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The importance of diagnosis in implementing successful organization change : five case studies.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF DIAGNOSIS

IN IMPLEMENTING

SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATION CHANGE:

FIVE CASE STUDIES

A Dissertation Presented

By

SYLVIA IRENE CARTER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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January   1976

Leadership and Organization Development

THE IMPORTANCE OF DIAGNOSIS

IN IMPLEMENTING

SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATION CHANGE:

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An Abstract of

THE IMPORTANCE OF DIAGNOSIS IN IMPLEMENTING

SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE:

FIVE CASE STUDIES

by

Sylvia I. Carter

Directed by: Kenneth H. Blanchard

Today the crisis of leadership pervades our institutions. An organization's survival or failure depends greatly on its leadership. Accelerating technological changes and growing sophistication of our work forces have created new demands on today's leaders. Those responsible for organizational growth and prosperity need new models to help them understand the complex nature of leadership.

The Life Cycle Theory (LCT) of leadership formulated by Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard is a model which attempts to identify some of the major elements in the leadership function and organize them into a framework for diagnosing the appropriate leadership style for a given situation. The purpose of this study is to test the usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic framework for effective leadership by applying it to five published case studies of organizational change acknowledged for their success or failure.

The Life Cycle Theory is based on the Ohio State leadership studies which identified two fundamental dimensions of leadership

behavior, and concluded that "initiating structure" and "consideration for People" are not mutually exclusive, but that a leader may exhibit both behaviors in varying degrees. These two behaviors were plotted on two separate axis, forming a grid which contains four basic leader styles.

Hersey and Blanchard renamed the two leadership behaviors "task" and "relationships" behaviors. They added a "maturity continuum" to the grid. This continuum refers to subordinates task relevant maturity. In order to diagnose a subordinate's level of "maturity", a leader must take into account 1) their achievement motivation, 2) their willingness and ability to perform the task, 3) their task relevant education and/or experience. Once a leader has determined the subordinate's level of "maturity" according to these variables, he or she, can select the leadership style most appropriate to the subordinates' needs.

A summary of each case precedes a final analysis. Each phase of the case, before, during and after change, is analyzed according to the analytic framework to discover if the style of leadership used by the key leader was appropriate for the particular situation.

Anatomy of Educational Innovation by L. Smith and P. Keith examines the unsuccessful attempt to create an open school. Behind the Front Page by C. Argyris chronicles failure in a major American news- paper. Making Waves In Foggy Bottom by A. Marrow described successful and unsuccessful change in the State Department. Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership by R. Guest describes how an auto- mobile assembly plant was brought from last to first place in its

division. Management by Participation by A. Marrow, D. Bowers and

S. Seashore describes successful change in the garment industry.

In conclusion, five issues emerge from the study:

1. Leaders of successful change programs showed
   flexibility of style.

2. In cases of unsuccessful change, inadequate
   technical systems were not improved; attention
   was paid only to human systems.

3. The T-Group approach to organizational change
   was extremely unsuccessful.

4. Successful change was always preceded by
   recognition of organizational crisis, which
   brought to the fore an awareness and acceptance
   of inappropriate leadership. In unsuccessful
   cases, crisis either did not exist, or was not
   acknowledged.

5. As a diagnostic model, the Life Cycle Theory is
   subject to much individual interpretation. Its
   ultimate usefulness depends on the diagnostic
   skills of the practitioner.

While the Life Cycle Theory provides a useful framework for

diagnosing appropriate leadership in a given situation, it is still in

its initial stages of development and needs further research to provide

a more accurate measurement of "maturity". In the last analysis, the

Life Cycle Theory is a forerunner in the field of situational leadership.

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INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Leadership is a principal cause of organizational survival or failure. Today, the crisis of leadership is becoming ever more serious in our governmental, industrial, and educational institutions. This study offers a particular perspective on leadership that might provide some help to those responsible for organizational growth and prosperity.

The relatively new practice of assisting organizations in their growth, called Organizational Development (OD), began to develop in the early thirties, and has grown greatly over the last decade. Hersey and Blanchard (1975) define it as:

> planned change--an effort to increase the overall
> effectiveness of an organization or organizational
> unit [p. 14].

Although an organization is composed of technical and human systems, traditionally OD practitioners have tended to emphasize the human system and the human relations approach when attempting change.

This approach however, has had its difficulties. In a 1967 study of successful and unsuccessful attempts at organizational change, Buchanan was unable to find any crucial issues common to the successes and failures. He concluded that one of the reasons for this was that all ten cases he studied represented "a similar people approach to OD [p. 66]." Schein and Bennis (1965) are concerned that the emphasis on

a cohesive, leaderless democracy. They feel that as a result of laboratory training, people should be able to choose with greater knowledge what forms or practice might be most appropriate; for example, that under certain conditions, "autocracy might be more appropriate [p. 329]."

Many practitioners, such as Margulies and Raia (1972) have begun to call for a greater variety of approaches to OD. Finding that in actual practice, "most practitioners tend to focus on the personal-cultural subsystems, and merely pay lip service to technological and administrative changes [p. 477]," they suggest that OD techniques developed to date show an over-emphasis on the human aspect. If OD is truly to use a system approach to organizational effectiveness and change, then, they state, the practitioner must make an effort to make use of alternative change strategies. Ultimately, interventions to bring about organizational change will be concerned with the style of leadership directing the change(s) in the organization. As the theoreticians above have argued, leadership should vary according to the unique needs of each organization.

Hersey and Blanchard (1972) have built on existing situational approaches to leadership in developing the Life Cycle Theory of leadership. This method is used as a diagnostic tool in organizational development. A brief background of the Life Cycle Theory follows. The Ohio State Leadership studies (1945) described leadership according to two dimensions of initiating structure and consideration. From these studies, Blake and Mouton (1964) developed their Managerial Grid which

describes five types of leadership styles based on 'concern for people' and 'concern for production'. The Tri-Dimensional Leadership Effectiveness model as described by Hersey and Blanchard (1972), grows out of these previous studies. In the Tri-Dimensional model, leader style is related to an effectiveness dimension. The Life Cycle Theory of leadership is an outgrowth of the Tri-Dimensional model. This situational theory attempts to relate task behavior and relationship behavior of the leader, and maturity level of the followers. In so doing, the theory attempts to provide a leader with some understanding of the relationships between an effective style of leadership and the level of maturity of his or her followers. While Life Cycle Theory emphasizes appropriate leader behavior, Hersey and Blanchard have also used this theory as a framework to integrate many of the motivational and change theories available in the literature.

Purpose of the Study

This study will attempt to determine the usefulness of Hersey and Blanchard's Life Cycle Theory of leadership as a diagnostic method for determining the most appropriate leadership style in a given organizational situation. In order to accomplish this, five cases of organizational change taken from the literature, both successful and unsuccessful, will be described and analyzed according to an analytic framework. This framework will contain all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory and some variables from related situational leadership theories. In each case, we will attempt to see if the Life Cycle Theory accounts for the success or failure of the leader's attempt at change.

Significance of the Study

1. There is a need for a situational approach in OD interventions. Hopefully this study will examine the Life Cycle Theory as one useful situational approach.

2. Case studies are an important tool in furthering the development of the field of organizational development research. As Giaquinta and Bernstein (1971) observe, case studies provide an in depth observation of the efforts to institute planned change. As such they are useful to the future efforts of OD practitioners.

3. It is important to continue research in the field of organizational change. As Schein and Bennis (1965) note,

> In some organizational change programs a great deal
> of attention is being paid to research, but not
> enough research is yet being done [p. 323].

In particular, it is important to investigate the applicability of any diagnostic framework; thus the examination of the Life Cycle Theory which will be undertaken in this study.

4. The length of a case description and analysis has been deliberately limited to around twenty pages each in order to provide a set of cases of practical usefulness to the practitioner in classroom or workshop settings. It is the hope of the writer that this study will be used in the field, to make this theory "come alive" for people.

Delimitations of the Study

1. Because the writer will be dealing with already recorded case studies, knowledge of the interventions will be second hand.

2. Each case study written contains the personal biases of the author of the case, as well as the writer of this study. Schmuck and Miles (1971) note the problem arising from this method of case writing:

> Most OD practitioners are not researchers: they do not systematically evaluate the outcome of interventions except in informal ways.... Most OD consultants collect information from clients in the manner of an 'artistic clinician' [p. 231].

Buchanan, after his study of a number of OD interventions, noted that the information required to determine crucial issues in OD interventions was often not included in case reports because of what the writer was willing to reveal about his or her own work, or because of what the organization would allow the writer to record.

3. The Life Cycle Theory of leadership has not yet been fully researched. As a result, one cannot claim that it encompasses the total spectrum of organizational problems.

4. All of the dimensions of the Life Cycle Theory have not yet been defined through research and operationalized. Hence the practitioner must use subjective judgment to utilize the Life Cycle model.

Organization of the Study

This study will be divided into seven chapters. The present chapter introduces the study. Chapter two will outline a background of leadership theory, tracing the development of two theoretical schools of thought: one, that there is one best style of leadership in all situations, and two, that leadership is relative to the situation. Chapter three will describe the Life Cycle Theory of leadership, a situational theory which postulates a method for diagnosing the situation so that

the most appropriate leadership style can be selected. Chapter four develops an analytic framework which is used to analyze the cases under consideration. Chapter five describes and analyzes two unsuccessful cases, and one mixed success case of organizational change:

Case 1: Education <u>Anatomy of Educational Innovation</u>, by Louis M. Smith and Pat M. Keith. This case describes an unsuccessful attempt to create an open school.

Case 2: Business <u>Behind the Front Page</u>, by Chris Argyris. This case describes Argyris' unsuccessful three year attempt to bring about a participative management system in a major U. S. newspaper.

Case 3: Government <u>Making Waves In Foggy Bottom</u>, by Alfred J. Marrow. This case describes two unsuccessful attempts, and one successful attempt to reorganize the United States Department of State.

Chapter six describes and analyzes two successful cases or organizational change:

Case 4: Business <u>Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership</u>, by Robert Guest. This case describes how a plant manager brought an automobile assembly plant from last to first place in its division.

Case 5: Business <u>Management by Participation</u>, by Alfred J. Marrow, David G. Bowers, and Stanley E. Seashore. This case describes how the Harwood company brought the Weldon company from failure to success.

C H A P T E R II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

Applied behavioral scientists have been of two minds concerning leadership. One school of thought, the older, has held that leadership is absolute, and that there is one best style of leadership in all circumstances. Beginning in the early thirties, the generally humanistic and democratically oriented practitioners beloning to this school emphasized interpersonal relations and democratic leadership as the key to improving organizations. The other newer school of thought which began in the forties, and has gained momentum over the last decade, holds that leadership is relative to the situation. Practitioners in this school argue for a systems approach to Organizational Development with an emphasis on situational leadership.

This chapter will be divided into two parts. Since chronologically writers who view leadership as absolute, dependent solely on the characteristics of the leader, preceed those who view leadership as relative, Part One will outline some of the concepts that fall under the category of leadership as absolute. Part Two will describe some of the concepts of situational leadership. This order is summarized in the following flow chart. (See Figure 1.)

LEADERSHIP ABSOLUTE   LEADERSHIP SITUATIONAL

To 1900
<u>Traditional</u>
<u>Leadership Theory</u>

1930
<u>Human Relations</u>
<u>Leadership Theory</u>

1940
<u>White and Lippitt</u>   <u>Hemphill</u>
Autocratic - Democratic -   Leadership depends on
Laissez-Faire Leadership   Group

1950
<u>Fleishman and Harris</u>   <u>Fiedler</u>   <u>Korman</u>
Human Relations Training   Contingency   Criticism
in Industry   Theory   of Fiedler

1960
<u>Likert</u>   <u>Lawrence and Lorsch</u>
Participative Management   Integration - Differentiation
                              Theory

<u>Blake and Mouton</u>   <u>Lowin and Craig</u>
Managerial Grid   <u>Farris and Lim</u>
                              Leadership depends on Followers

Figure 1. Theory Flow Chart for Chapter Two

This chapter has three purposes. The brief history of leadership theory presented here will show the development of leadership theory and approaches to Organizational Development to the present. Today, behavioral science practitioners are calling for a greater variety of approaches to OD. There is a growing need for emphasis on the particular situation in order to determine what type of intervention to use to bring about organizational change.

This chapter will also show the derivation of the Life Cycle Theory of leadership. The Life Cycle Theory, to be fully described in Chapter Three, is a situational leadership theory which attempts to provide a method for diagnosing the situation in an organization so that a leader can select a leadership style suitable to the needs of the situation. This situational theory will be the primary one used to analyze the cases under consideration in this paper. Finally, this chapter will generally provide a theoretical reference for the analyses of the cases to be presented in this study.

<div align="center">Part One - Leadership As Absolute</div>

Introduction

The concepts of leadership summarized in this section will be those which are concerned with leadership as absolute; that there is one best style of leadership which exists independently and which is always appropriate. Those believing in a best approach divide themselves generally into two schools: the traditional and the human relations approach to leadership.

Leadership is inextricably linked to social systems. The traditional approach to leadership which will be described first, was the outcome of an autocratic social system that has been extant in the western world to the time of the industrial revolution. The human relations approach to leadership which will be considered next was the outcome of a democratic-technocratic social system which began with the industrial revolution and continues today. Some of the aspects of these two social systems relevant to the concepts of leadership they produced are presented in figure 2.

Classical-Traditional Concept of Leadership	Human Relations Concept of Leadership
autocratic social system: Greek times to industrial revolution	democratic-technocratic social system: industrial revolution to present
society based on class structure: King-serf Pope-laity master-servant boss-indentured worker	"classless" society
leaders ruled by power, status, position, wealth, education: independent of followers	leaders rule through power, status, position wealth, education through support of followers
leaders have control of life support systems of followers: hence leaders unconcerned with socio-emotional needs of followers	followers control own life support systems: hence leaders concerned with socio-emotional needs of followers

Figure 2. Traditional and Human Relations Concepts of Leadership Compared to Two Social Systems

Traditional Leadership Theory

For all recorded history leadership has been a subject of concern. In the western world, from the Greco-Roman era, leadership was the province of the male citizen who, by virtue of sex, status, education and wealth, held responsibility for governing. This hierarchical system continued basically unchanged through the industrial revolution in Europe and America. Leaders were men whose leadership positions were determined by birth and wealth.

Traditional leadership theory, derived from a hierarchical social system, holds that an organization, whether military, religious, educational or industrial, functions best when headed by a strong and authoritative leader. As Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) describe, this type of leader provides his followers with a detailed description of their role and function, establishes limited and prescribed communications channels, and directly oversees no more than five or six immediate subordinates. (See figure 3.) In this type of organization, influence is highest at the top, and decreases to none at the lowest levels. Departmentalization is viewed positively; the more of it the better, as it contributes to easier coordination. Conflicts are resolved by superiors. Authority and responsibility rest with the supreme head, whose influence derives from his position, control of rewards and punishments, and superior knowledge.

Because of the responsibility and importance of the leadership position in this heirarchical system, much time was spent in teaching the sons of priviledged classes the skills and characteristics considered necessary to good leadership. And the literature of leader-

ship, from Cicero to the 1930's, largely reflected this attitude. Gibb (1959) has summarized the traits or characteristics of the good leader which were to be sought for and emulated. There have been many hours spent in researching the characteristics of successful leaders. However, as Hemphill (1949) points out, while the results have yielded a mass of data on the personal qualities of leaders in many specific situations, personal qualities common to all leaders have not been found.

Figure 3. Traditional Leadership and Organizational Pattern

Human Relations Leadership Theory

With the advent of compulsory mass education, the abolition of child labor, the rise of the unions with attendant labor-management conflicts, the waste of human resources in industry, and a rise in worker apathy and boredom because of mass production, industry sought new ways to achieve high production output in the face of rapid change. The efforts of Elton Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson in the early 30's, to improve production at the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric, marked the beginning of the human relations approach to leadership in industry.

In Mayo's 1933 study, the working conditions of the women who assembled telephone relays were gradually improved; scheduled rest periods, company lunches and shorter work weeks were implemented. As each of these innovations was introduced, production in this experimental group increased. Finally, the researchers removed all of the improvements, expecting production to drop. However it rose to a new high. The researchers concluded that because of the attention devoted to them, these workers felt they were an important part of the company. They had developed feelings of affiliation, competence and pride. Hence when the improvements in working conditions were removed, they felt the company was "in trouble" and made an extra effort in production.

This study signaled the need for management to study and understand relationships among people. As Hersey and Blanchard (1972) note, in these studies at the Hawthorne plant and the many that followed, the most significant factor affecting organizational productivity was found to be the interpersonal relationships developed on the job. This led

to an emphasis on the human relations approach as the best style of leadership. The main tenets of this approach, as summarized by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) are:

1. that the participation of the lower echelons is secured in solving organizational problems.

2. that more openness and trust is fostered among individuals and groups in the organization.

In contrast to the traditional approach, the human relations movement advocates low structure organizations with widely shared influence among members, open confronting methods of conflict resolution, and a high state of integration.

A Comparison of the Traditional and Human Relations Approaches

Extensive studies of these two approaches to leadership have resulted in general agreement among researchers that leadership concepts tend to sort themselves into two general categories. As Bowers and Seashore (1966) state, one category is concerned with people, and the other with getting the job done. The following chart (see figure) attempts to summarize the titles for each of these two categories, and the functions of each of the two types of leaders as seen by several theoreticians. The theoreticians include: Bales (1965), Bowers and Seashore (1966), Borgatte (1960), Gibb (1959), Homans (1950), Kretch and Crutchfield (1948), Carter (1954), Leary (1959), Longabaugh (1966), Shepherd (1964), and Thibaut and Kelly (1959). A key to the authors of each title is given under the chart.

After the Mayo study, much time was devoted to comparing these two types of leadership in an attempt to determine which was the "best".

In general, the ensuing studies tended to favor the democratic people-oriented approach. This value judgment may be observed in the definitions of traditional leadership in figure 4. Several studies will now be reviewed which show the development of the research supporting the viewpoint of the human relations approach as the best method.

Human Relations Approach to Leadership: The Best Method

White and Lippitt. Ralph White and Ronald Lippitt (1943) studied the effects of three leadership styles -- autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire -- in a boys' recreational club, and concluded that a democratic leadership style was best. They found that the autocratic style often created hostility, aggression, including a tendency to scapegoat, latent discontent, more dependence on the leader and less individuality, and a submissive group cohesiveness characterized by a "we're all in the same boat" attitude. The laissez-faire style resulted in less and poorer work done and was more characterized by play. The democratic style created more group-mindedness and more friendliness. Although the quantity of work was slightly greater under the autocratic style, work motivation and originality was stronger under the democratic style.

These findings led White and Lippitt to support the democratic leadership style as best. For the next ten years, this view predominated in leadership research. It was not until the early fifties that doubts were raised about the universal applicability of the human relations approach as the best method of leadership.

TITLES

<u>Classical (L&L)</u>
     or
<u>Authoritarian</u> (G)
     or
<u>Task Oriented</u> (B&S)
     or
<u>Instrumental-Adaptive</u> (B)
     or
<u>Power</u> (L)
     or
<u>Attainment/Achievement</u> (C)

TITLES

<u>Human Relations (L&L)</u>
     or
<u>Democratic</u> (G)
     or
<u>People Oriented</u> (B&S)
     or
<u>Integrative-Expressive</u> (B)
     or
<u>Interpersonal Affiliation</u> (L)
     or
<u>Sociability</u> (C)

FUNCTIONS

TRADITIONAL	HUMAN RELATIONS
goal oriented	group oriented
production oriented	employee oriented
emphasizes high performance goals	emphasizes group supportive relationships
initiates structure	initiates consideration
provides for organizational needs	provides for individual needs
emphasizes management skills	emphasizes human relations skills
directs group in solving problems	assists group in solving problems
represents group in dealing with outside groups or situations	group represents itself in dealing with outside groups or situations
introduces new ideas	encourages new ideas from group members
has key position in decision making	shares decision making
copes with and exercises power over social and physical environment – maintains external system	maintains group's inner/ internal system – maintains solidarity among group members
maintains segregation within group – sees that communication between members is kept to a minimum except insofar as it is through leader and focussed on leader	seeks to reinforce and encourage interpersonal contacts and communication between group members
emphasizes obedience, focussed particularly on leader	seeks to spread responsibility throughout group and avoid hierarchical structure, special priviledge and status
creates and exploits group needs which create dependence on leader	encourages interdependence
mechanistic	organic
rational emphasis	emotional emphasis

<u>CODE</u>

B – Bales
B&S – Bowers and Seashore
C – Carter

G – Gibb
L – Leary
L&L – Lawrence and Lorsch

Figure 4. A Comparison of Traditional and Human Relations Approaches to
          Leadership

Fleishman and Harris. In order to discover:

1. if the effects of human relations training were permanent

2. how the effects of human relations training are influenced by actual work situations

3. the effectiveness of human relations training in industry

Edwin Fleishman, Edwin Harris and Harold Burtt (1955) conducted a leadership training program for first line foremen at International Harvester. These researchers emerged from their study skeptical about the human relations approach to leadership.

Fleishman and Harris' findings had significant implications for advocates of the human relations approach to leadership. They discovered that although there was a general increase in consideration attitudes on the part of the foremen immediately after training, once back at the plant, there was a significant tendency for the trained group to be lower in consideration behavior, and higher in task orientation than the foremen who had not attended the course.

They also discovered that day to day climate was more important in influencing a foreman's leadership style than the leadership training program, and concluded that specific training in human relations is wasted unless the environment in the plant is also strong in human relations. Because of this finding, they recommended that behavioral scientists begin working with leadership attitudes at the top of the organization so that a favorable leadership climate will spread downward through the organization.

Further, they discovered a conflict between leadership styles preferred by bosses for production efficiency and effective leadership styles as inferred from the worker's behavior. In production oriented divisions, supervisors saw proficient foremen as tending toward being authoritarian. This leadership style however, was accompanied by more absenteeism, accidents, grievances, and employee turnover. The workers however, tended not to like working for authoritarian foremen and preferred foremen with a people-oriented leadership style. On the basis of this finding, Fleishman and Harris questioned the assumption that good morale leads to increased production.

After their study, Fleishman and Harris doubted the universal effectiveness of the purely human relations leadership style, and seemed to be reaching toward a best style that would combine the task oriented (traditional) approach and the relationships oriented (human relations) approach. Perhaps, they suggested, a foreman or supervisor who can be both high in task and high in consideration may be able to reconcile this conflict; however, more research, they concluded, would be needed to clarify this. Such research was in fact being conducted at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, during the same period of time in which Fleishman and Harris were conducting their study.

Likert. In 1947 the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan began investigations into the field of leadership to discover what organizational structures, principles, and methods of leadership result in "the best performance." For fourteen years Director Rensis Likert and his colleagues investigated the factors correlating to

high productivity and the factors correlating to low productivity. (See figure 5.)

In 1961 Likert found that productivity depends not on employee morale, but on how well supervisors perform their leadership function. He also found that effective managers are characterized by cooperative, people-oriented attitudes, and an ability to create a situation in which employees establish high performance goals for themselves. His basic components of effective leadership were:

1. human relations orientation

2. ability to bring about compatability of organizational and individual goals

3. ability to create high performance goals.

Likert (1961) incorporated these findings into four systems of management: 1) exploitive authoritative, 2) benevolent authoritative, 3) consultative, and 4) participative group. He posited that system four, Participative Management, is the most effective.

System One: Exploitive Authoritative

This management system assumes that labor is largely a market commodity, with time freely sold and purchased. It conceives of the manager's job as consisting of decision, direction, and surveillance, relies primarily upon coercion as a motivating force, and makes little or no provision for the effects of human emotion and inter-dependence. As a result, communication in this system is sluggish, largely downward in direction, and frequently distorted. Goals are established and decisions made by top management only, based upon fragmentary, often inaccurate and inadequate information. This produces disparity between the desires and interests of the members and the goals of the organization. For these reasons, only high levels of the organization feel any real responsibility for the attainment of established objectives. Their reliance upon coercion as a motivating force leads to an almost total absence of cooperative

High Productivity	Low Productivity
supervisor is employee oriented; concentrates on building work group with high performance goals	supervisor concentrates on task and production
reasonable pressure	unreasonable pressure
	conflict between employees and supervisors
supervisor makes objectives clear to subordinates, and gives them freedom to do job	
	excessively routine job
favorable attitude of employees to supervisor, working conditions, compensation and work itself.	
employees free to set own work pace, but only in situation of frequent contact and interaction between employee, colleagues and supervisor	
manager skilled in using group methods to create employee motivation	
goals of work group consistent with goals of organization	goals of work groups counter to goals of organization
work groups have high peer-group loyalty	
good communication between employees, and employees and supervisors	poor communication between employees and employees and supervisors

Figure 5. Likert's Factors Correlating to High and Low Productivity

teamwork and mutual influence and to a quite low true ability of superiors to exercise control in the work situation. Dissatisfaction is prevalent, with sub-servient attitudes toward superiors, hostility toward peers, and contempt for subordinates. Performance is usually mediocre, with high costs, excessive absence, and substantial manpower turnover. Quality is maintained only by extensive surveillance and a great deal of rework [p. 223-233].

System Two: Benevolent Authoritative

This management system assumes that labor is a market commodity but an imperfect one: Once purchased, it is susceptible to periodic emotional and interpersonal "interferences". Consequently, to decision, direction, and surveillance it adds a fourth managerial duty: expurging the annoying affect of subordinate members. This fact permits some small amount of upward and lateral communication, although most is downward, and sizeable distortion usually exists. Policies are established and basic decisions made by upper management, sometimes with opportunity for comment from subordinate supervisory levels. Some minor implementation decisions may be made at lower levels, but only within the care-fully prescribed limits set by the top echelon. Managerial personnel, therefore, usually feel responsibil-ity for attaining the assigned objectives, whereas rank-and-file members usually feel little or none. Very little cooperative teamwork exists, and superiors at lower echelons are able to exercise only moderate true control in the work situation. Attitudes toward superiors are subservient, and hostility is prevalent toward peers, but the absence of open contempt toward subordinates makes dissatisfaction less intense. Performance may be fair to good, although high costs, absence, and manpower turnover frequently occur [p. 223-233].

System Three: Consultative

This management system does not assume labor to be a market commodity. It still reserves to the manager the tasks of decision, and direction, but removes surveillance as a major function. Little recourse to coercion occurs. In their places recognition of the frequently disruptive effects of human emotion is expanded to include employee involvement through consultation. This practice encourages a moderate amount of valid upward communication, although lateral communication is limited by the prevalence of man-

to-man, rather than group, decision-making. Communication is, therefore, usually accurate and only occasionally distorted. In line with this, broad policy decisions are made at the top, but specific objectives to implement these policies are entrusted to lower managers for consultative decision-making. For all these reasons, a substantial proportion of the members of the organization feel responsible for attaining established objectives, and the system makes use of most positive motivational forces, except those which would otherwise arise from group processes. Some dissatisfaction may exist, but normally satisfaction is moderately high, with only some degree of hostility expressed toward peers, some condescension toward subordinates. Performance is ordinarily good; costs, absence, and turnover moderate; and quality problems no cause for major concern [p. 223-233].

System Four: Participative Group

This management system assumes that employees are essential parts of an organizational structure which has been built at great cost and necessarily maintained with the same attention and care given more tangible assets. It conceives of decision as a process, rather than a prerogative, with the manager's responsibility consisting, not of himself deciding, but of making sure that the best possible decisions result. In this light, he focuses his efforts upon building an over-lapping structure of cohesive, highly motivated, participative groups, coordinated by multiple member-ships. Within this highly coordinated and motivated system, characterized by high mutual confidence and trust, communication is adequate, rapid and accurate. Because goals are established and decisions made with the participation of all those affected, objectives are comparatively closely aligned with the needs and interests of all members, and all motivational forces push in the direction of obtaining the established objectives. The closely knit system in addition permits superiors and subordinates alike to exercise great control over the work situation. Employees at all levels are highly satisfied, but without complacency, and feel great reciprocal respect and trust. Performance is very good; costs absence and turnover are low; and high quality is the natural concern of all [p. 223-233].

Likert's conclusions place him in the camp of those who advocate a best style of leadership. His system of Participative Management suggests that he supports the democratic, human relations approach as the best method of management, although he notes this as an ideal. Likert seems to suggest that before attaining the ideal of system four Participative Management, the manager would have to practice a certain amount of task-oriented leadership behavior in order to bring about compatability of organizational and individual goals. However, it remained for researchers Blake and Mouton to make the final step towards stating that the best style of leadership was one that combined a high concern for task and a high concern for people.

Blake and Mouton. While Likert was carrying out his studies at the University of Michigan, Robert Blake and Jane Mouton were researching types of leadership styles at the University of Texas. Drawing upon the work of John Hemphill (1949), and the work of other Ohio State University researchers, in 1964 they published the "Management Grid", a theoretical model which supports "team" leadership (high concern for task and high concern for people) as the best style of leadership.

Rather than seeing leadership as an either-or proposition, either authoritarian or democratic, they plotted concern for production on one axis, and concern for people on another. (See figure 6.) Each was expressed in a nine point scale from low (1) to high (9). The manner in which the two concerns intertwine would define a leader's style. They concentrated on analyzing the assumptions of a leader at each of the four corners (the extremes) and at the mid-point.

```
High 9 | 1-9 Management                              9-9 Management
       | Country Club                                Team
     8 | Leader                                      Leader
       |
     7 |
       |
     6 |
       |                    5-5 Management
     5 |--------------------Middle of the--------------------
       |                    Road Leader
     4 |
       |
     3 |
       |
     2 | 1-1 Management                              9-1 Management
       | Impoverished                                Autocratic
 Low 1 | Leader                                      Leader
       |_____
        1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9
        Low                                                  High
```

Figure 6. The Management Grid

The 9-1 Style: Nice guys finish last. A leader assumes that
people are instruments of production; he heavily emphasizes tasks and
job requirements, one to one relationships with his subordinates,
obedience, supresses conflict and minimizes human relations.

The 1-9 Style: Nice guy's don't fight. A "big brother" leader
who encourages people to work; he expects them, because of loyalty and
acceptance, to turn out some work to avoid trouble; emphasizes the group
as the key unit; encourages friendliness and harmony.

The 1-1 Style: Don't make waves. The leader exerts minimum
effort, shows little concern for production or people, passes blame
along, carries messages between layers of the organization, and rarely
initiates criticism except for self defense.

The 5-5 Style: Let's vote on it. The leader seeks to maintain
balance; emphasizes people as much as production, communicates with
subordinates but censors information; tends to develop two counter-
balancing systems—formal and informal; holds meetings to hear sugges-
tions and convey to people a sense that they have a hand in making
decisions.

The 9-9 Style: Let's get involved. The leader utilizes the
capacities of himself and subordinates for creative thinking and
problem-solving; uses goal setting; exhibits a high concern for people
and production; involves those responsible in work planning and
execution; emphasizes the organization as the key unit; creates
commitment in subordinates to have a stake in the outcome through
interdependent effort.

Blake and Mouton began their book with a statement that seems
to imply a situational approach to leadership; however, their concluding
remarks show a resounding preference for the 9-9 style which places
them with those who promote "a best style".

> Managerial styles based on 9-1 (direction with
> compliance), 5-5 (conformity with compromise),
> 1-9 (security and comfort through convenience),
> 1-1 (acquiescence and complacency, or 'clever'
> but corrupt facades) are, at best, second best.
> Actually they are quite unacceptable, long term.
> In comparison with 9-9's condition of candid
> communication based on conviction and commitment
> which results in creativity, other bases for work
> relations seem to fall short.... 9-9 defines a
> trend leading to maturity and relationships among
> men toward which production organizations seem to
> be evolving [p. 318].

Conclusion: No One Best Style

As we have seen, the study of leadership passed through several stages. First it was studied as qualities in individuals. Many writers stressed specific qualities in an individual's behavior which could be identified as leadership. This focus was in keeping with the views of leadership stemming from earliest times, that leaders are born, not made, and must therefore possess special qualities in common. At the same time, society held the traditional view that the best style of leadership was paternalistic, task oriented, and authoritative.

After it had been proven that there were no qualities, characteristics, or traits common to all successful leaders, many writers attempted to establish leadership as a behavioral continuum from autocratic to democratic. Beginning in the 30's, theoreticians supported the democratic or human relations approach as the best style of leadership.

However, research began to show that leadership was not an either-or proposition. When the task leader showed high scores on task attitudes and behaviors, he or she did not always score low on socio-emotional attitudes and behaviors. This indicated that task and relationships behaviors were probably independent variables; not two ends of one continuum, but two separate factors entirely. A leader could be high in both, low in both, or high in one and low in the other. Based on this, some researchers, such as Blake and Mouton, suggested that the best leader was high on both the task and relationships scales.

However, other theoreticians who adopted a more relativistic viewpoint, began to conclude that leadership was not an independent entity, existing on its own. It was, on the contrary, linked to the followers and the situation in which the leader was operating. In 1949 Hemphill had stated:

> the finding of these...studies (of leadership traits) support the contention that characteristics of leaders' behavior are related in some way to the social situation. However, since the investigators made no attempt to study the social situation in a systematic manner, little can be concluded concerning what factors are related to what behaviors of the leader [p. 10].

Some researchers, such as Hemphill, came to the conclusion that there was no one "best style" of leadership, but rather that leadership is situational in nature. The nature of the followers, and the environment in which the leader and followers are interacting, become important factors in the study of leadership. Part Two of this chapter will show the development of situational leadership theory, by presenting a brief chronological description of the work of some key situational theorists.

Part Two - Leadership As Situational

Introduction

In an autocratic society, the leader's ability to influence rested upon the leader, by virtue of "divine right", birth, or money. In a democratic society leadership becomes "a function of the leader's personality and the social system in interaction (Gibb, 1959, p. 917)." Followers become important because of their influence upon decision making, an influence they did not possess in an autocratic society.

In a democratic system, the leader must accomplish objectives not only through people, but with people. Leadership thus becomes a process in which the leader attempts to influence others to achieve certain goals (Gibb, 1959; Hersey & Blanchard, 1972). Since people are different, by virtue of education, ability and personality, no one leadership style will be effective in influencing all people. Thus a leadership style must be considered as it relates to the situation at hand. As Gibb (1959) states:

> It is important for the use we can make of our resources and of our groups that we recognize authoritarianism and democracy as poles of a continuum neither of which is wholly good or wholly bad, but which represent extremes of a variable "leadership technique" that should be adapted to all the elements of the situation [p. 911].

Faced with a new field to explore -- the situation -- theoreticians turned their attention to new questions: what were the important factors in the situation that had a bearing on leadership style? What was the relationship between effective leadership style and the situation? How could this be determined? It was to these, and related questions, that the following researchers in situational leadership addressed themselves.

Hemphill: Leadership Depends Upon the Group Situation

John Hemphill, one of the early researchers of situational leadership, carried out his investigations during the 40's at Ohio State University. His studies were among the first of a number to become known as the Ohio State Leadership Studies. Blake and Mouton, who have been previously discussed, drew heavily upon his research.

Hemphill was not concerned with discovering which leadership style was best -- authoritarian, democratic or some point in between -- but with what causes a leader to be seen as excellent, fair or poor. Starting with the hypothesis that the leader is inextricably bound to the group situation, Hemphill focussed his investigations on the relationship between leader behavior and group situation.

Hemphill first devised a questionnaire that would describe a group according to fifteen dimensions on a scale of one to nine. He then developed a questionnaire by which group members could judge the adequacy of the leader's behavior as "high" (excellent or good), or "low" (fair or poor). His assumption was that if there was a high degree of correspondence between the behavior demanded by the group situation and the leader's behavior, then the leader would be judged to be excellent. But if there was no correspondence, the leader would be judged to be poor.

Hemphill's assumption was borne out. After analysing 500 questionnaires, he found that leaders were seen as effective or in-effective, adequate or inadequate, depending on the nature of the group. Hemphill was one of the first to open the doors to future research into the nature of the relationship between leader behavior and the situation.

Fiedler: A Contingency Theory of Leadership

The research of Fred Fiedler at the University of Illinois has spanned more than fifteen years. In his early work, Fiedler and his associates attempted to identify the factors underlying group effec-tiveness. The results of this early research (1958) showed that group

performance could not be predicted on the basis of leadership alone, but only when three other factors were considered:

1. the group's socio-metric structure

2. the leader-keyman relationship

3. the demands of the task

Fiedler's later research investigated the relationship between the leader's attributes, group performance and the situation. The basic hypothesis underlying his research was that the leadership style required for effective group performance depended upon the degree to which the group situation was favorable or unfavorable to the leader.

In order to test his hypothesis, he developed the Contingency Model of leadership (Fiedler, 1964, p. 164). (See figure 7.) The three factors influencing the situation are arranged along the horizontal axis of the model, from conditions which are favorable for the leader (1) to conditions which are very unfavorable for the leader (8). Fiedler had identified six factors in a situation likely to affect a leader's influence on a group:

1. the leader's <u>personal relations</u> with members of the group

2. the <u>power and authority</u> which the leader's position provides

3. the <u>degree of structure</u> in the task

4. the <u>relative abilities</u> of the leader and the members

5. the member's <u>motivation</u>

6. the extent to which the group is operating under conditions of <u>external stress</u>

Relationships Oriented
High LPC

Median Correlations Between
Leader LPC and Group
Performance

Task Oriented
Low PC

	Fav.		Favorableness for Leader					Unfav.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Leader-member Rel.	Good	G	G	G	M-P	M-P	M-Poor	M-Poor
Task Structure	H	H	L	L	H	H	L	L
Leader Position Power	H	L	H	L	H	L	H	L

Figure 7. Fiedler's Contingency Model

In his investigations Fiedler found that the first three of these factors were the most important situational variables. The vertical axis of the model measures the leader's attributes, from the active, controlling, high task leader (Low LPC) to the passive, permissive, high relationships leader (High LPC). It also shows group performance.

Through the use of this model, Fiedler concluded that: 1) a high task leader is associated with high group performance when the situation is either highly favorable or unfavorable to the leader, and 2) a more lenient or high relationships leader is associated with high group performance when the situation is moderately favorable or moderately unfavorable.

In the light of these results, Fiedler (1967) suggested that leadership training should focus on giving an individual methods to diagnose their group-task situation, and adapt the situation to their particular style of leadership. Fiedler argued that matching the situation to the individual would be more successful than trying to train a person to develop a flexible leadership style and adapt their style to the situation.

Criticism of Fiedler's theory. Fiedler's work has inspired many researchers to replicate and attempt to verify his studies, and many to criticize his theories. Korman (1971) criticised the fact that Fiedler's research was carried out in laboratory environments only remotely relevant to those of organizations. He expressed doubt about the contingency approach in general -- "While intuitively appealing, it has yet to be shown to be of value in the study of organizational leader-

ship [p. 129]" -- and took issue with Fiedler's "static" contingency approach which Korman felt did not take into consideration the possible value of changing people to fit the situation.

While Hemphill focussed on the leader in relation to the group, and Fiedler on the relationships of leadership style and situation to group performance, Lawrence and Lorsch concentrated on the organization in relation to the situation.

Lawrence and Lorsch: A Systems Approach to Organizational Effectiveness

The research of Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch (1967) attempted to answer the question "What organizational characteristics are required to deal effectively with external market and technological conditions"? After studying ten organizations intensively, they concluded that in order to be effective in today's rapidly changing society, 1) an organization has to be able to successfully integrate the functions of many different departments within it, and 2) must have many different leaders to carry out different roles.

Each department of an organization will have a different structure, interpersonal orientation, time orientation and goal orientation. Each department must relate inwardly to the other departments of the organization and the management of the organization, and outwardly to the social environment in which the organization operates. These complex relationships of integration and differentiation are illustrated in the following chart.* (See figure 8.)

---

*Chart developed by J. Ferrie, Department of Educational Planning and Management, University of Massachusetts.

Lawrence and Lorsch also concluded that multiple leadership will be required in an organization today; many leaders will be responsible for decisions of "great consequence". As well, several different leadership roles will be required: the innovative, risk-taking leader, the traditional routine leader, the integrator, and at the top, the formulators. The formulators are the most important leaders who will need integrative creative capacities in order to formulate "frameworks of purpose" to "guide the efforts of the parts of the organization".

The management style required for organizational effectiveness in any area depends on many factors: the department of the organization, its structure, its interpersonal orientation, its time orientation, its goal orientation, and its degree of certainty. Lorsch and Sheldon (1972) conclude that no one management style is appropriate to all situations:

> What style of management will facilitate subsystem
> performance depends on the other inputs to the
> system [p. 169].

Lowin and Craig: Farris and Lim: The Followers Affect Leader Behavior

Some researchers examined leadership as being determined by the followers. Aaron Lowin and James Craig (1968) conducted a laboratory study to test the hypothesis that group productivity influences leadership style. They found that fourteen out of sixteen "supervisors" behaved in a high task, low relationships style when faced with a non-productive "employee", and twelve out of sixteen "supervisors" behaved in a high relationships low task style when faced with a highly productive "employee".

Figure 8. Differentiation - Integration Chart

KEY

1 - <u>Structure</u> (a) span of control
            (b) number of levels to a shared superior
            (c) time span of review
            (d) specificity of review
            (e) importance of formal rules
            (f) criteria for evaluation

2 - <u>Interpersonal Orientation</u> (a) primary concern for task
                                    (b) primary concern for social
                                         relationships

3.- <u>Time Orientation</u> Estimate of % of total time used working on
                      activities affecting organization's profits
                      within a specific time period.

4 - <u>Goal Orientation</u> criteria which managers might consider in making
                      decisions relevant to product and process
                      innovation.

5 - <u>Certainty</u> (a) rate of change of conditions over time in
                subenvironment
            (b) certainty of information about conditions in the
                subenvironment at any particular time
            (c) rate of feedback

Following the same line of investigation, George Farris and Francis Lim (1969) found that leaders who were told their groups were highly productive were perceived as behaving in a high relationships style, more so than leaders who were told their groups were low producing.

Both of these studies re-confirmed that leadership style and follower behavior are inter-dependent, and raised the possibility that leadership style is a consequence of follower performance.

Conclusions: Leadership is Situational

Researchers who began with the assumption that effective leadership is relative to the situation spent much time attempting to determine what the important factors in the situation were that had a bearing on leadership. A wealth of situational factors have been advanced. For Hemphill, it was the nature of the group and the nature of the leader. For Fiedler, it was the nature of the leader, the leader-member relations, the leader's power and authority, the nature of the task, the abilities of the leader and the members, the members' motivation, and the amount of environmental stress. For Lawrence and Lorsch, it was all of these, plus the structure of any department in the organization, its interpersonal orientation, time orientation, goal orientation, and the relationship of the organization to its environment. For Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, it was the productivity of the followers. These many situational factors can be contained in three general categories: "leader", "follower" and "other" (including the organization, the environment, time, task, superiors and associates).

While there has been general agreement on key situational factors, there are many different theories as to what the relationship is between effective leadership and the situation. Hemphill advanced several hypotheses; Fiedler suggests his Contingency Theory; Lawrence and Lorsch put forward their Integration-Differentiation Theory. The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership, to be described in Chapter Three, is a situational theory which suggests that the relationship between effective leadership and the situation lies in adapting leader style to follower "maturity".

This chapter has presented a brief overview of leadership theory, showing the development of the two main streams of thought within this body of theory: the one best style school, and the situational school. In so doing, this chapter has provided a background for the Life Cycle Theory, and a theoretical reference for the analyses of the cases to be presented in this paper.

C H A P T E R III

THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY OF LEADERSHIP

Introduction

This chapter will describe the Life Cycle Theory of leadership. Chapter Four will compare the Life Cycle Theory to the previously discussed situational leadership theories of Hemphill, Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, Fiedler, and Lawrence and Lorsch. Through this comparison, the components of the analytic framework will be selected. They will be used to analyze the cases presented in this paper. The analytic framework will encompass all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory, and some additional variables from related situational concepts. Through applying this analytic framework to the cases under consideration, we hope to demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method for determining the most appropriate leadership style in any given organizational situation.

The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model

The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972) is an outgrowth of the Ohio State Leadership Studies. The various theories contributing to the Life Cycle Theory are illustrated in figure 9. The work of Hemphill, Blake and Mouton, and the Ohio State Leadership Studies have already been described. This section will

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┌─────────────────────────────┐
│   Ohio State Leadership      │
│         Studies              │
│       begun 1945             │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              ↓
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│        Hemphill              │
│                              │
│         1949                 │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              ↓
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│   Ohio State Leadership      │
│        Quadrants             │
│          1959                │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              ↓
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│    Blake and Mouton          │
│    Managerial Grid           │
│         1964                 │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              ↓
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│        Reddin                │
│    3-D Management            │
│      Style Theory            │
│         1967                 │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              ↓
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│   Tri-Dimensional Leader     │
│   Effectiveness Model        │
│   Hersey and Blanchard       │
│         1969                 │
└─────────────────────────────┘
```

┌─────────────────┐   ┌─────────────────────┐
│   Argyris   │   │   McClelland   │
│ Developmental │   │   Achievement   │
│   Continuums   │   │ Motivation Theory   │
│   1957   │   │   1973   │
└─────────────────┘   └─────────────────────┘

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┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│        Hersey and Blanchard          │
│   Life Cycle Theory of Leadership    │
│              1969                    │
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
Figure 9. Derivations of the Life Cycle Theory

Leadership Studies have already been described. This section will briefly describe the Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972) and the theories of Reddin, Argyris, and McClelland as they contribute to the Life Cycle Theory.

The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model formulated by Hersey and Blanchard (1972) is based upon the Ohio State Leadership Studies and the work of William Reddin (1967). The Ohio State University researchers identified two fundamental dimensions of leader behavior: "initiating structure" and "consideration". These were defined by Fleishman and Peters (1962) as follows:

> Initiating Structure (S) reflects the extent to which an individual is likely to define and structure his role and those of his subordinates toward goal attainment [p. 130].

> Consideration (C): reflects the extent to which an individual is likely to have job relationships characterized by mutual trust, respect for subordinates' ideas, and consideration of their feelings [p. 130].

Results of these studies showed that leadership was not univariate but bivariate. Thus, the researchers plotted "initiating structure" and "consideration" behavior on two separate axis at midpoint, they created four quadrants which showed four combinations of "initiating structure" and "consideration" behavior. See figure 10.

The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model uses the Ohio State Leadership quadrants (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p.74), two axis "task behavior" (for "initiating structure") and "relationships behavior" (for "consideration"). Hersey and Blanchard (1972) define "task" and "relationships" behavior as follows:

High

High
Consideration
and
Low
Structure

High
Structure
and
High
Consideration

Consideration

Low
Structure
and
Low
Consideration

High
Structure
and
Low
Consideration

Low   Initiating Structure   High

Figure 10.   Ohio State Leadership Quadrants

> Task Behavior. The extent to which a leader is
> likely to organize and define the roles of individuals
> and group members by explaining what activities
> members are to do as well as when, where and how
> tasks are to be accomplished. It is further char-
> acterized by the extent to which the leader defines
> patterns of organization, formalizes channels of
> communication and specifies ways of getting jobs
> accomplished [p. 83].

> Relationships Behavior. The extent to which the leader
> develops personal relationships between him or herself
> and individuals or group members; the amount of
> socioemotional support and psychological strokes
> provided by the leader for members, as well as the
> extent to which the leader engages in interpersonal
> communication and facilitating behaviors [p. 83].

The four quadrants of the Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model

(Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p. 82) are illustrated in figure 11.

Attempting to integrate the concepts of leader style with the

situational demands of a specific environment, Hersey and Blanchard

added an effectiveness dimension to the two dimensional model shown in

figure 11 and created the Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model

(Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p. 84) illustrated in figure 12. In doing

so, they drew upon the 3-D Management Theory of William J. Reddin

(1967) whom, they state, "was the first to add an effectiveness

dimension to the task and relationships dimensions of earlier models

[p. 83]." Hersey and Blanchard define a leader's style as "the

behavior pattern he exhibits when he is involved in directing the

activities of others [p. 82]." If a leader's style is appropriate to

a given situation, they term it effective. If inappropriate, they term

it ineffective. The effectiveness dimension is not however, an either-

or situation, but one, they believe, that should be represented as a

continuum, since effectiveness is a matter of degree.

High

High Relationships
and
Low Task

High Task
and
High Relationships

Relationships Behavior

Low Task
and
Low Relationships

High Task
and
Low Relationships

Low

Task Behavior

High

Figure 11.   The Four Basic Leader Behavior
Styles of the Tri-Dimensional
Leader Effectiveness Model

Figure 12. The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model

The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model combines the Ohio State Leadership concepts and Reddin's effectiveness concept into one situational model. However, there are differences between the Leader Effectiveness Model and Reddin's Model. Unlike the Managerial Grid (a two dimensional Model), the Tri-Dimensional Model does not depict a single ideal leadership style as being appropriate in all situations, but suggests that any leadership style is effective or ineffective depending on whether it is appropriate or inappropriate to the situation. Hersey and Blanchard (1969) further explain that the Leader Effectiveness Model is behavioral, does not contain value laden labels, is concerned with leadership, and emphasizes both intervening and output variables, while Reddin's Model is attitudinal, contains evaluative labels, is concerned with management, and emphasizes only output variables.

The Maturity Continuum in the Life Cycle Model

If effective leadership depends upon a leader behaving appropriately in a given situation, the question becomes 'how can a leader judge the situation so as to know which leadership style to use'? The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership attempts to address this problem by adding a maturity continuum to the Tri-Dimensional Model. In so doing, Hersey and Blanchard attempt to relate task behavior, relationships behavior and maturity, in order "to provide a leader with some understanding of the relationships between an effective style of leadership and the level of maturity of his followers [p. 134]". Maturity of the

followers is shown on the continuum drawn below the four quadrants.
This continuum, proceeding from low to high maturity, right to left,
is divided into three sections: below average maturity on the right,
average maturity in the centre, and above average maturity on the left.
Figure 13 illustrates Hersey and Blanchard's Life Cycle Theory of
Leadership Model (1972, p. 135).

Argyris' Definition of Maturity

In defining maturity, Hersey and Blanchard drew upon the
theories of Chris Argyris (1957) and David C. McClelland (1953, 1961,
1965, 1966). Argyris' developmental stages leading to maturity, and
McClelland's theory of achievement motivation will be briefly described,
and related to the maturity continuum in Life Cycle Theory.

Argyris (1957, p. 49) describes seven developmental trends of
people in North American culture. He states that human beings in our
culture tend to develop:

1. from a state of passivity as infants to a state
   of activity as adults

2. from a state of dependence upon others as
   infants, to a state of relative independence
   as adults

3. from being capable of behaving only in a few
   ways as an infant, to being capable of
   behaving in many different ways as an adult

4. from having erratic, casual, shallow, quickly-
   dropped interests as an infant, to having deeper
   interests as an adult

5. from having a short time perspective as an
   infant, to a much longer time perspective as
   an adult

Figure 13. Life Cycle Theory of Leadership Model

6. from being in a subordinate position in the
   family and society as an infant, to aspiring
   to occupy an equal and/or superordinate
   position relative to their peers

7. from a lack of awareness of self as an infant
   to an awareness of and control over self as an
   adult.

These are seven dimensions of the growth of the individual towards

self-actualization. He further notes that when an individual is

expressing needs related to the adult end of each developmental

continua, that individual is approaching maturity.

McClelland's Definition of Achievement Motivation

David C. McClelland (1953, 1961, 1965, 1966) has identified

seven characteristics of people with high "n Ach" (needs to achieve).

Risk-Taking. In the area of risk-taking, those with high

achievement motivation take moderate, calculated risks, not high or

low risks. As well, the goals they set are moderately difficult, but

potentially achievable (McClelland, 1966, p. 212). The attraction of

the moderately risky situation for the person with high n Ach is that

the outcome depends more clearly on the person's skill.

> The greater preference that subjects with high n Ach
> have for situations involving moderate risk in all
> likelihood appears only when they have some chance
> of influencing the outcome through their own skills
> and abilities (McClelland, 1961, p. 214).

Creative Problem Solving. Highly achievement motivated people

do not do well at routine jobs, but prefer "nonroutine tasks that

require some degree of personal initiative, or even inventiveness for

solution (McClelland, 1961, p. 216)". Such people are always setting

challenges for themselves, tasks that make them stretch themselves a little (McClelland, 1966, p. 259). Argyris too, mentions the search for challenge in connection with his fourth developmental stage of shallow, quickly-dropped interests to deeper interests. Expanding on this stage, he notes that

> the mature state is characterized by an endless series
> of <u>challenges</u>, where the reward comes from doing
> something for its own sake (Argyris, 1957, p. 50).

<u>Positive Attitude</u>. McClelland discovered that people with high n Ach tend to have a positive even overconfident attitude toward the probability of their being successful, even when there are no facts to justify their estimates. (McClelland, 1961, p. 222). He feels that this attitude is based upon the person's conviction that "he can modify the outcome of an uncertain situation by his own personal achievements [p. 224]."

<u>Goals</u>. People with high n Ach "think ahead" more. They tend to deal more often with the remote future (McClelland, 1961, p. 237). Once set upon accomplishing a goal, McClelland found that those who are highly motivated to achieve will work just as hard for a group goal as an individual goal. Public recognition is not the key motivating factor, but rather

> the achievement satisfaction arises from having
> initiated the action that is successful, rather
> than from public recognition for an individual
> accomplishment [McClelland, 1961, p. 226].

<u>Personal Accomplishment</u>. People with high n Ach appear to work harder only when there is a chance that personal efforts will make a difference in the outcome (McClelland, 1961, p. 226). Personal achieve-

ment is an important incentive to the person who is highly achievement motivated. This incentive becomes stronger when "winning" at the task can be interpreted as a personal achievement (McClelland, 1961, p. 216).

Feedback. People, who are highly motivated to achieve, prefer to work in situations in which they get concrete feedback on how well they are doing. A business executive, or salesman would be in such a situation; a teacher would not, (McClelland, 1966, p. 259). McClelland found that those with high n Ach perform significantly better when they have positive and definite feedback on how well they are doing.

Money. People with high n Ach cannot be motivated by money alone; in fact, they have been found by McClelland not to be much influenced by money rewards (McClelland, 1961, p. 235). Money is the measure of success, and those who are highly achievement motivated want it primarily as a symbol of higher achievement.

Given the theory developed by Argyris and McClelland above, Hersey and Blanchard (1972) formulate a definition of maturity. Their definition however, is restricted to task relevant subordinate behaviors, and is defined as being a function of the following variables:

1. achievement motivation

2. the willingness and ability to take responsibility

3. task relevant education and experience of an individual or a group [p. 134].

In this definition, age may be a factor, but it is not directly related to maturity as used in Life Cycle Theory. Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between Argyris' description of maturity, McClellands'

```
┌─────────────────────────────┐    ┌─────────────────────────────┐
│         ARGYRIS             │    │        McCLELLAND           │
│                             │    │                             │
│  CHARACTERISTICS OF MATURE  │    │  CHARACTERISTICS OF ACHIEVE-│
│         PEOPLE              │    │  MENT MOTIVATED PEOPLE       │
├─────────────────────────────┤    ├─────────────────────────────┤
│  1.  active                 │    │  1.  take moderate, calculated│
│  2.  independent            │    │      risks                  │
│  3.  capable of behaving in │    │  2.  positive, even over-   │
│  4.  deep interests         │    │      confident attitudes to │
│  5.  long time perspective  │    │      success                │
│  6.  occupies equal or      │    │  3.  prefer concrete feedback│
│      superordinate position │    │      on how well they are doing│
│      relative to peers      │    │  4.  prefer nonroutine,     │
│  7.  awareness and control  │    │      challenging jobs        │
│      over self              │    │  5.  deal with long term goals│
│                             │    │  6.  motivated by personal  │
│                             │    │      achievement            │
│                             │    │  7.  money a measure of success,│
│                             │    │      not a motivator in itself│
└─────────────────────────────┘    └─────────────────────────────┘
```

```
              ┌─────────────────────────────┐
              │    HERSEY AND BLANCHARD      │
              │                             │
              │    DEFINITION OF MATURITY    │
              ├─────────────────────────────┤
              │  1.  achievement motivation  │
              │                             │
              │  2.  willingness and ability │
              │      to take responsibility  │
              │                             │
              │  3.  task relevant education │
              │      and experience of an    │
              │      individual or a group   │
              └─────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 14. Relationship Between Argyris' Maturity
            Characteristics, McClelland's Characteristics
            of the Achievement Motivated Person, and Hersey
            and Blanchard's Definition of Maturity

achievement motivation theory, and Hersey and Blanchard's definition
of maturity.

The Relationship Between Follower Maturity and Leader Style in Life Cycle Theory

Reviewing again briefly the Life Cycle Theory of Leadership
Model (figure 13), we recall that this model attempts to relate task
behavior, relationships behavior and maturity of followers. We have
reviewed the derivation and development of the four quadrants in the
model. These represent four combinations of task and relationships
behavior:

1. Quadrant One: high task - low relationships

2. Quadrant Two: high task - high relationships

3. Quadrant Three: high relationships - low task

4. Quadrant Four: low task - low relationships

As well, the derivation and components of the continuum
representing the maturity of the followers has been discussed. The
continuum is generally divided into above average, average, and below
average maturity, in order to provide some bench marks for degree of
maturity. Maturity is defined as achievement motivation, the willing-
ness and ability to take responsibility, and task relevant education
and experience.

The curve superimposed over the four quadrants is a graphic
illustration of distribution of leader styles. Hersey and Blanchard
suggest that the majority of leader styles fall within quadrants two
and three; that is, most people practice a leadership style falling

between quadrant two, high relationships - high task, and quadrant three, high relationships - low task, while fewer people practice leader styles at the extreme of the curve: quadrant one, high task - low relationships, and quadrant four, low task - low relationships.

Life Cycle Theory postulates that when working with people of below average maturity in relation to a particular task in a particular situation, a high task - low relationships style (quadrant one) has the best probability of success. In dealing with people of average maturity, the high task, high relationships style (quadrant two) and the high relationships, low task style (quadrant three) appear to be most appropriate. Quadrant four, the low task, low relationships style has the highest probability of success with people of above average maturity.

Based on the inconsistancies in the theory and research on leadership evident in the previous chapter, Hersey and Blanchard have formulated a position which attempts to explain and account for these inconsistancies. They draw examples from a variety of situations, including parent-child relationships, a military setting in the far north, teacher-student relationships in a college setting, administrator-trustee relationships, and administrator-faculty relation-ships, to illustrate their thesis that effective leadership style varies with the maturity of the followers.

As a child matures, it is appropriate for the parent to increase socioemotional support and decrease structure; research personnel working on the DEW line responded poorly to a high task-low relationships leader-

ship style--a low task-low relationships style would have been more appropriate for them in light of their education and experience. So too, unstructured programs do not succeed universally with all students; for those with clear goals and objectives, they are advantageous. For students who lack self-direction and ability to structure their own work schedule, a low-task-low relationships teaching style can be detrimental.

With these, and other examples, Hersey and Blanchard support their contention that structured task behavior is appropriate for working with people of below average maturity. If one's followers progress from below average to the above average maturity, a leader's behavior should move through (2) high task-high relationships, (3) high relationships-low task, to (4) low task-low relationships. Indeed, a leader can assist followers in maturity development by changing leader behavior in this sequence.

In order to determine the appropriate leader style in a given situation, the practitioner must first have the diagnostic ability to assess the maturity level of his or her followers. This is followed by marking the assessed maturity level on the maturity continuum of the Life Cycle Model, and drawing a vertical line from this point to intersect with the style curve. (figure 15) The point of intersection with the curve will fall within one of the four quadrants, and indicate the appropriate leader style for that situation. This process is based on two assumptions: that the practitioner has diagnostic skills, and flexibility of leadership style. As Hersey and Blanchard emphasize:

Figure 15.   Determining Appropriate Leader Style

The importance of a leader's <u>diagnostic ability</u>
cannot be overemphasized...Yet even with good
diagnostic skills, a leader may still not be
effective unless he can <u>adapt</u> his leader
personality (style) to meet the demands of his
environment [p. 133].

C H A P T E R IV

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This chapter will develop a framework which will be used to analyze the cases under consideration. In order to develop this analytic framework, two steps have already been taken. First, in Chapter Two, a brief history of leadership theory has been presented, showing the evolution of situational leadership theory. Secondly, in Chapter Three, the Life Cycle Theory of leadership has been described, demonstrating its development from, and relationship to, existing theory. In this chapter, a comparison will be made between the Life Cycle Theory and the situational theories previously discussed. From this comparison, the components of the analytic framework will be selected. In Chapters Five and Six this analytic framework will be applied to the cases under consideration in this paper. It is hoped that this application will demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic tool for determining the most appropriate leadership style in any given situation.

Content of the Analytic Framework

The framework (see figure 16) consists of three basic sections:
1. Leader
2. Followers
3. Other factors in the situation

Each section contains a number of sub-categories taken from the Life Cycle Theory and related situational theories.

Since the purpose of this study is to demonstrate the usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method, parts A and B of the analytic framework include all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory. Part C of the framework includes some situational variables which, although not specifically stated in the Life Cycle Theory, are included by Hersey and Blanchard in their discussion of leader effectiveness. For them, a leader must diagnose not only the needs of the followers, but also the needs of the situation, in order to determine the most appropriate leader style.

> An effective leader is able to adapt his
> style of leader behavior to the needs of
> situation and the followers [p. 80].

They illustrate this concept in the formula, effectiveness is a function of the leader, followers, and the situation. $E=f(l,f,s)$. The function of leader has been defined as being divided into task and relationships behaviors. The function of followers has been defined as task relevant maturity, divided into achievement motivation, willingness and ability to take responsibility, and task relevant education and experience. The above are the two variables included in the Life Cycle Theory.

Using the term 'environment' and 'leadership situation' interchangeably, Hersey and Blanchard (1972, p. 109) view the leadership situation as being made up of:

1. leader's personality (style) and expectations
2. followers' personalities (styles) and
   expectations

Figure 16. Analytic Framework

3. superiors' personalities (styles) and
   expectations
4. associates' personalities (styles) and
   expectations
5. organization's personality (styles) and
   expectations
6. job demands
7. amount of follower interaction
8. time

They suggest that this is only a partial list, and that

> specific organizations may have additional
> variables that are unique to themselves
> which must be evaluated before determining
> effectiveness [p. 121].

Variables three through eight in the above list are not
incorporated in the Life Cycle Theory per se, but are part of the
general leadership _situation_ which Hersey and Blanchard (1972, p. 80)
include as a function of leader effectiveness. As such, these variables
of the situation will also be considered in the following discussion.

This chapter then, will compare the variables of the Life Cycle
Theory delineated above, and the variables of the situation described
by Hersey and Blanchard, to those variables presented by the major
situational theorists in Chapter Two. The assumption here is that
there is a substantial agreement among all these various theories.
This comparison will provide the criteria for the analytic framework.

The following situational theorists reviewed in Chapter Two will
be included in the comparison:

1. Hemphill
2. Lowin and Craig
3. Farris and Lim
4. Fiedler
5. Lawrence and Lorsch

While this writer has made every attempt to include all of the situational factors mentioned by the writers cited above, and to compare them to definitions used in the Life Cycle Theory, it must be acknowledged that because of the different use of language, and the differing degrees of comprehensiveness of each writer, all of these comparisons can only be approximate.

Format of the Analytic Framework

This comparison of theories will be divided into three sections, each focusing on one of the three variables which are postulated to account for leader effectiveness: the leader, the followers, and the situation. Each of these three sections will be accompanied by a chart which will attempt to illustrate the comparisons. Because of the amount of detail in the definition of the leader, the leader chart has been expanded into two; one dealing with task behaviors, and the other with relationships behaviors of the leader.

In each of the charts, the variable of leader, followers, and situation as defined by Hersey and Blanchard appears in the centre of the page. Surrounding it are the related dimensions set forth by the situational theorists listed above.

Each of the variables as defined by Hersey and Blanchard is shown in a circle divided into two parts: the upper portion gives the name of the variable and general title for the definition, and the lower portion gives the detailed definition of that variable.

Some of the theorists to be compared give a general reference to a variable; such as, 'the leader: initiating structure behavior',

or 'the leader: consideration behavior', and do not give any details or further definitions for that variable. Where this is the case, an arrow has been drawn connecting the reference of the writer being cited to the upper portion of the central circle. This indicates a general comparison to the variable under consideration. Where writers have given detailed definitions of a variable, an arrow has been drawn connecting to the lower portion of the central circle. This indicates a comparison between specific definitions of writers.

Leader

Task Behavior (figure 17). House, and Lowin and Craig divide leadership generally into two broad categories of behavior, corresponding to the task and relationships behaviors described in Life Cycle Theory. House (1971) divides leader behavior into high initiating structure behavior and high consideration behavior, and suggests when each will be successful according to the nature of the task. Lowin and Craig (1968) measured three aspects of supervisory behavior: closeness of supervision, initiating structure and consideration for the sub-ordinate, in relation to subordinates' competence. For the purposes of this comparison, closeness of supervision and initiating structure have been combined under the heading 'initiating structure'.

Fiedler, Farris and Lim, and Hemphill divide leadership into two broad categories, and elaborate on the behaviors in each category. Fiedler (1958) described two types of leaders: one distant, rejecting to those whom he considers to be potentially poor co-workers, and who tends to judge the personalities of others in the light of their ability

Lowin & Craig

Initiating
Structure
Behavior

Hemphill

.sets pace for group

.advances purpose of group

.inspires members to greater
activity

.indicates competence in
administrative functions

Life Cycle Theory
LEADER
TASK BEHAVIOR

.organizes and defines roles of
individuals and group members

.explains what activities to do

.explains when, where, and how to
accomplish tasks

.endeavors to establish well
defined patterns of organization

.endeavors to formalize
channels of communica-
tion

Fielder

Low L.P.C.

.active
.controlling

Farris and Lim

.pressures for performance

.communicates clearly

.maintains performance
standards

Figure 17. Leader Task Behavior Comparisons

to do their job. The other type of leader has relatively greater feelings of closeness, acceptance and warmth, even to those with whom he cannot work, and would be less willing to reject a person just because he cannot perform in a team situation. In his later work (1964), Fiedler continued to explore the relationships between group performance and leader attributes such as human relations orientation, close interpersonal relations, and permissive accepting attitudes. In his Leadership Contingency Model (1964) he divided leader behavior into two types which bear resemblance to his 1958 leader descriptions. Measured by Fiedler's Least Preferred Co-Worker questionnaire, one type of leader (high LPC), permissive and passive, is relationships oriented. The other (low LPC), controlling and active, is task oriented.

Farris and Lim (1969) investigated the relationship between leader behavior and subordinates' performance. They had leaders rated according to Bowers and Seashore's (1966) four aspects of leadership behavior: support, interaction facilitation, goal emphasis, and work facilitation. Within these four categories, they measured a leader's:

1. sensitivity
2. giving of recognition
3. trust
4. stressing a feeling of price in the group
5. allowing freedom
6. encouraging speaking out
7. emphasizing teamwork
8. degree of punitiveness
9. pressure for performance
10. maintaining of performance standards
11. communication

In the above list, one through seven seem to relate to relationship behavior, eight can refer both to task and relationships behavior, and nine to eleven seem to relate to task behavior.

Hemphill (1949), in his study of the relationships between successful leader behavior and the characteristics of group situations, developed six general descriptions of leader behavior:

1. a leader exhibits behavior that advances the purpose of the group
2. indicates competence in administrative functions
3. inspires members to greater activity
4. sets the pace for the group
5. enables the individual to feel secure in his place in the group
6. does not serve his own interests

One through four in the above list fall under task behavior, while five and six are a part of relationships behavior.

Relationships Behavior (figure 18). House (1971), and Lowin and Craig's (1968) second broad category of leader behavior - consideration behavior - is compared to the relationships behavior of Life Cycle Theory. Fiedler's (1964) other extreme of leader behavior - high L.P.C., permissive and passive - is compared to the definition of relationships behavior in Life Cycle Theory.

As well, Farris and Lim's (1969) previously noted list of leader behaviors including sensitivity, giving of recognition, trust, stressing a feeling of pride in the group, allowing freedom, encouraging speaking out, emphasizing teamwork, and being non-punitive are shown compared to the definition of relationships behavior of Life Cycle Theory.

As mentioned above, Hemphill (1949), in his general descriptions of leader behavior, included enabling the group member to feel secure in his place in the group and not serving his own interests.

Figure 18. Leader Relationships Behavior Comparisons

Lowin & Craig

Consideration
Behavior

Hemphill & Ohio State Studies

.emotionality
.obligation to group
.membership in group
.authoritativeness
.enables person to feel secure
 in group
.does not serve own interests

Life Cycle Theory
LEADER
RELATIONSHIP BEHAVIOR

.extent to which leader:

.develops personal relationships
 between him or herself and
 individuals or group members
.gives socioemotional support
.gives psychological strokes
.engages in interpersonal
 communication
.engages in facilitating
 behaviors

Fielder

High L.P.C.

.passive
.permissive

Farris and Lim

.encourages speaking out
.allows freedom
.emphasizes teamwork
.sensitivity
.stresses pride in group
.trusting
.non-punitive
.gives recognition

As Hemphill explored his hypothesis that the behavior of a leader which results in being recognized as a good leader may also make group membership a pleasant, satisfying experience, and foster unity and cohesiveness, he tested several leadership behaviors. His purpose was to see under what conditions a leader acting in this way would be seen as effective or inadequate in the eyes of the group. These tested behaviors included:

1. quickness of, confidence in, and keeping to decisions
2. control of emotions
3. being authoritative
4. showing obligation to the group
5. acting as a member of the group

While number one above appears to relate to task, or initiating structure behavior, two to five in the above list seem to relate to relationships or consideration behavior, in that they would affect the relationships between the leader and group members.

When tested, all of the behaviors in the above list were verified as being situationally effective. Control of emotions was tested as the degree to which a leader maintains emotional control over him or herself, even loses control of emotions. Emotionality was seen as influencing the reactions of the group to the leader. Authoritative behavior was shown to have an impact on leader-member relationships, either improving or destroying the attitude to the leader, depending upon the nature of the group. Leader obligation is the extent to which a leader will risk his or her personal welfare for the group. Again, this behavior influenced the relationships between leader and group, either positively or negatively, depending on the type of group.

Finally, membership is the extent to which a leader becomes a member of the group, as opposed to seeking socioemotional support outside it. Whether a leader prefers the company of superiors, rather than the group, will affect leader member relations positively or negatively, again depending upon the nature of the group.

Position Power and Personal Power. Before leaving the discussion of leader behavior, a word must be said about position power and personal power, two aspects of leadership that cannot be ignored. Position power (figure 19), is mentioned by Hemphill, Fiedler, and Hersey and Blanchard as a variable affecting leadership effectiveness. It has been placed here as a separate item, for unlike task and relationships behaviors which are within the control of a leader, the power derived from position is outside the control of the leader. He or she cannot act to create this power within themselves; it is inherent in the position, not in him or herself.

Figure 19. Leader Position Power Comparisons

Harder to define is personal power. References to personal power are not abundant in the writings of the situational theorists being compared in this section. In their analysis of five types of power, French and Raven (1959) describe "referent power [p. 28]" as power based on the follower's identification with the leader. They define identification as the follower's "feeling of oneness [p. 29]" with the leader, or "a desire for such an identity [p. 29]." Thus because of attraction to the leader, the follower will desire close association, and the leader will have the ability to influence the follower without attempting to do so. French and Raven suggest as a further hypothesis that the more the follower is attracted to the leader, the broader the range of the leaders referent power will be. However, after describing French and Raven's study, Cartwright (1965) concludes that "little is known about the determinants of the range of referent power [p. 29]."

French and Raven's definition of referent power seems to echo Redl's (1942) description of how a leader influences a group or person. According to Redl, when a relationship exists between a person and a group which is characterized by love of the central person by the group members, then the group or followers will attempt to incorporate the personality of the central person into their ego ideal; that is, they will wish to become the kind of person he or she is (Gibb, 1959, p. 881).

Hersey and Blanchard (1972) describe both Etzioni's and Machiavelli's concept of personal power. According to Etzioni, it accrues to a leader who derives his or her power from followers. Gibb (1959) restates this as occurring when the leader's authority is

spontaneously accorded him or her by fellow group members, the followers.
For Machiavelli, personal power comes from a relationship built on love.

Fiedler (1958) described two attributes that a leader must have,
concurrently, and the first is that the leader must be acceptable to his
or her followers. Fiedler defines that operationally as "sociometric
acceptance [p. 43]." This is of such importance that without it, group
performance cannot be predicted.

It is conceivable that a leader could pratice all the relation-
ships behaviors previously discussed, and still have little personal
power. There seems to be an additional element to personal power which
is not explained in the definitions of relationships behavior.
Machiavelli associated personal power with love; others associate it
with charisma. Allowing it to evade behavioral definition, it seems
clear that personal power is associated with the relationship between
leader and followers, and must be considered in any analysis of leadership.

Followers

Fiedler, Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, Secord and Bachman
and Hemphill all describe the followers as a variable affecting leader-
ship. (See figure 20). Fiedler (1964) lists six situational factors
likely to affect a leader's influence:

1. personal relations with group members
2. the power and authority provided by the
   leader's position
3. the degree of structure in the task
4. the relative abilities of the leader
   and the group members
5. members' motivation

6. the extent to which the group is
operating under conditions of external
stress.

Of these six factors, four - the relative abilities of group members,
and five - members' motivation, are factors relating to the followers.

In their 1968 study of how managerial style can be affected by
subordinate productivity, Lowin and Craig set up a laboratory situation
in which 'subordinates' were to perform their jobs in a highly produc-
tive and non-productive manner; that is, they acted as competent and
incompetent employees. Thus in this experiment, Lowin and Craig defined
followers in terms of their productivity.

Farris and Lim (1969) investigated how performance of sub-
ordinates affects leadership. In this experiment, leaders were told
that their group was high performing, or low performing. As in Lowin
and Craig's study, followers were described in terms of their
productivity.

Although Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, and Fiedler, all
discuss followers as a situational variable, none details characteris-
tics of followers to Hemphill's extent. In order to investigate the
characteristics of group situations as they are related to leader
behavior, Hemphill (1949) developed fifteen dimensions by which he
measured and described groups:

1. size
2. viscidity (morale)
3. homogeneity
4. flexibility (how formal or informal)
5. permeability
6. polarization (group's purpose: single or diverse)
7. stability
8. intimacy

Figure 20. Followers Comparison of Variables

9. autonomy
10. control
11. position
12. potency
13. hedonic tone (satisfaction)
14. participation
15. dependence

Three of Hemphill's group dimensions refer exclusively to interpersonal relations among the followers: 1) degree of satisfaction (hedonic tone), 2) degree of intimacy, and 3) morale (viscidity). These dimensions, all relating to feelings among the followers, are not included in the definition of maturity in Life Cycle Theory. They suggest that a further exploration (beyond the scope of this paper) into member relations might discover another important variable influencing leader effectiveness.

Situation

For the theorists being compared in part two of this chapter, the situation is a key variable in effective leadership. (See figure 21). In _Management of Organizational Behavior_ (1972), Hersey and Blanchard describe eight variables in the situation, previously listed in this paper, and suggest there may be many more. From their list, we have discussed so far the leader and the followers, the variables in the Life Cycle Theory. However, according to Hersey and Blanchard, the situation also includes superiors, associates, the organization, job demands, and time. They point out that to be effective, a leader must diagnose not only the followers, but also the needs of the situation.

Superiors, associates, and the organization are focused on by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in their study of organizational effective-

Hersey and Blanchard
SITUATION

.leader's superiors

.leader's associates

.the organization

.job demands

.time

Fiedler

.degree of complexity
 of task
.extent to which group
 operating under conditions
 of external stress

Lawrence & Lorsch

.factors in the environment:
 -rate of change
 -certainty of information about conditions
 -rate of feedback
.organizational structure in each dept.:
 -span of control
 -number of levels to a shared supervisor
 -time span of review
 -importance of formal review
 -importance of formal rules
 -criteria for evaluation
.interpersonal orientation of each dept.:
 -concern for task
 -concern for social relationships
.time orientation of each dept.
.goal orientation of each dept.

Figure 21. Situation Comparison of Variables

ness. They outline four factors influencing the organization. With
respect to each department in the organization they consider:

1. its structure
2. its interpersonal orientation
3. its time orientation
4. its goal orientation.

Lawrence and Lorsch also discuss the environment as an influence upon
the situation. Gibb (1959) mentions this as one of his five categories
of behavioral determinants in the situation and describes it as "the
characteristics of the total culture in which the group exists and from
which the members come [p. 901]."

In Fiedler's (1964) list of six situational factors likely to
influence a leader, previously cited in this paper, two factors not
referring to the leader or the followers are:

1. the degree of structure in the task
2. the extent to which the group is operating
    under conditions of external stress.

As Lawrence and Lorsch, Gibb and Fiedler consider situational
variables other than the leader and the followers, the following emerge
as commonly mentioned:

1. the organization
2. the environment and stress in the environment
3. the nature of the task.

Summary of the Analytic Framework

In order to arrive at the final analytic framework, this section
will summarize what has been said by the situational theorists discussed
in this chapter. All theorists reviewed agree on the behavior of the
leader as one key variable in effective leadership, and divide leader

behavior into two categories. Using Life Cycle Theory terms, these are 1) task behavior and 2) relationships behavior. As well, five theorists cite personal power and position power as important variables in leader-ship.

All of the theorists reviewed agreed that the followers are another key variable in effective leadership. The definition of followers according to Life Cycle Theory is supported. In addition, four writers include productivity in their description of followers. One theorist discussed interpersonal relations among followers as important in describing the followers. This may be summarized as morale.

Ten writers agreed on the situation as a variable in effective leadership. Most included the leader and followers as variables in the situation. Out of the many situational variables mentioned, those frequently described which will be included in this framework are: the organization, including superiors and associates, the task (job), the environment, and time.

Not all writers defined these aspects of the situation opera-tionally. Therefore each of these situational variables will be defined according to different theorists. For the variable of the organization, Lawrence and Lorsch's definition will be utilized. The variable of superiors and associates will be defined according to leadership style using the Life Cycle Theory of leadership, and personal and position power. The variable of the task or job will be defined according to Fiedler's degree of complexity. The variable of time will be defined

according to Lawrence and Lorsch as short term or long term. The
variable of the environment will be defined according to Fiedler in
terms of degree of stress. The final framework is presented in figure 16.

Methodology for the Study

1. For each of the five cases to be considered in this study,
first a brief account of the case will be given. This account will be
a precis of approximately twenty pages drawn by the writer from the
original published case source. This account will be presented in three
stages, so divided by the writer:

A. Before change

B. During change

C. After change

2. An analysis of the case will follow the account. The
analysis will be divided into three stages corresponding to the three
stages in the account of the case:

A. Before change

B. During change

C. After change

Each of the three parts of the analytic framework -- the leader, the
followers and the situation -- will be applied to each stage in the
analysis. Given the information available in the case description, the
writer will attempt to classify the data according to the categories
in the analytic framework. Through this classification, the writer
will attempt to diagnose the nature of the situation, leadership style
of the key leaders in the case, and level of follower maturity, in each

stage of the case. The appropriateness of the leadership style to the follower maturity and situation will be determined using the Life Cycle Model.

3. Each analysis will conclude with a summary of the factors which, in the writer's opinion, contributed to the success or failure of the attempted change effort in each case. This summary will be made in the light of the analytic framework, with particular reference to the Life Cycle Theory.

4. After presenting and analyzing five case studies, the writer will present her conclusions on:

A. the usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method for determining the most appropriate leadership style in any situation

B. any patterns in leadership styles for the successful and unsuccessful cases.

C H A P T E R   V

UNSUCCESSFUL AND MIXED SUCCESS CASE STUDIES

Case One: Creating an Open School

Background

This case is taken from <u>Anatomy of Educational Innovation</u> by
Louis M. Smith and Pat M. Keith (1971). In the early sixties, a
uniquely designed elementary school building was constructed in the
Ohio River valley. In keeping with its architecture, the school was to
pioneer a new, innovative program of open education. Louis Smith and
Pat Keith, funded by The United States Office of Education, undertook
as a research project the study of the development of the school. Their
foci included: the development of the faculty social system, the
teachers' innovations in education, the development of the pupils'
social system, the influence process, what and how cliques are formed,
and the Principal's decision-making role.

At the invitation of the Superintendent, the Curriculum Director
and the Principal, Smith and Keith spent one year in the school as
observers. Their copious "on the scene" observation notes were
supplemented by informal interviews, verbatim accounts of meetings,
and intensive analysis of school records. Both were "in the building"
at all times; from the beginning of the teachers' summer preparatory
workshop to the June close of the first academic year. What follows is
a précis of their chronicle of a failed attempt in innovative education.

Before Change

The Area

Kensington school was built in the early 1960's in a lower middle class white suburban district outside a large deteriorating metropolitan area in the Ohio river valley. The Milford district, grown several times over, was peopled with new arrivals who wanted their children to have a better education than they. The parents projected aspirations for their children that were higher than the district wide ability tests indicated were feasible.

The District

The Milford district's reputation as a community that fought over its school program had been gained through its record of bond and tax problems, squabbles in firing, rehiring and then retiring the previous superintendent. The district also sought outside funds continuously.

Educational Leaders

In public schools, the community elects the school board which in turn hires a superintendent who is responsible for staffing the schools. (See figure 22). The prior superintendent had been articulate and bright, a "comer", who held strong interests in developing a unique, novel and ultra contemporary educational program in the Milford district. Steven Spanman, the present superintendent, had intentions of national leadership by Milford. While the board and

Figure 22. Structure of Educational Leadership in Milford District

central office staff supported Spanman in the majority of decisions, they were split over the grand design for Milford and the specific program at Kensington; the old guard viewed Kensington with suspicion.

Spanman, deputy superintendent and curriculum directly Jerl Cohen, and Eugene Shelby, principal of Kensington, were friends and intimate colleagues. Shelby was not a part of the old guard group of elementary school principals in the district; in fact, they viewed him as a deviant newcomer. An observer noted that "Spanman, Eugene and Jerl are the in-group or ruling clique of the school". All three had a strong desire to have an impact on American education.

Though apart from the district patrons, Spanman, Cohen and Shelby assumed the district to be ready for change. The populace, only partly aware of the changes underway, circulated a number of half-truths about Kensington, which remained uncorrected, for Spanman, Cohen and Shelby felt that parents would not understand what they were trying to do.

Kensington's Formal Doctrine

The formal doctrine of Kensington developed out of two documents:
the <u>Mandate</u>, issued by the superintendent, and the <u>Institutional Plan</u>,
developed from the Mandate by the principal. The Mandate was first
presented by Spanman to the total school faculty during the summer work-
shop preceding the beginning of school. Said Spanman:

> We want adults who have developed effective
> language techniques, life-long habits of
> continuous learning and values which guide
> them as individuals and as members of society.

To accomplish this,

> We are looking for ways of re-organizing the
> curriculum.... The curriculum (will be)
> determined by the needs of the pupils....
> The faculty will do this.... The faculty is
> the curriculum.

He continued, stating that the school should have varied lengths of time
in the school day, no bells, pupils coming and going at will, be open to
two, three and four year olds, have a completely individualized program,
and operate on a twelve month schedule. Further, Kensington was to be a
"protected subculture" which "will protect good teachers from being
influenced by group norms". Spanman concluded his remarks with "A man's
reach should exceed his grasp or else what's a heaven for?"

The Institutional Plan was the design of the school according to
the principal. Its three goals, as presented to visiting reporters,
educators and parents were:

> 1. To assist pupils to become fully functioning
>   mature human beings.
> 2. To meet the needs of individual differences
>   by providing a differentiated program.

3. To provide the skills, structures and under-
    standings which will enable pupils to identify
    worthwhile goals for themselves.

The doctrine treated issues on an abstract level and did not define

terms operationally.

Organization of the School

Figure 23 shows the organization of Kensington according to

Shelby's plan. According to the Institutional Plan,

| Principal	INDEPENDENT STUDY DIVISION			
Secretary	Language Arts Specialist	Academic Counselor	Academic Counselor	Academic Counselor
Instructional Materials Specialist	Science Specialist			
Library Clerk	Math Specialist	70 Pupils	70 Pupils	70 Pupils
Audio Visual Technician	Social Studies Specialist			
Physical Education Specialist	Transition Division			
Creative Arts Specialist	Teacher	Teacher		Teacher
	90 Pupils			
Counselor (one-fourth time)	Basic Skills Division			
Teacher Aid	3 Teachers		3 Teachers	
Instructional Clerk	90 Pupils		90 Pupils	
	Kindegarten			

Figure 23. Kensington's Organization

1. Learning was to be an interactive process; there was to be no set curriculum. Shelby believed that since learning results only from experience, one can only structure the environment so that the experience is likely to occur.

2. Kensington was to place primary emphasis on process development as opposed to content development.

3. The organization of individualized learning was to include team teaching, ungradedness and total democratic pupil-teaching decision making.

4. The organization of the school was to depend on the program.

Aware, and skeptical of classical management theory, Shelby told an observer that at Kensington "span of control" and "unit of authority" were being deliberately violated, and he was interested in the consequences of this.

Jargon

Along with the doctrine, a jargon arose. One teacher, complaining she felt brainwashed, said that when she was finished with the year, there were three words she would never use again: "Conceptualize", "fully functioning", and "process". An observer noted:

> The program of the school is so clouded with clichés and razzle-dazzle that it is very difficult to see clearly what will happen to the children.

The Building

For the first time in the United States, such a program was to be implemented with a corresponding new uniquely designed building. (See figure 24). The building won an award for architectural design, and was much visited.

Figure 24. Floor Plan of Kensington School

1. Covered play shelter 2. Stage 3. Administrative suite
4. Childrens' Theatre 5. Projection Room 6. Acting Tower
7. Curriculum Center 8. Aquarium 9. Perception Core
10. Laboratory Suites
    (101-120)

It was described in the document from the Architectural Design Institute as follows:

> The initial impact is embodied in the simplicity
> of the building design, calling form an image
> of an earlier era of civilization. A Parthenon
> whose qualities contribute to an effect of
> organizationally articulated form rather than
> mere massiveness, of subtle refinement rather
> than gross power. A building whose shape is in
> fact a prototype of evolutionary progress is
> educational growth. It is a facility offering
> facility and speed, mobility and flexibility to
> a nongraded, organic, fluid approach to inquiry.

The Teachers

Shelby hired a teaching staff he felt would be compatible with the school doctrine. In general the twenty-one faculty were:

1. New to the district — So they could be trained more easily in new procedures.

2. Inexperienced — Seven had no experience; two more than twenty years; the rest less than five years

3. Very able intellectually — Three had completed all but their doctoral dissertations.

4. Politically liberal — One of the central office staff said, "Not a Republican in the group".

According to an observer, they seemed an unusual group: young, more than a little bit bright, enthusiastic, with an excitement about teaching "even though they are not very specific and clear about this yet". During the first few days of the summer workshop they had high morale, and an aura of 'We can do it and what we're doing is important'.

The Summer Workshop

A summer workshop was held for the faculty between August 10 and September 8. For the first week, primarily through Shelby's efforts, National Training Laboratories conducted T-group training. Because of his past experiences in similar programs, Shelby thought his decision was "intuitively good", and that he "could build a rationale after the fact about it". The purposes of the T-groups were to plan for the coming year, to enable the faculty to "begin to become a group", "to get to know one another, and to learn to work together".

During the T-group week the principal introduced his Institutional Plan. It was presented as a given, and he indicated that a serious problem would arise if personal goals were radically different from the plan. He was most reluctant to depart from the plan and create new and different structures with the staff. One of the observers commented:

> Eugene's comments came like a blast a lunch yesterday.
> His feelings and continual reiteration of the plan
> raised some skepticism in a few of the people.

This week was characterized by revelations of self, revelations about salary, and some intense development of empathy. Teachers' reactions to the T-groups subsequently appeared in The Bulletin:

> Although a group development laboratory is never
> a comfortable thing to participate in, it should
> prove helpful to us as we work together during
> the year....

> We will not deny the frustration of the experience,
> but undoubtedly it will prove to have been most
> profitable as we work together toward our goal
> this year....

According to an observer, the T-groups highlighted and legitimized high emotionality, self-revelation, and decision making by consensus. Interpersonal communication was of the utmost importance. There was a minimum of concentration on nuts and bolts issues. These effects were felt all year long.

At the beginning of the second week, the principal chaired a total staff meeting at which he stated that for the remainder of the workshop, the faculty were to meet in their teams as they deemed necessary to prepare for school opening. In addition, the faculty were to indicate which of eight committees they would like to be on, to fill out daily logs, and to be on individual schedules with the principal.

During this period, difficulties in the team and committee meetings arose. One teacher noted that when the principal was not in the group, it made tremendous progress. Another teacher expressed irritation at the railroading of items, the inability of anybody to get anything done in the committee, and the number of committees she was on (three). She said, "If things don't straighten out very soon, I'll pack up my bag and go home". None of the committees produced any authoritative position papers.

At the end of the third week, Bill Kirkham, an experienced teacher on the ISD team, was fired. The stated reasons were that his point of view was too different and that he blocked the smooth functioning of the team. The apparent group decision was made at an Independent Study Division (I.S.D.) team meeting. Various reasons were put forward for why this happened:

1. The outside consultant who was working with this team had behaved inappropriately.
2. A scapegoating because of the team's failure to progress.
3. Bill's curriculum ideas were a threat to the principal.

This episode increased distrust, fear and guilt in the ISD team.

In the final week two parent meetings were held. One was a large protest meeting over the book and fee assessment that had been levied against each pupil. In the second meeting, the principal and faculty sought to explain the program. The parents asked specific questions: How do the teachers know what the individual children are doing? How do the children get instruction in spelling? What happens to the children if these two years turn out to be a failure? They were concerned, confused and hostile over the promotion, grading, and report cards. In short, the parents were divided into a small loyal group and a large opposed group.

<div align="center">During Change</div>

Opening Day

When the summer workshop ended on September 8, the opening day of school, the staff were still making organizational plans. Because the new building was not finished, the three divisions were given temporary quarters in three nearby schools.

ISD Division. The 210 students in the Independent Studies Division gathered on the first day in the Milford High gym. These observations were recorded during the day:

Morning. Children arrive well dressed and well
scrubbed - parents angry over lack of bus
schedule - noise level rising - temperature
rising - humidity increasing - only David's
group reading - teachers and kids milling
about - some horseplay - some students sit at
tables and gaze about - kids in David's group
sitting like chained muted animals as David
trying to conduct a T-group - noise high -
observer about to get a headache.

Noon. Tremendous amount of listless behavior -
one teacher left her group because the students
would not do anything - a few of the older and
brighter kids seem able to handle freedom and
are working on their log sheets.

Four. Staff seems exhausted.

Four-thirty pm. Kids lined up for buses - no
one knows when or where they will come - they
arrive at 4:45 pm. - kids passive.

After the first day the teachers realized that it was possible

that the children in ISD would not be able to work in an individualized,

independent program. Many of the students could not write, and there-

fore could not fill in their daily log, even with supervision. As the

teachers had not agreed upon a uniform method for signing up for learn-

ing groups, many children were unable to schedule instruction. At the

close of day two, two ISD teachers decided on a self-contained area.

Transition Division. The 90 students in the Transition Division

were housed in one large room and two classrooms in Milford Junior High.

An observer noted that on the first day "nothing went right". Some of

the students arrived before 9 am. and the buses did not come until 5 pm.

leaving a very tired staff. The teachers described the noise as "chaos".

At the end of the first day, they decided to go toward more traditional

teaching methods, and assigned 30 students to each team member while

noting that this was contrary to the Kensington philosophy, which none of them was sure would work anyway.

Basic Skills Division. The 180 students and six teachers in Basic Skills were located in Hillside Elementary School. Because of disagreements during the summer workshop, the teachers had already split into a team of four and a team of two. The team of four had a difficult time holding the childrens' interest the first day. Very tired and confused, they met at the end of the day and commented that the lack of structure actually bound them a great deal, inhibiting their freedom.

The team of two, composed of one very experienced teacher, and one new teacher, presented an academically-oriented and traditional program the first day. An observer noted that "It will be interesting if this team works the smoothest and most efficiently".

October Developments

The teachers coped with long bus waits, with a lack of materials and facilities, with a high noise level which caused some teachers to get whistles, with attempting to get to know about 200 students each, with a majority of children who were unable to devise and carry out individual work plans, with great demands on their time, and with teaching a variety of subjects though hired for two areas of competency.

Team teaching was affected. Experienced teachers said they could provide more individual pupil decision making in a self-contained classroom where their behavior was not contingent upon their (inexperienced) teaching peers. At a team level, there were no norms except

for the lack of rules. Risks were high, for when one did act, his or her assumptions and actions were subject to team scrutiny. To act at all came to be identified with a lack of concern for the team, and to risk being charged with directiveness.

Many teachers were discouraged. Sick of the dust, dirt, confusion, lack of order and noise, two members of Basic Skills were thinking of quitting at mid-term. One said, "Almost everybody is giving serious thought about not coming back next year".

There was reluctance to tell the principal. As one teacher put it, "It's his baby, and you can't tell a person that his baby is no good". On his part, the principal told an observer that he was troubled by the sterile programs being offered in some classes, by personal anxiety, by his relationship with an outside consultant, and by feelings of "general apprehension and anxiousness". Further, he felt that some of the staff did not appreciate the freedom he had given them, and that some teachers were inadequate.

November: The New Building

The building had won an award for "Imaginative architecture leading to intriguing design.... This building is flexible, free flowing and functional...." Differences between the ideal, as described in the architect's design, and the real, as experienced by the teachers and students, developed. These differences caused new problems for the teachers to cope with.

The Teacher Work Center (see figure 24) became an informal gathering place for teachers and office personnel to have lunch, drink

coffee and talk, and for staff and community meetings. The Perception Core, for student study, became used as extra teaching space and a hallway, as the building had no corridors. Lavatories were individual, and became gathering places and playgrounds for the children. Teachers had continual problems keeping the students out of them.

The classrooms, called Learning Laboratory Suites, were twenty open spaces separated by moveable dividers and equipped with overhead projectors. Because of the emphasis on "process curriculum", no teacher would admit to having a prepared set of transparencies. As well, time and energy restrictions caused teachers to move to blackboard use.

The ampitheatre-like Physical Education Shelter, substituting for a gymnasium, was to be surrounded by shrubbery, warmed by infra-red heaters, and used by students for physical education, and the community for concerts. Because the shrubbery was never planted, the wind blew rain, snow and dirt into the area. The heating units, designed for California, were totally inadequate. The field could not be used because of the new grass. Thus the planned physical education program could not be carried out.

Because the Satellite Kitchens were too small, hot food had to be brought in daily from other schools. There were no lunchrooms. As a result, classroom spaces were used for eating, and litter and garbage accumulated. The open Administrative Suite afforded no privacy to the principal, secretary, nurse and speech teacher who all worked there. The Auditorium was never used instructionally; on several occasions it was used by large parent groups.

The <u>Childrens' Theatre</u> was a large open space surrounded by three acting areas, two joined by a bridge which crossed a life science stream. This area was carpeted, as was the whole school. According to the observers, the theatre was the most successful and creative part of the school. Through the efforts of the teachers, many productions took place.

December: The Rules

In response to the discipline problems just after the move, parental pressure, and his own feelings of anxiety, the principal issued two sets of rules. The first set, on December 8th, contained 35 rules relating to general policies and operating procedures. Some of the rules covered: where and when lunch would be served, the use of permission slips to go home for lunch, and to enter the Perception Core, when pupils should arrive at school, where the students should walk in the school, how the teachers were to write reports about mis-behavior and keep records of chronic misbehavior which were to be given to the principal.

The second set of ten administrative regulations appeared December 14th. Some of the rules covered: not keeping children after school without the consent of the parents, not allowing children outside the building unless the teacher had given permission, making requests for custodial help to the office instead of the custodian, the use of permanent passes to the Perception Core for consistently conscientious students, and limitations on the use of AV equipment to three office personnel.

The staff reacted to these rules with hostility, particularly those who most closely identified with early versions of the formal doctrine. The rules were perceived both as a retreat from Kensington's doctrine, and as coming from the principal. An observer noted a lack of spirit in the overall staff. The dejected teachers appeared to have lost any faith they previously had in a democratically functioning staff. When asked if the staff were consulted, one teacher said:

> Yes, we were consulted, and we told him (the principal) what we did not want. After we told him this, he left it in anyway.

She did not hide her feelings that this had been a fake democratic approach by the principal.

Christmas holidays found the faculty tired, frustrated and ill. The majority took full vacations away from the area. An observer noted that this would leave little time for planning for the next semester and "should put them in the soup all spring".

January: Publicity and Reorganization

After Christmas, many reporters and observers visited the school. Kensington also achieved prominence as the major plank in the Milford school district's bid for private and federal funds to support the curriculum reorganization project. All of this created excitement, enthusiasm and euphoria in the staff. An observer noted, "Everyone is kind of high".

However, behind the scenes, problems continued. Clerical problems were severe; parents were dissatisfied; teachers spent long

hours producing instructional materials; supplies frequently ran out; the lack of textbooks began to be felt.

On January 9th, in response to parental reaction, the principal initiated a change to a series of self-contained classrooms in the ISD Division. The principal chaired the meeting at which this decision was made. According to the transcripts of that meeting, members hardly talked. After the meeting was over, The Bulletin announced that as of February 1st, the ISD Division would consist of five academic advisors who would be totally responsible for 40 pupils each. Co-operative teaching would be encouraged, but on an informal basis. Teacher reactions varied:

> I'm quite opposed. I don't like the large
> group instruction and it doesn't fit what
> I want to do.

> I'm in agreement. This is more what I wanted
> anyway.

> I see it as a necessary step.

April and May Developments

In April and May, the _district_ was in the throes of a tax campaign which failed. Following this, scapegoats were sought; Kensington was a plausible possibility. The _superintendent_ had problems with growing board opposition, lack of teacher support, and trouble with central office staff with whom he had only had a couple of general meetings in the last three years. At a May meeting, the _parents_ said they did not understand what the school was trying to do.

The _teachers_ expressed various frustrations. One of the teachers with 28 years of experience said she felt she had been a total failure during the year, and for that reason decided not to return. This sentiment was echoed by other experienced teachers. Another teacher, looking back, said he felt problems had been aided by the T-groups which ironically had caused some of the difficulties they were trying to overcome.

The Final Staff Meeting

On May 24th, the principal set the agenda and chaired a meeting for the next year's staff. Eight of the old staff and two new staff were present. The principal outlined the situation for the coming year:

1. 40% reduction in custodial budget
2. reduction of two teacher aides
3. interns turned down by the board, one of whom said people were tired of everything going to Kensington
4. materials budget cut from $10,000 to $2,500
5. plans for a two week summer workshop contingent on foundation support which the principal thought was not probable.

Discussion ensued about the pupils, curriculum, other schools, and record keeping. Doubts were raised about pupil grouping; no decision was made. The principal stated that:

> Curriculum development will have to be done locally. My own feeling is that next year we should emphasize local need. The other goals require additional financial and human resources. We must be realistic.

Along with this, visits to other schools were discussed. The principal broadened this to "improving relationships with the other schools in

the district". Formalized record keeping was raised; though the principal tried for a motion on the subject, none was forthcoming. No decision was made.

After Change

The Principal

The principal left in the middle of the second year. A going away party, "quite an emotional undertaking" according to an observer, was held for him in February. At the party, the principal stated that the school would not be so tied up with local control in the future. In his eyes, the reasons for the difficulties were public opinion in the community, and the lack of resources to carry out the task. According to a teacher, the "villian" was the district which wouldn't support the idea the school was trying to convey. With Shelby's departure, the administration chose a conservative successor.

The Faculty

With a new principal, policy shifts occurred in the school, causing a continued faculty turnover. Almost all the teachers who came in the second year left before the third year. New faculty were more traditional. Classes became pretty much self-contained.

Educational Leaders

Two years after Kensington began, the school board changed. The curriculum director left after the first year. The superintendent

resigned after a year's leave of absence, to be replaced with a more conservative successor. Kensington was now, both in philosophy and action, part of "the old Milford".

Analysis of Case One

> The natural tendency of all systems is toward
> disorder, or entropy....There is no escaping
> the need for some system of control in organiza-
> tions, including participative organizations...
> to forestall the inevitable deterioration into
> randomness.
>
> Arnold S. Tannenbaum
> Control in Organizations

Before Change

The Situation

Ideal structure of the organization. In this case, the organiza-
tion did not yet exist; it was to be created. Let us look then, at the
organization as it was supposed to be. In general terms, this school
was to be a completely participative organization, akin to Likert's
(1961) system four organization:

1. Motivational forces arise from group processes.
   Group participates in setting goals, improving
   methods, and appraising progress toward goals.
   Strongly favorable attitudes toward implement-
   ing organizational goals.
2. Favorable cooperative attitudes throughout the
   organization with mutual trust and confidence.
   High job satisfaction.
3. Communication flows freely vertically, and
   horizontally.

4. Extensive, friendly interaction and cooperation between all levels.
5. Decision making widely shared. Widespread responsibility for the control process.

The principal said that "span of control" and "unit of authority" were to be deliberately violated in this school. There were to be no department heads, but teaching teams. Neither formal rules nor formal review were to exist. Review and criteria for evaluation were not mentioned. There was to be total democratic teacher-pupil decision making.

In terms of interpersonal orientation, there was to be a high concern for social relationships. The summer T-groups were to socialize the staff to this behavior.

The Mandate and Institutional Plan set forth many general goals for the school which might be summarized as: to produce a "fully functioning pupil", able to work independently, who will become a "fully functioning" mature human being. The means to attain this end were to be left completely up to the teacher and the individual student. Each student was to develop his or her own program; there was to be no set curriculum.

Ideal task. With a freely developing curriculum, the task of the various teachers would be ambiguous (no set methods), highly varied (each student would have an individual program), and highly interdependent (total democratic teacher-pupil decision making and team teaching).

Ideal environment. The rate of change in the environment was slow, marked by the re-election of the school board every two years. Information about conditions in the environment would be certain,

through the central office, the principals in the district, and the parents. Rate of feedback to the school would be high, through the parents. However, this was not to affect Kensington which was to be a "protected subculture". The teachers would thus not be affected by "group norms" from the environment. Any stress in the environment was not to affect the teachers and students.

What a System Four Organization Needs

According to Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), this type of organization requires a high degree of integration. Likert himself (1961) posits system four, participative management, as an "ideal". In order to achieve it, an organization will need:

1. a leader who can create a situation in which members establish high performance goals for themselves

2. good communications

3. an atmosphere free of hostility, fear, distrust, unreasonable pressure, conflict between employees and supervisors

4. machinery to handle conflict

5. personnel skilled in group process

6. a work group with high confidence, trust, loyalty and co-operative motivation.

The leaders who created Kensington attempted to achieve these conditions by providing:

1. a one month summer workshop with T-groups for the total staff

2. a system of team teaching

3. complete freedom to the teachers in creating the curriculum

4. democratic decision making

5. a specially designed open building; a "protected" environment.

Yet in spite of all these things, the creation of this open school failed completely. How did it happen? To clarify this, let us look more closely at the various groups of people involved.

Real environment. The Milford district generally held traditional attitudes toward schooling. Half of the school board, half of the central office staff, and all of the elementary school principals were described as "old guard". The previous superintendent who had ideas of developing an ultra contemporary educational program had been fired, rehired and retired.

The district was active in educational affairs. The central office sought outside funds continuously, as for example, the curriculum reorganization project. Parents fought over bond and tax problems. They frequently held meetings at which they protested over actions of which they did not approve, as in the case of the student fees levied by Kensington, and the matter of the previous superintendent. Ambitious for their children, the parents were actively involved in school affairs.

Principal's Superiors and Associates. Close friends and colleagues, the superintendent, Steven Spanman, deputy superintendent and curriculum director Jerl Cohen, and principal Eugene Shelby worked together to bring about the dream of Kensington. Spanman wrote the Mandate for the school; Cohen sought a foundation grant to support the

project, and Shelby designed the school in his Institutional Plan, derived from the Mandate. All three had a strong desire to have an impact on American education.

In working together they looked more to each other for guidance and support than to their constituencies. Spanman held only two meetings with his central office staff in three years. Cohen spent most of his time at Kensington. Shelby did not become part of the powerful group of elementary school principals in the district. As a result, they viewed him as a deviant newcomer. An observer commented that these three men were the "ruling clique" of the school. All three largely ignored the parents whom they felt "would not understand what they (were) trying to do".

They seemed to want to create an isolated educational utopia, a "protected subenvironment", in spite of the fact that Kensington was a public school in a traditional and insistent environment. These factors prevented integration and communication between the organization and its environment. An organization cannot ignore its environment.

The Followers: The Teachers

Achievement motivation. The twenty-one teachers were described by an observer as young, excited about teaching, and "more than a little bit bright". Three had all but their doctoral dissertations completed. Upwardly mobile, most had "places they wanted to go and things they wanted to do professionally beyond Kensington school". Enthusiastic about the school, they began the summer workshop with an attitude of "We can do it and what we're doing is important".

According to McClelland's theory, they would be highly achievement motivated people. They preferred a non-routine job that required personal initiative and inventiveness; they had a positive, confident attitude toward the probability of their being successful at Kensington; they were thinking ahead, and had goals for the future; they were not motivated by money, but by the ideal of Kensington and teaching. Only through their personal efforts would the goals of the school be achieved. While teaching at Kensington might appear a high risk to some, it may have appeared initially to them to be a moderately difficult but potentially achievable task. McClelland does not believe that a teacher is in a situation where he or she gets concrete feedback on how well he or she is doing. Those who have been teachers might disagree. In all, this group exhibited many characteristics of high n Ach.

Their willingness to take responsibility was evident in their eagerness, enthusiasm, excitement and espousal of the Kensington doctrine. They were willing, though not "very specific and clear" about what that entailed. Although their educational level was high, their task relevant experience, and their ability to take responsibility in this type of teaching situation was low. Only two had more than twenty years experience; seven had no experience at all and the rest less than five years experience in traditional schools.

According to Life Cycle Theory, their "maturity" level at the beginning of the summer workshop would be low to average. (See figure 25). This indicates that the appropriate leadership style for this group initially would be high task and high relationships.

Figure 25. Faculty Maturity Level

The Principal: During the Summer Workshop

The Mandate had declared that Kensington would be a non-structured, open school. The school's organization was to follow its program, and its program was to develop spontaneously. The principal reinforced this in his Institutional Plan in which he stated that since learning only results from experience, one can only structure the environment. Process development, not content development was to be emphasized. Total democratic decision making was the rule.

During the summer workshop, Shelby adopted a laissez-faire leadership style which he believed was in harmony with this doctrine. He participated in the T-groups. He told an observer that part of his decision making style was to deliberately delay decisions, as he did in the ordering of the textbooks. During the committee meetings in the workshop, he generally played a laissez-faire role.

During the workshop, some of Shelby's behaviors indicated a second leadership style of high task and low relationships. He announced his Institutional Plan to the staff, for the first time, during the week of the T-groups, stating that it was a given, and that a serious problem would arise if the teachers' personal goals were radically different from his plan. It came, said an observer, "like a blast". In the second week, he instructed the faculty to meet in their teams as they deemed necessary, sign up for already named committees, fill out daily logs, and report to him on an individual basis during the remainder of the workshop. As the workshop progressed, a teacher noted that when the principal was not in a group, it made "tremendous progress".

These actions show the principal organizing and defining roles, explaining what activities to do, establishing patterns of organization, formalizing channels of communication, and establishing ways of getting the job done. This high task and low relationships leadership style was opposite to the doctrine of total democratic decision making and the laissez-faire style. This difference in leadership styles became manifest in Shelby's variation between laissez-faire style and high task, low relationships style in the committee group meetings, as noticed by one teacher.

According to Life Cycle Theory, Shelby's basic leadership style during the summer workshop was low task and low relationships (laissez-faire) and his secondary leadership style was high task and low relationships. (See figure 26). In either case, according to Life Cycle Theory, neither style would be appropriate for the initial "maturity" level of the teachers which, as previously diagnosed, calls for a high task and high relationships style initially.

The results of the summer workshop support this diagnosis. The goals of the summer workshop were not fully met. Teachers reactions to the T-groups were generally unfavorable:

> Although a group development laboratory is never
> a comfortable thing to participate in, it should
> prove helpful....

> We will not deny the frustration of the experience,
> but undoubtedly it will prove to have been most
> profitable....

They felt it would have been more appropriate "to begin group action by working on an actual problem instead of studying group process". None of the committee produced any authoritative position papers. Because

High
Task
High
Relation-
ships

Leadership Style
Appropriate to
Follower "Maturity"

Shelby's
Basic
Style

Low
Task
Low
Relation-
ships

High
Task
Low
Relation-
ships

Shelby's
Secondary
Style

Figure 26.   Shelby's Leadership Styles During
Summer Workshop

of the emphasis on group process and the de-emphasis on nuts and bolts issues, the staff were not organized for the opening day of school.

During Change

> The popular practice of letting children have unrestricted freedom has made tyrants of children and slaves of the parents...Well-defined restrictions give a sense of security and certainty of function within the social structure. Without this, the child feels at a total loss....His ever renewed efforts to find himself take a destructive course... Without order, there can be no freedom.
>
> Rudolf Dreikurs
> Children the Challenge

Staff Leadership of Students

Thus far, we have considered the principal's initial leadership style as it related to the teachers (followers). This relationship, however, is also affected by the interaction between the teachers as leaders and the students as followers.

The students at Kensington were assumed to be ready to learn in an open school. Yet before school opened, a district-wide ability test revealed that the childrens' abilities were lower than their parents' aspirations for them. As well, the children were coming to Kensington from traditional schools. During the first days of school it became apparent that only a few children could operate in the environment. Many could not write. Behavior ranged from horseplay to passive listlessness.

According to Life Cycle Theory, the childrens' "maturity" level in this situation was low. (See figure 27). Unused to learning in this type of school, only a few "of the older and brighter" students showed any achievement motivation. One teacher estimated that only about fifteen percent of his science class were able to follow. The students' experience and education in an open school was nil; hence their ability generally was very low. Except for a few, overall willingness to learn in this setting was low.

According to the school doctrine, the curriculum was to develop out of the individual student's interests. Ideally, teachers were to follow the student's direction, and facilitate his or her learning in whatever way possible. The role of the "academic advisor" was to support and encourage, but not initiate. In Life Cycle Theory terms, the teachers were to adopt a quadrant three style of high relationship and low task. (See figure 13). A few teachers, such as David, who conducted the student T-groups, used a quadrant four low task and low relationships style.

Largely inexperienced and unprepared for students' reactions, some teachers began to move toward more traditional methods after the second day of school. Although some moved more quickly than others, by the end of the first semester, most of the staff were teaching in self contained units. In terms of Life Cycle Theory, the teachers' leadership style gradually became more structured; they moved backward through the quadrants from low task and low relationships (quadrant four), to quadrant three (T-groups, free movement in the building, no structure initiated by teachers), to quadrant two (whistles, self-

Figure 27. Students' "Maturity" Level

contained units, breakdown of team teaching), to quadrant one
(permission slips, students marching from one place to another in
groups at specific times.

According to Life Cycle Theory, the change cycle is effective
only when leader style changes through each quadrant in turn from one
to four, but not in reverse. Movement forward will be seen as positive
reinforcement by followers, while movement backward through the cycle
will be perceived as punishment. The negative consequences of a reverse
style development were shown in the increasing frustrations and
difficulties within the school as the year progressed.

The Principal: During the Year

During the summer workshop, the principal's leadership style
varied between a basically low task and low relationships style, and a
secondary high task and low relationships style. As the first semester
progressed, the principal became more and more dissatisfied with the
"sterile programs being offered in some classrooms", and increasingly
used high task and low relationships style in an attempt to remedy the
situation. The following chronology shows his change to a quadrant one
style:

1. October   principal anxious, dissatisfied

2. November   move to the new building

3. December   principal issues two lists of
                     45 rules

4. January   principal changes ISD Division
                     to self contained units with
                     individual teaching

fires outside consultant

changes organization of physical
education program to more
traditional approach

5. May   announces budget cuts and
advocates more traditional
curriculum and closer co-
operation with other schools

The principal's issuing of the December rules provides a
critical example of his high task and low relationships style. Parental
dissatisfaction, teacher dissatisfaction, problems and frustrations with
the new building and personal anxiety all drove the principal to take
action in December. In an attempt to create order, he issued some
rules. While a logical step, the manner in which he did this caused
more problems. In his eyes, he acted democratically, for he consulted
with the teachers before issuing the rules. The teachers, however,
perceived this as a "fake democratic approach" for he did not incor-
porate any of their suggestions. Essentially, the principal drew up
the rules as he saw them necessary, and issued them. As Tannenbaum and
Schmidt (1958) caution:

> If (a leader) actually intends to make a certain
> decision himself, but the subordinate group gets
> the impression that he has delegated this authority,
> considerable confusion and resentment are likely
> to follow.

In this instance, the rules created hostility against the principal,
disillusionment with the principal's doctrine of complete democracy and
apathy in the staff.

Thus, this high task and low relationships action by Shelby was
inappropriate; even initially a quadrant two style was called for. As

well as being inappropriate, the action came too late; at this point in
the year teacher morale was already low, and needed building up. A
high task and high relationships style might have been more appropriate.
The fact that the rules created not anger, but apathy, indicates the
low level of staff morale.

Shelby's inability to practice relationships behavior prevented
him from using a quadrant two or three leadership style. During the
summer workshop, there is no record of Shelby providing socio-emotional
support, or psychological strokes for the staff. In October, though
unhappy and frustrated, teachers were reluctant to tell this to Shelby.
This in itself, indicated a certain amount to fear and distrust. In
turn, though Shelby was beset by many anxieties, he told an observer,
but not his staff. This lack of personal communications prevented
relationships behaviors. Though, as one observer commented, Shelby was
an expert teacher himself, he did not share this, or attempt to assist
floundering new teachers. The reasons why were never advanced. Unable
therefore, to adopt a quadrant two or three leadership style, and only
able to use a quadrant four or one style, Shelby was unable to develop
the "maturity" of his teachers by varying his style through all four
quadrants. This difficulty was compounded by the fact that, like the
staff, Shelby progressed backwards through the cycle jumping from
quadrant four, to quadrant one. This had an effect of increasing
hostility, fear and distrust, and decreasing morale in the staff, so
that when most support and cooperation was needed, there was the
least possibility for it.

Summary

Why did Kensington Fail?

The principal blamed Kensington's failure on adverse public opinion, and lack of resources. Some of the teachers blamed the failure on the non-supportive Milford district. While these were some of the factors working against Kensington, there were others. To summarize, some of the reasons Kensington failed include:

1. No diagnosis of student population; hence leadership style of teachers inappropriate to students' needs.

2. Principal's leadership style inappropriate to teachers' needs. Principal lacked flexibility in leadership style; hence could not adapt to changing teacher needs.

3. Both teachers and principal attempted a reverse change cycle according to Life Cycle Theory, creating confusion, fear, hostility, and distrust. This contributed to a breakdown in communications.

4. Educational leaders ignored community environment; thus cut off support and increased hostility from environment.

5. Emphasis on process in the school doctrine resulted in poor administration of nuts and bolts items which in turn resulted in all round frustration.

6. The design of the building created frustration.

7. The Milford district's failure to obtain outside funding for its curriculum project caused Kensington to become a scapegoat.

<u>Case Two: Change In A Newspaper</u>

<u>Background</u>

This case is taken from <u>Behind The Front Page</u> by Chris Argyris (1974). Motivated by his interest in "the processes needed to enhance organizational health and create effective on-going renewal activities within organizations (p. ix)," Argyris, during the sixties, chose as a field for his research a major American newspaper of considerable renown.

He had three reasons for electing to study this successful organization.

1. So far as he could see, the communications media had shown little interest in learning how healthy organizations can be designed and managed effectively [p.x.].

2. He had never studied an organization that was skeptical about the value of behavioral science. If he could be admitted to do research in an un-cooperative organization, he 'might learn more about the process of gaining credibility where we need it most [p.x].'

3. He wanted to learn what impact the internal system of the newspaper had upon the perceptions, thoughts and writing of those who worked for it [p.x].

After initiating an interview with the President and senior executives of the newspaper during which he declared his motives and outlined his proposed study, Argyris was invited in.

For three years Argyris interviewed top management, observed and analyzed their meetings and conducted training seminars. At the end of the third year, his attempt to bring about organizational self

renewal quietly ground to a halt. Because of increasing fear and resistance, the newspaper executives decided to discontinue the seminars, and the change program ended, "not with a bang, but a whimper."

Before Change

The Environment

The American press had been under attack for having grown remote and unresponsive to its public. A national blueribbon task force, privately financed, cited as causes of this situation, a lack of nation-wide standards, non-competitive salaries, too much emphasis on the sensational and dramatic, decreased competition between newspapers, and control of newspapers by individuals who are forced to be profit conscious. In response, the task force recommended that a national press council be established to control these problems.

The Organization

The increasingly critical environment was beginning to cause some creditility problems for the Daily Planet. However, in spite of this, the Planet had a fine reputation, was acknowledged to be a newspaper of high professional standards, and was judged both by the sponsors of the task force and others in the field to be an excellent newspaper.

Organizational consultant Dr. Chris Argyris chose to study this newspaper for three reasons:

1. He wanted to learn how healthy organizations can be designed

and managed effectively so as to create within themselves on-going renewal activities. So far as he could see, the communications media had shown little interest in such activities.

2. He wanted to learn what impact the internal system of the organization had upon the perceptions, thoughts, and writing of the employees.

3. He wanted to study an organization that was skeptical about the value of behavioral science. He felt that in a resistant organization he could learn more about the process of gaining credibility for the behavioral sciences "where we need it most [p.x]." According to Argyris, the Daily Planet was "full of executives who genuinely did not believe [p.x]" in his approach. As one informant told Argyris, "To put it mildly, they would consider your views to be nonsense [p.x]."

In order to preserve anonymity, Argyris did not supply many details about the newspaper's organizational structure. We can glean however, that the Daily Planet was a heirarchical bureaucracy with the following structure:

Board ————————————	Board of the corporation that publishes the newspaper
President ————————————	member of the Board and publisher of the newspaper
Executive Vice-President	
Vice Presidents	} — Executive Committee
Senior Editors	
Editors	
Copy Editors	
Reporters	

Argyris focussed his study on "the top forty executives [p. 2]" at "the highest levels of editorial, news and administrative activity [p. 2]." After he asked for their cooperation, declared his motives, and described possible pay-offs for them, they invited him in to make the study, although expressing reservations. One old timer warned Argyris, "Hell, it's like tilting with windmills to think you can change anything in this place [p. 40]."

The Top Forty Officials

For one year Argyris interviewed and carefully observed the meetings of this group. From this study, he formed a diagnosis of their attitudes and behavior regarding work, competitiveness, meetings, decision making, leadership, conflict, self perceptions, and feelings of pessimism.

Work. Over three quarters of this group believed that being task oriented, working hard, and producing led to promotion and raises, and that their effectiveness was measured by how well they performed their tasks. Working hard also fulfilled a need to feel essential to the success of the newspaper which was, in turn, essential to the nation. Working for the prestigious Daily Planet also satisfied the need for confirmation that professionally one was above average to tops. An overwhelming majority said their need for security was satisfied by the Planet's backing up its employees' articles. 84% expressed enjoyment in overcoming intellectual challenges which were seen as personal challenges. Almost all said they sought jobs which provided this kind of challenge, and 80% said that working for the Planet was intellectually challenging.

Competition

Almost all described colleagues as very competitive.

> They're competitive as the devil; they're
> competitive for a sandwich [p. 10].

Furthermore, almost everyone, including the president, felt that competitiveness is a good quality in news people. Stories were often secretly assigned to several different reporters, who were thus placed in severe competition. As support for this, two administrators cited a letter by the president which said in effect that a good staff is a restless staff, and that the company is not an old age home.

> If we're honest, I'd have to say that we're
> so competitive that our reaction is...who
> cares about the old guys (those demoted)
> just so long as it isn't me [p. 2].

Discussions of important issues were commonly competitive win-lose interchanges, enjoyed and seen as "fun" by most of the group. "That's the name of the game [p. 11]" said one administrator. Said another:

> Somebody defined a good newspaperman as being
> like a kid who murders his parents and then
> pleads sympathy from the court because he is
> an orphan [p. 10].

After observing fifty meetings, Argyris commented that the scores for members not helping others were the highest he had recorded in all his studies. Those scores indicated that people were cutting each other off in order to seize scarce air time.

According to Argyris, this focus on winning intellectual challenges resulted in managers speaking in a persuasive or selling manner in meetings. Others immunized themselves by deflating him,

cutting off his speech, tuning him out, or listening to find
weaknesses.

Meetings. The general feeling was that group meetings were a
waste of time, and what was needed was a good, strong leader. 82% of
the top group spoke in a derogatory manner about meetings.

> If I had my way, I'd cancel all group meetings....
> They're a big waste of time....You get people
> who...repeat, repeat, repeat--to impress the
> boss, I guess--and who are unbelievably stupid
> [p. 15].

Meetings were considered poor places to explore new ideas.
Members characteristically resolved ambiguous issues immediately, with-
out discussion. One executive said:

> You can throw them anything and they'll have
> the answer [p. 13].

As a result, meetings were considered places where only unimportant
issues were discussed.

Almost three-quarters of this group saw meetings as a place for
the chairman to set forth his ideas, and thought this was appropriate.
Because the superior's needs were made the center of attention, comments
and ideas of the superior often became orders to those below, often to
the superior's surprise:

> There's a tendency for some people to walk out
> of the room thinking they heard an order and
> pass it down as a command, when in fact the
> intention most of the time is to raise a
> question [p. 27].

Decision-making. In meetings, subordinates presented their
views persuasively, argued down the other side, and waited for the
ruling from on high. Threatening decisions were passed upward, often

to the president. This helped lower levels play it safe and "get off the hook [p. 26]." Argyris observed that when the buck landed at the top, the top accepted it, and even seemed to enjoy making the decision.

Important decision-making was thus centralized at the top. Many were aware of the dependency of executives upon the president, and their easily given acquiescence to what he asked. Disagreement with the president was often difficult to discern because it was put so mildly. It was usually followed by the individual assuring the president that having raised his doubts, he would now go along with the president's decision, even before the president had reacted.

The executive committee, advisory to the president, was seen by the majority of its own members as being ineffective. Said one member of that committee:

> It's not a very effective group....First of all
> by and large, the executive committee has not
> dealt with important issues, and has tended to
> deal with minor matters. Secondly, it is highly
> indecisive. Thirdly, there is little evidence
> of trust, and there have been few indications
> of past successes on which we could build. There
> is very little data brought to bear, and decisions,
> when they are taken, all too frequently are taken
> by default; we don't take any action, but that
> in effect, is making a decision. In other cases
> we are in a crisis situation and time has run out,
> and something has to be done. And we just walk
> out on it....[p. 36].

As well as being passed upwards, decisions were made in secrecy. 70% of the top forty believed, "This is a management by secrets and conspiracies....Our management wants to do something without saying so; it's the hallmark of our style [p. 22]."

Leadership. 94% of these administrators believed that groups are effective when they have a strong leader. A leader is one who runs disciplined meetings, and knows what the decisions should be before the meeting begins. They identified two types of leaders in their organization; one type was directive and controlling, the other passive and withdrawn. Most said that the majority of leaders in the newspaper were in category one.

1. Most of the top people are brilliant, insecure, emotional, with a need to dominate [p. 29].

2. Most of the executives really want participation until we disagree with them [p. 29].

Though approved of, strong leadership was nevertheless risky in this organization. As an example: for supervising conflicted situations in which performance was relatively effective, management sought executives who were "diplomatic [p. 40]" and could "help the situation defuse [p. 40]." If performance was highly ineffective, they sought more aggressive executives who were charged with "cleaning up the mess [p. 40]," while warned to "go easy lest there be union difficulties or someone hurt [p. 40]." However, executives who upset the system while "cleaning up the mess", even if successful, were apt to find themselves ostracized and not supported. One administrator described what happened to another in such a situation:

What I admired S for most, when he took over, he had to get rid of the old layers, and he did. In doing that, in my opinion, S committed suicide on this paper. It is too bad in many ways. That was the mission that descended upon him, and I admire him for having done it. At the same time I admire him...I don't want to do it myself...[p. 40].

Because of this, cautious administrators spent much time and effort "setting up [p. 41]" people for change.

> You have to start a long way in advance,
> say three or six months and longer. You
> have to plant seeds in people's minds [p. 41].

Being cautious reached a point where some key executives felt forced to use subterfuge to manage change.

<u>Conflict</u>. One executive summed it up this way:

> Conflict resolution is conflict supression.
> Now you see it; now you don't [p. 19].

The prevailing opinion was that conflict should be managed "diplomatically [p. 19]," that is covertly. "Diplomatic" handling meant, for 91%, that when interpersonal conflict arises, an effective leader "tells a joke to cool things off [p. 19]." "Bury it [p. 19]" or "hide it [p. 19]" were other methods. Said one administrator:

> I have a horror of conflict....So I idle
> around the thing, and only go to confront-
> tation when it is the last desperate resort [p. 19].

Management dealt with a dispute between the reporters and the copy editors by setting rules that reporters were not permitted to talk to copy editors directly, only through "channels". Demotion, another conflict-ridden situation, was handled by "easing out a person and putting him on the shelf [p. 21]." One executive explained:

> We don't demote a person around here. He doesn't
> get a demotion on the chart. In fact, it may
> show up as a promotion. This company is known
> for cushioning the shock [p. 21].

<u>Self-perception</u>. Top management had a desire to run a "humane" system, and rated themselves high on encouraging the expression of

others' views, and on openness to new ideas. Said one executive:

> I am trying to get people to be open. This
> is unusual in our business [p. 3.].

Said another:

> Every morning I assign them their work. I
> try to be gentle with them. I try to avoid
> being authoritarian. Of course, it is up
> to me to show then the way to do the job.
> I've got to assume that the way I do it is
> correct [p. 31].

The executives were seen by their subordinates as being unaware of the gap between their self-perception of openness, and their behavior which caused conformity and dependence. Subordinates feared breaking the norms of the system. To do so would make an individual appear "like a damn fool [p. 39]." Said one reporter,

> If you ever tried to deal with issues openly
> and directly, everyone would ask, 'What the
> hell does he think he's doing [p. 39]?'

Pessimism. The group, according to Argyris, had a deep and open pessimism about changing human nature. Many expressed a sense of helplessness about changing internal conditions. "Not you, or anyone else will ever change this place [p. xi]," was a prediction Argyris heard often. One editor said:

> After a while, you wonder if this is all worth it.
> What the hell is life all about? Is this what I
> should be doing? Maybe I should go back to my
> typewriter [p. 32].

The Reporters

According to Argyris, "resistance from the upper levels [p. 45]" prevented him from studying the reporters. Therefore they will be

included in this study only as they bear upon the upper administration. Some important facts that emerged from interviews of twenty young reporters were that they:

1. have a need for recognition [p. 49].

2. have a need for immediate feedback [p. 49].

3. doubt their capacity to take action: "Most of us like to rattle things around--but what the hell would we do if it were our job to resolve them [p. 54]?"

4. expect authoritarian leadership: "The boss has to show tight control, and it's our job to complain about his control [p. 63]."

During Change

Feedback of the Diagnosis

Feedback Meeting

This was the first meeting in a two year series of interventions. For one and a half days, the top fifteen news, editorial and administrative executives discussed the report containing Argyris' analysis of the newspaper's "living system [p. 1]." At this meeting, the executives were concerned with nine issues. How desirable or undesirable were the findings? Said one, "How else would you run our business [p. 73]?" They asked Argyris how they compared with other organizations. They sought explanation of the technical details of his analysis, and challenged the validity of his research methods. They asked Argyris to identify persons whose behavior was being discussed.

They questioned the results of the study:

> A: I thought (those meetings) were well
> conducted and very productive. Are
> you saying I'm wrong about that?

> Argyris: I'm saying that almost none of the people
> I interviewed would agree with you [p. 77].

They expressed disappointment and anger at being misunderstood by sub-
ordinates:

> Hell, people may think that, but that's not
> our intention (said with anger) [p. 76].

Some openly questioned the advisability of continuing with the
program. Argyris' suggestion of periodic half day meetings to discuss
organizational issues and to diagnose the behavior of group members,
was met with many questions. Why was training necessary? Should feel-
ings be discussed?

> I just question the desirability of having a
> sort of group theraputic self-examination [p. 85].

Should the president's leadership be discussed?

> If we are going to talk about leadership, we're
> going to have to discuss the president's leader-
> ship. Do we really want to do this [p. 85]?

Argyris suggested they hold a meeting without him (Argyris) present to
decide whether to undertake a change program.

The Meeting with the President

The president told Argyris three weeks later that all but one
had voted to go ahead. He went on to state that he was planning
certain changes, and asked Argyris to guarantee that promotions,
demotions, and the jobs of each top executive would not be discussed

in the learning experience. He felt such discussion would threaten the men who had questions about their jobs. Argyris said no, and suggested the president think carefully about continuing to employ Argyris in the study.

After several weeks, the president independently made a round of changes in the top management. He promised Argyris that this was the final change, and that he would not now require any constraints in a learning seminar. Argyris agreed to return in two months for a planning meeting, if the president would tell the group the reason why the program had been postponed. The president agreed.

Planning for the Learning Seminar

The Planning Meeting

The president opened the meeting stating its objective: to discuss various designs for a conference away from the office. Argyris then made a presentation in which he stated that the conference would focus on "increasing our effectiveness in dealing with human relation-ships [p. 90]," ways of using power effectively, and leadership styles. Real life organizational problems would be gathered in pre-conference interviews, and become the springboard for discussing these issues. After giving his rationale for exploring behavior, he closed by recommending a week long conference.

The executives responded with many questions. Would the session be worthwhile? Said one:

> I can't see the value of it to us, in a way
> that it would actually affect our future
> actions as executives of the organization...
> Maybe it will relieve people of feelings.
> I can't see it myself, but that doesn't mean
> that I won't give it a try [p. 92].

Were they going to make real decisions about actual business problems?
In that case, said one executive, "We'd better reserve this place for
a month [p. 93]." Would examining personal behavior accentuate
difficulties?

> How do you (Argyris) know a conference like
> this might not make interpersonal conflict
> even worse [p. 92]?

Can systems really be managed by focussing on personal needs; would it
not make more sense to discuss new kinds of structures rather than
interpersonal relationships?

Argyris responded to all these concerns, stating that the group
might experiment to see if the session was worthwhile, and that it
could be stopped whenever there was agreement it was not; that he
would work hard to see that no one got hurt; that no one would be
coerced to do or say anything; that the conference should be at least
five days; that the entire top group be invited but not required to
attend, and that effectiveness depends on making explicit the present
covert personality-centered management style of the group, so that the
system could be oriented towards growth and innovation instead of
defenses and anxieties. The meeting ended with a commitment for hold-
ing the conference, for two and a half days.

The Learning Seminar

<u>Session One: Day One, evening</u>

The group was composed of approximately fifteen members of top
management, men in their forties and fifties. On arrival, each member
was given an agenda containing the five issues gathered in the pre-
seminar interviews. These were:

1. The president: his role, his style of
    leadership; his hopes and aspirations
    for the organization [p. 96].

2. The executive committee: why is it
    unable to take action [p. 97]?

3. The long-range development of the
    newspaper [p. 97].

4. The relationship between departments [p. 98].

5. The total organization, including
    subsidiaries: its future growth [p. 98].

Argyris began this session by reiterating the objectives for
the seminar. During the evening, the members attempted to decide which
of the agenda items to discuss, with no success. One member finally
said:

> Look, let's face it. One and two are the guts
> of the issue. A lot of us are leery. We're
> dancing around it...We're simply postponing
> the moment of truth [p. 114].

The session ended with an agreement to discuss items one and two during
the next session, and a request for drinks.

<u>Session Four: Day Two, afternoon</u>

During this session, several agenda items were put forth and
ignored. When time ran out, members quickly agreed that in the next
session they would focus on "the new feature [p. 120]," an issue that
had a four year history in the paper.

<u>Session Five: Day Two, evening</u>

In this session, one member proposed a compromise plan for
producing the new feature. No agreement was reached to accept this
plan.

<u>Session Six: Day Three, morning</u>

Argyris opened this session by asking if people would like to
discuss how they felt about the previous night's session. The director
of the editorial department revealed hurt feelings over the previous
session. He felt his department had been destructively attacked. There
ensued four hours of discussion, after which the director said that he
now thought the whole process of the seminar was worth a serious try.
Argyris noted that this was the first overt change of commitment to
the learning seminar.

<u>Session Seven: Day Three, afternoon</u>

Most of the time in this session was spent in conceptualizing
the progress of the group to date.

Session Eight: Day Three, evening

Argyris opened this session by reminding the group that it had made a commitment to discuss leadership styles, particularly the president's. Despite both the president's and Argyris' efforts, the group avoided this issue, and instead attacked Argyris:

> When we finish with this exercise, you (Argyris)
> go back to your school. These men have to
> live with each other. Your idea is to force
> us to tell the truth directly to the president.
> This will be clarifying, and you think purifying.
> I think it could be destructive. That explains
> the silence in the room [p. 131].

Session Nine: Day Four, morning

During this session, several members gave feedback to other members; one for fifteen uninterrupted minutes.

Session Ten: Day Four, afternoon

The member who had received lengthy feedback during the previous session, received more, and raised the issue of how to use it back on the job.

Session Eleven: Day Four, evening

Argyris gave a short lecture on the giving and receiving of feedback; discussion of feedback followed.

Conclusion of the Learning Seminar

After the feedback lecture and discussion, all members said that more progress had been made than they had expected. Several said it was one of the most meaningful experiences they had with that group. Some raised the possibility of continuing the seminar which had already gone a day and a half over the set time. The decision was made to stop. Some wanted to set a date for a follow-up session.

Evaluation of the Learning Seminar

Two weeks after the seminar, Argyris interviewed all the participants. Some of the responses they gave in the evaluation included:

1. Little behavioral change had occurred. Experimenting took place only with fellow seminar participants [p. 142].

2. One executive wanted to start a similar program in his department [p. 142].

3. The president reported no behavioral change; however, he felt others showed signs of taking initiative, though all too few [p. 142].

4. One person who reported positive feelings to Argyris, secretly reported a contrary message to the president, and asked to be excluded from any experiences [p. 143].

One month later, a meeting was held to assess people's views, and if desired, to plan the next step. Although members began at this meeting, according to Argyris, for the first time to explore openly the connection between success on the job, and feelings of personal self- esteem, opinion in the group was divided on whether or not to go ahead. The meeting ended with members agreeing to another meeting to discuss next steps.

Consequences of the Learning Seminar

The New Feature

The issue of the new feature, which had been raised at the
learning seminar, was continued in this subsequent meeting. Who would
have leadership of the new feature, the news department, or the editorial
department? The director of the editorial department felt that because
he had a long history of involvement with the new feature, it should be
part of his department. The director of the news department was
concerned that if his department had to give up ten percent of its
space to the editorial department for the new feature, he would be
"stoned [p. 155]" by his subordinates.

At this critical point in the meeting, when each side had
clarified its stand, the president stated he had to leave to catch a
plane, and asked that the meeting be stopped. He then asked if the
next step should be a series of one-to-one meetings. No one supported
this. He asked if the group wanted him to make the decision. They
said no. The meeting ended with a promise to meet again.

No such meeting took place. Several months later the president
announced his decision to place the new feature under the control of
the editorial department. "There wasn't enough time [p. 158]," he told
Argyris.

> Besides, this decision has been over four
> years in the making and I knew they weren't
> going to make it. So I made it [p. 158].

The news director's reaction, according to Argyris, was mild
anger and disappointment. He said:

> The president does whatever he wants to do.
> That's the trouble with this stuff
> (behavioral science). If the man at the
> top doesn't really believe in it, then I
> wonder [p. 158].

The editorial director, however, was concerned about the hostility emanating from the news department. Several days later he reported to Argyris he had been ridiculed and humiliated at lunch by the director of news, who was "out to knife [p. 160]" him. Argyris suggested they meet to discuss these issues. Several weeks later, Argyris was asked to attend such a meeting.

Editorial and News Explore their Problems

When the director of news gave his version of what had happened at lunch, it became clear to the editorial director that there was no intention to hurt him. The two executives then proceeded to discuss other issues concerning them. They discovered areas of agreement; they both agreed there was too much subjective interpretation in the paper. The news director said his deepest concern was finding a way for both of them to come together. At the end of the meeting both said it had been very helpful; it had shown that their problems were solveable. The director of news set a date for Argyris to meet with his department.

The Meeting with the News Department

This meeting was attended by the director of news and seven of his immediate subordinates. Argyris outlined the problems as set forth in his initial report, described the type of learning experience he proposed, and its objectives. The members expressed many fears and

objections, summarized in the following list:

1. Homogenization

   I have the sneaky feeling, not that you are trying to pull anything over on us, but that leadership styles will get homogenized. I'm not convinced that any single leadership style works the same way for everybody [p. 186].

2. Feedback is harmful and negative

   What bothers me is every time I discuss something with you (Argyris), your approach is negative [p. 189].

3. Waste of time

   The reason I think it'll be a waste of time is because we've been talking for maybe an hour, and nothing relates to me [p. 188].

4. Artificial

   We don't have councils of war like this. When you were here before and we had those meetings, they were bullshit, if I can be blunt [p. 189].

5. Unnecessary

   They maintained that things had changed since the last report. However, the director was resistant to Argyris making a new study of his department [p. 191].

After four hours, the news director asked for a decision. The group's answer was that he should make the decision, saying:

If a director feels that this (project) would be beneficial....then we ought to do it, no matter what [p. 198].

Argyris urged the director to let the group take responsibility for this decision. The group then voted against the project: five voted no, the director voted yes, and two remained undecided.

In interviews after the meeting, members expressed further reasons for their resistance. Some of these include:

1. Belief that the president had pressured the
    unwilling director into the meeting (two
    members) [p. 203].

2. Argyris had pressured the unwilling director
    into the meeting [p. 204].

3. Opening old wounds would destroy good
    working relationships [p. 205].

4. Changing behavior would be ineffective.
    "Let's say you (Argyris) make me work at
    a slower pace. I don't think this job is
    manageable without a fast pace [p. 208]."

The President Meets the Editorial Department

During three meetings after the learning seminar, the president

and the director of the editorial department stated their concerns to

each other. The basic concerns are summarized in the following chart:

President | Editorial Director

As president and publisher, we have to keep this corporation going and...have to perform some very dangerous balancing acts between the board and the editorial group [p. 172].

Although the president has final authority and veto power over the editorial page, he should not publish an editorial promoting any corporate interest, including the paper's own.

The tone of the editorial page is too strong, too much on the attack. The president described his feelings when several board members read the editorial to find their company's actions condemned [p. 176].

For years the editorials were flabby. I was determined that if I made it to the editorial group, I'd begin writing editorials that said something [p. 173].

Figure 28. A Comparison the President and Editorial Director's Concerns

In the third meeting, in response to the president's statement that he had never been able to have a "rational discussion that would lead somewhere [p. 179]" with his executive group, the editorial director suggested the top people meet regularly to talk about important issues. Such meetings had not previously taken place. Both the president and the editorial director agreed that this had been a very important meeting; it had broken down old barriers to action, old myths, and created an atmosphere of willingness to experiment.

The president said the next step was to hold a meeting with a few more top people. After several months, with no meeting called, the president explained to Argyris that the problem was "getting these guys together [p. 181]." Argyris asked to have a meeting with those who had attended the seminar, to test their commitment. The president agreed.

The Final Meeting of the Top Group

Three months after the president had agreed to call this meeting, he called Argyris and apologized for the delay, saying several executives had been travelling. The final meeting was attended by the president and three top people in the news and editorial departments. Its objective was to explore their commitment to further organizational development. They began by describing important problems, some of which included:

1. The president was concerned that there be
   a better dynamics of choice than previously
   to fill several key positions during the next
   few years. "I'd rather not make the decision
   in a little dark room by myself, and then have
   arguments with you for the next three or four
   years [p. 221]."

2. How to handle the high-ranking editor Z, who was being critical of the Daily Planet in public [p. 223].

3. The group's willingness to discuss organizational problems and their behavior as a group [p. 225].

After these and other issues had been discussed, the president asked if the next step was not to set up another meeting. All agreed. The news director then said to Argyris:

> I really admire you...The desire to stay with us through all these years--that's great--If I were him (Argyris), I would have walked out two years ago....[p. 226].

After this meeting, Argyris received letters and telephone calls, assuring him of "everyone's great interest" in continuing the program, but no further meeting was ever called.

After Change

According to the president, there were two reasons why no further meetings were called: one was extended travel and vacation plans. The second, and more important, was that a new top management team was being appointed. The president said he wanted Argyris to continue working with the new top team. Argyris said he would if the new team expressed interest. Up to the time this case was published, it had not.

Argyris interviewed eight of the top ten executives to gather their reactions to the whole program. Some concluded:

1. We became aware of our lack of communication [p. 232].

2. I remember it as something fine that almost came about [p. 232].

3. Our problem was that we never learned the concepts or the skills [p. 232].

4. We were unable to learn the language of genuine openness [p. 232].

5. There is probably not very much behavioral change....People didn't change their 'spots [p. 232].'

The majority expressed feelings that, although the learning session raised the level of openness and candor,

the behavioral patterns have not improved. In fact, the results may be contrary. We have more difficulties, such as competitiveness and secrecy. I see growing signs of empire-building, efforts at personal publicity, secrecy, un-willingness to tell other people what is going on--and I think it's going to get worse [p. 234].

One change that did occur has remained. "The strident tone of the editorial page has diminished significantly [p. 236]."

Analysis of Case Two

Before Change

This newspaper will break your goddamn heart.
The paper does not owe you a goddamn thing.
I tell my people that they should work hard
like hell because that is what they really
want.
                    An executive on the Daily Planet

The Situation

The organization. Although we are given few details about the organizational structure of the Daily Planet, we do learn that it is,

over all, a traditional bureaucracy. It has many departments, and many managers with a short span of control. For example, there are forty "top administrators [p. 2]." It emphasizes formal rules, "channels of communication [p. 38]" and adheres to unspoken norms. Although there is constant evaluation of effectiveness in performing tasks, negative evaluation is withheld. As Baldrige (1971) states, an "emasculating promotion" process is practiced, which promotes administrators who are negatively evaluated, up and out of power.

The task of the newspaper requires it to be alert to almost hourly changes in the environment, and to ingest constant feedback, in an atmosphere of high stress and uncertainty. All departments, news, editorial, and reporting, work under great time pressure, at complex interdependent tasks, for immediate, short term goals. A newspaper must meet daily deadlines. The executive branch must also be concerned with long term goals, such as the future of the newspaper, and operate with the time frame of years.

In general, this is a highly differentiated organization, operating under conditions which require directive leadership and swift decisions in daily operations. Integration is a constant and accepted problem. Communications are commonly vertical, one a one-to-one basis. Decision-making is centralized at the top executive level. It is usually carried out in secret. This has helped erode trust. High competitiveness and a win-lose orientation have further lowered trust until it is non-existent. The interpersonal orientation of the departments is towards task; social relationships are usually attempted in nearby bars where people "blow off steam [p. 55]" and try to get close.

However, as one reported said, "You feel close (in bars)--yet you are not close [p. 55]."

All this has resulted in internal difficulties in the newspaper. Decisions are often passed to the president, accompanied by subsequent complaints. Turnover in administrators is fairly frequent, once at the beginning of Argyris intervention, and again at the end. As Argyris predicted, angry resignations and psychological withdrawals over secretive job shifts were increasing; the younger more aggressive reporters were increasingly demanding more influence in managerial activities. There were increasing problems between the president and the board over the growing subjective and anti-big business tone of the newspaper.

The environment. Without, the paper was just beginning to lose some of its credibility with its constituencies. One prominent editor had begun to publically criticize the newspaper. Nationally, a disgruntled public had created a task force which had studied the American press and recommended a national press council to raise standards. However, in spite of all this, the Daily Planet still maintained its "fine reputation [p. 42]" as an excellent newspaper. Its problems had not yet reached a crisis stage.

Resistance to change. This case presents a paradox. The president and administrators allowed Argyris to carry out a study involving a change program oriented towards participative management. Yet, in the final analysis, they wanted to carry on in the traditional bureaucratic way. Ironically, the administration met many problems by repeating more strongly the behaviors and practices which had initially

caused the problems. Why was there such resistance to the change program? And why did it fail? One answer may lie in the leadership styles of the key group.

The Followers

The top forty administrators of the newspaper had two roles: they were leaders in their own departments, and followers in their relationship to the president. This analysis will concentrate on the top forty as an administrative group subordinate to the president.

Ability to take responsibility. The task relevant experience of this group in the workings of a newspaper was very high. The Daily Planet had a tradition of promotion from within; administrators rose through the ranks. The director of the editorial department, for example, had worked his way up from reporter. They were thus generally able to take responsibility.

Achievement motivation. According to McClelland's definition, this group was highly achievement oriented. Risks were taken in a calculated manner, with great caution. For example, up to six months was spent "setting up [p. 4.]" for an attempt at change. Almost everyone said they sought intellectually challenging jobs, and that working for the Planet provided this kind of challenge. Intellectual challenges, seen as personal challenges, were opportunities for win-lose interchanges which were enjoyed and seen as "part of the game [p. 11]." As a group, they were highly competitive in everything. When Argyris presented his diagnosis, they immediately wanted to know how they compared to other organizations Argyris had studied. Competitiveness

was considered a good quality in news people, and was an approved, accepted group norm.

Constant feedback was important as a check on effectiveness. In itself, working for the prestigious Planet provided confirmation that one was competent. Promotions and raises were a measure of how well one was doing; success on the job was of prime importance.

Willingness to take responsibility. In terms of willingness to take responsibility, this group was divided. As leaders to the middle echelons, they were very willing to take responsibility in their departments. This was shown in the training of reporters and copy editors. As one manager said,

> Every morning I assign them their work...It is up
> to me to show them the way to do the job [p. 31].

In this role, their leadership style was high task and low relationships, a style expected and considered appropriate by the reporters. All the reporters interviewed agreed that "the boss has to show tight control [p. 63]." Their effectiveness as leaders in their own departments was reflected in the Planet's reputation for high professional standards and excellence in writing.

As a policy making executive group reporting to the president, this group was unwilling to take responsibility, as illustrated in their decision-making process. The procedure for handling policy decisions was well established. First, the lower echelons met to discuss the problem. Each side stated its position, argued the other side down, and waited for the superior to make the decision. If two departments were involved, the middle management met, argued the other

side down, and waited for top management to make the decision. This process was often repeated until the buck stopped with the president. In this manner, meetings became competitions for air time, and decision-making was avoided.

Maturity of the followers. Although, according to Argyris' description of maturity, this administrative group would be generally immature (see figure 14), according to Life Cycle Theory, these administrators would be "mature" in relation to their departments, and "immature" only as they related to the president. In their own departments, their "maturity" would be very high, as discussed above. (See figure 29). Thus, the appropriate leadership style for their superiors to adopt for them as leaders within their department would be quadrant four; low task and low relationshps. This in fact was generally the practice.

On the other hand, the "maturity" level of these administrators as executive decision makers relating to the president, would be low. (See figure 30). They were unwilling to accept responsibility; they were not motivated to try, and they had no experience in acting as an administrative unit because they had never been trained to do it. Thus the appropriate leadership style at this time for these executives, if the president wanted group decision making, would be quadrant one; high task and low relationships. This in fact was the primary leadership style adopted by the president. Yet the executives avoided making decisions. In order to account for this apparent contradiction, let us examine the president's leadership style in more depth.

Leadership style
appropriate for
administrators
in their own
departments

Low Task
and
Low Relation-
ships

above
average   average   below
                              average   Maturity Continuum

.n Ach
.Ability
.Willingness
.Task Relevant Experience

Figure 29.   Maturity Level of Administrators as Leaders in
             their own Departments

Appropriate
initial
leadership
style with
Administrative
Group

High Task
and
Low Relation-
ships

above
average

average

below
average

Maturity Continuum

.n Ach
.Willingness
.Ability
.Task Relevant Experience

Figure 30. Maturity Level of Administrative Group as They
Relate to the President

During Change

> Authoritarian organizations tend to develop
> dependent people and few leaders.
> Rensis Likert

The President: Primary Leadership Style

Task behavior. Over the two year intervention period, the president's leadership style on a one to one basis, was primarily quadrant one; high task and low relationships. He usually explained when, where and how to accomplish tasks; for example, he customarily opened meetings by stating their objective. He attempted to set the length of the learning seminar with Argyris. He endeavoured to formalize channels of communication when he established the executive committee, and when he volunteered to become a mediator between the director of news and the director of the editorial department. He established patterns of organization when he placed the new feature under the control of the editorial department. He attempted to establish better ways of getting the job done when he supported Argyris' change program, and set up various meetings for Argyris. During the learning seminar, he attempted to focus the discussion on his leadership style.

Relationships behavior. We have almost no evidence of the president developing personal relationships with members of the executive group, giving them socio-emotional support or psychological strokes, or of engaging in interpersonal communication.

The President: Secondary Leadership Style

    The president's secondary leadership style, in respect to his
executives <u>as a group</u>, was quadrant four; low task and low relationships.
As we have shown, the appropriate leadership style, according to Life
Cycle Theory, for the floundering executive committee, would be quadrant
one; high task and low relationships. (See figure 31). Yet the
president largely ignored the executive committee, the group which he
said he wanted to take an active role in policy making. Lacking
direction, the executive group became more and more ineffective. Their
ineffeciveness attests to the inappropriateness of the president's
quadrant four style with them.

Figure 31. Diagnosis of Executive Committee

It is interesting to note in passing, that according to Life
Cycle Theory, Argyris' leadership style as a consultant was also
inappropriate to this executive group. (See figure 32). In attempting
to use a T-group approach, with an emphasis on interpersonal relations,
Argyris was using a quadrant three high relationships and low task
style. Life Cycle Theory would predict that this approach would fail
with this group, as indeed it did.

Figure 32. Leadership styles of Argyris and President in Relation to
the Executive Committee

The President: Lack of flexibility

Although according to Life Cycle Theory the president's basic
leadership style was appropriate to the present "maturity" level of his

administrators, he 1) did not adopt the appropriate style on a group level, and 2) he lacked leadership flexibility. Life Cycle Theory postulates that when a group is low in task relevant "maturity", an effective leader begins by adopting a quadrant one high task and low relationships style. As the group learns the task and gains in "maturity", the leader should reward the new behavior, while gradually increasing his or her relationships behavior and decreasing task behavior. In this way, followers "mature" in the task as the leader progresses through quadrant two and quadrant three leadership styles, and finally adopts a quadrant four style when the followers are highly "mature" and no longer need the leader. The president, like many of the executives in the organization, was able to adopt quadrant one and quadrant four styles, but not quadrant two and three styles -- those involving relationships behaviors. (See figure 33).

President's   LT   HT   President's
secondary   LR   LR   style
style

Figure 33. The President's Leadership Styles

Results of the President's Leadership Style

According to Life Cycle Theory, a high task and low relation-ships style is initially appropriate for followers with below average task relevant "maturity". However, if a leader lacks the flexibility to adopt different styles, and maintains a quadrant one style, he or she will prevent followers from developing "maturity" in the task, and keep them dependent. Eventually the continued use of a quadrant one style will become inappropriate. Follower growth will be stalemated.

This postulation is borne out in the present case. The Daily Planet administrators waited for the president to tell them what to do. The frustrated president tried various tactics to get his administrators off their behinds. For example, he emphasized competition, reflected in his remark "The company is not an old age home [p. 30]." When they did not respond, the president's frustration increased. In order to get decisions made, he practiced secret decision-making, such as when he discussed issues with one member of the executive committee, and asked him not to tell any of the other members. He went around exec-utives, and talked directly to their subordinates. Although ambivalent about Argyris' theories, he allowed him in, verbally supported his change program, and asked for feedback in the learning seminar.

The discrepancy between the president's verbal espousal of a theory Y participative management approach, and his on the job theory X behavior was clear to his subordinates. As the director of news observed,

> If the man at the top doesn't really believe in
> it (participative management), then I wonder [p. 158].

Thus, despite the president's verbal efforts in the learning seminar, the executives would not give him feedback on his leadership style, make decisions, or initiate action. As Likert (1961) observed, "Authoritarian organizations tend to develop dependent people and few leaders [p. 236]."

As the president's frustration grew, he made more unilateral decisions. This increased fear and uncertainty in the executives, who became more cautious and secretive in their activities. They increased their avoidance of decision-making, and disagreeing with the president. The president, at the end of the change program, felt as though he was "in a little dark room by himself [p. 221]" with respect to policy making. Top administration was caught in a downward spiral.

After Change

Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
French proverb

Orientation of the Change Program

In this change program, Argyris was attempting to raise the awareness of administration so as to move toward a participative system of management. In the following chart (see figure 34), some of the values expressed by Argyris during this case are compared to Likert's (1961) system four of participative management [p. 223-233.]

Orientation of the Daily Planet

The orientation of the Daily Planet was more in keeping with Likert's (1961) system one of exploitive authoritative management.

Argyris	Likert's System Four
1. Pent-up feelings and frustrations should be dealt with when and where they are occurring, confronted in their natural setting [p. 34].	Members are skilled in group process. Machinery for handling conflict exists. Atmosphere is free of conflict.
2. People liking subterfuge could be a sign of sickness in the system [p. 80].	The atmosphere is free of hostility, fear and distrust. Good communications.
3. Planet executives accept this low quality of life because they accept a Calvanistic-Masochistic view of life which allows them, and others to continue working even though it is not much fun [p. 43].	There is extensive, friendly superior-subordinate interaction.
4. Healthy organizations are self-examining and contain on-going renewal activities [p. ix].	The work group has high confidence, trust, loyalty and cooperative motivation.

Figure 34. Argyris' Values Compared to Likert's System Four of Participative Management

Decisions and goal setting were made at the top. Subordinates worked under fear, punishment and occasional rewards. In addition, as Kelly (1970) states, the attitude was taken that conflict is to be avoided at all costs, and scapegoats are inevitable.

Rejection of the Change Program

The clash between these two opposing value systems was one of the causes of the rejection of Argyris' change program. Rather than a gradual developmental approach, the change program with its previously

described orientation, was introduced at once. In terms of Life Cycle
Theory, in order to get from quadrant one to a quadrant four leadership
style, a leader must gradually progress, in order, through all four
quadrants. So too, to develop from system one to system four, it
would seem appropriate to start where the people are at, in system one,
and progress grdually towards system four. Indeed, in planning for the
learning seminar, the administrators said they felt it would make more
ense to start by discussing new kinds of budgeting, information, and
long-range planning structures, rather than interpersonal difficulties.

Results of the Change Program

The results of the change program were negligible. Although some
people reported temporary changes in attitudes, behavior remained the
same. The president seemed to follow his previous behavior pattern. In
the final meeting, he made a plea for a new, more participative personnel
selection process, so he wouldn't have to take decisions about filling
new key positions "in a little dark room by myself [p. 221]." The
president and all members present agreed another meeting was necessary
to discuss this and other issues. Some time after, the president told
Argyris he had not called a further meeting because a new top management
team was being appointed -- we can infer, by the president's usual
methods.

Some administrators reported that behavior had, in fact, become
even more bureaucratic after the change program. There was more
competitiveness, secrecy, and empire-building than before, and they
felt it would grow.

Summary

Why Did the Change Program Fail?

Some of the reasons include:

1. The quadrant one high task and low relationships style practiced by the president and administrators was expected by subordinates; considered appropriate, by subordinates, to a newspaper, and was an accepted norm of leadership throughout the organization.

2. The quadrant one leadership style was, to that time, effective. The newspaper was nationally recognized with an excellent reputation.

3. Although the president supported the participative management approach of Argyris change program, his subordinates perceived his behavior as supporting a system one autocratic approach, and behaved accordingly.

4. The values underlying Argyris' change program suddenly introduced, clashed with the values of the organization.

5. Argyris perceived problems in the organization; the majority of members in the organization did not.

Thus according to situational leadership theory, the Daily Planet, although ineffective in its human relations, was efficient in production. It was a theory X, system one organization that produced a high quality, nationally recognized newspaper. It did not change because in the eyes of the employees, its leadership was, and remained, appropriate to organizational needs.

<u>Case Three: Change in the State Department</u>

<u>Background</u>

This case is taken from <u>Making Waves In Foggy Bottom</u> by Alfred
J. Marrow (1974). In 1964, Alfred Marrow was invited to a luncheon
meeting by Deputy Undersecretary of State William Crockett, to talk
with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other businessmen and behavioral
scientists about the management problems besetting the State Department.
From this beginning, Marrow became an advisor to Crockett's change
program which had as its aim the reorganization of the State Department
into a more participative system of management. He advised and observed
the progress of the reorganization through to Crockett's resignation in
1967. Crockett's successor, Idar Rimestad liquidated the reorganiza-
tion program, restored the State Department's management system to its
former status quo, and dismissed Marrow, along with the other advisors
and consultants to the program.

When William Macomber replaced Rimestad in 1969, Marrow
received another invitation to lunch. On this occasion, along with
Professor Harry Levinson of Harvard, he met with Deputy Undersecretary
Macomber, Secretary William Rogers, Undersecretary Elliot Richardson
and other senior staff members to discuss Crockett's reorganization
program, and future reform of the management system of the State Depart-
ment. Once again, Marrow became an advisor to a change program which
culminated successfully one year later in July 1971.

What follows is a summary of Marrow's personal account of the
progress of change over seven years in a massive bureaucracy. In it he

describes two change cycles: one unsuccessful under Crockett, and one successful under Macomber.

Before Change

Introduction

Effecting change in the United States Department of State, often called the "Fudge Factory [p. 3]" would appear to be nearly impossible. Established in 1789, grown in the days of Yankee Clippers, the State Department is the oldest federal department. At the time of World War II, its 2000 employees, including diplomats trained in the classic tradition of messages sealed in red wax, were housed in one building. In 1973, the State Department employed 11,950 people.

The Secretary of State, first ranking officer in the President's cabinet, heads the State Department. The deputy undersecretary of administration is chief administrator. Employees in 1973 included 8750 support staff, administrators, department managers, lawyers, and secretaries, and 3200 foreign service officers.

Prior to World War II, foreign service officers were most often sons of prominent eastern families. After World War II, a selection test, patterned after the traditional image, resulted in a corps of FSOs primarily liberal arts scholars from Ivy League schools. The difficult foreign service examinations administered by the Foreign Service Institute, admit a group of competent and committed people, largely men with 5% women. They regard themselves as the State Department's elite corps, are proud and jealous of their rank, perquisites,

and the intellectual and social status implied by their FSO title. They
see themselves as "humanistic, subjective, cultural, qualitative, and
generalizers detached from personal conflict".

Problems in the State Department

For fifty years the Department of State and its foreign service
have been criticized for inefficiency. Critics have made charges of
overstaffing, and under-employment of human resources. Possessed of an
enormously long chain of command, the Department has earned the repu-
tation of being administratively rigid, choked by red tape, sluggish
and overcautious. These are attributed to its hierarchical structure,
emphasis on authority as the indispensible means of managerial control,
detailed prescriptions for carrying out each job, outmoded personnel
practices, and sanctified routines. Over the years the State's manage-
ment problems have been examined, chided, reported on, and experimented
with. Sweeping changes affecting organizational structure, staffing
and training the foreign service corps were always recommended and
resisted.

The Bypassed Organization

Agreeing with President John Kennedy's 1962 characterization of
the State Department as a "bowl of jello [p. 7]," the bright, slightly
disrespectful young men of the Executive Branch of government devised
methods to bypass the Department's bureaucracy whenever speed in
decision making was required. They were annoyed by the "timid" nine-
teenth century pace of foreign service diplomats in a twentieth century

world. In developing international policies, all Presidents chose to
rely on a few trusted men, bypassing the 6000 people in the Department
at home, and 6000 people abroad. Thus, with the power shifted to the
White House, and the general belittling of the State Department by the
Washington power structure, morale in the Department plunged and
resentment was high.

Change Cycle One

Enter the Dragon

William J. Crockett was appointed deputy undersecretary of
state for administration in 1963. His reputation for unorthodox
approach to management had been gained at the United States Embassy in
Rome. "Results are more important than regulations [p. 13]," Crockett
said. "Regulations are not chisled in stone. They are printed on
paper...they can be changed [p. 13]." Crockett took on duties
following the inability of two capable administrators to reform the
foreign service system. His aim was major reorganization -- one that
would encourage wider participation in problem solving and decision
making.

Through conferences and reading, Crockett had become highly
interested in Douglas McGregor's theories of management. Recognizing
that McGregor's Theory X assumptions underlay the authoritarian system
operating in the State Department, Crockett hoped to replace this with
a Theory Y based system of flexibility and participation.

Action One: Consultation

Crockett consulted with Alfred J. Marrow, a psychological consultant to organizations. During their discussion of the Department's problems, Marrow suggested that the T-group training method might help bring about a participative management system.

Action Two: Advisory Groups

In 1964 Crockett set up five groups of advisors. Group one was composed of three prominent businessmen: E. E. Fogle, vice-president Union Carbide; Dr. F. A. L. Holloway, president Esso; Dr. A. J. Marrow, chairman of the board, Harwood Manufacturing. Their task was to advise Crockett on introducing a more participative management system into the department. Group two, a team of National Training Laboratories behavioral scientists, led a series of T-group training seminars for State Department personnel that were to increase the participant's awareness of their behavior. Group three was composed of internal and external specialists in art and architecture, building construction, food supply, education, and others. Their purpose was not specified in the original case study.

Group four, a scientific task force from the University of Michigan, was to evaluate the effectiveness of the reform program. Group five, a consortium of behavioral scientists and some State Department officers, were to develop and implement a program to administrate the total reform effort, and serve as a link to N.T.L. This was called

ACORD—Action for Organizational Development. All of these groups worked separately and directed their efforts to help Crockett.

Action Three: Change in Structure

In June 1965 Crockett announced a major reform designed to reduce bureaucratic stratification. With Secretary of State Rusk's agreement, he abolished six supervisory layers between himself and the operating managers, cutting the time required for a problem to reach him from six months to two days. This eliminated 125 positions, and caused 160 employees to be transferred to other parts of the Department. This announcement was couched in Theory Y concepts of openness, participation, self management, decentralization, responsibility, and management by objectives. In a speech Crockett stated:

> I believe that our present concept of decentralized
> management by objectives and programs will accomplish
> these objectives by: decentralizing our management
> into self-contained, semi-independent, and semi-
> autonomous programs, each with a manager; elimina-
> ting every intermediate supervisory level; dele-
> gating almost complete authority for daily operations
> to the program managers....[p. 20].

The staff perceived the reorganization as an order, and were dismayed at its inconsistency and premptoriness. Grumbling, complaints and fears were evident among those who had no opportunity to participate in the decision, and their resistance helped limit Crockett's original objectives. The old climate of suspicion, fear, and anger was only slightly improved. State Department officials were generally pleased for they could now reach the deputy undersecretary in one step. For timid young officers, suddenly deprived of the security of the six layered superstructure, there was anxiety.

Action Four: T-Groups

Several months after the reforms had begun, upon the advice of his advisory group, Crockett instructed the team of NTL behavioral scientists to conduct training seminars for the staff. More than 200 FSOs and senior officials attended. Some were coerced into attending. Each seminar lasted one week and was held away from the work site. The seminars were taped.

We will focus briefly on one seminar as an example, conducted in the summer of 1965 by Chris Argyris of Yale University, and Warren Bennis, then of MIT. Six months prior to the seminar, Argyris held thirty-one interviews with young FSOs to determine critical problems. The FSOs stated that the foreign service community was characterized by:

1.   suppression of interpersonal issues
2.   minimal openness and trust
3.   withdrawal from interpersonal difficulties and
     conflict
4.   little risk taking and acceptance of
     responsibility
5.   overdependence on the superior
6.   crisis orientation
7.   cautious memo writing
8.   an attitude of "Don't make waves [p. 55]."

During the seminar, these issues surfaced. The attitudes of the foreign service officers and the administration towards each other were revealed as illustrated in figure 35.

The seminars were rated very valuable by most participants. Typical of the positive feelings is the following:

> I'm prepared to testify personally that the
> value of my week of T-group training was
> higher than that of any week of foreign
> service institute training to which I have
> been exposed [p. 56].

The FSOs thought the administrators would see them as [p. 30]:	The administrators actually saw them as [p. 31]:
· arrogant snobs · cliquish · effete · resistant to change	· resourceful and serious · inclined to stability · dedicated to job · externally oriented · cautious and rational · masked, isolated · surrounded by mystique · manipulative and defensive
The administrators thought the FSOs would see them as [p. 31]:	The FSOs actually saw them as [p. 31]:
· bureaucratic · practical · preoccupied with minutiae · limited perspective · educated clerks · defensive · inflexible · a necessary evil	· doers and implementors · decisive and forceful · noncultural · limited goals · interested in form · jealous of us · drones but necessary evils

Figure 35. Attitudes of Foreign Service Officers and Administration

Those less enthusiastic were those irritated at being "sent". Clarifying of perceptions produced some lessening of antagonism and made the climate a bit less hostile to change.

The report. Argyris was asked if a summary of what happened at the seminars could be produced. The report presented an objective and unvarnished summary of the actual taped statements made by FSOs during the seminars. The FSOs described the following norms as influencing their organization:

1. a tendency to withdraw from interpersonal difficulties and conflict

2. not being open about interpersonal problems or substantitive issues that could be threatening to others, especially superiors and peers

3. distrust of aggressive or openly competitive behavior in others

4. a tendency to withdraw from aggression and judge the other man negatively, but not tell him [p. 53-54].

In his report, Argyris stated that the FSOs feared being engulfed by "the system [p. 54]" and felt helpless about changing it. Under the system as it was the FSOs learned to check with everyone, develop policies that upset no one, take positions in such a way that their superiors had to bear the responsibility for them, and to make protection of one's "bureaucratic skin [p. 55]" the prime concern.

Initially the report was sent only to participants. However, it created a furor. One senior FSO told Argyris it was harder to get than one stamped top secret. In order to counter accusations of censorship by critics of the State Department, several top level FSOs decided to publish the report to symbolize the Department's interest in improvement. Crockett volunteered to write the introduction in which he gave a detailed explanation for reasons for publishing the report. Nevertheless, arguments over making the report freely accessible were heated and acrimonious.

Action Five: The Executive Group

In response to pressure from his superior, Secretary Dean Rusk, Undersecretary Ball, and his own staff, Crockett created an executive

group in 1966 to assist him in managing the administrative area. Rusk and Ball had grown concerned that Crockett was moving too far too fast and that his span of control was excessive. Rusk asked "What to you substitute for a hierarchy? How do you ensure that it isn't running off in all directions without much guidance [p. 42]?" Crockett felt that:

> The executive group was introduced to establish
> the 'window dressing' for the span of control
> problem because this was a persistent problem
> on the part of my bosses....[p. 41].

As well as pressure from above, Crockett was being pushed by his staff. He stated that:

> They wanted greater clarification of the functions
> and responsibilities of the special assistants
> whom I had appointed as coordinators [p. 42].

Crockett saw the executive group as a 'council of elders' staff members with no line responsibilities.

> My concept was that almost anything that came to
> my desk was something that the executive group
> might take on. I was willing to relinquish much--
> most all of the authority--so that I wouldn't be a
> single authoritarian voice in it. I was willing
> to play the game absolutely open in dealing with
> the executive group [p. 42].

The executive group accomplished little. Despte Crockett's view of them, they found it difficult to separate themselves from their role as line managers. Ambiguity, arising because their duties and functions were not clearly established, created misunderstandings and rocky group functioning. When news of Crockett's impending resignation moved through the grapevine, they moved even more cautiously, hesitating to make any change that could jeopardize their position under a new undersecretary.

Action Six: The Evaluation of the Program

Fourteen months after the first reforms were ordered, and at
Marrow's advice, Crockett directed the evaluation team under the
direction of Rensis Likert, Director for Social Research at the
University of Michigan, to begin its study. They reported that:

1. The stripping away of six layers of hierarchy
    had increased managerial autonomy. Response was
    generally positive. However, several managers
    who spoke negatively said they felt isolated
    and frustrated because no one was near enough
    to notice if a good job was done. Crockett
    saw that dependent managers were threatened
    by the new program [p. 37-38].

2. There were inadequate and erratic resources,
    especially in funds, to develop the new program.
    Crockett agreed and explained that the budget
    appropriation was late in being submitted.
    "Too bad", he said, "but we are grown-up and
    people ought to understand [p. 38]."

3. The manager's role in the decision making
    process was slightly to moderately increased.
    In matters affecting operations of the program,
    subordinates felt an increase of influence on
    superior's decisions [p. 38].

4. There were slight gains in communication in all
    areas. Some managers complained of longer delays
    in communication. This was because in the
    preceding six months, Crockett had been away for
    about five months [p. 39].

5. Generally, the new program did heighten incentive
    for better performance in the operating unit [p. 39].

6. Net effect of changes on motivation and attitudes
    of managers was positive [p. 40].

7. There was a reduction in coordination. The reforms
    resulted in excessive fragmentation. There was
    uncertainty about responsibilities and little
    direction from above [p. 40].

Action Seven: Resignation

The strife caused by his reforms played a large part in Crockett's resignation. He had expected to meet resistance, but not as strong as it turned out to be. Attacks on "Crockett's Rockettes [p. 44]" were growing more frequent and intense. His superiors were not supportive. Budget problems and job stresses grew. Some FSOs who overtly supported his reforms, covertly were sabotaging them. Progress was sluggish. He feared distorted reports of shattered morale being leaked to the press. When a job offer was made from IBM, Crockett accepted. From there, he took an executive position in Saga foods which he still holds. Eighteen months after he had started the reorganization program, Crockett announced his resignation in January of 1967. Simultaneously with his announcement, he left.

After Change

Idar Rimestad, whose experience was limited to his having worked in a traditional hierarchical structure, replaced Crockett in January 1967. As an old line administrator, Rimestad had little interest "in making waves [p. 47]." Rumor spread that the Crockett program would be eliminated or drastically altered. Before long, Rimestad made it clear he considered the new system a mess.

Angered at the reports of the Michigan evaluation team, Rimestad declared to Marrow that it was ridiculous to spend money on a project that found so much negative to report. Negative information, in his view, encouraged employees to express dissatisfaction. When he

learned the Michigan evaluation team planned to feed back the data to
the staff, and involve the staff in planning, he suggested that the
University of Michigan cancel its contract. Because the data was
already in the computer, Rimestad instead cut $25,000 from the
Michigan contract, leaving enough to complete the analysis of the data.
Likert had to receive a private grant to publish the results.

Rimestad saw no value in continuing to use specialists from
industry and behavioral scientists, even though they had been volunteer-
ing their time. He removed them, and cancelled the contract with NTL.
In December 1967, he abolished ACORD, and restored line supervisors to
their old jobs.

About four months after he had taken this post, the Argyris'
report was published and Rimestad appeared at congressional appropria-
tions hearing. Chairman John Rooney, irritated because he had not been
informed about this report, questioned Rimestad and expressed his
displeasure at the report. Rimestad responded:

> I have no exception to a study (such as the
> Argyris' report). I do not agree with this
> study in its rather clinical approach; its
> very small sampling of people. I think we
> could have arrived at this type of information
> without spending $3000. I also do not agree
> with having it printed for public distribution.
> I think it should have been for the use of
> officials of the Department and the foreign
> service....[p. 49].

This episode seemed to stiffen Rimestad's resolve to return to the old
style authoritarian bureaucratic system based on Theory X assumptions
about people.

Eager to shift to a less turbulent atmosphere, Rimestad bid for the opened post of special Ambassador in Geneva, Switzerland, and was appointed. He left in October, 1969, after a little over two and a half years as deputy undersecretary.

Change Cycle Two

Pressure For Change

William B. Macomber replaced Rimestad in October 1969. The new leadership of the State Department was under pressure to reorganize. The new President, Richard M. Nixon, dissatisfied with the operations of the State Department, declared he wanted to "clean house in the State Department [p. 59]." He wanted the Department's managerial capacity strengthened through modern techniques. The foreign service officers pressured in a similar manner through their professional association. Their drive culminated in the American Foreign Service Association becoming an independent professional union in 1973. Calls for change also came from the junior Foreign Officers Club.

In response to these urgings, undersecretary Elliot Richardson invited Professor Harry Levinson of Harvard University, Alfred Marrow, Macomber, and several top members of the State Department staff to meet with him. They discussed the failure of the previous reform efforts. Levinson and Marrow advised Richardson and his staff not to bring in outside experts, but have the Department undertake to change itself from within. Secretary of State Rogers, Richardson, and Macomber, after further discussions among themselves, agreed on a self study

conducted by an in-house set of task forces. They would also encourage
the widest possible participation by all FSOs.

Macomber's First Step

On January 14, 1970, Macomber spoke to a large meeting of exec-
utives of the State Department. His chief theme was that a reform
program was imperative, and that there were many outside the Department
who would happily impose reform ideas; earlier rumours had it that
Senator Fullbright was planning a full-scale hearing on Department
effectiveness. Macomber described the situation clearly:

> Management had not been out bag....We have
> tended to be intuitive in nature, weak in
> planning, and unenthusiastic about management.
> In retrospect, it is clear that these resistant
> instincts have caused a great share of our
> difficulties....The key fact is....either we
> produce the improvements necessary to meet
> this challenge, or, as I have suggested, this
> this will be done for us....[p. 63].

> An absolutely essential requirement for our
> future ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission,
> assistant secretaries, deputy assistant
> secretaries and counterparts in our sister
> agencies is the capacity to manage [p. 63].

Macomber pointed out that the Secretary of State, the Under-
secretary and himself believed that outside efforts would not be as
effective or informed as those of the staff members themselves. Some
outsiders claimed the job could not be done from within. But, said
Macomber, he did not agree with them.

Macomber acknowledged the helpful studies previously made, and
how useful this work would be. He affirmed his confidence in the staff,

and stated that in his view, the competence level of the foreign service officers was unequalled.

The "Diplomacy of the 70's" Program

Enthusiastically, the staff responded by creating thirteen in-house task forces, working under the title "Diplomacy of the 70's [p. 64]." Their aim was to study basic questions troubling the State Department. The thirteen task forces comprised more than 250 career professionals of State, and forty officers from other foreign affairs units. Each task force was composed of about twenty members. Chairmen were chosen from the most outstanding men in the Department. Members were selected through a nomination system, and through volunteers. Macomber and his staff carefully avoided suggesting chairmen or members. Each group set its own meeting schedule; on the average they met weekly. They were given complete freedom to examine any problems, and come up with whatever recommendations they chose. Macomber set loose guidelines, so that questions could be discussed in a very frank spirit.

Results of the Program

Slightly less than one year later, a summary report written by a member of Macomber's staff was presented to the Secretary of State. In addition, each task force submitted its own report. The thirteen reports contained slightly over 500 recommendations. This process was probably without precedent in the history of any government agency.

Secretary of State Rogers quickly approved about 400 recommendations in principle. A few recommendations needed further study, and some were rejected. Macomber was directed to begin implementation at once, and in July 1971, about six months later, he reported about 75% had been put into effect.

In February 1972 Macomber again addressed Department personnel. Reviewing what had been accomplished, he described the self-study as:

> the most comprehensive and searching critique
> ever written about the Department....no other
> document can match it....[p. 66].

He continued, praising the staff as he outlined their achievement:

> The past two years have been a time of turmoil....
> No effort of this kind starts without antecedents.
> Much of the credit must go to those career officers
> among you who, in increasing numbers in the years
> immediately preceding January 1970, pressed for
> reform; and to the many who joined you in the past
> two years, we owe a considerable debt [p. 66].

> For the first time, under the reform program,
> members of the foreign service will have an
> important and formal voice in the development
> of all personnel policies....Furthermore,
> modernization and reform, if they are to be
> really effective, require the development of
> an increasingly effective, fair, and enlightened
> system of human relations....[p. 67].

> Here too, we have had a remarkable two years
> with much progress being made....What has
> emerged is a system under which the men and
> women of the foreign services can have a real
> voice in the policies and regulations affecting
> their careers [p. 67].

The self-study program was supported by Secretary of State Rogers.

When he received the report he said:

> The efforts we are making in-house speak very
> well for the vitality and dynamism of the

Department and the foreign service. I continue
to believe that if we could leave behind us
an improved and modernized system for dealing
with this country's foreign policy problems,
this could well be a more lasting and
significant contribution to the public interest
than success in handling many of the more
transitory matters which necessarily occupy
our attention [p. 67].

Analysis of Case Three

Before Change

We trained hard, but it seemed every time we
were beginning to form up into teams we would
be reorganized. I was to learn later in life
that we tend to meet any new situation by
reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can
be for creating the illusion of progress
while producing confusion, inefficiency, and
demoralization.

Petronius Arbiter, ca. 60 AD

The Situation

The organization. This organization is a massive bureaucracy

nearing two centuries of age, employing nearly 12000 people. According

to Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) Integration-Differentiation Model, it

is a highly structured organization, highly differentiated, with little

or no integration between departments [p. 169-171].

1. Hierarchically ordered, the great number
   of administrators in the long chain of
   command have short spans of control in
   overstaffed departments.

2. Formal rules and review are exceedingly
   important; in fact they are the modus
   operendi of the entire organization.

3. Traditionally, <u>time orientation has been long term</u>; it took six months for an issue to travel through six supervisory layers up to the chief administrator of the organization.

4. Primarily <u>concerned with tasks</u>, the interpersonal orientation of this organization is formal and cautious. Emphasis is on authority as the means of managerial control.

5. When making <u>decisions</u>, formal rules and immediate superiors are considered first. Saving one's bureaucratic skin and making decisions in such a way that responsibility does not fall on you, are the prime criteria.

<u>The environment</u>. Rate of change in the world of foreign affairs is meteoric. Certainty about conditions is low; conditions, for example, in the current oil crisis, change hourly. Rate of feedback on the environment is high, to top administrators. The time available in which to make decisions is very short; the non-stop Henry Kissinger attests to this.

There is then a disparity between the organization and its environment. Lacking methods of integration and adaptability, the organization cannot respond to the demands of the environment. This has resulted in two things: 1) the environment has become increasingly hostile; witness the derisive names assigned to the organization, and the many attempts at wholesale reform. 2) The organization has been bypassed. Presidents have assigned foreign policy responsibilities to a few trusted politicians, taking matters out of the hands of the organization. These have had an effect rather like poking a porcupine with a stick; instead of moving any faster, the porcupine merely rolls up into a fiercely bristling, untouchable ball, and refuses to move at all.

The task. The main task of the State Department is dealing with the foreign policy problems of the United States. As may be appreciated, this is an enormously complex task; one requiring the highest amount of interdependence, and performed under conditions of stress. When one is a lower-echelon employee, one of 11,950, the satisfactions of working on any part of that task must be small. By the time the task has filtered down through the maze of layers, it has been diluted, divided, and specialized, so that a secretary sees only a fragment of the whole. Satisfactions, such as they are, are experiened more by those at the top of the organization.

The Followers

There are two general categories of employees in this organization; support staff, and foreign service officers. The 8750 support staff, domestic and foreign, who do not travel, are composed of administrators, department managers, lawyers, and secretaries. For the purpose of this analysis, the FSOs will be focussed upon.

Achievement motivation. According to McClelland (1961), the foreign service officers have many of the characteristics of high achievers. In McClelland's theory, a person with high achievement motivation is a moderate, calculated risk-taker, prefers non-routine tasks, tends to be overconfident, tends to think ahead, works harder when there is a chance his or her personal efforts will make a difference in the outcome, prefers concrete feedback, and is not motivated by money alone [p. 211 -237].

All of these apply to the FSOs. In order to become a foreign service officer, one must compete for the position in the difficult foreign service examinations. This results in the selection of a group of FSOs who are intelligent, competitive, and committed. They are seen by the administration as resourceful, serious, dedicated, cautious, rational, manipulative and externally oriented. Their self image is confident; they see themselves as subjective, cultural, qualitative and generalizers detached from personal conflict. Thus they may be described as persons with high n Ach.

Ability to take responsibility. Well educated, the best of the brightest, the FSOs are part of an elite tradition of Ivy League scholars. They are described by Marrow as proud and jealous of their rank, perquisites, intellectual and social status. Trained by the Foreign Service Institute, their ability to take responsibility is high.

Willingness to take responsibility. However, their morale, productivity, and willingness to take responsibility is low. Why is this? Though they enter the State Department highly motivated, the organization soon teaches them to check with everyone, develop policies that upset no one, take positions in such a way as to place responsibility on their superiors, and cover their ass. The organization has caused the FSOs to:

1. supress interpersonal issues
2. give minimal openness and trust
3. withdraw from interpersonal difficulties and conflicts
4. take few risks and accept little responsibility
5. be overdependent on the superior
6. be crisis oriented

7. write cautious memos
8. adopt an attitude of "Don't make waves [p. 55-56]."

In Herzberg's terms, they have been "overhired". The effect is akin to putting racehorses in a starting gate that never opens. Feeling helpless about changing the system, and fearing being engulfed by it, the FSOs watched power and opportunities shift to the White House. They became frustrated and resistant.

<u>Maturity of the followers</u>. According to Life Cycle Theory, although the "maturity" level of the FSOs was potentially high, it was reduced by the organization. At the beginning of this case, it would fall in the middle of the maturity continuum. (See figure 36). Achievement motivation is generally above average, though little expression is allowed by the organization. Ability to take responsibility is above average, though the situation allows few opportunities. Willingness to take responsibility is below average because of the situation. Taking a midpoint between these three would place the FSOs at an average level of maturity. Thus the appropriate leadership style called for in this situation would be a combination of quadrant two, high task and high relationships, and quadrant three, high relationships and low task.

Change Cycle One

One of the most fascinating spectator sports of the last ten years has been watching the responses of large bureaucratic organizations to efforts of change....Most of them have had the impact of thrusting a fist into a feather pillow, holding it there for a while and withdrawing it. While many of the feathers have been ruffled, the shape of the pillow remains unchanged. How does this happen?
Richard S. Underhill
<u>First Tango in Boston</u>

Figure 36. Foreign Service Officers' Maturity Level

Crockett's Leadership Style

Basic Style: Quadrant One

Reliance on experts. Crockett's first act was to seek the advice of Alfred Marrow, an outside professional consultant. Of the five groups Crockett set up, the first was formed of three external businessmen, including Marrow; the second, of a team of NTL behavioral scientists; the third, of individual specialists containing some State Department personnel; the fourth, of University of Michigan researchers; the fifth, of behavioral scientists, and some State Department officers. In seeking advice, training, and evaluation, Crocket did not assess the skills within the organization but relied on outside experts. Being bypassed was a familiar condition to Department employees, one that had already caused much resentment. It might be expected that the presence of so many external consultants would fuel the fires of resistance even higher.

In setting up these five groups, Crockett was establishing a structure for the reform program, and channels of communication. The groups worked separately, and each directed their efforts to help Crockett. Thus Crockett was the central point of the communications system. (See figure 37).

Coercive change stragegy. Crockett's first step in the reform program was the elimination of six supervisory positions, 125 jobs, and the shifting of 160 employees to other departments. We are not told if he was advised to take this step, so must assume it was largely his own

Figure 37. Relation of Five Consulting Teams to Crockett

decision. In this action, Crockett was using his position power in a

coercive change strategy, illustrated in figure 38 - (Hersey & Blanchard,

1972, p. 160). It resulted in greater efficiency of communication and

it also intensified resentment, fear, suspicion, and lowered morale.

Chris Argyris (1971) has noted that people who do not own up to

feelings, who are not open, who reject experimenting, and who do not

help others, can attitudinally support Theory Y assumptions that people

Figure 38. Coercive Change Cycle

have the capacity for creative problem solving, motivation, and self-direction. And, similarly, people who do own up to feelings, are open, do experiment, and do help others can attitudinally support Theory X assumptions that people are unambitious, have no desire for responsibility, no capacity for creative problem solving, and need to be closely controlled, if not coerced into action. Though attitudinally Crockett sympathized with Theory Y assumptions, his behavior followed Theory X assumptions.

Given the situation, speedier communications were desired, but this short term result was achieved at the expense of lowering already low morale, and increasing resistance, thus jeopardizing long term success in the reform.

T-groups. Of all types of training, T-groups are most directly concerned with interpersonal relationships, and good interpersonal relationships with open communications are one of the foundations of management based on Theory Y assumptions. How can we reconcile a high task and low relationships quadrant one style with a series of T-group seminars?

Crockett established the seminars upon the advice of his external consultants, believing they would help bring about a system based on Theory Y assumptions. However, once again, in the decision and recruiting of participants, Crockett adopted a coercive change strategy, and used a high task low relationships leader style. Those who would be involved in the T-groups were not consulted or included in making this decision. Furthermore, some of the participants were

coerced into attending. His intentions notwithstanding, Crockett attempted paradoxically to command openness and trust.

Another factor mitigating against the effectiveness of the T-group seminars was the nature of the State Department itself. In a 1955 study of human relations training in industry, Fleishman, Harris and Burtt found that day to day climate is more important in determining an employee's behavior than the human relations training he or she has received. Training in isolation (which is how the training for the State Department was carried out) was found not to last in real life situations which are counter to the climate in training. Such was the case of the closed, fearful attitudes in the State Department. Fleishman et al concluded that:

> to a considerable extent, the specific
> training in human relations is wasted
> unless the environment in the plant
> (organization) is also strong in human
> relations [p. 387].

Crockett's basic style. The behaviors above all fall under the task category of leader behavior. If we look at relationships behavior, we see very little recorded evidence of Crockett developing personal relationships with his staff, giving them socio-emotional support, psychological strokes, or engaging in interpersonal communications. His basic leadership style falls into quadrant one of the Life Cycle Model: high task and low relationships.

Secondary Style: Quadrant Four

MBO program. Crockett established the Management by Objectives program because he believed that by decentralizing management into self-

contained, semi-independent and semi-autonomous programs, eliminating
every intermediate supervisory level, and delegating almost complete
authority for daily operations to the program managers, a system of
management based on Theory Y assumptions would develop. Following his
previous pattern, Crockett used a coercive change strategy and instituted
the MBO program from the top, not by or with the managers who would be
involved. In setting up this program, Crockett exhibited a high task
and low relationships leadership style.

After Crockett reviewed and signed a manager's list of objectives
for the year, Crockett became absent, even to the point of being out of
the country five out of six months. In so doing, he was unavailable for
periodic review and support of managers unfamiliar with the system, one
periodic review and support of managers unfamiliar with the system, one
of the steps essential to the MBO process. Thus after setting up the
MBO program, Crockett adopted a quadrant four low task and low relation-
ships style.

In terms of Life Cycle Theory, a quadrant four style is appro-
priate to followers of high "maturity". In adopting this leadership
style, Crockett appears to have assumed a high "maturity" level among
all his subordinates; however, this assumption proved to be incorrect.
Inexperienced and dependent managers felt threatened, as shown when they
pressured for more clarification of their roles, and complained they
felt isolated by the new program. Noting this problem, Hersey and
Blanchard (1974) suggest that MBO could be more effective if superior
and subordinate negotiated the leadership style the superior would use
in helping the subordinate accomplish each of his or her objectives.

In handling the MBO program, Crockett could not be said to have demonstrated relationships behaviors with his managers such as allowing them to participate in the decision making for change, developing personal relationships with them, giving them socio-emotional support, or engaging in interpersonal communication.

Executive group. Crockett used the same low task and low relationships leadership style with his executive group. Assuming their "maturity" level to be high, as indicated by his calling them a "council of elders", he did not define their duties, function, or roles. As previous program managers, they in fact, had little experience in being members of an executive group. Crockett's quadrant four leadership style would thus be inappropriate for this group, and was, as evidenced by their lack of accomplishment.

Inappropriateness of Crockett's Leadership Style

According to Life Cycle Theory, Crockett's leadership style tends to fall into two quadrants. His basic style is high task and low relationships; his secondary style is low task and low relationships. He does not show a sequence of style, but alternates between quadrant one and quadrant four. Previously, we diagnosed that the appropriate leadership style needed by the followers, the FSOs, in light of the situation, was quadrant two and quadrant three. Thus Life Cycle Theory suggests that Crockett's style would be inappropriate in this situation, and that in the long run, he would be ineffective. (See figure 39).

Style Appropriate to Followers

Crockett's
Secondary Style

Crockett's
Basic Style

Figure 39. Comparison of Crockett's Leadership Style
and Style Appropriate to Followers

Crockett's Effectiveness

If Crockett launched the reform program, how could he be said to be ineffective? Bernard M. Bass (1960) distinguished between successful and effective leadership. When person A attempts to influence another to do something, and person B does it, then behaviorally speaking, person A has been successful. However, if B is antagonized, and responds only because A has control over the rewards and punishments, then A has been successful, but not effective. If B responds becaue he or she wants to, because the activity is rewarding to B, then A has been successful and effective.

If a leader is interested in success, he or she will emphasize position power, which is delegated downward. If a leader is effective, he or she will also depend on personal power which tends to be generated upward through follower acceptance. Hersey and Blanchard (1972, p. 93-94) illustrate this concept. See figure 40.

Figure 40.   Successful and Effective Leadership

As deputy undersecretary of state for administration, Crockett's position power helped his short term success in launching a reform program. However, his leadership styles hindered the long term development of his followers' human resources, and reduced his personal power. Crockett's first action of reducing stratification created resistance and resentment which steadily grew. By the time of his resignation, Crockett's personal power was at a low ebb, as some FSOs secretly sabotaged the program, while both staff and superiors verbally attacked it. Thus, while Crockett's leadership style was successful in the short run, it was not effective in the long run.

After Change

> A state official noted that he had not achieved
> his position by jumping on quixotic bandwagons.
> His position, when faced with proposals for
> change, was to assume the position of a passive
> observer, to provide minimum response under
> pressure, to conform where essential, and to
> wait for the tide to ebb.
> Richard S. Undershill
> First Tango in Boston

Rimestad's Leadership Style

Rimestad's leadership style paralleled Crockett's. Although attitudinally Rimestad was Theory X and Crockett Theory Y, behaviorally their styles had similarities. After reading the evaluation report, and talking with the various external consultants, Rimestad cut the University of Michigan team's budget, removed the outside experts, abolished ACORD, restored the supervisory positions that had been

eliminated and restored the fired supervisors to their former jobs.
All of these actions were aimed at restoring organizational structure,
organizing and defining roles of staff, formalizing channels of
communication and establishing ways of getting the job done. Rimestad
concentrated on task; we have little evidence of relationships behavior.

His initial comment that he considered the system a mess, and
the rumors that he would eliminate it, would have tended to increase the
tension and fear in the situation. His discussions with the external
consultants focussed on task, as did his meeting with the Congressional
Appropriations Committee. As did Crockett, Rimestad directed his
communications outward to consultants and upward to superiors. His
leadership style falls then primarily into quadrant one; high task and
low relationships.

Figure 41. Rimestad's Leadership Style

Rimestad's Effectiveness

Again, according to Life Cycle Theory, Rimestad's leadership
style would be inappropriate to the followers and the situation, and

as such would be likely to be ineffective. Rimestad laid coercive change on coercive change. Some of the FSOs and administrators had been involved in T-groups, and had found them beneficial, and some managers had flourished under the MBO system. These people, who had found Crockett's low task and low relationships style appropriate, would find Rimestad's quadrant one style especially inappropriate.

Reactions to Rimestad's leadership bear this out. Dissatisfaction with the State Department and pressure to reorganize it grew, not only from superiors, but also from subordinates. President Nixon demanded a "house cleaning [p. 59]." The foreign service officers joined forces; both their professional association, which unionized, and the junior Foreign Officers Club, called for change. During the period of Rimestad's leadership, pressure for change came to a peak, both within and without the organization.

Change Cycle Two

> Fundamentally, most efforts at bringing about
> change in government organizations have failed
> because they have not been directed at the needs
> of the participants who are responsible for the
> success of the change.
> Richard S. Undershill
> First Tango in Boston

Macomber's Leadership Style

Macomber's First Step

William B. Macomber's leader behavior was different from that of his predecessors. It was Macomber's superior, Elliot Richardson,

who called the first meeting to discuss reorganization. Macomber, several top members of the State Department, and <u>two</u> outside consultants were present. After seeking advice, Richardson and Macomber decided upon a method of change -- a study by in-house task forces. Thus Macomber, his superior, and officers of the Department were collaboratively involved in planning for change.

Macomber's Initial Leadership Style: Quadrant Two

Having settled on a method, Macomber's next step was to present the situation and the proposed method for change to Department personnel at a large meeting. He outlined the "now or never" aspect of the situation to the assembled group, clearly setting forth the pressure on the Department to change. At the same time he stated the reasons why change was necessary in the long run: the capacity to manage was essential to Department officers in the future.

In this speech which demonstrated Macomber's Theory Y assumptions, he also acknowledged the helpful studies of predecessors, declared confidence in the staff, and praised the FSOs competence level as being unequalled.

Macomber in this action combined an emphasis on task, and an emphasis on relationships in his talk; in Life Cycle Theory terms, he practiced a quadrant two leadership style of high task and high relationships. According to the previous diagnosis of follower "maturity", this would be an initially appropriate style. The response from the staff in creating thirteen in-house task forces, attests to the appropriateness of Macomber's style.

Sequence of Macomber's Leadership Style

As the task forces were being formed, Macomber and his immediate staff supported the effort, but deliberately avoided suggesting chairpersons, members, or selection methods, thereby giving people a say in these decisions. Department staff themselves decided how many persons on each task force, and selection methods of chairpersons and members. Each task force decided its own meeting schedule. Macomber set very loose guidelines so that the task forces could examine any problems and make any recommendations they chose. During this stage, Macomber moved into a quadrant three leadership style: high relationships and low task.

During the year the task forces were at work, Macomber practiced a quadrant four style: low task and low relationships. Each task force presented its own report to Macomber's superior Elliot Richardson. Macomber's own report was written by a member of his staff.

According to Life Cycle Theory, given the "maturity" level of the staff, this sequence of leadership styles would be appropriate and effective in this situation. (See figure 42). Macomber's leadership resulted in the formation of thirteen in-house task forces, thirteen reports, 500 recommendations, 400 recommendations approved by Secretary of State Rogers, and 75% implemented by Macomber in six months. As well, morale had improved; the FSOs for the first time had involvement and power in developing Department policies. Morale was built up further by the praise of Secretary of State Rogers for the "Diplomacy of the 70s" program.

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Style Diagnosed as Initially
Appropriate to Followers

2. Macomber's
   style during
   formulation
   and work of
   task forces

HR
LT

HT
HR

1. Macomber's
   initial style
   during speech

3. Macomber's
   style during
   time task
   forces at
   work, and
   presenting
   reports

LT
LR

above
average

average

below
average

Maturity
Continuum

Figure 42. Sequence of Macomber's Leadership Style During
          Change Cycle Two

Summary

Why Was the Reorganization Under Crockett Unsuccessful?

Based on the data presented by Marrow, as analyzed according to the theoretical framework, some of the reasons why the reorganization under Crockett failed may include:

1. Consultation of outside experts by Crockett, rather than those within the organization who would be directly affected by the re-organization created resentment and resistance.

2. The first structural reform was accomplished through a "top down" coercive change strategy. This created resentment and lowered morale among staff.

3. The T-group training seminars were "laid on" by top management, creating resistance and resentment among those who felt coerced into attending.

4. Because the State Department was still closer to Likert's (1961) system one and two type of organization, it presented an environment unsupportive to human relations training. The T-groups were an inappropriate intervention at that time.

5. Crockett's initial high task and low relationships leadership style was inappropriate to the initial "average maturity" level of the FSOs, creating resistance and resentment in them to the reform program.

6. The MBO program was inappropriately implemented, creating insecurity among some administrators.

7. Crockett's low task and low relationships leadership style was inappropriate to the "low maturity" level of the Executive Group, resulting in their inability to take effective action.

8. Crockett's leadership style and reform program were not fully supported by his superiors.

9. Crockett's high task-low relationships, and low task-low relationships leadership style profile did not allow him the flexibility to develop the task "maturity" of some staff members, or meet the needs of those with "average maturity".

Why The Reorganization Under Macomber Succeeded

1. Macomber and his associates had the benefit of learning from Crockett's previous reorganization program.

2. Some of the State Department staff had responded responded positively to Crockett's progressive program, and had grown in it. They were ready to support another such program.

3. Forces from within (unionization of the FSOs) and without (the White House) the State Department were both pressing for reform simultaneously.

4. Macomber's initial high task and high relationships leadership style was appropriate to the "maturity" level of his staff who responded positively. His flexibility allowed him to change his style as the program got underway, and the staff increased in "maturity". Ultimately he was able to leave responsibility entirely in the hands of his staff.

5. Macomber's collaborative approach was appropriate to the needs and competence level of his staff. Those who would be affected by the change responded positively to being involved in and responsible for it.

C H A P T E R   VI

SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES

Case Four: Change in an Automobile Assembly Plant

Background

This case is taken from Chris Weisfelder's (1974) condensation of Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership by Robert Guest (1962). In the early 1950's, Robert Guest and his colleagues at the Technology Project of the Yale Institute for Human Relations conducted a series of studies in two large automobile assembly plants. They wanted to discover "how modern technological methods influenced intrinsic work satisfactions [p.4]," and how mass production affected interpersonal relations among hourly workers.

In 1953 Guest focused his attention on "Plant Y", (a fictitious name) the plant under consideration in this case. Poorest of the six plants in its division, it was under the threat of being closed by the corporation. In order to find out the causes of this critical condition, the Yale researchers interviewed everyone from foremen to executive vice-president, observed production, held informal discussions with workers, and examined personnel and performance records.

During the two and a half years this study was in progress, a new plant manager was hired, and word began to circulate that Plant Y

was undergoing "some profound changes [p. 5]." Spurred by a desire to discover what led to the positive changes in Plant Y, Guest began a new full-scale research program in February 1956. Again, he conducted interviews, and examined records of personnel, performance and technical changes. By learning about "the way in which human beings actually behave in our complex industrial society [p. 7]," Guest hoped to produce findings which would shed light on the "broader theoretical questions about leadership and change in complex organizations [p. 6]."

The following is a précis of his account of three years in the life of Plant Y--a period which saw it rise from last to first place in its division.

Before Change

The Organization

Structure. Plant Y is an automobile assembly plant, part of a corporation employing more than half a million people. The corporate structure, and brief job description for each level is shown in figure 43.

Approximately one third of the plant population is made up of non-production personnel including:

Resident Comptroller	-	in charge of the budget
Personnel Director	-	all personnel matters
Plant Engineer	-	in charge of maintenance
Director of Material and Production Control	-	handling and supplying materials

| Supervisor of work standards | — in charge of work procedures and performance evaluation |
| Chief Inspector | — in charge of all product inspection and responding to reports from dealers |

Operations. Plant Y is a highly complex operation which requires an enormous amount of planning and cooperation by specialized technical groups. The assembly line, focal point of thousands of parts and units, produced completed automobiles at a rate of over 350 each eight hour day, or over 700 on a two shift basis. Parts are delivered mechanically to and from operators working in a maze of conveyors and machinery. Any mechanical breakdown, or human error in this sensitive assembly line can upset the work flow of the entire plant, and create waves in management from foreman to manager, and higher.

The Situation

In the mid-fifties, the automobile industry found itself "going all out [p. 6]" to meet booming market demands. However, at Plant Y, something was going wrong. Costs were too high, schedules were not being met. In short, Plant Y was failing to meet the new demands. The increasing demand from the public was accompanied by an increasing number of urgent telephone calls, telegrams, letters, memos, and visits from the division to Plant Y, demanding better performance. Dealers were complaining about defects and poor delivery.

Board is responsible
to stockholders

Chairman of
the Board

Chief Executive

President

Executive Vice-
President

Divisional Group
Vice-President

Responsible in 1954
for seven final
assembly plants

General Manager
of the Division

Plant
Y

Ten dept. heads
report to him

Plant Y
Manager

Heads all operations
connected with assemb-
ling the product

Production
Manager

General
Superintendent

Each runs
one area of
assembly line

| Dept. Super. | Dept. Super. | Dept. Super. | Dept. Super. | Dept. Super. |

Approx. 20
general
foremen

| General Foreman | General Foreman | General Foreman | General Foreman |

Approx.
100

| Section Foreman | Section Foreman | Section Foreman | Section Foreman | Section Foreman | Section Foreman |

Approx. 2000-
5000 workers

Hourly Wage Employees

Figure 43. Organizational Structure of Corporation, and Plant Y

The Plant Manager

The Plant Manager was "on the spot [p. 6]." He explained his bind to observer and case author Guest this way:

> They just don't know in the central office what we have to face....They think everything can be done by schedule, no matter how fantastic. They keep saying to me, 'Why can't you do it'?.... When I get this kind of pressure on me, I get butterflies in my stomach. It makes it hard for me. I can't tell those below me I can't do anything about this impossible schedule, so of course I get blamed for a lot of it. I can't treat my superintendents the way I get treated. They would just pack up and go home....I can't say these things to my people. I can't say them to my superiors. Results are all that matter to them....[p. 7].

On two occasions, the Plant Manager made recordings of his staff meetings, and played them back to the division manager. One official said later:

> He was trying to show the division manager that he was carrying out orders. I think he was also trying to put the blame on his own staff. They knew this [p. 7].

The plant manager held sporadic meetings with his staff, which he called as a result of a divisional complaint or an emergency in the plant. With the focus in these meetings on short run solutions to immediate problems, he generally requested information or explanations from individuals, and frequently interrupted members with his own opinions or orders. In these meetings, there were few lateral discussions among staff. As one department head observed:

> We spend most of our time making explanations about why something went wrong and who made it go wrong [p. 8].

The plant manager's usual response to an emergency was a trip to the production department, where he gave orders to individuals or groups. The trips were frequent; the pattern the same. One general foreman put it this way:

> He has the first and last word. I just say 'Yes, sir [p. 8].'

The Subordinates

Superintendents, general foremen, and others said that the plant manager "puts the heat on us and we can't talk back [p. 7]." All agreed that the manager's behavior was characterized by obedience to orders, enforcement of rules, and the exercise of power through threat of punishment. One superintendent observed:

> This plant is a one-man show, so people are taught not to be self reliant. Fear, that's the trouble. Nobody questions an order.... In the meetings we have, they just give us hell [p. 9].

Said a general foreman:

> The only time I have anything to do with the manager is when he comes down and chews me out, usually in front of others [p. 9].

A section foreman commented:

> The manager would come down and stand next to me and point out some man and say 'What the hell is that guy doing'? I get all nervous and confused....You can't work under a manager like that [p. 9].

The foreman was caught in the middle. Subject to punishment from above if he failed to carry out orders, he risked alienating his men if he obeyed orders as given. His dilemma was the same as the manager's.

In addition, superiors commonly ignored the chain of command. One superintendent objected to the frequent by-passing of the general foreman. The section foremen, most affected by discplinary measures taken against the hourly workers, found officials above taking over this responsibility. Said one foreman:

> I get aggravated by all the interference....
> They are always trying to run the men in my
> section....I resent this [p. 11].

New foremen, promoted from the ranks, found themselves quickly changing to conform to plant norms, even though they began their jobs with a desire to treat their men otherwise. As one new foreman said:

> You just can't do that (act differently toward
> the workers). You can't change overnight what's
> been going on for fifteen years. Now I treat
> my men the way they have been treated more or
> less in the past [p. 12].

Problems in Operations

Assembly line operations require close cooperation between the operating (line) groups and the non-production departments. Because this cooperation did not exist, there were many problems in operations.

Because the system of material flow and the layout of equip-ment was inadequate in some areas, "bottlenecks [p. 12]" and shortages were chronic. As technical difficulties worsened, interpersonal conflicts increased. A general foreman described the problem this way:

> A line like this depends upon good material flow.
> A shortage holds up the operator....I call the
> material department. First time they ever heard
> about it. Say they'll check. Nothing happens.
> I go look for myself. My foreman in the mean-

time is getting into other troubles, and I'm not around to help [p. 12].

The lack of communication links between lower level departments, along with the formal separation of function, created frequent complaints. Inspectors were ultimately responsible to the chief inspector, not to the section foremen or other production supervisors, who expressed the need to be in close touch with the inspectors in order to gain a fuller understanding of quality requirements. In addition, standards varied because the inspectors in different areas rarely communicated with each other as a group. In like manner, the work standards department "dictated [p. 14]" how a foreman should distribute his work load, without getting the foreman's opinion. Production scheduling changed schedules without due consideration of the current manpower situation.

Plant Y's performance record was abysmal. With the poorest efficiency of all the division's assembly plants, it exceeded the division's maximum standard of defects and rejections, and had the poorest quality record of all the plants. Plant Y's safety record placed it between last and second-last place in the division. Grievances were substantially higher than those of other assembly plants, and its turnover rate was double that of the average of the other plants. This poor performance could hardly be accounted for by chance; nor was there evidence that the plant's geographical location or market conditions were significantly different from other plants.

During Change

When an unofficial and costly walkout hit the deteriorating Plant Y, divisional executives decided to take action. They retired the plant manager with an early pension arrangement, and hired Matthew Cooley as new plant manager. In his previous position as manager of another plant, Cooley had demonstrated his ability to increase efficiency.

Introduction of the New Manager

The division manager escorted Cooley to an introductory dinner meeting attended by all the members of the organization down through the foremen. Both the reactions of the guests, and Cooley's behavior at that dinner are captured in these comments by a general foreman:

> When I went to this dinner meeting, the first thing that struck me was the way they had the seating arrangement. I think it was done very well. Whoever arranged it made sure that the old cliques they had in supervision were broken up. We also noticed that the new plant manager sat down among the foremen and general foremen.
>
> We can remember when an earlier manager came here, and he got rid of a whole lot of people in supervision....We wondered what the new man was going to do.
>
> After the meeting...he (Cooley) just kept circulating on the floor and meeting as many of the guys as he could. I was quite sur- prised and so were the others [p. 16].

Early Days Under Cooley

Attitude from the top. From the first day of Cooley's arrival, there was an abrupt reduction of "interference from above [p. 26]."

Specific directives, telling the manager what to do in response to each crisis, came to a halt. What appears to have happened, based on the comment of a high corporation official, was that the division manager was urged by superiors, to let the new manager at Plant Y "run his own show [p. 27]." Top management added a "blank cheque [p. 27]" clause to their instructions to the new manager: "We don't care what you do, as long as you get the plant out of the mess it is in [p. 27]." Cooley was told he could have whatever personnel he needed, and was advised to "clear out the dead wood [p. 16]."

Cooley's first meeting. In his first meeting with all supervision, Cooley put forward "a few basic goals [p. 16]" for the organization in terms of expected efficiency and quality. Stating candidly that Plant Y had a bad reputation, and that he had heard that many employees were not capable of doing their jobs, he said he was "willing to prove that this was not so, and until shown otherwise, I personally have full confidence in the group [p. 16]." He declared, "I don't believe in firing a lot of people and using threats and fear [p. 17]," and went on to say that his job was "not to catch and punish people for doing a poor job, but rather to help them in any way he could to do a good job [p. 16]."

Letters to the foremen. One of Cooley's first steps was to send a letter to each foreman, asking that the foreman invite Cooley to his section. That surprised the foremen. As one said:

> I guess this new fellow is a pretty good
> manager. He wants to be invited to come
> down to inspect my section. I'll be
> very happy if he does come around [p. 17].

Meeting the union shop committee. Within the first three days, Cooley met with the union shop committee, and urged them to make any comments they wanted to on his general objectives. The union president reported the meeting this way:

> He (Cooley) said that before he came in, he had been briefed on this plant, and that he had heard it was a lousy plant with lousy people in it.... Then he said that he didn't believe the story one single bit -- that in the couple of days he had been around he had found that people at Plant Y were okay. He said he was going to operate this way....
>
> He said he was inviting us personally to see him at any time about ways to make the plant better. He said he welcomed any suggestions.
>
> This was a completely new approach to the committee, and although some of the boys were skeptical, most of us felt that this man meant what he said. What a change [p. 17]!

Lack of planning. Cooley recognized that there was little long range planning at the local level, and that the "cooperate or else" philosophy under which the plant had operated was not working. He said:

> I saw that the organization needed a long-range program, spelled out in writing and reviewed with department heads, the staf, and superintendents. They needed to be in agreement on something that was realizable and tangible and practical. It had to come from the whole organization and be explained to the whole organization [p. 18].

Reduction of overtime. Another of Cooley's first steps was to get permission from the division to begin reduction of the long overtime hours. As one union officer described this:

> We have had managers come in and give us a lot of soft talk, but they never backed it up. This fellow showed up, and one of the first things he did was to cut down on the long hours which had been going on for months. It had been ragged on the men [p. 18].

In these first weeks, no measurable changes in performance were observed. Nevertheless, Cooley's behavior evoked favorable comments.

Major Changes in Communications

Relationships between the production and non-production groups.

Early in the change process, some members of material control, and the production departments were assigned "to study the bottlenecks, especially in the trim department [p. 31]." They discussed their recommendations at weekly department meetings. These meetings were among a series of regularly scheduled meetings initiated by Cooley, involving members of supervision at all levels. These meetings continued for the balance of Cooley's term of office. Thoroughly discussed alternative proposals were presented to the plant manager and his staff by this committee. In this new method of decision making, management was able to choose a recommendation and implement it. As a result of this committee's work, foremen were able to concentrate on planning that would avoid emergencies, rather than on handling crises.

Inspection.

At weekly meetings initiated by Cooley, the chief inspector and operating supervisors down through the general foremen discussed critical problems. Ultimately this group outlined a training program for inspectors and foremen. As a result, operating supervisors and inspectors were able to agree on what was, and was not, acceptable quality; communications between these two groups was no longer dominated by the inspectors, and finally, inspectors were accepted by the foremen "as part of my group [p. 33]." Now foremen "tipped off [p. 32]" inspectors on jobs causing trouble. This greater

acceptance of inspectors took place even though quality standards had measurably stiffened during this time.

Also, once a week, initiated by Cooley, the comptroller, the production manager, the heads of personnel and work standards, all supervisors in production down through general foremen, and the chief inspector, met to review matters relating to inspection and quality.

Work standards. After several months of discussion between work standards and operating supervisors at all levels, a change in policy was made, whereby the section foremen were made chiefly responsible for determining the work assignment of the individual hourly employee. Before, it had been done by work standards. As a result, foremen and work standards now communicated frequently, and collaborated.

The union also appeared to change its policy with respect to work standards disputes. One union officer said:

> Now what we do when we hear a complaint is to take
> a quick look at it. If a man doesn't have a gripe,
> we tell him. If he does, we talk to the foreman
> and get it settled. So, management doesn't have to
> send the time standards men out all the time [p. 34].

Maintenance. Within four months, it was observed that operating and service departments at lower levels were beginning to meet together, though not specifically ordered to do so by Cooley. With the integration of activities by other departments, the head of plant maintenance now focussed on solving technical problems in cooperation with the people involved. "Doing the right thing for the plant [p. 34]" replaced "doing the right thing for the department -- the maintenance department [p. 34]."

Comptroller. Two or three times a week, Cooley "grabbed [p. 35]" the comptroller and took him for a "walk through the plant [p. 35]." During this time, the comptroller talked with department heads, superintendents, general foremen, and section foremen about how the figures coming out of the comptroller's office could be made meaningful to them. It was discovered that there were many factors that could cause a foreman to be "over standard [p. 35]," and although some were beyond his control, he was punished for them. As a result of these walks and talks, the comptroller worked hard, and produced a formula which all the foremen and supervisors could use to analyze efficiency figures quickly. The idea was presented to all of supervision, saying that this had come out of the comptroller's talks with them.

Another result was that the comptroller's department, now "cut in on the deal [p. 37]," was able to make a more convincing case to the division for money for major physical changes. Now almost no requests were denied.

Also once a week, at Cooley's initiation, a cost meeting was held by the comptroller and production manager, attended by Cooley, heads of personnel and work standards, and all production supervisors down through general foremen. The comptroller and production manager presented current figures on costs and plant efficiency, while participants asked questions and made suggestions.

General meetings. Cooley initiated once a month general meetings of all members of plant supervision, to "tell everyone in the

organization what was ahead for the next thirty days, review the past thirty days, and answer questions that come up [p. 19]." Cooley encouraged supervisors to submit written questions about any subject, and promised frank answers.

Staff meetings. Once a week, Cooley chaired a meeting of his immediate staff at which they discussed new developments, information, and directives from the division and corporation. This group in time became a decision making body for the plant as a whole.

Reactions by supervisors. Although several members of supervision initially thought the group meetings were too "time consuming [p. 20]," they changed their opinion. Said one general foreman:

> It began to dawn on us that if we were ever to
> stop running around and putting out fires, we
> had to do this. Also, just getting together as
> a group was worth something in itself [p. 20].

Major Changes in Personnel

Although Plant Y made many shifts in supervisory personnel, only three of the three hundred salaried personnel were discharged or asked to resign. Plant Y adopted a policy of internal promotions and lateral job transfers.

Shifts in job assignments were made possible in two ways: one, when members of supervision on temporary assignment to Plant Y returned to their home plants, and second, when other plants requested supervisors from Plant Y. Eventually, Plant Y came to be looked upon as a "training ground [p. 21]" for other plants in the division.

One example of an internal promotion occured when a young time study man who held a non-supervisory position in the work standards department was moved up rapidly, and at age twenty-nine became production manager for the entire plant.

Most personnel shifts were not promotions, but planned lateral job transfers, mostly of production foremen. Men were "tried out [p. 22]" for a period of time. If they did not "work out [p. 22]" they were returned to their old job. In the long run, the foremen's knowledge of operations was expanded. One foreman observed:

> The thing we have noticed is that they do move
> the foremen around a lot more than they ever did
> before. I think it is helpful because it gives
> the foreman a much broader knowledge of the job
> [p. 22].

A deliberate long-range program was instituted to develop understudies. Each member of management above the foreman level gave his job over to one or more of his subordinates for a temporary period of sixty days.

Major Technical Changes

Few physical changes had been requested or made for several years in Plant Y, although it was the oldest among all the assembly plants. The first requests Cooley made to the division for capital expenditures were for improvements in working conditions.

The obsolete cafeteria was refurbished, re-lighted and air-conditioned. New clothes lockers were installed. Parking areas were expanded. Exhaust fans were installed. Large heaters were installed

at the rail freight doors. Electric fans were provided for areas hot
in summer. To eliminate cold drafts, and facilitate unloading, the
entire receiving area was re-located. Hand loading was eliminated
by elevator platforms. The plant hospital was air-conditioned. New
plumbing was installed in the repainted and retiled washrooms. A
union officer commented that these changes showed that "Cooley meant
business [p. 23]."

Further physical changes were made to improve the operations
themselves. Old ovens were ripped out of the paint department and re-
located on the roof. New spray booths were installed. Major improve-
ments were made in the metal department. Heavy, obsolete tools were
replaced with lighter tools as quickly as possible. Because of
increased electric power requirements, a new power station and later, a
new power house were built.

The method by which changes in the trim department were brought
about provides a model of the change program generally. First Cooley
and the production manager asked the foremen and general foremen for
suggestions on how operations in the trim department could be improved.
Later, his superintendent began to meet with the foremen and general
foremen to discuss and agree on a minimum number of changes. Next, the
production manager took over a further series of meetings including
service and production groups. Then the agreed-upon changes were
implemented. A general foreman observed that there was "a good spirit
[p. 24]" in the thrashing out process, and "we finally arrived at some-
thing to satisfy all of us [p. 24]."

Responses to Technical Changes

When the technical "bottlenecks [p. 24]" were eliminated, the conflicts were sharply reduced, and the extreme sense of emergency eliminated. Many comments agreed with these of a general foreman:

> With all those little changes and big changes....
> we can think a little bit more about planning,
> instead of worrying what's going to happen the
> next minute.

> It was when the men saw some of these changes
> being made that they began to believe that we
> were trying to do something for them. You can
> talk a lot about human relations, but unless
> you can show something that you have done, why
> it is only a lot of talk. We used to get that
> talk in the old training sessions, but it didn't
> mean anything [p. 25].

As a result of the changes, supervisors had more time to plan and reduce the potential for interpersonal conflict. As one foreman said:

> All of us are more willing to get along because
> there are fewer reasons for squawking at each
> other [p. 25].

After Change

Climate

After three years, the old climate of fear had disappeared. One superintendent observed that now "nobody today who knows he's doing a reasonably good job has any fear of losing his job [p. 26]." With fear gone, supervisors felt free to express their ideas for improving the organization.

Attitude Toward Manager

Several supervisors stressed Cooley's belief in "the worth of the individual [p. 27]," and stated tha this individual approach was felt "right down through the organization [p. 27]." The manager's informal visits were now seen as opportunities to exchange technical ideas, or "socializing [p. 27]," not as being for the purpose of punishment. These visits were helped by Cooley's avoiding in his words, or dress, any display of superior status. Here are some comments of the foremen:

1. The manager goes all over the plant and
speaks to everybody. Not the way it used
to be. He comes up and says 'Good morning'
to me and the men, and he means it [p. 28].

2. The foreman knows (that)...top management
wants to help the foreman get ahead [p. 28].

Attitudes Among Subordinates

Although attitudes among subordinates were slower to change, three changes were observed. First, opinions of superiors and subordinates about each other were now more positive. Second, more information was flowing between superiors and subordinates. Third, a greater proportion of communications concerned future planning.

There was a change from fixing the blame on the foreman, to concentrating on the problem. Said one foreman:

They don't take it out on the men or the foremen
as the scapegoat, but they take it out on the
problem first [p. 29].

This resulted in more information and help being supplied to the fore-
man who was now in a better position to make his own decisions. This
in turn caused superiors to trust their subordinates to manage; thus
interference from above lessened. One general foreman commented:

> Now I don't have to worry all the time about my
> foremen getting me into hot water [p. 30].

Promotion, often mentioned before the change, was rarely
mentioned after. Almost no one expressed the hope or desire of
advancing out of the plant.

However, despite all the positive changes in attitudes, two of
the twenty-five foremen still feared that if it were not for the pattern
set by the plant manager, some members of middle management would return
to their former tactics of using threats of punishment.

Plant Performance

With labor costs down fourteen percent, Plant Y's position was
first in the division. When two major schedule changes during the
year caused major cutbacks, Plant Y's cost rose less than any of the
other plants, and it "recovered" more quickly than any. After the fall
introduction of new models, Plant Y's manufacturing costs were fifty
percent lower than the poorest of the seven plants, and it came up to
line speed more quickly than any of the other plants. The non-production
departments tied for first place in the division for lowest cost per unit.

Plant Y consistently held either first or second place in the
division for quality performance. It stood fourth for its safety
record, remarkable since its potential for accidents was higher than

for many other types of production operations. With respect to labor grievances Plant Y stood first in the division with three grievances per hundred workers per month. Its absentee rate dropped to 4.9 percent, as did its average monthly turnover rate. In general, when compared to the other similar assembly plants, Plant Y went from bottom to top position in most categories.

At the end of three years, Cooley ws promoted to a higher position in the division. When he left, Plant Y not only maintained itself as the leader in the division, but continued to improve.

Analysis of Case Four

Before Change

We become our environment.
Leland Kaiser

The Situation

The organization. Plant Y itself, and the corporation of which it was a part, were traditional bureaucratic structures. (See figure 43). The production department of Plant Y, focal point of this analysis, had four organizational levels below plant manager, approximately 125 supervisors of different types, each with a short span of control, and three levels to a shared department superintendent. Time and goal orientation of the production department was short term and specific: approximately 350 automobiles per eight hour shift. Formal regulations,

such as quality standards, were of utmost importance. The primary focus of this department, and the plant in general, was on task efficiency.

Each hourly worker on the assembly line performed a clear and routine task, under time pressure. Taken together, these thousands of tasks were highly interdependent, requiring precise orchestration to keep the sensitive assembly line moving. It was an enormously complex and stress filled operation.

The environment. A booming economy was creating an insatiable demand for cars. Demands for different models changed seasonally, necessitating changes in production that involved all departments in Plant Y. Feedback from the public and dealerships was constant and insistent. Pressure on Plant Y was intense.

Superiors. As demand from the environment increased, so did demands from divisional headquarters. With each new crisis in the plant, the division responded by directing the plant manager as to exactly what to do in response to the situation. This high task and low relationships leadership style increased pressure on the already harried plant manager. He responded defensively and dependently by, for example, tape recording two of his meetings and playing them back to the divisional manager to prove he was obeying orders.

Given its organizational structure, type of operation, stress of demand from the environment, and pressure from top management, Plant Y needed a high degree of integration between its departments in order

to function efficiently. Plant Y's rock bottom performance showed that this integration was lacking. Let us examine the factors that prevented Plant Y from meeting production demands.

Factors hindering production. Plant Y was technically inadequate in many areas. Poor layout of equipment, shortages of materials, outdated heavy hand tools, all combined to produce bottlenecks on the assembly line. This created short tempers and frustration. As bottlenecks increased, pressure from above increased, and interpersonal relations worsened.

Low supervisory morale was not bettered by poor hygiene factors. Eating in a dismal cafeteria in need of repainting, on old rickety furniture, using rundown washrooms that needed new plumbing, unloading and loading supplies in freezing drafts, breathing in paint fumes from inadequately ventilated paint booths -- all of these things and more increased the workers' dissatisfaction, and further worsened human relations.

There were no meetings held between supervisory staff of different departments, or indeed within departments. For example, inspectors in one area frequently held different quality standards than inspectors in another area, thus creating greater frustration and difficulties for the foremen. A general lack of communication existed because there were no established means by which people could discuss problems. Therefore, the socio-technical structure worked against efficient production.

Plant Manager's Leadership Style

Feeling pressured and panicky, "butterflies in my stomach [p. 7]," the plant manager attempted to control the situation by using a punitive quadrant one leadership style. In response to divisional orders, he customarily made a trip to the plant, "chewed a man out [p. 9]," and issued orders. As one general foreman put it, "He has the first and last word. I just say 'Yes, Sir' [p. 8]." Another response the plant manager made to a crisis, was to call a meeting to solve the immediate problem. He requested information, explanations, and gave opinions and orders. Again, his interruption did not allow subordinates to respond or discuss the issue. Communications were vertical, not lateral.

Subordinates Maturity Level

The subordinates' response to the plant manager's quadrant one leadership style indicates that their "maturity" level, as defined by Life Cycle Theory, was higher than the plant manager realized. What were the signs? Subordinates recognized that the plant manager led through fear. One superintendent commented:

> Whatever we had of success was paid for at a great
> cost. What a cost!...Out and out fear. This
> plant [runs] on fear, and fear alone [p. 25].

As well, subordinates perceived the plant manager's leadership style as ineffective. His giving of orders was seen as "chewing out [p. 9]." His emphasis on task was seen this way by a superintendent:

> This plant is a one-man show, so people are
> taught not to be self-reliant [p. 9].

His attempts to solve problems was perceived as useless according to
one section foreman:

> I get all nervous and confused....You can't
> work under a manager like that [p. 9].

According to a department head, the plant manager's problem-solving
attempts were attempts to place blame, and as such, ineffective:

> We spent most of our time making explanations
> about why something went wrong and who made
> it go wrong [p. 8.]

According to Hersey and Blanchard (1972), a leader's style may
be seen as appropriate or inappropriate by the followers. If it is
perceived as inappropriate, then the leader's behavior will be in-
effective. They explain that when a quadrant one high task and low
relationships style is being used inappropriately, the leader is often
seen by followers as having no confidence in others, unpleasant, and
interested only in short-run output. Such was the case in this
situation. The plant's ever decreasing performance and worsening human
relations, culminating in a walk-out, attested to the inappropriateness
and ineffectiveness of the manager's quadrant one style.

On the basis of the above evidence, we argue that the "maturity"
level of the supervisory group was at this time average, not below
average. In terms of ability, they were not as incompetent as the
gripes, absenteeism, turnover, and accidents among the workers made
them appear. Many section and general foremen had been promoted from
the ranks. Their experience on the job, and knowledge of its problems

was high. Their unwillingness to participate in problem-solving, and their low achievement motivation was the result of the plant manager's leadership style which raised their level of fear to the point where they were afraid to give the suggestions they had. Equally as important, technical problems kept them too busy running around "putting out fires [p. 20]" to think about long term performance improvement.

With this diagnosis, according to Life Cycle Theory, a more appropriate initial leadership style for this group in their present situation, would be quadrant two, high task and high relationships. (See figure 44). Emphasis on task would be needed to rectify the present problems in operations, while emphasis on relationships would be needed to raise morale and mend shattered interpersonal relations.

Supervisors' Leadership Style

The plant manager's leadership style had a two-stage effect on subordinates: it caused them to become "nervous, confused [p. 9]" and fearful, which in turn caused them to exercise the same punishing leadership style on those beneath them. General foremen were afraid that the section foremen would 'get them into hot water' if they were not constantly watching them. They often disciplined the section foreman's men, much to the resentment of the usurped section foremen. In this way anger and distrust built up.

At this time, Plant Y was an example of Likert's (1961) system one of exploitive authoritarian management. Figure 45 shows a comparison between Likert's system one and Plant Y before change.

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
Figure 44.   Appropriate Leadership Style for
Supervisory Group Before Change

Likert's System One	Plant Y Before Change
*management is seen as having no confidence or trust in subordinates	*at rare meetings, manager gives orders, asks questions; subordinates do not talk to each other, discuss or make suggestions
*control lies in top management; subordinates seldom involved in decision-making; bulk of decisins and goal setting made at top and issued down chain of command	*division tells plant manager what to do in each crisis; plant manager tells supervisors what to do
*subordinates forced to work with fear, threats, punishment and occasional rewards	*plant manager 'chews out' foremen; general foremen punish section foremen
*superiors see subordinates operating at physiological and safety levels	*'if you can't do it, get out'
*the little superior-subordinate interaction that does take place, is with fear and mistrust	*plant manager plays back tapes of his meetings to division manager to prove his obedience to orders; 'I just say yes, sir.'
*an informal organization within the formal organization opposes the goals of the formal organization	*union disputes constant; quality lowest in division.

Figure 45. A Comparison of Likert's System
One and Plant Y Before Change

During Change

Cooley's Leadership Style

During Cooley's term as plant manager, his leadership style evolved through three stages according to the Life Cycle Theory. Initially he adopted a quadrant two, high task and high relationships style. Toward the middle of his term, he moved to a quadrant three style of high relationships and low task. At the end of his term, he adopted a quadrant four style of low task and low relationships. Let us follow his development through each of these stages.

Beginning at the introductory dinner meeting, Cooley attempted to develop personal relationships between himself and members of plant supervisory personnel. He sat down to dinner with the foremen. After dinner, instead of hobnobbing with top management, he circulated the floor, meeting as many men as he could. Right at the beginning of his term of office, he emphasized and modelled relationships behavior.

Early stage. During his first days on the job, Cooley immediately attacked two problems: 1) poor interpersonal relations and morale, and 2) lack of integration between and within departments. During this time, according to Life Cycle Theory, he used a quadrant two style.

Cooley entered a situation full of hostility and frustration; workers had just staged a walkout. All of his subordinates, down through foremen, expected him to "get rid of a whole lot of people

[p. 16]." Division management had advised him to "clear out the dead wood [p. 16]." Contrary to expectations, Cooley began by admitting the situation -- he had been told it was a "lousy plant with lousy people in it [p. 17]," and stating that he didn't believe it. He persisted in developing personal relationships (sent a letter to each foreman asking to be _invited_ to visit his section); giving socio-emotional support and psychological strokes (told all of supervision at a meeting that he believed everyone was capable of doing his job, and he, Cooley, had full confidence in the group); engaging in facilitating behaviors (personally invited the union shop committee to make suggestions as to how to make the plant better).

With many years of conditioning in fear, his subordinates were initially skeptical. They had heard "a lot of soft talk [p. 18]" before. Cooley demonstrated his sincerity in his first step of getting overtime hours reduced for the hourly workers. The improvements in working conditions made by Cooley further demonstrated to the workers that he meant business. A re-modelled cafeteria, refurbished wash-rooms, fans, heaters -- all these raised worker morale.

Recognizing the lack of long range planning, Cooley initiated meetings at all levels; between material control and production; between the chief inspector and supervisors; between the comptroller, production manager, and work standards; general meetings of all members of plant supervision; staff meetings of his immediate sub-ordinates. Cooley wanted a concrete, practical, long range program that "came from the whole organization [p. 18]."

In setting up these meetings, Cooley demonstrated task behavior: through these meetings he was attempting to establish new channels of communication and ways of getting the job done. He was also demonstrating relationships behavior; he was present at all meetings initially; he encouraged the flow of ideas; he used and acknowledged these ideas, such as the comptroller's formula for analysis of costs. These meetings opened lateral communications, and created integration within and between departments. Interpersonal relations began to improve. Although initially doubtful, one general foreman's comment shows the positive subordinate reaction:

> It began to dawn on us that if we were ever to
> stop running around and putting out fires, we
> had to do this. Also, just getting together as
> a group was worth something in itself [p. 20].

This response by the supervisory group attests to the appropriateness of Cooley's initial high task and high relationships leadership style.

Middle stage. Through these meetings, Cooley had established a means of participative decision making which eventually enabled him to move a quadrant three high relationships and low task leadership style. When it came to making major physical changes in the plant, the changes were discussed by those involved in the area who would be most affected by the changes. It must be noted that the process by which the committees became independent from Cooley was gradual. The change program in the trim department provides an example.

Initially, Cooley and the production manager met with the general and section foremen and asked for suggestions on how to improve operations in the trim department. Later, the superintendent met with

the foremen to agree on the minimum number of changes. Next, the production manager took over further meetings. Finally, the agreed-upon changes were implemented.

A number of things are noteworthy about this process. First, it enabled everyone to have a say. Second, although it allowed initial control to remain in the hands of Cooley and the production manager, it also allowed Cooley to exit from the process so that the production manager could take over. As this committee grew more experienced, Cooley was not necessary, not even to initiate the process.

Through this mechanism, physical changes in the paint department, metal department, and in the machinery were made. These eliminated the bottlenecks on the assembly line. These improvements, made through the committee decision making process, in turn reinforced the participative decision making process. The committee process enabled supervisory personnel to gradually gain in experience, to become more independent, and in terms of Life Cycle Theory, to "mature" as decision makers.

Cooley's approach to personnel shifts also provided opportunities for supervisors to "mature". Rather than discharge men, Cooley established a procedure of lateral job transfers, so that supervisors could "tryout" another position. In this way, they gained broader knowledge about the job. Another of Cooley's innovations, the "understudy [p. 217]" program, enabled each member of management above foreman level, to train a subordinate in his position. Thus when another plant requested a supervisor from Plant Y, there was a replacement available.

Signs of the group's increase in task relevant "maturity" began to appear. Inspectors and foremen cooperated on quality standards; the

union shop committee began to settle disputes without always involving management; the operating and service departments began to meet on their own initiative; Cooley's immediate subordinates, the staff committee, became a decision making body for the plant as a whole.

As subordinates gained in "maturity", Cooley gradually moved to a quadrant three high relationships and low task leadership style. His visits around the plant became informal opportunities to exchange technical ideas and socialize. Rising plant performance, and improving human relations were witness to the appropriateness of Cooley's quadrant three style.

After Change

> Each system tends to mould people in its own image....Participative organizations tend to develop emotionally and socially mature persons capable of effective interaction, initiative, and leadership.
>   Rensis Likert

The Organization

As a result of Cooley's leadership, Plant Y, without changing its organizational structure, and dismissing only three out of three hundred salaried personnel, changed from Likert's (1961) authoritarian system one, to one approaching a system four of participative management. The following chart compares the elements of Likert's system four with Plant Y after change.

Likert's System Four	Plant Y After Change
management has complete confidence and trust in subordinates	changes was in the hands of the committees
decision-making widely dispersed throughout the organization and well integrated	foremen involved in long range planning; foremen responsible for work assignment to hourly employees; all supervisory personnel involved in cost control
communication flows up and down the hierarchy and among peers	Cooley a member at some committee meetings, and later, they are held without him; Cooley invites suggestions
workers motivated by participation and involvement in: developing economic rewards, setting goals, improving methods, and appraising progress toward goals	subordinates feel top management wants them to get ahead; they participate actively in committees; a free flow of suggestions
extensive, friendly superior-subordinate interaction with a high degree of confidence and trust	Cooley visits plant to exchange ideas and socialize; well liked by all subordinates; no fear, high trust; positive superior-subordinate opinion; no scapegoating; promotion out of the plant not sought
widespread responsibility for control process, with lower units fully involved.	inspectors and foremen take responsibility for quality control
informal and formal organization one and the same	union committee settles its few grievances largely without involving management

Along with this change in orientation and management style, Plant Y rose to a top position in almost every category among all of the assembly plants in the division. Other plants began requesting Plant Y personnel; it came to be looked on as a training ground.

Cooley's Leadership Style

Figure 46 shows a comparison between Cooley's sequence of leadership styles, and Likert's four systems of management.

According to Life Cycle Theory, Plant Y after change was operated by a highly "mature" group. As such, the appropriate leadership style for this group would now be quadrant four, low task and low relationships. (See figure 46). This in effect happened, for when Cooley was promoted out of the plant to a divisional position, Plant Y maintained itself as the leader in the division, and continued to improve.

Summary

Why Did Cooley Succeed?

1. Cooley's leadership style was both appropriate and flexible. His initial high task and high relationships style was perceived as appropriate by his subordinates who responded in a positive manner. His flexibility allowed him to change his leadership style as the managers and workers of Plant Y gained in "maturity".

2. Cooley's implementation of plant-wide meetings at all levels improved communications, and allowed managers and workers practice in decision-making and problem-solving. Through these meetings, they were able to develop their managerial ability-- their "maturity".

2. Cooley's second leadership style during change

High Relation-ships Low Task

High Task High Relation-ships

1. Cooley's initial leadership style

SYSTEM 4

SYSTEM 3

3. Cooley's final leadership style after change

Low Task Low Relation-ships

SYSTEM 2

SYSTEM 1

above average   average   below average   Maturity Continuum

Supervisory group's maturity level after change

Supervisory group's initial maturity level before change

Figure 46.   Cooley's Leadership Styles and Likert's
Four Systems of Management Compared

3. Improvements in working conditions raised morale. In Herzberg's (1959) terms, 'hygiene factors' were satisfied through improvements in working conditions, while 'motivators' were satisfied through meetings. In this way, the productive ability of Plant Y personnel increased.

4. Technical improvements supported and enhanced improvements in the social and managerial systems within the plant.

<u>Case Five: Change In The Garment Industry</u>

<u>Background</u>

In the mid 1930's Alfred and Seymour Marrow took over their father's pajama factory. Alfred, a psychologist, became chairman of the board, while his brother Seymour, an engineer, assumed the presidency.

Because of their interest in applying group dynamics to management problems, in 1939 they invited Kurt Lewin to conduct a program of leadership training and behavioral science research in the Harwood company. This approach succeeded, and the company thrived.

Twenty-two years later Harwood purchased its leading competitor, the Weldon company. The initial plan was to continue Weldon as an autonomous division; however, within a few months Harwood's owners decided that they would have to step in and make major changes in their fast sinking acquisition.

The following case is a condensed account of that change, as seen through the eyes of Alfred Marrow and other behavioral scientists. It follows the events of two years, during which the Harwood company changed the management system of the Weldon Company.

<div align="center">Before Change</div>

<u>Background of the Harwood Company</u>

In 1899, with a carefully put together capital of $1000, a personable man of limited technical knowledge opened a pajama factory.

With a philosophy of benevolent management, he survived on a marginal basis in the highly competitive garment business, and after more than thirty-five years, turned the company over to his two sons. Seymour Marrow, an engineer, became president, and Alfred, a psyhologist, became chairman of the board. They expanded the company in 1939 by opening a new plant in a small Virginia community.

Seymour and Alfred began immediately to apply group dynamics to management problems by, in 1939, inviting Kurt Lewin to work with plant management in a program of leadership training and behavioral research. Their aim was to bring about more satisfying employee relationships, and more willing, active cooperation in work. As Harwood's president put it:

> People can enjoy working together far more than they do. For a majority....dissatisfaction, ill will and conflict have produced anxiety, resentment, and hostility, with disruptive and harmful consequences for the individual and the organization [p. xiii].

Some tenets of Harwood philosophy were that:

1. a participative approach to management leads to more loyalty, flexibility, cooperation and efficiency, and will succeed only when there is mutual confidence [p. 27].

2. a job is done best when employees feel their needs are considered in a way that they can maintain self-respect and a sense of responsibility [p. 26.]

3. employees have more informed opinions on matters relating to their own jobs than top managers, and can make practical suggestions of merit [p. 26].

4. when the findings are the group's own, they will be inspired to change their behavior [p. 26].

5. employees are unlikely to rebel against decisions they helped make [p. 33].

6. employees want the same things that their employers do [p. 32].

After twenty years, gratifying job satisfaction among employees and owners, high profits and productivity demonstrated the effectiveness of Harwood's participative approach to management. On January 1, 1962, with underutilized capital, and an opportunity for growth, and higher profits, Harwood purchased its largest competitor, the Weldon Manufacturing Company. As of 1967 Harwood-Weldon was the largest company in its field, producing about twenty percent of the world's supply of its product. This case describes the process by which the Harwood company, within two years, changed the management system of the failing Weldon company.

Background of the Weldon Company

In 1932 the Weldon Manufacturing Company, under the leadership of two owner-managers, moved into a plant in the coal region of Pennsylvania, and became one of the fastest growing producers of quality pajamas in the industry. During the 30s and 40s attempts to unionize Weldon failed, as they were to do for the next three decades. Whenever a union organizer appeared in town, Weldon's management would shut off the machines, start rumours that the plant would move if the union came in, and make intimidating speeches. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of American (ACWA) officials said that the company's methods for playing on workers' fears were they worst they had encountered in

the Pennsylvania area. In spite of this, Weldon became by the end of
World War II, one of the recognized and highly respected leaders in the
garment industry. By the mid-fifties, at the height of its success,
Weldon had expanded to five plants which employed 3500 people.

Weldon's Leaders

The company was almost solely run by two partner-owners. (See
figure 47). According to Harwood's president, one outgoing partner in
charge of merchandising, would frequently solicit ideas from his staff
on policy, but would always make the final decision to suit himself.
The other more taciturn and uncommunicative partner in charge of manu-
facturing rarely shared problems, plans, or objectives. He announced
schedules, budgets and production quotas, expected his staff to meet them,
and gave a hard time to anyone who failed to. Each partner directed his
area independently of the other. With energy and competence, they made
all the necessary plans and decisions.

In this situation, over a number of years, the partners drove
themselves and their staff almost to the point of collapse. Every small
and necessary expenditure had to be personally approved by one of the
partners, regardless of the time loss or work delays. They spent evenings
and week ends on the job and required most of their executives to do
likewise.

Weldon's Decline

In the postwar transition from a sellers' to a buyers' market,
Weldon's management problems began to grow. The owner-managers made

Figure 47. Organizational Structure of Weldon Company

decisions independently of each other and their executives. This resulted in two costly errors for the company. In 1953, though lacking in necessary technology, the owners entered the lower-priced, mass production shirt and pajama business, and the womens' pajama business. Both ventures failed.

At the end of the fifties, Weldon's problems intensified. There was bad will toward Weldon when, in 1960, the union picketed the prestigious stores selling Weldon products. Yet when the union held a vote at Weldon, because of management threats of firings, it lost again. Between 1959 and 1960 Weldon closed five plants, and consolidated its work and remaining 1000 employees in the main Pennsylvania plant. To meet mounting loses, the partners cut down on staff, withheld wage increases, called on people to make sacrifices, and applied strong pressure from production. Within months following the failed union election, Harwood purchased Weldon.

During Change

The Situation at Weldon

At the time of purchase, Harwood's plan was to continue Weldon as an autonomous division, with no change in its product, management, or employees. Weldon's two owner-managers were to continue as salaried managers. In the months after purchase, it became painfully obvious to Harwood that this plan was not possible and that major organizational changes would have to be made -- and fast. According to the Harwood chairman of the board:

> Heavy losses, haphazard inventory building,
> excessive costs and sagging sales called for
> organizational changes...to protect our
> investment at Weldon [p. 64].

Harwood's discoveries about Weldon's advantages an disadvantages are
summarized in figure 48.

Goals of the Program

Because they felt that the Weldon people had little experience
in learning new ways of working together, the Harwood executives indepen-
dently planned the goals and approach of the change program, and in the
words of the board chairman, "imposed [p. 65]" it on Weldon. The four
goals of the change program were:

1. to retain existing personnel if possible
2. to modernize the physical plant and work methods
3. to introduce a new pattern of organizational life
4. to accomplish these changes as soon as possible [p. 66].

Method of the Change Program

Harwood hired five consulting organizations to work on different
problems.

Teams 1 and 2	Norris & Elliott Inc. Consulting Engineers	to improve engineering and production
Team 3	Leadership Development Associates and Dept. of Behavioral Science, Boston University	to improve interpersonal relations
Team 4	Ladhams Associates, training engineers	to train operators
Team 5	Survey Resarch Center, University of Michigan	to observe events, measure what was done, and evaluate program

Disadvantages	Advantages
former owner-managers, now salaried managers, do not communicate; make unilateral decisions; do not delegate authority	large roster of desirable customers
	orders on hand to be filled.
little communication, no coordination, antagonism between manufacturing and merchandising.	basic facilities sound; plant very large; floor space for production ample.
	large number of technically competent supervisory staff.
plant production in turmoil; mixed batch system, no production coordination, high costs, poor layout.	large number of energetic people, willing and motivated to undertake a change program.
outdated equipment, no repair supplies.	highly skilled core of hourly employees.
supervisory staff overworked (1 supervisor to 155 employees) uninformed about policy decisions; lack job security; do not delegate authority; discouraged from making suggestions; some falsified records to keep information from owner-managers.	two-thirds of hourly employees were older (over 25) and experienced (over two years).

personal relationships between hourly employees good; 85% liked their fellow employees.

personal relationships between supervisors and hourly employees fairly good; 64% satisfied with supervisor. |
| one-third of hourly employees (80% women) young (under 25) and inexperienced; highly transient (half were planning to leave); had high absenteeism, double that in the industry-12% per day. | |
| inadequate operator training; chaotic production system prevented skill development. | |

Figure 48. Advantages and Disadvantages of Weldon at Purchase

Steps in the Change Program

The two and a half year change program had three phases: phase
one, assessment, during which a diagnosis of Weldon was made; phase two
of technical change, and phase three, changes in the management system.
Figure 49 presents a detailed chronology of the change program. Each
of the numbered items in the chronology will be briefly discussed.

Phase One: Assessment

Initial Period of Calm

The acquisition of Weldon brought relief to those who had
feared the plant would be shut down, and also raised anxieties about
"cleaning house [p. 130]" through wholesale staff dismissals. The new
owners made statements of their philosophy of management, assuring
employees that the operation would continue, and that no changes in
personnel were planned. According to the Weldon plant manager,
changes introduced by the new owners were imperceptible at first.
Plans were made to bring in a new personnel manager, and attitude
surveys were conducted. One executive commented:

> It seemed to me there was no change for a long
> time. After all the talk about the new people
> and new ideas, nothing happened. More than once
> I said to myself 'You wouldn't even know we had
> new owners [p. 131].'

This period of quiet ended when the personnel manager was hired. In
the view of a top plant staff member, this action

> was an early indication, I think, that things were
> going to be stirred up a bit....I would say it was
> the first indication that there was going to be a

Assessment	Jan. 1962	Harwood buys Weldon
	June 1962	attitude surveys and feedback begin
	Oct. 1962	Personnel Manager hired
Technical Changes	Dec. 1962	1. <u>Unit production system begun</u>
		shipping department reorganized
		incentive pay plan introduced
	Feb. 1963	2. <u>Supervisors and Managers staff meetings begin</u>
		<u>selection tests for new employees begin</u>
		3. <u>absence and termination policy changes</u>
Management System Changes	Mar. 1963	4. <u>Management training program begins</u> – first group
		5. <u>Operator training program begins</u>
	Apr. 1963	Management training program – second group
	May 1963	Supervisors and Managers staff meetings end
	July 1963	three units in production
		6. <u>earnings development program begins</u>
	Sept.1963	evaluation of Management training program
	Oct. 1963	7. <u>problem-solving meetings of Supervisors and Operators begin</u>
	Nov. 1963	unionization; minimum wage increase
	Dec. 1963	Operator training program completed
		period of rapid change ends
Consolodation	Jan. 1964 to Dec. 1964	during this year: unit production systems completed attitude surveys and feedback completed problem solving meetings continued change program ends, consultants leave

Figure 49. Chronology of Change Program at Weldon

completely different approach, at least to
personnel....[p. 68].

Phase Two: Technical Changes

Unit System of Production

The desire to satisfy their customers had resulted in the
practice of putting small lots into production in any part of the
plant without much consideration of the effects on work flow. In
some cases, operators faced seven to nine job changes in an eight
hour shift. In order to raise operator earnings, lower costs, and
better utilize operators, materials and machines, a decision was
made to change to a unit system of production.

This conversion was accomplished through several technical
changes. Four self-contained production units were set up. Cutting
work was modified and work standards introduced so that cutters were
provided with incentive earnings opportunities. Warehousing and
shipping operations were reorganized, cutting down on the overload
of employees in that area. Newer machines were brought in to replace
outmoded ones. Maintenance service was improved and stocks were
brought up to requirements. The technically competent employees, who
expected and respected expertness in their superior, understood and
appreciated these improvements.

Supervisors and Managers Staff Meetings

To improve production efficiency of the new unit system,
supervisors, managers and consulting engineers met every Saturday

morning to review plant progress, discuss priorities, and decide next steps. Initialy, the effort to get a freer flow of reactions and ideas did not go well. At early meetings, the plant manager did most of the talking while the supervisors and managers remained generally quiet. This pattern did not change until the supervisory training program (to be described later) was completed. After this, the supervisors began to address each other directly in their staff meetings, join in the discussion, and challenge the opinions of the managers and the consultants.

Personnel Policy Changes

Weldon's high turnover (90% in the four months after purchase) and absenteeism (double the usual rate in the industry) was accepted by supervisory staff as an unavoidable fact of life. The supervisors felt that there was a shortage of good people in their community, and that "You can't get people to work on a more consistent basis [p. 117]."

Unable to gain support for investigating the causes of absenteeism, the personnel manager, outside consultants, and some staff found that the same people were continually absent due primarily to factors that existed within the plant. This data, along with tables demonstrating the high costs of one absentee for a department, was shown to the supervisors, who in time were convinced that reduction in absenteeism was possible and necessary.

Once convinced, the supervisors kept records on absenteeism, discussed with absentees their reasons for staying away, and tried to

assist absentees with outside problems. Gradually a new plant policy was formulated in which:

1. selection tests were introduced
2. chronic absentees would not be recalled after layoff
3. after a cutoff date, a certain number of unexcused absences would result in dismissal [p. 118].

Absentee rates were cut in half. Employees regarded the new policy as a fair one.

Phase Three: Management System Changes

Management Training Program

Although things were improving, the new owners felt that the hostilities, fears and suspicions of managers and supervisors were blocking potential progress. Only one approach to solving this problem was seriously considered by Harwood executives and decided upon: a direct examination by staff members themselves, of their own ideas, attitudes and practices in management. This examination would:

1. be conducted away from the normal working environment
2. last for two to four days
3. focus on practical problems arising at work
4. use methods derived from "laboratory" or "sensitivity" training
5. use a "family group" format
6. be mandatory - staff members were expected to attend
7. all be conducted by the same trainer
8. not include the new owners or their representatives unless asked by the group
9. have a follow-up of a similar kind [p. 98-99].

Merchandising Sub-System

Initially three major training sessions were held. Session one was attended by the five merchandising department heads from the New York office. Despite the mandate to attend, their superior, the former owner-manager, did not. He became the focus of discussion. One result of this session was a subsequent problem solving meeting with the superior, soon after which he left the company. The five department heads and the two new owners distributed organizational responsibility and authority among themselves, changing the pattern of the organization. Friendship among them spread from business to social relationships off the job.

Manufacturing Sub-System

Session two was attended by the six top administrators from the Weldon plant, but not the former owner-manager who by this time had become inactive in the daily affairs of the plant. The administrators focused on the plant manager, who as a result of this session, changed his behavior in the plant in a way satisfactory to himself and his staff. Another result of this session was the beginning of positive relationships with the New York office.

Merchandising and Manufacturing Together

Session three was attended jointly by administrators from manufacturing and merchandising. According to the consultant, the

session resulted in better communication, some openness and trust, and a detailed plan for improving cooperation.

Later sessions, not family groups, were held for groups of supervisors, assistant supervisors, and senior staff members, until all staff were covered. According to the consultant, evaluations of all sessions in the series were favorable.

The consultant for the training sessions described some instances of transfer of training to on-the-job situations in the plant. In response to interdepartmental quarrels, the plant manager initiated a series of staff meetings modeled on the training sessions. Differences were talked out, and some solutions tried. Meetings were initiated between operator trainers and their trainees; frustrations were reduced. Overproduction of merchandise was confonted in a meeting with top management in which plant staff acknowledged their limitations and requested assistance from top management. This degree of openness was previously unknown.

Operator Training Program

A vestibule training area was set up where new operators would be trained under the same conditions as the production line except for pace and interruptions for demonstrations. Trainers were drawn from the staff, and instructed in teaching methods. After four weeks in the vestibule area, operators moved to the production line with the machine on which they were trained. As well, selection tests were introduced, efforts were made to pre-determine the number of

trainees needed in each department, and provisions were made for re-training low performing operators.

With considerable skepticism among some supervisors, the program was initiated, and positive effects became quickly apparent. Within four months:

1. labor turnover decreased from 90% to 50%
2. speed of learning increased from 89% of standard to 105%
3. training costs were reduced from $1,650 per trainee to $703 [p. 92-93].

Earnings Development Program

The operator earnings program was initiated to raise low operator income. First the consulting engineer made a three or four hour production study of the operator to estimate her performance potential. He and her supervisor then sat with the operator for three or four hours while the engineer taught the operator more effective work methods and encouraged her. Often meetings of these three were held to discuss how the operator could increase her output and earnings. In this way, supervisors were trained in assisting operators to improve their performance.

Familiar with the tasks and equipment of garment making, and lacking in knowledge of the principles and methods of controlling work flow, the supervisors reacted to the engineers stoically at first. They carried out his advice, even if they disagreed with it. As success was demonstrated, the supervisors began to seek out the engineers for assistance. Gradually the need for help diminished.

The operators' response to this program was, according to the consultants, generally good from the start. By the end of 1963, the majority of employees felt that management wanted them to improve their production, and would help them get their earnings up.

Problem Solving Meetings

Shortly after the sensitivity training sessions for plant supervisors were completed, problem solving meetings between supervisors and operators began. In this program, work groups met in two one hour sessions, approximately two weeks apart. In the first meeting, the production manager, the personnel manager, and the two production assistants met with the consultant, floor supervisor and a group of operators. They outlined their ideas about participation and discussion of work problems, supported the program, and left. The consultant and floor supervisor then asked the operators to give their ideas for improving operations. These ideas were recorded and posted on the walls. When the next group entered the room, they started by reviewing the suggestions of the previous group. In the second meeting, the group sorted out the more practical suggestions, and discussed conflict-laden issues. Out of this meeting came a list of problems which became the basis for follow-up investigations.

As a result of these meetings, employee morale improved. As one operator said:

> What a welcome change. This is something Weldon
> never did before. You have a chance to tell them
> what you think, and you feel you're a part of the
> company [p. 121].

Supervisors began to spend more time following up on problems, and delegated more responsibility to their assistants. One supervisor commented:

> I began to think about the problems my unit faced and I began to come up with answers. I amazed even myself, because there was never any time before to do anything but go from one crisis in the sewing room to another [p. 122].

According to the consultant, one example of the way this approach was transferred to daily operations occured when an inventory imbalance made a cutback in production necessary. The final decision, to reduce the work load for all employees, was mutually agreed on as the most equitable solution by the plant manager and the operators.

In the eyes of the plant manager, the problem solving meetings were a painful process to people unused to frequent contact with the high levels of the organization. As well, the program put very heavy demands on the staff physically and emotionally. Fifteen hour days with week-end and take-home work were common. In the face of this, many were surprised at the interest in the "experiment [p. 137]" of trying to change Weldon, and the ease of getting positive results.

Period of Slower Change

The acceptance of the union in November 1963 marked the beginning of a slower period of consolidation for Weldon. During the following year, the change-over to the unit system of production was completed; the attitude surveys and feedback sessions were completed, and the problem solving meetings continued. In December 1964 when the outside consultants left, the change program officially ended.

After Change

At the end of 1964, the team of consultants from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan reported their findings on the effects of the change program at Weldon. In mid 1969, two consultants returned to Weldon to make further assessment of the long term results of the change program. For discussion purposes, the findings will be generally grouped into three broad categories: 1) performance and production changes, 2) leadership changes, and 3) interpersonal relations changes.

Performance and Production

Employee age, experience and stability. During the span of the formal change program, the employees age and level of experience increased. By 1964, very few employees were under 25, or had less than two years of experience. As well as this change, there was a change in attitude toward staying with the company (p. 198). See figure 50.

	1962	1964	1969
Plan to stay indefinitely	72%	87%	66%

Figure 50. Attitude Toward Staying with Weldon

The desire to remain with the plant was accompanied by a lowering of absenteeism and turnover (p. 147). See figure 51.

	1962	1964
Absentee Rate (per day)	6%	3%
Turnover Rate (per month)	10%	4%

Figure 51. Absentee and Turnover Rate at Weldon

Operator performance. During the change program, there was a substantial rise in operators' performance and operators' earnings (p. 147). See figure 52.

	1962	1964	1969
Operator Performance	89%	114%	?
Operator Earnings above minimum – incentive employees	none	16%	sustained at a relatively high level

Figure 52. Operator Performance and Earnings at Weldon

After extensive analysis, the consultants concluded that the following four elements in the change program, in this order, were the prime cases for the above changes:

1. earnings development program
2. weeding out of low earners in 1963, and training of supervisors and staff in interpersonal relations
3. group consultation and problem solving meetings
4. miscellaneous sources, or the combination of several sources [p. 181-182].

Efficiency of production. Over the period of the change program, production and profits rose, and continued to rise through 1969 (. 147). See figure 53.

	1962	1964
Production Efficiency	-11%	+14%
Return of Capital Invested	-15%	+17%

Figure 53. Production and Profit at Weldon

According to the consultants after their 1969 visit to Weldon, "during the period since 1964, there have been substantial gains in efficiency and volume for the factory as a whole".

Leadership

Supervisors. The consultants divided leadership generally into 1) "supportive" and 2) "goal setting" or "work facilitating". The conclusions about the change in leadership styles practiced by supervisors as experienced by employees, during the change program, are summarized in figure 54 (p. 209).

	1962	1964	1969
Supervisors' Supportiveness	remained constant relatively high		rose
Supervisors' Goal Emphasis and work facilitation	38%	27%	47%

Figure 54. Leadership Styles of Supervisors at Weldon

The consultants state that while the amount of task oriented leadership provided by the supervisors to the operators dropped substantially

during the change program, the task oriented leadership provided by the supervisors to their assistant supervisors was relatively high during the same period.

According to the operators, when the supervisors changed to less close supervision and gave less exclusive emphasis to productivity, they became 'less good at dealing with people [p. 208].' This was accompanied by a drop in satisfaction with supervisors which remained constant to 1969. After the change program, the employees' task orientation increased greatly (p. 208). See figure 55 below.

	1962	1964	1969
Peers approve of high producers	58%	58%	66%
Desired closeness of supervision	57%	52%	64%
Satisfaction with supervisors	64%	54%	54%

Figure 55. Task Orientation and Attitude toward Supervisors of Weldon Operators

Organization. One of the goals of the new owners was to transform Weldom into a system four organization with a completely participative management system. According to the employees, the control structure at Weldon did not change much during the change program. The influence of the higher people diminished slightly, but the changes were not statistically significant. However, trends toward

system four began to appear. There was a general agreement that before change Weldon fell at the border line between Likert's (1961) system one, exploitive-authoritarian, and system two, benevolent-authoritarian management systems. Ratings in 1964 showed that Weldon had shifted to system three, a consultative management system. In 1969, there was a small change "of modest degree" which brought Weldon still closer to system four.

According to the plant manager at Weldon, some who felt at home in the old system found it very difficult to change. As of this writing, one senior member of management had left. To a majority, the strenuous, if not painful change, "has meant a good adjustment to their work for the first time, and they derive a good deal of satisfaction from it".

Interpersonal Relations

	1962	1964	1969
Like fellow employees	85%	86%	85%
Group Cohesiveness	25%	25%	30%

Figure 56. Personal Relationships at Weldon

In general, attitudes toward the company moved from neutral to slightly more positive [p. 189]; attitudes toward the job remained quite positive [p. 189], and attitudes toward fellow employees remained quite positive [p. 197].

<u>Analysis of Case Five</u>

Before Change

I've passed a law that everyone should be happy.
                    Eugene O'Neill,
                    <u>Marco Millions</u>

<u>The Leaders: Original Owner-Managers</u>

Weldon's original owner-managers practiced an almost exclusively high task leadership style. They organized the roles of all their administrators; they directed when, where and how all activities were to be carried out; they set up the pattern of organization in two separate hierarchies, and they formalized the channels of communication -- one way, downward, with almost no horizontal communication between them, or their two divisions. Not only did they not engage in inter-personal communications, their policy was to deliberately maintain secrecy about all of their decisions. For example, the sale of Weldon to Harwood came as a complete surprise to all but a very few top executives. Along with their policy of secrecy went a spy system, in which certain of their subordinates "reported confidentially [p. 9]" to them any deviations from their orders. The effects of this created animosity, fear, hostility and frustration among management.

Insofar as relationships behavior is concerned, these two leaders appeared to adopt a style devoid of personal relationships. They established no personal relationships with their executives, save,

one might suppose, that between themselves and their relatives whom they had placed in positions of authority. They appeared to give no socioemotional support, or psychological strokes. Subordinates heard from them only when they had done a bad job. This behavior, practiced on overworked executives and administrators who were many times required to spend evenings and week-ends on the job, was demoralizing. Finally, the owners intimidated and threatened the largely female work force, for over thirty years, to prevent unionization. As the ACWA said, their methods of playing on worker fears were the worst the union had encountered in the Pennsylvania area. The hourly workers, therefore, lived in a perpetual state of job insecurity.

According to Life Cycle Theory, each of the four basic leadership styles can range from extremely effective (+4) to extremely ineffective (-1). In this case, the owners' leadership style would fall close to the ineffective extreme of the continuum, in a quadrant one high task and low relationship style. Hersey and Blanchard (1972) state that an ineffective quadrant one leader is seen by subordinates as having no confidence in others, unpleasant, and interested only in short run output.

The Followers: Managerial Staff

For discussion, the followers referred to will be the personnel in manufacturing, and will be divided into two groups: 1) executives, administrators, department heads, supervisors, and assistant supervisors, and 2) hourly workers or operators. This section, will focus on group one.

Task relevant experience. As a group, the Weldon managers were highly knowledgeable in the details of making garmets, the styles, the manufacturing process, the plant's problems, and its equipment. Thus their level of technical competence was high. As policy makers, the managers' task relevant experience was low, for they were actively discouraged from making suggestions or giving ideas for improvements, and deliberately kept uninformed about costs, policy decisions, and what was happening in merchandising.

Willingness and ability to take responsibility. Considering the conditions under which management worked, their willingness to take responsibility was surprisingly high. Although there was only one supervisor to 155 workers, orders were always produced. The production manager literally ran through the sewing rooms all day giving orders and checking on them, to make sure production quotas were met. According to the Harwood vice-president, considering they (the managers) were terribly overworked, bogged down in detail, and not given the information needed to understand supervisory responsibilities, their performance was better than might have been expected.

That their ability to take responsibility was greater than they were allowed, was evidenced by their frustration. Each level of management checked the work of the one below it, often unnecessarily reversing decisions that had been made. As managers and supervisors were frustrated by their inability to deal directly with matters within their personal competence, their anger, worry and confusion increased.

Achievement motivation. According to McClelland's (1961, 1965, 1972, 1974) theory, Weldon's management were moderately high in achieve-

ment motivation. These managers took moderate, calculated risks; in order to get merchandise produced on time, they would use any methods they could. In their situation, they felt production depended on their skills and abilities, and were frustrated they could not exercise them more. They constantly had to meet the challenge of ever changing orders for different items. Their creativity was stretched in finding ways to meet demands in a chaotic factory. It is difficult to assess their attitude toward the probability of their being successful in their job. It seems likely that by the time of purchase, confidence was at a low ebb. Long range goals were not made by the managers; goals were set by the owners, who, if they had them, kept them to themselves. Managers' goals were, by and large, to meet the demands of the season, while supervisors concentrated on meeting quota demands each day. Feedback to the managers was constant; quotas were met or they were not met; customers were pleased, or they were not. The managers always knew how well they were doing, though usually they heard about their mistakes rather than their successes.

To summarize, those factors characteristic of high achievement motivation were: risks were calculated, personal efforts were important in outcomes, challenges were constant, and feedback was immediate and constant. Those factors characteristic of low achievement motivation were: their attitude of confidence was low and they did not plan ahead.

Maturity Level. From the above, in terms of Life Cycle Theory, management's "maturity" level, as managers, at the time of purchase,

would be low average. (See figure 57). With this "maturity" level,
the initial leadership style appropriate for management at the time of
purchase would be quadrant two, high task and high relationships.

As previously discussed, the owners practiced an ineffective
quadrant one high task and low relationships leadership style. Accord-
ing to Life Cycle Theory, this style would be inappropriate to manage-
ment's "maturity" level. The frustration, hostility and breakdown at
Weldon attest to the inappropriateness and ultimate ineffectiveness of
the owner's leadership style.

Why was the Owners' Leadership Style Unsuccessful?

The question may be asked, why, if the owners' leadership style
was inappropriate, did Weldon succeed for over thirty years? To answer
this, let us first consider the Weldon organization. The garment
industry operates by seasons, at the mercy of fashion dictates. As a
manufacturer of quality garments, Weldon operated under the stress of
seasonal style changes and special orders from prestigious stores. The
primary orientation of each department in manufacturing was towards
task. Time pressures were intense; every eight hour shift, certain
orders had to be produced. Customers were always waiting. While each
operator had a clear independent task, high coordination of production
was required to produce the finished item under time pressure. In
order to produce large amounts of merchandise within short time spans,
high cooperation and coordination between the departments within
manufacturing, and between manufacturing and merchandising was needed.

Figure 57. Weldon Management's Maturity Level at Purchase

During Weldon's beginnings, when all manufacturing operations were located under one roof, and all merchandising operations were in one New York office, the partner-owners could personally control all the activities in their building. In this situation, it would be possible for them to personally sign every order. Through close supervision they could keep production going even though coordination and cooperation was poor. However, when Weldon expanded to five plants in the mid-fifties, the owners could no longer personally direct all operations. Like the frog who tried to swallow the pond, they drove themselves and their staff to exhaustion and ulcers trying.

Another question logically occurs: if the owners were successful at the beginning when Weldon was one factory, why were they not successful when Weldon shrank its operations back to one plant and 1000 employees? By 1959 Weldon's leadership had created hostility among the staff, fear among its workers, and bad will in the public. In addition, in the early fifties, the owners had made two costly business errors. The reasons for the owners' decision to enter the two unsuccessful ventures were never explained; however, had they consulted their executives, they might have been prevented from making these mistakes. With a great loss of capital, the owners had not kept up with technological changes. Unable and apparently unwilling to put money into equipment, they now operated with outdated machines. At this point, Weldon was caught in a downward spiral.

The Followers: Hourly Workers

The hourly workers at the time of purchase were, as a group,

below average in "maturity". Because of Weldon's practice of taking on operators before peak periods, and firing them immediately afterward, Weldon had come to be regarded as a place of seasonal employment. Workers would leave as soon as they could find other jobs. The workers' view was summarized by a taxi driver:

It's a sweat shop. They work you like crazy for a couple of weeks and then throw you out [p. 114].

Turnover and absenteeism were very high. At the time of purchase, half of the employees were planning to quit. In the four months after purchase, turnover was 90%. The absentee rate of 12% per day ran double that in the industry. Workers operated in an atmosphere of job insecurity, increased by top management's anti-union intimidation and threats.

In this situation, achievement motivation was low. Even though two thirds of the largely women workers were older and experienced, with a core of highly skilled workers, ability to take responsibility was generally low. Experienced senior operators kept the "best" and easiest jobs. Because of the chaotic production system, an operator often had seven to nine job changes in an eight hour shift, preventing skill development for new operators.

Thus the general level of skill in the sewing room was below industry strandards, and earnings for a great number of operators were at minimum or below. With no fringe benefits, no opportuniies to gain skills to make more money, willingness to take responsibility was generally low. Thus, according to Life Cycle Theory, the hourly workers "maturity" level at the time of purchase was low. (See figure 58).

Figure 58. Maturity Level of Hourly Workers at Time of Purchase

As such, the appropriate leadership style for the hourly employees at purchase would be quadrant one, high task and low relationships. (See figure 58). This was, in fact, the leadership style attempted by management, but to no avail. With one supervisor to 155 workers, there were simply not enough managerial staff to go around. In addition, the supervisory staff were given no opportunity to actually supervise; the plant manager retained the authority and control in the plant. This resulted in the plant manager giving most of the task leadership, and bearing most of the managerial responsibility in the plant. Hence the hourly workers lacked the direction and assistance they needed.

We note at this point, that in spite of their condition, the interpersonal relations among the hourly employees was good: 85% liked their fellow employees. 64% were satisfied with their supervisor.

Situation At Purchase

The following diagram illustrates the situation and motivation level of each of the levels of the hierarchy of the Weldon manufacturing division at purchase.

During Change

A boss who is considerate tends to have foremen
who believe and behave the same way.
Fleishman & Harris

New Leaders: The Harwood Owners

According to Life Cycle Theory, the new owners, after an initial assessment period, adopted a quadrant two high task and high relation-

MOTIVATION LEVEL

SITUATION AT PURCHASE

Two Owner Managers

all authority and control
very little horizontal communication
all communication downward

Executives
Department Heads

no job security (except for relatives)
very little authority and control
very poor impersonal relations
very poor communications

Supervisors

Assistant Supervisors

Hourly Workers

no job security
no fringe benefits
high turnover and absenteeism
low earnings
poor job training
outdated machines
average skill level overall
good interpersonal relations

Security

Security

Security

Psychological

Figure 59. Situation at Weldon Before Change

ships style at the beginning of the change program. Toward the middle
of the program they and their consultants adopted a quadrant three
high relationships and low task style. Toward the end of the change
program, they attempted a quadrant four low task and low relationships
leadership style, but found it to be premature. At the end of the
change program, they remained for the most part, in a quadrant three
style.

        Initial leadership style: quadrant two. The initial high task,
high relationships approach of Harwood was reflected in the decision to
implement a change program at Weldon. As the Harwood chairman of the
board Alfred Marrow stated, the Harwood executives independently
planned the goals of the program aimed at participative change, and
"imposed [p. 65]" it on Weldon. High relationships was shown from the
time of purchase, when the Harwood owners made statements of their
participative philosophy at Weldon, assured employees that the
operation would continue, and that no one would be fired.

        Quadrant two style was also shown in the technical changes at
Weldon. The change over to the unit system of production was decided
upon by Harwood, and implemented by their consulting engineers. How-
ever, these technical and physical changes were accompanied by
supervisor and manager staff meetings, where those present tried to
open channels of communications, share problem solving, and better
interpersonal relations.

        In like manner, Harwood owners saw that changes in personnel
policy were needed. They hired a personnel manager, and consultants

to bring about personnel policy changes. But rather than impose these policy changes on supervisors and workers, the consultants and personnel manager gathered evidence to convince the supervisory staff of the need for these changes, emphasizing joint decision making, the opening of communications, and facilitating behaviors.

The management training program was decided upon by Harwood, and attendance was mandatory. Yet the focus of the sessions was divided between practical problems and emotional issues affecting personal relationships.

In every facet of the change program, the Harwood owners continued to attend to task and relationships. The operator training program was instituted by Harwood; throughout the engineers encouraged the operators and supervisors, who were eventually won over by the demonstrations of success. So too the earnings development program, initiated by Harwood amid initial skepticism by supervisors. As earnings rose, operators gained in confidence, morale improved, and supervisors were convinced of the program's benefits.

The problem solving meetings between supervisors and operators, again initiated by Harwood, focused on problems in the plant and areas of interpersonal conflict between staff and workers. After the higher management personnel introduced and supported the meeting, they left, leaving it in the hands of the supervisors and consultant. In this way, supervisory authority was built up. Again, there was an emphasis in these meetings on both task and relationships.

As previously discussed, the appropriate leadership style for management at the time of purchase was quadrant two, high task and high

relationships. Thus the new owners initial leadership style was appropriate to management's "maturity" level at the time of purchase. It is interesting to note here that whereas Crockett attempted to use a coercive change strategy to bring about a participative system in the State Department case, and failed; here, the Harwood owners used a coercive change strategy for the same ends, and succeeded.

Some differences that might account for this are:

1. While Crockett's leadership style was diagnosed as being inappropriate to his staff's "maturity" level, the Harwood owners leadership style was diagnosed as being appropriate to their staff's "maturity" level.

2. Crockett had begun by making a structural change in his organization which raised anger, hostility and fear among his staff. The Harwood owners had begun with an extensive program of technical changes which had been implemented with success, and raised worker morale.

Later leadership style: quadrant three. When changes were well underway, the Harwood owners and their representatives began to practice a quadrant three high relationships and low task style. In the earnings development program, once operators had received instruction, the consulting engineers stepped back and let the supervisors take over the instruction and support function. As success became apparent, the initially skeptical supervisors would seek out the engineers for advice and guidance.

In the problem solving meetings, the consultant was able to take a back seat in the room and let the superior conduct the meetings. The consultant was present for support and advice if asked.

Thus as supervisory staff and managers gained expertise and bettered interpersonal relations, the consulting staff and managers gradually withdrew.

<u>An attempt at quadrant four</u>. Top management unsuccessfully attempted to adopt a quadrant four low task and low relationships leadership style late in the change program. When they left the production of the fall line entirely in the hands of the Weldon staff, they were warned that things were not going well. Indeed, the result was overproduction of unordered merchandise. In a meeting with top management, requested by the Weldon staff, the staff acknowledged they were not ready for complete responsibility and asked for help from top management. Though the quadrant four attempt was premature, the benefits of the change program were apparent in the meeting.

By the end of the change program, the Harwood leaders had progressed to a quadrant three high relationships and low task leadership style, with brief uses of quadrant two when help was requested.

The Followers: Managerial Staff

By the end of the change program, management "maturity" had risen. Because of the more equal distribution of authority and control, achievement motivation and willingness to take responsibility had increased. Through management training sessions and the earnings development program, managers and supervisors had increased their managerial competence. Their ability to take responsibility was rising. Through the training sessions, and with the former owner-managers gone,

morale had improved and interpersonal relations were better. In fact, greatest progress in improvement of interpersonal relations was made among the managerial staff. Thus by the end of the change program, Harwood leaders had brought the Weldon management to a position of high average "maturity". (See figure 60).

The Followers: Hourly Workers

As a result of the earnings development program, the operator training program, the problem solving meetings, the unit system of production, and unionization, operator skills, earnings, proficiency, hygiene factors, and fringe benefits increased. This was reflected in a lower rate of turnover (see figure 51) and absenteeism (see figure 51), a rise in production efficiency (see figure 53), and a rise in profits (see figure 53). Worker "maturity" gradually rose.

Leadership, which used to come from the plant manager, now came from several sources: the supervisors, assistant supervisors, and consultants. Generally speaking, the leadership style adopted during the change program by supervisory staff was quadrant two; high task and high relationships. This style was typified by the consulting engineers in the earnings development program, who would sit for hours with the operator, instructing her in skills and offering constant support and encouragement. The engineer modeled this leadership style to the supervisor who was constantly present during instruction, and who ultimately took over.

According to figure 54, task oriented leadership on the part of supervisors dropped during the change program, while their supportive

High Relation-
ships
Low Task

High Task
High Relation-
ships

above
average

average

below
average

Maturity
Continuum

Management
maturity at
end of change
program

Management
maturity at
beginning of
change program

Figure 60. Leadership Styles of Harwood Owners
            and Representatives at Beginning and
            End of Change Program

leadership behavior remained relatively high. The supervisors attend-
ing more to unit problems, delegated authority to their assistants,
who gradually took over their role with the operators. However, the
operators did not perceive this new behavior on the part of their
supervisors as a quadrant three high relationships style. According
to the consultant's measures, satisfaction with supervisors dropped and
remained at a lowered level through 1969. Workers also thought
supervisors became "less good with people [p. 208." It appeared to be
a case of 'out of sight, out of mind'.

By 1969, five years after the change program, supervisors' task
oriented leadership behavior had risen to its highest level ever; higher
that it had been at the beginning of the change program. (See figure 54).
Apparently, according to the consultants, worker turnover had again risen
in 1969, causing an influx of new employees. Hersey and Blanchard (1972)
suggest that a leader may have to move back through the cycle, to a
leadership style he or she previously used, in order to meet the ever
changing demands upon the people for whom he or she is responsible. In
this "project cycle", when the temporary needs of a person or group have
been met, the leader can return to his or her usual style. In this
situation, the supervisors had to return to a quadrant two style in order
to train the new employees. When the new employees had gained competence
and skills, the supervisors could return to their quadrant three style.
This raises an interesting question of whether, in a manufacturing situa-
tion where worker turnover is constant, supervisors can ever progress to
a quadrant four style, or whether they will arrive at a quadrant three
style, and then move between quadrant two and quadrant three.

After Change

> We should really begin working with leadership
> attitudes <u>at the top</u> so that a favorable leader-
> ship climate will spread down....Certainly it
> will not spread up in the industrial organization.
> Fleishman & Harris

The following diagram illustrates the focus on the change

program, what was done for each level of the manufacturing division of

Weldon, and the motivation or need level that group was likely operating

on at the end of the change program.

Summary

Why The Weldon Change Program Succeeded

1. The initial high task and high relationships
   leadership style of the new owners was
   appropriate to the initial "average maturity"
   level of the Weldon managerial staff. The new
   owners had flexibility in their leadership
   style which allowed them to shift to a high
   relationships and low task style as the
   "maturity" level of the Weldon managerial
   staff increased.

2. The new owners began with an extensive series
   of technical changes in the plant and corres-
   ponding training programs for operators. This
   raised both productivity and plant morale. It
   also allowed supervisors and managers to devote
   time to administration.

3. After the technical changes were well underway,
   management training programs for top management
   began followed in turn by training in problem-
   solving at each level of the plant's organiza-
   tion down to supervisors and operators. Thus
   changes in management style at each level were
   prepared for and supported by the level above.

SITUATION AFTER CHANGE

MOTIVATION LEVEL

Esteem
Self-
Actualization

Esteem
Affiliation
(Security)

Security
Affiliation

productive division
successful experiment in organization
development

management training
more authority and control
better interpersonal relations
(job security)

skill development
technical improvements
fringe benefits
increased earnings
job security

Harwood
Owners

Executives
Department Heads

Supervisors
Administrators

Assistant Supervisors

Hourly Workers

Figure 61. Results of Change Program at Weldon

In the words of those directly involved in evaluating the change at
Weldon, it succeeded because "a multiplicity of varied change
strategies and methods were employed [p. 233]," and because "there was
unusual scope and coherence in the program of change [p. 233]."

C H A P T E R   VII

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of the Study

This study has attempted to answer the question, "How useful is
the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method for determining the most
appropriate leadership style in any given organizational situation"?

Life Cycle Theory postulates that high task and low relation-
ships leader behavior (quadrant one) is appropriate for working with
people of below average "maturity", and has the best probability of
success. As the followers progress from below average to average
"maturity", a leader's behavior should move in turn through high task
and high relationships (quadrant two) to high relationships and low
task (quadrant three). With people of above average "maturity", a
leadership style of low task and low relationships (quadrant four) has
the highest probability of success.

Five cases of organizational change, acknowledged as successes
or failures by their writers, were selected for study. In the un-
successful cases of change, the objectives of the change program were
not achieved; in the successful cases the objectives, to a large extent,
were achieved.

Three cases contained accounts of change programs that had
failed. These were: "Creating An Open School", "Change in a Newspaper"
and "Change in the State Department". The attempt to create an open

school was not successful. At the end of the first year, classrooms became self-contained; all but eight teachers left the school; the superintendent went on leave of absence and resigned afterwards, and the curriculum director quit. The principal resigned during the first semester of the second year, and the school became traditional. The three-year attempt to bring about a participative management system in a newspaper also failed. Argyris was not asked back. The authoritarian management of the newspaper system continued as before. At the end of the first attempt to reorganize the State Department, the chief executive in charge of the change program resigned because of active resistance; the consultants he had hired were fired by his successor. His successor restored the organizational structure to its previous highly bureaucratic condition.

Three cases contained accounts of change programs that succeeded. These were: "Change in the State Department", "Change in an Automobile Plant" and "Change in the Garment Industry". As a result of the second and this time successful attempt to change the State Department, 500 recommendations for change were submitted by the employees; 400 were accepted; 75% were implemented; praise for the program was given by the Secretary of State, and employee morale was raised to a high level. After Cooley's period of leadership in the automobile assembly plant, the plant became the best in the division. Absenteeism, grievances, turnover and complaints from dealers dropped to a low level; profits, productivity and morale rose to a high level; other plants requested staff from that plant, and plant management operated collaboratively. After Harwood's two year program to change Weldon to a profit-making

division with a participative system of management, profits, productivity and management morale rose; turnover and absenteeism dropped, and the organization moved from one rated as borderline between systems one and two on Likert's [1961] scale to one rated in system three.

Each of these cases was first described and then analyzed according to a theoretical framework. The framework contained all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory and variables from other situational leadership theories.

Emergent Issues

Out of the analyses of these cases, several issues emerged for this writer.

1. The usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method.

2. The patterns of leadership revealed in the successful and unsuccessful change efforts.

3. The relationship between technical change and human systems change in successful change programs.

4. The casualty rate of outside consultants in organizational change programs and the predominant use of the T-group, human relations approach to organizational change.

5. The relationship of organizational crisis to organizational change.

The Life Cycle Theory as a Diagnostic Method

Leader Behavior

The analytic framework used to analyze the cases in this study contained all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory. The leadership style of the key leaders in each case was analyzed according to the LCT

variables of task and relationships behavior. In order to analyze the leader's style, all recorded evidences in the case of the leader's behavior were extracted and placed in one of these two categories. Leader behavior which, to this writer, showed the leader developing personal relationships between him or herself and group members, giving socioemotional support and psychological strokes, and engaging in inter-personal communications and in facilitating behavior, was placed in the category of leader relationships. Leader behavior which, to this writer, showed the leader organizing and defining roles of individuals and group members, explaining what activities to do, when, where, and how, and endeavoring to formalize channels of communication, was placed in the category of leader task behavior.

This Classification process was limited by the amount of informa-tion on the leader's behavior available in each case; this depended on what information about the leader's behavior the author of the particular case had chosen to include. In some cases this factor assumed more importance than in others. One of the consultants involved in Crockett's reorganization of the State Department expressed great disapproval of Marrow's account of the reorganization which he (consultant) considered extremely biased and limited. [Seashore, 1975]. He thus felt that this writer's analysis must necessarily suffer, being based on a partial account.

The classification process was therefore subject to two interpretations; 1) the information that the author of each case had chosen to include, and 2) the interpretation of that information by

this writer. Both conditions apply throughout the analyses of each case.

In spite of these two limitations, classification of the leader's behavior did not present difficulty to this writer. After categorizing the available information under task and relationships behaviors, a general tendency toward one category or other generally emerged, at least clearly enough to make a conclusion about the leadership style in question.

Followers' "Maturity" Level

Harder to classify, however, was the followers' "maturity" level. In order to analyze follower "maturity" with respect to a given task, the followers behavior was categorized under the four "maturity" variables of the LCT: 1) achievement motivation; 2) willingness to take responsibility; 3) ability to take responsibility; 4) task relevant education and/or experience.

In order to ascertain achievement motivation, McClelland's (1961, 1965, 1966, 1974) characteristics of the achievement motivated person were used as category headings. These included: 1) the tendency to take moderately difficult but potentially achievable risks; 2) the preference for non-routine jobs; 3) the tendency to have a positive, even over-confident attitude toward being successful; 4) the tendency to think ahead; 5) the tendency to work harder only when there is a chance that personal efforts will make a difference in the outcome; 6) a preference for constant feedback on how well one is doing; 7) a tendency not to be motivated by money alone. All follower behaviors

which, to this writer, corresponded to one or other of these characteristics were appropriately accounted for within the "maturity" dimension. At this point, the writer had to make a personal judgment on how many characteristics must be fulfilled in order to label the followers as "achievement motivated". A general rule of thumb which this writer adopted was that one to two of the above characteristics, if satisfied, would indicate low achievement motivation, three to five would indicate moderate achievement motivation, and if six or seven were satisfied, then high achievement motivation would be recorded. Using this method, it was not too difficult to analyze the respective level of achievement motivation of the followers in each case. Two limitations, however, preceded each analysis: 1) the information about the followers that each author chose to address, and 2) the classification of McClelland's achievement motivation theory adapted by this writer as outlined above.

With respect to the other three variables of "maturity": willingness to take responsibility, ability to take responsibility, and task relevant education and/or experience, the writer had to make entirely subjective decisions. These variables have not been operationally defined to the extent of the achievement motivation variable. One of the difficulties seemed to be that, at times, the "maturity" variables did not necessarily appear mutually exclusive, while on other occasions, discrepancies began to surface. This being the case, the writer had to decide upon the following questions: What behavior(s) indicates willingness to take responsibility? What indicates ability to take responsibility? What behaviors and other

types of information such as job qualifications, standards, and productivity results, would indicate that the followers had or had not the education or experience to carry out the job at hand? Therefore, in analyzing these three variables, the writer had to rely mostly upon subjective interpretation.

After the follower behavior had been classified and analyzed according to the above four variables, an overall assessment of the followers' level of "maturity" had to be made. In fact, the four assessments had to be reduced to one general judgment of the "maturity" of the followers. Here the writer met another problem. How was the final assessment to be arrived at? Was it simply a question of finding the average of the four assessments? Was there one variable that held more importance than the others? Should the interpreter follow the one or two variables that gave more reliable data? Whatever the slot, (above average, average, below average) that the maturity of the followers finally entered, some important considerations were apparently ignored.

Frequently this writer found a wide discrepancy between the four "maturity" characteristics. Often, for example, followers were high in ability to take responsibility but apparently low in their willingness to do so. Occasionally they were high in task-relevant education and/or experience while low in willingness. Several questions arose at this point. What causes people who are educated, experienced, and able, to be unwilling to accomplish the task? What causes educated, capable, and highly motivated people to sink in their achievement motivation? Merely averaging out the four variables seemed to ignore

the weight of importance attached to different variables. Also, the weight of importance of each variable appeared to be different in different cases and situations. Thus, rather than merely average out mechanically the assessment of the followers' level in each of the four "maturity" variables, this writer combined the four assessments, while attempting to acknowledge the importance of different variables in different cases. In short, the analysis of the follower's "maturity" level in each case was subject to a great deal of subjective interpretation on the part of this writer. Added to this, it should be noted that case studies limit the accuracy of analysis because they usually do not record sufficient or detailed data and, as such, deny the objectivity and first-hand data available to the participant observer or field researcher.

Recommendations for Future Study for the LCT

The "maturity" dimension within the LCT undoubtedly needs a clearer definition. (Currently a research project on this area is underway). Up until the present there has been a gap between the conceptual and operational definitions of the "maturity" variables of willingness and ability to take responsibility and task relevant education and/or experience. For the most part, analysis of these variables is dependent upon the subjective interpretation of the diagnostician, an interpretation which in turn depends upon the competence and skill of the practitioner as well as the degree and availability of relevant data.

While the "maturity" variables are differentiated within the
LCT, they are not entirely distinct measures of task maturity. There is
much overlapping. Ability to take responsibility seems far removed
from willingness to do the same, yet task relevant education and/or
experience appears to correspond highly with ability.

Task relevant education and ability appear to depend on
technical and intellectual factors, while willingness and achievement
motivation appear to depend on these plus emotive factors. One question
that arises here is: what influence does the emotional climate, the
interpersonal relationships among followers, have on their achievement
motivation and willingness to do a job? In other words, what influence
does the relationships among followers, presently not incorporated into
the LCT, have on their "maturity" level? It would seem that while
there is a task-relevant maturity, there is also a relationships-
relevant maturity, and that both of these will influence productivity.

Patterns of Leadership in Successful and Unsuccessful
Change Efforts

In cases describing successful change programs, the leadership
style showed flexibility; leaders of successful change programs were
able to adopt styles of both high task and high relationships, as the
situation demanded. (See figure 62).

When he changed the systems of the automobile assembly plant,
plant manager Cooley progressed through an initial quadrant two style
to quadrant three finally ending in quadrant four. (See figure 62).
When Harwood took over Weldon, the new Harwood owners and their

representatives began their change program using a quadrant two style
and progressed to a quadrant three style by the end of the change
program. They were still working toward their ultimate goal to turn
over management to Weldon staff, and adopt for themselves a quadrant
four style of leadership. (See figure 62). In bringing about change
in the State Dept., deputy undersecretary Macomber began by practicing
a quadrant two style, progressd to a quadrant three style and ended
using a quadrant four style. (See figure 62). In each of these cases
the change program was successful.

In these cases, too, the level of the followers' "maturity" was
assessed as average. The former plant manager of the automobile
assembly plant, the former owner-managers of the Weldon plant, and
deputy undersecretary Rimestad had all used an exclusively quadrant one
style. (See figure 62). Under these leaders, each of the organizations
reached a crisis point. These leadership profiles are in accord with
the Life Cycle Theory hypothesis that while a quadrant one style has
the best chance of success with followers of below average "maturity"
quadrant two and three styles have the best probability of success with
followers of average "maturity".

In the cases of unsuccessful change, the leader's styles
vacillated between quadrant one and quadrant four. Deputy undersecretary
Crockett practised a basic high task and low relationships style, with
a secondary style of quadrant four. (See figure 63). So too, the
president of the newspaper, and principal Shelby practices a pre-
dominantly quadrant one style. (See figure 63). Each of these leaders

SUCCESSFUL CHANGE PROGRAMS

	Before:	Situation	After
Automobile Assembly Plant	Former Plant Manager	.Inadequate technical-organizational system .Production efficiency worst in division .Followers - average "maturity" .At crisis point	Plant Manager Cooley
Garment Factory	Former Management	.Inadequate technical-organizational system .Near bankruptcy .Followers - average "maturity" .At crisis point	New Management
U.S. State Department	Deputy Undersecretary Rimestad	.Inadequate technical-organizational system .Followers - average "maturity" .Change demanded - within and without	Deputy Undersecretary Macomber

Figure 62. Leadership Profiles of Three Successful Cases

UNSUCCESSFUL CHANGE PROGRAMS

|	Before:	Situation	After
U.S. State Department		.Inadequate technical-organizational system .Followers - average "maturity" .Change demanded from without only No crisis	
	Deputy Undersecretary Crockett		Deputy Undersecretary Rimestad
Newspaper		.Adequate technical-organizational system .Followers - below average "maturity" .No crisis	
	President X		President X
Open School		.Inadequate technical-organization system .Followers - average "maturity" .At opening - no crisis; nine months later, at end of school year, crisis point reached	
	Principal Shelby		Principal Shelby

Figure 63. Leadership Profiles in Three Cases of Unsuccessful Change

were either highly visible directing all activities, or completely with-
drawn. None practiced a leadership style involving relationships
behaviors. These leadership profiles are in accord with the Life Cycle
Theory hypothesis that a leader who does not have flexibility in leader-
ship style and whose style does not progress in turn through each of
the four quadrants, will have less probability of success.

These leadership profiles suggest a question for further study:
Can the leader who does not practice relationships behavior be success-
ful in long term change programs? This study suggests not, if the leader
has to develop the potential of his or her followers from low to high
levels of "maturity". While most leaders who practiced quadrant one
and four styles were successful in the short run in the cases studied
here, their programs were not successful in the long run. The question
remains: what is the relationship between leadership styles lacking in
relationships behaviors, and successful change efforts?

Technical Change and Human Systems Change in Successful
Change Programs

In the cases of successful change, inadequate technical systems
were improved before human systems change was attempted. Before change,
in both the automobile assembly plant and the garment factory, equipment
was outdated, plant layout poor, and technical operations inefficient.
As well, the human system functioned poorly. Cooley's first move as new
plant manager was to improve working conditions in the factory; then he
introduced plant-wide meeings to improve communications. At Weldon, the
new owners first installed new production systems and taught operators

how to function in them. Then they introduced management training programs.

In the case of the newspaper, the technical systems functioned well both before and after change. Although laced with conflict and intrigue, those working for the newspaper understood and accepted this condition as a "fact of life". The human system functioned efficiently before the attempt at change. It still produces an internationally recognized newspaper.

In the cases of unsuccessful change, however, human systems change was attempted without corresponding improvements of technically inadequate systems. The State Department was overburdened with a multitude of administrative levels which strangled communications. After one attempt to cut out several bureaucratic layers, no further attempt at structural change was made; all efforts were bent towards human systems change.

The open school attempted a non-structured organizational system which functioned passably well at the beginning of the school year, and produced chaos toward the end of the year when the funds ran out. Here all attention was paid to the human system; it was assumed that technical and structural systems were unimportant.

In successful change programs, the leaders improved the technical systems and provided both the means and the opportunity for followers to take responsibility. This caused the followers to grow in ability. In unsuccessful change programs the leaders tried to 'fix' human relations in the system before they fixed the system so

that people could take responsibility. This suggests an issue for
further study; what is the nature of the relationship between technical
change and human systems change in an organization, and how does this
relationship affect attempts at organizational change?

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Casualty Rate of Outside Consultants and the Use of the
T- Group Approach to Organizational Change

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The casualty rate among outside consultants hired to assist and
advise on the process of organizational change in these cases was high.
Out of five cases, only the reorganization of the automobile assembly
plant used no outside consultants. Cooley, who directed the changes
was plant manager. Robert Guest, who wrote the account of the re-
organization, was an observer only.

In the change effort at the Weldon pajama manufacturing plant,
five teams of outside consultants were hired; two engineering teams,
one evaluation team, and two human systems teams. The engineering and
evaluation teams were concerned with technical factors. The human
systems teams used a T-group based approach to solve management problems.
These outside consulting teams were hired by the new owner-managers, the
Marrow brothers, who planned and spearheaded the changes. They, there-
fore, gave the consultants full support. Only in this case study did
the consultants survive and succeed in their task.

In the reorganization under Crockett at the State Department,
five teams of outside consultants were hired by Crockett: one advisory
team of human systems consultants (unpaid), two human systems teams, one
technical team, and one evaluation team. All three human systems teams

used the T-group aproach to organizational change. All the consultants were fired or dismissed when Rimestad took over as deputy undersecretary. There was some doubt in this case as to whether using outside consulting teams and their approach to the reorganization had the full support of Crockett's superiors.

In the attempted change program in the newspaper, Argyris was brought in by the president and top management to conduct a study of the newspaper's human system. He retained one other consultant to assist him during a training seminar for executives. Argyris used the T-group technique to facilitate organizational change. After three years his study was terminated by the newspaper's management.

In the attempt to create an open school, one human relations team and one outside consultant were hired by the principal to assist the faculty and administrators in implementing a new approach to education. The consulting team was hired for one week only to conduct a T-group as the first element in the teacher's summer preparatory workshop. The other consultant worked with the teachers in their meetings during the year; these meetings were conducted in the manner of mini-T-groups with norms of no one person taking task leadership, and considerable expression of feelings. During the first year, as teachers began to experience more and more difficulties, and the experiment began to fail, the principal fired the ongoing consultant. A summary of the survival and mortality rate of outside consultants is presented in figure 64.

Cases of Unsuccessful Change

	Consultant or team	Survived	Fired	Principal Technique
Change in the State Department (under Crockett)	Advisory Team		X	T-group Approach
	2 Human Systems Teams		X	T-group Approach
	Technical Team		X	?
	Evaluation Team		X	Statistical Measurement
Change in a newspaper	Chris Argyris		X	T-group Approach
	Co-trainer (assisted during executive training seminar only)	X		T-group Approach
Change in a School	Human Systems Team (one week only)	X		T-group Approach
	Human Systems consultant		X	T-group Approach

Cases of Successful Organizational Change

	Consultant or team	Survived	Fired	Principal Technique
Change in an Automobile Assembly Plant	None			
Change in the Garment Industry	2 Engineering Teams	X		1) Technical changes 2) Instruction
	Evaluation Team	X		Statistical Measurement
	2 Human Systems Teams	X		T-group Approach
Change in the State Department (under Macomber)	Marrow & Levinson (advisors only)	X		Advised in-house change program

Figure 64.   Survival Rate and Principal Technique of
Outside Consultants in Five Case Studies

Figure 64 shows the high mortality rate of outside consultants in cases of unsuccessful organizational change, as well as the predominating use of the T-group approach. The above observations suggest several issues for further study: 1) the effectiveness of the T-group as a method for bringing about organizational change. When is it appropriate? When isn't it? 2) The effect of the times on organizational development; today, the current trend is toward efficiency in organizations, and T-groups are no longer the popular method for training. Yet, paradoxically, there is an increased need today for human system development. How will it be accomplished? 3) The relationship between successful organizational change, and support for change within the organization. These case studies suggest a need for massive support for massive change.

The Relationship of Organizational Crisis to Organizational Change

For purposes of discussion, crisis will be defined as a period of substantial organizational turmoil (Greiner, 1972), acknowledged by those within and without the organization. When a crisis occurs, people together recognize the need for change. For example, in the automobile assembly plant, a wildcat walkout, followed by the "retirement" of the plant manager, signaled the point of crisis. By this time, the plant was the worst in the division, according to nearly every criteria. The Welden garment factory was at the point of bankruptcy when purchased by the Harwood company. Shortly after the change program began, the

former owner-managers left the company. It was when the foreign officers banded together to demand change, forming a union, and the White House pressured for change, that the former Deputy Undersecretary left and Macomber was hired to effect a reorganization.

Crisis and Change

Through this study, this writer observed that in each of the cases of unsuccessful change, there was no state of organizational crisis acknowledged by those both within and without the organization, prior to the change program. When deputy undersecretary Crockett was hired to reorganize the State Department, change was being called for by the upper echelons of government: the President, and the Executive Branch. However, those within the State Department were not calling for change. Thus, there was a great need for change in the eyes of the superiors, but not in the eyes of the employees.

Principal Shelby opened his innovative school well supported by grants and enthusiasm. During the first year, public fanfare and journalistic attention kept the fires of enthusiasm alight for him and the teachers. During the major portion of the academic year, although many parents, and some members of the superintendent's office thought the school was in need of reorganization, this sentiment was not shared by the majority of the school's staff.

Through his own efforts, Chris Argyris was "invited" in to conduct a study of the newspaper's organization. Although the president felt that his executive committee was ineffective, neither he nor his executives thought there was any overall crisis in the organization.

This observation suggests an issue for further study: what is the relationship between successful organizational change, and a prior recognition of organizational crisis by both those within and outside of the organization?

Leadership Style and Change

Through the analyses of the cases, this writer also observed that inappropriate leadership did not seem to become an issue in the organization until a point of organizational crisis was reached. In the State Department case, both Crockett's and Rimestad's leadership styles were inappropriate to their followers "maturity" level, according to Life Cycle Theory. Yet, successful organizational change did not occur until both those within and without the State Department demanded change. At that point, Macomber replaced Rimestad. It was not until funds ran out and both public pressure and teacher resignations pressured for change, that Principal Shelby resigned. Not until after the plant workers staged a walkout did top management retire the plant manager, whose leadership style, according to Life Cycle Theory, was inappropriate, and hire Cooley. Not until Weldon was at a point of bankruptcy and the union picketing stores selling its product, did the owner-managers sell. Their leadership style was diagnosed according to Life Cycle Theory as being inappropriate to their staff. Shortly after Harwood began its change program, they resigned.

In the newspaper case, executives refused to discuss the president's leadership style. While his quadrant four, low task and low relationships style was, according to Life Cycle Theory, inappropriate

for his executive committee, his basic quadrant one, high task and low
relationships style was, according to his executives, an appropriate
leadership style in a newspaper. In this situation, there was no
organizational crisis. Supported by a good technical system, an
efficient human system, and vast assets, the newspaper was functioning
effectively. As of this writing, this newspaper is continuing to
function successfully under the same president.

In an ideal 'system four' organization of highly mature
personnel, it would be possible theoretically for inappropriate leader-
ship to be recognized and dealt with before a crisis occurs. However,
in none of the cases in this study did this occur. These observations
suggest issues for further study: what is the relationship between the
recognition of organizational crisis and the recognition of, and dealing
with, inappropriate leadership? Is crisis necessary before successful
change can occur?

Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, the writer has drawn five issues from the
study, and raised questions associated with each issue. From these,
this writer suggests some recommendations for future studies.

1. As a diagnostic method, the Life Cycle Theory
   is subject to individual interpretation and
   the ability of the practitioner to diagnose
   the data at hand. This writer recommends
   that the situational variables incorporated
   in the "maturity" dimension be operationally
   defined.

2. The most outstanding difference between
    leaders of successful and unsuccessful change
    programs was that the former were able to use
    high relationships in their behavior towards
    followers. Leaders of unsuccessful programs
    tended to use low relationships behavior
    constantly towards followers. Recommendation
    for future study: an examination of the
    relationship between leadership styles lacking
    in relationships behavior and successful
    change programs.

3. In cases of unsuccessful change, inadequate
    technical systems were not improved; attention
    was given only to human systems. Recommenda-
    tion for future study: an examination of the
    relationship between technical change and
    human systems change and how this affects
    attempts at total organizational change.

4. The casualty rate of outside consultants who
    employed a T-group strategy for change was
    extremely high. Recommendation for future
    study: an examination of when the T-group
    approach is an appropriate strategy for
    bringing about successful organizational
    change.

5. Successful change was preceded by recognition
    of organizational crisis. Crisis brought an
    awareness of inappropriate leadership which
    was then dealt with. In cases of unsuccessful
    change, a state of crisis did not exist, or
    was not acknowledged. Recommendation for
    future study: the influence of organizational
    crisis on change.

It is the writer's opinion that the Life Cycle Theory provides

a useful framework for diagnosing the appropriate leadership style in

a given situation. In its present state of development, this model has

taken some important steps toward creating, if possible, a theory which

can incorporate the major variables of any organizational situation,

and determine the most successful style(s) of leadership for that

situation. Much study needs yet to be done. Since the Life Cycle

Theory classifies both leadership style and follower "maturity" in general terms, further research needs to be conducted to a) concretize leader-follower behaviors, b) to make more objective the interpretation of data, and c) to validate the basic assumptions that underlie the model itself. In the last analysis, the Life Cycle Theory is a fore-runner in situational leadership. For the experienced practitioner, it can be of immense help in his or her relationship with a client system.

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