View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
brought to you by CORE
provided by UEL Research Repository at University of East London

10.-Chapter 10

Slovenia

Jana Javornik

Introduction

There is a compelling warrant for a fresh look at the changing relationship between female employment and childcare policy in Slovenia, a former Yugoslav republic where the state has actively promoted a dual-earner family model for over five decades. In this country, years of relative growth and stability under state socialism have been rudely interrupted by the disruptions in the 1990s and, less than two decades later, by the new age of austerity, both spiralling unemployment and attempts to extend the working lives.
As one of the smallest post-socialist EU member states Slovenia makes an interesting case study because between 1990 and 2015 it experienced several major exogenous shocks, which caused significant change in both the local economy and policy. In 1990, Slovenia became an independent state, forming its own national economy, which, together with about thirty other socialist countries, plunged into an unprecedented recession. Gone were the days of labour shortages and full employment; fiscal shortfalls undermined efforts to maintain and expand the welfare state and the overall retrenchment spurred significant cuts in social budgets (Deacon, 1992, 2000; Unicef, 1999; UNDP/RBEC, 1999; Javornik, 2000; Mrak et al. 2004). Less than two decades into its post-socialist present and four years into its EU membership Slovenia experienced the consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis; a few years later the impact of another set of national austerity measures began to be felt, as successive coalition governments ushered in important policy reforms and budgetary constraints. Full effects are as yet unknown but, according to the historical institutionalism scholarship, such critical points create opportunities for significant reforms and radical shifts in policy structures (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Such political windows may be used to alter policy discourses until the new paradigms are made compatible with the old order (Spohr, 2016).

The literature focusing on the early transformative period indeed conveys a sense of path departure from the socialist past. It maintains that “the winds of change” evoked “a

renaissance" of traditional gender roles and familialism, with the conservative ideological climate pushing women out of the labour force back into traditional care roles (Pascall and Lewis, 2004; Rostgaard, 2004; Hantrais, 2004; Pascall and Kwak, 2005). Funk (1993) described such "returning women in to the private" as a central mechanism for transforming the socialist 'full employment' to a quasi-capitalist system".

Under socialism childcare policies were considered key structuring factors of gender equity, providing resources within which individuals and families developed employment strategies (Saraceno and Keck, 2011). The neo-familialism thesis argues that a path-breaking pattern of 'refamilialism' became obvious under new social and political climate. This encompassed the changing policies' logic, suggesting reallocation of care responsibilities from the state to the family.

This thesis implies that all socialist states and their childcare policies were similarly generous and supportive of female employment throughout the socialist era and that all turned neo-familialistic after 1990 (Motiejūnaitė, 2008; Javornik, 2014b). Such thesis has informed much of comparative welfare state research, which has developed around the idea that Eastern Europe is so different and distant that it deserves its own special 'post-socialist', 'post-communist', or, mistakenly, 'post-Soviet'[1] country cluster (Rostgaard, 2004; Hantrais, 2004; Saraceno and Keck, 2008). These have become used as shorthand terms for a great number of Eastern European nations, suggesting that the 1990 transition erased decades of history.

With reference to this literature one would expect that changes in the employment law and other relevant legislation since the 1990s would have significantly altered the context for female and particularly maternal employment. A glance at the socialist history before 1989, combined with the studies of labour market and policy developments in the 2000s, however, paints a different picture and suggests that, albeit geographically and historically close, Slovenia has followed a different path (Javornik, 2010, 2012, 2014b).

Slovenia stands out as a country with one of the highest full-time female employment and the highest (full-time) employment rates for mothers in the post-socialist world and the EU/OECD alike. Similarly to Denmark or Sweden, women with children aged 0-6 and 0-14 are more likely to be in employment than women in the 25-54 age group in general, with only small differences by the number and age of children or education levels (Unicef, 1999; Javornik, 2010; OECD, 2016). Age-employment profiles, casting light on gender differences in patterns of labour market entry and exit over the life course, show fairly similar employment profiles for males and females; although general female employment

rates are below male's, both take the inverted U shape: rates are low for younger cohorts, increasing between the ages of 25 and 39 and stabilising around 30-49, before declining sharply as men and women approach the retirement age (OECD, 2016). By contrast, female part-time employment has been among the lowest in the EU (Javornik, 2000; Eurostat, 2016), combined with long work hours among parents, limited flexibility exacerbated by organisational culture of presenteeism, and the lowest gender pay gaps (Javornik, 2007, 2010; Kanjuo-Mrčela and Sadar-Černigoj, 2011).

Although the decline in female employment in the early years of the 1990s was significant, in retrospect, this was a blip of readjustment (Javornik, 2015). By and large, employment patterns reject the neo-familialistic thesis, implying that Slovenian developments may have been inscribed in different cultural, political and economic contexts. This suggests that sensitivity to contextual differences, including inherited educational and social security programmes, may carry explanatory potential over country's current outlook (Page, 2006; Javornik, 2010, 2012, 2014b).

Against such background, this chapter aims to contribute to comparative research on pressures on the welfare state in times of critical junctions (Page, 2006). It covers the collapse of state socialism and the post-2008 fiscal austerity, which both mark the launch of deficit reduction plans, of which local budgets cuts and welfare reforms were integral part. These developments have been of particular relevance to women, who are disproportionately affected by decisions about budget priorities as they are both more likely to use public services than men and to work in health and social service sectors (Javornik and Yeandle, 2015).

The chapter first makes a snapshot of dynamic processes in maternal employment between 1960s and 2015, exploring whether the post-socialist developments led to dismantling childcare policies. Presenting a case study from 'supported defamilialistic' welfare state (Javornik, 2014a) it seek to unpack historical connections between maternal employment as a proxy for gender equity and two key policies that affect gender opportunities after childbirth: parental leave and childcare service (Leitner, 2003; Javornik, 2014a). The theoretical rather than actual policy impacts on gender equity in the workforce are assessed, as many of these changes have been introduced only recently; hence, it is too early to analyse the outcomes, to determine their actual impact.

Gendered access to paid work

Work has been central to the lives of people in Slovenia and key to social citizenship. Since 1990, it has been unequally distributed across highly polarised labour markets, with changed quantity and quality of available jobs and profound division of labour: the *overworked* on the one hand work longer hours, with the culture of presenteeism structuring their lives with less and less natural breathing space; the *underemployed* cycle between no pay and low pay, while many work below their potential (failing to utilise all their skill, experience or qualifications) often 'stuck' in low-paid jobs (Grant et al. 2005) because of a profound structural mismatch between how work is organized and diverse needs of increasingly diverse workforce on the other hand.
Compared to the contemporary challenges facing female workforce, motherhood still is the lowest common denominator; it affects both women who plan to and who have children and other women of reproductive age as potential mothers. It has been embedded into the "culture of [gendered] social obligation for care" (Daly, 2002) that women on average take more time off from work to care for dependants than men, and they still do. Such gender division of labour has been a major problem for the 'female worker': wary of losing employees and of perception that female employment involves higher non-wage costs because of their family responsibilities, many employers refrain from hiring or promoting women.
General female employment rates tell only a partial story of women in the workplace. While for men the reverse is true, women's opportunities in the workforce are negatively affected by the presence of young children – known as motherhood penalty (Datta-Gupta and Smith, 2001). While gender employment gaps are narrow for the young and single, mothers with young children fare particularly badly (Javornik and Yeandle, 2015). Such inequity in employment opportunities, pay and benefits disparities affect their lifetime incomes in work and retirement, which calls for policies that support their continuous lifetime employment (Polachek, 2014) or social recognition of care they provide.

Social systems, legislation and infrastructure are instrumental; it is therefore crucial to consider their impact on gender opportunity gap (Javornik, 2014a). Considerable bodies of research demonstrate that parental leave and childcare services have the highest explanatory potential for cross-country variation in female employment (Ruhm, 1998; Rubery et al. 1998; for overview see Javornik, 2010). The feminist critique of the welfare-state regimes also maintains that the normative assumptions about the social organization of care and gender roles most clearly underpin regulations on parental leave and childcare

services (Leitner, 2003; Javornik, 2014a; Ciccia and Verloo, 2012). This chapter therefore builds on the premise that these two policy domains frame the ways in which women with young children engage in employment and men in active fatherhood.

The chapter builds on the 'history matters' thesis (North 1990; Arthur 1994; Pierson 2000; Crouch & Farrell 2004). This maintains that understanding any transformative change can only be aided by examining a longer time period, which exposes "build-up of contexts informing politics and practices" (Page 2006), sustained country differences and stability despite the exposure to similar external factors such as the collapse of the regime or austerity (Pierson 2000; Easterly 2001). I adapt descriptive accounts proposed by Hacker's (2002) 'formation of policies', to ascertain the extent to which successive governments considered the uneven capacity of women to invest in employment and childcare.

To put some logical structure on to the sway of history, I surveyed the literature and drew on primary and secondary sources. I combined and contrasted international data sources (the Mutual Information System on Social Protection in EU, Eurydice, OECD, Unicef, UNDP/RBEC) and national archived documents. As Slovenia has received little attention in comparative welfare state research I consulted key informants over 2014/2015: two key politicians active at the federal (Yugoslav) and national (Slovenian) level in the social programme areas during the 1970-1980s, one local politician and two heads of education departments who led the development of the new childcare infrastructure during the 1970s and 1980s (listed below). The remainder of the chapter is organised in three sections. The first demarcates the state socialist era of late 1960s up to the late 1980s which can be uniformly described as the making of the 'adult worker', characterised by speed up in female employment, followed by a dynamic family policy-making and divergence in gendered roles assumptions. Given that the early post-socialist period has been thoroughly reported in the transition literature, the second section focuses on policy developments between 2000 and 2008, and the third on key post-2008 developments, concluding with a critical reflection about the 'post-socialist' path dependency/departure.

Farewell to the male breadwinner family model: the changing relationship between the state and the family

Albeit part of the socialist geo-political group Slovenia had least political and cultural interaction with its Slavic neighbours throughout history (Marc, 2009). Since WWII it

was one of the six constituent republics of Yugoslavia[2], with a national branch of the League of Communists and relative autonomy in much of its policy-making since the Constitution passed to Slovenia the powers to make laws on a range of devolved matters, including social security programme, social insurance, health and social services, education and childcare issues (Kidrič, 1996; Novak, 1996).

In the 1950s the country introduced a socialist system of workers' self-management (Kardelj, 1977); put simply, this was a socialist version of democracy 'from the bottom' (Jogan, 2006). As the only Yugoslav republic bordering Western Europe (Austria and Italy; but also Hungary and Croatia), its economy was, paradoxically, exposed to market forces, carrying elements of a relatively well-functioning 'liberal' economy. As the most economically developed of the Yugoslav republics, it began forming its relationship with the industrialised countries years before independence. Before the collapse it was its greatest exporter and richest republic – probably in the socialist world: according to some estimates, its GDP had been about twice the Yugoslav average, and by 1990, the country was wealthier than Greece, Portugal, almost at the level of Ireland (Mrak et al. 2004; Marc, 2009). Basically, its economy was informed by the developments in open economies and politics by processes of political liberalization/democratization, including women's active participation in social movements (Toš, 1999).
Slovenia has been distinguished by high full-time employment rates of women and the highest maternal employment rates since the 1920; mothers accounted for about one third of all gainfully employed women in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, which had further increased during both wars (Jogan, 2006). But it was the pace of economic growth after WWII that had produced extraordinary leap (Javornik, 2000). The socialist states suffered disproportionately more human casualties during the war than other countries (Rummel, 1990; Ellis, 1993). Post-war reconstruction, industrialization and the economic growth increased labour shortages, leading states to search for new workforce. The shift to employment was extraordinarily brisk and all-embracing: most adult women entered the labour force on a full-time basis; part-time was low and generally involuntary, except for persons in school, partially retired and those with health problems (Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001; Javornik, 2010, 2014b).
Much of the transition literature argues that it was the generous socialist childcare system that freed women to join the workforce (Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2001a).[3] But questions related to supporting women became acute political objectives only in the late

1960s (Javornik, 2014b). As rural-to-urban migration intensified and the pool of available carers shrank, familial care became decreasingly realistic. With maturing women's educational attainment their articulated demand for improved living conditions and alternative childcare finally propelled the issue of work-childcare onto the political agenda (Jogan, 2001).

Two associations, the *Socialist Alliance of Working People*[4] and the *Alliance of Women's Associations*[5], supported by political establishment, played key role in bringing gender equity and social organisation of childcare into the realm of formal political debate (Jogan, 1990). Continuously campaigning for party platforms and policies they accentuated maternity leave and public childcare as a structural condition for women's employment; this was formally recognised as a social and constitutional right, and thus a source of autonomy and self-realization. In 1968, Slovenia set out its vision for the family policy, deciding that childcare was a shared social responsibility (Jogan, 2006; Gaspari, personal conversation 2015). Following ILO Employment Recommendations (e.g. No. 123 from 1965), governments secured legislative protection to protect women workers; these included early retirement schemes, special working conditions for mothers and access to paid maternity leave (Pascall and Manning, 2000).

Parental leave - a historically significant shift in the Slovenian work-family policy

In 1976, soon after Sweden (Šircelj, 2006), Slovenia introduced an innovative parental leave scheme, which received relatively little attention in comparative policy analysis. Namely, study and exchange visits between Sweden and Slovenia were common (Gaspari and Jogan, personal conversation 2015). Both Vida Tomšič (Slovenia) and Alva Myrdal (Sweden), two prominent politicians of the period, promoted female employment as the linchpin of gender equality. They argued that the cost of having children was disproportionately borne by all women, while the benefits of producing generations of future workers were equally shared (Tomšič,1980; Jain, 2005). Therefore, they initiated the transformation of existing maternity leaves to include parental insurance. As Gaspari described it, explicit policy goal was "*to reshuffle working parents' opportunities and constraints, and transform the aspirations and expectations of both parents and employers*" (personal conversation 2014).

This was a policy novelty and represents a historic milestone by taking a symbolic step to redistributing childcare responsibilities and transforming gender roles. In principle, it

endorsed the notion that both working parents should care for the children on equal terms – arrangement that, in law, still exists today. Eligibility was based on women's labour force participation, and the replacement benefit was related to previous income. In addition to a complex mix of egalitarian ideals, this was the state's explicit attempt to facilitate women's continuous employment (Jogan, 2001). Namely, women increasingly enter the labour force before they give birth to qualify for leave benefits (Rubery et al. 1998; Ruhm, 1998). Empirical evidence also indicates that when granted paid leave with job-protection they are more likely to return to the same employer, showing continuous employment (Ruhm and Teague, 1997; Ruhm, 1998).

Moreover, such provision shaped parents' lives very differently as it offered more job security and control over family life, treating men, at least in principle, as equally adequate and likely caregivers. The scheme allowed couples to share paid leave; this softened the distinction between maternity and parenthood and was intended to allow mothers to return to work more quickly by handing over unused leave to fathers. The new approach could be seen as a major advance for gender equity, reshuffling gender opportunities gaps and transforming the aspirations and expectations of mothers (Javornik, 2014b).

Occasionally since the 1990s, Slovenian Social Attitudes surveys have included attitudinal questions asking about the roles of men and women within the family, in particular around providing an income from work and their role in the home. Responses to these questions show significant changes in what the public believes men's and women's roles should be: in 1992 60.3 percent of men and 69.7 percent of women thought that paid employment was the source of women's autonomy; this dropped down to 52.2 percent for men and 65.9 for women by 2011 (Jogan, 2013), when the second fiscal crisis and increased unemployment hit the country. But as there remains considerable support for both men and women contributing to the household income, the gender gap was statistically significant, reflecting in people's attitudes on the access to jobs when these are scarce. While 32.9 percent of men and 23.5 percent of women agreed that, when jobs are scarce, men should be given priority, there has been a substantial shift in people's views about that: 10.2 percent of men and 9.4 percent of women thought that should be the case in 2011 (Jogan, 2013).

But the design of law is every bit as important as the intentions behind them (Javornik, 2014a). Financial compensation was generous (100 percent of previous earnings; paid from parental social insurance and general taxation); this matters because income support

payments act similarly as the 'reservation wage' (the wage at which women are willing to work).

Four decades later we can see that such extension of women's parenting rights to fathers is proving more limited than the policy message suggested: while women use this entitlement to the full, less than one percent of eligible fathers took it until 2000 (Jogan, 2013).[6]

One of the fundamental flaw was framing it as a joint family right: while both parents were entitled to the same benefit that would have applied had they been at work, they could choose how to split it; but because leave was made contingent upon mothers' consent, the legislature failed to innovatively address fathers' access. The 2001 Parental Protection and Family Benefits Act transformed 130 days of parental leave into father's individual but transferable right, which has not increased its use - 5.9 percent in 2014 (Čuk, 2015).

Fathers' take-up significantly increased only after 2003, when an additional 90-day paternity leave was first introduced (15 days of which were paid at 100 percent replacement rate).[7] Offered as a father's individual 'use it or lose it' right and accompanied by awareness-raising and media campaigns, this entitlement had a snowball effect, rapidly counteracting the embedded stigma attached to fathers taking time off around childbirth (Javornik, 2014). By 2005, when it was fully introduced, nearly 80 percent of fathers had claimed paternity leave.[8] That notwithstanding, at-home fathering in Slovenia rarely extends beyond one month, with fathers commonly seen as "mothers' assistants" (Grönlund and Javornik, 2014).

But relative to other socialist countries, Slovenia had never installed extended leave and with reference to feminist economics its leave scheme has provided optimal support in terms of female employment. Comprehensive paid leave with job security of between six months and a year has proved to facilitate female continuous employment (Bruning and Plantenga, 1999; Leitner, 2003; OECD, 2007). In contrast, shorter or longer leave would both have negative effects (Esping-Andersen, 2009), translating into women's reduced job progression and lifetime earnings, especially for women in less protected and secure jobs (Fagan and Hebson, 2005). This suggests that women's individual access to social rights have altered the terms under which they entered and negotiated family relationships. Ultimately, they maintained continuous records of employment, punctuated only by brief periods around childbirth because; in principle, there has been no gap between end of paid parental leave and public childcare service entitlement.

Public childcare service: social investment approach

As women had massively entered the labour force, a low baseline of childcare provision resulted in a shortage of service supply;[9] patchwork arrangements not suited to families' needs disproportionately affected women's ability to work. In 1968, the *Slovenian Association of Childcare and Early Education*[10] announced its intention to develop a long-term childcare strategy (titled "*Gaining space for children*") "to support women's continuous employment and to equalize children's possibilities for later life and improve their health" (Tomšič, 1971). Recognising its early education element, policy priority was to move social investment towards a supply-led system with capped fees, offering place to at least 30 percent of children in urban settings, and 20 percent in rural areas; availability was to be further planned according to demographic, social and other indicators (Čok, 1975).

Public infrastructure, including childcare, was a government function and state budget investment. But contrary to other socialist countries Slovenia engaged local population in setting up childcare infrastructure during the 1970s and 1980s. Local 'coordination committees' (Čok, 1975) prepared plans, strategies and investment schemes; these included considerable financial participation[11] from the local electorate (SACEE reports 1974-1976; Tomšič, 1971). Between May 1970 and 1975, the people in Slovenia were asked to vote and to show whether they would sacrifice part of their salary to contribute financially towards local childcare.[12] Most referenda were successful (a question remains whether these were indeed 'voluntary' contributions), and the result of the extra money earmarked for public childcare was a growing network of purposely-built nurseries for children from age 1 to school age across the state.

Slovenia adopted the Swedish approach to setting up the prefabricated buildings[13]; made by a local manufacturer, the first such centre was set up in 1972, in a small municipality in the east (Kovše and Sodin, personal conversation 2014). The project became a honey pot site for Slovenian, Yugoslav and international politicians and experts alike; 40 such centres were built over the next few years across the country (Gaspari and Sodin, personal conversation, 2014). Rapid expansion created places for both children and female staff; this created places for children and opened up new jobs for female staff: in 1946, 2.2 percent of preschool children were in daycare and 7.7 in 1961, reaching 36.5 percent by 1981 (Šircelj, 2006). One of the effects of such economics of social ownership (i.e. out-

of-pocket contributions) was a public sentiment "*endorsing public childcare as a common good*" (Gaspari, personal conversation 2014). A very high take-up that continues into the 2000s is a clear indicator of that (Javornik, 2010).

By 1990, when Yugoslavia fell apart, Slovenia had firmly embarked on a path of 'supported defamilialism' (Javornik, 2014a): the state first explicitly and financially invested in familial care, while attempting at challenging gendered parenting via parental leave. Then it shifted investment to quality public childcare, with the crossover point located at the child's 11th month, to facilitate women's continuous and full-time employment. Such policy approach pairs Slovenia with the *social democratic ideas of the Nordic states* (Korpi, 2000; Javornik, 2014a). This clearly reflects in the employment rates for mothers as well as people's views on public childcare: in 1970, 61.9 percent of respondents saw childcare a responsibility of the municipality (23.3 percent of the state; Toš, 1970/71), while in 2010, 82.3 percent thought it was the state's responsibility (ESS 2010; no question was asked about the local government's role).

Unfortunately this approach failed to generate more fundamental change in household division of labour. While women became less dependent on their husbands, lack of promoting new masculinity continued to prescribe gender division of labour, i.e. women's primary responsibility as earners *and* family managers/carers (Javornik 2000, 2010). Namely, as the Slovenian Social Attitudes (SJM) surveys show there have been significant changes in what the public believes men's and women's roles should be. But while in 1975 90 percent of respondents thought that "all family members should equally contribute to household chores" (Toš, 1975/76), time use data show that 68.9 percent of men spent less than an hour on household daily chores in 2011 (Jogan, 2013). In 2012, 21 percent of women lived in households where men did not pitch in sharing household chores, while only 30 percent lived in a (self-assessed) gender-equal household (Jogan 2013). That gender attitudes are in fact egalitarian on top and traditional underneath is further confirmed by 51 percent of men and 66 percent of women thinking that men should take up *more* responsibilities for home (Jogan, 2013), while 96.2 percent of all respondents thought that men should take up *as much* responsibilities as women for home and children (ESS2004).

Figure 10.1: Public attitudes to gender roles, 1992-2012

Source: Author's calculations on Jogan (2013)

Early post-socialist transformation

By 1990, Slovenia had the highest living standard among post-socialist countries due to its highly developed, diversified industrial sector, active foreign trade and skilled workforce. It also was the most homogenous of the former republics.[14] That notwithstanding it experienced the double shock of making the transition from a socialist to a market economy in 1990. Recession, restructuring, privatisation, the collapse of trade with the states of the former Yugoslavia, the influx of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were some of the challenges. 'Leaping in the dark' (Kovács, 2002) adequately describe Slovenian politics in the very early 1990s when gradual transition to market economy started (UNDP/RBEC 1999; Javornik, 2000; Mahutga and Bandelj, 2008).[15] Its economy began to rebound fairly quickly and by the mid-1990s both the recovery and economic productivity increased.

How had these developments affected female employment? Falls in economic output across the region have entailed large drops in real wages and pressure on employers to reduce their workforces. Traditional industry and the agricultural sector declined. Plant closings became a fact of life, and a lack of trust in collective bargaining developed between the government and the trade unions. Workers could be laid off and unemployment became a new phenomenon after decades of full employment, and went from a negligible 1.6 percent in 1987 to 8.2 percent in 1991, 11.6 percent in 1992, reaching 15.4 percent by the end of 1993 (Unicef, 1999; Hanžek and Javornik, 1998).

Changes in economic output levels across the region have been accompanied by major structural shifts. In Slovenia, small-scale private enterprises in the service sector have played an important role in the recovery. These effects have been amplified by the need to improve labour productivity and to reduce the overstaffing and labour hoarding common in the former planned economies (UNDP/RBEC, 1999).

At the beginning of the transition, women were less likely to be laid off than men because they were not the predominant workers in heavy industry, which bore the initial brunt of layoffs (Unicef, 1999; Javornik, 2000). Modernizing labour markets, especially the service sector, opened up new opportunities for women with higher education and experiences in administrative roles. Women also showed liberal gender role attitudes and career-orientation. Morinaga et al. (1993) found they were less traditional in career aspirations than men, expressing a preference for employment even when presented with hypothetical situations in which they would not have to work. The 1993 CEDAW Report suggests that they were also more likely to accept lower wages just to keep their jobs.

Basically, women continued to work on a full-time basis throughout the 1990s, regardless of their marital or parental status (Van der Lippe, 2001a; Tang and Cousins, 2004), which suggests that female employment in Slovenia cannot be explained purely in economic terms.

New patterns of discrimination and horizontal segregation

Prior to transition, Slovenia was not much different from other parts of the world in respect to gender segregation by occupation and industry (Unicef, 1999). The public sector, dominating the economy through state-owned enterprises, supplied jobs seemingly without limit. The large state enterprises were prevalent in the economy, with full-time employment as the norm for women and men and job benefits and job security rigidly regulated (Skledar and Javornik, 2003). As in other parts of the world, women were concentrated in lower-paying occupations, and not equally represented in senior and decision-making positions (Skledar and Javornik, 2004).

Since 1990, with economic restructuring, the private sector has grown, and employment has become more diversified so now self-employment and small-scale enterprises became available alternatives. Concerns with regard to women's position in the labour force have emerged, and new patterns of employment discrimination common to open economies occurred (Skledar and Javornik, 2004b).

The service sector became further gender-segregated: while public service sector became central employer of women (education, health and social work), opportunities abound for men in private financial service sectors (e.g. banking, retail and financial mediation). Unicef (1999) found evidence of gender biased recruitment among private employers, largely due to perception that female employment involved higher non-wage costs because of their family responsibilities, earlier retirement benefits and the regulation preventing pregnant women from night work and from work. Companies allegedly required women, as a condition of their employment, to sign undated contracts stating that upon pregnancy they would quit their job (Hanžek and Javornik, 1998). By and large, the inherited statutory entitlements and employment benefits became a 'female worker' problem, as many private employers refrained from hiring or promoting women (Javornik, 2002).

There was fertile ground for litigation by women who were being discriminated against and not offered the same benefits by their companies as men. But before 2002, the fundamental provisions on non-discrimination and gender equality, including the special

protection of women (in relation to maternity, parenting and retirement) were contained only in the Constitution. Specific legislation regulating gender equality and gender discrimination was passed only in 2002, when the *Equal Opportunities for Women and Men Act* was enacted as an umbrella act, followed by the *Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment Act* in 2004 (Skledar and Javornik, 2004). This scheme created legal certainty, leaving scope for women (and men) to test access and to make discrimination claims through litigation using the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equality and Employment Acts.

The *Parental Protection and Family Benefit Act* (2001) introduced new measures to facilitate work-family reconciliation, including part-time work for one parent until a certain age of the child, depending on the number of children in the family (Javornik and Skledar, 2005). In addition to legislation, the *Resolution on the National Programme for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men 2005–2013* determined the political and institutional framework of gender equality policy; currently, the new Resolution is being prepared by the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, to "improve the status of women and ensure sustainable gender equality" (Report of the Government of RS, 2014).

Contemporary employment regime and childcare policy change

Today, Slovenian employment system resembles French or Dutch: collective bargaining agreements are mandated, with ensuing coverage rates shy of 100 per cent of all workers (Sayer and Gornick, 2012). Working time is regulated and limited to 40 hours weekly (with some exceptions) but long work hour culture prevails (OECD, 2015). 26 percent women and 40 percent of men frequently work overtime (Robnik, 2012). Work during unsocial hours is common, with about 35 percent of all employees working shifts, Saturdays, Sundays and evenings (Eurostat, 2013). Notwithstanding long work hours, 75 percent of workers are satisfied with the number of working hours, valuing job security, workplace relationships and salary over job flexibility (Robnik, 2012). By contrast, part time remains low, for both men and women (Figure 10.2), and is more common among parents with very young children.

Figure 10.2: Part-time employment, men and women, 1993-2014

Source: SURS 2016, Labour Force Survey.

Figure 10.3: Female employment and activity rate, 1993-2014

Source: SURS 2016, Labour Force Survey.

For both women and men the manufacturing and wholesale/retail represent the main sectors of employment (EC 2012). But while 29.8 percent of men work in manufacturing, the share of women was only 18.7 percent. The distribution of women and men across smaller sectors shows further gender gaps, with patterns similar to those in the EU-28. For example, the employment gap in education was about 10 percentage points. Occupational segregation shows similar gender pattern: 10.2 percent of women are in legal, social and cultural sector professions (6.1 percent of men); while 8.5 percent of men work as metal, machinery and related trades workers, only 0.4 of all women work in this occupation (SURS 2014).

The *Sectorial Gender Segregation Indicator* (Eurostat 2010; EC 2012) shows a slightly higher segregation (5.8 percentage points) than in the EU-27 (5.4 percentage points), underlining the gap between female- and male-dominated economic sectors. The extent of occupational gender segregation in Slovenia (3.7 percentage points) is, however, significantly lower than in the EU-27 (4.6 p.p.) but there are still inequalities as above.

New provisions allowing parents to work shorter hours, change schedule or opt out of night shift/emergency duties came into force in 2001; other types of workplace flexibility remain an employer-initiated strategy (Sayer and Gornick, 2012; Grönlund and Javornik, 2014). But working time arrangements and organisational cultures embedded in workplace practices and collective agreements no longer sufficiently accommodate the plurality of working and living arrangements (Javornik, under review). This reflects in people's experiences – in our earlier study most participants used the "language of normality" to mark out long hours, while workplace cultures (i.e. organizational norms) were frequently articulated as workplace-related stressors in their day-to-day management (Grönlund and Javornik, 2014). Organizational norms regarding availability and presenteeism were a common theme, suggesting that parents take account of perceived constraints, making a compromise between what they think is desirable and what is feasible. For instance, all parents in our group, including Nina, discussed how the working-time norms and the rules surrounding working hours (e.g. managing a balance sheet of debit and credit work hours, negotiating any changes) compounded her parental arrangement:

“There’s this Clock that bugs me. Sometimes, you finish by 2pm, but you must sit there and wait until 4pm. OK, sure, you kill that time, somehow, but it’s utterly stupid to be forced to hang around … Sure, it’s possible to vary the start/end of work, between 7 and 8 and 3 and 4. But then, if one frequently starts at 8 and finishes at 3, one accumulates debit hours … You sure don’t want that …Albeit in principle one could leave early, one needs to obtain the consent from the supervisor …”

Apart from introducing a few new reconciliation measures, Slovenia has only incrementally changed its two hallmark work-family policies (Unicef, 1999; Javornik, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014a; Szelewa and Polakowski, 2008). Stability in this domain may be explained by the Slovenian economically advantageous position, gradual approach to transition and embedded tradition of the social investment approach in supported defamilialism. The study among dual-earner families also shows that parents rely on this support in juggling their work and family parents, articulating a sense of entitlement to paid time off with children and public childcare.

Gender pay gap

Secondary and tertiary education attainment has risen steadily throughout the last decade and the share of women attending tertiary education almost doubled between 2002 and 2011, exceeding that of men (26.1 versus 17.3 percent). Women continue to dominate in educational sciences, health and social work, with lower pay on average; men dominate in STEM fields; that notwithstanding, the share of women is higher than in the EU-27: from 44 percent of all students in "science, maths and computing" in 1995 (Hanžek et al. 1999) down to 39.2 percent in 2012 and 25.4 percent in "engineering" (EC 2012).

The principle of equal pay for equal work / of equal value has been widely accepted in Slovenia. This mirrors in one of the lowest gender pay gaps in the EU (Javornik, 2007, 2010). After an increase at the beginning of the 1990s, it has been narrowing from the mid-1990s (Figure 10.4a). Today, the average female employee earns 4.4 percent less than the average male employee (EU-27 16.4 percent). But differences become more pronounced when salaries are compared by gender at the industry- and occupational levels: the gap is significantly wider in financial and business activities, but negative in construction (Eurostat 2016), wider for university-level and skilled workforce and in the public sector (Kanjuo-Mrčela, 2010).

Figure 10.4a: Women's wage as percentage of male (in %), 1991-1996

Source: Hanžek et al. 1999.

Figure 10.4b: Gender pay gap in unadjusted form - NACE Rev. 2, 2007-2014

Source: Eurostat 2016.

Work-family change

Although centre-right political actors, supported by the church, have been inclined towards extending the familialistic measures (often resorting to the demographic arguments), their attempts to extend maternity leave have, thus far, been overwhelmingly dismissed as 'misogynist endeavours' to re-familialize women (Jogan, 2000). Public attitudes also continue to show support for both maternal employment and full-time public childcare, suggesting that governments may face a stark choice in supporting sectional interests that depart from this path.[16] Namely, 91 percent of children aged 3 and more (and 39 percent of under 3s) are in public childcare, of whom 81 percent for 30 hours or more (McColgan, 2015).

However the 2008 *Kindergarten Act* extensively reorganized childcare policy. In the run up to the General Election in 2008, the right-wing coalition government extended free childcare (applied to the second and any further child simultaneously attending kindergarten).[17] The Act maintained the duty on local authorities to ensure the sufficiency of supply, but reduced standards regarding staffing. Local authorities responded to new national policy, to reduced central funding and to increased local demand for services but funding constraints have forced local decision-makers to reconsider how to make service provision efficient. As a result of such 'top-down' development of childcare services via the injection of central government and the commitment to free childcare entitlement, the nursery sector was characterized as 'in crisis' in 2008/09. These changes limited the powers of local authorities to modify arrangements locally, making the childcare system less embedded in local communities.

In 2012, however, Slovenia experienced a new economic downturn (UMAR, 2014). With a single Fiscal Balance Act the centre-right coalition government introduced a budgetary 'freeze'. Central Government funding has been restructured and the reductions imposed more resources were withdrawn from the local councils, in effect the local authorities facing the largest reduction in central funding. This included cuts in parental leave

benefits (from 100 percent to 90 percent of previous earnings, with an upper ceiling of 1.5 of the average salary) and free childcare. Meanwhile, the future funding of these programmes is debated extensively.
To reshuffle gender parenting and gender opportunity gap in workforce, centre-left coalition government sought to install a one-month daddy quota to parental leave »to tackle the gender opportunity gap and improve child well-being«. Before the public consultation the parents, the opposition and the negotiation partners made a business case against policy change, arguing that men's absence would disrupt the business process. This led to a complete policy withdrawal, instead reducing paternity leave down to 70 days, but offering 20 paid days in 2016 (previously 15 of 90, and to be further extended to 30 out of 70 days by 2018). With parental leave keeping the maternity designation, however, this policy change will likely fail to spur significant substitution effects. Women continue to spend more time on housework and childcare compared to men: 2hrs/daily and 11 hours/weekly more, respectively (Javornik, 2007; Sayer and Gornick, 2012). An educational pattern is discernible, with more highly educated women investing less time in housework (Humer and Kuhar, 2010). Men largely do "typically male tasks", such as yard work, maintaining the house, appliances and the car, while a "super dad" or "stay-at-home dad" arrangement remains low (Grönlund and Javornik, 2014).

Discussion

The relationship between female/maternal employment and childcare policy in Slovenia has been understood as a normative field, marked by debates on gender roles and the active role of the state in the family. Generous parental leave and public childcare system explicitly reflect cultural scripts for socially acceptable division of childcare responsibilities between the state and the family, and within the family between women and men.

In Slovenia, the structures and decision-making about childcare policy and maternal employment, part of the state socialist New Society agenda, has not changed significantly since the 1970s. Legally securing paid time off from work and providing public childcare arranged by the local authority has played the main role in re-shaping the employment opportunity gap of women with young children, and contributed to the highest maternal employment rates in EU/OECD. However substantial political and economic changes have stemmed from the 1990 collapse of state socialism and 2008 new austerity age, this

has not led to extensive reorganization of either policy or maternal employment patterns. The economic interests of women have been taken into account in this decision-making, although women's voices have not been specifically represented in these decision-making processes.

To be sure, parental leave regulation, with high income replacement, job security and paid from parental leave insurance and general taxation has been a major feature of women's continuous employment. But the failure to propose a more forceful structure, i.e. offering incentives for couples to share leave (more equally) means that this innovative and well-intentioned effort to de-gender childcare rings hollow. To the day, parental leave scheme has kept maternity designation, failing to spur significant substitution effect - i.e. fathers absorbing childcare while mothers return to work earlier. Neither the state nor companies have systematically encouraged fathers to share childcare, with the majority of parents and managers still citing the perception that fathers' taking (longer) parental leave is 'frowned upon or career limiting' (Grönlund and Javornik 2014). Opposite holds true for women: since 1986 when maternity and parental leave were extended to a year in total, women taking a year out from work has become an embedded and sustained motherhood ideal (Grönlund and Javornik 2014).

The ideals about motherhood and fatherhood are based on different social assumptions about gender roles. In the 2000s, people in Slovenia still believe that while mummy should contribute to the household income, daddy should only be "working out there". But unlike other countries, people in Slovenia do not believe that pre-school children suffer if their mother works.

Parents of young children in Slovenia expect to 'have it all' – maintaining a family and a career. But in the new economy, rigid working time arrangements and cultures embedded in workplace practices and collective agreements, differently affect diverse workforce. Many parents – mothers in particular – continue to face difficult challenges as they balance demanding work and commuting schedules with increasing familial responsibilities. For most men the opposite is true.

Governments and employers make choices in whether and how to support gender roles. These have consequences, differently structuring opportunities of women and men. The issue of reforming policy and encouraging new masculinity is particularly salient given the intensification of work and 'back to work' policies, which, similarly to its socialist economy, increasingly require all groups, including those outside the labour market, to be in paid work.

Work is a key source of income, social interactions and integration, and can be a source of well-being. It affects the way women and men, and societies live and the different opportunities different generations have in life. The state and employers increasingly have to consider how to keep workers in (full-time) employment, but also which kinds of worker and what kinds of jobs they will be doing. Statements by all political parties suggest that both these debates and the austerity measures will continue. Members of centre-left have signalled intentions to embark on a reform of parental leave, to challenge gendered parenting. But the gap between the offer of different parties' approach to the labour market measures and gender equality seems narrow, with no significant change likely in the coming years.

By and large, the developments in Slovenian policy and employment suggest path dependency. This suggests that a specific character of work-family policy has been most resilient to change. Although preliminary, this chapter offered some perspectives for further research that could derive more generalizations about policy resilience; this opens up a promising ground to further investigate why these policy elements and maternal employment patterns display such high degree of path dependency.

References

Aidukaite J. (2003) From Universal Social Policy to Particularistic? The Case of the Baltic States' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 36(4): 405-426.

Arthur B. (1994) *Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy*. Ann Arber: University of Michigan Press.

Bicskei E. (2006) Our Greatest Treasure, the Child: The Politics of Child Care in Hungary, 1945-1956. *Social Politics* 13(2): 1511-88.

Blossfeld H. P., Drobnič S. (2001) *Careers of Couples in Contemporary Society. From Male Breadwinner to Dual-Earner Families*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Bohle D., Greskovits B. (2007) Neoliberalism, embedded neoliberalism and neocorporatism. Towards transnational capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe. *West European Politics* 30(3): 443-466.

Blum S. Formánková L., Dobrotić I. (2014) Family Policies in 'Hybrid' Welfare States after the Crisis: Pathways between Policy Expansion and Retrenchment,' *Social Policy & Administration*, 48(4): 468-91.

Bruning, G. and Plantenga, J. (1999) Parental leave and equal opportunities: experiences in eight European countries. *Journal of European Social Policy* 9(3): 195 210.

R., Verloo M. (2012) Parental leave regulations and the persistence of the male breadwinner model: Using fuzzy-set ideal type analysis to assess gender equality in an enlarged Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 22(5): 507-528.

Ciccia R., Bleijenbergh I. (2014) After the Male Breadwinner Model? Childcare Services and the Division of Labor in European Countries. *Social Politics*, 21(1): 50-79.

Crouch C. and Farrell H. (2004) Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism,' *Rationality and Society*, 16(1): 5-43.

Černigoj-Sadar N. (2003) Employment of women in Slovenia. In: Domsch, M. et al. (ed.) *Gender equality in Central and Eastern European Countries*. Bern, Peter Lang.

—— (2005). Labour market integration of women and childcare in Slovenia. In Pfau Effinger, B. and Geissler, B. (eds.): *Care and Social Integration in European Societies*. Bristol, Policy Press, p. 235-53.

Čok J. (1975) Odvisnost investicijskih stroškov za postavitev objekto vzgojnovarstvenih

zavodov od programov in realizacij objektov VVZ. *Bilten republiške skupnosti otroškega varstva, št. 1*. Ljubljana: Republiška skupnost otroškega varstva.

Čuk J. (2015) *V letu 2013 so bile matere v Sloveniji ob rojstvu prvega otroka stare povprečno 29 let*, Posebna objava, Ljubljana: Statistični urad RS. Available at: http://www.stat.si/StatWeb/prikazi-novico?id=4994 (Accessed 20/03/15)

Daly M. (2002) Care as a Good for Social Policy. *Journal of Social Policy* 31(2): 251 270.

Datta G. and Smith, N. (2001) Children and Career Interruptions: The Family Gap in Denmark. *IZA Discussion Paper No. 263.* Bonn, IZA.

Deacon B. (1992) The Future of Social Policy in Eastern Europe. In: Deacon, B. (ed). *The New Eastern Europe. Social Policy Past, Present and Future*. London, Newbury Park, New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 167-91.

Deacon B. (2000) Eastern European welfare states: the impact of the politics of globalization. *Journal of European Social Policy* 10(2): 146-161.

Devčič B. and Lokar S. (2008) National report on the Slovenian experience of childcare provision. *Organisation of exchange of good practices on gender equality (VT/200/054)*, Focus Consultancy Ltd / Gopa Cartermill (manuscript)

Dobrotić I. (2012) *Dejavniki politik usklajevanja plačanega dela in družinskih obveznosti v posocialističnih državah*, PhD thesis, University of Ljubljana.

Domsch M. E., Ladwig D. H. and Tenten, E., (Eds) (2003) *Gender Equality in Central and Eastern European Countries*. Forum Personalmanagement. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, PETER LANG Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften.

Easterly W. (2001) *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Einhorn B. (1993) *Cinderella_Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe.* London and New York, Verso.

Ellis J. (1993) *World War II: A Statistical Survey: The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants*. London: Aurum Press.

Esping-Andersen G. (2009) *The incomplete revolution. Adapting to women's new roles.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

European Commission (2012) *The currents situation of gender equality in Slovenia – Country Profile*. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/epo_campaign/country_profile_sloven_en.pdf (last accessed: 30 Dec 2015).

Eurydice (2009) *Early Childhood Education and Care in Europe: Tackling Social and Cultural Inequalities*. Brussels, EACEA and Eurydice.

Fagan C., Hebson G. (2005) Making Work Pay - Debates from a Gender Perspective: A Comparative Review of Some Recent Policy Reforms in Thirty European Countries. Brussels: European Commission.

Fenger M. (2007) Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating post communist countries in a welfare regime typology. *Contemporary issues and ideas in social sciences* 3 (2).

Ferge Z. (1979) *A society in the Making. Hungarian Social and Societal Policy 1945 75*. Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd.

Fodor E., Glass C., Kawachi J, Popescu L. (2002) Family policies and gender in Hungary, Poland, and Romania. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 35: 475-490.

Fuchs D., Klingemann Hans-D. (2002) Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of Europe. *West European Politics* 25(2): 19-54.

Funk N. (1993) Introduction: women and post-communism. In: N. Funk and M. Mueller (Eds). *Gender politics and post-communism: reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union*. New York, Routledge: 1-14.

Gal S., Kligman G. (2000) *The Politics of Gender after Socialism*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Gauthier A. H. (1999) Historical Trends in State Support for Families in Europe (post 1945). *Children and Youth Review*, 21, 11/12: 937–65.

Glass C., Fodor E. (2007) From Public to Private Maternalism? Gender and Welfare in Poland and Hungary after 1989. *Social Politics. Special Issue: Gender and State in Post-communist Societies* 14(3): 323-350.

Gläser J. and Laudel G. (2009) *Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse*, Wiesbaden: VS.

Grant L., Yeandle S., Buckner L. (2005) Working Below Potential: Women and Part-time Work. EOC Working Paper Series No. 40, Manchester: Equal Opportunities

Commission: http://www.sociology.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/circle/wbp-synthesis.pdf (accessed 10/03/15)

Hall P. (1993) Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. *Comparative Politics*, 25(3): 275-296.

Haney L. (1997) But We Are Still Mothers': Gender and the Construction of Need in Post-Socialist Hungary. *Social Politics* 4(2): 208-244.

—— (2002). *Inventing the Needy. Gender and the Politics of Welfare in Hungary*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press.

Hantrais L. (2004) *Family Policy Matters. Responding to family change in Europe*. Bristol, Policy Press.

Hanžek M., Javornik J. (eds.) (1998) *Human Development Report – Slovenia 1998*. IMAD, UNDP: Ljubljana, NYC.

Hanžek, M., Javornik, J., Gregorčič, M. (eds.) (1999) *Human Development Report – Slovenia 1999*. IMAD, UNDP: Ljubljana, NYC.

Heinen J., Wator M. (2006) Child Care in Poland before, during, and after the Transition: Still a Women's Business. *Social Politics* 13(2): 189-216.

Humer Ž., Kuhar M. (2010) Domače in skrbstveno delo ter odnosi med spoloma: stare zgodbe v novih preoblekah? *Družboslovne razprave*, XXVI(64): 81-110.

ILO (1997) Perspectives. *International Labour Review* 136(1): 109-128.

Inglot T. (2008) *Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919-2004*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jain D. (2005) *Women, Development, and the UN: A Sixty-Year Quest for Equality and Justice*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Javornik J. (2015) Maternal Employment in Postsocialist Countries: Understanding the Implications of Childcare Policies. In: Höfacker, D., Roosalu, T. (Eds). *How Gender Works? Testing Established Theories in Post-Socialist Labour Markets*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Javornik J. (2014a) Measuring state de-familialism: Contesting post-socialist exceptionalism. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 24(3): 240-57.

Javornik J. (2014b) L'adieu au modèle de l'homme soutien de famille. Le present postsocialiste à la lumière du passé socialiste. *Politiques sociales et familiales, Dossier Genre, famille et État en Europe centrale et orientale*, 115: 11-24.

Javornik J. (2012) Rethinking comparative childcare policy analysis: Example of Central and Eastern Europe, Umeå University Welfare Studies Working Paper 10/2012.

Javornik J. (2010) *Exploring maternal employment in post-socialist countries. Understanding the implications of childcare policies.* PhD Thesis, University of Southampton.

Javornik J. (2000) *Spolna (ne)enakost, tranzicija in cena delovne sile.* Diplomsko delo. FDV, Ljubljana.

Javornik J., Skledar Š. (2005) Paternal leave from 2005. *Eironline: European Industrial Relations Observatory*: http://goo.gl/1zVZz

Javornik J., Skledar Š. (2004) Gender Equality Legislation Examined. *Eironline: European Industrial Relations Observatory*: http://goo.gl/SjtEB

Javornik J., Yeandle S. (2015) *Gender Initiatives: Case studies of organisational interventions to improve women's position in the workplace*. Report commissioned by UK Commission for Employment and Skills.

Jogan M. (2013) Družbena (ne)enakost spolov v slovenski postsocialistični zavesti. *Teorija in praksa*, 50(1): 5-38.

Jogan M. (2006) The decomposition of sexism in the second part of the 20th century in Slovenia. In: Saurer, E., Lanzinger, M., Frysak, E. (Eds). *Women's movements*. Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau: 197-211.

Jogan M. (2001) *Seksizem v vsakdanjem življenju*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.

Jogan M. (2000) Postsocializem in androcentrizem. *Družboslovne razprave: Tranzicija in (ne)enakost med spoloma* XVI(34-35): 9-30.

Jogan M. (1990) *Družbena konstrukcija hierarhije med spoloma*. Ljubljana, Fakulteta za sociologijo, politične vede in novinarstvo.

Kardelj E. (1977) *Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja*. Ljubljana, Komunist.

Kamerman S. (2000) Early Childhood Education and Care: An Overview of

Developments in the OECD Countries. *International Journal of Educational Research* 33(1): 7-29.

—— (2006) *A global history of early childhood education and care*. EFA Global Monitoring Report 2007, Strong foundations: early childhood care and education, UNESCO.

Kanjuo-Mrčela A. (2010) *Addressing the gender pay gap: Government and social partner actions – Slovenia.* EurWORK: Available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-contributions/slovenia/addressing-the-gender-pay-gap-government-and-social-partner-actions-slovenia (last accessed 30 Dec 2015)

Kanjuo-Mrčela A., Sadar Černigoj N. (2011) Social policies related to parenthood and capabilities of Slovenian parents. *Social Politics* 18(2): 199–231.

Karu M. (2011) *Fathers and parental leave: slow steps towards dual earner/dual carer family model in Estonia.* PhD Thesis: Tartu University Press.

Kidrič D. (1996) Socialna politika v Sloveniji po letu 1945. In: N. Borak, Ž. Lazarević (Eds). *Prevrati in slovensko gospodarstvo v XX. stoletju – 1918-1945-1991*. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, p. 65-78,

King L. (2002) Postcommunist Divergence: A Comparative Analysis of the Transition to Capitalism in Poland and Russia. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37(3): 3-34.

Kirschenbaum L. (2001) *Small Comrades: Revolutionizing Childhood in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932*. New York and London, Routledge Falmer.

Kocourková J. (2002) Leave arrangements and childcare services in Central Europe: policies and practices before and after the Transition,' *Community, Work and Family* 5(3): 301-318.

Kocourková J. (2001) *Comparing population policies in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary in the 1990s*. Paper presented at the European Population Conference, Helsinki (7–9 June).

Korpi W. (2000) Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class, and Patterns of Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States. *Social Politics* 7(2): 127-191.

Kovács Janos M. (2002) Approaching the EU and Reaching the US? Rival Narratives on Transforming Welfare Regimes in East-Central Europe. *West European Politics* 25(2): 175 - 204.

Křižková A., Mařiková H. and Dudová R. (2005) Reconciliation of work and private life in the Czech Republic. Report available at: ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2488&langId=en

Leitner S. (2003) Varieties of Familialism. The caring function of the family in comparative perspective. *European Societies* 5(4): 353-375.

Lipset S.M. and Rokkan S. (Eds.) (1967) *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross national perspectives*. New York: Free Press.

Lister R. (1990) Women, Economic Dependency and Citizenship. *Journal of Social Policy* 19(4): 445-67.

Mahutga M. C., Bandelj N. (2008) Foreign Investment and Income Inequality: The Natural Experiment of Central and Eastern Europe,' *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 49(6): 429-454.

Marc L. (2009) *What's so eastern about Eastern Europe? Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall*. Herts: Oldcastle Books.

McColgan A. (2015) *Measures to address the challenges of work-life balance in the EU Member States, Iceland, Liechenstein and Norway.* European Commission, Brussels.

McLaughlin E. and Glendinning C. (1994) Paying for Care in Europe: Is There a Feminist Approach? In: Hantrais, L. and Mangen, S. (Eds). *Concepts and Contexts in International Comparisons: Family Policy and the Welfare of Women*. Cross National Research Papers, University of Loughborough, p. 52-69.

Michel S. (2006) Introduction: Perspectives on Child Care, East and West. *Social Politics* 13(2): 145-150.

Mikalauskaitė A., Mitrikas A., Stankunienė V. (1999) Family policy in Lithuania: principles, experience, and expectations. *Revue Baltique* 13: 198-213.

Morgan K. (2005) The 'Production' of Child Care: How Labor Markets Shape Social Policy and Vice Versa. *Social Politics* 12(2): 243-263.

Morinaga Y., Frieze I. and Ferligoj A. (1993) Career Plans and Gender-Role Attitudes of College Students in the United States, Japan and Slovenia. *Sex Roles* 29(5): 317-334.

Motiejūnaitė A. (2008) *Female employment, gender roles, and attitudes. The Baltic countries in a broader context*. Doctoral Thesis, Stockholm Studies in Sociology, New Series 29.

Müller K. (2000) Ten Years after: Pension Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and

the Former Soviet Union,' *Frankfurt institute for Transformation Studies, Frankfurt (Oder) Discussion Papers*.

Mrak M., Rojec M. and Silva-Jauregui C. (Eds.) (2004) *Slovenia. From Yugoslavia to the European Union.* Washington, World Bank.

Narusk A., Kandolin I. (1997) Social well-being and gender: post-Soviet Estonia and the welfare state Finland. *Scandinavian Journal of Social Welfare* 6(2): 127-136.

North Douglas C. (1991) *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Novak M. (1996) Razvoj slovenske države blaginje. *Teorija in praksa*, 33(6): 922-39.

Page Scott E. (2006) Path Dependence. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1: 87 115.

Pascall G., Lewis J. (2004) 'Emerging Gender Regimes and Policies for Gender Equality in a Wider Europe. *Journal of Social Policy* 33(3): 373-394.

Pascall G., Kwak A. (2005) *Gender Regimes in Transition in Central and Eastern Europe*. Bristol, Policy Press.

Pascall G., Manning N. (2000) 'Gender and social policy: comparing welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,' *Journal of European Social Policy* 10(3): 240-266.

Pfau-Effinger B. (2011) Comparing path dependence and path departure in family policy development – the example of Germany and Finland. Paper presented at *2011 ESPAnet Annual Conference*, Valencia.

Pierson P. (2004) *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pierson P. (2000) Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics' *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-67.

Polachek S.W. (2014) Equal Pay Legislation and the Gender Wage Gap. *IZA* 2014: 16,

Pollert A. (2005) Gender, transformation and employment in Central Eastern Europe. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 11(2): 213-230.

Ray L. (2009) At the End of the Post-Communist Transformation? Normalization or Imagining Utopia? *European Journal of Social Theory* 12(3): 321-336.

Rostgaard T. (2004) Family Support Policy in Central and Eastern Europe - A Decade and a Half of Transition. *Early Childhood and Family Policy Series No 8*. Copenhagen, The Danish National Institute of Social Research, UNESCO
Education Sector.

Rubery J., Smith M., Fagan C. and Grimshaw D. (1998). *Women and European Employment*. New York, Routledge.

Ruhm C. J. (1998) The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons from Europe. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 113(1): 285-317.

Ruhm C. J. and Teague L. J. (1997) Parental Leave Policies in Europe and North America. In Blau, D. F. and Ehrenberg, G. R. (eds.) *Gender and Family Issues in the Workplace.* New York, Russell Sage Foundation.

Rummel R. (1990) *Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917*. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers.

SACEE 1974-1976. Otroško varstvo, *Bilten republiške skupnosti otroškega varstva*. Ljubljana: Republiška skupnost otroškegavarstva.

Saraceno C., Keck W. (2008) *The Institutional Framework of Intergenerational Family Obligations in Europe: A Conceptual and Methodological Overview*. http://www.multilinks-project.eu/uploads/papers/0000/0010/Report_Saraceno_Keck_Nov08.pdf [accessed Sept 2012]

Sayer L., Gornick J. (2012) Cross-national Variation in the Influence of Employment Hours on Child Care Time. *European Sociological Review* 28(4): 421–442.

Saxonberg S., Sirovatka T. (2006) Failing Family Policy in Post-Communist Central Europe. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis* 8(2): 185-202.

Saxonberg S., Szelewa D. (2007) The Continuing Legacy of the Communist Legacy? The development of family policies in Poland and the Czech Republic. *Social Politics. Special Issue: Gender and State in Post-communist Societies* 14(3): 351-379.

Saxonberg S., Sirovatka T., Miroslava J. (2013) When do policies become path dependant? The Czech example. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 23(4): 437: 450.

Skledar Š., Javornik J. (2004) Discrimination against women highlighted. Eironline: European Industrial Relations Observatory: http://goo.gl/pjctH

Skledar Š., Javornik J. (2003) Part-Time Work in Focus. Eironline: European Industrial Relations Observatory: http://goo.gl/fQJn6

Spohr F. (2016) Explaining Path Dependency and Deviation by Combining Multiple Streams Framework and Historical Institutionalism: A Comparative Analysis of German and Swedish Labor Market Policies. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* DOI:10.1080/13876988.2015.1122210

Stankuniene V. (2001) Family Policy of Lithuania: a Changing Strategy. Paper presented at the European Population Conference 2001, Helsinki, Finland (7-9 June).

Szalai J. and Orosz E. (1992) Social Policy in Hungary. In: Deacon, B. (ed.) *The New Eastern Europe. Social Policy Past, Present and Future*. London, Newbury Park, New Delhi, Sage Publications.

Szelewa D. (2007) Three faces of familialism. A historical development of family policies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Paper presented at 5th ESPAnet Conference, Vienna (20-22 Sep).

Szelewa D.and Polakowski Michal P. (2008) Who cares? Changing patterns of childcare in Central and Eastern Europe,' *Journal of European Social Policy* 18(2): 115-131.

Šircelj M. (2006) *Rodnost v Sloveniji od 18. do 21. stoletja (Fertility in Slovenia from the 18th to 21st Century)*. Ljubljana, Statistični urad Republike Slovenije.

Tang N., Cousins C. R. (2005) Working Time, Gender and Family: An East-West European Comparison. *Gender, Work and Organization* 12(6): 527-550.

Thévenon O. (2011) Family Policies in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis. *Population and Development Review* 37(1): 57-87.

Tomšič V. (1980). *Izbrani teksti II*. Ljubljana: Zavod SR Slovenije za šolstvo, Novi vidiki.

Tomšič V. (1976) K vprašanjem o položaju žensk v sodobnem svetu. *Teorija in praksa*, 5-6 (manuscript).

Tomšič V. (1971) Socialna diferenciacija in otroško varstvo – otroško varstvo za vse'. Zapis o pogovoru s člani izvršnega odbora republiške skupnosti otroškega varstva, *Komunist*, 16. januar.

Toš N. (1999) *Zaupanje Slovencev v demokratični sistem*. Ljubljana: Liberalna akademija in Znanstvena knjižnica FDV.

Unicef (1999). *Women in Transition. The Monee Project, CEE/CIS/Baltics. Regional Monitoring Report No 6*. Florence, Unicef.

Unicef (1999) *Women in Transition. Regional Monitoring Report 6*. UNICEF ICDC, Florence

UNDP/RBEC. 1999. *Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS 1999*. UNDP, New York.

Van der Lippe T., Van Dijk L. (Eds.) 2001. *Women's Employment in a Comparative Perspective*. New York, Aldine de Gruyter.

Van der Lippe T., Fodor E. (1998) Changes in gender inequality in six eastern European countries. *Acta Sociologica* 41(2): 131-149.

von Wahl A. (2008) The EU and Enlargement. Conceptualizing Beyond "East" and "West". In: Roth, S. (ed.) *Gender Politics in the Expanding European Union. Mobilization, Inclusion, Exclusion*. New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books:19-36.

UMAR (2014) *Ekonomski izzivi*. UMAR, Ljubljana.

Data source

Eurostat 2016. New Cronos dataset, Brussels: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data (2010). Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.

OECD Family Database. 2016. http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm (last accessed 15 Jan 2016)

Statistical Office of Slovenia. SI – Stat Data Portal: http://pxweb.stat.si/pxweb/dialog/statfile1.asp

Toš, Niko. Slovensko javno mnenje 1970/71 [datoteka podatkov]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani,
Fakulteta za družbene vede, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov [distribucija] 1999. http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm71/

Toš, Niko. Slovensko javno mnenje 1975/76 [datoteka podatkov]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani,
Fakulteta za družbene vede, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov [distribucija] 1999.

Notes

[1] Only few socialist states were in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with Slovenia and the Czech R. most closely connected with Austria/Germany. WWI offered the opportunity to regain independence, as Austria had to renounce its rule over large part of Eastern Europe; two new states were created: Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. WWII again reshuffled their geo-political positioning, separating the Slavic from the Germanic worlds of 'Eastern Europe'. The advent of communism altered relationships in Eastern Europe by bringing a new and previously unknown factor into their politics and societies (Marc, 2009). Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union during WWII, were its constituents until 1990, whilst Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were 'independent' states since 1918 (Motiejūnaitė 2008). Since the Soviet Union exerted much political and economic influence and control over these countries since the 1955 Warsaw Pact, they formed 'Eastern Bloc' with a Soviet-style communism (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002; Marc, 2009). In the 1990s, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (known as Višegrad Four) reclaimed the title of Central Europe, and the Baltic States gained their independence.

[2] The 1945 Constitution established six constituent republics in the Yugoslav federation, with borders drawn along ethnic and historical lines: Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Serbia had two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Powers were shared between the central (federal) and a local authority. This kept changing, but Constitution passed to Slovenia the powers to make laws on a range of issues. Among others, devolved matters included social security programme, regulating the social insurance and health and social services, education and child care issues (Kidrič, 1996; Novak, 1996). The Yugoslav model of state organization was a mix of planned and liberal economy, and the country experienced a period of strong economic growth and relative political stability up to the 1980s. After Tito's death in 1980, however, the weakened system of federal government was unable to cope with the rising challenges.

[3] In most countries, services were underdeveloped and early welfare programmes were 'skewed' towards income maintenance. States promoted 'socially responsible parenthood' by distributing milk for the babies, food coupons and cash benefits to employed parents, in order to reduce the widespread poverty, infant mortality, and to improve maternal health.

[4] Established in 1953 as the successor of the *Libertation Front of the Slovenian People* (established in 1941), to unify various political organisations during World War II (Jogan 2001).

[5] The *Conference for the Social Activity of Women* since 1961. As the first Slovenian women's organisation it was established in 1887 in Trieste, followed by the *Association of Slovenian Women Teachers* in 1898, and by *General Women's Association* in 1901 (Jogan 2001).

[6] In Sweden, this was the catalyst for the 'daddy quotas' in the 1990s (allocating specific leave time solely for fathers). Slovenia followed in 2001, when a complex paternity leave scheme was introduced. This created a total of 90 days of leave, 15 days of which were paid at 100 percent replacement rate. In both countries, the scheme significantly increased fathers' take-up: a snowball effect counteracted the stigma attached to fathers taking time off around childbirth (Javornik 2014).

[7] The Council Directive 96/34/EC was a catalyst for opening up leave to fathers (Javornik and Skledar 2005). Using the "harmonisation with the EU law" argument the Act was unanimously passed, initially allocating 90 additional days of leave; following the Spending Review, it was gradually introduced until 2005.

[8] 63 percent of fathers took up to 15 days in 2003, 71 per cent in 2004 (Stropnik 2006).

[9] Before state socialism, public childcare existed in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia; it was part of 'Trivial Schools', founded by Maria Theresa in the 18th century.

[10] In Slovenian: *Zveza skupnosti otroškega varstva* or *Republiška skupnost otroškega varstva*; the national body responsible for children and childcare under the auspices of Ministry of Health and Social Care, both led by Gaspari between 1967 and 1977.

[11] The locally collected resources included voluntary contributions (net salary sacrifice: 1%, craft trade and intellectual services: 1.5%, and cadastral income: 3%); employers fixed contributions per employee; contribution from the local budget; and 80% of nationally earmarked childcare contributions. In addition, SACEE matched every collected din with a din (local currency at the time) in a form of a long-term interest-free loan.

[12] No exact figures exist, but according to the informants' personal accounts, around 105 referenda were held across the state during that time (Gaspari, Sodin, Lokar, personal conversation 2014/2015). These were either part of a wider social investment plan (to build hospitals, healthcare centres *and* childcare; roads *and* childcare) or specifically for building childcare *and* school facilities.

[13] Similar approach is currently used in Iceland, to accommodate increased demand for childcare and early education in Reykjavik.

[14] While Yugoslavia had four major languages, three main religions and many ethnic groups, 90 percent of Slovenia's two million inhabitants were ethnic Slovene and Roman Catholic.
[15] This has been thoroughly recounted in the literature on economic development and general labour market conditions in the post-socialist countries, which detailed the processes and consequences of economic transformation, the market-making process, and the emerging varieties in industrial relations. This documented significant declines in economic output and revenues after 1989, with limited options to raise taxes.
[16] The question is how any such attempt would resonate under the current ideological climate, which, shaped by the well-organised conservative social movement and supported by the conservative partisan politics has already successfully rejected artificial reproduction and marriage equality.
[17] The decision was linked to the EU childcare recommendations and the need to improve socio-demographic trends (MSS 2007; DZ 2008). The reform was advocated under the social-investment rationale, the ‘new pronatalism’ and 'solidarity with young families' (Dobrotić 2012; Blum et al. 2014).