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Hurdles for the powerless : control deprivation, self-esteem threat, and anxiety.

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HURDLES FOR THE POWERLESS: CONTROL DEPRIVATION, SELF-ESTEEM THREAT, AND ANXIETY

A Dissertation Presented

by

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DEDICATION

To M. Elaine and K. Lucille.

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ABSTRACT

HURDLES FOR THE POWERLESS: CONTROL DEPRIVATION, SELF-ESTEEM THREAT, AND ANXIETY

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Research indicates that evaluated people form positively biased impressions of their evaluators (eg., Pepitone, 1950; Stevens & Fiske, 1995). It has been hypothesized that the extreme control deprivation associated with evaluation leads to positive impressions, even in face of contrary evidence, for two reasons: (1) accuracy and individuation are viewed as less useful strategies, and (2) positive expectancies protect threatened self-esteem (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). An experiment was performed in order to investigate these hypotheses as well as two potential mediators (self-esteem threat and anxiety) and two potential moderators (trait self-esteem and relationship orientation) of positively biased impressions. Regarding the mediators, it was hypothesized that: (1) as self-esteem threat increased, impressions would become more biased, and (2) as anxiety increased, impressions would become more categorical. Turning to the moderators, it was hypothesized that: (1) high trait self-esteem participants would be biased to perceive a competent evaluator who would recognize their good performance, while low trait self-esteem participants would be biased to perceive an incompetent evaluator whose evaluation would be easy to discount,

and (2) relations-oriented (high LPC) participants would believe their relationship with the evaluator was threatened by the impending evaluation and would be more positively biased than task-oriented (low LPC) participants. A non-dependent control group was included for comparison purposes. The study did replicate previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1995) and demonstrated that evaluated people do use positively biased strategies to form impressions of their evaluators. However, the roles of the potential mediators and moderators were less clear. Discussion of the results concludes with the proposal of a potentially clarifying study.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> A [person] is such a complex fact.... Whichever one of these aspects of its being I temporarily class [a thing] under, makes me unjust to the other aspects. But as I always am classing it under one aspect or another, I am always unjust, always partial, always exclusive. My excuse is necessity--the necessity which my finite and practical nature lays upon me. My thinking is first and last and always for the sake of my doing, and I can only do one thing at a time. (James, 1890/1983, pp. 959-60)

People have goals that depend on other people, and, as James reminds us, these goals may bias perception. Yet, initially, modern social cognitive psychologists focused on cognition to the neglect of goals and motivation. However, recently, social cognitive theorists have returned to their roots. Social perceivers now are viewed as motivated tacticians who consider their social interaction goals before choosing cognitive strategies (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Fiske, 1993; Forgas, 1992; Hilton & Darley, 1991; Kunda, 1987; Klein & Kunda, 1992).

Even within the motivated tactician perspective, however, the bulk of social cognitive research has examined mainly two types of goals: (1) accuracy-oriented goals, which promote individuated, detailed (but not necessarily accurate) impressions, and (2) expectancy-confirming goals, which promote quick, good-enough (but not necessarily inaccurate) impressions (for

a review, see Fiske, 1993). But, many goals may have little to do with attempting to form accurate or expectancy-confirming impressions. Goals can lead to specific, directional biases in person perception.

Evaluation and Person Perception

Whether one's aim is to earn a loan or to earn a doctorate, reaching a goal often depends on the good-will of at least temporarily powerful evaluators. The powerless, evaluated members of such asymmetrical power relationships, in which evaluators have complete control over the outcomes, are motivated to navigate their evaluation successfully in order to reach their goal. One way to cope with the potentially threatening nature of an upcoming evaluation is to believe truly in the good-will of the evaluator, to engage in wishful thinking.

In fact, evaluated people do form positively biased perceptions of their evaluators. As early as 1950, Pepitone found evidence of distortions in a positive direction. People, who were dependent on a group of three evaluators, overestimated how much the most negative evaluator liked them and underestimated how much influence this person had on group decisions. More recent research also indicates that evaluated people positively reframe their evaluator and engage in wishful thinking (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). Compared to people who were not evaluated, people who were evaluated spent most of their time on any negative information that was available, discounted this negative information, and formed a positively biased impression of the powerful evaluator.

Positive biases in person perception also occur under a different evaluative social structure: initial romantic interdependence. People seeking romantic relationships are evaluated by others who decide whether to accept or reject them as potential partners. Indeed, researchers have found that perceivers think positively about a potential date (Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Stephan, Berscheid, & Walster, 1971). In one recent set of studies, people who expected to date someone, compared to those who did not, viewed their potential date as competent even when the person was not: Incompetent targets were judged just as favorably as competent ones (Fiske, Goodwin, Rosen, & Rosenthal, 1994).

Existing Explanations for Positive Biases

Some attempts have been made to explain these positive, directional biases in person perception. Early researchers simply argued that people who are dependent on another person tend to arrive at wish-fulfilling conclusions about the person's dispositions (Berscheid et al., 1976; Pepitone, 1950; Stephan et al., 1971). However, pure task outcome dependency, simply being dependent on another person in the absence of evaluation (e.g., as teammates), does not result in positive biases (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990).

More recently, Stevens and Fiske (1995) hypothesized that evaluated people form positive impressions of their evaluators (and potential romantic partners), even in face of contrary evidence, for two reasons: (1) evaluated perceivers neglect accuracy and individuation as less useful strategies, and (2)

evaluated perceivers attempt to protect threatened self-esteem with positive expectancies.

First, with regard to the utility of accuracy and individuating strategies, normally, when people are outcome dependent, they individuate the other person in order to increase their sense of prediction and control (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Stevens & Fiske, 1995). However, these accuracy-motivated strategies occur only in pure task-oriented situations, perhaps because these outcome dependent people feel that they have some potential personal control; they will perform some of the work.

In contrast, evaluatively dependent people may perceive fewer opportunities personally to control their outcomes. Even if evaluatively dependent people do perform well, it may not matter; the powerful evaluator makes all the decisions. So, evaluatively dependent people may give up on accuracy and individuation as useless strategies. In fact, a recent study by Copeland (1994) revealed that evaluatively dependent people in dyads were less motivated to learn about their partner than were the powerful people.

Second, with regard to the protective nature of positive expectancies, evaluation not only provides feedback about performance on a task, but also provides information regarding the evaluated person's inherent worth. Thus, the powerful person's evaluation potentially threatens the perceiver's self-esteem. People may connect their evaluation to their self-view, which lasts well beyond the immediate setting; a single small task outcome does not typically have the same kind of lasting effects. Thus, evaluated people may

feel that a competent evaluator is most likely to evaluate them fairly and, therefore, favorably. As a result, people's perceptions of their evaluators may be positively biased.

Thus, theoretically, people's positively biased perceptions of evaluators are affected by both the extreme loss of control and the threat associated with evaluation. However, no data directly address how control deprivation and self-esteem threat operate together.

Control and Self-Esteem

Control deprivation is linked to self-esteem. Loss of control does more than simply motivate people to regain control. Control loss signals a threat; it suggests a shortcoming in people's abilities to cope with a demanding environment (Strube & Yost, 1993).

In fact, the self-esteem maintenance hypothesis posits that low control threatens people's self-esteem (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Abramson & Alloy, 1980). One way people cope with this threat is to overestimate their control over subsequent positive outcomes. Thus, the protection of threatened self-esteem may partially determine people's judgments of control (for a review, see Alloy, Clements, & Koenig, 1993).

According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), control deprivation activates a simple self-affirmation motive, a motive to affirm an image of competency and ability to control outcomes. Under threat, a self-affirmation motive may, for example, increase self-serving attributions that protect or enhance the self. Externalizing the causes of poor performance and internalizing the causes of good performance are examples of such self-serving

attributions (Jones & Berglas, 1978; Weary & Arkin, 1981; Weiner, 1985). Other strategies, such as attributing positive characteristics to an evaluator, are also self-protecting and self-serving (Stevens & Fiske, 1995).

Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) further argues that simply explaining an event may imply knowledge and competency (cf., Pittman & Heller, 1987). Consequently, a self-affirmation motive could increase attributions about events unrelated to the self or to the threat (e.g., Steele, 1975; 1988; Steele, & Lui, 1981; Steele & Lui, 1983). In other words, the self-affirmation motive aroused by control deprivation can be assuaged by self-affirmation on dimensions unrelated to the threat or by attributions about others unconnected to the self. In fact, while control-deprived people normally make more attributions than non-control-deprived people (Lui & Steele, 1986; Pittman & D'Agostino, 1989; Pittman & Pittman, 1980), the attributions of control-deprived people given the opportunity to engage in self-affirmation on a value dimension important to the self, but unrelated to the control-deprivation experience, do not differ from non-control-deprived people (Lui & Steele, 1986).

It is important to note that all of the research on self-affirmation increasing attributions about others was conducted in non-evaluative situations. In fact, consistent with self-affirmation theory, outcome dependent people who are not evaluated by a powerful other do increase their attributional activity about the powerful other. These attributions are accuracy-oriented and individuate the powerful other, but they are not self-protective or self-serving (Stevens & Fiske, 1995).

However, the evaluative nature of most power relationships may overwhelm people's ability to self-affirm by way of unrelated attributions. Instead, the extreme self-esteem threat associated with such a great loss of control may force evaluatively dependent powerless people to resort to more direct self-protective and self-serving attributions, such as forming positively biased impressions of the evaluator.

Self-Esteem and Control: Links to Anxiety

At a minimum, as well as being linked to control deprivation, we know that threatened self-esteem is clearly related to anxiety. Anxiety and anxiety-related problems are correlated negatively with self-esteem (e.g., French, 1968; Lipsitt, 1958; Rosenberg & Simmons, 1972), self-report and physiological indexes indicate that threats to self-esteem produce anxiety (e.g., Bennett & Holmes, 1975; Burish & Houston, 1979), and the defense of self-esteem reduces anxiety (e.g., Bennett & Holmes, 1975; Hakmiller, 1966; Mehlman & Snyder, 1985). In addition, proponents of terror management theory, for example, argue that self-esteem provides protection against anxiety in response to threat (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Rosenblatt, Burling, Lyon, Simon, & Pinel, 1992). Apparently, self-esteem is important not only for feelings of control; it is also an important piece of managing anxiety. Protecting self-esteem appears to be an effective way to reduce anxiety.

Furthermore, the control deprivation associated with outcome dependency also leads to anxiety. People whose outcomes are controlled by powerful outgroup members report feeling that their outcomes are less under their own control than people whose outcomes are controlled by ingroup

members (Dépret, 1994). In addition, people controlled by outgroup members reported feeling more jittery, unhappy, and angry, and less calm and happy than people controlled by ingroup members (Dépret, 1994).

These anxious people want to regain control. However, anxiety generates a simultaneous capacity decrement and heightened control motivation, which both result from intrusive thoughts. While anxious people want to regain control, their capacity decrement takes away the needed resources (Fiske & Emery, 1993). Thus, anxious people may compensate by trying to control others. Furthermore, the depleted cognitive resources may lead to stereotyped thinking (Wilder & Shapiro, 1989a; 1989b). Categorized people may appear simpler and easier to control than individuated people. Preliminary experimental and correlational evidence (Fiske & Morling, in press) supports these hypotheses.

In fact, the impressions that outcome dependent people form of their evaluators are categorically positive compared to the impressions of non-evaluatively outcome dependent and baseline people (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). These categorically positive impressions may result from the anxiety experienced by the evaluatively dependent powerless people.

Mediation

According to the above reasoning, the control deprivation associated with being evaluatively outcome dependent not only leads to threatened self-esteem, but it also leads to anxiety. In turn, this self-esteem threat may cause evaluatively dependent people to resort to self-protective attributions, positively biased impressions of the evaluator. In addition, the anxiety related

to being evaluatively dependent may cause these impressions of the evaluator to be categorically positive. In other words, threatened self-esteem and feelings of anxiety should mediate the effect control deprivation has on people's perceptions of their evaluator (see Figure 1).

However, being evaluated may not affect all people equally. Some people may become extremely threatened and anxious upon learning of an impending evaluation. These people may protect themselves with a different kind of biased impression of their evaluator. Alternatively, some people may not be very threatened by an evaluative relationship. These people's impressions of their evaluator may not be biased. In other words, personality characteristics may moderate the positively biased perceptions associated with being evaluated. Two moderators that may affect these processes are trait self-esteem and relationship orientation.

Trait Self-Esteem

If the threat associated with evaluation is perceived in the same way by all people, regardless of their trait self-esteem, then everyone should be biased in the same way. All evaluatively dependent people should form positively biased impressions of their evaluators. However, it is possible that trait self-esteem or long-term feelings of competency could affect people's biases.

In the aforementioned Stevens and Fiske study (1995), on which the current theoretical reasoning is based, the powerless people were specifically led to believe they would perform well on the task. Therefore, they may have desired a competent evaluator who would be likely to evaluate them fairly and favorably. However, if the possibility of failure had been salient, powerless

people may have preferred a different kind of evaluator, an incompetent evaluator. A negative evaluation from a competent evaluator would be difficult to ignore, but a negative evaluation from an incompetent evaluator is easy to discount. Thus, people with high self-esteem or a belief that they will be successful on the task may prefer a competent evaluator; to protect their self-esteem they may have positive illusions similar to those found in the research reviewed earlier. However, people with low self-esteem or a belief that they will not be successful on the task may prefer an incompetent evaluator; to protect their self-esteem they may have negative illusions about the evaluator (i.e., they can discount a negative evaluation if it comes from an incompetent evaluator).

Therefore, the self-protective strategies employed by evaluatively dependent people may be moderated by trait self-esteem (as well as long-term competence). People with high self-esteem may expect to do well in the study, experience less threat, and desire a competent evaluator. On the other hand, people with low self-esteem may expect to do poorly in the study, experience great threat, and desire an incompetent evaluator.

Relationship Orientation

Similarly, the manner in which evaluatively dependent perceivers approach relationships also may moderate their perceptions of evaluators. Most research on power assumes a traditional, individualistic, and task-oriented relationship. However, some types of power are more caretaking, attentive, and relationship-oriented. Evaluatively dependent perceivers who approach their asymmetrical power relationship with an evaluator in a task-

oriented manner may react differently to their impending evaluation than those who approach their power relationship in a more relationship-oriented fashion.

Perhaps the most well known model of these individual differences is Fiedler's contingency theory of leadership (Fiedler, 1964; 1967; 1978; Fiedler & Garcia, 1987). This work contrasts task-oriented leaders (powerful people), who think poorly of their least preferred coworker (LPC), and relations-oriented leaders (powerful people), who think less poorly of their LPC. People who are attuned to the relationship between the powerful person and dependent person may be more concerned about interpersonal aspects than task-related aspects of the relationship. Thus, high LPC (relations-oriented) people should be particularly concerned with maintaining a positive relationship. There is evidence that follower satisfaction increases linearly with leader LPC score (Rice, 1981). High LPC followers should also strive to maintain a positive relationship with their leaders and may be motivated to perceive the powerful in a positive manner.

On the other hand, people who focus on task-related aspects of the relationship between the powerful person and the dependent person may be more sensitive to issues such as task-competency than to interpersonal issues. Thus, low LPC (task-oriented) people should be particularly concerned with maintaining a productive task association. Low LPC followers should be driven to size up their superiors and may be motivated to perceive powerful people with particular regard to their task-competency. These low LPC

followers may process competency-related information about an evaluator accurately and individuate.

Therefore, the self-protective impression formation strategies employed by evaluatively dependent people may be moderated by their relationship orientation. The threat of evaluation may particularly worry relations-oriented people, who want to maintain positive associations with their evaluator, and the threat may lead high LPC followers to form positively biased impressions of their evaluator. On the other hand, the threat of evaluation may not bother task-oriented people, who want to maintain a productive task relationship with their evaluator, and low LPC followers may form accurate, competency-based impressions of their evaluator.

Summary and Predictions

In sum, evaluatively dependent people have lost control over their own outcomes without retaining control over the powerful person. This control deprivation, paired with the forthcoming evaluation, threatens evaluatively dependent people's self-esteem and produces anxiety. Self-esteem threat triggers self-affirmation that results in self-protective and self-serving attributions about the evaluator: The evaluator will be viewed positively (at least before the actual interaction). Anxiety may cause these impressions of the evaluator to be categorically positive. Thus, (Hypothesis 1) self-esteem threat and anxiety mediate the path from control deprivation to biased impressions.

Furthermore, the evaluatively dependent person's trait self-esteem and relationship orientation may moderate these effects. (Hypothesis 2) People

with high self-esteem may be less threatened by the situation and may be motivated to view the evaluator as a competent person who will recognize their good performance, while people with low self-esteem may be more threatened by the situation and may be motivated to view the evaluator as an incompetent person whose evaluation will be easy to discount. (Hypothesis 3) In addition, relations-oriented (high LPC) people may believe their relationship with the evaluator is threatened by the impending evaluation, and they may be motivated to view the evaluator as positive; alternatively, task-oriented (low LPC) people may be less threatened by the evaluation, and they may be motivated to accurately perceive the competency of the evaluator.



Figure 1. Model of Mediation

CHAPTER 2

EXPERIMENT

The experiment investigates two potential mediators (self-esteem threat and anxiety) and two potential moderators (trait self-esteem and relationship orientation) of the directionally biased impressions evaluatively dependent people form of their evaluators. Regarding the mediators, as self-esteem threat increases, impressions should become more biased. And, as anxiety increases, impressions should become more categorical. Turning to the moderators, high trait self-esteem participants may be biased to perceive a competent evaluator, while low trait self-esteem participants may be biased to perceive an incompetent evaluator. And relations-oriented (high LPC) participants' relationships may be more threatened (and therefore more biased) than task-oriented (low LPC) participants' relationships. A non-dependent control group is included for comparison purposes.

Method

Overview

An experimenter led participants to believe that their performance would (evaluative dependency) or would not (no dependency) be evaluated by a fictitious other, whom they expected to meet. In addition, the experimenter told participants they would be eligible for a prize based on the evaluation of their performance (no dependency subjects were also told they would be evaluated, but not by the fictitious other). The fictitious other was initially portrayed as competent (positive expectation) or incompetent (negative

expectation). Participants then received both positive and negative (expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent) information about the fictitious participant and voiced their reactions to that information into a tape recorder. This created a three-way design with two between-participants variables (dependency and expectation) and one within-participant variable (information valence). In addition, participants' trait self-esteem and relationship orientation scores were available from a prescreening session.

Participants

One hundred seventeen (82 females and 35 males) introductory psychology students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst received extra credit for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions created by the between-participants variables of dependency and expectation. The data of two participants who volunteered suspicion about the alleged other participant, one participant who understood English poorly, and one participant who was more than two and a half standard deviations above the mean on the critical variable of attention time were deleted from the analyses. In addition, two participants were deleted due to experimenter error.[1] Any other omissions were due to missing data. This left 111 participants, 27-29 in each cell of the critical two-way interaction between dependency (a between-participants variable) and information valence (the within-participants variable). Positivity of expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound valence and consistency of the information received.

Procedure

Prior to the experimental session, at the beginning of the semester, participants completed a prescreening questionnaire. Included in this questionnaire were the Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965; see Appendix A) and the Least-Preferred Coworker Scale (Fiedler, 1967; see Appendix B).

Immediately upon arrival at the experimental session, participants were asked to fill out a version of the Self-Esteem Scale, modified to measure state self-esteem (see Appendix C). After they completed this questionnaire, the experimenter explained that a work-study undergraduate also would be participating in the study. This alleged person, always the same sex as the participant, was waiting in another room. There were several wind-up toys, paper, pens, and pencils on the table that presumably would be used for the task.

The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers were supposedly investigating how discussion affects performance on a creative task. So, later in the study, the experimenter would ask them to think up educational games for children using the wind-up toys. For example, subtraction could be shown by winding up a toy and letting it hop away from the remaining toys. While explaining the task, the experimenter indicated that skill and creativity would be helpful. Supposedly, the experimenter would be comparing the performance of two groups of subjects--one group of people who discussed their ideas and another group of people who did not discuss their ideas.

The experimenter then informed participants that they happened to be in the condition of the study in which they would have the discussion with the fictitious work-study person. In fact, all participants were in this "condition."

The experimenter proceeded to inform participants that, as extra incentive, they would have an opportunity to earn some money. In the no-dependency condition, a research supervisor would be awarding the prizes. In the evaluative dependency condition, the fictitious work-study person with whom the participants would be discussing their ideas would be awarding the prizes. These were $50 prizes. Participants signed a form indicating that they understood how the prizes would be awarded. In an effort to make the evaluation more salient, participants were also told that they would receive their evaluation at the end of the hour before they left.

The experimenter then told participants that, in an effort to make the study more like a real-life work situation, they would be receiving some information about the person with whom they would be discussing their ideas. The first piece of information was a brief statement written by the other person explaining how well this person expected to do in the discussion. This statement served to manipulate participants' expectancy for the work-study person. The competent expectancy statement read: "To be honest, I think I might be pretty good at this. I've been a teaching assistant for several semesters now and I've done pretty well, especially with things like this." The incompetent expectancy statement read: "To be honest, I'm not sure if I'll be any good at this. I was a teaching assistant last semester, but I didn't

do so great, especially with things like this." Participants looked over this statement while the experimenter walked down the hall, allegedly to see if the work-study person was about ready to begin.

After returning, the experimenter asked participants to go through some additional information. This trait information was supposedly taken from an informal evaluation of the work-study person when that person was a teaching assistant. The experimenter told the participants that their initial reactions to this information was of interest to the researchers, who thus would like to record their reactions on an audiotape. After reassuring participants of the anonymity of their responses, especially with respect to the fictitious other person, the experimenter asked participants to read each piece of information aloud and to comment about it.

This information was mixed. The five positive sentences used the adjectives: clever, persistent, quick, efficient, and relaxed. The five negative sentences used the adjectives: irresponsible, vague, superficial, nitpicking, and sloppy. These statements were identical to those used in previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1995) and are available in Appendix D. The sentences appeared in a different random order for each participant, with the stipulation that no more than two positive or two negative statements appeared consecutively.

When participants finished commenting on the information about the work-study person, they were asked to complete three questionnaires. These questionnaires were arranged in order to capture the less persistent effects first. The first questionnaire utilized Epstein's Emotion Triads (see Appendix

E) to measure mood, especially anxiety. The second questionnaire contained the State Self-Esteem Scale used at the beginning of the experiment embedded in the Feelings of Inadequacy Scale[2] (Janis & Field, 1959; see Appendix F). Finally, the third questionnaire (see Appendix G) asked participants to rate how well the work-study person would do on the task and how much control the work-study person had over their outcomes. In addition, participants indicated their own competency at the task, their perceived control, and how happy they were with the work-study person. Participants also rated the consistency, clarity, and positivity of their impression of the work-study person. The questionnaire also asked participants how helpful the information about work-study person was and how much information they would like if they were participating again. In order to examine the positivity of impressions, participants were asked to rate the work-study person on a variety of traits. In addition, as a manipulation check, participants were asked to indicate who would be judging their performance. A second part of the questionnaire asked participants to recall the purpose of the experiment and comment on the study thus far.[3] Once this questionnaire was completed, the experimenter probed participants for suspicion and debriefed them. A random drawing for the $50 prizes was held when the study was completed.

Data from protocols. From the audiotapes, the experimenter, who was blind to condition, recorded the number of seconds participants considered the positive and negative information. Timing always commenced when participants began to read each statement. Participants' tape-recorded

comments were then coded into discrete categories (see Table 1) used in prior research (see Stevens & Fiske, 1995). In addition, each of the comments was also classified as discounting or not. To assess reliability of both coding schemes, another individual, who was also blind to condition, coded a random third of the protocols. Cohen's kappa coefficients were computed for each code type and are as follows: dispositions, $\underline{k}$ = .89; elaboration, $\underline{k}$ = .84; evaluations, $\underline{k}$ = .87; hedging, $\underline{k}$ = .98; attribute matching, $\underline{k}$ = .86; repetitions, $\underline{k}$ = .91; self-reference, $\underline{k}$ = .80; no comment, $\underline{k}$ = 1.00; and discounting, $\underline{k}$ = .94 (median $\underline{k}$ = .89).

Scales

Self-Esteem Scale (Trait). People's scores on the Self-Esteem Scale (SES) are related to many self-esteem-related constructs. For example, Lorr and Wunderlich (1986) reported a correlation of .65 between SES scores and confidence and a correlation of .39 between SES and popularity. Reynolds (1988) found a correlation of .38 between SES scores and overall academic self-concept. In addition, Fleming and Courtney (1984) demonstrated that SES scores correlated .78 with general self-regard, .51 with social confidence, and .35 with school abilities. A Cronbach α of .90 was obtained for the fall 1994 University of Massachusetts at Amherst prescreening sample and a Cronbach α of .90 was also obtained for the spring 1995 sample.

Least-Preferred Coworker Scale. People's scores of the Least-Preferred Coworker Scale (LPC) are associated with many relationship orientation concepts. For instance, Meuwese (1964) found that high LPC people are more considerate and that members of groups with high LPC leaders tend to be

lower in anxiety, get along better, and are more satisfied. Hawkins (1962) reported that low LPC people are more task-oriented than relationship-oriented and more punitive toward poor coworkers. Meuwese (1964) found that low LPC people are more efficient and goal-oriented. Finally, Bishop (1964) indicated that high LPC people derive their major satisfaction from successful interpersonal relationships while low LPC people derive their major satisfaction from task performance. A Cronbach α of .95 was obtained for the fall 1994 University of Massachusetts at Amherst prescreening sample and a Cronback α of .94 was obtained for the spring 1995 sample.

Epstein's Emotion Triads. This scale was designed to measure people's current emotional state (Epstein, 1979). The clusters of three adjectives were determined by factor analysis of adjective checklists (e.g., Epstein, 1976). In this experiment, we were interested particularly in a triad measuring anxiety. Morling and Fiske (1994) reported that high trait anxiety is related to high scores on the jittery-shaky-nervous triad. Thus, the jittery-shaky-nervous triad was used as our measure of state anxiety.

State Self-Esteem Scales. Because these scales have not been used widely in research, independent validity information is not available. However, using participants in this experiment, a Cronbach α of .89 was obtained for the first State Self-Esteem Scale and a Cronbach α of .88 was obtained for the second State Self-Esteem Scale.

Results

Manipulation Checks

A measure of participants' perceptions of how well the fictitious other was expected to do in the discussion indicated that the expectancy manipulation operated as designed. Participants in the positive expectancy condition expected the other person to do better in the discussion (M = 9.25) than did participants in the negative expectancy condition (M = 3.79), $F(1,107) = 238.74$, $MSE = 3.50$, $p < .0001$.[4] This accurately reflects the information these participants were given.

In addition, significantly more participants than would be expected by chance correctly answered the questionnaire item asking who would be judging their performance, $t(110) = 8.21$, $SE = 5.24$, $p < .001$. Therefore, most of the participants understood whom they were told would be judging their performance.

Contrary to previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1995), there was not a main effect for dependency on the measure of how much control the other person had over whether the participant won the prize. Participants who were not dependent did not differ from those who where evaluatively dependent. The item measuring the other person's control was on the final questionnaire and several new scales were added to the study prior to this final questionnaire. These new scales may have affected measures on the final questionnaire. This possibility will be addressed in the discussion.

Timed Attention

The total number of seconds participants attended to positive and negative attribute information was entered into a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) on Dependency (none, evaluative) X Expectation (positive, negative) X Information Valence (positive, negative). This analysis yielded two main effects. Participants in the evaluative condition spent more time on the trait information (M = 148.77 seconds) than participants in the no dependency condition (M = 127.76), $F(1,106) = 8.12$, MSE = 744.59, $p < .01$. This effect has been found in previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1995) and may indicate that evaluatively dependent participants require more time than other participants in order to discount some of the trait information. In addition, all participants spent more time on negative trait information (M = 74.65 seconds) than positive trait information (M = 63.61), $F(1,106) = 46.24$, MSE = 145.90, $p < .0001$.[5] This is not unusual. A great deal of person perception research has indicated that, in general, negative information is considered more informative than positive information (see Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).

Mediators

Self-Esteem Threat. Self-esteem threat was operationalized as the difference between each participant's state self-esteem score at the beginning of the experimental session (State Self-Esteem Scale) and each participant's state self-esteem score after the think-aloud protocol (State Self-Esteem Scale within Feelings of Inadequacy Scale).[6] These two state self-esteem measures used different response scales and, therefore, could not be compared directly

to one another. Thus, the each state self-esteem score was converted to a z-score. Self-esteem threat was computed by subtracting the second measure from the first. Therefore, threat would be indicated by a negative difference score.

This difference score was entered into a 2 X 2 ANOVA, using Dependency (none, evaluative) and Expectation (positive, negative) as the independent variables. It was hypothesized that participants expecting evaluation would be more threatened by the evaluation than other participants. However, there was no main effect for outcome dependency condition.

In addition, self-esteem threat was hypothesized to predict the degree of bias in participants' impressions of the evaluator. Thus, the total number[7] of discounting comments made by participants was regressed on this difference score. This regression was not significant.

State Anxiety. State anxiety was operationalized as each participant's score on the jittery-shaky-nervous triad of Epstein's Emotion Triads. This score was entered into a 2 X 2 ANOVA, using Dependency (none, evaluative) and Expectation (positive, negative) as the independent variables. It was hypothesized that participants expecting evaluation would be more anxious than other participants. However, there was no main effect for outcome dependency condition.

Furthermore, state anxiety was hypothesized to predict the degree of bias in participants' impressions of the evaluator. Thus, the total number of

discounting comments made by participants was regressed on this difference score. This regression was not significant.

Moderators[8]

Trait Self-Esteem. It was predicted that low self-esteem participants would be more threatened by the evaluation than high self-esteem participants. In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median split was performed on the Self-Esteem Scale, and a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA[9] was conducted on the self-esteem threat variable, using Dependency (none,evaluative), Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom half, top half) as the independent variables. This analysis did not yield the predicted effect.

It also was predicted that low self-esteem participants would be more negatively biased in their perceptions of the evaluator's traits than high self-esteem participants. In order to investigate this hypotheses, a median split was performed on the Self-Esteem Scale, and 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs were conducted on the trait measures, using Dependency (none,evaluative), Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom half, top half) as the independent variables. None of these analyses yielded the predicted effect.

Relationship Orientation. It was predicted that relations-oriented participants would be more threatened by the evaluation than task-oriented participants. In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median split was performed on the Least-Preferred Coworker Scale, and a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was conducted on the self-esteem threat variable, using Dependency (none,evaluative), Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom

half, top half) as the independent variables. This analysis did not yield the predicted effect.

It also was predicted that relations-oriented participants' perceptions of the evaluator would be more biased than task-oriented participants' perceptions. In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median split was performed on the Least-Preferred Coworker Scale, and 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs were conducted on the trait measures, using Dependency (none,evaluative), Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom half, top half) as the independent variables. These analyses did not yield the predicted effect.

The trait measures were on the final questionnaire and, as mentioned, the absence of effects on the final questionnaire may have been due to the addition of new measures prior to the questionnaire. Furthermore, the new measures were the measures of state self-esteem and state anxiety. As discussed, these mediators also did not behave as predicted.

Think-aloud Protocols

For each comment type that was used by at least 10% of the participants, the number of such comments served as the dependent variable entered into a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed-model ANOVA on Dependency (none, evaluative) X Expectation (positive, negative) X Information Valence (positive, negative).

Discounting. The ANOVA indicated that evaluatively dependent participants discounted the information more (M = 3.45) than did non-dependent participants (M = 2.04), $F(1,106) = 8.64$, $MSE = 3.24$, $p < .005$, replicating previous findings. In addition, a marginal dependency by valence

interaction, $F(1,106)=3.50$, $MSE = 2.82$, $p = .064$, indicated that while both non-dependent and evaluatively dependent participants discounted more negative ($M = 1.85$ and $M = 2.98$, respectively) than positive ($M = 0.18$ and $M = 0.47$, respectively) information, this difference was much larger for evaluatively dependent participants (see Figure 2). As found in previous research, this increased discounting may have been in an effort to interpret the information about the evaluator in a positive manner.

Mediation. In addition, self-esteem threat and state anxiety were predicted to mediate the effect of dependency on impression bias. We already know that dependency did not predict self-esteem threat or state anxiety. However, additional analyses indicated that dependency did predict discounting, $\beta = .27$, $t(1) = 2.71$, $p < .05$. Further analyses indicated that neither self-esteem threat nor state anxiety reduced the predictive power of dependency. Thus, neither self-esteem threat nor state anxiety could be considered a mediator of the effect of dependency on discounting (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Once again, the measures of state self-esteem and state anxiety did not behave as predicted.

Positivity bias. Most of the other significant effects for the comments were valence effects. The participants seemed more comfortable with the positive aspects of the other. Participants made more dispositional comments about the positive information ($M = 3.77$) than the negative information ($M = 2.30$), $F(1,106) = 54.42$, $MSE = 2.19$, $p < .0001$, and more evaluative comments about the positive information ($M = 4.29$) than the negative information ($M = 2.40$), $F(1,106) = 6.95$, $MSE = 1.03$, $p < .01$.[10] On the

other hand, participants discounted more negative information (M = 2.42) than positive (M = 0.33), F(1,106) = 85.50, MSE = 2.82, p < .0001. In addition, participants made more elaborations (many discounting) about the negative information (M = 4.82) than the positive information (M = 3.15), F(1,106) = 51.19, MSE = 2.99, p < .0001.[11] Similarly, participants made more attribute connections for the negative information (M = 0.60, mostly indicating disagreement with positive information) than the positive information (M = 0.26), F(1,106) = 11.24, MSE = 0.56, p < .005.[12] Finally, more hedges were made about the negative information (M = 4.19) than the positive information (M = 3.54), F(1,106) = 9.86, MSE = 2.43, p < .005.[13] These findings seem to indicate that participants preferred to view the other person in a positive rather than a negative manner. While they discounted, elaborated, and hedged about the negative information, they preferred to make dispositional inferences and comment on the valence of the positive comments.

Inaccuracy

A main effect for expectancy indicated that positive expectancy participants believed the other person would have more control over the experimental outcome (M = 6.91) than negative expectancy participants (M = 5.82), F(1,107) = 4.90, MSE = 6.93, p < .05. In an earlier study, Stevens and Fiske (1995, Experiment 3) reported a similar finding; across dependency conditions, positive expectancy participants believed the other person would have more control than negative expectancy participants. In the present

experiment, this inaccurate perception occurs for both dependency conditions and appears to reflect wishful thinking by all participants.

Finally, in previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1995), the elevated level of discounting, especially of negative information, observed in the evaluated participants was mirrored by a positivity bias in perceptions of the evaluator's traits. In this previous work, while non-dependent perceivers accurately reported the valence of the other person's traits, evaluated perceivers inflated the positivity of the negative evaluator's traits and equated them with the traits of the positive evaluator. However, these results were not replicated in this study. The absence of these effects will be addressed next.

Table 1. Content Categories for Participants' Comments about Target Information

Category	Explanation
Disposition	Inference about target's traits, tendencies, likes.
Elaboration	Interpretation of what the information means or implies.
Evaluation	Evaluation without interpretation.
Hedging	Comment not directed at anything in particular. A pause filled with "well...uh."
Attribute matching	Attempt to match information to prior knowledge of target.
Repetition	Verbatim or paraphrased restatement.
Self-reference	Self-comparison, reference to self, opinions.
No comment	No comment made or participant says "no comment."
Discounting	Changing the valence of information or providing an excuse for it.



Figure 2. Discounting of Positive and Negative Information

CHAPTER 3

DISCUSSION

As anticipated, relative to non-dependent participants, evaluatively dependent participants spent more time on trait information and discounted more information, particularly negative information. These findings substantiate the hypothesis that evaluatively dependent individuals are motivated to use potentially inaccurate processes to perceive an evaluator self-protectively (positively). Furthermore, these effects occurred in the context of an overall positivity bias, across all participants, which was orthogonal to the dependency effects.

Mediation?

The introduction argued that these biased processes result from the tremendous loss of control experienced by evaluated perceivers. This loss of control threatens self-esteem and produces anxiety. In turn, self-esteem threat and anxiety promote specific, positive biases in evaluated people's perceptions of their evaluators (see Figure 1).

However, in the experiment, evaluatively dependent perceivers did not differ from non-dependent perceivers on measures of perceived control, self-esteem threat, or anxiety. Even the individual difference measures of trait self-esteem and relationship orientation did not influence perceivers' self-esteem threat or anxiety.

One could argue that the dependency manipulation was not effective; the evaluation condition was not sufficiently threatening to the experimental participants. Yet, the same dependency manipulation was used successfully at

least twice before in the studies on which the theoretical reasoning in this paper is based (Stevens & Fiske, 1995, Experiments 2 and 3). In fact, in order to make the evaluation more salient in this study, participants were informed that they would be receiving their evaluation at the end of the experimental session.

It is more likely that the absence of effects on the self-esteem threat and anxiety measures was due to characteristics of the measures themselves. The jittery-shaky-nervous emotion triad was the seventh of nine emotion triads. While there were no significant effects on the preceding emotion triads, participants' feelings of anxiety could have dissipated as they worked through the questionnaire items. In addition, the second state self-esteem scale was embedded in a 26-item scale that has a correlation of .82 with the Self-Esteem Scale on which the state self-esteem measure was based (Eagly, 1969). Self-esteem effects could have been diluted across these 36 items. Perhaps these measures need to be refined or disguised in order to yield the predicted effects.

In any case, these measures were added to the experimental procedure after the think-aloud portion of the study. As reviewed above, the predicted effects were present for the think-aloud measures in the study. However, the addition of these measures seems to have interfered with the hypothesized effects for the final questionnaire.

Biased Perceptions?

As indicated, while this study replicated the attention and discounting biases found in the think aloud protocols of previous research (Stevens &

Fiske, 1995), additional effects were not replicated and new hypotheses were not confirmed. Based on previous research, it was predicted that an incompetent other would be inaccurately perceived as competent by evaluatively dependent participants. In addition, low self-esteem participants were hypothesized to desire a incompetent evaluator and task-oriented participants were hypothesized to be particularly sensitive to the evaluator's competency. None of these effects occurred.

These effects may have disappeared because participants were able to self-affirm via completion of the mood measure or the state self-esteem scale, which both followed the think-aloud portion of the study. As discussed in the introduction, self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) argues that information threatening the perceived adequacy or integrity of the self activates a self-defensive goal to affirm the general integrity of the self. In order to accomplish this affirmation, people may adapt to the specific self-threat, may affirm the broader self-concept, or may affirm a different, but equally important aspect of the self. The self-esteem and mood measures not only provided participants with a way to affirm their broader self-concept, but self-esteem and mood (anxiety) were hypothesized to be the specific self-threat in this evaluative context. Affirmation would have eliminated the effects of extreme control deprivation associated with being evaluatively dependent by restoring an efficacious self-image. Thus, the predicted perceived control and trait effects disappeared.

Proposed Study

Because the perceived control and trait effects did disappear after the opportunity to self-affirm on mood or self-esteem measures, it appears as though self-esteem or mood is important in an evaluative context. However, we also know from this study that measures of mood and state self-esteem are sensitive measures. It would be advantageous to conduct a study in which only half of the participants are given the opportunity to complete the mood and state self-esteem measures. If findings from the Stevens and Fiske (1995) study are replicated by the participants who do not complete the mood and state self-esteem measures, while the participants who do complete the mood and state self-esteem measures mirror the participants in this study, we will know a little more about how mood and self-esteem affect the use of biased processes of impression formation.

In conclusion, this research on how evaluated powerless people form impressions of their evaluators does indicate that people are motivated tacticians who take their goals into account before choosing strategies; evaluatively dependent people choose different strategies than non-dependent people. Furthermore, we know that some strategies can be directionally biased; evaluated people use positively biased strategies. However, most significantly, this research reveals how much we do not know about the underlying forces that guide these motivated tacticians.

APPENDIX A

SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (TRAIT)

Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements on the scan sheet.

0 = Strongly Disagree 1 = Disagree 2 = Agree 3 = Strongly Agree

1. I feel that I'm person of worth, at least on equal basis with others.
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times, I think I am no good at all.

APPENDIX B

LEAST-PREFERRED COWORKER SCALE

People differ in the ways the think about those with whom they work. This may be important in working with others. Please give your immediate, first reaction to the following items.

Think of everyone with whom you have ever worked on a common task. Now, pick out the person with whom you work least well. This person may be someone you work with now, or may be someone you knew in the past.

This person does not have to be the person you like least well, but should be the person with whom you had the most difficulty in getting a job done. Describe this person as he/she appears to you.

Look at the words at both ends of the line before you decide upon your answer. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers. Work rapidly; your first answer is likely to be the best. Please do not omit any items. Fill in the bubble on the scan sheet for the one number you have chosen for each item.

pleasant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unpleasant

friendly 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unfriendly

rejecting 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 accepting

tense 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 relaxed

distant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 close

cold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 warm

supportive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 hostile

boring 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 interesting

quarrelsome 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 harmonious

gloomy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 cheerful

open 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 guarded

backbiting 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 loyal

untrustworthy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 trustworthy

considerate 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 inconsiderate

nasty 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 nice

agreeable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disagreeable

insincere 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 sincere

kind 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unkind

APPENDIX C

SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (STATE)

Please indicate how you feel right now. Remember, your answers are completely confidential.

1. Currently, I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities at this moment.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

3. Right now, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

4. At this moment, I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

5. At this moment, I think I am able to do things as well as most people.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

6. Right now, I take a positive attitude toward myself.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself at this moment.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

8. Currently, I wish I could have more respect for myself.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

9. I certainly feel useless at this moment.

   1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

10. Currently, I think I am no good at all.

    1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX D

STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT

Sentences Consistent with Competence

I thought the TA had just the right amount of persistence when trying to relate an idea to the class.

The TA was efficient and usually got the homework graded way ahead of time.

I thought the TA sometimes had very clever answers to questions.

The TA appeared to be relaxed during teaching.

I liked how quickly the TA went through the material without omitting any important points.

Sentences Consistent with Incompetence

I thought the TA was sort of vague when explaining things.

The TA was sloppy and had illegible handwriting.

From the amount of preparation and the level of organization, I would say that the TA was an irresponsible instructor.

The TA took a superficial approach to teaching, not showing a lot of interest in the participant.

In the discussion section, the TA spent a lot of time nitpicking at minor details.

APPENDIX E

EPSTEIN'S EMOTION TRIADS

Please indicate how you feel right now by circling a number for each of the following groups of emotions:

	not at all						very much
happy, cheerful, OR joyous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
angry, irritated, OR annoyed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
unhappy, sad, OR gloomy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
frightened, worried, OR threatened	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
energetic, aroused, OR keyed-up	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
tired, weary, OR unreactive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
jittery, shaky, OR nervous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
calm, relaxed, OR at ease	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
enthusiastic, alive, OR alert	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX F

SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (STATE) WITHIN FEELINGS OF INADEQUACY SCALE

Please indicate how you feel right now. Remember, your answers are completely confidential.

1. Right now, do you feel inferior to most of the people you know?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

2. At this moment, do you worry about criticisms that might be made of your work?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

3. Right now, do feel you are able to do things as well as most people?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

4. If you had to read an essay and understand it at this moment, would you feel worried or concerned about it?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

5. At this moment, do you feel confident that someday the people you know will look up to you and respect you?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

6. Currently, do you feel self-conscious?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

7. Do you certainly feel useless at this moment?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

8. At this moment, do you think you would have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about if you were in a group?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

9. Right now, if you had to write an argument to convince someone, who may disagree with your ideas, would you feel concerned or worried about it?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

10. Currently, do you think you are no good at all?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

11. At this moment, do you worry about how well you get along with other people?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

12. Do you think that you are a worthless individual at this moment?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

13. Currently, do you feel afraid or anxious about going into a room by yourself where other people have already gathered and are talking?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

14. Do you feel that you have a number of good qualities at this moment?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

15. Currently, would you have trouble expressing your ideas if you tried to put them into writing?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

16. Right now, do you worry about whether other people will regard you as a success or failure?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

17. Currently, do you wish you could have more respect for yourself?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

18. Currently, do you feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder whether you are a worthwhile person?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

19. At this moment, do you imagine that you have less scholastic ability than your classmates?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

20. At this moment, would you feel uncomfortable meeting new people?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

21. Right now, are you inclined to feel that you are a failure?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

22. Right now, do you dislike yourself?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

23. Are you troubled with shyness at this moment?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

24. Right now, do you take a positive attitude toward yourself?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

25. If you turned in a major assignment right now, would you feel you did an excellent job on it?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

26. Do you feel worried or bothered about what other people think about you at this moment?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

27. Right now, if you made an embarrassing mistake or did something that makes you look foolish, would it take you a long time to get over it?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

28. Are you satisfied with yourself at the moment?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

29. Right now, do you feel confident about your abilities?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

30. Currently, are you worried about whether other people like to be with you?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

31. Currently, do you feel that you are a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

32. Right now, would you have trouble understanding things you read?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

33. Right now, if you thought that some of the people you meet might have an unfavorable opinion of you, would you feel concerned or worried about it?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

34. Currently, do you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do well?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

35. At this moment, do you feel you do not have much to be proud of?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

36. Currently, compared with classmates, do you feel you must study more than they do to get the same grades?

definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes

APPENDIX G

EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Part I

Please answer the following questions honestly. Your answers are completely confidential.

How well do you think you will do on the task?

not very well 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very well

How well does the work-study person expect to do in the discussion?

not very well 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very well

How much control do you feel you will have over your outcomes in this experiment?

very little 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 a lot

How much control do you feel the work-study student will have over your outcomes in this experiment?

very little 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 a lot

You have received some information about the work-study person with whom you will discuss your ideas. Do you think this information will be helpful?

not very helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very helpful

If you were participating in this experiment again, would you like:

less info about the work-study 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 more info about the work-study

the same amount

How inconsistent or consistent was the information you received about the work-study student?

very inconsistent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very consistent

How positive or negative was the information you received about the work-study student?

very positive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very negative

How unclear or clear is your impression of the work-study person?

very unclear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very clear

Does the work-study person seem:

Competent.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Likable.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Lazy.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Outgoing.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Honest.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Friendly.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Irresponsible.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Loyal.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Hard-working.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

Nervous.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very

How happy or unhappy do you feel about having this person as the person you'll be discussing your ideas with?

very happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very unhappy

Who will be evaluating your performance in order to give away the prizes?

What kind of things do you think will influence how well you do on the task and in the evaluation?

Part II

Based on what you remember from the explanation given earlier, please briefly describe what you are getting ready to work on.

We are always interested in any comments, ideas, questions, or predictions people have about our studies. If you have any, please describe them below.

ENDNOTES

[1] The six deleted participants were distributed across conditions: Four were in the no dependency-positive expectancy condition, none were in the no dependency-negative expectancy condition, one was in the evaluative dependency-positive expectancy condition, and one was in the evaluative dependency-negative expectancy condition.

[2] The Feelings of Inadequacy Scale simply was used to disguise the second presentation of the State Self-Esteem Scale and will not be discussed in any further.

[3] Only those questionnaire items that yielded significant effects are discussed in the results section.

[4] Five additional expectancy main effects also served as manipulation checks. Participants expecting a positive other indicated that the information they received was less negative ($\underline{M}$ =4.75) than participants expecting a negative other ($\underline{M}$ = 6.29), $\underline{F}(1,107) = 16.46$, $\underline{MSE} = 3.99$, $\underline{p} < .0005$. Participants expecting a positive other also rated the other more competent ($\underline{M}$ = 7.47), more likable ($\underline{M}$ = 7.33), more outgoing ($\underline{M}$ = 6.98), and less nervous ($\underline{M}$ = 3.56) than participants expecting a negative other ($\underline{M}$ = 5.91, $\underline{M}$ =6.66, $\underline{M}$ = 5.45, and $\underline{M}$ = 6.91, respectively), $\underline{F}(1,107) = 18.13$, $\underline{MSE}$ = 3.71, $\underline{p} < .0001$, $\underline{F}(1,107) = 4.55$, $\underline{MSE} = 2.67$, $\underline{p} < .05$, $\underline{F}(1,107) = 23.66$, $\underline{MSE} = 2.78$, $\underline{p} < .0005$, $\underline{F}(1,107) = 61.07$, $\underline{MSE} = 5.07$, $\underline{p} < .0001$, respectively.

[5] A valence by expectation interaction indicated that participants who

expected the other to be positive had a larger difference between time spent on negative (M = 76.02) and positive (M = 61.19) information than participants who expected the other to be negative (negative M = 73.29, positive M = 66.04), $F(1,106) = 5.49$, $MSE = 145.90$, $p < .05$.

[6] Other operationalizations of self-esteem threat were investigated and the results of those analyses did not differ from the presented analyses.

[7] Using only the discounting comments made about negative information did not affect the results.

[8] A measure of trait anxiety also was available from the prescreening questionnaire. Although no hypotheses were made about trait anxiety, exploratory analyses were conducted. None of these analyses yielded any meaningful effects.

[9] Moderator effects were also investigated using regression analyses and the results did not differ from those of the ANOVAs.

[10] Participants expecting a positive other also seemed more comfortable commenting on the valence of the information; they made more evaluative comments (M = 4.29) than participants expecting a negative other (M = 2.40), $F(1,106) = 6.95$, $MSE = 7.05$, $p < .01$.

[11] More elaborations were made by evaluative participants (M = 9.29) than by non-dependent participants (M = 6.64), $F(1,106) = 5.20$, MSE = 18.51, $p < .05$. Furthermore, a dependency by valence interaction indicated that while both non-dependent and evaluatively dependent participants both made more elaborations about the negative information (M = 3.87 and M = 5.76, respectively) than the positive information (M = 2.76 and M = 3.53,

respectively), this difference was larger for evaluatively dependent participants, $\underline{F}(1,106) = 5.92$, $\underline{MSE} = 2.99$, $\underline{p} < .05$. Once again, many of these elaborations were also discounting comments.

[12] In addition, two main effects indicated that evaluatively dependent participants ($\underline{M} = 0.58$) made more attribute connections than non-dependent participants ($\underline{M} = 0.28$), $\underline{F}(1,106) = 6.17$, $\underline{MSE} = 0.83$, $\underline{p} < .05$, and that participants expecting a positive fictitious other ($\underline{M} = 0.57$) made more attribute connections than participants expecting a negative fictitious other ($\underline{M} = 0.29$), $\underline{F}(1,106) = 5.47$, $\underline{MSE} = 0.83$, $\underline{p} < .05$. Again, in these statements, participants highlighted the negative information's disagreement with the positive information. Both participants expecting a positive fictitious other and participants being evaluated appeared to have positive expectations for the other person.

[13] An expectation by valence interaction indicated that the same number of hedges about the positive information were made by participants expecting a positive other and participants expecting a negative other ($\underline{M} = 3.45$ and $\underline{M} = 3.62$, respectively). However, participants expecting a positive other made many more hedges about the negative information ($\underline{M} = 4.71$) than participants expecting a negative other ($\underline{M} = 3.67$), $\underline{F}(1,106) = 8.27$, $\underline{MSE} = 2.43$, $\underline{p} < .005$. Participants expecting a positive other may have been surprised unpleasantly by the negative information.

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