




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Debates about the desirability and disadvantages of nonstandard work arrangements often make assumptions about the motivations and attitudes of individuals who work in these arrangements, as well as the quality of jobs associated with them. For example, temporary workers—and some part-time workers—are usually thought to work in their jobs involuntarily and to have jobs with less security, lower earnings, and fewer other job rewards. Consequently, temporary and part-time workers are usually believed to be dissatisfied with their jobs and to engage in fewer organizational citizenship behaviors. Although these assumptions provide the basis for much of our thinking about nonstandard work arrangements and for our policy recommendations related to them, these beliefs are often untested.

To the extent that studies have examined the correlates of nonstandard work arrangements at all, they have generally focused on their economic rewards (usually wages, and sometimes fringe benefits). We know much less about the meanings that nonstandard workers attach to their work, such as the extent to which they regard work as a central life interest, the importance they place on various job characteristics, and whether they choose nonstandard work voluntarily. It is commonly assumed, for example, that part-time workers are more concerned than full-time workers with nonwork aspects of life, such as family and leisure, and that part-time and temporary workers are less concerned than

full-time workers with career advancement. Moreover, we know relatively little about the noneconomic benefits and utilities that nonstandard workers obtain from their jobs, such as their degree of job security, perceived opportunities for promotion, and assessments of the intrinsic rewards (i.e., the degree to which jobs are interesting, meaningful, and challenging). Finally, there is little empirical evidence available on how regular full-time workers and nonstandard workers differ in measures of well-being, such as job satisfaction and work-related stress, and outcomes, such as organizational commitment, work effort, and absenteeism.

In this chapter, we seek to fill in some of these gaps by examining the extent to which workers in nonstandard arrangements differ from full-time workers in their work values, job rewards, work attitudes (job satisfaction, work-related stress, and organizational commitment) and work behaviors (such as reported absenteeism). Our analysis is based on a cross-national survey data set, the 1997 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) module on “work orientations” (see Appendix A for a description of the data). This data set permits us to examine the work attitudes and job rewards associated with various nonstandard work arrangements in the United States, Japan, and a number of European countries.

We first discuss how we measure nonstandard work arrangements in this data set. We then summarize how our measures of work values, job rewards, and worker attitudes and behaviors differ among the various work arrangements and countries. Finally, we indicate implications of our findings for future research on nonstandard work arrangements.

NONSTANDARD WORK ARRANGEMENTS

Types of Nonstandard Work Arrangements

Nonstandard work arrangements between an employer and worker may differ in one or more ways from standard (i.e., full-time, open-ended) work arrangements. First, nonstandard work arrangements might be part-time and involve fewer hours per week than full-time work. Second, they might be temporary, such as in fixed-term arrange-

ments, where the employment relation is closed- rather than open-ended. Third, the nonstandard work arrangement might not be an employment relationship at all, but might constitute a contracting relationship between an employer and a self-employed contractor. We will examine these three common types of nonstandard work arrangements in this chapter.

Measuring Work Arrangements

We restricted the sample to those working for pay and then coded respondents into four mutually exclusive types of work arrangements. Respondents who indicated that they were self-employed were coded as such regardless of their full- or part-time status. We identified as “fixed-term temporaries” those who said that their job is for a fixed term lasting either “less than 12 months” or “for one year or more.”¹ The remaining respondents were then classified as being either full-time or part-time based on a work status variable coded by the ISSP researchers.²

Table 12.1 presents estimates of the prevalence of part-time, fixed-term temporary, and self-employed work arrangements in the ISSP data for the 11 countries we examine.³ In the remainder of the chapter, we examine how these four categories of work arrangements differ with regard to their work values, job rewards, and work attitudes and behaviors. Appendix Table 12.B1 describes how we measured each of these dependent variables in the ISSP data set.

WORK VALUES

By *work values*, we mean the motivations that people have for working and the importance they place on work in general and on specific facets of their jobs. Work values consist of three sets of concepts: 1) the extent to which people are involved in work, or the centrality of work to their lives; 2) the importance people place on various job facets, or their “conceptions of the desirable” with regard to their work activity; and 3) the extent to which people work in the particular arrangement voluntarily or involuntarily.

Table 12.1 Persons in Nonstandard Work Arrangements, by Country (%)

Country	Part-time	Fixed-term (temp)	Self-employed
United States	15	10	14
Japan	9	24	27
West Germany	11	9	11
Great Britain	15	12	15
Netherlands	35	22	NA
France	12	11	5
Italy	5	8	30
Spain	11	25	4
Denmark	14	11	7
Sweden	19	8	11
Norway	10	12	11

SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

Table 12.2 presents descriptive statistics (means or percentages) on these three sets of variables for each of the four work arrangements in each of the 11 countries. Table 12.3 presents results for regression models that estimate differences in these measures of work values between full-time workers, on the one hand, and part-time, fixed-term, and self-employed persons, on the other, controlling for gender, age, education, and three dichotomous variables representing occupational groups (i.e., managerial, professional, and other white-collar occupations). These regression coefficients were obtained from the following equation, which we estimated for each work value.

$$(1) \quad Y = a + b_1\text{PT} + b_2\text{FIXED-TERM} + b_3\text{SELF-EMPLOYED} \\ + b_4\text{CONTROLS} + e$$

Centrality of Work

Part-time workers do not differ much from full-time workers in the extent to which they regard work as a central life interest. This result is consistent with analyses of U.S. data from earlier time periods (Kalle-

Table 12.2 Mean Work Values by Job Status and Country

Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interest-ing work	Flexible hours	Percent involuntary
United States							
Full-time	2.6	4.6	4.0	4.2	4.4	3.6	28.1
Part-time	2.5	4.4	3.8	4.2	4.5	3.7	43.2
Fixed-term	2.6	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.6	3.6	22.2
Self-employed	2.8	4.3	4.0	4.2	4.5	3.8	32.7
Total	2.6	4.5	4.0	4.2	4.5	3.6	30.3
Japan							
Full-time	3.7	4.0	4.0	2.8	4.0	3.4	15.4
Part-time	4.1	3.9	3.7	2.6	3.9	3.6	22.6
Fixed-term	3.8	4.2	3.8	2.8	3.9	3.3	16.9
Self-employed	4.4	4.1	4.0	2.9	4.0	3.7	39.5
Total	4.0	4.1	3.9	2.8	4.0	3.5	22.8
West Germany							
Full-time	2.9	4.7	3.9	3.8	4.5	3.3	27.3
Part-time	2.8	4.6	3.7	3.7	4.4	3.5	9.6
Fixed-term	2.7	4.6	3.8	3.9	4.6	3.4	25.8
Self-employed	3.1	4.3	3.5	3.7	4.6	3.6	35.5
Total	2.9	4.6	3.8	3.8	4.5	3.4	26.2
Great Britain							
Full-time	2.5	4.7	3.9	4.0	4.5	3.2	30.9

(continued)

Table 12.2 (continued)

Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interest-ing work	Flexible hours	Percent involuntary
Part-time	2.5	4.5	3.7	3.8	4.4	3.5	15.2
Fixed-term	2.6	4.6	3.8	4.0	4.5	3.3	30.2
Self-employed	2.7	4.5	3.8	3.8	4.4	3.5	32.9
Total	2.5	4.6	3.9	3.9	4.4	3.3	28.8
Netherlands							
Full-time	2.8	4.2	3.6	4.0	4.4	3.4	19.3
Part-time	2.7	4.2	3.5	3.8	4.3	3.7	28.0
Fixed-term	2.7	4.2	3.5	3.9	4.4	3.6	22.5
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	2.8	4.2	3.6	3.9	4.4	3.6	23.0
France							
Full-time	3.0	4.5	3.9	3.8	4.7	3.6	52.7
Part-time	3.1	4.6	3.8	3.5	4.6	4.0	22.1
Fixed-term	3.2	4.5	3.8	3.6	4.6	3.6	33.3
Self-employed	3.5	4.2	3.8	3.6	4.7	3.9	58.3
Total	3.1	4.5	3.9	3.8	4.7	3.7	47.1
Italy							
Full-time	3.0	4.6	4.1	3.9	4.4	3.8	34.4
Part-time	2.9	4.3	3.8	3.9	4.5	3.9	30.8
Fixed-term	3.4	4.7	4.1	3.9	4.5	3.6	39.5

Self-employed	3.2	4.4	4.0	3.9	4.6	4.2	38.2
Total	3.1	4.6	4.1	3.9	4.5	3.9	35.8
<hr/>							
Spain							
Full-time	3.5	4.7	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.6	11.9
Part-time	2.9	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.1	3.9	50.0
Fixed-term	3.3	4.6	4.3	4.1	4.3	3.7	23.0
Self-employed	3.1	4.9	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.1	57.1
Total	3.4	4.6	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.6	20.3
<hr/>							
Denmark							
Full-time	3.1	4.1	3.5	3.2	4.6	3.4	27.0
Part-time	3.0	4.1	3.4	3.2	4.5	3.5	24.7
Fixed-term	2.9	3.7	3.5	3.3	4.6	3.4	29.7
Self-employed	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.1	4.7	4.2	26.7
Total	3.1	4.0	3.5	3.2	4.6	3.4	27.0
<hr/>							
Sweden							
Full-time	3.1	4.5	3.9	3.4	4.5	3.7	37.9
Part-time	3.3	4.5	3.7	3.3	4.4	3.7	26.7
Fixed-term	2.7	4.2	3.7	3.3	4.5	3.8	43.1
Self-employed	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.3	4.4	3.9	44.8
Total	3.1	4.4	3.8	3.4	4.5	3.8	37.0
<hr/>							
Norway							
Full-time	3.1	4.5	3.8	3.5	4.5	3.5	31.1
Part-time	3.1	4.6	3.6	3.3	4.4	3.6	18.2

(continued)

Table 12.2 (continued)

Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interest-ing work	Flexible hours	Percent involuntary
Fixed-term	3.1	4.3	3.6	3.5	4.6	3.4	19.4
Self-employed	3.5	4.2	3.6	3.2	4.4	3.7	52.9
Total	3.2	4.5	3.7	3.4	4.5	3.5	30.8

SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

berg 1995). The mean levels of work involvement are higher for part-time than for full-time workers in Sweden, Japan, and France (Table 12.2), although this difference is statistically significant only in Sweden when we control for the background demographic variables and occupational differences (Table 12.3). Only in Spain are part-time workers significantly less likely than full-time workers to regard work as a central life interest once we control for demographic and occupational differences.

Self-employed persons are more likely than full-time employees to regard work as a central life interest (except in Spain; Table 12.2), but this gap is statistically significant only in Sweden and (at $p < 0.10$) in Norway and Italy (Table 12.3).

Fixed-term workers in Italy, France, and Norway are significantly more likely than full-time workers to regard work as a central life interest (Table 12.2). Fixed-term employees in West Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden are less likely to be involved in work than full-time workers (Table 12.2), but these differences are not statistically significant when demographic and occupational variables are controlled for (Table 12.3).

Importance of Job Facets

Individuals value different things about their work. Some persons place primary importance on money, or extrinsic rewards. Others find more meaning in jobs that are intrinsically satisfying. Still others see a job as a stepping-stone to other, more highly rewarding jobs. This section examines whether employees in nonstandard work arrangements value different aspects of their jobs differently than full-time workers.

Job security

Part-time workers are significantly less likely to place high importance on job security than full-time workers in the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain; part-time workers are more likely than full-time workers in the Netherlands to value job security (Table 12.3). Self-employed persons are significantly less likely to value job security than are regular full-time employees in all countries except Great Britain, Spain, and Japan (Table 12.3). Fixed-term employees are significantly less likely than regular full-time workers in

Table 12.3 Regressions of Work Values on Job Status^a

Dependent variable = Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interesting work	Flexible hours	Involuntary ^b
United States							
Part-time	-0.13	-0.17**	-0.21***	-0.04	0.08	0.05	1.92***
Fixed-term	0.00	-0.07	0.12	-0.07	0.10	0.01	0.68
Self-employed	0.11	-0.27***	0.01	-0.05	0.10	0.29***	1.24
<i>N</i> =	817	808	806	801	806	800	816
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.011	0.023	0.022	0.035	0.013	0.021	0.059
Japan							
Part-time	0.18	-0.07	-0.20*	0.02	0.00	0.18	2.67**
Fixed-term	0.06	0.14*	-0.12	-0.07	-0.05	-0.09	1.28
Self-employed	0.19	0.08	0.00	0.16	0.10	0.28**	5.85***
<i>N</i> =	724	714	723	708	725	721	672
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.109	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.015	0.028	0.121
West Germany							
Part-time	-0.18	-0.15*	-0.14	-0.01	0.08**	0.19	0.12***
Fixed-term	0.01	-0.10	-0.14	0.12	0.08	-0.01	0.95
Self-employed	0.06	-0.28***	-0.39***	-0.02	0.07*	0.33**	1.35
<i>N</i> =	603	627	620	611	624	607	629
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.057	0.036	0.027	0.001	0.051	0.015	0.156
Great Britain							
Part-time	0.04	-0.25***	-0.16	-0.03	-0.01	0.19	0.19***
Fixed-term	0.21	-0.11	-0.06	0.05	0.08	-0.02	0.65
Self-employed	0.12	-0.10	-0.12	-0.12	0.02	0.32***	1.15

Table 12.2 Mean Work Values by Job Status and Country

Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interest-ing work	Flexible hours	Percent involuntary
United States							
Full-time	2.6	4.6	4.0	4.2	4.4	3.6	28.1
Part-time	2.5	4.4	3.8	4.2	4.5	3.7	43.2
Fixed-term	2.6	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.6	3.6	22.2
Self-employed	2.8	4.3	4.0	4.2	4.5	3.8	32.7
Total	2.6	4.5	4.0	4.2	4.5	3.6	30.3
Japan							
Full-time	3.7	4.0	4.0	2.8	4.0	3.4	15.4
Part-time	4.1	3.9	3.7	2.6	3.9	3.6	22.6
Fixed-term	3.8	4.2	3.8	2.8	3.9	3.3	16.9
Self-employed	4.4	4.1	4.0	2.9	4.0	3.7	39.5
Total	4.0	4.1	3.9	2.8	4.0	3.5	22.8
West Germany							
Full-time	2.9	4.7	3.9	3.8	4.5	3.3	27.3
Part-time	2.8	4.6	3.7	3.7	4.4	3.5	9.6
Fixed-term	2.7	4.6	3.8	3.9	4.6	3.4	25.8
Self-employed	3.1	4.3	3.5	3.7	4.6	3.6	35.5
Total	2.9	4.6	3.8	3.8	4.5	3.4	26.2
Great Britain							
Full-time	2.5	4.7	3.9	4.0	4.5	3.2	30.9

(continued)

Table 12.2 (continued)

Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interest-ing work	Flexible hours	Percent involuntary
Part-time	2.5	4.5	3.7	3.8	4.4	3.5	15.2
Fixed-term	2.6	4.6	3.8	4.0	4.5	3.3	30.2
Self-employed	2.7	4.5	3.8	3.8	4.4	3.5	32.9
Total	2.5	4.6	3.9	3.9	4.4	3.3	28.8
Netherlands							
Full-time	2.8	4.2	3.6	4.0	4.4	3.4	19.3
Part-time	2.7	4.2	3.5	3.8	4.3	3.7	28.0
Fixed-term	2.7	4.2	3.5	3.9	4.4	3.6	22.5
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	2.8	4.2	3.6	3.9	4.4	3.6	23.0
France							
Full-time	3.0	4.5	3.9	3.8	4.7	3.6	52.7
Part-time	3.1	4.6	3.8	3.5	4.6	4.0	22.1
Fixed-term	3.2	4.5	3.8	3.6	4.6	3.6	33.3
Self-employed	3.5	4.2	3.8	3.6	4.7	3.9	58.3
Total	3.1	4.5	3.9	3.8	4.7	3.7	47.1
Italy							
Full-time	3.0	4.6	4.1	3.9	4.4	3.8	34.4
Part-time	2.9	4.3	3.8	3.9	4.5	3.9	30.8
Fixed-term	3.4	4.7	4.1	3.9	4.5	3.6	39.5

Self-employed	3.2	4.4	4.0	3.9	4.6	4.2	38.2
Total	3.1	4.6	4.1	3.9	4.5	3.9	35.8
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Spain							
Full-time	3.5	4.7	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.6	11.9
Part-time	2.9	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.1	3.9	50.0
Fixed-term	3.3	4.6	4.3	4.1	4.3	3.7	23.0
Self-employed	3.1	4.9	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.1	57.1
Total	3.4	4.6	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.6	20.3
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Denmark							
Full-time	3.1	4.1	3.5	3.2	4.6	3.4	27.0
Part-time	3.0	4.1	3.4	3.2	4.5	3.5	24.7
Fixed-term	2.9	3.7	3.5	3.3	4.6	3.4	29.7
Self-employed	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.1	4.7	4.2	26.7
Total	3.1	4.0	3.5	3.2	4.6	3.4	27.0
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Sweden							
Full-time	3.1	4.5	3.9	3.4	4.5	3.7	37.9
Part-time	3.3	4.5	3.7	3.3	4.4	3.7	26.7
Fixed-term	2.7	4.2	3.7	3.3	4.5	3.8	43.1
Self-employed	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.3	4.4	3.9	44.8
Total	3.1	4.4	3.8	3.4	4.5	3.8	37.0
<hr/>							
Norway							
Full-time	3.1	4.5	3.8	3.5	4.5	3.5	31.1
Part-time	3.1	4.6	3.6	3.3	4.4	3.6	18.2

(continued)

Table 12.2 (continued)

Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interest-ing work	Flexible hours	Percent involuntary
Fixed-term	3.1	4.3	3.6	3.5	4.6	3.4	19.4
Self-employed	3.5	4.2	3.6	3.2	4.4	3.7	52.9
Total	3.2	4.5	3.7	3.4	4.5	3.5	30.8

SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

Table 12.3 Regressions of Work Values on Job Status^a

Dependent variable = Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interesting work	Flexible hours	Involuntary ^b
United States							
Part-time	-0.13	-0.17**	-0.21***	-0.04	0.08	0.05	1.92***
Fixed-term	0.00	-0.07	0.12	-0.07	0.10	0.01	0.68
Self-employed	0.11	-0.27***	0.01	-0.05	0.10	0.29***	1.24
<i>N</i> =	817	808	806	801	806	800	816
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.011	0.023	0.022	0.035	0.013	0.021	0.059
Japan							
Part-time	0.18	-0.07	-0.20*	0.02	0.00	0.18	2.67**
Fixed-term	0.06	0.14*	-0.12	-0.07	-0.05	-0.09	1.28
Self-employed	0.19	0.08	0.00	0.16	0.10	0.28**	5.85***
<i>N</i> =	724	714	723	708	725	721	672
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.109	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.015	0.028	0.121
West Germany							
Part-time	-0.18	-0.15*	-0.14	-0.01	0.08**	0.19	0.12***
Fixed-term	0.01	-0.10	-0.14	0.12	0.08	-0.01	0.95
Self-employed	0.06	-0.28***	-0.39***	-0.02	0.07*	0.33**	1.35
<i>N</i> =	603	627	620	611	624	607	629
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.057	0.036	0.027	0.001	0.051	0.015	0.156
Great Britain							
Part-time	0.04	-0.25***	-0.16	-0.03	-0.01	0.19	0.19***
Fixed-term	0.21	-0.11	-0.06	0.05	0.08	-0.02	0.65
Self-employed	0.12	-0.10	-0.12	-0.12	0.02	0.32***	1.15

<i>N</i> =	523	539	535	535	535	534	540
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.015	0.013	0.026	0.024	0.046	0.030	0.120
Netherlands							
Part-time	-0.03	0.12*	-0.05	-0.03	0.06	0.17*	1.95***
Fixed-term	-0.06	0.09	-0.08	-0.03	0.05	0.05	1.27
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<i>N</i> =	1204	662	651	646	381	1146	1063
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.036	0.042	0.039	0.031	0.049	0.028	0.034
France							
Part-time	0.08	-0.09	-0.12	-0.32***	-0.03	0.23	0.17***
Fixed-term	0.32**	-0.15*	-0.23**	-0.26**	-0.01	-0.11	0.37***
Self-employed	0.36	-0.37***	-0.17	-0.29*	0.04	0.29	1.69
<i>N</i> =	687	689	679	676	686	673	693
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.080	0.085	0.012	0.031	0.015	0.024	0.129
Italy							
Part-time	0.17	-0.30**	-0.31*	-0.02	0.06	0.00	0.48
Fixed-term	0.50**	0.12	-0.05	0.03	0.09	-0.26	0.97
Self-employed	0.25*	-0.22***	-0.11	0.01	0.16***	0.34***	1.10
<i>N</i> =	476	475	475	473	476	473	474
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.041	0.071	0.032	0.021	0.046	0.047	0.085
Spain							
Part-time	-0.616***	-0.19*	0.16	-0.11	-0.05	0.47**	6.65***
Fixed-term	-0.128	-0.06	0.02	-0.10	0.04	0.19	1.69
Self-employed	-0.522	0.15	0.25	0.16	0.15	0.54*	13.75***
<i>N</i> =	388	392	391	391	391	387	392
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.044	0.003	0.005	-0.012	0.051	0.018	0.200

(continued)

<i>N</i> =	523	539	535	535	535	534	540
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.015	0.013	0.026	0.024	0.046	0.030	0.120
Netherlands							
Part-time	-0.03	0.12*	-0.05	-0.03	0.06	0.17*	1.95***
Fixed-term	-0.06	0.09	-0.08	-0.03	0.05	0.05	1.27
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<i>N</i> =	1204	662	651	646	381	1146	1063
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.036	0.042	0.039	0.031	0.049	0.028	0.034
France							
Part-time	0.08	-0.09	-0.12	-0.32***	-0.03	0.23	0.17***
Fixed-term	0.32**	-0.15*	-0.23**	-0.26**	-0.01	-0.11	0.37***
Self-employed	0.36	-0.37***	-0.17	-0.29*	0.04	0.29	1.69
<i>N</i> =	687	689	679	676	686	673	693
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.080	0.085	0.012	0.031	0.015	0.024	0.129
Italy							
Part-time	0.17	-0.30**	-0.31*	-0.02	0.06	0.00	0.48
Fixed-term	0.50**	0.12	-0.05	0.03	0.09	-0.26	0.97
Self-employed	0.25*	-0.22***	-0.11	0.01	0.16***	0.34***	1.10
<i>N</i> =	476	475	475	473	476	473	474
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.041	0.071	0.032	0.021	0.046	0.047	0.085
Spain							
Part-time	-0.616***	-0.19*	0.16	-0.11	-0.05	0.47**	6.65***
Fixed-term	-0.128	-0.06	0.02	-0.10	0.04	0.19	1.69
Self-employed	-0.522	0.15	0.25	0.16	0.15	0.54*	13.75***
<i>N</i> =	388	392	391	391	391	387	392
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.044	0.003	0.005	-0.012	0.051	0.018	0.200

(continued)

Dependent variable = Importance of . . .	Work	Job security	High earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interesting work	Flexible hours	Involuntary ^b
Denmark							
Part-time	-0.053	-0.09	-0.08	0.06	-0.10	0.01	0.60*
Fixed-term	0.017	-0.40***	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.10	1.51
Self-employed	0.358	-0.50***	-0.24	-0.17	0.15	0.92***	1.08
<i>N</i> =	625	623	625	625	625	623	625
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.062	0.064	0.008	0.057	0.041	0.049	0.053
Sweden							
Part-time	0.24**	-0.11	-0.19*	-0.12	-0.14**	0.03	0.38***
Fixed-term	-0.20	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.26**	-0.07	-0.01	1.02
Self-employed	0.32**	-0.63***	-0.32***	-0.12	0.00	0.14	1.63**
<i>N</i> =	750	773	769	765	772	769	786
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.114	0.157	0.034	0.046	0.073	0.030	0.072
Norway							
Part-time	0.003	-0.09	-0.15**	-0.13	-0.04	0.06	0.21***
Fixed-term	0.000**	-0.22***	-0.14**	-0.01	0.09**	-0.17**	0.39***
Self-employed	0.000*	-0.34***	-0.26***	-0.24***	-0.03	0.30***	3.42***
<i>N</i> =	1406	1433	1425	1413	1427	1423	1432
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.079	0.085	0.023	0.045	0.038	0.032	0.192

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

^a Unstandardized coefficients are presented.

^b The last column reports odds ratios from logistic regressions and the Nagelkerke R^2 . All the other coefficients are unstandardized OLS estimates. All models control for sex, age, education, and occupation (except the model for the Netherlands, which does not include variables for occupation). The Nagelkerke R^2 is a measure of the strength of association in a logistic regression model (see N.J.D. Nagelkerke, 1991. "A Note on a General Definition of the Coefficient of Determination." *Biometrika* 78(3): 691-692. There is, however, no widely accepted direct analog to OLS regression's R^2 in a logistic regression. SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and France, to value job security, but they are more likely to value job security in Japan (Table 12.3).

Earnings

Full-time workers are more likely to place greater importance on high income than part-time workers in all countries except Spain (Table 12.2). The differences between part- and full-time workers remain statistically significant in the United States, Japan, Italy, Sweden, and Norway once we control for demographic characteristics and occupational differences (Table 12.3).

Fixed-term employees in France, Sweden, and Norway are significantly less likely to value high income; only in West Germany, Sweden, and Norway are self-employed persons significantly less likely than full-time employees to value high income (Table 12.3).

Opportunities for promotion

Individuals in the four work arrangements do not appear to differ much in the importance they place on opportunities for promotion. Part-time workers place less value on opportunities for promotion than full-time workers in Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Sweden, and Norway (Table 12.2), although only in France are these differences statistically significant once we control for demographic characteristics and occupational groups (Table 12.3). In addition only in France and Sweden do fixed-term employees place significantly less importance than full-time workers on opportunities for promotion (Table 12.3).

Interesting work

There are also relatively few differences among workers in terms of the importance placed on interesting work. Part-time workers value interesting work significantly more than full-time workers only in West Germany and they value it less only in Sweden. Self-employed persons in West Germany and Italy are significantly more likely to value interesting work. Fixed-term and full-time employees differ in the importance they place on having interesting work only in Norway (fixed-term workers value this more; Table 12.3).

Flexible hours

Part-time workers are more likely than full-time workers to value flexible hours in all countries except Sweden (Table 12.2), but only in the Netherlands, France, and Spain is this difference statistically significant once we control for demographic characteristics and occupation (Table 12.3). Self-employed persons value flexible work more highly than regular full-time workers in all countries (Table 12.2); this difference remains statistically significant after controlling for the background demographic variables and occupation in all countries except France and Sweden (Table 12.3). This pattern is consistent with the view that workers (especially women with children) often become self-employed to have greater flexibility in their schedules (Boden 1999). Full-time and fixed-term employees do not differ significantly in the importance they place on flexible hours except in Norway (where fixed-term employees value flexible hours less; Table 12.3).

Working Voluntarily versus Involuntarily

Individuals may choose or be constrained to work in the various types of work arrangements. Research on this issue, of course, is hampered by the ambiguity of what is meant by “voluntary” behavior.

We coded respondents as working voluntarily or involuntarily differently in the various work arrangements. Self-employed persons were coded as involuntary if they said that they would rather work for someone else as opposed to being self-employed. Full-time workers were coded as involuntary if they said that they would rather work part-time, while part-time workers were coded as involuntary if they said that they preferred to work full-time. Unfortunately, we do not have a measure of whether fixed-term workers chose temporary work arrangements involuntarily. Thus, for fixed-term employees, we created a measure of involuntary status based on their part-time/full-time status. The resulting estimates for fixed-term employees are somewhat lower than we would expect based on a conventional understanding of involuntary employment given that most fixed-term employees do not likely choose fixed-term work. For example, data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) in the United States indicate that people tend to work in temporary jobs involuntarily in the sense that they would prefer to work in standard work arrangements.⁴

Workers in the United States are especially likely to say they are working part-time involuntarily. Our results suggest that 43.2 percent of part-time workers in the United States are involuntary, a little higher than estimates based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which indicate that about one-third of part-time workers in 1993 preferred a full-time job. Our estimate of involuntary full-time employment in the United States (28.1 percent) is also higher than the estimate from BLS data of the full-time workers who prefer part-time jobs (about 10 percent in 1985; see Tilly 1996). Fifty percent of the part-time workers in Spain and 30.8 percent of part-time workers in Italy also say that they would prefer a full-time job (Table 12.2). Relatively few part-time workers in West Germany (9.6 percent) and Great Britain (15.2 percent) say they would prefer a full-time job. On the other hand, more than half the full-time employees in France say they would prefer a part-time job. Part-time workers in the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain are significantly more likely to desire a change in work status than full-time employees. In Italy, part-time workers and full-time workers are equally likely to desire a change in work status. In all the other countries, workers seem to prefer part-time work: a larger percentage of full-time workers desire part-time work than vice versa (Table 12.3).

More than one-quarter of self-employed persons in each country say that they would prefer to work for someone else (Table 12.2); the highest percentages (more than half of such persons) are in Spain, Norway, and France. Approximately 40 percent of self-employed persons in Sweden and Japan say they would rather work for someone else. In some cases, these relatively high rates of involuntary self-employment may reflect poor economic conditions. For example, in Japan, a significant portion of unemployment is likely to be disguised as self-employment. Given the prolonged recession in that country, the Japanese have a tendency to dismiss (retire) older workers and hire them back as low-paid consultants.

JOB REWARDS

Job rewards refers to the benefits and utilities that people obtain from their jobs. Most research on nonstandard work and job rewards focuses on earnings and has shown that part-time workers and temporaries generally earn less than regular full-time workers and they receive fewer fringe benefits. However, workers may also seek other, noneconomic benefits from their jobs. These include intrinsic rewards obtained from jobs that are interesting, meaningful, and challenging; opportunities for promotion and career advancement; job security; and flexibility in setting one's own hours.

Table 12.4 presents mean levels of job rewards for each work arrangement in each of the 11 countries. Table 12.5 presents results for regression models that estimate differences in these measures of job rewards between full-time workers, on the one hand, and part-time, fixed-term, and self-employed persons, on the other, controlling for the importance the person places on the reward, along with his or her gender, age, education, and occupation (similar to Equation 1).

Perception of pay

Full-time employees perceive that their pay is high compared with part-time workers in each country (Table 12.4), although the gap is statistically significant only in West Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden (Table 12.5). Full-time workers are more likely than fixed-term employees to perceive that their pay is good in all countries, except Japan (Tables 12.4 and 12.5) and Norway (Table 12.5). Full-time employees are significantly more likely than self-employed persons in Japan, West Germany, and Sweden to perceive that their pay is high (Table 12.5).

Job security

The differences between part-time and full-time employees in their perceived job security are not large. Part-time workers are less likely than full-time workers in Japan, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Norway to report that their job security is good (Table 12.4), but only in Italy is this difference statistically significant once we control for the background demographic variables and occu-

Table 12.4 Mean Reported Level of Job Rewards by Job Status and Country

Reported level of . . .	Fear of losing job	Job security	Earnings	Opportunity for promotion	Interesting job	Ability to set hours
United States						
Full-time	1.7	3.8	2.8	2.9	3.8	1.5
Part-time	1.5	3.8	2.5	2.7	3.7	1.6
Fixed-term	1.9	3.5	2.5	2.8	3.8	1.4
Self-employed	1.5	3.8	3.0	3.2	4.2	2.3
Total	1.6	3.8	2.7	2.9	3.8	1.6
Japan						
Full-time	1.7	3.8	2.5	2.2	3.5	1.3
Part-time	1.5	3.7	2.3	1.3	3.4	1.3
Fixed-term	1.6	3.9	2.7	2.2	3.6	1.3
Self-employed	1.6	4.1	2.6	2.1	3.9	2.3
Total	1.6	3.9	2.6	2.1	3.6	1.6
West Germany						
Full-time	2.0	4.0	3.0	2.6	4.0	1.5
Part-time	1.7	3.9	2.4	2.0	3.8	1.7
Fixed-term	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.5	4.1	1.4
Self-employed	1.9	3.6	2.8	2.6	4.4	2.5
Total	2.0	3.8	2.8	2.5	4.1	1.6
Great Britain						
Full-time	2.0	3.4	2.6	2.7	3.7	1.5
Part-time	1.7	3.6	2.2	2.4	3.7	1.5

(continued)

Table 12.4 (continued)

Reported level of . . .	Fear of losing job	Job security	Earnings	Opportunity for promotion	Interesting job	Ability to set hours
Fixed-term	2.1	3.2	2.1	2.5	3.7	1.4
Self-employed	1.9	3.0	2.6	2.5	4.0	2.2
Total	2.0	3.3	2.5	2.6	3.7	1.6
Netherlands						
Full-time	1.5	3.8	3.0	2.9	3.9	1.6
Part-time	1.5	3.7	2.6	2.5	3.7	1.6
Fixed-term	1.6	3.5	2.7	2.8	3.8	1.5
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	1.5	3.7	2.8	2.7	3.8	1.6
France						
Full-time	1.9	3.4	2.6	2.4	4.0	1.6
Part-time	1.9	3.5	2.3	2.1	3.8	1.6
Fixed-term	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.1	3.9	1.4
Self-employed	2.0	3.0	2.7	2.4	4.3	2.4
Total	2.0	3.3	2.5	2.3	3.9	1.6
Italy						
Full-time	1.8	4.0	2.9	2.5	3.7	1.4
Part-time	1.8	2.7	2.4	2.3	3.6	1.8
Fixed-term	2.3	3.2	2.5	2.1	3.4	1.3
Self-employed	1.9	3.3	2.9	2.7	4.2	2.3
Total	1.9	3.6	2.8	2.5	3.8	1.7
Spain						
Full-time	2.4	3.8	2.7	2.5	3.7	1.5

Part-time	2.6	3.4	2.0	1.6	3.3	1.6
Fixed-term	3.0	2.8	2.3	2.4	3.4	1.2
Self-employed	2.8	3.1	2.5	2.0	4.1	2.5
Total	2.6	3.5	2.5	2.4	3.6	1.5
<hr/>						
Denmark						
Full-time	1.5	4.2	3.2	2.5	4.4	1.6
Part-time	1.5	4.4	2.8	2.3	4.3	1.5
Fixed-term	1.6	3.5	2.6	2.4	4.4	1.6
Self-employed	1.6	4.3	3.4	2.5	4.8	2.6
Total	1.5	4.2	3.1	2.5	4.4	1.7
<hr/>						
Sweden						
Full-time	1.8	3.7	2.7	2.7	3.9	1.7
Part-time	1.9	3.5	2.1	2.3	3.7	1.7
Fixed-term	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.5	3.8	1.7
Self-employed	1.6	3.1	2.6	2.9	4.2	2.5
Total	1.8	3.5	2.5	2.7	3.9	1.8
<hr/>						
Norway						
Full-time	1.4	3.9	2.6	2.5	3.9	1.5
Part-time	1.5	3.8	2.1	2.0	3.6	1.4
Fixed-term	1.7	3.3	2.3	2.5	3.9	1.4
Self-employed	1.5	3.5	2.6	2.3	4.1	2.4
Total	1.5	3.8	2.5	2.5	3.9	1.6

SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

pational differences (Table 12.5). Part-time workers are significantly more likely than full-time workers in Great Britain and Denmark to perceive that their job security is good (at $p \leq 0.10$; Table 12.5). Part-time workers are significantly less likely than full-time employees in the United States, West Germany, and Great Britain to worry about the possibility of losing their jobs (Table 12.5).

Fixed-term employees perceive that they have significantly less job security than regular full-time workers in the United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway (Table 12.5). In Japan, the mean of perceived job security is slightly higher for fixed-term relative to full-time employees (Table 12.4), but this difference is not statistically significant (Table 12.5). Fixed-term employees are also significantly more likely than regular full-time workers in West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Norway to worry about the possibility of losing their jobs (Table 12.5).

Self-employed persons perceive that they have significantly less job security than full-time workers in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Norway. In Japan, self-employed persons perceive that they have more job security—and are less likely to worry about losing their jobs—than full-time workers (Table 12.5).

Opportunities for promotion

Part-time workers are significantly less likely than full-time workers in the United States, Japan, West Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Norway to perceive that they have good opportunities for advancement within their organizations (Table 12.5). Fixed-term employees perceive that they have lower promotion possibilities than full-time employees in West Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden (Table 12.5). Self-employed persons perceive that they have significantly better opportunities for promotion than full-time workers only in the United States and Sweden, and they report lower opportunities for promotion in Japan, Spain, and Norway (Table 12.5), though the meaning of promotion is somewhat ambiguous for self-employed persons.

Interesting work

In all countries except Spain, self-employed persons are more likely than regular full-time workers to believe that their jobs are interesting (Table 12.5). This undoubtedly reflects the greater control over work

Table 12.5 OLS Regressions of Job Rewards on Job Status and Work Values^a

Dependent variable = Self-reported . . .	Fear of losing job	Job security	Earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interesting job	Ability to set hours
United States						
Part-time	-0.17*	-0.03	-0.16	-0.19*	-0.03	0.14**
Fixed-term	0.17	-0.34***	-0.37***	-0.16	-0.11	-0.13*
Self-employed	-0.14	0.01	0.08	0.28***	0.43***	0.78***
Valuation of reward	0.03	0.10*	0.15***	0.15***	0.18***	0.00
<i>N</i> =	792	780	780	772	782	782
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.007	0.010	0.078	0.079	0.083	0.233
Japan						
Part-time	-0.10	-0.20	-0.31	-0.47***	0.05	0.28***
Fixed-term	-0.06	0.06	0.10	-0.01	0.05	0.04
Self-employed	-0.26**	0.42**	-0.50***	-0.28**	0.40**	1.21***
Valuation of reward	-0.03	0.14**	0.03	0.25***	0.43***	0.10***
<i>N</i> =	714	685	661	669	715	713
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.040	0.027	0.045	0.181	0.112	0.383
West Germany						
Part-time	-0.29**	0.03	-0.32**	-0.26*	0.12	0.21***
Fixed-term	0.72***	-1.35***	-0.52***	-0.31*	0.12	-0.08
Self-employed	-0.14	-0.35**	-0.31**	0.02	0.11*	0.83***
Valuation of reward	0.04	0.10	0.14***	0.38***	0.06***	0.09***
<i>N</i> =	600	602	604	586	615	601
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.062	0.133	0.193	0.207	0.149	0.286

Great Britain						
Part-time	-0.34**	0.30*	-0.08	0.02	0.03	0.10
Fixed-term	0.07	-0.17	-0.43***	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01
Self-employed	-0.13	-0.40***	0.02	-0.02	0.35***	0.73***
Valuation of reward	0.03	0.11	0.10*	0.23***	0.23***	0.10***
<i>N</i> =	520	531	527	516	527	528
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.006	0.044	0.090	0.114	0.096	0.228
Netherlands						
Part-time	-0.06	-0.09	-0.26***	-0.24***	-0.14**	0.03
Fixed-term	0.09	-0.18**	-0.15*	-0.10	-0.06	-0.12**
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Valuation of reward	-0.01	0.01	0.06	0.12***	0.30***	0.05***
<i>N</i> =	1056	1026	1034	1034	1049	1058
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.003	0.006	0.070	0.069	0.064	0.047
France						
Part-time	-0.14	0.04	-0.14	-0.06	-0.14	0.07
Fixed-term	0.54***	-1.05***	-0.43***	-0.26**	-0.03	-0.12
Self-employed	-0.03	-0.18	0.10	0.10	0.42***	0.76***
Valuation of reward	0.01	0.16**	-0.06	0.09**	0.27***	0.02
<i>N</i> =	670	677	669	656	679	667
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.099	0.120	0.152	0.115	0.113	0.178

Table 12.5 (continued)

Dependent variable = Self-reported . . .	Fear of losing job	Job security	Earnings	Oppty. for promotion	Interesting job	Ability to set hours
Italy						
Part-time	0.05	-1.11***	-0.22	-0.12	0.02	0.39***
Fixed-term	0.44**	-0.77***	-0.28*	-0.34*	-0.32*	-0.07
Self-employed	0.01	-0.64***	0.08	0.17	0.60***	0.96***
Valuation of reward	-0.01	0.24***	0.08	0.16**	0.19**	0.05*
<i>N</i> =	459	471	474	468	476	472
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.055	0.145	0.068	0.076	0.141	0.416
Spain						
Part-time	0.18	0.02	-0.50***	-0.56***	-0.09	0.16
Fixed-term	0.49***	-0.77***	-0.30**	-0.04	-0.23*	-0.25***
Self-employed	0.43	-0.85**	-0.18	-0.49*	0.39	0.84***
Valuation of reward	0.00	0.08	0.03	-0.07	0.10	0.10***
<i>N</i> =	378	388	388	382	389	386
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.064	0.186	0.102	0.110	0.122	0.162
Denmark						
Part-time	0.07	0.23*	-0.06	-0.17	0.00	-0.07
Fixed-term	0.08	-0.80***	-0.46***	-0.11	0.10	0.02
Self-employed	0.08	0.10	0.02	0.30	0.29**	0.77***
Valuation of reward	-0.01	0.15***	0.20***	0.33***	0.38***	0.13***
<i>N</i> =	622	617	625	622	625	623
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.005	0.063	0.115	0.183	0.189	0.249

Sweden						
Part-time	0.04	-0.14	-0.30***	-0.25**	-0.18**	-0.01
Fixed-term	0.42***	-1.46***	-0.50***	-0.25**	-0.08	-0.08
Self-employed	-0.16	-0.68***	-0.20*	0.31***	0.40***	0.77***
Valuation of reward	0.02	-0.03	-0.07	0.18***	0.21***	0.08***
<i>N</i> =	748	751	760	741	766	765
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.034	0.137	0.174	0.132	0.148	0.234
Norway						
Part-time	0.07	-0.07	-0.15	-0.22*	-0.21***	0.03
Fixed-term	0.29***	-0.67***	-0.11	0.01	0.04	-0.03
Self-employed	-0.04	-0.23**	-0.08	-0.15*	0.28***	0.79***
Valuation of reward	0.04**	0.19***	0.07**	0.19***	0.31***	0.11***
<i>N</i> =	1363	1399	1419	1379	1416	1413
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.043	0.089	0.117	0.153	0.143	0.287

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

^a The data are unstandardized coefficients from equations that control for sex, age, education, and occupation. The models for the Netherlands do not control for occupation.

SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

and “being the boss” that accompanies self-employment. Only in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway are part-time workers significantly less likely than full-time workers to perceive that their jobs are interesting (Table 12.5). Only in Italy and Spain are fixed-term employees less likely than regular full-time workers to believe that their jobs are interesting (at $p \leq 0.10$; Table 12.5).

Control over work schedule

Part-time workers are significantly more likely than full-time workers in the United States, Japan, West Germany, and Italy to believe that they can decide when they start and finish work (Table 12.5).⁵ In contrast, fixed-term employees believe that they have significantly less control over their schedule than full-time workers (Table 12.4), but this gap is statistically significant only in the United States, the Netherlands, and Spain (Table 12.5). Self-employed persons perceive that they have significantly more control over their work schedules than full-time workers in all the countries, again reflecting the greater control over work in general that is enjoyed by the self-employed (Table 12.5).

The regression analyses reported in Table 12.5 included as a regressor the degree of importance the respondent placed on the reward. Thus, any differences between full-time workers and the various categories of nonstandard work are not because of differences in the valuation of these job rewards.⁶ Valuation of a particular reward was significantly (positively) related to the job reward in 41 of 66 regressions. This suggests that workers tend to have jobs that correspond to their values, although the exact mechanism by which this occurs is ambiguous; this could occur, for example, if people select (or are otherwise sorted into) jobs that have characteristics that they believe are important, or if people tend to value what they are already receiving.

WORK ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS

We examine two kinds of outcomes. First, we study work attitudes that reflect the worker’s overall affective evaluation of the job (job sat-

isfaction) and the degree of perceived stress in the job. A large research literature has established that both of these work-related attitudes are linked to a wide variety of nonwork outcomes, such as psychological and physical well-being. Second, we examine work attitudes and behaviors that are important for the organization and its performance: the degree to which the worker is committed to the organization (defined as identifying with the organization's goals, intending to remain with the organization, and willingness to work hard in the organization's behalf); and the extent to which the worker is absent from work (self-reported). Table 12.6 presents the means of each of these dependent variables, separately by work arrangement and country.

To examine differences among work arrangements in these outcomes, we estimate two models. First, we estimate a slightly modified version of Equation 1 that also controls for involuntary status (Equation 2). This determines whether there are differences in these worker outcomes among the various types of nonstandard work arrangements after controlling for 1) whether the person works in the particular work status involuntarily, and 2) demographic background and occupational variables. Second, we estimate Equation 3, which determines the extent to which there are net differences among work arrangements, controlling for work values and job rewards.⁷

$$(2) \quad Y = a + b_1\text{PT} + b_2\text{FIXED-TERM} + b_3\text{SELF-EMPLOYED} \\ + b_4\text{INVOL} + b_5\text{CONTROLS} + e$$

$$(3) \quad Y = a + b_1\text{PT} + b_2\text{FIXED-TERM} + b_3\text{SELF-EMPLOYED} \\ + b_4\text{INVOL} + b_5\text{WORK VALUES} + b_6\text{JOB REWARDS} \\ + b_7\text{CONTROLS} + e$$

Job Satisfaction

The results for job satisfaction are presented in the first set of columns in Table 12.7. The first set of columns in Table 12.6 presents estimates of overall mean differences in job satisfaction among the various work arrangements. Part-time workers are more satisfied with their jobs than are full-time workers in the United States, Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, but part-time workers are less satisfied than full-time workers in Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Table

Table 12.6 Mean Reported Levels of Worker Outcomes, Organizational Commitment, and Absenteeism by Job Status and Country

Reported . . .	Job satisfaction	Work-related stress	Organizational commitment	Effort	Days absent in last 6 months
United States					
Full-time	5.3	3.3	3.5	3.9	0.8
Part-time	5.5	2.9	3.4	3.9	1.1
Fixed-term	5.3	3.4	3.4	4.0	0.9
Self-employed	5.6	3.3	3.9	4.1	0.7
Total	5.4	3.3	3.5	3.9	0.9
Japan					
Full-time	4.7	3.3	3.3	3.5	1.2
Part-time	5.0	2.8	3.3	3.1	1.5
Fixed-term	4.8	3.4	3.4	3.6	1.4
Self-employed	5.2	3.0	3.8	4.0	1.1
Total	4.9	3.2	3.5	3.6	1.3
West Germany					
Full-time	5.1	3.3	3.2	3.5	0.8
Part-time	5.3	2.9	3.2	3.2	0.8
Fixed-term	5.3	3.1	3.0	3.4	1.0
Self-employed	5.6	3.1	3.5	3.8	0.6
Total	5.2	3.2	3.2	3.5	0.8
Great Britain					
Full-time	5.0	3.3	3.2	3.6	0.8

(continued)

Table 12.6 (continued)

Reported . . .	Job satisfaction	Work-related stress	Organizational commitment	Effort	Days absent in last 6 months
Part-time	5.4	2.6	3.4	3.6	0.6
Fixed-term	5.1	3.2	3.2	3.6	0.8
Self-employed	5.4	3.1	3.4	3.8	0.5
Total	5.1	3.2	3.3	3.6	0.7
Netherlands					
Full-time	5.4	3.2	3.4	3.7	0.9
Part-time	5.5	2.6	3.2	3.5	0.9
Fixed-term	5.4	2.9	3.3	3.6	1.0
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	5.4	2.9	3.3	3.6	0.9
France					
Full-time	5.1	3.5	2.9	2.8	0.5
Part-time	5.1	3.3	2.8	2.8	0.5
Fixed-term	5.0	3.1	2.9	2.7	0.5
Self-employed	5.5	3.5	3.4	3.1	0.2
Total	5.1	3.4	2.9	2.8	0.5
Italy					
Full-time	5.1	3.2	2.9	2.8	0.7
Part-time	4.6	2.7	3.1	3.2	0.8
Fixed-term	4.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	0.5

Self-employed	5.5	3.2	3.5	3.3	0.6
Total	5.2	3.1	3.1	3.0	0.7
<hr/>					
Spain					
Full-time	5.5	3.1	3.3	3.4	0.6
Part-time	5.1	2.6	3.0	3.1	0.3
Fixed-term	5.2	2.7	3.0	3.1	0.5
Self-employed	5.7	3.5	4.0	4.5	0.5
Total	5.4	2.9	3.2	3.3	0.5
<hr/>					
Denmark					
Full-time	5.7	3.1	3.3	3.6	0.8
Part-time	5.7	2.9	3.5	3.7	1.1
Fixed-term	5.7	2.9	3.4	3.6	0.7
Self-employed	5.8	2.7	4.3	4.5	0.4
Total	5.7	3.1	3.4	3.6	0.8
<hr/>					
Sweden					
Full-time	5.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	0.8
Part-time	5.0	3.5	3.0	3.0	1.3
Fixed-term	5.1	3.4	2.9	3.1	0.9
Self-employed	5.7	3.3	3.9	4.1	0.7
Total	5.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	0.9
<hr/>					
Norway					
Full-time	5.2	3.3	3.3	3.6	0.7
Part-time	5.2	3.3	3.2	3.5	0.8

(continued)

Table 12.6 (continued)

Reported . . .	Job satisfaction	Work-related stress	Organizational commitment	Effort	Days absent in last 6 months
Fixed-term	5.3	3.2	3.3	3.5	0.6
Self-employed	5.4	3.2	3.7	3.9	0.6
Total	5.2	3.3	3.3	3.6	0.7

SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

12.6). Only part-time workers in the United States are more satisfied with their jobs than full-time workers after controlling for the demographic and occupational variables and measures of involuntary employment (Table 12.7, column 1), as well as for all measures of work values and job rewards (Table 12.7, column 2). Part-time workers in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway are significantly more satisfied than full-time workers once we control for work values and job rewards (column 2). Part-time workers in West Germany and the Netherlands tend to have jobs that respondents perceive as paying less and having fewer opportunities for promotion (see Table 12.5), and part-time workers in Norway perceive fewer opportunities for promotion and fewer intrinsic rewards (as do part-time workers in the Netherlands). Thus, controlling for job rewards in these countries reveals the positive direct effects of part-time work on satisfaction. By contrast, part-time workers in Italy and Sweden remain more dissatisfied than full-time workers after controlling for our measures of work values and job rewards.

Self-employed persons are more satisfied with their jobs than regular full-time workers in all countries (Table 12.6). This appears to be mainly due to the job rewards associated with self-employment (especially intrinsic rewards; see Tables 12.4 and 12.5), because controlling for values and rewards explains the gap between self-employed and full-time workers in all countries except Sweden and West Germany (where the gap does not disappear but is reduced substantially and is significant only at $p \leq 0.10$).

Fixed-term temporaries generally do not differ from full-time workers in their job satisfaction (Table 12.7, column 1). This is consistent with data from studies comparing contingent workers and more secure employees (Pearce 1998; see also Futagami 1999). The only countries in which the differences are significant when all the other variables are controlled for are West Germany and Norway (Table 12.7, column 2). In part, this reflects the disadvantages associated with fixed-term employment in these countries (especially in West Germany; see Table 12.5). Controlling for job rewards reveals the positive direct effect of fixed-term employment on job satisfaction.

Respondents who indicated that they were in their particular work arrangement involuntarily were significantly more dissatisfied in all countries,⁸ except Spain and the Netherlands (where the negative coef-

Table 12.7 OLS Regressions of Worker Outcomes by Job Status and Country^a

Dependent variable = Self reported . . .	Job satisfaction		Work-related stress	
	1	2	1	2
	United States			
Part-time	0.23*	0.24**	-0.39***	-0.36***
Fixed-term	-0.02	0.16	0.01	-0.06
Self-employed	0.31**	-0.09	-0.06	0.05
Involuntary	-0.27***	-0.12	0.10	0.10
<i>N</i> =	804	724	799	731
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.025	0.357	0.041	0.049
Japan				
Part-time	0.13	0.03	-0.62***	-0.49**
Fixed-term	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03
Self-employed	0.38**	0.22	-0.44***	-0.29
Involuntary	-0.21*	0.00	0.05	0.00
<i>N</i> =	665	573	799	573
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.084	0.339	0.066	0.086
West Germany				
Part-time	0.14	0.38***	-0.40***	-0.31**
Fixed-term	0.11	0.34**	-0.24*	-0.34**
Self-employed	0.40***	0.26*	-0.42***	-0.28**
Involuntary	-0.26***	-0.11	0.02	0.12
<i>N</i> =	621	521	620	522

Adj. R^2 =	0.038	0.314	0.041	0.111
<hr/>				
Great Britain				
Part-time	0.21	-0.05	-0.67***	-0.64***
Fixed-term	0.03	0.02	-0.12	-0.12
Self-employed	0.36**	0.02	-0.14	-0.09
Involuntary	-0.25**	-0.24**	0.03	-0.04
N =	535	480	533	480
Adj. R^2 =	0.037	0.398	0.099	0.126
<hr/>				
Netherlands				
Part-time	0.06	0.16**	-0.47***	-0.39***
Fixed-term	-0.06	0.01	-0.24***	-0.30***
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA
Involuntary	-0.08	-0.08	0.09	0.06
N =	1058	945	1058	944
Adj. R^2 =	0.014	0.283	0.065	0.109
<hr/>				
France				
Part-time	-0.10	0.10	-0.20	-0.07
Fixed-term	-0.09	0.21	-0.40***	-0.49***
Self-employed	0.54**	0.15	0.02	0.02
Involuntary	-0.28***	-0.10	-0.01	0.05
N =	688	588	690	589
Adj. R^2 =	0.033	0.416	0.020	0.061

(continued)

Table 12.7 (continued)

Dependent variable = Self reported . . .	Job satisfaction		Work-related stress	
	1	2	1	2
	Italy			
Part-time	-0.62**	-0.67***	-0.48**	-0.39
Fixed-term	-0.23	-0.02	-0.38**	-0.45**
Self-employed	0.37***	-0.04	-0.06	-0.09
Involuntary	-0.51***	-0.35***	0.31***	0.32***
<i>N</i> =	473	440	474	441
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.094	0.325	0.022	0.044
Spain				
Part-time	-0.23	-0.13	-0.28	-0.27
Fixed-term	-0.18	-0.08	-0.26*	-0.19
Self-employed	0.18	0.11	0.44	0.35
Involuntary	-0.05	0.02	-0.10	-0.09
<i>N</i> =	389	364	390	365
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.033	0.188	0.015	-0.005
Denmark				
Part-time	-0.03	0.01	-0.22**	-0.21**
Fixed-term	0.01	0.05	-0.11	-0.17
Self-employed	0.10	-0.14	-0.36**	-0.27*
Involuntary	-0.24**	-0.13	0.13	0.11

<i>N</i> =	625	610	625	610
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.015	0.244	0.084	0.117
Sweden				
Part-time	-0.39***	-0.23**	-0.08	-0.09
Fixed-term	-0.18	0.07	-0.10	-0.06
Self-employed	0.43***	0.23*	-0.04	0.05
Involuntary	-0.31***	-0.11	0.01	0.00
<i>N</i> =	784	685	780	684
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.056	0.348	0.019	0.023
Norway				
Part-time	0.03	0.22**	-0.04	-0.05
Fixed-term	0.12	0.21***	-0.16***	-0.13*
Self-employed	0.31***	0.15	-0.17***	-0.05
Involuntary	-0.25***	-0.09	0.19***	0.20***
<i>N</i> =	1425	1258	1419	1257
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.033	0.307	0.029	0.053

p* ≤ 0.10; *p* ≤ 0.05; ****p* ≤ 0.01.

^a Unstandardized coefficients are presented. The first equation for each dependent variable controls for sex, age, education, occupation, and involuntary status. The second equation includes the controls in the first model as well as the work values and job rewards listed in Tables 12.2 and 12.4. (Note: None of the models for the Netherlands includes variables for occupation.)

SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

ficients for involuntary status were not significant). This pervasive negative effect of involuntary work status appears linked in most countries to the mediating role of work values and job rewards (compare columns 1 and 2, Table 12.7); only in Great Britain and Italy does the coefficient of “involuntary” remain significant after we control for values and rewards (column 2), and this coefficient is markedly reduced in column 2 in all countries except Great Britain.

Work-Related Stress

Our results for stress are reported in the second set of columns in Table 12.7. We find that part-time workers report they have significantly less stress than full-time workers in all countries except France, Spain, Sweden, and Norway (see column 1). Adding measures of work values and job rewards to the equations (see column 2) generally reduces these differences only slightly, and the gaps in the United States, Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark remain statistically significant. The direct, negative effect of part-time work on stress may reflect that part-time workers are simply working fewer hours and have fewer responsibilities than full-time workers. It may also reflect, in part, the greater control that part-time workers in some countries say they have over the scheduling (see Table 12.5).

Self-employed persons report lower levels of work-related stress in Japan, West Germany, Denmark, and Norway, although this difference appears to be due largely to work values and job rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table 12.7). Fixed-term employees report lower levels of stress than full-time workers in West Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Norway. The lower stress levels reported by fixed-term employees in these countries do not appear to be explained by our measures of work values and job rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table 12.7). Finally, respondents who indicate that they worked involuntarily in their work arrangement reported significantly higher levels of stress only in Italy and Norway (Table 12.7).

Organizational Commitment and Effort

The results for organizational commitment are presented in the first two columns in Table 12.8. Although “effort” is one of the three items in the organizational commitment scale, we examine this variable separately because this is the dimension of commitment that is most strongly related to job performance (Kalleberg and Marsden 1995).

Part-time workers appear to be less committed overall to their organizations than full-time workers only in Sweden and France, and this gap is explained by differences in work values and job rewards (columns 1 and 2; Table 12.8). Part-time workers appear to be more committed than full-time workers in Great Britain to their organizations, although this difference also becomes nonsignificant when we control for values and rewards.⁹ The finding of no difference in commitment between part-time and full-time employees in the United States is consistent with analyses of data from the early 1990s (Kalleberg 1995).¹⁰ With regard to the measure of whether the employee is willing to work harder to help the company succeed, part-time workers are less likely than full-time workers in West Germany and Sweden to say they are willing to work harder, and these differences are only partially explained by work values and job rewards. Part-time workers in Italy say they are willing to work harder than full-time workers, although this difference becomes nonsignificant when we control for values and rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table 12.8).

Self-employed persons are more committed to their organizations than regular full-time workers in all 10 of the countries for which we have data on self-employment, and this gap remains significant except in Great Britain, Japan, and West Germany once we control for work values and job rewards. Self-employed persons are significantly more likely than regular full-time workers in the United States, Japan, West Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway to say that they are willing to work harder than they have to; a substantial portion of this difference is accounted for by work values and job rewards, although only in the United States, West Germany, and Italy does the effect of self-employment on effort become nonsignificant.

Fixed-term employees are less committed to their organizations than full-time workers only in West Germany, Spain, and Sweden,

Table 12.8 OLS Regressions of Organizational Commitment and Absenteeism on Job Status^a

Dependent variable = Self-reported . . .	Organizational commitment		Effort		Days absent in last 6 months	
	1	2	1	2	1	2
United States						
Part-time	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.12	0.18*	0.20*
Fixed-term	-0.05	0.02	0.08	0.10	0.05	-0.08
Self-employed	0.36***	0.23***	0.15*	0.14	-0.13	-0.09
Involuntary	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.11*	0.30***	0.27***
<i>N</i> =	788	719	781	712	780	713
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.055	0.295	0.026	0.135	0.031	0.049
Japan						
Part-time	-0.02	0.13	-0.05	-0.01	0.23	0.28
Fixed-term	0.03	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.14	0.16
Self-employed	0.23*	0.21	0.41**	0.40**	0.01	-0.02
Involuntary	-0.24***	-0.16*	-0.27**	-0.16	0.01	0.12
<i>N</i> =	662	570	781	564	452	405
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.125	0.310	0.098	0.183	0.015	0.034
West Germany						
Part-time	-0.05	0.12	-0.43***	-0.25*	-0.32	0.04
Fixed-term	-0.21*	-0.12	-0.25*	-0.12	-0.12	-0.05
Self-employed	0.27***	0.11	0.22*	0.21	-0.26	0.02
Involuntary	-0.23***	-0.11	-0.46***	-0.32***	-0.03	0.08
<i>N</i> =	616	519	589	504	614	513
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.077	0.276	0.082	0.222	0.013	0.036

Great Britain						
Part-time	0.22**	0.10	-0.07	-0.19	-0.32**	-0.31*
Fixed-term	0.08	0.08	-0.06	-0.02	-0.12	-0.11
Self-employed	0.23**	0.10	0.14	-0.04	-0.26**	-0.32**
Involuntary	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.01
<i>N</i> =	519	467	506	456	523	467
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.077	0.360	0.049	0.207	0.040	0.050
Netherlands						
Part-time	-0.08	-0.04	-0.05	0.00	-0.14	-0.10
Fixed-term	-0.05	0.04	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	-0.03
Self-employed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Involuntary	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.03	0.01	-0.03
<i>N</i> =	1055	941	1041	936	1033	926
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.007	0.247	0.008	0.103	0.003	0.029
France						
Part-time	-0.17*	-0.03	-0.03	0.09	0.05	-0.01
Fixed-term	-0.02	0.08	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05
Self-employed	0.49***	0.33**	0.27	0.15	-0.19	-0.18
Involuntary	-0.23***	-0.07	-0.22**	-0.01	0.09	0.11
<i>N</i> =	671	579	644	560	681	585
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.066	0.297	0.029	0.113	-0.003	-0.001
Italy						
Part-time	0.23	0.19	0.49**	0.37	-0.10	-0.02
Fixed-term	0.02	0.17	0.24	0.30	-0.24	-0.22

(continued)

Table 12.8 (continued)

Dependent variable = Self reported ...	Organizational commitment		Effort		Days absent in last 6 months	
	1	2	1	2	1	2
	Self-employed	0.53***	0.21*	0.52***	0.19	-0.13
Involuntary	-0.22***	-0.07	-0.10	-0.02	0.01	0.00
<i>N</i> =	473	440	468	436	468	436
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.112	0.289	0.071	0.165	0.009	0.007
Spain						
Part-time	-0.13	0.06	-0.03	0.16	-0.12	-0.20
Fixed-term	-0.22**	-0.08	-0.20	-0.03	-0.02	-0.17
Self-employed	0.67***	0.60**	0.99***	0.74**	-0.06	-0.09
Involuntary	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.21	-0.21
<i>N</i> =	387	363	376	354	384	361
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.069	0.217	0.073	0.176	-0.006	0.013
Denmark						
Part-time	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.35***	0.34***
Fixed-term	0.06	0.06	-0.14	-0.16	-0.21	-0.23
Self-employed	1.01***	0.65***	0.95***	0.58**	-0.16	0.01
Involuntary	-0.26***	-0.15**	-0.42***	-0.30***	0.28***	0.31***
<i>N</i> =	624	609	617	604	622	607
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.096	0.273	0.060	0.144	0.085	0.092
Sweden						
Part-time	-0.18**	-0.09	-0.31***	-0.23**	0.39***	0.40***
Fixed-term	-0.29***	-0.17*	-0.29**	-0.24*	-0.07	-0.01

Self-employed	0.72***	0.50***	0.66***	0.47***	-0.16	0.10
Involuntary	-0.21***	-0.09*	-0.23***	-0.12*	0.24***	0.23***
<i>N</i> =	773	677	757	665	772	677
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.153	0.354	0.139	0.232	0.083	0.084
Norway						
Part-time	-0.09	0.02	-0.01	0.05	0.01	0.03
Fixed-term	0.03	0.09*	-0.04	-0.01	-0.10	-0.07
Self-employed	0.40***	0.27***	0.36***	0.21**	-0.25***	-0.13
Involuntary	-0.11**	0.01	-0.22***	-0.13**	0.21***	0.22***
<i>N</i> =	1415	1253	1382	1226	1412	1247
Adj. <i>R</i> ² =	0.068	0.332	0.055	0.151	0.026	0.022

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

^a Unstandardized coefficients are presented. The first equation for each dependent variable controls for sex, age, education, occupation, and involuntary status. The second equation includes the controls in the first model as well as the work values and job rewards listed in Tables 12.2 and 12.4. (None of the models for the Netherlands includes variables for occupation.)

SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.

although only in Sweden does this gap remain significant (at $p \leq 0.10$) after controlling for work values and job rewards. The lack of difference in commitment (and other organizational citizenship behaviors) between fixed-term and full-time employees reinforces studies discussed by Pearce (1998).¹¹ In addition, fixed-term employees are less likely than full-time workers only in West Germany and Sweden to say that they are willing to work hard, but this gap is largely explained by differences in work values and job rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table 12.8).

Respondents in Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway who were in their work arrangement involuntarily were significantly less committed to their organizations. In each country except Japan, Denmark, and Sweden, these differences in involuntary status appeared to be due to work values and job rewards (columns 2 and 3).

Persons who said they were working involuntarily in their work arrangement were less likely to say that they would work harder than they had to in Japan, West Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Controlling for work values and job rewards did not explain these differences in West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, or Norway (although values and rewards reduced the effects of involuntary status in these countries also). In the United States, persons who said they were working involuntarily were willing to work harder after controlling for work values and job rewards.

Absenteeism

Part-time workers were more likely than full-time workers to report that they were absent in the last six months only in the United States, Denmark, and Sweden (Table 12.8, column 1), and these differences remained strong and significant even after we controlled for work values and job rewards (column 2). In contrast, part-time workers in Great Britain were less likely than full-time workers to report that they were absent, even controlling for involuntary status and the work values and job rewards.

Self-employed persons were less likely than full-time workers in Great Britain and Norway to report absences, although this difference remains significant only in Great Britain after controlling for values

and rewards. Respondents in their work arrangement involuntarily reported that they were more often absent only in the United States, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. These differences remained, moreover, even after we controlled for work values and job rewards (column 2).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have examined differences between full-time, open-ended employment relations and three types of nonstandard work arrangements—part-time, fixed-term temporary, and self-employment—in work values, job rewards, and work attitudes. The types of work arrangements, attitudes, and job rewards, and the countries that we have analyzed are extremely varied. Accordingly, our results are complex and belie easy generalizations; nevertheless, they suggest three main conclusions.

First, part-time workers appear generally to have work attitudes and behaviors that are at least as positive, if not more so, than full-time workers. Part-time workers are equally or more satisfied with their jobs than full-time employees in most countries. Part-time workers tend also to be no less committed to their organizations than full-time workers and equally likely to say that they are willing to work harder than they have to in order to help their companies succeed. Moreover, part-time workers generally say that they experience less stress at work and do not report being absent from their jobs more often than full-time workers.

One reason for why part-time workers have generally positive work attitudes relative to full-time employees is that, in many countries, their work values appear to correspond fairly well to their job rewards. Although part-time workers and full-time workers may differ in the rewards they obtain from their jobs, these differences correspond to variations in what these two groups want from their jobs. Thus, part-time workers are generally less likely than full-time workers to perceive that their pay is high, but part-time workers are also less likely than full-time workers to value a high income. The differences between part-time workers and full-time workers in perceived job security are

not that large, but in the countries in which full-time workers have greater perceived job security, the part-time workers also tend to value security less. Part-time workers are less likely than full-time workers to feel that they have good opportunities for advancement, but part-time workers also generally place less importance on such opportunities. On the other hand, part-time workers value flexible hours more than full-time workers in a number of countries, and part-time workers are as or more likely to believe that they can control their schedules. These results are consistent with our finding that individuals in most countries tend to work part-time voluntarily: more full-time workers desire part-time work than vice versa.

Sweden appears to be an exception to this pattern. Part-time workers in Sweden are less satisfied with their jobs than full-time workers. Swedish part-time workers are also less committed to their organizations overall and less likely to say that they would work harder than they have to in order to help their companies succeed. In Sweden, part-time workers also reported that they were absent from their jobs more often than full-time workers. Economic conditions in Sweden may explain some of these results. Sweden went through a very deep recession in the mid-1990s, and a considerable number of part-time workers worked involuntarily, preferring more hours. Their inability to secure full-time employment may have contributed to their unhappiness with their part-time status. The negative attitudes displayed by part-time workers in Sweden may also reflect the higher expectations that Swedes have with regard to part-time work. For example, Sweden is the only country in which part-time workers were significantly more likely than full-time workers to regard work as a central life interest. These gaps between part-time workers and full-time workers in Sweden may also reflect, in part, differences in job rewards. Swedish part-time workers are less likely than full-time workers to believe that their jobs are interesting, offer good opportunities for promotion, are secure, or pay well.

A second conclusion is that fixed-term employees generally do not display more negative work attitudes and behaviors than full-time employees. Consistent with most prior research, fixed-term temporaries do not differ much from full-time workers in their job satisfaction, organizational commitment, reported effort, and absenteeism. Some of these similarities may reflect the desire of fixed-term employees to dis-

play positive work attitudes and behaviors in the hope of obtaining permanent positions with the employer. It may also reflect the perception in some countries that fixed-term employment is a normal step on a career progression toward full-time employment. Hence, fixed-term employees may not display more negative attitudes despite being less likely than full-time workers to perceive that their pay is high and that they have good job security, to worry more about losing their jobs, and to believe that they have less control over their schedules.

Despite these differences in perceived job rewards, fixed-term and full-time employees generally do not differ much in their work values among the various countries (with the possible exceptions of the valuation of job security and high earnings, on which fixed-term employees place lower importance than full-time workers in four and three countries, respectively). The lack of differences in the importance placed on various aspects of jobs between full-time and fixed-term employees is consistent with the view that the growth in nonstandard work in some countries, especially with regard to temporary employment, is not primarily due to shifts in workers' preferences for temporary work but rather reflects a demand-side phenomenon accompanying employers' search for flexibility in employment relations.

Third, self-employed persons generally display more positive work attitudes and reported behaviors than persons who are employed full-time. The self-employed are more satisfied with their jobs and are usually more committed to their organizations. Self-employed workers report lower levels of stress and fewer absences in some countries, but generally do not differ from full-time employees once work values and job rewards are controlled for. The more positive work attitudes on the part of self-employed persons largely reflect the greater control over their work; self-employed persons in every country were more likely than full-time employees to believe that they had more control over their schedules, and in almost all countries they were more likely to report that their jobs were interesting (a job reward that is closely related to the amount of autonomy that one has). Moreover, self-employed persons were more likely than full-time employees to report that they valued flexible work, which they are able to attain by virtue of their greater control over schedules. Otherwise, there were few systematic and significant differences in the work motivations between self-employed persons and full-time employees.

Our analyses of the relationships between types of work arrangements and work values, job rewards, and worker attitudes and reported behaviors were not ideal. We would have liked to distinguish between fixed-term temporaries and those who are employed by a temporary help agency, as well as to differentiate between groups such as independent contractors and the self-employed. By emphasizing differences between regular full-time employees and the various nonstandard work arrangements, we have also glossed over differences within part-time (a particularly heterogeneous category), temporary, and self-employed persons (as well as differences among full-time employees). We could also have introduced much more complexity into our analyses of worker attitudes. For example, we did not examine potential interactions by gender, age, education, or occupation, in an effort to focus on the overall patterns within each country. Nor did we assess the likely simultaneous relationships between variables such as work status and effort. These matters constitute important topics on the agenda for future research on the correlates and consequences of nonstandard work arrangements within and among countries.

Our results, finally, suggest a number of country differences in the relationships between nonstandard work arrangements, on one hand, and work values, job rewards, and work attitudes, on the other. We have speculated about some possible explanations of these country differences but have not sought to account for them systematically. However, accounting for these country differences constitutes another important agenda item for research on nonstandard work arrangements. Future cross-national research should use more refined measures of nonstandard work arrangements to better differentiate between types of part-time workers (i.e., fixed-term temporaries, on-call workers, and temporary help agency employees) and independent contractors and other self-employed persons. Accounting for cross-national sources of variation in nonstandard work arrangements and work attitudes is important for understanding institutional and cultural differences in employment relations and their consequences for workers.

Notes

1. These data do not permit us to distinguish direct-hire temporaries from employees of temporary help agencies. We also cannot differentiate between independent contractors and other self-employed persons.
2. For simplicity and because of sample size restrictions, we constructed our measures of the four work arrangements to be mutually exclusive. In reality, combinations of the work statuses may occur (e.g., fixed-term or self-employed persons can work either full-time or part-time).
3. We present unweighted results in all tables. Approximately half of the countries do not supply weights: the data from France, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Sweden come with weights, but the data from the United States, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway do not.
4. We can obtain a sense of whether fixed-term workers are working in this arrangement involuntarily from responses to the question about the importance of job security. We find that 88 percent of fixed-term temporaries in Japan, 95 percent in the United States, 90 percent in France, 95 percent in Great Britain, 97 percent in West Germany, 83 percent in Sweden, and 100 percent in Italy report that having job security is “important” or “very important” to them. This suggests that the vast majority of fixed-term temporaries are working in this arrangement involuntarily.
5. The results for part-time workers versus full-time workers in the United States are consistent with those obtained by Golden (2001) in his analysis of the May 1997 Current Population Survey data.
6. We also estimated the models reported in Table 12.5 with measures of work values omitted. The results were nearly identical to those presented in Table 12.5. In only 9 of 192 cases did the coefficient of a job status variable change from nonsignificant to significant (or vice versa), and in 7 of 9 of these cases, this involved a change from $p \leq 0.10$ to nonsignificance (or vice versa). The results of this supplemental analysis are available on request from the authors.
7. Equation 3 estimates the impact of work values and job rewards separately. This model produces the same estimates of the job status parameters as one that controls for each job reward as well as the difference between the job reward and the respondent’s valuation of the reward.
8. See the discussion of “volition” as an important determinant of work-related attitudes in Krausz, Brandwein, and Fox (1995). Feldman, Doeringhaus, and Turnley’s (1995) survey of 186 temporary agency employees in the southeast region of the United States also found that involuntary temporary workers are less satisfied on a variety of dimensions (and less committed) than temporary workers who work voluntarily. See also Aeppel (1997) and Ellingson, Gruys, and Sackett (1998).
9. Similarly, Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (1999) found a great deal of similarity between part-time workers and full-time workers with regard to organizational

commitment and organizational citizenship behaviors in a number of public service occupations in Britain.

10. See also the review by Van Dyne and Ang (1998), which cites a number of studies that found no evidence that contingent workers in the United States had less positive work attitudes than regular employees. They did, however, find that contingent (temporary or on-call) workers in Singapore were less committed and engaged in fewer organizational citizenship behaviors than regular employees in Singapore. They explain this by arguing that contingent workers in Singapore work in these jobs voluntarily (due to very tight labor markets) and so expect less of their employers (and vice versa). By contrast, contingent workers in the United States often work in temporary jobs involuntarily, and so may display positive attitudes in their attempts to obtain regular employment.
11. Futagami (1999) found that, in Japan, temporary agency employees (not fixed-term temporaries, as analyzed here) were less committed to their organizations than regular full-time employees, although temporary workers were also found to have a relatively high level of organizational commitment.

Appendix A

ISSP Data

The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is an annual program of cross-national collaboration among mostly academic survey organizations that compile comparable cross-national data on social attitudes and values (see Davis and Jowell 1989). Founded in 1984, the ISSP has grown to include 37 nations. In 1997, 27 countries participated in collecting data on “work orientations” (ASEP 1999). The merging of the data into a cross-national data set was performed by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of Cologne, in collaboration with the Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políticos in Spain.

In the ISSP, efforts are made to ask questions in the same way in each country, thus producing a high-quality, cross-culturally comparable data set. The annual topics for ISSP are developed over several years by a subcommittee and pretested in various countries. The annual plenary meeting of ISSP adopts the final questionnaire. The ISSP researchers concentrate on developing questions that are 1) meaningful and relevant to all countries, and 2) can be expressed in an equivalent manner in all relevant languages. The questionnaire is originally drafted in British English and translated to other languages using standard back-translation procedures. The collaboration between organizations in the ISSP is not special or intermittent, but routine and continual.

ISSP rules require that all surveys be representative probability samples of the adult population of each country. Checks are made against census and other gold standards in each country to ensure that the samples obtained are representative. Descriptions of the samples are included in the codebook for each country. In some countries (e.g., United States, Great Britain, and sometimes Germany), the ISSP is a module on a larger survey (General Social Survey; British Social Attitudes Survey; and the Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfragen der Sozialwissenschaften [ALLBUS]), but in most countries, it is either part of a larger omnibus survey or a stand-alone survey. Further information on the ISSP is available on two Web sites: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of Cologne: <http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/en/issp/> and ISSP Secretariat: <http://www.issp.org/>.

Additional information on the ISSP is available from the ISSP secretariat: Tom W. Smith, NORC, 1155 East 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637; phone: (773) 256-6288; fax: (773) 753-7866; e-mail: smitht@norcmail.uchicago.edu. See also Smith 2000.

Appendix B

Table 12B.1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable name	Description	Coding
Work values		
Work	Please tick one box for each statement below to show how much you agree or disagree with it, thinking of work in general: work is a person's most important activity.	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
From the following list, please tick one box for each item to show how important you personally think it is in a job:		
Job security	Job security	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
High earnings	High income	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Opportunity for promotion	Good opportunities for advancement	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Interesting work	An interesting job	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Flexible hours	A job that allows someone to decide their times or days of work	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Involuntary	For persons who are not self-employed, this variable is coded "1" if the person works full-time but would rather work part-time and vice versa. For self-employed persons, this variable is coded as "1" if the person says that he/she would rather work for someone else.	1 = Involuntary; 0 = Voluntary
Job rewards		
Fear of losing job	To what extent, if at all, do you worry about the possibility of losing your job?	1 = I do not worry at all to 4 = I worry a great deal
For each of these statements about your (main) job, please tick one box to show how much you agree or disagree that it applies to your job.		
High earnings	My income is high	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Job security	My job is secure	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree

Opportunity for promotion	My opportunities for advancement are high	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Interesting work	My job is interesting	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Flexible hours	Which of the following statements best describes how your working hours are decided? (By working hours, we mean the times you start and finish work and not the total hours you work per week or month.)	1 = starting and finishing times are decided by my employer and I cannot change them on my own. 2 = I can decide the time I start and finish work, within limits. 3 = I am entirely free to decide when I start and finish work.
Worker outcomes		
Job satisfaction	How satisfied are you in your (main) job?	1 = completely dissatisfied to 7 = completely satisfied
Stress at work	How often do you find your work stressful?	1 = never to 5 = always
Organizational commitment and absenteeism		
Organizational commitment scale	Scale computed as the average score on three variables: <i>hlporgr1r</i> : I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization succeed. <i>pridorgr</i> : I am proud to be working for my firm or organization. <i>styorg3r</i> : I would turn down another job that offered quite a bit more pay in order to stay with this organization.	For each of the three items and the scale 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree Cronbach's alpha = 0.63
Effort	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization succeed.	1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Days absent in last 6 months	About how many days have you been absent from work in the last 6 months (not counting vacation)?	0 = none 1 = 1-5 2 = 6-10 3 = 11-20 4 > 20

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