% increase in positive responses. This finding is statistically significant with a confidence interval of 99%, and the large magnitude of the effect demonstrates that it is also substantively significant. This means that in addition to the domestic benefits of cultural diplomacy, cultural centers and language training facilities can work to benefit a state's national image abroad.

As in the last chapter, I also conduct robustness checks. These are listed in Appendix C. I find that using a five-point rather than a binary dependent variable, and using the total number of Confucius Institutes rather than the presence of at least one Institute, still yields statistically significant results in the same direction of influence**.** When separated by country, Confucius Institutes have a positive effect in four countries (Indonesia, India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka) and a negative effect in Thailand and the Philippines. This positive effect is also larger on average than the negative effect in either country.

Out of the control variables, the only ones to have a significant effect at a confidence interval of 95% are perception of US influence, gender, and history of conflict. A more positive view of US influence is associated with an increase of 8.52% in positive views of Chinese influence. Women, on the other hand, were 3.14% less likely to have a positive view of Chinese influence. At the state level, respondents from countries that have fought a military conflict

Table 3

Coefficients and Predicted Probabilities for Model 4

Variable	Coefficients	Predicted Probabilities
Confucius Institutes	0.5318***	0.1123***
	(0.14)	(0.03)
National pride	-0.1015	-0.0214
	(0.09)	(0.02)
Pan-Asian identity	0.0126	0.0027
	(0.09)	(0.02)
Foreign relative	-0.0463	-0.0098
	(0.05)	(0.01)
Foreign travel	0.0136	0.0029
	(0.19)	(0.01)
Foreign friend	0.1130	0.0239
	(0.07)	(0.01)
Foreign correspondence	0.0138	0.0029
	(0.09)	(0.02)
Foreign job	-0.0842	-0.0178
	(0.15)	(0.03)
US influence	0.4034***	0.0852***
	(0.07)	(0.01)
Age	-0.0057*	-0.0012*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.1486***	-0.0314***
	(0.04)	(0.01)
University+	0.0377	0.008
	(0.13)	(0.03)
Distance (in 1000 km)	0.0001	0.0281
	(0.00)	(0.02)
Conflict	-0.9688***	-0.2046***
	(0.28)	(0.06)
Chinese imports	-0.0062*	-0.0013*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes
N	18479	18479

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$.

with China since 1937 (India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam) were 20.46% less likely to have a positive view of China.

It would seem that unlike an increase in pop culture products, the presence of cultural centers is not linked to a corresponding increase in nationalism. This finding is interesting because it demonstrates that different cultural diplomacy strategies can have widely different impacts on foreign public opinion. As shown in the last chapter, an increase in cultural product imports is associated with a statistically significant decrease in positive views of the cultural exporter. The presence of at least one Confucius Institute, on the other hand, is associated with an *increase* in positive views of Chinese influence. This would suggest that cultural product imports are indeed more likely than the presence of foreign cultural centers to result in backlashes of negative sentiment against foreign cultural producers.

Although Confucius Institutes have stirred up some negative sentiments in the United States in recent years, they have not triggered the kind of public responses Japanese and South Korean cultural products have in Asia. Suspicion in the United States over Confucius Institutes is based on the fear that the Chinese government uses them to subvert academic discourse on China (Chua, 2012; Mosher, 2012). This negative reaction, however, is not a widespread public response nor linked to corresponding cultural nationalism.

Why are Confucius Institutes not associated with nationalist backlashes in the same way cultural products are? Cultural centers generally function as an introduction to a country's traditional culture and often as a language learning resource. They also help project an image of a country's people. When writing about cultural centers, Paschalidis (2009) argues that “[this] projection is of a cohesive community, united by an uncontroversial, shared reality, a distinctive culture and heritage. By claiming to communicate the nation, to turn it into a communication, external cultural policy is primarily a special kind of cultural display” (p. 287). The significance of highlighting traditional culture in this cultural display is that traditional culture is seen as less

political and relatively non-threatening abroad. Unlike pop cultures, exposure to foreign traditional cultures and languages can increase sympathy and encourage more favorable views internationally.

Conclusions

Based on these results, it seems that cultural centers such China's Confucius Institutes program have the potential to provide states with both domestic and international benefits. More cultural exposure in other countries and more opportunities for language learning can lead to a corresponding increase in tourism and business opportunities, providing states with domestic economic benefits. At the same time, it can also still serve as a common point for the development of a national identity at home.

These findings, alongside the results presented in Chapter 2, bring up an interesting question. If the cultural center approach can result in all the benefits of the pop culture approach without the negative impact on foreign public opinion, why do states still invest in pop culture development and promotion? One explanation is that the domestic benefits of pop culture development are significantly greater than the domestic benefits of cultural centers. The same emotional attachments that lead to nationalist backlashes against foreign pop cultures might increase the nation building potential of pop culture diplomacy at home. For many people, pop culture plays a significant role in how they express themselves and construct their sense of identity. Traditional culture does not play nearly as large of a role in most people's everyday lives and it does not have the same impact or importance to them. Pop culture development can also be useful for states because media industries, especially those with significant export markets abroad, can generate a lot of wealth. If the domestic benefits of pop culture development and promotion are great enough to outweigh the negative effects on foreign public opinion, states will continue to employ the pop culture approach to cultural diplomacy.

The Chinese government, for example, supports the production and export of Chinese pop culture products in addition to operating the Confucius Institute program. Given the positive effect Confucius Institutes have on China's national image, cultural centers might be a way to balance out the negative effects of pop culture diplomacy. As a result, it is likely that China will continue to invest in both its pop culture industry and in the Confucius Institute program as complementary parts of its cultural diplomacy program.

Chapter IV

Overview of Research

The aim of this research is to investigate the effects of cultural diplomacy strategies and approaches on foreign public opinion. I focus on Asia, and specifically the cultural diplomacy programs of China, Japan, and South Korea. I first examine pop culture diplomacy, which is based on the development of pop culture industries and exporting pop culture products abroad. While cultural diplomacy can provide states with both domestic and international benefits, examples of nationalist backlashes against foreign pop cultures suggest that this might not always be the case. In fact, some scholars argue that cultural diplomacy can have a negative effect on how states are viewed abroad.

Using the AsiaBarometer survey data, I first test the effects of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean cultural product exports on how these countries are perceived in Asia. I find that an increase in cultural product exports to the respondent's country has a negative effect on how respondents view the exporting country in all three cases. The magnitude of the effect is different for each exporter, however. The negative effect is largest for Japan, next largest for South Korea, and smallest for China. I next test the effect of cultural centers using Confucius Institutes as the key independent variable. I find that unlike cultural products, Confucius Institutes are associated with an increase in positive views of Chinese influence. These results highlight the different and sometimes unexpected results cultural diplomacy programs can have on international public opinion.

Implications

These findings have several important implications both for states engaging in cultural diplomacy and for academics studying its effects. While cultural diplomacy has been around for a long time, it has become an increasingly large focus of many foreign policy agendas since the turn of the century. A number of countries, from India to New Zealand, have recently begun to seriously invest in cultural diplomacy. Thanks to a number of factors, like globalization and advances in technology, gaining influence through cultural diplomacy is increasingly seen as a better alternative than expending military/economic power. Cultural diplomacy is also available to everyone; any state with attractive cultural traits and values (in line with global norms) can seek to gain influence through cultural diplomacy regardless of their military or economic strength. As a result, cultural diplomacy is more relevant today than it has ever been before. It is therefore important to understand its functions and its effects.

While this research focuses on East Asia, there is significant reason to believe the results are generalizable outside of the region. Examples of growing nationalist sentiments in response to a foreign cultural presence are not limited to East Asia. For instance, the prevelance of the United States' popular culture around the world has led to backlashes and condemnations of American cultural imperialism in New Zealand (Lealand, 1994) and Canada (Granatstein, 1996). In fact, cultural nationalism has long been a social and political force around the world, from Ireland (Hutchinson, 2012) to Palestine (Abu-Ghazaleh, 1972). On top of this, one consequence of globalization is that it enables the rapid spread of cultural products. As a result, countries have access to wider spheres of cultural influence. As more states implement cultural diplomacy programs, the effects observed in this research are likely to be increasingly applicable around the world.

The first major implication this research has for the study of cultural diplomacy is the evidence that different cultural diplomacy programs can have different effects on foreign public opinion. This may seem obvious, but previous studies have not distinguished between the different effects that different kinds of cultural diplomacy strategies can have. These results demonstrate that it is important to recognize the effects that different kinds of cultural diplomacy can have when examining how they influence public opinion.

The second significant implication of this research comes from the empirical evidence that pop culture products have a negative rather than a positive impact on foreign public opinion. According to these results, pop culture products do not actually help states achieve international benefits from cultural diplomacy. People are emotionally invested in pop culture and it often plays a significant role in shaping individual identities. As a result, cultural diplomacy that relies on pop culture exports may result in greater domestic benefits, but it also tends to stir up nationalism and increase negative views of the cultural producer. Cultural centers, on the other hand, appear to improve international perception and thereby bring about both domestic and international benefits. By focusing on traditional cultures, they offer a more benign image of a state than its pop culture exports. Increasing access to language learning resources is also a more reliable way to increase sympathetic views abroad. Because of this, states solely interested in the economic benefits might be better advised to rely on cultural centers rather than programs focused on pop culture exports. If the domestic benefits of pop culture products outweigh their negative effects on international opinion, however, states might still consider them a worthwhile investment. If this is the case, states have an incentive to invest in both pop culture exports and cultural centers in order to maximize their domestic and international benefits.

Future Research

This research is focused solely on the international benefits of cultural diplomacy. However, research into its domestic benefits might be necessary to explain why states engage in different cultural diplomacy strategies. This would include research in how culture plays a role in nation building and the development of national identity. How does the role of pop culture differ from the role of traditional culture? Another similar avenue for further research would be the economic benefits of different pop culture industries. If the wealth generated by a successful film industry, for example, is large enough, it might justify the negative consequences their products can have on foreign public opinion.

A second area for further research would be the role of digital media in exposure to foreign cultural products. Since these numbers are not publicly available, we are forced to rely on physical media purchases as indicators of cultural consumption. Once we can take these sales into account, factoring in online streaming and downloads would provide a more accurate picture of cultural product consumption abroad.

This research also only examines two kinds of cultural diplomacy strategy, cultural product exports and cultural centers. In reality, states have a plethora of programs to choose between. Some other examples would be educational exchanges and sporting events. Study abroad programs, for instance, might be able to increase empathy for the host country. Another interesting area for future research would be the effect of hosting a major international sporting event, like the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup, on a country's international image.

Finally, additional indicators of cultural exposure would also provide more insight into how foreign cultural products can lead to nationalist backlashes. One example would be to use the value of cultural product imports from an exporting country as a share of total imports from

that country as the key independent variable. This would help to distinguish between cultural influence and influence derived from economic or political power. Another useful indicator would be the cultural product imports from one country as a share of total cultural product imports. This would better represent the relative cultural influence of different exporting countries. Lastly, using a country's cultural product imports as a share of its cultural product exports as the key independent variable would help take into account a country's cultural presence. Individuals from a country with high levels of cultural product exports might be less likely to feel like their domestic culture is being threatened by cultural product imports. Each of these alternate indicators of cultural influence would help provide nuance and context to the findings of this research.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Data, Measurements, and Variables

Table 4

List of Variables

Variable	Model	Description
Perception of influence	All	Respondent answered the question, “Do you think [China/Japan/South Korea] has a good or bad influence on your country?” with “Very good” or “Good”
Cultural product imports	1,2,3	The total value of cultural product imports from China/Japan/South Korea to the respondent's country
Confucius Institutes	4	Equal to 1 if there is at least one Confucius Institute present in the respondent's country
National pride	All	Respondent answered the question, “How proud are you of being [your country’s people]?” with “Very proud”
Pan-Asian identity	All	Respondent answered the question, “Do you identify with any transnational group?” with “Asian”
Foreign relatives	All	Respondent has relative or family member living abroad
Foreign travel	All	Respondent has traveled abroad three or more times in the last year
Foreign friend	All	Respondent has a friend from a foreign country living in their country
Foreign correspondence	All	Respondent has frequent correspondence with people from other countries
Foreign job	All	Respondent’s job involves contact with organizations and people from other countries
US influence	All	Respondent's views on US influence on their country; 5-point scale where 1 is equal to “Very bad” and 5 is equal to “Very good”
Age	All	Respondent's age
Female	All	Respondent is female
University	All	Respondent has at least a university-level education
Distance	All	Bilateral distance between China/Japan/South Korea and respondent's country, weighted by population
Conflict	4	Respondent's country has had a military conflict with China since 1937
Conflict and Colonization	1,2,3	Equal to 1 if respondent's country has had a military conflict with the cultural exporter since 1937; Equal to 2 if respondent's country was ever colonized by the cultural exporter
Chinese Imports	4	Total dollar value of imports from China to the respondent's country (in millions USD)

Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 are from Chapter 2 and use cultural product imports from China, Japan, and South Korea as the independent variables. Model 4 is from Chapter 3 and uses the presence of Confucius Institutes as the independent variable.

Table 5

List of Cultural Products

Commodity code	Commodity description
4901	Printed books, brochures, leaflets, etc.
490300	Children's pictures, drawing or coloring books
4902	Newspapers and periodicals
490400	Printed music
491191	Pictures, designs, and photographs
852410	Gramophone records
852431	Discs for laser-reading systems for reproducing sound
9701	Paintings, drawings, pastels, collages, etc.
950410	Video games used with a television receiver
3706	Photographic and cinematographic film, exposed and developed

Note. Codes used are from the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 2007.

Appendix B

Summary Statistics

Table 6

Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variable				
Perception of influence (China)	0.5209	0.4996	0	1
Perception of influence (Japan)	0.5725	0.4947	0	1
Perception of influence (South Korea)	0.4289	0.4949	0	1
Key independent variables				
Cultural product imports (China)	5.7938	12.6139	0.0013	54.4519
Cultural product imports (Japan)	12.5616	15.4775	0.0806	44.4233
Cultural product imports (South Korea)	5.6509	13.1191	0.0590	64.6356
Confucius Institutes	0.5210	0.4996	0	1
Individual-level				
National pride	0.6593	0.4739	0	1
Pan-Asian identity	0.5642	0.4959	0	1
Foreign relatives	0.2342	0.4235	0	1
Foreign travel	0.0687	0.2529	0	1
Foreign friend	0.1110	0.3141	0	1
Foreign correspondence	0.0642	0.2452	0	1
Foreign job	0.0433	0.2036	0	1
US influence	3.1926	1.1331	1	5
Age	38.2850	11.9215	20	69
Female	0.5124	0.4999	0	1
University	0.1919	0.3938	0	1
State-level				
Distance (China)	3153.630	1115.485	1168.165	4914.149
Distance (Japan)	3973.210	1675.653	951.737	6600.833
Distance (South Korea)	3389.173	1568.622	951.737	5781.108
Conflict and Colonization (China)	0.4148	0.4927	0	1
Conflict and Colonization (Japan)	1.1098	0.6239	0	2
Conflict and Colonization (South Korea)	0.1505	0.3576	0	1
Chinese Imports	17028.380	25940.710	225.434	108477.600

Note. All imports measured in 100,000 USD. Distances measured in km.

Appendix C:

Robustness Checks

Table 7

Ordered Logit Coefficients Using 5-point Dependent Variable: Cultural Product Imports

Variable	Model 1: China	Model 2: Japan	Model 3: South Korea
Cultural product imports	-0.0012***	-0.0348***	-0.0174***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
National pride	-0.1130	-0.0739	0.0741
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Pan-Asian identity	0.0079	0.2249***	0.1603**
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Foreign relative	-0.0445	0.1533***	0.0494
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Foreign travel	0.1047	0.3393***	-0.0334
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.11)
Foreign friend	0.1100*	0.0717	0.0004
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Foreign correspondence	0.0263	0.1397**	0.0246
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Foreign job	-0.0781	-0.0034	-0.1202
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
US influence	0.4569***	0.5807***	0.2961***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Age	-0.0034	-0.0056**	-0.0076***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.0848*	-0.1591***	-0.1061***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)
University+	-0.0416	-0.1187	0.0307
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.04)
Distance (in 1000 km)	0.1264	0.2998***	-0.0507
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Conflict and Colonization	-0.9387***	-0.0832	0.5389***
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.14)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	18479	18455	16769

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8

Ordered Logit Coefficients Using 5-point Dependent Variable: Number of Confucius Institutes

Variable	Model 4: China
Confucius Institutes (total)	0.0242**
	(0.01)
National pride	-0.1293*
	(0.07)
Pan-Asian identity	0.0206
	(0.08)
Foreign relative	-0.0239
	(0.04)
Foreign travel	0.1074
	(0.10)
Foreign friend	0.0996*
	(0.05)
Foreign correspondence	0.0338
	(0.06)
Foreign job	-0.0865
	(0.10)
US influence	0.4560***
	(0.08)
Age	-0.0040
	(0.00)
Female	-0.0882**
	(0.04)
University+	-0.0496
	(0.09)
Distance (in 1000 km)	0.1226
	(0.11)
Conflict and Colonization	-0.9635***
	(0.30)
Year Effects	Yes
N	18479

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9

Regression Results by Country for Model 1: Japanese Cultural Product Imports

Variable	CHN	IDN	IND	KHM	KOR	LKA	MYS	PHL	SGP	THA	VNM
Cultural product	-0.18***	-0.06	-0.18	-2.27***	-0.04***	-0.17	0.20*	-0.88***	0.51***	0.19	-0.30***
import	(0.02)	(0.37)	(0.49)	(0.42)	(0.01)	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.07)
National pride	0.02	0.29*	-0.55***	0.32*	0.12	0.07	0.26**	-0.27	0.19	0.06	-0.06
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.13)
Pan-Asian	0.10	0.14	-0.08	0.38	-0.08	0.41**	0.16	-0.42***	0.31**	0.20*	-0.19
identity	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Foreign relative	0.28**	0.05	0.19	0.13	0.13	-0.11	0.18	0.08	-0.06	-0.03	0.10
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.09)
Foreign travel	0.78***	1.30	-0.68**	0.85*	0.16	0.11	-0.21	-0.05	0.06	-0.23	-0.20
	(0.71)	(1.08)	(0.34)	(0.49)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.12)	(0.26)	(0.32)
Foreign friend	0.52***	-0.10	-0.14	-0.13	0.56**	0.41*	-0.02	0.19	0.26**	0.27	0.31**
	(0.18)	(0.45)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.13)
Foreign corresp.	-0.52**	-0.38	0.10	0.03	-0.39	-0.23	0.06	0.36	0.28*	0.27	0.28*
	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.44)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.12)	(0.30)	(0.16)
Foreign job	0.27	-0.15	-0.09	-0.44	0.58***	0.55	-0.32	-0.18	-0.44***	0.06	0.20
	(0.24)	(0.55)	(0.35)	(0.47)	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.25)	(0.39)	(0.16)	(0.35)	(0.22)
Age	-0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	0.02***	-0.02***	0.00	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.02***	-0.01*	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.11	-0.10	-0.15	-0.21	-0.38***	0.30**	-0.25**	-0.43***	-0.22*	-0.20**	-0.42***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)
University+	-0.13	0.25	0.06	0.74**	0.12**	0.08	-0.02	-0.02	0.13	0.24*	0.20*
	(0.12)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3670	1670	1807	1516	2529	1405	2340	1652	1595	2342	1562

Note. Country codes: CHN = China; IDN = Indonesia; IND = India; KHM = Cambodia; KOR = South Korea; LKA = Sri Lanka; MYS = Malaysia; PHL = Philippines; SGP = Singapore; THA = Thailand; VNM = Vietnam. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10

Regression Results by Country for Model 2: South Korean Cultural Product Imports

Variable	CHN	IDN	IND	JPN	KHM	LKA	MYS	PHL	SGP	THA	VNM
Cultural product	0.51***	-0.32***	-0.36***	-0.01*	-2.37***	-1.43*	0.13***	-0.78***	-0.07***	2.13***	-0.19
import	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.42)	(0.22)	(0.79)	(0.05)	(0.28)	(0.02)	(0.61)	(0.36)
National pride	0.15**	0.41	-0.12***	0.21**	0.33**	0.37**	-0.12	0.25	0.01	0.14	0.32**
	(0.07)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Pan-Asian identity	0.05	-0.14	-0.02	0.21**	-0.08	0.56***	0.43***	0.09	0.21	0.20	0.34**
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Foreign relative	0.00	-0.30	0.55***	0.17	0.27**	-0.05	0.01	-0.11	-0.13	0.01	-0.08
	(0.11)	(0.29)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.09)
Foreign travel	0.06	-1.56*	-0.48	0.02	0.51	0.15	-0.26	-0.14	0.18	0.39	0.27
	(0.23)	(0.84)	(0.44)	(0.17)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.32)
Foreign friend	-0.06	-0.46	-0.15	-0.09	0.22	0.04	0.07	0.26*	0.22	0.02	0.03
	(0.18)	(0.86)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.13)
Foreign corresp.	-0.07	1.08	0.51	-0.01	-0.36	0.10	0.21	0.07	0.04	0.20	0.37**
	(0.18)	(0.74)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.16)
Foreign job	-0.50**	-0.01	-0.44	0.08	0.33	0.14	-0.43*	-0.19	-0.00	-0.23	0.07
	(0.21)	(0.01)	(0.41)	(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.01)	(0.34)	(0.22)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.01*	0.00	-0.01***	-0.06	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.11)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.12	-0.01	-0.03	-0.37***	-0.15	0.03	-0.01	-0.16	-0.06	-0.26***	-0.16
	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.09)
University+	0.24***	0.35	0.37***	0.25**	0.04	0.04	0.13	-0.05	0.06	0.09	0.16
	(0.08)	(0.33)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3670	1670	1807	2529	1516	1405	2340	1652	1595	2342	1562

Note. Country codes: CHN = China; IDN = Indonesia; IND = India; KHM = Cambodia; KOR = South Korea; LKA = Sri Lanka; MYS = Malaysia; PHL = Philippines; SGP = Singapore; THA = Thailand; VNM = Vietnam. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11

Regression Results by Country for Model 3: Chinese Cultural Product Imports

Variable	IDN	IND	JPN	KHM	KOR	LKA	MYS	PHL	SGP	THA	VNM
Cultural product	-0.08**	0.14***	-0.00	9.53***	-0.02***	2.40**	0.03**	-0.09**	-0.00*	-0.25**	-0.08
import	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.82)	(0.01)	(0.95)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.12)	(0.15)
National pride	0.34**	-0.42**	0.41***	0.06	0.08	0.33**	-0.07	-0.17	-0.09	-0.06	-0.02
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.16)
Pan-Asian identity	0.06	-0.58***	0.18	0.36**	-0.05	0.50***	0.11	-0.21*	0.55***	0.04	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Foreign relative	-0.08	0.33**	0.06	0.04	0.16	-0.01	-0.06	0.11	-0.02	-0.08	-0.16
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Foreign travel	1.04	-0.65*	0.43**	0.22	0.02	0.11	0.11	-0.17	1.04	-0.09	1.19***
	(0.71)	(0.35)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.34)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.42)
Foreign friend	-0.42	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.59***	0.15	-0.14	0.12	0.26**	0.04	-0.10
	(0.41)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.15)
Foreign corresp.	-0.10	-0.08	0.04	-0.12	-0.53**	0.06	0.39*	-0.03	0.28**	-0.15	0.34*
	(0.63)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.28)	(0.21)
Foreign job	0.17	-0.41	0.05	0.03	0.80***	0.17	0.09	-0.11	-0.53***	-0.10	-0.22
	(0.49)	(0.33)	(0.19)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.14)	(0.34)	(0.28)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.02***	0.00	-0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Female	-0.02	0.06	-0.26***	-0.01	--0.13	0.07	-0.18*	-0.02	-0.19*	-0.29***	-0.18
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)
University+	0.25	-0.36***	0.25**	-0.07	0.20**	0.05	0.03	-0.16	0.04	0.45***	0.27
	(0.25)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)*
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1670	1807	2544	1516	2529	1405	2340	1652	1595	2342	1562

Note. Country codes: CHN = China; IDN = Indonesia; IND = India; KHM = Cambodia; KOR = South Korea; LKA = Sri Lanka; MYS = Malaysia; PHL = Philippines; SGP = Singapore; THA = Thailand; VNM = Vietnam. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12

Regression Results by Country for Model 4: Confucius Institutes

Variable	IDN	IND	JPN	KOR	LKA	MYS	PHL	SGP	THA
Cultural product	0.20**	1.09***	-0.16	-0.06	0.34**	0.45***	-0.23**	0.19*	-0.36**
import	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.00)	(0.12)
National pride	0.34**	-0.42**	0.41***	0.09	0.33**	-0.06	-0.17	-0.09	-0.07
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.20)
Pan-Asian identity	0.05	-0.58***	0.18	-0.00	0.58***	0.01	-0.21*	0.58***	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Foreign relative	-0.08	0.33**	0.06	0.15	-0.01	-0.08	0.11	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Foreign travel	1.04	-0.65*	0.43**	-0.00	-0.01	0.13	-0.17	-0.13	-0.09
	(0.71)	(0.35)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.34)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.27)
Foreign friend	-0.42	0.30	0.25	0.57***	0.15	-0.10	0.12	0.26**	0.02
	(0.41)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.21)
Foreign corresp.	-0.10	-0.08	0.04	-0.52**	0.06	0.43*	-0.03	0.28**	-0.13
	(0.63)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.28)
Foreign job	0.17	-0.42	0.05	0.85***	-0.21	0.06	-0.11	-0.54***	-0.10
	(0.49)	(0.33)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.15)	(0.35)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02***	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Female	-0.02	0.06	-0.26***	-0.13	0.07	-0.18*	-0.02	-0.19*	-0.27***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)
University+	0.25	-0.36***	0.26**	0.18**	0.05	0.02	-0.16	0.05	0.43***
	(0.25)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1670	1807	2544	2529	1405	2340	1652	1595	2342

Note: Cambodia and Vietnam not included because no Confucius Institute was established in either country during the years covered by the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$.