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The Role of Money and Endorsements in Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Initiatives

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The Role of Money and Endorsements in Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Initiatives

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Abstract

This research examines how well certain theories of direct democracy explain outcomes of ballot measures on gay marriage bans. Most theories of direct democracy focus on the types of issues that are quite dissimilar from gay marriage bans. Therefore these theories will likely not do a good job of explaining the results of these elections. In particular I examine the role of campaign spending and elite endorsements in campaigns for gay marriage ban ballot initiatives. In candidate elections, voters commonly use heuristics such as party labels and past performance to help them decide. In most ballot initiative contests voters rely on the information provided by campaigns in lieu of these heuristics, since these are removed in ballot initiative contests. Greater campaign expenditures allow each side to get out more information regarding the proposition, which could be vital in swaying the minds of less informed voters. Elite endorsements can provide voters with partisan signals that may aid in their decision-making. Campaign expenditures and elite endorsements have been found to be important factors in determining which side wins in some ballot initiative elections. However, social issues such as gay marriage are quite different from the areas normally covered by ballot initiatives. As a moral issue, gay marriage has low information needs. Voters do not need to conduct a lot of research to be able to decide their opinion on gay marriage. Therefore, the effect of heuristics such as campaign expenditures and elite endorsements may be lower than it normally is in ballot initiative campaigns. My findings support these hypotheses. I find that campaign expenditures are not significantly correlated with the vote outcomes of same-sex marriage bans. Survey experiments also found that being primed with President Obama's view on same-sex marriage did not affect most respondents' opinion on marriage equality.

Table of Contents

Tables and Figures	5
Chapter 1: Introduction	7
Chapter 2: Literature Review	17
Chapter 3: Campaign Expenditures	43
Chapter 4: Experiments Testing Elite Endorsements	65
Chapter 5: Conclusion	87
Appendix	92
Works Cited	100

Tables and Figures

Figure 1.1	Number of initiatives and referenda by decade	10
Table 1.1	Percent of ballot measures that address social issues, by year	11
Table 2.1	Influences on support for anti-discrimination laws, gays in the military, and gay marriage	36
Table 3.1	State DOMA ballot measures	45
Table 3.2	Multiple regression on same-sex marriage ban votes	50
Table 3.3	Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a low ratio of spending by proponents to opponents	54
Table 3.4	Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a moderate ratio of spending by proponents to opponents	55
Table 3.5	Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a high ratio of spending by proponents to opponents	56
Table 3.6	Multilevel logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes	58
Table 3.7	Multiple regression on same-sex marriage ban campaign expenditures per capita	59
Table 3.8	Multiple regression on gambling ballot initiative votes	62
Table 4.1	Race of survey respondents	68
Table 4.2	“Do you favor allowing gays to marry legally?” (Mechanical Turk survey)	69
Table 4.3	Cross-tabulation of support for same-sex marriage and elite prime (Mechanical Turk survey)	71
Table 4.4	Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage (Mechanical Turk survey)	73
Table 4.5	Impact of priming treatment on marriage equality for different levels of Obama approval	74

Table 4.6	“Do you favor allowing gays to marry legally?” (St. Louis exit poll)	76
Table 4.7	Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage (St. Louis exit poll)	77
Table 4.8	Impact of the priming treatment for different races	78
Table 4.9	“Do you favor increasing access to gambling?”	80
Table 4.10	Cross-tabulation of support for gambling and elite prime	81
Table 4.11	Ordinal logit regression on opinion on gambling	82
Table 4.12	Impact of priming treatment on gambling for different levels of Obama approval	84
Table A.1	Campaign spending on same-sex marriage ballot initiatives	96
Table A.2	Multiple regression on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, 2000-2012	97
Table A.3	Multiple regression on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, 2000-2012, excluding Utah and Arkansas	98
Table A.4	Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage (Mechanical Turk survey)	99
Table A.5	Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage (St. Louis 2013 exit poll)	99
Table A.6	Ordinal logit regression on opinion on gambling	99

Chapter 1: Introduction

Research Question

Voters in the United States are increasingly being confronted with ballot initiatives regarding social issues. The use of direct democracy is increasing in the states and many of these ballot initiatives and referenda involve social issues (NCSL 2014a), such as marriage equality. Gay marriage has become a highly contentious issue over the past decade. Most voter involvement in the issue is through direct democracy. Since 2000 there have been 37 ballot propositions to either ban or legalize gay marriage at the state level. However, little scholarly attention has been paid to how voters decide when voting on this issue. This work helps to fill that void.

In candidate elections, voters commonly use heuristics such as party labels and past performance to help them decide. These heuristics are removed in ballot initiative contests, and therefore, voters rely on the information provided by the ballot initiative campaigns in lieu of these heuristics. Greater campaign expenditures allow each side to get out more information regarding the proposition, which could be vital in swaying the minds of less informed voters. Campaign expenditures and elite endorsements have been found to be an important factor in which side wins in a ballot initiative election.

However, social issues such as gay marriage are quite different from the issue areas normally covered by ballot initiatives. Social issues are often referred to as morality issues or emotive-symbolic policies. The defining characteristics of morality

policy are that they “generate conflict of basic moral values, do not lend themselves to compromise, and are widely salient and technically simple” (Mooney and Schuldt 2008, 199). Emotive symbolic policies “generate emotional support for deeply held values, but unlike the other [public policy] types... the values sought are essentially noneconomic” (Smith 1975, 90).

Gay marriage is what Carmines and Stimson (1980, 80) would call an “easy issue.” “Easy issues” have three characteristics:

“1) The easy issue would be symbolic rather than technical; 2) It would more likely deal more with policy ends than means; and 3) It would be an issue long on the political agenda.”


As an “easy issue,” gay marriage has low information needs. Voters do not need to conduct a lot of research to be able to decide their opinion on morality issues like gay marriage. Therefore, the effects of campaign expenditures and elite endorsements may be lower than they normally are in ballot initiative campaigns. The goal of this work is to determine how much of an effect campaign expenditures and elite endorsements have on outcomes of gay marriage ballot initiatives. In this study I compare the “easy” issue of marriage equality to the “hard” issue of gambling. The differences and similarities between these issues will be explored in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

This study uses a quantitative research design, including multivariate and logit regression to examine the effects of campaign expenditures, elite endorsements, and social and political factors on public opinion and the outcomes of gay marriage ban ballot measures.

Importance of the Problem

In the 2012 election, there were nearly 200 ballot initiatives in the states (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2010). The use of direct democracy has increased greatly over the past couple decades (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2012). Many of these recent ballot initiatives address social issues. The focus of this project is the issue of marriage equality, which has often been the subject of ballot initiatives. However, this work might also be generalizable to other social issues that are increasingly the target of direct democracy, such as marijuana and abortion.

There are two standard ways that direct democracy occurs in a state. The first is an initiative, which allows voters to propose a statutory measure or a constitutional amendment by filing a petition bearing the required number of citizen signatures. The second is a referendum, which occurs when the legislature refers a proposed or existing law or statute to voters for their approval or rejection (Matsusaka 2005). Both of these methods have been used in the issue of gay marriage.



*Data from the National Conference of State Legislatures Ballot Measure Database

The use of initiative and referenda has greatly increased over the past couple decades, as can be seen in Figure 1.1. There were over one thousand ballot initiatives in the last decade and the current decade seems to be on pace to surpass that number (NCSL 2014a). As can be seen in Table 1.1, social issues make up a significant portion of ballot measures. There is at least one ballot measure on a social issue in each election over the last decade. Additionally, the portion of ballot measures devoted to social issues increased in the later part of the decade. However, there has been little research regarding how these social issue ballot measures might differ from the ballot measures concerning “hard” issues, such as governance and tax policies. It is important to determine how well theories of direct democracy apply to ballot measures concerning social issues, such as gay rights, abortion rights, and marijuana. The social issue that this project focuses on is marriage equality.

Table 1.1. Percent of ballot measures that address social issues, by year.

Year	Percent of ballot measures regarding social issues
2000	11.4%
2001	2.6%
2002	8.5%
2003	7.4%
2004	20.8%
2005	11.1%
2006	16.4%
2007	9.1%
2008	17.8%
2009	12.5%
2010	7.6%
2011	14.7%

*Data from the National Conference of State Legislatures Ballot Measure Database

The study of gay rights is a relatively new field in academia. For a long time, scholars were wary of studying gay rights (Cook 1999) and therefore, scholarship in the area suffered. The field has greatly expanded in recent decades however, now that scholars are not as afraid of being branded as homosexual (Cook 1999) and as the issue of gay rights has become more present in current political discussion.

Early gay rights advocates did not focus on marriage as a goal. Rather, many early activists viewed marriage as an assimilationist goal. The gay liberation movement, which stressed the differences between the gay community and the heteronormative society, dominated until recently (Egan and Sherrill 2005; Chauncey 2004). Instead of marriage, early activists were far more concerned with issues like police harassment, education, and employment discrimination. These issues were much more pressing than marriage for the early gay rights movement. Addressing police harassment was vital since police often used unfair policing tactics like entrapment when dealing with homosexuals. The early gay rights movement also focused much of its efforts on educating society about homosexuality in an attempt to soften public opinion (D'Emilio 1983).

The issue of marriage equality began to slowly come onto the public agenda in the 1990s. Several same-sex couples took the marriage issue to the courts and they found their first victory in Hawaii. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that denying marriage to same-sex couples without a compelling justification violated the state constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law. In 1996, the Court ruled that the state had failed to meet the requirement of compelling state interests. These apparent victories for the gay rights movement were short-lived, however. In response to the court decisions, Hawaiian voters passed an amendment to the state constitution in 1998 that allowed the legislature to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples only (Rosenberg 2008). The federal government also passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which was introduced in 1996. DOMA federally defined marriage as only

between one man and one woman and acknowledged the rights of each state to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages from other states. It passed overwhelmingly in both the House and Senate and was quietly signed by President Clinton (Rosenberg 2008).

In 1999 marriage equality won another apparent victory. In *Baker v Vermont*, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that not allowing same-sex couples to marry denied them the benefits of civil marriage protected under the state constitution. Instead of forcing same-sex marriage on the state, the Court suggested that a domestic partnership law would be constitutionally acceptable and the legislature promptly passed a bill to create civil unions (Rosenberg 2008).

The issue of same-sex marriage really started to gain steam after the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003 decision in *Lawrence v Texas* that ruled laws banning same-sex sodomy were unconstitutional. While not explicitly about gay marriage, the decision was seen by many as a prelude to marriage equality (Egan, Persily, and Wallsten 2008). Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the ruling left state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage on "pretty shaky grounds," since the decision "dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions" (*Lawrence v Texas* 2003 Scalia Dissent, 20-21). The decision sparked an increase in media attention to the issue of gay marriage (Egan, Persily, and Wallsten 2008; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen 2006; Ura 2009).

Lawrence v Texas was quickly followed by another important court ruling. In November 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize gay marriage due to the state's Supreme Court decision in *Goodridge v Department of Public Health*. Media

coverage of gay marriage spiked. Since then, gay marriage has been in the public spotlight and it has become a major goal for gay rights activist groups (Ball 2012).

After 2003, many in the religious right felt on the defensive on the issue of gay rights. Gay marriage was already illegal by statute in many states. To prevent state courts from legalizing gay marriage, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court had, religious right groups put initiatives on the ballots in many states to include bans on gay marriage in the state constitution.

Gay marriage continues to be a contested issue. Thirty-one states have passed laws that prohibit same-sex marriage, with 28 of those being constitutional provisions that define marriage as between one man and one woman (NCSL 2014). Nearly all of these were passed using direct democracy. The issue continues to stay in the spotlight. Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington¹ voted on gay marriage in the November 2012 election. The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled in *Obergefell v Hodges* that these marriage bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment, making same-sex marriage legal in all states.

In the following chapter, I will explore the relevant literature on voting behavior in ballot measure campaigns. The existing theories surrounding the effects of heuristics in ballot initiative campaigns will be examined. In addition, the research regarding the determinants of the outcome of same-sex marriage bans will also be detailed.

¹ The Maine, Maryland, and Washington ballot measures are different from others before it, however, since they actually seek to legalize, not ban gay marriage.

Chapter 3 will contain the data analysis for the impact of campaign expenditures on the outcomes of same-sex marriage bans. I find that campaign expenditures do not have an effect on the outcome of same-sex marriage bans. Demographic variables did a much better job than campaign spending in predicting outcomes of same-sex marriage bans. I also include analysis of the impact of campaign expenditures on ballot initiatives regarding gambling as a comparison “hard” issue. My analysis indicates that campaign expenditures do not have an impact on the outcome of gambling measures either.

Chapter 4 details the data analysis for the impact of elite endorsements on opinion on marriage equality. The results indicate that the effect of elite endorsements on marriage equality opinion is complex. One survey experiment found no evidence that being primed with an elite endorsement changed opinion on marriage equality, while the other found that it did change opinion but only for respondents who disapprove of Pres. Obama. In Chapter 4 I again used gambling as a comparison “hard” issue and found that the priming treatment did boost opposition to gambling. Chapter 5 includes concluding thoughts and implications for further research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

There are several forms of direct democracy that can occur in a state. Ballot measures or propositions are elections in which citizens vote directly on specific laws. These are the most popular form of direct democracy and the one that this paper focuses on. Ballot measures vary in how they get on the ballot and whether they propose a new law or attempt to repeal an existing one. An initiative is a new law that is proposed by citizens and qualifies for the ballot by the collection of a certain number of signatures from voters. A petition referendum also qualifies for the ballot by collecting voter signatures, but is a vote on a law already approved by the legislature. A legislative referendum is placed on the ballot directly by the legislature. Most states require constitutional amendments to be approved by popular vote (Matsusaka 2005). Over 70 percent of Americans live in either a state or municipality where some form of direct democracy is available (Matsusaka 2004).

Most research on direct democracy has focused on how ballot measures affect public policy (Tolbert and Smith 2006). The conclusion that these studies have come to is that states that have the initiative and that use it frequently have different policies than states that do not have the initiative (Tolbert and Smith 2006). States with the initiative spend and tax less than states without the initiative (Matsusaka 2004). States that use the initiative frequently are more likely to adopt governance policies, such as term limits and campaign contribution limits (Tolbert 2003). Initiative states are also

more responsive to their citizen's abortion policy preferences (Arceneaux 2002).

In addition to affecting public policy, initiative use also has “spillover effects,” meaning that it can alter the attitudes and behavior of citizens as well as the strategies of interest groups and political parties (Tolbert and Smith 2006). Initiative use is linked to increased voter turnout (Smith and Tolbert 2004; Tolbert et al 2001; Tolbert and Smith 2005; Tolbert and Bowen 2008). Direct democracy can have an educative effect – citizens that live in states with more propositions on the ballot are more aware of and more interested in ballot issues (Donovan et al 2009; Tolbert and Bowen 2008). Certain ballot measures can have agenda setting and priming effects (Nicholson 2005; Donovan et al 2008). Initiatives on controversial issues (such as same-sex marriage) can play a role in shaping the agenda of an election, which in turn shapes how voters judge candidates (Nicholson 2005). These effects have been found on topics such as abortion (Nicholson 2005), affirmative action (Nicholson 2005), and gay marriage (Donovan et al 2008).

Donovan et al (2008) found that ballot measures can have effects on presidential choice since issue salience can be conditioned by ballot measures. In 2004, thirteen states had same-sex marriage bans on the ballot. Many observers and pundits credit the presence of these gay marriage bans on the ballot for President Bush's victory in the presidential election. These ballot measures created an information environment that increased the likelihood that some voters used the issue of marriage equality when evaluating the presidential candidates. The campaigns generated by those ballot measures increased the salience of gay marriage as an issue for evaluating presidential

candidates (Donovan et al 2008). Indeed, there is evidence that political organizations have used this priming effect to their advantage by proposing ballot measures in order to affect the electoral landscape by mobilizing base supporters (Smith and Tolbert 2004).

Instead of focusing on the effects of direct democracy, this research focuses on how voters decide how to vote in direct democracy elections. I specifically examine types of heuristics to determine if heuristics are needed for certain types of direct democracy issues. Is the voter's decision-making process different for different types of issues?

Heuristics

Voters often rely on heuristics, or information shortcuts, to simplify the voting decisions they must make. Voters use heuristics to compensate for a lack of complete information about politics (Ferejohn 1990; Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 2000). Research has shown that voters can use limited information efficiently to make the same voting decision that they would have made if they had taken the time to acquire complete information about the measure (Lupia 1994). Lupia and McCubbins (1998; 2000) argue that reasoned choice does not require full information. Instead, it simply requires the ability to predict the consequences of actions. People can use shortcuts/heuristics to dependably figure out what they favor and oppose politically to simplify the choices they must make (Ferejohn 1990; Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al 1991). Heuristics can be a useful alternative to gathering

complete information about a candidate or proposition. The use of heuristics can allow poorly informed voters to emulate the behavior of relatively well-informed voters (Lupia 1994).

In today's society, lack of access to information is rarely a problem. Political information is not scarce, but people generally lack the time and energy needed to make sense of all this information. People *choose* to disregard most of the information they could acquire and instead base their decisions on limited information (Iyengar 1990). Voters rely on information shortcuts not because it is impossible to gather the necessary information, but because there is little incentive to do so (Downs 1957; Ferejohn 1990; Fiorina 1990). However, this limited information does not need to prevent people from making reasoned choices. People make effective use of the information that is available to them by sorting the information that is useful from that which is not (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).

Lau and Redlawsk (2001) found that most voters use at least one of the following heuristics: party affiliation, ideology, endorsements, viability, and candidate appearance. There is evidence that use of heuristics may actually decrease correct voting for politically unsophisticated voters. However, political sophistication may help a voter to use heuristics more effectively. Political sophistication brings in knowledge of the political world, which allows the voter to make better inferences from heuristic cues (Lau and Redlawsk 2001).

Voters are generally able to use heuristics effectively to choose the candidate they would have chosen if they had complete information (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lau

2013). However, this becomes more difficult for voters in certain elections, such as primaries. Voters have a more difficult task in primary elections since these elections are often low-information, there are often more than two candidates, all candidates are the same party, and candidates are often more ideologically similar than candidates in general elections. With fewer heuristics to rely upon and more candidates to decide between, voters often do not vote “correctly” in primary elections (Lau 2013).

Affect can act as a heuristic – voters can use their likes and dislikes to determine their policy preferences (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Sniderman et al 1991). Citizens can rely on their political affect to determine who wants what politically and who lines up on the same and opposing sides of key issues. This likability heuristic is organized around how people feel about groups such as liberals and conservatives (Brady and Sniderman 1985). People can usually accurately estimate the issue positions of strategic groups in politics. This is accomplished by relying on their political affect, or how much they like or dislike these groups. Using the likability heuristic, those who do not know a lot about politics can still figure out the issue positions of strategic groups. Those with less political information are more likely to rely on this likability heuristic (Sniderman et al 1991). This likability heuristic is useful to voters assessing elite endorsements. How much they like or dislike the person or group giving the endorsement will affect how they use that information. Additionally, whether the voter likes or dislikes the group that may be targeted by a ballot measure will affect their assessment of that measure, especially when it involves a traditionally disliked group like gays and lesbians.

Heuristics are not always useful – in certain situations, they can lead citizens

astray. For example, while political interested citizens are most likely to know their senator's vote when she votes with her party, they are also likely to incorrectly identify their senator's vote when she votes against her party (Dancey and Sheagley 2012).

Two of the most common heuristics are party label and past performance (Popkin 1991; Gerber and Phillips 2003). However, this information is not available to voters in a direct democracy election. Initiatives do not have a party label attached. Nor can voters make a retrospective evaluation on a ballot initiative the way they might in a candidate election. Without these heuristics to rely upon, voters may have a more difficult time voting their preferences and will therefore be more reliant on information provided during the campaign (Gerber and Phillips 2003), such as campaign advertisements or elite endorsements. Another difficulty that voters face in direct democracy elections is that the issues they must vote on are usually complex. Many of the ballot initiatives that voters face deal with complicated governmental issues or revenues. This can make it even more difficult for voters to correctly align their preferences with their vote.

In the absence of heuristics such as party label and past performance, voters in direct democracy elections must find other heuristics to help them decide how to cast their vote. Research has found that voters most often rely upon elite endorsements and campaign advertisements to help them decide how to vote in direct democracy elections. There is evidence that even with limited information, voters can still make reasonably informed choices in direct democracy elections (Bowler and Donovan 2001).

Campaign Expenditures

Campaign advertising can help to subsidize the information costs involved in direct democracy (Lewkowicz 2006). Much of a campaign's expenditures are spent on campaign advertising and so they are often used as a proxy for each other in research. Greater campaign expenditures allow each side to get out more information regarding their position on the proposition, which could be vital in swaying the minds of less informed voters (Magleby 1984; Bowler and Donovan 2001). This is the reason that money has been called "the single most important factor determining direct legislation outcomes" (Cronin 1989, 215). Interest groups certainly believe that money can sway voters – in 2008, ballot measure committees raised more than \$813 million (Streb 2011).

Many earlier studies found that campaign spending has unequal effects in direct democracy elections. Spending by both sides has an effect on votes, but the effect of opponent spending has often been found to be larger than the effect of proponent spending. This led researchers to conclude that negative campaigns are more effective in decreasing support than proponent campaigns are at increasing support for ballot measures (Banducci 1998; Bowler and Donovan 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998; Garrett and Gerber 2001; Magleby 1984; Bowler and Donovan 2001). Campaigns against a ballot measures are generally attempting to preserve the status quo and therefore simply need to create enough doubt among voters about the effects of the measure. Spending money on campaign advertisements detailing the negative consequences of the measure can often create sufficient concern to prevent the ballot measure from

passing (Gerber 1999). These studies concluded that proponents of initiatives are generally unable to obtain passage by simply outspending the opposition; however opponents of an initiative might be able to virtually guarantee the defeat of an initiative if they significantly outspend the proponents (Magleby 1984).

However, more recent studies have called these findings into question and argue that spending by both sides of a campaign have an impact on ballot measures. These earlier studies did not account for the endogeneity of campaign spending (Stratmann 2006) and also assumed that spending will have a constant, linear effect on outcomes (de Figueiredo et al 2011). After accounting for the endogeneity of the campaign spending, Stratmann (2006) finds that advertising by supporters of a measure is as productive as opposition spending. Campaign spending may be driven partly by the probability of success. A group sponsoring a measure that is popular might spend less than it would on a measure that has less popular support. After making allowances for the diminishing marginal returns of high campaign expenditures, de Figueiredo et al (2011) found that campaign spending in favor of initiatives has a positive and significant effect on outcomes. They argue that interest groups can boost the chances of passing an initiative just as effectively as opponents can spend to stop them. Once a campaign has spent a million dollars, an extra ten thousand may not have a large impact. However, ten thousand dollars to a campaign that has only spent a thousand will have more of an impact. Not every dollar has an equal effect.

Advertising can be an important tool for campaigns to educate voters regarding propositions. While there are other opportunities to obtain information about ballot

measures, Burnett (2013) finds that well-funded campaigns are very effective at informing voters on the pieces of information they choose to emphasize. Campaign advertisements may also help to inform voters on which political elites support or oppose the measure, which can also be a helpful heuristic for voters (Karp 1998; Bowler and Donovan 2001).

Elite Endorsements

When political elites endorse a proposition, it can send a partisan cue to voters. While a party label might not be on the ballot for propositions, endorsements by political elites may serve the same function. Endorsements by interest groups may help to mobilize their members or those who are supportive of their cause (Lewkowicz 2006). Endorsements are more persuasive when the interest group is perceived as knowledgeable about the issue (Gerber and Phillips 2003). For example, an endorsement has more of an effect when the interest group is relevant to the issue. An endorsement by an environmental group will probably not mean much to voters for an initiative about education, but the endorsement of a teaching group would be influential. Additionally, endorsements by fictional interest groups do not influence voters (Forehand, Gastil, and Smith 2004). Endorsements also have more of an impact when the voter believes that they and the endorser share common interests (Gerber and Phillips 2003).

Lupia (1994) finds that knowledge of the position of certain groups can enable voters to make decisions on a ballot measure similar to that of well-informed voters.

The endorsement of a group can give relatively uninformed voters the crucial piece of information they need to emulate the behavior of well-informed voters.

Opposition to (but not support of) a ballot measure by elected officials has a significant effect on the outcome of the measure (Karp 1998; Paul and Brown 2006). Elected officials can be a useful cue for voters since elected officials are visible to voters, which means that voters are more likely to hear information from them. Therefore, endorsements by elected officials have a greater impact than endorsements from other types of community leaders, such as business leaders, citizen groups, and minority leaders (Paul and Brown 2006). There is evidence that voters may value the opinion of political elites more than that of political parties. Cues from salient political leaders may be more effective than cues from the major political parties. Voters may see the parties as too broad and vague (Borges 2008). Nicholson (2012) found that while cues from party leaders often affected voters' policy opinions, party cues alone did not have a similar effect. Additionally, party cues are only helpful for some voters. For moderates, knowledge of a political party's endorsement of a ballot measure does not affect their vote. Knowledge of a party cue has an effect on partisan voters, but not independent voters (Burnett and McCubbins 2014).

How a voter uses a cue from an elite is conditional on one's assessment of the cue-giver (Karp 1998; Burnett and McCubbins 2013). Endorsements from politicians are more effective for voters who approve of the cue giver's performance in office. Voters who disapprove of the politician's performance are also likely to use the endorsement as a heuristic. If a political elite that a voter disapproves of endorses a proposition, that

voter is more likely to vote against the measure (Burnett and McCubbins 2013). Indeed, out-party cues may have more of an impact than in-party cues. While people may see their own group as holding varied opinions, they often view out-groups as holding homogeneous opinions. Partisans may define themselves less as a member of the party and more in relation to the opposition party (Nicholson 2012).

Paul and Brown (2006) argue that elite cues may be more influential when voters know little about a ballot measure. However, Burnett and Parry (2014) found that a governor's endorsement of a ballot measure only had a significant effect on voter support for only one of three ballot measures examined. The endorsement of the governor was only effective for the most high profile ballot measure but not the two lower profile ballot measures (Burnett and Parry 2014). Nicholson (2011) argues that "easy" issues, such as same-sex marriage, are likely to be more resistant to the influence of elite cues. Endorsements should have more of an effect on voters dealing with complex issues, when voters will need to rely on heuristics more in order to make a decision. If a policy is more complex and difficult to understand, source cues dominate policy. However, if a policy is relatively straightforward, policy cues dominate over source cues. Unless the source cue conveys unexpected information or if it is from a despised group, participants in Nicholson's (2011) experiment ignored the source cues and made their decisions based on policy considerations. When faced with decisions on "easy" issues, voters are likely to ignore source cues. Party cues only mattered to the experiment participants when they conveyed unexpected information.

Morality Politics

While money and endorsements are generally important in elections, especially for ballot initiatives, there is reason to believe that this might not always be the case. Not all ballot initiatives are equal. Most of the research on ballot initiatives has been conducted on initiatives regarding “hard issues,” such as tax policy or governmental policy change. The factors for the passage of ballot initiatives regarding morality issues should be very different than the factors affecting the passage of a ballot initiative for a tax issue.

Morality issues are different than other policy areas and need to be treated as such. Haider-Markel and Meier (1996; 2003) have offered a good definition of the characteristics of morality politics. In morality politics at least one side portrays the issue as one of morality and uses moral arguments. Morality politics have low information needs since voters do not need to conduct a lot of research to be able to decide their opinion on morality issues. Morality politics is highly salient and tends to be partisan. Morality politics offers no incremental solutions, since it is difficult to compromise on morality (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; 2003). These characteristics clearly describe the policy area of gay rights.

Issues such as marriage equality have low information needs. Voters facing ballot initiatives on gay marriage may not need to rely on campaign advertising and endorsements to subsidize their information costs and help make their decision on how to vote. Most Americans already have an opinion regarding gay marriage. In the 2012 ANES survey, only 0.64 percent of respondents said they did not know how they felt

about gay marriage. This is in contrast to the 23 percent who neither favored nor opposed legalizing marijuana or the 35 percent who neither favored nor opposed the TARP program. Therefore, campaign expenditures and elite endorsements should not have as much of an impact on outcomes of ballot initiatives on gay marriage as in direct democracy campaigns on other issues.

There is already some evidence to support the argument that voters do not need to rely on heuristics to decide on the issue of marriage equality. Becker and Scheufele (2011) found that news media exposure does not significantly influence public attitudes toward homosexuality. They concluded that other factors, such as religiosity and demographic variables, are better able to explain the variance in public opinion on homosexuality.

Public Support for Gay Rights

Demographics

Most of the current research on LGBT issues and public opinion surrounding these issues has focused on demographic and basic political variables. Variables such as party identification, ideology, religion, religiosity, gender, education, age, and race have consistently been found to be correlated with support for gay rights.

Many studies have found that Democratic voters are more likely to support gay rights (Bramlett 2012; Brewer 2003; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Sherkat et al 2011; Winslow and Napier 2012; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007) and that states with higher numbers of Democrats in the state legislature (Haider-

Markel and Meier 1996), states with Democrats controlling many of the state institutions (Hume 2011), states with higher numbers of registered Democrats (Haider-Markel and Meier 2003), and states with higher vote shares for the Democratic Presidential nominee (Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Salka and Burnett 2012; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996) are more likely to adopt gay rights policies (or less likely to adopt anti-gay rights policies). For decades the Democratic Party has been more supportive of gay rights than the Republican Party. The 2004 Democratic Party platform stated that the Party “support[s] full inclusion of gay and lesbian families in the life of our nation and seek equal responsibilities, benefits, and protections for these families.” (DNC 2004) While the 2004 Democratic Party platform argued that marriage should continue to be defined at the state level, the 2012 platform included support for marriage equality and the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act (DNC 2004; DNC 2012). In contrast, the 2004, 2008, and 2012 Republican Party platforms have included support for both the Defense of Marriage Act and a federal Constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman (RNC 2004; RNC 2008; RNC 2012). Additionally, individuals who identify as liberal are more likely to support gay rights (Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012; Brewer 2003; Brown and Henriquez 2011; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Duncan and Kimmelmeier 2012; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Poteat and Mereish 2012; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010; Sherkat et al 2011; Wilcox et al 2007; Woodford et al 2012).

Membership in an Evangelical or Fundamentalist denomination is negatively

correlated with support for gay rights (Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012; Loftus 2001; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Sherkat et al 2011) as is identifying as a born-again Christian (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008). On an aggregate level, states with fewer born-again Christians or fewer members of Evangelical or Fundamentalist denominations are more likely to support gay rights (Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Haider-Markel, Querze, and Lindaman 2007; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996). Religiosity is a slightly different variable, usually measured by how frequently the respondent attends religious services. The more often a person attends church, the more likely he or she is to be opposed to gay rights (Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012; Brown and Henriquez 2011; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Duncan and Kimmelmeier 2012; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010; Sherkat et al 2011; Woodford et al 2012).

There are many different gender gaps in individual attitudes toward homosexuality and gay rights policies. Women are more likely to be supportive of gay rights policies (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Becker and Scheufele 2011; Brewer 2003; Brown and Henriquez 2011; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Duncan & Kimmelmeier 2012; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Loftus 2001; Moskowitz, Rieger, & Rologg 2010; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006; Sherkat et al 2011; Wilcox et al 2007). Also, attitudes toward gay men tend to be more negative than attitudes toward lesbians (Herek 2002; Moskowitz, Rieger, and Roloff 2010). This is dependent on the sex of the respondent

and the sex of the target. Heterosexuals tend to hold more negative attitudes toward gay people of their same sex, with the pattern being stronger for men than women (Herek 2002; Moskowitz, Rieger, and Roloff 2010).

Individuals who have more education are more likely to be supportive of gay rights (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Loftus 2001; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010; Wilcox et al 2007). On an aggregate level, states and communities with a more educated citizenry are more likely to adopt gay rights legislation (Barclay and Fischer 2003; Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Haider-Markel, Querze, and Lindaman 2007; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996).

Furthermore, younger individuals are more likely to support gay rights (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Bramlett 2012; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Sherkat et al 2011; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010). However, favorable opinion on homosexuality has been increasing over time within all birth cohorts (Andersen and Fetner 2008). Lewis and Edwards (2011) found that disapproval of homosexuality increased within cohorts during the 1980s (possibly due to the AIDS crisis), which more than offset the increases in public tolerance due to cohort turnover. They also found that disapproval of homosexuality decreased sharply for cohorts in the early 1990s, which compounded the effect of cohort replacement.

There are also racial differences in support for homosexuality and gay rights.

Blacks are more likely than whites to believe that homosexuality is wrong (Brumbaugh et al 2008; Lewis 2003; Loftus 2001). Even after controlling for religious, educational, age, and gender differences, these differences remain although they are smaller. Blacks are also more likely to oppose marriage equality (Brumbaugh et al 2008; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Sherkat et al 2011; Woodford et al 2012). However, those racial differences disappear when looking at attitudes towards employment discrimination protection (Lewis 2003; Loftus 2001). This suggests that, while African-Americans may not approve of homosexuality, they also do not approve of discriminating on that basis.

Worldview

Attitudes on homosexuality and gay rights are likely structured by the larger worldview that an individual holds. Worldviews such as authoritarianism (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Winslow and Napier 2012), moral traditionalism (Brewer 2003; Brewer 2008; Callahan and Vescio 2011; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Wilcox et al 2007) and egalitarianism (Brewer 2008; Wilcox et al 2007) have been found to be significantly correlated with opinion on homosexuality and gay rights.

Religion and religiosity are likely related to gay rights policies and attitudes because of the traditional attitudes on morality that some conservative denominations teach. Individuals who hold more traditional attitudes on family values are more likely to hold negative attitudes on gay rights policies (Haider-Markel & Meier 2003; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006; Callahan & Vescio 2011; Brewer 2003). However, Brewer

(2008) finds evidence that this relationship is diminishing. The relationship between moral traditionalism and opinion on antidiscrimination and gays in the military was weaker in 2004 than it had been in 1992 (Brewer 2008).

I extended Brewer's analysis to determine if this relationship is continuing to weaken. As shown in Table 2.1, this trend appears to have continued. Examining data from 2008 shows no statistically significant relationship between moral traditionalism and support for antidiscrimination laws or gays in the military when controlling for other factors. However, moral traditionalism still has a significant effect on support for marriage equality.

In Brewer's research and my extension of it, the dependent variables are how the respondent answered the following questions:

- "Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination?" Respondents answered on five-point scale from favor strongly to oppose strongly.
- "Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Forces or don't you think so?" Respondents had five options, ranging from feel strong should be allowed to feel strongly should not be allowed.
- "Should same-sex couples be allowed to marry, or do you think they should not be allowed to marry?" Respondents were given three options from should be allowed to should not be allowed, with a civil unions option in the middle.

The moral traditionalism and egalitarianism variables are averages of the responses to questions intended to measure the respective worldviews.² Also included in the analysis were the thermometer ratings for gay and lesbians, which is a scale from 1-100; a seven-point scale for partisanship; a seven-point scale for ideology; religiosity, a scale that ranges from attendance at a religious service every week to never attending; a three-point scale which measures to what extent the respondent believes the Bible is the word of God; as well as gender, race, age, education, and household income. OLS regression was used.

² The following questions measure egalitarianism. Responses were coded from (1) strong disagree to (5) strongly agree. Questions marked with an * were reverse coded. Reliability = .66

- "Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed."
- "We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country." *
- "One of the big problem in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal change."
- "This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are." *
- "It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others." *
- "If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer options."

The following questions measure moral traditionalism. Responses were coded from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. Questions marked with an * were reverse coded. Reliability = .55

- "The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes." *
- "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society."
- "We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own." *
- "This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties."

Table 2.1. Influences on support for anti-discrimination laws, gays in the military, and gay marriage, 2008

	Anti-Discrimination Laws	Gays in the Military	Gay Marriage
Independent Variable	OLS Coefficients (Standard Error)	OLS Coefficients (Standard Error)	OLS Coefficients (Standard Error)
Feelings toward gay men and lesbians	-.017*** (.002)	-.017*** (.002)	-.009*** (.001)
Party identification	.032 (.029)	-.027 (.028)	-.005 (.014)
Ideology	.067 (.04)	.116** (.039)	.042* (.020)
Bible should be taken literally	-.178* (.089)	-.056 (.085)	-.215*** (.044)
Egalitarianism	.133* (.067)	.142* (.065)	.054 (.033)
Moral traditionalism	-.117 (.064)	-.100 (.061)	-.166*** (.031)
Religiosity	-.043 (.045)	-.094 (.043)	-.166*** (.031)
	N=854	N=852	N=841

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Source: American National Election Studies, 2008.

Note: The model also included controls for gender, race, age, education, and household income.

The results of my extension are detailed in Table 2.1. Moral traditionalism is significantly correlated with opinion on gay marriage, but not with opinion on the issues of gays in the military or anti-discrimination laws. For every one point increase in the five-point moral traditionalism scale, support for gay marriage on a three-point scale

drops by nearly .2 points. Egalitarianism is a significant factor in support for both anti-discrimination laws and gays in the military (but not marriage), showing that respondents who value equality are more supportive of both policies. While most of the religious variables are not correlated with opinion on anti-discrimination laws and gays in the military (with the exception for taking the Bible literally and support of anti-discrimination laws), the religious variables remain highly significant in predicting opinion on marriage equality. This is likely for the same reason that moral traditionalism continues to have such a significant effect on opinion on marriage equality. Marriage is a mostly religious and moral issue in America. Voters who are more religious and believe more strongly in traditional moral values have more of a problem with changes happening to an institution that they see as religious. In all three policy areas, feelings toward gay men and lesbians are the most significant predictor of opinion on gay rights policies, with more positive feelings leading to increased support for each policy.

Additional research has shown that an individual's tendency toward authoritarianism also has an impact on attitudes regarding marriage equality. People who score high in authoritarianism tend to view the world in concrete, black and white terms. They view the social order as fragile and under attack and therefore tend to feel negatively about, behave aggressively toward, and be intolerant of those whom they perceive violate time-honored norms or fail to adhere to established social conventions. Authoritarians are more likely to be opposed to homosexuality and gay rights (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Winslow and Napier 2012) and to be conservative on cultural issues more generally (Cizmar et al 2014).

Contact Theory

Contact theory was developed by Allport in 1954 and posits that contact with members of other groups will lead to less prejudice towards those groups. He argued that “prejudice may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals” (Allport 1954). Not all contact is equal though. Casual contact does not dispel prejudice; it may actually increase it. Casual contact is superficial and people will often overlook the casual contacts that defy the stereotypes they hold about a certain group and instead focus on the ones that confirm those stereotypes. Contact that leads to the perception of common interests between members of different groups will be more powerful than casual contact (Allport 1954).

Contact theory has often been successfully applied research about attitudes toward gays and lesbians. The argument is that familiarity and personal contact with gay men and lesbians will lead individuals to be more supportive of gay rights. Knowing someone who is gay is correlated with increased support for gay rights (Brewer 2008; Brown and Henriquez 2011; Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2008; Hans et al 2012; Dyck & Pearson-Merkowitz 2014), but the strength of the relationship does matter (Becker and Scheufele 2011). Casual contact does not have the same impact as a closer, more meaningful relationship.

There is evidence that contact with gays and lesbians does not change opinion for the religious. Bramlett (2012) found that while there was a contact effect for some denominations, casual contact with someone who is gay does not change opinion on same-sex marriage for white evangelical Protestants or black Protestants. There is also

evidence that the views of strong Republicans are not affected by contact with gays and lesbians. Dyck & Pearson-Merkowitz (2014) found a contact effect regarding opinion on a federal same-sex marriage ban among strong Democrats, but no statistically significant effect for strong Republicans.

There is a potential problem with endogeneity: contact with gays and lesbians is often not random. There is the possibility that gays and lesbians will be more likely to reveal their sexual orientation to those who are already predisposed to be supportive of gay rights. Burnett and King (2015) addressed this issue by using a matching technique to create control and treatment groups that have the same propensity to know someone who is gay or lesbian. Their analysis found some support for the hypothesis that simply knowing someone who is gay or lesbian has an effect on opinion on same-sex marriage, even after controlling for the endogeneity issue.

Attribution Theory

There is also evidence that beliefs about the origins of homosexuality might impact opinion on gay marriage. According to attribution theory, individuals develop causal theories to explain the world around them. Whether behavior is seen as controllable has an impact; people who are observed to have caused their stigma will be evaluated more negatively than those who are stigmatized as a consequence of misfortune or the actions of others (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Lewis 2009). Individuals who believe that homosexuality is biological and therefore uncontrollable are more supportive of homosexuality and gay rights, while those who attribute

homosexuality to choice are more likely to be opposed to homosexuality and gay rights (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Hans et al 2012; Lewis 2009; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Woodford et al 2012).

However, there is a potential problem with attribution theory regarding causality. Attributions both arise from and reinforce ideological beliefs. For example, Lewis (2009) found evidence that value judgments about homosexuality drive attributions, not the other way around.

Hypotheses

Based on a review of the literature, I have two main hypotheses. The first involves the relationship between campaign spending and vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans. Since gay marriage is an “easy issue” and most voters already have an opinion on the issue, they will not need to rely on campaign advertising to obtain information on the issue. More advertising and higher spending by each side should not impact how voters decide on the issue since they have already decided and do not need the information that the campaigns will provide. Therefore,

H₁= There will be no relationship between campaign spending and vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans.

The second hypothesis involves the relationship between elite endorsements and vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans. Again, since gay marriage is an “easy issue,” voters will not need to rely on endorsements by political elites and interest

groups for information on how to vote on the issue. Voters will not need the cue that elite endorsements provide to decide how to vote on gay marriage bans. Therefore,

H₂= There will be no relationship between elite endorsements and opinion on same-sex marriage.

Rather, outcomes of gay marriage bans should be correlated with variables that are more demographic and individual in nature. Variables such as party identification, religion, and educational levels have all been found to impact support of gay rights issues. Public opinion has become increasingly supportive of gay marriage over time, so the year in which the ballot initiative was voted on should also be significant. Therefore,

H₃= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be correlated social and political variables.

Specifically,

H_{3a}= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be negatively correlated with the percentage of Democratic voters in a state.

H_{3b}= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be negatively correlated with the educational levels in a state.

H_{3c}= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be negatively correlated with the year in which the ban was voted on.

H_{3d}= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be

positively correlated with the size of Evangelical denominations.

Conclusion

When faced with ballot initiatives, most voters rely heavily on heuristics to help them decide how to vote. The two types of heuristics that are most useful to direct democracy voters are campaign advertisements and elite endorsements. Campaign advertisements are one of the biggest expenses in a campaign and it is therefore generally helpful to examine campaign expenditures. Numerous studies have found that campaign expenditures have a significant impact on the outcomes of direct democracy elections. Endorsements from political elites can also help voters to decide on ballot initiatives. Multiple studies have found that endorsements have an impact on the outcomes of direct democracy issues. However, there has been an absence of literature examining how ballot initiatives on morality issues might differ from the standard issues covered by direct democracy. It is precisely this gap in the literature that this work addresses. Morality issues have much lower information needs than the types of issues that are usually the subject of direct democracy. Therefore, heuristics such as campaign advertising and elite endorsements will likely not be as important. The types of variables that are significant for gay and lesbian issues, especially marriage equality, have been well-documented in the past decade. Support for gay rights issues is usually correlated with party identification, ideology, religion, religiosity, race, gender, education, and age.

Chapter 3: Campaign Expenditures

This chapter focuses on the effects of campaign spending on same-sex marriage bans and gambling measures. Conventional wisdom assumes that money has a huge influence in politics. The role of money in elections is a continuing controversy. Opponents of direct democracy often cite the influence of money as a reason to limit or disallow direct democracy. They fear that direct democracy will (or already has) become another tool of special interests that will be able to buy whatever policy they would like (Magelby 1984). Instead of opening up democracy to ordinary citizens, they argue that the ballot initiative process has become so costly that it is mostly used by wealthy special interests rather than citizen groups.

A lot of money is spent on ballot measures every year. In 2014, nearly \$500 million was contributed to ballot measure campaigns and almost \$1 trillion was contributed in 2012 (National Institute on Money in State Politics). This is not as much as the \$3.5 trillion contributed to candidates in the 2014 elections or the \$4.5 trillion in 2012. But it is still an incredibly large amount of money. Obviously many contributors expect that this money will have an impact on the election.

Research shows that campaign spending does have a significant effect on the outcomes of ballot initiative elections (Banducci 1998; Bowler and Donovan 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998; de Figueiredo et al 2011; Garrett and Gerber 2001; Magleby 1984). Voters in direct democracy elections do not have access to many of the

information shortcuts that are so helpful in subsidizing information costs when voting on candidates. Campaign spending can help minimize the information costs required by voters in direct democracy elections (Lewkowicz 2006).

However, since morality issues such as gay marriage have low information needs, I argue that campaign spending will not be as important for these types of ballot initiatives. For an issue such as marriage equality, voters do not need the information that can be provided with campaign funds to help them decide how to vote. Indeed, my results indicate that campaign spending does not have a significant effect on outcomes of gay marriage ban votes. Instead, demographic variables do a much better job of explaining vote outcomes on gay marriage bans. By comparison, gambling measures are more typical “hard” issues where campaign spending can influence the election outcome. However, my evidence does not support that hypothesis.

In this chapter I will use both multivariate and logit regression to examine the effects of campaigns expenditures as well as social and political factors on the outcomes of gay marriage ban ballot measures.

Methods and Data

The first hypothesis is that there will be no relationship between campaign spending and vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans. To test this hypothesis, I examine state election results on gay marriage ban ballot measures. I use OLS regression with bootstrapped standard errors in order to obtain more reliable results. The dependent variable measures the percent voting in favor of a same-sex marriage ballot

initiative in each state that has had such a measure on the ballot. Many states have voted on this issue in the past two decades. Until 2012, all of these bans had been successful except for Arizona in 2006 (although Arizona did subsequently pass a same-sex marriage ban in 2008). Some states are included in the analysis twice if the state voted on the issue more than once.

Table 3.1. State DOMA ballot measures

Year	Number	States
1998	2	Alaska, Hawaii
2000	3	California, Nebraska, Nevada
2002	1	Nevada
2004	13	Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah
2005	2	Kansas, Texas
2006	9	Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin
2008	3	Arizona, California, Florida
2009	1	Maine
2012	2	North Carolina, Minnesota ³

³ Three additional states (Maine, Maryland, and Washington) also voted on the issue of marriage equality in 2012. However, the vote in these states was different from other states since the ballot initiative in these states was to legalize same-sex marriage, not to ban it. These states were included in the analysis

The main independent variable for this analysis is based on the amount of campaign money spent by supporters and opponents. Campaign expenditures were collected by The Institute on Money in State Politics (The National Institute on Money in State Politics 2005; O'Connell 2006; Moore 2007; Quist 2009; Evilsizer 2009). Data was only available for 2004 and after, therefore the states that voted on the issue prior to 2004 were not included in the analysis. The main independent variable is a ratio of the amount of money spent by supporters of the ban to the amount of money spent by the opposition. If the ratio is equal to 1, then the spending is equal on both sides; if the ratio is greater than 1, then supporters spent more; if less than 1, then the opponents outspent the supporters.⁴ This measure is preferable to using raw spending data because it accounts for the fact that spending by one side may impact spending by the other side. This measure also controls for variation in population between states so that states with higher populations will not necessarily have high ratios. The conventional wisdom is that the side that spends the most money in a ballot initiative campaign will sway voters to vote with that side. My hypothesis is that campaign expenditures will have no effect on outcomes of gay marriage ban campaigns. A complete list of the ratios for all states can be found in the appendix.

A few control variables were also included in the analysis, including partisanship, educational levels, religiosity, and religion. Previous studies (Haider-Markel & Meier 1996) use the partisanship of the state legislature as a control variable. Since this study

but they were reverse coded.

⁴ There are two cases in which the opposition spent nothing. This poses a problem when dealing with ratios. In order to avoid having missing data, the amount spent by the opposition was changed from \$0 to \$1, thus providing a ratio that could be used in the analysis.

focuses more on votes by the electorate, I use a variable that measures the percentage of the public that identifies with the Democratic Party. This varies from 23 percent in Utah to nearly 51 percent in Maryland. Since individuals who identify as Democrats are more likely to hold more tolerant views towards homosexuality and gay rights (Bramlett 2012; Brewer 2003; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Sherkat et al 2011; Winslow and Napier 2012; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007), it is expected that the percentage of Democrats in a state will have a negative relationship with same-sex marriage ban votes.

Another control variable is educational levels in the state. Data for this variable came from the 2004 American Community Survey. The educational level data measures the percentage of the population 25 years and over who have a bachelor's degree or higher. This varies from 18 percent in Arkansas to 34.5 percent in Maryland. Previous studies have found that communities with a more educated citizenry are more likely to adopt gay rights legislation (Barclay and Fischer 2003; Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Haider-Markel, Querze, and Lindaman 2007; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996). A negative relationship is expected between education levels and voting to ban same-sex marriage.

There are two variables to control for religion and religiosity. The first was collected from the Association of Religion Data Archives and measures the rates of adherence for Evangelical denominations as a percent of the population in each state in 2000. This varies from 2 percent in Utah to 42 percent in Alabama. An additional variable measures the percent of citizens in each state in 2008 that respond that religion

is very important to their life. This varies from 48 percent in Maine to 85 percent in Mississippi. Electorates with more members of Evangelical or Fundamentalist denominations have been found to be more opposed to gay rights laws (Haider-Markel & Meier 1996; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Haider-Markel, Querze, and Lindaman 2007; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Wald, Button & Rienzo 1996). The 2004 Election Panel Study found that 65 percent of Evangelicals oppose gay marriage, compared to 38 percent of all Americans (Campbell & Monson 2007). Individuals who attend church more regularly are more likely to be opposed to gay rights (Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012; Brown and Henriquez 2011; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Duncan and Kimmelmeier 2012; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010; Sherkat et al 2011; Woodford et al 2012). Therefore I would expect both evangelical denominations and religiosity to have a positive relationship with votes on same-sex marriage bans.

A variable that controls for the year in which the gay marriage was voted on is also included. As public opinion is becoming more accepting of homosexuality, gay marriage bans continue to pass by smaller margins every year. Finally, in 2012 a gay marriage ban actually failed in Minnesota. A May 2013 Gallup poll found that 53 percent of respondents favor legalizing same-sex marriage, compared with 44 percent in 2010 and 27 percent in 1996 (Gallup 2013). The year of the election should be negatively associated with voting to ban same-sex marriage.

Results

The results are detailed in Table 3.2⁵. The results show that campaign expenditures do not have an effect on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, thus confirming H₁. Previous research generally shows that campaign expenditures have an impact on the outcomes of ballot initiatives. These results indicate that the issue of same-sex marriage might be different than the types of issues previously analyzed when it comes to the effect of money on direct democracy elections.

Several of the control variables were significant predictors of voting behavior as expected. Vote totals in favor of a same-sex marriage ban were larger in states with a lower percentage of Democrats and with more religious residents. In addition, the year in which the ban was voted on was significant, indicating that votes in favor of same-sex marriage bans are decreasing over time as public opinion becomes more accepting of gay rights. Voter support for gay marriage bans drops by 1.5 percentage points each year during the period examined, on average. However, education levels in the state were not significantly related to initiatives banning gay marriage. There is a decrease in yes votes for a gay marriage ban by .34 percentage points for every one percentage point increase of Democrats in a state. The percentage of evangelicals and religiosity had similar effects to one another. For each percentage point increase in evangelicals and those responding that religion is important to them, there was a .42 percentage

⁵ A model was also specified using the log of the raw spending figures, rather than a ratio. Campaign expenditures were not significantly related to voter support for same-sex marriage bans in this model as well. While the year of the election was the only control variable significantly correlated with spending in favor of the ban, spending against the ban was significantly correlated with percent of evangelicals and with the partisanship and religiosity of the state's citizens. Results are detailed in Appendix Table A.2.

point and .48 percentage point increase, respectively, in voter support for gay marriage bans.

Table 3.2. Multiple regression on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, 2000-2012

Independent Variables	OLS Coefficient (Bootstrap Standard Error)
Ratio of Money Spent by Supporters to Money Spent by Opposition	.00001 (.051)
Education Levels	-.209 (.395)
Percent Democrats	-.340* (.135)
Percent Evangelical	.422* (.191)
Religiosity	.483* (.146)
Year of Election	-1.450*** (.240)
Constant	49.949*** (15.578)
N	32
R²	.85

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

A couple of states are outliers in this analysis – Utah and Arkansas. A regression was also run without these two states to see if the results differed. The results were slightly altered without these outliers, but not drastically. The main differences between the two regressions is that religiosity and the percent of evangelicals in the state were

slightly statistically significant with the inclusion of these two states and are slightly statistically insignificant when they are excluded. The impact of campaign spending is still insignificant when both states are excluded from the analysis. The full results are detailed in Appendix Table A.3.

This analysis suggests that campaign expenditures do not have a significant impact on the outcomes of same-sex marriage ballot measures. While previous research indicates that money usually has an impact on ballot initiative outcomes, same-sex marriage bans do not have the same information requirements that the majority of ballot initiatives have. Morality issues such as same-sex marriage generally have very low information needs. For most types of ballot initiatives, campaign expenditures are an important factor determining the success or failure of the measure. These data show that the issue of same-sex marriage may be a different case and that campaign expenditures do not have a significant impact on same-sex marriage ban outcomes. Rather than campaign expenditures, the most important factors for determining the vote outcome for same-sex marriage bans were demographic variables and moral attitudes, which have been found to be significant in numerous previous studies. This confirms H₃ which predicted that demographic variables would be more important in predicting outcomes for same-sex marriage ban campaigns than campaign expenditures.

Examining exit poll data is another way to look at the effect of campaign expenditures. Exit poll data from several states that have voted on same-sex marriage bans can help us see if there are any major differences in the variables that affect

voters' decisions in states that differ in campaign expenditures. The National Election Pool Exit Polls for 2004, 2006, and 2008 were used for the following analysis. I have divided the elections into those in which the ratio of spending by proponents of the ban to opponents was low (Wisconsin and Virginia), moderate (California, Florida, Arizona in 2006, Oregon, and Kentucky), or high (Ohio, Tennessee, Michigan, Arizona in 2008, and Georgia). Unfortunately, exit poll data is not available for every state election in which a same-sex marriage ban was present, but the data can still help to determine if there are significant differences in the voters' choices in elections where the campaign expenditures differed.

In this analysis, the dependent variable is whether the exit poll respondent voted for the gay marriage ban in that state. Independent variables were included that measure the sex, age, and educational level of the respondent. Educational level is a five-category variable and the age variable was divided into nine categories. A three-category variable measuring partisanship was also included, as well as a variable measuring religiosity. The religiosity variable measured how often the respondent attends religious services and was divided into five categories ranging from "Never" to "More than once a week." Not every question was included in the exit poll in every state, so variables measuring education and religiosity are missing for some of the states.

Looking at Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, we can see there are only slight changes in which variables are associated with support for a ban on gay marriage in each election. In all elections that were examined, more religious, Republican, and less educated

voters were more likely to vote in favor of banning same-sex marriage (except for the strange case of Arizona in 2008 in which no variables were found to be significant). In general, party identification and religiosity have the strongest relationship with voter support for a ban on same-sex marriage. Sex is found to be significant in several states, but not in others. However, this does not appear to be a pattern related to campaign spending. Similarly, age is significant in some states, but not others. However, there is no discernible pattern here either – some of the elections in which it is significant are moderate ratio elections and others are high ratio elections, but there are other elections in each category in which age was not significant. For the most part, the same demographic variables were important in determining how people voted amongst all the states included in this analysis. Even in states where campaign spending on the same-sex marriage ban was drastically different, these same demographic variables were important in explaining voting behavior.

Table 3.3. Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a low ratio of spending by proponents to opponents.

	Wisconsin (ratio = .150)		Virginia (ratio = .268)	
Variable	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change
Sex	-.404 (.213)		-.301* (.147)	-26.0%
Age	.090 (.048)		.067 (.035)	
Party ID	1.257*** (.128)	251.4%	1.359*** (.090)	289.2%
Religiosity	.705*** (.096)	102.3%	.544*** (.056)	72.4%
Education	-.398*** (.101)	-32.8%	-.604*** (.068)	-45.3%
Constant	1.474 (.766)		1.475*** (.463)	
	N=620 Pseudo R ² = .32		N=1237 Pseudo R ² = .31	

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Table 3.4. Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a moderate ratio of spending by proponents to opponents.

	California (ratio=.887)		Florida (ratio=.371)		Arizona06 (ratio=.547)	
Variable	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change
Sex	-.366 (.247)		-.049 (.081)		-.132 (.098)	
Age	.068 (.052)		.065*** (.017)	6.7%	.068** (.022)	7.0%
Party ID	1.105*** (.152)	202.0%	.783*** (.048)	118.7%	.980*** (.058)	116.4%
Religiosity	1.020*** (.108)	177.2%	--		--	
Education	-.512*** (.116)	-40.1%	-.352*** (.039)	-29.7%	-.469*** (.047)	-37.5%
Constant	3.433*** (.785)		-.170 (.219)		-.385 (.284)	
	N=493 Pseudo R ² = .35		N=2979 Pseudo R ² = .09		N=2130 Pseudo R ² = .15	

	Oregon (ratio=.830)		Kentucky (ratio=.385)	
Variable	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change
Sex	-.223 (.157)		-.600*** (.164)	-45.1%
Age	.124*** (.034)	13.2%	.052 (.037)	
Party ID	1.319*** (.102)	273.8%	.625*** (.089)	86.8%
Religiosity	--		.500*** (.065)	64.9%
Education	-.412*** (.074)	-33.8%	--	
Constant	-1.370** (.450)		1.845*** (.443)	
	N=909 Pseudo R ² = .21		N=904 Pseudo R ² = .12	

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Table 3.5. Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a high ratio of spending by proponents to opponents.

	Ohio (ratio=1.276)		Tennessee (ratio=1.884)		Michigan (ratio=2.260)	
Variable	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change
Sex	-.190 (.119)		.039 (.131)		-.351*** (.107)	-29.6%
Age	.083** (.028)	8.7%	.019 (.031)		.038 (.023)	
Party ID	.933*** (.071)	154.0%	.822*** (.080)	127.5%	.845*** (.064)	132.7%
Religiosity	.478*** (.049)	61.2%	.616*** (.050)	85.1%	.495*** (.042)	64.0%
Education	-.454*** (.056)	-36.5%	-.645*** (.062)	-47.5%	-.322*** (.050)	-27.5%
Constant	1.468*** (.378)		3.599*** (.423)		1.673*** (.326)	
	N=1569 Pseudo R ² = .19		N=1954 Pseudo R ² = .20		N=1862 Pseudo R ² = .16	

	Arizona08 (ratio=9.433)		Georgia (ratio=n/a)	
Variable	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change	Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)	% change
Sex	-.19 (.132)		-.425** (.140)	-34.6%
Age	.002 (.027)		.109** (.036)	11.5%
Party ID	-.074 (.076)		.658*** (.077)	93.2%
Religiosity	--		.660*** (.057)	93.4%
Education	-.119 (.063)		--	--
Constant	-.338 (.370)		1.733*** (.382)	
	N=978 Pseudo R ² = .004		N=1334 Pseudo R ² = .17	

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

In states with different levels of spending, the predicted probability of the average voter voting for the same-sex marriage ban is fairly similar. The predicted probability of the average voter in low-ratio Wisconsin voting for the same-sex marriage ban is 55 percent, while the predicted probability for the average voter in high-ratio Michigan to do the same is 61 percent, which is within the 95 percent confidence interval. Even though in each state, the side that spent the most was drastically different, the probability of the average voter making the same choice is quite similar. There is evidence that large amounts of spending by one side might not have had the intended effect. Montana had one of the lowest amounts of total supporter spending and the predicted probability of the average voter voting in favor of the same-sex marriage ban is 67 percent. In contrast, Arizona in 2008 had one of the highest amounts of supporter spending and the predicted probability of the average voter voting yes is 40 percent.

A multilevel logit regression was also run using the exit poll data. This allows us to directly test the impact of the campaign spending measure for a sample of states. Exit polls were not available for every state examined in the OLS regression model in Table 3.2. This data includes exit polls from elections that including a same-sex marriage ban ballot measure in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The multilevel results are detailed in Table 3.6. An individual's sex, age, partisanship, religiosity, and education all had a statistically significant effect on how the respondent voted on the state's same-sex marriage ban. The relationship between each of these variables and support for a ban on same-sex

marriage is in the expected direction. Campaign expenditures in each state did not have a statistically significant effect on the respondent's vote.

Table 3.6. Multilevel logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes

Independent Variables		Logit Coefficient (Standard Error)
State Factors	Ratio of Money Spent by Supporters to Money Spent by Opposition	.279 (.167)
Individual Factors	Sex	-.239*** (.057)
	Age	.052*** (.013)
	Party ID	.995*** (.035)
	Religiosity	.570*** (.023)
	Education	-.482*** (.027)
	Constant	-1.711*** (.278)
N		7735

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

From this analysis, it appears that campaign expenditures do not have an effect on the outcome of same-sex marriage bans. If this is the case, then then why do organizations spend so much money campaigning on the issue? Whether the goal of supporters and opponents in these campaigns is to change minds or to increase turnout, the ultimate goal is to influence the outcome of the election. It appears that campaign expenditures do not attain that goal.

Table 3.7. Multiple regression on same-sex marriage ban campaign expenditures per capita

	Proponent Spending	Opponent Spending	Total Spending
Variable	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Education Levels	-.029 (.028)	-.019 (.045)	-.048 (.069)
Percent Democrats	.005 (.016)	-.010 (.026)	-.005 (.040)
Percent Evangelical	.002 (.015)	.021 (.025)	.022 (.038)
Religiosity	-.040* (.017)	-.069* (.027)	-.109* (.040)
Year of Election	.143** (.048)	.178* (.078)	.322* (.118)
Constant	-283.78** (97.59)	-352.32* (156.99)	-636* (238)
	N=28 R ² = .57	N=28 R ² = .52	N=28 R ² = .57

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

In order to help explain what prompts organizations to spend more money in one state rather than another, a regression was run using per capita campaign expenditures as the dependent variable. As can be seen in Table 3.7, the only variables that have a statistically significant impact on the amount of money spent on a same-sex marriage ban campaign in a state are how religious the state is and the year of the

election. For every one point increase in the percentage responding that religion is important, total campaign expenditures decrease by \$0.11 per capita. Gay marriage bans pass more easily in states that are more religious. This result suggests that perhaps less money is spent in these states because it is assumed that the ban will pass regardless of how much money is spent. Additionally, more money is being spent on same-sex marriage ban campaigns each year. For every year that passes, \$0.32 more per capita is being spent on these campaigns. This is likely due to the increased salience of the issue nationally.

Gambling

In order to test whether campaign expenditures have an impact on outcomes of other ballot measures, it would be helpful at this point to examine a different direct democracy issue. There are similarities and differences between the issues of marriage equality and gambling. Like same-sex marriage, gambling is an issue that has been a subject in direct democracy campaigns in many states. However, gambling is different than gay marriage bans since it is rarely considered a morality issue.

While there are some moral objections to gambling, lottery critics mostly avoid morality arguments and instead denounce the negative consequences of gambling and criticize the role of government in sanctioning lotteries. Lottery supporters focus on the benefits of lottery creation, such as jobs and revenues for state programs (Ferraiolo 2013). When opponents did use morality frames to argue against lotteries, they often argued against the morality of the government taking this action rather than arguing

against the morality of private, individual behavior (Ferraiolo 2013). Reviewing legislative debates of the adoption of a state lottery, Ferraiolo (2013) found that opponents were mostly concerned about the regressive nature of lotteries, lotteries' poor odds of winning, and their fiscal inefficiency. Opposition is often not framed around the immorality of personal gambling behavior and rarely references God or the Bible. According to Ferraiolo (2013, 223), "Observers have argued that playing the lottery is seen in many quarters as no more morally questionable or harmful than many other forms of entertainment." According to a 2013 Pew survey, 25 percent of Americans believe that gambling is morally acceptable, while 47 percent do not consider it to be a moral issue at all and another 24 percent believe it is morally unacceptable (Pew 2014).

The gambling initiatives that were included in this analysis were all between 2004 and 2010. Six of these measures would have authorized new gambling facilities in the state. Two measures sought to legalize new machines at facilities that already existed and the remaining three would have allowed slot machines at racing tracks. It appears that only one of these pitted casino interests against each other. Ohio Amendment 6 in 2008 would have authorized a single casino near Wilmington (Ballotpedia). This measure more than doubled the previous record for most-expensive campaign in Ohio history. The opposition was mostly financed by Penn National Gaming, Inc., a Pennsylvania based casino company. Penn National Gaming operates a casino in Indiana, less than 30 miles from Cincinnati (Ballotpedia).

The same control variables were used as in the gay marriage analysis to increase

comparability. These control variables are education levels, the percent of Democrats, the percent of Evangelicals, and the religiosity of each state. Since campaign expenditures usually have a significant effect on ballot initiative outcomes, I expect there to be a significant relationship between campaign expenditures and the outcome of gambling ballot initiatives.

Table 3.8. Multiple regression on gambling ballot initiative votes

Independent Variables	OLS Coefficient (Bootstrap Standard Error)
Ratio of Money Spent by Supporters to Money Spent by Opposition	.081 (1.481)
Education Levels	1.704 (1.994)
Percent Democrats	1.663*** (.495)
Percent Evangelical	.059 (.596)
Religiosity	-1.173 (.621)
Constant	20.043 (51.217)
N	10
R²	.91

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

The results detailed in Table 3.8 indicate that campaign expenditures are not significantly correlated with the outcomes of gambling ballot initiatives, although the

regression coefficient is positive as expected. Partisanship was actually the only variable that was significantly correlated with gambling ballot measure outcomes. Pro-gambling initiatives tend to receive more voter support in states with more Democrats. There is a smaller sample of state gambling measures for this time period, but the results again suggest that campaign spending is not closely related to the election results.

Discussion

Campaign expenditures are an important factor to determine the outcome of most types of ballot initiatives. Theories of direct democracy argue that campaign expenditures are one of the most important factors in the passage or failure of ballot initiatives. However, not all ballot initiatives are the same. When dealing with ballot initiatives on a morality issue such as same-sex marriage, I found that campaign expenditures do not have a significant effect on election outcomes. Demographic and political variables, such as partisanship, education, and religion are far more important to outcomes of gay marriage ban campaigns than campaign expenditures are. This suggests that voters in same-sex marriage ban campaigns do not need to rely upon heuristics in the same way that voters in most direct democracy campaigns do. While most ballot measures deal with relatively complex issues that have high information costs, same-sex marriage has much lower information needs. Many voters already have an opinion regarding marriage equality and therefore do not need heuristics, such as campaign advertising, to make gathering information and deciding how to vote easier. Rather than campaign expenditures, demographic variables and political attitudes

remain key in determining outcomes of same-sex marriage ban campaigns, as has been found in numerous previous studies.

Chapter 4: Experiments Testing Elite Endorsements

The data in the previous chapter showed that campaign expenditures do not have a significant impact on outcomes of same sex marriage ballot measures. This chapter will show that the same is true for endorsements from political elites. The common wisdom is that endorsements from elites generally influence public opinion. Information from political elites can impact public opinion at any time, not only during an election.

In most ballot initiative campaigns, endorsements from political elites have a significant effect on outcomes. Ballot measure campaigns seek out endorsements from political elites for exactly this reason. Endorsements from political elites can send a partisan cue to voters, giving them cues to help them decide how to vote on an issue. If a voter generally agrees with or likes a particular political elite, the knowledge that the politician supports or opposes a specific ballot measure can impact one's own opinion on that measure. Endorsements from an elite that a voter does not like can also influence one's opinion on an issue in the opposite direction.

While endorsements from political elites usually influence voters in direct democracy elections, I argue that this will not be the case for same-sex marriage ban campaigns. As already demonstrated, same-sex marriage is a different type of issue than those often addressed by direct democracy. Morality issues such as same-sex marriage have low information needs. In same-sex marriage ban campaigns, voters will not need

to rely on the information that can be provided by elite endorsements to help them form their opinion on the issue. Therefore, I argue that elite endorsements will not be as important for these types of ballot initiatives.

In this chapter I will use ordinal logit regression and two different survey experiments to examine the effects of elite endorsements on opinion on marriage equality.

Methods and Data

It is impossible to find comparable data on elite endorsements for each same-sex marriage ban election. Some of the campaigns, especially the earlier ones, received little to no media attention. In these less salient elections, it is unclear whether any political elites endorsed either side and that information is difficult to find even when there were elite endorsements. Even when the issue is more salient, there are many politicians that have preferred to stay away from the issue so as not to alienate any voters. There is also inconsistency in the reporting of these endorsements. Certain politicians' support or opposition may be reported on more than others. Therefore a senator's endorsement in one state might not be comparable to a senator's endorsement in another state if it was not reported as widely or frequently.

Due to the difficulty of finding actual data on elite endorsements of same-sex marriage bans, I conducted a survey experiment using Mechanical Turk to test the endorsement hypothesis. Numerous studies have shown that Mechanical Turk is a useful, and cost-effective source for experimental samples (Paolacci et al 2010; Berinsky

et al 2012). Goodman et al (2013) conclude that Mechanical Turk samples produce reliable results that are consistent with standard decision-making biases. They found many similarities between Mechanical Turk samples and traditional samples. Paolacci et al (2010) found that participants in Mechanical Turk surveys exhibit the same classic heuristics and biases as those from traditional sources. Mechanical Turk samples are significantly more diverse than typical American college samples. Data obtained through Mechanical Turk are at least as reliable as those obtained via traditional methods (Buhrmester et al 2011). Finally, Mechanical Turk respondents are usually more representative and more diverse than convenience samples (Berinsky et al 2012)

The survey was conducted from July 3 - July 24, 2013 and received 998 responses. There were two different forms of the survey to which respondents were randomly assigned. In one form of the survey, respondents were asked their opinions on same-sex marriage and gambling, as well as several demographic questions. In the other form of the survey, they were asked the same questions, but were primed with an elite endorsement for the issue. For example, the primed version of the same-sex marriage questions is:

“Barack Obama has recently stated his support for same-sex marriage. Do you favor or oppose allow gays and lesbians to marry legally?”

The full survey can be found in the appendix.

As with most Mechanical Turk surveys, the respondents were not fully representative of the United States population as a whole. There were more male

respondents (64 percent) than female respondents (35 percent) and a few transgender respondents (3 total). The sample was also not racially diverse, as is detailed in Table 4.1. The sample was also quite liberal: 53 percent identified as liberal, 33 percent as moderate, and only 13 percent as conservative. There were also many non-religious respondents. Fifty-six percent of the respondents chose “none” when asked about their religion and 50 percent never attend religious services.

Table 4.1. Race of survey respondents

Race of Respondent	Number	Percent
White	701	70.31%
Black	36	3.61%
Hispanic/Latino	59	5.92%
Asian	147	14.74%
Other/Multiracial	54	5.42%

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

The dependent variable for this analysis is the response to the question: “Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?” Respondents were given four options: strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, and strongly oppose. The responses are detailed below in Table 4.2. A large majority of the Mechanical Turk respondents favor marriage equality. According to Gallup, at the time of this survey, 53 percent of Americans favored legalizing same-sex marriage (Gallup 2013).

The main independent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was informed about President Obama’s endorsement of marriage equality. The respondent's opinion of President Obama is likely to impact how much his endorsement of same-sex marriage would impact their own opinion on the subject. Those who either strongly approve or strongly disapprove of President Obama’s job should be more likely to be influenced by his opinion on the issue. To capture this relationship, an interaction term with the respondents’ approval of President Obama and whether the respondent received the priming treatment was included as an independent variable.

Table 4.2. “Do you favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?”

	Number	Percent
Strongly favor	653	65.69%
Somewhat favor	192	19.32%
Somewhat oppose	74	7.44%
Strongly oppose	75	7.55%

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

Control variables were also included in the analysis. Sex was included as a control variable since women are more likely to support gay rights policies (Brumbaugh et al 2008; Herek 2002). Race was also included as a dummy variable for white or nonwhite. As noted in Chapter 2, African-Americans are less likely than other races to

approve of homosexuality; however, this disapproval does not always translate into opposition to gay rights policies (Lewis 2003). A significant relationship between race and support for marriage equality is therefore not expected.

Party identification and ideology were included in the analysis. Respondents were asked their party identification and given the options of Democrat, Independent, or Republican. For ideology, they were asked to choose between liberal, moderate, and conservative. Democrats and liberals have been found in several studies to be more supportive of gay rights, including same-sex marriage (Haider-Markel & Meier 2003; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Schwartz 2010). A positive correlation with support for same-sex marriage is expected.

Contact with gays and lesbians was included as a control variable. Respondents were asked if any of their immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, co-workers, or close friends were gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Contact with gays or lesbians has been shown to have a positive correlation with opinion on homosexuality and gay rights. (Brewer 2008; Brown and Henriquez 2011; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Hans et al 2012)

Religion was also included as a control variable. Respondents were asked with which religion they identify. They were given the following options: "Protestant," "Catholic," "Mormon/LDS," "Other Christian," "Jewish," "Muslim," "Something else," and "None." Respondents were categorized as Christian if their response was Protestant, Catholic Mormon/LDS, or other Christian. Respondents were also asked if they identified as a born-again or evangelical Christian. This was included as a dummy

variable. Those who identify as evangelical are expected to be less supportive of marriage equality.

Results

Simply looking at a cross-tabulation of the dependent variable and the main independent variable shows that there is not much difference in support for same-sex marriage between those who were primed with the elite endorsements and those who were not.

Table 4.3. Cross-tabulation of support for same-sex marriage and elite priming

“Do you favor allowing gays to marry legally?”	Not Primed		Primed	
Strongly favor	333	67%	320	64%
Somewhat favor	105	21%	87	17%
Somewhat oppose	30	6%	44	9%
Strongly oppose	28	6%	47	9%

Pearson’s Chi-Squared = 9.40 Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

An ordinal logit regression was also run and results are detailed in Table 4.4⁶. In Model 1, without the interaction term, the priming treatment is statistically significant.

⁶ A model was also run without the control variables. The results indicated no significant correlation between the respondent’s support for same-sex marriage and whether the respondent received the priming treatment. The results are detailed in the Appendix Table A.4.

However, this effect is in the opposite direction than would be expected. Respondents who received the priming treatment were more likely to express opposition for same-sex marriage. However, when the interaction term is included in Model 2, the relationship is no longer statistically significant. The interaction term helps to make sense of why the priming treatment works in the direction opposite than one would expect. The effect of the prime is only statistically significant for people who disapprove of Pres. Obama, as can be seen in Table 4.5. The effect of the priming treatment is not reliable since its statistical significance depends on which covariates are included. There is evidence that the priming treatment does affect opinion on marriage equality, but not for everyone.

Table 4.4. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage

Independent Variables	Model 1 (without interaction term)		Model 2 (with interaction term)	
	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Percent Change	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Percent Change
Interaction Between Receiving the Elite Prime and Approval of Obama's Job			.235 (.173)	
Respondent Received the Elite Prime	.465** (.152)	59.2%	-.192 (.504)	
Approval of Obama's Job	.101 (.102)		-.031 (.140)	
Sex of Respondent	-.084 (.167)		-.088 (.167)	
Race of Respondent	-.136 (.167)		-.134 (.167)	
Party Identification	.163 (.147)		.164 (.147)	
Contact with a Gay Man or Lesbian	.929*** (.153)	153.3%	.927*** (.154)	152.8%
Ideology	1.406*** (.145)	308.0%	1.411*** (.145)	309.8%
Christian	.907*** (.171)	147.8%	.915*** (.171)	149.8%
Evangelical	-1.080*** (.236)	-66.0%	-1.057*** (.237)	-65.3%
	N=964 Pseudo R ² = .23		N=964 Pseudo R ² = .23	

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013⁷

⁷ The brant test for this regression was significant, indicating that the parallel regression assumption was violated by the ideology and Christian variables.

Table 4.5. Impact of the priming treatment on marriage equality for different levels of Obama approval

Approval of Pres. Obama	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Strong approve	.043 (.344)
Somewhat approve	.278 (.204)
Somewhat disapprove	.513*** (.156)
Strongly disapprove	.748** (.258)

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

Some of the demographic variables performed well. As expected, religious variables were significant in a negative direction with support for same-sex marriage. Evangelical respondents were more likely to be opposed to gay marriage than non-Evangelical respondents. Ideology was positively correlated with support for marriage equality, but party identification was not. Contact with a gay man or lesbian was also positively correlated with support for marriage equality. Having a relative, co-worker, or close friend who is gay increases the likelihood that the respondent approves of same-sex marriage by 154 percent. Sex and race were not found to be significant.

In addition to the Mechanical Turk Survey, I was also able to use data from an exit poll conducted during the St. Louis City mayoral primary election on March 5, 2013. As in the Mechanical Turk survey, there were two conditions to which respondents were

randomly assigned. Approximately half of the respondents were told of President Obama's views on same-sex marriage and then asked their opinion, while the remaining respondents were simply asked their opinion on same-sex marriage. The two versions of the question are:

"Do you favor or oppose President Obama's proposal to legalize same-sex marriage?"

or

"Do you favor or oppose a proposal to legalize same-sex marriage?"

The respondents of the exit poll strongly identify with the Democratic Party (69 percent), as is to be expected from the City of St. Louis. The sample is also more religious than the Mechanical Turk sample. Sixty-seven percent of respondents report being a Christian (either Catholic, Protestant, or "Other Christian") and only 17 percent claim no religion. Only 23 percent of respondents report never going to religious service, while 39 percent report going once a week. The exit poll sample is also more racially diverse than the Mechanical Turk survey. A slim majority (55 percent) identified as White, 42 percent as Black, and small minorities identifying as either Asian, Hispanic/Latino, or other (.6%, .6%, and 1.3% respectively). Their opinions on same-sex marriage are also more varied than the Mechanical Turk survey, as detailed below in Table 4.5. As opposed to the Mechanical Turk survey, the St. Louis exit poll sample consists entirely of actual voters.

Table 4.6. “Do you favor allowing gays to marry legally?”

	Number	Percent
Strongly favor	246	46.86%
Somewhat favor	113	21.52%
Somewhat oppose	46	8.76%
Strongly oppose	120	22.86%

Source: St. Louis exit poll, 3/5/2013

The results of the ordinal logit regression using the exit poll data are detailed in Table 4.7.⁸ Respondents in this survey were not asked about their approval of Pres. Obama. In Model 2, the priming treatment is instead interacted with the race of the respondent. Whether the respondent received the priming was not significantly correlated with opinion on same-sex marriage in both models. The priming treatment is broken down by race in Table 4.8. The priming treatment is not statistically significant for either Whites or non-Whites. With both surveys showing similar results, there is strong evidence that elite endorsements do not affect opinion on marriage equality.

⁸ A model was also run without the control variables. The results indicated no significant correlation between the respondent’s support for same-sex marriage and whether the respondent received the priming treatment. The results are detailed in the Appendix Table A.5.

Table 4.7. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage

Independent Variables	Model 1 (without interaction term)		Model 2 (with interaction term)	
	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Percent Change	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Percent Change
Interaction Between Receiving the Elite Prime and Race of Respondent			-.350 (.403)	
Respondent Received the Elite Prime	.153 (.199)		.355 (.306)	
Sex of Respondent	-.240 (.200)		-.241 (.200)	
Race of Respondent (Non-White)	-.955*** (.215)	-61.5%	-.424 (.647)	
Party Identification	.282* (.115)	32.6%	.275* (.116)	31.7%
Ideology	1.260*** (.159)	252.7%	1.269*** (.159)	255.6%
Education Level	-.409*** (.097)	-33.7%	-.408*** (.098)	-33.5%
Christian	.646* (.252)	90.7%	.632* (.253)	88.1%
Religiosity	-.450*** (.096)	-36.2%	-.452*** (.096)	-36.4%
	N=445 Pseudo R ² = .20		N=445 Pseudo R ² = .20	

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: St. Louis 2013 exit poll⁹

⁹ The brant test for these regression models was not significant, indicating that the parallel regression assumption was not violated.

Some of the demographic variables performed differently from the Mechanical Turk survey. While race and party identification were insignificant in the Mechanical Turk survey, in the St. Louis exit poll they were both significant and positively correlated with opinion on marriage equality. Both religion and religiosity were significant and negatively correlated with marriage equality opinion as expected. As in the Mechanical Turk survey, ideology was also significant and positively correlated with marriage equality opinion.

Table 4.8. Impact of the priming treatment for different races

Race	Coefficient (Standard Error)
White	.005 (.262)
Non-White	-.345 (.607)

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: St. Louis 2013 exit poll

The results from both surveys show that being primed with President Obama’s support for same-sex marriage did not influence most respondents’ opinion on the issue. Both surveys were conducted quite differently. The Mechanical Turk survey was an online survey conducted over the span of a few weeks. The respondents for the Mechanical Turk survey were more liberal and less religious than the average American. The St. Louis exit poll was conducted in person on one day in one city. The exit poll sample was more diverse and more religious than the Mechanical Turk survey. Even

though both surveys were conducted quite differently, the results were quite similar. Both surveys indicated that the priming treatment had no effect on most individuals' opinions on marriage equality.

This suggests that elite endorsements do not have an effect on same-sex marriage opinion. Elite endorsements often help voters shape their opinions on numerous issues. Elite endorsements can function as a proxy for a party label in direct democracy elections. Elite endorsements can help subsidize information costs. It again appears that marriage equality is a different type of issue. As a morality issue, marriage equality has lower information needs than most of the issues that confront voters. Therefore voters will not need to be as reliant on cues from political elites to form their opinion.

Gambling

As in Chapter 3, we will look at the issue of gambling as a comparison. Gambling is less of a morality issue than marriage equality. Like same-sex marriage, gambling is an issue that has been voted on by ballot initiative in many states. In the Mechanical Turk survey, respondents were asked if they favor increasing access to gambling. Half of the respondents were informed that Mitt Romney opposes increasing access to gambling. During the 2012 presidential campaign Romney mentioned his opposition to internet gambling, citing "the social costs associated with gaming" (Corn 2012). In one form of the survey, respondents were asked their opinions on gambling, as well as several demographic questions. In the other form of the survey, they were asked the same

questions, but were primed with an elite endorsement for the issue.

“Mitt Romney has stated his opposition to increasing access to gambling. Do you favor or oppose increasing access to gambling?”

Table 4.9. “Do you favor increasing access to gambling?”

	Number	Percent
Strongly favor	144	14.44%
Somewhat favor	424	42.53%
Somewhat oppose	352	35.31%
Strongly oppose	77	7.72%

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

We can see in Table 4.9 that the respondents were much more ambivalent about the issue of gambling than they were about same-sex marriage. For the issue of same-sex marriage, 73 percent of the respondents gave strongly favored or strongly opposed responses (see Table 4.2). For the issue of gambling, most respondents clustered in the middle, giving “somewhat” responses, indicating that they did not feel strongly about the issue.

Table 4.10. Cross-tabulation of support for gambling and elite prime

“Do you favor increasing access to gambling?”	Not Primed		Primed	
Strongly favor	76	15%	68	14%
Somewhat favor	231	46%	193	39%
Somewhat oppose	173	35%	179	36%
Strongly oppose	20	4%	57	11%

Pearson’s Chi-Squared = 21.72 Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

The crosstabulation in Table 4.10 seems to indicate that priming might have a slight impact on opinion on gambling. More respondents in the primed group strongly oppose gambling than in the group that was not primed with Romney’s position on gambling. There are also fewer respondents in the primed group that somewhat favor gambling than in the group that was not primed. This seems to show that being primed with Romney’s position on gambling decreases support for increasing access to gambling.

Table 4.11. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on gambling

Independent Variables	Model 1 (without interaction term)		Model 2 (with interaction term)	
	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Percent Change	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Percent Change
Interaction Between Receiving the Elite Prime and Approval of Obama's Job			.102 (.143)	
Respondent Received the Elite Prime	.375** (.121)	45.6%	.108 (.392)	
Approval of Obama's Job	-.214* (.083)	-19.3%	-.265* (.109)	-23.3%
Sex of Respondent	-.431*** (.125)	-35.0%	-.429*** (.125)	-34.9%
Race of Respondent	-.396** (.135)	-32.7%	-.396** (.135)	-32.7%
Party Identification	.016 (.126)		.017 (.126)	
Ideology	.026 (.122)		.027 (.122)	
Christian	-.063 (.149)		-.060 (.149)	
Evangelical	-.770*** (.228)	-53.7%	-.760** (.229)	-53.2%
	N = 975 Pseudo R ² = .02		N = 975 Pseudo R ² = .02	

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

An ordinal logit regression model was estimated and the results are detailed below in Table 4.11¹⁰. Prior to including the interaction term, there was a significant correlation between the respondent's support for increasing access to gambling and whether the respondent received the priming treatment noting Governor Romney's opposition to the issue. However, once the dependent variable was changed to an interaction between receiving the prime and the respondent's approval of President Obama's job, the relationship was no longer statistically significant.

Unlike the issue of marriage equality, the prime seems to work on most respondents, except those who highly approved of Pres. Obama's job. This is detailed in Table 4.12. Unfortunately, the respondents were not asked about their approval of Governor Romney. Using their approval of President Obama so soon after the 2012 presidential election is a relatively close approximation of the respondents' approval of Governor Romney, but it possible that the results would have been different if the respondents were asked their approval of Governor Romney. However, it appears that being primed with Governor Romney's opinion on the issue did not influence the respondents' opinion on the issue. Race and sex were significantly correlated with opinion on gambling, as was identifying as Evangelical.

¹⁰ A model was also run without the control variables. In this model, there is a statistically significant correlation between the respondent's support for increasing access to gambling and whether the respondent received the priming treatment. The results are detailed in Appendix Table A.6.

Table 4.12. Impact of the priming treatment on gambling for different levels of Obama approval

Approval of Pres. Obama	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Strong approve	.210 (.260)
Somewhat approve	.312* (.149)
Somewhat disapprove	.415** (.133)
Strongly disapprove	.517* (.231)

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

Discussion

The results in this chapter indicate that elite endorsements do not influence all voters' opinions on same-sex marriage. Results from both the Mechanical Turk survey and the St. Louis Exit Poll show that being primed with President Obama's opinion on same-sex marriage did not influence the all respondents' opinion on the issue. This suggests that H₂ is correct and that elite endorsements do not have an effect on same-sex marriage opinion. While asking for respondents' opinions on marriage equality is not exactly the same as them voting on a ballot measure, the policy decision is the same in both instances. Thus, public opinion is closely tied to vote choice. If an elite endorsement does not influence opinion on marriage equality in a survey, it is likely that it would also not influence vote choice on a ballot measure.

For most issues, elite endorsements can help voters shape their opinion by subsidizing information costs. However, as a morality issue, marriage equality has lower information needs than many other issues. Therefore voters do not need to rely on heuristics such as elite endorsements in order to form their opinion.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this study I attempted to determine whether the assumptions made for direct democracy campaigns also applied to campaigns to ban same-sex marriage. It is usually argued that voters will rely more on heuristics when voting on ballot measures than when voting on candidates since ballot measures are usually low-information, low-salience contests. Heuristics can be quite helpful to voters by subsidizing their information costs. Rather than gathering complete information on candidates or ballot measures, voters can rely on heuristics to guide their decisions. The two main heuristics that I focus on in this study are campaign expenditures (as a proxy for campaign advertising and messaging) and elite endorsements. While in candidate elections, there are more heuristics available to voters (such as party label and past performance), these two are the most widely available in direct democracy campaigns.

These heuristics are generally useful to direct democracy voters. However, I found that this is not the case with the issue of marriage equality. As a morality issue, marriage equality has low information needs. Morality issues are about basic values and voters often rely on their “gut” to make moral decisions, rather than relying on information given to them by a campaign. Marriage equality is also a highly salient issue, which lowers information costs further. Since issues such as marriage equality have low information needs, voters do not need to be as dependent on heuristics to aid them in making their voter choice.

In Chapter 3, I examined the impact of campaign expenditures on same-sex marriage ban outcomes. Previous research indicates that campaign expenditures usually have an impact on ballot initiative outcomes. I found support for my hypothesis that campaign expenditures do *not* have an effect on the outcome of same-sex marriage bans. Instead, many demographic and political variables, such as partisanship, education, and religion, were significantly correlated with same-sex marriage ban outcomes, confirming the results of numerous previous studies. This has the potential to impact how ballot measure campaigns are conducted. Each year, increasing amounts of money are spent on ballot measures. Nearly \$1 trillion was donated to ballot measure campaigns in 2012 (National Institute on Money in State Politics). The assumption for those who donate to these campaigns is that these donations will impact the outcome of the ballot measure. Yet for certain issues, these expenditures may not have an effect on the outcome of the election.

In Chapter 4, I examined the influence of elite endorsements on marriage equality opinion. Endorsements from elites usually have an effect on issue opinion. I found some support for my hypothesis that elite endorsements do *not* influence opinion on marriage equality. Using data from two survey experiments, I found that whether a respondent received a prime informing her of President Obama's support for gay marriage was not significantly correlated with opinion on gay marriage. Many organizations pursue endorsements from political elites in the hopes that this information will sway voter opinion. These endorsements likely do influence opinion on many issues, but it appears that it does not have the intended effect on same-sex

marriage. This is significant because President Obama has polarized public opinion on other issues, like health care and criminal justice reform, by taking public positions on those issues.

Taken together, these results suggest that voters in same-sex marriage campaigns do not rely upon heuristics in the same way that voters in most direct democracy campaigns do. While most ballot measures deal with relatively complex issues that have high information costs, social issues such as same-sex marriage have much lower information needs. Many voters already have an opinion regarding marriage equality and therefore do not need heuristics, such as campaign advertising or elite endorsements, to make gathering information and deciding how to vote easier. Rather than campaign expenditures, demographic variables and political attitudes remain key in determining outcomes of same-sex marriage ban campaigns, as has been found in numerous previous studies.

These results also indicate that voting behavior on ballot measures is not monolithic. The same factors do not predict outcomes for all ballot measures. While campaign spending and elite endorsements are significant predictors for many ballot measures, they cannot predict outcomes for all ballot measures. As the results for the gambling ballot measures show, sometimes even the usual demographic and political attitude variables cannot predict outcomes.

In a variation on the likability heuristic, voting decisions on gay marriage ban ballot measures are likely influenced by what people think about homosexuality and gay people. In the state-level analysis on the effect of campaign expenditures, one of the

significant predictors of the outcome was the year of the election. There has been significant long-term movement in public opinion towards gay rights and the gay community in the past decade and this is likely why the year of the election had such an impact. In the individual-level analysis on the effect of elite endorsements, one of the significant predictors of opinion was contact with a gay man or lesbian. This likability effect may also be a factor in other ballot measures that target specific groups, such as immigration.

Future research will examine the usefulness of heuristics for other types social issue ballot measures such as abortion and marijuana. Since the number of ballot measures continues to increase, this will continue to be an important question. While the fight for marriage equality moved from the ballot box to the courthouse, there are other social issues that are increasingly being determined by direct democracy. Marijuana policies have been voted on nineteen times from 2008-2014 and these issues may appear on the ballot in eighteen more states in 2016. Ballot measures that regulate abortion have been voted on seven times in the same years. Do voters on these issues rely on heuristics such as campaign expenditures and elite endorsements? Public opinion on abortion is relatively stable, therefore individuals would be unlikely to be swayed by campaign expenditures or elite endorsements. Public opinion on marijuana is similar to opinion on marriage equality in that it has been increasing steadily over the past few decades. And there have been very few elites that have taken a public position on legalizing marijuana.

Appendix

Mechanical Turk Survey - Form A

conducted July 3-24, 2013; 998 respondents

1. Do you usually think of yourself as:
 - a. Democratic
 - b. Republican
 - c. Independent
2. Barack Obama has recently stated his support for same-sex marriage. Do you favor or oppose allow gays and lesbians to marry legally?
 - a. Strongly favor
 - b. Somewhat favor
 - c. Somewhat oppose
 - d. Strongly oppose
3. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president?
 - a. Strongly approve
 - b. Somewhat approve
 - c. Somewhat disapprove
 - d. Strongly disapprove
4. Among your immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, co-workers, or close friends, are any of them gay, lesbian, or bisexual as far as you know?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
5. Mitt Romney has stated his opposition to increasing access to gambling. Do you favor or oppose increasing access to gambling?
 - a. Strongly favor
 - b. Somewhat favor
 - c. Somewhat oppose
 - d. Strongly oppose
6. On most political matters, do you consider yourself:
 - a. Liberal
 - b. Moderate
 - c. Conservative
7. Are you:
 - a. Protestant
 - b. Catholic
 - c. Mormon/LDS
 - d. Other Christian
 - e. Jewish
 - f. Muslim
 - g. Something else

- h. None
- 8. Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
- 9. How often do you attend religious services?
 - a. More than once a week
 - b. Once a week
 - c. A few times a month
 - d. A few times a year
 - e. Never
- 10. Are you:
 - a. Female
 - b. Male
- 11. Are you:
 - a. White
 - b. Black
 - c. Hispanic/Latino
 - d. Asian
 - e. Other

Mechanical Turk Survey - Form B

conducted July 3-24, 2013; 998 respondents

1. Do you usually think of yourself as:
 - a. Democratic
 - b. Republican
 - c. Independent
2. Do you favor or oppose allow gays and lesbians to marry legally?
 - a. Strongly favor
 - b. Somewhat favor
 - c. Somewhat oppose
 - d. Strongly oppose
3. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president?
 - a. Strongly approve
 - b. Somewhat approve
 - c. Somewhat disapprove
 - d. Strongly disapprove
4. Among your immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, co-workers, or close friends, are any of them gay, lesbian, or bisexual as far as you know?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
5. Do you favor or oppose increasing access to gambling?
 - a. Strongly favor
 - b. Somewhat favor
 - c. Somewhat oppose
 - d. Strongly oppose
6. On most political matters, do you consider yourself:
 - a. Liberal
 - b. Moderate
 - c. Conservative
7. Are you:
 - a. Protestant
 - b. Catholic
 - c. Mormon/LDS
 - d. Other Christian
 - e. Jewish
 - f. Muslim
 - g. Something else
 - h. None
8. Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
9. How often do you attend religious services?
 - a. More than once a week

- b. Once a week
- c. A few times a month
- d. A few times a year
- e. Never

10. Are you:

- a. Female
- b. Male

11. Are you:

- a. White
- b. Black
- c. Hispanic/Latino
- d. Asian
- e. Other

Table A.1. Campaign Spending on Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Initiatives

State	Year	Spent by Supporters	Spent by Opposition	Ratio
North Dakota	2004	\$0	\$8,974	0
Missouri	2004	\$29,612	\$488,189	.061
Wisconsin	2006	\$647,491	\$4,313,365	.150
Washington	2012	\$2,724,100	\$15,063,677	.181
Montana	2004	\$10,870	\$51,498	.211
Colorado	2006	\$1,369,754	\$5,459,145	.251
Idaho	2006	\$27,104	\$106,378	.255
Virginia	2006	\$413,490	\$1,545,257	.268
Maryland	2012	\$1,734,482	\$6,371,357	.272
Maine	2012	\$2,572,534	\$8,891,988	.289
South Carolina	2006	\$108,545	\$370,427	.293
Florida	2008	\$1,607,574	\$4,327,703	.371
Kentucky	2004	\$201,132	\$522,864	.385
Arizona	2006	\$1,039,093	\$1,899,948	.547
Maine	2009	\$3,367,018	\$5,678,579	.593
Texas	2005	\$505,992	\$782,409	.647
Utah	2004	\$506,922	\$780,740	.649
South Dakota	2006	\$123,166	\$171,578	.718
Oregon	2004	\$2,434,454	\$2,933,998	.830
California	2008	\$40,455,774	\$45,624,979	.887
Minnesota	2012	\$4,099,445	\$3,267,703	1.255
Ohio	2004	\$1,202,761	\$942,421	1.276
Kansas	2005	\$158,729	\$106,011	1.497
North Carolina	2012	\$4,595,543	\$2,863,201	1.605
Louisiana	2004	\$43,117	\$23,547	1.831
Oklahoma	2004	\$21,644	\$11,616	1.863
Tennessee	2006	\$299,279	\$158,814	1.884
Michigan	2004	\$1,930,429	\$854,212	2.260
Arizona	2008	\$7,764,115	\$823,041	9.433
Arkansas	2004	\$334,731	\$2,952	113.391
Georgia	2004	\$92,765	\$0	92765*
Mississippi	2004	\$7,215	\$0	7215*

Table A.2. Multiple regression on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, 2000-2012

	Proponent Spending	Opponent Spending
Independent Variables	OLS Coefficient (Bootstrap Standard Error)	OLS Coefficient (Bootstrap Standard Error)
Log of campaign expenditures	-.552 (.546)	-.224 (.370)
Education Levels	-.134 (.356)	-.179 (.277)
Percent Democrats	-.231 (.203)	-.301* (.137)
Percent Evangelical	.535 (.322)	.442* (.214)
Religiosity	.298 (.294)	.407* (.206)
Year of Election	-1.231*** (.340)	-1.362*** (.226)***
Constant	2521*** (675)	2778 (447)
N	30	
R²	.87	

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Table A.3. Multiple regression on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, 2000-2012, excluding Utah and Arkansas

Independent Variables	OLS Coefficient (Bootstrap Standard Error)
Ratio of Money Spent by Supporters to Money Spent by Opposition	.0000009 (.336)
Education Levels	-.281 (.363)
Percent Democrats	-.314* (.148)
Percent Evangelical	.511 (.283)
Religiosity	.399 (.251)
Year of Election	-1.423*** (.243)
Constant	2900*** (486.25)
N	30
R²	.85

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Table A.4. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage

Independent Variables	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Respondent Received the Elite Prime	.203 (.131)

N=994
Pseudo R²= .001

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

Table A.5. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage

Independent Variables	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Respondent Received the Elite Prime	.173 (.162)

N=994
Pseudo R²= .001

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: St. Louis 2013 exit poll

Table A.6. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on gambling

Independent Variables	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Percent Change
Respondent Received the Elite Prime	.379*** (.118)	46.1%

N=997
Pseudo R²= .004

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

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