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A DEFENSE OF NATURALISM IN MORAL EDUCATION

A Dissertation Presented

By

Philip C. Guin

Submitted to the Graduate School of
the University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

April, 1975

Foundations of Education

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Philip C. Guin

Approved as to style and content by:



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

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

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

Louis Fischer, Acting Dean
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April, 1975

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A Defense of Naturalism in Moral Education (April 1975)

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Directed by: Dr. Robert R. Wellman

The dissertation investigates the possibility of a naturalist approach to moral education. The two initial chapters deal with questions of freedom and moral relativity, respectively. Freedom is held to be a necessary condition of any moral theory; if one cannot help doing what in fact one does, no sense can be made of obligation and responsibility, and there would be no purpose in discussing moral education. Although it is granted that the causal principle holds, viz., that every event has a cause, determinism is held to be compatible with a concept of freedom. The concept of freedom is subsequently developed in terms of (1) genuine alternatives available to the agent, (2) the reasons given for choice, and (3) the translation of choice into intentionality or action. In regard to moral relativity, it is argued that the facts of cultural diversity, contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion, fail to support a thesis of cultural relativity. Consequently, a normative theory of moral education can be generated and justified without the onus of either authoritarian control or _laissez-faire_ subjectivity.

The final two chapters focus on anti-naturalist attempts to discredit naturalism, and on the relation of naturalism to moral education. Account is taken of the anti-naturalist critique of naturalism, beginning with the publication of G.E. Moore's _Principia Ethica_, 1903, and concluding with current expositors of emotivism and prescriptivism. Emotivists and

prescriptivists, it is held, presuppose the existence of a logical gap between description and evaluation, between "is" and "ought," a presupposition which, in turn, is used to discredit a misleading, if not spurious, account of naturalism--an account first expounded in Principia Ethica. Moreover, it is argued that anti-naturalists have been seduced by what they believe to be the unique function of ethical discourse, without thereby yielding an adequate account of ethical and moral life, or of the critical demands laid upon the agent in making moral decisions. The naturalist rejoinder argues four points concerning morality: (1) that there is no basis for a logical distinction between description and evaluation, (2) that contingent features fecundate the meaning of evaluative and moral judgments, (3) that morality has a content to be identified in the benefit or goodness perceived in holding a given moral point of view, and (4) that judgments of moral principle, like all judgments, are grounded in the agent's perception of relations, bearings and consequences in confronting concrete problem situations. In the concluding chapter, a naturalist moral theory is related to moral education. Morality is envisaged as arising out of the experience of the child, manifested in the strategies employed in attacking moral problems, and in the child's perception of the benefit or goodness attendant on choice and action. The dissemination of moral principles in the classroom is therefore held to be unwarranted. Finally, democracy, defined as a community of shared common interests, is detected as the principal institutional background for moral education. It is held that democratic principles best complement human nature, perceived as inseparable from a social environment,

and best guarantee freedom, the necessary condition of morality. Conse-
quently, moral education is grounded in the perspective which acknowledges
the conjoint efforts of men in confronting environmental and social prob-
lems.

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CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

In this chapter an attempt will be made to unpack the concept of freedom. The substantive claim is that freedom is a necessary condition for any ethical theory; only the free agent can be held morally responsible for his choices and actions. Those who would deny moral responsibility argue that, if determinism holds, if one cannot help doing what in fact one does, no sense can be made of obligation and responsibility. For the grounds of his argument, the determinist cites the causal principle, viz., that every event has a cause. Without the assumption of this principle, discontinuity in nature would have to be sanctioned, prediction and explanation compromised. Accordingly, if it can be demonstrated that internal and external restraints mediate choice and action, freedom becomes a chimera and responsibility a concept devoid of content. In educational terms, it is argued that, if determinism holds, such manipulative means as indoctrination and conditioning gain support as principal teaching techniques. The student is thus regarded as a moral proselyte, incapable of independent motivation and development, and moral education is thereby grounded in the external imposition of principles of conduct. The position taken throughout this chapter denies that the causal principle implies the consequences envisaged by the determinist and that it is possible to adduce a concept of freedom which is compatible with the causal principle without doing violence to common usage. In the fourth chapter,

the implications of the concept of freedom for moral education will be examined in detail.

Determinism and the Possibility of Moral Education

Because writers espouse varying degrees of determinism, there is probably no completely adequate definition of the position. In this paper only the so-called 'hard' determinists will be considered. Among those in sympathy with this position, Brandt holds that determinism is the view that "any event could be predicted if all the laws of nature were known, and enough were known about previous states of nature to permit use of the laws for prediction."[1] Broad maintains that, for any event e to be completely determined, means that "e has zero range of indeterminism for every dimension of every determinable characteristic of which it is a manifestation."[2] Hospers simply defines determinism as the position which holds that "every event has a cause."[3] Suppose we follow Hospers' definition. What does it mean to say that "every event has a cause?" It at least means there can be no discontinuity in nature, every state-of-affairs falls within some causal condition in such a way that it ideally could be predicted. Applied to man, it would mean that each individual constitutes a state-of-affairs subject to causal laws. Not only would each individual be subject to the external restraints of the environment, but, if we allow that there are mental states, these will be subject to internal restraints as well.

As for the word "cause", it is sufficiently ambiguous as to require some elucidation. Historically, Hume's critique of the Aristotelian

notion of cause as "necessary connection" made possible an empirical analysis of the problem. But Hume's own definition of "cause" as "constant conjunction" was itself ambiguous. Not all constantly conjoined events are said to be causally related, e.g., the procession of the seasons or the alternation of traffic lights. Nor does it seem that "constant conjunction" does justice to all causal events, e.g., the relation of the moon to ocean tides. In an effort to remedy the defects in Hume's analysis, Mill defended cause as "sufficient condition." Mill reasoned that, although there are necessary conditions for events to occur, "cause" could not be defined as "necessary condition." For example, a necessary condition for combustion is the presence of oxygen, but it is not sufficient for the event to occur. Only when oxygen is accompanied by other necessary conditions, a combustible material and a proper temperature, does combustion occur. Mill concludes:

> The cause, then philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent (event) invariably follows.[4]

In rendering "cause" as "sufficient condition," it is not to be supposed that, in practice, one will be able to ascertain the sufficient conditions for all events or even very many of them. The sufficient condition for my car starting in the morning may involve hundreds of necessary conditions. Therefore, in line with ordinary usage, it makes sense to speak of proximate conditions as causal conditions, e.g., turning the key in the ignition. Yet, as Mill says, he is trying to give a philosophically

adequate definition of "cause"; he is not concerned with the programs required to ascertain various sufficient conditions.

Following Mill's lead, if "cause" is taken to be "sufficient condition," the determinist can state his position according to a formal causal principle:

> For every event in the universe, there is a set of conditions (the necessary conditions) such that, whenever these conditions obtain, the event invariably occurs.[5]

According to the determinist, if the causal principle holds, it portends important consequences for man. As an event, the individual must be subject to determinism, there can be no question of physical and mental conduct being exempt from the causal nexus. One may not be aware of the antecedent conditions for choice and action, but no matter how complex they may be, their presence is a necessary consequence of the causal principle. And the proximate conditions themselves will have their antecedents. One's character and personality will involve causal chains and clusters reaching back to infancy and beyond. As Hospers says, it is all a matter of luck when a child turns out "all right," but when he does not, when the adult character is flawed, it is no less than "the twentieth-century version of the family curse, the curse on the House of Atreus."[6] The child beater of today was mauled by his parents; they in turn by theirs. In the light of the causal principle, the determinist charges that such terms as "freedom," "choice," "approbation" and "disapprobation" are vacuous. Not only is moral indignation over heinous crime itself determined, but it rests on the faulty assumption the agent could

have acted otherwise, that he was responsible for his act. Moreover, the distinction between the moral and legal derivation of law rests on arbitrary grounds; no matter how the law is held to be derived, punishment can only be justified for utilitarian purposes.

But the question remains: Does every event have a cause? How could such a claim be justified? Many determinists point to the spectacular success of science in defense of their position. The areas of unexplained phenomena are dwindling, causal laws are continually being developed for physical and psychological processes. An extrapolation from the history of science would indicate that all events are lawful. Yet, if we appeal to the success of induction to justify induction, we are confronted with the empiricist's dilemma, we are liable to the charge of committing the fallacy of begging the question. Whether the future will be like the past cannot rest on an appeal to induction. Furthermore, most scientists today would agree with Schrödinger that "the exact laws which we observe are 'statistical laws'."[7] What holds consistently are statistical probabilities rather than exact causal relations. Consequently, there would be no logical contradiction in a denial of any law of science. Still it is argued that, just as we observe uniformities in nature giving rise to the laws of science, so the causal principle is an inductive generalization based on these uniformities and their attendant laws. To be sure, the causal principle is more general and inclusive, but the method of its derivation is exactly the same as any other law. Mill seems to argue this way for he says that "we should never have had the notion of causation

(in the philosophical meaning of the term) as a condition of all phenomena unless many cases of causation, or, in other words, many partial uniformities of sequence, had previously become familiar.[8] However, it is difficult to see how Mill can escape his own indictment of universal causality:

> Doubtless (it may be said) most phenomena are connected as effects with some antecedent or cause.... If, then, the processes which bring these cases within the same category with the rest require that we should assume the universality of the very law which they do not at first sight appear to exemplify, is not this a *petitio principii*? Can we prove a proposition by an argument which takes it for granted?[9]

Still the determinist persists. At best, sense might be made of freedom, if determinism holds. Comparatively unimportant decisions, such as on which side of the street one walks, might be cited by the indeterminist as obvious examples of caprice. Only a philosophical purist would hold out for determinism in such cases. The determinist answers that, even if these cases are granted, these are not the ones the indeterminist wishes to reserve for freedom. Instead, it is those decisions of great magnitude which capture the imaginations of indeterminists, those with consequences altering the course of a person's life. Confronted with life or death situations, we certainly do not want to think of our choices as being merely arbitrary, unrelated to our character and our previous experiences and choices. We wish to say, "far from being a whim or blind fancy, this is *my* choice; it was made with deliberate effort; it reflects *me* as a unique personality." As Broad says, the indeterminists (or libertarians

as he calls them),

> ...would like to say that the putting forth of a certain amount of effort in a certain direction at a certain time _is_ completely determined, but is determined in a unique and peculiar way. It is literally determined _by the agent or self_, considered as a substance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factors _events in_ and _dispositions of_ the agent.[10]

If this position can be maintained, the determinist might agree with the indeterminist, he might grant that "freedom" makes sense if it refers to the uniqueness of self-identity. It is not antecedent events, but a special "substance or continuant" that makes the choice. Supposedly, by assigning meaning to such phrases as "my choice," this move would allow for both determinism and freedom. Can this argument stand up to scrutiny? Not only is the question of self-identity problematic, but, even if it were resolved, it is not clear why the self should _not_ be regarded as an event. However unique it otherwise may be, it would seem a bold move to preclude the self from the class comprising events. Unless the determinist can adduce further justification, he would probably be better off disavowing a concept of freedom.

Since the causal principle cannot be supported by induction without begging the question, and since it evidently is not an analytically true proposition, viz., one which cannot be denied without contradiction, is there any justification for holding it? "I see no _prima facie_ objection to there being events that are not completely determined," says Broad,[11] and, although it appears _prima facie_ as though most events are caused, this may not hold true in the case of human deliberation and action.

Perhaps the determinist's most plausible recourse would be to treat the causal principle, not as a proposition having truth value, but as what some have called a leading principle.[12] For instance, in deference to the beliefs of the patient, the doctor may excuse the patient's recovery as being indeed a miracle. As a doctor *qua* doctor, of course, he believes nothing of the kind. He will continue to search for an explanation of the alleged miracle. In other words, the causal principle is assumed as a leading principle in the course of being a proficient doctor. Similarly, the determinist might attempt to justify the causal principle in terms of the consequences of holding the principle, i.e., in terms of its success in dealing with the world. In this case, the causal principle would not be held to be true or false, because no evidence would be allowed to count for or against it. Confronted with a phenomenon for which no cause is evident, the determinist can simply demur until such a time as it is possible to assign an explanation. He can then point to science and medicine, not as evidence for an inductive generalization, but that their very existence presupposes the causal principle. Insofar as description, explanation and prediction constitute viable activity, they presuppose universal causality.

A Concept of Freedom

The Availability of Genuine Alternatives is a Necessary Condition of Freedom. Viewed as a leading principle, the causal principle makes a great deal more sense. No proof is required; by employing it we are led to find more and more causal relations. Does it then imply that we would

be better off giving up our ideas of freedom and responsibility? Skinner seems to suggest this in his latest book, and it has been argued by others that the thought of freedom is merely a human conceit. In his assessment of unconscious motivation, Hospers writes:

> To be sure, the domination by the unconscious in the case of "normal" individuals is somewhat more benevolent than the tyranny and despotism exercised in neurotic cases, and therefore the former have evoked less comment; but the principle remains in all cases the same: the unconscious is the master of every fate and the captain of every soul.[13]

Without giving up the causal principle, there appear to be locutions which do allow for freedom. Consider the assertion:

> The middleclass child has more freedom than the ghetto child, because he has more alternatives open to him.

This seems to be a straightforward paradigm in conformity with common usage. Much social legislation in recent years has such assertions as its rationale. We say of the ghetto child that he fails because his environment fails; the alternatives open to him are few, while those available often lead to virulent solutions of pressing problems. Nor would it appear that the causal principle has been violated. It is in fact a presupposition of the kind of explanation given for the general disparity between the lives of middleclass and ghetto children. Where cases seem to belie the general tendency, other causal factors are cited, those unique to particular lives but not to be found in the general groups. It is commonly felt that, as available alternatives become more nearly equal, a convergence of choice will occur within a more definitive range. Whether or not this is an adequate prognosis and cure for present-day social ills is not

really so much the point; rather, it is the fact that such an appraisal _is_ often given, and to this extent it is congruous with a use of "freedom" compatible with the causal principle. Insofar as assertions like the above are made, it makes sense partially to define "freedom" in terms of the alternatives open to the agent.

Consider another example. Suppose I am invited to a cocktail party. Upon my arrival, the hostess offers me a choice among certain drinks. Suppose that I find none of the proffered alternatives to be particularly attractive. Nevertheless, I do make a choice, the least offensive from my point of view. According to the causal principle, my disposition to choose and the choice made are causally related to antecedent dispositions, choices and experiences. True, I am not completely satisfied with my choice, and, if I am churlish and obstinate, I will voice my dissatisfaction to the hostess. She, in turn, being properly concerned, may endeavor to provide a drink to which I am partial, i.e., a new alternative. But this new alternative has an added feature--its availability has increased my freedom of choice. Now that my taste dispostion has been abetted, my ill-humor mollified, I will surely choose the new alternative. The origi-nal alternatives reduced my freedom quantitatively by one, the important one which, if it had originally been available, would have been my prefer-ence. As with the former example, there appears to be no violation here of either the causal principle or common usage. Implied is a necessary relation between one ordinary sense of freedom and a given number of al-ternatives available to the agent for a given case.

Available alternatives, while they are a necessary condition of freedom, are not sufficient. Would we hold a person to be free, never mind the determinist/indeterminist conflict, if that person could not differentiate the options open to him? Without preferential discrimination, rather than saying the person chooses freely, would we not be more apt to say that that person is a victim of circumstances beyond his control? Perceived alternatives are imperative for conditions of freedom. Myers supplies a touching portrait of the unfree, those who ostensively have available alternatives, but who do not perceive them as such:

> There is...a city in a region which has made great use of migratory labor. These people live more or less as a group, out of economic necessity and for mutual comfort. Many of them are afraid to go from their familiar area to other areas of the city....What stops them? They are, as we say, legally free. The police do not stop them. Their more established compatriots are not prevented from trading in the stores, and they are not excluded from the movie houses. But are the newcomers free? I think not. Not only are they ignorant of their "rights" but they feel the positive barrier of fear, the fear of a different and unfriendly world.[14]

If there is to be freedom, available alternatives are not enough; they must be genuine alternatives, i.e., perceived as such, those involving the capacity to trace, as thoroughly as possible, their implications and consequences. Alternatives dimly realized and partially understood cannot be genuine. The school dropout who opts for the glamour of the drug culture may have abandoned or failed to recognize genuine alternatives which in the long run may better have served him. It might be a caricature to say of him that he has chosen freely; the pressures of environment and peer group, the accessibility of quick rewards foreshadow the choices and

actions of the unfree. Nor do propitious circumstances automatically guarantee genuine alternatives. "There is hardly more freedom on the side of varied and flexible capacity of choice," says Dewey, since "preferences are restricted to the line laid down, and in the end the individual becomes the slave of his success."[15] The capacity to discriminate among alternatives is the very basis of choice; no matter what the circumstances of the agent, whether favorable or unfavorable, blinders can inhibit this capacity. Therefore, choice implies intelligent deliberation regarding genuine alternative; it can no more rest on blind impulse than on the vicissitudes of the agent's life. It follows that, to the extent the agent is ignorant of his options and their consequences, his freedom is proportionately diminished. Again, in Dewey's words:

> Choice, in the distinctively human sense...presents itself as one preference among and out of preferences....as the formation of a new preference out of a conflict of preferences.... In so far as a variable life history and intelligent insight and foresight enter into it, choice signifies a capacity for deliberately changing preferences. The hypothesis that is suggested is that in these two traits we have before us the essential constituents of choice as freedom: the factor of individual participation.[16]

Giving Quality Reasons for Choice is a Condition of Freedom. It has been argued that the availability of genuine alternatives is a necessary condition of freedom. In addition, it was noted that the presence of genuine alternatives implies a strong cognitive dimension in ascertaining choice. In this section it will be argued that this cognitive dimension is identified in the reasons given for choice. Moreover, it will be argued that, of the reasons given for choice, it is their quality which marks

another necessary condition. Philosophers have long recognized the cognitive aspect of freedom. In holding that knowledge is the most powerful affect in a deterministic universe, Spinoza allows that freedom is knowledge of one's determined character. Freedom consists in knowing what is impossible; it is blind response to stimuli which characterizes the unfree. As insight and understanding increase, freedom and responsibility develop as logical derivatives. But Spinoza misses the future orientation of choice. We do not say of rocks and trees, caught as they are in the causal nexus, that they choose what they will be; only man has options pointing to the future; only man can initiate significant change. To ignore the future would be tantamount to delegating man to the condition of the rest of nature, to the _status quo_, the causal conditions which in fact prevail. Recent writers like Dewey locate the grounds of freedom and responsibility in the future consequences of choice. If we heed only the antecedent causal conditions, as we might in the case of rocks and trees, we miss the distinctively human contribution, the use of insight and foresight in making choices. Hence, it is one thing to understand causal relations, quite another to initiate intelligent change. Knowledge and understanding, in the Spinozistic sense, supply only part of what is meant by choice, but they fail to allow for creativity and novelty. Spinozistic man can only conform to the conditions of his life, but like the neurotic, his life is repetitious rather than innovative.

The cognitive dimension of freedom requires that no choice will count as free, in the requisite sense, unless it is an intelligent choice, in

conformity with both the causal conditions and the consequences of the choice. The intelligent choice implies the absence of restraints and blinders which would attenuate the choice. Nevertheless, an argument, which initially might look convincing, has been proffered against this view. The argument rests on a distinction between causality and compulsion. A person's choice will be free, but caused, when it is uncompelled. A man locked up or in chains falls under causal conditions, but he is unfree not for that reason, he is compelled. Now, according to the previous argument, where conditions allow for intelligent choice through deliberation, evaluation, insight and foresight, one's choice will be free, but caused, yet uncompelled. According to this position, an intelligent choice implies certain conditions--the absence of debilitating restraints, thus allowing for an innovative and hence uncompelled choice. However, if it could be demonstrated that most, if not all, events are compelled, then freedom would be an illusion, cognitive activity, since it too would be compelled, would be to no avail. The wily criminal who employs great ingenuity in the execution of his trade would be no more blameworthy or praiseworthy than the average citizen.

The argument for compulsion derives its support from the discovery of unconscious motivation. According to this interpretation of psychoanalytic theory, for the reasons given for a choice, there will be a further explanation unascertainable by the agent. This further explanation is the <u>real</u> explanation, it exposes unconscious motives, those accounting for why the former reasons carried more weight with the agent

than others. From the agent's perspective, unconscious motivation will be discontinuous with conscious cognitive activity, the former being always veiled from the agent. It follows that conscious cognitive activity will constitute mere rationalizations or compromises of unconscious motivation. As Hospers expresses the argument for compulsion:

> An act is free when it is determined by a man's character, say moralists; but what if the most decisive aspects of his character were already irrevocably acquired before he could do anything to mold them? What if even the degree of will power available to him in shaping his habits and disciplining himself now to overcome the influence of his early environment is a factor over which he has no control? What are we to say of this kind of "freedom?"...The conscious life of the human being, including the conscious decisions and volitions, is merely a mouthpiece for the unconscious--not directly for the enactment of unconscious drives, but of the compromise between unconscious drives and unconscious reproaches.[17]

Most of the examples cited by Hospers are, to say the least, exotic, and, although he purports to be giving an analysis of normal behavior, one senses that there certainly must be degrees of compulsion. We hold suspect the compulsive hand washer whose only excuse is that he wants to keep clean; if he were a dentist or mechanic, there would be no grounds for skepticism. What seems to count, in terms of freedom, is the <u>quality</u> of reasons given for choice, not some inherent aspect of the choice itself. This is recognized in courts of law where the insanity plea is often invoked to cover the inadequacy of the reasons given by the agent for his crime. Most everyone recognizes a distinction between adequate and inadequate reasons, just as most everyone uses the distinction for assigning culpability for acts. It may be that the main defect in Hospers' defense

of the argument for compulsion lies in his interpretation of psychoanalytic theory. There would appear to be a difference between the theory itself and the mechanical principles of therapy implied by the theory. The theory deals with inexorable laws of human nature, but the therapy would seem to indicate increasing stages of culpability in proportion to its success. A person who comes to understand his compulsive behavior is in a position to do something about it.

It is along these lines that Peters takes a hard stand against the argument for compulsion. There is a distinction to be made between causes in general and causes which would count as exonerating circumstances for a choice, belief or act. Moreover, "the causes of a belief must be distinguished from its grounds" says Peters, "and it seems only relevant to speculate about causes when there are no grounds."[18] In the case of the "mixed-up kid" who commits a crime, exonerating circumstances would obtain--if and only if--it could be shown that environmental and social conditions were unalterably connected with certain dispositions and traits. Compulsive behavior is allowed as an excuse only when rational behavior is missing:

> I would want to distinguish carefully between causes proper such as movements of the body and brain, and things like deliberating, deciding, having reasons, understanding truths, etc., which are often also called 'causes'. My view is that only when explanations of the second sort break down or have no application can causes of the first sort be sufficient to account for the happening in question.[19]

Obviously, Peters wants to avoid considering reasons as causes; it is the autonomy of the former he wishes to preserve. A scientific account

of causes, say an account of neural processes, does accord with the causal principle, but mental conduct has a different set of defining characteristics. This distinction allows Peters to aver of Freudian determinism that, although it is a brilliant insight into abnormal moves, it does not suffice to explain normal behavior. Reasons or grounds are explanatory of behavior though they are not causes. Unlike some of his followers, Freud endeavored to free rather than enslave man, for he believed that, as a person comes to understand his behavior, he is better able to take charge of it.

Still, it is not clear why reasons cannot count as causes. Assuredly, one could point out differences between mental and physical conduct, the private character of mental acts and their lack of spatial dimension, but the causal principle is predicated in terms of the conditions for an event, and it is not clear why reasons, beliefs and motives are not events causally explained in the requisite sense. Kenneth Strike maintains the purported difference is that we never ask for the justification of a cause, it is neither moral nor immoral, neither true nor false; but of reasons, we do ask for justification. Strike seems to be suggesting that, if reasons _in fact_ have the neutral characteristics of causes, there would be no grounds for differentiating between the two. To this end he cites, as the paradigm cases of reasons for behaving, motives and beliefs. It makes sense to ask of motives whether they are moral or immoral, of beliefs whether they are true or false. But what of the _fact_ of holding a motive or belief? Do we ask of the fact itself whether it is moral or immoral, true or false? The motive and what is believed, of course, will

be moral or immoral, true or false, but the fact itself will have the neutral characteristics of causes. It follows that reasons *are* causes. For example, the man who damaged the *Pieta* probably had motives, but whether good or bad, it was his holding of the motives that marked the neutrality of causal efficacy. Or take Strike's example. He asks that we consider two sentences:

(1) The reason John goes to church is that he believes in God.

(2) John's reason for going to church is that God exists.

In the first sentence, the referent of the word "reason" is the relation between John and the proposition "God exists," viz., the fact of believing. The fact of believing is the relation. However, the referent of the term in the second sentence is the proposition which John believes:

> The fact of believing and the proposition believed have quite different properties. It is the believing which explains John's behavior; however, believing is neither true nor false. On the other hand, the proposition believed does not explain John's behavior. The proposition is, however, either true or false. Thus, if true, it may constitute part of the grounds for going to church. At the same time, the proposition is itself an object of justification....Reasons cause people to behave; that is, people behave because of their motives and beliefs.[20]

There appear to be difficulties in Strike's analysis, or, at least, it is misleading. It is conceivable that Hospers might retort that, even if John is sincere, he might be compelled for reasons other than the fact of his believing. What if he has been systematically indoctrinated so that *not* going to church results in real physical or mental discomfort? Or, what if what really motivates him is the pretty girl in the choir? In

other words, how are we to discriminate those beliefs and motives which are causal from those which are not? What seems convincing about reasons and their causal efficacy is their _quality_, and part of what is meant by their quality is their relatedness to other beliefs, motives and reasons, to one's goals and interests. Rather than single acts of believing or holding motives, it is the coherency and consistency of clusters of motives and beliefs that yields credibility to the claim that reasons are causes. Singularly, torn from context, they fall prey to the argument for compulsion. _A fortiori_, beliefs fall on a continuum, some having little or no support, others with more or less substantial support. For instance, in Strike's sentence (1), the fact of John's believing may rest in an act of faith, i.e., belief in the absence of evidence. But then perhaps he subscribes to one of the rational proofs for the existence of God, or perhaps he has had a compelling religious experience. Surely knowing the origin, strength and relatedness of John's belief should weigh in an appraisal of the belief's causal efficacy. One may "believe" in prophetic utterances of doom without unburdening oneself of sinful ways. Not only must the agent know himself, but, if his reasons are to count, others must know him as well. Not _all_ beliefs will be causally instantiated; it is their quality which marks those which are and those which are not.

The question of to what extent reasons are causes can be left in abeyance without undercutting the thrust of Peters' position. His main objective is to distinguish between actions which merely happen to a person, such as a muscle spasm, and those which are purposive. No doubt, in

neural functions and bodily movements, we can identify necessary conditions of behavior, but they are not sufficient to explain it. Motives and beliefs do not arise in a vacuum, nor are the reasons a person gives for his behavior ordinarily divorced from goals and interests; rather, they exemplify a "rule-following purposive pattern."[21] To describe actions only in causal terms precludes them from being "intelligent or unintelligent, correct or incorrect, efficient or inefficient." These predicates are applicable, as it becomes apparent how reasons hang together, how they describe a consistent, coherent pattern. This contextual awareness distinguishes compulsive from intelligent behavior, isolated from meaningful acts; it is the best evidence that most choices are not merely rationalizations of unconscious motives. According to Peters, "the concept of an action is inseparable from that of intelligence....the ability to vary movements relative to a goal...."[22] And later he says, "the goal which is quoted to justify a man's action must also be such that reference to it actually explains what a man has done."[23] We may fairly ask of a motive or belief whether it is _the_ reason the agent acted as he did. It will be a _quality_ reason insofar as it has bearing on the agent's life--his purposes, interests and goals. Hospers' contention that all actions are sham, veiled unconscious motives, fails precisely because it fails to identify this contextual awareness on the part of the agent. The facts belie the argument for compulsion; it would be nothing short of grotesque to analyze purposive behavior into just so many compulsive acts, into dumb, unintelligent moves.

It has been the burden of this section to describe the cognitive dimension of freedom. This cognitive dimension is revealed in the quality of reasons given for an act. The rationalist's insistence on an understanding of causal relations is a partial clue to the effectiveness of reasons to explain behavior. But knowledge, in itself, is insufficient to account for the human contribution of novelty and innovation. Hence, a quality reason must be intelligent; it must be related to other motives and beliefs and to the goals of the agent. Since the argument for compulsion fails to account for the contextual setting in which reasons are given, unconscious motivation, ordinarily, will not suffice to explain behavior. Nevertheless, there would appear to be one further condition of freedom. It is conceivable that a person may have the necessary knowledge, interests and goals, yet fail to take action on their behalf. If there is no intentional action, i.e., active participation in the world, there can be no freedom.

Intentionality is a Necessary Condition of Freedom. It might be thought that intentionality involves some kind of strict mental conduct. Increasingly, the term has come to refer as well to action. As O'Shaughnessy puts it, "intentional action is the logically primary case of action."[24] Moreover, the term implies a social context, "a world that is dynamic inasmuch as certain items in that world are goals or dangers in relation to which one is intentionally acting."[25] From the standpoint of freedom, the problem lies in translating cognitive activity--deliberation, reasons, knowledge, insight and foresight--into active participation in the affairs

of the world. For Spinoza, intentional action presents no problem, since freedom is merely knowledge of one's determined character. Action is accordingly attenuated "by the progressive saturation of all laws and institutions with greater acknowledgement of the necessary laws governing the constitution of things."[26] One merely comes to accept the inevitable; no meaning, from the human perspective, can be attached to such terms as "innovation" and "creativity." Classical Liberalism fares no better. On the one hand, the absence of restraints on economic exploitation, the theory of laissez faire, only leads to the exploitation of the vast majority of men by vested interests. On the other hand, those who, like Rousseau, would guarantee intentionality on the basis of the unimpeded development of innate potentialities, fail to note how choice and action are mediated by the environmental context. Social interaction dramatically alters desires and beliefs. What then is the locus of intentionality? How is cognition related to action in a social context?

In response to the challenge of Rationalism and Liberalism, the Marxist stresses the importance of "human agency" and "practice." Necessity is not envisaged from the lofty perch of metaphysical speculation about nature and man, but from a world historical perspective, in which man can and must bring about significant change. To dissever man from productive action would be a violation of freedom. For the Marxist the gulf between theory and practice, between cognition and action, can only be bridged through "real knowledge of the subject."[27] This means that freedom and action are inseparable, and, unless cognition permits the

exercise of intelligent action in pursuit of goals, freedom will be jeopardized, no real knowledge of the subject will occur. Man confronts nature as one of her own forces, and, as in the case of social progress, the consistent history of class struggle is inexplicable except in terms of human agency in the world. Therefore, the ground of intention rests in the encouragement of responsible and self-producing individuals capable of properly utilizing nature's laws. "Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws," writes Engels, "but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends.[28]

However, natural laws are not predicated along the usual lines of the hypothetico-deductive method familiar to most scientists; rather, they are held to be dialectical laws. When Marx admonishes man to "change the world," he means that man, in confronting the world, in participating, is engaged in reciprocal causality. Not only does participation extend the agent's consciousness, but nature is altered as well. No matter how meager the participation, both agent and nature are proportionately changed. Now the soul of dialectic is contradiction. Accordingly, on both the physical and social levels, the agent is responsible for discovering inherent contradictions; in turn, these are expressed as the dialectical laws of nature and society. For instance, the relation between positive and negative electricity on the physical level is analogous to the relation between proletariat and bourgeoisie on the social level. It follows that intentional action involves both the discovery of and the yielding to the

inexorable laws governing the motion of nature and society. Only as man comes to appreciate the demands of historical and dialectical materialism can there be freedom.

The Marxist's emphasis on practice and reciprocal causality is laudable, but there are difficulties attending the metaphysical schema. The Marxist seems to be saying the relation between the agent and world is _itself_ lawful and invariable. Evidence would suggest the relation is far more flexible; different individuals often come to the same conclusions about the world via different means; uniqueness marks inquiry as much as does conformity. For instance, Hesse has demonstrated how one might arrive at a wave theory of light propagation through either mathematical models or common analogies to sound and water waves.[30] Moreover, the Marxist's contention that natural and social laws are dialectical is suspect. If contradictions are in fact real, if they are known to exist by the Marxist, there must be theories and laws governing their operation. How else could one account for their existence? But one of the chief canons of scientific investigation is testability; there must at least be the logical possibility of a counterinstance of a given theory or law. According to Marxist theory though, no event could stand as a counterinstance, the metaphysical presupposition, the belief in the existence of contradictions, is inclusive and all-embracing. This is poignantly expressed in an example drawn from Soviet education. One Soviet professor advised his university class that sociology is in fact "historical materialism in action," that its goal should be to "generalize the experience of building socialism."

However, his class remained unconvinced. "If we set out to find general laws of socialist construction," questioned one member, "then are we really being scientific? Perhaps we will find fewer general laws than we think. We really should begin with an open mind."[31]

Unlike Rationalism and Liberalism, the virtue of Marxism lies in its promise to all men, regardless of station, of the fruits of technology and of the opportunity of effecting significant social change. Intentionality obtains in the translation of knowledge into productive action, in arduous labor and experimentation within the human situation where subject and object "are integrated into a single dialectical event, transformative of both.[32] Finally, "freedom is made identical with knowledge, and it thus becomes--intelligent action, or the scientifically informed production of both natural and social goods."[33] Were it not for zealously held metaphysical presuppositions, the Marxist view of intentionality would have to be taken seriously. Unfortunately, the dialectical laws governing the movement of nature and society are still forthcoming, and, although the Marxist allows for an elastic and accommodating timetable, e.g., capitalist retrenchments, the essential condition of testability would appear to be beyond reach. Still, by bringing the essentials of human freedom down to earth, the Marxist has forced us to face up to such nagging problems as equalitarian humanism, impartiality, rights and justice. This is certainly no humble accomplishment.

Dewey's concept of freedom bears remarkable resemblance to the Marxist account. There is the recognition that theory and practice are

intrinsically related; the reciprocity between man and environment is respected. Along with the Marxist, Dewey recognizes the inadequacy of the Spinozistic overemphasis on knowledge, Liberalism's neglect of social relations, the faith that the absence of restraints will alone facilitate the unfolding of natural potentialities. However, as with the older positions, the Marxist fails to account for the element of originality and creativity in choice. The inevitability of natural and historical development allows man, at best, to aid and hasten the process, but man cannot change it. The future is contained in the antecedent; the causal chain is inexorable; the outcome unfailingly predictable. Rather than this closed system, Dewey seeks "freedom in something which comes to be, in a certain kind of growth; in consequences, rather than in antecedents."[34] Antecedent conditioning falls under the purview of science and causal law, it deals with the "relations between things," but it fails to account for the "individualities of things."[35] Such individuality would have to be anathema for the Marxist. For him the locus of predictability resides in the antecedent; the relation between agent and object is inviolable; the resolution of tension between opposites always lawful. It would follow that, if intentionality is to have relevance for freedom, the consequences of choice must be considered as well as the antecedent conditions of choice.

Dewey is aware that intentionality is a necessary condition of freedom. "Choice would hardly be significant if it did not take effect in outward action," he says, and "the essential problem of freedom...is the

problem of the relation of choice and unimpeded effective action to each other."[36] The problem is the relation between freedom conceived as choice and freedom conceived as power-to-do. The failure of the positions surveyed above, viz., that freedom is either the unimpeded unfolding of innate potentialities--something antecedently possessed--or nothing at all, indicates that choice and power have been unduly dichotomized. A distinction between the two can be drawn for purposes of analysis, as in fact Dewey does, but he is quick to mark it as contrived and artificial:

> There is an intrinsic connection between choice as freedom and power of action as freedom. A choice which intelligently manifests individuality enlarges the range of action, and this enlargement in turn confers upon our desires greater insight and foresight, and makes choice more intelligent.[37]

If intentionality were conceived procedurally, the misleading dichotomy between theory and practice, thought and action would be surmounted. All things in nature, whether electrons, rocks, trees or man, act intentionally, but only man reflects intelligently; only man can trace the consequences of his choices. This does not mean that antecedent conditions are without value in the development of individual freedom; "these are, <u>when known</u>, aids to the development of that freedom."[38] But when one's intention is the outcome of reflective thinking, antecedents convey only part of the process; there is still the environment, the unique situation with its demand for choice involving new and perhaps surprising consequences. Obviously, choice, thinking and power of action are connected procedurally; consequences call for operations uniting the present with the future. In the words of a well-known contemporary analyst:

> What distinguishes sensible from silly operations is not their parentage but their procedure, and this holds no less for intellectual than for practical performances. "Intelligent" cannot be defined in terms of "intellectual"..."thinking what I am doing" does not connote "both thinking and what to do and doing it". When I do something intelligently, i.e., thinking what I am doing, I am doing one thing and not two. My performance has a special procedure or manner, not special antecedents.[39]

And, in an attack against the artificial distinction often drawn between thought and action, Hampshire asserts:

> A certain minimum of consistency and regularity is required in behaviour, if that behaviour is to be counted as intentional human action at all. There is here also the requirement of connectedness, of a trajectory of intention that fits a sequence of behaviour into an intelligible whole, intelligible as having a direction, the direction of means towards an end.[40]

As conceived procedurally, intentionality accords with common usage. As Dewey says, it allows for "what men actually cherish under the name of freedom," viz., "that power of varied and flexible growth, of change of disposition and character, that spring from intelligent choice."[41] It promotes individual growth, but not just from within, not just as conditioned by antecedents; rather, growth occurs as the agent interacts with the environmental context in pursuit of interests and goals. In fact, it is from a contextual setting that men derive their sense of freedom. Witness the relation between prison riots and prison reform, between totalitarian parents and nations and their recalcitrant offspring and subjects. Intentionality, if it is to express freedom, must involve individual participation. Aversive controls rend the ends-means continuum the agent associates with freedom; his choice, rather than being intelligent, is

coerced. Moreover, as conceived procedurally, intentionality accords with the causal principle. Although Dewey is occasionally ambiguous regarding this point, he does say that uniform relations and laws are a necessary factor in the development of power and freedom, for they "take effect in making preference, desire, and purpose more flexible, alert, and resolute."[42] Perhaps it is a matter of emphasis. By stressing the consequences of choice, Dewey wants to protect individual preference and creativity. This does not mean that the causal sequence breaks down, but only that the relation between the agent and the environment is not <u>pre-determined</u>. An intelligent choice is not a fatalistic choice; it can, however, comply with the causal principle in entirely new and unforeseen ways. The "choice" of combination among chemical elements is entirely determined quantitatively by weight. Human choice is variable and flexible; the determining factors--available genuine alternatives, quality reasons, unimpeded action--promote real individuality of choice.

In this section, an attempt has been made to formulate an adequate concept of freedom. It is proposed that such a concept is the prior condition for any ethical theory. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to formulate a concept of freedom which is compatible with the causal principle, while, at the same time, it does not violate common usage. Insofar as men cherish individuality of choice, causal relations and laws, rather than being impediments, provide lawful criteria by which the consequences of choice can be evaluated. In other words, projected consequences are not ends, they are hypothetical entities, ends-in-view.

Consequently, in order to overcome the limitations of hit-and-miss projections, an appreciation of causal relations becomes an invaluable asset to the agent. His hypotheses regarding future consequences are intelligent rather than guesses. Hence, even if the causal principle holds, this is not sufficient to vitiate a concept of freedom to which individuals can give their assent. It is hoped that the conditions of freedom explicated above will provide the framework within which the agent may enjoy the widest possible range of individual choice.

Indoctrination and the Concept of Freedom

Since freedom forms the foundation of any ethical theory, it follows that pedagogical techniques which undermine the concept of freedom developed above will, in turn, undermine the development of an adequate theory of moral education. Implicit in the concept of freedom is the requirement that the agent comes to see the point of his beliefs, choices and actions. Bodies of belief, doctrines or ethical codes containing _unquestioned basic assumptions_ are therefore liable to techniques of teaching obstructive to conditions of freedom. Of course, a doctrine or code of values can display internal coherency and consistency; to this extent it could pass muster as being rational and evidence-regarding. Still, if the basic assumptions are unquestioned, the curious student's query can only be met with irritation or silence. For instance, a class of children might be taught that biological life on earth has not passed through a process of evolutionary development, but exists today as it always has. Now it may be the case

that this position is coherent and consistent with a whole body of beliefs--say based on the literal interpretation of Biblical creation--and to this extent, certain evidence, such as Biblical quotations, and certain demonstrative principles can be adduced. But there is no doubt that certain assumptions have gone unquestioned. The beliefs of the curious student may be altered; he may accede to the basic assumptions of the position; his behavior might be modified on the basis of his altered beliefs, but has he come to see the point of his new orientation? Is his acceptance of the position in accord with the concept of freedom?

Where unquestioned assumptions form the basis of a doctrine, we might expect that the relation between teacher and student would be one of indoctrination, i.e., the conscious attempt by the teacher to alter the _beliefs_ of the student. Of course, if it were only a matter of modifying the _behavior_ of the student, methods of conditioning might be more appropriate. Yet most teachers, who themselves embrace a given doctrine, are quite anxious that their wards _voluntarily_ accede to the beliefs and directives of the doctrine. Moreover, it is clear that indoctrination involves bodies or systems of beliefs rather than isolated beliefs.[43] For instance, the teacher stands before the class and declares that "Springfield is the capital of Massachusetts." Certainly, the class may believe that it is; they may trust the knowledge of the teacher, but from the teacher's perspective, is this indoctrination? I would seem odd to suggest that it is. The teacher might be purposely lying or ignorant, but what would seem to be the logical case of indoctrination is the case where

the teacher believes what is taught. And, unless a given belief has reference to other facts and beliefs, it is unlikely that the teacher would hold the belief in question. Indoctrination involves bodies or systems of beliefs, such as a religious doctrine or a code of values.

It may be the case that there can be no body or system of beliefs without unquestioned assumptions. It might be argued that even the physical sciences hold to assumed canons and procedural techniques. However, the question addressed here is the relation of indoctrination to freedom, and ultimately, to moral education. Historically, a number of ethical codes have been grounded on normative principles which have been assumed. Obviously, indoctrination works with such codes; it is a viable tool in regard to a given doctrinal context. But the requirement of freedom, i.e., that the agent comes to see the point of his orientation, would seem to be missing. Consider the condition of genuine alternatives. Ethical codes based on assumed normative principles cannot vouchsafe genuine alternatives, viz., those alternatives proscribed by normative principles. One can easily imagine situations where a Kantian sense of duty must come into conflict with the Neitzschean will to power. Moreover, what reasons can an agent give for his actions, except to refer ultimately to assumed principles? Does this require reflective thinking--deliberation, insight and foresight? What of intentionality? One's intentions will always be dictated by the parameters of the system. Hence, although an ethical code with assumed principles can unquestionably profit from indoctrinational procedures, it does so at the risk of vitiating the very foundation of

ethics and morality, viz., freedom. It follows that indoctrination must be held inimical to the development of an adequate theory of moral education. This would hold as well for the deliberate and explicit dissemination of values in the school. However moral education is to be conceived, if freedom is to be preserved, such terms as "good" or "bad," "right" or "wrong," must be predicated on the basis of the student's experience, not the teacher's.

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CHAPTER II

ANTHROPOLOGY AND MORAL EDUCATION

Students in this writer's philosophy of education course often cite the facts of ethical diversity as substantive justification for an attitude of ethical subjectivity. "Do your own thing" is the contemporary cliché. Given a society or subgroup within a society, students point out, one is likely to encounter more diversity than homogeneity. General principles regulating choice and conduct, at best, are sanctioned by group enterprise; never can they be universalized for all peoples. Cultural and ethical diversity dispel the myth propounded by Herbert Spencer and E.B. Taylor of a "psychic unity of mankind." It follows, students contend, that there can be no basis for a theory of moral education. Questions as to what one ought to value and what one ought to do are answered by reference to the mores of one's society or by personal opinion and preference. It will therefore be the purpose of this chapter to investigate the significance of cultural and ethical diversity for the possibility of a theory of moral education.

Cultural Diversity and the Thesis of Cultural Relativity

Concern with cultural and ethical diversity is at least as old as the pre-Socratics. "To God all things are beautiful, good, and right," says Heraclitus, thereby assigning the onus of evaluation to man, for he will "deem some things right and others wrong."[1] And Protagoras contends, of the gods man can know nothing, hence, "of all things the measure is man."[2] By virtue of his station, man must evaluate, he is forced to be

an ethical creature. But how are we to explain the diversity? What inference(s) can be drawn from the obvious fact that ethical opinions differ? There appear to be at least four stages in the anthropological interpretation of the data of cultural and ethical diversity. The first stage, as Louch suggests, regards the anthropologist as traveller.[3] He enumerates the various practices of a given culture, he recites interesting stories about diet, economy, religion and sexual practices. Yet, the traveller's report hardly yields an adequate explanation of the diverse cultures encountered. He may, of course, qualify his experiences with such terms as "exotic," "alien" or "bizarre," but the question of why such-and-such is the case remains unresolved. Why polygamy or monogamy? Why infanticide or parricide? Cultural phenomena require explanation.

In the second stage there is a genuine attempt to interpret data. The variegated practices of a culture are perceived to be functionally related. No institution or general mode of behavior is to be considered in isolation from the conditions under which the culture operates as a whole. Moreover, since different cultures exhibit obvious functional disparities, the concept of cultural and ethical relativity begins to emerge as a contingent inference from the facts of cultural and ethical diversity. "The first impression which one receives from the study of a series of unrelated cultures is one of almost unlimited variety," observes Linton, and "since all the varied patterns function successfully as parts of one culture or another, the stage is set for the development of the concept of cultural relativity."[4] For instance, the phenomenon of the potlatch viewed

functionally is not merely the wasteful distribution of one's property; instead, one's social prestige is enhanced in proportion to one's resolve to be freed from material possessions. In like manner, the Dobuan obsession with yams is explained in terms of economy and social structure.

Characteristically, this initial stage of genuine cultural explanation asserts nothing about normative justification; the anthropologist assiduously avoids value judgements of cultural traits; ethical content is couched in metaethical explications. The meaning and justification of institutions and practices are sought in light of the entire functioning culture of which these traits are but parts. However, not all anthropologists have abjured personal evaluation. The third stage of the anthropological interpretation of cultural and ethical diversity regards attempts to imbue what is perceived as functional properties of cultures with normative status. As Herskovits says, "the very core of cultural relativism is the social discipline that comes of respect for differences--of mutual respect."[5] And in Man and His Works, the same writer says that "the relativists point of view brings into relief the validity of every set of norms for the people whose lives are guided by them."[6] The same call for tolerance can be found in the closing words of Benedict in her Patterns of Culture:

> We shall arrive then at a more realistic faith, accepting as grounds of hope and as new bases for tolerance the coexisting and equally valid patterns of life which mankind has created for itself from the raw materials of existence.[7]

Assuming the functional quality of cultural traits and the edict to abet mutual tolerance, the fourth stage of anthropological interpretation

materializes as a sophisticated anthropological thesis. The very fact that there exists cultural and ethical diversity should lead us to divest ourselves of the belief that ethical rules and principles can be universally justified. Given an opinion or action, about which there is ethical disagreement, there is no rational way in which the disagreement can be resolved. As Brandt formulates the general relativist thesis: "There are conflicting ethical opinions that are equally valid."[8] Derivatively, given the same subject or set of conditions, there can be conflicting ethical evaluations which cannot be adjudicated. This of course does not mean that there are no ethical opinions universally held by mankind, but only that where ethical opinions do conflict, there can be no rational method by which the conflict can be resolved. The only justifiable position, in light of ethical diversity, is one of skeptical or solipsistic reserve, albeit, tempered with tolerance.

And certainly tolerance seems to be the most compelling feature about this thesis, an attitude which might very well lead to our uncritical approbation. As relativists we are enabled to allow for an unlimited variety of possibilities, egocentrism is avoided, and brotherly love flourishes. Yet, if there is no way to adjudicate conflicting ethical opinions, and since tolerance is certainly an ethical opinion, can it really serve the relativist's cause? Can the relativist consistently hold that tolerance is to be preferred to intolerance? Moreover, as Marcuse points out, tolerance often leads to intolerance. In a critique of Comte's positive philosophy, which ostensibly calls for objectivity and an attitude of

tolerance, Marcuse indicates that in reality Comte cannot abide "standards that go beyond given realities" and the "prevailing social system," so that "the cry of toleration became increasingly useful to the beneficiaries of the system."[9] Forces of revolution as well as of reaction are met head-on by the tyranny of the majority. Then too, the cry for toleration tends to blind us of the possibility of common features among cultures, features which could provide a basis for empathy and better understanding among people. And, indeed, why should not one question the ethical propriety of many cultural practices regardless of their functional expediency? Should tolerance be an inviolable principle without any regard for the consequences of holding the principle?

Failure of the Thesis of Ethical Relativity

There is an even more interesting philosophic question at stake. How has the anthropologist managed to move from the empirical fact of diversity to the general thesis of cultural and ethical relativity? What is the basis for this surprising inference? For instance, in his account of the development of folkways, Sumner says "need was the impelling force," need mediated by pleasure and pain was the only "psychical power." All else evolved from this: habits, customs, the expediencies of the group.[10] One might suspect that Sumner is attempting to explain diversity either causally or deductively. On the one hand, if the explanation is causal, in what sense are basic needs sufficient conditions for cultural traits? Do we not require a more precise explanation of the causal relation between needs and their cultural expression, why a given set of needs _must_ be related to certain cultural traits and to no others? On the other hand, if

the explanation is in terms of deductive inference, a similar problem of precision is encountered. Let us assume that human basic needs are empirically ascertainable, and, when enumerated along with initial environmental conditions, provide premises from which habits, customs and expediencies can be logically inferred. Still, how can we deduce from a set of premises containing no value terms a conclusion which does? Have we not violated the canons of validity? If medical science discovers that fluoridation stops tooth decay, it does not logically follow that we ought to fluoridate. Insofar as habits, customs and expediencies are value laden--enforced through prescription and proscription--their genesis cannot be explained merely in terms of empirically enumerated basic needs. As the Edels see it, anthropological inferences "are like enthymemes, whose missing premises--whether of value, fact, definition, metaphysics--would be the most interesting and possibly surprising parts of their analysis."[11] As in the example above, a valid deductive argument can be effected by the introduction of the hidden premise that "We ought to stop tooth decay." Sumner, however, is like an ideal observer. He extrapolates from diversity to the original "psychical power" of need and then proceeds to justify that in terms of empirical data. The argument appears circular, and without further justification, is no more than an enthymeme. A fortiori, the same can be said of all relativists who hold that differing ethical opinions cannot be adjudicated. They must first produce the basis for their inference. Is it deductive? inductive? causal? or what? Secondly, the status of their premises must be established. Are they inductive? assumed

or stipulative? huristic? metaphysical? or what? In short, the thesis of cultural and ethical relativity cannot rest on an intuitive inference from the facts of cultural and ethical diversity.

Asch has attempted to explain the anthropological hiatus between evidence and inference. Between external conditions and actions by an agent, there exists meaning and evaluation, knowledge and understanding. The relativists, however, have failed to take cognizance of these intervening steps. Instead, they have tacitly assumed as their explanatory model the structure of stimulus-response psychology. As Asch explains it, the theory "asserts that one can at will attach to a given situation S_1 any number of acts, feelings, and evaluations, depending on the consequences that follow.[12] Simply by manipulating rewards and punishments the same situation is compatible with a number of responses. Hence, the relativists thesis follows, viz., that it is possible in identical situations for there to be opposed evaluations. As Sumner would have it, pleasure and pain are the mediating forces; the agent is enculturated through tradition, imitation and authority. This causal explanation attenuates the possibility of a conscious grasp of the relation between act and consequence, between habitual modes of behavior and rewards and punishments. As Dewey would say, there has been an omission of the role of intelligence in the determination of choice and action:

> The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends--to free experience from routine and caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action....

> Intelligence _as_ intelligence is inherently forward-looking; only by ignoring its primary function does it become a mere means for an end already given. The latter _is_ servile, even when the end is labeled moral, religious, or esthetic.[13]

In the last chapter the role of intelligence or reflective thinking was emphasized in connection with conditions of freedom. When those considerations are applied here, one might surmise that some anthropologists have denied man's freedom, that they have perceived the major determining factor in human motivation to be antecedent events. Perhaps the apparent coherency and consistency of various modes of behavior encountered in societies has led anthropologists to identify such factors as authority and tradition as conspicuous cultural determinants. Nevertheless, and momentarily leaving aside the question of the role of intelligence, the thesis of cultural and ethical relativity makes a stronger claim than the contention that there exists a causal relation between antecedent and consequence. It says in addition that there can be conflicting ethical opinions of the _same_ subject. Moreover, the relativist wants to show that societies differ in a fundamental way, e.g., that diverse ethical practices indicate diverse ethical rules and principles. One might wonder how the relativist can maintain these points without undercutting his own thesis. On the one hand, if societies have different rules and principles, then it is difficult to see in what sense the _same_ subject is at stake. On the other hand, if societies have identical rules and principles yet have diverse ethical practices, this might support the thesis (insofar as identical rules and principles imply the _same_ subject), but only by default,

for then the relativist would be forced to forfeit his cherished corollaries: the validity of abiding tolerance, subjective and solipsistic ethical appraisal, the essential differences separating societies. The existence of identical rules and principles, rather than supporting the thesis of cultural and ethical relativity, would seem to support an opposing thesis, one denoting the common bonds uniting societies.

Then there is the problem of identifying the _same_ subject. To make his point, the relativist must show that there can be different societies manifesting conflicting ethical opinions regarding the _same_ subject, that is, situations, perceived and understood in essentially the same way by members of different societies. Relativism, as Asch contends, "if it is to be psychologically valid, must assert that one can attach different evaluations to situations that have the same cognitive and emotional content."[14] But in order to show the same cognitive and emotional content, the relativist must guarantee that _his_ data is accurate--that his informants have devulged the truth to him regarding their respective societies and that he has interpreted the beliefs expressed correctly, without expunging crucial relations or imputing his own evaluations. For instance, the phenomenon of infanticide might rest in beliefs or attitudes which, for some reason of deficiency of data or interpretation, are glossed by the relativist--in one society beliefs concerning what it is to be human, while in another, attitudes concerning population control. Unless these beliefs and attitudes are uncovered by the relativist, and though he may believe he has described the _same_ subject on the basis of brute data, i.e.,

the killing of infants, he obviously will not have been in a position to describe correctly the significance of the practice as it occurs in the respective societies. Not only will he have failed to describe the same subject, but he will have failed to establish the necessary condition required for exposing a conflict of ethical opinions--if in fact such a conflict exists. And we might wonder how extensively societies must be probed in order to fulfull this requirement. To the extent that differences of belief or attitude could be cited to explain similarities of practice in different societies, the same subject would appear to be elusively out of reach. Where would the regress end and where would we draw the line? What then is the basis for a conflict of ethical opinions? In the third and final chapters of this dissertation, it will be argued that the theoretical basis for a conflict of ethical opinions is misconstrued--that the real basis for conflict is to be detected in differences of approach to problems arising from contextual situations. In the meantime, though the theoretical requirement seems straightforward, there would appear to be insuperable difficulties attending the relativist's empirical task, and the contention that there can be differing ethical opinions regarding the same subject remains problematic.

Thus far the relativist's position would appear vulnerable. It is at least logically possible that various cultures might enjoy certain general ethical principles in common. It would not be necessary for these principles to be verbally available to an agent. It is conceivable that he could act according to principle without explicit assent. In fact, one

of the probable weaknesses of the relativist's position is his insistence on some sort of tenacious relation between ethical practices and ethical principles, as though, in cookbook fashion, the agent's choices and actions are to be precisely determined. It is doubtful that general principles can be applied in this way. Peters makes the point that principles "cannot prescribe precisely what we ought to do, but at least they rule out certain courses of action and sensitize us to features of a situation which are morally relevant. They function more as signposts than as guidebooks."[15] Accordingly, if it could be shown that diverse ethical practices are not necessarily indicative of diverse ethical principles, and if the relation between the individual and group can be shown to be not wholly determined by the quality of culture, then relativism would have to be held suspect. There appear to be two considerations at stake. In the first place, the relativist may be confusing lower order rules with principles. If indeed principles are implicit in the agent's choices and actions, the relativist's informant may not produce an accurate account of ultimate ethical concern. It is entirely possible for a descriptive metaethical statement to be true while the normative assertion of an informant is false; an informant may lie or otherwise be himself misinformed. For example, tradition and authority, as we have witnessed in Sumner's case, are often cited as ultimate ethical determinants by the anthropologist, both in terms of his personal apprehension of the culture and in terms of reinforcement by the testimony of his informants. But the <u>content</u> of tradition and authority may be concerned more with rules for carrying out principles than the

actual principles themselves. By imbuing himself with his adversary's powers, one might consider the cannibal's actions under the rubrics of war, under practical rules rather than ethical principles. In the second place, the relativist fails to take account of the individual agent, his unique perception of the situation, his determination to bend the rules (possibly principles) and interpret the facts in terms of the problem at hand. One is reminded of the deviant Mondugamors who retreat to the lofty cliffs surrounding the community to lead the lives of hermits rather than accede to the practices of the group. As suggested before, the relativist disregards the role of intelligence; he views cultures as complex wholes; he selects evidence supportive of his thesis while glossing individual initiative. For the individual and group "the same external situation may possess quite varied meanings, depending upon the existing level of knowledge and other conditions. The resulting differences of action may therefore not be due to a diversity of principle."[16] There is no reason to believe that an individual, no matter how insular his group, is just the victim of external determinants. The anthropologist must allow for individual cognition.

There is good reason to think that cognition, or as we have previously defined it, the exercise of intelligence, is central to ethical belief and discourse wherever encountered. In the first place, recent philosophers, such as Dewey,[17] Frankena,[18] Ladd,[19], and McClintock,[20] have pointed out that ethics is not a theoretical body of knowledge, in the sense that it lies logically independent of contingent considerations; rather, ethics is

a practical rational discipline. Ethical belief and discourse are to be understood in terms of general practical discourse:

> There are a number of types of practical discourse. For example, one type is concerned with the playing and winning of games, another with conducting a military establishment, another with running for political office, another with conducting a scientific experiment, and so on....Each has fundamental criteria or principles...in terms of which justificatory reasons are given for practical judgements...in terms of which people can be motivated to act....[21]

Continuing this characterization of ethical discourse, it is obvious that since the requisite criteria are determined by the domain or type of practical discourse at hand, the agent is forced to take cognizance of the contextual setting in which problems arise. At times the contextual demands laid upon the agent will be decided by fiat, habit or custom. The rules of the game govern choice and action; one violates them at his peril; appropriate penalties are inforced. However, there are times when contexual settings exhibit unique features, for conditions often do change, and the agent is forced to rely upon his own perception of the situation. It is then that rules and principles from other domains of practical discourse impinge upon the agent. One may not ordinarily lie or cheat, but under specified conditions, say to save a person's life, one might resort to atypical behavior. In this way the usual hypothetical imperatives employed in a concrete situation can give way to those of more categorical duration. It would follow that in order to differentiate that part of practical discourse concerned with typically moral or ethical issues is to identify those rules and principles that reign superior and ultimate:

> _For a given person_ his moral or ethical statements are those of his practical statements which _he_ regards as superior and ultimate. That is, they are those judgments, rules and principles (including arguments) of a practical sort which he regards: (1) as overriding any other sorts of practical judgments, rules, and principles with which they might (or do) come into conflict; and (2) as being the final court of appeal in justifying or showing to be unjustified people's acting or not acting in certain circumstances.[22]

Consequently, the agent must exercise intelligence; he identifies leading principles which have served in the past; he sees their relevance to the _present_ concrete situation. Rules and principles do not become ultimate and superior because of any absolute or inviolable imperative; rather, their relevance obtains just because fiat, habit and custom are arbitrary, because they are unfit to solve the problem at hand. Even the most ardent Kantian, no matter how much he may disagree with this position, must admit that allegiance to the categorical realm is insufficient to decide the problem of applicability. Whether one eschews stealing or exhorts the sanctity of life in a given case requires deliberation to ascertain whether the contingent realm is relevant to principle. It would be foolish to legislate "Thou shalt not steal" in a situation which fails to call for it. No moral philosopher, any more than the individual agent, can escape the role of intelligence in the determination of the relation between moral decision and principle.

In the second place, the centrality of intelligence to ethical belief and discourse is to be recorded in the distinction between motivation and justification. The rules and principles governing a realm of practical discourse may themselves be sufficient to motivate the agent to action,

and it is possible that, as under aversive conditions, these rules and principles alone are perceived as justification for a given act. But, as we observed in the last chapter, unless good reasons can be given for an act, the agent is held to be compelled rather than free; his is not a responsible and hence a moral or an ethical act. The distinction between the motivational and justificatory use of practical discourse discloses that, if freedom is absent, there can be no question of ethical principle at issue. For there to be moral or ethical import, in answer to the question "What ought I to do?", the agent is entitled to good and sufficient reasons for choosing and acting in a certain way. The rules and principles of a realm of practical discourse will suffice, in the justificatory sense, only if they are good and sufficient reasons for motivation. An agent can always legitimately ask of any reasons given for or against a given act whether the reasons do in fact justify or indict the act. The force of theories of mechanical motivation, such as stimulus-response, are therefore vitiated by the distinction between motivation and justification; the reasons given for a particular action, in an ethical sense, will override those rules and principles of practical discourse based upon purely arbitrary grounds. In fact the anthropologist cannot cite the stimulus-response model in the identification of ethical and moral content, because the model is insufficient to differentiate the typically ethical and moral realm of practical discourse. There is no reason to believe that in general societies fail to make the distinction between motivation and justification, between blind obedience and reasoned choice and action.

It becomes increasingly evident that cultural diversity cannot support ethical relativity. Since the exercise of intelligence is a necessary condition for ethical belief and discourse, the anthropologist's descriptive statements, although perhaps true, may not have as their subject ethical or moral content. As we have seen, descriptive statements are metaethical, they differ in regard to truth conditions from normative statements. Depending on such variables as the informant's reasons and factual beliefs, his perception of the situation, the rules and principles he is prepared to exercise, a belief or an act may or may not have ethical or moral significance. It follows that since these variables can conceivably differ with each agent, inferences from anthropological description to ethical relativity must ultimately show diversity at the level of ethical and moral principles. Unless it were known whether ethical principles were at issue, known that beliefs and acts were related _only_ to some other domain of practical discourse, the descriptive picture of the agent would be incomplete. There would be no bases for establishing conflicting ethical or moral opinions that might support the thesis of ethical relativity. As McClintock contends, "until a diversity of moral principles has been found, it cannot be known that a diversity of morals has been discovered. What might have been discovered is a diversity of practical judgments or rules of different kinds."[23] It would not serve the anthropologist to cite diverse cultural practices in defense of his position; as enumerated general patterns, these practices carry no explanatory weight in ethical or moral terms. The anthropologist would have to know, in addition, _how_ the _individual_

agent arrives at his beliefs and actions. Of course, it is probably true that all cultures extol certain virtues. Parents, teachers, politicians and ecclesiastical authorities all disseminate normative advice, and, insofar as the anthropologist is merely calling attention to cultural differences in terms of these avowals, there would be little reason to argue. However, such evidence of relativity is trivial; it is torn from the context in which ethical and moral discourse obtains; it is torn from the lives of the individuals who make ethical and moral decisions. Whether individuals actually accord justice, honesty, truthfulness and trustworthiness ultimate and superior authority can only be ascertained through an exhaustive analysis of individual motivation and justification. It is suggested that such an analysis could very well reveal much more commonality than diversity among the peoples of the world.

Is There a Way to Identify Ethical Universals?

It should be acknowledged that some anthropologists have attempted to uncover common features of cultures rather than emphasize alleged differences. Kluckhohn and Murray cite such inescapable constants as biological inheritance, sexual differentiation, care of infants, adjustment to social life, food, shelter, and clothing, and they conclude that "these universalities of human life produce comparable effects upon the developing personalities of men of all times, places, and races."[24] And in another place Kluckhohn enumerates common structural categories to be used in the study of cultures, but readily admits there is no guarantee these can be filled with uniform cross-cultural content, unless "one states the

content in extremely general form--e.g., clothing, shelter, incest taboos, and the like."[25] These rigid generalities tell us little about the distinctively ethical and moral realm of practical discourse. In the Edels' words, "these are so general that they are more nearly universal principles of social organization than statements about moral agreements."[26] Allowing that these empty categories signify universal concerns of all cultures, it would seem that the crucial consideration, in ethical and moral terms, is whether the _potential_ exists of objective norms as a means of coping with these concerns. This would indeed be cross-cultural content relevant to ethical universals. The various strategies employed by individuals and groups to solve their problems, the individual and collective exercise of intelligence, could identify the locus of the convergence of ethical and moral norms. As witnessed before, the task of the anthropologist cannot rest in mere descriptions of diverse practices and _prima facie_ interpretations, but in an analysis of the way individuals _actually_ grapple with the problems which arise in the social and environmental context. It is the proficient and consistent schemes and strategies actually employed which mark the arduous construction of ethical and moral content. "We must recognize that the mind has a pattern, a scheme of arrangement in its constituent elements," explains Dewey, "and...it is the business of a serious comparative psychology to exhibit these patterns, forms or types in detail."[27] In other words, the anthropologist is charged with the identification of the method by which certain ethical norms gain ascendancy in the lives of individuals. If the method is held as a common

possession, its exposure might lead to the discovery of a common articulation of norms. If the method presupposes rational and objective criteria of judgment and evaluation, it seems reasonable to suppose that some of these would stand the test of universality.

There may be important empirical evidence to support the universality of certain ethical and moral norms. Kohlberg takes a developmental approach to moral awareness. Backed by empirical investigations, six rather distinct stages of ethical and moral development are to be encountered in all societies. Universality obtains in two respects: (1) for individuals and groups, the stages themselves are universal; each succeeding stage *logically* presupposes the preceding stage; and (2) stage six comprises ethical and moral principles which potentially could gain universal assent:

> Our findings lead us to conclude that there are differences in fundamental principles between individuals or between groups, differences in stage.[28]

Moreover, Kohlberg's investigations appear to confirm our above contention that moral judgment centrally involves cognitive development:

> Effective moral channeling mechanisms are cognitive principles defining situations....While more than truth value is involved in moral principles, the analogy is that you follow moral principles in a situation because you feel they correctly define that situation, not because of an abstract affective identification with these principles as verbal abstractions.[30]

Cognitive awareness is to a great extent a function of social relationships, especially role-taking, so that "the precondition for a moral conflict is man's capacity for role-taking."[31] Here, Kohlberg cites the pioneer work of Piaget, Mead and Baldwin who suggest, as opposed to the

stultification associated with a particular value system, that role-taking is basic to moral development, that it defines rights and obligations and the reciprocity between individuals and groups. Finally, moral conflicts arising from social relationships will be adequately mediated by principles of justice which are only completely articulated in stage six:

> In our view, mature principles are neither rules (means) nor values (ends), but are guides to perceiving and integrating all the morally relevant elements in concrete situations.... If our formal characterization of the functioning of mature principles is correct, it is clear that only principles of justice have an ultimate claim to being adequate universal, prescriptive principles. By definition, principles of justice are principles for deciding between competing claims of individuals, for "giving each man his due."[32]

There are patent dangers in Kohlberg's analysis. Not only do the stages appear stipulative of morality, but even if we grant their vitality, there is the danger of catapulting these psychological findings into a self-contained normative position. Each stage tends to become an index of the relative worth of that stage; the criteria defining successive increments of development tend to become value criteria. In this regard, stages four, five and six offer instructive contrasts. The essential difference between stages four and five is that between a law-maintaining perspective and a law-making perspective. Law and order, regardless of source or content, dominates stage four, while in stage five, contractual and voluntary considerations of law are the dominant themes. However, neither the law-maintaining or law-making perspectives are as "high" a stage of development as the principles of justice generated in stage six, "because the claims of law and contract my be deduced from them."[33]

Admittedly, it would not be difficult for many of us to bestow normative advantage upon these stages by virtue of their defining characteristics. What is crucial for Kohlberg's position is whether the defining characteristics are related to empirically ascertained states-of-affairs.

Kohlberg denies he is making a normative appraisal of the stages; rather, it is the adequacy and scope of a given stage in resolving moral conflicts which assures its position. Unlike the cognitive preconditions for it, Kohlberg finds morality to be "a unique, _sui generis_ realm," definable by a _formalistic_ set of criteria:

> We define morality in terms of the formal character of a moral judgment, method, or point of view, rather than in terms of its content. Impersonality, ideality, universalizability, preemptiveness, etc., are the formal characteristics of a moral judgment. These are best seen in the reasons given for a moral judgment, a moral reason being one which has these properties.[34]

It is not clear that this definition of morality avoids begging the question. It is likely that "the reasons given for a moral judgment" include characteristics of both form and content (at least Kohlberg fails to make clear where the disjunction between the two occurs), thereby casting "impersonality, ideality, universalizability, preemptiveness, etc." in the role of _arbitrary_ criteria of morality. The message seems to be that morality based on reasons describing rules, factual beliefs or the idiosyncrasies of an informant (content) nourishes an inadequate relativistic position, while reasons describing principles of justice (form), being entirely general, abet universal acclamation. However, even if we allow that justice has been adequately articulated, why should morality be defined in terms of reasons describing _only_ formal properties? Why should

the reasons given describe a sui generis realm somehow discontinuous with the cognitive features which are its precondition? Kohlberg maintains that his developmental definition of morality approximates the philosopher's position. Yet, the philosophers he has in mind are those formalists from Kant to Sidgwick and Ross, and more recently, such quasi-formalists as Hare and Rawls. Needless to say, not all moral philosophers hold a formalist position, e.g., naturalists and emotivists, and whether morality describes a unique realm having unique criteria needs to be clearly shown if Kohlberg's position is to be upheld. This is not to say that "impersonality, ideality, universalizability, preemptiveness" have no bearing on morality, but only to question their alleged status independent of such cognitive features as facts and beliefs. At best, Kohlberg has shown that cognitive development parallels moral development, but the significance of this beyond mere coincidence is lost in the formalistic definition. The precise relation between the two needs to be spelled out if cognition is indeed the precondition of morality. Kohlberg argues that cognitive development is a necessary condition of morality, but he must further show why it is not sufficient as well. His final defense is unconvincing:

> Philosophers who offer alternative definitions of morality do so because they ignore formal features of morality, and define it instead in terms of the particular content of the normative morality they advocate. To my knowledge, those who object to a formalist definition of morality have no positive alternative to offer except (a) morality is what is in accord with my own system, or (b) morality is relative. Regardless of psychology, then, our conception of morality has a strong philosophical base. Anyone who tries to criticize it must provide a stronger positive alternative.[35]

The purpose of the following chapters will be to explicate and defend an alternative definition of morality. However, this is not meant to impugn some interesting and potentially important results of Kohlberg's investigations. Empirical studies such as his are surely needed if cross-cultural norms are to be identified. Moreover, the cited parallelism between cognitive and moral development at least accords with our contention that there exists a typically ethical and moral realm of practical discourse. Consequently, while a formalist interpretation of Kohlberg's empirical data is plausible, it would not appear to be the only alternative; a naturalistic interpretation could prove to be viable provided an isomorphic relation can be exhibited between ethical and moral discourse and cognitive considerations in general. The various realms of practical discourse may describe unique classes for purposes of analysis, but it does not follow that in practice they are unrelated. On the contrary, our philosophical analysis would indicate that ethical and moral discourse is coextensive with and constructed out of the cognitive features which prevail in all problematic contextual situations. The task, then, is to eliminate the false dichotomy between cognition and morality.

Anthropology and Moral Education

The burden of this chapter has been to examine the significance of cultural and ethical diversity for the possibility of a theory of moral education. It has been argued that diversity cannot support a general thesis of cultural and ethical relativity. It follows that diversity cannot be inimical to a theory of moral education. Questions concerning

choice and action, in an ethical and moral sense, are not answered merely on the basis of societal mores or personal preference. On the one hand, to define morality exclusively in terms of social propriety involves practical rules to the exclusion of ethical or moral discourse. On the other hand, a definition of morality in terms of subjective preference neglects the role of intelligence and objective public criteria in the determination of choice and action. The suggestion has been that diversity is generally due to the presence of compelling cultural forces such as tradition, authority and lower order rules. As these are augmented by the exercise of individual and group intelligence, the distinctively ethical and moral realm of practical discourse emerges, a convergence of principles may be expected; motivation and justification for choice and action are perceived in light of objective criteria available to the individual and group. Implied are certain structural features a theory of moral education might contain. These features will be further explicated in subsequent chapters.

(1) It is submitted that ethical and moral principles cannot be disseminated as such. One cannot _just_ teach morality any more than one can _just_ teach knowledge and truth. The suggestion is tendered that the traditional techniques associated with the term "teaching" (instruction, training, conditioning, indoctrination, demonstration and example, etc.) are not sufficient conditions for learning morality or knowledge, because they are compatible with conditions of both truth and falsity. Teaching techniques can be utilized with false as well as true material; the

criteria needed to differentiate the two are not logically embedded in the techniques themselves. Hence, in addition to teaching techniques, other conditions are necessary in order to guarantee moral agency.

(2) Perhaps the most important additional condition concerns the activity of the pupil. Even if it is granted that teaching is a necessary condition of morality, a concession which has been disputed, the burden must ultimately be shared with the pupil. The demand for the exercise of intelligence requires the active participation of the pupil. Hence, one comes to be moral not that one is taught morality.

(3) It is submitted that no artificial distinction between cognitive and moral realms is sound. A theory of moral education, if the arguments of this chapter and the last are convincing, would have to involve objective public criteria of judgment. This is especially evident in the reasons given for motivation and justification, in the intelligent manifestation of deliberation, evaluation and insight, in the determination of the agent to construct general principles out of the demands of contextual problems situations. The "is/ought" controversy of contemporary moral philosophy would therefore appear amenable to a naturalist solution.

Footnotes

1. Kathleen Freeman, _Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 31

2. _Ibid_., p. 125

3. A.R. Louch, "Anthropology and Moral Explanation," _Monist_, Vol. 47, No. 4, Summer, 1963, p. 612

4. Ralph Linton, "The Problem of Universal Values," in _Method and Perspective in Anthropology_, ed. by Robert F. Spencer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954).

5. Melville J. Herskovits, _Cultural Anthropology_ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), p. 365

6. Melville J. Herskovits, _Man and His Works_ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), p. 76

7. Ruth Benedict, _Patterns of Culture_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), p.278

8. Richard B. Brandt, _Ethical Theory_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 272

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10. W.G. Sumner, _Folkways_, quoted from Solomon E. Asch, _Social Psychology_ (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1952).

11. May Edel and Abraham Edel, "The Confrontation of Anthropology and Ethics," _Monist_, Vol. 47, No. 4, Summer, 1963, p. 490

12. Solomon E. Asch, _Social Psychology_ (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1952).

13. John Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" in _On Experience, Nature, and Freedom_, ed. by Richard J. Bernstein (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1960), p. 65

14. Asch, _op. cit_.,

15. Richard S. Peters, "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions" in _Moral Education_, ed. by Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 34

16. Asch, op. cit.

17. John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.), see especially Chap. XIV, "The Logic of Judgments of Practice."

18. William K. Frankena, "Recent Conceptions of Morality," in Morality and the Language of Conduct, ed. by Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), p. 2

19. John Ladd, "The Issue of Relativism," Monist, Vol. 47, No. 4, Summer, 1963, p. 586

20. T.L. McClintock, "The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals," Monist, Vol. 47, No. 4, Summer, 1963, pp. 534-35

21. Ibid., p. 534

22. Ibid., p. 535

23. Ibid., p. 539

24. Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, "Outline of a Conception of Personality," in Personality in Nature, Society and Culture, ed. by Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray and David M. Schneider (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956), p. 24

25. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture," in Anthropology Today, ed. by A.L. Kroeber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953)

26. May Edel and Abraham Edel, op. cit., p. 490

27. John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), p. 175

28. Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development," unpublished manuscript for a chapter in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. by T. Mischel, Academic Press, p. 38

29. Ibid., p. 40

30. Ibid., pp. 100-01

31. Ibid., p. 62

32. Ibid., p. 91

33. Ibid., p. 82

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35. Ibid., p. 89

CHAPTER III

NATURALISM AND ITS OPPONENTS

The aim of this chapter will be threefold: (1) to explicate the current debate between naturalists and anti-naturalists; (2) to defend naturalism against its detractors; and (3) to indicate the general features and problems of naturalism. Naturalism will be identified principally in two ways. First, as the normative claim that ethical and moral problems can be settled by empirically gleaned facts, especially those arising out of the methodology employed in the empirical sciences; second, as the metaethical claim that ethical and moral judgments are factual assertions, or that descriptive predicates can be substituted for evaluative predicates. There will then be dissenting anti-naturalist theses corresponding to both positive claims, and, although a clear demarcation appears futile, it is still helpful to acknowledge these distinctions. For instance, an anti-naturalist, while holding the metaethical position that value judgments are not factual assertions, could agree with the normative position of naturalism that ethical and moral judgments are rendered more or less appropriate on the basis of factual content. However, since it is the metaethical claim that has captured the current debate, most of the subsequent discussion will focus on what has been termed the "is/ought question" or the "fact/value question." The central problem throughout the chapter, then, will be the attempt to unravel the relation between description and evaluation.

The Anti-Naturalist Refutation of Naturalism

Contemporary anti-naturalists often acknowledge Hume to be their precursor. In a famous passage in his Treatise, Hume avows that all the moralists he knows make an "imperceptible" move from assertions of God's existence or observations of human affairs using the "usual copulations of prepositions, *is*, and *is not*" to prepositions "connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*." For Hume, the consequence of this move is all important; it necessitates a reason be given "for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."[1] Opponents of naturalism have interpreted this passage to mean that no set of descriptive nonmoral premises can logically entail a normative conclusion; there exists a logical hiatus between description and evaluation, between *is* and *ought*. True, there have been conflicting interpretations of the passage, and some have even proffered a naturalist reading.[2] Nevertheless, R.M. Hare, perhaps the present leading expositor of anti-naturalism, refers to himself as "a stout defender of Hume's doctrine that one cannot deduce moral judgements from non-moral statements of fact.[3]

Readers of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica, 1903, will discover our century's most influential affirmation of the anti-naturalist interpretation of Hume's position. Although he does not refer to Hume in the index, Moore's insistence on the indefinability of "good" and the *sui generis* basis of moral questioning complements the traditional interpretation of Hume and focuses the contemporary Anglo-American moral debate. Emotivists

and prescriptivists, while eschewing his intuitionism, have generally applauded Moore's refutation of naturalism. Moore's influence suggests three issues in connection with Principia Ethica: (1) arguments for the indefinability of "good"; (2) the relation of (1) to the interpretation and critique of naturalism; and (3) the scope and nature of ethical reasoning based on (1) and (2).

In regard to the first issue, the indefinability of "good," Moore states in the preface his reasons for writing the book. "I have tried," he says, "to distinguish clearly two kinds of question, which moral philosophers have always professed to answer, but which...they have almost always confused both with one another and with other quesitions." These are: "What kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes?" and "What kind of actions ought we to perform?"[4] Provided we have a clear understanding of these questions, we should be enabled to discover what kind of evidence, if any, would count in support of moral judgments, what moral judgments are susceptible of proof. In general Moore's answer to the first question is that things intrinsically good ought to exist for their own sakes; the subject matter of ethics will therefore be "the general enquiry into what is good."[5] Given an enumeration of things good in themselves, the second question is answered by causal or factual reference to goodness, i.e., those actions ought to be performed which eventuate in the most goodness under the circumstances. Presumably, other moral predicates, "obligation" and "duty" for instance, are to be treated in the same derivative manner. In sum, there are two classes of moral predicates, one containing predicates

for which no evidence will count and the other containing predicates with evidential foundation in the first.

In the first chapter, Moore continues his examination of the predicate "good," far less often its converse "bad." If the problem were merely verbal, a stipulative or lexical definition would suffice to tell us the meaning of "good," use of a dictionary to ascertain how "good" is used in English. But this would be of no philosophic interest. The important case of definition, Moore thinks, occurs through "analysis" of the "object or idea" for which a word stands, "definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean."[6] Now it is plain to Moore that any object or idea capable or definition in the important sense, a real definition, must be complex and rendered by an enumeration of parts which compose a whole, as when "horse" is defined in terms of legs, heart, lungs, etc., arranged in definite relations to one another. It is equally plain to Moore that "good" cannot be defined in the requisite sense. Consider an analogy to color words. The physicist can quantify yellow things in terms of frequency, wave length and position on a spectrum, but this is not what is meant by the term "yellow" denoting the simple and unanalyzable property. Just as we judge a thing to be yellow by virtue of its having the simple property of yellowness, so we judge a thing to be good solely by virtue of its having the simple property of goodness. Moore admits the conclusion to be drawn may seem very disappointing:

> If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked "How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it.[7]

Moore's concept of definition is puzzling. It seems clear he thinks that if some things are complex and thereby capable of analysis, they must arise from simple and unanalyzable things without parts. This is a view, perhaps natural, long held by philosophers (although now discredited), Descartes, Leibniz and the Logical Atomists for example, and Moore is here merely voicing a traditional view of definition. Analysis of complex terms will expose the simple ultimate underpinnings of experience, and since good or goodness is one of these simple elements, for "good" to have a meaning it must denote, name, or otherwise stand for this ultimate substantive. It does not seem to have occurred to Moore, at least in Principia, that "good" might be defined in terms of its function, in evoking certain actions or expressing certain motives, in commanding or giving approbation. As we shall see, it was left to more recent anti-naturalists, emotivists and prescriptivists, to expand functional definitions of "good" at the expense of the substantive. At any rate, by virtue of his paradoxical explication of definition and meaning, Moore holds "good" to be referable to a property, but "good" itself remains undefinable.

Often it is unclear whether Moore is concerned with a word or concept, or with something denoted by a word, such as a property or characteristic. However, when he offers arguments to back his claim that "good" is indefinable, it is clear he thinks that only two other alternatives are possible:

> In fact, if it is not the case that 'good' denotes something simple and indefinable, only two alternatives are possible: either it is a complex, a given whole, about the correct analysis of which there may be disagreement; or else it means nothing at all, and there is no such subject as Ethics.[8]

The former alternative, that "good" (assuming that Moore means the word or concept) is complex, "may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it may always be asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good."[9] Referred to as the "open-question test or argument," the point is that for any proposed definition of "good," say that "good" means produces pleasure, it is always significant to ask (or doubt the initial definition) "Is what produces pleasure good?" It is significant to ask this question, because if it is the case that "good" means produces pleasure, then whatever produces pleasure is good, and this is no more than saying that whatever produces pleasure produces pleasure; the predicate "good" loses cognitive significance. But obviously, argues Moore, when one says "good" means produces pleasure, one has before the mind two different notions, not the trivial tautology that X is X. Certainly, a person genuinely concerned with moral issues wants to affirm more than a simple identity, but this being the case, it is always an open-question whether any proposed definition is adequate. Consequently, "good" cannot be held to be complex without falling prey to destructive analysis. Similar considerations are advanced against the second alternative that "good" means nothing at all and there is no subject matter such as ethics. When anything is said to be good, the agent wants to utter more than a mere tautology, that pleasure

is pleasure for instance; rather, the agent, by virtue of his moral concern, must be aware of some distinction between goodness and other things in the world, for "whoever will attentively consider with himself what is actually before his mind when he asks the question 'Is pleasure (or whatever it may be) after all good?' can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering whether pleasure is pleasant....that in every case he has before the mind a unique object."[10] Although this seems more a rewording of the position than an argument, the thrust is that ethics is salvaged and "good" has a meaning, because we all do in fact distinguish goodness as a unique object from other things; we are not concerned with ethical and moral problems for nothing.

We have, then, the indefinability of "good" based on Moore's concept of definition and his insistence on the primacy of analysis. The second issue cited above, the relation of the indefinability of "good" to the interpretation and critique of naturalism, can now be examined. Moore distinguishes between natural and non-natural properties of objects, but, more often than not, he does so by example rather than on the basis of unambiguous criteria. Pleasure, for instance, is held to be a natural property, while good or goodness is counted a non-natural property. Consequently, one is led to believe that the arguments for the indefinability of "good" are directed solely at attempts to equate natural with non-natural properties. And it is true that Moore holds in special contempt those who have ventured to say, e.g., that "good" means "produces pleasure," "happiness," "in accordance with human needs" or "in accordance with God's

providence," but his primary concern is to show that <u>any</u> definition of "good" constitutes a fallacy, the fallacy of attempting to define the indefinable. Even if it were the case that "good" denotes a natural property, "that would not alter the nature of the fallacy or diminish its importance one whit."[11] Hence, the "naturalistic fallacy," to use Moore's title (although he does not much care for it), is directed primarily at any definition of "good" and only secondarily at the confusion of natural with non-natural properties. In its primary sense, the naturalistic fallacy materializes due to the concept of a simple and an unanalyzable property, as in the attempt to define the indefinable; in its secondary sense, it focuses on attempts to equate natural with non-natural properties, as in the equation of pleasure with goodness. It is in the secondary sense of the naturalistic fallacy that Moore identifies the position of naturalism:

> I have thus appropriated the same Naturalism to a particular method of approaching Ethics....This method consists in substituting for 'good' some one property of a natural object or of a collection of natural objects; and in thus replacing Ethics by some one of the natural sciences.... The name then is perfectly general; for, no matter what the something is that good is held to mean, the theory is still Naturalism. Whether good be defined as yellow or green or blue, as loud or soft, as round or square, as sweet or bitter, as productive of life or productive of pleasure, as willed or desired or felt..., I have called such theories naturalistic because all of these terms denote properties, simple or complex, of some simple or complex natural object.[12]

At the beginning of this chapter, a distinction was drawn between a normative and metaethical sense of naturalism. This distinction appears clouded in Moore's above description. On the one hand, a naturalist at

least holds that the factual claims of the natural sciences are relevant to the solution of ethical problems, that factual information somehow supports normative judgments. On the other hand, Moore appears to tender a much stronger characterization of naturalism, the metaethical claim that ethics as such does not constitute an independent discipline, its typical nomenclature, in particular the term "good," to be replaced by, or defined in terms of some natural property (ies) of objects. A naturalist, therefore, is one who commits the naturalistic fallacy; regardless of the grounds for the replacement or definition, the equation of natural with non-natural properties constitutes the commission of a fallacy. Moore cites, for example, those philosophers from Rousseau to Spencer who have held as obvious that everything natural is good. Not only is it questionable on empirical grounds whether everything natural is good, but, a fortiori, "this must not be taken to be obvious; that it must be regarded as an open question. To declare it to be obvious is to suggest the naturalistic fallacy."[13] Insofar as everything natural is good constitutes more than a tautology, it is significant to ask whether everything natural is in fact good, and failure to do so commits the naturalistic fallacy. In short, it would be inconsistent to maintain that everything natural is good and, at the same time, maintain that the equation represents more than a trivial tautology. Hence arises the dubitability of all naturalistic positions; in each case there is the fallacy of attempting to equate natural with non-natural properties. Naturalism, as described by Moore, destroys the possibility of securing ethics as a legitimate and independent

discipline, and it is a "science of ethics" that Moore wants to preserve at all costs.[14] What then does Moore offer as an alternative? To answer this question we must turn to the third issue mentioned above, viz., the scope and nature of ethical reasoning based on the indefinability of "good" and the interpretation and critique of naturalism.

Moore avers that one of his main objectives in Principia is to "discover what are the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning."[15] Ordinarily, especially if one leans toward naturalism and away from formalism, ethical reasoning entails the discovery of facts, criteria, arguments or reasons relative to the solution of ethical and moral problems. For the naturalist, each problem carried its own requirements; within each problem context what emerges as right or wrong, good or bad, is directly related to these unique requirements. It is therefore ironic, despite his avowed concern, that Moore not only obviates the role of ethical reasoning as here construed, but he is unable to allow it much of a substantive role at all. Since "good" denotes an unanalyzable and indefinable property, its presence cannot be ascertained on the basis of facts, criteria, arguments or reasons. To claim that goodness is so based would allow for the incursion of inferential chains, the fallacious attempt to bridge the logical gap between natural and non-natural properties. Goodness is logically independent of anything else and to grant that anything, aside from goodness itself, counts in its apprehension would destroy the foundation of Moore's position. Moore is aware of this impasse, for he acknowledges that, though judgments about goodness or intrinsic value are independent

of anything else, still facts, criteria, etc., "may indeed have relevance to practical Ethics."[16] Practical ethics deals not with intrinsic value, those things which ought to exist for their own sakes, but with the question: What actions ought we to perform? In answer, Moore contends that it is demonstrably certain "that the assertion 'I am morally bound to perform this action' is identical with the assertion 'This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe.'"[17] Given the apprehension of goodness, ethical reasoning is reduced to the purely mechanical process of establishing the causal or inductive factors which will produce the most goodness in the world. Yet these same factors are to no avail when confronted with what we earlier cited as the central problem of ethics for Moore, viz., "the general enquiry into what is good." G.J. Warnock insightfully appraises this role assigned to ethical reasoning:

> In view of Moore's announced concern with 'the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning', it is curious that his conclusion is really that there are no such principles. For on questions about goodness he has no place for reasoning at all, while on questions of what is right there is purely causal or inductive enquiry into the consequences of actions, of a kind that we might engage in without any moral interest whatever.[18]

To ascertain, then, whether ethical reasoning is relevant, one must be clear regarding the status of the ethical assertion at hand. Assertions of the kind "This is good," since they are <u>sui generis</u>, require no reasoning in their justification, for one simply sees (although not literally) that such is the case. Assertions concerning right action, obligation or duty, since they have subordinate status, do require reasoning in their

justification, but always with reference to goodness. Hence, the "general enquiry into what is good," rather than providing grounds for argumentation, virtually eliminates a fecund role for ethical reasoning; such assertions as the former are "synthetic," incapable of being "logically deduced from any other proposition," for "the fundamental principles of Ethics must be self-evident."[19] Moore allows that he is an intuitionist, though he disclaims the traditional position. Accordingly, he abjures deontological intuitionism, obligation and duty, since they are not fundamental ethical principles, must be ascertained by measure of consequences and by causal inference. Moreover, there is no claim by Moore for a special faculty of intuition. He is not concerned with the psychological factors involved in the act of intuition; the truth of the assertion that "X is good" depends solely on the necessary relation between X and the property of goodness, depends on the _fact_ of the relation, not on the perception of the fact. That an assertion appears true to us may, of course, _cause_ us to utter it, but the objectivity of the fact is not thereby disturbed. Presumably, whatever their psychological etiology, intuitions are corrigible, for "in every way in which it is possible to cognise a true proposition, it is also possible to cognise a false one."[20] As in the case of the naturalistic fallacy, the case for intuition follows from the concept of the simple, indefinable and unanalyzable property of goodness, and though Moore is consistent in his adaptation, it is doubtful that he has avoided the difficulties of the traditional position. Indeed, since intuitions are corrigible, on what basis could one adjudicate among conflicting intuitions? How could one differentiate between belief and

knowledge, between "I believe that X" and "I know that X," between "It appears to me that X is good" and "X is good?" On the basis of intuition, the "science of Ethics" that Moore is anxious to establish appears improbable; its fundamental principles would always lie veiled from the normal channels of scientific investigation.

A Naturalist Rejoinder

The picture emerging from these considerations of *Principia Ethica* is one of economy and austerity. All ethical problems have ultimately to do with the possession or nonpossession of just the one property of goodness. Only one kind of ethical problem exists, and it can be settled by factual or causal reference to goodness. We can now examine the extent to which Moore has been successful in his attempt to discredit naturalism. Let us begin with Moore's characterization of naturalism. Since it strikes at the heart of the metaethical claim that descriptive and ethical predicates are somehow interchangeable, the open-question test is undoubtedly Moore's most incisive weapon. Certainly, this test has inspired much of the subsequent anti-naturalist critique of naturalism. From Moore's point of view, the naturalist retains both descriptive and ethical vocabularies, but that on those occasions where "good" is to be defined, terms of the descriptive vocabulary are substituted. The open-question test implies that the substitution is made at the risk of inconsistency, that the naturalist cannot have it both ways, both that the equation of natural with nonnatural properties is significant and yet avoids being a mere tautology. On the one hand, if the naturalist

maintains that "good" means "produces pleasure, etc.," then the assertion "whatever produces pleasure, etc., is good" is tautologically equivalent to the assertion "whatever produces pleasure, etc., produces pleasure, etc." On the other hand, if the naturalist maintains that more than a tautology is at stake, it is difficult to see how "good" could mean "produces pleasure, etc." One would presume that, in order to show that the equation is significant, the naturalist is prepared to advance grounds for the equation. But in that case, one could always significantly question whether "good" in fact means "produces pleasure, etc.," and by extension whether "whatever produces pleasure, etc.," is in fact good. However, when certain philosophers with unassailable naturalistic credentials are considered, the crucial question is whether Moore has caught very many of them in his net, whether it is not the case that a straw man has been constructed. Mill, for instance, is clearly a naturalist in the wide normative sense, in that he believes that factual content does have bearing on the solution of ethical problems. Yet, as Carl Wellman asks, "does he believe that the word 'good' stands for pleasantness, or does he simply believe that pleasure is the one thing which is in fact good? It is not easy to know whether hedonism is analytic or synthetic for Mill."[21] Again, Dewey could hardly be accused of creating a synonymy between the predicate "good" and some natural term, that "good" stands for just this or that natural term or denotes just this or that natural property. In fact, Dewey often proceeds as though it were possible to dispense entirely with an ethical vocabulary, as when he speaks of de jure and de facto problem solutions. It is difficult to see how Dewey, a consummate naturalist, would be liable

to the restricted picture of naturalism drawn by the open-question test.

Admittedly, anyone to whom the open-question test is applicable, in the way described by Moore, would be a naturalist; he would hold, as cited at the beginning of this chapter, a species of metaethical naturalism. However, the two positions are not identical. The metaethical position, as such, does not discriminate among ethical predicates, nor does it single out one which is *sui generis*. But Moore's position does, and it will be recalled that for him a naturalist is one who "substitutes for 'good' some one property of a natural object or of a collection of natural objects." Of course, the open-question test could be modified so that it might be thought to be applicable to metaethical naturalists in general. There would be no restriction of ethical predicates; the question would remain open for the proposed substitution of natural predicates for *any* ethical predicates, more broadly, for any evaluative terms. This modification would be in the spirit of Hume's observation of the "imperceptible" move from description to evaluation, the move from *is* to *ought*. Still, it is doubtful that this modification would really expose a defect of naturalism. Vigorous naturalists are dedicated to a reformative program for ethics, and mere verbal definitions, if they are all that the open-question test is intended to reveal, completely neglect the context in which evaluations are made. For many naturalists, a necessary condition for any substitution of descriptive for evaluative terms is the awareness of the contextual background of evaluation. The critical vitality of the open-question test does not lie in the exposure of alleged verbal stipulations of "good" (or of other evaluative

terms), but in whether an object or a course of action is worth pursuing, liking, desiring, approving, etc. When the naturalist asks, by way of the open-question test, "But is it good?" he is asking whether an object or course of action is worthy of choice, asking for justification not a definition of the term "good." In this way, the open-question test can function to alert the naturalist of unchallenged presuppositions, of the failure to justify evaluations, of the need to expose inconsistencies and counter-examples; but it cannot be used to undercut naturalism at the level of verbal analysis. Moore supposes the naturalist seeks the _summum bonum_, a synonymy whose denial would be self-contradictory. His failure, all too often the failure of those who have followed his lead, lies in not having drawn a distinction between what Brandt has called overt and covert synonymy. "Male sibling" and "brother" are overtly synonymous, recognized immediately by virtue of knowing the meanings of the terms involved, and denial leads to self-contradiction. Yet, only a very idiosyncratically inclined naturalist would relate descriptive and evaluative terms in this manner, for he would realize that this move would destroy the reformative object of ethical naturalism. It is for this reason that Dewey speaks only of multiple goods; the relation between "good" and descriptive predicates represents covert synonymy, dependent always upon the context at hand. Consequently, though Moore criticizes a naturalist position, it is doubtful that there exist many, if any, naturalists who would be liable to his strictures, and thus the assumption that the critical analysis of the definition of ethical terms is the only proper procedure in ethical theory should be viewed with skepticism.

Indeed, even if it were the case that credible ethical theory deals only with the attempt to define ethical terms, it begs the question to assume this as its purpose. It also begs the question to assume that any suggested definition must fail due to the existence of a simple and an unanalyzable object, for if goodness were allowed to be complex, then, as Mary Warnock observes, "not only might one perhaps be able to analyse it, but it would naturally be significant to convert the proposition and inquire whether that into which one had analysed it was good."[22] Rather than *ad hoc* support for a curious assumption regarding the nature of definition, the utility of the open-question test is really apparent in its possibility as a corrective instrument. Strange it is that Moore, for all his emphasis on definition, should find his central concept to be indefinable. Yet, he is quite prepared to attribute to naturalists the definition his own theory will not allow. Moore accuses the naturalist of seeking a synonymy or analyticity of terms, and he finds that the open-question test will be fatal for any definition by exposing a naturalistic fallacy, but only because he has previously supposed there to be an independent class of indefinable predicates. Obviously, there would be no naturalistic fallacy, no logical confusion, if there were no pretense at overt synonymy, no attempt to define the indefinable. Equally, there would be no naturalistic fallacy should Moore's concept of definition prove to be incorrect. There *might* be, as Frankena points out, a definist fallacy, viz., "the process of confusing or identifying two properties, of defining one property by another, or of substituting one property for another."[23] Moore has supposed

that "good" is indefinable and that the naturalist has committed the naturalistic fallacy - (1) by committing the definist fallacy, and (2) by attempting to define the indefinable. And it may be the case that some naturalists are liable to (1), but it would surely be impossible to establish this by the assumption of (2). The open-question test cannot, as Moore supposes, uncover the commission of a fallacy without using that which is to be proved, viz., the indefinability of "good," as part of the proof. Naturalists may run afoul of the definist fallacy because of error, but that would be a far cry from the offense attributed to them by Moore.

The artificiality of the _is/ought_ dichotomy is evinced in Moore's presuppositions. Though he cannot clearly differentiate the two, Moore has hypostatized both natural and non-natural realms; he has characterized naturalists as those who have fallaciously confused these realms by defining terms relating to the latter by terms relating to the former. The naturalist must fail in his attempt to define "good," because for "good" to have a meaning it must denote or stand for some simple and indefinable property, just as "yellow" denotes or stands for the simple and indefinable property we perceive. Clearly, the _is/ought_ dichotomy has been created by the supposition that there exists an independent realm of indefinable predicates. Recent anti-naturalists, capitalizing on Moore's example, believe they have preserved the logical gap between _is_ and _ought_ by devising equally rigid structures in which to cast naturalism. Two moves are believed to exemplify naturalists, and further, that both are untenable: (1) the deduction of an ethical conclusion, in an argument, from premises containing

no ethical content, and (2) the definition of ethical terms by non-ethical terms. For instance, in reference to (1), P.H. Nowell-Smith says of an argument containing factual premises and an ethical conclusion that it "must be illegitimate reasoning, since the conclusion of an argument can contain nothing which is not in the premises."[24] And in reference to (2), R.M. Hare says that "value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which themselves do not perform this function."[25] The assumption, in these cases, is that naturalists are bound to violate either the canons of logic or the function of ethical language, in the reduction or <u>ought</u> to <u>is</u>. Some form of the open-question test would surely expose the violation; the reduction must fail because no further alternatives are envisioned. Generally, anti-naturalists have described naturalists as definists who have committed the definist fallacy, to use Frankena's terminology, and this they believe they have established by virtue of the invulnerability of the <u>is</u>/<u>ought</u> distinction--that naturalists engage in invalid deductions and illegitimate definitions, because they have failed to preceive this invulnerability. No doubt there are naturalists who are also definists, for example, R.B. Perry; yet it is not clear, at least to this writer, that anti-naturalists have exerted the effort to examine seriously the definitions proposed by definists. After all, some of them may be correct. Obviously, the anti-naturalists cannot concede this possibility without relinquishing belief in a logical gap between <u>is</u> and <u>ought</u>. Still, the question is whether the gap really exists, or whether it merely appears to exist due to presuppositions

and stipulations on the part of anti-naturalists. Moreover, a naturalist would be a definist, in the requisite sense, only if he were engaged in overt synonymy. If there were grounds for covert synonymy, room for contextual considerations, it is difficult to see how the above moves would be applicable to all naturalistic positions. One might describe many naturalists as being more in the tradition of Socrates and his interlocutors, concerned with questions of goodness and virtue, but with the awareness that the endless dialogue is inimical to the belief in definitive answers. With the exception of naturalists who are in fact definists, and as noted before, the problem may not be a matter of stipulative or reportive definition at all, but one of reformative justification, the active construction of covert synonymy, a commitment to experience and denial of ethical theory which arbitrarily bifurcates _is_ from _ought_. It remains to be seen whether the naturalist can defend such a commitment.

Contemporary anti-naturalists have not abandoned significant features of Moore's ethical program. They have further emphasized the logical structure of ethical language, which, for them, has become the focal point of ethical theory. They have also accepted Moore's characterization of naturalism, and they have viewed some form of the open-question test as being deadly for naturalism. Above, it was suggested that the open-question test, because of the justificatory and reformative aim of ethical naturalism, serves as a corrective instrument; it is not destructive of naturalism, since, of itself, it does not _prove_ that any proposed definition is wrong. Only when the open-question test is taken in conjunction with certain

generated assumptions, e.g., the indefinability of "good," then, within the frame of these assumptions, a proposed definition will fail. The extent to which recent anti-naturalists have adopted the open-question test against the backdrop of supposition is not entirely clear; their positions are still in the middle of the ethical debate. However, both emotivists and prescriptivists have initiated one significant departure from Moore's concept of definition which may hold the answer. Moore's insistence that for "good" to have a meaning it must denote or stand for some property or characteristic is contrasted with the proposal that ethical terms are to be defined by their use, role or function. The is/ought dichotomy is held invulnerable by the observation that ethical predicates, unlike descriptive predicates, are defined by their function, in evoking certain actions or expressing certain attitudes and motives, in bestowing approbation or disapprobation. Hence, the open-question test does not divulge the commission of the naturalistic fallacy, the attempt to define the indefinable, but rather the definist fallacy, of substituting for ethical predicates terms irrelevant to their function. The above quote from Hare recommending that we adopt the commendatory function of value-terms is a case in point. This prescriptivist appeal coupled with the open-question test allows Hare the following remarks about naturalism: "The essence of naturalism is to say 'If you understand the meaning of such and such a moral word, you cannot deny such and such a moral assertion',"[26] and further on he says that "the naturalist seeks to tie certain moral judgements analytically to certain content. This really is to try to make verbal legislation do the work of

moral thought."[27] The upshot is that the naturalist will be exposed as a definist, presumably by the open-question test, and this because he has failed to comprehend the real business of ethical language, that of commending, prescribing or guiding conduct. For a slightly different approach, consider the following working models of the emotivist, C.L. Stevenson:

(1) "This is wrong" means I disapprove of this; do so as well.

(2) "He ought to do this" means I disapprove of his leaving this undone; do so as well.

(3) "This is good" means I approve of this; do so as well.[28]

These models reveal the emotive and persuasive character of ethical language, that ethical terms function, on the one hand, to reveal the agent's beliefs and attitudes, while on the other, they are calculated to alter the beliefs and attitudes of the recipient. Stevenson further indicates his departure from Moore:

> Almost all those who now emphasize the emotive aspects of ethics...have at one time been greatly under Moore's influence. It is not easy to believe that this is an accident. The parallel between his views and the present one--will be evident from this observation: Wherever Moore would point to a "naturalistic fallacy," the present writer...would point to a persuasive definition.[29]

According to Stevenson, a persuasive definition, among other things, lays stress on the emotive impact a term or an expression will have in influencing the attitudes of a recipient, as, e.g., in the case of a toastmaster introducing an otherwise unscrupulous politician as "a man of culture." Whatever cognitive or descriptive content the phrase contains will be clouded, for the sake of influence, by its positive emotive content. Even

more pronounced is the emotive function of ethical predicates, for they will not contain, in Stevenson's estimation, any cognitive content, and they can therefore only function to betray the agent's attitudes and influence the attitudes of those to whom they are addressed. It follows that anyone, especially a naturalist, who fails to apprehend this emotive function of ethical predicates will be liable to the definist fallacy, because, whereas he believes he has identified a synonymy or analyticity of terms, he has really created a persuasive definition, as in the style of the above models. The open-question test readily uncovers the definist fallacy:

> I may add that my analysis answers Moore's objection about the open question. Whatever scientifically knowable properties a thing may have, it is always open to question whether a thing having these (enumerated) qualities is good. For to ask whether it is good is to ask for *influence*.[30]

Here we have a clear example of how certain presuppositions about the nature of ethical language allow for a critique of naturalism. In this example, the open-question test is employed to reveal the definist fallacy of defining ethical terms by terms not representing their function. This serves to keep alive the myth that naturalists violate the *is*/*ought* gap by their devotion to overt synonymy, in Hare's words, that they "try to make verbal legislation do the work of moral thought."

Undoubtedly, ethical language often does function in the various ways enumerated by emotivists and prescriptivists. As emotivists contend, beliefs and attitudes often are intoned in a way to influence psychologically the beliefs and attitudes of others. And a strong empirical case can be

made that much ethical language is used to commend and prescribe just as prescriptivists insist it does. No advantage would be gained by the naturalist in overlooking these obvious uses of ethical discourse. However, these anti-naturalists also maintain that they have discovered the real function of ethical language, and what is more, that this function fully explains ethical life and obviates naturalists' attempts to reconcile description and evaluation. This point requires examination, and, since Hare is especially instructive, the remainder of the anti-naturalist critique of naturalism will be principally concerned with his position. Naturalists cannot, for example, ignore Hare's avowal that "what is wrong with naturalist theories is that they leave out the prescriptive or commendatory element in value judgements, by seeking to make them derivable from statements of fact."[31] For if Hare is correct, the case against naturalism could be couched purely in terms of linguistic analysis, and the determination of internal logic would tend to underscore the substance of ethical theory rather than reformative acts of reasoning and deliberation. Hare's argument, substantially supported by Stevenson, appears to make the following points:

(1) Ethical language has a special function.

(2) Given this special function, two types of meaning obtain, (a) descriptive or factual meaning, and (b) evaluative meaning.

(3) Since the internal logic of one type constitutes that which distinguishes it from the other type, any attempt to derive logically one from the other is fallacious.

(4) Naturalists commit the definist fallacy, as exposed by the open-question test, by attempting to derive evaluative meaning from descriptive or factual meaning.

Although the argument is leveled at naturalists, the bifurcation of meaning applies to Stevenson's and Hare's positions with equal force. Whereas Stevenson distinguishes between descriptive and emotive meaning, Hare distinguishes between descriptive and evaluative meaning. Between the two positions, the similarities are far greater than the disparities, and Hare, like Stevenson, is alert to the emotive factor present in evaluative meaning, but his concentration on the prescriptive and commendatory functions of ethical terms frees him of a purely psychological analysis of ethical discourse, that ethical discourse is fundamentally nonrational and must ultimately create an "influence" to be successful. Aside from this difference, both Stevenson and Hare are faced with the same problem of justifying and relating two kinds of meaning. Hare clearly perceives "the key problem" in his distinction between "This is a sweet strawberry" and "This is a good strawberry":

> The first sort of remark is often given as a reason for making the second sort of remark; but the first sort does not by itself entail the second sort, nor vice versa. Yet there seems to be some close logical connexion between them. Our problem is: 'What is this connexion?'; for no light is shed by saying that there is a connexion, unless we can say what it is.[32]

Before we can estimate the success of Hare's answer to the problem, there is a prior obstacle. Since the bifurcation of meaning hangs on the contention that ethical language is defined by its unique function, Hare must defend his view that ethical language is exclusively prescriptive and commendatory.

Hare's defense of the prescriptive and commendatory function of ethical

language stems primarily from his observations and reflections regarding how this language is ordinarily used. We discover what a person's moral principles are by observing his actions, and this because, whatever relevant facts a situation may bear, whatever alternative choices available, the central problem before an agent is "What should I do?" It is in confronting this question "that he would reveal in what principles of conduct he really believed. The reasons why actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the function of moral principles is to guide conduct. The language of morals is one sort of prescriptive language."[33] The principal function of ethical language, then, is guidance--given in such diverse forms as advice and instruction, in commending and affirming; in a word, ethical language is prescriptive. In order to clarify his insight, Hare asks us to consider a logical peculiarity of value words in general and of ethical words in particular--words such as "good," "bad," "right," and "ought." "All such words are names of 'supervenient' or 'consequential' properties."[34] Hare is not alluding to the natural and non-natural properties adumbrated by Moore; rather, supervenient properties, he thinks, define the function value and ethical words perform. As an illustration, suppose it were said of two pictures that both were alike in every respect save one, viz., that one was good while the other was bad. Hearers of this distinction would naturally be puzzled; they would insist that some further difference accounted for one picture being good, the other bad. Yet no protest would be leveled if it were said of two pictures that both were alike in every respect save one, viz., that one was signed

while the other was not. Such examples, Hare maintains, will always reveal the supervenient character of value and ethical words, that words like "good" and "bad" will always differ essentially from words like "signed" because there is a difference in the logic of their application. It is in accounting for this supervenient character that Hare detects the weakness of all naturalist positions:

> And so a natural response to the discovery that 'good' behaves as it does, is to suspect that there is a set of characteristics which together entail a thing being good, and to set out to discover what these characteristics are. This is the genesis of that group of ethical theories which Professor Moore called 'naturalist'.... The term has, unfortunately, since Moore's introduction of it, been used very loosely. It is best to confine it to those theories against which Moore's refutation (or a recognizable version of it) is valid....I shall argue...that what is wrong with naturalist theories is that they leave out the prescriptive or commendatory element in value-judgements, by seeking to make them derivable from statements of fact. If I am right in this opinion, my own theory, which preserves this element, is not naturalist.[35]

Hare's kinship to Moore is abundantly clear in this passage. Both view the naturalist as attempting to create a synonymy or analyticity between descriptive and evaluative predicates; both indicate a miscalculation of the logic of ethical discourse as the naturalists' prime error. But, whereas Moore thinks of ethical discourse as being primarily informative, by pointing or alluding to the non-natural property of goodness, Hare seeks its importance in its function, in its supervenient character. Supervenience lies in the prescriptive function of ethical language--to teach or affirm, or otherwise draw attention to rules, standards and principles governing choice and action.[35] Naturalists, in their account of supervenience,

violate this function of ethical discourse. To mark the locus of supervenience in descriptive predicates, an "entailment" between description and evaluation, prevents value and ethical predicates from doing the job for which they are logically responsible. In the example of the two pictures, a naturalist computation of descriptive predicates disallows the prescriptive function and masks supervenience. The open-question test readily exposes the definist fallacy:

> Let us generalize. If 'P is a good picture' is held to mean the same as 'P is a picture and P is C', then it will become impossible to commend pictures for being C; it will be possible only to say that they are C. It is important to realize that this difficulty has nothing to do with the particular example that I have chosen. It is not because we have chosen the wrong defining characteristics; it is because, whatever defining characteristics we choose, this objection arises, that we can no longer commend an object for possessing those characteristics.[36]

We have noted the circularity in Moore's position, that his refutation of naturalism stands or falls with the existence or non-existence of the non-natural property of goodness. Similarly, it would appear that Hare, in order to avoid circularity, must show that ethical discourse is restricted to the unique function he describes, and that naturalists are indeed liable to the overt synonymy he ascribes. Only then could the open-question test uncover the commission of a fallacy. Analysis, however, seems to reveal a wider functional base than that indicated by Hare. Warnock, for instance, cites multiple functions of ethical discourse:

> There are...dozens of things which those who employ moral words may therein be doing. They may be prescribing, certainly; but also they may be advising, exhorting, imploring; commending, condemning, deploring; resolving, confessing, undertaking; and so on, and so on.[37]

Hare would presumably retort that, of course ethical discourse exhibits these multiple uses, roles and functions, but at bottom they are all action-guiding, all basically prescriptive. As we have seen, Hare's defense of prescriptivity is drawn from reflections on the ordinary use of ethical discourse, that to understand ethical life is just to understand its definitive language. Accordingly, it is observed that there is a close connection between choice and action, the substantive question "What should I do?" calling for a prescription, the agent's principles revealed in his actions. Yet there is something grossly misleading in Hare's analysis. Few would argue that ethics has to do with the relation between choice and action, and the first chapter of this dissertation argued that the establishment of this relation is a necessary condition for any ethical theory. But Hare, all too often, is saying the relation itself is fully explained in the functional dimension of ethical discourse. He is saying that to understand any ethical utterance is just to understand what we are doing with it. And his answer is that we are prescribing. Even if this were the case, does it follow that this function _is_ the relation between choice and action? Can an analysis of ordinary usage really explain the arduous process the agent must undergo in order to choose and act rationally and wisely? Surely, one would suspect that linguistic analysis, in this case, has rendered a rather shallow description of ethical life. Surely, it is misleading to draw the inference, from the fact that ethical discourse is prescriptive, that the relation between choice and action is _itself_ explained by prescriptivity. A correct analysis of ethical discourse is one

thing, but this is no certain indicator of the richness and manifold requirements of ethical life.

There is, then, a sense in which it is unnecessary for the ethical naturalist to dispute prescriptivity; Hare may well have advanced our understanding of the logic of ethical discourse, and for this he is to be commended. The ethical naturalist will point out, however, that ethical discourse does not measure the full extent of ethical life, what it means to be an ethical agent. Hare purports that naturalists blindly manipulate descriptive and evaluative predicates--at the linguistic level, and that they are therefore liable, at this level, to the open-question test and its subsequent disclosure of a fallacy. Naturalists cannot prescribe or commend, that is, perform the correct linguistic function, because they have attempted something quite different, viz., to tie together, linguistically, descriptive and evaluative predicates. In short, Hare charges naturalists of overt synonymy. Yet by his own reckoning he identifies the central problem to be the relation between choice and action, in all cases a prescription being advanced. How can prescriptivity, binding as it is only discursively, explain the relation between choice and action? Prescriptivity says nothing about the grounds of decision, says nothing about the background of evaluation, why a particular course of conduct is in fact instituted. The agent may be prescribing, but not _merely_ prescribing; he is choosing and acting in a situation, against a backdrop of deliberation. On Hare's account, how could one differentiate between the merely capricious and gratuitous, and conduct which could be termed moral or ethical? At the

risk of importing a foreign terminology into the present discussion, Dewey does prove instructive. He is alive to the anti-naturalist's utilization of the open-question test, termed by him a "regressus ad infinitum," but he asks us to look to the conditions under which evaluations are made. Dewey concedes the possibility of a "tautological" relationship between means to ends and ends themselves, that it is possible "to isolate some event projected as an end out of the context of a world of moving changes." And he further concedes that "human beings do indulge in such arrests.":

> But to treat them as models for forming a theory of ends is to substitute a manipulation of ideas, abstracted from the contexts in which they arise and function, for the conclusions of observations of concrete facts. It is a sign either of insanity, immaturity, indurated routine, or of a fanaticism that is a mixture of all three."[38]

How unlike this is from Hare's caricature of naturalism, the imputation that naturalists are in search of the correct "defining characteristics," or that they confuse verbal legislation with moral thought. For, whatever else evaluation may entail, if choice and action are to be at all meaningful, the contextual background of evaluation is all-important. By adopting Moore's characterization of naturalism, Hare has failed to demonstrate that naturalists have a propensity for overt synonymy, and this because both Moore and Hare have failed to consider context, the covert grounds of evaluation, in their explication of the relation between choice and action.

We can now return to Hare's bifurcation of meaning. Like Moore and Stevenson before him, Hare is faced with the problem of justifying and relating two kinds of meaning, descriptive and evaluative. We have seen that, in Hare's estimation, there exists a logical gulf between descriptive

and value words, it being the supervenient character of value words, their prescriptivity, which sets them apart from words which merely describe. Value words indicate a course of action or conduct; descriptive words tell what is the case. How then can any given prescription be justified? How can a prescription based on whim or fancy be distinguished from a prescription which represents a truly ethical or moral judgment? On the one hand, prescriptivity cannot be grounded in descriptive judgments, because the logic or criteria of application of descriptive words is at variance with those which prescribe; but, on the other hand, prescriptions cannot be left dangling without grounds, because such an omission would be tantamount to an evasion of questions ethical and moral. Hare is aware of this dilemma, and though his solution is quite complex, for our purposes the salient moves are relatively clear. Let us begin by unpacking prescriptivity a bit further. If we consider a simple prescription such as "Shut the door," it will be evident that the command may or may not eventuate in the appropriate action; it will only if the addressee assents to the command. The case of value judgments is different, in Hare's view, for, although all value judgments will be prescriptive and thus "entail" imperatives or commands, not all imperatives or commands will be value judgments. The essential difference is that, in the case of value judgments, it is a matter of definition and/or common usage for Hare that the addressee _assent_ to the command:

> I propose to say that the test, whether someone is using the judgement 'I ought to do X' as a value-judgement or not is, 'Does he or does he not recognize that if he assents to the judgement, he must also assent to the command "Let me do X"?'[39]

What is true of value judgments in general will also apply to ethical and moral judgments in particular. Since the principal function of ethical and moral language is guidance in determining choice and action, the agent must assent to the command:

> But to guide choices or actions, a moral judgement has to be such that if a person assents to it, he must assent to some imperative sentence derivable from it, in other words, if a person does not assent to some such imperative sentence, that is knock-down evidence that he does not assent to the moral judgement in an evaluative sense.... This is true by my definition of the word evaluative.... Thus to say that moral judgements guide actions, and to say that they entail imperatives, comes to much the same thing.[40]

Ethical and moral judgments share in common with imperatives their prescriptivity, but they differ from imperatives in general because they require assent by the agent to the command. Just as in logic, if proposition p entails proposition q, I cannot with consistency assert p and deny or reject q. I cannot assent to a moral judgment without assent to the imperative the judgment entails. One mark of ethical or moral judgments, then, is the agent's commitment to the imperative entailed by a judgment.

Although it may be a necessary condition for ethical and moral judgments that they entail imperatives to which the agent gives assent, it is obviously not a sufficient condition. Assent, in itself, is hardly an index of morality, and innumerable cases could be cited, such as the agent under coercive conditions, where ethical or moral content would be absent. Consequently, in order to further discriminate ethical and moral judgments, Hare introduces the concept of universalizability. Confronted with a prescription, the addressee is entitled to ask the question "Why?"--that is to

ask for a reason. The reason cannot be, as naturalists are alleged to contend, a set of descriptive predicates; rather, the reason must allude to some standard. In the example previously mentioned, "This is a sweet strawberry" and "This is a good strawberry," the first statement may be a reason for the second only if one were to accept the appropriate major premise, namely, that sweetness is a standard by which to measure the goodness of strawberries. Only if one were prepared to accept the standard would there be an "entailment" between the two statements. Another mark, then, of value judgments in general and of ethical and moral judgments in particular is the agent's readiness to apply certain standards, that in any given situation whose features measure up to appropriate standards, the agent is prepared to make the same judgment; cases of the same kind deserve to be judged in the same way. In other words, certain judgments must be universalizable if they are to pass muster as being ethical or moral. Lest it be thought that the universalizability thesis has been smuggled in as a disguised moral principle, Hare explains:

> The thesis of universalizability itself, however, is still a logical thesis. It is very important not to confuse the thesis of universalizability with the substantial moral principles to which, according to it, a person who makes a moral judgement commits himself. By a 'logical' thesis I mean a thesis about the meanings of words, or dependent solely upon them. I have been maintaining that the meaning of the word 'ought' and other moral words is such that a person who uses them commits himself thereby to a universal rule.[41]

As best I understand Hare, he is saying that both descriptive and evaluative judgments are universalizable, and we are thus committed to the same logical requirements in both cases. Accordingly, "if I call a thing red,

I am committed to calling anything else like it red. And if I call a thing a good X, I am committed to calling any X like it good." The universalizability thesis is therefore not a moral principle; the thesis is a reminder once more that the logic of ethical discourse sets demands for its proper use. We are thus better able to understand Hare's contention regarding supervenience, that ethical and moral words are used to call attention to rules, standards and principles of conduct. The proper use of these words obligates the agent to choose and act according to linguistic rule. Instead of grounding ethical and value judgments in descriptive predicates, as Hare imputes to naturalists, they are grounded in the rules, standards and principles embraced by the agent. Summarizing, then, according to Hare, there are three truths about ethical and moral judgments: (1) they are a species of imperatives or commands; (2) they imply assent by the addressee,and (3) they are subject to the thesis of universalizability.

We are now in a position to observe how Hare proposes to cope with the relation between descriptive and evaluative meaning. His substantive claim is that evaluative meaning <u>has</u> descriptive meaning. To understand how this can be, it is necessary to review briefly the use of "meaning-rules." For Hare, all descriptive words and judgments are defined in terms of meaning rules. By this, he is not referring to conventional grammatical or syntactical rules, nor is he referring to traditional philosophic interpretations of meaning such as those found in the referential or coherence theories. "By 'rules' I do not mean very simple general rules which can be formulated in words," explains Hare, "but, rather, that consistency of practice in the use of an expression which is the condition of its

intelligibility."[42] This is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's edict that to know the meaning of a word is to know its use in discourse. I can be said to know the meaning of the word "red," if I display consistency in its application, if I can demonstrate a grasp of its criteria of application, if I do not, for instance, call red things blue or blue things red. Knowing the meaning-rules of a descriptive word is not an independent exercise; it is a matter of experience and practice, a matter of progressively learning and refining the criteria of its application. Now, in the case of a value word, this is not enough, because meaning-rules alone are not sufficient to indicate its meaning; in fact, "its meaning is independent of the criteria for its application."[43] What, in addition to descriptive meaning-rules, complicates value expressions? As noted before, both descriptive and evaluative judgments are subject to universalizability. Now we can see that, in the case of descriptive judgments, universalizability is solely a matter of consistency, governed by the correct application of meaning-rules. In the case of evaluative judgments, consistency of application must be augmented by reference to standards and principles. Though universalizability is a common characteristic of both descriptive and evaluative language, the latter must, in addition to meaning-rules, _describe_ some standard of judgment. Given some standard, expressions such as "This is a good X," or "I ought to do X," are, in effect, partly descriptive as well as prescriptive; I am saying, in effect, that some standard has been met. Those who are aware of my standards will know that I am not merely mouthing ungrounded exhortations, but that I am prescribing

according to the standards and principles I have embraced. Evaluative judgments, then, have both descriptive and evaluative meaning. There must be an implicit description of the standard by which an evaluative judgment is made, for without this entailment between standards and judgments, choice and action would be meaningless, prescriptions without grounds. An agent without standards will have abandoned the basis of choice and action, but more importantly, he will have failed to use ethical and moral language correctly, and it will remain essentially nonproductive and nonrational. Consequently, by establishing descriptive meaning as part of evaluative meaning, Hare believes he has decisively undermined the foundation of naturalism:

> Both naturalism and my own view lay great stress on the fact that, when we make a moral judgement about something, we make it <u>because</u> of the possession by it of certain non-moral properties. Thus both views hold that moral judgements about particular things are made for reasons; and the notion of a reason, as always, brings with it the notion of a rule which lays down that something is a reason for something else. Both views, therefore, involve universalizability. The difference is that the naturalist thinks that the rule in question is a descriptive meaning-rule which exhausts the meaning of the moral term used....But for me the position is different. Since the 'descriptive meaning' of moral terms does not exhaust their meaning, the other element in their meaning can make a difference to the logical behavior of these terms in inference. This is the point at issue in the controversy about whether an 'ought' can be derived from an 'is'.[44]

And Hare leaves no doubt regarding "the other element in their meaning," for "in the case of moral judgements the universal rules which determine this descriptive meaning are not mere meaning-rules, but moral principles of substance."[45]

General Features and Problems of Naturalism

We have now the picture of anti-naturalism's critique of naturalism. We have witnessed that anti-naturalists err in their characterization of naturalism by building a straw man. Naturalists are accused of attempting to create a synonymy of descriptive and evaluative predicates and, as indicated in the final quote from Hare in the previous section, naturalists have failed to exhaust evaluative meaning due to having taken descriptive meaning-rules as the sole authority in deriving an ought from an is. The point has been labored, throughout, that the error in this approach is its uncritical adaptation of Moore's original stipulation of naturalism, an interpretation which, in turn, is easily dispatched by the open-question test by rendering a definist fallacy. In their refutation, however, anti-naturalists have failed to discern the difference between overt and covert synonymy, and in their sketch of naturalism, no allowance has been made for such non-linguistic factors in evaluation as context, the alternatives available to the agent, and the consequences of choice and action. No allowance has been made for the fact that deliberation, insight, imagination and foresight, the necessary marks of the responsible agent, are always products of the actual situations in which problems arise. True, anti-naturalists sometimes acknowledge the importance of contingencies, but all too often they are an afterthought, considered as rather embarrassing and untidy adjuncts, compared to the artful unraveling of the internal logic of ethical discourse. Because of their articulation of ethical theory, it is understandable that anti-naturalists would wish to cast

naturalism according to rules and precepts that they, the anti-naturalists, have assiduously promoted. These same rules and precepts define the contours of legitimate ethical theory; they are thus readily utilized to undercut a misleading, if not spurious, account of naturalism. Still, it is understandable that Hare would hedge his description of naturalism by contending that "it is best to confine it to those theories against which Moore's refutation is valid;" it is understandable, since it is just that particular way of interpreting naturalism which avails itself of exposure to logical irregularities. Hence, it is demonstrated that naturalists have failed to observe certain logical peculiarities of ethical discourse; they have failed to observe the prescriptive and commendatory function of ethical and moral words; they have restricted analysis to descriptive meaning-rules, thereby failing to note that standards and principles are somehow "entailed" by evaluative judgments. Nevertheless, why should we not inquire of the anti-naturalist concerning his preoccupation with the logic of ethical discourse? And even if we were to grant that anti-naturalists do take account of more than internal logic, why then must their refutation of naturalism be restricted to the commission of logical errors? Apparently, if the anti-naturalist is determined to go the way of analysis, maintaining his own rules and precepts, his description of naturalism will be unavoidably inaccurate. But if he introduces non-linguistic factors, then he can hardly rest his case against naturalism as being simply a failure of logical awareness.

The final quote of the last section betrays one more fundamental defect of Hare's position. Because of his concentration on ethical discourse,

scant attention is paid by Hare to what has been called the ethical life. In order to account for evaluative meaning, Hare must augment descriptive meaning-rules; he cannot rely on them exclusively, as he improperly imputes to naturalists, for then the resulting equation would be subject to the open-question test. Consequently, in addition to meaning-rules, there is another element in the meaning of evaluation--"moral principles of substance." These principles, which supposedly ground prescriptions, are implicitly described in making ethical or moral judgments. Now, few would argue concerning the importance of principles to ethical life; they are, for many, the sine qua non of choice and action. Granting their importance (we shall presently study their relationship to naturalism), in Hare's case they appear without warrant and serve only to complement a linguistic function. On the basis of Hare's analysis, principles must, of necessity, lie logically prior to the prescriptions that they are intrusted to guide. What, then, is the basis of these principles? We are told by Hare that principles are always a matter of "decisions."[46] What, then, is the basis of these decisions? In fairness to Hare, it should be noted that he does adduce criteria for decisions of principle, but they do not differ markedly from criteria that many other ethical theorists, including naturalists, might produce. We are told to appeal to fact, to imagination, to inclination and interest; but the point to notice is that these appeals are made independent of ethical discourse. Precisely those factors stressed by naturalists are, for Hare, discrete and independent concerns. We are thus left with the impression that ethical discourse and ethical life are really

not related at all. Since prescriptivity is the most important concern for Hare, ethical life is left barren, and there is only silence, except to refer the matter to decisions, regarding the crucial connection between the two. George C. Kerner has succinctly described the problem:

> According to Hare, whenever assertions like 'This is a good strawberry' are genuinely evaluative, they have no logical connextion with any factual statements whatever. The connexion between evaluations and descriptions depends on standards and principles and those, in turn, on decisions. Such a conclusion is clearly unsatisfactory. Hare has told us that the most important thing about value-judgements is their prescriptive and commendatory force. Their function is thus to guide our decisions. But if the connexion between value-judgements and their reasons depends on our decisions, what is and what is not a well-supported value-judgement is itself a matter of decision. We are thus clearly going in a circle.[47]

If we appeal to principles, within discourse, there will be grounding for prescriptions. If we are then asked to justify principles, we must abandon discourse and appeal to those factors already stressed by naturalists, but which, in discourse, are insufficient for Hare, i.e., descriptive meaning-rules. What then is the relation between principles as they function in discourse and principles as they are arrived at by consideration of independent criteria? By his own admission, Hare does not wish to allow a logical connection between description and evaluation, and therefore, there can be no logical connection between descriptive meaning-rules and evaluation. How then can principles be legitimately grounded? For if we appeal to facts, imagination and interest, etc., that is, appeal to independent criteria, have we not done precisely what Hare thinks he has prohibited the naturalists from doing? Clearly, Hare has not produced a coherent picture which would account for both ethical discourse and ethical life.

Hare's failure to provide a satisfactory account of ethical and moral principles grows out of his futile effort to relate descriptive and evaluative meaning. The needed continuity of ethical discourse and ethical life is not forthcoming, and a sterile, if uncompromising, ethical theory is the reward. Therefore, we might consider whether a naturalist theory will better serve us. In light of Hare's failure, reconciliation of ethical discourse with ethical life, by virtue of an adequate account of meaning and the status of principles, would constitute the basic requirement of such a theory. Let us begin with the problem of meaning. Anti-naturalists consistently maintain a sharp distinction between descriptive and evaluative meaning. The suggestion has been made that the distinction may be unwarranted, a presupposition rather than a point to be defended, and it may be the case that two kinds of meaning are unnecessary where contextual considerations are granted equal audience with discourse. Now we are in a position to appreciate that this is the case.

The term "meaning" is not easily unpacked; its long and controversial history in philosophy, the multiple senses in which it is used, would require a tedious digression. For our purposes, three senses of the term are appropriate. The first sense, as we have encountered it with the anti-naturalists, has meaning tied with the rules governing the function that descriptive and evaluative _words_ perform. Yet, to be precise, it is unclear that words normally perform _any_ function as such. Normally, it is sentences not words which have useful significance. We can speak of word meaning in terms of definition, a lexical meaning, but as Kerner

points out, "what has meaning in a primary and full sense is a complete utterance or speach-act, such as informing, describing, warning, commending, ordering, promising, and so on."[48] If we are to speak profitably of "meaning," we require a second sense of the term, one which deals with a complete utterance or sentence. Obviously, if we are interested in the locus of sentence meaning, lexical definitions will be to no avail; the meanings of sentences must be sought elsewhere. Now we might turn to the rules governing grammatical and syntactical meaning, or as indicated in recent literature, we might turn to philosophic or logical meaning criteria. For instance, the expression "He drew a square circle on the blackboard," might be held as being grammatically and syntactically meaningful, but as a contradiction it lacks philosophic significance. Moreover, we might take the broader view of anti-naturalism and maintain that meaning is established by having discovered the correct functions of language. What is common to all these ways of establishing sentence meaning is their reliance on rules and criteria suitable for a universe of discourse. But, although the naturalist appreciates these avenues of establishing significance, he cannot allow that they are sufficient. Plainly, an utterance does not simply belong to a universe of discourse, dependent exclusively on rules and criteria; it belongs, in addition, to the circumstances which brought it into existence. Plainly, an utterance is a sign of something independent of discourse (provided it is not merely analytic or tautological), a sign of the extralinguistic context in which it is made. Consequently, a third sense of "meaning" is required, one which will, in addition to rules and

criteria, fully exhaust the significance of sentences and utterances. We must account for a contextual sense of meaning.

The anti-naturalist will likely object that, with this third sense of "meaning," we have smuggled in an improper extension of the range of the term. It will be argued that, strictly speaking, there can be no such thing as a contextual sense of meaning, that the various senses of the term "meaning" are properly restricted to linguistic entities, to words or sentences, or to meaning-rules. There is reason to restrict the range of the term precisely because the implementation of rules and criteria governing the maneuvers of linguistic entities _constitutes_ meaning. This alleged third sense is not really a different _sense_ of the term, but an entirely unwarranted and unrecognized _application_ of the term. This objection is surely untenable, for even granting the role played by linguistic rules and criteria, the significance of an utterance is only complete in the further sense that it _belongs to_, or is a _sign of_ an extralinguistic context. Failure to note that significance depends upon extralinguistic factors only serves to bifurcate language from its origin in what Wittgenstein has called "a form of life," the observation that language is integrally "woven" into other activities.[49] Wittgenstein's cryptic comment that "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him"[50] is immediately deciphered with the recognition that language must be augmented by other typically human activities in order that meaning accrues. The obdurate and narrow view which restricts the term "meaning" to linguistic entities is clearly arbitrary; to speak of a contextual sense of meaning seems entirely justified. Undoubtedly it is very important for the anti-naturalist

to restrict meaning to linguistic entities, to disallow contextual meaning, for to do otherwise seriously jeopardizes the crucial epistemological distinction maintained between description and evaluation. The naturalist's espousal of contextual meaning would appear to obviate the need for this distinction. This is most clearly evident in the observation that contextual meaning allows for both descriptive and evaluative judgments to arise from contextual considerations. Consequently, if it is plainly unrewarding to attempt to exhaust meaning in terms of a universe of discourse, there is reason to believe no anomaly exists between description and evaluation; we can plausibly suppose that ethical discourse and ethical life can be related without the assumption of two incompatible kinds of meaning. Moreover, the collapse of the distinction frees the naturalist to pursue his reformative program for ethics, that in reconciling ethical discourse and ethical life, he is in a favorable position to give a credible account of choice and action.

If it is granted that meaning, in its original and most important sense, is tied to an extralinguistic context, two questions are occasioned: (1) How, in general, does context bestow significance on judgments? (2) What constitutes typically evaluative judgments within a contextual setting? In regard to the first question, perhaps the best way we might illustrate contextual significance is in terms of the instrumentalities afforded by a context. In this sense, certain qualities of a situation accrue significance in proportion to their instrumental possibilities in solving problems. This concept of contextual meaning is central in Dewey's

position:

> In responding to things not in their immediate qualities but for the sake of ulterior results, immediate qualities are dimmed, while those features which are signs, indices of something else, are distinguished. A thing is more significantly what it makes possible than what it immediately is. The very conception of cognitive meaning, intellectual significance, is that things in their immediacy are subordinated to what they portend and give evidence of. An intellectual sign denotes that a thing is not taken immediately but is referred to something that may come in consequence of it. Intellectual meanings may themselves be appropriated, enjoyed and appreciated; but the character of intellectual meaning is instrumental.[51]

Let us suppose, for example, that I am lost in the forest. My dominate concern is to discover a way to familiar terrain. My immediate situation bombards me with contingencies, with trees and rocks, with streams and sky, and it is to these qualities of the situation that I must turn if my future is to be secured. Now, many of the qualities and features surrounding me are plainly irrelevant; these "qualities are dimmed, while those features which are signs, indices of something else, are distinguished." Some qualities, the compass and map in my pocket, the food in my knapsack, the direction of the streams and the position of moss on trees and rocks, accrue significance as they portend possible solutions of my problem. True, before awareness of my predicament, these qualities were there in their "immediacy," but now, in my new appraisal, they become propitious, each points to "something that may come in consequence of it." Consequently, "things in their immediacy are subordinated to what they portend and give evidence of." In my situation, there is a congeries of things in their immediacy, but they are not all significant in connection with the context of my problem; only some will point the way to solution.

There is a slightly different but related way we might approach contextual significance. Dewey's distinction between things in their immediacy and things in relation to what they portend is a reflection on the future orientation of significance as it relates to choice and action. The distinction suggests what might come to be by virtue of certain operations on the part of the agent. But the illustration also indicates how context may determine the significance of <u>individual</u> judgments. Suppose I am about to commence my trek into the forest, and I am asked by a friend to enumerate the survival gear I have in my possession. Among other things, I make the judgment that "I have a compass in my pocket." The judgment, in this initial state of affairs, is innocuous; its significance blends with the other items of my enumeration, taken collectively, a purely precautionary and prudential statement of possibility, having no more or less import than judgments concerning many other features surrounding me. However, in the ominous circumstance of being lost, the context, we might say, determines a new significance, one dealing with imminent peril. My original cursory and incidental judgment now stands out, its significance magnified by a threatening context. The report to my self that "I have a compass in my pocket" has new significance by virtue of the context in which I now find myself. At all times and places, then, qualities are contextually bound. The overriding character of a context bestows significance, a significance which permeates and enhances qualities, and which, in turn, is reflected in the significance of judgments concerning them. We can conclude that, not only do qualities portend a future, but the

contexts in which they find reference, overlap and envelop one another, and judgments will therefore change in significance as they reflect this fluidity of circumstance. The compass in my pocket varies with the context in significance, but so do the judgments concerning it vary in significance due to the context in which they are made. We could say of descriptive judgments, then, that they have both present and future significance, the deciding emphasis, in any given case, a matter of determining when and where the judgment is made.

Not all contexts represent immediate natural conditions; human contrivance often marks the origin of operational situations. Contexts appropriated from past deliberation bestow significance on present and future contexts, and meanings of the past consistently foreshadow present and future deliberation. Especially, in regard to social institutions, do we encounter the impress of previous deliberation and decision. Antecedent meanings, which have adequately served in the past, become conventionalized and institutionalized; they appropriate the mantle of rule-like directives to which the agent turns for advice. Where there are social conditions, enumerable contexts function by dent of tradition or authority, by ascent or consent. In many cases, perhaps the majority, these fixed contexts are innocuous enough, serving to organize and give meaning to data, thereby characterizing the habitual ways a society conducts its affairs. Many games, to take a simple example, are defined by rules, and it is in reference to rules that brute data and judgment gain meaning:

> Many of the actions one performs in a game of baseball one can do by oneself or with others whether there is a game or not. For example, one can throw a ball, run, or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood. But one cannot steal a base, or strike out, or draw a walk, or make an error, or balk; although one can do certain things which appear to resemble these actions such as sliding into a bag, missing a grounder and so on. Striking out, stealing a base, balking, etc., are all actions which can only happen in a game. No matter what a person did, what he did would not be described as stealing a base or striking out or drawing a walk unless he could also be described as playing baseball, and for him to be doing this presupposes the rule-like practice which constitutes the game. The practice is logically prior to particular cases: unless there is the practice the terms referring to actions specified by it lack sense.[52]

Antecedent meanings, however, can and do become unyielding and virulent; as testimonies of past deliberation, they may or may not constitute criteria suitable for inclusion in the significance of present and future deliberation. Charles Peirce points out "the uncorrigible tendencies of tenacity, and _a priori_ speculation--which may have good purposes in building character, social institutions, and new perspectives," but he cautions that such "fixations of belief" are "unreliable as modes of inquiry for setting conflicts or doubts."[53] At this time, we can affirm that antecedent meanings constitute prime material for moral and ethical deliberation, and we shall see, momentarily, that they represent for naturalism a formidable problem. For the present, let us summarize the general relation between context and the meaning of descriptive judgments. We have seen that both temporal and spatial factors are intimately "woven," to use Wittgenstein's term, into descriptive judgments. The irritation, doubt and disequilibrium, evinced by problem situations, imbue qualities and judgments with meanings, facilitating and directing choice and action towards a more

stable condition. The sharp edge of confrontation between present meanings and projected conditions (Dewey calls them ends-in-view) is dissolved through deliberation; choice and action arrogate meanings derived from overlapping and enveloping contexts. Then, too, there is often an element of the past in judgment; habitual modes of behavior, fixed ideas and beliefs, which may or may not facilitate adequate decisions and actions, contribute their share of significance to judgment. The salient point at issue, however, is that descriptive judgments, as regards their meaning, cannot be dissevered from contextual considerations; the attempt to exhaust meaning in terms of linguistic rules and criteria is, at heart, a fruitless enterprise destructive of any theory of meaning aspiring to completeness.

The naturalist further argues that not only are the meanings of descriptive judgments derived from contextual considerations, but they are also value laden. Therefore, we must turn to the second question above: What constitutes typically evaluative judgments within a contextual setting? The key point that the naturalist would make is that <u>any</u> descriptive judgment <u>may</u>, since its significance depends on contextual factors, be evaluative as well. In the above illustration of the rules governing baseball, evaluative meaning abounds, the criteria of evaluation being constitutive of the institution. A good game, a bad pitch, the right strategy, or the obligation and duties of players are all explicitly spelled out in the authentic execution of the game. Our enjoyment of the national pastime is enhanced by our knowledge of the criteria of judgment embodied in the institution, and no better place can be found to appreciate the fact of

evaluation than in the active disputations of spectators at the game. Where criteria of judgment are implicit in the institution, known by the agent, no mystery attends the fact that description entails evaluation. Whether grading apples, automobiles or baseball players, the agent brings to bear his knowledge of the criteria of judgment, his knowledge being the consequence of prior experience. "In its popular sense," says Dewey, "all judgment is estimation, appraisal, assigning value to something; a discrimination as to advantage, serviceability, fitness for a purpose, enjoyability, and so on."[54] In cases where the context is formalized and the criteria known, even the preliminaries of judgment, discrimination and selectivity, are initial acts of valuing and prizing. However, what of contexts in which institutional criteria are diffuse or lacking? In what sense would judgments be evaluative? Contexts often appear to give rise to immediate and uncritical valuings and prizings where, as Dewey says, attention is "absorbed in the object, a person, act, natural scene, work of art," to the exclusion of extraneous features and relationships. Dewey speaks of an "intuitive" aspect of judgment, where the agent seems to "size up" immediately the situation at hand and bestows valuation without apparent recourse to deliberation.[55] The choice of the term would be unfortunate if it were simply used in the tradition of such British moralists as Moore, Prichard and Ross, but Dewey's reference to intuition is far more provocative and subtle. He is not referring to a faculty of intuition, nor is he contending that evaluative predicates are perceived as analytically tied to descriptive features. Dewey's point is that, due to previous experience

and habit, expertise gained through prolonged training and practice, the agent can immediately, in many cases, come to terms with objects and persons, in a way prohibited the uninitiated. Dewey is no traditional intuitionist; rather, he is giving an account of intuition which will square with his commitment to experience:

> The results of prior experience, including previous conscious thinking, get taken up into direct habits, and express themselves in direct appraisals of value. Most of our moral judgments are intuitive, but this fact is not a proof of the existence of a separate faculty of moral insight, but is the result of past experience funded into direct outlook upon the scene of life. As Aristotle remarked in effect a long time ago, the immediate judgments of good and evil of a good man are more to be trusted than many of the elaborately reasoned out estimates of the inexperienced.[56]

However, to say that most moral judgments are intuitive does not commit one to saying that prior deliberation and experience can, of themselves, vouchsafe the moral content of a present judgment. The fact that immediate prizings are unreflective suggests that the moral issue is problematic, that judgments made without reference to present features and relations of the context may not, as experience demonstrates, command moral approbation; Aristotle's good man is capable of the greatest vices as well as the greatest virtues. Immediate prizings may well give evidence of consistency but not necessarily of commendable morality, and consequently, the crucial questions of choice and action cannot be decided merely on the basis of intuition.

The subtlety and importance of Dewey's point in binding intuition to prior experience becomes evident when it is recalled that far too many theories of moral life are arrested before they can do justice to what

ordinary people most desire and need to know about choice and action. Antecedent meanings are all too often taken as the final arbiters of morality. The search for the summum bonum is testimony of this tendency. And more recent theories fare no better. Consider the extreme case of intuition, a situation in which, except for the isolation of the object prized, intuition is entirely divorced from present or future conditions. Intuitions would be explicable only in causal terms, "of psychological rather than moral import....indicators of formed habits rather than adequate evidence of what should be approved or disapproved."[57] There would be no basis for distinguishing immediate prizing from appraising of moral content. Yet, this psychological determinism is precisely what the emotivist pretends is the basis of ethical and moral life, the meaning of judgment being the creation of influence. One's accumulation of attitudes, dispositions and habits exhausts the significance of judgment. And we have witnessed that prescriptivists, in order to assure a measure of rationality, invoke standards and principles of judgment. Still, the burden is placed on antecedent meanings, on decisions made in the past. In all these cases, antecedent meanings, as evinced in immediate prizings, are thought to guarantee the morality of choice and action. But, because of their connection with the past, intuitions fail to yield an adequate ethical or moral theory. Unless the intuitionist can produce evidence for a faculty of intuition, the explanation of immediate prizing reverts to prior experience and habit, and moral import is shuttled to antecedent meanings rather than meanings gleaned from present and potential contextual

situations. It follows that, unless the present resembles the past in relevant respects, the application of antecedent meanings to present and potential contextual situations is gross, mechanical and gratuitous, a matter of casuistry rather than of morality. It further follows that, in order to demonstrate applicability, it is a necessary condition of morality that the meanings of the present context be considered. No one would dispute the advantage of antecedent meanings; they give evidence of direct "sympathetic response," as Dewey says, and "they form the chief materials of our knowledge of ourselves and of others."[58] But for all that they are not, in themselves, guarantees of morality. Having the courage of one's convictions is no sure indication of morality; but it may be the mark of an obdurate refusal to face up to the demands of ethical and moral life. Of course, it could be argued that we must have tested standards and principles to guide us, but regardless of their efficiency in numerous situations, their applicability is always problematic, a function of present contextual features. No categorical scheme can be its own guarantee of applicability. There is no escaping the fact that antecedent meanings must take account of the contingent and present to determine their fitness, and in the event they should prove inappropriate, the quest for morality, held in abeyance, is still ominously with us. Ethical theories which place the emphasis of morality in antecedent meanings, in patent formulas, are sterile, lacking adequacy and completeness; they attenuate the role of intelligence, and crucial concerns of choice and action are divorced from thought, deliberation, the tracing of consequences, the identification

of relations, and the weighing of alternatives within the potentially moral context.

The case for the role of intelligence in its connection with freedom was argued in the first chapter. It was further argued that freedom is an indispensable prerequisite of any ethical theory. If freedom requires the exercise of intelligence, it follows that an adequate and a complete account of morality must be based on the exercise of intelligence. Since only the free agent can be held morally responsible for choice and action, theories allotting the burden of morality to antecedent meanings fail, because they fail to afford the full measure of freedom. The free agent exercises intelligence, not the agent exclusively bound to antecedent meanings; only the former satisfies the conditions of morality. A context exudes a moral tenor if intelligence reigns:

> The primary significance of the unique and morally ultimate character of the concrete situation is to transfer the weight and burden of morality to intelligence. It does not destroy responsibility, it only locates it. A moral situation is one in which judgment and choice are required antecedently to overt action. The practical meaning of the situation--that is to say the action needed to satisfy it--is not self-evident. It has to be searched for.[60]

If a context is to contribute moral significance for judgment, intuitive meanings must be fecundated by the direct exercise of intelligence. Dewey sometimes uses distinctions of locution to drive his point: between esteem and estimation, prizing and appraising, appreciation and criticism, _de facto_ and _de jure_, desired and desirable, satisfying and satisfactory. At other times, the distinction between the intuitive and problematic is drawn in terms of the additional conduct demanded of the agent: the need

for exercise of intelligence, the need for inquiry and deliberation, the imaginative rehearsal, the awareness of alternatives and projected consequences. If I understand Dewey correctly, in all cases of moral significance, what appears to be common is that _any_ descriptive judgment may accrue moral significance as the judgment is made with a view of its relations and bearings, in terms of the conditions which brought it into existence, and in terms of its portent of the future. There would be, for instance, no difference in _kind_ between assertion of warranted belief about the world and assertion of warranted value or morality. The assertions "I believe that X," "X," "I believe that X is good," and "X is good" are all warranted by consideration of the same _kind_ of judgment because they all specify the same _kind_ of extraneous relations. This I take to be the import of Dewey's contention that "properties and relations that _entitle_ an object to be found good in belief are extraneous to the qualities that are its immediate good; they are causal, and hence found only by search into the antecedent and the eventual."[60] To differentiate descriptive and evaluative judgments is not a matter of encapsulation into discrete classes, but a matter of emphasis and degree. The notation of antecedent and consequence, of relations and properties, of persons and objects denotes judgments of the same kind, and hence no artificial bifurcation of them into inviolable classes of descriptive, evaluative and moral is required. Distinctions among them are detected in the agent's perspicacity in dealing with contextual features and relations. How I go about securing desperately needed funds may be decided on the basis of arbitrariness, uncalculated

response, prescription or proscription, but if these intuitive meanings are the _only_ considerations, my eventual choice can only be judged in _de facto_ terms. Strictly speaking, my choice will be neither moral or immoral, but amoral. Upon consideration of the weight and impact of my choice, its relation to myself, to my friends and family, perhaps even its relation to the fabric of society, my choice accrues a moral tenor, a consequence of the exercise of intelligence. Of course, it could be allowed that moral judgments are a species of evaluative judgments, which in turn, are a species of descriptive judgments, yet the passage from one to another is not a consequence of bridging the unique logic of classes, but a matter of emphasis and degree, a matter of the extraneous relations which obtain.

The observation that all judgment is warranted by the same kind of extraneous relations grounds the metaethical position of naturalism. The usual ascription to naturalists of normative presuppositions which are codified in the contrived and logically unjustified synonymy of descriptive and evaluative predicates is misleading and shallow. In holding that ethical and moral judgments are factual assertions, or that descriptive predicates can be substituted for evaluative predicates, the naturalist is holding an epistemological view of judgment, not merely a view of the logic of judgment. He is saying that _any_ judgment is liable to ethical or moral interpretation to the extent that (1) its _meaning_ is derived from context, and (2) it is _warranted_ by the intelligent consideration of the extraneous relations defining context. At this point, it might be objected that this view of judgment confuses meaning with truth, that conditions of meaning lie logically and temporally prior to conditions of

truth, belief and knowledge, that it would make no sense to attempt to warrant a judgment whose significance had not been previously established. This objection would carry weight if meaning were only a function of language. For then it would have to be treated as a logically separate issue from truth which is, unless construed analytically or in rationalist terms, ultimately a function of experience. However, if meaning as well as truth are contextually bound, the burden for *discovering* both still rests with the agent. The naturalist test for both meaning and truth hinges on whether the agent is in a position to make meaningful and truthful judgments, tested by the agent's exercise of intelligence. Accordingly, to say that a judgment is descriptive, evaluative, or moral indicates that the agent has been or is in a position to *discover* that such is the case, but it does not follow that meaning and truth are thereby logically and temporally compartmentalized, components of meaning *vis-a-vis* components of truth. Whether, in any given case, meaning or truth is to be stressed or sustained is itself a matter of critical judgment:

> But the realm of meanings is wider than that of true-and-false meanings; it is more urgent and fertile. When the claim of meanings to truth enters in, then truth is indeed preeminent. But this fact is often confused with the idea that truth has a claim to enter everywhere; that it has monopolistic jurisdiction. Poetic meanings, moral meanings, a large part of the goods of life are matters of richness and freedom of meanings, rather than of truth; a large part of our life is carried on in a realm of meanings to which truth and falsity as such are irrelevant.[61]

We could say, then, that the metaethical position of naturalism is grounded in a general description of how meaning and truth are manifested in intelligent judgment. This has been the object of the above discussion of contextual

significance. Actually, metaethical naturalism is, if the foregoing is substantially correct, the epistemology of judgment; since the naturalist denies there are grounds for the logical separation of description and evaluation, his metaethical position is really an investigation of the general nature of judgment. If it is subsequently found that all intelligent judgment must take account of the same kind of extraneous relations, that the _is/ought_ distinction is really a verbal distinction having no basis in experience, metaethical naturalism will have performed its task.

In concluding this chapter, a preliminary word must be said about the naturalist treatment of principles. In the concluding chapter, the question of principles will be more fully developed in connection with education. We have observed Hare's failure to give a credible account of principles because of his failure to relate two kinds of meaning, descriptive and evaluative, and that the continuity of ethical discourse with ethical life is thereby jeopardized. By alleviating the need for a logical distinction between description and evaluation, it might be thought that, in so doing, the naturalist has resolved the problem of principles. However, numerous questions will inevitably arise; Has the naturalist really tapped the wellspring of morality? Or has he engaged in a bit of legerdemain to divert attention from the real issue? Having transferred the burden of morality from antecedent meanings to critical and intelligent judgment, can the naturalist now stand aside and dispassionately appraise the worth of his enterprise? What would constitute the basis of such an appraisal if not the authority of cherished standards and principles?

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What, for instance, regulates the direction of intelligent deliberation and action, and how does the agent recognize the potentially moral situation? On the basis of problems? But since most problems admit of a variety of strategies, on what basis does the agent select the moral direction? In assimilating prior meanings to the present exercise of intelligence, have we not abandoned the mark of the moral agent, viz., guidance by immutable standards and principles? Has not the naturalist accorded intelligence and all it implies the status of a principle? Can it be supported? By yet another principle? And where does it end? Can the exercise of intelligence by the agent, notoriously prone to error and foible, be justified other than as an article of faith? It would seem that no ethical theory can dispense with the notion of principles, whether or not they are construed as essential to the theory, and the question is whether the naturalist can give a better account. Consider Eliseo Vivas' rather scathing remarks regarding Dewey's alleged neglect of principles:

> Remember that, for Dewey, men are adequately understood as systems of impulses and desires, regulated by habit and intelligence. Principles and ideals are for him but needs and demands stated in generalized terms. Hence, if a secularly oriented intelligence cannot effectively satisfy its ideals, it is of the essence of its wisdom to modify or abandon its demands. But this conception of human nature is true only of the uprooted denizens of our acquisitive civilization. It is not desires that constitute men but values, organized hierarchically against the disruptive forces of the world; these are our true selves, the innermost core of our moral personality.[62]

The above questions and Vivas' comments, suggesting again a gulf between description and evaluation, indicate that the first step required is the identification of what "moral" means. Specifically, what does it mean

to have a moral view or make a moral judgment? Can a judgment without obeisance to principle really be termed moral? We have seen that the naturalist, from the standpoint of metaethics, will answer that a judgment is moral to the extent that it is made with a view of its relations and bearings. But since this is equally true of descriptive and evaluative judgments, is there not some way, in view of these relations and bearings, that we can further identify the typically moral judgment? At the outset, it must be admitted that the naturalist cannot give a precise definition of "moral." If all judgments specify the same kind of extraneous relations, the naturalist, of necessity, must refer to a general range of phenomena or clusters of actions; he must admit of numerous marginal cases where precise application of the term remains in doubt. Still, it seems to me possible to tighten up on the naturalist concept of morality without doing violence to the overall position.

The history of philosophy bears testimony of conflicting accounts of morality. Kant exalts in the moral law, while Hume, oblivious of this possibility, propounds a theory of moral sentiments. Between the _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ range a variety of possibilities. Warnock suggests that the problem can be somewhat simplified by distinguishing between positions "which do, and those which do not, assign to moral discourse a characteristic content or subject matter."[63] Then it is noted that positions assigning no content tell us very little about morality; they can be "_about_ anything at all."[64] If, for instance, it is held that morality is etched in the conscience, in feelings of guilt and reproach, or, as in the case of

Vivas that morality is represented in the independent principles of conduct which dominate in a person's life, or, as in the case of Hare those principles the agent is prepared to prescribe universally, then a moral view can cover virtually any content; there will be nothing about which morality is essentially concerned. This is not to say there is nothing of morality in these positions, but that they represent a _view of morality_ which covers all cases indiscriminately, covers none in particular, and which is therefore not particularly illuminating. Analogously, the vacuity of a scientific theory which entails all observation statements and hence none in particular, as with the luminiferous ether, constitutes a _reductio ad absurdum_. We are left, then, with those positions which attempt, albeit roughly, to discriminate or specify moral content, a general range of phenomena or considerations, certain clusters of decisions and actions. The question hangs on what could possibly or understandably pass as a moral point of view. I think a strong argument can be made that, if we ask a man to justify his moral views, he will of necessity, provided he is to understand our question and we his answer, refer to some benefit or harm, some goodness or badness commensurate with the observance or breach of his code. He can, of course, deny he has a code, that his life is of the moment, or that though he admires various virtues, he never lives up to them or thinks of them as being decisive in his life. However, if his position is conscientiously held, it is doubtful his retort would constitute an exception; it has proven beneficial to live accordingly, and presumably such a life will continue to be reinforcing. The point is that

we do justify our own moral views along the lines of benefit or harm, goodness or badness. We are, accordingly, amenable to codes which, like the utilitarian, promote the greatest happiness principle, or codes which abet human desires, interests and needs, or the harmonious reciprocity between persons. Also, we will wish to acknowledge tortuous and benighted moral codes; it is not necessary that there actually be benefit or goodness, but that in holding a moral view it is presumed or thought that benefit or goodness does and will accrue. What justification can be given if not in these terms? A fortiori, would be understand anything less as being moral justification? There is, then, a sense in which men of goodwill, concerned with the good or harm or well-being attendant on their choice and action, are not entirely at odds with storm-trooper morality. But for the same reason that they share commonality, one cannot say that morality is arbitrary and without roughly specifiable content. A parent beats his children and justifies it with the insouciant remark that "It is good for them." Whatever contorted advantage due the children, there is nevertheless some advantage envisioned, if the action is to lie within the moral purview. The term "moral" carries with it roughly specifiable content; our understanding of its application, our crediting of others with its proper use, are not without foundation or explanation.

It will no doubt be objected that by identifying estimations of benefit or harm, goodness or badness as the content of morality we have said very little. It will be objected that the content, itself, is a matter of judgment and can provide no neutral guide to choice and action. In

Dewey's estimation, "if the standard is itself a value, then it is by definition only another name for the object of a particular liking, on the part of some particular subjective creature."[65] Warnock agrees that the charge of circularity must be answered:

> It might be urged that the notions of benefit or harm are themselves 'evaluative' notions--that they cannot be supposed to fix the content of morality for the reason that they themselves have no definite, independently specifiable content. And so for 'interests' or 'needs': a man's interests or needs cannot, surely, be the factual _grounds_ of judgment, since it is a matter of judgment what his needs or his interests really are.[66]

Warnock tenders two replies to the charge of circularity: In the first place, we should not let ourselves be "bullied out of the conviction" that some things are beneficial or good, deficient or harmful, or that the reasons we give are not wholly arbitrary and without merit. In the second place, and more philosophically important, the content will involve circularity "only if it can be shown itself to involve the exercise of _moral_ judgments":

> That a certain person, or a certain community of persons, would, if certain things were done, be in a better or worse condition, advantaged or disadvantaged, helped or harmed, may be partly or even wholly a matter of judgment; but it is, I submit, quite clear that it is not always, not wholly or necessarily, a matter of _moral_ judgment. But if so there is, from the point of view of moral theory, no reason to object to the project of defining morality at least partly in such terms.[67]

It seems to me that our considerations of meaning support Warnock's observations. If all judgment is of the same logical _kind_, what is descriptive, evaluative and moral is a matter of emphasis and degree. In saying that benefit or harm, etc., define the rough contours of morality

we are saying this from the standpoint of a prima facie argument as to what we all, or most of us, will accept as legitimate justification for moral views. When we ask a person to justify his moral views we are, in effect, ascertaining whether they are gratuitous, relatively groundless, or based on the exercise of intelligence. A person is inclined in the moral direction in proportion to his perception and appraisal of the relations entailed by his moral perspective. That a person is in fact headed in a moral direction is not substantially a moral judgment, but a judgment that he has critically and intelligently taken control of his life. Of course, a moral view need not lead to any beneficial results for anyone; but it is a necessary condition that it be thought or supposed to be beneficial. Moreover, it may be that there are no logical limits to what a person may approve and desire, but surely there are limits to what a person could understandably be said to approve and desire: "What does he want it for? What appeals to him about it? In what way, should he get what he wants, does he expect to be satisfied? If we have no notion at all of answers to these questions, then someone's assertion that he wants whatever it may be is, in a clear sense, not intelligible to us."[68] Since it is true that reflection may alter a person's approvals and desires, or cast them in such perspective that change is initiated, we expect that good and sufficient reasons will be adduced for moral views. This bears on an impressive and important point. For if the locus of morality is content, definable in terms of benefit or harm, goodness or badness, needs, desires or interests, the crucial questions of choice and action, the ethical life, fall

under the aegis of naturalism, i.e., the test for morality will be experiential. This is clearly the case when it is realized that the differentiation between the <u>supposition</u> of morality and the <u>realization</u> of morality is made on the basis of the critical judgment of the consequences of holding a given moral point of view. It is simply not the case that what is of benefit or harm, etc., is merely a matter of opinion. Though sweets are desired and prized by a child, it would still be remiss of his parent not to admonish against gorging; good and sufficient reasons account for parental intrusion, not arbitrary whim. It is this difference between uncritical judgments and prudent judgments which is analogous to the difference between the supposition of morality and the warranted support and attainment of morality.

There is yet another objection to our account of morality. Granted that morality has the content specified, how are we to decide between egoism and altruism? It cannot be denied, in view of our concept of morality, that both egoism and altruism are legitimate alternative moral views; at least this would appear to be the case. The content of morality would appear to justify both the manipulation of means to ends with selfish intent, and genuine concern for the welfare of others. The issue might seem to turn on whether egoism or altruism represent innate or acquired dispositions. Robert G. Olson argues that "men are born selfish," but that we must not confuse this innate drive with what he terms a "basic drive." Olson distinguishes between the pursuit of selfishness, identified, as innate, and the pursuit of self-interest, identified as an

acquired basic drive:

> A basic desire is not an original desire or an innate drive waiting to be unfolded. It does not antedate conscious experience; it rather emerges in the course of experience as our knowledge and understanding increase. It is a principle of conduct that we believe would bring us greater overall satisfaction than any envisaged alternative--a principle, moreover, upon which we do not necessarily always act but upon which we would like to be able consistently to act.[69]

Rational self-interest thus becomes a moral principle or criterion for Olson. The question is whether or not, in the light of reason, interests, needs and desires will be altered or changed in such a way that the agent will discover it to be in his interest to engage in social reform and to have concern for the welfare of others. Olson is convinced that there can be no essential conflict between the long-range interests of the agent and long-range interests of society:

> For if I am right, the rational pursuit of one's own best long-range interests can rarely if ever be rightly as detrimental to the best long-range interests of society as a whole; and if or when it could, the appropriate moral reaction is not to berate the man who exercises his right to the pursuit of happiness but rather to dedicate ourselves to the creation of a social order in which the interests of all individuals may be more fully harmonized.[70]

The difficulty with Olson's position, as I see it, is that he cannot really dissever himself from his assumption that man is innately selfish. Instead, he reintroduces this original drive in morally respectable guise, as a principle of conduct, that is as rational self-interest. But is egoism or altruism really innate in man? As Spinoza says, there is no vice in nature, but only as we so interpret it. Unless it can be demonstrated that human nature reveals such sophisticated drives as selfishness,

we would probably be better off not promoting rational self-interest (or altruism for that matter) as a principle of conduct. For this reason, Dewey finds "that neither egoism nor altruism nor any combination of the two is a satisfactory principle."[71] The truth of the matter is that neither selfishness nor unselfishness are revealed as innate drives; "our native impulses and acts...are not actuated by conscious regard for either one's own good or that of others. They are rather direct responses to situations...certain reflex acts."[72] Selfish and unselfish acts must be attributed to a wider context, to choices and actions which have resulted from critical judgment or a lack thereof. Olson is therefore correct in thinking that interests, needs and desires are altered and changed by reason and knowledge, that individual and social interests can be harmonized, but that our interest in the welfare of others must be weighed against a principle of rational self-interest is an unnecessary assumption. The naturalist holds that the moral question of egoism and altruism must be settled through experience, where the dominate emphasis is placed on "what kind of a self is being furthered and formed."[73] Then it will be noticed that neither egoism nor altruism are automatically to be regarded as being of benefit or harm, of goodness or badness, in the interest of oneself or of others. Selfishness and unselfishness are derivative concepts, their significance a consequence of further considerations of relations and bearings; they are not general principles to be obeyed in any and all circumstances. This being the case, we could just as well say that cooperation with others is as much characteristic of human nature

as selfishness or self-interest.

If it can be held, then, that morality has a content, there is no anomaly in the naturalist embracing general leading principles of conduct. It is the status of these principles which distinguishes naturalism from traditional positions. For the naturalist, principles do not stand as independent and supreme ends to be achieved; there is no attempt to ferret out the summum bonum, of Egoism versus Altruism, Good, Pleasure or Happiness. As we have witnessed, the reason for this is that antecedent meanings, intuitions, cannot provide an infallible guide to choice and action, their application to contingencies being problematic. Therefore, there can be no analytic relation between principles and choice and action; no specific requirements can be deduced from principles. Since morality is grounded in what we will allow as justification for a moral view, it will have roughly specifiable content, but since the test for morality is experiential, the relation between concrete decision, on the one hand, and principles on the other is noncommutative. That is to say, the content is specifiable but its application is experiential. We do not call out principles to give specific guidance, recipes for conducting our lives, for this must be hewn out of the contingent situation. But principles, insofar as they are felt embodied in concrete situations, are directional criteria. It is not Benefit or Goodness we seek, but that on this occasion or in this situation, certain specific choices and actions are envisaged, in view of their relations and projected consequences, to have a better chance of providing benefit or goodness, for this occasion or this situation,

than alternative choices and actions. The reason that principles are thought to provide specific guidance is because they are confused with intuitive meanings, with rules or habitual modes of behavior:

> Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are the final methods used in judging suggested courses of action. The fundamental error of the intuitionalist is that he is on the outlook for rules which will of themselves tell agents just what course of action to pursue; whereas the object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself.[74]

If our interpretation of meaning is correct, principles are not themselves moral judgments having a status distinct from other judgments, for then the content of morality would entail circularity. Since all judgment has the same logical status, principles cannot constitute independent ends to be achieved. Benefit and harm, goodness and badness, interests, needs and desires, like egoism and altruism, are determinations of concrete situations. As general criteria, the content of morality provides a basis for selection and discrimination, for what is meaningful in a given situation. Embodied in concrete situations, principles serve to suggest that certain ends-in-view will be of benefit or harm, will contribute goodness or badness, will meet desires and interests, and will accord with human needs. Principles are signposts, not recipes; they provide a coherent direction without specifying the details of that direction, in Dewey's words, a principle provides a "point of view from which to consider acts."[75] The naturalist will therefore conduct his life according to principle, but there will be no automatic guarantee of success; no ultimate end can serve as

infallible reference. Naturalists' principles are always subject to reinterpretation and modification as new experience and situations confront the agent.

FOOTNOTES

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6. Ibid., p. 7

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8. Ibid., p. 15

9. Ibid., p. 15

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31. Hare, _The Language of Morals_, p. 82.

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33. _Ibid_., p. 1

34. _Ibid_., p. 80

35. _Ibid_., pp. 81-82

36. _Ibid_., p. 85

37. G.J. Warnock, _Contemporary Moral Philosophy_, p.35.

38. John Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," in _International Encyclopedia of Unified Science_, Vol. II, No. 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 44.

39. Hare, _op. cit_., pp. 168-69.

40. _Ibid_., pp. 171-72.

41. Hare, _Freedom and Reason_, pp. 30-31.

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43. Hare, _The Language of Morals_, p. 106.

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51. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover, 1958), p. 128.

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65. Dewey, *op*. *cit*., p. 60.

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71. Dewey, *Theory of the Moral Life*, p. 163.

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CHAPTER IV

NATURALISM AND MORAL EDUCATION

Moral Principles and Moral Education

Until now we have been occupied with problems and considerations antedating the serious development of an adequate theory of moral education. In the first chapter, it was argued that freedom is a necessary condition of any ethical theory. It would follow that an adequate theory of moral education must guarantee freedom. This means, in light of the arguments of the first chapter, that three necessary conditions must obtain in moral education commensurate with freedom. These are, first, that there be available to the agent genuine alternatives; second, that quality reasons be given for choice; and third, that there be intentionality, a transition from choice to action. In the last chapter, the argument was advanced that anti-naturalist positions, those we have considered, have failed to afford the full measure of freedom, primarily because they have appropriated antecedent meanings, intuitions, as the final arbiters of morality. In so doing, there is an attenuation of critical and intelligent judgment regarding present and potential contextual conditions; alternatives go unperceived, reasons revert to the antecedent, and choice and action are accordingly compromised. Moral responsibility is diminished because the development of freedom is arrested. We might imagine, then, that anti-naturalist theories of moral education will reflect the inadequacies of the general moral positions advanced, and that they represent fairly accurate paradigms of moral education as it often exists in our classrooms today. Hare, for instance, writing on the question

of moral education, urges the dissemination of moral principles in the classroom:

> Without principles, most kinds of teaching are impossible, for what is taught is in most cases a principle. In particular, when we learn to do something, what we learn is always a principle. Even to learn or be taught a fact (like the names of the five rivers of the Punjab) is to learn how to answer a question; it is to learn a principle....The point is...this, that to learn to do anything is never to learn to do an individual act; it is always to learn to do acts of a certain kind in a certain kind of situation; and this is to learn a principle.[1]

According to the thesis of universalizability propounded by Hare, cases of the same kind deserve to be treated in the same way; we need principles to assure consistency. Therefore, it might be expected that if a student can acquire a catalog of relevant principles, along with specifications for exceptions, he will be in the best possible position to solve moral dilemmas. However, Hare is not so naive as to think that principles acquired through instruction can be utilized in cookbook fashion to solve moral problems. In addition to the dissemination of principles, the student is admonished not to follow instruction unquestioningly, and it is incumbent on the instructor to explain, with consideration for the age and development of his group, why certain principles are thought to be good and why a given moral view or way of life is considered desirable. Moreover, it must be made plain to students that, although the instructor holds certain principles dear and extols a certain way of life, students are free to decide for themselves whether to follow the instructor's lead:

> What we do, if we are sensible, is to give him [the student] a solid basis of principles, but at the same time ample opportunity

> of making the decisions upon which these principles are based, and by which they are modified, improved, adapted to changed circumstances, or even abandoned if they become entirely unsuited to a new environment. To teach only the principles, without giving the opportunity of subjecting them to the learner's own decisions of principle, is like teaching science exclusively from textbooks without entering a laboratory.[2]

Finally, we are familiar with Hare's rationale for this approach to moral education:

> To become morally adult...is to learn to use 'ought'-sentences in the realization that they can only be verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own. This is what our present generation is so painfully trying to do.[3]

There can be no doubt of the continuity of Hare's theory of moral education with his general moral orientation. Since prescriptions and hence choice and action are grounded in decisions of principle, it is understandable that Hare would urge the dissemination of principles as the basis of moral education. The sophistication of the instructor is pitted against the inexperience of the student; the former, a repository of wisdom, articulates and defends principles which will guide the latter on occasions of choice and action. Hare's position has the commendable feature that its aim is not strictly moral discipline, a matter of prescribing conduct, but of giving the grounds of conduct. Moreover, the position allows for the fact that the contingent realm frequently fails to answer to principle and that the student is therefore encouraged to approach the instructor's advice critically, to modify and improve principles, and in some cases to give them up entirely. But does Hare's position afford the full measure

of freedom? Certainly, in providing for criticism, a considerable measure of freedom is afforded, and principles, as a result, are obviously not sacrosanct. But there is also an emphasis on divulging, giving or disseminating, in practical terms of which, the idea of principles originates external to the experience of the student. The student's initial encounter with principles will be tainted with the real posibility of indoctrination. Faith in or allegiance to the instructor could sufficiently smother further critical development on the part of the student. From an affective point of view, then, there is doubt whether Hare's position can get students aware of their moral responsibility, as long as the instructor stands in an initial position of moral authority. However, it is the logical and philosophical problems of Hare's position which are most dangerous for the development of freedom. Of necessity, decisions of principle must lie temporally and logically prior to the prescriptions which they are entrusted to guide; that is, problems are grouped according to kind, according to the principles under which they are to be subsumed. But if principles come first in the order of priority, they will always enjoy a status independent of the situations to which they are to be applied, and their applicability will always be problematic. Hence, the only way the instructor or student can justify the application of principles is to turn to the contingent realm, in an effort to discover under which principles a situation belongs. The emphasis will be on discovering the correct class to which the problem situation belongs, not on the critical examination of principles; moral perplexity will not be settled by critical examination of principles, or

of the situation at hand, but in defining the problem according to class. Morality, then, reverts to antecedent meanings, to the attempt to adduce tried and true principles which have served in the past. The modification, improvement or abandonment of principles will be of subservient importance compared to the search for the correct principle, and critical and intelligent judgment will be directed to the logic of classes rather than to the unique properties defining the problem situation. This means that freedom, which is manifested in the quality of judgment, will be diminished, because the agent's attention has fastened on the fruits of past deliberation.

This emphasis on the dissemination of principles is certainly not an isolated feature of Anglo-American moral education. Israel Scheffler, although he stresses the importance of "reasonableness" over tradition and authority, nonetheless calls out a propaedeutic for inculcating the "moral point of view":

> The moral point of view is attained, if at all, by acquiring a tradition of practice, embodied in rules and habits of conduct. Without a preliminary immersion in such a tradition--an appreciation of the import of its rules, obligations, rights, and demands--the concept of choice of actions and rules for oneself can hardly be achieved.[4]

Similarly, Frankena, in an influential article on moral education, indicates "that the problem of producing virtue in the next generation is a twofold one: (1) that of handing on a 'knowledge of good and evil' or 'knowing how' to act, and (2) that of ensuring that our children's conduct will conform to this 'knowledge'."[5] These quotes reveal an attitude toward moral education, at least as old as Aristotle's ethics, rooted in the conviction

that the moral proselyte, if he is to take rational possession of his conduct, must be at least partially indoctrinated in the traditions and habits of his community. And while there is certainly much to recommend this attitude, it also indicates a crisis of confidence as to what can reasonably be expected of teachers and students, a conviction that the individual, left to his own devices, will inevitably fail to achieve moral awareness. Although neither Scheffler or Frankena advocate an uncritical acceptance of principles, they do stress, like Hare, antecedent meanings in the arrangement of pedagogical priorities. Perhaps, then, the rationale for the dissemination of principles is more subtle. Much of the professional malaise in current moral education is funded by the _is/ought_ distinction, by the belief that description is logically incapable of indubitable support for evaluation. Moreover, a pervasive feeling that all moral views are subjective, whether individual or collective, has been buttressed by what seems to be unassailable evidence that people and societies simply do not agree on moral issues. It is natural to believe, then, that in concern for moral education, teachers must be content with impressing students to behave in ways sanctioned by society. It is thought that this _modus vivendi_ at least has the advantage of protecting the fabric of society, of preparing and training that individual least apt to challenge time-honored authority, of providing the best chance of securing individual success and societal goals. Because the moral philosopher despairs of justifying any other alternative, his attitude toward moral education is one of skepticism. R.F. Atkinson's assessment of the meager role which can be justified for moral education reflects this prevailing skepticism of Anglo-American

moral philosophy:

> Take any moral position and its opposite can be maintained without logical error or factual mistake. It can, of course, be taught and learnt (it is a possible object of knowledge) that a certain moral position is held by certain people, but, whatever adequate grounds for holding a moral position might be, it is clear that... there can be moral teaching, instruction in, as opposed to instruction about morality, only if there are criteria of truth, cogency, correctness in the field. Are there such criteria?[6]

Atkinson's conclusion is that there are irreconcilable differences of moral orientation. The inference to be drawn is that moral education must be descriptive rather than normative--or else, as Hare, Scheffler and Frankena seem to think, the teacher must be content with the dissemination of societal norms, rules and principles; only as the student achieves rational fruition, his budget of received principles having taken hold, can he be trusted to be a morally competent, autonomous agent. The message seems to be that, since there are really no certain grounds of morality, the teacher, forced to make a decision, can turn to either second-order description or first-order indoctrination. In lieu of certainty and as a buttress against subjectivity, the teacher, for the benefit of his students and society, must contrive a sense of objectivity. But must we demand apodictic certainty in order to forge a significant theory of normative education? If the prevailing supposition of subjectivity persists, we can only be disheartened at the usurpation of freedom and responsibility. The second chapter above suggested that there is no great body of evidence to support the current wave of subjectivity. On the contrary, relativity in morals can only be supported if it can be shown that

people and societies do in fact differ at the level of principles. If we are dealing with rules for carrying out principles (Dewey's distinction between rules and principles is relevant here), the anthropologist or moralist may have evidence of cultural diversity, but a thesis of ethical and moral relativity would have to await evidence that there exists a difference of principles. It seems to me that the _only way in which it could be established that principles differ_ is to suppose that their status is such that we must maintain a logical distinction between judgments of principle and judgments in general. Obviously, if we conceive of principles as externally imposed guides to choice and action, there may be no logical limit to what might conceivably pass as a moral principle. With the recognition that there are no logically incompatible realms of description and evaluation, judgments of principle, like judgments in general, are grounded by the same kind of considerations of relations, bearings and consequences, grounded in concrete operational contexts. This being the case, the complexion of moral education most change; pedagogical priorities must be reconsidered. True, with the recognition that in making moral judgments we are in fact exhibiting moral principles, there is no additional claim for apodictic certainty, but, by the same token, the naturalist cannot agree with Atkinson's dismal conclusion that there are no criteria of judgment--that "any moral position and its opposite can be maintained without logical error or factual mistake." For if the criteria of judgment are conceived as internally constitutive of the contextual situation, externally imposed criteria, such as antecedent meanings in the guise of

principles, must themselves be judged, in turn, as to their fitness, from considerations of the contextual situation at hand. For instance, in a situation where the student or teacher claims that "X is good," X need not be subsumed under an independent principle, but that it is shown that X is perceived as good in light of certain relations, bearings and projected consequences, among which there may well be antecedent meanings. Consequently, those who would have the teacher disseminate principles, no matter how imaginatively, impartially and critically the task is done, must eventually come to terms with the status of principles. If the naturalist is correct, it is no answer to describe principles as representative of various subjective appraisals, from which the student is encouraged to choose; nor is it an adequate answer to represent principles as the best that our society and our teacher have been able to devise. For if we attempt to justify principles as being more than mere decisions, to use Hare's term, we are forced, precluding the possibility of a moral faculty, to turn to the experiential situation at hand, to the embodiment of principles in judgments of concrete operational contexts. It follows that the dissemination of principles cannot be a logical priority of moral education.

In order to focus the issue clearly, it is unlikely that the council of despair in moral education will change until educators are prepared to reexamine the status of moral principles. As long as principles are held to belong to an independent realm, moral education will tend to be associated with a disjunction, an option between either authority or subjectivity.

The reason for this, as Atkinson indicates, is because it is thought that there can be no objective criteria by which to adjudicate conflicting moral positions. At the extremes, the options are reflected in such slogans as "We must return to the traditional values," or "Each person has the right to his own opinions." On the one hand, some educators will cling to principles, not as though they are self-vindicating, but out of fear of subjective anarchy. Independent principles are sought because they are tried and true, since having answered to our demands for moral instruction in the past, we have reason to believe they will serve with equal poignancy in the future. Because the evils of anarchy will have been averted, freedom will thrive, with necessary amendments, within the parameters of rational standards of authority. On the other hand, precisely the same despair of finding objective criteria signals to those of a more daring liberal persuasion that practically anything goes. Since independent principles cannot be grounded, they must be eschewed in order to avoid the repression of tradition and authority. With the loss of security associated with objective standards, educators can at least guarantee the maximum of personal freedom for the student; he will at least be free to create his own morality out of the welter of alternatives open to him. In neither case is the question of truth or falsity an issue; rather, both extremes represent a reaction to the despair of discovering a public system of justification--intersubjective grounds of morality. However, neither alternative accords with our concept of freedom, and therefore, neither indicates an acceptable basis for moral education. In fact, by disclaiming that there are grounds

for moral judgment, both alternatives constitute an abrogation of moral responsibility and a diminution of freedom, for neither is capable of releasing the critical and intelligent capacities required of moral judgment. The naturalist, on the other hand, reassesses the status of principles. Principles are perceived as embodied in judgments of concrete problem situations. In the last chapter, we spoke of moral justification in terms of the understandable or conceivable reasons which could be given for a judgment or moral point of view. And the reasons given, if we are to understand the agent, will describe some benefit or goodness, etc., which is envisaged in regard to certain choices and actions. In other words, we will not accept as moral justification just any reasons, but only those which have contextual grounding according to some specifiable moral content. Hence there will be no divorce of moral principles from the judgments, reasons, facts, choices and actions actually exhibited in attacking moral problems. The lamented criteria sought by Atkinson and others is to be found, not in transcendent independence, but embedded in the problem context at hand.

It is clear, then, that it is logically and pedagogically unsound to base the model of moral education on priorities of either the dissemination of principles or the promotion of blind subjectivity. There is, however, a logical priority in moral education, in the sense that the presence of morality can only be ascertained by reference to the actual attempts of the student to come to grips with problem situations. If the criteria of judgment cannot be divorced from the actual strategies employed in confronting problem situations, it would be pointless, in terms of

procedural priority, to attempt to derive a theory of moral education which did not take this fact under initial consideration. When a student claims that "X is good," or that "I ought to do X," there is no supposition on the part of the teacher of an analytic relation between the judgment and an independent principle, nor is it supposed that the judgment is based on mere whim or fancy; on the contrary, the logic of the situation assigns to the teacher a unique position in relation to the student. The teacher is in a position to nurture and guide, not by calling out the correct principle or by encouraging laissez-faire subjectivity, but by knowing whether the student has been in a position warranting the judgment made, in a position to identify relevant relations and consequences. For the naturalist, moral education will take its cue from this special relation between teacher and student, from the observation that morality will ultimately arise from the experience of the student. Now, it will be objected that this special relation holds up only under certain conditions, those conditions where there could be no disputing, as a condition of rationality, the conclusion reached or the criteria of judgment involved. A student having been exposed to all the evidence for the shape of the earth, would be thought either dull or perverse, were he to continue to ask why he should believe it to be round; for it will be argued that the questions of what evidence is given and what will count as evidence, in this case, are not subjects for rational disputation. Hence, the special relation between teacher and student will be preserved in cases where the issue is a statement of fact. However, the relation breaks down with problems of

evaluation and morality; for it will be argued that there would be no obliquity in the student's questioning either the evidence or what will count as evidence. The student could count anything he wished as evidence for "X is good," and while the teacher might disagree, there would be no rational basis for disputing the student's avowal. This contrast between the preservation or breakdown of the teacher-student relation is, of course, analogous to the contrast represented in the respective theoretical approaches to morality of naturalism and anti-naturalism, and in the words of Philippa Foot, "it would not be an exageration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluation," whereby it is thought that in regard to statements of fact, "no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance." Whereas, in regard to statements of evaluation or morality, "one man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence at all, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another."[7] We therefore encounter the question of moral autonomy as a concrete classroom issue; for if the teacher decides that there are insufficient grounds for preserving the teacher-student relation, at least in cases of evaluation and morality, the options of authority or subjectivity take on new significance regardless of their logical dubitability.

But could a student, without logical error, base his moral views on

premises which no one else accepted or recognized, or refuse to accept the evidence that others take to be supportive of a moral view, simply because he has decided not to acknowledge this as evidence for him? If the answer is in the affirmative, we might suppose, for instance, that a morally eccentric student could hold "that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands, and never turned NNE after turning SSW. He could also reject someone else's evaluation simply by denying that his evidence was evidence at all."[8] Those holding a thesis of the autonomy of moral terms, i.e., that there must be certain _free_ moral terms, seem entirely resigned to the possibility and validity of such a _reductio ad absurdum_, and that, unless perforce certain specific measures are taken in the classroom, such as conditioning or indoctrination, there will be no defense against impending chaos. But surely, before we would accept just _any_ judgment or action, we would want to have a notion of what will _generally_ pass as _moral_ judgment or action. The oddity of the moral eccentric's suggestion prompts us to suppose there is a special background to be disclosed by such questions as "Why?" or "What is the point?" And surely to speak about the point is not to speak about _anything_ whatsoever:

> It is no good saying that there would be a point in doing the action because the action was a morally good action: the question is how it can be given any such description if we cannot first speak about the point. At it is just as crazy to suppose that we can call _anything_ the point of doing something without having to say what the point of _that_ is. In clasping one's hands one may make a slight sucking noise, but what is the point of that? It is surely clear that moral virtues must be connected with human good and harm, and that it is quite impossible to call anything you like good or harm.[9]

Mrs. Foot's contrast between the claims of the moral eccentric and *the* point of moral judgment or action dramatizes the need for a satisfactory concept of morality; to deny the question of how judgment or action affect people, the benefit or harm, goodness or badness, etc., conveyed, bestows legitimacy on the moral eccentric's claim and is tantamount to refusing anything as the substantive content of morality. A person cannot decide for himself what evidence will count for a moral view any more than he can decide for himself what evidence will count for a disease or a scientific theory. What Mrs. Foot seems to be asking is whether it is profitable to speak of morality without assuming it to have a point, and whether *the* point or ultimate reason has been given in the moral eccentric's claim. The reference to moral content, much like that developed in the last chapter, does not appear to be based on an *a priori* assumption, but on the contingent observation that, in calling for reasons, the agent must narrow the range of his responses before we are convinced his judgments and actions fall within the moral purview. However, it might be urged that we have not discovered the content of morality, that benefit or goodness, etc., are not always *the* point of judgment or action, though they may be incidental. For instance, some might feel that making a promise entails carrying it out, without further reference to a specified moral content. Still, the content we have adduced is a relative matter, a matter of *perceived* relations and bearings, a reference to a general range or cluster of concerns. Under ordinary circumstances, the feeling of obligation may very well be *the* point of executing a promise. But we could just as well

hold that the institution of promising has its office in some sense of benefit or harm; for surely, if one were convinced that carrying out his promise would lead to irreparable harm, this conviction would figure in one's final decision whether to keep a promise. At least, we would tend to assign the moral edge to the decision which took this into consideration. Our position is this: if there is to be a point to morality, it seems there must be some restriction as to what will pass as a moral view, and though we have perhaps missed the mark as to the content (we can only ask the reader to consider for himself), there would seem to be no question that some content must be cited. It follows that, if there is to be a point to moral education, there will be logical restrictions placed on the teacher-student relation; for as Dewey says, "the teacher presents in actuality what the pupil presents only in *posse*. That is, the teacher already knows the things which the student is only learning. Hence the problem of the two is radically unlike."[10] If it is granted that morality has the content we have adduced, or at least some content, then the student cannot, with logical consistency, base his moral views on just any premises, nor can he refuse to accept all evidence which fails to support his cherished convictions. Since it is the teacher who possesses the perspective needed to identify the content of morality, it is the teacher's responsibility to guide the student to the realization that not any view, whatsoever, can be a moral point of view.

If it can be held, then, that morality has a content and that not just any evidence can support just any moral judgment or view, it follows

that what will count as a moral principle, in any given case, will have to be established against a contextual background which includes intelligent thought and action. As might be expected, the process of moral education sheds light on the status of principles, and an impartial observer of the teacher-student relation would be expected to detect great variations of moral awareness. It might be discovered that, in the early stages of a child's moral development, goodness and badness, benefit and harm relate to considerations of immediate needs and desires. As initial principles regulating choice and action, immediate needs and desires, through their satisfaction may, in turn, generate new needs and desires, new principles by which to gauge choice and action. One might discover, for instance, that self-interest gives way to a wider range of considerations, such as benevolence, trust or social impact. In other words, the process of moral education sheds light on general questions of morality, by exhibiting how moral context, evidence and principles are combined and interrelated in attacking concrete problems. In studying choice and action against a background of intelligent deliberation, an observer begins to grasp how morality is manifested, how it is that the traditional separation of such terms as "good," "bad," or "ought" from such terms as "benefit," "harm," or "desire" is untenable. They cannot be separated in moral philosophy because they are not separated meaningfully (though, of course, they are separated linguistically) when applied in concrete operational contexts. To say that they should be is thus seen to be an evaluative judgment which can only lead to circularity, no basis being found for

their separation in experience. We have surveyed the reasons for treating principles as embodied in judgment, and we have endeavored to show that judgments of principle do not differ logically from judgments in general, the relation between principles and evidence being itself a matter of judgment, principles comprising part of what is meant by judgment:

> How exactly the concepts of harm, advantage, benefit, importance, etc., are related to the different moral concepts, such as rightness, obligation, goodness, duty, and virtue, is something that needs the most patient investigation, but that they are so related seems undeniable, and it follows that a man cannot make his own personal decision about the considerations which are to count as evidence in morals.[11]

As a child becomes evidence- and reason-regarding, principles are generated out of the experience of the child; the teacher, shepherding and nurturing through wisdom and a wider moral perspective, is in a position to identify the _cul-de-sac_ and to take measures freeing choice and action in enterprising and enlightening directions. The teacher-student relation is maintained and validated as the child becomes increasingly adroit in discriminating and selecting those meanings of the contextual situation contributing moral weight.

Democratic Principles and Moral Education

There is another way we might approach principles and their function, as Dewey says, in supplying "the final methods used in judging suggested courses of action."[12] A number of recent writers inclined toward naturalism have distinguished between brute and institutional facts. The object seems to be an attempt to render a rigorous basis for identifying meaning

according to the contexts defining institutional requirements; institutions imply the meanings to be assigned to evidence. This, of course, is reminiscent of the antecedent and intuitive meanings we have previously discussed, and of the attendant danger of catapulting them into a position of external authority. It seems clear, however, that some institutional requirements have a more compelling claim on our attention and allegiance than others; it has been urged, for instance, that there is reason to embrace democratic over despotic institutions. Consider the following simple example of the relation between brute and institutional facts:

> A man hits a home run only given the institution of baseball; without the institution he only hits a sphere with a stick. Similarly, a man gets married or makes a promise only within the institutions of marriage and promising. Without them, all he does is utter words or make gestures. We might characterize such facts as institutional facts, and contrast them with noninstitutional, or brute, facts; that a man has a bit of paper with green ink on it is a brute fact; that he has five dollars is an institutional fact.[13]

We sometimes speak of the institution of justice, in the sense that it defines many forms of duty, rights, obligations, reciprocity and commitments. We seize on justice because, in a generic sense, this institution does so much work for us, as opposed to the specter of might makes right or utter chaos, and in Chapter Two we saw that there may be empirical backing for principles of justice operating in all societies. The institution of justice retains its cogency because it is capable of guiding even the most mundane transactions:

> That I owe the grocer such-and-such a sum would be one of a set of facts which would be 'brute' in relation to the description 'I am a bilker'. 'Bilking' is of course a

> species of 'dishonesty' or 'injustice'. (Naturally the consideration will not have any effect on my actions unless I want to commit or avoid acts of injustice.)[14]

If it is true that the institution of justice can influence even the most ordinary matters, we might inquire as to whether there are educational principles which can be defended and which can perform a comparable service. The basic requirement would be, as with the example of justice, that the presence and efficacy of such principles would be perceived and felt in confronting concrete problems. We would hardly expect that a child would appreciate principles of justice or democracy in some pure form, as external ideals to which to conform, or to apply, indiscriminately, to any and all circumstances. We have argued that principles must arise from the experience of the child, and it is no good thinking that justice and democracy, as abstract concepts, will command the allegiance of a child whose perspective is circumscribed by urgent and limited demands. The logic of the teacher-student relation suggests, however, that the teacher's perspective may include leading principles for reasons unascertainable by the student. There can be no doubt that in our society much is said about democracy in very loose and unenlightening ways, but the very ubiquity of the term's use suggests a pro-attitude, a desire to preserve this institution regardless of how dimly its requirements are perceived. The pertinent question is whether democracy is a living presence in our lives, an institution whose presence is felt in decisions and actions, or whether democracy is an empty concept whose function, as the emotivist would contend, is to influence and cajole us to choose and act in prescribed ways,

whether or not democratic in any meaningful sense. In short, although we are aware of institutional facts, the task is to ascertain whether democracy as an institution can be defended.

We must attempt to uncover, then, whether the institution of democracy can be defended, whether democratic principles are manifested in choice and action, and whether the institution guarantees the full measure of freedom and responsibility. Democracy is often defined as a system of government, whereby various possibilities of reciprocity among the governed exist, and we will therefore begin by examining political democracy to see if this is the concept we require. Robert Paul Wolff has recently argued that the moral autonomy of the individual will be of necessity inimical to the moral authority of the state. That the _concept_ of the state implies moral authority is tautological for Wolff, since "the distinctive characteristic of the state is supreme authority," and "to _claim_ authority is to claim the right to be obeyed."[15] The problem is to determine whether there is _de jure_ as opposed to _de facto_ justification for the concept of the state. That is, the descriptive concept of the state's authority is justified by pointing out that some states do in fact claim supreme authority, while the normative concept of the state's authority, since it is nonempirical, referring "to what ought to be rather than to what is," must await _a priori_ justification. "We must demonstrate by an _a priori_ argument that there can be forms of human community in which some men have a moral right to rule."[16] However, conflict is foreshadowed as men become aware that they are "metaphysically free," aware that they cannot put aside

responsibility for choice and action; "the moral condition demands that we acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy wherever and whenever possible."[17] To the extent that we submit to the claims of the moral authority of the state we forfeit moral autonomy and responsibility; therefore, no a priori argument for the de jure authority of the state can be sustained, the primacy of autonomy and responsibility precluding the demonstration or deduction of the state's legitimacy:

> If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose subjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous, and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man.[18]

If we turn to political democracy in an effort to resolve the conflict between moral authority and moral autonomy, we encounter several possibilities, every one of which Wolff believes must fail. We might, for instance, turn to "unanimous direct democracy," whereby every member of society freely gives assent. This indeed would solve the conflict, except, practically, one dissenting vote on a crucial issue could bring the operations of government to a halt. Similarly, with "representative democracy," we have no ultimate control over elected officials who may at will disregard our prerogatives, and hence we have no moral obligation to obey laws to which we are vehemently opposed. Finally, in the case of "majoritarian democracy," we encounter the tyranny of the majority, as Mill called it, whereby the minority systematically suffers the loss of moral autonomy. Clearly, the critique of political democracy is based on Wolff's premise

describing the logical incompatibility of moral authority and moral autonomy. It would do no good to signal such redeeming slogans as "Democracy is the best system that we have been able to devise," because, if the logical incompatibility between moral authority and moral autonomy holds, no system can be proven to be morally superior over another purely on grounds of prudential results:

> Indeed, the prudential and casuistical defenses of democracy do not succeed in distinguishing it morally from any other form of political community. A man might find that his affairs flourished in a dictatorship or monarchy, and even that the welfare of the people as a whole was effectively advanced by the policies of such a state. Democracy, then, could claim to be no more than one type of de facto government among many, and its virtues, if any, would be purely relative.[19]

Though Wolff's argument is indeed ingenious, I think a naturalist assessing its impact would point out that it proceeds along with two assumptions. In the first place, there is no doubt that Wolff has stipulated the independence of a normative realm, and he freely admits that he has "been forced to assume a number of very important propositions about the nature, sources, and limits of moral obligation," and that he has "simply taken for granted an entire ethical theory."[20] In the second place, it is assumed that political authority, in the sense that men ought to accede to supreme authority, is identified with this normative realm; indeed all authority is moral authority. Given the independence of moral authority and the identification of all authority with moral authority, and since the primary case of morality is moral autonomy, no a priori argument can be adduced in defense of de jure political authority. Moral authority and

moral autonomy are strictly incompatible. However, it is doubtful that Wolff has made the strong case he would like, and a naturalist interpretation would challenge his underlying assumptions. Provided we do not assume the independence of morality, moral authority becomes a chimera, and the need for *a priori* justification of political authority disappears. Moral authority, if not simply a *contradictio in adjecto*, would have to be authority derived from a consideration of the consequences of holding a given moral view; in like manner, political democracy, if it is to be assessed for moral worth, would have to be assessed in terms of the consequences which follow from it. Wolff analyzes the concepts of authority and autonomy as rarefied abstractions, and he has done so through the agency of arbitrary fiat--that moral and political authority are divorced, in terms of their justification, from contingent considerations. Naturally, if we can solve the problem through *a priori* analysis, authority and autonomy will be manifestly incompatible, it being contradictory that a person could be both free and coerced at the same time and in the same respect. By the same magic of *a priori* analysis, we can derive correlative reinforcement of the point, viz., that we cannot morally distinguish democracy from any other political system, and that a person's moral autonomy is inversely proportionate to the coercion of his choice and action. Nevertheless, if morality is perceived in the consequences which follow from a moral view or political system, not only are we able to distinguish morally among competing political systems, but it may be the case that moral autonomy cannot be analyzed *in vacuo*, without reference to other

considerations. It might be determined, for instance, that there is considerable advantage to be gained through the conjoint efforts of a community of individuals and that certain extensions of authority may be compatible with personal and collective freedom. This being the case, the _a priori_ concept of moral autonomy would be vacuous and would have no bearing on substantive questions of morality. In short, it may be the case that moral autonomy can only be understood within a wider context of considerations, and that authority may well be compatible with these considerations. In this regard, Jeffrey Reiman describes the fallibility of moral autonomy--a suggestion of wrongheadedness in assuming that the concept's significance can be exhausted by _a priori_ analysis:

> Political and legal systems arise in response to the fact of power in human communities, and to the assumption that individual conscience or moral autonomy is not an adequate safeguard against the exercise of that power by some to the detriment of others or to the community as a whole. Without the _fact_ of power, and the _assumption_ that individual conscience is an inadequate control, there would be no such thing as a _political_ system. Hence _the starting point of a political system is the fallibility of conscience_.[21]

Moral autonomy, conceptually bound by _a priori_ analysis, constitutes no more than inner freedom, exclusive and personal, and as Wolff points out, it is conceptually incompatible with political authority. But the question remains whether conceptual analysis can render the content we need to understand autonomy and authority. If Reiman is correct, there can be no moral autonomy without both political autonomy and political authority, it being power which links them all. The power for which men struggle and die is political autonomy, for it is perceived that only through political

autonomy can moral autonomy survive; yet the conjoint efforts of men to gain political autonomy require social order. That is to say, some forms of political authority would be indispensable for political autonomy and hence for moral autonomy. Reiman is suggesting, as opposed to conceptual analysis that "in reality, moral autonomy depends on political autonomy. It depends on the availability of power--to think, to inquire, to evaluate, to experiment, to accumulate and exchange and test ideas--and this depends on social order."[22] Translated in terms of moral education, we might be inclined to think that political democracy constitutes the political authority we need--that in the forum of debate, political democracy would surely win over competing systems, because it manifests superiority in the release of power and moral autonomy. However, such a conclusion could be misleading, for if political democracy must, in terms of its justification, encompass reasons, procedures and possibilities external to any of its forms as a system of government--forms such as representative or majoritarian--then political democracy would appear to be too narrow to yield the principles we require in moral education. The emphasis would be on democracy as an antecedently conceived meaning, a system of government competing with others, but not necessarily a living constituent of the judgments actually made by students. To be sure, the student would cite the consequences of abetting one form or system over another, but the presence of democratic principles in judgment would not thereby be identified or explained. Even though some form of political democracy might win a student's allegiance--that he notes that the form satisfies certain requirements, such as the

release of power, the teacher would still want to know how it is that the student is able to come to that conclusion. What is needed is an explanation of why the student is able to reach the conclusion, not simply the reasons he gives for the conclusion. We need to know what it is that permits the student to affirm political democracy. Consequently, the concept of democracy we require must not only encompass a form of government, but must be broad enough to encompass the factors leading to the justification of the form. For this reason, Dewey draws a distinction between democracy as a social idea and political democracy as a system of government:

> The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, industry, religion. And even as far as political arrangements are concerned, governmental institutions are but mechanism for securing to an idea channels of effective operation.[23]

However much we may be disposed to political democracy in general, or to one of its forms in particular, we still must inquire into the conditions under which it is permitted to operate, what it is that makes it effective in promoting individual and communal welfare. Only by identifying these further conditions are we in a position to understand how democratic principles might be manifested in moral education. By way of further distinguishing democracy as a social ideal from political democracy, Dewey describes a "community of shared common interests," wherein various social groups are free to interact in "meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse":

> A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer

> his own action to that of others, and to consider the actions of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in his action. They secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests.[24]

In attempting to unpack this concept of democracy, to show its significance, it seems to me possible to cite at least two principal ways of justifying the concept and of showing its bearing on moral education. In the first place, to the extent that education ought to accord with human nature, and to the extent that the only feasible way to get at human nature is by reference to a social environment, there may be grounds to justify democracy as a community of shared common interests. Of course, it might be argued that human nature is so perverse and fallible that we ought not attempt to organize education on that basis. Moreover, if human nature is thought to have no evil stigma, it might still be argued that, since it denotes an inner core of innate capacity, it cannot be properly expounded in terms of social interaction and interdependence. Since both objections suppose that human nature is dominated by inherent or innate characteristics, they are both liable to the same critical analysis; if one fails, they both fail. Now we have witnessed the fallibility of moral autonomy as an a priori conception, and we might therefore be wary of a concept of human nature characterized by innate, self-actualizing capacities. There have been attempts, of course, in the name of individualism,

to expunge the picture of the frail dependent agent and, instead, promote the vision of the isolated, proudly independent being. This impetus is detected in Locke's skepticism regarding government which exceeds the preservation of inherent rights of property, in Cartesian doubt and the meditating ego's claim of indubitable truth, and in the rugged individualism of Rousseau's natural man, unfolding from within, unimpeded by societal demands. And it is not unusual, today, to find many who perceive the essence of democracy in the preservation of laissez-faire individualism. Individualism follows from a belief in the inherent or innate, the belief that government and society, at best, constitute necessary evils, while inevitably clouding natural proclivities and hindering their natural development. The individual, up against government and society, must learn to preserve his integrity; he must learn to manipulate in order to gain the best possible advantage. Human nature thus conceived naturally revolts against assimilation, and, although it is possible that human nature, when coupled with technological achievement, might eventuate in the "Great Society," to use Dewey's expression, the dominate feature of this society would be a disparity and conflict of interests, various factions represented by competing individuals and isolated groups, and the "Great Community" of shared common interests would fall short of realization.[25] The problem confronting those who hold this view of human nature is one of testability, a problem of separating the inherent or innate from learned dispositions and behavior. On first glance, the test would seem improbable, it being after the fact, probing the individual already, in some calculable degree,

a product of environment and society. Indeed, unless we are convinced by _a priori_ arguments for innateness, the practical logistics of unraveling innate characteristics would appear rife with technical difficulties.

The peculiar difficulty of uncovering an innate core of self or human nature is evident in Carl Rogers' attempt to reveal the existence of an "organismic base for an organized valuing process within the human individual."[26] The persuasiveness of Rogers' insight rests in his authoritative interpretation of psychotherapy and his extensive experience with patients. Rogers believes he has detected a basic tension, in the valuing process of his patients, between what he calls operative and conceived values. An _operative_ value springs from an organismic base; "it is simply the value choice which is indicated behaviorally when the organism selects one object, rejects another."[27] Accordingly, in an infant's world, food, comfort and security are positively valued; pain, hunger, bitter tastes and sudden loud sounds are negatively valued. And operative evaluation occurs in "much more complex situations." Studies have recorded a specific appetite, whereby an infant will choose, according to the "wisdom of the body," those foods which enrich a deficient diet. These paradigm cases of infant evaluations become, for Rogers, the model for the adult, whereby "the locus of evaluation is again established firmly within the person."[28] However, as the child grows, he is subject to approbation and disapprobation regarding behaviors, confronted with the _conceived_ values of his parents and society. If I understand Rogers correctly, conceived values are comparable to the antecedent or intuitive meanings previously discussed, and when confronted with these values, the child begins to lose contact with the organismic

base which has served so well in the past. In order to hold the love of parents and the approbation of society, he introjects values often alien to himself. Hence, the adult personality becomes fractured, operative and conceived values at loggerheads, the agent no longer in contact with the inner core:

> I believe that this picture of the individual, with values mostly introjected,...is the picture of most of us. By taking over the conceptions of others as our own, we lose contact with the potential wisdom of our own functioning and lose confidence in ourselves. Since these value constructs are often sharply at variance with what is going on in our own experiencing, we have in a very basic way divorced ourselves from ourselves, and this accounts for much of modern strain and insecurity.[29]

There is, of course, no lack of evidence for introjected values: the young student, out of deference to parental wishes, becomes convinced of the value of being a doctor rather than an artist; the older brother enjoys pulling his sister's hair until, faced with parental disapprobation, he becomes convinced his behavior is unworthy. But why must we assume, given this evidence of introjected values, that they are representative of evaluations in general, operative values at odds with conceived values? Rogers seems to be saying that they will be at odds, unless, perhaps, introjected conceived values, mediated through an organismic valuing process, become operative values, become the agent's own. However, since the organismic valuing process has been forced to assimilate alien material, the seeds of conflict take root, an unauthentic self or personality the consequence. Rogers does not pursue the possibility that an introjected value might be deemed worthy for reasons which are entirely objective and intersubjectively

open to validation. And it seems to me that the reason he does not pursue this possibility is because he is using as his model the extreme cases rendered in psychotherapy. Rogers' argument appears to be centered on two major moves: (1) an extrapolation from infant studies, where unsophisticated evaluations are plausibly tied to what might be termed an organismic base, to the sophisticated and complex evaluations of the adult; and (2) an interpretaion of the patient's attempts at recovery as attempts to recapture this primitive organismic base enjoyed by infants. However, when we inquire regarding what it is that Rogers means by "organismic base," we learn that "it is the capacity [italics mine] for receiving feedback information which enables the organism continually to adjust behavior and reactions so as to achieve the maximum possible self-enhancement."[30] Leaving aside the open-question of self-enhancement, is Rogers saying anything more than that the organismic base is the capacity for evaluation, anything more than the capacity to choose and act wisely? Why then would we want, in general, to distinguish between operative and conceived values? We have argued that intelligent judgment generates values, not because of some special locus or etiology marking these values, but because the agent is aware of relevant relations and bearings. Although it is not entirely clear what it is that Rogers wants to establish, it seems clear that he has not empirically established that there are operative values, tied to an internal organismic base and conceived values, tied to external sanctions. What he may have shown is that, in some cases, those revealed in psychotherapy, some values figure preeminently in a person's life to the exclusion of

others which might have figured had the full capacity for evaluation been present. But this does not imply a unique locus or origin of values independent of judgment. When values are considered as the product of intelligent judgment, it seems a metaphorical assignation, based on a dubious inference from what is empirically known, to single out values as originating within the self, others as externally imposed. Only in cases where intelligent judgment is arrested does it make sense to cite external or internal restraints or sanctions to explain judgment. And it seems to me that Rogers has been unduly swayed by cases of arrested judgment in giving us a model of human nature or self.

Rogers seems to have been overly impressed by successful retrenchments of personality encountered in psychotherapy. He thus sees the success of therapy "marked by one primary value: namely, that this person, this client, has worth. He as a person is valued in his separateness and uniqueness."[31] It follows that, if we are to understand the mechanisms of recovery, the capacity for evaluation must be represented by an inner self, crying to be heard, and just as we perceive an organismic base in infants, the unimpeded wisdom of the body, so it must be that the patient is striving to cast off the onerous load of introjected values and return to this primitive base of optimum functioning. Genuine evaluation will be the reward and consequence of this return to an organismic base. But to characterize successful therapy in terms of an organismic base patterned on the stimulus-response prizings of infants exceeds the bounds of what is empirically ascertainable. Rogers tries to explain therapeutic success in

terms of an implosion of personality, whereas we might just as well say that the successful patient has learned to submit his judgments to a tribunal of factors which would not be properly characterized as being either subjective or objective, internal or external. That we have evidence of a patient striving for a sense of worth or self-confidence does not necessarily imply a search for an organismic base, for we cannot establish what a new sense of value means independent of the circumstances of evaluation. In other words, we have argued that values are the product of the process of evaluation, and the capacity for evaluation, intelligent and hence healthy evaluation, depends on factors which cannot be established prior to actual cases of evaluation. To say, then, that genuine evaluation concerns operative values, having an origin or locus in an organismic base, exceeds the evidence and seems entirely arbitrary.

If we cannot make a determination of values prior to an assessment of the factors involved in evaluation, it would seem pointless to speak of human nature or self as being somehow independent of choices and actions as they occur in an environmental setting, that is, to speak of the self as an independent, metaphysical entity, empirically unascertainable. Yet, Rogers often seems to be saying just that, and though he does cite, as indicative of a mature individual's judgments, the value of information and feedback, "it means that this is taken for what it is--outside evidence--and is not as significant as his own reactions."[32] The "outside," and by extension, "inside" metaphors are surely empirically unwarranted, surely not the locus of the pathological and healthy, for what is empirically

ascertainable are choices and actions regulated by environmental factors whose locus is established in the process of judgment, not independent of it or prior to it. The distinction between the pathological and healthy, from an empirical standpoint, is made only because we can distinguish intelligent from arrested judgments and evaluations. To say that a person has a need or desire which springs from "within" suggests that the need or desire has no object, has no relation to features, goals and purposes which are environmentally bound. It might make some sense to say that an infant's wants and needs spring from "within," in an effort to make sense of positing an organismic base, but there can be no doubt that their significance and satisfaction are just as much a function of factors "without"--the mother's breast, the warmth of the blanket, and other agencies of comfort and security. The question concerns where to draw the line between inner and outer, and even if we make the differentiation in theory, this is not what is perceived empirically. It would therefore appear that the practicable and profitable way to view the self is in terms of an environmental complex which includes what is deemed inner and outer. In this way we can explain the pathological cases of introjection cited by Rogers without the assumption of an inner core of values. Along with Rogers, we can single out such factors as the influence of parents, peers and society; we can identify cases of obdurate habit and exaggerated reliance on conceived values. But now explanation is couched in terms of empirical data, in terms of factors regulating (arresting) choice and action, not by hypotheses positing an inner self or organismic base. The latter we cannot

empirically ascertain, and the factors which we cite indicate, as opposed to hypothetical supposition, that human nature and personality are developmental concepts, functions of the process of evaluation. Consider the pathological cases rendered by Rogers. As Dewey rhetorically asks, "What are [these]...pathological phenomena but evidences that the self loses integration within itself when it loses integration with the medium in which it lives."[33] Hence, we cannot really speak of "within" unless we cite "without," and what would appear to be significant about the self is not the bifurcation of the two, as we certainly do for linguistic purposes, but discriminations of the total environment in which choices and actions are manifested.

The self, then, is a developmental and environmental concept. When the self is conceived developmentally, the pathological is registered in arrested or restricted discrimination and deliberation, rather than in aberations of an inner core, and the unity and integrity of the self, which the positing of an inner core is alleged to preserve, is really manifested in a person's choices and actions, in what a person decides to become. Dewey assesses the role of deliberation and choice in the determination of the self:

> In committing oneself to a particular course, a person gives a lasting set to his own being. Consequently, it is proper to say that in choosing this object rather than that, one is in reality choosing what kind of person or self one is going to be. Superficially, the deliberation which terminates in choice is concerned with weighing the values of particular ends. Below the surface, it is a process of discovering what sort of being a person most wants to become.[34]

When the self is conceived environmentally, the emphasis is shifted to the materials of deliberation and choice. The putative fact here is a social environment, and deliberation and choice will therefore be marked by concerns of associated life:

> The stuff of belief and proposition is not originated by us. It comes to us from others, by education, tradition and the suggestion of the environment. Our intelligence is bound up, so far as its materials are concerned, with the community life of which we are a part. We know what it communicates to us, and know according to habits it forms in us.[35]

In view of this developmental and environmental concept of the self, we would appear to have grounds for the concept of democracy as a community of shared common interests, and that, since human nature manifests no necessarily incorrigible aspects, we have in democracy thus construed a principle of utmost importance for moral education. If we cannot feasibly understand the individual except in terms of development within a social environment, moral education would stand to profit enormously from this disclosure. Morality and community would be coextensive. However, the immediate objection will be leveled that the fact of an individual developing in a social environment does not commit us to the normative acceptance of a community of shared common interests. Leaving aside the possibility that no fact or set of facts would have relevance for normative acceptance, a possibility it is now hoped will be deemed untenable, it could still be argued that the fact is compatible with the antithetical moral view. It might be argued that rather than a community of shared common interests, the fact might just as well suggest the ruthless pursuit of self-interest, suggest the

vision of competing factions striving for ascendancy, call out the moral edict that might makes right. One might conclude that _intelligent_ judgment _ought_ to accord with the pursuit of self-interest regardless of the consequences for others. Certainly moral education will be concerned with social verities, with manipulative techniques and sophistic maxims on how to cope and succeed. This argument is certainly captious, but I think, in view of arguments already tendered, that it must fail. An intelligent judgment, as we have seen, and in the words of Dewey, "lies in the quality and degree of the preceptions of ties and interdependencies; in the use to which they are put."[36] It follows that the normative justification of democracy as a community of shared common interests is a matter of intelligent judgment. Moreover, we have argued that a moral view is justified in proportion to some benefit or goodness thought to be derived from acting according to the view. The justification, in other words, rests in the fact, if it is a fact, that individuals _do_ cite and _do_ receive benefit and goodness as a concequence of conjoint effort. Accordingly, we have Dewey's estimation of the community of shared common interests:

> Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications constitutes the idea of democracy.[37]

If Dewey is correct, it would appear that self-interest will not suffice as the moral view we require, for it will be found that a person's interests are integrally woven into considerations of cooperation. The

naturalist justification of the normative view of democracy as a community of shared common interests is funded by the argument that all judgments have the same logical status; all are claims regarding facts, interdependencies, relations and consequences. In like manner, self-interest is justified as a moral position to the extent that certain relations and consequences, etc., are considered, insofar as benefit and goodness are cited. Clearly there are grounds for deciding between the two positions. It is just as clear that the perspicacity displayed in judgment tells us that unbridled self-interest has very little independent meaning; for when it is carried to its logical consequence, judgment informs us that self-interest can only be fully understood in terms of a wider communal context. But since the two positions are susceptible to objective analysis and comparison, we need to find some factor, some benefit or goodness to be derived from the one but attenuated or absent in the other. If this additional factor can be brought to surface, we will have strong justification for our construal of democracy, and the basis for a strong argument against the prevailing subjectivity in moral education; education in general and moral education in particular will be shown to prosper best as a communal enterprise, because some desirable factor will have been realized in communal association. It seems to me that this additional increment of benefit or goodness lies in what we have consistently held regarding freedom, viz., that democracy affords us the power to do--subjectivity and self-interest, in their isolation, pale in comparison. Therefore, the second justification for our construal of democracy and its relation to moral education rests in its capacity to generate freedom, the power to do.

Democracy conceived as a community of shared common interests is partially justified by the fact that human nature is explicable only in terms of a social environment. If it were possible to defend a concept of self in terms of inherent characteristics alone, it might make some sense to speak of freedom as unique and personal, as the belief that men are free so far as their thoughts are free. But a self bound to a social environment casts the question of freedom anew, in terms of expression and action. No longer can it be understood in isolation, for account must be taken of the other, the connection of one's desires, hopes and fears, goals and needs with the wider implications of a social context. Hence, in addition to its justification in light of a social self, i.e., the fact of an individual developing in a social environment, democracy conceived as a community of shared common interests is further justified because it is capable of releasing and expressing the power gained through conjoint effort. Institutions arise in response to human needs and desires, and the ensuing reciprocity between agent and society constitutes a new fact, a further testimony of how democratic principles might be embodied in choice and action. Nevertheless, an argument might be advanced that a social self, as such, is subject to the unfreedom resulting from ignorance and conflicts of interest, and since this has so often been the case historically, self-interest and moral subjectivity gain credibility as plausible alternatives. Since the fact of social relationships _implies_ nothing additional, one must turn to his own devices, to means ensuring the satisfaction of urgent needs and desires; in the face of impelling demands, the

agent must devise strategies aimed at gratification, choice and action weighed according to opportunism, immediacy and propinquity.

I think this argument fails on at least two counts. In the first place, needs and desires are identified and modified in consequence of conjoint effort. For instance, using Dewey's example, "a physician or engineer is free in his thought and action in the degree in which he knows what he deals with. Possibly we find here the key to any freedom."[38] And we might add that freedom of thought and action depend on the existence of genuine alternatives, many of which will only be generated through conjoint enterprise; one is not a physician, engineer, carpenter or teacher *in vacuo*. Obviously the only way that one can appreciate or disavow alternatives generated through conjoint effort is by being exposed to them. Hence, conjoint effort may open avenues of expression precluded the agent chained to a limited repertoire of demands. In the second place, conjoint effort allows for meeting new and unforeseen events and problems. Changes in the natural environment, political and technological innovation call for the efforts and intelligence of the community. The fact of a social environment suggests the inestimable power of collective intelligence in coping with environmental problems, assessing political processes, maintaining order and distributing justice. "Law, government, institutions, all social arrangements," says Dewey, "must be informed with a rationality that corresponds to the order of the whole,...to the end that power of unimpeded action can be found anywhere."[39]

Therefore, though a case can be made for unlicensed self-interest and

moral subjectivity, there is abundant and compelling evidence indicating the value of cooperation and the rewards to be won through communal experience and intelligence. The agent begins to realize that it is the quality of judgment, the extent of connections and relations perceived, which best accords with the satisfaction of needs, desires and goals. The benefit and good derived from conjoint effort outmatches that of individual initiative blinded to possibilities originating in the public domain. This means that intelligent and informed judgment is valued in and for itself, and needs, desires and goals are colored and altered as a result. The agent learns that freedom is not an original or personal possession, existing logically prior to modes of association, but is actually the power to be derived from those associations. The agent learns that he has a vested interest in what transpires in the world around him; since his own best interests are a complement of intelligent judgment, he now acknowledges his place within the community. Above, we noted Reiman's indictment of moral autonomy as an _a priori_ possession, its fallibility and impotence, and now we can fully appreciate that the concrete _fact_ of freedom is the _fact_ of power as it exists in human communities. Democracy, as a community of shared common interests, is thus an ideal, but not an ideal dissevered from empirical expression; rather, the ideal is embodied in the actual choices and actions of men, reinforced and justified by the consequences. It follows that education, as sanctioned by society, will reflect this ideal, and that moral education in particular will be concerned with the production of the free agent who actively enters into the life of the community.

The ramifications for moral education of democracy thus construed are dramatic and immediate. No longer is there reason to condone moral subjectivity and asocial behavior in the name of individualism. We have argued that the case for subjectivity, reflected in Atkinson's skeptical conclusion that any moral position and its opposite can be maintained, fails because there are criteria by virtue of which we can adjudicate conflicting moral positions. Because criteria can be adduced, the naturalist maintains, as opposed to moral subjectivity, that there can be a normative theory of moral education and that the teacher-student relation remains viable. That is to say, we have argued at length that the primary case of morality lies in the agent's identification of the content of morality, the benefit and goodness attendant on choice and action, which in turn implies that the agent has identified relevant relations, bearings and consequences. Since there are intersubjective criteria, moral education has firm grounding in experience, and the teacher-student relation is vouchsafed in matters of evaluation and morality. Moral educators, seduced by the _is/ought_ distinction, will discover mitigation in the knowledge that the distinction cannot be supported on either logical or experiential grounds--that ultimately the distinction collapses and the burden of morality is envisaged to lie in the quality of judgment, in the connections perceived and put to work in the student's experience. Moreover, we have argued that freedom, the necessary condition of any moral theory, cannot be divorced from considerations of a social context, and that consequently self-interest is basically a vacuous concept, unless

interests and desires are referred to this wider context of concern. Here the naturalist records the fact of human nature and the fact of power to do. It follows that only a naturalist position affords the full measure of freedom and is therefore the adequate and complete theory required for moral education. Anti-naturalists, in their attempt to identify morality in the antecedent, in independent principles, denigrate or cloud descriptive material and thereby compromise freedom; they are unable to account for the liberation of power through critical deliberation, the real mark of the moral agent. However, the naturalist does account for freedom--by adducing a social concept of human nature and by identifying the locus of freedom in the conjoint efforts of men to solve their problems. A naturalist theory of moral education will therefore be geared to a social end, and as Dewey says, "it is equivalent to that training of the child which will give him such possession of himself that he may take charge of himself; may not only adapt himself to the changes which are going on, but have power to shape and direct those changes."[40] And the "unifying principle" which will guide the pupil in shaping and directing changes is the "consciousness of his social environment, [which] confers upon him the ability to interpret his own powers from the standpoint of their possibilities in social use."[41] The name we have given this unifying principle is democracy.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the school only exists because it is sanctioned by society, and that the democratic society, the community of shared common interests, has a right in demanding that the school abet a social ideal. Therefore, much of current permissiveness, excused under such rubrics as "creativity" and "individuality" should be

held suspect. If our arguments are sound, these terms are mistakenly taken to denote original possessions, whereas they are really derivative concepts whose concrete expression is registered in the child's ability to cope with problems in a social environment. Consequently, our arguments suggest that the school has a fundamental moral responsibility or aim, one which, all too often, has been lost in the welter of proposals regarding the "free child":

> The moral responsibility of the school, and of those who conduct it, is to society. The school is fundamentally an institution erected by society to do a certain specific work--to exercise a certain specific function in maintaining the life and advancing the welfare of society. The educational system which does not recognize this fact as entailing upon it an ethical responsibility is derelict and a defaulter.[42]

This moral responsibility of the school implies that education is a function of social institutions whose primary aim is the development of quality judgments. To the extent that genuine education is liberating--that pupils perceive relevant relations, interdependencies and the consequences of their choice and action--there will be quality judgments; creativity and individuality will be manifested. It follows that education and moral education are coextensive, both being concerned with the quality of judgment; although, to be sure, it does not mean that every aim or study must accommodate a moral conclusion. But it does mean that, since judgments cannot be distinguished on the basis of logical kind, there will be no logical distinction between educational aims and moral aims. In this sense education and morality are coextensive. Our argument has been that democratic principles, embodied in choice and action, best guarantee the generation of quality judgments and the liberation of moral education.

FOOTNOTES

1. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 60

2. Ibid., p. 76

3. Ibid., pp. 77-78

4. Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1973), p. 143

5. W.K. Frankena, "Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education," in Moral Education, prepared by Richard Rowson (Walton Hall, Bletchley, Bucks: The Open University Press, 1973), p. 11

6. R.F. Atkinson, "Instruction and Indoctrination," in Philosophical Analysis and Education, ed. by R.D. Archambault (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 176

7. Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," in The Is/Ought Question, ed. by W.D. Hudson (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 196

8. Ibid., p. 197

9. Ibid., p. 205

10. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 183

11. Philippa Foot, "Moral Arguments" in Readings in Contemporary Ethical Theory, ed. by Kenneth Pahel and Marvin Schiller (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1970), p. 153

12. John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 141

13. John R. Searle, "How to Derive "Ought" from "Is," in Readings in Contemporary Ethical Theory, ed. by Kenneth Pahel and Marvin Schiller (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1970), p. 165

14. G.E.M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in The Is/Ought Question, ed. by W.D. Hudson (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 178

15. Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 4-5

16. Ibid., p. 8

17. Ibid., p. 17

18. Ibid., p. 19

19. Ibid., p. viii

20. Jeffrey H. Reiman, In Defense of Political Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 31

21. Ibid., p. 76

22. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Denver, Colo., Alan Swallow, 1954), p. 143

23. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 86-87

24. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 142

25. Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1969), p. 251

26. Ibid., p. 241

27. Ibid., p. 249

28. Ibid., p. 247

29. Ibid., p. 251

30. Ibid., p. 247

31. Ibid., p. 249

32. John Dewey, Intelligence in the Modern World, ed. by Joseph Ratner (New York: Random House, 1939), p. 824

33. John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), p. 317

34. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, Random House, 1957), p. 287

35. Ibid., p. 290

36. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 149

37. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 278

38. John Dewey, "Philosophies of Freedom," in *On Experience, Nature and Freedom*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), pp. 273-74

39. John Dewey, *John Dewey on Education*, ed. by Reginald D. Archambault (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 114

40. *Ibid*., p. 121

41. *Ibid*., p. 112

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