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Separate and Unequal Risks for Victimization? An Examination of the Relationship Between City-Level Conditions and Risks for Non-Fatal Victimization

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**SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL RISKS FOR VICTIMIZATION? AN
EXAMINATION OF CITY-LEVEL CONDITIONS ON VICTIMIZATION RISKS**

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A Dissertation submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri-St. Louis
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Criminology and Criminal Justice

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between city conditions and risks for non-fatal victimization has been relatively ignored in the victimization literature. Little is known about the risks for victimization at the city-level or whether 'known' correlates of victimization at the individual- and neighborhood-level vary across city context. This study examines the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization. Furthermore, the risks for victimization at the individual-, neighborhood-, and city-level are considered simultaneously. Because the study includes twelve different cities, examinations of individual and neighborhood factors across cities can also be examined. Lastly, macro-level research has suggested that risks for victimization vary across race and ethnicity. Therefore, the importance of these relationships among non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics is considered. The findings reveal that city context is indeed associated with non-fatal victimization among cities. However, there appear to be no substantive differences in the relationship between individual and neighborhood factors and non-fatal victimization across cities. Individual and neighborhood risks for non-fatal victimization are similar regardless of the city being studied. However, there does appear to be substantive differences in risks for non-fatal victimization across racial/ethnic groups. The relevance of these findings to victimization research and theory and the policy implications of the results are also discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The research on non-fatal victimization is extensive. With the inception of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) in the 1970s came many empirical assessments of risks for non-fatal victimization and numerous theories of victimization. These studies have pointed to variations in risks across individual traits or characteristics and across community context. However, relatively little is known about risks for non-fatal victimization at the city level. Few have looked at city conditions and their possible influence on non-fatal *victimization* risks (for exceptions see Messner & South, 1986; Sampson, 1983; Decker et al., 1982). Is it reasonable to assume that since risks vary across individuals and neighborhoods that they will also vary across cities? If so, what city conditions are most relevant to victimization risks? On the other hand, much more is known about city conditions and their relation to homicide and non-fatal forms of crime. Findings reveal that city conditions such as residential segregation (i.e., Massey & Denton, 1993), economic inequality (i.e., Blau & Blau, 1982) and other forms of structural disadvantage including family disruption (i.e., Sampson, 1987) and underemployment (i.e., Crutchfield, 1989) are linked to city crime rates.

The studies on links between city conditions and fatal and non-fatal crime serve as a guide to links between city characteristics and victimization risks. Yet the relative inattention given non-fatal victimization in city-level research is problematic. First, homicide and non-fatal crime data are often derived from official reports. While this is less a concern for homicide research, it can certainly present problems when looking at non-fatal violence. Victimization reports often show that nearly half of violent crime

victims choose not to report their experience to the authorities (BJS, 2004; BJS, 2003; BJS, 1998). Official data then is not reflective of crimes that are underreported. Second, homicide is widely studied and often used as a mechanism for understanding violence. Yet the occurrence of homicide is rare, accounting for only 0.6% of serious violence and 0.2% of all violent crime (Rennison & Planty, 2004). The nature of homicide may be distinct from other types of violence. For instance, homicides typically involve victims and offenders who are non-strangers (BJS, 2004; Blau & Blau, 1982) but the same is not true for robbery. Over 70 percent of robbery victims report that their assailant was a stranger (BJS, 2003).

This study contributes to the victimization and city-level literature by examining the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization risks. The focus here is not on homicide since the research in this area is broad and has generally lead to the same conclusion: residential segregation, economic inequality and other forms of structural disadvantage are most detrimental to inner-city blacks and explain their higher rates compared to whites (i.e., Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996; Peterson & Krivo, 1999; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996). However, there is ambiguity regarding the relationship between these city conditions and non-fatal crime and victimization. Some find that city conditions, though related to murder, are not significantly related to other types of violence such as robbery and rape (Blau & Blau, 1982; Crutchfield, 1989). Conversely, others have found that city characteristics are indeed associated with non-fatal crime and victimization (Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996; Sampson, 1987; Messner & South, 1986). Though, it is important to note that among the city-level research that has looked at fatal and non-fatal crime and found significant effects when considering both (i.e., Shihadeh &

Ousey, 1996; Sampson, 1987), the magnitude of the relationship is greater for murder than it is for other crime types. In other words, city conditions are more strongly related to murder rates within cities than it is to other forms of crime. To address these disparate findings, I restrict the study to non-fatal violent and property crime victimization within and across cities. I will also disaggregate the victimization data by race to determine whether race-specific patterns similar to those found in the city/homicide research will emerge. In addition to studying city conditions and non-fatal victimization risks, contextual models including city-, neighborhood- and individual-level factors will be also be examined. Generally, neighborhood and individual correlates of victimization have been studied without consideration of city conditions. The degree of residential segregation, economic inequality and structural disadvantage within cities may influence individual- and community-level risks for victimization.

The organization of the dissertation reflects these general goals. Chapter 1 focuses on the pertinent literature by reviewing the correlates of victimization and theories related to these correlates. The following chapter outlines the research goals, data used to address these goals, and research methods. Chapter 3 covers the city-level analyses. Here the relationship between city conditions and rates of fatal and non-fatal victimization among the twelve cities are examined. In Chapter 4, the city conditions/non-fatal victimization relationship is further explored and individual and neighborhood factors are considered. Moreover, differences across racial/ethnic groups and across cities are assessed. The final chapter summarizes the findings of the current study, notes the limitations and outlines avenues for further research, and discusses the policy implications based on the results of the current study.

Chapter 1. Literature Review

There is a vast amount of extant literature on risks of victimization. Previously research generally focused on individual characteristics or traits such as race or age of the victim (i.e. Hindelang, et al., 1978; Garofalo, 1987). Recent attention, however, is given to community explanations of crime and victimization (i.e. Anderson, 1990, 1999; Wilson, 1996; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Sampson, et al, 1997; for earlier works see Burgess, 1923; Shaw and McKay, 1942). In fact, some argue that many individual correlates of victimization may be explained by the neighborhood conditions under which people live (e.g. McNulty and Bellair, 2003; Lauritsen, 2003; Lauritsen and White, 2001; Sampson et al, 1997; Krivo and Peterson, 1996). While the research on victimization at the individual- and neighborhood-level is extensive, less is known about city conditions and their influence on non-fatal victimization risks (for exceptions see Messner and South, 1986; Sampson, 1983; Decker et al., 1982). Instead studies have shown that some cities experience more crime and victimization than do others. In this chapter, correlates of victimization at each level—individual, neighborhood, and city— and the theoretical explanations for these associations are discussed.

The advent of the National Crime Survey (NCS)—now known as the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)—in 1973 can be credited with peaked interest in and research on victimization. It is produced by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), which enlists the aid of the U. S. Census Bureau to collect data on victimization from a nationally representative sample of households each year. Each sample consists of

approximately 42,000 households and 75,000 people.¹ For each household, information on the household characteristics (i.e. annual household income) and any household property crimes which include burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft that occurred in the past six months are recorded. Also, those persons age twelve and older in the household are asked to report on any personal victimization they may have experienced during the past six months. Specifically, they are asked to report on violent victimizations including rape, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated and simple assault and personal thefts that occurred during the past six months. Demographic characteristics on the participants such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, marital status and educational level are also recorded in the survey.

While there are many advantages to the NCVS, it was created for two specific purposes: (1) to present findings that could be compared with results from police data and namely the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and (2) to present detailed information on victims and incidents of crime that had not been collected before with other surveys (Cantor and Lynch, 2000). Considering the first goal of the NCVS, its estimates are often compared to estimates from the UCR, which is arguably the most widely used source of police data. Under the auspice of the BJS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) compiles data on crimes reported to and arrests made by the police from over 90% of all police departments across the country to produce the UCR. The crimes that are included in the UCR are separated into two categories: Part I and Part II Offenses. Part I Offenses, also known as index crimes, include homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson. The Part II Offenses are generally

¹ See Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) website, "Survey Methodology for Criminal Victimization in the United States".

less serious and are based on arrests made for crimes such as vandalism and drug abuse. Because some of the same crimes are included in both the UCR and NCVS, comparisons of estimates are possible.²

These comparisons are important since police data alone may not accurately reflect the occurrence and nature of crime. Police reports are limited to crimes that come to the attention of the police. On the other hand, victimization surveys are not and thus can be highly useful. By comparing estimates from both, a more precise evaluation of crime can be made. Moreover, it is important to know if and where there are discrepancies in police and victim data. For example, the NCVS often reports higher estimates of rape than does the UCR.³ Understanding why this occurs and the implications it has on the resourcefulness of each data source are important to measuring crime and developing theories of crime and victimization.

The second goal or purpose of the NCVS, which entails collecting detailed information on victims and crime incidents, is arguably the most significant contribution of the survey. Because of the rich data the NCVS provides, much is known about variations in risks for victimization. Such risks are not equally distributed across individuals, neighborhoods or cities. In the following sections, the risks of victimization and proposed theories related to these risks are reviewed.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL RISKS FOR VICTIMIZATION

² There are differences in reporting techniques and the estimates produced by the UCR and NCS/NCVS. See Cantor and Lynch (2000) and Lauritsen and Schaum (2005a) for a full description of differences between the two reports and how comparisons can be made.

³ See Cantor and Lynch, 2000 for a full discussion.

The NCVS has been most instrumental in the development of victimization theories at the individual level. This is because the NCVS more often provides detailed data at this unit of analysis than at others. Findings from the NCVS consistently show that age, race/ethnicity, gender, income, and marital status are all associated with risks for victimization. The nature of these relationships, however, is contingent upon whether property or violent victimization is being studied.⁴ Each of these correlates will be reviewed separately in the proceeding subsections.

Age

Age is one of the strongest correlates and is inversely related to victimization. Teenagers and young adults are more often victims than are older adults and the elderly. This trend has been consistent since the late 1970s despite changes in victimization rates.

Non-Fatal Violence

In general, persons age 16 to 19 are more likely to be victims of violent victimization (53.0 per 1000).⁵ They are followed by 12 to 15 year olds whose rate is 51.6 per 1000. People age 65 and older experienced the lowest rate of 2.0 per 1000. Similar patterns can be found when looking at specific types of violence. For instance, 16 to 19 year olds were victims of simple assault at a rate of 36.4 per 1000 while those 65 and older were victimized at a rate of 1.1 per 1000. Likewise, those 16 to 19 and 20 to 24 years experienced similar aggravated assault rates. Their rate of aggravated assault

⁴ These are all based on findings from the National Crime Victimization Survey. While the findings on individual characteristics and violence are reliable, those related to household property crimes may be less accurate. One member over the age of 18 in the household is chosen to report. However, selection of the person reporting is not random. This individual's demographic characteristics (i.e. race, gender), which may not be indicative of all household members, are reflected in the findings. See the National Crime Victimization Survey Interviewing Manual for Field Representatives, U.S. Census Bureau for a full description.

⁵ Overall violent victimization includes victims of robbery, rape, sexual assault and simple and aggravated assault. The terms 'victims of violence' and 'violent victimization' are also used in reference to overall violent victimization.

victimization was nearly double the rate for 25 to 34 year olds (6.0 per 1000), over seven times higher than that of 50 to 64 year olds (1.6 per 1000) and one hundred times more than that of those 65 and older (0.1 per 1000) (Catalano, 2004).

Non-fatal violence rates are consistently highest for teens and young adults. From 1976 to 2000, persons 12 to 24 were more likely to be victims of violence compared to those 25 and older. The highest rates shifted between 12-17 year olds and 18-24 year olds. The peak rates between these groups illustrate the often vast differences between them. For 12-17 year olds, non-fatal violent victimizations peaked at nearly 130 per 1000 and 115 per 1000 among 18-24 year olds. Peak rates for these groups occurred in the early 1990s while peaks for the '25-34' and '35-49' age groups occurred in the early 1980s. Among 25 to 34 year olds, the peak rate was close to 70 per 1000 and for those age 35 to 49 the peak rate was 47 per 1000. Little change occurred for those 50 to 64 years old and those age 65 and older, staying below 20 per 1000 (Klaus and Rennison, 2002a).

Overall, rates for all groups (except 50-64 year olds whose rates have always been the lowest) have been declining since the early 1990s. The greatest declines were among the most victimized groups—12 to 17 year olds and 18 to 24 year olds (Klaus and Rennison, 2002a). Younger persons, however, are still more likely to be victims of violence than others. Between 1993 and 2002, 12 to 24 year olds' rate of 82 per 1000 is 20 times higher than that of those age 65 and older, whose average group rate was 4 per 1000 (Klaus, 2005).

Property Crime

The relationship between property crime victimization and age is a bit more complex. Property crimes can be crimes against households and crimes against persons, making types within this category important. They include burglary, and household motor vehicle and personal theft. For crimes like burglary, in which the head of the household's characteristics are considered, juvenile victims tend to be excluded since attempts are made to contact household members age 18 and older.⁶ Nonetheless, households headed by those under the age of 20 had higher rates of burglary victimization in 2002—64.1 per 1000. This was substantially greater than the rate for 20-34 year olds (35.4 per 1000), who had the second highest rate. Both groups' rates were significantly higher than that of persons age 65 and older whose rate was 14.7 per 1000 for burglary (BJS, 2003).

For personal thefts, in which the victim's characteristics are considered, younger people are also more likely to be victims than are the elderly. In 2003, the rates for personal theft are highest for the 20 to 24 and 12-15 age groups (1.6 and 1.5 per 1000, respectively) and lowest for 50 to 64 year olds (0.3 per 1000) (Catalano, 2004).

Race/Ethnicity

Another correlate of victimization is race and ethnicity. Minorities, namely African Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, tend to be victimized at greater rates than are whites. Yet Asians' rates have often been found to be lower than those of whites (see Klaus and Rennison, 2002b; McNulty & Bellair, 2003; Catalano, 2004).

Because Native Americans, Asians and other minority groups are relatively small

⁶ See the National Crime Victimization Survey Interviewing Manual for Field Representatives, U.S. Census Bureau and Finkelhor & Ormrod, 2000.

compared to blacks and Hispanics, information on their victimization experiences is limited.

Non-Fatal Violence

African Americans are victims of non-lethal forms of violence at higher rates than those of other racial and ethnic backgrounds (except American Indians, see Perry, 2004). In 2003, blacks were the victims of violent crimes at a rate of 29.1 per 1000 compared to 24.2 for Hispanics and 21.5 for whites. These differences remain once crime type is considered. African Americans, whose rate of robbery victimization is 5.9 per 1000, are nearly twice as likely as Hispanics (3.1 per 1000) to be victims of robbery. Yet the difference between blacks and whites is staggering—5.9 versus 1.9 per 1000, respectively. African Americans and Hispanics, however, have similar rates of simple assault victimization (about 16 per 1000) which are slightly higher than that of whites (14.7 per 1000) (Catalano, 2004).

When the rates of victimization among Hispanics are compared to those of Non-Hispanics, the highest rates are found among Non-Hispanic American Indians.⁷ Their rate of 52.3 per 1000 was higher than of Non-Hispanic blacks (34.1), Non-Hispanic whites (26.5) and non-Hispanic Asians (8.4). This pattern has persisted over time. From 1993 to 2000, Non-Hispanic American Indians' average violent victimization rate of 105 per 1000 was higher than that of all other groups. The rate among Non-Hispanic blacks was 51.2 per 1000 and 40.8 per 1000 for Non-Hispanic whites. Again, the lowest rate was found among Non-Hispanic Asians (21.7 per 1000) (Klaus and Rennison, 2002b).

Property Crimes

⁷ Hispanics can report being any race therefore, the categories presented here are Hispanic and Non-Hispanic.

The rate of property crime victimization is higher among blacks than it is for those of other racial backgrounds. Overall, black households experienced 190 victimizations per 1000 households compared to 159 per 1000 households for whites, and 163.6 per 1000 households for those of other racial backgrounds. For burglary, 39 per 1000 black households were victimized compared to 28 per 1000 for white households (Catalano, 2004). Black households were also more likely to experience motor vehicle thefts (17.2 per 1000) compared to whites (7.5 per 1000) and others (12.5 per 1000). However, rates of household thefts were slightly higher among whites at 124.1 per 1000 versus 115.2 for blacks and 107.9 for others (BJS, 2003).

Gender

There is also variation across gender, with males typically being at greater risk for victimization than are females. These differences, however, depend upon crime type. For some crimes, females are more often victims than are their male counterparts.

Non-Fatal Violence

Generally speaking, males are more likely to be victims of violence compared to females. In 2003, males were violent crime victims at a rate of 26.3 per 1000 while women were victimized at a rate of 19.0 per 1000 persons. Across victimization types, males are more likely than females to be the victims of robbery (3.2 versus 1.9 per 1000), and simple (17.1 versus 12.4 per 1000) and aggravated (5.9 versus 3.3 per 1000) assault. The only exception is the crime of rape, for which women and girls are seven times more likely to be victimized (1.5 per 1000 compared to 0.2, respectively) (Catalano, 2004).

The same trend is found over time. From 1993 to 2003, males continued to be victims of violence at higher rates than did females. Yet their differences are beginning

to converge. During this time period, the rates peaked for both groups in 1994. The male rate was 61.1 per 1000 compared to 43 per 1000 for females, which represents an 18.1 difference between the male and female rate of violent victimization. By 2003, the difference between their rates was only 7.3. The rate for males had dropped to 26.3 per 1000 and though the female rate had declined also (19 per 1000), their decline was not as great as that among males (Catalano, 2004).

Property Crime

Considering property crimes, there are also some categories in which females are more likely to be victims. In 2003, females reported experiencing more personal thefts than did males. Males report being victims of personal theft at a rate of 0.4 per 1000 compared to 1.1 per 1000 among females (Catalano, 2004). This difference, though statistically significant, is not as large as the differences between males and females for crimes of violence.

Although age, race/ethnicity and gender are among the strongest correlates of victimization, there are other individual-level correlates that are related to such risks. Namely, one's income and marital status is associated with their likelihood of victimization.

Income

In the NCVS, risks for victimization across annual household income of persons and households is typically presented across seven categories: less than \$7500, \$7500-\$14,999, \$15,000-\$24,999, \$25,000-\$34,999, \$35,000-\$49,999, \$50,000-\$74,999, and \$75,000 or more. Generally, those with lower incomes are more often victims of crimes

than are those with higher incomes. Poverty status, in particular, has been associated with crime and victimization and has thus been widely researched.

Non-Fatal Violence

In 2003, persons with annual household incomes less than \$7,500 had a violent victimization rate of 39.3 per 1000 persons. On the other hand, those earning \$75,000 or more had the lowest rate of 15.4 violent victimizations per 1000 persons. The disparities between the groups remain regardless of crime type. For instance, persons in households earning less than \$7,500 per year were about 5 times more likely to be victims of robbery compared to those with household incomes over \$75,000 annually (9.0 per 1000 versus 1.7 per 1000) (Catalano, 2004).

The relatively high violent victimization among poorer persons compared to those who are more affluent has persisted since 1993. The rates for those with annual household incomes below \$7,500 ranged from 86 per 1000 to 45.5 per 1000 between 1993 and 2000. These rates were higher than those of persons in all other income groups, including the most affluent (earning \$75,000/year) whose rates ranged from 41.3 to 17.5 per 1000. All income groups experienced declines during this decade but the slowest declines were among the poorest group. Their decline of 41.1% was significantly lower than the drop for those earning \$75,000 per year, which was 57.6% (Catalano, 2004).

Property

Generally, households with yearly incomes less than \$7,500 were victimized at a rate of 204.6 per 1000 but households earning more had lower rates ranging from 168 to 180 per 1000. This pattern changes though when specific types of property victimization are considered. While burglary rates were higher for those with annual household

incomes below \$7,500 compared to those earning more, households with incomes above \$7,500 annually were burglarized at statistically similar rates. It appears then, that those at the lower financial end are at the greatest risk of victimization. However, the inverse is true with motor vehicle theft; households with annual incomes under \$7,500 were less likely to experience motor vehicle theft than those with incomes over \$7,500 (Catalano, 2004). It is important to note that this may be due to the availability of motor vehicles for households with incomes below \$7500. Specifically, such households may be less likely to possess cars and therefore, less often affected by this form of victimization.

Over time trends in property crime victimizations changed dramatically. In 1993, the highest rate of victimization was found among those earning \$75,000 or more (400.3 per 1000) and the lowest rates, 305.9 and 285.9 per 1000 belonged to the poorer groups (those earning less than \$7,500 and those earning \$7,500-14,999, respectively). The relationship between income and property victimization had begun to change by 1997 as the differences between the affluent (incomes \$75,000 or more) and the poor (incomes less than \$7,500) narrowed. In 1997, the difference between the affluent and the poor was 34 per 1000 compared to a difference of 94.4 per 1000 in 1993, with the affluent being more victimized. In 2002, the relationship reversed and poorer groups experienced more property crimes than those earning more than \$7,500 (Catalano, 2004).

Marital Status

The marital status of individuals has also been linked to non-fatal victimization. The risks for victimization tend to vary across the following categories of marital status: never married, married, divorced/separated, and widowed.

Non-Fatal Violence

The NCVS shows that in 2003, never married individuals were victims of violent crime at rates higher than those of married, widowed, and separated or divorced individuals. Widowed persons experienced the least amount of violence with a victimization rate of 5.3 per 1000 persons, followed by married individuals whose rate was 10.4 per 1000 persons. The victimization rate for single people, however, was 42.4 per 1000 persons, which is significantly higher than that of married and widowed individuals. Divorced and separated persons also have significantly higher violent victimization rates than married and widowed people. The gap between single and separated/divorced individuals, though, is narrow, 42.4 per 1000 compared to 33.0 per 1000 person, respectively (Catalano, 2004).

Property Crime

The differences across categories of marital status are less when property crime is considered. Still, persons that were never married tend to experience more property crime than those who are married, divorced/separated, or widowed. For example, single people's personal theft rate of 1.4 per 1000 was higher than that of married persons (0.3 per 1000), who had the lowest rate (Catalano, 2004).

In summary, the NCVS has highlighted the importance of these demographic characteristics in relation to risks of victimization. Consequently, theories of victimization have relied largely on the findings of the survey (see Cantor and Lynch, 2000: 90). The lifestyle model and routine activities theory are especially dominant among theories of victimization. The routine activities and lifestyle perspective explain factors that increase the likelihood of the occurrence of crime or being victimized rather than motivations for criminality (see Hindelang et al, 1978; Garofalo, 1987).

According to the lifestyle model, a person's vocational and leisure activities determine their personal associations with others and exposure to particular environments that are conducive to victimization. One's associations with criminal others and exposure to dangerous environments are affected by the individual's social characteristics such as age, race/ethnicity, and sex. These characteristics, in turn, impact role expectations and structural constraints on individual adaptations to society. Structural constraints include economic status, educational level and family structure while role expectation refers to societal expectations based on social characteristics. Role expectations and structural constraints influence the lifestyle pattern which is a determinant of the amount of associations a person has with criminal others and exposure to places and times with varying degrees of risk for victimization. These associations and exposures, in turn, predict victimization (Garofalo: 1987).

Routine activities theory proposes that people's lifestyles changed dramatically after World War II, which resulted in shifts in predatory-type crimes. In particular, activities centered on work, family and leisure were altered as people began to spend less time with family and more time at work and away from their homes. These changes or shifts in routine activities influence criminal opportunity and therefore affect crime trends by increasing the likelihood of the convergence in time and space between motivated offenders and suitable targets in the absence of capable guardians (Cohen and Felson, 1979). It is these three elements—motivated offenders, suitable targets, an absence of capable guardians—that are essential to the routine activities approach. It is important to note that the theory is not proposed at the individual level but as Cohen and Felson (1979:

594) note, “the veracity of the routine activity approach can be assessed by analyses of both microlevel and macrolevel interdependencies of human activities”.⁸

The lifestyle model and routine activities theory of crime are able to account for individual-level differences by positing that individual traits or characteristics are often related to exposure to or participation in certain activities. The higher rate of violent victimization among African Americans compared to whites, for example, may be explained by the groups differing exposure to potential offenders. From the lifestyle model perspective, African Americans may be more likely to live in disadvantaged and dangerous neighborhoods, therefore placing them at greater risk for proximity to criminal others. The routine activities approach may account for higher rates of victimization among blacks by arguing that the processes of suburbanization and deindustrialization following WWII, which have especially affected blacks, has had important implications on their work, family and leisure activities most related to predatory-crime. Many works have shown that the social and economic isolation of African Americans in urban areas has been linked to concentrations of female-headed households, unemployment and poverty, which in turn, have been linked to crime (i.e. Shihadeh and Steffensmeier, 1994; Wilson, 1987; Sampson, 1987). The problem with these arguments, however, is that it is difficult to determine from these assessments if the basic premises of routine activities or lifestyle theories or the social context of the neighborhood in which people live or the level of disadvantage (i.e. individual characteristics) people experience is most important to risk for victimization.

⁸ Routine Activities Theory attempts to explain trends in crime in the United States but because situational antecedents (convergence between motivated offenders, suitable targets, and lack of capable guardians) are emphasized, research on the theory has often been conducted at the individual level.

Contemporary research on the lifestyle and routine activities approaches to victimization highlight the shortcomings of the theories. For instance, Mustaine & Tewksbury (1998: 851) conclude that rudimentary indicators of lifestyle or routine activities used in early studies such as ‘how often do you spend the evening away from home’ are weak and inadequate measures of victimization risk rather “it is not just *leaving* the home that is the important predictor, but *where one goes* when one leaves the home, or *what activities* one is participating in when one is out in public”.

Neighborhood-level research and theory has pointed to the social context of the neighborhood as a predictor of crime and victimization. Neighborhood characteristics may influence one’s associations with deviant others and exposure to risky environments. Moreover, neighborhood structure and composition may also influence changes in routine activities as well. An alternative position is that individual correlates of victimization are explained by community factors. The NCVS, however, does not routinely provide the same level of detailed information on neighborhood conditions as it does for individual characteristics. Nonetheless, it does present general information on the place of residence of victims (i.e. urban, suburban, and rural). Furthermore, a select version of the survey, the area-identified NCVS, has allowed for a more in-depth examination of neighborhood conditions and their relation to non-fatal victimization.⁹ These findings have also contributed to neighborhood research and the development of such theories.

NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL RISKS FOR VICTIMIZATION

⁹ See Lauritsen (2003), Lauritsen & White (2001), and Lauritsen & Schaum (2005b) for further description of the area-identified NCVS.

Generally, urban neighborhoods tend to have higher risks for victimization compared to suburban and rural communities. In 2004, residents of urban communities experienced far more violent crime victimizations than those living in other types of neighborhoods. Their rate of 29 per 1000 residents was higher than that of suburban and rural residents—18 and 19.9 per 1000 residents, respectively. This pattern remained regardless of crime type. Furthermore, urban residents are also more likely to be victims of personal thefts and household property crimes. Between 1993 and 2004, urban households experienced more property crimes than did households in suburban and rural neighborhoods. Although the rate for 2004 was among the lowest for urbanites (214.7 per 1000 households), it was still greater than that for suburban (143.2 per 1000) and rural (134.4 per 1000) households (Catalano, 2005). While these findings suggest that the location of neighborhoods is important, they do not explain why such differences emerge.

First, of particular import to neighborhood explanations of crime and victimization is establishing a definition for neighborhood. Such definitions are often vague and tend to vary, however Bursik & Grasmick (1993a: 6) provide a comprehensive depiction of such:

First, and most basically, a neighborhood is a small physical area embedded within a larger area in which people inhabit dwellings. Thus, it is a geographic and social subset of a larger unit. Second, there is a collective life that emerges from the social networks that have arisen among the residents and the set of institutional arrangements that overlap these networks. That is, the neighborhood is inhabited by people who perceive themselves to have a common interest in that

area and to whom a common life is available. Finally, the neighborhood has some tradition and continuity over time.

When described as such, the neighborhood then is an intimate area in which people reside that is qualitatively distinct from surrounding neighborhoods. The social context of the neighborhood, more so than its physical boundaries, is what distinguishes it from others in close proximity to it. Furthermore, informal and formal rules governing the norms, behavior and activities within the neighborhood are essential to its functioning and well-being. Early neighborhood theorists, Shaw & McKay (1942) found that delinquency rates were highest in poor neighborhoods. Rather than attribute delinquency to poverty, though, they argued that poverty was important only insofar as it produced residential instability and racial or ethnic heterogeneity within neighborhoods. These factors, in turn, caused neighborhoods to be socially disorganized and inhibited social control since instability and heterogeneity tend to decrease communication and mutual trust among residents (see Bursik & Grasmick, 1993a; Sampson et al, 1997). Social disorganization is the inability of a neighborhood to collectively work together to socially control the behavior of residents and outsiders in an effort to reduce crime and violence within the neighborhood (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993a). Disorganization within neighborhoods, rather than poverty, leads to high crime rates in communities. Systemic ties or networks between residents, residents and local institutions, and residents and external sociopolitical institutions are important to inhibiting social disorganization and thus, crime (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993a).

Likewise, Sampson and his colleagues (1997) argue that the social and organizational structure of neighborhoods, not the composition of residents, accounts for

neighborhood crime rates. This structure, or what they term collective efficacy among residents, is “the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good” (p. 919). Of primacy to the theory is this form of informal social control. It is collective efficacy that inhibits crime and violence within communities. Collective efficacy is weakened in communities that are impoverished and residentially unstable. Poverty enhances social isolation within communities by blocking resources that are essential to collective efficacy. They argue, “the alienation, exploitation, and dependency wrought by resource deprivation act as a centrifugal force that stymies collective efficacy” (p. 920). Furthermore, because collective efficacy builds over time, residential instability within communities hinders the development and efficiency of such informal social control (Sampson et al., 1997).

Aside from crime and victimization, socially disorganized neighborhoods tend to have higher levels of social and physical disorder, greater perceptions of neighborhood crime and fear of crime among residents. These conditions too have been linked to lower levels of detachment among residents, social and economic investment in the neighborhood among current and prospective residents and businesses, and neighborhood social control (see Skogan, 1990). Consequently, neighborhoods lacking social control or collective efficacy are physically, socially and economically undesirable. Not only are rates of crime and victimization high but these areas also are more likely to suffer from physical and social decay such as vacant/abandoned buildings, unsupervised/rowdy youth groups, panhandlers and homeless populations hanging out on neighborhood street corners. These ‘incivilities’ pose threats to social order and is associated with serious crime and victimization within neighborhoods.

Neighborhood-level theories have received a wealth of empirical support (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993b; Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Sampson et al, 1997; Venkatesh, 1997; Peterson et al, 2000; Velez, 2001; Bellair, 2000; Lauritsen, 2003; Lauritsen & White, 2001; McNulty & Bellair, 2003). An important area of study within the neighborhood research has been explaining racial differences. McNulty & Bellair (2003) conclude that differences in crime and victimization rates among whites and blacks can be attributed to community disadvantage. Blacks tend to live in qualitatively poorer neighborhoods compared to whites and these conditions, in turn, explain variations in neighborhood crime rates among the two groups. Likewise, Lauritsen (2003) and Lauritsen and White (2001) find that victimization risks are highest in the poorest neighborhoods and blacks and Hispanics more often live in these communities compared to whites, thus explaining their greater risks for victimization.

Although neighborhood conditions are related to crime and victimization, they do not fully explain some individual level or compositional correlates of victimization. Using the area-identified NCVS, Lauritsen (2003) finds that compositional characteristics of a community such as the proportion that are below age 18 are still significantly related to victimization risk even after considering neighborhood characteristics. Similarly, the relationship between structural disadvantage (i.e. extreme poverty) and crime within neighborhoods remains important even after neighborhood social controls are considered (see Peterson et al, 2000; Lauritsen, 2003; Sampson et al, 1997; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993b).

It is quite possible then that individual and neighborhood correlates of victimization are explained by broader macro-level factors. Just as there are differences across individuals and neighborhoods, cities also tend to vary in rates of and risks for victimization. Although limited, the NCVS has conducted studies on victimization within and across cities in the United States (BJS, 1975a, 1975b, 1978). Large-scale studies across cities were first conducted in the 1970s. Generally, the purpose of these examinations was to provide the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) with city-level data on victimization. The specific goals of the studies are explicated in a 1975 report:

As one of the most ambitious efforts yet undertaken for filling some of the gaps in crime data, victimization surveys are expected to supply criminal justice officials with new insights into crime and its victims, complementing data resources already on hand for purposes of planning, evaluation, and analysis...they also furnish a means for developing victim typologies and for identifiable sectors of society, yield information necessary to compute the relative risk of being a victimized...conducted under the same procedures in different locales, they provide a basis for comparing the crime situation between two or more cities or other geographic areas (BJS, 1975).

Prior to these studies, city-level assessments were based on crime data which essentially come from police reports. As aforementioned, one critical problem with relying on police data is that not all crime comes to the attention of the police.

CITY-LEVEL RISKS FOR VICTIMIZATION

In the early city-level reports, crimes were classified as personal and property crimes. Personal crimes or crimes against persons include crimes of violence such as rape, personal robbery, and simple and aggravated assault and personal theft. Property crimes, also known as crimes against households, include burglary, household larceny and motor vehicle theft. Lastly, crimes against establishments are also included in the reports. These crimes include robberies and burglaries of businesses rather than an individual or household. One of the earliest reports compared the cities of Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. A study the subsequent year compared 13 cities—Boston, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Houston, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Oakland, Pittsburgh, San Diego, San Francisco and D.C. The last study during this time period compared the five largest cities which were Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. Findings from these early reports show that both personal and property crimes differ across the cities. For example, in the 13 Cities report violent victimization rates ranged from a low of 31 per 1000 persons in Washington, D.C. to a high of 71 per 1000 in San Francisco, CA. Still, regardless of the cities being examined, the general findings were similar. In each city property victimizations were far more common than violent victimization and for personal victimizations larceny and personal theft was the most common victimization while the violent crime of rape was far less common in all cities.

The results from these reports certainly warrant further investigation into the city/non-fatal victimization relationship. Importantly, they point to the significance of city conditions in relation to victimization rates. However, the city-level victimization studies do not indicate which city conditions may be important to victimization risks;

they simply illustrate that cities differ. Determining which conditions are of import and understanding their relationship to victimization is needed. In spite of these preliminary studies, few in-depth examinations of the city/non-fatal victimization relationship have been undertaken. Instead, the focus has been on crime and homicide in cities. These studies reveal that city conditions such as residential segregation (i.e., Massey & Denton, 1993), economic inequality (i.e., Blau & Blau, 1982) and other forms of structural disadvantage including family disruption (i.e., Sampson, 1987) and underemployment (i.e., Crutchfield, 1989) are linked to city crime rates. They serve as a guide to possible links between city characteristics and victimization risks.

Residential Segregation

The pervasiveness of residential segregation in American cities is well-documented. Historically, whites have lived in communities distinct from those inhabited by minorities and namely blacks, Hispanics and Asians (Massey & Denton, 1993; Logan et al, 2004; Lewis Mumford Center, 2001; Massey & Eggers, 1990). Overall, residential segregation between these minority groups and whites has declined in recent years. Currently, Asians are least likely to be segregated from whites, compared to Hispanics and blacks. Furthermore, Hispanics experience even less segregation from whites than blacks. Some research shows that residential segregation takes on distinct patterns depending upon the racial or ethnic groups considered. These works suggest that segregation between blacks and whites is largely based upon race while income differences account for Hispanics and Asians segregation from whites (Massey &

Denton, 1987; Logan et al, 2004; Fischer et al, 2004).¹⁰ Hispanics and Asians that have higher incomes, speak English and are born in the United States are less likely to be segregated from whites. The same pattern is not found for blacks. In spite of improvements in income for blacks in recent decades, they are still more likely to be segregated from whites than other minority groups (except Puerto Ricans, see Massey & Denton, 1993). The Lewis Mumford Center (2001:1) reports:

There were some signs of progress [regarding black-white segregation] in the 1980s, with a five-point drop in the segregation index (from 73.8 to 68.8).¹¹ The change continued at a slower rate in the 1990s (a decline of just under 4 points). The good news is that these small changes are cumulating over time. The source of concern is that at this pace it may take forty more years for black-white segregation to come down even to the current level of Hispanic-white segregation.

Segregation is linked to disorder, crime and victimization across communities (Massey 1990; Massey & Denton, 1993) and crime and victimization within cities (Massey, 1995; Peterson & Krivo, 1993, 1999; Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996). Cities that are highly racially segregated tend to have higher crime rates. Much of the research points to segregation being most detrimental to minorities and particularly, blacks. Previous research found either no or a weak relationship between residential segregation and crime. However, others argued that these works failed to consider differences across racial groups. Segregation may function to protect whites from crime and victimization while concentrating such among minorities. The homicide

¹⁰ Fischer et al (2004) include Non-Hispanic whites and blacks, Hispanics and individuals who are “foreign born” in their study. Those who are foreign born includes Asians but this category is not restricted solely to Asians.

¹¹ This is based upon the Index of Dissimilarity, which is a common measure of residential segregation (see Massey & Denton, 1993).

research, in particular, has substantiated this claim. These works have shown that residential segregation is most detrimental to inner-city blacks and explain their higher rates compared to whites (i.e., Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996; Peterson & Krivo, 1999; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996).

In explaining these findings, Massey & Denton (1993) propose that segregation concentrates poverty—especially black poverty. This concentration of poverty, in turn, increases crime and victimization rates in communities within cities (Massey & Denton, 1993). Likewise, Peterson et al (2004: 7) theorize that segregation operates at the regional- (i.e., city) and local- (i.e., neighborhood) level to produce crime:

[L]evels of region-wide residential segregation result in varying degrees of homogeneity in the racial, ethnic, and immigrant composition of neighborhoods. Very high levels of segregation among some groups, particularly Blacks and Whites, mean that large proportions of neighborhoods are remarkably homogeneous. These White, Black, Latino, and immigrant areas often vary widely in neighborhood structural conditions such as levels of disadvantage and advantage (e.g. poverty, joblessness, economic affluence), family structure, residential instability, and the age/sex composition of residents that are central in affecting social control and crime facilitating processes. These, in turn, determine levels of crime.

Economic Inequality

Economic inequality and crime has been studied far more than the segregation/crime relationship (Blau & Blau, 1982; Crutchfield, 1989; Harer & Steffensmeier, 1992; Messner, 1982; Messner & Golden, 1992; Shihadeh &

Steffensmeier, 1994). Economic inequality is generally measured in two ways: (1) as income inequality between racial groups and (2) as income inequality within a racial group. Blau & Blau (1982) find that both economic inequality within and between racial groups increase the likelihood of violent crime in cities. They argue that racial inequality especially leads to violence because it is based upon an ascribed characteristic—race. Such inequality is viewed as unfair in democratic societies and subsequently produces feelings of strain. Yet others argue that within-race economic inequality is a better predictor of crime than is economic inequality between racial groups (Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994; Harer & Steffensmeier, 1992). They posit that individuals do not look across race for comparison of economic status but rather compare themselves to others within their own racial group. In spite of these debates, there is empirical evidence to support the notion that both forms of inequality are linked to violence within cities.

One possible explanation for the economic inequality/crime relationship is that the process of suburbanization (Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996) and deindustrialization (Wilson, 1987) has increased income inequality both between and within racial groups. Wilson (1987) contends that the migration of business and industry out of urban areas and into suburban and rural communities during the 1960s and 1970s led to a lack of employment opportunities for those in inner-cities, and namely African Americans. With deindustrialization also came middle-class flight out of urban neighborhoods. These processes economically and socially isolated the poor in inner-city communities (Wilson, 1987; Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996; Ousey, 2000). The conditions of such neighborhoods are best described as deplorable; deplete of economic, political and social resources. It is

these conditions which produce increased risks for criminality, violence and victimization among city residents.

For Wilson (1987), the causes of crime are invariant across race; white or black communities suffering from extreme economic deprivation will have high crime rates (also see, Krivo & Peterson, 1996). However, urban blacks have been most affected by deindustrialization and suburbanization (Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996). Between 1970 and 1984, rates of joblessness among blacks were significantly higher than those among whites in cities. According to Wilson (1987: 39):

Urban minorities have been particularly vulnerable to structural economic changes, such as the shift from goods-producing to service-producing industries, the increasing polarization of the labor market into low-wage and high-wage sectors, technological innovations, and the relocation of manufacturing industries out of the central cities.

Currently, ratios of black to white unemployment continue to be high. For example, in 2000 the black to white unemployment ratio was 3.07 in Chicago, indicating that blacks are about 3 times more likely to be unemployed compared to whites.¹²

Urban, African American males, in particular, experienced the greatest amount of unemployment during these shifts:

The fact that only 58 percent of all black young adult males, 34 percent of all black males aged eighteen to nineteen, and 16 percent of those aged sixteen to seventeen were employed in 1984 reveals a problem of joblessness for young black men that had reached catastrophic proportions (Wilson, 1987: 43).

¹² See Lewis Mumford Center website.

These high rates of joblessness among young, black, urbanite males have been linked to their higher rate of violent victimization and particularly homicide (Wilson, 1987; Anderson, 1999).

African Americans face deleterious socioeconomic conditions that whites generally have not faced. Short (1997: 51) argues:

[S]imple comparisons between poor whites and poor blacks are impossible because poor whites and blacks reside in areas that are ecologically and economically very different. In 1980, in the five largest U.S. central cities, for example, approximately 70 percent of all poor whites lived in *non-poverty areas*, compared to 15 percent of poor blacks; and nearly 40 percent of poor blacks lived in areas characterized by *extreme poverty* compared to only 7 percent of poor whites.

More poignantly, Sampson and Wilson (1995), in their analysis of cities with populations over 100,000, did not find one city in which blacks and whites live in ecological equality. They conclude, “the worse urban contexts in which whites reside are considerably better than the average context of black communities” (Sampson and Wilson, 1995: 42). In this respect, income inequality between groups equates to residential differences, which have been linked crime and victimization.

In addition to residential segregation and economic inequality, the composition¹³ of a city may influence victimization rates. Specifically, poverty and unemployment among residents, higher percentages of female-headed households, and concentrations of young people in cities can have negative implications on risks for victimization.

Persons Living Below Poverty & Unemployed

¹³ These factors (Persons Living Below Poverty & Unemployed, Female Headed Households, and Persons Below Age 18) are compositional, in terms of the way in which they are often measured in city-level research. They generally represent the number of percentage of persons falling under these categories in cities. However, they are indicators of structural disadvantage as discussed in their respective sections.

The poverty and employment status of residents within cities has been linked to crime and victimization (Crutchfield, 1989; Wilson, 1987, 1996; Jargowsky, 1997; Massey & Denton, 1993; Massey & Eggers, 1990; Anderson, 1999; Ousey, 2000). These works have shown that extreme poverty and high levels of unemployment are concentrated in urban neighborhoods. These negative social conditions, in turn, increase crime in inner-city communities. While much of this research has focused on differences between groups, overall rates of such within cities should be significantly related to violence and victimization as well. Cities experiencing higher rates of unemployment and poverty among residents will likely have higher victimization rates.

Female Headed Households

At the neighborhood-level, research has shown that the relationship between family structure and violence is significant (Lauritsen, 2003; Rountree & Warner, 1999). Those neighborhoods with higher concentrations of female-headed households tend to have higher rates of violence and victimization. The limited economic resources of these families often equate to living in disadvantaged areas and thus place youth at greater risks for victimization (Lauritsen, 2003). Moreover, others posit that female ties within communities entail neighboring and increases informal social control. However, in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of female-headed households, female ties become strained. The lack of social and financial support from males in such communities weakens female ties and consequently leads to increased violence within these neighborhoods (Rountree & Warner, 1999).

The number or percentage of female-headed families also has implications at the city level. Female-headed families too tend to be situated in poor, urban areas

(Jargowsky, 1997; Wilson, 1987; Massey & Denton, 1993). Furthermore, blacks often have greater percentages of female-headed families than whites (Jargowsky, 1997; Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994; Wilson, 1987; Massey & Denton, 1993; Sampson, 1987). Sampson (1987) and Shihadeh & Steffensmeier (1994) find that family disruption is strongly related to robbery and homicide rates among blacks, especially black juveniles. Family disruption has been linked to other forms of structural disadvantage such as poverty (Jargowsky, 1997; Wilson, 1987; Massey & Denton, 1993), economic inequality (Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994) and unemployment among males (Wilson, 1987; Massey & Denton, 1993). According to Wilson (1987), the unemployment status of black males is related to the delay in marriage and lower rates of remarriage among black women. This in turn increases the likelihood of out-of-wedlock births and female-headed households for blacks (Wilson, 1987). Consequently, the percentage of female-headed families may be associated with poverty, unemployment and crime rates within cities.

Persons Below Age 18

The concentration of young people below the age of 18 within neighborhoods has also been linked to risks for victimization (see Lauritsen, 2003). Furthermore, it is plausible that victimization rates will be higher in cities with greater percentages of people under 18 years. Wilson (1987) finds that the age structure of urban areas is linked to the level of crime in cities. He also adds:

Youth is not only a factor in crime; it is also associated with out-of-wedlock births, female-headed homes, and welfare dependency...In short, much of what

has gone awry in the inner city is due in part to the sheer increase in the number of young people, especially young minorities (37).

In other words, greater concentrations of youth also equate to greater concentrations of other forms of structural disadvantage. Cities with higher proportions of young people then have more persons at risks for criminality and victimization and may have greater levels of concentrated disadvantage.

In summary, while much work has looked at the city/crime and city/homicide relationships, relatively little is known about the city/non-fatal victimization relationship. The lack of studies on non-fatal victimization at the city-level is attributed to the lack of data at this level. It is important to understand how the structural conditions and compositions of cities may relate to non-fatal victimization risks. Much of the city-level research demonstrates that conditions such as residential segregation and economic inequality are significantly related to lethal and non-lethal *crime* within cities. If and how they are related to *non-fatal victimization* is certainly worth examining. The relative inattention given non-fatal victimization in city-level research is problematic. First, homicide and non-fatal crime data are often derived from official reports. While this is less a concern for homicide research, it can certainly present problems when looking at non-fatal violence. Victimization reports often show that nearly half of violent crime victims choose not to report their experience to the authorities (BJS, 2003; Smith et al., 1998). Official data then is not reflective of crimes that are underreported. Second, homicide is widely studied and often used as a mechanism for understanding violence. Yet the occurrence of homicide is rare, accounting for only 0.6% of serious violence and 0.2% of all violent crime (Rennison and Planty, 2004). The nature of homicide may be

distinct from other types of violence. For instance, homicides typically involve victims and offenders who are non-strangers (BJS, 2004; Blau & Blau, 1982) but the same is not true for robbery. Over 70 percent of robbery victims report that their assailant was a stranger (BJS, 2003).

Moreover, these conditions and how they might affect relationships between individual and neighborhood correlates and victimization should also be considered. Risks for victimization vary across individuals, neighborhoods and cities. In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of victimization risk these factors must be considered simultaneously. It is plausible that individual and neighborhood correlates of victimization may be related to city conditions as well. Residential segregation, economic inequality and other forms of structural disadvantage have been linked to neighborhood structure and composition (i.e., Peterson et al, 2004; Massey & Denton, 1993; Jargowsky, 1997; Wilson, 1987).

Understanding the influence that city conditions have on victimization has important policy implications for the reduction of crime and victimization in cities. There are differences in victimization rates across cities and evaluating the possible causes of such variations can help guide crime prevention strategies at the city-level. For instance, if research at the city-level demonstrates that residential segregation between whites and minorities is associated with crime and victimization in the city then policies aimed at reducing segregation may be useful. Moreover, because victimization within and across cities has been studied less, the proposed research also serves as a contribution to the existing victimization literature. The risks for victimization vary across people and

social contexts; knowing why these differences emerge can inform victimization theory and further victimization research at the macro level.

For these reasons, the current study focuses on non-fatal victimization within and across cities. The next chapter outlines the specific goals and research questions of the current study. The data used to evaluate the goals and research questions is also discussed. Lastly, the chapter gives characteristics of the sample and the cities included in the current study.

Chapter 2. Research Goals, Data & Measures

There are two goals of the dissertation. The first and primary goal is to examine the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization. While the relationship between city conditions and homicide has been researched extensively, little is known about non-fatal victimization at the city level. Still there is reason to believe that inequality between whites and minorities, especially when measured as residential segregation and economic inequality, will be associated with increased rates of non-lethal violence and property victimization rates among cities. These negative social conditions have been linked to higher crime and homicide rates in cities and therefore, may have a similar relationship with non-fatal victimization. Furthermore, when rates of non-lethal victimization are disaggregated by race, residential segregation and economic inequality between whites and minorities will be most detrimental to minorities. In their compilation *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences*, editors Neil Smelser, William J. Wilson, and Faith Mitchell (2001) argue that conditions that work to advantage or disadvantage groups according to their race promote racial inequality. Residential segregation, in particular, “creates mechanisms that affect race-neutral processes that ultimately influence minority group outcomes”. Specifically, “the more segregated or isolated a neighborhood, the less likely it is that the residents will have easy access to information concerning schools, apprenticeship programs, the labor market, financial markets, and so on” (Smelser, et al., 2001: 11). In other words, residential segregation essentially limits access to needed resources that work to inhibit criminality and victimization.

Economic inequality functions in a similar fashion. In cities where there are greater disparities in the incomes among whites and minorities, rates of non-fatal victimization will likely be higher. These differences are often the result of changes in social institutions and economic markets such as the labor industry. The lower demand for low-skilled labor, specifically, following deindustrialization in many major cities has contributed to the gap in economic status between whites and minorities. Minorities, who are often concentrated in the low-skilled labor industry, are disproportionately affected by this shift in industrialization (see Wilson, 1987; 1996). As such, it is plausible that economic inequality will have a greater effect on their risks for non-lethal victimization than it will on such risks among whites. Smelser, et al. (2001:11) conclude:

[G]overnment policies that pertain to taxation, interest rates, the labor market, international trade, criminal justice, and investment and redistribution, as well as corporate decisions involving the mobility and location of industries, affect economic-class groups in different ways. Because minorities are more concentrated in low-income positions, some of these policies have distinctly racial implications.

Lastly, concentrations of disadvantage in the form of high proportions of female-headed households, unemployed persons, people living below the poverty level, and high proportions of persons below age eighteen are also linked to rates of non-fatal violent and property victimization among cities. The poverty and employment status of residents within cities has been linked to crime and victimization (Crutchfield, 1989; Wilson, 1987, 1996; Jargowsky, 1997; Massey & Denton, 1993; Massey & Eggers, 1990; Anderson, 1999; Ousey, 2000). Furthermore, the proportion of female-headed families has been

linked to crime and violence since such households tend to be situated in poor, urban areas (Jargowsky, 1997; Wilson, 1987; Massey & Denton, 1993). Lastly, the age composition of urban areas is also related to rates of non-fatal violent and property victimization. Specifically, greater concentrations of youth also equate to greater concentrations of other forms of structural disadvantage (see Wilson, 1987; Lauritsen, 2003). Because minorities are more likely to experience these forms of disadvantage, higher proportions of these conditions within cities may be most relevant to their rates of non-fatal forms of victimization compared to those among whites.

Secondly, the relative effects of city-, neighborhood- and individual-level factors on non-fatal victimization will be studied. Individual characteristics and neighborhood conditions have been linked to non-fatal victimization. It is important to understand if or how these relationships are affected once city characteristics are considered. Much of the victimization research has either focused on individual or neighborhood conditions. Those multilevel studies that have been conducted have used either national-level data (i.e. Lauritsen and White, 2001; Lauritsen, 2003) or have focused on individual and neighborhood correlates in one city (i.e. Sampson, et al., 1997). While these studies have furthered our understanding of victimization risks, they are limited. First, national-level studies often ignore city-level variations in crime and victimization. For instance, Washington, D.C. has had unequivocal high rates of homicide compared to other major cities. Research at the national-level cannot explain why such differences emerge at the city level. Furthermore, those studies that examine individual and neighborhood indicators of victimization within a particular city do not account for possible differences in individual and neighborhood risks across cities. The current data includes twelve cities

which allow for an examination of individual and community conditions across more than one city. By looking across cities, we can determine whether these relationships are uniform or vary.

The following research questions address these goals:

Goal 1: City Conditions and Non-Fatal Victimization

1. Is the degree of residential segregation between non-Hispanic whites and minority groups related to the non-lethal victimization rate for cities? Is the degree of economic inequality between non-Hispanic whites and minority groups related to the non-lethal victimization rate for cities? When using racially disaggregated victimization data, does the relationship between these conditions and non-lethal victimization differ among whites and minorities?
2. Are city variations in composition related to non-lethal victimization? Specifically, is the proportion of female-headed families, persons unemployed, persons living below the poverty line and youth below the age of 18 associated with the non-fatal victimization rates of cities? When using racially disaggregated victimization data, do these various measures have a different relationship with the non-fatal victimization rate among whites than it does with the non-fatal victimization rate among minorities?

Goal 2: City, Neighborhood and Individual Factors and Non-Fatal Victimization

3. How are individual and neighborhood factors related to non-lethal victimization risks when various cities are considered? After controlling for individual and neighborhood correlates, are there city differences in victimization risk? If so,

which city characteristics appear to be most strongly related to individual- and neighborhood-level correlates of victimization?

Data

The primary data used to investigate these research questions are derived from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) 12 Cities study, which was obtained through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) website. The NCVS 12 Cities study is the result of the collaborative efforts of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to collect data on violent and property victimizations, perceptions of local policing and community safety across cities. The twelve cities sampled are Chicago, IL, Kansas City, MO, Knoxville, TN, Los Angeles, CA, Madison, WI, New York, NY, San Diego, CA, Savannah, GA, Spokane, WA, Springfield, MA, Tucson, AZ, and Washington, D.C. These cities were selected because each had police departments utilizing community-oriented policing strategies.

For each city, there is a random sample of households. To obtain these samples, the Demographic Statistical Methods Division (DSMD) used the GENESYS Random-Digit Dialing (RDD) Sampling System to gather household telephone numbers that corresponded with city zip codes. Once these were gathered, the DSMD used zip code maps illustrating city and county boundaries to determine which zip codes should be included in the sample. In the event that a zip code crossed boundaries, the DSMD then looked at population counts to determine if those zip codes should be included. The cut-off levels for zip code inclusions in these cases entailed taking in as much city population as possible while minimizing the population located outside of the city. This sampling

strategy is different from the multi-clustered sampling design used in data collection for the traditional NCVS.

The DSMD estimated that approximately 870 household interviews (and 1600 person interviews) were needed in each city.¹⁴ The targeted household counts differed across cities depending on the percent of the city population age 12 and older. Of the 10,440 households and 19,000 persons targeted, 9,327 households and 13,918 persons were actually interviewed. Table 1.1 shows the ‘Target’ and ‘Actual’ household and person counts for each city and the entire sample.

TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE

The data collection occurred over a 4-month period, starting in February 1998. Interviews were conducted via telephone using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). The CATI method has been used since 1992 and was implemented to reduce possible errors by interviewers and to improve the quality of the data collected.¹⁵

Because the NCVS 12 Cities data does not provide measures of city composition and structure, data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Lewis Mumford Center, and the American Communities Project at Brown University are used to supplement the NCVS 12 Cities data. The proportions of female-headed households, persons living below poverty, persons unemployed, and persons below age 18 in each of the cities were gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau. Ratios of residential segregation and economic equality for each city were obtained from the American Communities Project and the Lewis Mumford Center websites.

¹⁴ See the methodology section of Smith et al (1998) for a full description of estimations used to determine the targeted sample size.

¹⁵ See Cantor & Lynch for discussion on the effects of CATI on NCVS data.

TABLE 1.1. NCVS 12 Cities Survey Respondents, 1998

City	<u>Households</u>			<u>Persons</u>		
	Target	Actual	(%)	Target	Actual	(%)
Total	10,449	9,327	89%	19,200	13,918†	72%
Chicago, IL	885	790	89	1,600	1,124	70
Kansas City, MO	884	798	90	1,600	1,162	73
Knoxville, TN	844	756	96	1,600	1,198	75
Los Angeles, CA	881	844	87	1,600	1,121	70
Madison, WI	840	731	87	1,600	1,162	73
New York, NY	866	744	86	1,600	1,059	66
San Diego, CA	868	791	91	1,600	1,131	71
Savannah, GA	891	766	86	1,600	1,245	78
Spokane, WA	875	801	92	1,600	1,239	77
Springfield, MA	894	771	86	1,600	1,231	77
Tucson, AZ	878	813	93	1,600	1,233	77
Washington, DC	843	722	86	1,600	1,013	63

Source: Smith et al (1998). "Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety". Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. Percentages are calculated by the author.

† The actual number of persons surveyed is 18,514. However, 4596 people had a person weight of 0 which reduced the sample to 13918. See Methodology section of the above source.

Measures

The following sections detail the measurement of individual, neighborhood and city factors and victimization.

Individual-Level Measures

Demographic information on the respondents is collected in the 12 Cities survey. At the individual level, age, race/ethnicity, gender, income and marital status are examined.¹⁶ Age ranges from 12 to 90 across the sample. There are five categories of race/ethnicity: non-Latino whites, non-Latino blacks, non-Latino Asians, non-Latino others¹⁷, and Latinos. Gender consists of males and females. Income is comprised of fourteen unequal categories: 1 = less than \$5,000; 2 = \$5,000-7,499; 3 = \$7,500-9,999; 4 = \$10,000-12,499; 5 = \$12,500-14,999; 6 = \$15,000-17,499; 7 = \$17,500-19,999; 8 = \$20,000-24,999; 9 = \$25,000-29,999; 10 = \$30,000-34,999; 11 = \$35,000-39,999; 12 = \$40,000-49,999; 13 = \$50,000-74,999; 14 = \$75,000 or more. Lastly, marital status includes married, widowed, divorced, separated and never married individuals. Descriptive statistics on these characteristics across the sample are shown in Table 1.2.

TABLE 1.2 ABOUT HERE

Neighborhood-Level Measures

Unlike the traditional NCVS, respondents age sixteen and older in the 12 Cities study were asked to report on their perceptions of their neighborhood. These measures are included since previous studies suggest that individuals' perceptions of their neighborhood are related to their risks of victimization (DeFrances & Smith, 1998;

¹⁶ All 'blank', 'don't know' and 'refused' responses to these questions are ignored in the statistical procedures.

¹⁷ Non-Latino others includes American Indians, Eskimos, and those who do not fall into the other categories.

TABLE 1.2. NCVS 12 Cities Sample Characteristics, 1998†

City	Mean Age	Mean Income*	% Non-Latino Black	% Latino	% Male	% Never Married
Chicago	39.8	10.2	32.4	16.2	45.9	40.5
Kansas City	41.4	10.4	21.3	4.2	46.8	30.3
Knoxville	43.5	10.1	8.4	1.5	47.5	26.1
Los Angeles	41.3	10.5	14.2	25.1	50.7	38.7
Madison	38.0	10.9	3.1	2.7	50.4	40.1
New York	39.9	10.6	26.4	19.2	42.6	44.4
San Diego	40.6	11.1	5.6	15.4	49.4	35.9
Savannah	40.5	9.8	39.7	3.5	46.0	31.5
Spokane	42.1	9.8	2.0	2.5	46.3	27.5
Springfield	40.0	9.8	19.1	14.2	45.2	37.2
Tucson	41.7	9.8	3.4	20.0	48.4	28.4
DC	41.7	10.6	52.6	4.6	46.9	46.4
Total	40.4	10.5	22.7	18.2	45.9	40.7
Median	38.0	12.0	--	--	--	--
Standard Dev.	17.9	3.7	--	--	--	--

Source: The estimates for the cities and total sample are based on the weighted sample (N=14,167,413) of the 12 Cities Survey (ICPSR 2743).

* Based on 14 unequal categories of income: 1 = < \$5,000; 2 = \$5,000-7,499; 3 = \$7,500-9,999; 4 = \$10,000-12,499; 5 = \$12,500-14,999; 6 = \$15,000-17,499; 7 = \$17,500-19,999; 8 = \$20,000-24,999; 9 = \$25,000-29,999; 10 = \$30,000-34,999; 11 = \$35,000-39,999; 12 = \$40,000-49,000; 13 = \$50,000-75,000; 14 = \$75,000 or more.

Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). There are fourteen questions related to neighborhood disorder. Respondents are asked to answer ‘1=yes’ or ‘0=no’ to whether the following conditions exist in their neighborhood: ‘abandoned buildings/cars’, ‘rundown/neglected buildings’, ‘poor lighting’, ‘overgrown trees/shrubs’, ‘trash’, ‘empty lots’, ‘public drinking/drug use’, ‘public drug sales’, ‘vandalism/graffiti’, ‘prostitution’, ‘panhandling/begging’, ‘loitering/hanging out’, ‘truancy/youth skipping school’, and ‘transient/homeless populations sleeping on the streets of the neighborhood’.¹⁸

To determine the extent of commonality between the disorder items, numerous principal components analyses using a varimax rotation were performed. These analyses were based upon the neighborhood disorder literature which suggests that there are different forms of disorder (see Skogan, 1990). The NCVS 12 Cities data includes measures of two types of disorder—physical decay (i.e. abandoned buildings) and social disorder (i.e. prostitution). The principal components analyses yielded two components (see Data_Measures Appendix for results).¹⁹ The first, *Disorder*, consists of ‘abandoned buildings/cars’, ‘rundown/neglected buildings’, ‘public drinking/drug use’, ‘public drug sales’, ‘loitering/hanging out’, and ‘truancy/youth skipping school’. ‘Panhandling/begging’ and ‘transient/homeless populations sleeping on the streets of the neighborhood’ loaded well together; this component is labeled *Homeless/Transients*. The component regression scores of these summary indices are used in the multivariate analyses.

¹⁸ Originally, the value for ‘yes’ equaled 1 and ‘no’ equaled 2. Also responses to all neighborhood-related questions included ‘blank’, ‘don’t know’, and ‘refused’ responses but they are ignored in the statistical procedures.

¹⁹ Six of the disorder items, however, did not load well with the other disorder items regardless of the combination considered: poor lighting, overgrown trees/shrubs, trash, empty lots, vandalism/graffiti, and prostitution.

In addition to questions on disorder, respondents are asked about their satisfaction with the quality of life in their neighborhood, how fearful they are of crime in the neighborhood and if they perceive that there is serious crime in the neighborhood. The values for 'satisfaction with the quality of life in the neighborhood' are as follows: 1=very satisfied, 2=satisfied, 3=dissatisfied and 4=very dissatisfied. Similarly, the scale for 'fear of crime' was coded so that the values were 1 (not at all fearful), 2 (not very fearful), 3 (somewhat fearful) and 4 (very fearful).²⁰ Lastly, respondents are asked to answer '1=yes', '2=no' or '3=not aware of any in current area' to whether there is serious crime (*Serious Crime*) in their neighborhood.²¹ Based on results from principal component analyses with varimax rotations, 'satisfaction with the quality of life in the neighborhood' and 'fear of crime in the neighborhood' load well together.²² Therefore, a summary index of these two items was created and labeled *Poor Neighborhood Quality* (see Data_Measures Appendix for results). The component regression scores of this summary index are used in the multivariate analyses.²³ The descriptive statistics on all of the neighborhood measures are shown in Table 1.3.

TABLE 1.3 ABOUT HERE

City-Level Measures

There are two measures of city structure: residential segregation and economic equality. The Index of Dissimilarity (D) is used as the measure of residential segregation. The values of D range from 0 to 100 and illustrate the degree to which racial/ethnic

²⁰ The variables were originally coded in the reverse order and were changed so that they were comparable to the question on satisfaction with the quality of life in the neighborhood.

²¹ In the multivariate analyses, serious crime was coded so that 'yes' responses were given a value of 1 and 'no' or 'not aware of any in current area' responses were given a value of 0.

²² As with disorder, various combinations of principal component analyses with varimax rotations were performed. 'Serious crime in the neighborhood' did not load well with 'satisfaction with the quality of life in the neighborhood' and 'fear of crime' in the neighborhood.

²³ The results of all the factor analyses are presented in Appendix A.

TABLE 1.3. NCVS 12 Cities Neighborhood Conditions, 1998

	Mean	Median	Standard Dev.
<i>Neighborhood Disorder</i>			
Abandoned cars and/or buildings	0.22	0.00	0.41
Rundown/neglected buildings	0.21	0.00	0.41
Poor lighting	0.27	0.00	0.44
Overgrown trees/shrubs	0.18	0.00	0.39
Trash	0.23	0.00	0.42
Empty lots	0.19	0.00	0.40
Public drinking/drug use	0.29	0.00	0.45
Public drug sales	0.24	0.00	0.43
Vandalism or graffiti	0.40	0.00	0.49
Prostitution	0.10	0.00	0.30
Panhandling/begging	0.35	0.00	0.48
Loitering/Hanging out	0.43	0.00	0.50
Truancy/youth skipping school	0.28	0.00	0.45
Transient/homeless sleeping on streets	0.29	0.00	0.45
<i>Fear of Crime</i>	2.27	2.00	0.87
<i>Satisfaction w/Quality of Life</i>	1.95	2.00	0.74
<i>Serious Crime</i>	1.72	2.00	0.65
<i>Summary Indices[‡]</i>			
Disorder	0.00	-0.62	1.00
Homeless/Transients	0.00	-0.66	1.00
Poor Neighborhood Quality	0.00	-0.15	1.00

Source: All descriptive statistics are based on the weighted sample of the 12 Cities survey (ICPSR 2743).

[‡] The descriptive statistics for the indices regression scores are shown.

groups are spread across census tracts in the city. For example, the index of dissimilarity for blacks and whites in Chicago is 85.2, which illustrates that 85.2% of whites or blacks must move into different census tracts in Chicago to be equally distributed throughout the city. Cities with D values between 0 and 30 are considered to have low levels of segregation. Those with values between 40 and 50 are considered moderately segregated. Cities with values of 60 or above are considered highly segregated.²⁴ The D values for each of the twelve cities are shown in Table 1.4.²⁵ The ratio of economic equality between whites and minorities across the twelve cities is shown in Table 1.5. The economic equality ratio is the proportion of one groups' median household income compared to that of the other group. For example, a ratio of .65 for black-to-white median household income indicates that the average black household lives in a neighborhood where the median household income is only 65% of that of the average white household income.

Lastly, four measures of city composition were gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau Summary File 1 and 3. The proportion of female-headed households in each city was obtained from Summary File 1. It represents the number of female-headed households with children under age 18 of the total number of households with children under age eighteen.²⁶ The other measures of city composition—the proportion below poverty, the proportion unemployed and the proportion below age 18—are derived from Summary File 3. The proportion living below poverty is the number of persons with

²⁴ This is the classification used by the American Communities Project at Brown University.

²⁵ In eight of the twelve cities, the index of Asian/white segregation is based on small population of Asians in the city. Therefore, the Asian/white segregation index will not be used in any of the statistical analyses but are presented to simply show the extent of segregation between minorities and whites in the twelve cities.

²⁶ These are the householders' own children.

incomes in 1999 below the poverty-level of the total number of persons for whom poverty status is determined. The proportion unemployed is the number of persons over age 16 that are unemployed of the total population that is over age 16. The proportion below age 18 is the number of persons less than 18 years of age of the total population. These measures are shown in Table 1.6.

TABLE 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 ABOUT HERE

Non-Fatal & Fatal Victimization Measures

The rates of non-fatal and fatal victimization are shown in Table 1.7 and 1.8, respectively. The rates of non-fatal victimization represent the number of victimization incidents that occurred per 1000 persons in the city. The homicide rates are the number of murder victims per 100,000 persons in the city.

TABLE 1.7 & 1.8 ABOUT HERE

Only non-fatal victimizations²⁷ are recorded in the 12 Cities survey. Non-fatal violent victimizations include rape, sexual assault, robbery, simple and aggravated assault. Property victimizations consist of household burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. These same victimizations are recorded in the traditional NCVS. However, a 12-month reference period on victimization experiences is used in the 12 Cities survey, which differs from the 6-month reference period used in the traditional NCVS.

The homicide rates for the twelve cities are derived from the Uniform Crime Reports and are presented in the NCVS 12 Cities report (see Smith et al., 1998). They are included solely as a means by which to compare the city conditions/homicide

²⁷ This includes attempted and completed victimizations.

TABLE 1.4. Residential Segregation Across the 12 Cities, 2000 (American Communities Project at Brown University)

City	Blacks from Whites	Hispanics from Whites	Asians from Whites
Chicago, IL	85.2	59.2	46.8†
Kansas City, MO	66.7	50.5	32.7
Knoxville, TN	55.0	20.1†	37.3†
Los Angeles, CA	71.5	65.6	44.9
Madison, WI	35.2‡	26.6‡	32.7‡
New York, NY	83.2	67.1	49.2
San Diego, CA	60.7‡	60.1	47.6
Savannah, GA	54.9	30.3‡	21.5‡
Spokane, WA	24.9†	15.3†	15.8†
Springfield, MA	46.5	48.8	36.8†
Tucson, AZ	29.4†	50.0	20.6†
Washington, DC	79.4	59.4†	25.7†
‡Mean	57.7	46.1	34.3
Median	57.9	50.2	34.8
Standard Dev.	20.6	18.2	11.5

Source: American Communities Project at Brown University website; the Index of Dissimilarity is presented.

† Index is based on a small percentage (less than 10%) of this minority group in the city.

‡ The mean, median and standard deviation are based on an 'n' of 12.

TABLE 1.5. Economic Equality Across the 12 Cities, 2000 (Lewis Mumford Center)

City	Blacks to Whites	Hispanics to Whites	Asians to Whites
Chicago, IL	0.63	0.75	0.85†
Kansas City, MO	0.63	0.72	0.83
Knoxville, TN	0.71	0.91†	0.82†
Los Angeles, CA	0.56	0.57	0.71
Madison, WI	0.88†	0.86†	0.79†
New York, NY	0.61	0.60	0.81
San Diego, CA	0.68†	0.68	0.98
Savannah, GA	0.73	0.91†	0.92†
Spokane, WA	0.79†	0.89†	0.93†
Springfield, MA	0.78	0.65	0.89†
Tucson, AZ	0.93†	0.86	0.92†
Washington, DC	0.53	0.69†	0.81†
‡Mean	0.71	0.76	0.86
Median	0.70	0.74	0.84
Standard Dev.	0.12	0.12	0.08

Source: Lewis Mumford Center, 2002; ratios based on 2000 Census data.

† Ratio is based on a small percentage (less than 10%) of this minority group in the city.

‡ The mean, median, and standard deviation are based on an 'n' of 12.

TABLE 1.6. City Composition Across the 12 Cities, 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau)

City	% Below Poverty	% Unemployed	% Female Headed Households*	% Below 18 Years
Chicago, IL	19.6%	6.2%	34.5%	26.1%
Kansas City, MO	14.3	4.2	34.8	21.4
Knoxville, TN	20.8	3.9	35.1	19.7
Los Angeles, CA	22.1	5.6	24.5	26.5
Madison, WI	15.0	3.5	22.6	17.5
New York, NY	21.2	5.5	34.8	24.1
San Diego, CA	14.6	3.8	21.7	20.3
Savannah, GA	21.8	4.7	43.5	25.5
Spokane, WA	15.9	5.7	28.4	24.6
Springfield, MA	23.1	5.0	47.8	28.8
Tucson, AZ	18.4	3.6	29.3	24.4
Washington, DC	20.2	6.8	50.0	20.0
‡Mean	18.9	4.9	33.9	23.2
Median	19.9	4.9	34.7	24.3
Standard Dev.	3.2	1.1	9.4	3.4

Source: Based on data from the Summary File 1 and Summary File 3 of the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau.

* Based on households with related children under 18 years.

‡ The mean, median, and standard deviation are based on an 'n' of 12.

TABLE 1.7. NCVS 12 Cities' Rates of Non-Lethal Victimization, by Race of the Victim, 1998

City	Total Population Age 12 & Older†	Rates per 1000 persons Violence			Rates per 1000 Households Property		
		All	Whites	Blacks	All	Whites	Blacks
Chicago	2,237,203	68	66	50	433	394	478
Kansas City	366,351	61	58	58	331	293	465
Knoxville	138,066	70	70	-	314	316	295
Los Angeles	2,954,058	65	62	114	347	308	503
Madison	164,987	70	75	-	322	327	395
New York	6,116,941	85	55	123	260	255	311
San Diego	982,314	63	64	-	308	300	416
Savannah	112,349	81	75	91	445	437	440
Spokane	156,428	67	60	-	411	398	953
Springfield	122,501	78	69	85	365	349	468
Tucson	380,067	82	78	-	432	425	425
D.C.	436,151	60	52	67	445	513	383
Total	14,167,416	75	61	99	326	311	387

Source: Smith et al (1998). "Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety". Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice.

†Based on the weighted sample of the 12 Cities survey (ICPSR 2743)

- Fewer than 10 cases reported in survey.

TABLE 1.8. NCVS 12 Cities' Rates of Lethal Victimization, by Race of the Victim†, 1997

City	Homicide Rate per 100,000 Persons		
	All	Whites	Blacks
Chicago, IL	27.4	7.4	19.0
Kansas City, MO	22.1	7.2	15.5
Knoxville, TN	10.8	--	--
Los Angeles, CA	16.3	10.2	5.2
Madison, WI	1.5	--	--
New York, NY	10.5	4.2	5.3
San Diego, CA	5.7	3.4	1.9
Savannah, GA	18.1	--	--
Spokane, WA	5.4	--	--
Springfield, MA	6.0	--	--
Tucson, AZ	10.3	8.3	2.1
Washington, D.C.	56.9	2.7	47.4

Source: Smith et al (1998). "Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety". Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice.

†Racially disaggregated homicide rates are gathered from the Bureau of Justice Statistics website.

- Racially disaggregated homicide data is not available via the Bureau of Justice Statistics website.

relationship to that of city conditions and non-fatal victimization. The following chapter discusses these relationships.

Chapter 3. The Relationship between City Conditions and Non-Fatal Victimization

The first goal of the dissertation is three fold: (1) to explore the relationship between city conditions²⁸ and rates of non-fatal victimization, (2) to assess whether city conditions have a similar effect on fatal and non-fatal forms of victimization and (3) to examine whether there are differences in these relationships across racial groups. In addressing these goals, two sets of analyses were conducted. First, scatterplots were examined to assess the extent of non-linearity between city conditions and victimization and to identify possible outliers. Secondly, the linear relationship between city conditions and non-lethal victimization is examined using the Pearson's correlation coefficient (or *Pearson's r*). These results are then compared to those related to homicide, which has been studied more at the macro level. Because the cities included in the analyses are different in many respects—from their population size to their location in the country to their racial/ethnic composition, etc.—it is imperative to first begin with a detailed description of each.

THE TWELVE CITIES

The unit of analysis in this examination is the city as opposed to the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or metropolitan area (MA). As noted in Chapter 2, the NCVS 12 Cities data is a sample of households within cities; therefore, at this level indicators of city characteristics are studied. Furthermore, MSAs or MAs typically include cities but are not limited to them. They also contain surrounding communities that are economically and socially tied to the city. The areas included in MSA/MAs can be quite

²⁸ City conditions generally refer to residential segregation and economic equality between minorities and whites, and levels of unemployment, female headed households, poverty, and underage populations within cities.

distant from one another and even cross state lines. On the other hand, a city is simply defined as an incorporated place within a state.²⁹ In contrast to MSA/MAs, the city provides a more distinct and precise depiction of an area. Because the purpose of the study is to assess the character of the cities and how it may relate to victimization, limiting the study to the city as opposed to considering the entire metropolitan area may be more beneficial.³⁰ In the following sections, a historical examination of each city including their origins, changing demographic and socioeconomic conditions and crime rates are provided.³¹ The city-level measures used in the analyses are indicators of conditions in the city in the late 1990s and 2000. While important, these data do not provide a comprehensive picture of the city nor fully capture the similarities and/or differences between them. Many of the proposed city-level measures such as residential segregation between groups are tied to the history and population trends of the cities. Therefore, it is essential to first provide a detailed description of each of the twelve cities, which will help to explain the findings of the analyses.

Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C., which is surrounded by the states of Maryland and Virginia, has served as the nation's capital since 1800. As such, it is home to the federal government and located in the city boundaries are notable government agencies and buildings such as the Capitol of the United States, the Federal Trade Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the National Archives Building, the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and

²⁹ See the glossary section of the United States Census Bureau at <http://www.census.gov>.

³⁰ The importance of using MSA/MA data is not minimized. In fact, if city context in relation to victimization does matter then examining MSA/MAs is certainly warranted.

³¹ While including the changes in the victimization rates of each city would have been ideal, such data could not be found. Therefore, UCR crime data for the each city is provided.

the White House. Also notable is the relatively small size of the city. At its inception the city was only 10 square miles but has grown to approximately 61 square miles. In spite of its small geographic area, the city's population places it among the largest cities in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998; U.S. Census Bureau 2000). The population peaked at 802,178 in 1950 and Census estimates between 1950 and 1960 indicate that the number of black residents grew by approximately 50%, making Washington, D.C. a majority-minority city; however, the white population had decreased 33% during this period (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). Some have attributed the city's Southern location and increased suburbanization among the white middle-class after World War II to the significant growth in the number of black residents in D.C.³²

Since the peak in 1950, the city population declined each subsequent decade and by 2000 it had dwindled to 572,059 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Important shifts also occurred among the non-Latino white and non-Latino black population between 1980 and 2000. The percent of white residents in the city increased slightly from 25.7% in 1980 to 27.8% by 2000 but the black population declined. In 1980, nearly 70% of the city population was non-Latino black but by 2000 it had dropped to 60.5%. Furthermore, the number of Hispanics and Asians increased. The Hispanic population rose from a low of 2.8% in 1980 to nearly 8% by 2000. Likewise, the percent Asian increased from 1% in 1980 to 3% in 2000.³³

These demographic changes are important because they have been linked to social conditions in the city. In 2000, nearly 20% of the city residents lived below the poverty

³² See also Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia (<http://encarta.msn.com>), "Washington, D.C.".

³³ See Lewis Mumford Center website (<http://mumford1.dynds.org>).

level and 6.8% were unemployed.³⁴ These percentages supersede national estimates for the same year—12.4% had incomes below the poverty level and 3.7% were unemployed.³⁵ Although the levels of poverty and unemployment increased for whites, blacks, Hispanics and Asians between 1990 and 2000, the proportions were much higher among minority groups and especially blacks than they were among whites in the city. For example, by 2000 the percent living below poverty was 23.7% for blacks, 18.1% for Hispanics, and 16.3% for Asians compared to 11.3% for whites. Similarly, the respective percent unemployed among blacks and Hispanics and Asians was 13.5% and 7.4%. Yet only 5.4% of whites were jobless in 2000.

In spite of the high levels of poverty and unemployment among D.C.³⁶ residents, the city has a high percent of persons that are college-educated and working in professional occupations. The estimates for 2000 show that 39.1% of D.C. residents have received Bachelor's degrees or higher compared to 24.4% for the nation.³⁷ Also, nearly half of D.C. residents are professionally employed while only 33.6% of U.S. residents work in professional occupations.³⁸ These high levels are not surprising since white-collar employment via government and related agencies increased dramatically during the 1980s.³⁹ The proportion college-educated and employed in professional occupations increased for all noted racial and ethnic groups between 1990 and 2000. Still, even in 2000, the percent college-educated among blacks was far behind that for whites, Asians

³⁴ See Table 6 in the Data_Measures Chapter.

³⁵ The percentages are provided by the U.S. Census Bureau's American Fact Finder website.

³⁶ Washington, D.C. is commonly referred to as D.C. since the city (Washington) boundaries are identical to that of the area or the District of Columbia (D.C.)

³⁷ These estimates are for the city and national population age 25 and older.

³⁸ The percentages are provided by the U.S. Census Bureau's American Fact Finder website. Professional employment/occupation refers to the Census-designated category 'management, professional, and related occupations'.

³⁹ See MSN Encarta, "Washington, D.C.".

and Hispanics: 71% of whites, 64.4% of Asians and 44.3% of Hispanics in the city were college-educated compared to only 21.4% of blacks. Blacks and Hispanics were similarly disadvantaged in terms of employment in professional occupations compared to whites and Asians. While nearly 70% of white residents and 63.3% of Asian residents were employed in professional occupations, approximately 27% of blacks and 22.6% of Hispanics worked in professional areas.⁴⁰

Taken together, D.C. appears to be occupied by the very affluent and the very poor; the gap between the two groups is also divided among racial and ethnic lines. The proportion of blacks that are impoverished, unemployed, college educated, and working in professional occupations compared to their racial and ethnic counterparts in D.C. is troubling. Considering their social status in D.C., it is not surprising that between 1990 and 2000, the median household income improved for all groups except for blacks. Their median household income of \$34,248 is substantially lower than that of whites (\$64,256), Asians (\$52,207), and Hispanics (\$44,126). These disparities have equated in neighborhood differences especially between the two largest groups in the city—blacks and whites. The index of dissimilarity, a common measure of residential segregation, for black/white segregation in D.C. has been exceptionally high over the past two decades increasing from 76.8 in 1980 to 79.4 by 2000. The most current index illustrates that 79.4% of either the black or white population would have to move into different census tracts in order for the two groups to be equally distributed in neighborhoods throughout the city.⁴¹

⁴⁰ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁴¹ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

The inequitable social conditions in the city correspond with its increased homicide rate during the 1990s. Prior to this decade, D.C.'s homicide rate was comparable to that of other large cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago (see Smith et al, 1998: 9; Wilson, 1987: 24). Yet in 1991 its homicide rate peaked at 80.6 per 100,000 persons; 93.8% of these victims were black. By 1997, the homicide rate dropped to 56.9 per 100,000; still over 90% of the victims were black. The city was also devastated by increases non-lethal violent crime during the 1990s. The violent crime rate peaked at 2843.3 per 100,000 in 1993 but has since declined, reaching 1289.5 per 100,000 in 2004. This was the lowest rate recorded for the city since 1985.⁴²

Chicago, IL

The populous city of Chicago also places it among the largest in the country and in the Midwest region. It was first explored in 1673 by Canadian explorer and mapmaker Louis Jolliet and French-born Jesuit missionary Father Jacques Marquette. However, it was not until the 1770s, when Haitian trader Jean Baptiste Point du Sable established a trading post in the area that non-Natives actually settled in Chicago. As a port city, Chicago's early economy centered on trade and shipping. It was incorporated as a city in 1837 and shortly thereafter was nearly destroyed in The Great Fire of 1871 which ruined its business district. However, the city was rebuilt in 1875 and grew exponentially during the city's industrial boom as European immigrants and later black migrants from the South flocked to the area. The growth in the number of canals and railways during this

⁴² The rates of homicide and violent crime for each city are provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Crime and Justice Data Online website: <http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/>. The violent crime rate is comprised of the forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault rate per 100,000 persons in the city. It is based on crime data provided by the city's police department via the Uniform Crime Reporting program.

period also aided in the city's development; in fact, Chicago is often credited with having the most extensive transportation system in the country. The population doubled from 503,185 in 1880 to 1,099,850 in 1890 and continued to grow in subsequent decades until 1950 following the period of deindustrialization. Furthermore, the city was devastated by periods of political corruption and race riots during the early 1900s. Despite the subsequent declines, Chicago is the third largest city in the United States and boasted a population of 2,896,016 residents in 2000.⁴³

Unlike D.C., Chicago is more racially and ethnically diverse. According to the 2000 Census, the majority of city residents are non-Hispanic black (36.9%) and non-Hispanic whites constitute the second largest group in the city (31.3%). Chicago also has a sizable number of Hispanic residents; they make-up 26% of the city populace. Yet, as was the case with D.C., the plight of black residents in the city compared to other racial and ethnic groups is disturbing. The processes of deindustrialization and suburbanization following World War II have certainly impacted poor Chicago residents, and namely blacks. Wilson (1987: 12) points out that in Chicago (and other major industrial cities) "blacks have been severely hurt by deindustrialization because of their heavy concentration in the automobile, rubber, steel, and other smokestack industries". The decline in these jobs and relocation of the middle-class to the suburbs has resulted in the social and economic isolation of extremely poor blacks in the central city. The isolation indices for black Chicagoans in 1980, 1990 and 2000 are extremely high, exceeding a value of 80, which indicate that for each of these decades the average black in the city

⁴³ All historic information on the city is derived from its official website: <http://www.ci.chi.il.us/city/webportal/home.do> and MSN Encarta, an on-line encyclopedia.

lived in a neighborhood that was over 80% black (see Massey and Denton, 1993; also see Lewis Mumford Center website).

While economic conditions improved for all groups between 1990 and 2000, the figures for blacks were notably different from those for whites, Hispanics and Asians. Their median household income increased from \$27,488 in 1990 to \$31,199 in 2000. However, their 2000 median household income was less than the 1990 median household income for Hispanics (\$31,482) and Hispanics' median household income in 2000 was nearly \$6,000 greater than the median household income of blacks in 2000. The differences are even greater when blacks' median household income is compared to that of whites and Asians. In 2000, the Asian median household income was over \$11,000 greater and the white median household income was about \$18,400 more than blacks'. Although the proportion below poverty and unemployed decreased between 1990 and 2000 among all racial and ethnic groups considered, the disparities between whites' and blacks' rates are staggering. By 2000, blacks were nearly two and a half times more likely than whites to be impoverished and about three times more likely than whites to be unemployed.⁴⁴

The peaks in homicide for the city tend to coincide with periods of recession (see Wilson, 1987: 22-23). Since blacks are the most economically disadvantaged group, it is not surprising that they more often are the victims of homicide. The latest peak in homicide for the city occurred in 1992 at 33.1 per 100,000. Specifically, in this year there were 939 homicides recorded by the Chicago Police Department and nearly 80% of the victims were black. There have been declines in the city's homicide rate, and thus the homicide victimization rate among blacks, following 1992. By 2000, the homicide rate

⁴⁴ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

had dropped to 21.8 per 100,000 and almost 75% of the victims were black.⁴⁵ The violent crime rate also rose in the 1990s. It peaked at 3059.6 per 100,000 in 1991 but declined each year since and by 2004 had reached its lowest in the past 19 years—1202.3 per 100,000.⁴⁶

Kansas City, MO

Settlement by whites in the area now known as Kansas City increased in 1821 when Frenchman Francois Chouteau established a trading post there. This same year Missouri was admitted into the Union and by 1853 the city was incorporated by the state. At this time the city was only a square mile but had a population of 2,500 people. The geographic area increased and the population grew to approximately 60,000 residents in the late 1800s. Specifically, in 1869 the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Bridge was completed, making it the first bridge to cross the Missouri River. Also by 1881, Kansas City had over 15 railroads that serviced the area. Consequently, the city's economy boomed during the 20th century as stockyards and manufacturing plants increased.⁴⁷

The number of residents grew steadily until 1970 when it declined from 507,087 to 435,146 by 1990.⁴⁸ The drop during this period has been attributed to an increase in suburbanization among residents and particularly, whites. Although the rates of suburbanization increased among blacks and whites between 1970 and 1980, nearly 60%

⁴⁵ The rate is calculated by dividing the number homicides in 2000 as reported by the Chicago Illinois Police Department (see BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website) by the total population for the city of Chicago per the U.S. Census Bureau. This number was then multiplied by 100,000 to obtain the rate per 100,000. The percent of black victims was provided by BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

⁴⁶ The homicide and violent crime rates, except where noted, are provided by BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

⁴⁷ All historic information is derived from the city's official website, www.kcmo.org, and Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia (see <http://encarta.msn.com>).

⁴⁸ The population counts for 1970 are based on Census figures and are provided by Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page). The 1990 population is also based on Census data and is provided by the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research.

of white residents lived in suburban areas compared to only 4.8% among blacks in the metropolitan area in 1980 (Massey and Denton, 1993: 68). It is important to note that the population in the city did increase between 1990 and 2000 but this is most likely the result of annexation laws, which have allowed the city to encompass many surrounding suburbs.⁴⁹ Still, the white population continued to decline between these decades, falling from 65% in 1990 to 57.6% in 2000. Yet, during this same time the number of black, Hispanic and Asian residents increased. In 1990 blacks were 29.4% of the city populous but their proportion grew to 32% by 2000. The Hispanic population increased from 3.9% in 1980 to 6.9% by 2000. Lastly, though they are a relatively small group, the number of Asian residents nearly tripled from 3,499 in 1980 to 9,963 in 2000.⁵⁰

Though there were socioeconomic improvements for residents between 1990 and 2000, the disparities between whites and minorities remain vast. This is because the social indicators for whites in 1990 were substantially better than those for minorities. By 2000, not only had their social status advanced but in many cases, the gap between whites and minorities widened. For instance, median household income increased for all racial and ethnic groups between 1990 and 2000 but the increase for whites was \$4450 as opposed to \$3129 for blacks, \$2989 for Asians and \$2091 for Hispanics. By 2000, the median white household income was \$45,246 compared to \$28,393 among blacks, \$32,440 among Hispanics and \$37,456 among Asians .

As the Hispanic and Asian population grew, disparities between Hispanics and whites and Asians and whites actually increased. The Hispanic-to-white poverty level ratio increased from 1.88 to 1.99. The ratio of Hispanic/white unemployment also grew

⁴⁹ This information was provided by Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia, (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page) and MSN Encarta.

⁵⁰ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

to 1.92 in 2000 compared to 1.56 in 1990. Similarly, the Asian-to-white unemployment ratio increased from 1.20 in 1990 to 1.39 in 2000. Though the Asian/white poverty level ratio dropped between 1990 and 2000, Asians were still 1.57 times more likely than whites to be impoverished in 2000 . Because Hispanic and Asian segregation from whites, in particular, has been linked to their economic status, it is not surprising that their level of neighborhood integration with whites declined between 1990 and 2000 (see Massey & Denton, 1987; Logan et al, 2004; Fischer et al, 2004⁵¹). During this time, the dissimilarity index of Hispanic/white segregation increased 7.8 points to 50.5 in 2000. Also, the percent white in their communities decreased from 63.7% to 52.9%. Between 1990 and 2000, the Asian/white segregation index decreased slightly but because there are fewer Asians compared to other racial and ethnic groups their integration into predominantly white communities may be easier. Still the percent of white residents in the average neighborhood that Asians reside in declined from 73.4% in 1990 to 64.8% in 2000.⁵²

Though relatively unchanged, the greatest discrepancies are found between blacks and whites. In 1990 and 2000, blacks were over two times more likely than whites to live below the poverty level (2.42 and 2.26 for each respective year) and be unemployed (2.28 and 2.41 for each respective year). In 1990 and 2000 their median household income was approximately 60% that of whites' median household income. In spite of the economic disparities between these groups, the black/white dissimilarity index did decrease from 70.8 in 1990 to 66.7 in 2000. It is important to note, however, that the 2000 index is still

⁵¹ Fischer et al (2004) include Non-Hispanic whites and blacks, Hispanics and individuals who are “foreign born” in their study. Those who are foreign born include Asians but this category is not restricted solely to Asians.

⁵² See Lewis Mumford Center website.

very high and demonstrates that blacks and whites tend to live separate from one another. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the drop in black/white segregation in the city is the result of the declining white population in the city between 1990 and 2000 or is truly an indicator of neighborhood integration between the groups.

At any rate, homicide and violent crime rates increased in the city during the 1990s. In 1993, homicides in Kansas City peaked at 35.1 per 100,000. Nearly 72% of the victims in this year were black. The violent crime rate also peaked the previous year at 2,824.7 per 100,000. Since these peaks, there have been substantive decreases in the murder and violent crime rate. By 2002 the murder rate had reached a low of 18.5 per 100,000 and 62.7% of the victims were black, which is a notable decline from the 1993 figures. In 2004, the violent crime rate had also dropped to 1423.9 per 100,000, which was lower than the rate in 1985.⁵³

Knoxville, TN

In 1786, James White became the first known white settler in the valley region located between the Cumberland Mountains and the Great Smoky Mountains. Five years later the Cherokee Indians, via treaty, relinquished their rights to the land. William Blount, the governor of the Southwest Territory, named the area Knoxville for President Washington's War Secretary Henry Knox. He also established the location that James White settled in as the capital of the territory. Knoxville was incorporated as a city in 1815 and by 1818 it had served as the capital of the territory and the state of Tennessee. Because of its location near the Tennessee River and the expansion of railroad services in the area, Knoxville grew as a distribution center during the 1800s.

⁵³ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

However, the advent of the American Civil War divided Knoxville and like many other Southern cities it became a battleground between Union and Confederate troops. By the early 1900s, Knoxville was rebuilt as commercial and industrial development increased in the area following the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933. The TVA was developed by the federal government in an effort to improve the conditions of the entire Tennessee River Valley region, including Knoxville. The valley was one of the most impoverished and underdeveloped areas in the country at the time. The TVA was responsible for providing cost-efficient electrical power to residents and local businesses. Knoxville's city limits were also expanded during this time and by 1982 it hosted the World's Fair.⁵⁴

In spite of these efforts to improve the economic conditions of the city, the population declined by almost 10,000 between 1980 and 1990 . Moreover, nearly 21% of the city population lived below the poverty level in 1990; compared to only 13.1% for the entire nation the same year.⁵⁵ By 2000, the city's poverty status had remained unchanged. However, the population did grow to 173,890 from 165,121 in 1990. The increase was due to the growing proportions of non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics and Asians in the city. The non-Latino white population was still the majority in 2000 but after their decline between 1980 and 1990 their proportion had dropped notably from almost 84% in 1980 to 79% in 2000. Nearly 17% of the city residents were black and Hispanics and Asians made up less than 2% of the population, respectively, in 2000.

⁵⁴ The historical background of the city was gathered from the official website of the city of Knoxville (<http://www.cityofknoxville.org/>) and from Wikipedia and MSN Encarta, on-line encyclopedias.

⁵⁵ The 1990 percent below poverty for the city and the nation are derived by dividing the number of residents living below the poverty level by the number of residents for whom poverty status is determined. The data used to calculate the percentages are gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Fact Finder website.

The growth in the number of minority residents in Knoxville corresponds with heightened levels of neighborhood integration. There was a 14-point drop in the level of black/white segregation as the dissimilarity index fell from 69.1 in 1980 to 55 in 2000. Similarly, the Hispanic/white dissimilarity index decreased nine points during this period and by 2000 was remarkably low at 20.1. Lastly, the level of Asians segregation from whites declined 10 points reaching 37.3 in 2000.⁵⁶

Consequently, the decline in segregation has produced somewhat of a paradox in terms of the social status of minorities and whites in the city. While the heightened level of desegregation in Knoxville did correspond with improved socioeconomic conditions for minorities, the disparities between whites and minorities remain large and in some cases unchanged. The most obvious improvement was in the median household incomes of minority groups. Between 1990 and 2000, Asians' and Hispanics' median household income increased by \$2655 and \$3123, respectively. The median household income among blacks, which was less than that of the other minority groups, rose by \$2383. However, the median household income among whites only increased by \$1186. As a result, the income gap between whites and these groups narrowed by 2000—Hispanics' median household income was 91% that of whites', Asians' median household income was 82% that of whites', and blacks' median household income was 71% that of whites'. On the other hand, the proportion of blacks, Hispanics and Asians living below the poverty level remained high despite declines for all groups since 1990. In 2000, nearly 32% of blacks, 23% of Hispanics and 29% of Asians were impoverished compared to

⁵⁶ The dissimilarity indices for Hispanic/white and Asian/white segregation should be viewed with caution. The index measures the evenness in the spatial distribution of the two groups without taking into account the relative size of the groups. This is also the case with other sampled cities when the minority populations are relatively small compared to the white population.

19% among whites. Also, the discrepancies in minority/white unemployment grew slightly for all groups between 1990 and 2000 with the most notable differences being between blacks and whites. Blacks were almost twice as likely as whites to be unemployed in 1990 and 2000. Furthermore, the percent of Hispanics and Asians who were college educated and professionally employed declined during these decades. In 1990, both groups had higher proportions than did whites. By 2000, the percent college educated among Hispanics and whites were equal and whites were more likely to be professionally employed than were Hispanics. Asians were still more likely to be college educated and professionally employed than were whites in 2000 but the gaps between them declined. For example, in 1990 Asians were 1.89 times more likely than whites to be college educated but by 2000 the ratio had decreased to 1.53.⁵⁷

In sum, the decrease in segregation between whites and minorities was substantial and coincided with economic improvements for minority groups. However, the level of socioeconomic inequality between whites and minorities did not decline as rapidly as did the level of segregation in the city. In fact, improvements seemed to be slow-in-coming for blacks and in some ways stagnated among Hispanics and Asians. Though the waning segregation indices in Knoxville are promising, Massey and Denton (1993) caution that erroneous conclusions can be drawn if they are misinterpreted. They note that large scale declines in segregation indeed occurred in some small and mid-sized metropolitan areas in the south and west. However, because the minority populations in these areas are small, massive desegregation will be tolerated by whites since it typically does not result

⁵⁷ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

in high levels of contact between them and minorities.⁵⁸ In this sense, it is plausible that the declines in residential segregation in Knoxville are unrelated to the socioeconomic conditions among residents but instead reflect the increased likelihood of “an open housing market” when minority populations are relatively small compared to the white population of the city (Massey and Denton, 1993: 111; also see Jargowsky, 1997: 172-174).

Like other American cities, the homicide and violent crime rate in Knoxville also peaked during the 1990s. The murder rate was 20.9 per 100,000 persons in 1991 and was the highest rate recorded by the Knoxville Police Department between 1985 and 2004. By 1993, the homicide rate had dropped by nearly half to 8.2 per 100,000 persons. Surprisingly, the rate began to climb again in the following years and in 1998 it was 20 per 100,000, which is almost identical to the peak rate of 1991. Thereafter, the homicide rate declined and in 2004 had reached a low of 11.4 per 100,000 persons. In 1995, the violent crime rate peaked at 1838.3 per 100,000 residents but dropped in the 800s per 100,000 until 2000 when it surged up to 1069.6 per 100,000 persons. By 2004, the rate had dropped to 938.7 per 100,000 residents but was still higher than the 1985 rate of 604.6 per 100,000.⁵⁹ Only in those sampled cities of similar size—Madison, Savannah, Springfield, and Spokane—did homicide and violent crime rate peaks occur throughout the late 1990s and into the 2000s. Furthermore, unlike the other cities, their violent crime rates were higher in 2004 than they were in 1985.

Madison, WI

⁵⁸ In their discussion of desegregation in southern and western cities, Massey and Denton (1993) focus specifically on blacks' integration into white neighborhoods.

⁵⁹ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website. Racially disaggregated homicide data are not available for the Knoxville.

The area now known as the city of Madison was purchased in 1829 by James Duane Doty, a former federal judge, who bought the then 1,200 acre area for \$1,500. In 1836, he convinced the Wisconsin territory legislature to relocate the capital to the site he purchased. He named the area Madison after James Madison, the fourth President of the United States, who had died the same year. By 1848, the Village of Madison was incorporated and Wisconsin became a state. The population in Madison at the time was 626 but grew to 6,864 in 1856 and Madison became a city. Among the first settlers were migrants from eastern states. Soon after, German, Irish and Norwegian immigrants followed. The expansion of railroad services from Milwaukee and increased employment opportunities via the University of Wisconsin-Madison are credited with the city's growth during its formative years. As industrial development increased in the 1920s and government and educational facilities expanded during the 1960s and 1970s, Madison's populace continued to grow. In fact, the city is often credited with maintaining a residential atmosphere in spite of its commercial growth.⁶⁰

Consequently, the population of Madison continued to increase well into the late 1900s. The latest Census estimates indicate that of the 208,054 residents in the city, 82% are non-Latino white, 5.8% are non-Latino black, 4.1% are Hispanic and 6.4% are Asian. Despite its persistent growth, the proportion of whites in the city declined between 1980 and 2000. It is imperative to point out that the actual number of white residents did not decline but, in fact, increased from 159,513 in 1980 to 171,166 in 1990. Their numbers dropped slightly to 170,509 in 2000. However, the growth in the minority population was more rapid and steady between 1980 and 2000. The number of black residents more

⁶⁰ The historical information for Madison is derived from its official website, www.ci.madison.wi.us, and Wikipedia and MSN Encarta, both on-line encyclopedias.

than tripled (4576 to 13,891), the Hispanic population nearly quadrupled (2242 to 8512) and the number of Asian residents was five times greater (2688 to 13,361).⁶¹

The shifts in the racial and ethnic composition of the city correspond with changes in the social status and level of residential segregation among the groups. Between 1980 and 2000, the black/white and Hispanic/white dissimilarity index increased from 32.7 to 35.2 and 22.2 to 26.6, respectively. Ironically, these increased occurred during the time that socioeconomic conditions were improving for blacks and Hispanics. The income gap between these minorities and whites had decreased and by 2000 blacks' and Hispanics' median household income was 88% and 86% that of whites', respectively. The high earnings among blacks and Hispanics in relation to whites is not surprising given that Madison is a 'college-town' and a sizable proportion of residents are college-educated. By 2000, nearly 49% of whites, 40% of blacks and 47% of Hispanics were college-educated. Still the disparities between groups persisted. Although the percent living below the poverty level decreased for blacks and Hispanics between 1990 and 2000, blacks were still 1.25 times and Hispanics 1.41 times more likely than whites to be impoverished. Furthermore, the proportion unemployed increased for all groups and in 2000 nearly 6% of blacks and 5.4% of Hispanics were unemployed compared to 4.3% among whites.⁶²

Between 1980 and 1990, Asians were the most segregated from whites; their dissimilarity index increased from 40.3 to 43.9 between 1980 and 1990. However, by 2000 the index had dropped below that of black/white segregation to 32.7. Regardless of the shift toward desegregation, Asians were the most disadvantaged group. Though their

⁶¹ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁶² See Lewis Mumford Center website.

median household income increased from \$28,059 to \$34,973 between 1990 and 2000, it was lower than that of whites, blacks and Hispanics in both decades. Yet the increase narrowed the Asian/white income gap from 0.69 to 0.79. The proportion of Asians living below the poverty level also decreased from 33.8% in 1990 to 26.6% in 2000. Again, however, in both decades whites, blacks and Hispanics had lower proportions impoverished and in 2000 only about 20% of Hispanics, 18% of blacks and 14% of whites lived below the poverty level. Asians are just as likely as blacks (5.7% and 6%, respectively) but more likely than Hispanics and whites to be unemployed. The relatively poor socioeconomic conditions among Asians are especially troubling considering they were more likely than all other groups to be college-educated and professionally employed in 1990 and 2000. Although dropped from 62.3% to 58% during these decades, the proportion college-educated among Asians was 8.6% greater than whites, 18% greater than blacks, and 11% greater than Hispanics. Moreover, 51.4% of Asians worked in professional occupations in 2000 compared to 47.5% of whites, 40.9% of blacks, and 44.4% of Hispanics. It is important to note that the ratio of Asians/white professional employment dropped from 1.45 in 1990 to 1.17 in 2000 because the percent increased by nearly 3% for whites but less than 1% among Asians.⁶³

Madison has had relatively low violent crime and murder rates over the past twenty years. Still these rates peaked for the city during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Between 1985 and 2004, the highest homicide rates recorded for the city were 3.9 per 100,000 in 1989 and 3.7 in 2003. Likewise, the violent crime rate reached a high of 396.5 per 100,000 in 1991. Each year thereafter the rate dropped but rose again to 390.2 in 1996 and peaked at 431.4 the following year. In spite of declines over the next three

⁶³ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

years, the rate began increasing again and in 2004 was at 381.5 per 100,000. The 2004 rate was higher than the rate for 1985, which was 260.2 per 100,000.⁶⁴

Savannah, GA

The city of Savannah and the colony of Georgia were founded in 1733 by English General James Oglethorpe amid peaceful relations with the Yamacraws, a Native American tribe, who first inhabited the area. The city planning was sophisticated and designed so that each ward faced a central public square; each square varies and includes a range of things from public buildings and monuments to churches and parks. Currently, twenty-one of the twenty-four original squares have been preserved in the city's historic district.

As a port city on the Savannah River, the city's economy during its formative years was supported by silk, indigo and cotton production and export. European immigration, especially among Jews, increased in the 1730s and 1740s. The British seized control over the colony between 1778 and 1782 during the American Revolutionary War. Prior to and following the war, Savannah served as the capital of Georgia until 1786 and in 1789 became an incorporated city. Economic and social growth in the city was stunted when it was quarantined following a yellow fever epidemic in 1818. Savannah recovered the next year when the first steamship to cross the Atlantic Ocean sailed from its port. During the American Civil War, the city became a contentious battleground between Union and Confederate troops and in 1864 was overtaken by the Union. Following the war and during periods of urban development, many historic buildings and landmarks were destroyed between the 1870s and 1940s so efforts were undertaken by the Historic Savannah Foundation and the Savannah College

⁶⁴ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

of Art and Design to preserve the city. The college, which was founded in 1979, is credited for its renovation and reuse of many of the historic downtown facilities. Consequently, Savannah reinvented itself as a tourist attraction in the late 1990s. The current economy also relies on paper and aircraft production as Savannah is home to one of the largest paper mills, International Paper, and the Gulfstream Aerospace Company, which produces private jets.⁶⁵

Despite its tenacity, the population in Savannah has declined since 1980. At that time, the city had 141,387 residents and nearly 49% were non-Hispanic white and black, respectively. Hispanics and Asians respective populations were 1.3% and 0.7%. By 2000, the number of residents had dropped to 131,510. Nearly 38% were non-Latino white, 57% were non-Latino black, 2% were Hispanic and 1.8% were Asian. Residential segregation between whites and minorities also declined amid these changing demographics in the city. From 1980 to 2000, Hispanic/white segregation fell from 41.1 to 30.3 and Asian/white segregation declined 10 points to 21.5. Although still the most segregated groups, the most significant drop was among blacks and whites. Their dissimilarity index dropped from 73.8 to 54.9; a nearly 19-point decrease.⁶⁶

The changing face of residential segregation, especially among blacks and whites, in southern cities like Savannah is probably best explained by the historical context under which it occurred—the Jim Crow system:

...Jim Crow did not increase segregation, however, or reduce the frequency of black-white contact; it governed the terms under which integration occurred and strictly regulated the nature of interracial social contacts. Neighborhoods in many

⁶⁵ All historic information on the city is derived from MSN Encarta and Wikipedia, on-line encyclopedias.

⁶⁶ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

southern cities evolved a residential structure characterized by broad avenues interspersed with small streets and alleys. Large avenues contained white families, who employed black servants and laborers who lived on the smaller streets (Massey and Denton, 1993: 26).

By the 1980s and 1990s, in spite of lower levels of segregation compared to northern cities, housing segregation in southern metropolitan areas persisted via initiatives such as the development of black suburbs on the outskirts of urban areas or the expansion of white suburbs into areas inhabited by rural blacks (Massey and Denton, 1993).

It is not surprising then that socioeconomic disparities between whites and blacks persisted between 1990 and 2000 despite improved conditions for blacks. Hispanics and Asians were far more likely to have social statuses comparable to that of whites. In 2000, the median household income was \$35,865 for whites, \$33,169 for Asians, \$32,484 for Hispanics but it was only \$26,146 among blacks. Furthermore, blacks were 2.31 and 1.60 times more likely than whites to be impoverished in 1990 and 2000, respectively, although the proportion below poverty declined among blacks but not other racial and ethnic groups during this period. In contrast, after increases in their proportion impoverished, Hispanics were 1.19 times and Asians 1.17 times more likely than whites to live below the poverty level in 2000. Likewise, the percent unemployed decreased among blacks but rose among Hispanics, Asians and whites. Still, blacks were 1.73 times as likely as whites to be jobless in 2000. The ratios of Hispanic/white and Asian/white unemployment were much lower at 1.08 and 1.15, respectively.⁶⁷

The homicide and violent crime rate peaked in Savannah in 1991. The homicide rate was 42 per 100,000 persons and the violent crime rate was 1193.1 per 100,000

⁶⁷ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

persons. Even though these were the highest rates recorded between 1985 and 2004, there were subsequent increases in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The homicide rate fell dramatically to 16 per 100,000 in 1992 but by 1999 had increased again to 29.1 per 100,000. Similarly, the violent crime rate fluctuated throughout the 1990s, ranging from 1026.2 to 768.2 per 100,000, after the 1991 peak. However, by 2001 the rate rose to 1122.6 per 100,000 before dropping to 834.3 per 100,000 in 2004. The 2004 rate, though low, was still 143.9 greater than the 1985 rate.⁶⁸

Springfield, MA

The town of Springfield was founded in 1636 by Puritan leader and assistant treasurer of the Massachusetts Bay Colony William Pynchon, who named the town after his birthplace in England. The town was incorporated by 1641 but soon thereafter was attacked and much of it destroyed by Wampanoag Indians in retribution for the death of their leader during King Philip's War. The war was the result of disputes over land between English colonial leaders and Native Americans in the region. The town was moved to the east bank of the Connecticut River in an effort to avoid further conflict with Native Americans.

The early economy of the town centered on fur-trading and agriculture but quickly grew to be industrial following the development of water-powered mills along the river during the 18th century. The town also became the site of the U.S. National Armory and served as an important ammunition and weapon depot for the country during the American Revolution. The arsenal was unsuccessfully attacked in 1787 by Daniel

⁶⁸See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website. Racially disaggregated homicide data was not available for the city of Savannah.

Shays and other poor farmers in response to land seizures and excessive land taxes; the event became known as Shay's Rebellion.

The expansion of railroad services to Springfield in 1839 furthered its economy. Following Shay's Rebellion, the armory remained viable throughout the late 1800s and 1900s as gun manufacturing in the town increased. In fact, in 1852, the same year that Springfield became a city, the Smith and Wesson Company was founded. The company is the largest producer of handguns in the United States and its headquarters are still located in Springfield. Additionally, by the time that the federal armory closed in 1968 it had produced over nine million weapons and notable among them were the Springfield rifle and the M1 semiautomatic. The automobile and motorcycle industry also increased in the city by the late 19th century. Springfield is credited with producing the first gasoline-powered automobile (1893) and manufacturing the first motorcycle (1901) in the United States.⁶⁹

The city's population increased steadily over the following decades and peaked at 174,463 in 1960.⁷⁰ By 1980, the population had declined to 152,319, of which 73.8% were non-Hispanic white, 16.2% were non-Hispanic black, 9.1% were Hispanic and less than 1% were Asian. However, the population increased to 156,983 in 1990 but the number of white residents continued to decrease while the minority proportions grew. In 2000, the population dropped slightly and Springfield had 152,082 residents. Although still the majority, whites only made up 48.8% of the city populace in 2000. The Hispanic population nearly tripled since 1980 and in 2000 comprised 27.2% of city residents. The

⁶⁹ All historical information on the city was gathered from the city's official website, <http://www.cityofspringfieldmass.com/>, and MSN Encarta and Wikipedia, on-line encyclopedias.

⁷⁰ The population counts for 1960 are based on Census figures and are provided by Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia.

number of Asians in the city increased from 517 in 1980 to 3246 (or 2.1%) in 2000.

Lastly, the percent black also increased but to a lesser extent and in 2000 they constituted almost 21% of the city population.⁷¹

The level of residential segregation between minorities and whites also fluctuated between 1980 and 2000. The dissimilarity indices for black/white and Hispanic/white segregation declined during this period. The black/white index dropped from 64.3 to 46.5. Hispanics were more likely to be segregated from whites even after the Hispanic/white index fell from 69.2 to 48.8. Conversely, Asian/white segregation increased from 31.2 to 36.8 between 1980 and 2000.⁷²

From 1990 to 2000, the socioeconomic status of Hispanics and blacks improved but disparities between them and whites remained high. On the other hand, despite increased segregation from whites, Asians' social status remained relatively unchanged and similar to that of whites. Between 1990 and 2000, the ratio of Hispanic/white and black/white median household income increased and in 2000 was 0.65 and 0.78, respectively. Conversely, the Asian median household income in 1990 and 2000 was approximately 90% that of whites. Furthermore, poverty levels increased among whites and Asians but declined slightly among Hispanics and blacks during this time. Yet, Asians and whites were still less likely to be impoverished; 17.2% of whites, 23.1% of Asians, 34.2% of Hispanics and 27% of blacks lived below the poverty level. Though the percent unemployed dropped for all racial and ethnic groups, blacks and Hispanics were

⁷¹ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁷² Because the white population declined so much between 1980 and 2000, it is unclear whether the indices are a function of changing levels of residential segregation or the changing size of the white population. The decline in the white population was not as drastic in the other sampled cities as it was for Springfield.

more often unemployed in 2000: 7.5% of whites and 9.2% of Asians compared to 10.3% of blacks and 11.9% of Hispanics.⁷³

The homicide and violent crime rates also increased during the 1990s and into 2000. Although the city could be referred to as ‘gun capital’ of the country, its homicide rates are relatively low, even in the 1990s when gun-related homicides were particularly high.⁷⁴ The homicide rate peaked at 13 per 100,000 in 1993 and just two years later rose again to 12.7 per 100,000. Thereafter the murder rate declined until 1998 when it reached 11.3 per 100,000. Between 1999 and 2003, the rate fluctuated from 4.7 to 8.5 per 100,000. By 2004, it increased again to 11.2 per 100,000. The city’s violent crime rates however are comparable to that of larger cities. The rate first peaked at 2897.1 per 100,000 in 1992. The rate decreased until the late 1990s when it grew to its highest level—3069.5 per 100,000 in 1997—between 1985 and 2004. By 2000, the violent crime rate had dropped to 1829.9 per 100,000 but the following year it increased to 2247.3 per 100,000. The rate fell again to 1812.8 per 100,000 in 2004 but this rate was still higher than the rate of 1985 (1209.9 per 100,000).⁷⁵

Spokane, WA

European settlement increased in Spokane Falls (as it was then called) in the late 1881, when railroad services expanded in the area via the Northern Pacific Railway. The city derived its name from its original inhabitants, the Spokane Native Americans, and its location at the falls of the Spokane River. However, ten years later its name was changed to Spokane. During its formative years the city’s economy consisted of fur-trading but

⁷³ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁷⁴ See Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 1998 for discussion of the relationship between homicide trends and gun violence.

⁷⁵ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

later came to rely on local grain and lumber mills. Also, the city became an important shipping center for miners and farmers in the surrounding areas. Consequently, the population grew from 36,848 in 1900 to 104,402 in 1910. By 1942, with the completion of the Grand Coulee Dam, hydroelectricity became a source of inexpensive power for the city and resulted in its continued industrial growth throughout the late 1900s. In 1974, Spokane became the first small city to host the World's Fair and many of the structures built for the fair now serve as city attractions.⁷⁶

Spokane is currently the second largest city in Washington.⁷⁷ The city populace continued to increase between 1980 and 2000, with the number of residents growing from 171,300 to 195,629. In each of these decades, the majority (approximately 90%) of the population has been non-Hispanic white. However, since 1980 the non-Hispanic black and Hispanic population doubled and the Asian population almost tripled. Consequently, Hispanics, blacks and Asians comprise approximately 3% of the city populace, respectively.⁷⁸

The levels of segregation between whites and minorities are relatively low in Spokane. In fact, the black/white dissimilarity index decreased from 37.5 in 1980 to 24.9 in 2000. Both the Hispanic/white and Asian/white indices increased between 1980 and 1990 but declined by 2000. For each decade, their segregation levels were lower than blacks and in 2000 the Hispanic/white index was 15.3 and the Asian/white index was 15.8.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ All historical information is provided by the city's official website, <http://www.spokanecity.org>, and MSN Encarta and Wikipedia, on-line encyclopedias.

⁷⁷ See "Spokane (city)", MSN Encarta.

⁷⁸ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁷⁹ See Lewis Mumford Center website. Because minorities constitute such a small proportion of the population, the indices of residential segregation between these groups and whites must be viewed with caution.

Although the socioeconomic conditions of whites are better than those of minorities in the city, the disparities between the groups are relatively small. The status of Asians was most comparable to that of whites. They were just as likely as whites to be college-educated and professionally employed in 1990 and 2000. As such, their median household income was over 90% that of whites in 1990 and 2000. However, Asians were slightly more likely to be unemployed (9.5% versus 8.8%, respectively) and impoverished (18.6% versus 16.3%, respectively) in 2000; these rates were very similar to those of 1990. The same pattern is found among Hispanics and whites. Hispanics' median household income was also nearly 90% that of whites in 1990 and 2000. Yet Hispanics also were more likely than whites to be unemployed (10.1% versus 8.8%, respectively) and impoverished (19.5% versus 16.3%, respectively) in 2000 and the same was true in 1990. Blacks are the most 'disadvantaged' group. In both decades, their median household income was about 80% that of whites. The difference in blacks and whites rates of unemployment remained stable from 1990 to 2000 and in 2000 nearly 24% of blacks were unemployed compared to only 16% of whites. Additionally, about 11% of blacks lived below the poverty level compared to 8% among whites in 1990 and 2000.⁸⁰

Though the homicide and violent crime rate of the city peaked in the 1990s, Spokane's rates are remarkably low. In 1995, there were 11.7 murders per 100,000 residents in the city, which was its highest rate recorded between 1985 and 2004. Still, in 2002 the rate increased to 9.9 per 100,000 after dropping to 3.5 per 100,000 the previous year. The violent crime rate peaked in 1994 at 863.3 per 100,000. It dropped to levels in the 600s in the following two years but rose again to 824.1 per 100,000 in 1998. By

⁸⁰ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

2004, the rate was 602.7 per 100,000, which was larger than the 1985 rate of 525.8 per 100,000.⁸¹

New York, NY

Dutch settlement in the area now known as New York City began shortly after navigator Henry Hudson, employed by the Dutch East India Company, arrived in the New York harbor in 1609. The Dutch, who called the city New Amsterdam, were soon joined by Germans, Swiss, Moravians, French, English and Portuguese settlers and by 1650 over 18 different languages were spoken in the city. However, Dutch rule ended in 1664 when the English forcefully took over the city. The city was renamed New York for the Duke of York, who was the brother of British King Charles II. The British control over the city did not end until 1783 following the American Revolution. New York City served as the capital of the United States between 1785 and 1790 and the capital of New York State until 1797.

As a leading port city and area of trade for the nation, New York grew exponentially during the 19th century. Following the vast amount of European immigrants entering New York between 1840 and 1850, over half of the residents in 1860 were foreign-born. The same year the city ranked first in the nation in population, industrial development, bank deposits and wholesale trade. Consequently, the surrounding communities, which included Queens, Brooklyn, Staten Island and the Bronx, were annexed in 1898; Manhattan, another borough, was originally apart of the city. By 1900, the city populous had grown to 3,437,202. The city continued to grow in following years but beginning in 1920, the middle-class base began to decline. Yet there

⁸¹ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

was a steady influx of the poor and especially rural blacks from the South and the city suffered tremendously during the Great Depression of the 1930s.

The advent of World War II actually boosted New York's economy by providing employment in many industries and port facilities. During the war, the Brooklyn Navy Yard alone employed 70,000 workers, twenty-four hours a day to manufacture warships and merchant vessels. The war is also credited with establishing Wall Street (home of the New York Stock Exchange) as one of the most dominant financial centers of the world. Shortly thereafter, in 1952, the United Nation's headquarters were established in Manhattan, increasing the political influence of the city as well.

By the 1960s and 1970s, however, deindustrialization had resulted in the lost of more than 600,000 jobs in the city. Consequently, New York City was forced to cut back on government jobs and city services and in 1975 the fiscal crisis of the city was exemplified in its' \$3.3 billion deficit.⁸² The worse hit communities were typically poor, minority ones. For instance, the fire department eradicated thirty-five departments between 1969 and 1976 and over 70% were located in black ghettos and Puerto Rican barrios of the Bronx, Manhattan, and Brooklyn. The cuts are believed to have been concentrated in these areas because of the lack of political power among residents and thus backlash as a result of the shortages (see Massey and Denton, 1993). In contrast, the growth in white-collar and managerial occupations during the 1980s aided in the city's economic rebirth and by the late 1990s the city budget surpluses were in the billions.⁸³

New York's population of 8,008,278 in 2000 makes it the largest city in the United States; a title it has held for many decades (i.e. U.S. Census Bureau, 1998; 2000).

⁸² The historical information on New York city is provided by MSN Encarta and Wikipedia on-line encyclopedias.

⁸³ See "New York (city)", MSN Encarta.

The city's population growth since 1980 is the result of the increase in the Hispanic and Asian population and, to a lesser extent, the black population. The proportion of Hispanic residents grew from nearly 20% in 1980 to 27% in 2000. Similarly, the Asian population increased from 3.3% in 1980 to nearly 11% in 2000. Lastly, the percent black in the city only increased slightly (1.6%) during these decades and in 2000 blacks comprised 25.6% of the populace. Nevertheless, the number of white residents in the city declined between 1980 and 2000 falling from 3,668,865 (51.9%) to 2,801,267 (35%).⁸⁴

As the minority population grew, so too did residential segregation. Blacks are the most segregated minority group in the city. The history of residential segregation between blacks and whites in northern cities like New York is a contentious one. During periods of economic crises, southern rural blacks were often a source of cheap labor in northern industries. Specifically, between 1895 and 1916, blacks were used at least seven times as strikebreakers in labor disputes in New York City. Consequently, hostile race riots occurred in the early 1900s, in which blacks were often the victims. The level of black/white segregation reached remarkable highs and the formation of black ghettos began during this time. In 1940, the black/white dissimilarity index had reached 86.8. Although it had declined by 1970, it was still noticeably high at 81 (Massey and Denton, 1993). The index has increased in subsequent decades: 82.8 in 1980, 83.5 in 1990 and 83.2 in 2000. Furthermore, the isolation indices for blacks in the city remained over 60% between 1980 and 2000. In other words, the average black in New York lives in a census tract where over 60% of the residents are also black.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁸⁵ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

Asians and Hispanics were also increasingly segregated from whites between 1980 and 2000 but to a lesser extent. Though the Asian/white dissimilarity index decreased from 49.2 in 1980 to 48 in 1990, it had increased back to 49.2 by 2000. The Hispanic/white segregation index grew steadily during these decades, rising from 64.1 in 1980 to 67.1 in 2000.⁸⁶

Unsurprisingly, between 1990 and 2000 social conditions among blacks and Hispanics—the most segregated minorities—are far below those of whites. There are also disparities among Asians and whites; however, they do not approach the levels of inequality between whites and the other minority groups. While median household income increased for all groups between these decades, the ratios of minority-to-white median household income decreased. By 2000, Asians' median household income was 81% that of whites, while Hispanics' and blacks' median household income was about 60% that of whites'. Moreover, the proportion below poverty increased for all groups. In 2000, 26.2% of blacks, nearly 28% of Hispanics and 17.5% of Asians lived below the poverty level compared to only 12.8% among whites. In this respect, blacks and Hispanics were twice as likely as whites to be impoverished. Lastly, the percent unemployed among blacks and Hispanics increased between 1990 and 2000 but at the same time the percentages remained low and stable among whites and Asians. Consequently, blacks and Hispanics were twice as likely as whites to be unemployed in 1990 and 2000.⁸⁷

The violent crime and homicide rate in New York City rose during the 1990s. In 1990, the murder rate peaked at 30.7 per 100,000 and the percentage of black and white

⁸⁶ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁸⁷ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

victims was equally distributed (51 and 46.2, respectively). The homicide rate declined in the following years. By 2002, it had dropped to 7.3 per 100,000. However, the percent of black victims increased while the proportion decreased among whites: 58.3% were black and 38.3% were white. The violent crime rate peaked at 2352.9 per 100,000 and has declined each year since. In 2004, the rate had decreased to a low 687.4 per 100,000 residents—its' lowest since 1985.⁸⁸

San Diego, CA

Prior to Spanish conquest, San Diego was inhabited by the Kumeyaay Indians. In fact, an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Kumeyaay lived in the area in 1542 when Juan Cabrillo, a Portuguese explorer, declared it a region of Spain. Shortly thereafter in 1602, the area was named for Spanish Catholic Saint Didacus (San Diego) de Alcalá by Spanish explorer Sebastián Vizcaíno. However, Spanish settlement did not increase in the area until 1769, when two events occurred: the Presidio of San Diego (a military camp) was established and a mission, Mission San Diego de Alcalá, lead by Father Junípero Serra arrived. The area grew rapidly and between 1820 and 1830 over six hundred people had settled there. In 1821, Mexico won independence from Spain and San Diego fell under Mexican rule until the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848. Two years later, San Diego was incorporated as a city and California became a state. Railroad services expanded to the area in 1885 and by 1886 an estimated 40,000 people lived in the city.

The economy of San Diego grew in the 1900s as the city's naval military increased in response to both world wars and after it hosted two international fairs, the Panama-California Exposition and the California Pacific International Exposition. By 1950, the city populace was 334,387 and over the span of the decade grew to 573,224.

⁸⁸ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

At this time, both aircraft and electronic industries were leading employers for the city. San Diego became the second largest city in California in 1970 and it continued to grow in the following decades.⁸⁹

Between 1980 and 2000 the population increased from 875,522 to 1,223,400. However, the white population declined by over 47,000 after 1990. At this time, the economy turned downward as defense spending was cut following the Cold War; local employment in the aerospace industry alone dropped from 27,800 in 1989 to 9,300 by 1995. The cost of living in the city, which is about one-fifth higher than the national average, has also been a source of concern among residents. However, its recent growth in biotechnology, communications and software industries and residential redevelopment initiatives have aided in the revitalization of the city.⁹⁰ Currently, approximately 49% of the residents are non-Hispanic white, 8.5% are non-Hispanic black, nearly 25% are Hispanic and 15.4% are Asian.⁹¹

The socioeconomic conditions of whites and Asians in the city are better than those of blacks and Hispanics. Whites and Asians median household income in 2000 was \$54,674 and \$53,445, respectively. In contrast, the median household income of Hispanics and blacks was slightly over \$37,000. Similarly, blacks and Hispanics were almost twice as likely as whites and Asians to be unemployed and impoverished in 1990 and 2000. Consequently, levels of black/white and Hispanic/white segregation indices

⁸⁹ All historic information on San Diego is provided by its official website, www.sandiego.gov/, and MSN Encarta and Wikipedia, on-line encyclopedias.

⁹⁰ See MSN Encarta, "San Diego".

⁹¹ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

were slightly above 60 in 2000. However, the Asian/white dissimilarity index was 47.6 this same year.⁹²

San Diego's homicide and violent crime rate is relatively low compared to similarly large cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. The homicide rate peaked at 14.7 per 100,000 in 1991. Of the 167 homicides recorded that year, 70% of the victims were white and 19% were black. Both whites and blacks were homicide victims at disproportionate rates considering they only comprise 49% and 8.5% of the city populace, respectively. The violent crime rate peaked in 1992 at 1271.5 per 100,000 people. Homicide and violent crime rates continued to decline throughout the 1990s and in 2004 the homicide rate was 4.8 per 100,000 and the violent crime rate was 523.9 per 100,000.⁹³

Los Angeles, CA

Like San Diego, Spanish settlement in present-day Los Angeles increased after the formation of missions in the area. The Misión del Santo Arcángel San Gabriel del los Temblores (Mission of the Holy Archangel Saint Gabriel of the Earthquakes) arrived in the city in 1771. The area was already inhabited by a sizable Native American population, the Tongva, many of which were displaced or died from disease and stringent work conditions imposed on them by the new settlers. In 1781, the city was named El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora Reina de Los Angeles del Río de Porciúncula (the Town of Our Lady Queen of the Angels of the River Porciúncula) by Spanish governor Felipe de Neve and later the city was referred to simply as Los Angeles. A second mission, Misión San Fernando Rey De España (Mission of Saint Ferdinand, King of Spain), was founded

⁹² See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁹³ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

in 1797. Additionally, retired Spanish soldiers were given large estates, or ranchos, in the city by the Spanish government. The early economy of the city relied heavily on the labor of Native Americans, who produced foods and wool for the settlers and rancheros. However, after Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico granted the mission lands to the Native Americans. Still, Native Americans soon lost much of their land following unfair practices by the rancheros and settlers in the area. Shortly thereafter, the city became a battleground during the Mexican American War and after Mexico's surrender in 1847 the entire region became part of the United States.

The population in Los Angeles grew slowly during its formative years and in 1850 there were only 1610 residents, most of which were of Mexican or Native American descent. By this time, the city's economy relied largely on cattle ranching but following the expansion of railroad services in the area in the late 1870s, it shifted to industry and agriculture. The population grew from 11,183 in 1880 to 50,395 in 1890; it more than doubled by the following decade, reaching 102,479 in 1900. Between the 1890s and 1930s, the growth in oil production in the city led to the development of automobile and rubber industries. Also, the fruit and vegetable agriculture of the city's valley regions stimulated the economy. However, the most notable economic gains for the city are attributed to the motion picture and aircraft (and later, aerospace) industries which expanded during the 1930s.

These economic booms coincided with population growth and, particularly, among minority groups including Asians, Hispanics and African Americans. Consequently, the city was devastated by racial tensions and riots during much of the 20th century. The most infamous events include the repatriation of thousands of Mexicans

during the Great Depression, the transportation of approximately 40,000 Japanese Americans to concentration camps following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the attack on Mexicans and Mexican Americans during the Zoot Suit Riot of 1943, the 1965 Watts Riots, and the riots following the acquittal of white police officers accused of severely beating African American motorist Rodney King in 1991.⁹⁴

Nevertheless, the city continued to grow throughout the late 1900s especially as Hispanic and Asian populations increased. The non-Hispanic white and black population, however, declined. In 1980, 1,419,402 whites lived in the city and comprised nearly half the city population but by 2000 their numbers dropped and their proportion decreased to almost 30%. Similarly, the number of black residents fell from 495,722 (or 16.7%) in 1980 to 422,819 (or 11.4%) in 2000. Conversely, the Asian and Hispanic populations more than doubled between these decades and they constituted 10.8% and 46.5% of the city population in 2000, respectively. In spite of its shifting demographics, Los Angeles' population in 2000—3,694,820—makes it the largest city in California and second largest in the United States.⁹⁵

Regardless of the continued diversity of the city, racial tensions persist as exemplified in the level of residential segregation between minorities and whites over the past two decades. Hispanics, which have been the majority since 1990, have been increasingly segregated from non-Hispanic whites. In 1980 the Hispanic/white dissimilarity index was extremely high at 62 but continued to increase over the next two decades and in 2000 reached 65.6. Nevertheless, blacks are more likely than Hispanics to be segregated from whites. In response to the growing number of blacks in the city

⁹⁴ See MSN Encarta, "Los Angeles".

⁹⁵ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

between 1940 and 1960 (an increase from approximately 75,000 to 500,000, respectively), blacks were relegated to city neighborhoods mainly in the South Central and Watts area.⁹⁶ Unsurprisingly, the black/white dissimilarity index of 85 in 1980 was exceptionally high. Despite declines since, the black/white dissimilarity index in 2000 was still noticeable at 71.5. Asians are the least segregated from whites; the Asian/white dissimilarity index dropped from 51.7 in 1980 to 44.9 by 2000.⁹⁷

Moreover, the socioeconomic disparities between minorities and whites persisted between 1990 and 2000. The median household income decreased for all groups except blacks during this time but the decline was minimal for whites (\$552) compared to that for Asians (\$1539) and Hispanics (\$2217). In 2000, whites' median household income was \$55,837 as opposed to \$39,590 among Asians and \$31,839 among Hispanics. The increase in the median household income of blacks was so small (\$389) that their incomes were still the lowest among the other racial and ethnic groups in 2000—\$31,372. During both decades, blacks and Hispanics were twice as likely as whites to be impoverished and Asians were approximately 1.60 times as likely as whites to live below the poverty level. The gap in minority-to-white unemployment decreased between 1990 and 2000 but blacks were still 1.85 times and Hispanics 1.61 times more likely than whites to be jobless in 2000. Asians were slightly more likely than whites to be unemployed in 1990 (8% versus 6%, respectively) and in 2000 (8.8% versus 6.8%, respectively). Lastly, in spite of the vast number of colleges and universities and commercial centers in the city and metropolitan area, minority/white disparities in the proportion college educated and professionally employed persist. By 2000, nearly 40%

⁹⁶ See note 44.

⁹⁷ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

of white residents were college-educated compared to only 29% among Asians, 17% among blacks, and almost 15% among Hispanics. Furthermore, approximately half of the white populace was professionally employed while only 34.6% of Asians, 25.6% of blacks and 21.9% of Hispanics worked in professional occupations in 2000.⁹⁸

The city's homicide and violent crime rate also increased during the 1990s. Notable for the city was the growth in gang violence, in particular. In the early 1990s, gang membership in Los Angeles was estimated at 30,000; the gangs tended to be concentrated in predominantly poor and working-class minority communities in the city.⁹⁹ The homicide rate of the city peaked at 30.5 per 100,000 in 1993 but has declined substantially since and in 1999 reached the lowest levels recorded between 1985 and 2004—11.6 per 100,000. Thereafter, the homicide rate began to rise again but only peaked at 17.1 per 100,000 in 2002. In the following two years, the homicide rate steadied at 13.4 per 100,000.¹⁰⁰ The trend in homicide rates coincide with trends in gang homicides in the city. The number of gang homicides steadily decreased after reaching nearly 350 in 1991. Between 1996 and 1998, alone, the number dropped dramatically from 295 to 173, which is a 41% decrease (Maxson et al., 2002). The violent crime rate followed a similar pattern. It rose during the late 1980s and peaked at 2496.9 per 100,000 in 1991. By 1997, it had dropped to 1580.2 per 100,000. The rate reached its lowest point—1093.9 per 100,000—in 2004.¹⁰¹ This is not to say that all, or even most, of the homicides and non-fatal violent crimes in Los Angeles during the 1990s were

⁹⁸ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

⁹⁹ See MSN Encarta, "Los Angeles".

¹⁰⁰ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website. Although racially disaggregated homicide data is available for the city of Los Angeles, it does not take into account ethnicity. The majority of city residents are Hispanics, which can be of any race, so the data may be less informative.

¹⁰¹ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

gang-related but rather gangs were a significant source of concern for the city at this time. In fact, some researchers have suggested that in cities like Los Angeles, gang violence accounted for over 25% of the cities' homicides and assaults (see Decker, 2002).

Tucson, AZ

Prior to the arrival of Spanish Jesuit missionary Eusebio Kino in 1692, Tucson had long been settled by Pima and Tohono O'odham Native Americans. In 1700, Kino founded a mission in the area—the Mission San Xavier del Bac—just south of the Native American village. A second mission, the Mission San Agustin, was founded in 1757. By 1775 a presidio was also established there and the city was named Tucson. The Spanish lost control over the city in 1821 when Mexico won independence from Spain. However, Tucson became a part of the United States following the Gadsden Purchase of 1853. The city served as the capital of the Confederate Territory of Arizona (1861-1862) and the Arizona Territory (1867-1877). Following the expansion of railroad services in Tucson in 1880, the city population increased to nearly 8000. Throughout the 1900s, the population continued to grow and in 1940 36,818 people resided in the city. Much of the city's economy has centered on the University of Arizona (established in 1885) and military bases in the area.¹⁰²

Between 1980 and 2000, Tucson's population increased steadily. The number of Hispanic residents more than doubled from 82,189 in 1980 to 173,868 (or 35.7%) in 2000. The proportion Asian increased from 1% in 1980 to 3% in 2000. The number of black residents also increased from 11,931 to 22,558 between 1980 and 2000. In 2000, blacks comprised 4.6% of the city populace. While the number of non-Hispanic whites

¹⁰² All historical information is provided by the city's official website, <http://www.tucsonaz.gov/>, and MSN Encarta and Wikipedia, on-line encyclopedias.

also grew (from 227,839 to 263,748), their proportions declined in relation to the increased number of minorities in the city. They made up 54.2% of the population in 2000.¹⁰³

The levels of residential integration and economic equality between whites and minorities in the city are relatively high. Residential segregation between the groups declined between 1980 and 2000. By 2000, Hispanics were the most segregated from whites and the dissimilarity index among the groups was 50. The black/white and Asian/white dissimilarity indices were 29.4 and 20.6, respectively. In terms of economic equality to whites, blacks and Asians also fare better than Hispanics. The median household income increased for all groups between 1990 and 2000. In 2000, blacks' and Asians' median household income was over 90% that of whites. In fact, the income of blacks was slightly higher than that of Asians in both decades. Hispanics' median household income was 85% and 86% that of whites in 1990 and 2000, respectively. After declines for all groups in 1990, blacks and Asians were slightly more likely than whites to be unemployed in 2000. The percent unemployed was 5.9% for Asians and 6.3% for blacks compared to 5.3% among whites. However, in the same year, 7.1% of Hispanics were unemployed. The poverty figures for 2000 are similar: 22.6% of Hispanics, 19.9% of Asians, 19.1% of blacks and 16.2% of whites live below the poverty level .

Like the other smaller cities, Tucson's murder rate is relatively low and fluctuated throughout the 1990s. The rate peaked at 14.4 per 100,000 in 1995, which was the highest rate between 1985 and 2000. However, the rate jumped to 12.3 per 100,000 in 2000. In 1995, the violent crime rate peaked at 1191.7 per 100,000 but declined each

¹⁰³ See Lewis Mumford Center website.

year thereafter. By 2004, the violent crime rate was 932.7, which was lower than its rate of 964.9 per 100,000 in 1985.¹⁰⁴

In summation, though some of the cities vary widely in terms of their populations, demographics and violent crime rates, there are some important commonalities. First, blacks were the most socially and economically disadvantaged group in most of the cities between 1990 and 2000. For example, in only four of the twelve cities did blacks have median household incomes that were at least 80% that of whites' in 2000. Hispanics earned at least 80% of whites' median household income in five of the cities. However, Asians' median household income was 80% or more that of whites in each city. Secondly, serious crime peaked in *all* of the cities during the 1990s. These peaks occurred regardless of the size of the city, its racial/ethnic composition or its level of inequality between whites and minorities. However, the peaks more often occurred in the early 1990s in larger cities while peaks tended to occur during the late 1990s in smaller cities. The peaks were also lower in the smaller cities; yet it has not been shown whether these rates correspond with the lower levels of inequality between groups or the relatively small size of the minority population within the cities.

VICTIMIZATION AMONG THE TWELVE CITIES

Of importance is how city conditions affect fatal and non-fatal forms of victimization. The rates of non-fatal violent and property victimization for each city are available for 1998 via the NCVS 12 Cities study. They are presented in Graph 1 along with the homicide victimization rates for 1997. The graph shows that the cities tend to differ more in terms of homicide and property victimization than they do in rates of non-lethal violent victimization. For instance, the lowest homicide rate is 1.5 per 100,000

¹⁰⁴ See BJS Crime and Justice Data Online website.

(Madison, WI) while the highest is 56.9 per 100,000 (Washington, D.C.). Both Savannah and D.C. tied at 445 per 1000 households for the highest property crime rate; New York had the lowest rate of 260 per 1000 households. However, the difference between the highest and lowest rate of non-lethal victimization is smaller: 85 per 1000 persons (New York, NY) compared to 60 per 1000 persons (Washington, D.C.).

GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE


Bivariate Relationships

To examine the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization, scatterplots were first conducted. Specifically, these tests were performed to determine whether the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal forms of victimization is generally linear or non-linear. Furthermore, the scatterplots allow for identification of any outliers in the data. These preliminary tests are especially useful when the sample size is small (i.e. 12 cities) and thus limited statistically. All possible relationships between city conditions and non-fatal victimization rates were explored and based on the scatterplots there appear to be no obvious non-linear (i.e. curvilinear or U-shaped) relationships between city conditions and non-fatal violent or property victimization. Furthermore, none of the cities emerge as outliers for any of the city conditions, property or non-lethal violent victimization.¹⁰⁵

There is also reason to believe that the linear relationship between city conditions and victimization may vary across victimization type. As noted above, the cities differ more in terms of homicide and property victimization rates than they do in rates of non-lethal violent victimization. Thus, the bivariate relationships between victimization types were examined and the results are shown in Scatterplots 1, 2 and 3. First, Scatterplots 1

¹⁰⁵ The scatterplots are available upon request.

Graph 1. Rates of Fatal and Non-Fatal Victimization in 12 Cities (1997, 1998)




Source: The victimization rates are derived from Smith et al (1998). "Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety". Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice.

and 2 clearly show that Washington, D.C. (city 12) is an outlier for homicide victimization. When D.C. is included, the relationship between non-lethal violence and homicide is linear and negative. Still, there is only 4% of shared variance between these forms of victimization. However, without D.C. the relationship remains negative but the percent of shared variance between homicide and non-lethal violent victimization rates drops to 1.6% (see Scatterplot 1a). Unlike the non-lethal violence/homicide relationship, the relationship between property victimization and homicide is positively linear. There is only about 5% of common variance between these forms of victimization and when D.C. is excluded it declines to 3.6%. So it is plausible that the relationship between city conditions and homicide may differ from the relationship between city conditions and non-lethal victimization among the twelve cities. Moreover, Scatterplot 3 shows that there is virtually no relationship between the two non-fatal forms of victimization and little shared variance between them (0.3%). Thus city conditions may not be related to non-lethal violent and property victimization in similar ways either.

SCATTERPLOTS 1, 1a, 2, 2a AND 3 ABOUT HERE

Consequently, it is hypothesized that poor structural conditions such as high degrees of residential segregation and economic inequality between minorities and whites are positively related to rates of fatal victimization at significant levels. Furthermore, high levels of residential segregation and economic inequality should be most detrimental to minorities; thus, when homicide rates are disaggregated by race, these conditions should have a significant, positive relationship with homicide victimization among blacks but not among whites. The composition of cities is also expected to be significantly related to lethal victimization. Cities with greater levels of disadvantage—higher


Scatterplot 1. Linear Relationship between Non-Lethal Violent and Homicide Victimization Rates among 12 Cities



Violent Victimization Rate per 1000 (1998)

Note: Each city is represented by a numbered red dot. 1=Chicago, 2=Kansas City, 3=Knoxville, 4=Los Angeles, 5=Madison, 6=New York, 7=San Diego, 8=Savannah, 9=Spokane, 10=Springfield, 11=Tucson, 12=D.C.


Scatterplot 1a. Linear Relationship between Non-lethal Violent and Homicide Victimization Rates (without D.C.)



Violent Victimization Rate per 1000 (1998)


Note: Each city is represented by a numbered red dot. 1=Chicago, 2=Kansas City, 3=Knoxville, 4=Los Angeles, 5=Madison, 6=New York, 7=San Diego, 8=Savannah, 9=Spokane, 10=Springfield, 11=Tucson.

Scatterplot 2. Linear Relationship between Property and Homicide Victimization Rates among 12 Cities



Note: Each city is represented by a numbered red dot. 1=Chicago, 2=Kansas City, 3=Knoxville, 4=Los Angeles, 5=Madison, 6=New York, 7=San Diego, 8=Savannah, 9=Spokane, 10=Springfield, 11=Tucson, 12=D.C.


Scatterplot 2a. Linear Relationship between Property and Homicide Victimization Rates (without D.C.)



Property Victimization Rate per 1000 (1998)

Note: Each city is represented by a numbered red dot. 1=Chicago, 2=Kansas City, 3=Knoxville, 4=Los Angeles, 5=Madison, 6=New York, 7=San Diego, 8=Savannah, 9=Spokane, 10=Springfield, 11=Tucson.

Scatterplot 3. Linear Relationship between Property and Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Rates among 12 Cities



Property Victimization Rate per 1000 (1998)

Note: Each city is represented by a numbered red dot. 1=Chicago, 2=Kansas City, 3=Knoxville, 4=Los Angeles, 5=Madison, 6=New York, 7=San Diego, 8=Savannah, 9=Spokane, 10=Springfield, 11=Tucson, 12=D.C.

proportions of female-headed households and persons who are living in poverty, unemployed and below age eighteen—should have higher homicide victimization rates. Because minorities experience these forms of disadvantage more often, these conditions are expected to be significantly and positively related to homicide victimization among blacks but have a null effect on victimization among whites. Lastly, the proportion of the city population that is black and the proportion Latino (see Table 2.1) is expected to be positively related to homicide rates among the cities since blacks and Latinos are more often the victims of homicide victimization compared to whites.¹⁰⁶ These proposed relationships are in accordance with previous city-level research. However, it remains to be determined if and how these city conditions are related to non-lethal forms of victimization.

TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE

City Structure and Fatal and Non-fatal Victimization

The findings related to city structure and victimization is shown in the top portion of Table 2.2. Beginning with residential segregation, black/white segregation has a strong positive effect on lethal victimization ($r=0.60$). Furthermore, the magnitude of the relationship increases when D.C. is excluded from the sample ($r=0.66$). Hispanic/white segregation was also positively related to homicide but the affect is weaker ($r=0.38$) and without D.C. the magnitude of the relationship decreased further ($r=0.36$). In contrast, segregation generally has a negative effect on non-lethal forms of victimization.

Black/white segregation had a weak and negative effect on non-lethal violent victimization ($r=-0.22$) while Hispanic/white segregation had a null effect on non-lethal

¹⁰⁶ The percent of the city population that is black and Latino are considered in the analyses since these measures are often used in city-level research. The percentages are provided by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau and are based on data from Summary File 1.

TABLE 2.1. The Percent Black and Hispanic Across the 12 Cities, 2000 (U.S Census Bureau)

City	% Black	% Hispanic
Chicago	36.8	26.0
Kansas City	31.2	6.9
Knoxville	16.2	1.6
Los Angeles	11.2	46.5
Madison	5.8	4.1
New York	26.6	27.0
San Diego	7.9	25.4
Savannah	57.1	2.2
Spokane	2.1	3.0
Springfield	21.0	27.2
Tucson	4.3	35.7
D.C.	60.0	7.9

Source: Based on data from Summary File 1 of the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau.

violence ($r=-0.05$). The relationship between black/white segregation and property victimization ($r=-0.16$) and Hispanic/white segregation and property victimization ($r=-0.14$) were similar.

The same pattern is found for economic equality and victimization. Black/white economic equality had a strong negative effect on homicide victimization among all the cities ($r=-0.65$). However, when D.C. is excluded the r coefficient of the relationship declines to -0.58 . Hispanic/white economic equality had a weaker affect on lethal victimization with and without D.C. ($r=-0.21$ and $r=-0.13$, respectively). Conversely, the relationship between economic equality and non-lethal forms of victimization is positive. Black/white economic equality has a moderate effect on non-lethal violence ($r=0.46$). The relationship between Hispanic/white economic equality and non-lethal violence, on the other hand, is weak ($r=0.15$). Lastly, Hispanic/white economic equality had more of a positive effect on property victimization ($r=0.38$) than did black/white economic equality ($r=0.12$).

Overall, the city structure/homicide relationships are in the proposed direction and opposite those of the city structure/non-lethal forms of victimization relationship. Moreover, these findings suggest that the relationship between city structure and homicide victimization is more meaningful than that between city structure and non-lethal forms of victimization.

TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE

City Composition and Fatal and Non-fatal Victimization

In the lower portion of Table 2.2, the bivariate relationships between city composition and victimization are presented. Three forms of city composition are

TABLE 2.2. Bivariate Linear Relationship Between City Conditions and Victimization Rates Among 12 Cities (Pearson's *r*)

City Conditions	Lethal Victimization		Non-Lethal Victimization	
	(All)	(Without D.C.)	Violent	Property
<i>City Structure</i>				
Black/White Segregation	0.60*	0.66*	-0.22	-0.16
Hispanic/White Segregation	0.38	0.36	-0.05	-0.14
Black/White Economic Equality	-0.65*	-0.58	0.46	0.12
Hispanic/White Economic Equality	-0.21	-0.13	0.15	0.38
<i>City Composition</i>				
% Female-headed Households	0.59*	0.29	0.17	0.41
% Poverty	0.21	0.20	0.48	0.17
% Below 18	-0.10	0.33	0.44	0.32
% Unemployed	0.66*	0.44	-0.21	0.39
% Black	0.79**	0.69*	-0.03	0.43
% Hispanic	-0.11	0.12	0.20	-0.10

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

positively and significantly linked to homicide victimization among the twelve cities: the proportion of female-headed families ($r=0.59$), the proportion of persons unemployed ($r=0.66$) and the proportion of the city population that is black ($r=0.79$). However, the magnitude of these relationships decline when D.C. is excluded from the sample. The effect of the proportion of female-headed families ($r=0.29$) on homicide rates is no longer significant. The relationship between the proportion of persons unemployed and homicide victimization also loses significance but is still notable ($r=0.44$). The affect of the percent black on homicide rates also reduces but to a lesser extent ($r=0.69$) and thus, remains the strongest predictor of lethal victimization.

The effects of city composition on non-lethal forms of victimization were in the same direction but the importance each measure of composition varied across victimization type. The proportion of persons impoverished and below age eighteen were the only compositional measures that had a moderate effect on non-lethal violent victimization ($r=0.48$ and $r=0.44$, respectively). On the other hand, the proportion of female-headed households, of persons unemployed and of black residents were the only compositional indicators that had a noticeable effect on property victimization ($r=0.41$, $r=0.39$ and $r=0.43$, respectively).

Taken together, these findings suggest that the relationship between city composition and lethal victimization were generally in the expected direction—positive. The results for city composition and non-lethal forms of victimization were also in the same direction. Yet the magnitude of the effects depended on the type of victimization being examined. For instance, the percent black had a strong positive effect on lethal

victimization. However, the relationship between the percent black and non-lethal violence was null.

The overall findings for city structure and composition suggest that these conditions, at best, have a weak-to-moderate effect on non-lethal victimization. Specifically, city structure generally has a stronger effect on homicide victimization than it does on non-lethal forms of victimization; and, equally important, the effects across these victimization types are in the opposite direction. City composition is similarly related to lethal and non-lethal forms of victimization yet the importance of these relationships vary across victimization type.

It is important to note that these disparate findings across victimization type may be explained by the differences across the sampled cities. Specifically, the city conditions/fatal victimization relationship is likely driven by the inclusion of Washington, D.C. in the sample. For instance, the 'r' coefficient of the relationship between the proportion of female-headed households and fatal victimization is 0.59 when D.C. is included in the sample but it declines to 0.29 when the city is excluded. The findings may be related to the unique character of D.C. Among the 12 Cities, it is has the highest homicide rate as well as one of the highest levels of residential segregation and the lowest level of economic equality between whites and blacks. Furthermore, the city also ranks among the highest for proportion unemployed, impoverished and female-headed households. The prevalent structural disadvantage of Washington, D.C. and the uniqueness of the city in terms of its composition and social structure distinguish it from the other sampled cities and in many respects, may account for the city conditions/fatal victimization relationship.

However, before these conclusions can be made the relationship between city conditions and racially-disaggregated rates of non-fatal victimization must also be examined. As noted earlier, residential segregation and economic inequality may have a different effect on rates among blacks and whites. Furthermore, minorities more often experience disadvantage and therefore the measures of city composition may be more relevant to their rates of victimization as opposed to victimization rates among whites. These possibilities are explored in the next two sections.

White and Black Property Victimization among 12 Cities

The rates of property victimization are available for both blacks and whites across all twelve cities (see Table 1.7 of Chapter 2). The relationship between city conditions and their rates of property victimization are shown in Table 2.3. City structure has a similar effect on white and black victimization rates. Black/white and Hispanic/white segregation is negatively related to property victimization among blacks and whites. However, the magnitudes of these relationships are stronger for blacks. For example, black/white segregation has a moderate negative effect on property victimization among blacks ($r=-0.47$) but a weak relationship to white property victimization ($r=-0.13$). Black/white and Hispanic/white economic equality are also similarly related to white and black rates of property victimization; the relationships are weak and positive.

More differences between whites' and blacks' rates emerge when city composition is considered. The percent of female-headed households has a moderate and positive relationship to property victimization among whites but a weak negative relationship to black property victimization ($r=0.51$ and $r=-0.19$, respectively). Similarly, the percent impoverished has a weak positive effect on white property victimization

($r=0.18$) and a weak negative effect on black property victimization ($r=-0.29$). The other measures of city composition were related to white and black property victimization in similar ways. Still the relationship between the percent unemployed and property victimization approaches significant levels for whites but not blacks ($r=0.41$ and $r=0.28$, respectively). Likewise, the relationship between the percent black and property victimization approaches significant levels for blacks but not whites ($r=-0.43$ and $r=-0.30$, respectively).

TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE

White and Black Non-lethal Violent Victimization among 7 Cities

Reliable estimates of black non-lethal violent victimization could only be computed for cities that had sufficient black populations. Therefore, comparisons across racial groups for non-lethal violent victimization are restricted to seven cities: Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New York, Savannah, Springfield, and D.C.

The results are presented in Table 2.4. City structure has a greater affect on white non-lethal violent victimization rates. Black/white and Hispanic/white segregation has a strong negative effect on non-lethal violent victimization among whites ($r=-0.66$ and $r=-0.74$, respectively) but the relationships between these forms of segregation and black non-lethal violent victimization are weak ($r=-0.07$ and $r=0.24$, respectively). Furthermore, the relationship between Hispanic/white segregation and non-lethal violent victimization is negative for whites but positive for blacks. Black/white economic equality had a strong positive effect on whites' non-lethal violent victimization ($r=0.80$) but a null effect on blacks' ($r=-0.02$). Hispanic/white economic equality was positively

TABLE 2.3. Bivariate Linear Relationship Between City Conditions and Property Victimization by Race Among 12 Cities (Pearson's r)

<u>City Conditions</u>	<u>Property Victimization</u>	
	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Blacks</i>
<i>City Structure</i>		
Black/White Segregation	-0.13	-0.47
Hispanic White Segregation	-0.15	-0.39
Black/White Economic Equality	0.08	0.19
Hispanic/White Economic Equality	0.37	0.22
<i>City Composition</i>		
% Female-headed Households	0.51	-0.19
% Poverty	0.18	-0.29
% Below 18	0.08	0.32
% Unemployed	0.41	0.28
% Black	-0.30	-0.43
% Hispanic	-0.00	0.50

*Significant at the .05 level.

and strongly associated with whites' non-lethal violent victimization ($r=0.60$) but the relationship was moderate and weak for blacks ($r=-0.45$).

The measures of city composition, on the other hand, were more important to blacks' rates of non-lethal violent victimization. The relationship between the proportion below poverty and non-lethal victimization approaches significant levels for blacks ($r=0.59$) but not whites ($r=0.39$). Also the percent black and Hispanic have a moderate affect on blacks' rates of non-lethal violence ($r=-0.43$ and $r=0.50$, respectively) but not whites ($r=0.02$ and $r=-0.05$, respectively). There are two exceptions, however, to this trend: the proportion below age eighteen and unemployed. The magnitude of the relationship between the proportion below eighteen and non-lethal violent victimization was 0.73 for whites compared to 0.31 for blacks. Also, the magnitude of the relationship between the proportion unemployed and non-lethal violent victimization was -0.43 for whites but -0.10 for blacks.

TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE

In summary, important findings emerge when city conditions and non-lethal violent and property victimization among blacks and whites are examined. Residential segregation and economic inequality are similarly related to property victimization among blacks and whites; still, the negative affect of segregation was stronger for black property victimization. The relationship between city structure and non-lethal violent victimization differed across racial groups. Segregation had a strong negative influence on non-lethal violent victimization among whites but was not significantly related to such victimization among blacks. Moreover, increased economic equality between whites and minorities were associated with increased non-lethal violent victimizations among whites

TABLE 2.4. Bivariate Linear Relationship Between City Conditions and Non-Lethal Violent Victimization by Race Among 7 Cities† (Pearson's *r*)

<u>City Conditions</u>	<u>Non-lethal Violent Victimization</u>	
	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Blacks</i>
<i>City Structure</i>		
Black/White Segregation	-0.66	-0.07
Hispanic White Segregation	-0.74	0.24
Black/White Economic Equality	0.80*	-0.02
Hispanic/White Economic Equality	0.60	-0.45
<i>City Composition</i>		
% Female-headed Households	0.09	-0.32
% Poverty	0.39	0.59
% Below 18	0.73	0.31
% Unemployed	-0.43	-0.10
% Black	0.02	-0.43
% Hispanic	-0.05	0.50

†The seven cities are Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New York, Savannah, Springfield and D.C.

*Significant at the .05 level.

but decreased rates among blacks. Lastly, city composition generally had a similar affect on white and black non-lethal violent and property victimization rates in spite of the noted exceptions. However, the importance of the relationship between city composition and non-lethal violent and property victimization differed across groups. For example, the proportion below age eighteen had a strong affect on whites' non-lethal violent victimization but not blacks'. On the other hand, the proportion of Hispanic residents had a moderate effect on blacks' property victimization but not whites'.

Further Considerations

There are two areas in which further exploration into these results are warranted. First, it is plausible that the disparate findings for city conditions in relation to rates of lethal and non-lethal victimization are attributed to reporting differences across the victimization types (see Table 2.2). More serious victimization, like homicide, are more likely to be reported to the police or come to their attention. However, only about 35% of the non-lethal violent and property victimizations recorded in the NCVS 12 Cities study were reported to the police. Therefore, it is imperative that lethal victimization be compared to only those non-lethal violent and property crimes that were reported to the police.¹⁰⁷

In Table 1 of Appendix B, the rates of reported non-lethal victimization are shown.¹⁰⁸ The relationship between city conditions and these rates are shown in Table 2 of the appendix. The most notable changes were in the strength, rather than the direction,

¹⁰⁷ Hereafter, the rate of victimization reported to the police will be referred to as reported victimization and the rates that include both reported and non-reported victimizations will be referred to as overall victimization.

¹⁰⁸ The NCVS 12 Cities report only gives the percent of the non-lethal violent and property victimization rate that was reported to the police. The rates of reported non-lethal victimization were calculated by multiplying these percents by the overall rates of non-lethal victimization.

of the relationship between city conditions and non-lethal forms of victimization. The magnitudes of the relationship between city structure and non-lethal violent victimization decreased. For instance, the effect of black/white economic equality on overall non-lethal violent victimization ($r=0.46$) is stronger than its effect on reported non-lethal violent victimization ($r=0.29$). Conversely, the magnitudes increased for the city structure and property victimization relationship. For example, the effect of Hispanic/white economic equality on overall property victimization ($r=0.38$) is weaker than its effect on reported property victimization ($r=0.54$). There was no clear pattern in the changes in the effect of city composition on overall and reported non-lethal violent and property victimization. The most notable change, however, was in the relationship between the proportion of female-headed households and non-lethal violent victimization ($r=0.17$ with overall non-lethal violence and $r=0.70$ with reported non-lethal violence). This finding suggests that the proportion of female-headed households is significantly and positively associated with reported violent victimization among the twelve cities. Importantly, this relationship is not apparent when overall victimization rates are considered.

Secondly, comparisons of lethal and non-lethal victimization using racially-disaggregated data should be made. The relationship between city conditions and non-lethal property and violent victimization differed across racial groups (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). An important aspect of the current study is to compare similarly disaggregated homicide rates to these findings. However, racially disaggregated homicide rates were only available for 5 cities: Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New York, and D.C. Descriptive statistics for these cities are presented in Table 3 of the appendix. These five

cities are the most segregated, have the largest proportions of black residents, and are slightly more disadvantaged in terms of city composition.¹⁰⁹ Also, the differences in the distribution of victimization across racial groups are notable. For example, for non-lethal violent victimization the mean for whites is 58.6 with a standard deviation of 5.6 compared a mean of 82.4 for blacks with a standard deviation of 33.7. Therefore, it is expected that greater differences across racial groups may emerge and the importance of city structure and composition to black victimization rates may be more evident.

The findings are presented in Table 4 of the appendix. Generally, city structure had an opposite effect on blacks and whites' rates of fatal and non-fatal violent and property victimization. The most notable differences were across forms of economic equality. For example, Hispanic/white economic equality had a strong negative affect on non-lethal violent victimization among blacks ($r=-0.97$) but a weak positive affect on non-lethal violent victimization among whites ($r=0.20$). The relationship between city composition and victimization rates among blacks and whites differed across victimization types. For both lethal and property victimization, their relation to city composition was opposite for blacks and whites. The proportion of female-headed households, for example, had a notable affect on both lethal and property victimization rates among blacks and whites. However, in both cases, the direction of these relationships were opposite across the groups. The percent of female-headed households had a negative effect on whites' lethal victimization ($r=-0.89$) but a positive affect on blacks' ($r=0.91$). Similarly, it had a positive effect on whites' property victimization ($r=0.77$) but a negative affect on blacks' ($r=-0.51$). The relationship between city

¹⁰⁹ The mean value for city composition measures among the 12 cities are provided in Table 6 of Chapter 2 and can be compared to the mean values presented in Table 3 of the Appendix B.

composition and non-lethal violent victimization among blacks and whites were in the same direction. Still the magnitudes of these relationships differed across the groups. For instance, the percent below age eighteen had a stronger affect on non-lethal violent victimization among whites ($r=0.81$) than it did on non-lethal victimization among blacks ($r=0.36$).

DISCUSSION

The research presented in this chapter addressed the first goal of the dissertation, which was to examine the relationship between city conditions and rates of non-fatal victimization (both overall and racially-disaggregated rates). Additionally, these results were compared to those for the city conditions/fatal victimization relationship. The findings suggest that the effects of city conditions on rates of lethal and non-lethal victimization are indeed different. City structure, when measured as residential segregation and economic equality between whites and minorities, generally has a stronger effect on lethal victimization than it does on rates of non-lethal violent and property victimization; furthermore, the effects across victimization type are in the opposite direction. High levels of residential segregation and low levels of economic equality were positively associated with lethal victimization among the twelve cities. However, the opposite was found for non-lethal violent and property victimization. Also, the various measures of city composition (i.e. the proportion of female-headed households) generally had a positive effect on lethal and non-lethal victimization among the cities. Yet, the importance of these relationships varied across all forms of victimization—lethal, non-lethal violent and property. These varying findings across victimization type are explained in part by the varying conditions of the twelve cities.

The differences in the results across fatal and non-fatal forms of victimization are likely due to the unique character of Washington, D.C. in particular. As one of the most racially divided cities and the most disadvantaged, many of the findings related to city conditions and rates of homicide changed when this city was not considered. This is not surprising considering the high rate of homicide for Washington, D.C. Its rate of 56.9 per 100,000 was nearly double that of Chicago, whose rate was second highest, and nearly forty times greater than that of the city with the lowest homicide rate, Madison, Wisconsin. Still, even after these qualitative differences are taken into account, city conditions still had a stronger effect on fatal victimization and these relationships were in the opposite direction of those found for city conditions and non-fatal forms of victimization.

Moreover, when the non-lethal forms of victimization are disaggregated by race, notable differences between blacks and whites emerge. City structure had a stronger affect on property victimization among blacks and non-lethal violent victimization among whites. City composition, for the most part, had a positive effect on non-lethal violent and property victimization among blacks and whites. The notable exceptions being the percent black, which had a negative effect on blacks' non-lethal violent and property victimization, and the proportion unemployed, which was negatively associated with whites' non-lethal violent victimization rates. The results suggest that the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization depend on the racial group being examined. Some conditions have a stronger effect on blacks' risks while others are more important to whites' risks.

In spite of the efforts and goals of the research conducted, the findings presented here are limited in terms of their generalizability. The analyses were based on twelve cities and in some cases, as few as seven cities. Yet they provide a basis for further examination of the city conditions/non-fatal victimization relationship especially across racial groups. Therefore, the next set of analyses explores the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization using individual-level data. Moreover, the importance of individual- and neighborhood-level correlates of non-fatal victimization across cities is examined. The research methods and findings of these analyses are detailed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4. The Relationship between Individual-, Neighborhood- and City-Level Factors and Non-Lethal Victimization

In the previous chapter, the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization was examined. The findings revealed that city context, at best, has a moderate association with overall rates of non-fatal violent and property victimization among the twelve cities. For example, the r coefficient for the black/white economic equality and lethal victimization relationship is -0.65 but it is 0.46 for black/white economic equality and non-lethal violent victimization. Notably, these relationships are in opposite directions and it appears that segregation may have a stronger association with murder rates than it does with non-fatal violence within cities. Furthermore, when the rates are disaggregated by race substantial differences across groups in the city conditions/non-fatal victimization relationship emerge. For instance, the proportion of residents that are Hispanic within the cities has virtually no relationship with whites' property victimization rates. However, it exerts a notable positive influence on property victimization rates among blacks ($r=0.50$).

The goal in this chapter is to further explore these relationships using individual-level survey data from the NCVS 12 Cities study. At this unit of analysis, "known" correlates of victimization (i.e. individual and neighborhood risks) can be studied in addition to city conditions. The results in the previous chapter do not take into account these correlates therefore it is unclear whether the aggregate relationships reflect compositional differences in the populations of the cities or differences in the types of neighborhoods within each city. It is important to determine whether city conditions will have a similar relationship with non-fatal victimization once these factors are considered.

For example, does the relationship between residential segregation and non-fatal victimization hold after neighborhood conditions are taken into account? Secondly, another goal of the research at this level is to assess the importance of individual and neighborhood risks for non-lethal victimization *across* cities. Many studies examining individual and neighborhood-level risks for victimization have focused on either national samples (i.e. Lauritsen and White, 2001) or one city in particular (i.e. Sampson et al., 1997; Rountree et al., 1994). It is important to know whether such risks for non-lethal victimization vary across the twelve cities. Lastly, the relationship between individual, neighborhood and city conditions and non-fatal victimization across racial and ethnic groups will also be examined. As noted, the previous analyses reveal that city context has a different influence on rates of non-lethal victimization across racial groups. It is important to understand whether such differences emerge after individual and neighborhood conditions are taken into account.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

The difficulty in studying the risk for non-fatal victimization at the individual-, neighborhood- and city level can be attributed to the lack of data suited for such multilevel analyses. However, the current research is made possible by the NCVS 12 Cities survey which provides data at the individual- and neighborhood-level. This data was then matched with city-level indicators of residential segregation, economic equality, female-headed households, unemployment, poverty and age composition provided by the American Communities Project/Lewis Mumford Center and the 2000 census data files. While the use of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) would have been ideal for the

present study, there have been criticisms of using this analytic technique with a small number of cases at the group- or second-level. Studies have shown that an insufficient sample size (i.e. less than fifty) at the group-level can result in inaccurate estimates of the standard error and variance components at this level (Hox & Maas, 2002; Hoffman & Johnson, 2000). The data essential to address the current research questions using HLM is not available. There have been few studies in recent years that allow for examination of the risks for non-fatal victimization at the individual-, neighborhood- and city-level. As such, a more traditional analytic approach is more feasible and therefore, logistic regression models examining the risks for non-lethal victimization across individual, neighborhood and city factors were studied.

The analyses entail first examining the relationship between individual-level predictors and non-fatal forms of victimization. This is done to assess the extent to which age, race, gender, income and marital status are related to non-fatal victimization using the 12 Cities sample. Next, models including individual and neighborhood factors are considered. Previous studies have found that some individual correlates of crime and victimization are explained by community-level indicators. These models will help to determine whether such findings hold in the present study. Lastly, individual, neighborhood and city conditions will be considered simultaneously. The full models examine the importance of city conditions while controlling for individual and neighborhood factors.

The descriptive statistics for the sample are shown in Table 1.2 of Chapter 2. Also, descriptive statistics related to residents' perceptions of disorder, serious crime and poor neighborhood quality are presented in Table 1.3 of Chapter 2. As noted in the

chapter, the summary indices for disorder and neighborhood quality are used in the current analyses. Lastly, the original values of the indicators of city conditions, which are shown in Tables 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 of Chapter 2, are used in the multivariate analyses.

FINDINGS

The Risk for Non-Lethal Victimization at the Individual-, Neighborhood- and City-Level

Property Victimization

The results related to risks for property victimization are presented in Table 3.1. The first set of findings (Model 1) indicate that when only individual-level factors are considered age, income, marital status and race/ethnicity are significantly related to property victimization. Specifically, age is negatively associated with property victimization and the magnitude of the relationship suggests that younger persons are slightly more likely to be victims of property crimes. Those with higher incomes are also slightly more likely to be property crime victims than are those with lesser incomes. Never married individuals are less likely than married persons to experience property victimization. Lastly, Asians and those of other ethnic backgrounds (non-Hispanic others) are less likely to be victims of property crimes while non-Hispanic blacks are more likely to experience property crime than are non-Hispanic whites.

In Model 2 of Table 3.1, the risks for property victimization at the individual- and neighborhood-level are shown. At the individual-level, the relationship between age and property victimization and income and property victimization are relatively unchanged once neighborhood context is considered. Furthermore, never married individuals are at

less risk for property victimization than are married persons and the magnitude of the relationship increased ($b=-0.14$ to $b=-0.27$) after controlling for neighborhood perceptions. The relationship between race/ethnicity when measured as non-Hispanic others and property victimization also intensified ($b=-0.35$ to $b=-0.45$) after neighborhood conditions were considered. However, the risk for property victimization among blacks was no longer significantly different from the risk among whites after neighborhood conditions were controlled for. However, Hispanics are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to be property crime victims at significant levels when neighborhood perceptions are taken into account. At the neighborhood level, perceptions of neighborhood disorder and homeless/transient populations on the streets of the neighborhood are positively and significantly related to property victimization. Lastly, the perception of serious neighborhood crime is also positively related to property victimization at a significant level.

In the full model which includes individual, neighborhood and city conditions (Model 3), the individual- and neighborhood-level predictors of property victimization from the previous model are still significantly related to property victimization. At the city-level, only one city condition is linked to property victimization at a significant level: the proportion impoverished. As poverty increases at the city level, property victimization decreases. However, the magnitude of this relationship is weak ($b=-0.06$). Importantly, the high levels of poverty among the twelve cities may account for this unexpected finding. In over half the sampled cities, the proportion living below the poverty line exceeds 20%.

TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE

TABLE 3.1. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Property Victimization (Entire Sample)

Individual Level	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)
Age									
Gender									
Female (reference group)	-0.02 ***	0.00	0.98	-0.02 ***	0.00	0.98	-0.02 ***	0.00	0.98
Male									
Income									
0.00	0.00	0.06	1.00	-0.05	0.12	0.95	-0.06	0.12	0.94
0.02 ***	0.02 ***	0.01	1.02	0.03 ***	0.01	1.03	0.03 ***	0.01	1.03
Marital Status									
Married (reference group)									
Never Married									
Divorce/separated	-0.14 ***	0.04	0.87	-0.27 ***	0.04	0.76	-0.24 ***	0.05	0.78
Widowed	0.07	0.09	1.07	-0.01	0.20	0.99	0.01	0.20	1.01
Race/ethnicity									
0.10	0.10	0.07	1.11	-0.01	0.19	0.99	0.04	0.20	1.04
Non-Hispanic Whites (reference group)									
Non-Hispanic Others									
Non-Hispanic Blacks	-0.35 ***	0.11	0.70	-0.45 **	0.17	0.64	-0.38 *	0.18	0.69
Hispanics	0.15 *	0.07	1.16	-0.01	0.13	0.99	0.04	0.11	1.04
Neighborhood Level									
-0.09	-0.09	0.06	0.91	-0.41 ***	0.09	0.66	-0.38 ***	0.12	0.69
Disorder									
Homeless/Transients				0.30 ***	0.10	1.34	0.30 ***	0.10	1.36
Poor Quality of Life				0.09 *	0.04	1.10	0.10 ***	0.05	1.11
Serious Crime				0.06	0.06	1.06	0.06	0.06	1.06
0.30 ***	0.30 ***	0.06	1.35	0.32 ***	0.06	1.38	0.32 ***	0.06	1.38
City Level (Original Values)									
Black/white segregation							-0.01	0.01	0.99
Black/white income equality							-0.91	1.08	0.40
% Female headed households							0.00	0.01	1.00
% Poverty							-0.06 *	0.03	0.94
% Unemployed							0.21	0.15	1.23
% Below 18							0.05	0.03	1.05
Log pseudo-likelihood		-5505.2			-3748.41			-3726.23	
Pseudo R-squared		0.0137			0.0493			0.055	

* p<.05
 ** p<.01
 *** p<.001

Taken together, the findings suggest that individual and neighborhood conditions are significantly related to property victimization. These relationships are relatively unaffected by city conditions. Age, marital status and perceptions of neighborhood disorder are still significantly linked to property victimization once neighborhood context is considered.

Non-Fatal Violent Victimization

The risk for non-fatal violent victimization is shown in Table 3.2. The individual-level predictors for non-lethal violent victimization are age, gender and marital status in Model 1. Young people are at slightly greater risk than are older people for non-fatal violent victimization. Males are also more likely to be victims of non-lethal violence than are females. Never married and divorce/separated individuals are at greater risk for non-lethal violent victimization than are married persons. Race and ethnicity fail to be significantly related to non-lethal forms of violent victimization. When individual and neighborhood factors are considered simultaneously (Model 2), age and marital status are still related to non-lethal violent victimization but gender is not. Moreover, non-Hispanic others are significantly more likely than whites to be victims of non-lethal violence once neighborhood conditions are considered. At the neighborhood level, all neighborhood perceptions except the presence of homeless and transients in the neighborhood are significantly and positively related to risks for non-fatal violent victimization. Finally, these individual and neighborhood factors remain significantly linked with non-lethal victimization even once city context is considered.

Some city conditions are also related to non-lethal violence at significant levels. Namely, black/white economic equality has a positive influence on non-fatal violent

Table 3.2. Logistic Regression Predicting Non-Fatal Violent Victimization

Individual Level	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Age						
Gender						
Female (reference group)	-0.03 ***	0.00	-0.03 ***	0.00	-0.03 ***	0.00
Male	0.40 *	0.17	0.22	0.15	0.22	0.16
Income	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
Marital Status						
Married (reference group)						
Never Married	0.33 **	0.13	0.36 ***	0.11	0.39 ***	0.11
Divorce/separated	0.53 ***	0.10	0.65 ***	0.11	0.62 ***	0.12
Widowed	0.30	0.26	0.53	0.33	0.54	0.31
Race/ethnicity						
Non-Hispanic Whites (reference group)						
Non-Hispanic Others	-0.18	0.17	0.18 **	0.33	0.23	0.34
Non-Hispanic Blacks	0.20	0.28	-0.10	0.31	-0.04	0.34
Hispanics	0.25	0.31	0.51	0.34	0.62	0.33
Neighborhood Level						
Disorder			0.35 **	0.13	0.35 **	0.14
Homeless/Transients			0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08
Poor Quality of Life			0.24 ***	0.06	0.25 ***	0.06
Serious Crime			0.26 *	0.11	0.26 *	0.12
City Level (Original Values)						
Black/white segregation					0.00	0.00
% Female headed households					1.37 **	0.55
% Poverty					0.01	0.01
% Unemployed					-0.02	0.02
% Below 18					-0.06	0.05
% Below 18					-0.03 *	0.02
Log pseudo-likelihood	-2550.18		-1640.23		-1632.71	
Pseudo R-squared	0.0467		0.0922		0.0964	

* p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001

n/a indicates that the variable was dropped from the model due to collinearity

victimization while the proportion of persons below age eighteen is negatively related to property victimization. Of these conditions, black/white economic equality was the greatest predictor of non-lethal violent victimization ($\exp(b) = 3.94$).

TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE

In summation, age and marital status were linked to non-fatal violent victimization. Importantly, never married individuals were 47% more likely to be victims of violence and divorced/separated individuals were 86% more likely to be victims of violence than were married individuals, even once neighborhood and city conditions were taken into account. At the neighborhood level, those with disorder in their neighborhoods were 1.42 times, more likely to be victims of crime than were those without disorder in their neighborhoods. Those who perceived that the conditions in their neighborhoods were poor and felt that serious crime occurred in their neighborhoods were nearly 30% more likely to be victims of violence than those without such perceptions. Lastly, city conditions were also associated with non-fatal victimization. Of particular importance is the black/white economic equality and non-fatal violence relationship. Those in more equitable cities were nearly four times more likely to be victims of violence. This finding is contrary to the hypothesis offered.

This unexpected finding too may be a function of the sampled cities. As noted the poverty levels among the twelve cities are notably high. As such, it is possible that highly equitable cities are cities with equally poor blacks and whites. This is certainly the case among the twelve cities. For example, in Knoxville the ratio of black-to-white average household income is 0.71 indicating that blacks' average household income is 71% that of the average white household. In Knoxville, whites' median household

income is between \$30,000 and \$34,999 while blacks' income ranges between \$17,500 and \$19,999. However, in the less equitable city of Washington, D.C. where the ratio of black/white income is 0.53, the average incomes of blacks and whites are substantially higher. White residents' mean income in D.C. is between \$40,000 and \$49,999 and blacks' mean income falls between \$30,000 and \$34,999. Therefore, the finding that increased black/white economic equality is related to increased violent victimization is likely the result of the relationship between poverty and violent victimization. Cities with high levels of economic equality between blacks and whites are likely to be disadvantaged. In this sense, economic equality reflects lower incomes among whites rather than higher incomes among blacks.

The Risk for Non-Lethal Victimization across Race and Ethnicity

Another important aspect of the current study is to determine whether individual, neighborhood and city conditions have a similar effect on property and non-lethal violent victimization across racial/ethnic groups. Does segregation, for example, have a different influence on non-fatal victimization among whites than it does among blacks and if so, why? Although, this question could be addressed by examining interactions between race and city conditions in relation to non-fatal victimization, the analyses focus on race-specific models of non-fatal victimization. This method allows for an examination of the relationship between factors at each level and non-fatal victimization. It is possible that individual and neighborhood correlates of victimization also vary across racial/ethnic groups. Therefore, separate models predicting non-fatal victimization among each group are examined.

In accordance with prior research, the groups that are compared are non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks. As Lauritsen and White (2001: 43) note simple comparisons across race (i.e. black versus white) can result in overestimates of risks among whites since Hispanics, who can be of any race, often report being white. Moreover, comparisons between Hispanics and non-Hispanics underestimate differences between groups because white and blacks are both included in the latter group. In the NCVS 12 Cities survey respondents are asked to report on their race and ethnicity; their responses to these questions were cross-classified to produce the two groups.¹¹⁰ The findings across race and ethnicity are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.

TABLES 3.3 AND 3.4 ABOUT HERE

Property Victimization

Beginning with property victimization (Table 3.3), age is the only significant predictor at the individual-level for both groups. Age has a negative association with property victimization among non-Hispanic whites and blacks. Income was positively related to property victimization among non-Hispanic blacks at a significant level but the relationship was positive and not significant among non-Hispanic whites. Marital status, on the other hand, had a significant influence on property victimization among non-Hispanic whites but not non-Hispanic blacks. Whites who were never married were nearly 20% less likely to be victims of property crime. The results of the chi-square test of statistical difference in these coefficients indicate that there are no significant

¹¹⁰ It is important to note that the survey item on race included seven categories, 'white', 'black/negro', 'American Indian', 'Eskimo', 'Aleut', 'Asian or Pacific Islander' and 'other' while ethnicity consists of 'Hispanic' and 'non-Hispanic'. However the other groups are not considered in the analyses because their small size makes comparisons difficult.

TABLE 3.3 Logistic Regression Predicting Property Victimization by Race/Ethnicity

Individual Level	Non-Hispanic Whites			Non-Hispanic Blacks			Chi-Square Difference
	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)	
Age							
Gender							
Female (reference group)	-0.03 ***	0.01	0.97	-0.02 ***	0.00	0.98	1.00
Male	0.19	0.19	1.21	-0.30 ***	0.19	0.74	2.00
Income	0.03	0.02	1.03	0.07 ***	0.02	1.08	2.25
Marital Status							
Married (reference group)							
Never Married	-0.24 **	0.09	0.79	0.01	0.14	1.01	2.26
Divorce/separated	-0.18	0.28	0.84	-0.14	0.30	0.87	0.01
Widowed	0.39	0.38	1.47	-0.12	0.21	0.88	1.38
Race/ethnicity							
Non-Hispanic Whites (reference group)							
Non-Hispanic Others							
Non-Hispanic Blacks							
Hispanics							
Neighborhood Level							
Disorder	0.50 ***	0.15	1.65	0.22 *	0.09	1.25	2.56
Homeless/Transients	0.20	0.07	1.22	-0.35 ***	0.05	0.71	40.88 ***
Poor Quality of Life	-0.02 ***	0.09	0.98	0.38 ***	0.03	1.46	17.78 ***
Serious Crime	0.31 ***	0.11	1.37	-0.24	0.13	0.79	18.97 ***
City Level (Original Values)							
Black/white segregation	-0.02 *	0.01	0.98	-0.03 ***	0.00	0.97	1.00
Black/white income equality	-1.60	1.16	0.20	-0.57	0.86	0.57	0.51
% Female headed households	0.00	0.01	1.00	-0.03 ***	0.01	0.97	4.50 *
% Poverty	-0.02	0.03	0.98	-0.10 ***	0.03	0.90	3.56
% Unemployed	0.08	0.13	1.09	0.62 ***	0.11	1.86	10.06 ***
% Below 18	0.05	0.04	1.05	0.02	0.03	1.02	0.36
Log pseudo-likelihood	-2525.11			-614.817			
Pseudo R-squared	0.0783			0.0835			

* p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001

TABLE 3.4 Logistic Regression Predicting Non-Fatal Violent Victimization by Race/Ethnicity

Individual Level	Non-Hispanic Whites			Non-Hispanic Blacks			Chi-Square Difference
	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)	
Age	-0.03 ***	0.01	0.97	-0.05 *	0.02	0.95	0.80
Gender							
Female (reference group)							
Male	0.50	0.37	1.64	-0.38	0.24	0.68	3.98 *
Income	0.04	0.03	1.04	-0.04 ***	0.01	0.96	6.40 **
Marital Status							
Married (reference group)							
Never Married	0.67 **	0.26	1.95	-0.45	0.63	0.63	2.70
Divorce/separated	0.37	0.34	1.45	0.07	0.40	1.07	0.33
Widowed	0.42	0.64	1.52	n/a			n/a
Race/ethnicity							
Non-Hispanic Whites (reference group)							
Non-Hispanic Others							
Non-Hispanic Blacks							
Hispanics							
Neighborhood Level							
Disorder	0.27 ***	0.03	1.31	0.29	0.16	1.33	0.03
Homeless/Transients	0.10	0.13	1.10	-0.06	0.11	0.94	0.88
Poor Quality of Life	0.40	0.26	1.50	0.35	0.18	1.42	0.03
Serious Crime	0.20	0.19	1.22	0.07	0.10	1.07	0.37
City Level (Original Values)							
Black/white segregation	-0.01	0.01	0.99	0.01	0.01	1.01	2.00
Black/white income equality	0.93	1.45	2.53	-0.32	2.05	0.72	0.20
% Female headed households	0.01	0.01	1.01	-0.01	0.02	0.99	0.80
% Poverty	-0.15	0.08	0.86	0.28 ***	0.05	1.32	20.78 ***
% Unemployed	0.03	0.16	1.03	-0.49 ***	0.16	0.62	5.28 *
% Below 18	0.08	0.06	1.09	-0.19 ***	0.06	0.83	10.13 ***
Log pseudo-likelihood	-872.434			-243.081			
Pseudo R-squared	0.1029			0.135			

* p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001

differences between non-Hispanic white and blacks' risks for property victimization at the individual-level.

At the neighborhood level, perceptions of neighborhood disorder had a significant influence on property victimization among non-Hispanic whites but did not have a meaningful association with property victimization among non-Hispanic blacks. The perception of disorder and serious crime within whites' neighborhoods is positively associated with property victimization among non-Hispanic whites. Whites in neighborhoods that are disordered are 1.65 times more likely to be property crime victims while those in neighborhoods with serious crime are 1.37 times more likely to be property crime victims. Lastly, the perception of poor neighborhood quality among non-Hispanic whites was significantly linked to property victimization. However, the direction of this relationship is negative indicating that those with such perceptions of their neighborhood were less likely to be victims of property crimes. Chi-square tests reveal that the differences in the coefficients for the relationship between poor neighborhood quality and property victimization and the relationship between serious crime and property victimization is significantly different among non-Hispanic whites and blacks.

Finally, the relationship between city conditions and property victimization across racial/ethnic groups is shown in the lower right portion of Table 3.3. Black/white segregation was negatively and significantly related to property victimization among non-Hispanic whites and blacks. The proportion of female-headed households, the proportion impoverished and the proportion of persons unemployed is significantly linked to property victimization among non-Hispanic blacks. The greatest predictor of property

victimization among non-Hispanic blacks was the proportion unemployed. Blacks in cities with higher levels of unemployment were 86% more likely than blacks in cities with lower levels of unemployment to be victims of property crimes. However, neither unemployment nor the other city conditions were significantly related to property victimization among non-Hispanic whites.

The only meaningful differences in the city conditions/property victimization relationship between non-Hispanic blacks and whites are for the proportion of female-headed households and unemployed. However, the relationship between the proportion of persons impoverished and property victimization approaches, but does not reach statistical significance ($\chi^2=3.56$ and χ^2 critical=3.84).

In summation, the greatest differences across race/ethnicity emerged at the neighborhood- and city-level. The relationships between neighborhood conditions and property victimization were significant for non-Hispanic whites and blacks. However, in some cases, as with the perception that there were homeless/transient populations within the neighborhood, the direction of these relationships contrasted. While this relationship was positive among non-Hispanic whites, it was negative for non-Hispanic blacks. At the city-level, the relationships were generally in the same direction but the magnitudes were greater among non-Hispanic blacks. This finding concurs with the city-level research and urban theories which suggest that negative city conditions are most related to blacks' risks for victimization. However, with the exception of the proportion unemployed, city conditions were typically associated with decreased property victimization risks among non-Hispanic blacks. One plausible explanation for this unexpected finding is that high levels of disadvantage such as unemployment and female-

headed households may increase levels of guardianship and thus reduce risks for property victimization.

Non-Lethal Violent Victimization

The results related to non-lethal violent victimization are shown in Table 3.4. At the individual-level, age has a significant and negative influence on non-lethal violent victimization among non-Hispanic whites and blacks. The income/non-lethal violence relationship is significant for non-Hispanic blacks not non-Hispanic whites. Furthermore, the chi-square tests reveal that the relationship between income and non-lethal violent victimization is significantly different among non-Latino whites and blacks. Lastly, non-Hispanic whites who were never married were significantly more likely to be victims of non-fatal violent victimization than were married non-Hispanic whites.

With the exception of perceptions of neighborhood disorder, neighborhood conditions were not significantly related to non-lethal violent victimization among non-Hispanic whites. Whites who perceived that their neighborhoods were disordered were 31% more likely to be victims of non-fatal violence than were whites who did not. The perception of the neighborhood was not significantly linked to non-lethal violence among non-Hispanic blacks. Furthermore, there are no significant differences in these coefficients among non-Hispanic whites and blacks.

At the city level, black/white segregation and economic equality and the proportion of female-headed households were not significantly related to non-fatal violent victimization among non-Hispanic whites or blacks. The proportion of persons impoverished, unemployed and below age eighteen was linked to non-fatal violent victimization among non-Hispanic blacks at significant levels. The proportion

impoverished was positively related to blacks' risk for non-fatal violent victimization. On the other hand, both the proportion unemployed and below age eighteen was negatively associated with blacks' risk for non-fatal violent victimization.

Overall, the findings suggest that there are indeed differences in risks for non-fatal violent and property victimization between non-Hispanic whites and blacks. For property victimization, substantial differences across the groups emerge at the individual, neighborhood-, and city-level. For non-lethal violent victimization, most differences among non-Hispanic whites and blacks were at the city-level. These findings support the city-level literature which shows that racial differences in crime and victimization are explained by structural conditions which are most detrimental to blacks (i.e. Shihadeh and Flynn, 1996). However, contrary to this body of research, blacks' risks were decreased in cities with high levels of disadvantaged. One possible explanation for such a finding is that the skewed nature of city-level disadvantage (i.e. unemployment) among the sample is responsible for the results.

The Risk for Non-Lethal Victimization across the Twelve Cities

Finally, in a series of city-specific analyses the importance of individual and neighborhood conditions on risks for property and non-lethal violent victimization across cities are examined. These tests are another way of examining the importance of city context. Differences in individual and neighborhood correlates of victimization across cities would indicate that city conditions are important and that generalizing from one city may be inaccurate.

Property Victimization

Table 3.5 presents the findings across cities for property victimization. With the exception of age, most individual-level factors did not have a significant relationship with property victimization within each of the cities. Age was not significant in four cities: Chicago, Madison, New York and Springfield. There were no significant gender differences in property victimization in any of the twelve cities. Income was significantly associated with property victimization in Washington, D.C. but not the other cities. Marital status, when comparing divorced/separated individuals to married individuals, was significantly related to property victimization in Chicago and Kansas City but not in the other cities. The direction of these relationships differed across the two cities ($b = -1.47$ in Chicago and $b = 0.72$ in Kansas City). The relationship between Hispanic ethnicity and property victimization was significant in Los Angeles and San Diego but not in the other cities. Again, the direction of the relationship depended upon the city being studied. When compared to non-Latino whites, Hispanics' odds of being property crime victims was 0.57 in Los Angeles but in San Diego they were at much greater risk (1.81) compared to non-Hispanic whites. This difference in risks for property victimization for Hispanics in Los Angeles and San Diego is statistically significant (see Table 3.6a). Lastly, in most cities (Chicago, Kansas City, New York, San Diego, Spokane, Springfield, and D.C.) the perception of disorder was linked to property crime victimization at significant levels.¹¹¹ However, the magnitude of the relationship between disorder and property victimization differed across the cities and in some cases

¹¹¹ To determine whether neighborhood context is over specified in the current models, the analyses were redone including only the disorder measure at the neighborhood level. The results indicate that when the other neighborhood measures are excluded the disorder/property victimization relationship is significant in Knoxville, Savannah and Tucson also. However, the findings did not change for Los Angeles and Madison; disorder failed to be significantly related to property victimization in these cities regardless of whether the models were restricted to neighborhood disorder only or included all neighborhood indicators.

the differences in the coefficients are statistically significant (see Table 3.6b). The presence of homeless/transient population in the neighborhood was significantly and positively related to property victimization in Knoxville and San Diego but not in the other cities. Also, the perception of poor neighborhood quality was linked to property victimization in Kansas City, Spokane, and D.C. at significant levels. However, the relationship was not significant in the other cities. Finally, the perception of serious neighborhood crime was significantly related to property victimization in Tucson and Los Angeles only.

TABLE 3.5, 3.6a, 3.6b AND 3.6c ABOUT HERE

Non-Fatal Violent Victimization

For non-fatal violent victimization, there were also differences across the cities. At the individual-level, age was significantly and negatively related to non-lethal violent victimization in seven cities: Kansas City, Knoxville, Savannah, Spokane, Springfield, Tucson and D.C. Gender was not significant in any of the cities except Springfield and D.C. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship across the two cities differs. In Springfield the relationship is negative ($b=-0.81$) while in D.C. it is positive ($b=1.16$); there is a statistically significant difference in these coefficients (see Table 3.8b). Income was associated with non-fatal violent victimization at a significant level in D.C. but not in any of the other cities. Marital status (i.e. divorce/separated) was significantly linked to non-lethal violent victimization in Madison, Spokane, Tucson and D.C. The results of the chi-square test for differences in the coefficients for Spokane and Tucson reveal that the difference between the two is not statistically significant (but it does approach significance). Race and ethnicity was significant in two cities: New York and

TABLE 3.5. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Property Victimization Across Cities

Individual Level	Chicago		Kansas City		Knoxville	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Age	-0.02	0.01	-0.02 *	0.01	-0.02 *	0.01
Gender						
Female (reference group)						
Male	0.25	0.21	0.18	0.23	0.36	0.22
Income	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.04	-0.01	0.03
Marital Status						
Married (reference group)						
Never Married	-0.25	0.27	0.19	0.29	0.21	0.28
Divorce/separated	-1.47 **	0.53	0.72 *	0.30	-0.14	0.35
Widowed	-0.41	0.56	0.22	0.82	0.55	0.58
Race/Ethnicity						
Non-Latino Whites (reference group)						
Non-Latino Others	0.62	0.47	-1.60	1.08	n/a	0.23
Non-Latino Blacks	0.22	0.28	-0.06	0.30	0.23	0.39
Latinos	-0.33	0.33	-0.67	0.68	0.25	0.69
Neighborhood Level						
Disorder	0.30 **	0.11	0.48 ***	0.12	0.28	0.15
Homeless/Transients	-0.09	0.12	0.19	0.17	0.38 **	0.16
Poor Quality of Life	0.07	0.13	0.31 **	0.12	0.14	0.14
Serious Crime	0.33	0.23	0.17	0.23	0.08	0.26
Log pseudo-likelihood	-306.9246		-289.5653		-310.1672	
Pseudo R-squared	0.0795		0.1024		0.0594	

Note: Data file is derived from the NCVS 12 Cities Study

The findings are based on the weighed sample for each city. The unweighted N for each city: Chicago (1584), KC (1500), Knoxville (1476), LA (1701), Madison (1432), New York (1482),

n/a indicates that the variable was dropped from the model because when its value equal 0 it predicts failure perfectly

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

	Los Angeles		Madison		New York				
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE			
		exp (b)		exp (b)		exp (b)			
	-0.04 ***	0.01	0.96	-0.02	0.01	0.98	-0.01	0.01	0.99
	-0.01	0.22	0.99	0.27	0.21	1.31	-0.40	0.27	0.67
	0.04	0.03	1.04	0.01	0.04	1.01	0.03	0.04	1.03
	-0.48	0.27	0.62	-0.47	0.28	0.62	-0.23	0.32	0.79
	0.23	0.36	1.25	0.14	0.32	1.15	0.18	0.39	1.20
	0.88	0.52	2.40	-0.62	1.13	0.54	-0.03	0.63	0.97
	-0.84	0.52	0.43	-0.40	0.59	0.67	-0.41	0.49	0.66
	0.33	0.33	1.40	0.44	0.54	1.55	-0.18	0.35	0.84
	-0.56 *	0.29	0.57	-0.53	0.77	0.59	-0.47	0.37	0.63
	-0.02	0.14	0.98	-0.02	0.15	0.98	0.51 ***	0.14	1.66
	0.07	0.11	1.08	0.29	0.15	1.34	0.14	0.13	1.15
	0.13	0.13	1.14	0.17	0.15	1.19	-0.07	0.15	0.93
	0.60 *	0.25	1.82	-0.32	0.24	0.73	0.30	0.27	1.35
	-290.253			-326.166			-208.4808		
	0.0636			0.023			0.0686		

, San Diego (1619), Savannah (1608), Spokane (1569), Springfield (1655), Tucson (1566), DC (1316).

b	San Diego		Savannah		Spokane			
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE		
-0.03 **	0.01	0.97	-0.02 *	0.01	0.98	-0.03 ***	0.01	0.97
0.13	0.23	1.14	0.31	0.21	1.37	0.10	0.19	1.10
0.04	0.04	1.04	0.04	0.03	1.04	0.03	0.03	1.03
-0.12	0.28	0.89	-0.04	0.25	0.97	0.04	0.26	1.04
0.31	0.33	1.37	-0.02	0.31	0.98	0.37	0.29	1.45
0.24	0.88	1.28	-0.14	0.67	0.87	0.34	0.62	1.41
-0.27	0.43	0.77	0.44	0.53	1.56	0.55	0.47	1.74
0.72	0.48	2.05	0.22	0.22	1.25	0.56	0.62	1.76
0.60 *	0.29	1.81	-0.44	0.58	0.65	-0.16	0.66	0.85
0.73 ***	0.14	2.08	0.21	0.11	1.23	0.36 ***	0.11	1.43
0.27 *	0.12	1.31	0.16	0.15	1.17	-0.07	0.17	0.94
0.00	0.14	1.00	0.22	0.12	1.24	0.36 ***	0.12	1.44
-0.10	0.24	0.91	0.24	0.22	1.28	0.09	0.22	1.10
-289.5291			-351.602			-356.6212		
0.1189			0.0518			0.0873		

	Springfield			Tucson			Washington, DC		
	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)
	-0.01	0.01	0.99	-0.02 *	0.01	0.98	-0.02 *	0.01	0.98
	-0.37	0.22	0.69	0.07	0.19	1.07	-0.01	0.21	0.99
	0.06	0.03	1.06	-0.04	0.03	0.96	0.13 ***	0.04	1.14
	0.02	0.26	1.02	-0.09	0.26	0.91	-0.19	0.28	0.83
	0.19	0.31	1.21	0.21	0.24	1.24	-0.13	0.31	0.88
	-0.40	0.61	0.67	-0.26	0.56	0.77	-1.51	0.87	0.22
	-1.74	0.97	0.18	-0.71	0.51	0.49	0.47	0.58	1.60
	-0.16	0.31	0.85	0.11	0.51	1.11	-0.24	0.26	0.78
	0.09	0.32	1.09	-0.24	0.23	0.78	0.11	0.45	1.12
	0.30 **	0.11	1.35	0.07	0.12	1.07	0.26 *	0.11	1.30
	0.26	0.17	1.29	0.12	0.10	1.13	-0.10	0.11	0.91
	0.08	0.12	1.09	0.21	0.12	1.24	0.37 **	0.13	1.45
	0.30	0.25	1.35	0.42 *	0.20	1.52	0.19	0.24	1.21
	-312.0186			-378.2823			-275.1829		
	0.0596			0.0445			0.1007		

TABLE 3.6a. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Property Victimization Across Cities

Individual Level	Los Angeles			San Diego			Ratio of Coefficients	Chi-Square for Difference
	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)		
Race/Ethnicity								
Latinos	-0.56 *	0.29	0.57	0.60 *	0.29	1.81	-1.07	8.00 ***

TABLE 3.6b. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Property Victimization Across Cities

Neighborhood Level	Chicago			Washington, DC			Ratio of Coefficients	Chi-Square for Difference
	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)		
Disorder	0.73 ***	0.14	2.08	0.26 *	0.11	1.30	0.37	6.97 **

TABLE 3.6c. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Property Victimization Across Cities

Neighborhood Level	Los Angeles			Tucson			Ratio of Coefficients	Chi-Square for Difference
	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)		
Serious Crime	0.60 *	0.25	1.82	0.42 *	0.20	1.52	0.70	0.32

Springfield. In New York, Hispanics were 4.57 times more likely than non-Hispanic whites to be victims of non-lethal violence. On the other hand, non-Hispanic blacks were less likely to be victims of non-lethal violence in Springfield ($\exp(b)=0.35$) than were non-Hispanic whites. At the neighborhood-level, neighborhood perceptions are not significantly linked to non-fatal violent victimization in most cities. However, perceptions of disorder were significantly related to non-fatal violent victimization in Knoxville, New York and Springfield. Also, the perception of homeless/transients in the neighborhood was associated with non-fatal violent victimization in Chicago and Madison. Poor neighborhood quality was linked to non-fatal violence in Springfield but none of the other cities. Lastly, perceived serious crime in the neighborhood had a positive influence on non-lethal violent victimization in San Diego and Tucson.

TABLES 3.7, 3.8a, 3.8b, 3.8c, 3.8 d AND 3.8e ABOUT HERE

Overall, the cities are more similar in their risks for non-lethal victimization (i.e. property and violent) than they are different. For property victimization, differences in the relationship between Hispanic origin/property victimization across Los Angeles and San Diego emerged. Ironically, these relationships were not similar across cities. Hispanics were more likely to be victims of property crime in San Diego but less likely to be victims of property crime in Los Angeles. This finding may be due to the unique context of each city. As noted in the previous chapter, Los Angeles also has a long history of racial tension between minorities, and particularly Hispanics, and whites. Los Angeles was also plagued by high rates of violence and in particular, gang violence, during the 1990s. San Diego, on the other hand, is an affluent city as illustrated by the remarkably high cost of living in the area and has a relatively low violent crime rate

TABLE 3.7. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Across Cities

Individual Level	Chicago		Kansas City		Knoxville				
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE			
Age	-0.02	0.02	0.98	-0.03 *	0.02	0.97	-0.07 ***	0.02	0.94
Gender									
Female (reference group)									
Male	0.59	0.36	1.80	0.47	0.39	1.60	0.30	0.36	1.35
Income	0.03	0.05	1.03	-0.03	0.07	0.97	-0.07	0.04	0.93
Marital Status									
Married (reference group)									
Never Married	0.61	0.52	1.84	0.47	0.44	1.59	-0.40	0.46	0.67
Divorced/separated	0.41	0.76	1.51	0.39	0.61	1.47	0.03	0.58	1.03
Widowed	n/a			n/a			1.25	1.26	3.48
Race/Ethnicity									
Non-Latino Whites (reference group)									
Non-Latino Others	-0.02	0.78	0.98	0.07	1.40	1.07	n/a		
Non-Latino Blacks	-0.99	0.61	0.37	-0.97	0.63	0.38	-0.44	0.79	0.64
Latinos	0.49	0.51	1.63	-0.36	0.81	0.70	1.38	0.89	3.96
Neighborhood Level									
Disorder	0.17	0.20	1.19	0.24	0.19	1.27	0.53 **	0.19	1.71
Homeless/Transients	0.46 *	0.20	1.58	0.30	0.26	1.36	0.37	0.21	1.45
Poor Quality of Life	0.26	0.20	1.30	0.21	0.23	1.24	0.00	0.18	1.00
Serious Crime	0.35	0.42	1.42	0.28	0.37	1.32	0.70	0.38	2.02
Log pseudo-likelihood	-122.922		-120.67		-138.908				
Pseudo R-squared	0.1183		0.0957		0.1915				

Note: Data file is derived from the NCVS 12 Cities Study

The findings are based on the weighed sample for each city. The unweighted N for each city: Chicago (1584), KC (1500), Knoxville (1476), LA (1701), Madison (1432), New York (148)

n/a indicates that the variable was dropped from the model because when its value equal 0 it predicts failure perfectly

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

	Los Angeles		Madison		New York		San Diego					
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE				
	exp (b)		exp (b)		exp (b)		exp (b)					
	-0.03	0.02	0.97	-0.02	0.01	0.98	-0.02	0.02	0.98	-0.01	0.01	0.99
	0.46	0.45	1.58	0.10	0.32	1.11	-0.17	0.39	0.85	-0.01	0.36	0.99
	0.03	0.05	1.03	0.03	0.05	1.03	0.08	0.08	1.08	-0.02	0.05	0.98
	0.59	0.54	1.80	0.95	0.50	2.59	0.13	0.54	1.14	0.78	0.47	2.18
	-0.25	0.92	0.78	1.89***	0.50	6.59	0.62	0.60	1.85	0.11	0.58	1.11
	1.70	0.93	5.47	1.59	0.95	4.92	0.45	1.21	1.56	0.42	1.23	1.52
	0.04	0.77	1.04	-0.77	1.12	0.46	1.18	0.75	3.26	-0.34	0.70	0.71
	0.19	0.60	1.21	n/a	0.71	1.31	0.72	0.70	2.05	0.09	0.78	1.09
	0.09	0.62	1.09	0.27	0.71	1.31	1.52 *	0.62	4.57	0.69	0.43	1.99
	0.15	0.26	1.17	0.50 *	0.23	1.65	0.69 ***	0.23	2.00	0.15	0.23	1.17
	-0.13	0.25	0.88	0.46 *	0.19	1.59	0.05	0.21	1.05	0.02	0.18	1.02
	0.41	0.34	1.51	-0.16	0.21	0.85	0.22	0.26	1.25	-0.38	0.26	0.68
	-0.36	0.43	0.70	-0.04	0.33	0.96	0.26	0.49	1.30	0.67 *	0.32	1.95
	-102.039			-170.93			-100.279					-145.015
	0.0702			0.1121			0.189					0.0606

2). San Diego (1619), Savannah (1608), Spokane (1569), Springfield (1655), Tucson (1566), DC (1316).

Savannah			Spokane			Springfield		
b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)
-0.03 **	0.01	0.97	-0.05 ****	0.01	0.95	-0.03 *	0.01	0.97
0.56	0.36	1.76	0.11	0.39	1.12	-0.81 *	0.41	0.45
-0.07	0.05	0.93	0.03	0.05	1.03	-0.03	0.05	0.97
-0.05	0.47	0.95	0.99 *	0.50	2.69	0.08	0.44	1.08
1.26 ***	0.39	3.52	2.17 ***	0.49	8.74	-0.01	0.52	0.99
n/a			1.98	1.17	7.26	n/a		
n/a			n/a			-0.41	0.64	0.66
-0.07	0.38	0.94	n/a			-1.06 *	0.51	0.35
-0.05	0.80	0.95	0.25	0.88	1.28	-0.36	0.51	0.70
0.28	0.18	1.32	0.31	0.18	1.36	0.42 *	0.18	1.52
0.32	0.24	1.37	0.16	0.25	1.17	-0.21	0.27	0.81
0.18	0.21	1.20	0.17	0.22	1.18	0.42 **	0.16	1.52
0.28	0.40	1.32	0.42	0.40	1.52	0.66	0.38	1.93
-146.542			-124.082			-135.995		
0.1307			0.1509			0.2031		

Tucson				Washington, DC			
b		exp (b)		b		exp (b)	
	SE				SE		
-0.06 ***	0.02	0.95		-0.06 ***	0.02	0.94	
0.56	0.37	1.76		1.16 **	0.47	3.20	
0.07	0.05	1.07		-0.13 *	0.06	0.88	
0.33	0.41	1.40		-0.58	0.65	0.56	
0.95 *	0.45	2.58		1.43 *	0.68	4.17	
n/a				n/a			
0.20	0.89	1.23		-0.40	1.19	0.67	
0.79	0.82	2.20		-0.35	0.59	0.70	
-0.52	0.42	0.60		0.57	0.67	1.76	
0.30	0.19	1.36		0.31	0.20	1.36	
0.28	0.17	1.33		0.10	0.20	1.10	
0.10	0.24	1.11		0.07	0.24	1.07	
0.88 **	0.34	2.42		-0.11	0.52	0.89	
<hr/>				<hr/>			
-138.845				-97.335			
0.1524				0.1679			

TABLE 3.8a. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Across Cities

Individual Level	Knoxville		Kansas City		Ratio of Coefficients	Chi-Square for Difference			
	b	SE	b	SE					
Age	-0.07 ***	0.02	0.94		-0.03 *	0.02	0.97	0.43	2.00

TABLE 3.8b. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Across Cities

Individual Level	Washington, DC		Springfield		Ratio of Coefficients	Chi-Square for Difference			
	b	SE	b	SE					
Male	1.16 ***	0.47	3.20		-0.81 *	0.41	0.45	-0.70	9.17 ***

TABLE 3.8c. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Across Cities

Individual Level	Spokane		Tucson		Ratio of Coefficients	Chi-Square for Difference			
	b	SE	b	SE					
Male	2.17 ***	0.49	8.74		0.95 *	0.45	2.58	0.44	3.36

TABLE 3.8d. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Across Cities

Neighborhood Level	New York		Springfield		Ratio of Coefficients	Chi-Square for Difference			
	b	SE	b	SE					
Disorder	0.69 ***	0.23	2.00		0.42 *	0.18	1.52	0.61	0.86

TABLE 3.8e. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Across Cities

Neighborhood Level	Tucson		San Diego		Ratio of Coefficients	Chi-Square for Difference			
	b	SE	b	SE					
Serious Crime	0.88 **	0.34	2.42		0.67 *	0.32	1.95	0.76	0.20

compared to Los Angeles. San Diego has a sizable but smaller Hispanic population than does Los Angeles (25% versus 46%), which may account for the lower level of residential segregation that Hispanics in the city experience. Taken together, the qualitative differences between the cities may explain the divergent findings among their largest minority population. Hispanics in Los Angeles may be more likely to live in impoverished conditions, experience inequality and separation from whites, and thus may more often be victims of violence. However, the affluence of San Diego compared to Los Angeles may equate to lower risks for violence but higher risks for property victimization. When conceived in this manner, being of Hispanic origin is not as important as city context to risk for victimization.

Moreover, the cities differed even less in terms of non-fatal violent victimization. With the exception of gender/non-fatal victimization there were no other significant differences across the cities. The relationship between gender and non-lethal violent victimization was significant in Springfield and Washington, D.C. The gender-related findings in these cities may not be surprising considering that both have among the highest percent (nearly 50%) of female-headed households compared to the other cities. However, the importance of gender differs across the cities. While the gender/non-fatal violent victimization relationship is negative in Springfield, the opposite is true for Washington, D.C. In D.C., males are 3.2 times more likely than females to be victims of non-lethal violent crime. It may be that these disparate findings are explained by racial differences in victimization risks among males. Specifically, the victimization literature suggests that black males are more likely to be victims of non-fatal violence. Therefore, the models were rerun including a measure for black males. The findings

reveal that when this variable is considered it has a strong positive association with non-fatal violent victimization ($b=1.68$). Furthermore, black males in Springfield are 5.36 times more likely to be victims of violence than males of other racial/ethnic backgrounds. The relationship between gender and non-fatal violent victimization remains significant but the magnitude decreases once gender and race are considered ($b=1.16$ for males and $b=0.61$ for black males). These findings suggest that gender and race are better predictors of non-fatal violent victimization than is gender alone.¹¹²

DISCUSSION

The goal in this chapter was to examine the risks for non-fatal victimization at various levels—individual, neighborhood, and city. Specifically, the focus was on determining whether city characteristics matter once individual and neighborhood differences are controlled for. The simple response is yes. The proportion of persons impoverished is significantly linked to risk for property victimization while black/white economic equality and the proportion below age eighteen is associated with non-fatal violent victimization even after individual and neighborhood conditions are considered. That being said, individual- (i.e. age) and neighborhood- (i.e. perceptions of neighborhood disorder) level differences in risks for non-lethal victimization (i.e. property and violent) persist even after city context is considered.

Furthermore, risks for non-fatal victimization differed across race and ethnicity. Differences among non-Hispanic whites and blacks were most pronounced at the neighborhood- and city-level. For example, while the perception of poor quality of life in

¹¹² All of the city-specific analyses were rerun including the measure for black males. The results are presented in Appendix C.

the neighborhood is negatively associated with whites' risk for property victimization, it was positively related to blacks' risk. Similarly, the proportion unemployed is positively associated with whites' risk for non-lethal violent victimization but negatively related to such risk among blacks'.

Lastly, comparisons of individual- and neighborhood-level risks for victimization across cities were made. Generally, predictors of property and non-lethal violent victimization did not vary across cities. In other words, individual (i.e. age) and neighborhood conditions (i.e. perceptions of serious crime) were similarly related to victimization in the twelve cities. However, when differences did emerge it was likely due to qualitative differences in the cities. For instance, the relationship between ethnicity and property victimization differed across San Diego and Los Angeles. While both cities have a relatively large Hispanic population, the contexts of the cities vary greatly. Los Angeles has had a tumultuous history of racial and ethnic discord and has recently been plagued by violent crime. San Diego, in contrast, has not been devastated by social unrest or crime rates to the same extent as Los Angeles. These different city conditions, may explain the distinct findings among Hispanics in the two cities. Nevertheless, city context even among the twelve cities were not so different as to result in notable differences in predictors for non-lethal violent and property victimization.

Considering the findings from this study, the need for more multilevel research on non-fatal victimization is clearly warranted. The results here are based on twelve cities and it is not apparent whether similar results would emerge if more cities were considered. Furthermore, other city conditions—for example, racial/ethnic isolation within neighborhoods across cities (see Krivo and Peterson, 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn,

1996) and sex ratios in city composition (i.e. Messner and Sampson, 1991)—should be considered. Still the current research suggests that there are independent risks for property and non-lethal violent victimization at the individual, neighborhood and city level. Consistent with prior research, racial/ethnic differences in victimization, especially non-lethal violent victimization, subside once neighborhood and city conditions are controlled for; however, other individual-level factors remain significantly linked to non-fatal forms of victimization even when neighborhood and city conditions are considered. The broad conclusion drawn here then is that risks for victimization are not explained solely by micro- or macro-level conditions. Rather, both account for victimization risk and policies and programs designed to prevent victimization should consider both individual-level factors and the social context under which people live.

In the following chapter the policy implications related to these findings will be discussed. Furthermore, most studies are often limited and the current is of no exception to this rule. The limitations of this study and possible avenues of future research on city-level risks for non-fatal victimization are discussed.

Chapter 5. Conclusion/Discussion

Despite the vast amount of victimization literature at the individual- and neighborhood-level, relatively little is known about city conditions and their relationship to non-fatal victimization. The current study examined this relationship and the results suggested that city context does matter. Residential segregation, economic inequality and city composition (i.e. the proportion of female-headed households) was found to be associated with non-fatal forms of victimization. However, at the city level residential segregation and economic inequality had a different relationship with homicide victimization than it did with non-fatal forms of violence. For example, residential segregation had a significant positive relationship with homicide victimization among the twelve cities but a moderate-to-weak negative relationship with non-fatal violent and property victimization. In contrast, city composition, measured as the proportion of female-headed households, persons unemployed, persons impoverished and the proportion below age eighteen, was related to fatal and non-fatal forms of victimization in similar ways. For instance, the proportion of female-headed households and persons unemployed was positively related to lethal and non-lethal (i.e. property and violent) victimization.

A critical issue for the study was to assess whether the effects of city factors on victimization differed across racial/ethnic groups. The bivariate analyses revealed that city context does have a different influence on non-fatal victimization risks among blacks and whites. Segregation indices were moderately associated with property victimization among blacks but had a weak relationship to property victimization among whites. On the other hand, segregation had a strong relationship with non-lethal violent victimization

among whites but a weak association with non-lethal violence among blacks. These findings suggest that city conditions, especially in the form of residential segregation between minorities and whites, are not equally felt by racial and ethnic groups.

Segregation was associated with lower property victimization among blacks does not have a similar effect on such victimization among whites. Furthermore, segregation appears to protect whites from non-fatal violent victimization but is not meaningfully related to non-fatal violence among blacks.

These findings were further explored in later models that included measures of individual, neighborhood and city conditions. It is important to determine whether city conditions are related to non-fatal violent and property victimization once individual and neighborhood characteristics are taken into account. City conditions such as residential segregation are often associated with individual and neighborhood factors. As Peterson and her colleagues note:

[L]evels of region-wide residential segregation result in varying degrees of homogeneity in the racial, ethnic, and immigrant composition of neighborhoods. Very high levels of segregation among some groups, particularly Blacks and Whites, mean that large proportions of neighborhoods are remarkably homogeneous. These White, Black, Latino, and immigrant areas often vary widely in neighborhood structural conditions such as levels of disadvantage and advantage (e.g. poverty, joblessness, economic affluence), family structure, residential instability, and the age/sex composition of residents that are central in affecting social control and crime facilitating processes. These, in turn, determine levels of crime.

The focal point of this study is to understand the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization therefore it is imperative that ‘known’ correlates of victimization be considered in addition to city characteristics. Though urban theorists and researchers often connect individual-, neighborhood- and city-level predictors of crime and victimization there are few, if any, direct tests that include measures at each level. The person-level analyses found that city conditions are related to non-fatal victimization risks (property and violence). However, despite the city context/non-fatal victimization relationship, individual and neighborhood predictors remain significant even once city conditions are taken into account. Consequently, risks for non-fatal victimization vary at the individual-, neighborhood-, and city-level; factors at each level are independent of one another. Still, city conditions were often better predictors of victimization risks than were individual and neighborhood characteristics. For instance, the *b* coefficient for the relationship between black/white economic equality and non-fatal violent victimization was 1.37, which indicates that those in more equitable cities were nearly four times more likely to be victims of non-fatal violence than were those in less equitable cities. However, the coefficient for the never married/non-fatal violent victimization relationship was 0.39 (in other words, never married persons are 47% more likely than married persons to be victims) and for the serious crime/non-fatal violent victimization relationship the coefficient was 0.26 (meaning those in neighborhoods with serious crime were 29% more likely to be victims than those in neighborhoods without serious crime). Therefore, city conditions are just as important, and in some cases more important, than individual and neighborhood factors to risks for victimization.

The current study also showed that differences across racial/ethnic groups emerge when the data are disaggregated by race and ethnicity. There were vast differences between whites and blacks in the relationship between neighborhood conditions and property victimization. For example, the perception of homeless and transients in the neighborhood was positively associated with property victimization among whites but negatively associated with such victimization among blacks. Likewise, the perception of poor neighborhood quality was positively associated with blacks' risks for property victimization but was negatively linked to such victimization among whites. Considering non-fatal violent victimization, notable differences between these groups occurred at the city level. Again, the direction of the relationships varied across the racial/ethnic groups. For instance, the proportion unemployed and below age eighteen was negatively associated with blacks' risk for non-fatal violent victimization but positively associated with such risk among whites.

To check for city-specific effects, the final analyses explored whether individual and neighborhood predictors of non-fatal violent and property victimization differed across cities. The models were re-estimated for each city to examine cross-level interactions. The findings showed that individual and neighborhood predictors of non-fatal violent and property victimization do not differ substantially across the twelve cities. For example, the predictors of victimization in Chicago were similar to the predictors of victimization in San Diego, even though the cities differ in many ways such as city size and composition.

While the current study contributes to the victimization literature, it is limited in several ways. First, the generalizability of the findings is restricted since the analyses are

based on only twelve cities. It is unclear if similar results would emerge if more cities—i.e. fifty—were compared. Still the current findings suggest that individual and neighborhood predictors of non-fatal forms of victimization did not differ much across the twelve cities in the current study. These cities were vastly different, in terms of their geographic and population sizes, their racial/ethnic make-up, their regions, etc.

Secondly, the current study does not account for other city-level indicators that may influence victimization risks. Particularly, previous works have shown that the isolation of minority groups within cities is an important predictor of crime and victimization within cities (e.g. Shihadeh and Flynn, 1996). It is possible that the isolation of groups within neighborhoods of the city should be examined rather than simply focusing on segregation between groups. Residential segregation between blacks and whites has been stable and persistent over time and has led to the concentration of poor urban blacks in central city neighborhoods (see Massey and Denton, 1993; Jargowsky, 1997; Wilson, 1987; Short, 1997). Peterson and Krivo (1999) find that such social isolation leads to increased violence among blacks. On the other hand, residential segregation acts as a protection mechanism for whites:

...whites are privileged by the racist practices that maintain racial residential segregation; they get the best housing in what is perceived as the best locations. Furthermore, white households insulate themselves from those individuals whom they considered to be the least desirable neighbors—blacks, who many whites believe lower their property values, raise crime rates, and generally make their neighborhoods a less than ‘decent place to live’ (p. 467).

The findings at the city-level and person-level support these notions. At the city-level, black/white segregation is substantially linked to non-fatal violent victimization among whites but has a null effect on such victimization among blacks. The importance of this disparate finding could be further explored by examining the relationship between concentrated disadvantage and isolation among blacks. Studies that only include measures of residential segregation ignore these consequences of residential segregation. The current study would certainly be helped by inclusion of such measures.

Lastly, examinations of the relationship between city conditions and non-fatal victimization may be enhanced with the use of MSAs. As noted in a Census Bureau report on residential segregation:

The census defined ‘place’, which often represents a city or town, is often too small. For example, some individuals in Washington, D.C., need only move across the street to be in another jurisdiction, such as Prince George’s County, Maryland. However, Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) seem too large; the New York CMSA stretches from Pennsylvania to Connecticut (Iceland et al., 2002: 7).

Consequently, MSAs may be better suited to examinations of residential segregation and victimization risks. The variation in city sizes in the sample, which includes cities like D.C. with small geographic areas and others like New York which are much more massive, considering the MSA instead of the cities only may be more feasible.

Despite the shortcomings of the current study, few (i.e. Messner and South, 1986; Sampson, 1983) have examined the city conditions/non-fatal victimization relationship and this study provides an impetus for further research. More city-level data that allows

for assessments of non-fatal forms of victimization at the city-level are definitely needed. Relatively little is known about city variations in risks for non-lethal violent and property victimization compared to studies at the macro-level on crime and homicide. The findings here suggest that the risks for homicide victimization are vastly different in some ways from the risks for property and non-lethal violent victimization at the city level. Moreover, city level assessments should include other theoretically relevant measures of city context such as isolation, sex ratios, concentrated disadvantage, etc. These measures are often considered in the homicide and crime studies at the city-level and examining their relationship to non-fatal forms of victimization are needed. Similarly, it may be that race-specific measures of city context (i.e. the proportion of black female-headed households) should be used in race-specific analyses of non-fatal victimization risks. In other words, the overall rates of poverty and unemployment, for example, may not be relevant to whites' risks for property victimization but rather indicators of white poverty and unemployment may be a predictor of property victimization among whites. Measures of actual neighborhood conditions should also be included in multilevel analyses to determine whether they are better predictors of non-fatal victimization than are perceptions of neighborhood conditions. The 12 Cities data only included perceptions of neighborhood conditions but previous studies, both neighborhood- and multi-level analyses, often rely on census and police data for indicators of neighborhood characteristics. Still, previous works have used perceptions of neighborhoods as an indicator of neighborhood conditions (i.e. Skogan, 1990; Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).

At any rate, the findings support much of the neighborhood and urban theories of crime and victimization. Neighborhood theories often posit that neighborhood conditions are better predictors of crime and victimization than are individual-level measures such as race/ethnicity. The current study supports this conclusion. Perceptions of neighborhood disorder, homeless and transient populations on the street, poor quality of life in the neighborhood, and serious neighborhood crime are significant predictors of property and non-fatal violent victimization. While there is not direct measure of social disorganization or collective efficacy in the present study, the findings suggest that when perceptions of the neighborhood are poor risks for victimization increase. Furthermore, city context when measured as residential segregation and economic inequality between whites and minorities are associated with non-fatal forms of victimization. Importantly, these conditions appear to be most detrimental to minorities but decrease the likelihood of victimization among whites. The importance of neighborhood and city conditions on crime and victimization risks is best summarized by Sampson and his colleagues (1997):

[T]he greater the race and class segregation in a metropolitan area, the smaller the number of neighborhoods absorbing economic shocks and the more severe the resulting concentration of poverty will be. Economic stratification by race and place fuels the neighborhood concentration of cumulative forms of disadvantage, intensifying the social isolation of lower income, minority, and single-parent from key resources supporting collective social control (p. 919).

Residential segregation and economic inequality between whites and minorities isolates minorities and impedes social control which is essential to preventing and reducing risks for victimization.

Finally, the results of the current study are only important insofar as they help guide prevention strategies aimed at reducing risks for non-fatal victimization. The present study showed that residential segregation at the city-level is associated with increased risk for victimization especially among minority residents. Currently, all states are allotted approximately \$500,000 each from Victims of Crime Assistance (VOCA) grants issued by the United States Department of Justice's Office of Victims of Crime (OVC). It is imperative that these funds be distributed and utilized appropriately. Primacy should be given to programs that focus on micro and macro sources of victimization risks. Certain individuals are at greater risk but neighborhood and city conditions are also predictors of victimization. So residents should be informed on activities that place them at risks for victimization (i.e. leaving windows unlocked) and those groups most likely to be victimized (i.e. younger people) should be targeted. This is not to say that age- or race-specific programs are needed but rather making people aware of their potential risk for victimization is important. Moreover, neighborhood conditions can be combated at the neighborhood-level via neighborhood watch groups and organizations. Furthermore, local community leaders can assist in improving perceptions of neighborhood quality, combating neighborhood disorder and improving collective efficacy among residents at the neighborhood level should help reduce neighborhood crime and victimization rates. Lastly, because city conditions are also related to risks for victimization, policy makers and city leaders should also be informed on city conditions are associated with risks and efforts should be made to implement programs and organizations aimed at addressing these risk factors. Since cities with higher rates of residential segregation, for instance, are more likely to have higher rates of

victimization then efforts should be made to reduce segregation in city neighborhoods. Taken together, comprehensive initiatives at the individual-, community- and city-level may be most beneficial in preventing criminal victimization.

Appendix A. Principal Components Analysis (Varimax Rotation) Results

Rotated Component Loadings

	Component 1	Component 2
Neighborhood Disorder Items		
Abandoned Buildings/Cars	.693	.061
Rundown/Neglected Buildings	.687	.127
Public Drinking/Drug Use	.756	.295
Public Drug Sales	.768	.192
Loitering/Hanging Out	.547	.531
Truancy/Youth Skipping School	.658	.222
Panhandling/Begging	.223	.831
Transient/Homeless Populations Sleeping on the Streets of the Neighborhood	.103	.860

Reliability Coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha)

.82 .71

Correlation Matrix of Component 1 Items

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(1) Abandoned Buildings/Cars	1.00					
(2) Rundown/Neglected Buildings	0.53	1.00				
(3) Public Drinking/Drug Use	0.38	0.39	1.00			
(4) Public Drug Sales	0.36	0.38	0.70	1.00		
(5) Loitering/Hanging Out	0.31	0.34	0.48	0.48	1.00	
(6) Truancy/Youth Skipping School	0.33	0.33	0.55	0.46	0.48	1.00

Correlation Matrix of Component 2 Items

	(1)	(2)
(1) Panhandling/Begging	1.00	
(2) Transient/Homeless Populations	0.56	1.00

Principal Components Analysis (Varimax Rotation) Results

	Component Loadings	
Satisfaction with the Quality of Life in the Neighborhood	(1)	(2)
	1.00	1.00
Fear of Crime in the Neighborhood	(1)	(2)
	0.37	1.00

Reliability Coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha)

.54

Correlation Matrix

	(1)	(2)
Satisfaction with the Quality of Life in the Neighborhood	1.00	1.00
Fear of Crime in the Neighborhood	0.37	1.00

Appendix B

TABLE 1. NCVS 12 Cities Rates of Non-Lethal Victimization Reported to the Police, 1998

City	Reported Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Rate per 1000 Persons	Reported Property Victimization Rate per 1000 Households
Chicago	26	160
Kansas City	27	149
Knoxville	29	135
Los Angeles	22	115
Madison	25	119
New York	27	75
San Diego	23	86
Savannah	32	209
Spokane	21	156
Springfield	45	150
Tucson	34	190
D.C.	30	182

Source: Based on the percentages of non-lethal victimization reported to the police. The percentages were obtained from Smith et al (1998). "Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety". Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice.

TABLE 2. Bivariate Linear Relationship between City Conditions and Homicide and Non-Lethal (Reported to the Police) Victimization Among 12 Cities (Pearson's r)

City Conditions	Lethal Victimization		Non-Lethal Victimization	
	(All)	(Without D.C.)	Reported Violent Victimization	Reported Property Victimization
<i>City Structure</i>				
Black/White Segregation	0.60*	0.66*	-0.15	-0.26
Hispanic/White Segregation	0.38	0.36	0.03	-0.32
Black/White Economic Equality	-0.65*	-0.58	0.29	0.24
Hispanic/White Economic Equality	-0.21	-0.13	-0.01	0.54
<i>City Composition</i>				
% Female-headed Households	0.59*	0.29	0.70*	0.54
% Poverty	0.21	0.20	0.53	0.19
% Below 18	-0.10	0.33	0.40	0.24
% Unemployed	0.66*	0.44	-0.08	0.15
% Black	0.79**	0.69*	0.25	0.48
% Hispanic	-0.11	0.12	0.08	-0.30

* Significant at the .05 level.
 ** Significant at the .01 level.

TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics on City Conditions and Victimization Rates Among 5 Cities†

City Conditions	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation
<i>City Structure</i>			
Black/White Segregation	77.2	79.4	7.86
Hispanic/White Segregation	60.4	59.4	6.56
Black/White Economic Equality	0.59	0.61	0.04
Hispanic/White Economic Equality	0.67	0.69	0.08
<i>City Composition</i>			
% Female-headed Households	35.7	34.8	9.12
% Poverty	19.5	20.2	3.05
% Below 18	23.6	24.1	2.86
% Unemployed	5.7	5.6	0.97
% Black	33.2	31.2	17.77
% Hispanic	22.9	26.0	16.31
<i>Victimization Rates</i>			
White Homicide	6.3	7.2	2.94
Black Homicide	18.5	15.5	17.23
White Non-Lethal Violence	58.6	58.0	5.55
Black Non-Lethal Violence	82.4	67.0	33.65
White Property	352.6	308.0	103.09
Black Property	428.0	465.0	79.39

Source: The descriptive statistics on city structure are based on data provided by the Lewis Mumford Center and the American Communities Project at Brown University. The descriptive statistics on city composition are based on data provided by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau. The descriptive statistics on victimization rates are based on data provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

†The five cities are Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New York, and D.C.

TABLE 4. Bivariate Linear Relationship Between City Conditions and All Forms of Victimization by Race Among 5 Cities[†] (Pearson's *r*)

City Conditions	Lethal Victimization		Non-Lethal Victimization			
	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Blacks</i>	Violent		Property	
<i>City Structure</i>			<i>Whites</i>	<i>Blacks</i>	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Blacks</i>
Black/White Segregation	-0.47	0.18	0.06	0.03	0.30	-0.49
Hispanic/White Segregation	-0.05	-0.35	-0.02	0.83	-0.19	-0.37
Black/White Economic Equality	0.26	-0.55	0.50	-0.25	-0.59	0.11
Hispanic/White Economic Equality	-0.20	0.51	0.20	-0.97**	0.46	0.23
<i>City Composition</i>						
% Female-headed Households	-0.89*	0.91*	-0.68	-0.45	0.77	-0.51
% Poverty	-0.01	-0.10	0.03	0.64	0.12	-0.23
% Below 18	0.71	-0.72	0.81	0.36	-0.44	0.40
% Unemployed	-0.41	0.61	-0.11	-0.06	0.78	-0.21
% Black	-0.80	0.95*	-0.51	-0.60	0.85	-0.35
% Latino	0.66	-0.67	0.54	0.65	-0.41	0.30

[†]The five cities are Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New York, and D.C.

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Appendix C

TABLE 1. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Property Victimization Across Cities

Individual Level	Chicago		Kansas City		Knoxville	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Age	-0.02	0.01	-0.02 *	0.01	-0.02 *	0.01
Gender						
Female (reference group)						
Male	0.25	0.21	0.18	0.23	0.36	0.22
Gender/Race						
Black Male	-0.78 ***	0.10	1.21 ***	0.03	-0.14 *	0.07
Income	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.04	-0.01	0.03
Marital Status						
Married (reference group)						
Never Married	-0.25	0.27	0.19	0.29	0.21	0.28
Divorced/separated	-1.47 **	0.53	0.72 *	0.30	-0.14	0.35
Widowed	-0.41	0.56	0.22	0.82	0.55	0.58
Race/Ethnicity						
Non-Latino Whites (reference group)					n/a	
Non-Latino Others	0.62	0.47	-1.60	1.08	0.23	0.39
Non-Latino Blacks	0.22	0.28	-0.06	0.30	0.25	0.69
Latinos	-0.33	0.33	-0.67	0.58	0.25	0.59
Neighborhood Level						
Disorder	0.30 **	0.11	0.48 ***	0.12	0.28	0.15
Homeless/Transients	-0.09	0.12	0.19	0.17	0.38 **	0.16
Poor Quality of Life	0.07	0.13	0.31 **	0.12	0.14	0.14
Serious Crime	0.33	0.23	0.17	0.23	0.08	0.26
Log pseudo-likelihood	-306.925		-289.565		-310.167	
Pseudo R-squared	0.0795		0.1024		0.0594	

Note: Data file is derived from the NCVS 12 Cities Study
 The findings are based on the weighted sample for each city.
 n/a indicates that the variable was dropped from the model because when its value equal 0 it predicts failure perfectly
 *p < .05

	Los Angeles		Madison		New York	
	b	exp (b)	b	exp (b)	b	exp (b)
	SE		SE		SE	
	-0.04 ***	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	0.01	0.96	0.01	0.98	0.01	0.99
	-0.01	0.22	0.27	1.31	-0.40	0.27
	0.22	0.99	0.21	1.31	0.27	0.67
	-1.72 ***	0.01	0.57 ***	0.10	0.32 ***	0.01
	0.01	0.18	0.10	1.77	0.01	1.37
	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.04
	0.03	1.04	0.04	1.01	0.04	1.03
	-0.48	0.27	-0.47	0.28	-0.23	0.32
	0.23	0.36	0.14	0.32	0.18	0.39
	0.88	0.52	-0.62	1.13	-0.03	0.63
	0.52	2.40	0.54	0.54	0.63	0.97
	-0.84	0.52	-0.40	0.59	-0.41	0.49
	0.33	0.43	0.44	0.54	-0.18	0.35
	-0.56 *	0.29	-0.53	0.77	-0.47	0.37
	0.29	0.57	0.59	0.67	0.49	0.66
	-0.02	0.14	-0.02	0.15	0.51 ***	0.14
	0.07	0.11	0.29	0.15	0.14	0.13
	0.13	1.08	0.17	1.34	-0.07	1.15
	0.60 *	0.13	-0.32	0.15	0.30	0.15
	0.13	1.14	0.24	1.19	0.30	0.93
	0.25	1.82	0.73	0.73	0.27	1.35
	0.25	1.82	0.73	0.73	0.27	1.35
	-290.253		-326.166		-208.481	
	0.0636		0.023		0.0686	

	San Diego		Savannah		Spokane	
	b	exp (b)	b	exp (b)	b	exp (b)
	SE		SE		SE	
	-0.03 **	0.01	-0.02 *	0.01	-0.03 ***	0.01
	0.13	0.23	0.31	0.21	0.10	0.19
	-1.12 ***	0.03	0.08 *	0.04	-2.35 ***	0.12
	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	-0.12	0.28	-0.04	0.25	0.04	0.26
	0.31	0.33	-0.02	0.31	0.37	0.29
	0.24	0.88	-0.14	0.67	0.34	0.62
	-0.27	0.43	0.44	0.53	0.55	0.47
	0.72	0.48	0.22	0.22	0.56	0.62
	0.60 *	0.29	-0.44	0.58	-0.16	0.66
	0.73 ***	0.14	0.21	0.11	0.36 ***	0.11
	0.27 *	0.12	0.16	0.15	-0.07	0.17
	0.00	0.14	0.22	0.12	0.36 ***	0.12
	-0.10	0.24	0.24	0.22	0.09	0.22
	-289.529		-351.602		-356.621	
	0.1189		0.0518		0.0873	

b	Springfield		Tucson		Washington, DC			
	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)
-0.01	0.01	0.99	-0.02 *	0.01	0.98	-0.02 *	0.01	0.98
-0.37	0.22	0.69	0.07	0.19	1.07	-0.01	0.21	0.99
0.89 ***	0.05	2.44	0.41 ***	0.06	1.50	-0.02	0.02	0.99
0.06	0.03	1.06	-0.04	0.03	0.96	0.13 ***	0.04	1.14
0.02	0.26	1.02	-0.09	0.26	0.91	-0.19	0.28	0.83
0.19	0.31	1.21	0.21	0.24	1.24	-0.13	0.31	0.88
-0.40	0.61	0.67	-0.26	0.56	0.77	-1.51	0.87	0.22
-1.74	0.97	0.18	-0.71	0.51	0.49	0.47	0.58	1.60
-0.16	0.31	0.85	0.11	0.51	1.11	-0.24	0.26	0.78
0.09	0.32	1.09	-0.24	0.23	0.78	0.11	0.45	1.12
0.30 **	0.11	1.35	0.07	0.12	1.07	0.26 *	0.11	1.30
0.26	0.17	1.29	0.12	0.10	1.13	-0.10	0.11	0.91
0.08	0.12	1.09	0.21	0.12	1.24	0.37 **	0.13	1.45
0.30	0.25	1.35	0.42 *	0.20	1.52	0.19	0.24	1.21
-312.019			-378.282			-275.183		
0.0596			0.0445			0.1007		

TABLE 2. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Non-Lethal Violent Victimization Across Cities

Individual Level	Chicago		Kansas City		Knoxville	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Age	-0.02	0.02	0.98	0.02	-0.07 ***	0.02
Gender						
Female (reference group)						
Male	0.59	0.36	1.80	0.39	1.60	0.36
Gender/Race						
Black Male	-2.35 ***	0.03	0.10	0.06	0.17	0.11
Income	0.03	0.05	1.03	0.07	0.97	0.04
Marital Status						
Married (reference group)						
Never Married	0.61	0.52	1.84	0.44	1.59	0.46
Divorce/separated	0.41	0.76	1.51	0.61	1.47	0.58
Widowed	n/a		n/a		1.25	1.26
Race/Ethnicity						
Non-Latino Whites (reference group)						
Non-Latino Others	-0.02	0.78	0.98	1.40	1.07	0.79
Non-Latino Blacks	-0.99	0.61	0.37	0.63	0.38	0.64
Latinos	0.49	0.51	1.63	0.81	0.70	0.89
Neighborhood Level						
Disorder	0.17	0.20	1.19	0.19	1.27	0.53 **
Homeless/Transients	0.46 *	0.20	1.58	0.26	1.35	0.21
Poor Quality of Life	0.26	0.20	1.30	0.23	1.24	0.18
Serious Crime	0.35	0.42	1.42	0.37	1.32	0.38
Log pseudo-likelihood	-122.922		-120.67		-138.908	
Pseudo R-squared	0.1183		0.0957		0.1915	

Note: Data file is derived from the NCVS 12 Cities Study

The findings are based on the weighted sample for each city.

n/a indicates that the variable was dropped from the model because when its value equal 0 it predicts failure perfectly

*p < .05

**p < .01

	Los Angeles		Madison		New York				
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE			
		exp (b)		exp (b)		exp (b)			
	-0.03	0.02	0.97	-0.02	0.01	0.98	-0.02	0.02	0.98
	0.46	0.45	1.58	0.10	0.32	1.11	-0.17	0.39	0.85
	-0.63 ***	0.02	0.53	-0.13	1,298.11	0.88	-0.40 ***	0.01	0.67
	0.03	0.05	1.03	0.03	0.05	1.03	0.08	0.08	1.08
	0.59	0.54	1.80	0.95	0.50	2.59	0.13	0.54	1.14
	-0.25	0.92	0.78	1.89 ***	0.50	6.59	0.62	0.60	1.85
	1.70	0.93	5.47	1.59	0.95	4.92	0.45	1.21	1.56
	0.04	0.77	1.04	-0.77	1.12	0.46	1.18	0.75	3.26
	0.19	0.60	1.21	n/a	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.70	2.05
	0.09	0.62	1.09	0.27	0.71	1.31	1.52 *	0.62	4.57
	0.15	0.26	1.17	0.50 *	0.23	1.65	0.69 ***	0.23	2.00
	-0.13	0.25	0.88	0.46 *	0.19	1.59	0.05	0.21	1.05
	0.41	0.34	1.51	-0.16	0.21	0.85	0.22	0.26	1.25
	-0.36	0.43	0.70	-0.04	0.33	0.96	0.26	0.49	1.30
	-102.039		-170.93		-100.279				
	0.0702		0.1121		0.189				

	San Diego		Savannah		Spokane	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
	-0.01	0.01	-0.03 **	0.01	-0.05 ***	0.01
	0.99	0.99	0.97	0.97	0.95	0.95
	0.99	0.99	1.76	1.76	1.12	1.12
	0.36	0.36	0.07	0.31	0.39	0.39
	285.77	0.00	-1.16 ***	0.05	-0.39	1,815.79
	-0.02	0.05	-0.07	0.93	0.03	0.05
	0.98	0.98	0.93	0.93	1.03	1.03
	0.78	0.47	-0.05	0.47	0.99 *	0.50
	0.11	0.58	1.26 ***	0.39	2.17 ***	0.49
	0.42	1.23	n/a	3.52	1.98	1.17
	2.18	1.52	0.95	0.95	2.69	2.69
	1.11	1.11	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74
	1.52	1.52	7.26	7.26	7.26	7.26
	-0.34	0.70	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	0.09	0.78	-0.07	0.38	0.25	0.88
	0.69	0.43	-0.05	0.80	0.25	1.28
	1.99	1.99	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
	0.71	0.71	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94
	1.09	1.09	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
	1.99	1.99	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88
	0.15	0.23	0.28	0.18	0.31	0.18
	0.02	0.18	0.32	0.24	0.16	0.25
	-0.38	0.26	0.18	0.21	0.17	0.22
	0.67 *	0.32	0.28	0.40	0.42	0.40
	1.95	1.95	1.32	1.32	1.52	1.52
	1.17	1.17	1.37	1.37	1.36	1.36
	1.02	1.02	1.20	1.20	1.18	1.18
	0.68	0.68	1.20	1.20	1.18	1.18
	1.95	1.95	1.32	1.32	1.52	1.52
	-145.015	-146.542	-124.082	-124.082	-124.082	-124.082
	0.0606	0.1307	0.1509	0.1509	0.1509	0.1509

	Springfield		Tucson		Washington, DC			
b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)	b	SE	exp (b)
-0.03 *	0.01	0.97	-0.06 ***	0.02	0.95	-0.06 ***	0.02	0.94
-0.81 *	0.41	0.45	0.56	0.37	1.76	1.16 **	0.47	3.20
1.68 ***	0.10	5.36	19.22	560.25	0.00	0.61 **	0.04	1.84
-0.03	0.05	0.97	0.07	0.05	1.07	-0.13 *	0.06	0.88
0.08	0.44	1.08	0.33	0.41	1.40	-0.58	0.65	0.56
n/a	0.52	0.99	0.95 *	0.45	2.58	1.43 *	0.68	4.17
			n/a			n/a		
-0.41	0.64	0.66	0.20	0.89	1.23	-0.40	1.19	0.67
-1.06 *	0.51	0.35	0.79	0.82	2.20	-0.35	0.59	0.70
-0.36	0.51	0.70	-0.52	0.42	0.60	0.57	0.67	1.76
0.42 *	0.18	1.52	0.30	0.19	1.36	0.31	0.20	1.36
-0.21	0.27	0.81	0.28	0.17	1.33	0.10	0.20	1.10
0.42 **	0.16	1.52	0.10	0.24	1.11	0.07	0.24	1.07
0.66	0.38	1.93	0.88 **	0.34	2.42	-0.11	0.52	0.89
-135.995			-138.845			-97.335		
0.2031			0.1524			0.1679		

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