

Regis University

ePublications at Regis University

All Regis University Theses

Spring 2018

When Helping Hurts: An Ideographic Critique of Faith-Based Organizations in International Aid and Development

Allison Foust
Regis University

Follow this and additional works at: <https://epublications.regis.edu/theses>

Recommended Citation

Foust, Allison, "When Helping Hurts: An Ideographic Critique of Faith-Based Organizations in International Aid and Development" (2018). *All Regis University Theses*. 899.
<https://epublications.regis.edu/theses/899>

This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by ePublications at Regis University. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Regis University Theses by an authorized administrator of ePublications at Regis University. For more information, please contact epublications@regis.edu.

**WHEN HELPING HURTS: AN IDEOGRAPHIC CRITIQUE OF FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL AID AND DEVELOPMENT**

**A thesis submitted to
Regis College
Honors Program
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for Graduation with Honors
by
Allison Foust**

May 2018

Thesis written by
Allison Foust

Approved by

Thesis Advisor

Thesis Reader

Accepted by

Director, University Honors Program

Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to the individuals who have molded me and supported me through the high points and low points of this project. I appreciate you all more than words can express.

To Glenn, Char, Jeff, and Honey, thank you for opening your home and your hearts to me. I don't think I would have been able to pursue this project nor become who I am today without your unconditional support the last two years. I love you all dearly.

To Dr. Rob Margesson, my advisor, a dear friend, and the best coach I have ever had. While debate taught me how to think and argue, you taught me the pursuit of storytelling and ethical arguments, no matter how hard they may be to find or articulate, will always be worth the fight. Thank you for sharing the wonders of rhetoric with me and for having faith in me even when I didn't. I never realized how far this project, or I, could go. I couldn't have done this, or graduate school, without you. Thank you for believing in me.

To Allison Peters, my friend, my mentor, one of the toughest women I know, and the best reader I could imagine. Thank you for your unconditional support and invaluable feedback. I am proud to not only have a strong woman like you in my life to look up to, I am beyond grateful to have one I can go to when things get tough.

To Dr. Kleier and Dr. Narcisi, thank you both for celebrating with me during the high points and being there for me during my absolute lowest points. Watching two strong women lead the honors program was not only inspiring but it was incredible motivation to continue pursuing my education.

And to Yareth's, this thesis is the product of tears, hard work, innumerable hours of research, a passionate love-hate relationship with writing, and most importantly countless smothered green chili burritos.

Finally, to those who find themselves questioning but feel held back by fear of damnation or overwhelming guilt: don't stop looking for answers — I swear to God, it is worth it.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments.....	v
Introduction: When Helping Hurts.....	1
Chapter Two: Literature Review.....	9
Definitions and Actors.....	10
Critiques on Proselytism.....	13
Presence of FBOs.....	16
Rise of FBOs in the U.S.....	17
Gaps in the Literature.....	19
Conclusion.....	19
Chapter Three: Theory Analysis and Methods.....	21
Constitutive Rhetoric.....	30
Conclusion for Methods.....	42
Chapter Four: Identity Creation in International Aid and Development.....	49
Development as an Ideograph.....	49
Ideographs, Aid, and Identity Creation.....	62
Proselytism Undermines Development and Dignity.....	72
Chapter Five: The Rise of FBOs and the Religious Right	74
The Rise of the Religious Right in Politics	74
Historical Context of the Religious Right.....	76
Rise of FBOs through the CFBCI.....	78
The Myth of Stewardship.....	82

Becoming a Prominent Player in U.S. Foreign Policy.....	87
Current Political Landscape.....	92
Conclusion/ Future of FBO in Politics.....	94
Chapter Six: Exporting “Family Values” to Uganda.....	96
Reconstructing African History and Identity.....	97
FBO Role in Rewriting History.....	102
What are Christian Values?.....	107
The Myth that Homosexuality is Un-African.....	109
Exporting “Values Education” to the East.....	119
Adopting American “Family Values” in Africa.....	123
The Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act.....	126
Conclusion.....	139
FBOs as Neo-Colonizers.....	142
FBOs as an Ideograph.....	143
Chapter Seven: Conclusion.....	145
References.....	154

Chapter One: When Helping Hurts

I genuinely believe that we live in a world today where people want to do “good.” Millennials specifically have been documented as caring more about issues of sustainability and fair trade when it comes to consumer habits. We are more likely to spend more money on “green” products, fair trade certified goods, and supporting local businesses. For all intents and purposes, it has become popular to be ethical (Rotabi et al., 2017). Millennials will even devote more of their free time and energy to making the world a better place as indicated in the spikes of young people choosing to volunteer with the less fortunate at home and on service trips abroad (Wuthnow, 1991). Thanks to the rise of social media, these same young people then have an unprecedented amount of information they can use to research products, services, and volunteer opportunities. They can also share their adventures in volunteering on their social media accounts to create awareness among their peers and continue outreach to communities from around the world. One could argue, it has never been easier nor more popular to volunteer.

At Regis, the focus on social justice is especially emphasized. The Jesuit credence “men and women for and with others” permeates every class I have taken, every project I had the privilege of undertaking with the Center for Service Learning and the Institute on the Common Good, and it has been a standard I strive to uphold. Throughout my four years at Regis I have been taught theoretical frameworks for ethically engaging in the world, the necessity for examining roles of power and privilege, and that structures of injustice exist. This new understanding led to personal epiphanies on how cycles of oppression are created and perpetuated through complicity in unjust structures. Through

learning various ethical theoretical lenses in which to view the world, it became apparent to me these structures not only existed but that I helped those structures stay in power through my silence all while passively benefitting from them. Once learning this reality, I could no longer claim to care about ethics while actively allowing others to be harmed.

I knew theoretically why I should care but I wasn't sure how to actively pursue an ethic of care for the other in the real world. This thesis is an attempt to reconcile the tension that naturally arises when theory transitions into praxis. I have studied theories of ethical service, development policy, and non-profit work over my college career yet I still find myself grappling on how to proceed; how can I personally be someone that dismantles systems of oppression instead of contributing to them?

Myself, and countless others in my generation, grapple with the struggle of good intentions and not knowing how to enact the change we want to see in the world. Take for example, individuals who purchase TOMS shoes because they genuinely want to help improve the lives of children living in poverty across the globe. These consumers have the best intentions of helping others but fail to realize that the TOMS distribution network can do more damage to community than good. Namely because when TOMS give a pair of free shoes to everyone in an impoverished community, they inadvertently flood the supply side of the market for shoes which ultimately leads to creating new dependencies on Western aid. TOMS Shoes unintentionally cripples local economies by driving shoe vendors and local repairmen out of business by oversaturating the local commodity concerning this single commodity. Then when these cheaply made shoes inevitably begin to fall apart, there is no one to buy new shoes from or go to for repairs as the cobblers and

shoe vendors were unable to keep their businesses afloat. These communities then rely on TOMS for another donation, and so on and so forth. This is one example upon countless others of individuals who have the best of intentions to help those in need but their actions end up hurting these communities more than helping.

I, like many other individuals my age, have a plethora of experience in volunteering. Volunteering (much like the TOMS example) is another field where helping can actually hurt. However, in the case of volunteering the stakes are much higher since it involves direct engagement between communities delivering and receiving invaluable resources. I became interested in this research through my own experiences with volunteering in which I stumbled upon one of the largest and least critically examined fields where good intentions and problematic practices intersect: Faith-based organizations (FBOs) in international aid and development. Specifically, my introduction to the world of volunteer service was through the inculcation of faith-based organizations. My first international trip was a mission trip with Easthaven Baptist Church. We went to Ensenada, Mexico to build a house for a family of four with Habit for Humanity and in partnership with the FBO Youth with a Mission (YWAM). While there, we hosted Vacation Bible Schools in poverty strapped neighborhoods, conducted tokenizing gestures of false generosity by handing out cheap toys to children in the *barrios*, and became undeniable voyeuristic “voluntourists” as we went to the red-light district handing out Gideon Bibles. Those in my group, myself included, applauded ourselves for “helping” and delivering the Gospel to “those that needed it most.”

Retrospectively, what I am most ashamed of is how we silenced the community we were attempting to “empower” through sharing about Jesus. We were fifteen kids from Montana relying on two translators more concerned with the number of souls saved than the individuals we worked with. While the children, women, and men we engaged with were always gracious, we did not properly return the favor since we seldom gave them the opportunity to speak for themselves. We didn’t learn their stories, ask their opinions, or bother to understand them because we didn’t take the time to ask. Instead we created narratives about them, exploiting their silence, in order to fit our assumptions and beliefs.

Sadly, this was not a one-off experience of my own naiveté leading me to work in problematic ways through FBOs. During the summers, I worked at a church camp as a counselor for young girls, ages 8-12, on the east side of Glacier National Park. The camp catered to children from the Blackfeet tribe living on the reservation in Browning. Like many reservations across the United States, Browning was riddled with drug and alcohol abuse and plagued with high suicide rates as well as domestic violence as a result of generations of cyclical poverty with little chance of social mobility. The camp I volunteered at would offer week long, overnight camp and was free to anyone willing to participate. As a result, tired grandparents would drop off their grandchildren for a week of respite. I remember one beautiful six-year old girl, she and her grandmother had lied about her birth date in order to meet the minimum enrollment age so she could participate in camp that summer. As a counselor, I taught children about hiking, swimming, local flora and fauna, and sat next to my girls after lunch as the director preached about the

truth of God and creationism. Every night I sat huddled around the dining hall tables with my girls while the camp director professed creationist ideology and countered evolution as an insidious myth (crafted by the scientific community no less). Initially, I believed in these sermons but as my views changed I felt physically ill that young, impressionable children were being subjected to this indoctrination while at innocent summer camp.

At the end of the summer some of the children would become Christians and get baptized in the creek. Understand, the Christians they became mimicked the form of Christianity they were introduced to and conditioned to understand at camp. This meant that if children decided to convert to Christianity at this church camp, they were inadvertently converting to a specific sub-sect of Christian ideology. This sub-section, or denomination, would hold different ideological beliefs on certain aspects of Christianity. For instance, where Catholics may believe in baptism for infants, the Baptists at this camp believed in the truth of full immersion baptism. Expanding beyond religious practices like baptism, this also translated into differing views on evolution, family values, and gender roles. In this instance, the form of Christianity these children adopted were the same as the camp directors, who happened to be creationist evangelicals.

This camp is an excellent example of an FBO that offered wonderful services: the opportunity to learn about nature and play in the outdoors, it fed and kept these children safe, and while these children were there they were continually told how loved they were. This FBO provided no financial barrier of entry in order to reach out to this vulnerable community, and as a result individuals relied on this service. Children learned to parrot Bible verses in order to get t-shirts and answer Biblical trivia to gain spots in line for

food, all individuals sang worship songs, and students would review creationist teaching throughout the day. Those at this church camp called their ministry to Native American children “outreach”, I call it coercive proselytism. Because when you can’t afford to send your children to summer camp, parents and grandparents feel pressure to send their children to free camps. Sure, some of them may have known the implicit cost would be exposing their children to fundamentalist right-wing ideology, but I wonder if these guardians understood the pressure these children felt to parrot back that ideology in order to get token gifts like t-shirts or to fall in the good graces of the camp leadership. I cannot even begin to convey how deeply I regret my participation in this and even now I struggle confessing my involvement in proselytizing to children.

Seeing firsthand the harms that various religious based non-profits (or FBOs) unintentionally inflict on the communities they aim to help is what drove me to research this work. I didn’t just want to regret my role in it, I wanted to explore the root cause of good intentions turning into coercion. I wanted to understand how I had contributed to the cyclical oppression that the Blackfeet tribe had experienced so that I would never do something so despicable again and I could explain, in an articulate way, to others to warn them not to partake in this work.

In some ways, I am writing this thesis as an atonement of my sins, for participating in proselytism, but beyond my own transgressions I am most interested in writing this as a warning for others who have the best of intentions and don’t realize that their “helping” can do unquantifiable harms. More importantly, this thesis is written out of a place of necessity. I believe that affluent groups in the West are coming to terms with

the immense amount of power and privilege they hold and want to give back in some ways. They are willing and able to devote time, money, and energy towards causes they believe in. Now all they need is critical direction. This thesis is an exploration for how praxis and theory can go terribly wrong without critical reflection and will begin to explore how to answer some of the most pressing questions of our time: what do you do when helping hurts?

This thesis will explore how ideographs are able to take root in development literature and the development field writ large. I will examine the theoretical construct of ideographs and look at ideographs in components in order to analyze their three functions. Though I describe ideographs in more detail in my methods section, I will flag that I am looking to discover their discernable functions through my analysis.

Ideographs are often undetected language terms in common discourse yet hold significant weight insofar as they form collective responses that lead individuals into group thought and action. Specifically, by dissecting them and breaking them into their parts I can discern 1) specific impacts ideographs have had on individual identities, 2) how the language we use can influence larger communities, and 3) how ideographs form political identity and community action. The first chapter of analysis looks exclusively at how “development” as a term is an ideograph and the implications of FBOs choosing to coopt it. The second chapter explores the rise of the Religious Right through political narrative constructive. The second half of the chapter explores introduction of American FBOs onto the international stage by analyzing the ideograph of stewardship as it plays out in secular and faith-based communities for fundraising. Finally, I end my argument

with the case study of “family values” in Uganda in order to show that FBOs are using ideographs and constitutive rhetoric when they engage in development practices.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

In the world of international development, billions of individuals are connected to one another through a complex network of aid which transfers resources and ideas on a daily basis in order to provide support to vulnerable populations. There is no denying that aid, and specifically foreign aid, has fundamentally changed a record number of lives in this time of globalization as human interaction and connection unceasingly span across all corners of the globe.

Yet questions remain in regards to the ethicality and efficacy of these organizations devoted to international aid and development in how they deliver resources and connect with people. These questions have sparked what scholars refer to as the “Great Aid Debate” (Lynch and Schwarz, 2016, p. 60). “The Great Aid Debate” acknowledges the growing field of development, the realities communities face when experiencing poverty or recovering from natural disasters, as well as recognizing that funding and personnel available to satiate the needs of these communities are limited. Individuals, governments, and groups want to invest their time and money into ethical and efficient structures to aid in development and the alleviation of poverty. The question then becomes how we identify ethical and efficient structures in which to invest in order to best serve those receiving aid.

In order to understand where we should invest and our own stake in the “Great Aid Debate,” first recognize the organizations that provide the backbone to international development on a systemic level by examining the structures that exist within these organizations who handle transferring resources. Specifically, this literature review will

examine the newest and fastest growing of the three predominant actors that provide aid to vulnerable populations on domestic and international fronts.

Definitions and Actors

In international aid and development, there are three predominant players who circulate aid: national governments (also referred to as state actors), secular non-governmental agencies (NGOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs). This paper will focus exclusively on FBOs as their role in international aid has grown significantly over the last decade, yet relatively little is known about them or their efficacy in serving vulnerable populations (Clarke, and Ware, 2015; Roberts-DeGennaro and Fogel, 2007). It is important to recognize that all three actors utilize different structures to collect and disperse aid in order to support billions of individuals across the world. Through recognizing the scope FBOs in particular have taken on to interact with communities, a rising imperative in development literature has begun to surface which calls for identifying and supporting actors which best solve for development to the populations they interact with.

Analyzing faith-based organizations has proven difficult due to the nebulous definition of FBO existing in the status quo. Without clear boundaries on what “faith-based” entails or how it plays out in an organization’s structure, a lack of clarity means many organizations do not self-identify or get classified by governments as FBOs. Specifically, an FBO is defined as any non-governmental organization “that derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teachings and principles of the faith or

from a particular interpretation or school of thought with a faith” (Clarke & Jennings, 2008; Hefferan, Adkins & Occhipian, 2009, p. 7). Meaning FBOs may manifest in a gambit of ways spanning from long- and short-term mission work, churches, faith networks reaching across the globe, or NGOs that exist because the founder and volunteers follow “inspiration and guidance” from their faith without imposing it on the populations they serve (Hefferan, Adkins and Occhipian, 2009, p. 12). Due to the lack of discussion around FBO aid writ large, these groups across the spectrum often do not either understand the importance of identifying as an FBO or believe they do not qualify as an FBO at all.

Faith is then integrated into these various organizations’ formats through vastly different means and to varying degrees. For some FBOs, conversion is the ultimate goal for the populations they serve and functionally why they exist, for others teachings from holy texts are used as models for aid and education, and some FBOs may appear as secular organizations but the reason for their existence and ability to continue is due to the motivations of personal faith by those who work within the organization (Clarke and Ware, 2015; Hefferan, Adkins and Occhipian, 2009, p. 10, “Table 1.1 FBO Typology”). Faith-based organizations have a unique way of dispersing aid as compared to their secular counterparts. In addition to being able to integrate into local communities through church networks, the ideology that FBOs hold are central to their identities in comparison to state sponsored aid or secular non-government organizations (NGOs). Due to their belief-based conception which is why it is important for FBOs to either identify

themselves or be classified by the government as faith-based instead of secular non-governmental organizations.

Despite the differences in FBOs faith-influenced structures, FBOs across the board internalize, reference or rely on three key themes as essential components in their day to day operations. These center pillars which define how faith is integrated into the organizations' operating structure and outcomes are proselytism, evangelizing, and witnessing (Doron and Foster, 2016). Proselytism typically refers to “end-directed efforts to spread faith through conversion” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 67; Stanhke, 1991, pp. 255-6) or more critically, “defined as actively promoting conversion to a particular ideology or religion or otherwise pressuring potential converts to accord with specific norms and practices” (Lynch and Schwartz, 2016, p. 60). While proselytism is typically frowned upon by FBOs and the international community (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68) the lack of binding legal definition means that proselytism conduct is still hotly debated among FBO members and participants. In this same vein, witnessing and evangelizing are also defined through subjective means depending on the individual or individual organization being interviewed. The lack of clear legal definitions around these buzzwords have resulted in a stigma around the word “proselytism” while using phrases like evangelizing and witnessing as a de facto form of proselytism on a massive scale (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68).

For those outside of the evangelical communities it can be immensely difficult to articulate why “evangelizing” is considered better than “proselytizing.” While I will describe these terms in length later, the simplest way to describe this distinction is that there isn't one: meaning that these terms effectively describe the same practices.

However, it is more palatable for the faith community to go out and “witness” or “evangelize” as those direct words have been conditioned as part of the call to action of these communities and as a central pillar of their faith. Even those within the FBO community recognize that “proselytism” is wrong without recognizing that they have succeeded in rebranding proselyting practices under these new terms.

Critiques on Proselytism

The vast array of disapproval toward proselytism stems from the perception of proselytism’s tendency to tie aid to religious conversion as a form of coercion. The perceived coercive nature of tying aid to pressure or incentivize changing “the ideologies or religious beliefs . . . of another” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 69) illicit rejection from the majority of FBOs and global agents alike. Specifically, large supra-national governmental groups like the United Nations oppose proselytism because they believe it is offering “conditional aid” and creating the opportunity for exploitation among the world’s most vulnerable populations like those living in extreme poverty in the Global South or those in need of assistance after natural disasters in developing countries (James, 2011). Essentially, critics of FBOs worry that by tying aid and ideology together when individuals are in dire need of assistance, means that a person is more susceptible to meet norms or go through the motions of a religious practice in order to satiate a basic need like hunger, thirst, shelter or to receive services like education or healthcare.

Proselytism is viewed as coercive by many because the fine line between incentivizing behavior to start conversations on faith and the perception of “holding aid

hostage” is an incredibly hard tension to navigate despite proper non-coercive intentions by FBOs. Larribeau and Broadhead (2014) highlight one clear example of how a group with the best intentions fell down the slippery-slope of proselytism when their Bangkok based church began outreach to refugees in Southeast Asia. It was apparent that NGOs and state actors could not provide aid to meet the needs of the swell of refugees entering into Thailand’s booming urban hub. FBOs like the aforementioned church were willing to step in to help provide food, shelter and various other resources. However, the church’s ability to provide aid and services to those immigrants slipping between the cracks was short-lived. Soon the church found it didn’t have the resources to sustain itself and answer the needs of the refugee community it aimed to help. Even typical services the church offered like its weekly fellowship dinner was coopted when an influx of refugees who desperately needed food began attending and were willing to pray or recite scripture in order to receive sustenance. The congregation found that their best intentions were creating unnecessary pressure for refugees to take on their faith, ideals and practices while refugees felt that they were manipulating their faith in order to receive food and other resources. Ultimately, the congregation joined BASRAN, Bangkok Asylum Seekers and Refugee Assistance Network (BASRAN) with other members consisting of FBOs, NGOs, and refugee leaders. The conclusion this FBO reached was that they needed to reach out to coordinate with groups better equipped to aid refugees and to curb potential coercion unintentionally caused by church’s good faith efforts. The necessity of relying on networks of aid outside of FBOs alone is a growing trend for FBOs who lack resources to provide social services for target groups they work with (Ager, 2014). As

evidenced by this case study, proselytism is not typically purposeful but when delivering assistance to vulnerable populations the propensity to proselytize and exploit communities falls on a slippery slope.

Despite the consensus on the harms of proselytism, no universal standards exist banning the practice. Individual countries like India have explicitly banned FBOs from proselytism but the critical need for aid and lack of binding legal definitions means that even these structures can be exploited again due to muddled lines between witnessing, evangelizing, and proselytism (Lynch and Schwartz, 2016) which deepens the divide and distrust of FBOs and their propensity to proselytize. International groups like the UNHCR published a Dialogue on Faith in 2012 which attempts to create an international standard as previous attempts like the Code of Conduct did before (Ager, 2014, p. 18). The problem with both the UNHCR Dialogue on Faith and the Code of Conduct before it are twofold: first, there is no binding mechanism to either individual FBOs or countries that are willing to enforce these standards as a universal norm. Secondly, few groups classify themselves as FBOs, even less realize that these guidelines apply to them. Without an enforcement mechanism and awareness of standards, these guidelines do little if anything to enforce ethical rules of engagement. Currently, the treatment of FBOs and proselytism is a patchwork quilt of standards and allows for the system to be exploited through nebulous definitions and an opt-in mentality for engaging with vulnerable communities.

Presence of FBOs

FBOs have spiked in popularity in the last two decades despite being around for thousands of years. Some analysts believe that FBOs acted as the first providers of social services (James, 2011). Throughout many religions, spanning from Christianity to Buddhism, a call to care for the poor and to care for the world around them act as transcendental themes in holy texts and dogma mobilizing millions. Due to this call, FBOs of all religions (Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, etc.) have been doing pertinent work around the globe since the inception of their religions (Kissane, 2007). Organizations like churches or individuals who personally feel compelled to answer this call have given resources and their time to helping marginalized communities for thousands of years, notably before the field of development began.

Today, in the world of globalization, FBOs are reaching record number of people and their scope has expanded to cover nearly the entire globe. Looking at the “volontourism” industry alone we have seen significant growth. According to a study done by Tourism Research and Marketing conducted in 2008, “up to 1.6 million people worldwide participate in volunteer tourism, spending between 832 million euros and 1.3 billion euros annually” (Luh Sin, Oakes, and Mostafanezhead, 2015, p. 119). Due to the expanded scope of FBOs and globalization, individuals who are interested in serving underserved populations can find it easier to engage with these groups through volontourism. Volontourism not only attracts millions, but the free volunteer support and impromptu leadership in offering social services like education, donating resources, healthcare, etc. mean that administrative costs are defrayed keeping FBOs cheaper than

their secular and state run counterparts (Roberts-Degennaro and Fogel, 2007, p. 49; McGehee, 2014, p. 848). Interacting with millions, collecting billions, and reaching countless across the globe FBOs have grown as globalization aids in making the world smaller and more accessible to travel, disseminate information, and forges connections through technological advancements.

Rise of FBOs in the US

The nature of government relations and FBOs in the US are rapidly changing. Over the last decade, funding has significantly expanded from governments like the United States to support faith-based initiatives in providing social services. Roberts-DeGennaro and Fogel argue that this is both beneficial as FBOs have a long history of serving communities in need and potentially detrimental as it erodes the line between separation of church and state (2007). They conclude with a call to action that the US federal government must define FBOs, outline appropriate FBO activity and outcomes, and create a place to access this data as no system is currently in place.

The trend of normalizing FBOs as social service providers came in 2004 when the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiative was created under President George W. Bush which allowed for billions in money to be granted out to NGOs and FBOs. The office expanded to reach eight different central departments in the United States Federal Government (USFG) as local state counterparts (based on the federal model) began popping up across the country as well. It is estimated that billions of dollars annually are funneled through the various state and federal offices of Faith-

Based and Community Initiative where bids for federal funding would typically be rewarded to FBOs over their secular counterparts (Roberts-Degennaro and Fogel, 2007, p. 62). The Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiative has an immense span of covering international and domestic development and aid. Though the idea of allowing more service providers to compete for grants does not initially sound problematic, we can see this is complicated when guidelines specify that grants from this office should not be put toward conversion or proselytism, however, the previously established lack of clear legal definitions on proselytism and FBOs left room in the system for many to apply for and successfully receive funding. As a result of this, lawsuits today against FBOs focus on claims that funds were misallocated by FBOs whose money appears to go to endeavors to support conversion instead of support and aid.

Outside of the US more international actors are utilizing FBOs to disperse aid or sponsoring them to dole out social services. Both of these roles were traditionally served by the state. Norway in particular has attempted to moderate their FBOs as they fund them by holding them to the same standard as any typical NGO (Øyhus, 2016; Berge, 2016). The decision to do so has allowed for more accountability and transparency in evaluating the efficiency of these organizations. The UN has also been more willing to work with Norwegian NGOs because of the high standard set upon them by Norway as the moderating government.

Gaps in the Literature

As more nation-states like the United States set aside funding for FBOs to perform social services traditionally reserved for the state, little is known about the efficacy of these programs. Specifically, there is a lack of data when it comes to follow up on these organizations or to evaluate how faith is integrated in their structures. To put it another way, FBOs are treated like secular NGOs in regards to ignoring the role faith plays within structures but FBOs are not documented in terms of their effectiveness in the manner that many NGOs or state actors are (Kissane, 2007; Ager, 2014). There is a large gap in the literature about the effectiveness of FBOs social services and this should require immediate attention as the US government alone funnels billions into these industries (\$1.7 Billion since the early 2000s) (Hefferan, Adkins and Occhipian, 2009, p. 5). Essentially, FBOs are now a prominent player in international aid and should be treated with the same, if not more closely monitored standards, than their secular NGO and government actors are.

Conclusion

Faith-based organizations (or FBOs) are an unignorably major actor in international and domestic development. When traditional actors like the state are unable or unwilling to care for their citizens experiencing violence through extreme poverty, conflict, resource shortages, or victim to natural disasters FBOs rally international networks to get involved in communities. Recognizing the major roles of FBO in our world today we must also recognize that FBOs have a unique internal structure which

they use reach areas of the globe when traditional actors find themselves lacking. When we decide to invest in FBOs or begin to replace traditional social services with FBO delivered social services, we must recognize that there are implications unmatched to other players in the development field.

The dangers of “conditional aid” and “proselytism” are a growing concern to individuals who worry the developed world will exploit or coerce vulnerable communities into taking on new ideals in order to receive gravely needed resources. The lack of research surrounding the efficacy of aid calls into question which form of FBOs we should invest in as structures vary greatly. The decision to invest in FBOs is not only one we should personally question by weighing the impacts on both sides, but it is also a reality that billions of dollars are already being invested into this industry. All of these factors creates an onus on individuals living in a globalized world to engage with FBOs in their entirety in order to explore questions of ethicality and efficacy.

Chapter Three: Theory Analysis and Methods

In today's current political climate, rhetoric has been consistently bastardized as being synonymous with empty words and devoid of meaningful analysis. As politicians are accused of spinning rhetorical circles as a means of mitigating action, the public has begun to feel averse to the mere mention of rhetoric. The tragedy underlying the creation of this cultural stigma is the loss of one of the most effective tools for critical evaluation in how individuals and groups function. The study of rhetoric examines how individuals communicate with one another, through an exchange of words and phrases laden with meaning, to unearth societal values.

Communication, though used daily by each of us, acts as the primary mechanism for how individuals find purpose and construct meaning in the world. When individuals talk to one another, we transmit our values and our perceptions of the world around us as we articulate our reality and views on life. In this chapter, I use the rhetorical practice of ideographic critique to unearth how individuals and groups employ certain words and phrases to create collective identity as well as to motivate action through this communicative phenomenon.

Specifically, I will look at how ideographs as a rhetorical construct alter the reality of those who use them. First, I identified the ideographs used in three prominent FBO organizations: World Vision, Compassion International, and the National Association of Evangelicals. Based upon coding from their published materials, I analyze the effectiveness of their ideographs. For instance, what a word like "development" would typically mean to unattuned audiences, what it means as an ideograph, the

implications of this hidden meaning, and how utilizing this ideograph creates very real impacts to communities.

In order to understand the power of rhetoric in not only our day-to-day lives, but how it can motivate political action for large swaths of people across the globe, it is important to understand how rhetoric forms individual identity. Dr. Calvin Michael McGee outlines, “the clearest access to persuasion (and hence to ideology) is through the discourse used to produce it” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 427). This important distinction indicates that ideology is created and transmitted through “discourse,” or the communicative process of dialoguing with one another. Rhetoric then encompasses the persuasive attempts of the aforementioned discourse and has a clear relationship with the formation of ideology. Therefore, ideology and persuasion cannot be separated from rhetoric.

Faith-based organizations (or FBOs) find themselves in a unique position in today’s world. These groups exist based on the ideology of the doctrine they choose to follow. Practitioners of all faiths from all major religions constantly employ rhetoric as they perform outreach to local and international communities in an effort either to act in accordance to their own ideology or to persuade others to adopt the ideology they preach. Therefore, the study of rhetoric and specifically ideographs (as I describe in my methods section) in FBO work is crucial as these groups deal in an unprecedented way with both ideology and discourse. Members of FBOs simultaneously attempt to persuade others to convert to their ideology, while themselves being motivated to do so by that same ideology. In fact, those involved in FBOs as individual members, or whole bodies

of believers, can attest to the power of the “holy word” in forming their identities. Collective identity formation is a critical end result of the utilization of ideographs—ideographs being plain language terms that are embedded with new meaning and ideology to act as dog whistles to communities who recognize this new meaning. To add an additional complicating layer, the purpose of many FBOs engaging in outreach, such as evangelical Christians, is to spread their ideology (i.e. the good news of the gospel and messages of salvation) across the globe. Christian evangelicals specifically aim to “witness” or “evangelize” to others by coming together and talking to them in an attempt to persuade individuals to adopt Christian ideology. This process of coming together and exchanging articulations of meaning and reality is the process of “discourse” that McGee describes above. In contrast to the bastardization of rhetoric as it is viewed by many in the US today, rhetoric as it is utilized by FBOs is far from a set of words devoid of action. Conversely, the rhetoric FBOs use creates cyclical action as it works to create identity and reinforce new realities by those who internalize the rhetoric of FBOs.

Acknowledging the inherent interactions between rhetoric and individuals in order to understand the complexities this relationship adds to objective reality. In McGee’s article on rhetoric’s influence in constituting identity, “In Search of ‘The People,’” McGee articulates that rhetoric, or “human responses,” “constitute[s] a filter for ‘facts’ which translates them into beliefs” (McGee, ‘In Search of ‘The People,’ 1980, p. 246). Essentially, the rhetoric individuals use to describe reality helps not only to find meaning but also to create new meaning which acts as a “filter.” This rhetorical “filter” alters the way in which individuals view the world and “facts” by casting a subjective

light in which they can opt into how they wish to perceive reality. This in turn forms an impetus to create beliefs. Based upon these beliefs, individuals experience a renewed urgency to act. Rhetoricians show that individuals who use persuasive means to expand and explain the world are engaging in meaning-making as manifested through rhetoric when engaging in discursive practices. Human interaction, as it manifests through communication, is both intrinsic to our nature and deeply complex as individuals create filters and beliefs.

The aim of this chapter is to provide the tools that will allow us to analyze two different rhetorical phenomena occurring when faith-based organizations engage in international development and aid. The different realms of rhetoric I examine in the context of faith-based organizations and international development fall under the classification of constitutive rhetoric.

According to Kenneth Burke constitutive rhetoric is a form of social identification that can occur “spontaneously, intuitively, even unconsciously” and is rhetorical by nature since it is a process rooted in discursive effects “that induce human cooperation” (Burke, 1968; Charland, 1987, pg. 133). Essentially, constitutive rhetoric is the study of how individuals come together to form meaning and collective identity as they create new realities and myths within which they can engage in discursive practices. The above analysis functions as an overview in how rhetoric permeates every individual’s life as we create meaning in the world through dialectic experiences. Under this umbrella, I flesh out the two unique spheres that this paper wants to address: the rhetoric employed in the field of international development and the rhetorical tradition and practices that faith-

based organizations rely on. In order to address all three levels of analysis and to deconstruct the comparative work of the distinct realms, I first outline the communicative theory needed to identify these structures. Additionally, I want to deconstruct the meaning embedded into these ideographs in order to carefully examine how these social constructs create real world impacts across the developed and developing worlds.

Ideographic critique represents one strategy that creates the preliminary framework to analyze rhetorical filters that create belief and in turn spur action.

Ideographs are rhetorical phenomena that occur in our daily interactions, yet typically go unnoticed by those who utilize them and are undetected by those outside of the community. An ideograph is defined as

an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. (McGee, "The Ideograph," 1980, p. 435)

Ideographs are fascinating because those who routinely utilize them in their vocabulary seldom recognize their significance and those outside of a group may not understand the weight of seemingly "ordinary-language terms." Yet these "abstractions" act as trigger words that can guide groups to act or "condition" individuals to conjure additional, predetermined meaning when they hear one of these ideographs ("The Ideograph," 1980, p. 428). McGee offers a concrete example to illustrate the power of

ideographs as they function in the real world. Take, for example, “When a claim is warranted by such terms as ‘law’ [or] ‘liberty,’ . . . it is presumed that human beings will react predictably and autonomically” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 428). When asked what the purpose of “law” or “liberty” entailed, many individuals would reiterate the phrase as a means in and of itself or list a highly detailed description of the values embedded into “law” or “liberty.” These are examples of ideographs because they go beyond the strict dictionary definition of the words. Instead, these words carry weight because of values embedded into them that are then picked up and used frequently in discourse both in and outside of the political sphere. Since many Americans would stress the importance of “rule of law” and “liberty,” it is blatantly evident that these “ill-defined normative goal[s]” have a “collective commitment.” McGee explains this phenomenon of pervasive social backing as “a rhetoric of control” in which “a system of persuasion presumed to be effective on the whole community” has “conditioned” individuals “to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief” (“The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 428). Despite the reality that many ideographs are seldom explicitly defined by communities that use them, similar meanings are internalized on local, national and international levels.

A clear imperative exists for rhetoric scholars to analyze how social constructs like ideographs function in order to understand manifestations of social control. Ultimately, McGee stresses, “the important fact about ideographs is that they exist in real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness... They come to be as a part of the lives of the people whose motives they articulate” (“The

Ideograph,” 1980, p. 429). Now, some would question the importance of “political consciousness” when this paper examines the role of faith-based organizations and their role in international development. Ideographs uniquely provide a lens in which to view the political consciousness that occurs as a result of the church as a social institution. As previously deconstructed, ideographs craft belief systems that create an impetus for individuals to act; ideographs are also uniquely reinforced with the ideals a group chooses to bestow on them. Despite existing as an abstract social construct, ideographs become as real to the people that use them as their actions that exist within the real world.

Secondarily, ideographs seldom exist on their own. Instead, ideographs function best when strung together or built upon, like “building blocks of ideology” (McGee, 1980, p. 248). Not only does this process of layering ideology add new complexity to the individual term, it also provides individuals insight as “an ideograph . . . is always understood in its relation to another; it is defined tautologically by using other terms in its cluster” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 434). By recognizing that ideographs are the components that make up a collective belief, it is clear that the power of ideographs derives from the collective. We analyze the components of the collective identity, of the mythic reality, in order to understand how and why those that choose to identify with it function the way they do.

The purpose of this methods section is to understand how ideographs function in order to highlight ideographs being used in intercultural and interfaith dialogue that faith-based organizations are engaging in when they enter into international development. In my chapter on analysis, I unpack what phrases like “the body of Christ,”

“stewardship,” “witnessing,” and “holistic development” mean as they function together. Independently they are all ideographs but when stacked upon each other like ideological building blocks, a new, more complex view forms. I will deconstruct the motivations and value system of those working with the FBO to deliver aid as well as begin to analyze the impacts that those receiving aid in the Global South experience through this close examination of ideographs “in its cluster.”

The simplest micro-example of ideographs frequently employed by FBOs are their propensity to reference “evangelizing” and “witnessing” in place of proselytism. Proselytism typically refers to “end-directed efforts to spread faith through conversion” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 67; Stanhke, 1999, pp. 255-6) or more critically, “defined as actively promoting conversion to a particular ideology or religion or otherwise pressuring potential converts to accord with specific norms and practices” (Lynch and Schwartz, 2016, p. 60). While proselytism is typically frowned upon by FBOs and the international community (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68) the lack of binding legal definition means that proselytism conduct is still hotly debated among FBO members and participants. However, witnessing and evangelizing fall outside this scrutiny as those out of the community do not recognize the extra meaning embedded into these seemingly plain language terms—rather they seem innocuous. Yet, witnessing and evangelizing are also defined through subjective means depending on the individual or individual organizations utilizing that rhetoric. The lack of clear legal definitions around all three of these buzzwords have resulted in stigma around the word “proselytism” with some nations banning missionaries entering into their country on the basis of proselytism. Yet, using

phrases like evangelizing and witnessing effectively act as a de facto form of proselytism on a massive scale (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68).

Witnessing and evangelizing are ideographs because to those who identify with the Religious Right, and specifically evangelicals, these words represent their ideological obligation to follow The Great Commission of Jesus. Subsequently, these words are revered as part of their identity and as a transition between ideology to group action. To outsiders, “witnessing” would simply mean the act of listening to or testifying about their faith and “evangelizing” means to spread the good news. In reality, the tactics of “witnessing” and “evangelizing” do more than to simply encourage or watch passively. They are descriptors for any tactics that an FBO utilizes for outreach. Using platforms like soup kitchens, delivering emergency aid after natural disasters, or handing out diapers in at-risk neighborhood to needy mothers would all provide opportunities for FBOs to “witness” or “evangelize” spreading their ideology to those who accept these donations. Some FBOs will even refuse to deliver these goods and services until after they have had an opportunity to engage in outreach, creating conditionality to their aid. Through the examination of the practices FBOs utilize when witnessing and evangelizing, it is evident that proselytism is repeated almost exactly in international aid and development yet undetected due to this rhetorical phenomenon in which members who know these ideographs will feel justified in their actions without seeing how coercive their actions truly are.

Ideographs are often undetected language terms in common discourse yet hold significant weight insofar as they form collective responses that lead individuals into

group thought and action. The critical aspect of ideographs derive from *how* ideographs are employed as building blocks, not simply their meaning taken on face. To think about this another way, consider Legos. Legos individually are incredibly unique as they come in a variety of colors, shapes and sizes. Yet, they are not valued individually. Instead, Lego building blocks matter when they are stacked upon one another to create a building or new entity. These seemingly plain blocks can completely transform a cluster of individual blocks as they come together. Ideographs within an FBO context function identically. While “witnessing” and “the body of Christ” illicit various group actions and ideological triggers, by utilizing these phrases together in clusters, groups form a collective identity and form subsequent collective myths that craft a new reality for actors in FBOs to situate themselves.

Constitutive Rhetoric

Rhetorical scholars refer to the process of creating new realities as myth creation. McGee claims that, “the heart of the collectivization process is a political myth” (McGee, “In Search of ‘The People,’” 1975, p. 243). McGee describes myths in this context as not descriptions of things, but expressions of a determination to act... A myth... is, at bottom identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression of those convictions in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence, unanalyzable into parts which could be placed on the plane of historical description. (“In Search of ‘The People,’” 1975)

When individuals come together to form a collective they buy into a larger collaboration in which they can be unified with others in thought and action. This is what is referred to as the “collectivization process.” As the group creates a myth to situate a reality to reside within, convictions manifest within the movement. The unique mythic component is that through the formation of the collective identity, the group can even transcend “historical description” as it becomes a living entity. Individuals then can elect to live in a “more comfortable . . . alternate reality” they create rather than having to abide in a world where they have found no meaning or place for their unique identity, or “so called ‘objective reality’” (McGee, “In Search of ‘The People,’” 1975). Individuals in groups create new realities or fall into “false consciousnesses” as they create meaning in the world through dialogue. They remain situated in these myths even while the myths act as a new filter or lens which themselves create new “expressions” and “determinations to act.”

As I will cover in my analysis chapters, members of FBOs create and exist in mythic realities as they come together to form groups. The very nature of being a faith-founded collective is critical to both the identity formation of the individuals who compose the collective and to the end goal of the group in their desire to consolidate their faith-based network. Therefore, the nature of the groups formed in these political myths can vary dramatically. For instance, the collectivization process may refer to individuals becoming one unit as the “the body of Christ” or as individuals doing the work of their god. On the other end of this interaction, those who receive aid may find themselves developing a new identity as potential converts or new disciples depending on the myths

that are introduced to them and their community when FBOs enter their homes, neighborhoods, and nations.

McGee introduced ideographs and their subsequent role in constitutive rhetoric to academia in his articles “In Search of ‘The People’” and “The Ideograph.” Building upon this tradition, two schools of thought budded. Dana Cloud in her work “The rhetoric of <family values>: scapegoating, utopia and the privatization of social responsibility” and from Condit and Lucaites in their book *Crafting Equality* offered two variations of ideographic critique. The two distinct deviations represented in these two schools of thought are, first, Condit’s and Lucaite’s belief that ideographs are neutral vessels, and second, Cloud’s interpretation that ideographs are inherently dominative and oppressive to vulnerable groups. Condit and Lucaites outline in their book *Crafting Equality* the public nature of ideographs as they examine phrases like “equality” and “liberty.” Condit and Lucaites argue that ideographs construct a public “set of identifications and commitments” while Cloud believes that an ideograph like <family values> is a privatized identity (Cloud, 1998, p. 391) which then in turn causes individuals to act. However, the private/public distinction pales in comparison to the major clash deriving from Cloud and Condit and Lucaites. Cloud builds upon McGee’s original beliefs that ideographs 1) are inherently vessels that foster domination of people vulnerable to exploitation, and 2) that ideographs can be used to oppress populations through adopting charged ideographs in political rhetoric (See Cloud’s <family values>). Condit and Lucaites, on the other hand, believe that ideographs are neutral vessels, devoid of malice or other intent.

I have chosen to follow Cloud's interpretation because I believe that ideographs contain an inherent element of manipulation and are thus easily used to oppress marginalized populations. They are embedded with meaning which is then used to achieve the motives and goals of the group that created or normalized this rhetoric. In the same way that one cannot help but to create a rhetorical filter of how they view the world and alter facts, as McGee argues, I agree with Cloud that through the very nature of embedding meaning and constantly utilizing these terms in a self-feeding loop, thus it is imperative to acknowledge that "the dimension of social control and coercion in understanding the ideograph is crucial" (Cloud, 1998, p. 389). This does not mean that individuals maliciously create ideographs to oppress and dominate those who are vulnerable. Rather, it is simply a result of the human condition that our own biases influence how we view, create, and articulate our reality. Logically, when individuals engage in discursive activities to share those views then we subsequently pass along those biases and views, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

The final distinction between ideographic criticism in the two major schools of thought is the methodology each party utilizes in their analysis. While McGee outlines two different approaches Cloud prefers a diachronic method of analysis, conversely, Condit and Lucaites employ a synchronic method. In their text *Crafting Equality*, Condit and Lucaites utilize the diachronic approach which traces the usage of the ideograph "equality" back decades and documents the evolutions of this ideograph over time in order to discern its impacts on individuals. Specifically, Condit and Lucaites note, "The diachronic structure of an ideograph represents the full range and history of its usages for

a particular rhetorical culture” (*Crafting Equality*, 1993, p. xiii). Conversely, Cloud prefers to use a synchronic approach in her analysis of <family values> and ideograph clusters like “responsibility” or “opportunity.” She follows McGee’s preferred approach to “discover the functional meaning of the term by measure of its grammatic and pragmatic context” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 432).

In my study, I adopt Cloud and McGee’s synchronic approach. I believe that the behavior of faith-based organizations as they administer social services on the ground today is uniquely important to examine. Additionally, due to the current rising trend of FBOs’ growing presence in international aid, it is important to limit the scale of my analysis to how ideographs are being employed now; as current trends indicate the greatest significance to these ideographs. Finally, using a synchronic methodology I believe I can cover more ideographs and analyze how they function in clusters more efficiently to best discern how constitutive rhetoric influences those who give and receive aid from FBOs. A diachronic approach limits the span of analysis I am able to do on multiple ideographs due to time constraints afford by the limitation of this project. Therefore, I have chosen to follow Dr. Cloud’s interpretation and method of analysis on ideographs in order to evaluate their role in identity construction for FBOs.

A synchronic approach yields the best analysis of clusters for ideographs, while the narrow focus of the diachronic method is better suited to analyze the history and evolution of specific ideographs. McGee stresses the importance of deconstructing meaning from clusters of ideographs as he explains, “such structures appear to be ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ patterns of political consciousness which have the capacity

both to control ‘power’ and to influence (if not determine) the shape and texture of each individual’s ‘reality’” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 427). It is important to recognize that rhetoric, as manifested through ideographs, not only functions as a way individuals embed meaning into particular words; rhetoric also allows individuals to “determine the shape and texture” of the reality they elect to live in.

The importance of ideographs in rhetorical analysis derives from how they come together to constitute identity. McGee bridges this transition from ideograph as a single unit of analysis to the function of ideographs in constituting identity in his article “In Search of ‘The People.’” Ideographs do not exist in a vacuum devoid of interaction, so to analyze them in such a vacuum is counterproductive. The political myths that are generated through collectivization processes become the foundation to understanding how identity is constituted. McGee begins this conversation by showing that groups, whether as small as a Sunday school class or as big as a whole society, are infused with an artificial identity. So from a rhetorical perspective, the entire socialization process is nothing but intensive and continual exercises in persuasion: Individuals must be seduced into abandoning their individuality, convinced of their sociality . . . (McGee, “In Search of ‘The People;’” 1975)

As individuals abandon their own “individuality” in favor of joining an “artificial identity” they begin to infuse life into these narratives. Political myths, “false consciousness,” and these new realities which constitute identity are not static. They are living entities that take on lives of their own as “persons begin to *respond* to a myth, not only by exhibiting collective behavior, but also by publicly ratifying the transaction

wherein they give up control over their individual destinies for sake of a dream” (McGee, 1975, p. 243). The responsive element is unique to adding life to the myth which in turn sparks action of participants as well as adds legitimacy to this new “alternate reality” or “artificial identity.”

Scholars like Maurice Charland build off McGee’s analysis of ideographs and their role in constitutive rhetoric by introducing a clear case study of how groups form through the rhetorical collectivization process. The result of these processes creates artificial realities which become real and transhistorical as evidenced in Charland’s article “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the People Quebecois.” Charland argues “collective identities” form the “basis of rhetorical appeals” because “the people Quebecois” and “peoples” in general exist only through an ideological discourse that constitutes them (Charland, 1987, p. 139). So in the same way that French Canadians retroactively wrote themselves into history as articulated by their white paper, their identity of “Quebecois” became more than merely a descriptive term, it became a living entity. Evangelicals view their role similarly insofar as they will find identity as a collective and work to contribute to be active participants as members of “the body of Christ” because “the body” lives through the constant ideological discourse that people have with one another. In both cases, these identity descriptors, evangelical and Quebecois, are not only real to the individuals that form in the collective, but they are alive as they help individuals find meaning in the world through these identities. The “collective identities” then are not simply fictitious. The “collective identities” are simultaneously fictitious and real because the individuals who buy into this “artificial

reality” have accepted “living within a political myth” (Charland, 1987, p. 138) and have allowed individuals to create a new reality in which to reside.

After observing a group that appears to have a collective identity, there are three criteria, or standards, that allow scholars to determine if constitutive rhetoric has been employed in a group. The first is that the group must form into a collective subject. This goes beyond typical social cohesion, rather it manifests as individuals choose how they want to identify and to some extent “abandon . . . their individuality, convinced of their sociality . . .” (McGee, “In Search of ‘The People,’” 1975, p. 242). When ideographs are strung together they form a collective subject, or as McGee would articulate “the people.” There can be multiple “people” or bodies formed as a result of constitutive rhetoric—a “people” is not confined to nationality, ethnicity or any other traits unless the group chooses to create an identity focusing on these characteristics. For example, a common illustration of constitutive rhetoric crafted by an ideograph is the way individuals buy into nationalistic conceptions of what it means to be an “American.” Those who view themselves as Americans, and any additional meaning they want to embed into this title, may also buy into other constitutive identities like, for example, to be an active member in the “body of Christ” as a Catholic. Using ideographs as identity markers represents the first standard to uncovering the political myths that collective identities are forged within.

The second criteria is that the “people” (a.k.a. the collective identity) must ascribe to becoming a transhistorative subject. Or to put it more simply, the process of a group of individuals coming together, prescribing a collective history to the group, and the resulting collective action they partake in directly evidences how rhetoric constructs the

reality they live in. This simply underscores the living nature of constitutive rhetoric and the extensiveness of “false consciousness.” Again, looking back to Charland’s analysis of the People Quebecois. This title had not existed previously and yet, when this group came together, they were able to rewrite history and assert that their group had existed all along in publishing a white paper. Legitimacy was granted to their group and within their group when they were able to prescribe a shared history for members.

Finally, ritual is used to reinforce the new reality intrinsic to the nature of the constitutive identity of the group. Ritual functions as a binding process in which the expectation of social participation serves to cohesively grow the experiences of the group. This may manifest in partaking in traditional practices such as partaking in communion or daily group prayer, listening to sermons on a weekly basis to re-establish ideology, or through a recurring practice of giving and receiving with set roles for both participants. Regardless of the traditions they undertake, rituals bind together individuals through common experience; partner this with the power of creating a new narrative (i.e. shared history) and the danger of constitutive rhetoric begin to unfold as groups will sacrifice individual identity to join the collective. Having joined, the collective members are more likely to define themselves based on this identity, think as a group, and act as a unified body.

Though constitutive rhetoric may not initially sound harmful, it is important to realize the danger manifests in practice, not theory alone. Specifically, Charland explains,

The significance of constitutive rhetoric is that it positions the reader towards political, social, and economic action in the material world and it is in this positioning that its ideological character becomes significant. (Charland, 1987, p. 140)

For FBOs, and evangelical FBOs specifically, the most significant thing to them is their “ideological character;” as ideology is not only their starting motivation but it is also the end goal they hope to disseminate through their outreach in international aid and development. What I aim to prove in this paper is that once we are able to prove the legitimacy of groups’ existence through rhetorical construction, we need to recognize that there are no actions the group will not utilize if at the groups disposal (e.g. political, social, and economic action).

“The Body” the church creates also provides a unique interpretation of how ideologies become “material practices” or manifests as real-world action by a large group across the globe. Charland explicates, “The unique power deriving from constitutive rhetoric is that it is action oriented” (Charland, 1987, p. 143). This is because “ideology is material;” it does not exist in the realm of the hypothetical but is geared toward “material practices” (Charland, 1987, p.143). According to the church, Jesus calls his followers to create “fishers of men” and make disciples of the world. Christians, Buddhists, Muslims and Hindus are also charged with caring for the poor and vulnerable. Their ideologies clearly not only impact their actions but even constitute the reason that millions across the world choose to act. Whether someone works in a soup kitchen, volunteers with an NGO, or makes sure their neighbor has their material needs satisfied, it is blatantly

evident that religion, and specifically faith-based organizations, have clear material impacts on those they interact with.

When “the people” and bodies are threatened then the group adopts a unique justification for taking action and a newfound sense of urgency. Take, for example, the self-described narrative of the “People Quebecois” which “concludes by identifying a threat to its very existence as a narrative” (Charland, 1987, p. 146). A major component of their story, and the validity of the group’s existence writ large, is based on the idea that their group is cited as existing in opposition to others. So not only did the Quebecois want to illustrate their presence throughout history, but also that they had to fight for legitimacy. Today, the Christian church behaves very similarly in creating narratives of persecution. Many evangelical churches employ rhetoric of Christian persecution to explain why their ministry is under attack worldwide through persecution by non-believers, or how God is being attacked in public schools by not allowing prayer in classrooms (Marsden, 2008, p. 115). Highlighting these stories creates an urgency to act (either by soliciting donations, strengthening the call for outreach, or increased intergroup communication through prayer). In total, the threat of persecution prompts continued action and binds together the group through a mentality that their purpose is even more important because their existence is at stake. This can lead to more radical action using any means the group has access to. This is problematic when the group has access to social, political, or economic means, and this becomes even more concerning when we recognize that the means FBOs use when engaging internationally typically look like

development work and aid relief (specially, utilizing programs that administer education, workfare, and delivering social services like health care to impoverished communities).

Using these three standards to determine if constitutive rhetoric has been employed is a litmus test of dire importance in reviewing the work of FBOs for two reasons. First, it is critical to see if FBOs exist within certain “political myths,” because depending on which myths they view as reality, their subsequent actions will be influenced by their perception as they spread their ideology to the Global South through development work and aid relief in a nuanced form of Western imperialism. It may also influence the forms of persuasion tactics they use (e.g. the fine line between “witnessing” and proselytism). Or even more problematically, based on the rhetoric that FBOs use when administering aid and social services, new groups can be unintentionally created as a result of constitutive rhetoric disseminated by FBOs. Thus, FBOs cannot be treated as though they exist in a vacuum. If FBOs and their rhetoric are not examined then the myths they reside in are allowed to spread as they come into discursive contact with other groups who reside in different political myths or are situated in alternative perceptions of reality.

The most important component of ideographs to remember is that “The significance of ideographs is in their concrete history as usages, not in their alleged ide-content” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 431). Regardless of the benevolent intentions of the creator who embedded meaning into these terms or the community that consolidates meaning through their interaction and usage of ideographs, their concrete “usages” are what I analyze in this paper. Much of the rhetoric used by FBOs carry a

much different meaning than their “alleged idea-content,” and so the actual usages are particularly relevant here (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 431).

Conclusion for Methods

I will employ ideographic criticism (as defined by Dr. Dana Cloud) and an analysis of constitutive rhetoric in regards to faith-based organizations and the work they do in international aid. This work is particularly important because today FBOs find themselves administering billions of dollars for ever-increasing social services around the globe with a shocking lack of accountability. Accountability here references both the lack of monitoring what materials, rhetoric, and practices these FBO utilize while on the ground when administering social services, as well as checking outcomes versus funds raised¹. I argue that FBOs, due to their growing presence and influence, need accountability in regards to how do outreach to poor, marginalized communities. Most importantly, a critical examination of the rhetoric they employ to potential donors, the church body, and individuals on the ground in developing nations is critical in understanding intentional and unintentional outcomes resulting from FBOs’ presence. Without this critical examination, there can be no true measure of accountability on the

¹ This is not to say that faith-based organizations have no financial accountability; in fact, for NGOs writ large accountability is a unique hurdle to overcome as they have pressure from donors to keep administrative costs low. However, without administrators to monitor progress and effective spending there is no way to have accountable practices and checks from year to year. (Singer, *Ethics in the Real World*, “Holding Charities Accountable” 163-167)

outcome of FBOs' efforts, which means we risk hurting the very groups whom FBOs are committed to serving: the most vulnerable.

In order to perform this examination, I dissect the published work of three prominent organizations. The first two, Compassion International and World Vision, are two of the largest FBOs in existence. Compassion International received approximately \$800 million in contributions and gifts in the 2016 fiscal year alone and describes itself as follows:

“Compassion International is a Christian child development organization that works to release children from poverty in Jesus’ name. Compassion revolutionized the fight against global poverty by working exclusively with the Church to lift children out of spiritual, economic, social and physical poverty. Compassion partners with more than 6,700 churches in 25 countries to deliver its holistic child development program to over 1.8 million babies, children and young adults. It is the only child sponsorship program to be validated through independent, empirical research.” (“About Us,” 2018)

Compassion International, based out of Colorado Springs, Colorado, represents the most traditional model of FBO. As explained in the literature review, there are four essential structures of FBOs. Compassion International falls into the model which is founded on Biblical principles, incorporates faith principles and practices into their deliverance of social services, and bases successful outcomes on conversions of participants to faith goals (as reflected in the pitches they submit to their Christian donor base). Compassion International is known in the international nonprofit world for two unique characteristics.

First, Compassion Child is a child sponsorship program that interacts with millions of children across the globe since 1952. Secondly, Compassion International is infamous for its proselytism. I want to highlight and analyze their work and rhetoric because their influence across the world is apparent. The question then becomes how their rhetoric and influence translate what they tell the church body to the individuals they deliver aid to. By unearthing these tensions we can describe not only whether or not Compassion International is guilty of proselytism but also unearth the largely societal implications of their involvement.

The second FBO I analyze is World Vision. World Vision is known by some as “the Walmart of FBOs.” Doling out a record number of \$835 million in 2016 alone for international outreach, World Vision is a major player in international aid and development, as well as one of the largest FBOs across the globe. This is not coincidental, the former vice president of World Vision, Andrew Natsios was appointed Director of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (a branch under USAID) under President George W. Bush and to this day World Vision receives approximately 23% of their operating revenue from public grants. In order to understand World Vision’s rhetorical impact I will look at the literature they have published on their website and compare it to that of Compassion International. World Vision, while also a large FBO which offers child sponsorship programs, embodies a different form of FBO. This form, as described in the literature review, references individuals founded on Biblical principles that do not require, implicitly or explicitly, individuals to convert to their faith in order to receive aid or social services. World Vision also generates funds from private donors

(church bodies) as well as receiving a substantial amount of government funding to deliver US development overseas. Last year alone World Vision received over \$200 million from United States Aid and International Development agency (USAID).

Finally, I analyze literature published by the National Association of Evangelicals (NEA) and the outreach projects they endorse. The reality of most FBOs is that they are not large multi-million dollar organizations like World Vision and Compassion International. Rather the majority are small churches who self-fund to take on mission work in other countries. These missions may entail aiding in social services (teaching English, building wells, etc.) for various durations of time. Long term and short-term service trips and mission work are a national phenomenon. Through self-funding, church sponsorship or even institutional sponsorship (for example when faith-backed universities like Regis send students to volunteer, or large foundations set aside money for FBOs like The Opus Foundation) leave FBOs in a precarious position because they exist in a “pay to engage” sphere. As long as they can accrue funds to travel, they can preach, partake in any outreach they so choose, and engage with the community in any way the community will allow. By looking at smaller churches, the NEA, and responses to this kind of work, I will examine the remaining two forms of FBO models and be able to apply and contrast the efficiency and efficacy of these models.

The type of artifacts I will be exploring for my rhetorical analysis are various texts the above specified FBOs publish on themselves for fundraising purposes, to maintain good public relations, and responses by news sources, video comments and blog posts. These response texts are critical in analyzing how members of the church view

their work in an authentic, non-censored way as well as individuals on the other side of the interaction. By the nature of international aid and development work, we seldom hear responses from those who have received the aid. Beyond typical cultural barriers (like language), the populations FBOs target are uniquely sought out for being known as marginalized or “at-risk.” Typically, this means FBOs seek out individuals living in poverty in the Global South with limited access to platforms that would allow them to vocalize dissent against these groups that bring in aid, social services, and infrastructure. Instead these groups get to choose what voices get heard when they publish their experiences and include narratives in their promotional material. Blogs, video comments on platforms like YouTube, or comments on news articles are the only places I can mine for information from members of the church who aren’t controlling the broadcasted narrative of the FBO because these platforms do not have a substantial barrier of entry for individuals on the other side of the development spectrum. Anyone can post to these destinations which is both a blessing and a curse. It can be immensely difficult to verify these sources so the majority of my analysis will come from verified sources like accredited journals, scholarly peer-reviewed articles for case studies, the website of the specified organization and verified news sources. However, it is important not to discount more informal sources in order to glean ideographs as they trickle down to individuals across the globe.

I will be looking for ideographs in two contexts. The first context is the sphere in which ideographs are used by FBOs to garner support by fellow believers and the second is how the church reaches out to non-believers or secular entities like the United States

Federal Government (USFG). It is important to recognize that two spheres exist within the donation and fundraising realm as sometimes churches will cater to both church members and the government. The only way to garner funds from both sources is to use ideographs that act as dog whistles or code words to believers and that those outside of the group would not see significance in. But secondly, and more importantly, it is important to see if the way what rhetoric creates new realities and new myths once it leaves US soil. Looking at sermons, pamphlets, and sociological studies documenting decades of evangelizing presence unearths how FBOs create big impacts, regardless of their intentions. Once again, I am choosing to utilize Cloud's definition of ideographs because she illustrates that regardless of intentions, the way we utilize rhetoric and language can constitute new realities and new social norms. Thus, these artifacts are key to understanding the intentional and unintentional outcomes which result from FBOs work in international development and aid.

The last caveat to consider as I conclude my methods section is why I am narrowing my research to Christian, and specifically evangelical organizations. Not only do charismatic evangelical churches represent "the fastest growing movement in the world" (Farley, 2014, p. 15), Christian evangelical churches are heavily involved in international aid and development due to their call to "evangelize" and engage in outreach. Additionally, while faith-based organizations can derive from any spirituality and religion, the United States allocates a disproportionate amount of funding to Christian FBOs. In fact, in a large exposé published by the Boston Globe in 2006, it was revealed that 98% of the funds from the Office of Faith Based Initiatives and Community

Initiatives were allocated to Christian FBOs (Stockman et al., 2006). Since the creation of this office in President George W. Bush's first term, hundreds of millions of dollars have been siphoned off from USAID and funneled to FBOs (Marsden, 2008, p. 126). In my next chapter I will further explain the power that Christianity holds in American politics and the power Christians have had domestically and abroad in transforming policy. By deconstructing the influence of Christianity in American politics, we realize that "political myths are purely rhetorical phenomena" (McGee, "In Search of 'The People,'" 1975, p. 247) but are nonetheless able to create new mythic realities like the ones these groups have created in countries like South Sudan, Nicaragua, and Uganda, as well as here at home in the United States. Causing, in turn, this rhetorical phenomena of constitutive identity and the creation of "political myths" to be solidified in the very real creation of governmental policy.

Chapter Four: Identity Creation in International Aid and Development

Development as an Ideograph

This chapter begins to weave the theoretical implications of ideographs and constitutive rhetoric with development literature. Specifically, by looking at the ideograph of development I argue the importance of discernment for the various types of FBOs. The second half of the chapter explores how individuals with the best of intentions can inadvertently harm communities due to the precarious relationship between donors and recipients of development resources and aid. This is further complicated due to the rhetorical intricacies both groups engage with.

Ideographs utilized in religious and faith-based organizations are not a recent phenomenon. As discussed previously, the “body of Christ” has existed as a major component of the Christian church since its insemination. Over the centuries, the church and the “body” have evolved to adapt Christian doctrine to “divinely revealed” dogma meant to highlight or insert the Church’s positions on relevant societal issues of the day. Conversely, ideographs used in development are not a recent phenomenon either. In fact, one of the largest ideographs to exist is the phrase “development” itself when referring to humanitarian or community outreach work on international and domestic scales. Development is a largely empty term which has had meaning embedded into it since its creation. Webster’s Dictionary defines development as “the act or process of causing something to grow or become larger or more advanced.” The first time development was introduced in regards to international aid was in President Truman’s inaugural address in 1949 in which he introduced the idea of “developed” and “underdeveloped” countries.

Over time, this terminology and subsequent humanitarian aid work led to the creation of an industry of nonprofits and government organizations in the pursuit of “good works” in countries outside of the global North. But the question still remains, what precisely is development work? As a common language term we can understand that it encompasses advancement in some form, however, advancement in and of itself is an incredibly nebulous term. Further, “advancement” is an entirely relative term subject to varying cultural interpretations. Since the UN was founded in 1945, “development” has evolved and been refined into an ideograph utilized by the United Nations, their partners, and member nation states as growth “that promotes prosperity and economic opportunity, greater social well-being, and protection of the environment” (“Promote Sustainable Development,” n.d.). The variable then becomes how one is able to/will pursue sustainable development. I argue that depending on the entity, not only does the pursuit vary greatly but that “development,” as defined by the international community, can be coopted to fit the objectives of the specific entity engaging in humanitarian work. With development work being a multi-billion dollar industry that engages countless individuals and communities across the globe, it becomes even more important to realize that abstract goal setting or any processes that depend on mutual understanding of ideographs can be subject to extreme variation in outcomes, and potentially even exploitation.

Faith-based organizations (FBOs) uniquely have coopted the ideograph of “development” in a way that allows them to continue to engage with the common held conception of “development” while also allowing them to embed additional meaning that only their constituents would understand. Or to put this another way, FBOs are able to

work effectively in the sphere of development because they are acutely attuned and know how to use buzzwords like “development” and “empowerment” when interacting in the community; but they have also masked in plain sight a complicated additional meaning that only fellow members would be privy to. Specifically, FBOs have coopted the ideograph of “development” and expanded it to “holistic development” and “transformation” as evidenced in their literature. Through deconstruction of these ideographs, we can glean insight as to FBOs true development goals and begin to elucidate the means they may use to pursue said objectives. Upon understanding these goals, we can then juxtapose how a religious entity might pursue development differently than their separate secular counterparts.

Compassion International and World Vision are both renowned as two of the largest FBOs in international development. Both identify as child development organizations with special focuses on “transformation” and “holistic development” through their child sponsorship programs². For context, child sponsorship programs entail collecting a monthly donation from an affluent donor in order to sponsor the education and needs of a child in a developing country. Each organization varies in the parameters they set for the relationship between donor and child. For the Compassion Child program, you can select a child based on their name, age, gender, ethnicity, picture, country of origin, birthday, etc. Donors are then able to write monthly correspondence with the child where the child

² They also engage in other forms of international development and aid work. However, their child sponsorship is one of their most well-known programs and clearest source of documentation on their websites.

will respond. Compassion International will also orchestrate mission trips where donors can meet and visit their Compassion Child in the child's country.

Compassion International (CI) and World Vision (WV) both attest to the strengths of "holistic development" in all of their work and specifically in their Child Sponsorship programs. On the surface "holistic development" may sound like an empty buzzword. One would assume that within the context of development that holistic development would mean to take careful consideration to not leave any aspect of community or individual advancement behind. To those without a religious backing this may conjure an image of development work that encompasses economic, sociopolitical, cultural, and environmental factors in both long term and short-term capacities. However, for religious communities this is a very clear code word for development that will encompass faith. Through inspection on Compassion Child's website and uniquely their page for donors titled "Our Commitment to You," the nature of "holistic development" becomes explicit: "We commit to holistic child development — developing minds, bodies and spirits. All of our child development programs provide opportunities that encourage healthy development in four areas — spiritual, physical, social and economic" ("Compassion International: Commitment," 2018).

World Vision offers similar rhetoric but present it initially in a more subtle manner. On their "Child Sponsorship FAQ" page, WV explains their goals and alludes to their methods, "We see a world where each child experiences fullness of life, and we know this can only be achieved by addressing the problems of poverty and injustice in a holistic way—that is

how World Vision is unique. . . . We bring all of our skills across many areas of expertise to each community where we work, enabling us to care for children’s physical, social, emotional, and spiritual well-being... Our holistic approach—which can include digging wells, teaching new farming skills, training community leaders and much more—makes the difference between short-term fixes and long-term self-sufficiency. (“World Vision: Child Sponsorship FAQ,” 2018)

Notice that “holistic approach” and “holistic way” implicitly apply a spiritual emphasis (“enabling care for . . . spiritual well-being,” “training community leaders and much more”). Not only does this fail to address what leaders are being trained in, where in the community these leaders come from, or the incredibly vague content of “much more,” this leaves out the major component that World Vision administers almost all of their services through their local church partners in over 100 countries across the world. While World Vision has done some interfaith outreach to Muslims in mosques, their church partnerships are predominantly Christian. World Vision is a prominent actor, in 2016 alone the president of World Vision Richard Stearns highlighted in WVI’s Annual Fiscal Report that “the total value of private and public donations to World Vision US this year totaled \$1.014 billion” (2016, p. 1) which allowed them to work with 41 million children and families across the globe. World vision also “...responded to 130 humanitarian emergencies around the world offering a second chance to 15.4 million disaster survivors, refugees and displaced people” (“WV: 2016 Fiscal Report,” 2016). World Vision is an undeniable powerhouse and the influence they exert is tangible so it is imperative to

discover what the goals and methods they employ entail in order to assess the efficacy, efficiency, and whether or not the USFG should continue giving them funding.

Upon further exploration of World Vision’s published materials, one member’s editorial makes a palpable connection to the ideographs of “holistic” and “development” than the carefully censured WV’s stance previously mentioned. In a piece titled, “Are Christian charities more effective at humanitarian work?” Rachael Boyer writes, “If we simply did humanitarian work with no faith component, we wouldn’t be holistically taking care of people—mind, body, and spirit. We would leave the puzzle incomplete because the roots of poverty are often spiritual” (2017). Through examining a member of the organization’s rhetoric, a better image of what is actually taught within the organization comes to light. To believe that the “roots of poverty are often spiritual” indicates that tending to spiritual needs is much more important than initially alluded to. McGee explains that to determine the content of an ideograph, or the ideology being embedded in to it, we need to look at other words in the cluster. In this case, the content indicates that any “humanitarian work” or “development” work World Vision engages in will always carry this lens of a Christian charity and the focuses will be “holistic” by creating a unique weight on the spiritual component. Now, reflect back to the original passage from World Vision in which they claim “addressing the problems of poverty and injustice in a holistic way” is critical to their goal and approach. Understanding ideographs as ideological indicators, we can see how someone who has experiences in Christian narratives will be conditioned to understand “holistic development” as an ideograph either by listening to marketing material from FBOs like Compassion Child

and World Vision presented in church or sitting in the pews on Sunday. For individuals with this Christian context or an individual like Rachael Boyer, this statement from World Vision would not seem vague or subtle in the slightest.

In some ways this is masterful, and may have resulted unintentionally as a genuine miscommunication where each side assumes the other knows what both groups are talking about. Regardless of how this occurred, the process of coopting an ideograph creates a unique communicative phenomenon. On the one hand, secular non-profits, government entities, grantors, etc. may believe they understand the ideology and additional meaning accompanying terms that an FBO will use to describe their work in reports or grant applications such “development,” “holistic approach,” or “empowerment.” These secular organizations may even genuinely believe their goals are identical, thinking “How different can our approaches to development truly be?” Yet, as McGee states, due to the lack of conditioning to these ideographs they may have no idea the extent of ideology that is being conveyed through the use of the particular ideographs by an FBO since they will appear as common language term to the unsuspecting. Development has been coded in the Christian community to go beyond the traditional dictionary definition or even the common conception used by the international outreach community.

Proving the similarities between World Vision and Compassion International is critical for two reasons. Beyond being two of the largest FBOs to engage in international development and sounding almost identical on paper, the actions of both are deeply impactful. Compassion International is infamous for unabashedly proselytizing in

developing countries through their child sponsorship programs. World Vision on the other hand, claims to not proselytize as they receive hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States Federal Government. For example, in 2016 alone WV received \$220 million from the USFG (“Consolidated Financial Statements,” 2016). Due to the lack of monitoring FBOs and conditional aid, it is important to understand the true intentions and methods of these groups—especially when some FBOs receive federal funding.

Secondly, it is important to find where the similarities between these organizations end. Groups that are founded by similar ideologies and use the same ideographs are not necessarily identical in their conduct. In fact, the “Revised FBO Typology Table” taken from *Bridging the Gaps* gives us a way to classify different types of faith-based organizations in order to understand how World Vision and Compassion International can vary greatly despite their apparent similarities.

	Faith-Permeated	Faith-Centered	Faith-Affiliated	Faith Background	Faith-Secular Partnership	Secular
<i>Self-description</i>	Include explicit references to faith	Includes explicit references to faith	Faith references may be either explicit or implicit	May have implicit references to faith (e.g., references to values)	No reference to faith in mission of the partnership or of the secular partner	No faith content, but references to values are often present
<i>Founded/organized</i>	By faith group and/or for faith purposes	By faith group and/or for faith purposes	By faith group and/or for faith purposes	May have historic tie to a faith group or purpose, but that connection is no longer strong	Faith partners founded by faith group or for faith purpose; no reference to faith identity of founders of the secular partnerships may or may not be religious	No reference to faith identity or spiritual views (if any) if founder(s)/ Organizer
<i>Management /Leaders</i>	Faith or ecclesiastical commitment an	Faith commitment understood	Normally share the organization’	Faith criteria considered	Required to respect but not necessarily	Faith criteria

	explicit prerequisite	to be a prerequisite (may be implicit or explicit)	s faith orientation, but explicit faith criteria are considered irrelevant or improper	irrelevant or improper	share faith of the faith partners	considered improper
<i>Staff/Volunteers</i>	Faith commitment is important; most or all share organizations faith orientation; faith an explicit factor in hiring/recruitment process	Faith commitment may be an explicit selection favor for tasks involving religion, but may be less important in other positions	Staff/volunteers are expected to respect but not necessarily share the faith orientation of the organization; faith beliefs motivate self-selection of some staff/volunteers	Little to no consideration of faith commitment; faith beliefs may motivate self-selection of some staff/volunteers	Staff/volunteers expected to respect faith of the faith partner(s); program relies significantly on volunteers from faith partners	Faith criteria for any staff/volunteer considered improper
<i>Financial and other support</i>	Garners support from faith community	Garners support from faith community	Able to garner some support from faith community	Able to garner some support from faith community	Able to garner some support from faith community	Little to no ability to garner support from faith community
<i>Organized faith practices of personnel/volunteers (prayer, devotions, etc.)</i>	Faith practices play a significant role in the functioning of the organization; personnel/volunteers expected or required to participate	Faith practices play a significant role in the functioning of the organization ; personnel/volunteers expected or required to participate	Faith practices are optional and not extensive	Faith practices are rare and peripheral to the organization	Faith partners may sponsor voluntary faith practices; secular parties do not	No organized faith practices
<i>Main form of integrating faith content with other program variables</i>	Integrated/Mandatory (engagement with explicit faith content is required of all beneficiaries)	Integrated/Optional or Invitational (engagement of beneficiaries with explicit faith content is optional or takes place in activities outside	Invitational, Relational or Implicit (engagement of participants with explicit faith content takes place in optional activities outside the program parameters or	Implicit (beneficiaries only encounter faith content if they seek it out)	Implicit, Invitational, or Relational, depending on staff/volunteers of the faith partner)	None

		program parameters)	in informal relationships with staff and/ or volunteers)			
<i>Expected connection between faith and outcomes</i>	Expectation of explicit faith experience or change, and belief that this is essential or significant to desired outcome	Strong hope for explicit faith experience or change, and belief that this contributes significantly to desired outcome	Little expectation that faith change or activity is necessary for desired outcome, though it may be valued for its own sake; some believe that acts of compassion and care alone have an implicit spiritual impact that contributes to outcome	No expectation that faith experience or change is necessary for desired outcome	No expectation that faith experience or change is necessary for desired outcome, but the faith of volunteers from faith partners is expected to add value to the program	No expectation of faith change or experience
<i>Faith Symbols Present</i>	Usually	Usually	Often	Sometimes	Sometimes (program's administration usually located in a secular environment; program activities may be located in a faith environment)	No

(Source: Revised Table drawn from Sider and Unruh (2004); as taken from *Bridging the Gaps* by Hefferan, Adkins, and Occhipinti, 2009, pp. 20-25)

As shown above, faith can be integrated in many different capacities and can permeate the structure through content administered, conduct of the staff, and into the day in and day out practices. Tamsin Bradley in their 2009 article “A call for clarification and

critical analysis of the work of faith-based development organizations (FBDO)” defines “an FBDO to be an organization where faith is embedded into the organizational structures producing a diversity of approaches to development practice. In some cases, faith acts as a platform for close partnerships at the community level.” In order to distinguish which category an NGO falls under, one must determine how influential faith is within the organization. Depending on that factor, the way an organization measures success can function on different metrics. For instance, “Faith-Permeated” or “Faith-Centered” models will evaluate the success of their outreach depending on whether participants have an “explicit faith experience of change.” Similarly, to secular NGOs, those with a faith background (like the Red Cross, Oxfam and Amnesty International) have no expectation of an individual experiencing a spiritual moment or changing their faith as a result of receiving their services. Even though all four groups could receive money to deliver social services or resources, the overarching objective of each vary greatly from conversions to being satisfied with delivering aid as an end in and of itself.

As explicated in the literature review, one of the most difficult components of analyzing FBOs is the refusal of these organizations to engage in the terminology and accurately self-identify. Rather, they prefer to stress their roles as “Christian development” agencies but not all Christian agencies are equal. The degree faith is incorporated alters the way they function in theory and in reality. Therefore, it is critical to understand the nuances betwixt them. Take for example our three case studies. Compassion Child, a specific program from Compassion International, is a classic example of a “Faith-Centered” FBO while World Vision more aptly falls under the

“Faith-Affiliated” category due to the ways they describe themselves. Compassion international self-identifies as “a Christian child development organization dedicated to releasing children from poverty” with a focus on benefiting children in their sponsorship program through “the opportunity to hear the gospel and learn about Jesus; regular Christian training; . . . a caring and safe Christian environment to grow in self-confidence and social skills; personal attention, guidance and love” (“Compassion International Our Mission,” 2018). World Vision specifies “Our goal is for our Christian faith to be woven through all we do and not as an ‘add on’ to development projects. We never require those we serve listen to a religious message or convert to Christianity as a condition of aid.” (“FAQ- About Child Sponsorship,” 2018). By explicitly stating that WV does not apply conditions to their aid and following through in action, the divide between CI and WV becomes even more apparent proving not all Christian Development organizations play by the same rules despite being motivated by the same ideology.

The National Association of Evangelicals differs from WV and CI because it does not exist primarily as a development agency. The NAE exists to unify churches and organizations by setting forth a standard on doctrine and service outreach that partners can ascribe to. Within the NAE there is a humanitarian arm, World Relief, but even more importantly are the partnerships. Colleges like Wheaton to give Christ-Permeated FBOs like Samaritan’s Purse down to dozens of smaller churches across the US share the same Statement of Faith. In addition, they share a similar standard of what “Christian community development” should look like. Noel Castellanos, CEO of the Christian Community Development and former appointee to President Obama’s Council for Faith

and Neighborhood Partnerships, wrote a sponsored post for the NAE addressing the differences between Christian community development differ and secular community development.

Community development focuses on transforming the physical environment of a neighborhood as its primary goal. Christian Community Development is also committed to that process. However, it begins with the premise that not only the neighborhood, but also the people that live in it are important to God and deserve to live in a healthy, flourishing community. (“National Association of Evangelicals: On Community Development,” 2016)

The difficulty above is the subtly. By discerning the premise that people in communities are shown how important they are to God, it indicates that all people need to learn this view. You can’t learn how important you are to God unless you know who He is. Where this becomes complicated is realizing that this mission statement by the NAE represents “more than 45,000 local churches from nearly 40 different denominations, in addition to nondenominational churches” (“National Associations of Evangelicals: Churches,” 2018). The mission is left vague enough that churches can interpret to what degree they want to evangelize, based on the one required backing that they evangelize or share the good news of the Gospel. Recognizing however, that evangelizing is an ideograph to certain members within the evangelical community this standard can act as the justification for exploitation for NAE partner organizations like Samaritan’s purse or small congregations sending missionaries abroad with a lack of experience.

Without a critical lens one might mistakenly lump together all Christian development agencies or fall back to large sweeping generalizations that all FBOs are the same. In reality Oxfam couldn't be more different than the service trips your local church or religious school puts together. Clarke stresses the need to define differences as they "raises caution that not all FBDOs share the vision of culturally sensitive development practice. Greater critical analysis is needed into the work of FBDOs in order to prevent funding from being directed towards those FBDOs whose objectives are to proselytize or/and denigrate other faiths" (2007). This quote once again stresses the importance that not all FBOs should be defunded or forbidden, but more critical analysis is needed to ensure funding goes to FBOs whose primary goal is delivering aid instead of proselytizing.

Ultimately, determining how influential faith is to the structure of an FBO is an important distinction because it can effect hiring practices, where they get their funds from, and can fundamentally alter how these groups practice engagement when entering into the donor/receiver relationship of dispersing aid or social services. FBOs are a reflection of not only the faiths they represent but the United States. I posit that we should know how other nations perceive who we are in the world and it is critical to know exactly what we pay for when the government uses taxpayer dollars to fund FBOs.

Ideographs, Aid, and Identity Creation

The second level of ideographic analysis this chapter covers refers to the practices Christian FBOs use and how that can fundamentally alter the identity creation,

intentionally or unintentionally, of themselves and communities they interact with when they engage in aid. A unique relationship exists between donor and recipient in traditional development relationships (Probasco, 2016). FBOs uniquely face additional levels of complexity in this already terse relationship as they transfer material goods as well as ideology. Examining the language they use during these interactions provides a unique insight to how the relationship is altered and how it impacts identity creation of both parties. In the long term, this allows for better assessment of the efficacy and efficiency of FBOs actions.

Walking into development relationships an inherent imbalance of power exists. Donors yield a significant advantage to influence situations as they have the ability to specify where to engage, who can get aid, what conditions (if any) they need to meet, and what the ultimate goal of the transaction should be. By introducing religion into the equation, this becomes even messier as “Religion influences the act of giving care to strangers, from the frequency of volunteering to the amount and objects of charitable donations to shaping the moral identities of people who give” (Allahyari, 2000; Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011; Wuthnow, 1991; Probasco, 2016). While I agree with the following I believe that it also shapes the identities of those who receive the aid. In a study done by Dr. Erin Probasco in 2009 to 2011 on how Nicaraguans felt receiving aid from secular versus FBOs. FBOs would refer to their donations as “gifts” to the communities. Typically, gift exchanges can increase solidarity between parties but only if there is an ability to reciprocate. Probasco explains that in instances where social and material inequality exist, like within aid interactions, “the cycle of reciprocity is broken” because

those on the receiving end are led to believe that they “can never return gifts that are equal in material value to those received.” The larger impact is that “‘giver’ and ‘receiver’ become identity markers rather than temporary statuses. In cultures that practice cyclical gift exchange, an inability to reciprocate signals both economic and moral inferiority” (Probasco, 2016, p. 235). In this case study, the after-math of internalizing these identity markers fostered greater dependence on Western aid and feelings of hopelessness from the Nicaraguan population to address their own situations. For example, some Nicaraguans began to pray that they would be worthy to receive the gifts from “angels” in the West adding a literal nuance to the “white savior” argument. As Probasco explains,

Divine agency becomes the prime mover in initiating and accomplishing specific aid exchanges that are identified in advance as desirable by recipients. In these accounts, foreign volunteers were not careful observers of poverty who identified needs. Instead, they were the messengers or delivery system of divine will. (Probasco, 2016, p. 241)

Western FBOs acting as “messengers . . . of divine will” do not refer to themselves as angels or explicitly encourage dependence on their aid. In fact, often times FBOs want to create empowerment in the communities they engage with by encouraging self-sufficiency. However, due to the intermingling of “divine will” with the volatile relation between donor and recipient, these roles can be internalized. Typically, “when donor and recipient goals clash, common wisdom and experience suggest that recipients will adapt to donor requirements” (Probasco, 2016, p. 232; Bradley, 2009) meaning that recipients

will also adopt the rhetoric of these organizations in order engage with these requirements. By sharing language and rituals like prayer, it bonds the groups together. However, it also creates buy-in to the narrative presented by FBO to communities in developing countries when both groups use the same language for meaning making and describing their identity. This case study is critical to illustrate that group identity can be unintentionally constituted as a result of interacting with another collective identity when engaging in delicate relationships like the transference of international aid and religious ideology.

Beyond adopting the rhetoric and internalizing identity markers, recipient communities may also cater to what they perceive the “requirements of donors” to be (Bradley, 2008). One of the most heart-breaking examples is the commodification and objectification of Cambodian orphans. Cambodia, like other nations in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, experience high volumes of “voluntourism.” Meaning tourists would come to Cambodia and volunteer either in addition to their vacations or create vacation around this experience. During their visits to Cambodia tourists would pour in donations and support local businesses. Typically, foreigners visiting a developing country is beneficial as it stimulates the local economy. The tourist may come individually or with a group like a service trip or mission trip. Regardless of the number, “voluntourists” typically come with open pocket books and the best of intentions (Rotabi et. al, 2017). The problem then became the volume of “voluntourists” unintentionally created a market for the problem they were attempting to solve: the abuse of Cambodian orphans.

According to Juliana Ruhfus' article "Cambodia's Orphan Business" published in 2012 by Aljazeera, this influx in tourism centered around working in orphanages created incentive for Cambodians to cater to the newly created market by maintaining appearances of "poverty porn" and ensuring that orphanages stay open. Ruhfus explicates "despite a period of prosperity in the country, the number of children in orphanages has more than doubled in the past decade, and over 70 per cent of the estimated 10,000 'orphans' have at least one living parent" (Ruhfus, 2012). Parents in Cambodia would choose to send their children to orphanages because it was financially lucrative for them to do so as Westerners would pour donations in. What's worse, in order to maintain this industry Cambodian orphanages and communities would often purposefully attempt to continue underdevelopment to cater to this "poverty porn" standard the "voluntourism" industry implicitly demanded. This resulted in the very real exploitation of children in these orphanages as failing orphanages would be kept open to draw in Westerners and the money they received did not go to the children but to those running these orphanage industries.

Additionally, there have been allegations of abuse by Westerners but even more commonly are the psychological damage done to these children who face constant cycles of abandonment. When volunteers are at the orphanage for week long spans they give affection to the children and leave soon after. Children get emotionally connected to individuals or are threatened to appear happy in order to continue receiving donations. One such story is of Yan Chanty and Kong Thy who became homeless after their French-funded organization shut down due to embezzlement on the part of the director. Ruhfus

writes, “Both young men are deeply traumatized by their removal from their parents and life in the orphanage. Yet, Chanty and Kong are the survivors. They tell us how half of the orphanages' former inhabitants are now homeless and living on the streets, while many have mental problems and some have even died” (Ruhfus, 2012).

This case study, while tragic, illustrates that recipients respond to donor demands. These demands are not always explicitly articulated by donors, often they are portrayed through the creation of markets like the one for voluntourism. Within the context of FBOs this is important because 1) FBOs send large volumes of groups to do outreach to these groups fueling these industries and 2) FBOs may not realize the implicit or perceived donor demands they create. If FBOs claim that they are merely “encouraging” those they deliver aid and social services to accept Christianity, there are undertones of pressure for individuals experiencing extreme duress to adapt these views, rhetoric, and customs in order to continue receiving services.

Thus far, I have shown you the identity construction that occurs as a result of the relationship between donors and recipients and how the rhetoric used by both groups can act to bridge cultural divides as well as to constrain individuals to new cycles of dependency; the different structures of NGOs and FBOs fundamentally alter the practices and objectives of development agencies. Now I will examine how FBOs employ ideographs to justify their practices and the implications of doing so.

The most popular ideographs for FBOs are their propensity to reference “evangelizing” and “witnessing” in place of proselytism. To outsiders, “witnessing” would simply mean the act of listening to or testifying about their faith and

“evangelizing” means to spread the good news of the Gospel. In reality, the tactics of “witnessing” and “evangelizing” do more than to simply encourage or watch passively. They are descriptors for any tactics that an FBO utilizes in their outreach. Using platforms like soup kitchens, delivering emergency aid after natural disasters, or handing out diapers in at-risk neighborhoods to needy mothers would all provide opportunities for FBOs to “witness” or “evangelize” spreading their ideology to those who accept these donations. Some FBOs will even refuse to deliver these goods and services until after they have had an opportunity to engage in outreach, creating conditionality to their aid. However, more often than not FBOs claim they do not coercively attempt to force participants to take on their ideology. However, as I have previously shown, the very nature of the aid-based relationships are complicated and can add an edge of compulsion FBO donors may not realize are there.

So what would coercive conversion look like? The international community would typically refer to this process as proselytism. Proselytism typically refers to “end-directed efforts to spread faith through conversion” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 67; Stanhke, 1999, p. 255-6) or more critically, “defined as actively promoting conversion to a particular ideology or religion or otherwise pressuring potential converts to accord with specific norms and practices” (Lynch and Schwartz, 2016, p. 60). While proselytism is typically frowned upon by FBOs and the international community (Fletcher, p. 68) the lack of binding legal definition means that proselytism conduct is still hotly debated among FBO members and participants. However, witnessing and evangelizing fall outside this scrutiny as those out of the community do not recognize the extra meaning embedded

into these seemingly plain language terms—rather they seem innocuous. Moreover, witnessing and evangelizing are also defined through subjective means depending on the individual or individual organizations utilizing that rhetoric. The lack of clear legal definitions around all three of these buzzwords have resulted in stigma around the word “proselytism” with some nations banning missionaries entering into their country on the basis of proselytism while turning a blind eye to evangelizing and witnessing. Ultimately, using phrases like evangelizing and witnessing effectively act as a de facto form of proselytism on a massive scale (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68). I believe that witnessing and evangelizing are ideographs because to those who identify with the Religious Right, and specifically evangelicals, these words represent their ideological obligation to follow The Great Commission of Jesus. Subsequently, these words are revered as part of their identity and as a transition between ideology to group action. There is clearly meaning embedded into these terms that outsiders would not recognize and the force of these ideographs manifest as the action component to collective identity. Through the examination of the practices FBOs utilize when witnessing and evangelizing, it is evident that proselytism is repeated almost exactly in international aid and development yet undetected due to this rhetorical phenomenon in which members who know these ideographs will feel justified in their actions without seeing how coercive their actions truly are.

Since these practices are hidden in plain sight as ideographs, the best way to determine what “witnessing” and evangelizing” manifest as are to examine how FBOs use them in their literature. McGee tells us that ideographs are conveyed through

“Ideology [as] a political language composed of slogan like terms signifying collective commitment” (McGee, 1980, p. 435). One report by Dr. Kaoma with the organization Political Research Associates researched evangelical FBO presence in sub-Saharan Africa in 2009 found that evangelicals use “‘Social witness’ [as] a term describing how churches respond to God’s call to work for peace and justice” (2009, p. 2). This definition is mirrored in literature published by World Vision, “As we help children and families gain access to life essentials – like clean water, nutritious food, and healthcare – we strive to serve as a vibrant witness throughout our lives, deeds, and words to God’s unconditional love for all people in the hope available in Christ” (“World Vision: Christian Faith,” 2018). Serving as a “witness” in this context goes beyond the assumed quiet observation those outside the community might expect. Instead, it indicates “collective commitment” to proclaiming “God’s unconditional love for all people” while delivering life essentials. To build on this and tie directly to McGee, “bearing witness” is a slogan like term that binds collectives and drives them to act, “We believe that bearing witness to Christ is every Christian’s responsibility. We demonstrate our faith in various ways—by who we are and how we live, the words we use to express our faith and pointing to God’s work (i.e., life, deed, word and sign).” The emphasis being, there is nothing passive about witnessing.

NAE sponsored organizations like Samaritan’s Purse prefer to use “evangelizing” in lieu of “witnessing” in their literature but functionally they serve the same purpose. Franklin Graham, founder of Samaritan’s Purse shares the NAE Statement of Faith to evangelize across the globe. Samaritan’s Purse has become one of the world largest FBOs

and it holds tight to its spiritual backing, even at times to the detriment of the individuals receiving the organization's assistance. For example, Samaritan's Purse was awarded \$830,000 by USAID to create a medical center in Lubango, Angola (Marsden, 2012; Stockman et al., 2006). Graham created the Evangelical Medical Center and required that staff must be evangelical (and even used this reasoning to justify hiring discrimination when refusing to employ Catholics). The most important tenant is that nurses were expected to evangelize on the job. This mirrored former requirements Graham had put out to employees distributing aid like in 2001 when Samaritan's Purse refused to provide instruction for earthquake victims to set up USAID funded shelters until after evangelistic services. Upon the dedication of the Evangelical Medical Center, Graham "claims to have led 13,496 souls to Jesus" (Stockman et al., 2006). Clearly, evangelizing as Graham has employed in El Salvador, Angola and most recently in Haiti after the 2014 hurricane, means "end-directed efforts to spread faith through conversion" (Fletcher, 2014, p. 67; Stanhke, 1999, pp. 255-6). By smuggling in a false agenda using ideographs, Graham has been able to skirt federal regulation and invest millions of tax payer dollars into his proselytizing agenda. The largest current controversy Graham's FBO is facing is accusations of proselytism in India as Operation Christmas Child care packages continue to flood in the country offering toys for children, hygiene products, and Bibles. Some may believe that this seems relatively harmless, however, Franklin Graham's intentions have been abundantly clear as he has been quoted saying he targets India to receive aid because of the "hundreds of millions of people locked in the darkness of Hinduism . . . bound by Satan's power" (Subramanya, 2015). Clearly, the objectives of Franklin's FBO

are for conversions and he, like other NEA affiliated partners, use the deliverance of aid and social services (like education and health care) as a platform to force engagement.

Proselytism is one of the largest harms that FBOs continually partake in and it is constantly evolving. Under the guise of “witnessing” and “evangelizing” FBO can receive government funding to deliver aid and apply conditions, implicitly like in the case of Cambodia and Nicaragua, and explicitly as indicated by Samaritan’s Purse in Angola, Haiti, El Salvador and India. Due to the ideographic nature of “witnessing” and “evangelizing” proselytism has increased while governments can claim plausible deniability in their awareness. However, it could not be more clear to those within FBOs, and those interacting with them, the reality of the situation. This is not only unethical but it is frightening to see proselytism evolve from one missionary waving a loaf of bread in front of a starving child with one hand while holding a Bible in the other, to a savvy state-sponsored enterprise in which aid or development resources (spanning from microloans to medical care) are held on the condition of conforming to religious rhetoric.

Proselytism Undermines Development and Dignity

The practices FBOs engage in can ultimately undermine the overarching goals of “empowerment” and “development” that the United States and the United Nations are devoted to. More importantly, when groups engage in practices that negatively impact the groups they are attempting to help (as evidenced through case studies like Nicaragua, Cambodia, Haiti, India, and El Salvador) it calls into question the role of these groups. For the sake of FBOs and the groups they are attempting to help it is crucial to reevaluate

implicit and explicit demands that are altering the donor/recipient relationship as well as the subsequent identity construction of these groups. Finally, proselytism should be avoided at all costs and ideographs that have created de facto proselytism should be heavily scrutinized. As Mahatma Gandhi so eloquently articulated, "I hold that proselytizing under the cloak of humanitarian work, is to say the least, unhealthy. It is most certainly resented by the people here" (Subramanya, 2015). Recognizing local populations resent proselytizing practices, when an FBO chooses to utilize these practices it ultimately undermines the objectives of the sponsoring organization and even more importantly, it is un-dignifying to coerce individuals into adopting religious practices during times of extreme duress in their life.

Chapter Five: The Rise of FBOs and the Religious Right

Within the last ten years, as invocations of God or reference to faith by government officials set modern era highs, three out of four Americans report identifying as Christians (Domke & Coe, 2010). Unsurprisingly, the rise of American Christian FBOs in international development and aid did not occur spontaneously. Rather, their increased influence occurred as a direct result of the Religious Right's careful creation to carve out a space for themselves as a prominent and un-ignorable force in United States politics. In this chapter I will walk through the rise of the Religious Right and the implications on domestic and foreign policy.

This chapter covers the insemination of the Religious Right as a voting bloc in the United States. By tracing their mythic reality back to its inception, I unearth the social implications of constitutive rhetoric in mobilizing political action on domestic and international scales. Further, I will deconstruct "stewardship" as a lynchpin that holds this myth of FBOs being more effective in disseminating aid. This myth is what allowed for the Religious Right to steer foreign policy to get involved in Sudan, the AIDS fight in Africa, and many issues of development.

The Rise of the Religious Right in Politics

Defining the Religious Right is the first step in understanding the vast impact they have had on shifting the American political climate in the last fifty years. According to Dr. Lee Marsden, an expert from East Anglia University who specializes in researching the Christian Right and their impacts on U.S. foreign policy, there are a multitude of

terms that can be used to describe this collective identity such as the “‘Religious Right,’ ‘born-again Christians,’ ‘conservative evangelicals,’ ‘religious conservatives,’ and ‘dominionists’ (Marsden, 2008, p. 3). Alternatively, Clyde Wilcox defines the Christian Right as “a social movement that attempts to mobilize *evangelical* Protestants and other orthodox Christians into conservative political action” (Marsden, 2008, p. 3). Due to the nebulous nature of defining the Christian Right, it can be difficult to quantify their numbers. For instance, pollsters and statisticians have difficulty conducting research in estimating or predicating their future decision making.

Marsden explains that it is difficult to define the Religious Right as a movement because it appears to exist as a phenomenon. I would argue that though Marsden is correct that defining the Religious Right as a movement and predicating their subsequent actions is difficult, it would be a fundamental misstep to classify the Religious Right as a phenomenon. Rather, I agree with McGee who states that collective identities (e.g. “the people”) “are more *process* than *phenomenon*” (McGee, 1975, p. 240). Meaning that this group did not arise from thin air nor will it remain in its constant state. “The People” are alive and constantly evolving through their use of narrative construction, ritual creation, and contributing to shared meaning making. The Christian Right is the perfect example of the process it takes to constitute identity and to illustrate the evolutions a group will undergo throughout this process.

Historical Context of the Religious Right

President Jimmy Carter began incorporating his Southern Baptist Christian identity into his presidential rhetoric in the late 1970s. Drawing on his experiences as a Sunday school teacher, he was able to connect with fellow Christian voters by broadcasting that narrative in interviews, presidential debates, and public addresses. However, it wasn't until a strategic decision made by top Republicans during President Ronald Reagan's campaign that the official courtship of the Religious Right began. In the 1980 presidential election Reagan faced off against presidential incumbent Jimmy Carter. Republicans, in need of votes and resolved to win the executive office, shifted the conservative platform to focus on "family values" in order to court a much needed and previously untapped voting block: religious voters. In doing so, Republicans inadvertently created a new Christian political identity: the Religious Right. By the very nature of creating this political platform Republicans were able to dictate what "family values" and "Christian issues" entailed in politics. Capitalizing on controversial issues of the day they catered their platform to highlight issues they felt 1) would draw in protestants (like evangelicals) and 2) could benefit the goals of their party. The fight against abortion became a main issue, upholding religious freedom a close second, followed by "traditional" marriage or "family values" which manifested through anti-LGBTQ policies like opposing same-sex marriage as well as shaming promiscuity, and finally focusing on individual responsibility to emphasize their opposition to big government. The creation of this platform is magnificently unique insofar as it reached out to an identity that was already constituted and it assigned political action to the group in order to serve the organizer's

agenda. Over time, the explicit instruction that Reagan did to form this narrative (e.g. the “Christians for Reagan” campaign) eventually began to evolve into more subtle references by the time Obama came to power (Coe and Chennoweth, 2015, p. 281).

To this day, the simplest way to identify the Religious Right is by the policies they support, not by their titles. As evidence Marsden claims that “the Christian Right are politically active conservatives, united in their opposition to abortion, euthanasia, stem-cell research, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, promiscuity, secularism and big government” (2008, pg. 4). The National Association of Evangelicals cite their purpose as “provid[ing] a forum where Evangelicals can work together to preserve religious liberty, nurture families and children, protect the sanctity of human life, seek justice for the poor, promote human right, work for peace, and care for God’s creation” (“National Association of Evangelicals: Mission and Work,” 2018). The overlap between Christian values today and the Republican agenda from the 1980s has infiltrated an identity so deeply that the group not only uses these points to identify its purpose, but evangelicals do not remember this transition. The National Association of Evangelicals claims that only “theological convictions define us—not political, social or cultural trends” (“National Association of Evangelicals: What is an Evangelical?,” 2018). The deep irony being that evangelicals are one of the most powerful voting blocs in the United States today (largely credited as securing President Trump’s presidency) and the NAE articulates the church’s opinion on current issues. For all intents and purposes, they are constantly adding to the identity of “evangelical” by requiring political action from their actors but refusing to recognize the conscious efforts that have and are being used to

construct their narrative. McGee describes these political myths as “endemic to the human condition and, though technically they represent nothing but a “false consciousness,” they nonetheless function as a means of providing social unity and collective identity. Indeed, “the people” *are* the social and political myths they accept” (McGee, 1975, p. 247). The religious right, “the people” I am examining, are responding to social and political myths and are bonding through those myths. They then go on to continue evolving the myth to expand the fiction to fit their perception of the world. Using these “social and political myths” to filter facts and create a new reality, groups can rewrite, erase or invent a history and facticity of their choosing.

Of equal relevance, beyond recrafting the narrative for one group, Coa and Chennoweth report that many Americans are conditioned through the political discourse of Christian leaders “to connect the country’s ‘moral prestige’ with Christian values” (2015, p. 281). These very values, once again, being largely constructed by career politicians to secure votes, not deriving explicitly from doctrine like the Christian Right would advocate.

Rise of FBOs through the CFBCI

Since the 1990s, social policy has elevated the status of FBOs to “supplement or replace government in addressing social problems” (De Vita, 1999; Marwell, 2004; Smith & Sosin, 2001; Vanderwoerd, 2008). In the 1996 welfare reform, the “Charitable Choice” legislation included in the 1996 welfare reform would pave the road to allowing the government to increase access of FBO to apply for state funding while loosening

constraints on these organizations to include faith tenants in their outreach. These legislative changes set the field for the creation of the White House Office for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.

The largest consolidation of power for the Religious Right occurred during President George W. Bush's first term. George W. Bush introduced the world to "compassionate conservatism" where he highlighted his Christian faith as a candidate and used it as justification for supporting conservative policies or using prayer as a means of appeasing religious constituents who were not happy about his policy decisions. In many ways, this acted as an evolution of the Religious Right narrative but was much more subtle than Reagan's explicit appeal to Christians. In response to wanting to cater to his constituents, fortifying compassionate conservatism and pressure to cut down on government spending for welfare, the Bush administration crafted a plan to outsource social services. In late 2001, Bush created the Center for Faith-Based and Community (CFBCI) Initiatives within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Huliaras, 2008). The CFBCI acted as the main point of contact between USAID and the faith communities by reaching out to FBOs to instruct them how to apply for government funding to develop social services domestically and internationally at organized church meetings across the country. Lack of experience or expertise in the field would not jeopardize FBOs' opportunity to receive funding, rather funding to FBOs doubled and all State Department offices were told to encourage FBOs to assist in delivery of social services (Huliaras, 2008; Marsden, 2008).

The CFBCI quickly brought about several problems. First, many worried the separation between church and state was being degraded. Though there were official rules in place to prohibit proselytism, individuals found ways to skirt around those rules with Bush himself even being quoted on the record saying to a group of religious leaders about FBOs in 2004, “I think if you ask them their biggest problem, they'd say, ‘Well, we need to expand, there's more souls to be saved, we need a little extra space for our rescue mission,’ he said. He then assured the groups: ‘The government has got resources’” (Stockman et al., 2006). Founder of Samaritan’s Purse, Franklin Graham parroted these sentiments in a later interview after controversies surrounding his proselytism in Sudan and Angola saying, “Of course you cannot proselytize with tax dollars, and rightfully so. I agree with that. But it doesn't mean that we can't build buildings, we cannot provide housing and buy bricks and mortar. The proselytizing or the preaching or the giving out of Bibles, people give us funds for those” (Stockman et al., 2006). Technically, this loophole is permissible because many FBOs combine government funding with private donation. The most common example being the millions USAID has allocated for FBOs to build religious medical centers and to buy medical equipment in developing countries. Despite, evangelizing while administering care, FBOs like Samaritan’s Purse can claim that handing out Bibles and missionaries do not come from the government’s so they are free to engage in the activity they want by reallocating what money (state or private) they use to sponsor their various activities. The true reason that so many have been able to get away with proselytism on the government’s dime is because the CFBCI lacks an

enforcement mechanism. Additionally, USAID does not monitor proselytism (Stockman et al., 2006; Marsden, 2008)

Another problem that arose from the creation of this office has been fund allocation. An expose by the Boston Globe in 2006 found that “98 percent of funds went to Christian Organizations” (Stockman et al., 2006). There was a clearly bias in favor of Bush’s constituents and little has been done to address this to this day. The ethical question of whether Bush could sequester millions to woo his voters remain controversial. Bush claimed no bias factored into his decision. Instead he justified the creation and existence of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives because he believed that “the best, most efficient purveyors of social services were faith-based organizations, since they often worked with low overhead and volunteer labor” (Hefferan, Adkins & Occhipian, 2009, p. 6). The image that FBOs are still altruistic and adhere to a strict moral discipline continues to bolster the narrative that allows FBOs to continue receiving hundreds of millions annually from USAID (Bradley, 2009). In many ways, the perception of FBO effectiveness as an ideal distributor of aid is an offshoot from the mythic reality created by the Religious Right. While volunteering does occur within these organizations it does not create for better services. In fact because the overhead is so low, and FBOs and NGOs alike will strive to keep it low, it means that FBOs will not hire an administrator to keep up with the outcomes (or unintended consequences) of dispersing aid to assess the impacts of the organizations involvement in international aid and development. In many ways, the creation of the CFBCI was a deal with the devil. Bush got to seal the religious bloc for Republicans, claimed to lower

welfare and development costs by outsourcing social service to FBOs and in exchange governments would look the other way when funds were used to degrade the separation between church and state through proselytism, and conveniently ignore the shocking lack of accountability and assessment for FBOs once they had the money. At the end of the day, the CFBCI solidified a place of power for the Religious Right as they could apply for grant money from USAID to go overseas or to stay home with little to no monitoring or supervision. This is essentially the equivalent of writing a blank check to an agency and saying you solved for US hegemonic soft power overseas but being too afraid to check your bank account to see what that exchange ended up costing you.

The Myth of Stewardship

Based upon the complex mythic reality composed by decades of politicians consolidating with religious leaders, it became apparent that certain standards would need to be met in a *quid pro quo* exchange between the church and state. The government would allow more leniency to FBOs on the condition that they could bolster the mythic reality of better spending. As a result, the ideograph of stewardship bridged an understanding between the groups. To an outsider, stewardship would mean to mind resources (typically in an agricultural sense). However, the state used stewardship as a coded word for a big government alternative who would be fiscally responsible. Conversely, FBOs would use it as managing resources in a way that honored their donors wishes. When government officials would read it, they would see their needs being met, but unbeknownst to them, stewardship is also used as an ideograph within the religious

communities to indicate their ability to use their resources to meet their desired outcomes. In the last chapter, I showed the necessity to understand the practices and objectives of various structures of FBOs. This chapter will expand into how FBOs indicate to their community that faith and pragmatic objectives have been met. By looking at examples of stewardship employed in World Vision's and Compassion International's fiscal reports and fundraising material it will become evident how ideographs can be equivocated as logic.

Some faith-based organizations have a unique advantage of drawing upon an immense pool of private donations from their supporters and congregations while also drawing upon immense amount of government funds. Recognizing this, these FBOs also face a unique challenge: the ability to appease two very different donors to ensure their money is being spent properly in order to ask for more donations from each in the future. FBOs have been able to navigate this tension in two distinct ways: first, by catering the content to an organization you know will exclusively deal with. For example, if World Vision writes a grant to USAID requesting funding to build a school in rural Kenya, they would minimize the language about faith components and write specifically about how they will accomplish USAID's objectives of international development and do it a cheaper price because they have other sources of funding to draw from. For USAID, it would be an obvious thing to sponsor since they bid at the cheapest price and it will accomplish what USAID could not do on its own. On the other hand, if World Vision was crafting a pitch for a closed-door room of religious leaders then the pitch would encompass the importance of education as critical to holistic development. They may

mention the spiritual implications of children being able to read their own Bible, or that the lessons this school will teach will incorporate Biblical teaching. The trick then becomes how FBOs navigate the tension of publishing materials both groups will see and interact with. The answer, is by coding certain phrases to speak to each group without the other realizing. For example, when we examine Compassion International and World Vision's CFOs' fiscal reports for 2016 similar sentiments arise. World Vision claims to be "committed to the highest standards of financial stewardship." While Compassion International reaffirms their value of stewardship, "our commitment to stewardship has not changed." In laymen's terms, both of these phrases would be the equivalent of saying, "We are investing your money wisely." Now the shift for "stewardship" as an ideograph occurs through the recognition that wise investments would vary greatly depending on the donor reading it.

McGee explains that in order to determine the content of an ideograph we must examine the ideological building blocks surrounding it based on the content that surrounds it. In this instance, by tracing donation links through these websites it is possible to find the true objectives of the organization and the true meaning of stewardship as an ideograph. Often times, it takes time to trace through links to unearth what the organization is really trying to convey to Christian audiences. For instance, Compassion International does not receive any government funding so their fundraising tactics are much more transparent as to their objectives. As potential donors navigate through the side they are met with Bible verses with hyperlinks to the donation page on topics ranging from generosity, the Lord's call to help those in need, and on broader

subjects like children. If you navigate to those donation pages, you are met with promises of “stewardship” and financial certification on the bottom of donation pages reassuring you of best business practices. Digging deeper, unearths what your donation will be put toward if you decide to invest in healthcare, education, or sponsorship. Compassion International lists one specific benefit a child will receive when sponsored is “the opportunity to hear the gospel and learn about Jesus; regular Christian training . . . a caring and safe Christian environment to grow in self-confidence and social skills; personal attention, guidance and love.” Further down the fundraising rabbit hole on their fundraising page, below their promises for stewardship, they cite research findings which surveyed former sponsored children and asked which component of Compassion’s program was most beneficial to them, the most common answer was “educational support” (38.5%). The second most common response related to “spiritual development” (29.4%). Listing both of these are immensely telling about Compassion International’s true objectives. They aim to grow students spiritually and through education. These objectives are not inherently wrong, but it is important to realize where the organization truly stands so when claims of “Outstanding stewardship is more than a priority at Compassion. It’s a deeply held value.” Donors can understand where their money will go.

Stewardship for World Vision has a stronger ideographic link as they code their content catering to two separate audiences, private donors and the government. The complexity that comes with stewardship here is not the definition they give, they are rather upfront about what they believe stewardship to mean “The resources at our disposal are not our own. They are a trust from God through donors on behalf of the poor.

We speak and act honestly. We are open and factual in our dealings with donors, project communities, governments and the public at large,” (“WV: We are Good Stewards, 2017). The complexity derives from the results they list to evidence this claim. For instance, “3,494,939 children and youth participation in discipleship and values education” (“World Vision: Christian Faith,” 2018) and on their sponsorship page “Your monthly gift will help ensure that World Vision serves as a beacon light of God’s love, touching the lives of children and families all over the globe” (“World Vision: Ways to Give to Christian Faith,” 2018). Linking the outcome of their success in regard to an ideograph to two additional ideographs creates this complexity. Specifically, Cloud writes extensively on the empty term that is “values education.” Groups choose what values to teach to these children. In the next chapter, we will explore the implications of teaching millions of children across the globe “family values.” Further, WV links into yet another ideograph by tying your donation to the “beacon light” ideograph. This ideograph is commonly seen as a visual ideograph and refers to spreading, witnessing, and evangelizing across the globe.

Ultimately, stewardship for World Vision and Compassion International go beyond the simple dictionary definition of minding resources and beyond secular conceptions of accountability. In reality, stewardship acts as a signifier to different communities that their goals are being prioritized in met depending on the reader. When these goals entail “evangelizing” and “witnessing” than the signals that politicians, governments, and various granting agencies are being blinded from the reality of how their money will be spent. Much to the government’s chagrin, accountability has little to do with FBOs’

continued usage of “stewardship.” This has been proven in 2006 when the US Government Accountability Office sampled a small pool of 13 federally financed FBOs, 4 of which did “not appear to understand the requirements to separate these activities [evangelizing and delivering state sponsored assistance] in time or location from their program services” (Huliaras, 2008, p. 166).

The significance of stewardship derives less from revealing a particularly complicated meaning in the ideograph but rather how necessary to support the mythic reality of the Religious Right in the United States. This ideograph is fundamental to the narrative that FBOs are justified having a place in the US government. Realizing that the justification is entirely factious calls into question the major impacts that the Religious Right has been able to enact as a result of using these groups and this office to get closer to policy makers and presidents.

Becoming a Prominent Player in US Foreign Policy

Through close government connections founded on mythic realities like Bush’s “compassionate conservatism,” FBOs began gaining power to determine where and how foreign aid was being delivered.

While FBOs were encouraged to apply for USAID money, secular organizations began to struggle. For agencies like CARE, UN Population Fund, Reproductive Health for Refugee Consortium, Marie Stopes, and Advocates for Youth have also seen their government funding decline by millions over the years as the award to Christian groups increase (Marsden, 2008, p. 135; Kaplan, 2005; Stockman et al., 2006). Marsden

theorizes this is “based on political considerations rather than ability or expertise in delivering services” (2008, p. 126) and as a direct result of these secular agencies losing funding, it increases the likelihood of secular NGOs having to leaving due to the constraint in resources. In order to fill the void left behind by the absence of these secular social service providers, FBOs (both government sponsored and those willing to fundraise independently) would take the place of secular NGOs giving FBOs the opportunity to carry their moral agenda into their aid work in greater concentrations.

This process occurs twofold as FBOs that receive no government funding (e.g. money from USAID) can draw on their congregation and own donor pools in order to independently raise funds for any development or aid project they choose to pursue domestically or internationally. Without government funding, these FBOs can engage in any outreach or ministry they see fit without the pretense of avoiding proselytizing, witnessing or evangelizing since they aren’t bound to USFG standards or any punitive measures. Secular NGOs do not traditionally have as large donor pools to draw from nor can they draw on them with such consistency. Meaning that when government money is earmarked, or given special preference to FBOs, then secular NGOs are more likely to disappear from at-risk areas altogether if they lose large portions of their funds from their largest backer. FBOs on the other hand can more readily make up the difference of government money lost by relying predominantly on individual donations to cover materials they wish to distribute, building costs, etc. In a self-fulfilling cycle, NGOs are then able to bid partial costs for projects since they know they can raise the remainder (and at times prefer this so they can justify proselytizing using private money). In

comparison, secular NGOs or state sponsored aid will have to petition for higher costs since they do not have as large a donor pool to draw from. When they do not secure the majority of funds, or if they lose said funds, they are more likely to leave. Subsequently, when these NGOs leave there is a dire “need” to aid these communities who find themselves strapped for resources. This “need” can then be used as a pitch by FBOs in their own fundraising (to proposition the government or to fill up collection plates on Sunday) to fill those gaps. The trajectory of prioritizing government money for FBOs means secular NGOs are more likely to leave and the presence of more FBOs that are partially government funded and independently funded take their place.

The CFBCI and fundraising techniques described have resulted in the creation of a “pay to play system” where essentially if organizations are able to raise money either partially or fully then they can independently decide what to do with the funds. If an organization like Compassion Child, which is fully independently funded, wants to proselytize there is technically no law to stop them (unless a country has enacted that on their own terms). However, ethically it violates the Red Cross Code of Conduct as well as reflects poorly on the institution which is why most organizations will use proselytizing practices under the guise of “witnessing” and “evangelizing.” The tie in to government funding is what makes the “pay to play” system so convoluted. Because a secular organization, Planned Parenthood, is barred from applying to government aid because they offer abortion as an option in their guidance on reproductive health (Marsden, 2008, p. 125). Being denied USAID funding because their ideology does not align with the

current administration seems discriminatory at best and a dangerous abuse of power at worst.

Conversely, Planned Parenthood can fundraise independently they could also join the “pay to play” system and choose where they wanted to deliver aid, how they wanted to do it, etc., but due to the differences in fundraising this is not viable. I argue this offers an illusion of equality, as proven and experienced healthcare administrators are systematically kept from delivering state sponsored social services and FBOs, who lack experience, accountability, and struggle separating transferring ideology with aid, have a unique leg up in the system.

Yet another component of this pay to play system means that more relationships are forged between government officials and FBOs. These close-knit relationships resulted in several key foreign policy decisions. For example, Christian FBOs like the FRC, Persecution Project Foundation, International Christian Concern, Christian Freedom International, and Voice of Martyrs, etc. to name a few (Marsden, 2008, p. 135) successfully lobbied Congress and the White House to intervene in the Sudanese conflict. This represented a turning point in the power of the Christian Right, now they were no longer only being wooed by the Republican party, they were honing their influence in Washington to drive foreign policy agendas.

Sudan was a unique battle ground. It represented the first time the Religious Right was able to successfully shift US foreign policy agenda to fit their objectives. The Religious Right were able to mobilize in record numbers to convince the Bush administration to get involved in the Sudanese conflicts. Not only is this demonstrative of

what constitutive identity can do when the people and government officials buy into the same values and reality, but it shows the power of individuals fighting to preserve a threatened narrative. As it turned out, engaging in Sudan actually helped to strengthen the narrative of Christians fighting the “good fight” group. The Sudanese conflict was portrayed as a righteous struggle between Christians in the south and Muslims in the north. Due to the emphasis on two foundational mythic realities the evangelical church relied upon for their narrative, Sudan was able to create the lifeblood to the movement. First, the mythic reality of the living body of Christ. Secondly, that of the persecuted church. The Bible commonly references the persecution of those who believe in Jesus as a sign of validity for their beliefs (for example, 2 Timothy 3:12, “Indeed, all who desire to live a godly life in Christ Jesus will be persecuted,” and John 15:18, “If the world hates you, know that it has hated me before it hated you.”) In order to prove this narrative, Christians within the United States would show images of Sudanese Christians being targeted. By illustrating that Christians are still persecuted overseas, it not only fulfills this narrative but it illustrates to Christians within the United States that their very identity as the collective of “the body of Christ” was under attack.

After successful intervention in Sudan, the Religious Right grew empowered. FBO had changed the rules of the game when it comes to United States foreign policy. They mobilized to dictate where and how and development was delivered. Africa became the newest battle ground as the Christian Right were ultimately the ones to convince the Bush Administration to invest \$15 billion to fight HIV/AIDS (a request he had ignored from secular humanitarian organizations for year) (Marsden, 2008, p. 249).

Controversially, one third of that money was to be reserved for promotion of abstinence only prevention initiative. Also known as the ABC approach (abstinence; be faithful; and use condoms as a last resort for couples where one partner was infected) (Green, 2003, p. 6; Marsden, 2008, p. 6). The Christian Right also succeed in banning needle exchanges and condoning prostitution in Africa (Kaplan, 2005, p. 188-99). Money even began funneling directly to churches in Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya from the President's Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) (Kaoma, 2009). These funds were also used to promote abstinence-only HIV/AIDS prevention programs. This is just one example of many of the rising influence the Christian Right has had in dictating foreign policy and international development.

Current Political Landscape

Within the last two administrations we have not seen a significant shift from what Bush started in 2001. In fact, during the Obama administration the Reverend Jim Wallis stated, "There has been an incredible amount of outreach to the faith community from this administration. I've never seen so much before" (Marsden, 2008, p. 960; PBS, 2009). The biggest changes from the Obama administration to the CFBCI was remaining it to be more inclusive of neighborhood coalitions, in large part due to Obama's heavy history in community organizing. The Obama era office also created a new focus on "collaborative partnership between the US Government and community-based US NGOs," (Marsden, 2008, p. 99.) Falling into what we would recognize from the FBO typology table as more Faith-Secular Partnerships. After Obama's rebranding of the OCFBI and executive orders

banning prioritizing one religion over another for funding that the administration had begun to help level the “playing field for secular organizations” (Marsden, 2008, 963). However, this overlooks repeat offenders like Samaritan’s Purse and others who can continually rely on funding. Despite the cosmetic changes to the office and the restriction to proselytize, the practices FBOs utilize to receive funds remain largely the same. Even now in 2017 there are few punitive mechanisms for individuals who engage in proselytism and few mechanisms to monitor financial accountability and stewardship.

The Trump administration has yet to make any large changes to the CFCBI but the connection Trump holds with evangelicals is even more tangible. He blatantly offered Christians deals in exchange for being voted into office such as “Christians should vote for me because if I’m there, you’re going to have plenty of power. You don’t need anybody else.” Or my personal favorite, “Vote for me, and I will give you Supreme Court picks and abolish the Johnson Amendment.” (Sapp, 2016; Green, 2016). If the Johnson Amendment were repealed, pastors would be able to endorse candidates from the pulpit, which they’re currently not allowed to do by law. It would also allow more money to flow directly into politics from church donations. Repealing the Johnson amendment means religious groups become even more powerful political forces in American politics as we live in the days post *Citizens United v. FEC*.

After the 2016 election, pollsters credit the Christian Right for electing Trump into office. Specifically, Pew Research Center reported that 80% of evangelicals voted for Trump despite his blatantly un-Christian behaviors (divorce, adultery, crass language, etc.) (Smith and Martinez, 2016). Finally, Trump has reinstated the Mexico City policy

weeks after stepping into office meaning that any NGO that offers, recommends, or consults on abortions has had their funding pulled inhibiting their ability to offer international aid and development resources. This has disproportionately impacted secular NGOs who are the only ones that typically offer these services and once more gives the leg up to FBOs to secure government funds.

Conclusion

As the Religious Right became a prominent voting bloc in the United States, they were able to influence presidential administrations to carve out structures of power reserved for them in exchange for their continued support. This signified an interesting transition which began as conservative politicians from the Reagan administration creating values for the group to then having the group actualize as a collective and dictate foreign policy decisions. This chapter illustrates the mythic reality of the Religious Right and analyzes the basis of their rise to power through Bush's creation of the Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives. This rise to power was predicated on the back of a fallacy itself, a myth, that FBOs are ideal or preferable providers of social services and aid. In fact, there is little to no accountability required in this process so the ideograph of stewardship functions as a hollow promise meant to reassure donors. Or as McGee would argue, the rise of this mythic reality is predicated on a combination of ideographs where "Each term would be a connector, specifier, or contrary for those fundamental historical commitments, giving them a meaning and a unity easily mistaken for logic" (1980, p. 433). Clearly, there is a "logic" missing to justify the immense and rapid rise of FBOs

while making it harder for secular NGOs to get involved in international aid and development.

Today, the landscape of international development is evolving thanks to the creation of the CFBCI and rise of the Religious Right. International aid and development “is increasingly populated by small-scale, faith-based, and short-term volunteers” (Schnable, 2015; Wuthnow, 2009). Many are skeptical that this will change significantly in the near future as the Religious Right continue to hold their place of power in the Trump administration.

Chapter Six: Exporting “Family Values” to Uganda

Thus far, I have covered how ideographs function in development literature, for FBOs, and for the Christian Right. In this chapter, I explore how the West capitalized on colonization by using rhetoric to manipulate and exploit populations for centuries in sub-Saharan Africa. Through looking at the case study of FBO intervention in Uganda and formation of Ugandan national policy we can expose the impacts of rhetorical identity construction using Cloud’s method of ideographic critique and McGee’s analysis of constitutive rhetoric. To begin, I analyze the history and implications of colonization, I will highlight the tactics colonizers used that carry such significant implications these tactics influence policy in nations like Uganda to this day. I argue that through official colonizing tactics as well as through unofficial tactics (namely the use of FBOs and Christian missionaries) the West was able to mold and control African behavior and identity. Due to the rhetorical intervention of erasing and rewriting myths, Western intervention and dependence still occurs. In order to understand how this process occurred, I will examine the case study of Uganda and the treatment of the LGBTQIA community. Spoiler alert: the gross mistreatment of these communities derives from a long-standing narrative that to be gay is “un-African.” This myth was created by Western powers and tragically pervasively exists today largely as a remnant of colonialization.

Through examining the myth built around the ideograph of stewardship, I documented the history of how evangelicals were able to engage in the state department, social services, and were able to create a de facto “pay to play” system for international development work. Through the culmination of these actions, the stage was set not only

for state sponsored FBO intervention but compassionate conservatism to take root in other countries across the globe. When evangelicals began expanding the reach of where the Religious Right was able to engage they fundamentally amplified their ability to voice their beliefs to a larger audience. Through targeted and collective action on behalf of the American Religious Right, the “body of Christ” focused on sub-Saharan Africa with renewed and near religious fervor.

By the conclusion of this chapter, I will have proven that the history of Ugandan sexuality was rewritten by Western colonizers through the use of Christian missionaries and the FBO network during colonization. Since these networks and tactics are still employed, this myth continues to exist today much to the detriment of the LGBTQ community in nations like Uganda. Historically, FBO networks were so pervasive and effective in disseminating Christian values because they relied on the same proselytizing practices by missionaries today. Though as previously mentioned, these practices have been relabeled as “outreach tactics” to fit the rhetoric of the development field as well as the rhetoric of the church. Finally, I will illustrate the harms of allowing exclusionary narratives to exist by highlighting the ideograph that creates that damning narrative: “family values.”

Reconstructing African History and Identity

The colonization of Africa provided an unprecedented opportunity for constitutive rhetoric to play out on monumental scales. As Western Imperialists colonized the continent, they forced their ideals, languages, and practices onto local populations while

exporting in mass natural resources and indigenous people to colonizers' homelands. Specifically, these stolen "exports" were used to further the interests of the imperialist nations as local populations were enslaved and forced to harvest these resources for their occupiers. Many populations chose to comply and cater to colonizers' demands because they faced severe retaliation if they did not cooperate.

Spanning from the 15th to the 19th century, European colonizers left devastation in their wake on individual, societal, and continental levels. One of many examples being the grotesquely violent conduct of King Leopold and the legacy of his Belgium colonies in Africa (these colonies are now modern-day Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo). King Leopold ordered the hands of colonized Africans to be chopped off if they did not meet the King's quotas for rubber (Hochschild, 2000). Beyond this barbaric physical maiming inflicted on innocent civilians, colonies were metaphysically marred by abuses in myth-making. Colonizers employed rhetoric to subjugate native populations over the span of decades so both mentally and physically the colonized found themselves under the control of their occupiers.

Africa has been known as the "resource cursed continent" with "a third of the planet's mineral reserves, a tenth of the oil and . . . two-thirds of the diamonds" (*The Economist*, 2015) in addition to a plethora of natural resources such as timber, animal products. Centuries ago, even more important than these precious resources was that Africa was the key to trading routes to the East as far as Europeans were concerned. As Westerners developed the ability to traverse the seas, the continent was overrun with nations willing to exploit indigenous populations in order to control said resources and

trade routes. Westerners were largely successful due to their technological advantage. Colonizers held a prowess over steel production, domestication techniques and guns (Diamond, 2012). Using force, colonizers were able to restructure, exploit and enslave local communities. Societies were reconfigured into colonies as tribes were forced together into artificially constructed borders drawn up in closed meeting rooms in European parliaments.

Arguably one of the most harmful decrees from the West prohibited individuals from speaking their native language and “encouraged” Africans to adopt the language of their colonizers. Sadly, this encouragement was a thinly-veiled euphuism for brute force. In reality, the repercussions for using native languages would result in punishments spanning from at best beatings and at worse death or imprisonment. Some of these laws continue to exist today. Some schools in Uganda still practice corporal punishment when students speak in their native language (Segawa, 2017; Msegigire, 2014) much to the anger and despair of cultural activists.

With the threat of being shot and killed, this effectively deterred individuals from speaking their language and ultimately hindered their ability to pass on their people’s history from one generation to the next. This was uniquely harmful insofar as it destroyed the rich oral tradition of countless communities across Africa. because the majority of these communities passed down their traditions, culturally relevant myths, and history orally rather than via transcription (Diamond, 2012). By prohibiting the practice or learning of a culture’s language, generations of oral histories were erased. Tragically, this

left room for colonizers to rewrite the history of the communities they occupied at their own transgression.

Granted, this does not mean that a tribe's history was immediately erased entirely nor that it was replaced overnight with imported Western values. Colonizers initially struggled gaining access and control to the private lives of citizens. So, households or secluded communities became a safe haven to communicate with one another freely and avoid trans-historical occupancy colonizers. However, as generations passed away their stories and languages began to pass away as well. Especially as harsh punishments deterred the younger generations from learning their people's myths, components of cultural identity were lost and will never be recovered due to the unique nature of squelching a vibrant oral tradition. Capitalizing on this silence concerning myths, Western colonizers were able to supply their own myths and teachings through school curriculum, ordinances by state governing bodies, and through the rhetoric used in religious institutions. Behind these pulpits in schools and churches, colonizers dictated new realities into existence.

Narratives are a crucial component of rhetoric and identity creation. As McGee articulates "the clearest access to persuasion (and hence to ideology) is through the discourse used to produce it" (1980, p. 427). Through erasing oral history and degenerating the culture of countless tribes, colonizers were given an unprecedented ability to force "a myth change" on populaces as they controlled mainstream discourse and were in a position to impart ideology in addition to requiring the adoption of an alien

language. This in many ways set up a “perfect storm” for McGee’s description of constitutive rhetoric to play out on a massive scale. As McGee explains,

As myth change, “generations” change, and with the new generation comes a new “people,” defined not by circumstances or behavior, but by their collective faith in a rhetorical vision. . . . each political myth presupposes a “people” who can legislate reality with their collective belief. So long as “the people” believe basic myths, there is unity and collective identity. When there is no fundamental belief, one senses a crisis which can only be met with a new rhetoric, a new mythology. (1975, p. 246)

In this instance, the lack of “fundamental belief” did not derive from a choice on the behalf of a people who willingly selected out of a “basic myth” set. Rather, it was imposed upon them in order to form a collective identity of “colonized” by the colonizers because they would be easier to manage.

A “new rhetoric” and “mythology” emerged not only in how the West talked about its colonies (Said, 1978) but how those living in colonized Africa began conceptualizing their own identity (collectively and individually). For instance, Dr. Dana Cloud draws upon the rhetoric surrounding Dr. Samuel Huntington’s theory of the <Clash of Civilizations> and how the West continues to use this rhetoric to justify imperialist intervention as we see play out in the “War on Terror.” Specifically, the West described (and continues to describe) the colonized as “uncivilized,” “barbaric,” “savage,” and incapable of self-governance. This characterization creates an image of the oppressed to

be “an ‘inferior’ civilization” which in turn prompts a paternalistic and aggressive intervention from the oppressor, the colonizer (Cloud, 2004, p. 286).

In the case of African colonization, the aggressive intervention manifested in the form of a violent occupation, stripping away tribe’s history through force, and reconstituting the identities of individuals to subjugate local populations as inferior. Ultimately, colonization allowed for a myth of “helpless and savage” to take roots so that Africans and other colonizers projected that the colonized needed “saving from themselves” (Cloud, 2004, p. 286). Historian Marc Epprecht explicitly documents how this process occurred:

Dogmatic revulsion against same-sex behaviors, acts, relationships, and thoughts was introduced into the region by European colonialists and preachers,” who characterized such acts as signs of backwardness, he says. “Africans were encouraged through these discourses to equate homophobic constructions of sexuality with civilization and progress. (Epprecht, 2008, p. 53)

Though the days of colonialism have allegedly passed, this insidious, pervasive myth of inferiority and helplessness continues to exist in legislation, attitudes, rhetoric, and practices of former colonizers and in regards to internalized oppression of the formerly colonized to this day.

FBO Role in Rewriting History

Many of the aforementioned colonizing tactics represented official steps taken by the West to reconstitute the identity of African tribes. However, these official tactics

would not have been nearly as effective without being paired with unofficial tactics to act as a complement. Specifically, Christian missionaries and FBOs from the West acting in less official capacities, flooded into the continent to preach salvation and their cultural values (such as implementing structures of capitalism, practices like monogamy, and imparting notions of “civilization”). The presence of these missionaries represented one of the first forms of international development and aid. Scholars like Githuku recognize that Christianity was used explicitly to “sever East Africans from traditional, cultural, and religious practices and beliefs” (2010; Blevins, 2011, p. 57). This outreach was critical in the implementation of embedding Western values into the African colonies.

These Western missionaries also engaged with different populations than their formal counterparts. Missionaries were planted into communities. There they worked with individuals and families giving FBOs invaluable access into their homes. This access was coveted by the colonizers’ home states as the state could not reach that level of integration on its own accord. Hansen and Twaddle write in their book *Religion & Politics in East Africa*,

Colonial officials sought to build societies in East Africa. In Uganda, for example, a government circular pointed out that it was ‘desirous of encouraging the spread of Christian principles’” (1995, p. 223)

Colonizers believed they could make this dream a reality due to a foundational belief held by both missionaries and government officials. They believed that “building a Christian society could only be accomplished on the foundation of a Christian family” (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 233). This was viewed as desirable from the government’s

perspective because “the family is the basic and smallest unit of social organizations, all religions have an interest in influencing it” (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995) and, as previously discussed, to export values deemed acceptable by the West.

Religious values and cultural ideology are very closely linked. By having direct access to family units, FBOs were not only able to spread government ideals in the form of Christian values but they were encouraged to do so by the colonizing powers. Ultimately, rather than mandate change from a top-down policy oriented approach, colonizers acted through churches, missions, and FBO networks to disseminate values. Since they worked through a bottom-up approach, they were able to win the hearts and minds of communities through delivering much needed resources and social services thus infiltrating the private lives of the colonized as well as maintaining control of their public lies.

In the case of Uganda, missionaries from Christian churches targeted the local populations’ hungry stomachs, aching bodies, and young minds who came to them in need of an English education. Once members of local populations flocked to churches to receive aid, churches began offering more social services like English language education, providing resources for infrastructure, digging wells, or offering food. While receiving this aid, FBOs would impart cultural and Christian values onto recipients through proselytizing practices. Meaning that students would be expected to learn English by learning the scriptures and hungry populations would listen to sermons in exchange for receiving food. In the 1800 and 1900s, laws against proselytism did not exist. Instead, coercive practices meant to convert Africans were actually encouraged by

the state as colonizers viewed these practices and FBO networks as the best way to “civilize” Africans.

The lines between church sponsored social services and religious teaching quickly muddled together (much to the pleasure of the state). The state forged a close relationship with FBOs (a.k.a. Christian missions) through constant contact and in exchange the church was able to formalize a position of power in governments. Specifically, missionaries gained easier access to colonial lawmakers resulting in renewed agility in maneuvering around existing laws and creating laws to benefit their religious objectives. For instance, one Anglican bishop wrote, in no uncertain terms, that when the British mandated Ugandan educational policy to be administered by FBOs “the control of schools gave the church ‘a marvelous opportunity of moulding a nation at its formative stage’” (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 230). Education was then used as a tool to “mould” the nation of Uganda into adapting Christian values in the hopes of creating a Christian nation.

Beyond creating a Christian nation, Western powers wanted to create a Christian elite to work with. Once again looking to Uganda, Hansen and Twaddle describe that FBOs would concentrate their resources on teaching the children of chiefs Christianity in order to “build an economically powerful elite that is Christian” (1995, p. 230). The thought process was that by making a Christian elite it would allow for easier interaction between the colonizers and the colonized. By forcing the African elite to adapt similar values and educational background, it would not only link the two groups ideologically, it would be easier to work with Africans by erasing cultural divides.

When British government officials took over the administration of Uganda, they found that Christian missions offered education as part of their evangelization process. Education was not only a means controlled by missionaries to produce the type of citizens they desired but also a powerful vehicle of elite recruitment. It was an agent that literally recruited the elite of a colonial society from the masses. It was also a means of upward social mobility for those caught up in its embrace. (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 229)

In addition to controlling education, FBOs and Christian missionaries were able to legislate Christian values during colonial times. For example, crafting the Marriage Ordinance of 1902 and 1903 in Uganda which solidified Christian notions of traditional marriage between a man and a woman (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 241). Even more concrete and less subtle, however, was the legislative victories in the 1900 agreement which “established the victorious Christian chides in positions of political and economic power; based chieftainship on religious affiliation; gave Christian chiefs freehold land; and created a landed Christian aristocracy with enormous local power” (Makerere, 1957; Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 237). The state and the church worked hand in hand to create new rules to suit their relationship and their goal of spreading Western, aka Christian values, to their colonized territories.

The most effective way to transform a nation is to erase the history of older generations and indoctrinate younger generations with a new political myth while they are young. This statement is not merely an unfounded claim of my own, tragically, it is the summary of the tactics the British employed when colonizing eastern Africa. By controlling education and consolidating power in politics, FBOs were able to spread

Christian values during colonialism with dizzying speeds.

What are Christian Values?

The dissemination of Christian values from the West to their colonies has been occurring for centuries. Spanning from early explorers planting flags and building churches on foreign lands to more formalized campaigns like the crusades or funding Christian-based education systems, the spread of Christian values has utilized overt force and coopted more subtle means. Regardless, FBOs have been key actors in spreading both religious and cultural ideology to all corners of the globe. In the African context uniquely, these values were carried and implanted into communities by Christian missionaries and FBOs since the 1800s. Over 200 years later, missionaries to Africa still utilize the same proselytizing practices and similar rhetoric to justify “outreach” to Africa on similar premises. Through critically examining how the American Religious Right currently use FBOs to export cultural values in Uganda, I prove why FBOs today build on the damning legacy of FBOs in the past as they continue to rely on centuries old practices of delivering development resources and services to pursue neocolonial objectives.

Dr. Dana Cloud’s work concerning ideographic critique was developed in her analysis of the ideograph of <family values> in her article, “The Rhetoric of <Family Values>: Scapegoating, Utopia, and the Privatization of Social Responsibility.” Within this analysis Cloud reiterates McGee’s stance that ideographs are “Ideological slogans [that] construct a society’s key commitments are powerful tools of political language”

(Cloud, 1998, pg. 389) and adds that ideographs house an inherent “dimension of social control and coercion” (Cloud, 1998, pg. 389) making it imperative to understand and critically examine ideographs when encountered. Through analyzing the rhetoric of politicians in the 1990s, Cloud links <family values> to other concepts like “responsibility” and the ideal (typically white) nuclear family.

Together these ideographs draw back to a mythical narrative, a utopian view of when family values allegedly thrived in the 1950s. Cloud then carries ideographic critique to its logical conclusion which are that when used and analyzed in these clusters, politicians create a mythic reality to situate their audiences within. This can lead to political action as evidenced by Ugandans’ support for the Anti-Homosexuality Act or as politicians in the US and Africa use rhetoric to constitute the identities of individuals who do not fall within the parameters of the myth.

Cloud’s analysis showed that ideographs are not a dangerous hypothetical, rather the rhetoric we use can result in real harm to individuals and legislate into reality.

Specifically, when individuals in power are allowed to create a narrative that perpetuates a fictitious myth, it allows them to define the measures of success to benefit themselves and their positionality. By drawing on this fiction it effectively allowed politicians to prioritize an unattainable utopian standard that never existed while demonizing those who couldn’t reach this standard, namely the poor and people of color (as in the demonization of families “headed by single parents, racial minorities, and the poor” (Cloud, 1998, pg. 411)).

“Family values” has become a weaponized term used against the poor (those who took welfare money set aside by the state) and used against non-whites in America. This weaponization is not harmful in constituting identity on its own, rather it is harmful when it carves a space that purposefully excludes individuals from being “socially acceptable”. When these individuals can’t measure up to this arbitrary standard, they fall outside its confines and earn the scorn of the society. Astonishingly, family values continue to accomplish the same objectives when used by the American Religious Right and FBOs in Africa. However, the myth has now evolved to shift away from targeting the poor and racial minorities as Cloud originally hypothesized. Instead, family values have been repurposed as a weapon to target and demonize the LGBTQ community in Africa. Ultimately, this weaponization is what laid the ground work for the homophobic campaigns we see today occurring in Uganda to be codified into law.

The Myth that Homosexuality is Un-African

Uganda has a reputation as one of the most heavily evangelized nations in the world (Rice, 2004). Further, Roger Williams, the director of the award-winning documentary *God Loves Uganda* describes Uganda as the number one destination for American missionaries in the world. In 2017, a report by the Pew Research Center estimated that up to 87% of Ugandans were Christian, 12% were Muslim, and less than 1% of the population identified as unaffiliated or ascribing to traditional folk religion (“The Changing Global Religious Landscape,” 2017). While it is impossible to calculate the exact amount of money invested into Uganda by FBOs, it is entirely plausible to

recognize that the presence of Christian missionaries in Uganda has been a critical feature of Uganda since the late 1800s. Many scholars believe this factor heavily contributes to the high rate of Christian Ugandans in the 21st century.

One of the most disastrous remnants of FBO presence over the scope of the last two and a half centuries has been the rewriting of history concerning the presence of LGBTQ in the nation and the continent. As covered earlier in this chapter, erasing the living history of most African nations provided space for colonizers to move in and dictate a new history. The narratives that filled this vacuum were often carefully crafted inventions of the West meant to forward their interests at the expense of the locals. The narrative that colonizers put in place back in colonial times feeds an oppressive social reality to this day. This is important because it illustrates that myths do not stay fictitious, overtime they can be legislated into reality.

In a 2009 report titled “Exporting Cultural Wars” Dr. Kapya Kaomo cites a BBC report which quotes Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo’s address to African church leaders in Nigeria and Uganda that homosexuality “is clearly un-Biblical, unnatural and definitely un-African” (p. 13). The narrative that homosexuality is “not natural, it is not moral; and it’s not African” (Kaomo, 2009) is not an abnormality. Sadly, it exists across the continent as a result of careful narrative construction by Christian colonizers.

The myth that homosexuality is a Western invention exists today despite the ample evidence that homosexuality existed in Africa in prehistoric times (as depicted by cave drawings) and even pre-colonial times (as documented in groups like the Bahima, the Banvoro, and the Baganada (Mugisha 2014; Lewis, 2011; Oliver, 2013; Tamale,

2009, 2013)). The myth erasing the history of homosexuality has spread across Uganda and across the continent. This myth, as McGee stated it would, has evolved as the “people” evolved. I want to trace back the evolution of this myth to see how it, and the ideographs used to support it, have evolved over the last 200 years.

One of the easiest ways to trace the views of homosexuality in Uganda is via the constantly changing narrative of Uganda’s last ruler pre-colonization, King Mwanga II. Scholars like Dr. John Blevins have traced the evolution of this narrative as FBOs have used it to propel their agendas since the insemination of colonization to the present day. Today, it is used to legitimize the plight of Christians in passing anti-LGBTQ policy and to demonize the sin of homosexuality. In many ways, the story of King Mwanga II functions within a larger myth of homosexuality as un-African and more importantly is drawn upon to justify the discrimination and violence against queer bodies in Uganda.

Before seeing how Mwanga’s story evolved, we first have to trace back the evolution of the myth that “homosexuality is un-African.” The origin of this mythic narrative is twisted as it has been created and repurposed as a tool of imperialism for many years. There are three unique historical events that stand out in particular that I will point to indicate the evolutions. Coincidentally, during these times Mwanga’s narrative was repurposed as well. I will use Mwanga’s narrative as a measuring stick to gage the mentality of the people concerning LGBTQ folks. Interestingly, these myths also began to compound on one another allowing the myth to live and grow over time with the culture. This process constantly constituted the identities of the LGBTQ individuals in Africa as well as the communities defining themselves in opposition to them.

Initially, Christians in colonial times blamed the existence of homosexuality in Africa as a product of Muslim influence (Blevins, 2012, pg. 58). This was done to demonize both homosexuals and Muslims as being uncivilized, immoral, and animal-like (Blevins, 2012; Epprecht, 2008). This is evidenced by explorers like Sir Richard Burton and Andrew Battell who wrote in their journals about their journeys to and experiences in Africa recording homosexual behavior as early as the 1500s (Epprecht, 2008, p. 37). FBOs and Christian missionaries were told to go to specifically work to “civilize” Africans as they determined homosexuality to be “improper,” “unnatural,” and “lewd” (Wahab, 2016). This rhetoric from Western explorers coincides perfectly with Said’s argument concerning orientalism that the West referred to those in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East as uncivilized. They demonized the influence of Islam with the mentality that those living in the Orient and Africa “needed saving from themselves” (1978). This mentality justifies to Westerners that not only could they benefit financially from colonizing Africa but that they ought do so from a principled standpoint as well. Tragically, this couldn’t have been further from the truth.

It should also be noted that nature of LGBTQ practices in pre-colonized Africa were different. African men and women would engage in same- sex interactions and not identify as “gay,” “queer,” or “lesbian.” Rather, these interactions would be so commonplace it was simply normal to do so. Even ritual component of “wealth medicine” (Epprecht, 2008, p. 37) might entail engaging in same sex intercourse as individuals believed that “wealth medicine” would lead to prosperity in business, virility, or success against rivals. Many Africans pre-colonization would maintain heterosexual

relations and engage in outside relations with a member of the same sex. They wouldn't necessarily choose one over the other, they would simply have causal same-sex interactions in addition to the heterosexual relationship. Meaning that individuals wouldn't typically define themselves based on same sex interactions in the ways that Westerners did. In many ways, this meant that these practices were so commonplace the silence surrounding them indicated how normalized they had become. Yet, instead of recognizing this reality, colonizers exploited African's silence on the matter and conflated this lack of discussion as a lack of presence of interest.

Erasing the presence of LGBTQ members and practices in society was exacerbated when colonizers began enforcing language restrictions and constructing new vocabularies. Namely, a major component of language control came when missionaries and early colonial officials were in charge of the creation of dictionaries for the colonized. When they encountered a word or phrase they determined to be "obscene" they would either not provide a translation for the word or would replace it with a "crude and judgmental translation" (Epprecht, 2008, p. 41). For instance, "sodomite" replaced many African words for "ritual same-sex practices or gender-inverted roles" (Epprecht, 2008, p. 41) and encompassed practices ranging from bestiality to the vague concept of "heterosexual debauchery." Through these practices, colonizers exploited the relative silence surrounding LGBTQ practices and attitudes by filling this quiet contentedness with weaponized rhetoric that effectively instilled venomous stigma into societies.

Colonizers then matched cultural narratives to fit the tone set by their dictation processes. For instance, during colonization the colonizers altered the story of King

Mwanga to suit their needs. In this iteration King Mwanga II killed the 29 couriers for being Christians. This represented a significant shift from the original iterations of this myth. Instead of using it to justify paternalistic Western intervention to save Africans from themselves as it had been used originally, the narrative shifted to fortify an “us versus them” mentality to engulf sympathetic Africans. The story of King Mwanga focused on the need for Western intervention to protect “civilized Africans” from “uncivilized Africans” who would hurt Christians. By evolving the narrative, it was able to critically bond Africans who had come to ascribe to Western values (especially recent Christian converts) and otherize those who did not support the colonizers. Davies, Steele, and Markus write “According to social identity theory, such identity threats often lead to a heightening of in-group identity” (2008). Effectively, this iteration of the narrative pit Africans against one another, those who had “proper” values and those who felt differently. In group fighting began to happen giving colonizers more power to do as they pleased since the colonized were no longer fighting colonial rule as much as they were fighting one another.

In the 1980s, AIDS/HIV activists wanted to separate homosexuality from the AIDS endemic. It was actually considered a monumental success to some activists when Africans across the continent unequivocally claimed that homosexuality was virtually nonexistent within their nations therefore homosexuality or bisexuality should not be linked as the causation of Africa having the highest concentration of AIDS/HIV. The well-meaning intentions of activists to de-associate AIDS with homosexuality meant to help break the stigma surrounding homosexuality. However, in perpetuating the myth

that homosexuality did not exist in Africa, it further alienated the very real, very present communities of LGBTQ folks in Africa. Essentially, the narrative evolved to erase almost entirely the plight of LGBTQ which in the long run made it easier to discriminate against them through the most recent policy developments.

In the early 2000s after success directing intervention in Sudan, the Religious Right were able to gain federal funding to enter into communities to fight AIDS in Africa. Christian FBOs, armed with ideology in one hand and resources to dole out in the other, took Africa by storm. Through the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives the Bush administration gave \$15 billion to fight AIDS/HIV in Africa (Marsden, 2008, p. 249). A third of which was earmarked for abstinence focused outreach. The logic of the Christian Right was best articulated by our current Vice President, Mike Pence who said on the house floor, “Teach abstinence and send them values that work not condoms” (*God Loves Uganda*, 2013). This value focused funding largely went to FBOs, 98% of which were Christian (Stockman et. al, 2006), to administer education and aid in the AIDS epidemic. These FBOs would then use practices that coincided with “Christian values” and “family values.” This resulted in promoting “ABC” programs (referring to AIDS prevention program that taught “abstinence; be faithful; and use condoms as a last resort for couples where one partner was infected” (Green, 2003, p. 6; Marsden, 2008, p. 6)), bans on needle exchanges, forbidding the use of condoms, and the refusal to recognize the lifestyles of sex workers or the LGBTQ community writ large (Kaplan, 2005, pp. 188-99; Marsden, 2008, p. 249).

For many FBOs this policy change acted as a foot in the door for the Religious

Right to turn their mission focus to Africa. As discussed in the last chapter, some FBOs were able to receive state funding to proselytize while others were able to enter through the creation of a “pay to play” system for international development and aid that resulted in liberal Western governments cutting state spending on welfare and development programs. In a two birds one stone move, republicans in the United States were able to cut state spending on welfare and soft power and outsourcing to willing, and cheaper, partners like FBOs.

Once in the door, evangelicals along with their African church partners, altered the narrative of King Mwanga II yet again. In the early 2000s, the story of King Mwanga was altered once again. Now the Christian martyrs were killed for their refusal to engage in sexual relations with Mwanga. When the African Christian converts refused to partake in sodomy, their deaths were memorialized as one of the first groups of Christian martyrs in Uganda. The most fascinating component of the Baganda martyrology is that

“in the decades immediately after the massacre, there were no Baganda who spoke of sodomy. Interpretations of the event have shifted and will continue to do so. Such shifts illumine the contestations between Western influences and Ugandan perspectives” (Blevins, 2011, p. 62).

At this point, Uganda had been noted as one of the most heavily evangelized nations in the world, with 85% of its populations identifying as Christians. Ugandans now identified with the martyrs more than with their former king Mwanga II. Evangelicals and Ugandans would use this latest iteration of the Baganda Martyrs to justify that homosexuality was not African. Rather, the narrative claimed Africans stood

against homosexuality and were willing to die to fight it even before being told it was “wrong” by colonizers.

The great irony is that Africans vehemently reject homosexuality and LGBTQIA acceptance because they believe both to be Western constructs. Tragically, this overlooks that this narrative of LGBTQ being “un-African” is a carefully composed Western invention. Worse yet, it is an invention that has pitted Africans against one another. Take for example a direct quote from Canon Joshua Foluso Taiwo of Nigeria who said in no uncertain terms,

Homosexuality has never been part of our [society] that man will be sleeping with man; nothing like lesbianism in our dictionary. All these came from the West. I can tell you this. I have spent more than five decades on earth... We did not hear of homosexuality until late in the twentieth century when I first heard about it from the army. Many people who went into peace operations in [Europe] brought it. (Kaomo, 2009, p. 13)

Instead of fighting off the remnants of colonization, Ugandans buying into this insidious and fictitious myth have taken action to legislate their beliefs into reality. In doing so African communities have given more power to Western entities like Christian missionaries and FBOs creating a new form of dependence on the West for moral direction. Kaomo writes “the claim that homosexuality is un-African arises from the politics of postcolonial identity, which rejects anything “western” (2009, p. 9). Due to the unique scope FBOs have access to, FBOs can directly target a myriad of groups: the

young, individuals living in poverty, or families looking to gain social mobility through access to social service (microloans, education programs, workfare training, healthcare, etc.). After working with FBOs and being exposed to their ideology, or at worst their proselytizing practices, these communities are more likely to buy into the collectivization process that FBOs offer. As McGee and Charland articulate, this collectivization process can lead to groupthink as in adopting similar values and ideals which in turn can lead to mass political action.

This played out most clearly when Ugandans in 2009 supported legislation to solidify the mythic reality of “family values” into a legally binding force. Two examples being when Ugandan politician, David Bahati, proposed the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in 2009. The second when colonizers were able to set the parameters of marriage to be between one man and one woman in Uganda through the 1900 Agreement vis-à-vis the Marriage Ordinance both instances reflect taking a belief, that homosexuality is immoral thus should be illegal, and solidify into state policy.

This mirrors the process the *Peuple Québécois* used in publishing their white paper on the origins of their people. Charland explains “At particular historical moments, political rhetoric can reposition or rearticulate subjects by performing ideological work upon the texts in which social actors are inscribed” (Charland, 1987, p. 147). In this instance, Ugandans codified their “political rhetoric” into the penal code and by working within a binding text they were able to redefine the roles of social actors. Isolating these “particular historical moments” can be immensely difficult as these politicians did not appear spontaneously. Rather, these politicians may be the product of decades or

centuries of ideological exposure, converts themselves, they may rely on the support of their evangelical constituents (both at home and abroad), or most likely a combination of the aforementioned. Regardless, it is important to recognize the very real power of constitute rhetoric in crafting new realities by drawing on shared belief in myths, political action, and constraining the roles of other individuals.

Exporting “Values Education” to the East

The constant evolution in the narrative of King Mwanga and the Christian Martyrs are but one rhetorical tactic used by FBOs in colonial times and today. Essentially, the narrative acts as a marker of societal views held by the west or the directions the west attempted to steer Ugandans toward. More importantly however, it is critical to dive deeper into understanding the mechanisms used to manipulate the direction of society. Explicitly, in *how* the evolution of this narrative was made possible. Through the rhetorical evolution and manipulation of the ideographs of “family values” and “value education” in official and unofficial capacities, the West able to alter mindsets of communities they worked with. These ideographs acted as the means to disseminate values and reeducate the population on large scales by working with families, rural, and urban communities as well as the young and old. The age-old strategy of proselytism through the actor of FBOs would allow Western powers, in nations like Uganda, to re-educate the local populace through “values education” while delivering key services like healthcare, education, and aid. Just as it worked centuries ago, this strategy ultimately allowed Western powers to consolidate power during colonial times and today are still

used but seldom recognized as a form of Western neo-colonialism.

It is often said that only the victors write history. However, in the case of colonization in Uganda, the colonizers went a step beyond this axiom and were able to actively manipulate history in order to recategorize a nation's values. By switching values and hierarchy to prioritize Westerners, Western beliefs, and Western religion they were able to ensure continued victory in colonized lands. As previously mentioned, there are multiple statements from high ranking colonial officials (both in England and on the ground in Uganda at the turn of the 19th and 20th century) which clearly evidence the British intended to make Uganda a Christian nation. Officials also made it abundantly evident that they would do so by reeducating the populace through state and FBO efforts. It is important to recognize that education went beyond simply teaching arithmetic. Education, when controlled by the church or a theistic state, would incorporate values and pillars of religion as dictated by those in power. When education is reformatted through a Christian lens, it can easily replace a people's tradition in culture when that culture is silenced through the threat of violence. The ability to dictate a national identity by working through children gives an unprecedented amount of opportunity for those in power in both the immediate and long-term future.

Thus far, the three FBOs I have highlighted as doing commercialized international development and aid are World Vision, Compassion International, and the National Evangelical Association. World Vision, the agency that receives millions in government funding annually advertises on their "Christian Faith" page that "3,494,939 children and youth participation in discipleship and values education" (2018). By capitalizing on the

vague term of “values education” it allows for FBOs to use ideographs, or dog whistle words, in plain sight. This is important because it signals to donors the nature of the outreach they are doing while the state is able to happily reside within the myth that FBOs are the best philanthropic partner to deliver aid and development resources because they do not proselytize. Similarly, Compassion International has posted testimonials from their Compassion Child program alumni describing the merits of their value education. For instance, Tannia from Ethiopia attests, “The compassion program really helped me become a person with Godly values, a person who interacts well with others and a person who believes in hard work” (“15 Successful Compassion Alumni Share About Life After Sponsorship,” 2017). “Godly values” is just as abstract and devoid of intuitive meaning as “family values.” What is key to both organizations using the ideograph of “value education” is the FBO can choose what values to embed into these abstract and empty terms. They then face little to no accountability due to the ambiguous labelling of promoting “family values” and “values education.”

While the Bible does dictate certain values. Such as “Honor thy father and mother” (Exodus 20:5), “Do not wear clothing of mixed fibers” (Deuteronomy 22:11), and “Love thy neighbor as thy self” (Matthew 22:39). Yet, there is very little if any direct value dictation within the scriptures on modern-day issues (including but not limited to: sexuality, contraception, abortion, stem cell research, etc.). Yet, the Religious Right and evangelicals in FBOs will remain quiet on mixed fabrics, eating pork, and divorce while preaching Hell and damnation concerning abortion, Islam, and “deviant” sexuality.

Essentially, this means that values education is often dictated by those delivering services and resources to discern whichever values they want to pass along.

The National Association of Evangelicals prides themselves on discerning “Christian Values” for their partners and members. The NAE even advertises itself as “the premier organization for articulating an evangelical position on issues that affect our culture” (“National Association of Evangelicals: Endorsements,” 2018). Chad Hayward, the Executive Director of the Accord Network which is a self-described “Christ-centered Relief and Development” networking agency and one of the NAE’s 45,000 partners, describes this process:

By educating its sizable constituency, the National Association of Evangelicals promotes understanding of critical issues and also provides an unmatched platform for speaking into policy issues of the day. The influence of the NAE is unmistakable.” (“National Association of Evangelicals: Endorsements,” 2018)

Recognizing the “unmistakable” and daunting influence that FBOs, and the Religious Right as represented through the NAE alone, hold when engaging in international aid and development it is critical to carefully examine the impacts of their work. Cloud’s stresses critics of ideographs must “question the interests motivating ideographic choices as well as to assess potential consequences of public adherence to a particular vocabulary of motives” (1998, p. 389). Though Cloud’s analysis of “family values” focuses on how African-Americans and the poor were negatively impacted in the United States by the ideograph of “family values,” her logic coincides and can easily be expanded to the

influence of “family values” in Uganda. Specifically, as the “public adherence” to “family values” in Uganda is a remarkable, and terrifying, testament to the “consequences” of unquestioningly following oppressive ideology.

Adopting American “Family Values” in Africa

Family values, as an ideograph, has been exported to Uganda from colonial times to this day. This has resulted in a cultural clash between Ugandan “family values” and American “family values.” Remembering McGee tells us that ideographs are empty vessels in which meaning can be inserted, ideographs act as a vessel for ideology and cultural ideology. This played out on a large scale in the difference between traditional African “family values” and American “family values.” For instance, in Dr. Kaomo’s book *Globalizing the Culture Wars: US Conservatives, African Churches, & Homophobia* Dr. Kaomo explains

“When Americans and Africans refer to “family values,” they are talking about two different sets of social norms. Across Africa, people understand family as fundamental to identity. The African understanding of “family” is summed up in the concept of *ubuntu*, the idea that people are truly human only when they affirm the humanity of others.” (2009, p. 8)

The idea of *ubuntu*, or African “family values,” is most succinctly described by Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a 1984 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate from South Africa. Tutu describes *ubuntu* as “include[ing] all people regardless of their race, sociopolitical status, or sexual orientation. The African theological outlook . . . affirms the interconnectedness

and sacred worth of all beings” (Kaoma, 2009, p. 8). Therefore, when blatantly homophobic and discriminatory policies are passed allegedly founded on “family values” or in the name of preserving African identity we know this foreign invasion is in fact the antithesis of *ubuntu*.

Additionally, the influence of ideographs in Ugandan society is evident in Ugandans’ adoption of specific phrases surrounding the ideograph of “family values.” Swidler (2010), Bradley (2008), and Probasco (2014) document that it is common in for “residents of regions targeted for development [to] quickly adopt and adapt the buzzwords, discourses, and structures of international nongovernmental organizations.” Though it is common for recipients of development aid and outreach to parrot back ideologies or buzzwords it can still be surprising especially as this rhetoric directly contradicts with cultural and traditional practices and beliefs. For instance, a survey from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in 2006 found “a large majority of people in the Global South hold conservative views on sexuality. For example, 98 percent of Nigerians and 99 percent of Kenyans disapprove of homosexuality” (Kaomo, 2009, p. 13). More explicitly, Africans living in nations like Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, and Rwanda will cite wanting to uphold and protect “family values” as being the reason for their disapproval of homosexuality.

The power of the ideograph therefore is its alleged harmless appearance that masks its true insidious nature. While initially, “family values” or “values education” sounds benign, those who are being conditioned into understanding these seemingly lackluster words and phrases are “historically and culturally grounded commonplace rhetorical

terms that sum up and invoke identification with key social commitments” (Cloud 288). Cloud illustrates that these social commitments manifested in Clinton’s welfare laws in the 1990s to simultaneously highlight an ideal of a mythic family narrative while deaminizing those who fell outside those norms (e.g. demonizing families “headed by single parents, racial minorities, and the poor” (Cloud, 411)). In particular, Cloud argues that this method of idolizing the perfect nuclear family is because “[t]he mythic family is a persuasive fiction in the rhetoric of <family values>... the mythic quality of nostalgia for an idyllic nuclear family that really never existed as a way of life for the majority of people” (Cloud, 398). Similarly, the “mythic quality of nostalgia for an idyllic nuclear family” exists in Africa as well, however, the focus is not used to condemn single parents or black parents. Rather, the nuclear family is used to fortify the idea of marriage as exclusively being a union between a man and a woman, a mother and father as a homage to the traditional “idyllic nuclear family.”

Take for example, Kristen Cheney who claims that,

[T]he invention of “the traditional family” [occurs] within a discourse of postcolonial amnesia (which US evangelical intervention has capitalized on), remarking that “it is striking how ‘the traditional family’ is invoked in the bill, when in fact Ugandans have always had very pliable family arrangements” (p. 86). She claimed that this invention is related not only to the rise of transnational evangelical homophobia in Uganda but also to the “overwhelming concern with population and fertility (as indicator of social stability).” (Cheney, 2012, p. 87; Wahab, 2016, p. 705)

Since the Regan administration in the 1980s, the Religious Right has used family values to highlight issues of homosexuality and abortion to unite the right. Now the Religious Right will use family values as a platform to set a moral agenda that could reinforce traditional conceptions of the family and protect against this myth from “creeping tide: of homosexuality, sexual promiscuity, civil unions and same-sex partnerships, pornography, prostitution, abortion and stem-cell research” (Marsden, 2013, p. 133). Focus on the Family is one Christian Right group that has taken this to heart. They believe that through their domestic and international outreach their particular group can witness the Gospel by “stress[ing] the pre-eminence of evangelism, the permanence of marriage, the value of children, the sanctity of human life, the importance of social responsibility, and the value of stereotypical male and female roles” (Marsden, 2013, p. 139).

The Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act

In 2009, Member of Parliament David Bahati introduced the Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act. The bill originally stipulated the death penalty to those who violated the act by engaging in any form of sexual relations between members of the same sex and severe punishments to those who recognized or promoted homosexuality. It was later revised to prison sentences and fines to those who violated the act. The bill was signed into law in 2014 after being signed by Ugandan President Museveni but later that same year was ruled as invalid by the Constitutional Court of Uganda.

While this bill was ruled invalid, the sentiments that allowed it to pass are still very real and mob mentality rules in de facto settings adding an additional layer of peril

to LGBTQ members in Uganda and their allies. For instance, Ugandan gay rights activist and proud member of the LGBTQ community David Kato was beaten to death in his hometown of Bukes, Mukono Town due to his sexuality and outspoken views. Other gay activists have been beheaded by their neighbors. Countless others report constant threat of death or beatings by their neighbors because of the blatantly homophobic political climate on both the state level and within their own communities. Even so the protection for the LGBTQ community is virtually non-existent. Even the Minister of State for Ethics and Integrity, James Nsaba Buturo, has been quoted as saying “Homosexuals can forget about human rights” (Gettleman, 2011).

In addition to a complex history between LGBTQ issues and FBOs within sub-Saharan Africa, evangelicals working through FBOs were clearly the source, inspiration and influence of the Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act. In March 2009, infamous anti-LGBTQ “activists” American Reverend Scott Lively, Caleb Lee Brundidge, Don Schmierer and Stephen Langa (founder of Family Life Network Uganda) held seminars in Kampala to the Ugandan parliament labeled “Seminar on Exposing the Homosexual Agenda” (Kaomo, 2009, p. 15; Gettleman, 2010). These four as well as Ugandan pastor Martin Ssempe were largely responsible for framing the national narrative and “encourage[ing] broad-based action across Ugandan society to condemn homosexuality for its supposed threat to the family” (Kaomo, 2009, p. 15). These seminars were labeled as “viciously homophobic” as Lively drew on his previous work, *The Pink Swastika*, in which he blames homosexuality for the rise of Nazism in Germany and reveals the alleged “gay agenda” which he claims targets children worldwide.

While Lively's work has been blatantly disproven and his influence in the US limited, in Uganda, Lively, and others from the Christian Right, are accepted as factual. Dr. Kaoma writes that "their antigay statements are taken as gospel, not opinion, by many Africans" (2009). This has led to an increase in the persecution of sexual minorities and the criminalization of acts that do not fall within the strict (yet oddly selective) confines of "Christian family values." Given this elevated platform and access to influence American conservative from the Religious Right feel "freer to be open about their homophobia in Africa than in the United States" (Kaomo, 2009, p. 16). For instance, Pastor Rick Warren has been recorded saying "Homosexuality is not a natural way of life and thus not a human right... The Church of England is wrong on [homosexuality] and I support the Church of Uganda" (Kaomo, 2009, p. 15) While Rick Warren put on appearances as a moderate stateside, he espouses extreme and hate-filled views against the LGBTQ community while in Africa. Sadly, Rick Warren is not the exception to the rule. Rather he is an embodiment of the new standard our modern political climate has produced in this "pay to play" system where FBO evangelism has fundamentally reshaped development outreach in Uganda.

Evangelical Scott Lively not only cited the need to preserve family values in his sermons and addresses to Ugandan parliament, but he referred to his homophobic campaign in Uganda as a "pro-family mission to Uganda" ("Report from Uganda," 2009) to his congregation (a.k.a. his donors). Lively goes on to claim that "the Ugandan people are strongly pro-family, and there is a large Christian population which is much more activist minded than that of most western countries . . ." (2009). While there is a

difference in the rhetorical sleight of hand that Lively uses (“more activist minded than that of most western countries” attacking as a feeble mask to describe that Ugandans are more willing to support homophobic policy than those in the West) Lively does draw on the ideograph of “family values” in referencing “pro-family” mindsets. This same ideograph is the same one that has predicated policy change and political rhetoric in the US as Dr. Cloud cites referencing Clinton’s welfare policies. These ideographs are not only still employed in the developing world in place like Uganda, but they are perhaps even more deeply rooted due to the unique nature of development exchanges.

One final component of analysis to consider when discussing ideographs and constitutive identity. The unique nature of the evangelical mindset adds a component of moral absolutism to this very dangerous concoction of rhetoric. Dr. John Edwards in his book *Superchurch* describes the Fundamentalists’ mindset as follows.

Once a convert, the Fundamentalist believer is secure in his or her rightness, and this perspectival blindness continues to raise legitimate concerns about the conflagration of apocalyptic narratives with present-day politics...Just as apocalyptic events can be read as allegorical figures for present-day believers, present-day events can be and are read as allegories of apocalypse, present-day events can be and read as allegories of apocalypse, and political disagreements are reinterpreted as precursors to violent suppression that demand uncompromising and militaristic responses from the faithful against their enemies. (pp. 109-110)

Uganda has been selected as a battlefield for evangelicals to disseminate their version of

“Christian values” when mainstream America left their ideas behind. In this war, the rhetoric has been paired with threats of salvation and damnation, and anything but strict adherence to values can be linked to apocalyptic threats of end times. It is my belief that this moral absolutism is what conditions evangelicals and African converts to adopt “uncompromising and militaristic responses.” Additionally, due to the nature of constitutive rhetoric, the sanctioned action and group thought can be tightly controlled through weekly rituals like praying with groups, listening to sermons, and any additional social services offered by evangelical FBOs. Imagine, sitting in a pew being told what present political situations indicate signs of the end time. Imagine, being told that you will be literally left behind for anything less than strict adherence or wavering in your faith. Imagine, being told that you live in a holy war your “enemy” and codes of conduct are ascribed to you. Under these scenarios, constitutive rhetoric is no longer a complex theory. Rather, constitutive rhetoric explains one of the most oppressive policy and collective human rights abuses in modern history.

Linking immorality and the apocalypse to LGBTQ isn't a one-off theory or unfounded assertion. One concrete way that American and Ugandan evangelicals have adopted their rhetoric to link apocalypse and LGBTQ issues is citing progressive LGBTQ legislation in the U.S as proof of “the gay agenda.” Dr. Kaoma explains this process, “LGBT Africans suffer a kind of ‘collateral damage’ from the US culture wars, as every victory in the US increases their suffering from bigotry and violence” (2009, pg. 15). Scott Lively, would use LGBTQIA victories (such as the passage of anti-discrimination to protect gender and sexual minorities or the legalization of same-sex marriage) as

fodder for the narrative of an “encroaching gay conspiracy” resulting in increased bigotry and violence for the African audiences of fundamentalist American evangelicals.

Uganda has become a battleground for Christian values. However, moderate voices have been systematically cut out of the dialogue which has led to a rise in fundamentalist and more extreme beliefs. Ugandan Stephen Langa has been quoted on record saying he hopes to see “significant improvement in the moral climate of the nation, and a massive increase in pro-family activism in every social sphere. [Stephen Langa] said that a respected observer of society in Kampala had told him that our campaign was like a nuclear bomb against the “gay” agenda in Uganda. I pray that this, and the predictions, are true.” (Lively, 2009). The irony that Langa, a Christian, and other Christians who purport “pro-family activism” would ever advocate such violence is egregious and, frankly, heart breaking.

This culture war is allowed to happen because those in power of governments typically benefit from the myth that homosexuality is un-African. The myth that to be gay is un-African is that African leaders benefit from scapegoating the LGBTQ community. This hateful myth allows corrupt leaders to mask the wrongs of their administration and governments by diverting attention away from themselves. Therefore, those in positions of power in African societies allow the myth to continue and even go so far to perpetuate it. Dr. Kaoma writes,

“Since the late 1990s, the Anglican archbishops of Uganda, Kenya, and Nigeria, and presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and Sam Neuroma of Namibia have all used homosexuality to

distract people from the issues facing their countries and churches by claiming that homosexuals are responsible for moral decay in Africa. They have linked homosexuality with “child molestation, ritual child murder, corruption, opposition parties (in Uganda), pornography, and other social ills” (2009, pg. 15).

This is not to say that FBOs are necessarily responsible for the corruption of dictators like Mugabe and Museveni. However, it is important to recognize that multiple individuals have the ability to control and manipulate ideographs to fix their agendas. FBOs and corrupt leaders in Africa can both contribute to the same ideograph and do so with wildly different motivations. Cloud explains the need to understand “the dimension of social control and coercion in understanding the ideograph is crucial” (1998, p. 389) because those in power will use ideographs as tools to consolidate power leading those who are oppressed by them to not even question the systems of injustice they find themselves subject to. This is why FBOs, and those who participate in FBOs with the best intention of helping others, need to critically examine their actions and what values they support being taught. Even those from the Global North who participate in short term service trips to support those in developing countries with value education and proselytism outreach, leave long lasting consequences to the communities once they leave.

In addition to stigmatizing homosexuality, pastors and politicians would accuse opposition or even other pastors of being homosexual to “destroy them” (Farley, 2014, p.12). Politicians have spun transgressions on LGBTQ to not even be recognized as

human rights abuses. Prominent politicians, religious leaders, and heads of communities repeat sentiments like “[T]hey’re worse than animals, they’re worse than dogs” (Farley, 2014, p. 13). These governments want people to focus their attention on nonconforming sexualities in order to distract the people with “moral issues so they won’t focus on a corrupt dictator/president” (Farley, 2014, pg. 13). This scapegoating ramps up the anger against the LGBTQ and ensures that corrupt political leaders are able to stay in office longer. In exchange these leaders who are so confident in their all-encompassing power may act violently against citizens, these same groups then express their anger through projection on the LGBTQ community as political and religious leaders cite the LGBTQ community as being the root cause of their nation’s problems.

Coopting and rebranding “family values” and “value education” as ideographs are particularly pernicious because it coopts not only what normal is allowed to be but what is “moral.” It also sanctions actions of the collective going forward by constraining what action is permissible (according to those in positions of power). When that state sanctioned action involves harming and killing others based on who they choose to love and under the guise of morality, something has gone terribly wrong. McGee articulates this same conclusion in his 1975 work “In Search of ‘The People’” “the people” even though made “real” by their own belief and behavior, are still essentially a mass illusion” (McGee, pg. 242). The illusion that LGBTQ issues are somehow not human rights issues are predicated on the illusion that homosexuality is not present in Africa. This illusion though entirely false has become “real” and now results in very real death to countless LGBTQIA members, women and opposition members across the continent.

In rewriting the history of LGBTQIA presence in Africa, homosexuality has been categorized as “un-African” and as a form of Western imperialism. Additionally, attempting to step outside gender norms and pursue non-traditional sexuality (homosexuality, bisexuality, etc.) have been labeled as detrimental to the sanctity of “family values.” Specifically, the rhetoric used by evangelical missionaries (FBOs) to Ugandans have linked homosexuality to “sexual anarchy” with claims that it “weakens the moral fiber of the people” (*God Loves Uganda*, 2013). This pervasive myth that homosexuality “corrupts the young” is indoctrinated through rituals like preachers airing graphic scenes from gay pornography during church services paired with explicit lies claiming that homosexuals target children and mischaracterizing sexual encounters between two willing participants as violent and uncleanly (*God Loves Uganda*, 2013). American evangelicals teach their Ugandan counterparts to treat homosexuality like a disease. For instance, American evangelical Scott Lively advocated to give those who engage in same sex relations “to give arrestees the choice of therapy instead of imprisonment, similar to the therapy option I chose after being arrested for drunk driving” (“Report from Uganda,” 2009). The obvious implication of this statement is to treat homosexuality like a disease (similar to alcoholism) or as a product of a morally deficient choice like choosing to drink and drive.

The narrative of family values and that nature of LGBTQ issues were rewritten through multiple tactics that reinforce ritual. US conservatives would use FBOs (a.k.a. Christian missions) to fund radio broadcasts and control narratives on their airways. By broadcasting their narratives through sermons, slanted reiterations of the news or political

commentary they could directly control the messages that countless Ugandans could access in rural or urban parts of the nation (Kaoma, 2009, pg. 8). This could be teachings on homosexuality, apocalyptic sign of the impending end times, or misconstruing other tolerant or centric FBOs from the US. Dr. Kaomo writes that control of radio waves

“this gives conservatives ongoing opportunities to misrepresent mainline churches’ views to unsuspecting Africans. They saturate the continent with distorted images of mainline US denominations, branding them as imperialistic and opposed to African interests, when in fact mainline churches have long supported national liberation, social justice, and a preferential option for the poor. (Kaomo, 2009, p. 8)

In addition to radicalizing how Ugandans viewed more moderate denominations through FBOs control of constantly funded radio airwaves as well as FBO control of education systems, there are clear examples of ghostwriting in which Western FBOs blatantly used African leaders as leaders to broadcast their messages. One tragically clear example is the documentation of RD altering Kulah’s statement on churches in East Africa. The IRD published on its website a different reiteration still using Kulah’s name conforming Kulah’s original statement to the IRD’s positions. Dr. Kaomo reports,

In his original statement, Kulah had complained that: Euro-Western Churches seem to be deserting the biblical path of Church planting, disciple-making, of prayer, and evangelistic and missional endeavors to an inward focus. This inward focus of some Churches has almost changed the biblical mandate from the “Great Commission” to the “Great Omission.” (2009)

Conversely, the IRD's new version of Kulah's statement read:

“We in Africa are deeply concerned that elements of³ Euro-Western Methodism seem to be deserting the traditional path of Church planting, disciple-making, of prayer, evangelistic and missional endeavors with the aim of winning souls for Christ to an inward focus. This inward focus of some of the Church has almost changed its call from the “Great Commission” to the “Great Omission.” Its inward focus has further altered its agenda from issues addressing more than two billion people of the world who have never had the opportunity to hear of the saving grace of Christ and hence make a decision to accept or reject him to sociopolitical issues which have the propensity to destroy the very purpose of the Church's existence. (Kaoma, 2009)

Scholars like Paulo Freire often mention the harm of speaking for others because it takes away the voice, and therefore the agency, of an individual. If someone cannot articulate their own experiences of oppression, then they cannot name what structures need to be. By not only intervening but directly placing words in the statements of religious leaders, FBOs from the West gain absolute control in planting the narrative of acceptable “family values.”

This is deeply problematic because FBOs are stripping agency from the populations they claim they want to empower. Further, they are sanctioning what is socially acceptable through the use of prominent African leaders while pulling the puppet

³ Italics indicate significant changes made by the FBO IRD

strings from behind the scenes. By controlling this agenda FBOs ensure the scales of power will be tilted in their favor. Ultimately, this strengthens the conclusion of Jim Naughton, the author of *Following the Money*, who believes that “what has long been portrayed as the authentic voice of African Anglicanism is, manifestly, not African, and perhaps never has been.” (2005). When FBOs have been actively influencing African policy, tradition and beliefs for multiple centuries, it is not enough to call for critical examinations of FBOs in the last decade alone. Rather in order to dismantle stigma we must address all practices, over the course of centuries, that have lead to the egregious situation we find ourselves in today.

Therefore, it is unsurprising that over time African religious leaders also began to parrot the language of their Western counterparts out of necessity and incentive. They would do so either because they genuinely believed this rhetoric or to cater to implicit donor demands. In the film *God Loves Uganda*, Ugandan church leaders were quoted saying that “Donations from Western churches multiplied by three when we said no to homosexuality” (*God Loves Uganda*, 2013). This mirrors the findings from Dr. Tamsin Bradley who writes on the power relations that inadvertently are at play when FBOs engage in community work. Bradley writes “Power can be seen in the relationships between different FBDOs, dividing those that have money and can decide who to give it to and for what cause, from those FBDOs that are dependent on them for funding. Power also characterizes the relationships between FBDOs and local communities. (2009, pg.102). Building upon Bradley’s work it is evident why US conservatives have

succeeded in not only dominating African Christianity, but in rewriting aspects of African culture as well.

Providing social services and aid relief seems to be the magic bullet. Kaoma describes this process in detail:

By . . . simply out organizing mainline churches, for example, by providing scholarships—which insure that African clergy receive conservative theological training—as well as loans and other services. They sponsor orphanages, Bible schools, universities, and social welfare projects. By providing education and small-business opportunities, US conservatives have convinced Africans that they are the perfect partners (2009, p. 7-8).

Ugandan activist Frank Mugisha testifies to this process by confirming reports that Ugandans, typically recipients in the development relationship, have begun parroting the rhetoric of the Christian Right donors.

“Well-funded American evangelical organizations have for over ten years been relentlessly stoking a disgust and loathing of sexual minorities. . . . Now we are told that Uganda will not bow to “the gay agenda” – a phrase I had never heard until a few years ago when American evangelicals introduced it” (Mugisha, 2014).

There has been a documented change in rhetoric that Ugandans use to mimic their donors, and play into structures of injustice created by their oppressors. This happens in explicit ways and is often caused by implicit demands that the unique nature of aid lends itself to. This once again illustrates why it is critical to examine “the interests motivating ideographic choices” in order “assess potential consequences of public adherence to a

particular vocabulary of motives” (Cloud, 1998, p. 389). Further, it is critical for all stakeholders in this complex relationship to question their contribution in the process.

Conclusion

Beyond a purely rhetorical analysis, state sponsored Family Values in Africa has had a serious impact on the lives of people. In terms of development money devoted to fighting the AIDS/HIV endemic/ pandemic, Uganda became a war zone for differing cultural ideology. African and American “family values.” What is most unique about this case study is see we see claims by McGee play out on very real levels. For instance, McGee describes “Each political myth presupposes a “people’ who can legislate reality with their collective belief. So long as “the people” believe basic myths, there is unity and collective identity.” (McGee, 1975, p. 244). We have now seen the Ugandan people follow this mass illusion, buy into a mythic reality, and “legislate reality.”

As shown in the persecution of the LGBTQ community in Uganda, when constitutive rhetoric controls the political system and the minds of people, mob mentality rules and corrupts the rationality of democracy. Charland writes that “the significance of constitutive rhetoric is that it positions the reader towards political, social, and economic action in the material world and it is in this positioning that its ideological character becomes significant” (Charland, 1987, pg. 140). Clare Byarugaba reflects on the terrifying reality of extremist constitutive rhetoric as a gay woman and activist living in Uganda describing her experiences as “unbearable, because you never know when the

police are going to knock down your door, or a mob, or if your neighbor is going to beat you to death.” (Farley, 2014, pg. 13)

Policy also ensures systematic violence against the LGBTQ community, women and those living outside of the Religious Right’s evangelical “family values.” Policies leading to actions like government conducted raised of HIV/AIDS clinics in Uganda’s capitol, Kampala, which arrested clinic employees that cared for men who have sex with other men (Farley, 2014, p. 14). Backing abstinence only prevention policy for HIV/AIDS which has not only created stigma around condoms, practicing safe sex, and more pliable romantic relations, it has ostracized those who fall outside those confines making it even harder for these marginalized communities to get aid. Needle exchange programs have also been banned and through executive orders like Trump’s reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy, abortion and family planning are limited. The Mexico City Policy pulls funding from organizations offering family planning, and creates a vacuum for more FBOs to move in (either state sponsored or otherwise). Ugandan gay rights advocates are murdered in broad daylight as law enforcement officials willingly turn a blind eye. When we recognize that myths can become reality through legislation, constitutive rhetoric takes on a frighteningly sharp edge. If you do not hit in the confines of what or who society tells you to be, then the majority collectively accepts a false logic that you are not as worthy as they are. You are a threat to their existence and they will write legislation that won’t protect you, it will justify targeting you.

One thing is clear, Uganda is a cultural battleground for American values. Take for example Christian evangelical from the FBO Focus on the Family who, in no

uncertain terms, identified Uganda as “an important target for the ‘gays’ because of its internationally-renowned victory over AIDS through abstinence campaigns. It went from having the highest to the lowest disease rates in Africa” (Lively, “Report from Uganda,” 2009). This is blatantly false, Uganda now faces paramount struggles with HIV/AIDS because of abstinence campaigns and FBO prominence.

As a direct result, this has led to stigmatization and undoubtedly the death of vulnerable populations within Uganda like the LGBTQ community. Further it undermines international development efforts as the United Nations has put forward with the millennial development goals which emphasizes the need for family planning and ensuring basic human rights for all regardless of their race, gender or sexual orientation.

The US cannot both profess commitment to Millennium Development Goals and actively undermine them by actively inhibiting family planning overseas. Due to the hand in hand rise of the Religious Right and liberal approaches to welfare in the United States, the USFG has outsourced development resources and social services to the lowest bidder. Due to the extenuating circumstances of FBOs fundraising abilities, FBOs have been able to occupy a particularly large space in this new sector of private- public partnerships. In occupying this space, FBOs have fallen back to the same practices of indoctrination (proselytism, evangelizing, witnessing, etc.) that have been employed by colonial powers since the 1800s in sub-Saharan Africa. The desire of FBOs to both reach out to the most vulnerable and to create new converts have resulted in a neo-colonialist crusade in Africa and across the Global South.

FBOs as Neo-Colonizers

In the same way that the British used FBOs to indoctrinate Christian values and write over histories as a tactic to colonize Uganda, the American Religious Right has used FBOs to export cultural wars to Uganda since the 1980s through the guise of “family values.” FBOs use development outreach, like offering aid or social services, as a platform to disseminate this form of indoctrination through the guise of altruism. FBOs development outreach also spans further than most as these groups are willing to go where no other state or NGO would go. What’s more, they profess to protect the family while actively undermining true African family values and destroying families in the process. Take the heartfelt testimony of Frank Mugisha,

“I am a gay man. I am also Ugandan. There is nothing un-African about me. Uganda is where I was born, grew up, and call my home. It is also a country in which I have become little more than an unapprehend criminal because of who I am. I want my fellow Ugandans to understand that homosexuality is not a Western import. It is instead the current wave of homophobia that’s been imported from the ‘developed’ world.” (2014)

In the simplest terms, the waves of homophobia created in part by FBOs and evangelicals are hurting people. Activists, gay individuals, and allies in Uganda receive death threats from their neighbors and their government. Others still are imprisoned and murdered because of who they choose to love and refusing to conform to a narrative meant to oppress them. It is baffling that one of the most immoral acts in the history of mankind, murder, is justified on the premise of a false Christian morality. At times,

words fail me trying to articulate the evil that has come as a byproduct of those trying to intervene with good intentions. Even worse, those same individuals refuse to acknowledge their part in this creation and opt into a selective silence on the issues of immorality they have created.

FBOs as an Ideograph

Over the span of the last 20 years, Christian faith-based organizations in Africa have used the pretense of international aid and development to receive and deliver social service funding from their congregations and the US Federal Government. In addition to constituting identity of communities they interact with by engaging in coercive practices, FBO as a term has in effect become an ideograph in itself. In many ways, evangelical FBOs are recognized in political spheres as being synonymous with anti-abortion and, for many, as agencies against LGBTQ communities and rights. This recognition has been verbalized by our current President through his executive order reinstating the Mexico City Policy. Individuals from African nations who saw funds cut off to NGOs after the reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy saw a rise in FBO aid. One individual voiced their frustration that fundamentalist American values are being imported under the guise of aid. Specifically, FBO outreach in Africa has “nothing to do with gospels but American culture wars as their influence continues to spread” (*God Loves Uganda*, 2013). Recognizing that those abroad and at home are beginning to understand the practices and true objectives of FBOs it is time to hold FBOs accountable for their actions.

Through the case study of Uganda and the American Religious Right exporting “family values” we can understand why ideographs can never be merely neutral vessels but rather ideographs can be oppressive and manipulative tools used to constrain the identities of vulnerable groups in society (Cloud, 1998). Further, proselytism (regardless of what ideograph it is disguised as) and FBOs can be extremely dangerous because they are using colonizing practices in order to impose Western values. As Marsden writes, “the deliverer of humanitarian assistance by conservative organizations determined to convert patients, the hungry and the destitute to Christianity as their first priority will be seen as religious imperialism, to be added to the economic and cultural imperialism that causes so much consternation in the global South.” 2008, p. 251

Ultimately, I believe that by using international aid and development in order to get access to vulnerable populations FBOs are engaging in neo-colonial practices. In addition to being ethically dubious, the very principles FBOs are founded by are undercut through coercive, proselytizing practices. These principles occur from three perspectives: the state, the faith, and on a level of human dignity.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

William Shakespeare once wrote, would a rose under any other name smell as sweet? I would posit, does an FBO engaging in proselytizing practices reek any less of colonialism just because it is done in the name of God? The importance in understanding ideographs is underwritten in this logic. Ideographs, much like colonization, have tactics associated with them in order to manipulate and control populations. Putting these two ideas into conversation with one another shows the inexplicable evil that can happen when good intentions perpetuate insidious structures.

The director of the award-winning film *God Loves Uganda* was quoted as saying, “If any change is going to happen, it’s going to happen in the faith community, which I’m hoping will stand up and say, ‘This is not what Jesus would want’” (Williams, 2014, p. 15). I hope that through this paper those who find themselves either in (or out) of the faith community can both see that FBOs need to be critically examined for the sake of the people they aim to help and for the overall integrity of the church.

Through analyzing multiple case studies, this document has proven that organizations that ascribe to strong faith tenants and good intentions yet lack critical introspection can lead to disastrous consequences for the populations FBOs aim to help. Specifically, I have shown how ideographs have been coopted and weaponized, the way that collectives can legislate their values into reality, and how painful this can be for those who fall outside of the socially accepted narrative like we saw in Uganda.

Recognizing the limitations of this work, I would have liked to have had more time to devote to an in-depth study of the individual ideographs I have found through my

research (e.g. holistic development, stewardship, FBO, the Religious Right, evangelizing, etc.). Due to the time constraints provided by this project, I did not have enough time to perform dychronic analysis in addition to the synchronic analysis I explicated above for ideographs like “development” and “body of Christ.” The ability to trace these ideographs through decades or even centuries of evolution would unearth critical insight into how the narrative has been molded depending on which groups held power at the time. Uniquely, tracing back “the body of Christ” before it became such a large ideograph in evangelical traditions might dig up connections to the Catholic church, a tradition evangelicals attempt to separate themselves from. Similarly, it would be interesting to see how “development” is viewed from perspectives outside of the neoliberal lens of the United States and the Western views of the human rights tradition. Or even how “development” may differ as an ideograph for FBOs of non-Christian backgrounds.

Additionally, I would have liked to either expand my sample pool beyond Compassion International, World Vision, and the National Association of Evangelicals or to dive deeper into their evolutions. I would ideally like to trace the history and rhetoric these organizations used over the span of the last five decades to see they have evolved to keep with the ever-evolving political climate and the rise of international development and aid.

Moving forward, I see myself continuing this research for years to come. This thesis has only begun to scratch the surface of this cross section of issues. There are so many potential crossroads to delve into with these topics, I want to continue examining the rhetoric used by religious organizations with a special emphasis on the rhetoric

employed by the Christian Right. The myths that these groups have created are phenomenal in constituting identity by trans-historically reassigning divine intervention throughout modern history. I believe that the case studies I provided about FBO intervention in Uganda and South Sudan are mere microcosms, or symptoms if you will, of a much larger “divinely” inspired narrative. This narrative needs to be examined in order to unearth the rationale of these large collectives. Through understanding this rationale, political scientists can better evaluate how the Religious Right may behave in voting blocks, larger communities, etc.

I also hope to continue researching rhetoric used by non-profits and development agencies in the hopes of one day being able to conduct on-the-ground research in order to assess the impact of these groups on communities once FBOs leave. Currently, one of the largest problems with development work, and specifically FBOs, are lack of follow-up assessment to gauge how communities are impacted immediately post-departure of the foreign service provider or years down the line. Further, very few people investigate how the rhetoric used in the donor/recipient relationship impacts both stakeholders in the long term. In particular, how recipient communities are impacted by the rhetoric of the FBO long after the organization leaves. My dream is to conduct interviews with individuals who have gone through sponsorship programs with Compassion Child or World Vision or to follow up with individuals who converted to Christianity while receiving conditional aid from organizations like Samaritan’s Purse.

Ultimately, the best way to fine-tune development practices involve demanding more accountability from service providers in both short-term and long-term outcomes.

The only way to accomplish this is to return to communities after NGOs, FBOs, or state-sponsored aid have left in order to document what remnants of this interaction exist five, ten, or even twenty years down the line.

Another constraint for this project is that I was not able to find the testimony of many aid recipients. In order to understand how their identity is constituted on an intrapersonal and internalized level, direct quotes from individuals receiving aid in developing countries would need to be analyzed just as closely as FBOs published materials. Sadly, those testimonials are difficult to find online. Rather, the narrative that FBOs put out to potential donors and partners is carefully constructed to be what the FBO wants to project to the world. Due to the unique nature of FBOs' target audience being "the least of these" (loosely meaning the poorest of the poor living in the Global South) these individuals do not have the same platforms to share their narratives as resource rich FBOs.

Conversely, a more robust project would have focused on FBOs with other faith foundations like Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu FBOs. The way that faith influences each can greatly alter the goals they pursue when engaging in development and aid work as well as the methods they are willing to use. Due to the evangelical nature of the Religious Right, the implicit overarching goal of evangelical FBOs tend to be conversions. Hinduism, which is one of the only religions not to require conversion, might have very separate end goals and therefore may use different, less coercive practices. Which then begs the question, would some faiths be better suited for development work than others?

Finally, I could have limited my analysis to focus on one organization's work in order to narrow the scope and dive deeper into the relationships developed through one singular case study. The Church of Latter Day Saints, for instance, sends thousands of individuals, typically young men and women, to spread their faith and aid in community development through two year-long missions. Had I fine-tuned my focus to this group alone I believe I would have found further evidence of identity formation as a result of the rhetoric being used when LDS missionaries "witness" to some of the world's most vulnerable populations. Further, this group could uniquely lend a metric for analysis on long term community impact since LDS missions tend to stay in communities longer than disaster relief FBOs or short-term volunteer trips more common with Christian FBOs. Additionally, due to the well-organized nature of the LDS church, their English language schools, volunteer services, and start up projects have a higher likelihood of being maintained after individual missionaries are phased out since the administration will replace them with new missionaries. This ensures LDS projects are maintained long after individual missionaries are phased out, solidifying their presence as a staple of the community and offering a somewhat more sustainable model.

Going forward I expect to see similar patterns turn up in expanded research. Ideographs exist in both the worlds of development and faith communities so when the two spheres begin to mesh, these ideographs can become coopted and more complex. As I have illustrated through my analysis, this combination can result in tangible policy impacts as well as metaphysical distress to individuals based on their identity formation. This is why it is critical to understand coercion can occur as an unintended side effect of

this ideological exchange when groups tie this interaction to resources necessary for aid relief or much-needed social services.

In the same way that some claim spreading human rights ideology carries undertones of Western liberal ideals, FBOs spreading religious ideology also inadvertently transmit cultural values. In this instance, when evangelicals spread religious ideology they also spread the values they believe in which we would identify as the cultural values and norms of fundamentalist-right wing individuals. Their views on issues like family planning and sexuality seep into their teachings because their ideology is intrinsically linked to their cultural views and practices. As a result, FBOs can unintentionally create collective identities despite having the best intentions not to proselytize or be coercive. This is not necessarily malicious, rather it occurs because human interaction requires individuals to use communication to articulate meaning in the world when engaging with others. This communication unchecked or complicated by language barriers can muddy expectations of both parties in the donor/recipient relationship.

Evangelicals cherish their ideology because it allows them to create meaning, when they communicate this ideology to one another they use ideographs to bond together and to share that meaning making. This shared identity drives the collective to venture out into the world to share their passion, their ideology. Since these ideographs convey meaning, the groups will use them to communicate to one another, to others in the congregations (like potential donors), and to those they interact with on the ground. If those on the ground choose to adopt this ideology as their own, they become conditioned

to these language terms as well. Yet, even those who do not choose to take on this ideology will still find themselves engaging with the rhetoric of FBOs. Studies show that recipients will cater themselves to the requests of donors in order to receive their resources. This forces engagement on the part of the community regardless of whether or not they accept the ideology because as recipients they will adapt their language to the donors, or engage in the mythic reality that these groups exist in, to continue receiving aid.

Prescription

Greater accountability is needed to monitor whether government funded FBOs proselytize overseas and if they do, then repercussions need to be taken. We cannot both be a nation that claims to revere the separation between church and state, yet turn a blind eye to politicians who siphon off government funds to cater to the Religious Right voting bloc through funding their evangelizing overseas. Stop funding FBOs who cannot uphold basic standards tied to grant money and require government entities to hold groups who receive funding more accountable by measuring outcomes in how government money is being spent. This proposal will not end funding to FBOs entirely but it will ensure that the ones the United States Federal Government does fund are held to higher standards. This in return builds the United States' soft power approach to international aid and casts our presence in a more positive light.

Greater scrutiny needs to come from within the evangelical community about how fellow members engage in mission work. Due to the creation of a “pay to play” system in

international development, it is up to FBOs to hold one another accountable. The incentive for FBOs holding one another accountable is to keep the integrity of their message. Do not let the good news of the gospel be tainted by damning practices that jeopardize the dignity of the most vulnerable populations around the globe. Additionally, the pressure cannot only come from one church or institution to the next: the pressure also needs to come back from those sitting in the pews on Sunday morning. This requires active Christians to question narratives of a radicalized church or methods of “witnessing” that seem coercive. Jesus tells evangelicals that their responsibility is to plant the seed of faith and that God will do the rest. By treating individuals with the utmost dignity and not forcing ideology, evangelicals can uphold Jesus’s teachings and bring glory to his most beloved creation: mankind.

Finally, NGOs and state sanctioned social service providers need to employ critical analysis of the rhetoric they use as well as their religious counterparts. At best to ensure they do not use coercive practices and at worst to note the stigma that FBOs have created in order to dismantle them. For example, we cannot combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa if we do nothing to dismantle the stigma of condoms that has been created by decades of carefully constructed myths and transmissions of alleged “family values.” In order to deliver holistic development solutions for individuals living in abject poverty, individual identities and ideologies must be considered. Human beings are complex, our identities are created as result of the language we use to articulate our view of ourselves and our place in the world. As globalization increases, the world becomes increasingly smaller. We take on language and ideas from other people and cultures we

interact with. That being said, it would be a fatal mistake to forget the complex identities of those communities in the Global South who receive services and resources from a myriad of actors. By examining the rhetoric that these groups have learned and been formed by through their interactions with a plethora of actors, NGO and governments can find solutions that will either undo harmful narratives created by the West, and co-create solutions that will stick due to cultural relevance. If we continue to ignore the impacts of rhetoric on identity, all we will accomplish is pouring billions of dollars into tokenizing gestures of false generosity where we claim to “free” communities from poverty while trapping them in cycles of dependency on Western aid.

References

- “Truman S. Harry. “Presidential Library & Museum.” *Truman Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949* (Washington DC: USAID).
- Ager, A. (2014). Faith and the secular: tensions in realising humanitarian principles. *Forced Migration Review, 1*(48), 16-18. Retrieved from <http://www.fmreview.org/> on Academic Search Premier.
- Allahyari, R. A. (2000). *Visions of charity: volunteer workers and moral community*. Berkeley, CA: Univ of California Pr.
- Bekkers, R. & Wiepking, P. 2011. Who gives? A literature review of predictors of charitable giving. Part one: Religion, education, age and socialisation. *Voluntary Sector Review* 2(3):337–65.
- Bennett-Carpenter, B., McCallion, M. J., & Maines, D. R. (2013). <Personal Relationship With Jesus>: A Popular Ideograph among Evangelical Catholics. *Journal Of Communication & Religion, 36*(1), 1-24.
- Berge, G. (2016). Recognizing the role of religion in development cooperation: experiences and examples from Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). *Ecumenical Review, 68*(4), 423-432.
doi:10.1111/erev.12247
- Blevins, J. (2011). When sodomy leads to martyrdom: sex, religion, and politics in historical and contemporary contexts in Uganda and East Africa. *Theology & Sexuality, 17*(1), 51-74.
doi:10.1558/tse.v17i1.51

Boyer, R. (2017, July 20). "Are Christian charities more effective at humanitarian work?"

Retrieved May 5, 2018, from <https://www.worldvision.org/christian-faith-news-stories/christian-charities-effective-humanitarian-work>

Bradley, T. (2009). A call for clarification and critical analysis of the work of faith-based development organizations (FBDO). *Progress In Development Studies*, 9(2), 101-114.

Burke, K. (1968). *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*.

Berkeley: U of California P.

Charland, M. (1987). Constitutive rhetoric: the case of the Peuple Quebecois. *Quarterly Journal Of Speech*, 73(2), 133.

Cheney, K. (2012). Locating Neocolonialism, "Tradition," and Human Rights in Uganda's "Gay Death Penalty." *African Studies Review*, 55(2), 77-95.

Chu, D. C., Hung-En, S., & Hsiao, G. Y. (2012). Religious conversion and treatment outcome: An examination of clients in a faith-based residential substance treatment program. *Journal of Drug Issues*, 42(2), 197-209. doi:10.1177/0022042612446584

Clarke, G. (2007). Agents of transformation? donors, faith-based organisations and international development. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(1), 77-96. doi:10.1080/01436590601081880

Clarke, G. and Jennings, M. (2008). Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular. *Development and Change*, 40: 416–417.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01519_17.x

Clarke, M., & Ware, V. (2015). Understanding faith-based organizations: How FBOs are contrasted with NGOs in international development literature. *Progress In Development Studies*, 15(1), 37-48. doi:10.1177/1464993414546979

- Cloud, D. L. (1998). The rhetoric of <family values>: Scapegoating, Utopia, and the privatization of social responsibility. *Western Journal Of Communication*, 62(4), 387-419.
- Cloud, D. L. (2004). To veil the threat of terror: Afghan women and the <clash of civilizations> in the imagery of the U.S. war on terrorism. *Quarterly Journal Of Speech*, 90(3), 285-306.
doi:10.1080/0033563042000270726
- Coe, K., & Chenoweth, S. (2015). The Evolution of Christian America: Christianity in Presidential Discourse, 1981-2013. *International Journal Of Communication* (19328036), 9753-773.
- Condit, Celeste Michelle, Lucaites, John Louis. (1993) *Crafting equality: America's Anglo-African word* Chicago : University of Chicago Press,
- Davies, P. G., Steele, C. M., & Markus, H. (2008). A nation challenged: The impact of foreign threat on America's tolerance for diversity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95, 308–318.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.2.308
- De Vita, C. (1999). Nonprofits and devolution: What do we know? In E. T. Boris & C. E. Steuerle (Eds.), *Nonprofits and government: Collaboration and conflict* (pp. 213-233). Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press
- De Vita, C. (1999). Nonprofits and devolution: What do we know? In E. T. Boris & C. E. Steuerle (Eds.), *Nonprofits and government: Collaboration and conflict* (pp. 213-233). Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press
- Diamond, J. (2012). *Guns, germs, and steel: the fates of human societies*. New York: W W Norton.

- Doron, I., & Foster, C. (2016). Is there a duty to respect “historical” faith? Christian proselytism of an older Jewish woman with dementia. *Journal Of Law & Religion (Cambridge University Press)*, 31(2), 118-129. doi:10.1017/jlr.2016.16
- Duff, J. F., & Buckingham, W. 3. (2015). Strengthening of partnerships between the public sector and faith-based groups. *Lancet (London, England)*, 386(10005), 1786-1794. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60250-1
- Edwards, Jonathan J. (2015). *Superchurch: The Rhetoric and Politics of American Fundamentalism*. Michigan State University Press. ISBN-10: 1611861594
- Enck-Wanzer, D. (2012). Decolonizing Imaginaries: Rethinking “the People” in the Young Lords’ Church Offensive. *Quarterly Journal Of Speech*, 98(1), 1-23. doi:10.1080/00335630.2011.638656
- Epprecht, M.(2008). *Heterosexual Africa? The History of an Idea from the Age of Exploration to the Age of AIDS*. Athens: Ohio University Press. Retrieved March 11, 2018, from Project MUSE database.
- Farley, J. (2014). Uganda in the Hands of an Angry God. *Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide*, 21(4), 12-16.
- Fletcher, J. (2014). Proselytism. *Ecumenica*, 7(1-2), 67-70. Retrieved from <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/dml.regis.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=f0ba9789-b050-4399-9373-06eba8d3d700%40sessionmgr120&hid=129>
- Freidus, A. L. (2017). Unanticipated outcomes of voluntourism among Malawi's orphans. *Journal Of Sustainable Tourism*, 25(9), 1306-1321. doi:10.1080/09669582.2016.1263308

- Gettleman, J. (2010, January 4). After U.S. Evangelicals Visit, Uganda Considers Death for Gays. *New York Times*. p. 1.
- Gettleman, J. (2010, January 4). Gay in Uganda, and Feeling Hunted. *New York Times*. p. 1.
- Gettleman, J. (2011). "Ugandan Who Spoke Up for Gays Is Beaten to Death." *The New York Times*. Retrieved 29 February 2018.
- Githuku, S. 2010. "Conflict and African Spirituality: A Gikuyu Perspective." Retrieved from <http://www.anglicancommunion.org/ministry/continuingindaba/resources/pdf/hlp3/pdf>
- God Loves Uganda*. (2013).
- Green, E. (2016, August 02). Trump Wants to Make Churches the New Super PACs. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/how-trump-is-trying-to-put-more-money-in-politics/493823/>
- Green, E. C. (2003). *Faith-based organizations: contributions to HIV prevention*.
- Green, EC. (2003) *Faith-Based Organizations: Contributions to HIV Prevention*. Washington, DC: The Synergy Project, US Agency for International Development; 2003. Retrieved from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/aids/TechAreas/community/fbo.pdf
- Guiney, T., & Mostafanezhad, M. (2015). The political economy of orphanage tourism in Cambodia. *Tourist Studies*, 15(2), 132-155. doi:10.1177/1468797614563387
- Guiney, T., & Mostafanezhad, M. (2015). The political economy of orphanage tourism in Cambodia. *Tourist Studies*, 15(2), 132-155. doi:10.1177/1468797614563387
- Hansen, H. B. & Twaddle, Michael. (1995). *Religion and politics in East Africa: the period since independence*. London: James Currey.

- Hefferan, T., Adkins, J., & Occhipian, L. (2009) *Bridging the gaps: faith-based organizations, neoliberalism, and developments in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Hepworth, C., & Stitt, S. (2007). Social capital & faith-based organizations. *Heythrop Journal*, 48(6), 895-910. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.2007.00348.x
- Hill, T. E. (2016). (Re)Articulating Difference: Constitutive Rhetoric, Christian Identity, and Discourses of Race as Biology. *Journal Of Communication & Religion*, 39(1), 26-45.
- Hochschild, A. (2000, May 12). Leopold's Congo: a holocaust we have yet to comprehend. *Chronicle of Higher Education*. p. B4.
- Huliaras, A. (2008). The Evangelical Roots of US Africa Policy. *Survival* (00396338), 50(6), 161-182. doi:10.1080/00396330802601917
- James, R. (2009). Advantages and challenges for Christian Churches and organizations for doing development work.
- James, R. (2011). Handle with care: engaging with faith-based organisations in development. *Development in Practice*, 21(1), 109-117. doi:10.1080/09614524.2011.530231
- Johnson, A. K. (2014). Protecting Children's Rights in Asian Tourism. *International Journal Of Children's Rights*, 22(3), 581-617. doi:10.1163/15718182-02201001
- Kaoma, K. (2009). Globalizing the culture wars: US conservatives, African churches, & homophobia. Political Research Associates.
- Kaplan, S. (2009). Faith and Fragile States. *Harvard International Review*, 31(1), 22-26.

- Kissane, R. J. (2007). How do faith-based organizations compare to secular providers? Nonprofit directors' and poor women's assessments of FBOs. *Journal Of Poverty*, 11(4), 91-115.
doi:10.1300/J134v11n04-05
- Larribeau, S., & Broadhead, S. (2014). The costs of giving and receiving: dilemmas in Bangkok. *Forced Migration Review*, 1(48), 51-53. Retrieved from <http://www.fmreview.org/> on Academic Search Premier
- Lee, M. (2011). Faith Based Initiatives and the United States Agency for International Development. Conference Papers -- International Studies Association, 1-19.
- Lengel, L., & Holdsworth, H. (2015). Enacting Social Change Along the Cultural Identity Spectrum: Intercultural Identity Construction in Faith-Based Community Organizations. *Journal Of International & Intercultural Communication*, 8(3), 249-267.
doi:10.1080/17513057.2015.1057915
- Lewis, T.A. (2011). Religion, modernity and politics in Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lively, S. (2009, March 17). Report from Uganda: Pro-Family Resource Center of Abiding Truth Ministries. Retrieved from <http://www.defendthefamily.com/pfrc/archives.php?id=2345952>
- Low, D. A. (1957). *Religion and society in Buganda, 1875-1900* (No. 8). East African Institute of Social Research.
- Luh Sin, H., Oakes, T., & Mostafanezhad, M. (2015). Traveling for a cause: critical examinations of volunteer tourism and social justice. *Tourist Studies*, 15(2), 119-131.
doi:10.1177/1468797614563380

- Lynch, C., & Schwarz, T. B. (2016). Humanitarianism's proselytism problem. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(4), 636-646. doi:10.1093/isq/sqw024
- Marsden, L. (2008). *For God's sake: the Christian right and US foreign policy*. London: Zed Books.
- Marsden, L. (2012). Bush, Obama and a faith-based US foreign policy. *International Affairs*, 88(5), 953-974. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01113.
- McGee, M. C. (1975). In search of 'the people': a rhetorical alternative. *Quarterly Journal Of Speech*, 61(3), 235.
- McGee, M. C. (1980). The "Ideograph": a link between rhetoric and ideology. *Quarterly Journal Of Speech*, 66(1), 1.
- McGehee, N. G. (2014). Volunteer tourism: evolution, issues and futures. *Journal Of Sustainable Tourism*, 22(6), 847-854. doi:10.1080/09669582.2014.907299
- McKinnon, S. L. (2009). "Bringing New Hope and New Life": The Rhetoric of Faith-Based Refugee Resettlement Agencies. *Howard Journal Of Communications*, 20(4), 313-332. doi:10.1080/10646170903300747
- Moore, A. (2014). Sexual Tolerance in 1960s Uganda. *Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide*, 21(4), 6.
- Mugisha, F. (2014). How U.S. Evangelicals Sowed Hatred in Uganda. *Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide*, 21(3), 5.
- Mwesigire, B. B. (2014, September 17). Why are schools punishing children for speaking African languages? Retrieved from <https://thisisafrica.me/schools-punishing-children-speaking-african-languages/>

National Association of Evangelicals. (2018). Churches. Retrieved from

<https://www.nae.net/churches/>

National Association of Evangelicals. (2018). Endorsements. Retrieved May 5, 2018, from

<https://www.nae.net/about-nae/endorsements/>

National Association of Evangelicals. (2018). Mission and Work. Retrieved from

<https://www.nae.net/about-nae/mission-and-work/>

National Association of Evangelicals. (2018). What is an Evangelical? Retrieved from

<https://www.nae.net/what-is-an-evangelical/>

Naughton, J. (2005). "Following the Money," Special Report from the Washington Window, *Episcopal Diocese of Washington*.

Retrieved from <http://www.edow.org/follow/>

Oliver, M. (2013). Transnational sex politics, conservative Christianity, and antigay activism in Uganda. *Studies in Social Justice*, 7, 83–105.

Olivier, J., Tsimpo, C., Gemignani, R., Shojo, M., Coulombe, H., Dimmock, F., & ... Wodon, Q. (2015). Understanding the roles of faith-based health-care providers in Africa: Review of the evidence with a focus on magnitude, reach, cost, and satisfaction. *The Lancet*, 386(10005), 1765-1775. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60251-3

Øyhus, A. O. (2016). Religion and Development: the Norwegian AID Discourse. *Review Of Faith & International Affairs*, 14(3), 73-80. doi:10.1080/15570274.2016.1215844

PBS, 'Religion and Obama's First 100 days', *Religion and Ethics Newsweekly*, 1 May 2009, <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/may-1-2009/religion-and-obamas-rst-100-days/2866/>, accessed 11 January 2018.)

Pew Research Center. (2017). "The Changing Global Religious Landscape" retrieved from

<http://www.pewforum.org/2017/04/05/the-changing-global-religious-landscape/>

- Probasco, L. (2016). Prayer, Patronage, and Personal Agency in Nicaraguan Accounts of Receiving International Aid. *Journal For The Scientific Study Of Religion*, 55(2), 233-249. doi:10.1111/jssr.12263
- Proyrungroj, R. (2017). Orphan volunteer tourism in Thailand: Volunteer tourists' motivations and on-site experiences. *Journal Of Hospitality & Tourism Research*, 41(5), 560-584. doi:10.1177/1096348014525639
- Rakodi, C. (2012). Religion and development: subjecting religious perceptions and organisations to scrutiny. *Development In Practice*, 22(5/6), 621-633. doi:10.1080/09614524.2012.686602
- Reid, R. S. (2008). A Rhetoric of Contemporary Christian Discourse. *Journal Of Communication & Religion*, 31(2), 109-142.
- Rice, A. (2004). Enemy's Enemy. *New Republic*, 231(6), 18-21.
- Richter, L. M., & Norman, A. (2010). AIDS orphan tourism: A threat to young children in residential care. *Vulnerable Children And Youth Studies*, 5(3), 217-229. doi:10.1080/17450128.2010.487124
- Roberts-DeGennaro, M., & Fogel, S. J. (2007). Faith-based and community initiative: Service providers and approaches to studying service outcomes. *Journal of Policy Practice*, 6(2), 45-62. doi:10.1300/J508v06n02_0
- Rogerson, J. M., & Slater, D. (2014). Urban Volunteer Tourism: Orphanages in Johannesburg. *Urban Forum*, 25(4), 483-499. doi:10.1007/s12132-014-9240-6
- Rotabi, K. S., Roby, J. L., & Bunkers, K. M. (2017). Altruistic exploitation: Orphan tourism and global social work. *British Journal Of Social Work*, 47(3), 648-665.

- Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Bks.
- Sapp, E. (2016, September 02). Trump's Offer to Christians Is Same Offer Devil Made Christ. Retrieved from <https://www.christianpost.com/news/trumps-offer-to-christians-is-same-offer-devil-made-christ-168993/>
- Schnable, A. (2015). New American Relief and Development Organizations: Voluntarizing Global Aid. *Social Problems*, 62(2), 309-329. doi:10.1093/socpro/spv005
- Schnable, A. (2015). Religion and Giving for International Aid: Evidence from a Survey of U.S. Church Members. *Sociology Of Religion*, 76(1), 72-94. doi:10.1093/socrel/sru037
- Segawa, N. (2017, January 14). Beating English Into Kids' Heads? Parents In Uganda Split Over Corporal Punishment. Retrieved from <https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/uganda/beating-english-kids-heads-parents-uganda-split-corporal-punishment/>
- Sider, R. & Unruh, H. (2004). Typology of religious characteristics of social service and educational organizations and programs. *Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 33(1), 109-134
- Smith, G. A., & Martínez, J. (2016, November 09). How the faithful voted: A preliminary 2016 analysis. Retrieved from <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis/>
- Stahnke, T. (1999). Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law. *Brigham Young University Law Review*, 1999(1), 251 Retrieved from Academic Search Premier on March 16, 2017.

- Subramanya, R. (2015, March 27). Uncle Sam may be indirectly funding religious conversion in India. Retrieved from <https://www.firstpost.com/india/uncle-sam-may-be-indirectly-funding-religious-conversion-in-india-2176175.html>
- Swidler, A. (2010). The return of the sacred: what African chiefs teach us about secularization. *Sociology Of Religion*, 71(2), 157-171. doi:10.1093/socrel/srq036
- Tamale, S. (2009). A human rights impact assessment of the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Bill 2009. *The Equal Rights Review*, 4, 49–57. Tamale, S. (2013). Confronting the politics of nonconforming sexualities in Africa. *African Studies Review*, 56(2), 31–45.
- Tamale, S. (2009). A human rights impact assessment of the Ugandan Anti-homosexuality Bill 2009. *The Equal Rights Review*, 4, 49-57.
- The New International Webster's Dictionary & Thesaurus*. (1999). (Naples, FL): Trident.
- “The twilight of the resource curse?” (2015). *Economist*, 414(8920), 41-42.
- United Nations. (n.d.). Promote Sustainable Development. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/promote-sustainable-development/>
- Vanderwoerd, J. R. (2008). Religious Characteristics of Government-Funded Faith-Related Social Service Organizations. *Social Work & Christianity*, 35(3), 258-286.
- Wahab, A. (2016). "Homosexuality/Homophobia Is Un-African"?: Un-Mapping Transnational Discourses in the Context of Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill/Act. *Journal Of Homosexuality*, 63(5), 685-718. doi:10.1080/00918369.2015.1111105
- Ware, V., Ware, A., & Clarke, M. (2016). Domains of faith impact: how “faith” is perceived to shape faith-based international development organisations. *Development In Practice*, 26(3), 321-333. doi:10.1080/09614524.2016.114915

- Watkins, S. C., Swidler, A., & Hannan, T. (2012). Outsourcing Social Transformation: Development NGOs as Organizations. *Annual Review Of Sociology*, 38, 285-315.
doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145516
- World Vision. (2013, March 14). We are good stewards. Retrieved from <https://www.wvi.org/we-are-good-stewards>
- World Vision. (2016, September 30). Consolidated Financial Statements. Retrieved from https://www.worldvision.org/wp-content/uploads/F_630269_16_WorldVision_FS.pdf
- World Vision. (2018). Christian Faith. Retrieved from <https://www.worldvision.org/our-work/christian-faith>
- World Vision. (2018). Sponsoring a Child FAQs. Retrieved from <https://www.worldvision.org/sponsor-a-child/support-center/child-sponsorship-faqs>
- Wuthnow, R. (1991). *Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves*. Princeton Univ Pr.
- Wuthnow, R., Hackett, C., & Hsu, B. Y. (2004). The effectiveness and trustworthiness of faith-based and other service organizations: a study of recipients' perceptions. *Journal For The Scientific Study Of Religion*, 43(1), 1-17.