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**NURTURING PEACE:
UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS
IN THE AFTERMATH OF
INTRASTATE CONFLICTS, 1945-2002**

by

DUK H. KIM

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the department of
Political Science

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ABSTRACT

After World War II, intrastate conflicts rapidly replaced interstate conflicts as the dominant threat to international peace and security, a trend that has become all the more evident in the post-Cold War era. Given the prevalence of civil wars, there is increasing awareness of the need for post-conflict settlement procedures, development of local capacity for conflict resolution, and long-term peacebuilding efforts.

In his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali encouraged the international community to take responsibility for the full range of post-conflict management roles by introducing “post-conflict peace-building.” Even though the term “peacebuilding” did not exist prior to Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, the UN from its inception after World War II has engaged in various types of operations to maintain peace and to build local capacities for conflict resolution.

In addition to the UN, a number of NGOs in the field of humanitarian relief and development, such as World Vision, Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, have decisively responded with a resolution offering to support efforts toward peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts after 1945. The goal of this paper is to investigate theoretically and empirically the success of the UN and the NGOs in intrastate peacebuilding operations from 1945-2002.

My empirical findings indicate that overall UN peacebuilding operations contribute to promoting sustainable peace for war-torn societies. The findings also point out no statistical relationship between the efforts of the humanitarian NGOs and the duration of peace. A main reason might be that the NGOs primarily seek to relieve human sufferings rather than to remove the root causes of internal violence. For the 21st UN peace operations, this study offers several recommendations for an enhanced and strengthened UN.

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1

Introduction to International Peacebuilding

I. Introduction

After World War II, intrastate conflicts rapidly replaced interstate conflicts as the dominant threat to international peace and security, a trend that has become all the more evident in the post-Cold War era.¹ One study reports that “more than two-thirds of all armed conflicts in the world since 1945 have taken the form of civil wars.”² Economic inequalities; lack of democratic rules, laws, and institutions; and state discrimination against minority religions or languages are among those conditions commonly thought to favor insurgency.³ The consequences of civil wars are devastating. From 1945 to 1999, 16.5 million people died in internal conflicts, compared with 3.3 million in interstate wars.⁴ Furthermore, civil wars have raised the humanitarian issues surrounding displaced refugees, human rights, mass starvations, and massive internal violence, including assassination, rape, and systematic genocide.

As civil war⁵ has become the most common form of armed conflict, there is increasing awareness of the need for post-conflict settlement, development of local capacity for conflict resolution, and building long-lasting peace. This study explores the conditions associated with the termination of intrastate conflict and the creation of a

¹ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 1994, 88. See also Rochester 2002, 122.

² Holsti 1995, 322. See also Boutros-Ghali 1998, 21.

³ See Pearson and Rochester 1992, 277.

⁴ Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75.

⁵ Krishna Kumar defines the term “civil wars” as “violent conflicts between two or more parties for control of political authority in a state or part of it.” I will use Kumar’s definition of civil war in my study. I will also use the terms “intrastate conflict” and “civil war” interchangeably here. More specific definitions of civil wars will be discussed later in this study. See Kumar 1997, 2.

lasting peace, particularly the role of international organization. Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), primarily led by the United Nations (UN) and joined by humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)⁶, have often attempted to support efforts toward peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts. As the characteristics of armed conflict have been increasingly changing, the scope of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been expanded over time.⁷ The traditional peacekeeping forces' major function -- to separate two or more hostile parties in order to prevent the recurrence of war -- has been expanded to include various military and nonmilitary missions aimed at promoting long-lasting peace among the antagonists.

In his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali encouraged the international community to take responsibility for the full range of post-conflict management roles by introducing "post-conflict peace-building."⁸ There was growing attention being paid to not just stopping hostilities but also initiating long-term peacebuilding, which refers to "an attempt, after peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution."⁹ Hence, peacebuilding seeks to diminish the existing or potential internal threats and develop the social, political, and economic infrastructure in order to stabilize or improve domestic capacities.

An Agenda for Peace was a proposal to the international community and to the UN, challenging it to move beyond the traditional forms of peacekeeping and to undertake multidimensional *peacebuilding* missions, such as observing and supervising

⁶ "Humanitarian NGOs" refer to aid agencies that seek to prevent and to diminish human suffering during or after armed conflicts and natural disasters.

⁷ Holsti 1995, 63.

⁸ Boutros-Ghali 1992, 6.

⁹ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779.

local elections; disarming combatants; rebuilding economic infrastructure; verifying human rights; providing humanitarian relief; and administering various aspects of transitions to peace.

Multidimensional peacebuilding missions require not only an expanded UN role but also coordination with other IGOs and NGOs. Boutros-Ghali emphasized that peacebuilding could not be effectively carried out by the UN alone but required coordination and cooperation with other world organizations.¹⁰ The macro-level actors, such as states and IGOs, must accompany the micro-level actors, such as NGOs, business communities, public officials, and individual citizens to share responsibility for the maintenance of peace.¹¹ Critics may argue that there is a lack of coordination and cooperation among international organizations for international assistance. However, international organizations have often cooperatively engaged in a wide range of peacebuilding missions in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts.

Even though there exists an extensive amount of literature on peacebuilding that investigates cases involving UN and NGO intervention since 1945, the effectiveness of these interventions has never been rigorously tested nor have independent variables been carefully analyzed. It is surprising that very little work has been done to investigate theoretically and empirically whether international assistance conducted by the UN and the NGOs, indeed, contribute to peace that is more stable. Despite the severity of intrastate conflicts, civil wars have been studied far less than interstate conflicts and are not properly understood.

¹⁰ Boutros-Ghali 1992, 4-5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

One of the most significant challenges that the UN faces today is to determine whether peacebuilding, as it has already been defined, is an effective approach to promoting durable peace in the aftermath of a civil conflict. It has not been clear whether peacebuilding has been a significant tool in preventing states from relapsing into chaos. This study investigates the effectiveness of third-party intervention, primarily focused on the UN and the NGOs, in peacebuilding operations in the aftermath of civil wars. Even though the term “peacebuilding” did not exist before Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, the UN (since its inception after World War II) and humanitarian NGOs have engaged in various types of operations to maintain peace and to build local capacities for conflict resolution. I wish to investigate whether international assistance promotes peace in the aftermath of civil wars. The objective of this research is to examine whether durable peace can be attained after peacebuilding operations have been launched. I will consider the following four research puzzles, using “durable peace”¹² as my dependent variable.

1. I will examine how the level of local hostility affects the promoting of durable peace.
2. I will examine how the level of local development affects the promoting of durable peace.
3. I will examine the extent to which various types of UN military operations promote durable peace.
4. I will examine how various activities of NGOs in peacebuilding affect the promoting of durable peace.

A number of studies report that the level of hostility is one of the most significant determinants of war duration (Licklider, 1995; Regan and Abouharb, 2002) and the

¹² The terms “durable peace,” “long-lasting peace,” “self-enforcing peace,” and “sustainable peace” will be used interchangeably in this study.

likelihood of war recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2003, 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Walter, 1997). However, very interestingly, their explanations are mixed. One reports that highly intensive conflicts cause unavoidable emotional and psychological barriers, which eventually increase the likelihood of initiating war recurrence.¹³ Another reveals an opposite finding, that intensive hostilities reduce the capability of the contending parties to rebound and reinitiate war.¹⁴ I wish to resolve the contradictions.

The second puzzle relates to Boutros-Ghali's prediction, and my theoretical assumption, that peace and security are promoted as the level of economic development and the level of political stability are increased. That is, internal peace is expected to be promoted as economic inequality, social injustice, and political instability are gradually decreased by reconstructing, reforming and stabilizing economic, social, security, and political sectors.¹⁵ This involves establishing economic climates promising reliable business transactions, rules, and regulations; restoring social services, such as health, nutrition and education; and creating democratic rules, processes, laws, and institutions.¹⁶

The third puzzle has to do with which type of UN military operations works best to promote durable peace. Various types of UN military operations may be employed in any given conflict. I divide these into the following four operations: (1) monitoring or observer missions, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) peace enforcement, and (4) multidimensional peacebuilding.¹⁷ A few studies have investigated the effectiveness of UN military operations, but their findings are somewhat contradictory and outdated

¹³ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 785.

¹⁴ Walter 1997, 354.

¹⁵ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 787-789.

¹⁶ Kumar 1997, 3, 14, 25.

¹⁷ The definitions of the four UN operations will be addressed later in this chapter.

(Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2003, 2004).

Finally, despite the rapidly growing involvement of NGOs in peacebuilding, very surprisingly, no writings have empirically examined the success of their peacebuilding efforts.

To elucidate the existing confusions and to cover the huge gap in the literature, I reconstructed and updated the data originally put together by Doyle and Sambanis¹⁸ (hereafter “D&S”). The data include 124 civil wars from 1945 to 2002 that fit the definitions of civil wars employed by the authors. A civil war is defined as an armed conflict that causes more than 1,000 battle deaths in at least a single year,¹⁹ that challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state, that involves the state as a principal combatant, that occurs within the recognized boundary of that state, that includes rebels with the ability to mount organized military opposition to the state, and that has parties concerned with the prospect of living together within a defined political unit after the end of the war.²⁰

As I investigate the correlates of peacebuilding by examining the four research puzzles, I should be able to find not only a way to measure the effectiveness of peacebuilding but also a way to offer the most feasible possibilities for an enhanced and strengthened UN and humanitarian NGOs. In the next section, I begin to analyze how domestic conditions after civil wars are associated with the promotion of durable peace, and how I intend to resolve the first two puzzles of this study. I also discuss the termination and the initiation of civil wars, and how they are correlated to the promotion

¹⁸ Doyle and Sambanis 2000.

¹⁹ The data were gathered based on the total number of battle deaths (not measured annually as in Correlates of War definition). See also Small and Singer 1982, 214-215.

²⁰ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 783.

of stable domestic conditions for peace. Next, I analyze Boutros-Ghali's peacebuilding plan and discuss how I am going to employ his theory as I resolve the third research puzzle. Finally, I will discuss the rapidly growing involvement of humanitarian NGOs in peacebuilding and how I will measure the success of their missions.

II. Domestic Conditions for Sustainable Peace

A number of studies conclude that intrastate wars are more difficult to end than are interstate wars. One simple explanation might be that the opponents of interstate wars eventually draw back to their own territories. However, in the aftermath of civil wars, the opponents cannot remain separate and often retain their own armed forces. As a result, civil wars can be more difficult to end. In general, civil wars are eventually resolved by negotiated settlements or a military victory of one side. Licklider reports that of the 57 civil wars from 1945 to 1993 that ended, 25 percent (14) ended by negotiation, while 75 percent (43) ended in military victory.²¹ Licklider also finds that only 15 percent of the military victories as opposed to 50 percent of the negotiation settlements experienced war recurrence five years after the termination of the war.²² According to Licklider, "Negotiated settlements of civil wars are less likely to endure than are the results of military victories."²³ On the other hand, military victories will make potential rebels more difficult to confront in the future by disarming them and destroying the organizational identity of the losers.²⁴ As a result, military victories tend to endure compared with negotiated settlements.

²¹ Licklider 1995, 684.

²² Ibid., 685.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Wagner 1993, 261-262.

Discovering the causes for the breakdown of a peace accord is significant because they are associated with the conditions for domestic hostility and capacity. There are three explanations for the breakdown of negotiations. First, negotiated settlement in civil wars may fail when the antagonists are not committed to maintaining what they agreed to. After the negotiation, the rivals may find a strong incentive to withdraw their positions and to achieve their particular interests. In addition, they may strategically sign the peace settlement to obtain a reward or to temporarily avoid heavy pressure from the international community. Walter argues that leaders have many strategic reasons to participate in talks and even sign settlements they have no intention of actually supporting.²⁵ Second, negotiations may fail when the contending parties can not divide the stakes in a mutually agreeable way.²⁶ There are many indivisible resources, such as sovereignty, political, economic, and cultural values. “Stakes are usually less divisible in civil wars than in other types of war, and this makes settlements less likely.”²⁷ Third, a peace accord may fail when the rebels and the government place equally high value on winning the war.²⁸ The contending groups may realize that their winning chances are still very high, causing little chance for compromise. Negotiated settlements generally create a balance-power condition among the combatants.²⁹ The internal balance of power makes the new government function effectively.³⁰ As Organski and Kugler argue, the balance of power promotes peace as long as it is maintained.³¹ However, maintaining the internal

²⁵ Walter 1999, 40.

²⁶ Ibid., 41.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Wagner 1993, 261

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Organski and Kugler 1981, 14.

balance is as fragile as the international one because “many things happen that will lead antagonists to expect a more favorable outcome from the attempted use of force.”³²

Restoring trust, transforming conflicts constructively, and creating a sustainable peace are never easy tasks. Nevertheless, they can be successful when a peace accord would integrate the contending parties into a single state, make a new government capable of accommodating their interests, and create a new nonpartisan national military force.³³ According to Hartzell, the antagonists negotiating a settlement seek to create laws and institutions that seek to balance, divide, or share power among them.³⁴ The goal of peacebuilding is to construct the social, economic, and political institutions that manage group conflict without violence but with authority and legitimacy and create a self-enforcing peace.³⁵ A self-enforcing or sustainable peace is defined as a situation characterized by “the absence of physical violence; the elimination of unacceptable political, economic, and cultural forms of discrimination; a high level of internal and external legitimacy or support; self-sustainability; and a propensity to enhance the constructive transformation of conflicts.”³⁶ In short, peacebuilding attempts to create preconditions for sustainable peace.

Exploring the preconditions is a cornerstone of promoting sustainable peace. There are three significantly interrelated preconditions for peace. First is the establishment of reintegration, which refers to an effort to build mutual confidence among former contending factions, thereby reducing the risk of renewed hostilities.³⁷ The

³² Wagner 1993, 261.

³³ Walter 1999, 43.

³⁴ Hartzell 1999, 6.

³⁵ Kumar 1997, 12.

³⁶ Reyhler 2001, 12.

³⁷ Kumar 1997, 11.

process of reintegration involves building expectations of mutual benefits as a result of cooperation, a dismantling of psychological or emotional barriers, an assimilation of the common values that will show the way in the future, and a commitment to cooperate.³⁸ Furthermore, it involves demobilization, which refers to “the formal disbanding of military formations and, at the individual level, to the process of releasing combatants from a mobilized state,”³⁹ and rehabilitation of former combatants to reintegrate into society. In other words, the establishment of reintegration seeks to address the present sources of conflict and to diminish the potential hostility. The establishment of reintegration is the most effective way to eliminate former combatants’ ties to their fighting units and permits a means for them to provide for their dependents.⁴⁰ To assist the process effectively, it is crucial to create a communication, consultation, and mediation system at different levels and between the former warring groups.⁴¹

The process of reintegration seeks to minimize the potential internal threats and to promote the domestic stability. Hence, the success of reintegration seems to be associated with the level of local hostility, which is one of the most significant variables forecasting the duration of sustainable peace. I plan to conduct empirical analysis of how the local hostility is correlated to the promotion of long-lasting peace.

A second condition for peace is the establishment of structural reforms in the political, economic, social, and judicial sector. Political reform refers to the establishment of democratic norms, values, laws, and institutions that allow citizens to participate in the political process freely and equally. Cousens and Kumar argue that peacebuilding efforts

³⁸ Reyhler 2001, 13. See also Assefa 2001, 340.

³⁹ Berdal 1996, 39.

⁴⁰ Spear 2002, 145.

⁴¹ Reyhler 2001, 12.

should focus on the factors that allow a stable political process to emerge.⁴² Post-conflict elections might be a good example. Despite negotiated peace settlements, war-torn societies⁴³ are unstable, highly fragmented, and on the brink of violence. According to Kumar, the most significant objective of post-conflict elections is to transfer power to a democratically installed government that enjoys national and international legitimacy and to begin rebuilding the country.⁴⁴ In addition, Walter reports that the likelihood of a return to war would be increased when a former combatant's quality of life remains at a critically low level and has barriers to political participation.⁴⁵

Economic reform includes the establishment of a free market economic environment. Primarily, it involves a restoration of economic institutions and activities that can be managed by socially accepted rules, regulations, and contracts governing business transactions and legal rights defining ownership of private property.⁴⁶ Social reform must include two main tasks. One is to restore general social services providing health care, education, policing, and child welfare. The other is to help war victims resettle. The efforts include providing shelters and humanitarian relief to refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and orphans and offering rehabilitation services for war widows and sexually abused women.⁴⁷ Providing humanitarian needs for these groups is a crucial element in creating political, social, and economic stability. Finally, judicial reform refers to an establishment of an efficient and legitimate judicial system.

⁴² Cousens and Kumar 2001, 183.

⁴³ The term, "war-torn societies" refers to countries in the aftermath of violent internal conflict. See Kumar 1998, 5.

⁴⁴ Kumar 1998, 6.

⁴⁵ Walter 2004, 385.

⁴⁶ Kumar 1997, 25.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

The establishment of structural reforms attempts to accommodate various interests of the antagonists. The reforms require a creation of rules, laws, and institutions in political, economic, social, and judicial sectors. Creating or restoring basic infrastructures for war-torn societies seems to be a significant determinant improving the local capacity. The duration of peace after civil wars is expected when the level of local capacity is increased. The relationship will be tested later in this study.

The establishment of reintegration would prevent the potential for hostility and reintegrate former fighting groups into society. Structural reforms in the political, economic, and social sectors would boost the local capacity and accommodate the interests of the warring groups. There remains the last precondition for sustainable peace -- the establishment of international assistance, which can accelerate the transition to peace. The three preconditions are expected to be interrelated and are equally critical components of durable peace. By investigating the three conditions, I intend to measure the success of peacebuilding.

III. International Assistance for Sustainable Peace

The degree of international assistance is one of the most significant variables used when forecasting the duration of peace in the aftermath of civil wars. Traditionally, international assistance focused on economic development. In recent years, international actors have increasingly implemented programs for political and social development. In the political sphere, the programs generally have focused on institution building, promotion of elections, human rights monitoring, and demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.⁴⁸ In addition, the UN and NGOs have been particularly important actors in social rehabilitation programs for the resettlement of refugees and IDPs, for

⁴⁸ Ibid., 5.

unaccompanied and traumatized children, and for sexually abused women.⁴⁹ In the economic sphere, the international community has provided a wide range of economic rehabilitation programs and economic resources such as loans, grants, and technical expertise as well as promoting reforms in agriculture, physical infrastructure, and macroeconomic⁵⁰ to attract foreign investments. Primarily focused on the UN and humanitarian NGOs, this study attempts to reveal the relationship between the duration of long-lasting peace and the role of international organization. The third and the fourth research puzzles will be resolved as I empirically explore the relationship. Further discussion of these puzzles will be presented in the following sections.

The United Nations

The end of the Cold War marked the turning point for the UN in terms of enlarging the perspective of its missions in internal conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, the practice of peacebuilding has involved much more extensive civilian components, such as electoral observation, police monitoring/training, civilian administration, and humanitarian affairs.⁵¹ During the Cold War, the UN was generally not in the business of keeping peace among the antagonists within states. There were four reasons why the UN inactively responded to intrastate conflicts. First, traditionally international organizations such as the UN reluctantly intervened in matters within the internal or domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. The principle of state sovereignty, referring to a supreme political authority within a territory, presented an argument against UN action in the internal politics of a state.⁵² Furthermore, the UN involvement in most civil wars in the

⁴⁹ Ibid., 15.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 25.

⁵¹ Fortna 2004, 271.

⁵² Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 203.

post-World War II period was problematical because there was the East-West ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Second, the UN Charter was designed not to deal with internal conflicts but to manage interstate wars, which are generally characterized by the invasion of one state by another.⁵³ The lack of a clear constitutional basis caused a discord among the members of the Security Council to intervene in civil wars. In many internal conflicts, the lack of full support from the Security Council on peace operations frequently caused a vague and unobtainable goal of the mission.⁵⁴ In addition, the UN troops were not well trained to manage the issues of refugees, genocide, human rights, and massive starvation.

Third, related to the issue of state sovereignty, the UN was reluctant to send its troops because of the complex nature of civil conflicts. In many cases of internal conflicts, it was very difficult for the UN to identify the contending parties and to get consent to intervene from them when there was no government.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the UN frequently experienced problems to set a standard rule in terms of balancing between state sovereignty and its responsibility for initiating peace operations.⁵⁶

Finally, historically the UN suffered from budgetary problems and the lack of a reserve body of trained forces. In fact, the budget for UN peace operations has lagged far behind demand.⁵⁷ The financing problem for the UN still continues today. For example, in 2003, the annual budget for the UN was about \$1.3 billion⁵⁸, which was only 3 percent

⁵³ Ibid., 105.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 39-40.

⁵⁵ Walter and Snyder 1999, 18.

⁵⁶ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 105.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 108.

⁵⁸ United Nations 2004. According to the UN, the entire UN system (including the UN, the UN peacekeeping, the programs, and funds) spends about \$13 billion a year, which is less than one-third of New York City's budget in 2003.

of New York City's budget (\$43 billion).⁵⁹ The UN's budget is smaller than the University of Minnesota (\$1.9 billion) and Metropolitan Tokyo's Fire Department (\$1.8 billion).⁶⁰

The UN continues to face these challenges. However, state sovereignty has been weakened in the post-Cold War era. The rapid growth of IGOs, NGOs, and international norms, rules and laws, the development of global telecommunications, and the expansion of economic interdependence have diminished the centrality of the state as the primary actor in world politics.⁶¹ The principle of state sovereignty has been gradually eroded during the past few decades. The erosion created a new potential for multilateral action in internal affairs.⁶²

Furthermore, humanitarian issues, such as starvation, refugees, and genocide, have now become global problems and have given international organizations, such as the UN, a basis for taking their own actions. However, humanitarian intervention, which refers to an action whose objectives are generally limited to the direct relief of human suffering without attempting to influence the political outcome of a conflict,⁶³ remains very controversial. Opponents argue that humanitarian intervention can become an abusive use of force that permits a stronger power or group of powers to assert their will.⁶⁴ According to Glennon, the majority of UN members oppose the concept of humanitarian intervention because they worry about the infringement of sovereignty.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ The City of New York 2004, i. New York City's budget in 2003 was about \$43 billion.

⁶⁰ United Nations 2004.

⁶¹ Mingst and Karns 2000, 11. See also Mingst and Karns 2000, 105-106.

⁶² Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 105

⁶³ Mortimer 1998, 126.

⁶⁴ Harris 1995, 3.

⁶⁵ Glennon 2001, 2.

Glennon condemns humanitarian intervention by individual states and coalitions of states without Security Council approval.⁶⁶

On the other hand, proponents support the idea of intervention in order to prevent or punish a massive violation of humanitarian law. They claim that humanitarian intervention can be deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Mortimer asserts that even though it is somewhat vaguely stated, Article 39 gives the Security Council absolute discretion to determine that an internal conflict constitutes a threat to the peace⁶⁷ and to authorize humanitarian intervention by member states. Even though the issue of humanitarian intervention remains debatable, it seems to constitute a new norm in international affairs. In this and other ways, the post-Cold War environment has posed new challenges and opportunities for the UN in internal politics.

Boutros-Ghali's peacebuilding plan was introduced under these circumstances. It was designed as preparation for the post-conflict management roles, which the international community poorly implemented during the Cold War. He believed that peace would be promoted as economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression within states were diminished.⁶⁸ Critics argue that Boutros-Ghali's proposal could not be fully implemented since it exceeded the capacities and expectations of individual states and the UN.⁶⁹ Despite the criticisms, it remains a good road map for multilateral conflict-management roles that international organizations like the UN might play.⁷⁰ To strengthen and enhance the opportunity for successful post-conflict resolution, Boutros-

⁶⁶ Ibid., 158-159.

⁶⁷ Mortimer 1998, 135-136.

⁶⁸ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 1994, 173.

⁶⁹ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 99.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Ghali outlined the following five interconnected roles that the UN would play in the post-Cold War era:

- *Preventive diplomacy* refers to actions that “prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”⁷¹
- *Peace enforcement* refers to action “with or without the consent of the parties to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”⁷² Chapter VII of the UN Charter lays out direct military intervention and various enforcement mechanisms, such as economic, diplomatic, financial, and military sanctions, to deter or prevent threats to international peace.⁷³
- *Peacemaking* refers to actions that bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means, such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.⁷⁴
- *Peacekeeping* refers to “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the fields, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians, as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”⁷⁵
- *Multidimensional Peacebuilding* refers to activities including “disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”⁷⁶ In addition, peacebuilding activities include mediation and confidence building among the conflict parties, humanitarian assistance (including food aid, water, sanitation, and health care), stabilization of economic structures, information and the establishment of educational structures, campaigns informing and educating people regarding peacebuilding missions.⁷⁷

Peacebuilding encompasses a wide range of post-conflict management missions.

Peacebuilding operations should be designed to address the specific needs of a particular

⁷¹ Boutros-Ghali 1992, 5.

⁷² Doyle 1998, 2.

⁷³ Mingst and Karns 2000, 100.

⁷⁴ Boutros-Ghali 1992, 6.

⁷⁵ Ibid. See also Holsti 1995, 63.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 16.

⁷⁷ Truger 2001, 35.

conflict. In other words, a different type or level of peacebuilding operation should be planned to address a different type or level of a particular conflict. As Cousens and Kumar argue, “Peacebuilding should not be equated to the entire basket of postwar needs, as multiple and complex as they are.”⁷⁸ Implementing peacebuilding operations to address the specific needs of a conflict is a strategy of peacebuilding. Furthermore, UN peacebuilding has been one of the devices to be pursued at different stages of a conflict. “Peacebuilding can occur in advance, alongside, or even in the absence of a peacekeeping operation or a formal peacemaking effort, although it will face different constraints and enjoy fewer resources.”⁷⁹ In this sense, these forms of UN missions are mutually supportive and closely interconnected.

The third research puzzle is to investigate which type of UN military operations works best to promote durable peace. Since various types of UN military operations should deal with a different level of hostility, I wish to divide them into the following four operations: (1) monitoring or observer missions, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) multidimensional peacebuilding, and (4) peace enforcement. The purpose of monitoring or observer missions is to monitor the negotiated treaty and assist in the negotiation of a peace settlement with the presence of military and civilian observers. Traditional peacekeeping involves the insertion of UN troops between the armies of two or more hostile parties after a cease-fire has been agreed to by the parties to the conflict. Disarmament becomes the most essential responsibility of the peacekeeping operations because the contending parties in civil conflicts fight with light weapons.⁸⁰ Multidimensional peacebuilding refers to an arrangement of strategies to build a self-

⁷⁸ Cousens and Kumar 2001, 13.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 14.

⁸⁰ Jett 1999, 17.

sustaining peace, ranging from traditional peacekeeping operations to the development of local capacities and institutional rebuilding.⁸¹ In general, war-torn societies require comprehensive reform in their social, economic, political, and security sectors. This involves creating new or reorganizing the existing institutions to address specific needs and to enforce socially accepted rules.⁸² Peace enforcement refers to a variety of enforcement mechanisms, such as direct military intervention and a range of economic and military sanctions. Even though Boutros-Ghali's proposal was not fully implemented, exploring the potential validity of his assumptions and the potential of various conflict roles he proposes for the UN will be a critical factor in reforming and enhancing the capacity of the world's largest organization.

Humanitarian NGOs

In recent decades, humanitarian NGOs have grown significantly and have participated aggressively in a wide range of peacebuilding missions saving hundreds and thousands of lives in the aftermath of civil wars. The leading international NGOs,⁸³ such as the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), World Vision International, International Save the Children Alliance, Catholic Relief Services, Care International, Oxfam International, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and Christian Children's Fund, are the most powerful actors in regional conflict along with the UN. In fact, "the top level of the humanitarian system is occupied by the big multinational NGOs."⁸⁴ They are highly professional, leading campaigners, financially strong and highly visible in the media. Katarina West reports that the international humanitarian NGO community is a

⁸¹ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 781.

⁸² Kumar 1997, 3.

⁸³ The selection of larger humanitarian NGOs is made based upon their financial status in 2003. More-specific clarifications will be discussed later in Chapter 4.

⁸⁴ West 2001, 8.

rich world of professional bodies, local organizations, mammoth multinationals, charities, advocacy groups, business-like organizations, and voluntary associations.⁸⁵

Table 1. Annual Income* of Larger Humanitarian NGOs 1999–2004 (\$US million)

Year	The ICRC ⁸⁶	World Vision International	International Save the Children Alliance	Care USA ⁸⁷	Catholic Relief Services	The IRC	Oxfam Great Britain ⁸⁸
1999	670	774	N/A	426	N/A	N/A	300 ⁸⁹
2002	632	1003	467	421	269	157	344
2004	718 ⁹⁰	1550	772	572	552	169	339

*The annual income generally includes contributions (from governments, international organizations, and private citizens), grants, net assets, contracts, investment returns, loan administration fees and other. Sources: The ICRC's 1999, 2002, 2003 annual reports. World Vision International's 2004 annual report. International Save the Children Alliance's 2002 and 2004 annual reports. Catholic Relief Services' 2003 and 2004 annual reports. The IRC's 2002 and 2004 annual reports. Oxfam Great Britain's 2000 – 2004 annual reports.

The growth of humanitarian NGOs has been particularly remarkable in the last two decades. For example, in 1989, 180,000 tons of food were channeled through European-based humanitarian NGOs, and the amount was significantly increased to 450,000 tons in 1991.⁹¹ The U.S. official aid to humanitarian NGOs skyrocketed in ten years, from \$ 32 million to \$1 billion in 1994.⁹² Table 1 presents the total income of the leading humanitarian NGOs in the past half decade. According to Table 1, the income of NGOs has steadily increased and ranges from hundreds of million dollars to more than \$1

⁸⁵ Ibid., 1.

⁸⁶ The amount reported in the table includes contributions received for field and headquarters budgets in cash, kind, and services by donor (assets excluded).

⁸⁷ The annual budget of CARE International is not available. The table presents the annual budgets of CARE USA since its budget is relatively large enough to compare with other multinational NGOs. In addition, CARE USA is the largest in terms of financial status among 11 CARE International members.

⁸⁸ The total revenue of Oxfam International is not available. The total operating revenue of Oxfam Great Britain is reported here because its strong financial status. Oxfam Great Britain is financially the largest among the 16 Oxfam International affiliates.

⁸⁹ The total revenues in 2000-2001 are reported.

⁹⁰ The amount of total contribution in 2003 is reported.

⁹¹ Griffiths, Levine, and Weller 1995, 72.

⁹² Bennett and Kayetisi-Blewitt 1996, 13.

billion. Between 1999 and 2004, the increased rate of revenue ranged from 7 percent (the ICRC) to more than 100 percent (World Vision International). As of 2004, the world's largest humanitarian NGO, World Vision International, alone raised \$1.5 billion. CARE USA and Oxfam Great Britain compete with other multinational NGOs by raising \$572 million and \$339 million respectively. The dynamism of humanitarian NGOs activities is closely associated with the levels of their finances.⁹³ One of the main reasons for the rapidly growing involvement of humanitarian NGOs is that they provide fast, quality services. "They are flexible and speedy, they disregard state borders, are cheaper in relative terms, have links at grass-roots levels, and are not bureaucratic."⁹⁴ NGOs are in a much better position compared with IGOs when it comes to providing the current humanitarian activities, which require an immediate deployable capacity with expertise. This is because the decision-making process of IGOs is much more cumbersome than that of their counterparts. Hence, it is not surprising to witness the rapid involvement of NGOs in regional conflict.

In general, NGOs carry out their humanitarian relief action at the grassroots level, which is labor intensive.⁹⁵ Humanitarian relief action refers to an effort to prevent, alleviate or eliminate human suffering during a natural disaster and a man-made armed conflict.⁹⁶ It includes emergency assistance and political, social, and economic rehabilitation programs and is often conducted as a critical part of peacebuilding operations. West categorizes a wide variety of humanitarian relief operations as follows:

⁹³ Gordenker and Weiss 1996, 31.

⁹⁴ West 2001, 7.

⁹⁵ Natsios 1996, 75.

⁹⁶ West 2001, 13.

- *Preventive* operation refers to efforts to anticipate humanitarian crises rather than to improve them.⁹⁷ Its mechanism includes election monitoring, fact finding missions, early-warning systems, regional or international mediation, peace monitoring, lobbying and information sharing, and development assistance.⁹⁸ At this stage, NGOs raise international awareness regarding “alarming humanitarian developments and pressure governments and IGOs to take action.”⁹⁹
- *General* operation refers to efforts to raise international or national awareness of humanitarian issues in donor countries and to develop general principles of humanitarian action. These actions include public advocacy, lobbying, and campaigning at the national and international level in order to raise awareness of humanitarian issues.¹⁰⁰
- *Protective* operation refers to efforts to maintain basic order and to shield civilians from fighting. It includes prison visits, landmine clearance, and maintaining minimum standards in refugee camps.¹⁰¹ *Protective* action frequently works with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which manages massive refugee arrivals.¹⁰²
- *Relief* operation refers to efforts to alleviate human sufferings in conflict regions by providing clothing, shelter, food, medicine, and other basic necessities for survival. The scope of the relief operation can expand to include sanitation, health care, and the construction of temporary and more long-term shelters, etc.¹⁰³
- *Restorative* operation refers to efforts to deal with the most urgent human distress and damage caused by fighting and to manage psychological, social, economic, and administrative rehabilitation. According to West, restorative action is divided into conflict resolution, which attempts to find an agreement among the antagonists in order to terminate fighting, and peacebuilding, which aims to “improve general security, establish a legitimate government and rehabilitate the local economy and civil society.”¹⁰⁴

⁹⁷ Ibid., 14.

⁹⁸ Weiss and Collins 1996, 191. See also Alger 2005, 6.

⁹⁹ West 2001 14.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 18.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 15.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Alger 2005, 6.

¹⁰⁴ West 2001, 17.

- *Forcible* operation refers to efforts to enforce penalties for severe violations of international humanitarian law [e.g. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 827 for the former Yugoslavia in 1993] and for severe human rights violations [e.g. UNSC Resolution 794 for Somalia in 1992].¹⁰⁵ It generally works with assistance from UNSC. Humanitarian NGOs attempt to speed up enforcement of humanitarian law violations.

These six categories illustrate that humanitarian NGOs are engaged in almost every aspect of peacebuilding operations for war-torn societies. Preventive, general, and forcible operations are often coordinated with the UN and other IGOs. According to Alger, NGOs are increasingly involved in IGOs because most important peacebuilding issues are placed on the agendas of the UN and other IGOs.¹⁰⁶ Alger claims that successful completion of NGO tasks requires cooperation and coordination with the UN as well as other IGOs.¹⁰⁷ Protective, relief, and restorative operations seek not only to recover the trust and a sense of community but also to offer a better life for the victims of war and armed conflict, allowing them to begin the peacebuilding process. Humanitarian NGO activities include the process of “reconciliation,” which provides for a conflict-handling mechanism that addresses deep emotional wounds.¹⁰⁸ In this way, humanitarian NGO attempt to establish a new, favorable relationship among previous warring groups.

As West claims, humanitarian NGO tasks are expanded, diversified, detailed, complicated, and extremely significant. Governments of war-torn societies are generally incapable of providing basic humanitarian relief programs in the aftermath of prolonged intrastate conflicts. When a government fails, violates, or refuses to protect rights and to provide basic goods and services for its citizens, individuals or groups may seek help

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 16.

¹⁰⁶ Alger 2005, 4.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Assefa 2001, 340.

from external actors to express their concerns and even to protect their lives.¹⁰⁹ Then, the international community begins to put pressure on the host government and attempts to deploy aid agencies that generally channel between the host government and its citizens. In fact, the field agents of the UN and humanitarian NGOs frequently work as mediators negotiating with the authorities to address the various needs of individual citizens and obtaining the authorizations needed to implement a wide range of peacebuilding activities.¹¹⁰ Mediation is one of the most significant duties that the field agents must carry out.¹¹¹ Furthermore, the field agents are involved in protecting rights and providing goods and services that the host government fails to deliver.

The final research puzzle of this study is to measure the success of humanitarian NGOs in the aftermath of civil wars. I intend to explore how the leading humanitarian NGOs have engaged in different types of field operations, as West categorizes, and how their operations from 1945 to 2003 correlate with the promotion of long-lasting peace.

IV. Organization of This Study

The next chapter develops a theoretical framework by exploring the most dominant theories of international relations, such as neorealism, neoliberalism/neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. I intend to summarize their major assumptions, analyze how they differ from each other, and evaluate which school of thought offers the most appropriate explanations that aid our understanding of international peacebuilding. Chapter 3 outlines the existing literature on international assistance for war-torn societies and its relationship to efforts that promote sustainable peace. Chapter 3 also highlights the most significant explanatory variables that are associated with the success of third-

¹⁰⁹ Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12.

¹¹⁰ See The ICRC *Headquarters Appeal 2005*.

¹¹¹ Paffenholz 2001, 75.

party intervention. I will incorporate and apply them to construct my empirical models, in an effort to fill in the gaps in the literature.

Chapter 4 introduces research methods and various statistical models to solve the four research puzzles by testing the hypotheses of this study. In addition, in Chapter 4, I outline my findings and offer an extensive analysis of international peacebuilding operations after civil wars. Based upon my theoretical and quantitative findings, Chapter 5 addresses the current challenges surrounding the UN and discusses several recommendations for revitalizing UN peace operations. The concluding chapter reviews theoretical and empirical findings of this study and briefly discusses how the scope of this study can be enlarged.

2

Theoretical Perspectives on the Termination of Violence and the Creation of Sustainable Peace in the Aftermath of Intrastate Conflicts

I. Introduction

As civil war has become the most dominant form of armed conflict in the global system, conflict analysts have focused on applying the dominant theoretical frameworks to understand the conditions associated with the initiation and the termination of intrastate conflict and the creation of durable peace. Neorealists find that there are similarities between the anarchical international system and the lack of a central authority within war-torn societies. In their view, neorealism helps in understanding how civil wars begin and end, and offers prescriptions.

Neoliberal institutionalists disagree. In their view, neorealists simply neglect to discuss what happens in the aftermath of civil wars. Neoliberals assert that ending civil wars requires not only the absence of physical violence but also the creation of the social, political, and economic infrastructures for reinstating domestic order. According to their view, neorealists fail to provide an analysis of the conditions associated with the processes by which former warring groups mutually develop new governing institutions.¹¹²

Constructivists claim that both neorealists and neoliberals focus only on explaining states' materially based interests and are unable to explain the sources of states' motivations for international moral action, which is generally defined as "an

¹¹² Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 21.

international action that advances a moral principle rather than a selfish one.”¹¹³

Constructivists emphasize that they have better explanations for the role of states and international organizations in international moral action than neoliberals. Neorealists respond that arguments made by neoliberals and constructivists are exaggerated and inadequate to reflect the reality of intrastate conflicts today. Hence, neorealists call them idealists and utopians. The arguments among the three schools of thought continue today and seem to be endless.

This study explores the conditions associated with the termination of intrastate conflict and the creation of a durable peace, particularly the role of international organization. This chapter clarifies which school of thought offers the best explanation of these conditions. This process involves the identification and application of the major assumptions made by neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Even if neorealism could be arguably a dominant theory in explaining the creation and the termination of interstate conflicts, it does not seem to be applicable to intrastate wars. In addition, neorealism offers an insufficient prescription for post-conflict resolution. Neorealists overlook the roles that international organizations and domestic institutions can have in securing a peace agreement, protecting the right of political participation, providing basic social services, and reinstating domestic order for the previously warring groups. On the other hand, constructivists make a good point stating that neorealists and neoliberals do not do a good job in explaining most of the international moral actions after the Cold War. However, their discussion of state involvements in international moral action seems to be somewhat exaggerated.

¹¹³ Kaufmann and Pape 1999, 633.

This chapter demonstrates that neoliberal institutionalism appears to be a more useful framework for explaining the phenomenon of domestic capacity and international assistance in the aftermath of civil wars. In the next section, I explore how neorealists explain the conditions associated with the causes and the cures of intrastate conflicts. Then, I present the discussion of neoliberal institutionalists and argue how international organizations and domestic institutions can play a role in promoting sustainable peace. Next, I discuss how constructivists emphasize the role of states and international organizations in international responsibility and how they take a different theoretical approach in explaining the international system compared with neorealists and neoliberals (scholars of rational choice). Finally, I reconcile the three schools of thought and demonstrate that the neoliberal institutionalists view can be a relevant framework for this study.

II. The Neorealist Position

Neorealism has mainly focused on analyzing the nature of interstate conflicts. Nonetheless, in recent studies, analysts of intrastate wars borrow neorealists' views in order to scrutinize the causes and the cures of civil conflicts. In the neorealist view, neorealism can be applicable to intrastate conflicts.

The Core Assumptions of Neorealism

There are three major assumptions identified by the scholars of the Neorealist School. First, the essential nature of the international system, which is characterized by interactions among states, is anarchic. Grieco argues that the anarchical international system refers to the lack of a supreme authority to prevent other states from using

violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave.¹¹⁴ States in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security.¹¹⁵ According to Waltz, “anarchy is taken to mean not just the absence of government but also the presence of disorder and chaos.”¹¹⁶ For this reason, Waltz claims that the international system is a self-help system. “A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper.”¹¹⁷ While states have to boost economic capability, to increase military strength, and to develop effective tactics internally, they should also broaden their own alliance to weaken the military strength of potential enemies externally.¹¹⁸ Waltz argues that states are “unitary actors who, at minimum, seek their own preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination.”¹¹⁹ For neorealists, states’ most common and essential goal is to survive and maintain its status in the international system.

Second, states are not only the most important actors in the international system but also they can be conceptualized as unitary actors.¹²⁰ A state is unitary in that it is a “rational egoist” that seeks to maximize “national interests.” According to Waltz, states perform essential political, social, and economic functions which no other organization could possibly replace.¹²¹ In his view, the interactions among states essentially form the structure of the international political system.¹²²

¹¹⁴ Grieco 1993, 126.

¹¹⁵ Gilpin 1993, 3 and 305. According to Gilpin, “power” refers to military, economic, and technological capabilities of a state.

¹¹⁶ Waltz 1979, 114.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 95. See also Grieco 1993, 118.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² *Ibid.*

Third, the anarchical international system limits the cooperation between states.¹²³ According to Grieco, states are reluctant to cooperate with one another for two reasons. First, states are concerned about cheating. Most states strongly believe that it is extremely hard to monitor what others would gain and lose in the process of international cooperation. Because of this, Grieco maintains that international organizations are only marginally able to contribute to the promotion of international cooperation.¹²⁴ Second, states are concerned about relative achievements of gains.¹²⁵ States fears that “achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future.”¹²⁶ In the neorealist view, states are extremely concerned about what their partners would gain from the cooperation.

Neorealists believe that the absence of a central authority that provides order and mediates disputes compels states to help themselves. A key concept of neorealism, the security dilemma – an increase in one group’s security decreases the security of others¹²⁷– forces states to increase their own power, worry about the power of other states, and limit international cooperation. Arms races, forming balance of power coalitions,¹²⁸ and war are inevitable under the anarchic system.

¹²³ Grieco 1993, 118.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 118. See also Mearsheimer, 1995, 47-49.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 117-118.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 118.

¹²⁷ Jervis 1978, 186.

¹²⁸ According to Wagner, a key concept of neorealism, the balance of power, is associated with the notion that “weak states find it in their interest to join together to prevent the hegemony of powerful states.” See Wagner 1993, 247-248. Morgenthau also asserts that the balance of power signifies stability within the anarchic system and attempts to establish a new equilibrium of power. See Morgenthau 1993, 184.

The Causes and the Cures of Civil Wars

According to neorealists, neorealism can be applicable to understanding the causes and cures of intrastate conflicts.¹²⁹ In their view, the anarchical international system resembles the absence of a central authority within war-torn societies. “The absence of authority among states in the international system parallels the lack of effective central authority within states at risk of domestic conflict.”¹³⁰ Under anarchy, domestic political groups fear for their security in the same way that states do in the international system.

The security dilemma comes into play when domestic political groups’ security is no longer guaranteed. In the neorealist view, after a strong central government collapses, the groups suddenly monitor each other’s movements and interpret every act as a potential threat to their safety.¹³¹ At a minimum, they continuously maintain an approximate equilibrium of power against their rivals so that they can prevent the predominance of any single political group. Furthermore, each political group often strategically plans for military victory. Hence, the security dilemma increases the level of hostility among the contending parties and a chance for military showdown. “Efforts to provide for the security for the group create conditions that lead to both higher levels of collective insecurity and a great probability of violent intergroup conflict.”¹³²

After presenting the conditions associated with the causes of civil wars, neorealists offer three mechanisms for the cures. First, since the causes stem from the domestic anarchy, the restoration of a hierarchic order through the use of force will be

¹²⁹ See Wagner 1993, 236. See also Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 22.

¹³⁰ Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 22.

¹³¹ David 1997, 558.

¹³² Ibid. See also Kaufmann 1996, 147.

one of the most effective means to end wars.¹³³ One of the key concepts of neorealism, the hegemonic stability theory, comes into play when a stronger group achieves a military victory and dominates the weaker domestic groups. The hegemonic stability theory refers to the notion that the stability of the international system requires a single dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among states.¹³⁴ In the neorealist view, a powerful group exercises its hegemonic power¹³⁵ to establish the basic rules and orders favorable to its own interests as well as the weaker groups.¹³⁶ Under the conditions specified in the hegemonic stability theory, the lesser groups of a state comply with the authoritarian leadership for their security and benefit. Military victory is one of the effective means for ending civil wars according to neorealism.

Second, a division of the population and territory of warring groups can be a solution for ending civil wars.¹³⁷ Intrastate conflicts are generally more difficult to end than interstate wars because the warring groups cannot remain separate and retain their own armed forces. For this reason, neorealists suggest a mechanism that is designed to divide the country so that each of the major warring groups obtains its own sovereign state. The idea of partition stems from a core assumption of neorealism -- the balance of power system in which groups or states seek to maintain an approximate equilibrium of power among many rivals. In their case study of Bosnia, for example, Mearsheimer and Evera propose to split the state into two different ethnically homogenous independent countries: a Serb Republic and a Muslim-Croat Federation, each of which balances the

¹³³ Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 23. See also David 1997, 559.

¹³⁴ Snider 1985, 579.

¹³⁵ Keohane observes hegemony as a situation in which "one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing international relations and willing to do so." Keohane 1984, 34.

¹³⁶ Gilpin 1981, 30. See also Snider 1985, 582.

¹³⁷ Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 23. See also David 1997, 559.

other.¹³⁸ In their view, when a domestic group or a state fails to establish the balance of power, outsiders like the United States or the UN can step in to protect the weaker power.¹³⁹

Finally, civil wars can be ended by the intervention by outside powers. According to neorealists, even though most states are not tempted to intervene in the affairs of other states, they are often motivated to intervene when a civil conflict becomes a threat to their own interests and security. For neorealists, intervention can be an effective mechanism to accumulate more power and to pursue national interests.¹⁴⁰ Humanitarian intervention, for example, generally signifies the exercise of public authority within a foreign jurisdiction without the consent of the local sovereign and aims to assist significant segments of a population suffering from a natural disaster, starvation, or the inability of government to provide the basic needs.¹⁴¹ Neorealists believe humanitarian intervention is a cover for expansionist policies aimed to increase the relative power of the intervener.¹⁴²

Mearsheimer asserts that states are expected to intervene in a humanitarian crisis only when their expected benefits exceed their expected costs.¹⁴³ In addition, neorealists argue that an outside state can end internal wars by intervening as it “takes sides, tilts the local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals to win.”¹⁴⁴ Neorealists expect that the interveners increase the relative power through a permanent occupation or inclusion of a

¹³⁸ Mearsheimer and Evera 1995, 16.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁴⁰ Taliaferro 2001, 153. See also Finnemore 1996a, 156.

¹⁴¹ Griffiths, Levine, and Weller 1995, 40.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ Mearsheimer 2001, 47.

¹⁴⁴ Betts 1994, 21. Morgenthau also asserts that during the Cold War, the superpowers “interjected their power into the domestic conflicts of weak nations, supporting the government or the opposition.” See also Morgenthau 1967, 428.

territory in their sphere of influence.¹⁴⁵ For neorealists, since anarchy causes violence, establishing a strong hierarchical power is a significant factor for peace. However, the application of neorealism to internal war remains controversial and questionable.

Neorealism, in fact, often faces several criticisms.

Limitations of Neorealism

Even though the adoption of neorealist analysis has improved understanding of the processes by which intrastate conflicts may be initiated, it is nonetheless an insufficient approach to explain the conditions associated with the causes and the cures of civil wars. Neorealism may not be entirely applicable to internal conflicts since the anarchical international system is not fully comparable to the domestic anarchy, and civil war is not a small version of interstate conflict.

There are several critical limitations of neorealism. First, neorealism offers inadequate explanations of the origins of civil wars. In the neorealist view, domestic anarchy is a given. This is wrong. It does not typically emerge without human intervention. Neorealism neglects to explain how anarchy emerges on the domestic level in the first place.¹⁴⁶ Domestic anarchy generally emerges as the result of internal war (for example, in Liberia and Somalia), and most civil wars take place when governments continue to exercise at least some degree of control.¹⁴⁷ Thus, domestic anarchy may not be fully equivalent to the anarchical international system. Internal wars hardly occur under anarchy assumed by neorealism. Second, neorealists consider only the material factors, such as military capability or economic powers, as being the causes and fail to

¹⁴⁵ Löwenheim 2003, 25.

¹⁴⁶ David 1997, 560.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 561.

identify a wide range of other motivations that favor insurgency. Ethnic nationalism; lack of democratic rules, laws, and institutions; presence of political and economic discrimination against minorities; and state discrimination against minority religions or languages are commonly thought to fuel internal conflict.¹⁴⁸

However, even though these variables may be the underlying causes of violence, they are insufficient in explaining why civil wars break out. In fact, a number of analysts of intrastate conflicts have concluded that there is no single motivation that triggers violence. Walter and Snyder assert that elites often manipulate information for their self-interests — maintaining prestigious political power and economic status —and deceptively create malicious images of a potential rival in order to obtain popular support.¹⁴⁹ Then the elites make a decision to trigger violence based upon their evaluation of “how malicious or benign a potential rival might be.”¹⁵⁰ Brown also comes to a similar conclusion that “bad leaders,” are one of the most critical factors that fuel internal conflicts (for example, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan). Bad leaders typically trigger violence not to resolve the existing problems or to preserve peace for their citizens but to remain in power. Brown identifies four sets of proximate causes: internal, mass-level factors (bad domestic problems); external, mass-level factors (bad neighborhoods); external, elite-level factors (bad neighbors); or internal, elite-level factors (bad leaders).¹⁵¹ Though many civil wars are initiated by bad domestic problems, the vast majority are triggered by bad leaders.¹⁵² Neorealism assumes that a group makes a decision to go to war in support of its national interests. However, bad leaders in the vast

¹⁴⁸ Pearson and Rochester 1992, 277. See also Brown 1996, 12-23.

¹⁴⁹ Walter and Snyder, 1999, 9.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Brown 1996, 575.

¹⁵² Ibid.

majority of civil wars act on behalf of their own interests, according to Brown's conclusion.

Third, restoring a strong government power through the use of force is an insufficient solution. Neorealists assert that the domestic anarchy causes internal violence and that the restoration of a strong government authority or hegemonic power is the best way to resolve conflict. However, neorealism is silent when it comes to discussing how to make a new government capable of accommodating various interests of the contending parties and how to create a new nonpartisan national military force. Neorealism offers no guidelines for establishing a strong government capable of resolving problems such as ethnic strife, the lack of democratic institutions to channel conflict, and the absence of an experienced bureaucracy.¹⁵³

In addition, reinstating a strong hierarchy power through military victory is a painful solution. According to Zartman, internal conflicts often reach a "mutually painful stalemate," that is, a condition in which a government or rebel group realizes that the cost for staying in the conflict exceeds the benefits to be achieved.¹⁵⁴ As a result, neither side can win nor walk away defeated. However, the conflict usually goes on, because warring groups believe that it will bring political power or economic benefits. As a result, civil wars usually produce more devastating outcomes, such as massive casualties, displaced refugees, mass starvations, and last longer than international counterparts. After achieving military victory, a government traditionally tends to be hostile toward potential rebel groups in a way that diminishes the security dilemma. Snyder and Jervis argue that a government with predatory intentions against potential rebel groups can hardly be a

¹⁵³ David 1997, 560.

¹⁵⁴ Zartman 1985, 9.

solution to the problem of insecurity.¹⁵⁵ The predatory intentions can be a potential source of internal violence. Walter reports that the likelihood of a return to war would be increased when a former combatant's quality of life remains at a critically low level, and there are barriers to political participation.¹⁵⁶

Fourth, separating populations for conflict resolution remains deeply controversial and problematic. Proponents of the partition support neorealism by arguing that conflict resolutions, such as disarming, institution-building and power-sharing, that aim to accommodate the interests of former combatants will not work because of the security dilemma. According to Kaufmann, "The security dilemma generated by intermixed populations ensures that ethnic wars always separate the warring communities; this process cannot be stopped except by permanent military occupation or genocide, or by not having the war in the first place."¹⁵⁷ Opponents claim that partition of warring ethnic groups side by side will increase the level of violence and only be achieved with producing vast numbers of casualties and refugees.¹⁵⁸ Breaking of a state into mutually hostile entities possibly will promote internal peace at the expense of increased international war.¹⁵⁹ In addition, it does not solve the problem with irreconcilable minorities who are left behind and often face a difficult-to-obtain international recognition. Furthermore, in his empirical study, Sambanis finds that partition is, in fact, positively associated with recurrence of ethnic war.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ Snyder and Jervis 1999, 20-21.

¹⁵⁶ Walter 2004, 385.

¹⁵⁷ Kaufmann 1998, 124.

¹⁵⁸ Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 24-25. See also Kumar 1997 and Gottlieb 1994.

¹⁵⁹ David 1997, 572.

¹⁶⁰ Sambanis 2000, 480.

Finally, neorealism pays little attention to situations in which humanitarian intervention cannot be explained by the strategic interests of the intervener. Neorealists view that states pursue their geographic or political interests through humanitarian intervention. However, they do not explain how and why the U.S. and the UN intervened in Somalia and Cambodia in the early 1990s. In fact, Somalia and Cambodia were strategically insignificant to the U.S. and to the other interveners under UN auspices.¹⁶¹ The main purpose of the interventions was humanitarian. According to Finnemore, there has been a change in international norms of humanitarian intervention. In her view, contemporary humanitarian interventions in the 1990s were nonstrategic multilateral efforts, based on shared norms and principles of international responsibility.¹⁶²

In sum, even though neorealism makes a point that weak governments may invite internal violence, it still seems to be an insufficient framework for analyzing the origins and the cures of civil wars. Civil wars are essentially not comparable to their international counterparts. I turn to present the major arguments of neoliberals and how they offer explanations of the conditions associated with the termination of violence and the creation of sustainable peace in civil conflicts.

III. The Neoliberal Institutional Position

Ending civil wars requires not only the absence of physical violence but also the establishment of the preconditions for sustainable peace, such as building mutual confidence among former warring groups; creating the social, political, and economic infrastructures; and obtaining international assistance. Neorealists remain silent in

¹⁶¹ Finnemore 2003, 55.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 81. More arguments on changing international norms of humanitarian intervention will be discussed later in this chapter.

discussions about the conditions associated with reconciling a wide range of interests of former warring groups and with administering various aspects of transitions to peace. I underscore that institutions can play a critical role in promoting domestic stability, building mutual confidence among the former combatants, creating norms and rules in various sectors, and, hence, restoring domestic order. Even though neoliberals and neorealists both focus on the materially based interests of states, their theories contain very different assumptions.

The Core Assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism

The key assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism stem from neoliberal international theory. Neoliberals stress the rapid growth of transnational interdependence and the emergence of various types of international institutions and nonstate actors in world politics, especially in the post-Cold War period. Neoliberal institutionalism encompasses four assumptions. First, neoliberals, as do neorealists, recognize the anarchical international system. However, their interpretations are completely different from those of neorealists. According to Stein, neorealists emphasize a state's independent decision-making process under the anarchic system; neoliberals emphasize a joint decision-making process among states through international institutions.¹⁶³ Neoliberals believe that the anarchic system permits a variety of patterns of interactions among states based on a felt need to produce collective goods, resulting in pressures for "pooling sovereignty."¹⁶⁴ Humanitarian issues such as massive refugee migration, systemic genocide, mass starvations, and violence against women and children have become global problems and a threat to international peace and security and have given

¹⁶³ Stein 1993, 30-31.

¹⁶⁴ Rochester 2002, 98-99.

international organizations such as the UN a basis for taking action. Hence, states increasingly interact jointly, since these issues and problems frequently occur outside of their jurisdictions, and make the potential role of international institutions significant.

For example, UN peacebuilding operations can take place when civil conflicts create severe guerrilla warfare, massive refugees, and terrorism that spill over to the strategic allies of the intervener.¹⁶⁵ For example, in 1994 an estimated 2 million refugees from Rwanda fled to neighboring the states of Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the former Zaire.¹⁶⁶ However, none of these host countries were in a position to provide goods and services to these refugees. Refugees impose a heavy burden on host states.¹⁶⁷ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate rightly claim that states may hardly be expected to give up their sovereignty in the security field, but they still work with nonstate actors or multilateral institutions, such as NGOs, the World Bank, and the UN, in the economic, social, and humanitarian issue-areas.¹⁶⁸

Second, according to Zacher and Sutton, states have not always been concerned with maximizing their autonomy either as a core or instrumental value.¹⁶⁹ States' core values change in importance over time, and they often trade off autonomy to realize other important issues.¹⁷⁰ They criticize neorealists by arguing that a state's goals are not limited only to security and power. Promoting economic welfare, international justice, democracy, liberal values, and even peace can be goals of states.

¹⁶⁵ Löwenheim 2003, 26. See also Brown 1996, 8.

¹⁶⁶ Central Intelligence Agency 2005.

¹⁶⁷ Brown 1996, 7.

¹⁶⁸ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 203.

¹⁶⁹ Zacher and Sutton 1996, 21.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Third, neoliberals tend to downplay the barriers to cooperation. According to Zacher and Sutton, there is a network of formal or informal international organizations in world politics that promotes the negotiation of mutually beneficial accords and greater transparency in states' compliance with agreements.¹⁷¹ In contrast to neorealists, neoliberals stress that there are not many issue areas where states fear that gains by other states will pose serious threats to them.¹⁷² In addition, states are capable of monitoring what others would gain and lose in the process of the international cooperation by themselves. "States in the international system have devised a number of military and economic strategies to encourage cooperation even when incentives favor cheating."¹⁷³ States are capable of forming alliances to impose military or economic sanctions against deceptive behaviors. Not only can states use economic coercion to enhance the desirability of seeking rewards from cooperation, but they can also withhold key resources or implement reciprocal punishment strategies to ensure that violations are punished.¹⁷⁴

Finally, neoliberals emphasize the role of institutions. Where neorealism presents a pessimistic view on the effectiveness of international institutions, neoliberal institutionalism stresses that institutions can reconcile various strategically motivated interests of states and promote transnational cooperation under the anarchical system. Hence, neoliberals recognize that not only states but also international institutions play a major role in world politics. They also attach importance to other nonstate actors, such as specialized international agencies, interest groups, transnational actors (multinational

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 22.

¹⁷² Ibid., 21.

¹⁷³ Walter 1997, 337.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 338.

corporations, etc.) and individual citizens.¹⁷⁵ Rebuilding political, economic, and social institutions and reconstructing the infrastructure of war-torn societies require the special attention and effort of individual states, IGOs, NGOs, and individual citizens. In this process, neoliberals particularly stress the conflict-management roles that international organizations, like the UN, can potentially play. In fact, international peace can be realized through international cooperation. “Cooperation can include an acceptance of moral norms, adherence to international law, or collaboration through international organizations.”¹⁷⁶

Neoliberal institutionalism rejects most of neorealism’s propositions by arguing that security issues have had to compete for attention with other issues since the end of the Cold War and that states are increasingly focusing on ways in which they can become partners in order to pursue mutually beneficial interests. Neoliberal institutionalism offers a theoretical basis for examining the role of the UN in post-conflict resolution. In the next section, I adopt the neoliberal framework and discuss how domestic institutions can play a role in restoring domestic order.

The Role of Domestic Institutions in War-Torn Societies

Domestic institutions are critical elements for securing peace, since they provide a mechanism that seeks to channel various interests and expectations of former warring groups. In the aftermath of internal conflicts, institutions play a role in making a peace accord more credible by setting priorities among the demands, coordinating conflicting objectives, ensuring effective implementation of the agreement, and managing political

¹⁷⁵ Axelrod and Keohane 1993, 86.

¹⁷⁶ Zacher and Matthew 1995, 117.

factions to prevent the recurrence of war.¹⁷⁷ Nye posits that the role of institutions is crucial since they make people believe there is not going to be a violent conflict.¹⁷⁸ In particular, institutions can perform a critical role in decreasing the security dilemma. Furthermore, in recent years, the UN and humanitarian NGOs have increasingly joined domestic institutions to support efforts toward peace.

Domestic institutions take a wide range of roles in encouraging former combatants to mutually develop governing bodies, secure a peace agreement, and restore domestic order. First, institutions provide “a sense of continuity”¹⁷⁹ and community. As institutions continuously provide communication channels, security, and services, they can create an environment that allows former warriors to experience a sense of consistency, comfort, and cohesiveness. In the process of implementing the provisions of peace agreements and of making new governing bodies (rules, policies, and laws), members of war-torn societies slowly attain a sense that their demands and expectations should be balanced with other members and that their interests and needs can be coordinated and fulfilled when they work together. Especially allowing participation in the process of implementing peace accords indicates that the intentions of former warring groups are truly convincing. In this slow course of action, people increasingly develop a sense of belonging together and a shared faith that “mutual benefit comes from being together.”¹⁸⁰ As a result, they gradually find a stronger attraction to the community and obtain emotional and physical security.

¹⁷⁷ Weaver and Rockman 1993, 6.

¹⁷⁸ Nye 1997, 38.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁸⁰ McMillan 1996, 315.

Second, institutions provide a prospect for reciprocity.¹⁸¹ Public hearings, seminars, forums, and other mechanisms can be offered for communicating with former combatants. In this process, institutions provide a flow of information regarding what to expect from new governing bodies and what to be expected from members of society. Institutions are capable of monitoring behavior to verify that citizens are acting in accord with governing rules.¹⁸² “Recognizing that noncooperative behavior has the potential to be reciprocated in the future serves as a strong incentive to behave in accordance with established norms.”¹⁸³ Furthermore, in the process of establishing new governmental institutions, neoliberals strongly emphasize that former combatants must construct institutions that “seek to share, divide, and balance power”¹⁸⁴ among them. This is to prevent the dominance of political, economic, and military power controlled by a single group.

Third, institutions provide ways to prevent potential conflicts.¹⁸⁵ Implementing the provisions of peace accords requires constant negotiations and bargaining processes among the contending parties. Institutions serve as a mediator by setting priorities among goals and by reconciling the conflict objectives. In addition, institutions are capable of monitoring and imposing coercive measures against any deceptive arrangements or rebel movements. As Hoddie and Hartzell correctly point out, institutions both encourage citizens to comply with governing rules and punish “those who act outside the boundaries of acceptable behavior.”¹⁸⁶ For this reason, institutions can play a crucial role in shaping

¹⁸¹ Nye 1997, 39.

¹⁸² Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 27. See also Keohane and Martin 1995, 45.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Nye 1997, 39.

¹⁸⁶ Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 27. See also Weaver and Rockman 1993, 6.

the behavior of former combatants and in creating a climate that supports long-term peace.

Fourth, domestic institutions conduct structural reforms in the political, economic, social, and judicial sector. War-torn societies often require comprehensive reform in almost all sectors of society. This involves creating new or reorganizing the existing institutions to address specific needs and to enforce socially accepted rules.¹⁸⁷ Political reform implies the establishment of democratic norms, values, laws, and institutions that allow citizens to participate in the political process equally. Economic reform contains the establishment of a free-market economic environment. It also involves a restoration of economic institutions and activities that can be managed by socially accepted rules, regulations, and contracts governing business transactions and legal rights defining ownership of private property.¹⁸⁸ Social reform requires two elements. One is to restore general social services providing health care, education, policing, and child welfare. The other is to help war victims resettle. Along with the UN and humanitarian NGOs, the efforts include providing shelter and humanitarian relief to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and offering rehabilitation services to war widows and sexually abused women.¹⁸⁹ Providing humanitarian needs to these groups is a significant factor in developing political, social, and economic stability. At last, judicial reform seeks an establishment of an efficient and legitimate judicial system. The establishment of structural reforms attempts to accommodate various interests of antagonists. Creating or restoring basic infrastructures for war-torn societies seems to be a significant determinant

¹⁸⁷ Kumar 1997, 3.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

in improving the local capacity. The duration of peace after civil wars is likely to increase when the level of local capacity is increased.

Institutions can play an important role in restoring domestic order and in promoting durable peace in the aftermath of civil wars resolved either by negotiated settlements or by a military victory of one side.¹⁹⁰ Hoddie and Hartzell report on the strong correlation between efforts to implement peace accords through power-sharing institutions and the duration of peace.¹⁹¹ In her previous study, Hartzell reaches a similar conclusion that institutionalized peace settlements, which offer institutional guarantees for diminishing the security dilemma, tend to be stable.¹⁹² Though neoliberals maintain that institutionalism can be an appropriate theoretical framework for analyzing the conditions associated with the termination of internal conflicts and the initiation of peace, they agree with the neorealist position that more empirical studies have to be conducted to measure the effectiveness of institutions.

Limitations of Neoliberal Institutionalism

The theoretical framework I develop focuses on the role of institutions in the process of building sustainable peace. The adoption of neoliberal institutionalism has significantly improved my understanding of the processes by which former warring groups seek to build mutually favorable governing bodies and to promote peace in the aftermath of civil wars. Although institutionalism represents a major advance in understanding various aspects of transitions to peace, it has several shortcomings. First, institutionalism pays insufficient attention to the distribution of power among the contending parties. Though neoliberals recognize that the unequal distribution of social,

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, 318.

¹⁹² Hartzell 1999, 20.

economic, political and military power might invite internal violence in the future, they neglect to analyze how former warring groups compete and seize power.

Second, neoliberals overlook discussing how the most powerful group can be punished when it refuses or neglects to comply with mutual agreements. Failing to fully implement the provisions of a peace agreement is one of the most critical factors that invite the recurrence of internal violence. “Evidence of failure to act in a manner consistent with the agreement’s provisions increases the likelihood that individuals will lose faith in the good intentions of their competitors and will opt for a return to conflict.”¹⁹³ When a hegemonic power violates the agreements, it is questionable whether weaker groups would impose a punishment on them.

Third, neoliberals pay little attention to explaining why humanitarian NGOs are increasingly involved in costly international moral action. After the end of the Cold War, humanitarian NGOs have increasingly participated in humanitarian crises to relieve human suffering. However, according to constructivists, scholars of rational choice make assumptions based on utility maximization: among various options, an agent chooses the one that satisfies its best interests. Hence, neither neorealism nor neoliberal institutionalism sufficiently explains why humanitarian NGOs voluntarily engage in humanitarian relief efforts.¹⁹⁴ Even though most humanitarian NGOs receive a significant amount of money from states, they do not necessarily result in governmental control of policy. NGO is typically a value-based nonprofit organization. In fact, some humanitarian NGOs such as, Amnesty International and Human Right Watch, refuse any governmental financial assistance. According to constructivists, they have a major advantage for

¹⁹³ Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, 313.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 631. See also Finnemore 1996a, 165-157.

understanding humanitarian NGOs' engagements along with states in international moral action compared with scholars of rational choice. I turn to present the major assumptions of constructivists and to analyze how states are involved in international moral action.

IV. The Constructivist Position

Constructivism takes an ontological approach in that the behaviors of political actors are shaped by their social-cultural settings. Constructivism holds that state interests are defined and changed within the context of internationally recognized norms.¹⁹⁵ According to constructivists, neither neorealists nor neoliberals can explain why states after the Cold War have increasingly intervened in other states to save lives of innocent people and to relieve human suffering.

The Core Assumptions of Constructivism

There are three major assumptions. First, states and structures mutually construct each other.¹⁹⁶ According to Hopf, in world politics a structure is defined as “a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of a state.”¹⁹⁷ Structures limit and allow the behaviors of states, and states on the other hand make the context that constitutes the structures.¹⁹⁸ *Norms, beliefs, and identities* are major social rules that constitute the social structure of world politics.¹⁹⁹ In world politics, *norms* are shared understanding of appropriate action in international relations and define what is or isn't acceptable behavior of actors.²⁰⁰ *Beliefs* are defined as shared understandings of the

¹⁹⁵ Finnemore 1996b, 2.

¹⁹⁶ Frederking 2003, 364.

¹⁹⁷ Hopf 1998, 172.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Frederking 2003, 364.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 365.

world.²⁰¹ *Beliefs* are intersubjective terms that are concerned with common values and that “make truth claims about the world.”²⁰² *Identities* refer to sincerity claims about actors.²⁰³ *Identities* are recognized by a set of interests and of choices that actors have made. *Norms, beliefs, and identities* may provide international actors “with understanding of what is important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate means of obtaining those valued goods.”²⁰⁴

Second, social structures constitute the interests and identity of actors.

Constructivists reject standard materialist views of world politics and stress that state interests are formed and shaped by the normative context. “State interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and in understanding what is good and appropriate.” Constructivists stress that the normative context, which influences the behavior of decision-makers and of mass publics,²⁰⁵ changes over time, as internationally recognized norms change.²⁰⁶

Third, material structures have meaning for actors only within the social context. While neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism focus on analyzing the behaviors of actors within material structures, like the balance of power or markets, constructivism concentrates on explaining what power or money means to states within the context of social structures.²⁰⁷ For instance, South Korea is more concerned about the small quantity of nuclear weapons held by North Korea than the vast quantity in the United States. In

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid., 364.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Finnemore 1996b, 15.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 2.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Frederking 2003, 364.

the view of constructivists, an understanding of how nuclear weapons held by North Korea and the U.S. have different meanings for South Korea is important.

In world politics, from the constructivist view, the behavior of a state or other actors like humanitarian NGOs is largely shaped by the ideational and normative context of social structures. Constructivists criticize neorealists and neoliberals for failing to explicate the content and source of state interests.²⁰⁸ They further argue that scholars of rational choice fail to make clear how state interests change over time. I turn now to a discussion of how changes in international norms occur and what their effects are with regard to international moral action.

International Norms and International Assistance

During the post-Cold War era, the special efforts made by states and the UN directed at state-building in Cambodia, restoring domestic order in Haiti, and relieving human sufferings in Rwanda as well as in Somalia were seemingly driven by humanitarian impulses. In addition, humanitarian NGOs have undertaken the responsibility for protecting human rights, providing basic necessities for survival, and raising international awareness of humanitarian issues. Constructivists criticize neorealists and neoliberals for not providing sufficient explanations for these international moral actions. Constructivists note that none of the above mentioned countries were geographically, politically, or economically important. Constructivists believe that the behavioral changes of states, in particular after the Cold War, have closely corresponded to the change in international norms.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ Farrell 2002, 52.

²⁰⁹ Finnemore 1996b, 22-23.

There are two major changes in international norms after the Cold War. First, international norms of sovereign equality have changed.²¹⁰ Sovereign equality implies the presence of a single sovereign power through which a measure of sovereignty is dispensed equally to participating nations. From a constructivist perspective, during the post-Cold War era, the UN has undertaken more peacebuilding missions than ever, since there has been a change in internationally held norms of state sovereignty within social and normative dimensions.

During the Cold War, states reluctantly deployed their troops to protect citizens other than their own and to intervene in matters within the internal or domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. After the Cold War, states increasingly engage in multilateralism, acting through formal international organizations, primarily led by the UN. One of the reasons for multilateral actions is that they are more legitimate and relatively effective ways to gain public support compared with unilateral action.²¹¹ Furthermore, the principle of state sovereignty has gradually eroded after the Cold War. The erosion allowed for a new potential for multilateral action in internal affairs. The changes in understandings about sovereign equality as well as humanitarian issues altered how states respond to internal conflicts after the Cold War.

Second, international norms of human equality and human rights have changed.²¹² According to Finnemore, the change in understandings regarding humanity has altered the way states and humanitarian NGOs respond to humanitarian crisis.²¹³ The definition of who qualifies as being human expanded in the late 20th century, compared with the

²¹⁰ Finnemore 2003, 17.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid., 57.

²¹³ Ibid., 67.

19th century. While only white Christians received protection in the 19th century, most of the protected populations were non-white and non-Christians groups in the late 20th century.²¹⁴ All human beings are treated as equally deserving in the international normative context.²¹⁵ In addition, the scope of human rights has been expanded. In the 19th and the early 20th century, international norms focused on abolishing slavery and colonialism. International norms now seek to highlight human rights and humanitarian intervention in the aftermath of civil wars. In the late 20th century, human rights abusers were considered as being threats to international peace and security. As a result, states and humanitarian NGOs have increasingly participated in international moral actions.

The changing norms of sovereign equality, human equality, and human rights are mutually reinforced and closely interconnected. Internationally held norms shape the interests of states and give purpose and meaning to action.²¹⁶ They also influence the rights, values, and duties of states. The changes in understandings about state sovereignty and humanity have changed not only the way states use their force but also the way states promote peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts, especially during the post-Cold War era. Constructivists take a different approach compared with scholars of rational choice and offer a valuable explanation of the change in international norms. However, their arguments have some weaknesses.

Limitations of Constructivism

There are two major limitations of constructivism. First, constructivists pay little attention to explaining why a particular state would not respect internationally held norms so as to promote its own-interests rather than the common interest. A state could have its

²¹⁴ Ibid., 53.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 83.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 53.

own national interests, which do not necessarily reflect the prevailing international norms in the international society. It is unrealistic to expect that the norms will always come before those of a state's in the decision-making process. Constructivists fail to explain why international norms have greater impact in some countries than in others.²¹⁷ For example, in 2003, North Korea for the first time officially declared that it possessed nuclear weapons. The United States immediately claimed that the possession of nuclear weapons was a clear violation of the Geneva agreement of 1994 reached by President Clinton, and called for destroying them without delay. However, North Korea claimed that the weapons were a strategically important tool for its own survival. According to neorealists, it is very impractical to assume that the interests of states are mainly shaped by the normative context.

Second, constructivists fail to explain how norms arise in the first place and to clarify the role of states or other actors in the process of mutual constitution of agents (states) and structures (norms).²¹⁸ Constructivism primarily holds that the social structures shape states' interests and behaviors. However, constructivists do not clearly discuss how agents play a role in the process of mutual constitution. As a result, constructivists pay little attention to explaining the issues surrounding power and domestic interests. Hence, constructivism fails to account for the fact that international norms diffuse differently and that, more important, states indeed create internationally held norms in the first place. "It overemphasizes the role of social structures and norms at the expense of the agents who help create and change them in the first place."²¹⁹

Although constructivism better explains the sources of states' and humanitarian NGOs'

²¹⁷ Checkel 1998, 332.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 340.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 324.

motivations for international moral action compared with neorealism and neoliberalism, its arguments seem to be somewhat overstated.

V. A Theoretical Analysis of UN Peacebuilding

The primary goal of UN peacebuilding is to prevent the recurrence of war and to promote peace in the aftermath of civil wars. For war-torn societies, sustainable peace implies the absence of domestic violence, the creation of domestic infrastructure, and the acquisition of international assistance. The theoretical framework that I adopt focuses on understanding the conditions associated with the termination of intrastate conflicts and the creation of durable peace. Let me review neorealist, neoliberal, and constructivist arguments as they relate to intrastate war.

The Absence of Domestic Violence

The level of domestic hostility would be increased with the breakdown of a peace accord, the barriers of political participation, and the insecurity of lives. Neorealists urge the restoration of a hegemonic power so that no lesser groups within a state can challenge against it. They also posit that separating populations can be an alternative way to decreasing hostility. However, neorealist solutions seem to be inappropriate for three reasons. Above all, neorealists do not clearly explain how a group can obtain hegemonic power in the first place and how it can create a government that accommodates such issues as ethnic nationalism, discrimination against minority religions or languages, and the absence of democratic rules and institutions. Second, a government with military victory usually has been inclined to be hostile toward potential rebel groups. The hostility eventually increases the security dilemma. Third, dividing the populations can be a temporary solution and will increase the chance for interstate conflict in the near future.

Neoliberal institutionalism can be an alternative theoretical framework. Domestic institutions along with the UN and humanitarian NGOs can play a critical role in securing a peace accord, since they present mechanisms that seek to accommodate the conflicting interests among rivals systematically. Institutions can often play as a mediating role by setting priorities among agendas and by integrating the conflicting objectives. They also are capable of monitoring behavior to verify that former warriors act in accord with governing rules and of punishing any rebel movements. More importantly, neoliberals emphasize the creation of institutions that seek to balance the governing power.

The Creation of Domestic Infrastructure

Neoliberal institutionalism, in particular, emphasizes the role of domestic institutions in enhancing the domestic capacity. Domestic institutions undertake a wide range of roles in developing governing bodies, securing a peace accord, and restoring domestic order. They provide a sense of continuity and community, a prospect of reciprocity, and a way for preventing potential violence. A sense of continuity and community implies mutual confidence, thereby reducing the level of hostility. A prospect of reciprocity allows former warriors to participate in the political process equally. As a way of preventing violence, institutions constantly monitor any deceptive movements. According to Harzell, institutionalized peace settlements, which diminish the security dilemma, tend to be stable and promising. Furthermore, institutions are significant mechanisms for carrying out political, economic, social, and judicial reforms in the aftermath of internal wars. Neorealism remains silent when discussing the role of domestic capacity in achieving durable peace.

The Acquisition of International Assistance

The degree of international assistance has been known to be a significant factor in estimating the duration of peace in the aftermath of civil wars. Neoliberals primarily posit that the anarchical system allows a joint decision-making process between states and international organizations. Neoliberals also heavily emphasize the conflict-management roles that international organizations like the UN can play in the aftermath of civil wars. From preventive diplomacy to multidimensional peacebuilding, the UN undertakes a wide range of post-conflict management missions. The emergence of global problems — genocide, guerrilla warfare, refugees, and violence against women and children — that are raised by civil wars causes states to collaborate, because these problems are a threat to international peace and security and occur outside of their jurisdiction. Hence, neoliberal institutionalism is a more useful framework for understanding the conditions associated with how the UN can play a critical role in post-conflict management compared with neorealism or constructivism.

I accept the constructivist position that the changes in international norms of sovereignty and humanity have caused the behavioral changes of states during the post-Cold War era. Constructivism offers a theoretical basis for the role of humanitarian NGOs in international moral action. However, I believe that their arguments are somewhat exaggerated since they cannot account for how norms diffuse differently. It is also unrealistic to think that international norms override the domestic interests of a state.

VI. Conclusion

Ending civil wars and promoting sustainable peace require the absence of physical violence, the creation of domestic infrastructure, and international assistance.

This chapter finds that neoliberal institutionalism is a more relevant theoretical framework for analyzing the conditions associated with the termination of violence and with the creation of peace compared with neorealism and constructivism. It offers an adequate explanation for understanding how international assistance takes place and how domestic institutions can play an important role in securing a peace agreement, developing governing rules, and restoring domestic order.

3

A Review of Literature on Civil War

I. Introduction

In recent years, a vast amount of research has explored the conditions associated with the initiation and the termination of intrastate wars. Conflict analysts have investigated how to prevent wars in the first place and focused on identifying the causes that favor insurgency. They also have examined how to reduce the duration of wars by examining the effectiveness of third-party intervention. Furthermore, many recent studies have examined how civil wars end.

However, the conditions associated with the promotion of peace in the aftermath of civil wars have been significantly overlooked by such analysts. Even though there exists much literature on peacebuilding²²⁰ that investigates cases involving UN intervention since 1945, the success of these interventions has not been rigorously tested, nor has there been careful analysis of independent variables. It is surprising that very little work has been done to investigate empirically whether UN peacebuilding operations, indeed, help contribute to more stable peace. Previous research does not clearly indicate whether peacebuilding actually works in the aftermath of intrastate wars. Furthermore, the effectiveness of humanitarian NGOs in contributing to a durable peace in the aftermath of civil wars has not been thoroughly tested.

²²⁰ Although the term “peacebuilding” did not exist before Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, the UN (since its inception after World War II) and humanitarian NGOs have engaged in various types of operations to maintain peace and to build local capacities for conflict resolution.

In general, conflict analysts agree that the conditions associated with the causes and the cures of civil wars have been known as significant factors in estimating the duration of peace and that more empirical research is required to measure the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding. I will conduct an empirical analysis of these conditions in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I review the existing literature related to the conditions associated with the absence of physical violence, the development of local capacity, and the initiation of long-term peace in the aftermath of civil wars.

A literature review generally requires three major elements. First, it should concisely address the main arguments and the findings of existing research critically. Second, it should address the major problems or gaps that require additional research. It is important to discuss what questions the previous research has addressed and what issues have been ignored.²²¹ Third, it should address how one's study builds on the existing research and contributes to the literature. In reviewing previous research, this chapter focuses on three aspects of intrastate wars: (1) the causes of war, (2) the reduction in the duration of ongoing conflicts, and (3) war termination. Finally, I examine previous research relating to the causes of peace in the aftermath of internal conflicts.

II. The Causes of Civil Wars

As civil wars have become the dominant form of armed conflict in the world, conflict analysts have attempted to discover empirical evidences for the causes of these conflicts. Above all, they have focused on domestic attributes. Conflict analysts stress that rebellion²²² may be largely explained by economic, political, and cultural causes found within societies.

²²¹ Knopf 2006, 131.

²²² Rebellion typically refers to armed resistance that seeks to remove particular rulers or regimes.

Economic Causes

A number of studies investigate the causes of civil wars with special emphasis on economic factors, such as income inequality and the level of economic development. In fact, recent studies report that political and cultural causes have been replaced by economic causes.²²³ Collier and Hoeffler examine whether civil wars have economic causes based on utility theory; war occurs when the expected benefits exceed the costs of rebellion.²²⁴ They argue that conflicts are far more likely to be initiated by economic opportunities than simply by grievance. Above all, by using the Singer and Small data set on civil wars during the period from 1960 to 1999, Collier and Hoeffler investigate how income (GDP per capita) is related to the risk of civil war and find that higher per capita income decreases both the probability and duration of civil wars.²²⁵ Collier and Hoeffler interpret this as “being due to the effect of higher income on the opportunity cost of rebellion.”²²⁶ In general, civil wars are likely to be initiated in low-income countries, and they will further reduce income substantially.²²⁷ The result is similar to the findings of Elbadawi and Sambanis.²²⁸ But according to Elbadawi and Sambanis, its impact on war continuation is statistically insignificant.

For proxying economic development, while Collier and Hoeffler employ the degree of primary commodity exports, Henderson and Singer use the level of energy consumption.²²⁹ They all find a negative relationship between the level of economic development and the risk of civil wars. In short, most previous researchers arrive at a

See Lichbach and Gurr 1981, 5.

²²³ Keen 2000, 32.

²²⁴ Collier and Hoeffler 2001. See also their previous work, Collier and Hoeffler 1998.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

²²⁶ Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 571.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 568. See also Collier and Sambanis 2002.

²²⁸ Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, 322.

²²⁹ Collier and Hoeffler 2001, 8. See also Henderson and Singer 2000, 290. Ellingsen 2000, 243.

similar conclusion, stating that extremely poor countries are likely to be at greater danger of civil war and that high economic development effectively eliminates the risk (Auvinen 1997; Bannon and Collier 2003; Collier 1998 and 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 1998 and 2001; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; Henderson and Singer 2000).²³⁰

In addition to the two economic variables, Collier and Hoeffler report that the level of natural resource²³¹ possession is positively related to the probability of intrastate conflicts since it adds to the taxable base of a state's economy and attracts rebels to capture the state.²³² This conclusion receives support from Ross, who also reports that natural resources play a critical role in triggering, prolonging, and financing these conflicts.²³³ Collier and Hoeffler posit that an effective rebellion is often determined by the capacity of a future rebel government to reward its supporters.²³⁴ In their view, greed-driven rebellions are easier to set off than are grievance-driven rebellions, since the latter is likely to face collective action problems, which refer to the difficulty of getting a rebel group to act when its members benefit if others act, but incur a net cost if they act themselves.²³⁵

Rebellion is expensive. Obtaining sufficient financing to purchase weapons, food, and other military equipments and to pay recruits seems to be the key to successful rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler emphasize that the availability of finance is central to the opportunity for rebellion. "Without adequate financing to procure arms and rebel labor,

²³⁰ Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, 329.

²³¹ The natural resources that are commonly identified by conflict analysts are largely oil, hard-rock minerals, including coltan, diamonds, gold, and other gemstones, and timber. In addition, drugs are often arguably considered a natural resource. See Ross 2003, 17.

²³² Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 571.

²³³ Ross 2003, 17.

²³⁴ Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 564.

²³⁵ Ibid.

rebel organizations cannot survive through the first stages of conflict.”²³⁶ Rebel organizations meet the high costs of organization through various financial sources: the extortion of natural resources (e.g. diamonds in Sierra Leone and Congo, and timber in Cambodia), the production of illegal drugs (e.g. cocaine in Colombia), and the aids from foreign governments (e.g. Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe)’s financial and military assistance in creating the Renamo rebellion in Mozambique).²³⁷

In his recent study, Collier asserts that these natural resources and economic endowments have often been associated with high risk of large-scale violent conflict.²³⁸ Conversely, Collier and Hoeffler also find that at high levels, natural resources start to reduce the risk of war. According to their interpretation, a country with plenty of natural resources can increase its military capability to prevent any potential rebellion in advance.²³⁹

Political Causes

A state’s regime type or the level of democratization has been widely used by conflict analysts to forecast the likelihood of civil war. Above all, Auvinen claims that the type of political regime²⁴⁰ tends to affect the form of political conflict and has a role to play in both relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories.²⁴¹ Relative deprivation refers to “a discrepancy between deserved and actual enjoyment of goods or conditions of life and, more generally, discontent with government performance and alienation from the political system.”²⁴² Auvinen argues that the regime’s incapability to

²³⁶ Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, 309.

²³⁷ Collier and Hoeffler 2001, 3.

²³⁸ Collier 2003, 2.

²³⁹ Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 571.

²⁴⁰ Auvinen 1997. The type of political regime is determined by its degree of democracy.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 180.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 177.

provide economic goods and to allow a democratic participation in the making of political decision can be a source of relative deprivation.²⁴³ According to Auvinen, the likelihood of relative deprivation is likely to increase as a result of political authoritarianism, poor economic performance, ethnic domination, and a low level of economic development.²⁴⁴ Ethnic domination implies the predominance of the social, economic, and political power by a single group.

In his book, Snow further develops Auvinen's view by arguing that what triggers insurgence is not the existence of deprivation but the recognition and the realization that it should not continue.²⁴⁵ According to Snow, rebellion is likely to be initiated when there is a possibility of change through political action.²⁴⁶ Resource mobilization theory signifies that "the more democratic a regime, the greater extent of political conflict."²⁴⁷ Snow's argument contradicts most research which argues that it is the more democratic states that are better able to avoid civil war.

In general, full-fledged democratic regimes are more likely to experience more extensive protests²⁴⁸ and less likely to experience civil wars compared with autocratic regimes, due to the availability of legitimate mechanisms for dispute resolution.²⁴⁹ According to Benson and Kugler, democratic countries with highly competitive and participatory institutions diminish violent conflict within their borders.²⁵⁰ On the other hand, authoritarian regimes are likely to generate a profound sense of injustice and

²⁴³ Ibid., 180.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Snow 1996, 54.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Auvinen 1997, 180.

²⁴⁸ Lichbach and Gurr define protest as "open political conflict which centers on the policies followed by regimes." See Lichbach and Gurr 1981, 5.

²⁴⁹ Gurr and Lichbach 1979, 173. See also Eckstein and Gurr 1975, 452.

²⁵⁰ Benson and Kugler 1998, 206.

deprivation with a population, which may create intensive internal conflicts in the future.²⁵¹ In their recent study, Regan and Norton reach a similar conclusion that highly repressive states are far more likely to experience a civil war since largely unorganized rebels seek to avoid state-led violence or abuse and to be protected by the rebel organizations.²⁵²

In addition, Auvinen finds a positive relationship between the presence of an authoritarian regime and the likelihood of political conflict. This finding is also empirically supported by Rummel, who concludes that collective violence is highly likely to occur where political power is centralized, nondemocratic, and highly dependent upon one's social group membership, such as ethnicity or region.²⁵³ However, Auvinen also reports that "the extent of conflict increases up to middle levels of political authoritarianism but decreases sharply with severe authoritarianism."²⁵⁴ Moderately authoritarian regimes generally confront anti-dictatorship and pro-democracy demonstrations and often allow chances for the organized rebel movements. On the other hand, extremely autocratic regimes seem to be resistant to internal conflicts because "their use of repression often stifles dissent and undermines potential insurgency."²⁵⁵

Henderson and Singer also focus on how the degree of democratization is correlated with the likelihood of insurgency.²⁵⁶ Their political predictor, democratization (semi-democracy), is measured by the difference between the state's democracy and

²⁵¹ Auvinen 1997, 180.

²⁵² Regan and Norton 2005, 334.

²⁵³ Rummel 1997, 175.

²⁵⁴ Auvinen 1997, 186.

²⁵⁵ Henderson and Singer 2000, 279.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

autocracy scores, using the coding from the Polity III data set.²⁵⁷ Henderson and Singer find that the political factor has the greatest impact compared with economic and cultural variables on the probability of civil war.²⁵⁸ Semi-democracy is significantly associated with an increased likelihood of civil war. Political stability within a state has been known to be a significant variable to reduce the risk of war. In her article, Walter also reports that the risk of war is increased when there are barriers to political participation.²⁵⁹

However, some aspects of democratization seem to increase the risk of war. Mansfield and Snyder argue that democratization is a slow process rather than a sudden change.²⁶⁰ Democratization often creates a weak governmental authority that fails to reconcile the conflicting interests, and that may invite political conflicts.²⁶¹ Hence, formerly authoritarian states in a transition toward democracy are more likely to experience wars than are stable democracies or autocracies (e.g. the former Soviet Union).²⁶² According to their empirical findings, states changing from a mixed regime to democracy are, on average, about 50 percent more likely to go to war than states that remained mixed regimes.²⁶³

Furthermore, Ward and Gleditsch report a similar result that rapid transitions to democracy may increase the risk of being involved in warfare.²⁶⁴ However, they also find “larger changes toward democracy associated with smaller probabilities of war

²⁵⁷ The level of democracy/autocracy is measured based on “codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.” Common characteristics of autocracy are lack of regularized political competition and of concern for political freedom. Gurr, Jagers, and Moore 1990, 83-85. See also Jagers and Gurr 1995, 471.

²⁵⁸ Henderson and Singer 2000, 292.

²⁵⁹ Walter 2004, 385.

²⁶⁰ Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 81.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 79. See also Mansfield and Snyder 1997.

²⁶² *Ibid.*

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 82-83.

²⁶⁴ Ward and Gleditsch 1998, 57.

involvement.”²⁶⁵ The latter result is not consistent with the findings of Mansfield and Snyder. In addition, in their empirical study, Thompson and Tucker report that democratic transitions do not increase the vulnerability to war participation.²⁶⁶ However, conflict analysts, in general, agree that overall effects of democratization are to promote long-term peace (Auvinen 1997; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; Henderson and Singer 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Reynal-Querol 2002; Thompson and Tucker 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998).

Cultural Factors

Beyond economic and political factors, ethnicity is one of the significant factors identified by conflict analysts. As neorealists claim, the security dilemma may come into play when domestic ethnic groups’ security is no longer guaranteed. As a government fails to provide protection, the groups abruptly monitor each other’s movements and interpret every act as a potential threat to their safety.²⁶⁷ Under the specified conditions in the security dilemma, ethnic groups seek to maintain an approximate equilibrium of power against their rivals so that they can prevent the predominance of any single political group. Furthermore, they often strategically plan for military victory. Hence, Posen asserts that the security of these groups is considered as a function of their solidarity.²⁶⁸ “Group solidarity reinforces military capability, and the intensification of group identity is viewed as both necessary to group survival and threatening to others.”²⁶⁹ Kaufmann also argues that ethnic conflicts cannot be stopped except by permanent

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Thompson and Tucker 1997, 451.

²⁶⁷ David 1997, 558.

²⁶⁸ Posen 1993, 106.

²⁶⁹ Henderson and Singer 2000, 282.

military occupation or genocide, by not having the war in the first place, or by physical separation of the contending groups.²⁷⁰

Kaufmann's assertion is partially supported by Collier and Hoeffler's finding of a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and the likelihood of civil war.²⁷¹

According to Collier and Hoeffler, societies most at risk are the ones in the middle of the range of ethnic diversity.²⁷² However, highly fractionalized societies, like Indonesia, and highly homogeneous countries, such as South Korea, are not likely to invite internal conflicts due the high coordination costs of rebellion.²⁷³ Henderson and Singer also report a similar conclusion that the presence of politicized ethnic groups increases the risk of intrastate conflict.²⁷⁴ Ellingsen reaffirms that multiethnicity, which is measured by the size of the largest ethnic groups, the number of ethnic groups, and the size of the largest ethnic minority group, is positively correlated with the danger of domestic violence.²⁷⁵ This is consistent with the findings of Elbadawi and Sambanis, who conclude that ethnic diversity may cause the risk of civil war, but the danger can be managed through promoting democracy and economic development.²⁷⁶

However, not all civil wars are rooted in the same factors. Some civil wars are over state-building/ideological differences (e.g. Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Vietnam), while others are over ethnicity and "separatist" aspirations (e.g. Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Cyprus). Hence, it is important to distinguish intrastate conflicts by different types. In his article, Sambanis analyzes the causes of ethnic civil war by separating the ethnic/identity

²⁷⁰ Kaufmann 1998, 124.

²⁷¹ Collier 1998, 8.

²⁷² Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 570.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 568.

²⁷⁴ Henderson and Singer 2000, 287.

²⁷⁵ Ellingsen 2000, 245.

²⁷⁶ Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, 331. See also Rummel 1997.

war from the revolutionary/ideological war.²⁷⁷ He reports that ethnic wars are largely rooted in political issues more than economic grievances. “Identity wars are predominantly caused by political grievances, and they are unlikely to occur in politically free (i.e., democratic) societies.”²⁷⁸ An important new finding is that countries that have land borders with countries at war or undemocratic neighbors are significantly more likely to experience an ethnic war of their own.²⁷⁹ In sum, a number of conflict analysts, in general, agree that the presence of ethnic diversity is likely to increase war occurrence (Brown 1996; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; Henderson and Singer 2000; Kaufmann 1998; Posen 1993; Rummel 1997; Sambanis 2001; Walter and Snyder 1999).

The factors that conflict analysts most consistently identify with the causes of intrastate conflict are income inequality, the level of economic development, the level of natural resource possession, the regime type or the level of democratization, and the presence of ethnic diversity. As I discussed in Chapter 2, previous research has concluded that there is no single motivation that triggers violence. Walter and Snyder hold that elites often manipulate information for self-interests — maintaining prestigious political power and economic status —and deceptively create malicious images of a potential rival in order to obtain popular support.²⁸⁰ Then the elites make a decision to trigger violence based upon their evaluation of “how malicious or benign a potential rival might be.”²⁸¹ Brown reaches the same conclusion that “bad leaders” are one of the most critical factors

²⁷⁷ Sambanis 2001.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 280.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ Walter and Snyder 1999, 9.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

that fuel internal conflicts (e.g. Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan).²⁸² Bad leaders trigger violence not to resolve the existing problems or to preserve peace for their citizens but to remain in power. Brown's conclusion is reaffirmed by Sambanis, who reports that "ethnic conflict may be the result of mobilization of ethnic groups by ethnic entrepreneurs or elites pursuing private interests and capitalizing on the availability of ethnic networks."²⁸³

I now turn to discuss how third-party intervention influences the duration of civil wars.

III. Third-Party Intervention and the Duration of Internal Conflicts

When civil wars break out, states or international organizations initially play a mediator role, acting as a bridge between the contending parties and encouraging them to negotiate. Mediation is a process of dialogue and negotiation in which a third party assists the warring groups to bring an end to the hostilities.²⁸⁴ While international mediation is occasionally useful and effective, it also can extend the duration of civil wars by insisting on fair treatment of the contending parties and interfering with the quest for unilateral military victory.²⁸⁵ "Mediation is useful, but it helps peacemaking most where peacemaking needs help least."²⁸⁶ The effectiveness of international mediation remains controversial. However, according to previous research, the likelihood of the success of international mediation can be increased with low-intensity conflict, with high credibility of the mediator, and with a mediator's ability to put pressure on one or both of the contending parties to accept a proposed settlement (Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Kleiboer 1996; Carment and Rowlands 1998).

²⁸² Brown 1996, 575.

²⁸³ Sambanis 2001, 263.

²⁸⁴ Nathan 2001, 184.

²⁸⁵ Stedman 1996, 342. While mediation on civil wars may not be an effective tool, Dixon's empirical study finds that mediation on interstate wars can prevent and promote peaceful settlement. See Dixon 2001, 667.

²⁸⁶ Betts 1994, 24.

When initial peacemaking efforts fails, states or international organizations plan for intervention. Most multilateral interventions, such as UN peacekeeping operations, traditionally have taken place when a peace accord between states or the contending groups has been reached.²⁸⁷ In the post-Cold War era, the interventions have often occurred before the initiation of armed violence or in the middle of war.²⁸⁸ There has been a growing body of research highlighting the motivations, the conditions, and the success of third-party intervention, which is defined as “convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and the opposition forces.”²⁸⁹ The primary goal of third-party intervention is to stop armed violence.

Unilateral interventions were predominant throughout the Cold War, and multilateral interventions have become more common since. Unilateral interventions traditionally seek to shift or tilt local balance of power by biasing the intervention on behalf of a sitting government or opposing forces.²⁹⁰ On the other hand, multilateral interventions generally seek to maintain “a current balance at an agreed-upon level” and to reduce the violent consequences of the conflict.²⁹¹ Multilateral interventions are contemplated when the violent phase of the conflict has passed, a cease-fire has been negotiated, and the contending parties are trying to reconcile their differences.²⁹² Both

²⁸⁷ Carment and Rowlands 1998, 573.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Regan 2000a, 756.

²⁹⁰ Regan 2000b, 110.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Ibid.

unilateral and multilateral interventions are delivered on the prospect of costs and benefits of a success outcome.²⁹³

Motivations of Third-Party Intervention

Making a decision on intervention involves a complicated decision-making process. In a unilateral intervention, Regan argues that states will self-select themselves out of potential interventions for many reasons related to both domestic and international considerations.²⁹⁴ The decision-makers within a state generally consider intervention under the following three conditions: (1) the existence of public support, (2) a reasonable expectation for success, and (3) the expectation for a short-term intervention.²⁹⁵ Regan's assumption is partially supported by Fearon who argues that the degree of domestic public support is a significant factor for the decision-makers in an international crisis.²⁹⁶

In addition, Smith seeks an international reason for third-party intervention in the case of interstate conflicts. He estimates the probability of third-party intervention by examining whether states would respect alliance commitments and support allies at wars. He refers to this as "alliance reliability."²⁹⁷ According to his finding, states are likely to become involved in wars in which they expect allied support. However, his finding also indicates that estimating the probability of third-party intervention is problematic due to sampling bias.²⁹⁸ He then argues that whether an alliance is honored is only observed when a war actually occurs. Furthermore, according to Mullenbach, Smith's concept of alliance reliability is applicable to intrastate conflicts. Mullenbach reports that a military

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Regan 2000a, 756.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 757.

²⁹⁶ Fearon 1994, 585.

²⁹⁷ Smith 1996, 17.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 34. In general, sampling bias means that the estimated parameter value is not representative of the true parameter.

alliance between the government of the target state (civil war state) and the major global power or the major regional power decreases the likelihood of third-party peacekeeping missions in civil wars.²⁹⁹ One reason might be that major powers are reluctant to allow UN peacekeeping in their own spheres of influence.³⁰⁰

Regan also empirically examines the conditions associated with the decision to intervene and reports two findings. First, when there is an increase in the intensity of intrastate conflict with multiple shared borders, the probability of an outside intervention decreases.³⁰¹ One explanation might be that armed violence can be spread to neighboring states, and outside interveners would not take the responsibility for it.³⁰² In addition, since a conflict with a high level of casualties generally requires a massive amount of resources, the probability of third-party intervention decreases. Second, when there is a humanitarian crisis associated with civil wars, the likelihood of an intervention sharply increases.³⁰³ This finding is consistent with Finnemore's view that argues that states are increasingly involved in international moral action through multilateral interventions, particularly after the Cold War.³⁰⁴ As I discussed in Chapter 2, multilateral interventions in civil wars can be taken not only to maintain international peace and security but also to promote common interests. Cooper and Berdal support Regan's view that a decision for intervention can be made by the mixture of various domestic and international circumstances, and therefore, the motives and strategies of intervention will always vary from case to case.³⁰⁵

²⁹⁹ Mullenbach 2005, 449.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 550.

³⁰¹ Regan 2000a, 771.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, 774.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 773.

³⁰⁴ Finnemore 2003, 81.

³⁰⁵ Cooper and Berdal 1993, 134.

Conditions for Third-Party Intervention

Once a decision on intervention has been made, the decision-makers must consider how best to terminate physical violence in intrastate conflicts. Regan identifies 85 civil conflicts involving 196 interventions³⁰⁶ between 1944 and 1995 and outlines several important conditions for successful third-party intervention in civil wars. First, the likelihood of successful intervention decreases as a conflict takes on a revolutionary/ideological character.³⁰⁷ One explanation might be that the solutions for ideological conflicts generally tend to be more intangible compared with ethnic/identity wars. When intrastate conflicts are over grievances related to the desires for ethnic or religious autonomy and equality, potential solutions to the conflict are more readily evident compared with ideological conflicts.³⁰⁸

Second, military intervention along with economic sanctions or rewards can be an effective tool for stopping armed violence. Economic sanctions traditionally involve the threat or use of economic punishment, such as “trade embargoes, aid reductions or cutoffs, and asset-freezing.”³⁰⁹ Regan’s finding is partially consistent with Rogers’s finding in that economic sanctions can play a significant role in preventing, managing, and resolving internal conflicts.³¹⁰ Rogers tracks the record of economic sanctions between 1914 and 1989 and reports that they are more effective in containing than in stopping or preventing civil wars. According to Rogers, economic sanctions or the threat

³⁰⁶ Regan 1996, 338. Regan defines intrastate conflicts as “armed, sustained combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities.” This definition is lower than that generally used as part of the definition of war made by Small and Singer (1,000 battle deaths). 196 interventions include both unilateral and multilateral interventions.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 347.

³⁰⁸ Ibid. Critics also argue that ethnic wars often involve demands for “self-determination” and “separatism” that can make ethnic wars even harder to resolve.

³⁰⁹ Rogers 1996, 411.

³¹⁰ Ibid., 412.

of sanctions not only prevent any outside powers from becoming involved in civil wars but also avert any belligerents from attacking neighboring states.³¹¹ Rogers also asserts that U.S.-led economic sanctions in the aftermath of the Cold War seem to be effective. Regan adds that the balance of military forces is a significant factor influencing the expected outcome of combatants.³¹² When there are equally matched forces, each party will continue and pursue military victory.

Third, the involvement of major powers in the intervention increases the probability of successful intervention. Major powers like the United States and the United Kingdom often bring not only a greater degree of military forces but also a wide range of economic resources to ending the hostilities. Finally, the efficiency of third-party intervention is likely increased when the intervention takes place on behalf of a sitting government.

Furthermore, neutrality and consent are important concepts and conditions for successful multilateral interventions in intrastate conflicts. Maintaining the status quo is an important part of negotiated settlements in intrastate conflicts. A neutral third party with mutual consent of the contending parties can best serve and ensure that the current relative local balance of power remains unchanged.³¹³ In their study, Carment and Rowlands find that the credibility of the intervening party is critical to the outcome of the intervention.³¹⁴ I now turn to explore the literature's view on the overall success of third-party intervention in reducing the length of a conflict.

³¹¹ Ibid., 431.

³¹² Regan 1996, 348.

³¹³ Regan 2000b, 112-114.

³¹⁴ Carment and Rowlands 1998, 591.

External Intervention and Civil War Duration

Regan and Abouharb examine whether third-party intervention in the cases of 101 intrastate wars reduces the expected length of a conflict.³¹⁵ They start with an assumption that third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts is a form of conflict management that attempts to reduce the length of a conflict.³¹⁶ According to Regan and Abouharb, “military or economic interventions can contribute to the termination of civil conflicts, but the current evidence demonstrates that unless well-timed, an intervention will increase the amount of time until a settlement is reached.”³¹⁷ They also report that neutral interventions are likely to increase the duration of a conflict compared with biased interventions.³¹⁸ This conclusion is reconfirmed by Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, who investigate the impact of third-party intervention on the duration of 156 civil wars between 1820 and 1992. According to their findings, when the contending parties of the conflict are supported by their own outside alliance (balanced intervention) and the distribution of third-party contributions is roughly equal, the duration of the civil war is increased.³¹⁹ In addition, they report that when the third party increasingly supports either of the contending parties, the duration of the civil war significantly decreases.³²⁰

However, in their preliminary findings, Elbadawi and Sambanis report that external intervention is positively associated with war duration.³²¹ This finding contradicts previous research which claims that third-party interventions may be likely in order to reduce the duration of the war. Elbadawi and Sambanis assert that this evidence

³¹⁵ Regan and Abouharb 2002.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*

³¹⁹ Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, 632.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000.

does not necessarily show a casual relationship and that external interventions more likely take place in wars that are already long-lasting.³²² Traditionally, a high-intensity conflict requires a massive amount of military and economic resources and tends to drag out.

The duration of a conflict has been one of the most significant factors in peacebuilding success after the conflict is over. Generally speaking, longer wars are likely to increase hostility as they also increase the number of casualties. According to Doyle and Sambanis, “the greater the costs, the lower a society’s social and human capital, and the lower its ability to rebound after civil war.”³²³ In addition, Walter reports that longer wars are more likely to end in negotiated settlements than are short wars.³²⁴ It is because the duration of longer wars makes the parties tired of fighting and makes them realize that their chances of declaring military victory are gradually diminished.³²⁵

IV. How Civil Wars End

Intrastate wars are more difficult to end than are interstate wars for three reasons. First, the security dilemma often compels the contending parties to continue fighting. In interstate wars, the warring groups can eventually draw back to their own territories. However, in the aftermath of civil wars, the opponents cannot remain separate and retain their own armed forces. As neorealists argue, the security dilemma comes into play when domestic political groups’ security is not guaranteed. The contending parties often believe that an increase in their opponent’s security decreases their own security. Second, civil wars are often triggered by bad leaders who act on their self-interests in order to

³²² Ibid., 12.

³²³ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 785.

³²⁴ Walter 1997, 354.

³²⁵ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 785.

remain in power. Bad leaders are commonly motivated to take complete control over the country through military victory.³²⁶ Third, civil wars are very difficult to end through negotiation, because the stakes are very high and because no international or domestic institution can be trusted to enforce peace agreements.³²⁷ According to Licklider, of the 57 civil wars that occurred and concluded between 1945 and 1993, 14 ended by negotiation, while the remaining 43 ended in military victory.³²⁸

In general, civil wars are eventually resolved by negotiated settlements or a military victory of one side. Licklider examines the relative success of negotiated settlements and military victories in terms of promoting durable peace.³²⁹ According to Licklider, “negotiated settlements of civil wars are less likely to endure than are the results of military victories.”³³⁰ Wagner explains that negotiated settlements generally create a balance-power condition among the combatants that can allow the new government to function effectively for at least a while.³³¹ As Organski and Kugler argue, the balance of power promotes peace as long as it is maintained.³³² However, Wagner claims that maintaining the internal balance is as fragile as the international one because “many things happen that will lead antagonists to expect a more favorable outcome from the attempted use of force.”³³³ On the other hand, military victories will make potential rebels more difficult to organize in the future by disarming them and destroying the

³²⁶ Stedman 1996, 343.

³²⁷ Licklider 1995, 684.

³²⁸ *Ibid.* Stedman also reports that between 1900 and 1980, only 15 percent of civil wars ended by negotiation and the remaining 85 percent ended by military victory. According to Pillar, during the same time period, nearly 50 percent of interstate wars ended by negotiated settlements. See Stedman 1991. See also Pillar 1983.

³²⁹ Licklider 1995.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 685.

³³¹ Wagner 1993, 261.

³³² Organski and Kugler 1981, 14.

³³³ Wagner 1993, 261.

organizational identity of the losers.³³⁴ As a result, military victories tend to endure compared with negotiated settlements.

Furthermore, Hartzell identifies the key elements in promoting the stability of negotiated settlements. According to Hartzell, the antagonists negotiating a settlement will seek to create laws and institutions that seek to balance, divide, or share power among them.³³⁵ In other words, they seek to construct the governing rules and bodies that would ensure their own security. Hartzell concludes that negotiated settlements are likely to be stable when they provide institutional guarantees for the security of the contending parties.³³⁶ Promoting the stability of negotiated settlements is one of the most significant objectives of peacebuilding. Cousens and Kumar reach a similar conclusion by arguing that peacebuilding efforts should focus on the factors that allow a stable political process to emerge.³³⁷ Post-conflict elections might be a good example. Despite negotiated peace settlements, war-torn societies are unstable, highly fragmented, and on the brink of violence. According to Kumar, the most significant objective of post-conflict elections is to transfer power to a democratically installed government that enjoys national and international legitimacy and to begin rebuilding the country.³³⁸ In this sense, Cousens and Kumar argue that “without stable political processes, even useful efforts to rebuild the economy, the environment, or the infrastructure will come to little longer-term effect.”³³⁹

³³⁴ Ibid., 261-262.

³³⁵ Hartzell 1999, 6.

³³⁶ Ibid., 20.

³³⁷ Cousens and Kumar 2001, 183.

³³⁸ Kumar 1998, 6.

³³⁹ Cousens and Kumar 2001, 183-184.

V. The Causes of Peace

Previous research on civil wars has mainly focused on the conditions associated with the initiation and the termination of armed conflict and has largely neglected to discuss how to build peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts. Needless to say, more empirical studies are required in order to explore the causes of peace and the role of international assistance. I found only three studies that investigate the relationship between the duration of civil peace and third-party intervention.

Third-Party Intervention and Peacebuilding

Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild investigate whether multilateral third-party intervention is positively related to the short-term durability of negotiated civil war settlements (five years after the war).³⁴⁰ They seek to determine the key variables that would promote durable peace. According to their findings, third-party intervention, indeed, provides security and significantly increases the duration of peace.³⁴¹ They report that “the most durable settlements are likely to be those that (1) involve states in which the previous stable regime was a democracy, (2) have civil conflicts of low intensity that lasted for extended periods of time, and (3) include in the peace agreement provisions for the territorial autonomy of threatened groups.”³⁴² They find that third-party intervention and the level of hostility are significant variables in the promotion of a durable peace.

Doyle and Sambanis investigate the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding operations in 124 civil wars from 1944 to 1997 and find that “multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference.”³⁴³ They developed an empirical model to

³⁴⁰ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 184.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 202.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779.

scrutinize the assumption that international assistance led by the UN would contribute to a sustainable peace. The dependent variable, “peacebuilding success,” is represented by durable peace. According to their findings, overall UN peacebuilding helps promote peace. In addition, as Boutros-Ghali emphasizes in *An Agenda for Peace*, Doyle and Sambanis claim that the level of economic development, social justice, and political stability within a state is positively related to peacebuilding success.³⁴⁴ However, UN enforcement and observer missions seem to have a positive role in ending a war, but they have no effect on building lasting peace.³⁴⁵ Surprisingly, Doyle and Sambanis report that traditional peacekeeping is not a statistically significant variable as well.

However, in her article, Fortna investigates the effects of UN involvement in the recurrence of both intrastate and interstate conflicts. Just like Doyle and Sambanis, Fortna reaches a similar conclusion by arguing that only some kinds of UN military operations are working.³⁴⁶ However, regarding the impact of UN military operations, Fortna’s finding is somewhat surprising. It indicates that “Chapter VII enforcement missions have not been as effective at maintaining peace and may even be detrimental to stable peace.”³⁴⁷ Fortna asserts that UN enforcement missions are likely chosen and carried out “where peace is most precarious.”³⁴⁸ In addition, while Doyle and Sambanis find that traditional peacekeeping does not help promote peace, Fortna’s finding indicates that it has a statistically positive effect on the duration of civil peace.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 789. See also Boutros-Ghali 1992.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., 791.

³⁴⁶ Fortna 2003, 112.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 108.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 107.

I have briefly presented the findings of studies investigating the effectiveness of peacebuilding in the aftermath of civil wars. The findings are somewhat mixed. While Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild find a significant effect, Doyle, Sambanis, and Fortna find that only some kinds of UN military operations are effective. In addition, Doyle, Sambanis, and Fortna differ from the other authors on the effects of the UN military operations. The existing research does not clearly show whether peacebuilding operations are effective. Their research methods and data sets are nonetheless useful, and I will incorporate them into this research.

Humanitarian NGOs and Peacebuilding

The end of the Cold War marked the turning point for humanitarian NGOs in terms of enlarging the perspectives of their missions and of actively becoming involved in intrastate conflicts. The field operations of humanitarian NGOs in civil wars generally cover emergency aid for rehabilitation and development.³⁵⁰ In fact, NGOs have increasingly earned a reputation for being more caring, responsive, accessible, flexible, and accommodating than any other type of actor in the international community.³⁵¹ As West claims, they are flexible and speedy, they disregard state borders, are cheaper in relative terms, have links at grass-roots levels, and are not bureaucratic.³⁵² This distinguishes humanitarian NGOs from states or IGOs within the global system.

West effectively categorizes a wide variety of humanitarian relief operations, such as preventive, general, forcible, protective, relief, and restorative, and illustrates that humanitarian NGOs are engaged in almost every aspect of peacebuilding operations for

³⁵⁰ Whitman and Pocock 1996, 136.

³⁵¹ Weiss 1996, 458.

³⁵² West 2001, 7.

war-torn societies.³⁵³ Weiss also develops a list of various humanitarian NGO tasks in war zones and asserts that NGOs play three major roles: operational, educational and advocative missions. The delivery of emergency humanitarian relief aid is one of the most significant activities and a basis for the enthusiastic support from their donors.³⁵⁴ Weiss argues that bilateral and multilateral organizations are increasingly relying on humanitarian NGOs as subcontractors.³⁵⁵ In addition to providing relief services to the victims of humanitarian crises, NGOs seek to educate and lobby their donors, publics, and governments, exerting influence on public opinion and governmental policies.

Furthermore, Natsios raises an issue regarding the relationship between the major humanitarian NGOs on the one hand, such as the ICRC, Save the Children, World Vision, Oxfam, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services, and the UN on the other hand. Traditionally, the UN does its relief and development work at the governmental level and NGOs carry out their missions at the grassroots level. For this reason, the UN measures success by whether host governments are pleased; NGOs, by whether public and the private donors are satisfied.³⁵⁶ However, there are often overlapping functional claims and missions between the two sets of institutions in the middle of humanitarian crises, which imply “turf wars over competing roles and mandates.”³⁵⁷ Hence, Natsios notes the need to improve the current relief response system through the collaboration of the NGO community and the UN, although there has been some progress in improved collaboration in recent years. Domini supports Natsios’s proposition by arguing that the NGO community and the UN should develop efficient strategies for managing and

³⁵³ Ibid. 14-18. See Chapter 1 for more explanations on humanitarian relief operations by NGOs.

³⁵⁴ Weiss 1996, 441.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., 442.

³⁵⁶ Natsios 1996, 75.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

resolving the existing problems so that each side can be held accountable for its humanitarian relief operations.³⁵⁸ Furthermore, in her recent article, Reimann argues that NGOs increasingly gained formal and informal opportunities to participate in UN politics particularly in the 1990s. These opportunities signify a symbiotic relationship of mutual growth and interdependence among states, IGOs, and NGOs.³⁵⁹ Reimann concludes that the effect of UN-NGO relations should be further explored.

Although there have been numerous case studies of humanitarian relief operations in both interstate and intrastate conflicts, they are mostly descriptions of specific missions and of assessments of the role of humanitarian NGOs. I have not found any statistical analysis examining the relationship between the success of UN peacebuilding and the presence of humanitarian NGOs, something this study seeks to explore.

VI. Conclusion

The existing literature focuses on the initiation and the termination of ongoing civil wars. It neglects to empirically examine the conditions associated with the development of domestic capacity and the range of conflict-management roles that international organizations, such as the UN and humanitarian NGOs, can play in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts. As I discussed in Chapter 1, I chose seven of the most significant humanitarian NGOs—World Vision, Save the Children, the ICRC, CARE USA, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam UK, and the IRC—and will examine whether their participation influences the success of UN peacebuilding.

My intention is to close the gap in the literature. Above all, this involves updating and reconstructing the data set used in the existing literature on UN peacebuilding. For

³⁵⁸ Domini 1996, 99-100.

³⁵⁹ Reimann 2006, 55-57.

example, the data gathered by Doyle and Sambanis include civil wars between 1945 and 1997. My data include wars that ended in 2002. In addition, it involves adding new variables in order to explore other aspects of UN peacebuilding operations, in particular the relationship between the presence of humanitarian NGOs and the success of UN peacebuilding. In addition, my hope is to clear up contradictions in the existing literature and to provide a sharper picture of the role that such variables as the level of hostility, the duration of war, and the type of war termination play in peacebuilding. I will draw on the sophisticated research techniques and the key variables of previous studies in my statistical model.

4

Measuring the Effectiveness of International Organizations: A Quantitative Analysis of International Peacebuilding Operations in the Aftermath of Civil Wars, 1945-2002

I. Introduction

Preventing or stopping massive violence and promoting peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts are the most significant challenges that the international community faces today. International organizations, which are largely led by the UN and joined by many humanitarian NGOs, have often attempted to support efforts that prevent the recurrence of war and that relieve human suffering. In recent years, the UN and NGOs have often played active roles in providing political, economic, and social rehabilitation programs for demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, human rights-monitoring, the resettlement of refugees and IDPs, and promoting reforms in agriculture and physical infrastructure to attract foreign investments.³⁶⁰ Despite the frequency and severity of intrastate conflicts, civil wars have been studied far less than interstate conflicts. It has not been determined whether UN peacebuilding operations have been an effective tool in producing a sustainable peace. Furthermore, it has also been empirically uncertain whether the efforts made by humanitarian NGOs have contributed to peace and security, particularly during the post-Cold War era.

This chapter conducts an empirical analysis of the conditions associated with the termination of internal conflicts and the creation of a durable peace, including the role of

³⁶⁰ Kumar 1997, 5.

the UN and the five biggest humanitarian NGOs³⁶¹ — the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Save the Children, World Vision, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services — in the aftermath of civil wars. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the term “peacebuilding” did not exist before Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* in 1992. However, conflict analysts generally agree that the UN and NGOs have engaged in a wide range of missions that have aimed at building local capacities relating to sustainable peace since World War II. In addition, it is interesting to explore whether Boutros-Ghali’s peace plan in the early 1990s has served as a significant road map for preventing states from relapsing into chaos. This study acknowledges that Boutros-Ghali’s peace plan may not be fairly tested, since it has not been fully implemented. However, I believe that I can nevertheless assess the potential validity of his assumptions and the potential of the various conflict roles he proposes for the UN. I will examine, in some detail, the nature of conflict cases after the Cold War and to what extent the UN has been successful in the different areas he identifies.

The author classifies civil wars into two different time periods, the Cold War period and the post-Cold War era.³⁶² By examining the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding in two different periods, I intend to explore the potential validity of Boutros-Ghali’s peace proposal in the context of two very different international systems. By using sustainable peace as my dependent variable, this chapter examines how (1) the level of hostility of a conflict, (2) the level of local development, (3) various types of UN

³⁶¹ The selection of larger humanitarian NGOs is made based upon their financial status and history. (See Table 1.1 in Chapter 1) While the ICRC, Save the Children, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services were founded before or in 1945, World Vision was created in 1947. They are the world’s leading humanitarian aid and development agencies.

³⁶² While identifying an exact date for the end of the Cold War is difficult, in this study the Cold War period extends from the end of World War II in 1945 to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, an iconic symbol of the Cold War, in 1989. See Regan 2000a, 771. The post-Cold War era is ranged from 1990 to 2002. December 31, 2002 is an end point of this study.

military operations, and (4) a variety of humanitarian NGO missions contribute to promoting durable peace. As I investigate the effectiveness of peacebuilding by examining the four key research puzzles, I should be able to find not only a way to measure the impact of peacebuilding but also a way to provide the most feasible possibilities for an enhanced and strengthened UN.

My investigation into the success of peacebuilding is structured in the following manner. First, I discuss my research design, including statistical method, the data, variables, models, and hypotheses. Next, I conduct my empirical analysis by testing 10 hypotheses and reporting the empirical findings. Then, I review the statistical findings, discuss the implication, address the limitations of my research, and subsequently, develop an agenda for future study.

II. Research Design

This chapter explores how peace duration is statistically related to the degree of war-related hostility, the level of a state's capacity, and a wide range of international peace operations. As Boutros-Ghali predicted, my argument is that internal peace and security will be promoted as economic inequality, social injustice, and political instability are gradually decreased by reconstructing, reforming, and stabilizing economic, social, security, and political sectors through the UN and humanitarian NGO peace operations.

This chapter discusses how the outcomes of UN peacebuilding after the Cold War would be different from those during the Cold War period. Since the UN has engaged in more civil wars during the post-Cold War period than the Cold War era, it is interesting to compare the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding in two different international systems.

In addition, by evaluating the effectiveness of international organizations, I should be able to determine whether they have been an efficient tool for conflict resolution.

Research Method

The primary research method that was used to analyze the data is a logit regression with “durable peace” as the dichotomous dependent variable. The logit model is a widely used statistical model with binary endogenous variables.³⁶³ In a logit regression analysis, I calculate predicted probabilities of *Y* (the dependent variable) conditional upon a set of values for the *X* variables (independent variables).³⁶⁴ In other words, the logit regression predicts the probability of the occurrence of a particular event (of the dependent variable).

Data

This chapter investigates a data set consisting of 124 cases of civil wars from 1945 to 2002 that fit the definitions of civil wars employed by Doyle and Sambanis.³⁶⁵ According to Doyle and Sambanis, a civil war is defined as “an armed conflict that causes more than 1,000 battle deaths in at least a single year, that challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state, that involves the state as a principal combatant, that occurs within the recognized boundary of that state, that includes rebels with the ability to mount organized military opposition to the state, and that has parties concerned with the prospect of living together within a defined political unit after the end

³⁶³ Johnston and Dinardo 1997, 419.

³⁶⁴ Liao 1994, 7–9.

³⁶⁵ The cases are listed in the Appendix. p. 120. The 124 civil wars that erupted between 1945 and 2002 also satisfy the most of the criteria employed by Melvin Small and David Singer in *The Correlates of War* project: (1) the national government was one of the parties to the conflict; (2) there was effective resistance on the part of both the government and its adversaries during the course of conflict; (3) the conflict occurred within a defined political unit. However, while Small and Singer highlight the conflict generated at least 1,000 battle deaths per year, Doyle and Sambanis’s data were gathered based on the total number of battle deaths (not measured annually as in Correlates of War definition). See also Small and Singer 1982, 214–215.

of the war.”³⁶⁶ My data are gathered based on this definition of civil war. I have substantially reconstructed and updated the data set originally collected by Doyle and Sambanis by including more recent civil wars and creating new explanatory variables to examine the effectiveness of 57 humanitarian NGO peace operations during the post-Cold War era.

There were 10 ongoing civil wars at the end of my analysis period (Dec. 31, 2002). The ongoing wars are excluded in my analysis since there were no significant peace agreements before that period. A selection of the recent civil wars is determined by three different data sets. First, Harbom and Wallensteen’s data set contain the conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 battle-related deaths between 1946 and 2004.³⁶⁷ They categorize intrastate conflicts by three different levels of intensity -- minor, intermediate, and war.³⁶⁸ Second, in his recent article, Sambanis lists 154 cases (13 ongoing wars) from 1944 to 2002 and argues how the employment of different definitions of civil war among conflict analysts leads to different empirical results.³⁶⁹ Finally, Mullenbach and Dizon identify 214 intrastate conflicts between 1945 and 2002 on their Web site.³⁷⁰ One of the benefits of using Doyle and Sambanis’s data is that they include numerous aspects of civil wars. Primarily, Doyle and Sambanis make an effort to code how the level of hostility, the level of domestic capacity, and the level of international assistance through the UN military operations have an effect on promoting durable peace. However, as Fortna emphasizes, and because of the complicated nature of

³⁶⁶ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 783.

³⁶⁷ Harbom and Wallensteen 2005.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 634. According to Harbom and Wallensteen, *minor* conflicts refer to conflicts that produced at least 25 battle-related death and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of conflict. *Intermediate* refers to at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year. *War* refers to at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.

³⁶⁹ Sambanis 2004.

³⁷⁰ Mullenbach and Dizon 2006.

civil wars and their repetitive stop-and-go nature, there is no data set that includes a comprehensive aspect of every single case of intrastate conflicts.³⁷¹ In addition, because of limited resources, I must admit that my data may omit a number of short-lived cease-fires that may be included in other intrastate conflict studies. Because most short-lived cease-fires take place before the presence of the UN peacekeeping forces, a comprehensive accounting of short-lived cease-fires is not feasible.³⁷² Because of this selection bias in the data — the probable underreporting of the true population of short-lived cease-fires — my empirical findings tend to be biased.³⁷³

Dependent Variable

The binary dependent variable in this study is “durable peace.” Durable peace refers to the time between the termination of armed conflict by declaring military victory or negotiated settlement and the ignition of another war. The dependent variable is measured by peacebuilding success (coded as 1) or failure (coded as 0) two years after the termination of the war. According to Doyle and Sambanis, successful peacebuilding must satisfy three conditions. First, it requires an end to the war. Second, it requires an end to residual low-level violence.³⁷⁴ Hence, it implies that there is no contested sovereignty or undivided sovereignty. Finally, it requires a minimum standard of democratization that eliminated the most extreme authoritarian regimes, according to Gurr’s democracy scores.³⁷⁵ Hence, “successful peacebuilding” implies an absence of

³⁷¹ Fortna 2004, 276.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 276.

³⁷³ Note that a selection of the recent civil wars is determined by three different data sets. Hence, the data tend to underreport the actual number of all short-lived cease-fires.

³⁷⁴ In the reference section of his article, Sambanis clarifies the degree of residual violence after a particular civil war. My data are gathered based upon this information. See Sambanis 2004.

³⁷⁵ The level of democracy or autocracy is quantified based on “codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.” Gurr, Jagers, and Moore 1990, 83 – 85. See also Jagers and Gurr 1995, 471.

residual violence, no war recurrence, and an improvement of political openness two years after the end of the civil war. My dependent variable, durable peace (*pbs2s3*), consists of 43 peacebuilding successes (35 percent) and 81 failures (65 percent).³⁷⁶

Explanatory Variables

Durable peace is a function of (1) the local level of hostility, (2) the level of local capacity, and (3) the level of international assistance through the UN and humanitarian NGO peace operations. Proxy variables are employed in order to measure the impact of each explanatory variable. First, the level of hostility is measured with the natural log of deaths and displacements (*logcost*),³⁷⁷ the number of factions (*faction*),³⁷⁸ and the duration of the war (*wardur*).³⁷⁹ The level of hostility is one of the most significant variables determining both war duration (Licklider, 1995; Regan and Abouharb, 2002) and war recurrence. (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2003, 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Walter, 1997.)

Second, the level of local capacity is represented by two proxy variables. Previous history of democracy is measured by the average Polity score over the five years before the war (*gurrlog5*). According to Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, the history of democracy is one of the determinants of predicting war recurrence.³⁸⁰ In their view, “the most durable settlements are likely to be those that involve states in which the previous stable regime was a democracy.”³⁸¹ Furthermore, a number of studies find that the level of democratization has been widely used by conflict analysts to forecast the likelihood of

³⁷⁶ See Appendix p. 120.

³⁷⁷ The number of battle deaths and displacements were transformed with the natural log since its number, overall, was very high.

³⁷⁸ The number of faction is a dummy variable, which indicates that there were more than two factions.

³⁷⁹ The duration of the war is measured in months.

³⁸⁰ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 184.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

civil war. (Auvinen 1997; Benson and Kugler 1998; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Henderson and Singer 2000; Regan and Norton 2005; Rummel 1997; Snow 1996; Thompson and Tucker 1997.) However, Mansfield and Snyder report that democratization often creates a weak governmental authority that fails to reconcile the conflicting interests and that may invite political conflicts.³⁸²

In addition, a number of conflict analysts investigate the causes of civil wars with special emphasis on economic factors, such as the level of economic development and income inequality. In fact, recent studies report that political and cultural causes have been replaced by economic causes.³⁸³ The level of economic development is measured by the level of energy consumption per capita (*develop*). Conflict analysts find that most previous researchers arrive at a similar conclusion, stating that extremely poor countries are likely to be at greater risk of civil war and that high economic development effectively eliminates the risk. (Auvinen 1997; Bannon and Collier 2003; Collier 1998 and 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 1998 and 2001; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; Henderson and Singer 2000.)

Third to be measured is the effectiveness of international assistance. I will measure this by investigating various missions established by the UN as well as the five humanitarian NGOs. Investigating the individual impact of four different types of UN peace operations (observer missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, multidimensional peacebuilding missions, and peace enforcement missions³⁸⁴) is one of

³⁸² Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 79. See also Mansfield and Snyder 1997.

³⁸³ Keen 2000, 32.

³⁸⁴ Note that only two UN peace enforcement operations were conducted during and after the Cold War. Because of the lack of variation, the variable is excluded from my empirical analysis. See Tables 2 and 3. During the Cold War, UN peace enforcement operations were deployed only to liberate South Korea from North Korea's invasion in 1950. UN peace enforcement was deployed solely to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo in 1961, including arrangements for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations,

the research puzzles of this study. Recall the differences in the four operations. The purpose of observer missions is to monitor the negotiated treaty and to assist in the negotiation of a peace settlement with the presence of military and civilian observers. Traditional peacekeeping involves the insertion of UN troops between the armies of two or more hostile parties after a cease-fire has been agreed to by the parties in conflicts; disarmament becomes the most essential responsibility of the peacekeeping operations, because the contending parties in civil conflicts fight with light weapons.³⁸⁵

Multidimensional peacebuilding refers to an arrangement of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from traditional peacekeeping operations to the development of local capacities and institutional rebuilding.³⁸⁶ In general, war-torn societies require comprehensive reform in their social, economic, political, and security sectors. This involves either creating new or reorganizing the existing institutions to address specific needs and to enforce the legitimate rules.³⁸⁷ Peace enforcement refers to a variety of enforcement mechanisms, such as direct military intervention and a range of economic, financial, and military sanctions. The deployment of UN operations by mission type (*un2cint*)³⁸⁸ is also included. This variable is designed to test the effectiveness of the different types of UN peacebuilding as a whole.

and the prevention of clashes. During the post-Cold War, UN peace enforcement missions were operated in Yugoslavia-Croatia in 1995 and Yugoslavia in 1998. In addition, UN peace enforcement missions in Somalia are excluded from the data since, the Somalian civil war is one of the ongoing wars as of December 31, 2002.

³⁸⁵ Jett 1999, 17.

³⁸⁶ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 781.

³⁸⁷ Kumar 1997, 3.

³⁸⁸ This variable is designed to show how the presence of the four mandated operations is correlated to peacebuilding success as whole. Individual effects of the different operations will be discussed separately later in this paper.

Fourth, this chapter examines how the five larger humanitarian NGOs contribute to internal peace during the post-Cold War era.³⁸⁹ The data include 57 civil wars during this period and categorize a wide range of humanitarian relief efforts into six different missions (preventive, general, protective, relief, restorative, and forcible) that fit the definitions employed by West.³⁹⁰ A preventive operation is designed to monitor potential humanitarian crises by raising international awareness. A preventive operation's primary efforts include peace- and human rights-monitoring, lobbying, and information-gathering/-sharing and putting pressure on various international actors, such as states, IGOs, and NGOs, to be responsive. A general operation primarily seeks to increase international awareness in general (not to deal with a particular case) regarding the issues surrounding humanitarian assistance. General action includes public hearings, seminars, and campaigning at the domestic and intergovernmental level. A protective mission aims to inspect minimum living conditions in refugee camps or prisons. Its mission includes separating civilians from combatants.

A relief operation seeks to relieve human sufferings in conflict regions by providing water, food, sanitary facilities and medical care, tents, temporary shelters, and other basic necessities for survival. The restorative mission aims to assist in managing social, economic, psychological, and administrative rehabilitation programs. This mission also provides technical and financial assistance to agriculture and major industries and assists in constructing societal infrastructure for education, health care, housing,

³⁸⁹ This research originally proposed to explore the success of the five biggest humanitarian NGOs in all cases of the civil wars from 1945 to 2002. Because of limited resources, the scope of this study is somewhat reduced. Of the 57 cases, all of the five NGOs launched their various humanitarian missions on 56 cases. I sorted roughly about 250 various missions and determined which mission was the most dominant one for a particular case. The Web addresses of the larger NGOs can be found in the References section. Based upon my arrangement, I was able to create eight new variables representing the humanitarian efforts made by the NGOs.

³⁹⁰ See West 2001, 14.

communication, and so forth. Restorative-type operations have become among the most important efforts of humanitarian NGOs in the 1990s.³⁹¹ Conflict analysts have urged that humanitarian NGOs should change their strategies from the short-term action in emergency aid to long-term work in institutional development.³⁹² A forcible operation aims to impose sanctions on those who violate international humanitarian law. Traditionally, humanitarian agencies have worked with the UN to enforce penalties.

Finally, this study includes a couple of additional dichotomous variables. One is the presence of a peace treaty (*treaty*). I would like to determine whether wars that end with a peace treaty have a positive relationship with the duration of peace. The other is the nature of civil war (*wartype*), which distinguishes ethnic, religious, and identity armed conflict from ideological and revolutionary wars.

Statistical Model

The theory underlying the construction of my empirical model is that internal peace and security will be promoted and maintained with a low level of hostility, economic development, and international assistance in the aftermath of civil wars. My theoretical assumption is that international assistance through the UN and the larger humanitarian NGOs has a positive impact on the likelihood of successful peacebuilding. My binary logit regression model will be composed of the following:

$$Y_i (\text{durable peace}) = \alpha_i + \beta_1(\text{the level of hostility}) \\ + \beta_2 (\text{the level of local capacity}) \\ + \beta_3 (\text{international assistance}) + u_i$$

I now turn to briefly discuss 10 hypotheses by estimating logistic models of peacebuilding outcomes.

³⁹¹ Ibid., 17.

³⁹² Edwards and Hulme 1995, 7. See also West 2001, 17.

Hypotheses

I have chosen various interactive variables representing the dependent and the independent variables. There are 10 hypotheses to be tested in order to reveal the statistical conditions associated with the initiation and the termination of intrastate conflict and the creation of durable peace in two different time periods. The Cold War division on the UN Security Council made it difficult for the UN to become involved in civil wars. On the other hand, after 1989, the UN often more actively sought to uphold peace in the aftermath of internal conflicts. During this period, the UN peace operations focused on preventing the recurrence of war rather than on stopping physical violence. Furthermore, the practice of UN missions incorporated many more extensive civilian components, such as electoral observation, police training, civilian administration, and humanitarian assistance. The hypotheses are as follows:

- Hypothesis 1: The higher the number of fatalities, the lower the likelihood of peacebuilding success.
- Hypothesis 2: The higher the number of factions, the lower the likelihood of peacebuilding success.
- Hypothesis 3: The duration of the war positively influences the likelihood of peacebuilding success.
- Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of energy consumption, the greater the likelihood of peacebuilding success.
- Hypothesis 5: The higher the level of history of democracy, the greater the likelihood of peacebuilding success.
- Hypothesis 6: The practice of UN observer mission positively influences the likelihood of peacebuilding success.
- Hypothesis 7: The practice of traditional peacekeeping positively influences the likelihood of peacebuilding success.

Hypothesis 8: The practice of multidimensional peacebuilding operations positively influences the likelihood of peacebuilding success.

Hypothesis 9: The higher the likelihood of peacebuilding success when the conflict ends with negotiated settlements.

Hypothesis 10: The practice of humanitarian missions by NGOs positively influences the likelihood of peacebuilding success.

Hypothesis 1 is based on my assumption that a higher number of human fatalities erects unavoidable emotional and psychological barriers between the contending parties. Hypothesis 2 is based on standard assumptions about increasing the number of players in any “game.” Hypothesis 3 presumes that a lengthy war makes the parties tired of fighting and makes them realize that their chances of declaring military victory are gradually diminished. Hypotheses 4 and 5 are designed to address Boutros-Ghali’s prediction and my theoretical assumption that peace and security would be promoted as the level of local capacity is increased. Hypotheses 6-8 are based on my argument that the practice of UN peace operations would promote durable peace. Hypothesis 9 is based on Hartzell’s finding that negotiated settlements are stable when they ensure the safety of the antagonists. Hypothesis 10 is based on my assumption that various types of humanitarian NGOs joined by the UN may improve the quality of life for the victims of armed conflict after civil wars.

III. Empirical Results

In general, the results of the analysis confirm the central argument of this study. According to Table 1, UN peace operations appear to be an effective tool in promoting internal peace. In addition, the empirical findings indicate that the conditions associated with internal peace in two different time periods are somewhat different.

Table 1. Effectiveness of UN Peacebuilding by Different Time Periods³⁹³

	Model 1 From 1945 to 2002	Model 2 The Cold War	Model 3 The Post-Cold War
Human Cost of War	-.544*** (.138) -17%	-.507** (.208) -15%	-.909*** (.334) -17%
Factions	-1.536** (.631) -11%	-2.584** (1.045) -15%	-.873 (1.318)
Duration of War	.011*** (.003) 23%	.006 (.007)	.020** (.008) 48%
Economic Development	.000 (.000)	.001 (.001)	-.000 (.001)
History of Democracy	.064 (.047)	.118* (.063) 14%	-.124 (.111)
UN Peacebuilding	.752*** (.273) 22%	.847** (.421) 18%	1.241* (.632) 39%
Treaty	.966 (.667)	3.359** (1.317) 27%	1.158 (1.158)
Identity Wars	-1.617*** (.570) -12%	-2.681*** (.944) -16%	-1.056 (1.099)
Humanitarian Operations	N/A	N/A	-.311 (.433)
Observations	116	65	50
Log-Likelihood	-47.866	-22.558	-16.265
Pseudo-R ²	.359	.458	.502

Table 1 presents the effects of local hostility, local capacity, and international assistance on the duration of peace after civil wars end and in three different time periods. Model 1 includes 116 intrastate cases and presents overall effects of UN peacebuilding, as well as other control variables on the duration of peace. Model 1 also presents the results of the logit analysis in terms of the coefficients associated with each of the explanatory variables. In broad terms, I can evaluate the effect of specific variables by the

³⁹³ Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at 0.05; *significant at 0.1; two-tailed tests. Predicted probabilities (%) of the successful peacebuilding are also reported.

sign of its coefficient; more substantive interpretation can be developed by analyzing the predicted probability of the dependent variable. The predicted probability is an efficient measurement to compare the significant effect of the individual variables on the duration of peace.³⁹⁴ In addition, I report the pseudo-R² to discuss how well my models predict the likelihood of sustainable peace. Values of the pseudo-R² range from 0 to 1. A value of 1 indicates a perfect forecasting. According to Louviere, Henscher, and Swait, a model with good forecasting will have the pseudo-R² in the range of 0.3 and 0.4.³⁹⁵ The values of the pseudo-R² in my models range from 0.359 (Model 1) to 0.502 (Model 3), which imply that my models are statistically significant as a whole.

From 1945 to 2002

As Model 1 indicates, there is a negative relationship between *Human Cost of War* and the success of peacebuilding. As the number of battle deaths increases, the likelihood of a durable peace decreases. When holding other variables at their mean values, the likelihood of the success of peacebuilding decreases by 17 percent, with an increase in the level of hostility. In Model 1, *Factions* are also negatively associated with the dependent variable. From 1945 to 2002, while *Duration of War* is positively correlated to successful peacebuilding, its overall influence on the dependent variable seems to be considerable compared with other statically significant variables. According to Model 1, all of the three proxy variables for local hostility are statistically significant. Interestingly, the two proxy variables for local capacity, *Economic Development* and *History of Democracy*, do not seem to play a role in maintaining peace in this period.

³⁹⁴ See Liao 1994, 16. Predicted probabilities are obtained by the following operation:
 $P(Y = 1/X) = \exp(\sum bkXk) / [1 + \exp(\sum bkXk)]$. This equation computes the predicted probability for a given set of values of the independent variables. To be clear, it computes the predicted probability of an independent variable and sets the values in other variables at their sample means.

³⁹⁵ Louviere, Henscher, and Swait 2000.

In Model 1, 2, and 3, there is some evidence that UN peace operations (without specifying individual operations), indeed, positively contribute to peace and security in the aftermath of civil wars, regardless of the different time periods. In Model 1, the likelihood of a durable peace increases by 22 percent when the UN launches its peacebuilding missions, holding other variables constant. The variable is significant at the 1 percent level. The overall effect of *Identity Wars* is negatively correlated with peacebuilding success. Hence, identity wars (e.g., ethnic or religious) have a lower likelihood of peacebuilding success than do nonidentity wars (e.g., ideological or revolutionary). From 1945 to 2002, when holding other variables constant, civil war duration and UN peacebuilding seem to have more considerable effects on the duration of peace after civil wars than other explanatory variables.

During the Cold War

Two proxy variables for the level of hostility, *Human Cost of War* and *Factions*, continue to have a negative relationship with the dependent variable. Civil war duration is positively correlated, but it has no statistical implication. Though the level of energy consumption per capita (*Economic Development*) has a positive correlation, unexpectedly, it shows no empirical significance during the three different time periods. However, *History of Democracy* becomes statistically significant only during this period. *UN Peacebuilding* and *Treaty* show positive signs of their coefficients and are both significant at the 5 percent level. With the presence of a peace treaty signed by the contending parties, the likelihood of a sustainable peace increases by 27 percent, holding other variables constant. Whereas UN peacebuilding is the second-largest (18 percent)

and has a positive impact in this model, *Identity Wars* show a negative effect on peace.

After the Cold War

Model 3 presents the results of the logit analysis of how the humanitarian NGOs, joined by the UN as well as other control variables, contribute to internal peace during the post-Cold War era. According to the model, unpredictably, the overall effect of various humanitarian missions reduces the duration of peace but has no statistical significance. Compared with the Cold War period, the effectiveness of peacebuilding, joined by the humanitarian NGOs, becomes greater in the post-Cold War era. This finding partially supports Boutros-Ghali's assumption that international assistance, which is largely led by the UN, will promote international peace and security after the Cold War. The number of factions is no longer significant after 1989. *Duration of War* becomes significant at the 5 percent level, and its effect is greater than any other variable. When holding other control variables constant, the likelihood of durable peace increases by 48 percent with an increase in the duration of civil wars. *Economic Development* and *Identity Wars* are negatively correlated but have no statistical implication.

Testing Hypotheses

Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the main findings of this study. Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate the empirical results of the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding by mission type during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, respectively. While Table 1 reports the overall effects of UN peacebuilding and the humanitarian NGOs (Model 3), Tables 2 and 3 note the individual impact of the UN military operations. Table 4 presents the

individual effect of five different types of humanitarian missions performed by the five NGOs during the post-Cold War era.³⁹⁶

Table 2. Effectiveness of UN Peacebuilding by Mission Type During the Cold War Period³⁹⁷

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Human Cost of War	-.562** (.226) -15%	-.510** (.214) -25%	-.407** (.185) -14%
Factions	-2.511** (1.030) -14%	-1.936** (.954) -18%	-2.287** (1.013) -15%
Duration of War	.006 (.007)	.005 (.006)	.007 (.006)
Economic Development	.001 (.001)	.002 (.001)	.001 (.001)
History of Democracy	.113 (.062)	.086 (.061)	.094 (.061)
No UN Operation	-2.807** (1.217) -13%	-----	-----
UN Observer Mission	-----	2.858** (1.408) 9%	-----
Traditional Peacekeeping	-----	-----	1.924 (2.120)
Treaty	3.308** (1.395) 26%	3.392** (1.413) 12%	3.389*** (1.222) 28%
Identity Wars	-2.844*** (1.006) -16%	-2.053*** (.949) -7%	-2.488*** (.894) -8%
Observations	65	65	65
Log-Likelihood	-21.647	-22.509	-24.281
Pseudo-R ²	.480	.459	.416

³⁹⁶ No forcible mission was carried out during the post-Cold War era.

³⁹⁷ Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at 0.05; *significant at 0.1; two-tailed tests. Predicted probabilities (%) of the successful peacebuilding are also reported.

Table 3. Effectiveness of UN Peacebuilding by Mission Type During the Post-Cold War Period³⁹⁸

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Human Cost of War	-.905*** (.324) -30%	-.898*** (.324) -29%	-.834*** (.303) -30%	-.931*** (.333) -24%
Factions	-.176 (1.130)	.373 (.983)	.320 (1.005)	-.317 (.157)
Duration of War	.016* (.007) 40%	.017** (.007) 42%	.015** (.006) 37%	.014** (.007) 36%
Economic Development	-.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)
History of Democracy	-.137 (.108)	-.153 (.109)	-.139 (.109)	-.196* (.117) -16%
No UN Operation	-1.712 (1.213)	-----	-----	-----
UN Observer Mission	-----	-2.009 (1.532)	-----	-----
Traditional Peacekeeping	-----	-----	-.174 (1.517)	-----
Multidimensional Peacebuilding	-----	-----	-----	2.999** (1.389) 25%
Treaty	1.732 (1.282)	2.983** (1.303) 36%	2.717** (1.257) 33%	2.006 (1.312)
Identity Wars	.441 (1.119)	.819 (1.111)	.682 (1.131)	.958 (1.219)
Humanitarian Assistance	-.246 (.386)	-.280 (.374)	-.277 (.354)	-.469 (.419)
Observations	50	50	50	50
Log-Likelihood	-17.874	-17.822	-18.952	-16.077
Pseudo-R ²	.453	.455	.420	.508

³⁹⁸ Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at 0.05; *significant at 0.1; two-tailed tests. Predicted probabilities (%) of the successful peacebuilding are also reported

Table 4. Effectiveness of the Humanitarian NGO by Mission Type During the Post-Cold War Period³⁹⁹

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Human Cost of War	-.965*** (.323) -28%	-.949*** (.331) -25%	-.972*** (.320) -26%	-.945*** (.331) -25%	-.978*** (.322) -26%
Factions	-.881 (1.301)	-1.086 (1.372)	-1.037 (1.353)	-.890 (1.328)	-.939 (1.326)
Duration of War	.021** (.008) 49%	.020** (.008) 49%	.020** (.008) 48%	.019** (.008) 47%	.019** (.008) 47%
Economic Development	-.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)
History of Democracy	-.100 (.114)	-.137 (.120)	-.103 (.111)	-.114 (.110)	-.104 (.113)
UN Peacebuilding	1.250** (.617) 40%	1.201** (.120) 39%	1.201** (.594) 39%	1.191* (.610) 39%	1.187** (.600) 38%
Preventive Mission	1.134 (2.557)	-----	-----	-----	-----
General Mission	-----	.902 (1.537)	-----	-----	-----
Protective Mission	-----	-----	-.684 (1.352)	-----	-----
Relief Mission	-----	-----	-----	-.576 (1.178)	-----
Restorative Mission	-----	-----	-----	-----	.299 (1.018)
Treaty	.560 (1.347)	.639 (1.404)	.457 (1.362)	.578 (1.389)	.486 (1.371)
Identity Wars	-.225 (1.220)	-.276 (1.269)	-.519 (1.361)	-.164 (1.251)	-.331 (1.271)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50
Log-Likelihood	-16.435	-16.355	-16.395	-16.405	-16.484
Pseudo-R ²	.497	.494	.498	.498	.495

³⁹⁹ Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at 0.05; *significant at 0.1; two-tailed tests. Predicted probabilities (%) of the successful peacebuilding are also reported.

Hypothesis 1 (*Human Cost of War*): Accepted

According to all 15 models, *Human Cost of War* is significant and negatively associated with the success of peacebuilding. As the number of fatalities increases, the likelihood of peacebuilding success decreases from 14 percent (Model 6) to 30 percent (Models 9), holding other variables constant. Generally, the contending parties of civil wars remain within a defined geographical boundary rather than draw back to their territories, as they do in interstate wars. The higher number of battle deaths and displacements would eventually generate the inevitable emotional and psychological barriers, as well as resentments among the contending parties. These antagonistic emotions can be critical factors in initiating an armed conflict for revenge. According to Doyle and Sambanis, in many cases, the contending parties never overcome the social-psychological barriers and initiate another war.⁴⁰⁰

Hypothesis 2 (*Factions*): Accepted in Models 4 Through 6; Rejected in Models 7 Through 15

In Models 4 through 6, *Factions* are negatively correlated with the dependent variable. When holding other variables constant, the likelihood of peacebuilding success decreases from 14 percent to 18 percent, as the number of contending parties is increased during the Cold War period. This is consistent with my assumption that it would be harder to unify the different socio-economic interests among many contending parties. However, after 1989, the variable becomes statistically insignificant, and Models 8 and 9 even show a positive sign of its coefficient. The finding contradicts my hypothesis. Hence, I must reject my second hypothesis in Models 7 through 15.

⁴⁰⁰ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 785.

Hypothesis 3 (*Duration of War*): Accepted in Models 7 Through 15; Rejected in Models 4 Through 6

According to Models 7 through 15, *Duration of War* becomes statistically significant following the Cold War and has a positive correlation with the likelihood of successful peacebuilding. One explanation might be that longer wars make the contending parties tired of fighting and make them realize that their winning chances are gradually diminished.⁴⁰¹ In addition, in longer wars, the antagonists eventually suffer from insufficient social, economic, and military resources. The lengthy wars reduce the capability of the contending parties to rebound. In addition, *Duration of War* has the most effect on promoting long-term peace after 1989 compared with other explanatory variables. When there is an increase in war duration, the likelihood of peacebuilding increases from 36 percent (Model 10) to 49 percent (Models 11 and 12), holding other variables constant. The empirical finding is consistent with Walter's assumption that intensive hostilities reduce the capability of the contending parties to rebound and reinitiate war.⁴⁰² However, this finding somewhat contradicts with my empirical findings from the first two hypotheses. It is important to note here that when civil war duration prolongs, there will be usually two consequences. Above all, as the number of fatalities increases, emotional barriers and resentments are expected to grow. On the other hand, the long-lasting civil wars are likely to decrease the military and economic capabilities of the contending parties to initiate another physical violence. These somewhat complex and contrasting natures of civil wars can be offered in order to explain the lack of a statistical

⁴⁰¹ Walter 1997, 354.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

relationship between war duration and the success of peacebuilding during the Cold War period. Hence, I must reject the third hypothesis in Models 4 through 6.

Hypothesis 4 (*Economic Development*): Rejected

Surprisingly, all my 15 models indicate that the level of economic development has no statistical relationship with peacebuilding success. This does not support the findings of many conflict analysts that economic variables, such as the level of energy consumption, income inequality, and the level of natural resource possession, are significant factors in estimating the duration of peace. Although the variable is positively correlated during the Cold War and becomes a negative relationship with peace, it has no statistical implication.

Hypothesis 5 (*History of Democracy*): Rejected

Two proxy variables for local capacity, *Economic Development* and *History of Democracy*, are included in order to explore Boutros-Ghali's reflection on the perspective of neoliberalism that peace and security would be promoted as the level of economic development and the level of political stability are increased. In addition, my argument is that a state's previous practice and experience of democratic laws, values, political processes, and institutional structures before the war are significant factors in maintaining peace. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild make a similar argument by stating that a state in which the previous stable regime was a democracy will increase the probability that a peace settlement will endure.⁴⁰³ However, surprisingly, I have no statistical support for Boutros-Ghali's assumption and my argument after 1989. Looking at Model 10, a state's history of democracy has a negative effect on peace and becomes significant at the 10 percent level.

⁴⁰³ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 202.

Hypothesis 6 (UN Observer): Accepted in Model 5, and Rejected in Model 8

During the Cold War, the UN military operations heavily focused on the termination of interstate conflicts, and their occasional deployments in internal conflicts relied on either the UN observer or on the traditional peacekeeping missions. In Model 5, *UN Observer Mission* positively contributes to internal peace and is significant at the 5 percent level. The likelihood of durable peace increases by 9 percent with the presence of UN observer missions, holding other variables constant. Observer missions appear to have the largest effect on peace during the period compared with other types of UN missions. However, after 1989, it becomes statistically insignificant and is negatively correlated with the dependent variable. This finding is partially consistent with Fortna's empirical findings. According to her findings, observer missions are statistically significant during the entire post-World War II period (1947-1999) and the post-Cold War era (1989-1999).⁴⁰⁴ However, Doyle, and Sambanis find the variable insignificant in their study.⁴⁰⁵

Hypothesis 7 (Traditional Peacekeeping): Rejected

Does UN peacebuilding after civil wars indeed build peace, as Boutros-Ghali expected? He argued that the scope of UN traditional peacekeeping had to be expanded beyond interstate wars since internal conflicts had become the most common form of armed conflict after the Cold War. While UN traditional peacekeeping missions in the post-World War II period heavily focused on ending interstate conflicts or assisting decolonization within a state, UN efforts in the post-Cold War era have been refined to prevent the recurrence of internal conflicts by undertaking multidimensional

⁴⁰⁴ Fortna 2004, 283.

⁴⁰⁵ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 790.

peacebuilding missions. Looking at Table 1, overall, the practice of UN peacebuilding missions maintains peace. In addition, its effect seems to be considerably strong relative to the other variables, particularly after the Cold War, when the international community more actively attempted to maintain peace in internal conflicts.

Table 5. Types of UN Military Operations During the Cold War and the Post-Cold War

UN Military Operations	The Cold War	The Post-Cold War
None	55 (82%)	32 (56%)
UN Observer	6 (9%)	9 (16%)
Traditional Peacekeeping	3 (5%)	5 (9%)
Multidimensional Peacekeeping	1 (2%)	9 (16%)
UN Enforcement	2 (3%)	2 (4%)
Total Cases	67 (100%)	57 (100%)

Table 5 presents the number of UN peace operations that took place. Interestingly, of 67 civil wars during the Cold War, the UN did not launch any peace missions in 55 (82 percent) cases. This supports my argument, presented in Chapter 1, that the UN was reluctant to become involved in keeping peace among the contending parties within states during the Cold War. There were six UN observer missions (9 percent), three traditional peacekeeping (5 percent), only one multidimensional peacebuilding (2 percent), and two military enforcements (3 percent). After 1989, the UN has been more involved in intrastate conflicts by deploying its troops in 25 cases. The number of multidimensional peacebuilding missions rapidly increased during this period. While there had been only one multidimensional peacebuilding effort in nearly 45 years, there were nine within 12 years. This finding is consistent with Boutros-Ghali's argument that there was growing attention being paid to not just stopping hostilities but also to initiating long-term

peacebuilding that seeks to diminish the existing or potential internal threats and to develop the social, political, and economic infrastructure in order to stabilize or improve domestic capacities.

According to Model 4, when there were no UN peace operations, the likelihood of durable peace decreases by 13 percent during the Cold War, holding other variables constant. After 1989, there is still a negative relationship between the absence of UN missions and the duration of peace, though the variable has no statistical implication. In addition, *Traditional Peacekeeping* is positively correlated with peace but has no statistical implication during the Cold War. After 1989, it is negatively correlated with a sustainable peace when they are joined by the humanitarian NGOs and has no statistical significance.

Hypothesis 8 (*Multidimensional Peacebuilding*⁴⁰⁶): Accepted in Model 10

According to Model 10, it positively influences the promoting of sustainable peace during the post-Cold War era. After 1989, the likelihood of durable peace increases by 25 percent with the presence of multidimensional peacebuilding operation, holding other variables constant. Fortna, as well as Doyle and Sambanis, also reports a similar finding that multidimensional peacebuilding missions appear to lower the risk of war.⁴⁰⁷ Looking at Table 5, of the 25 cases where UN peace operations were implemented, more than one-third (36 percent) of the UN peace missions were multidimensional after 1989. It outnumbers *Traditional Peacekeeping* and *UN Enforcement* during the post-Cold war period.

⁴⁰⁶ Note that there was only one multidimensional peacebuilding operation that was conducted in Namibia during the Cold War period. Because of the lack of variation, the variable is excluded from Table 2.

⁴⁰⁷ Fortna 2004, 283. See also Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 790.

Hypothesis 9 (Treaty): Accepted in Models 4 Through 6, 8, 9; Rejected in Model 7 and Models 10 Through 15

In all models, *Treaty* positively correlates with the likelihood of peacebuilding success. The models during the Cold War indicate that the presence of a peace accord is one of the most effective variables in estimating sustainable peace and is significant at the 5 percent level. Even after 1989, three models demonstrate that signing a peace settlement is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Its overall effect seems to be strong relative to other variables. A negotiated settlement with a formal peace treaty is a strong indicator of the contending parties' will to end belligerence. Hartzell finds a similar conclusion, which states that the contending parties would sign a treaty that would ensure the security and the participation in the political decision-making process through constructing social, economic, and political infrastructures.⁴⁰⁸ The result is partially consistent with the finding of Doyle and Sambanis, who report that treaties are one of the most statistically significant variables that sustain durable peace during the entire post-World War period (1944-1997).⁴⁰⁹ However, Fortna finds no statistical relationship between a peace settlement and peace duration.⁴¹⁰

Hypothesis 10 (*Humanitarian Assistance*): Rejected

Surprisingly, I have no statistical support for my assumption that the efforts made by the larger humanitarian NGOs improve previous warriors' living conditions and contribute to the recovering of trust and to a sense of community for the victims of armed conflict. Hence, various humanitarian missions can contribute to internal peace. My assumption is based on Walter's report; the likelihood of a return to war would be

⁴⁰⁸ Hartzell 1999, 6.

⁴⁰⁹ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 789.

⁴¹⁰ Fortna 2004, 284.

increased when a former combatant's quality of life remains at a critically low level and there are barriers to political participation.⁴¹¹

Table 6. Types of Humanitarian Assistant Missions by NGOs After the Cold War⁴¹²

Types of Missions	The Post-Cold War
Preventive	3 (5%)
General	8 (14%)
Protective	7 (13%)
Relief	20 (36%)
Restorative	18 (32%)
Forcible	None
Total Cases	56 (100%)

Table 6 reports how various humanitarian missions are implemented after 1989.⁴¹³ Of the 56 cases, *Relief* (20) and *Restorative* (18) missions are the most dominant ones compared with *Preventive* (3), *General* (8), and *Protective* (7). Relief and restorative missions are primarily designed to relieve human suffering in conflict regions by providing water, food, clothing, shelter, and medicine and to provide political, economic, and social rehabilitation programs for the victims of armed conflict.

Although it is insignificant, Models 7 through 10 indicate that *Humanitarian Assistance* has a negative effect on peace when I control for an individual UN peace operation. Table 4 explores the individual impact of the six different types of humanitarian assistance missions. While none of them is significant, *Protective* and *Relief Mission* are negatively associated with durable peace. There was no *Forcible*

⁴¹¹ Walter 2004, 385.

⁴¹² Of 57 intrastate conflicts during the post-Cold War era, at least one of the five humanitarian NGOs deployed one of the six missions in 56 cases. No information found in the case of Moldova.

⁴¹³ Of the 57 intrastate conflicts after 1989, there is no information on the involvement of humanitarian NGOs in Moldova.

Mission launched by the NGOs, and the variable is excluded from the regression analysis. In Models 11 through 15, it is interesting to note that the overall effect of *UN Peacebuilding* is statistically significant and has the second-largest effect on peace while all five humanitarian missions are insignificant.

IV. The Causes of Peace

The results of my analysis point to interesting inferences about the conditions associated with the causes of and the cures for civil wars. This chapter began with an assumption that the conditions associated with durable peace during the Cold War may have been different from those after 1989. This is because the UN was involved in more intrastate conflicts than interstate wars during the post-Cold War period. It is evident that the conditions during the two different time periods for a sustainable peace are quite different. That is, the four research puzzles have dissimilar influences on peace. I now turn to review my empirical findings and to discuss their implications.

The Level of Hostility

Three findings are reported. The higher the number of fatalities, the harder it is to maintain peace, according to my findings. Emotional resentments and psychological barriers would hardly allow the development of a sense of belonging and a shared faith. As a result, emotional and physical insecurity are increased, and potential solutions can be hard to find. Fortna reaches a similar conclusion, stating, “A high death toll apparently fuels animosity and makes post-civil war reconciliation harder.”⁴¹⁴

In addition, my empirical models partially support that it is harder to maintain peace among many factions. As Weaver and Rockman argue, when a government fails to coordinate various conflicting parties, the risk of recurrent war is increased

⁴¹⁴ Fortna 2004, 287.

significantly.⁴¹⁵ Finally, although it is partially evident, those who participate in a weary, protracted war are not likely to fight again, because of the lack of resources and motivation. Hence, the longer that the war lasts, the more likely that peace will last.

The Level of Local Capacity

I started out stating that internal peace and security would be promoted as the level of economic development and the level of political stability are increased. In general, rebellion can be largely explained by economic, political, and cultural causes found within societies. A number of conflict analysts report that high economic development effectively eliminates the risk and that democratic regimes are more likely to experience more extensive protests and less likely to experience civil wars compared with autocratic regimes, due to the availability of legitimate mechanisms for dispute resolution.⁴¹⁶ However, surprisingly, there is no statistical relationship between peace and the level of local capacity, according to my results.

Two explanations are considered. First, my analysis only focuses on the degree of local development during the first two years after civil wars. It may be the case that two years are not enough time to stabilize economic and political conditions of war-torn societies. It could take an extensive amount of time to build the necessary political, economic, and social infrastructure for improving or stabilizing local capacities. Second, although it is weak evidence, my finding is partially consistent with Mansfield and Snyder's argument, which says that democratization may create a weak governmental

⁴¹⁵ Weaver and Rockman 1993, 6.

⁴¹⁶ Gurr and Lichbach 1979, 173. See also Eckstein and Gurr 1975, 452.

power that is unable to reconcile a wide range of interests, and that may cause the recurrence of war in near future.⁴¹⁷

Furthermore, the presence of formal written agreements between the contending parties creates legal obligations to stop physical violence and to initiate an effective peace process. Even though not all of my modes are statistically significant, the findings imply that the presence of a peace accord increases peace duration. Hartzell arrives at a similar conclusion, stating that the contending parties would sign a treaty that would ensure the security and the participation in the political decision-making process through constructing social, economic, and political infrastructures.⁴¹⁸

International Assistance

My empirical findings regarding the effectiveness of UN peace operations and of humanitarian NGOs should be carefully analyzed. Above all, the lack of a UN peace operation has a negative effect on peace, particularly during the Cold War. UN peacebuilding, indeed, positively contributes to internal peace. These findings suggest that the UN should actively launch its peace operations not only to stop physical violence but also to build a long-term peace in the aftermath of civil wars. However, the results of various UN military operations are somewhat unexpected. I have no strong statistical data that support that each operation would have a positive effect on peace. Only UN observer missions during the Cold War and multidimensional peacebuilding missions during the post-Cold War era appear to be successful, reducing the risk of war and promoting durable peace.

⁴¹⁷ Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 79.

⁴¹⁸ Hartzell 1999, 6.

One explanation is that in many cases, the UN peacebuilding encompasses a wide range of post-conflict management missions. It extensively ranges from the observer mission to the multidimensional peacebuilding, including the development of local capacities as well as institutional rebuilding. Peacebuilding is designed to address the specific needs of a particular conflict. A different type or level of a peace operation can be planned and often launched at the same time to address a different type or level of a particular conflict. For example, while observer missions are launched to monitor the negotiated treaty and to assist in the negotiation of a peace settlement, multidimensional peacebuilding can also be implemented in order to assist the victims of armed conflict by providing health care, education, policing, and child welfare. As Cousens and Kumar argue, implementing various UN peace operations to address the specific needs of a conflict is a strategy of UN peacebuilding.⁴¹⁹ As a result, the individual effect of various UN missions may not be fairly tested. Instead of measuring the effectiveness of each operation, it may be more appropriate to measure the overall impact of UN peacebuilding. Because there were not enough UN peace missions, I was not able to examine their individual effect during my analysis period. As Fortna argues, the principle of state sovereignty often presented an argument against UN action in the internal politics of a state.⁴²⁰ Furthermore, the UN traditionally suffered from budgetary problems and the lack of a reserve body of trained forces.

Moreover, my empirical findings demonstrate that humanitarian assistance by the larger NGOs does not contribute to internal peace. Two explanations should be considered. First, although the larger NGOs have strived to relieve human suffering by

⁴¹⁹ Cousens and Kumar 2001, 13.

⁴²⁰ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 203.

providing clothing, shelter, food, medicine, and other basic necessities for survival, their missions are mainly focused on the fieldwork at the grass-roots level. While the efforts made by humanitarian NGOs may improve the living conditions for the victims of armed conflict, their humanitarian works are not specifically designed to resolve the underlying reasons for war.

Second, the humanitarian NGOs may have limited resources and strategies with which to fully respond to humanitarian crises. After a highly intensified conflict, war-torn societies usually call for a massive amount of resources and a labor-intensive operation at the grass-roots level. For example, delivering emergency aid; maintaining refugee camps; providing health and specialized medical services; reconstructing roads, buildings, irrigation systems, and community infrastructures; removing mines from rural and urban areas; educating local population, providing assistance and tools for agriculture; and assisting to reconcile psychological and political problems generally require an enormous amount of money, labor, and time.⁴²¹ The humanitarian NGOs simply are not capable of providing a wide range of relief missions for war-torn societies alone. “NGOs have a problem of scale in their field programs; they produce patches of green in barren landscapes, patches that are small, fragile and usually unconnected to each other.”⁴²² Hence, conflict analysts stress that humanitarian NGOs must actively coordinate their operations with other relief actors, such as the UN. According to Natsios, humanitarian NGOs often need to concede their managerial and program autonomy and to integrate their work with other actors toward the goal of greater strategic coherence or managerial

⁴²¹ West 2001, 205.

⁴²² Natsios 1996, 76.

efficiency.⁴²³ As Boutros-Ghali emphasized in *Agenda for Peace*, maintaining peace requires coordination and cooperation among the macro- and the micro-level actors around the world.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the conditions that are associated with the causes of and the cures for intrastate conflicts by empirically examining the four main research puzzles of this research. Consistent with a growing body of literature, my results indicate that, overall, the level of local hostility is a significant factor in estimating the duration of peace. My results suggest that international assistance through the UN can play significant post-conflict management roles after civil wars and should more actively engage in a wide range of peacebuilding for war-torn societies. Boutros-Ghali's assumption is partially supported. The number of multidimensional peacebuilding operations has increased following the Cold War, and they indeed contribute to promoting peace. However, it is important to note that the UN still falls behind in assuming a post-conflict management role. Surprisingly — and inconsistent with the majority of research — the level of local capacity has almost no effect on peace. One explanation is that reconstructing war-torn societies and building peace are time-consuming procedures and require special attention from all international actors.

The scope of this study can be expanded by exploring the relationship between the conditions of war-torn societies and international assistance for longer than two years after civil wars and by adding more recent cases of civil wars. In addition, I must acknowledge that because of limited resources, I was not able to fully quantify a wider range of the humanitarian aid missions of the NGOs. It will be also interesting to explore

⁴²³ Ibid., 75.

how the NGOs were involved in the cases of intrastate conflict during the Cold War period. In the next chapter, I discuss the prospect of future UN peacebuilding and the ways in which the international community can efficiently assist war-torn societies.

Appendix : Cases of Civil Wars 1945-2002

Country Name	The First Year of the War	The Last Year of the War	UN Mission Type	NGOs Mission Type	Peacebuilding Success or Failure
India-partition	1946	1948	Observer	N/A	Success
China-Taiwan	1947	1947	None	N/A	Failure
Paraguay	1947	1947	None	N/A	Success
Israel-Palest.	1947	1997	None	Restorative	Success
Costa Rica	1948	1948	None	N/A	Success
Yemen	1948	1948	None	N/A	Success
Burma	1948	1951	None	N/A	Failure
Malaysia	1948	1959	None	N/A	Success
Colombia	1948	1962	None	N/A	Success
Indonesia-Mol.	1950	1950	None	N/A	Failure
China-Tibet	1950	1951	None	N/A	Failure
Philippines	1950	1952	None	N/A	Success
Korea	1950	1953	Enforcement	N/A	Failure
Bolivia	1952	1952	None	N/A	Success
Indonesia-Dar.	1953	1953	None	N/A	Failure
Guatemala	1954	1954	None	N/A	Success
Argentina	1955	1955	None	N/A	Success
Indonesia	1956	1960	None	N/A	Failure
Lebanon	1958	1958	Traditional PKO	N/A	Success
Cuba	1958	1959	None	N/A	Failure
Iraq-Shammar	1959	1959	None	N/A	Failure
Congo/Zaire	1960	1965	Enforcement	N/A	Failure
Laos	1960	1975	None	N/A	Failure
Vietnam Rep of	1960	1975	None	N/A	Failure
Iraq-Kurds	1961	1975	None	N/A	Failure
Algeria	1962	1963	None	N/A	Failure
Yemen-N/Arab Rep	1962	1969	Observer	N/A	Success
Cyprus	1963	1964	Traditional PKO	N/A	Failure
Rwanda	1963	1964	None	N/A	Failure
Sudan	1963	1972	None	N/A	Failure
Dominican Rep.	1965	1965	Observer	N/A	Success
India-Kashmir	1965	1965	Observer	N/A	Failure
Burundi	1965	1969	None	N/A	Failure
Chad	1965	1979	None	N/A	Failure
Namibia	1965	1989	Multidimensional	N/A	Success
Uganda	1966	1966	None	N/A	Success
Guatemala	1966	1972	None	N/A	Failure
Congo-Kisangani	1967	1967	None	N/A	Failure
China	1967	1968	None	N/A	Failure
Nigeria-Biafra	1967	1970	None	N/A	Failure
Thailand-Commun.	1967	1985	None	N/A	Success
Burma	1968	1982	None	N/A	Failure
Northern Ireland	1968	1994	None	Protective	Success
Cambodia	1970	1975	None	N/A	Failure
Jordan	1971	1971	None	N/A	Failure
Pakistan-Bngl.	1971	1971	None	N/A	Success
Sri Lanka (JVP I)	1971	1971	None	N/A	Success
Burundi	1972	1973	None	N/A	Failure
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia	1972	1980	None	N/A	Failure

Philip.-NPA	1972	1992	None	Protective	Failure
Pakistan-BIch	1973	1977	None	N/A	Failure
Bangladesh--Hill	1973	1994	None	Restorative	Success
Cyprus	1974	1974	Traditional PKO	N/A	Failure
Ethiopia-ideol	1974	1991	None	Protective	Success
Eritrean	1974	1991	None	Restorative	Success
Guatemala	1974	1994	Multidimensional	Restorative	Success
Lebanon	1975	1978	None	N/A	Failure
Congo-Shabba I&II	1975	1979	None	N/A	Failure
Indonesia-East Tim.	1975	1982	None	N/A	Failure
Morocco/WestSah	1975	1989	Observer	N/A	Failure
Angola	1975	1991	Observer	Relief	Failure
South Africa	1976	1994	Observer	Restorative	Success
Ethiopia-Ogaden	1977	1985	None	N/A	Failure
Iran-Revolut.	1978	1979	None	N/A	Failure
Nicaragua	1978	1979	None	N/A	Failure
Uganda	1978	1979	None	N/A	Failure
Afghanistan	1978	1992	None	Relief	Failure
Cambodia	1979	1991	Multidimensional	Relief	Success
El Salvador	1979	1992	Multidimensional	Restorative	Success
Mozambique	1979	1992	Multidimensional	Restorative	Success
Chad	1980	1994	Observer	General	Success
Peru	1980	1996	None	General	Failure
Nigeria-Muslim	1980	1984	None	N/A	Failure
Uganda	1980	1986	None	N/A	Failure
Iran	1981	1982	None	N/A	Failure
Nicaragua	1981	1989	Observer	N/A	Success
Lebanon	1982	1992	Traditional PKO	Restorative	Failure
Sri Lanka (Tamil)	1983	2002	None	Protective	Failure
Burma	1983	1995	None	Relief	Failure
Sudan	1983	2002	None	Relief	Failure
India-Sikh	1984	1994	None	General	Success
Turkey-Kurds	1984	1999	None	General	Failure
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia	1984	1984	None	N/A	Success
Indonesia	1986	1986	None	N/A	Failure
Yemen-S/Peoples R	1986	1987	None	N/A	Failure
Sri Lanka (JVP II)	1987	1989	None	N/A	Success
Papua NG	1988	1991	None	General	Failure
Burundi	1988	1988	None	N/A	Failure
Somalia	1988	1991	None	Relief	Failure
Azerbaijan	1988	1996	None	Relief	Failure
Iraq-Kurds	1988	1996	None	Restorative	Failure
Romania	1989	1989	None	N/A	Success
Liberia	1989	1992	Observer	Relief	Failure
Rwanda	1990	1994	Traditional PKO	Relief	Success
Mali	1990	1995	None	Restorative	Success
Haiti	1991	1994	Observer	Protective	Failure
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1991	1991	Traditional PKO	Relief	Failure
Iraq-Shiites	1991	1994	None	Relief	Failure
Djibouti	1991	1995	None	Relief	Success
Sierra Leone	1991	1996	None	Relief	Failure
Georgia-Abkhazia	1991	1993	Observer	Restorative	Failure
Kenya	1991	1993	None	Restorative	Failure

Moldova	1992	1994	None	None	Failure
Mexico	1992	1994	None	Preventive	Success
Tajikistan	1992	1994	Observer	Preventive	Failure
Afghanistan-Taliban	1992	1996	None	Preventive	Failure
Yugoslavia-Bosnia	1992	1995	Multidimensional	Protective	Failure
Angola	1992	1994	Traditional PKO	Restorative	Failure
Georgia-Ossetia	1992	1994	Observer	Restorative	Failure
Congo Brazzaville	1992	1996	None	Restorative	Failure
Liberia	1993	1996	Observer	Protective	Failure
Yemen	1994	1994	None	General	Success
Russia-Chechnya	1994	1996	None	Relief	Failure
Haiti	1995	1996	Multidimensional	General	Success
Central Africa	1995	1997	Traditional PKO	General	Success
Yugoslavia-Croatia	1995	1995	Enforcement	Relief	Success
Congo/Zaire	1996	1997	None	Restorative	Failure
Sierra Leone	1997	2001	Multidimensional	Relief	Success
Angola	1997	2002	Multidimensional	Relief	Failure
Congo-Brazzaville	1998	1999	None	Relief	Failure
Guinea-Bissau	1998	1999	None	Relief	Failure
Congo-Zaire	1998	2001	Multidimensional	Relief	Failure
Yugoslavia	1998	1999	Enforcement	Restorative	Failure
Indonesia	1999	2002	None	Restorative	Failure

5

United Nations Peace Operations for the New Century

I. Introduction

The empirical findings from Chapter 4 indicate that, overall, UN peacebuilding operations can be an effective tool in post-conflict management roles. An implication of the findings is that UN peace missions should have been resorted to more often in order to maintain international peace and security. According to my data, of the 67 civil wars during the Cold War period, the UN was absent in 55. Although the UN has been more involved in the aftermath of civil wars during the post-Cold War era, it has still lagged behind in responding to the demand for conflict resolution. From 1989 to 2002, of the 57 intrastate conflicts, the UN played post-conflict management roles in only 25. Simply stated, there are not enough UN peace missions worldwide.

The effectiveness of UN peace missions remains controversial in some cases. The UN has been harshly blamed for its ineffectiveness in a number of civil wars, such as those in Somalia and Cambodia, and for its not stopping the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the 1995 massacre in Bosnia. On the other hand, conflict analysts claim that, despite limited military and economic resources, the UN has often played important conflict-management roles, providing a path to peace such as in El Salvador and Mozambique.

Recall the reasons why the UN was not involved more often in intrastate conflicts during and after the Cold War era. Traditionally, the divisions on the UN Security Council, the issue of state sovereignty, the absence of standing armed forces, and the insufficient budget all made it difficult for the UN to respond effectively and to become

aggressively involved in intrastate conflicts. As of today, the UN still faces these challenges. Sixty-one years old, the UN now finds itself at a “critical juncture.”⁴²⁴ Members of the UN should decide to reduce their demands on the UN or they should recognize the necessity of improving and enlarging its post-conflict management roles by increasing resources and powers.⁴²⁵

Reforming the UN for the 21st century is long overdue. The challenges surrounding the UN were briefly discussed in Chapter 1. This chapter revisits the current problems and discusses several recommendations for an enhanced and strengthened UN. Above all, this chapter explores the conditions associated with the sluggish involvement of the UN in internal conflicts during and after the Cold War era and the special challenges it faces today. This chapter, then, seeks to investigate the ways in which UN peace missions can become more effective tools for post-conflict resolution in the new century.

II. Challenges Facing UN Peace Missions

Even before the end of World War II, in September 1945, 50 states had already signed the UN Charter and hoped that the UN would surpass the League of Nations and provide collective security.⁴²⁶ The concept of collective security implies that members of the UN would join forces to oppose any aggression. However, the UN’s collective security system did not work during the Cold War period.⁴²⁷ The success of collective security is usually determined by three conditions. First, the members must keep their

⁴²⁴ Kennedy and Russett 1995, 57.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Sanderson 1998, 147. See also Goldstein and Pevehouse 2006, 83. Goldstein defines collective security as “the formation of a broad alliance of most major actors in an international system for the purpose of jointly opposing aggression by any actor.”

⁴²⁷ Nye 2006, 178.

commitment to the group, even if it can be very costly to repress aggression by any actor.⁴²⁸ Second, the members must agree on determining the identity of the aggressor.⁴²⁹ Third, it will work best when the five permanent members do not use the veto power.⁴³⁰ Hence, to be successful, there must be no free-riders, an agreement on defining aggression, and there must exist the will of the international community to preserve international peace and security. The idea of collective security was problematic, because not all UN member states accepted these three precepts.

For example, the Korean War in 1950 was the focus of a contest between collective security and the unilateral use of force.⁴³¹ President Truman viewed the Korean War as a case of thinly veiled aggression by the Soviet Union, through its North Korean proxy, upon the sovereign Republic of Korea, the establishment of which had been sponsored by the both the United States and the UN. The U.S. was able to mobilize UN troops in Korea under Chapter VII of the Charter, because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at that time.⁴³² The Soviet Union criticized the involvement of the UN in the Korean War, claiming that it was a civil war and that the UN had no business getting involved.⁴³³ The Korean War illustrates how members of the Security Council were ideologically divided, how their participation was politically motivated, and how difficult it was to define aggression. During the Cold War, the members of the Security Council had little agreement on “what was a legitimate use of force, and great problems arose in defining aggression.”⁴³⁴

⁴²⁸ Goldstein and Pevehouse 2006, 83.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Nye 2006, 181.

⁴³¹ Buss 1982, 31.

⁴³² Nye 2006, 126.

⁴³³ Whelan 1990, 129.

⁴³⁴ Nye 2006, 178-179.

Because of the East-West ideological conflict during the Cold War era, the international community called for a new mechanism that would allow the UN to behave “within carefully defined limits when the major powers agreed or at least acquiesced.”⁴³⁵ The idea of peacekeeping emerged in order to break the UN impasse on collective security.⁴³⁶ Even though the term *peacekeeping* was not stated in the UN Charter, it became a major peace mechanism for the UN in order to preserve international peace and security.⁴³⁷ Hence, instead of identifying and punishing aggression, UN peacekeeping was designed to mobilize politically neutral troops and to deploy them with the consent of all the parties concerned in order to prevent the recurrence of war, particularly interstate wars. The change in the nature of UN peace operations was made by realities of power politics within the Security Council. UN peacekeeping activities during the Cold War era tended to be “small, diverse, low-level observer missions,”⁴³⁸ often entailing the creation of a buffer zone in an effort to separate the warring parties. UN troops were generally lightly armed, strictly neutral, and had limited rules of engagement.⁴³⁹

In addition to the East-West ideological division within the Security Council, the UN faced a number of additional challenges during the Cold War period — the lack of a legal basis within the UN Charter, the issue of sovereignty, the lack of standby armed forces, and budgetary problems — that often hampered and delayed peace operations and that were to persist into the post-Cold War period.

⁴³⁵ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 35.

⁴³⁶ Nye 2006, 179.

⁴³⁷ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 35.

⁴³⁸ Hultdt 1995, 101.

⁴³⁹ Stedman 1995, 42.

The Lack of a Legal Basis

The international balance of power during the aftermath of World War II was characterized by bipolarity. Within a bipolar system, the two major powers — the United States and the Soviet Union — needed to worry about only the capabilities and actions of each other. In doing so, each state shared an interest in preserving the status quo and avoiding direct military confrontation. As neorealists argue, states during the Cold War era maintained “a self-help system” and mostly were preoccupied with power security for their own survival.⁴⁴⁰ The UN Charter was, primarily, created under the realities of power politics to prevent the third world war and to manage interstate wars.⁴⁴¹ Hence, states during the Cold War period did not pay much attention to internal conflicts and to protecting citizens other than their own.

The concept of traditional UN peacekeeping operations became implemented when members of the UN enlarged the scope of Chapter VI, Article 33 of the Charter to resolve any dispute by peaceful means in a creative way.⁴⁴² Since there is no clear provision expressed in the UN Charter for peacekeeping, the roles and goals of UN troops have been often assigned unclearly and unrealistically. In addition, implementing UN peacekeeping operations has not been an easy task, since the warring parties must agree to invite UN forces and must to act in accordance with resolutions adopted under the UN Charter. Chapter VII, particularly Article 42 of the UN Charter, allows the Security Council to take military or nonmilitary actions to restore international peace and security as a last resort when there is “a threat to the peace.”

⁴⁴⁰ Waltz 1979, 118.

⁴⁴¹ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 105.

⁴⁴² Evans 1998, 63.

Because of the lack of specific reference to UN peace missions, the Security Council often has faced difficulties determining which roles UN troops are expected to play, defining what constitutes aggression, and setting goals of UN peace missions for particular conflicts. Under the circumstances, UN peace missions have often suffered from being “unrealistic, unsupported, too vague, or too weak.”⁴⁴³ Furthermore, “the lack of a clear international constitutional basis makes a consensus definition of peacekeeping difficult, particularly because peacekeeping operations have been improvised in response to the specific requirements of individual conflicts.”⁴⁴⁴

As Jett rightly claims, when the members of the UN have different definitions for the roles for UN troops and in determining the type of UN peace operations, they will have different goals, objectives, and expectations for a particular conflict. In the case of the Somalia civil war in the early 1990s, for example, before the U.S. decided to turn over the Somalia operation to the UN, the Clinton administration’s view on the role of peacekeepers was somewhat different from those of the other members of the Security Council.⁴⁴⁵ While the Clinton administration primarily sought to relieve human suffering by providing basic human needs, the UN aimed to restore a stable government through UN peace enforcement operations.⁴⁴⁶ However, the U.S. and the UN later realized that providing humanitarian assistance and engaging in state-building in Somalia were too unrealistic to achieve.⁴⁴⁷ The U.S. troops withdrew from Somalia in 1994, followed by UN forces in 1995, without succeeding in accomplishing their goals.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 39.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Stedman 1995, 48.

⁴⁴⁶ Jett 1999, 16.

⁴⁴⁷ Stedman 1995, 49.

Implementing UN peace missions can be even more complicated and problematic when UN troops are to play post-conflict management roles in intrastate conflicts compared with interstate wars. In civil wars, the scope of UN missions is expanded substantially and UN troops must deal with “the underlying causes of conflicts,”⁴⁴⁸ which generally are hard to resolve and require a long-term commitment.⁴⁴⁹ As intrastate conflicts commonly have “societal roots,”⁴⁵⁰ peacebuilding missions primarily seek to provide social, political, and economic development, institution-building, and humanitarian assistance. Conflict analysts warn that third-party intervention in civil wars may inadvertently prolong civil wars when the goal of intervention is not clearly defined.⁴⁵¹ To effectively respond to civil wars, conflict analysts claim that the UN Charter needs to be reconstructed to reflect the nature of intrastate conflicts, as civil wars have become the dominant form of armed conflict in the global system.

The Issue of Sovereignty

Sovereignty, which refers to a supreme authority within a state, has been one of the most important concepts in the study of international relations and is associated with the anarchical nature of the international system. According to Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”⁴⁵² In other words, the UN Charter was designed to protect state sovereignty and to limit foreign intervention, which generally refers to “external actions that influence the

⁴⁴⁸ Evans 1998, 62.

⁴⁴⁹ Stedman 1995, 49.

⁴⁵⁰ Sutterlin 2003, 85.

⁴⁵¹ Stedman 1993, 9.

⁴⁵² The United Nations 2006.

domestic affairs of another sovereign state.”⁴⁵³ The principle of state sovereignty, indeed, has often presented an argument against UN action in the internal politics of a state, although, the added language in Article 2 (7) — “this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Charter VII”⁴⁵⁴ — has allowed an opening for UN intervention.

During the Cold War era, UN troops were mostly dispatched to interstate conflicts, where the two superpowers’ strategic interests were not directly confronted.⁴⁵⁵ Typically, the troops were deployed as peacekeepers, with the consent of the parties. Their role was to help the conflicting parties observe the cease-fire agreement and to encourage them not to violate the peace accord.⁴⁵⁶ This is consistent with my data indicating that of the 67 civil wars, the UN played a post-conflict management role in only 12 cases. Of the 12 cases, UN troops conducted six observer missions and three traditional peacekeeping operations, which sought not to violate state sovereignty. During the Cold War, there were two UN peace enforcement operations. UN troops were deployed to liberate South Korea from North Korea’s invasion in 1950 and to prevent the occurrence of a civil war in the Congo in 1961.

It has been uncertain under what circumstances the UN should intervene in domestic affairs. It has also been one of the most controversial subjects, even when the UN has intervened for humanitarian assistance. Opponents claim that humanitarian intervention is usually designed by several great powers and can be abusively used to pursue their strategic interests. Weak states cannot resist outside diplomatic pressures,

⁴⁵³ Nye 2006, 162.

⁴⁵⁴ The United Nations 2006.

⁴⁵⁵ Mortimer 1998, 112. See also Stedman 1995, 41.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 113.

and their sovereignty can be easily infringed under the name of humanitarian assistance.⁴⁵⁷ On the other hand, proponents claim that most of the UN humanitarian assistance takes place in extremely poor countries, in which the major powers do not have many political and economic interests. In addition, proponents argue that UN missions are designed to prevent further violation of international humanitarian law, to relieve human suffering by monitoring human rights, and to provide basic human needs.

Throughout the post-Cold War era, state sovereignty has weakened. The changes in the nature of international armed conflicts, the rapid growth of IGOs, and NGOs, the development of global telecommunications, and the expansion of economic interdependence in the form of globalization have diminished the centrality of the state as the primary actor in world politics.⁴⁵⁸ The principle of state sovereignty has been gradually eroding during the past few decades. This erosion created a new potential for multilateral action in internal affairs.⁴⁵⁹ In addition, as constructivists claim, there has been a change in the context of internationally recognized norms to protect the lives of innocent people and to relieve human suffering. Multilateral forms of intervention are considered to be legitimate and effective, as the norms for sovereign equality have changed.⁴⁶⁰ More importantly, the end of the Cold War was a turning point for the UN in terms of enlarging the scope of its peace missions and of becoming more engaged in internal conflicts compared with the Cold War era. Even though the issue of humanitarian intervention remains contentious, it seems to constitute a new norm in international affairs. In this and in other ways, the post-Cold War environment poses new challenges

⁴⁵⁷ Glennon 2002, 2. See also Weiss 1995, 4-6.

⁴⁵⁸ Mingst and Karns 2000, 11.

⁴⁵⁹ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 105.

⁴⁶⁰ Finnemore 2003, 17.

and opportunities for the UN in internal politics. Humanitarian issues, such as massive starvation, refugees, and genocide, have now become global problems and have given international organizations, such as the UN, a basis for taking action.⁴⁶¹ This is consistent with my empirical findings that of the 57 civil wars between 1989 and 2002, the UN responded to 25 cases (44 percent) compared with 12 cases (18 percent) during the Cold War period. However, critics argue that the UN is still lagging behind in playing post-conflict management roles.

The Lack of Standby Armed Forces

In general, it is easier to prevent war than to deal with its consequences. Conflict analysts have argued that preventive deployment of UN troops can be an important part of preventive diplomacy in the prevention of war.⁴⁶² The need for and the role of standby armed forces have been examined by conflict analysts. The UN could have more effectively dealt with both interstate and intrastate conflicts if it had standby armed forces.⁴⁶³ Sutterlin argues that one of the most significant elements in the prevention of conflict is the availability of a “deterrence instrumentality.”⁴⁶⁴ An availability of rapidly deployable UN troops can deter potential physical violence. According to Sutterlin, UN peacekeeping forces that are deployed to play a mediating role and to decrease the likelihood of both interstate and intrastate conflicts can be an example of such instrumentality.⁴⁶⁵ In addition, conflict analysts emphasize the significance of well-trained UN forces that address the special needs of war-torn societies, since conflict

⁴⁶¹ Dallmeyer 1995, 23. See also Schachter 1993, 25.

⁴⁶² Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 99.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁴⁶⁴ Sutterlin 2003, 25.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

continues to be predominantly internal in nature. More discussions on the need for standby armed forces will be discussed later in this chapter.

Budgetary Problems

One observer has called attention to the endemic budgetary problems that have plagued the UN: “If all governments paid their assessed contributions in full and on time, there would be no serious UN financial problem, at least at its present level of operation. Late payments and failure to pay debilitate an organization that is not permitted to go into debt, especially when a proliferation of emergency peacekeeping operations is putting new strains on the old budgeting system.”⁴⁶⁶ The UN and all of its agencies, programs, and funds spend nearly \$20 billion annually. This is a very small budget compared with what the U.S. government and many others spend on their armed forces. For example, in 2005, the U.S. spent roughly \$478 billion on its military⁴⁶⁷ and spent nearly \$90 billion on the war in Iraq alone.⁴⁶⁸ Traditionally, the UN suffers from financial difficulties, and it has been forced to reduce the scope of important programs in all areas.⁴⁶⁹ Most members of the UN, particularly the U.S., have not paid their full dues on time and have often cut their donations to the UN’s voluntary funds.

⁴⁶⁶ Financing An Effective United Nations: Report of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing 1993, 4.

⁴⁶⁷ The SIPRI 2006.

⁴⁶⁸ Congressional Research Service 2006, 15.

⁴⁶⁹ Childers and Urquhart 1994, 148.

Table 1. The Contributions Owed to the UN by All Member States 1996 – 2006⁴⁷⁰

	Regular Budget		UN Peacekeeping		Total Debt	
	All Member States Total Debt	U.S. Total Debt	All Member States Total Debt	U.S. Total Debt	All Member States Total Debt	U.S. Total Debt
1996	511	377 (74%)	1,633	926 (57%)	2,144	1,303 (61%)
1997	474	373 (79%)	1,574	940 (60%)	2,048	1,313 (64%)
1998	417	316 (76%)	1,594	976 (61%)	2,011	1,292 (64%)
1999	244	168 (69%)	1,482	995 (67%)	1,726	1,163 (67%)
2000	222	165 (74%)	2,054	1,144 (67%)	2,276	1,309 (58%)
2001	240	165 (69%)	1,823	691 (38%)	2,063	856 (41%)
2002	305	190 (62%)	1,335	536 (40%)	1,640	726 (44%)
2003	441	268 (61%)	1,066	482 (45%)	1,507	750 (50%)
2004	357	241 (68%)	2,570	722 (28%)	2,927	963 (33%)
2005	333	252 (76%)	2,919	843 (29%)	3,252	1,095 (34%)
2006	661	526 (80%)	2,542	799 (31%)	3,203	1,325 (41%)

Table 1 presents the amount of the contributions owed to the UN by all member states for the period between 1996 and 2006. According to Table 1, as of October 2006, members' total debt to the UN Regular Budget⁴⁷¹ reached \$661 million, of which the United States owes \$526 million.⁴⁷² This has caused serious financial difficulties for the organization, and the Secretary-General often has had to cross-borrow money from peacekeeping operations in order to cover shortages in the UN Regular Budget, thereby reducing the scope of UN peace missions or delaying the deployment of peacekeepers in conflict regions.⁴⁷³

The UN system, which consists of various components including “specialized agencies, voluntary funds and programs, peacekeeping operations, and the parent United

⁴⁷⁰ All sums are rounded in \$US millions. Source: Global Policy Forum 2006. Debts to the UN are reported in December of each year. In 2006, the amount of the debts is reported in October.

⁴⁷¹ Global Policy Forum 2006b. The Regular Budget is a part of the mandatory contributions made by member states and covers UN activities, such as staffing costs in eight headquarters locations in the U.S., Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America; human rights promotion; special UN missions in conflict regions; and public information work.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Lehmann and McClellan 2006, 2.

Nations organization itself,”⁴⁷⁴ is primarily financed by contributions from its member states. The members usually make two payments to the UN system: voluntary contributions and assessed contributions. These two payments have different purposes. The voluntary contributions support a variety of ancillary UN funds and programs. The Regular Budget for core functions of the UN and its peacekeeping operations are covered by the assessed contributions. Both voluntary and assessed contributions also pay for specialized agencies.⁴⁷⁵ Since the assessed contributions are based on a country’s gross national income, the rich countries pay more.⁴⁷⁶ Traditionally, UN financial problems have been caused by late payments by the UN’s largest contributor, the U.S. In addition, most member states do not pay their dues on time. For example, as of 2006, more than 150 members failed to make their payments on time. Furthermore, member states tend to pay more voluntary contributions than their mandatory dues because “countries dedicate voluntary contributions to those UN funds and programs that deem them most promising and compatible with their own agenda.”⁴⁷⁷

Expenditures for UN peacekeeping operations skyrocketed right after the end of the Cold War, as the international community was more committed to preserving international peace and security compared with the Cold War era. Table 2 presents the annual expenditures for UN peacekeeping operations from 1947 to 2005. Graph 1 presents how rapidly the cost of UN peace missions increased after the end of the Cold War period. According to Table 2, the cost of traditional peacekeeping operations gradually increased during the Cold War period and sharply jumped from \$141 million to

⁴⁷⁴ Congressional Research Service 2005, 1.

⁴⁷⁵ Lehmann and McClellan 2006, 1.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid. According to the UN system, states are not permitted to pay more than 22 percent of the UN’s annual administrative budget.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., 2.

\$3,364 million between 1985 and 1995. Table 3 illustrates how much the six largest contributors still owe to the UN Regular Budget for peacekeeping operations. Overall, the amount of the unpaid mandatory contributions for UN peace missions has steadily increased. Again, Table 3 shows that the U.S. has one of the largest debts to the UN, along with Japan. These unpaid balances have not only caused UN financial problems but also impacted peacekeeping.

Table 2. UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Expenditures 1947 – 2005⁴⁷⁸

Year	UN PKO Expenditures	Year	UN PKO Expenditures
1947	0	1977	153
1948	4	1978	202
1949	7	1979	186
1950	7	1980	141
1951	6	1981	141
1952	6	1982	141
1953	6	1983	141
1954	6	1984	141
1955	6	1985	141
1956	9	1986	242
1957	26	1987	240
1958	30	1988	266
1959	26	1989	635
1960	76	1990	464
1961	126	1991	490
1962	126	1992	1,767
1963	127	1993	3,059
1964	91	1994	3,342
1965	45	1995	3,364
1966	45	1996	1,405
1967	37	1997	1,160
1968	24	1998	995
1969	24	1999	1,324
1970	24	2000	2,139
1971	24	2001	2,700
1972	24	2002	2,702
1973	37	2003	2,727
1974	131	2004	3,645
1975	153	2005	4,737
1976	153	2006	N/A

⁴⁷⁸ All sums are rounded in \$US millions. Source: Global Policy Forum 2006.

Graph 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures 1947 – 2005⁴⁷⁹




Table 3. The Contributions Owed to the UN for Peacekeeping Operations 1995 – 2005⁴⁸⁰

UN Members\Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
USA	816	926	940	976	995	1,144	691	536	482	722	843
Japan	3	78	89	98	96	303	473	312	154	759	845
Germany	23	12	10	9	14	9	9	3	0	103	103
France	13	2	9	5	24	78	138	0	0	109	100
Russia	404	209	136	126	80	62	37	0	0	N/A	N/A
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	26	88

As a result of the financial difficulties, the UN has had to postpone remuneration for countries that send troops,⁴⁸¹ resulting in a slow deployment of UN forces in conflict regions. Regan and Abouharb stress the significance of well-timed intervention in intrastate conflicts to stop hostilities and to restore peace. In their view, third-party

⁴⁷⁹ All sums are rounded in \$US millions. Source: Global Policy Forum 2006.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid. The table presents the contributions owed to the UN peacekeeping operations budget for the six largest contributors to the UN.

⁴⁸¹ Lehmann and McClellan 2006, 2.

intervention can end civil conflicts. More importantly, they argue that “unless well-timed, an intervention will increase the amount of time until a settlement is reached.”⁴⁸²

The traditional challenges — the ideological division within the Security of Council, the lack of a clear legal basis within the UN Charter, the issue of sovereignty, the lack of standby UN troops, and budgetary problems — have often caused the scaling down of the scope of UN peace missions, making it difficult for the world’s largest organization to be responsive and effective during and after the Cold War period. To overcome these shortcomings, the international community has strived to reform the world’s largest organization so that it can meet the demands of 21st century peace missions. I will now discuss several proposals that could result in a United Nations that is more responsive and effective in resolving conflicts.

III. UN Peace Missions for the New Century

After having failed to accomplish the assigned goals in Somalia and Cambodia and to stop the systemic genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s, the international community began to look for ways to revitalize and reform UN peace operations. It was evident that without an increased commitment, the UN would not satisfy its purposes, as stated in Article 1 of the Charter, which states that the UN is “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.”⁴⁸³ While Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* is a good road map for multilateral conflict-management roles that the UN might play after the Cold War, conflict analysts have often noted that his proposal could not be

⁴⁸² Regan and Abouharb 2002, 52.

⁴⁸³ The United Nations 2006.

implemented and tested since it was somewhat broad, idealistic, and impracticable.⁴⁸⁴

That is, it exceeded the capacities and expectations of individual states and the UN.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested a high-level group of experts, led by Lakhdar Brahimi, to make realistic and practical recommendations for change. In August 2000, the UN released the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, commonly called the “Brahimi Report.”⁴⁸⁵ The Report addressed the significant weaknesses in the UN’s ability to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,”⁴⁸⁶ as stated in the Charter, and recommended “sweeping changes”⁴⁸⁷ in the way that UN peace operations were carried out. The Brahimi Report is considered to be a significant road map for improving the UN’s ability to resolve conflicts in the 21st century. Several recommendations of the Report are discussed below.

The Need for Clearly Identified Goals

The lack of a clear constitutional basis often caused a discord among the members of the Security Council, keeping them from intervening and to assuming a post-conflict management role in the aftermath of civil wars. In addition, the lack of full support from the Security Council on peace operations in internal conflicts frequently caused a vague and unobtainable goal of the mission. Above all, conflict analysts suggest that the UN needs to clarify the scope of the Security Council’s mandate.⁴⁸⁸ As internal conflicts become the dominant form of armed conflict, the Security Council must adapt to this new reality by expanding the scope of UN peace missions and by developing a more

⁴⁸⁴ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 99.

⁴⁸⁵ UN General Assembly and Security Council. 2000. *Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. In this paper, “the Brahimi Report,” and “the Report” will be used interchangeably.

⁴⁸⁶ The United Nations 2006.

⁴⁸⁷ Durch, Holt, Earle and Shanahan 2003, 1.

⁴⁸⁸ Otunnu 1998, 311.

progressive interpretation of what becomes a threat to international peace and security.⁴⁸⁹

The cross-border flow of refugees, systemic genocide, massive starvation, extreme poverty, and the violation of human rights and international law can be examples of new threats in the 21st century.

In addition, the Brahimi Report recommends the need for clear, credible, and achievable mandates. Conflict analysts have often argued that “imprecise, ambiguous, erroneous, insensitive, and timid mandates approved by the Security Council directly contributed to flawed UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda.”⁴⁹⁰ Faulty mandates caused the deaths of UN peacekeepers, humanitarian assistance personnel, and civilians trapped in conflict regions.⁴⁹¹ According to the Brahimi Report, in numerous civil wars after the Cold War, the Security Council and the Secretariat did not have sufficient knowledge of how different types of UN military operations would address specific needs of war-torn societies.⁴⁹² The lack of information, knowledge, and understanding not only have often caused unclear and unachievable mandates but also improperly prepared, planned, and executed peace operations.⁴⁹³ To reduce this problem, according to the report, member states that contribute peacekeeping troops should be invited to consult with the members of the Security Council and should be responsible for establishing the mandates that become a guide for UN peace missions.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., 312.

⁴⁹⁰ Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coate 2006, 145.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Ibid., 140.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ The Brahimi Report 2000, I.

The Need for Well-Trained Standby Forces

In the post-Cold War era, UN troops have increasingly been asked to perform various types of tasks with which they were not familiar. The practice of peacebuilding has involved much more extensive civilian components, such as electoral observation, police monitoring/training, civilian administration, and humanitarian affairs.⁴⁹⁵ However, UN troops, in most instances, have not been trained to manage the issues of deploying civilian police officers, installing temporary judiciaries, monitoring human rights, and restoring civil society that could contribute to long-term conflict prevention.⁴⁹⁶ “The UN’s security mechanism was not designed to deal with violence and wars of this kind, and the blue helmets have encountered their most significant problems in attempting to quell internal wars.”⁴⁹⁷ In the early 1990s, the post-conflict management roles undertaken by the UN immediately after the Cold War were first played in Namibia, Angola, Cambodia, and El Salvador. The tasks included investigating human rights violations in El Salvador, carrying out land reform, educating and registering voters in Namibia, supervising the cease-fire in Angola, and managing the demobilization and disarming in Cambodia.⁴⁹⁸ In all of the above cases, the UN realized that it was ill-equipped to play the post-conflict management roles and acknowledged the urgent need for improving its capabilities to manage the new challenges.⁴⁹⁹ The UN has learned that successful peacebuilding operations require not only the commitments from the warring parties to observe peace settlements but also the speedy deployment of well-trained UN troops for the new tasks.

⁴⁹⁵ Fortna 2004, 271.

⁴⁹⁶ Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coate 2006, 142. See also Kittani 1998, 98.

⁴⁹⁷ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 104.

⁴⁹⁸ Stedman 1995, 41-48.

⁴⁹⁹ Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coate 2006, 142.

Conflict analysts repeatedly have pointed to the significance of standby UN armed forces for “rapid and effective deployment capabilities.”⁵⁰⁰ Rapid and effective deployment is highly important because it can prevent conflicts from spiraling out of control.⁵⁰¹ According to the Brahimi Report, the first six to 12 weeks after a peace settlement is made is the most important period to establish durable peace and the credibility of UN troops. Hence, the Report proposed that the UN develop the operational capabilities to deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days and to install multidimensional peacebuilding operations within 90 days.⁵⁰² More importantly, the Report points out that rapid deployment of well-trained troops alone may not be enough. For rapid and effective deployment, there is a need for planning, having mission leaders selected, having well-trained civilian police on call, having budgets available, and having transport arranged.⁵⁰³ In other words, the UN must be always ready for any new conflicts by establishing ready-to-go strategic deployment arrangements. Conflict analysts argue that developing rapid and effective deployment capabilities can be a significant step for the UN and will be achieved only when the UN members, the secretariat, and the Security Council are fully committed.⁵⁰⁴ Although the Brahimi Report addresses improving UN peace operations, critics argue that it is questionable whether its proposals would be fully implemented and whether they would resolve the current challenges.

The Need for a Sufficient Budget

The UN does not respond to every request for its post-conflict management role. One of the biggest challenges that the UN faces is its current budgetary environment.

⁵⁰⁰ The Brahimi Report 2000, 15. See also Annan 1998, 181.

⁵⁰¹ Urquhart and Heisbourg 1998, 190.

⁵⁰² The Brahimi Report 2000, 15.

⁵⁰³ Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coate 2006, 141.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

Essentially, the financial problem stems from the lack of enthusiasm and commitment from the UN members. Critics argue that the UN could have responded to a number of internal conflicts during the 1990s and saved millions of lives. The world's largest organization could not implement peacebuilding operations rapidly and effectively in numerous cases of civil wars because "too few people were too often asked to do too much with too little."⁵⁰⁵ For example, in the late 1990s, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DKPO) had about only 300 staff members supporting approximately 60,000 personnel who were deployed in more than a dozen peace missions.⁵⁰⁶ Peacebuilding attempts to eliminate the underlying causes that can trigger the recurrence of war. Hence, it requires effort, time, budget, staff, supplies, preparation, cooperation, and commitment. The UN needs more money. It needs more money to hire more professional personnel who can gather "more information and engage in planning and preparation."⁵⁰⁷ It needs more money in order to pay more UN peacekeepers and to stock sufficient supplies and equipment.

There have been several proposals aimed at relieving the current financial problems. First, the U.S. suggested that mandatory contributions should be based on states' purchasing power parity,⁵⁰⁸ which would yield a higher amount of contributions from rising economies, such as China and India.⁵⁰⁹ Second, Japan proposed that the five permanent members of the Security Council pay at least 3 percent of their annual budget

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., 144.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., 143.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid. See also Franck 1998, 291.

⁵⁰⁸ Purchasing power parity is an economic technique used to determine the relative values of two currencies. For example, if a cup of Starbucks coffee costs US \$2 in the U.S. and 3,000 won in Korea, we can determine that the exchange rate is US \$1 for 1,500 won.

⁵⁰⁹ Lehmann and McClellan 2006, 2.

to the UN budget, which is not the case for China and Russia.⁵¹⁰ Third, reducing the current Regular Budget ceiling rate from 22 percent to 10 percent was proposed. It implied less the amount of mandatory contributions for the U.S. and Japan at the expense of other countries and also would relieve the heavy dependence on particular states.⁵¹¹

The Brahimi Report urged a substantial increase in the amount of money devoted to peacekeeping and related missions and reminded members of their obligations to pay their full mandatory dues on time.⁵¹² The Brahimi Report warned that “changes that the Panel recommends will have no lasting impact, unless Member States summon the political will to support the UN politically, financially, and operationally.”⁵¹³ I have briefly highlighted several proposals that could make UN peace operations a more effective mechanism. Even though these recommendations seem to be essential and considerable, I must acknowledge that it is uncertain how seriously members of the UN would take them into consideration.

IV. Conclusion

To prepare for 21st century conflicts, the international community must have a comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of today’s typical conflicts. Successful peacebuilding requires not only the commitment of the warring parties to preserve peace but also well-trained and rapidly deployable UN troops, along with sufficient budgets. The Brahimi Report and other proposals discussed in this chapter certainly pointed out the possibility of revitalizing UN peace missions in the future. However, it is important to look into how the recommendations would be implemented

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

⁵¹² The Brahimi Report 2000, 46.

⁵¹³ Ibid., viii.

and carried out in the future. The concluding chapter that follows will summarize key findings and how they fit into the existing theoretical literature, and will suggest how the scope of this study might be enlarged in the future.

6

Conclusion

I. Introduction

The goal of this research is to determine whether UN peacebuilding operations are promising mechanisms for preventing the recurrence of war in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts. One of the motivations for having chosen to investigate intrastate conflicts as a unit of analysis is the fact that civil wars have become the common form of armed conflict in the international system. Even though civil wars have produced a larger number of human casualties than interstate wars and have resulted in catastrophic human suffering, they have not received much attention until recently. Surprisingly, not many studies have empirically explored the effectiveness of UN peace operations following a peace accord or military victory within a state. Hence, the intention of this study is to explore the conditions associated with the causes of and the cures for civil wars and to consider how the UN might play a post-conflict management role in the aftermath of internal conflicts. In addition, I researched how several humanitarian NGOs contribute to promoting internal peace in cooperation with the UN. In this chapter, I briefly review the findings of this study.

II. Theoretical Framework

UN peacebuilding seeks to not only address the current problems surrounding a conflict but also to remove the underlying causes. Hence, it is closely related to the political, social, and economic conditions within a state. The theoretical framework I developed emphasizes the significant role that both international and domestic

institutions play in war-torn societies. Neoliberal institutionalism offers a theoretical basis for understanding how international organizations, such as the United Nations, assume post-conflict management roles. Humanitarian issues, for example, are no longer considered to be domestic problems that can be managed by any one state. By pooling sovereignty, states join together to manage global problems. Neoliberal institutionalism also improves our understanding of the processes by which the conflicting parties attempt to build peace and by which domestic institutions perform structural reforms in the political, economic, social, and judicial sector for restoring stable domestic order.

Constructivism rightly claims that neither neorealism nor neoliberalism can provide adequate explanations for changes in international norms in the post-Cold War period. Constructivism offers a good theoretical basis for the role of humanitarian NGOs taking moral action internationally. Although neorealism's core concepts — the security dilemma, the balance of power, and hegemonic stability theory — may offer an explanation for the causes of and the cures for interstate conflicts, they are not as applicable to internal conflicts.

III. Literature Review

Previous studies, to the extent that they focused on the conditions associated with the initiation and the termination of intrastate conflicts, largely neglected to address how to build durable peace in war-torn societies. Economic inequality, the degree of economic development, the level of political democratization, a state's regime type, and the level of ethnic diversity are commonly identified as the causes of civil wars. A relationship between the degree of third-party intervention and the duration of internal conflicts remains controversial. Typically, civil wars end as a result of negotiated settlements or a

military victory. While the former tends to be fragile, the latter is likely to endure. One explanation is that many military victories tend to make potential rebels difficult to challenge in the future through massacre and disarmament. The effectiveness of third-party intervention in promoting sustainable peace in the aftermath of civil wars remains controversial.

IV. Empirical Findings

I began my research with four different research puzzles in Chapter 1 and empirically tested their implications. With regard to the level of hostility, the higher the human costs, the harder it is to preserve peace. This finding indicates that emotional resentment and psychological barriers among the conflicting parties are critical factors that make post-civil war reconciliation difficult. The existence of various factions increases the risk of recurrent war. Furthermore, I find that in longer wars the warring parties suffer because of the lack of social, economic, and military resources. Hence, lengthy wars reduce the capability of the contending parties to rebound. Surprisingly, there is no statistical relationship between peace and the level of local capacity. The two years following civil wars may not be enough time during which to install stable and democratic political infrastructures, as well as to build sustainable economic systems.

My empirical findings indicate that, overall, UN peacebuilding operations can be effective in promoting sustainable peace in the aftermath of civil wars. This study implies that the UN should actively respond to requests for peacebuilding. However, the individual impact of various UN military operations is somewhat unexpected. I have no empirical findings that support whether each operation has a positive effect on sustainable peace. Only UN observer missions during the Cold War and

multidimensional peacebuilding missions during the post-Cold War era appear to have been successful, reducing the risk of war and promoting durable peace. In many cases, UN peacebuilding performs a wide range of post-conflict management missions. Often, it includes the observer mission, multidimensional peacebuilding, development of local capacities, and institutional rebuilding. Peacebuilding seeks to address the specific needs of a particular conflict. A different type or level of a peace operation can be planned and often launched at the same time to address a different type or level of a particular conflict. As a result, the individual effect of various UN missions has not been rigorously tested. Instead of measuring the effectiveness of each operation, measuring the overall impact of UN peacebuilding would be more appropriate. According to my findings, the presence of a peace accord is one of the most effective variables when estimating sustainable peace. A formal peace treaty can be a strong indicator of the contending parties' will to end belligerence. Moreover, there is no relationship between the role of humanitarian NGOs and the duration of sustainable peace. One of the reasons may be that the NGOs, primarily, attempt to relieve human sufferings rather than to remove the causes of internal conflicts.

V. UN Peace Missions of the Future

To overcome the traditional shortcomings, several ways in which to enhance UN peace mission capabilities were discussed. The Brahimi Report and other reform processes inspired the creation of an intergovernmental advisory body that would help countries transition from war to peace. At the UN World Summit in 2005, the world's leaders agreed to establish a Peacebuilding Commission to assist war-torn countries with their post-conflict peacebuilding, reconstruction, and development efforts. The goal of

this advisory body is to keep countries from relapsing into war. With the Peacebuilding Commission, the UN has made clear its commitment to peacebuilding efforts. Even though the world's largest organization faces serious challenges to preserving international peace, hopefully it can better prepare itself for conflict in the 21st century. Surely the organization will require commitment from all of its member states.

VI. Conclusion

This study has made an initial step to close the gap in the existing literature. The scope of this study can be enlarged by investigating the statistical relationship between the political and economic conditions of war-torn societies and international assistance for a longer period of time and by adding more recent cases of civil wars. It can be also expanded by exploring the role that regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and African Union, play in civil wars. It would be of value to compare the role and the impact of global and several regional organizations. Furthermore, it would be instructive to explore the effectiveness of NGOs in intrastate conflicts during the Cold War era. There have been few areas of inquiry riper for and more worthy of systematic analyses than the correlational dynamics of intrastate war, whereby such conflicts begin, persist, and ultimately end. The human condition in the 21st century will depend, in no small measure, on our ability to better understand and cope with such conflicts.

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