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UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-SAINTE LOUIS

WOMEN IN KAZAKHSTAN: A MULTIFACTED APPROACH TO  
FEMALE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

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A Dissertation submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri – St.  
Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree  
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science  
December 2014

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## ABSTRACT

This investigation focuses on two competing theories (historical institutionalism and social constructivism) and their explanatory value in regards to female political representation in Kazakhstan. Historical Institutionalism maintains that current institutional dynamics are constrained by past institutional formations, even when these past institutions are no longer relevant. Social Constructivism challenges this theory by upholding that institutions are culturally situated and a reflection of shared ideas rather than material forces as argued by historical institutionalism.

Based on Hanna Pitkin's (1967) four dimensions of representation (formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic), I examine how Kazakhstan's Soviet past and its creation of a Kazakh ethnic-national identity resulted in the decline of female political representation in all four dimensions. Utilizing official documents, news reports, and interviews conducted with elite females and university students in Almaty, Kazakhstan, women are less represented now than they were under the Soviet regime. Although those interviewed felt they have more freedom under the current regime, realistically women not only have fewer formal mechanisms to guarantee representation, but also substantively, women's issues have been subverted in order to promote a unified Kazakh identity. Where women were once of symbol of equality under the Soviet regime, in its place stands ethnic nationalism epitomized in the form of one Kazakh man, President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Comparing these results back to the two theoretical frameworks, historical institutionalism and social constructivism individually do not adequately provide an overall assessment on the current status of women in Kazakhstan. By integrating these two theories under one overarching lens, a more complete analysis on how the combination of both Kazakhstan's desire to break from its institutional past and reassert dominance of a Kazakh national identity triggered the loss of female representation in Kazakhstan.

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this dissertation to the loving memory of my step-mother, Mary Kay Monroney Benedict who passed away weeks before the completion of this dissertation. As my foremost cheerleader, you not only introduced me to my love of political science, but you remained a constant source of support during this arduous process. Although you may not physically be there to see me graduate, your spirit lives through me as I move forward in life.

**Mary Kay Monroney Benedict**

**1957-2014**

"There are no goodbyes for us. Wherever you are, you will always be in our hearts." ~Mahatma Gandhi

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To Kraig, you have been my rock when I needed a firm foundation to stand on. You provided physical and emotional stability not only when I was injured but provided humor and determination when I needed that extra push.

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## **Chapter One:**

### **An Introduction: Gender Politics in Kazakhstan**

#### *Introduction*

This study focuses on female political representation in Kazakhstan by merging the frameworks of historical institutionalism and social constructivism under one lens. Through the utilization of on-the-ground interviews conducted while in Kazakhstan I argue that these frameworks alone do not adequately depict the current stage of female representation in Kazakhstan because each framework fails to account for the strengths found in the other. Historical institutionalism minimizes the role of cultural norms and construction of identity while social constructivism diminishes the role of path dependent behavior and critical junctures sending institutional patterns down a different trajectory.

Initially, my research on female political participation in Kazakhstan was to include interviews with elected female officials, party leadership, female political candidates, academics, and non-governmental organizations. However, time constraints due to Visa requirements restricting my time in country to 25 days and the lack of access to political institutions and key decision makers I was limited to interviewing a small number of non-governmental organizations, academics and group of university students. Yet, despite these limitations, two very important preliminary findings emerged: I find that the current status of female representation is both due to Kazakhstan's tumultuous relationship with its Soviet past in regards to historical institutional design and its changing relationship to the social construction of gender and ethnic identity.

I chose to study female political representation in Kazakhstan because it offers a unique case in studying female political participation as compared to not only its Central Asian neighbors but also other “Stans.” Although a predominantly Muslim country with over 70 percent of the population identifying as Muslim, religion remains a relatively non-issue in state institutions compared to other mostly Muslim countries. Even with as a self-described Muslim, President Nazarbayev, has banned religious symbols from governmental institutions and has promoted gender equality in his current rhetoric. Perhaps aligning itself with more of its Soviet past and not a jihadist uprising seen in neighboring countries, Kazakhstan serves an example of where we would most likely to expect to see changes or an improvement in female political representation.

### *Background of the Problem*

From 1917 to 1991, religion was seen as the antithesis of political enlightenment and women’s emancipation throughout the former Soviet Union. Under the Communist regime, over 6,000 Orthodox churches closed, Islamic regions stretching from Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan came under state control, and individuals were inundated with antireligious and scientific propaganda. While religious freedom was violently suppressed, women were forced into the public sphere and the paid labor force under this guise of emancipation. Although this process pushed women out of their traditional roles within the home and into the labor force, never were they really treated as equal. This both supported and contradicted Marx’s belief that for women, private gender relations mirrored capitalism and patriarchal oppression based upon private ownership over the means of production. However, Marxism’s promise for equality among men and women never bore fruit. Until the Soviet Union’s demise, women faced lower pay, less desirable

employment, little political voice, and the loss of a feminine identity that they could claim as their own.

Although Russification policies are often attributed to Stalin, primitive forms of these policies began under Tsar Alexander II and were instilled to “ensure state control over a diverse population” (Weeks 2010). One example was the promotion of Russian Orthodoxy over Catholicism in countries such as Poland and Lithuania. Although assimilation programs were a rare occurrence, the purpose of the rudimentary codes was to defuse separatist nationalism (Martin 2010). However, after the Russian Revolution of 1917, this relatively passive approach that had supported non-Russian national cultures in form but not content took a dramatic shift, specifically in Central Asia. Due to Central Asia’s Islamic history, the Central Party feared the idea of Pan-Islamism through which Muslims would identify themselves as a single community. Not only did this idea threaten the control Russia wanted to maintain, Soviet ideology also saw this and other religions as a “superstition that stood in the way of progress” (Kort 2004). In order to prevent the uniting of the Islamic republics of Central Asia, the Soviet CCP leadership came up with a two-pronged method to instill Russification policies within these societies. First, they separated Turkestan into five ethnic units (today: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) but left pockets of each group within the others’ borders to create internal friction between these groups. Second, in 1927, they changed the official written alphabet from Arabic to Latin and eventually to Cyrillic in the 1940s. This made previous literature inaccessible and impeded political national identity formation and continuity in the region (Kort 2004). The Russian language was used as a non-threatening tool to unite the multi-ethnic “Soviet people”

(Matuskiewicz 2010:213). In Kazakhstan, elites held positions within the state, but control remained within the Central Communist Party and among ethnic Russians. With ethnic Russians dominating the Republic's Communist Party and thus the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, the Kazakh language became all but obsolete in relation to governmental functions for nearly seven decades: Kazakhs who were unwilling to assimilate under these policies were seen as uncivilized and alienated from the political process.

Although Russification had more to do with homogenizing identity, Stalin's economic approach to industrialization through collectivization ultimately led to the conquering of these cultures through starvation tactics. Under policies meant to promote industrialization, 20 million peasant farms were seized in order to form two hundred thousand collective farms. The seizing of peasants' grain and property to feed the cities and factories led to the "Terror" famine which many have described as forced genocide, resulting in the starvation of millions. Most notably, Kazakhstan's nomadic culture of herding became all but obsolete: under Stalin's policies, over eighty percent of the livestock in Kazakhstan were killed or died of starvation over a four year period in the late 1920s to 1930s (Kort 2004:54). To further maintain his control, he jailed and murdered supposed opposition during the Great Purge of 1934-1938, eliminating any remaining opposition these cultures might have raised towards assimilation into the Soviet culture.

The combined effect of religious oppression and involuntary emancipation had an adverse outcome for women, especially in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and other Central Asia Republics. Comprising of 14% of the population, women held

traditional Muslim values, greatly contradicting Bolshevik ideology, even though the Communist party promised them higher living standards and modernization. When these republics finally gained independence following the collapse of the USSR, a resurgence of identity politics, emphasizing patriarchal and ethnic norms, once again forced women to the sidelines.

After the collapse, indigenous elites began institutionalizing Kazakhification policies (Kolsto 1998, Dave 2007). Kazakhification is the “process of the ascendance of Kazakhs as a national group at the expense of other national groups, mainly Russians” (Matuszkiewicz 2010:216). These policies include language and citizenship requirements which resulted in the mass emigration of the once majority Russian population. Under the 1999 “Law on Languages,” Kazakh formally became the state language in administrative governmental communications and public life (Peyrouse 2007:485). In order to run for political office, candidates must now be fluent in Kazakh, and only Kazakh-language media outlets are eligible for state subsidies. Although Russian is still the predominant language used by the population, since 2000 knowledge of Kazakh is mandatory for all public sector jobs. Kazakhification has also taken over the labor market. In 1995, 64.2 percent of government jobs were held by Kazakhs, 21 percent by Russians. Within the year, the percentage of government jobs held by Kazakhs rose to 81.4 percent (Dave 2007). Although Kazakhization reflects, in part, a backlash against its predecessor, many identify the state as an extension of the Kazakh nation. Unlike others who separate nationality and ethnicity into two distinct categories, many Kazakhs in a 1995-1996 poll saw Kazakh nationality and ethnicity as interchangeable (Sultanov 2012). Even as recently as February 6, 2014, President Nursultan Nazarbayev decided to look into

changing Kazakhstan's name to Kazakh Eli or "Land of Kazakhs," hinting at the idea that Kazakh is both a nationality and ethnicity.

Yet even with this resurgence in identity politics, women have been sidelined across all ethnicities. Under the USSR, women in Kazakhstan held 30 percent of all parliamentary seats (most in the lower chamber), due to the old Soviet quota system. During the Communist period, 20-25 percent of the nationally elected representatives in Eastern Europe and Central Asia had been reserved for women; their levels of participation in local and regional politics were among the highest worldwide. Even though many conditions under Communism shaped and limited women's influence in national politics, adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology ensured women a minimum level of participation in national and local party politics (Kunovich 2003). Under the Kazakhification, however, gender quotas were eliminated as a symbol of Russian dominance. The "women's question" championed under communism was pushed to the margins, in order to advance a Kazakh national identity. Non-ethnic women found it increasingly difficult to gain access to formal institutions due to new citizenship requirements and increased nationalism.

Up until 2012, the women of Kazakhstan rarely occupied more than 11% of legislative seats or more than 3% in President Nazarbayev's Cabinet. However, in 2012, women more than doubled their numbers in the bicameral parliament without implementing gender quotas. Although this increase is significant and the country officially claims to be undergoing a democratic transition with "open" elections, President Nursultan Nazarbayev has continued to exercise authoritarian control since 1991.



Kazakhstan has nonetheless become a signatory to many international treaties and conventions in regard to promoting women’s equal treatment, such as the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1982), which it ratified in 1998. Although women have only recently increased their political foothold in Kazakhstan, they do outrank men in regard to educational attainment. Due to mandatory schooling until the eleventh grade, 98 percent of all women and 97 percent of men completed primary education. Compare that to secondary education, where women outnumber their male counterparts, 91 percent to 82 percent, respectively. Finally, 36 percent of the female population has pursued some form of tertiary education, while men lag behind at 28 percent (IWRAW 2000).

**Table 1.1 Gender Development Indices**

<b>Kazakhstan Gender and Development Indices</b>	
<u>HDI by year</u>	<u>HDI by Gender (2013)</u>
.686 (1990)	Women .762
.679 (2000)	Men .721
.734 (2005)	
.744 (2008)	<u>Gender Inequality Index</u>
.747 (2010)	.459 (2008)
.750 (2011)	.468 (2009)
.757 (2012)	.428 (2010)
.756 (2013)	
Source: United Nations Development Program (2013)	

Kazakhstan also is categorized as having a “high” Human Development Index rating which has increased since independence in 1991. Even more interestingly, Human Development Indices by gender indicates that women have a higher level of human development compared to their male counterparts. This is probably due to the disparity

between life expectancy between women (70) and men (60) (Human Development Index 2013). However, even with this “improvement” in women’s human development, the Gender Inequality Index which measures the combination of reproductive health, political empowerment, and economic activity shows that gender inequality in Kazakhstan remains high.

Although women have made significant strides in development, this has not translated into higher positions of authority and decision making within government and private institutions. This leads to the question as to what exactly has hindered women, until recently, from gaining access to positions of power within Kazakhstan. Do women feel as if they are increasing in over all political representation? If not, how have they compensated for this? This dissertation seeks to answer these complex and interconnected questions, guided by two competing frameworks.

### *Purpose and Conceptual Framework*

Concerning female political representation, historical institutionalism and social constructivism debate whether material or cultural features most influence whether women are granted not only access to political institutions but also full representation within these institutions. Historical institutionalism (HI) argues that real world outcomes differ based on institutional dynamics; historical dynamics thus influence current and future outcomes. Social constructivism, by contrast, posits that in order to understand current power relationships within society, one must look at how institutions and groups are culturally situated. At the center of this debate is whether material forces influence ideas, or if ideas influence current institutional dynamics I argue that both are important in understanding female representation in Kazakhstan.

The purpose of this research is to first examine each framework as it relates to Hanna Pitkin's (1967) dimensions of representation using Kazakhstan as the case study. After applying these frameworks to female representation in Kazakhstan and demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of applying each framework individually, I attempt to merge these competing frameworks into one model to offer an overall explanation as to whether or not women in Kazakhstan are truly represented in all dimensions as categorized by Pitkin.

### *Research Questions and Hypotheses*

The overarching research question within this study centers on what factors have influenced the level of female political representation within Kazakhstan. Under the frameworks of historical institutionalism and social constructivism, I specifically ask how women's access to political institutions have changed following independence from the Soviet Union and how the role of women has been transformed since the subsequent rise of ethnic nationalism and return to traditional cultural values. I hypothesize that although Kazakhstan claims that it is a democratizing country, the levels of female political representation have decreased in regards to formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. I further contend that this reduction is a result of Kazakhstan's attempt to break from its Soviet past and to reconstruct the Kazakh identity.

### *Significance of Research*

The significance of this dissertation lies in its efforts to understand why women's access to political institutions remains uneven concerning the four dimensions of female political representation. Combining multiple theoretical frameworks into one multi-faceted approach allows us not only to see how individual influences interact with female

political representation but also how these influences overlap and interact with each other, providing a “big picture” of female political representation in Kazakhstan. This allows me to examine the main research question using a multi-level approach.

Regarding frameworks, several contributions emerge. Although historical institutionalism and its relationship to path dependency offer a comprehensive explanation as to how formal institutions in post-Soviet Kazakhstan have developed into what they are today, adding social constructivism clarifies how the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in Kazakhstan has pushed women to the sidelines in some dimensions of representation during the transformation from a communist regime to a “democratizing” one. Although descriptive representation has increased significantly since 2006, the idea of the need for stability over freedom (learned from its Soviet past), as reflected in the example of symbolic representation, is important because it demonstrates how democratization process is not constant and often uneven due to institutional and cultural barriers.

Gender theorists (Krook 2012; Fox & Lawless 2004) argue that the greater number of women in formal institutions the “better” a country will be. However, the case study of Kazakhstan provides an argument that even with an increase of descriptive representation, sometimes an individual politician, even a male politician may provide more protection or guarantees to women, rather than a critical mass alone. It is important to remember that prior to independence women comprised 25% of the USSR legislatures yet had very little voice.

Conceptually, this dissertation also expands the dimensions of representation to include informal institutions and civil society. If a lack of civil society of over eighty years, combined with political, economic, and social trends reduces women to the “peasantry” of society, the conceptualization and the impact of civil society in transforming authoritarian regimes becomes suspect. Therefore, this dissertation also examines how women have utilized non-governmental organizations to overcome formal barriers of political institutions.

This research also adds a Central Asian dimension to the picture and contributes on the literature on women’s participation within post-Soviet states. A large number of western democratization theorists focus on Robert Dahl’s seminal argument that democratization involves procedures and inclusiveness. Accordingly, “...a political system then is not democratic unless there is widespread participation in democratic institutions” (Caraway 2004:455). Most early research, limited to male suffrage (i.e., studies by Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992), does not explain the role that cultures play in determining why many nations rank at the bottom of the list in terms of the proportion of women in parliament (Norris, Inglehart, and Wetzel 2004). Seymour Lipset 1951) argues that as long as a country develops economically and become more stable, it will no longer tolerate oppressive regimes and transform itself into a democratic society. Historical institutionalist, Barrington Moore Jr. counters that this is not always the case and that much depends on a country’s distinct road; democratization cannot occur without the necessary presence of a bourgeoisie (See Chapter 2 for Moore’s argument). Both studies fail to explain why it is that once “revolutionary” countries democratize (fair and free elections, equal rule of law, active political and civil

participation by the citizenry, and protection of human rights), women are forced to the periphery and faced with further forms of discrimination within the public sector (Funk 1993). Therefore, by drawing upon theoretical frameworks to examine political participation in Kazakhstan, I build a more complete analysis of the barriers that continue to limit women's political participation.

### *Methodology*

To assess whether historical institutionalism or social constructivism adequately depicts the levels of female representation, I conducted field research from August 2013 to September 2013 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, based at the top ranking university within the country, KIMEP University. Although Almaty is the former capital of Kazakhstan, it remains the most populated city and the center of civil society in Kazakhstan, with over 200 NGOs headquartered there. Unable to interview my intended target population, I resorted to interviewing staff from three separate entities (Non-governmental Organizations, academics, and university students) to better understand the political, historical, and social dynamics shaping female representation in Kazakhstan. These interviews were semi-structured, focusing on a) forms of representation before and after independence; b) policy domains that have allowed for the greatest female influence; c) the role of patriarchy and other cultural norms; and d) methods employed by women to gain access to closed institutions.

Beyond these interviews, I also accessed official documents, journal articles, contemporary reports and news articles from media outlets found in Kazakhstan. Unfortunately most media under governmental control: President Nazarbayev's daughter owns the media conglomeration in Kazakhstan, and all media outlets are banned from

promoting any “anti-government” propaganda. Those caught soliciting against the government are shut down and/or arrested. Furthermore, upon personal investigation while in Almaty, I encountered while searching the internet that government censorship of many Western websites, anti-Kazakhstan blogs, EU and UN documents, etc.

### *Limitations*

The limitations found within in this study stem from my field research in Kazakhstan. As mentioned in the introduction, I spent 25 days as compared to the initially planned three to six months in Kazakhstan due to changing US-Kazakhstan Visa requirements. Furthermore, my visa limited my travel to Almaty. I chose this site for my field research because it is the hub of non-governmental organizations focusing on female issues; it is also the most populous city within Kazakhstan with a diverse population. Furthermore, my original target population was reduced to a fraction of my original intended sample, thus limiting the types of questions asked, due to time constraints and institutional barriers increasing the likelihood of community bias because of snowballing.

Snowball sampling occurs when one interviewee suggests another participant or respondent to be interviewed increasing the likelihood that I would individuals or entities that share common interests or viewpoints. This can lead to important segments of society such as rural elites being omitted from the sample and skewing the analysis. To the best of my abilities, I controlled for wrong anchoring (See Chapter 3) to ensure that this preliminary sample reflects a larger target population. I did this by interviewing three types of groups (academics, students, and staff at non-governmental organization). This allows for triangulation, decreasing inaccurate conclusions about the role of women in Kazakhstan.

This leads to the final and most important drawback concerning this research. Because of the small sample of elite women and elite university of students, my results may not accurately reflect the attitudes towards female representation in Kazakhstan. Although I went to Kazakhstan with only one on-the-ground contact who tried to help me increase the number of interviews conducted, my interviews centered on elite Almaty women. Therefore, the findings found within in this analysis serve only as a stepping stone into further research on an understudied phenomena, female representation in an often forgotten part of the world.

### *Outline of Research*

This dissertation is divided into six chapters, including the introductory chapter. Chapter Two offers an overview of previous research on representation and gender. Highlighting historical institutionalism and social constructivism, it illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of previous research within each framework. Chapter Two then bridges the two frameworks focusing on formal (institutional) and informal (civil society) mechanisms driving female political representation. Chapter Three describes the research design and methodology applied in examining factors that influence female political participation in the case study of Kazakhstan. Chapter Four applies historical institutionalism to Pitkin's dimensions of gender representation in Kazakhstan. Similarly, Chapter 5 applies social constructivism to these dimensions of gender representation in Kazakhstan. Chapter Six concludes by merging these two frameworks into one overarching analysis on female representation in Kazakhstan.



## **Chapter Two:**

### **Competing Theories in Pursuit of a Complex Issue**

#### *Introduction*

Women face serious problems of under representation, even in established democracies. Within the United States women only hold 100 seats out of 535 in the most recent election (Center for American Women and Politics 2014). Therefore, it comes as little surprise that women in transitioning countries, such as former Soviet states, might find it difficult to gain political representation when so much power is at stake. Some of the challenges that women confront as a country moves from an authoritarian communist regime to a democracy with a market economy include increased unemployment, domestic violence and reduction of state benefits (McMahon 2004:251). The barriers women face in their efforts to gain equal representation in formal institutions cannot be explained by way of a single theoretical framework. Instead, one needs to consider the interplay of several frameworks to understand why women in transitional societies are more poorly represented under “democracy” than under the old regime. Kazakhstan offers a unique case study for gender theorists because of its Soviet past entwined with its rise in cultural patriarchalism and ethnic nationalism.

This dissertation draws on two specific frameworks: Historical Institutionalism/Path Dependency and Social Constructivism. It also briefly touches on Gender Representation and Civil Society literature. Although women in Kazakhstan have made progress in terms of representation, the scholarly literature connecting barriers to female political representation and women’s mobilization in Central Asia is limited; not only is civil society a recent development in Central Asia but the women’s question has

often been pushed to the side in policy formulation in promotion of ethnic nationalism. Most scholarship on women's representation in this region fails to consider cultural factors blocking the transition from civil society to formal institutions.

### *Historical Institutionalism*

Historical institutionalism (HI) argues that in order to explain contemporary developments, we need to trace how historical developments have shaped current political dynamics (Immergut 1992; Steinmo 2007). This requires an examination of Kazakhstan's Soviet legacy and its influence on current institutional arrangements since the 1990s.

For purposes of comparative analysis, HI theorists contend that time and sequencing are crucial in explaining how earlier systemic choices and institutional patterns pre-shape current developments. Hall and Taylor (1995) argue that historical development is one of the key influences pushing institutional dynamics along a set of "paths." The concept of *path dependency* holds great explanatory power with regard to current outcomes under historical institutionalism because it provides for policy variation among countries.

Paul Pierson (2000) defines path dependency as a social process:

Grounded in a dynamic of "increasing returns" ... specific patterns of time and sequence matter; various social outcomes may be possible; larger consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular course of actions, once introduced can be almost impossible to

reverse; political development is punctuated by moments or junctures that shape contours of social life (2000:251).

These critical junctures send countries along different institutional reform and policy formulation trajectories. Thus two countries may experience the same critical juncture (the fall of the Soviet Union). But the path each country chooses to follow thereafter depends on earlier constructions of key institutions. Barrington Moore, Jr. argues that the development of modern political institutions among pre-modern agrarian societies has depended on a strong bourgeoisie. His argument, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy” holds that without a historical presence of a strong bourgeoisie, a liberal democracy will cease to emerge because of the need for a balance between royalty and the land owners who sought support from upper class townsmen. Bernhard (2004:3) exerts that when “the bourgeoisie is strong enough, the aristocracy is able to adapt itself to the emerging structures of the market, allowing for both commercial success and control of rural populations (although not without considerable human costs).” Without a strong bourgeoisie, two possibilities arise: a fascist dictatorship or communism.

Table 2.1 offers a narrative illustration of Moore’s thesis on the development on modern society.

**Table 2.1 Moore’s Modern Development of Political Institutions**

<b>Strength of Bourgeoisie</b>	<b>Type of Revolutionary Transition</b>	<b>Resulting Modern Society</b>
Strong	Bourgeois	Liberal Democracy
Weak	Revolution from Above	Fascist Dictatorship
Non-Existent	Peasant Revolution	Communism

According to Moore, if the bourgeoisie has the strength to change the feudal structure and adapt to market changes while regulating and controlling agricultural labor through economic competition, a liberal democracy will emerge. However, if the bourgeoisie is weak and forced to align itself with the “state” because it is unable to handle the accelerated rate of modernization, a revolution from above will occur, leading to the emergence of a fascist dictatorship, highlighted with an authoritarian charismatic leader who promotes the idea of a strong state at the expense of the people. Under this transition, there will be an increase in nationalism, a more formalized military, and reduction of internal tariffs to promote internal economic growth. Moore uses Nazi Germany and Japan as examples.

The third arrangement occurs when the bourgeoisie is relatively non-existent, and reforms undertaken by the state only exacerbate the already horrible living conditions of the peasantry, resulting in a peasantry with “the possibility of revolution” (Bernhard 2004:5). Yet as Bernhard and other critics (Skopcol) are quick to point out, Moore has a hard time explaining how Eastern European countries that once under USSR influence were able to transition relatively smoothly to a liberal democracy without the required presence of a strong bourgeoisie and why others are under authoritarian regimes as is the case in Kazakhstan. Although Moore wrote at a time where there was not the external force of the European Union that helped define their trajectory and is less applicable to former Second and Third World states, Moore’s description of a transition to a fascist dictatorship does hint at some of the institutional dynamics taking place within

Kazakhstan and how path dependent behavior and historical context surrounding individual nations explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in Central Asia.

Discussing Kazakh national identity Ingvar Svanberg (1996) argues that despite the complex history of nomadic tribes dating back to the 13<sup>th</sup> century, coupled with economic and structural dependence on the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991, Kazakhstan stands as a potential geopolitical power. Its ability to develop its natural resources has nonetheless been hindered by institutional dynamics. Svanberg highlights historical events such as the relocation of Russians to Kazakhstan at the turn of the century to help build farming and mining industries, coupled with Russification policies, i.e., as language requirements meant to strengthen Soviet control over Central Asia. The genocide of 1932-1933, rooted in an intentional famine induced by the Bolsheviks, claimed over ten millions lives within Central Asia and parts of the Ukraine. These historical events and the constant limitation on national identity within Kazakhstan help explain the push towards a resurgence of Kazakh national identity after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In her pivotal study of *Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power*, Bhavna Dave (2007) draws the connection between the previous Russification process and the current Kazakhization policies taking place since independence. Since the fall of the Soviet Union (followed by the continuous non-contested elections of Nazarbayev), there has been an increase in the promotion of Kazakh nationalism. Michael Huysseune (2006:2) argues that the “emergence of nationalism of cultural and ethnic minorities is to be understood as a reaction against policies of cultural homogenization of nation-states.” In other words, the nationalism that is taking over in Kazakhstan does not come as a surprise as nationalism is most likely to arise in previously occupied or colonized states

in which the citizens were forced to assimilate to a dominant or controlling culture. Thus, the current language requirements for all “elected” officials and the push for a new written history are to be expected. Interestingly, since most pre-Soviet Kazakhs were nomadic, illiterate, and lacking basic community or village social structures, no real written “Kazakh” history existed prior to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (Dave 2007).

The revival of cultural nationalism in Kazakhstan has led to tensions among ethnic groups. Although political power rests with Kazakh elites, most notably, Nazarbayev, economic, industrial, and educational resources have remained largely in the hands of the Russian minorities. Jonathan Murphy (2006) argues that although significant institutional changes have occurred within Kazakhstan, the market is still controlled by the same elites who ran the state prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. Former members of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) have simply exchanged the cloak of communism for the mantle of nationalism to protect their agenda and interests. This supports Moore’s argument that a weak bourgeoisie must align itself with the state and the promotion of nationalism in order to maintain its interests.

### *Social Constructivism*

However, the nationalism taking root in Kazakhstan has largely ignored the increase of ethnic-religious nationalism taking place within neighboring countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This relationship between religion, ethnicity, and national identity leads to a consideration of the social construction of identity, as it affects institutional dynamics in Kazakhstan and the post-Soviet republics. According to Kathleen Thelen (1999), institutions are a reflection of cultural norms and the way in

which a society understands how the world works. These structures of human association are shaped less by material or market forces than by the interaction of shared ideas (Wendt 1999). Hardly fixed or concrete, categories such as gender, race, ethnicity and class are not natural or biological and can change over time and across cultures. Rather, they transform as ideas evolve; they are transformed by history and in turn they themselves transform history (Amott and Mattaei 1996). History provides a social context for understanding contemporary political culture.

In regard to Kazakhstan, Edward Schatz (2000) claims that due to Kazakhstan's past, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a cultural/ethnic revival is increasing. He contends that rather than pushing towards a sustainable form of Kazakh national unity, this revival is dividing ethnic Kazakhs against themselves, e.g., urban and rural Kazakhs, and Kazakhs against Russians. Because of both direct and indirect forms of inter-ethnic discrimination, there has been an across the board reduction of ethnic Russians holding civil service/state posts within Kazakhstan: from 50% in 1991 to 25% in 1998 (Schatz 2000).

Inter-ethnic discrimination is not the only type witnessed in the new republic. Kathleen Collins (2003) considers the extent to which the historical presence of clans in Central Asia has influenced current political institutions. Given that Central Asia is a highly multi-ethnic region with no clear geographical boundaries to divide diverse sub-groups into individual states, clans have provided a sense of structure, providing a framework for political institutions. The clans themselves serve as fundamental political structures within these communities, supporting the concept of an "imagined community." According to Benedict Anderson (1983), an imagined community,

specifically a nation, is comprised of individuals who seem themselves as part of a group that is not based on day-to-day interactions (i.e., family, friends, co-workers). These transient groups are based on social identities that change as ideas evolve. They dictate the norms or rules of the society and who is allowed to have a voice or must remain silent.

### *Representation and Gender*

Since the main focus of this dissertation is to examine the factors hindering women from fully integrating themselves into political institutions, we must explore representation theory. In 1967, Hanna Pitkin identified four integrated but albeit analytically separate dimensions of representation: formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic. While most research focuses on one or two dimensions (Salmond 2006; Atkeson 2003; Carrillo 2007; Mansbridge 2009), Pitkin argues that separating these dimensions is impossible due to their causal connectedness. In other words, formal institutions facilitate descriptive representation, encourage policy responsiveness, and enhance the public's support for representation. Descriptive representation is moreover considered crucial for promoting symbolic representation (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:410).

In defining the pertinent characteristics of each dimension, I reflect on techniques suggested for each in regards to female political representation. This section also then turns to the relevance of each dimension within Kazakhstan, briefly examining how the "female" experience is or is not leading to women in Kazakhstan's overall feeling of being represented.



Formal representation refers to the rules, norms, and procedures shaping how representatives are selected. This can include types of political institutions, who is able to run, and the ways in which candidates are selected. Much of the literature assesses whether the type of voting system affects female representation, Ian McCallister and Donley Studler (2002) found that women were ten percent more likely to be elected in proportional representation systems versus single-member districts. This is attributed to evidence that political parties (often dominated by men) are more willing to nominate women and minorities in a multi-member district than in a district that only carries one seat (Matland 2008; Brown 1992; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).

However, a 62-nation study discovered that there is no relationship between electoral rules and the percentage of women in parliament (Inglehart and Norris 2003). In a cross-sectional time series of countries undergoing major changes in their electoral rules, Rob Salmond (2006) found that the effect of PR systems on levels of female representation is indeed positive, but the effect has been overstated (Matland 2008). Many of these studies assume that a positive effect on female representation is reflected in numerical representation; yet none explain whether or not a change in formal rules affects whether women “feel” more represented by these women.

A focus on descriptive representation raises the question as to whether there is a “compositional similarity between representatives and the represented” Pitkin (1967:10-11). She asks whether likes are truly representing likes. Most research focuses on descriptive representation because it is easy to count the number of women in parliament in over 180 countries, allowing for statistical analysis and cross-country comparisons (Krook 2010).

Initially revolving around the idea of *critical mass theory*, Drude Dahlerup (1988) argues that a “threshold number [or percentage] of women in a legislature is necessary for transforming the legislative context from one in which women-friendly policy is unlikely to one in which the opportunities for women’s policy success are increased” (Mansbridge 2005:222). Under critical mass theory, an increase in descriptive representation would lead to a natural increase in substantive representation. Mansbridge (1999) contends that one reason for critical mass is to convince members of the majority party coalition of the interests that they are advancing is widely held within that group. Yet, Dahlerup acknowledges that the everyday significance of critical mass has gotten lost in translation. Instead of focusing on the attainment of parity, focus should be on the critical acts, e.g., gender quota adoption that even a minority organization can undertake to empower women. The numbers and proportion of women holding parliamentary seats are only of minor importance in terms of policy outcomes depending on the political system. Policymakers should focus on actions that include women in the discourse.

The most common critical act described for increasing descriptive representation is the introduction of gender quotas. However, the “act of gender quota adoptions” is often the culminating event of previous critical acts. Critical acts depend on the “willingness and ability of the minority to mobilize the resources of the organization to improve the situation for themselves and the whole minority group” (Dahlerup 1998: 296). These acts include consciousness-raising, building a policy community, professionalization and internationalization, and the most recognized- institutionalization and gender mainstreaming (Mushaben 1999). Furthermore, these critical acts do not have

to be initiated by only women or minority groups. In fact, both men and women may be actors in formulating gender equitable policies.

For this research, causal connectedness between formal/institutional design and descriptive representation is seen through the ultimate “critical act” of gender quota implementation: institutional design affords selected groups greater descriptive representation than they might achieve under existing electoral systems, bringing the proportions of those groups in the legislature closer to the share of the general population (Mansbridge 1997). This suggests that women would have been better represented under the old Soviet quota system compared to non-gender quota societies.

Several other concerns arise when the focus rests primarily with increasing numerical representation. The first, essentialism, assumes that “members of a certain group have an essential identity that all members of that group share which with no others can partake” (Mansbridge 1997:637). Secondly, intersectionality and multiple identities may be just as or even more significant when it comes to applying gender quotas or critical mass theory to women in Kazakhstan. Overlapping identities are neither additive, nor easily separated; rather they are mutually constitutive. Investigating black women’s employment in the United States, Kimberlie Crenshaw (1983) argued that women of color are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently pursue conflicting agendas. The idea that members of one population necessarily represent all members of that population equally is erroneous because of the lack of shared experiences.

Nevertheless, without some levels of descriptive representation women cannot hope to attain symbolic representation. Often seen as an extension of descriptive representation, symbolic representation is the ability of a symbol's power to "evoke feelings or attitudes" (Pitkin 1967:97). Symbolic representation frames itself in relation to the effect that women's presence has on voter perceptions of politics as a male domain (Krook 2010). It asks whether the presence of women in elected positions provides legitimacy to current political institutions. Conclusions regarding symbolic representation are mixed. Several studies find that both female and male respondents believe that governments are more democratic when women are more visible within the process (Karp and Barducci 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). This supports rational actor theorists who argue that citizens' support for political institutions depends largely on whether constituencies view their institutions as legitimate (Jackman and Miller 1996; Mishler and Rose 2001; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Others agree that women's inclusion sends signals to female to the female citizenry, rendering them more politically efficacious (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007:94-95).

Largely conducted in Western and developed countries, many studies show that educational levels influence whether gender serves as a cue for political attitudes. Women with higher levels of education are less likely to vote for women simply because of a candidate is female (Lawless 2004; McDermott 2008) because they no longer require visual cues as means of deciding on whom to vote. Unfortunately, most studies on symbolic representation focus on women in the United States and less on developing countries where women's rights are pushed aside even today.

Of the four dimensions of representation, Pitkin (1967) argues that substantive representation holds the most importance because under substantive representation the wishes of the represented and the actions of the representatives are expected to converge (Pitkin 1967: 163-165). Substantive representation asks whether there is “articulation of policy concerns by specific office holders” (Krook 2010:234). Furthermore, representatives should behave as delegates when they represent. Substantive representation maintains that not only women but also men may meet the needs of their constituency when they overlap in other ways (e.g., religion, etc.). Although an increase in women could push men towards more gender sensitive policies, such developments could also trigger a backlash (Krook 2010), as seen in Iran after 1979 and other so-called Islamic states. Second, small numbers of women may be more beneficial because these women can specialize without stepping on their male counterparts’ “toes.”

One way to achieve substantive representation may include gender mainstreaming policies, such as illustrated by various United Nations Development Programs and World Bank’s initiatives. Within their action plans, these programs integrate a gendered dimension into their daily operations, lending practices, and strategic planning in their goals of reducing poverty and increasing sustainable development within these developing countries (World Bank 2002). Gender mainstreaming policies are supposed to include four elements: “1) measurement and monitoring (which means finding out what the situation of women and men is in a specific policy area), 2) implementation (which generally implies a policy analysis looking at the implications of an intended policy for gender relations and aiming to improve it, 3) creating awareness, ownership and understanding among stakeholders to lead improved policy making in the future, and 4)

gender proofing and evaluation to see the extent to which intended policies have had gender effects” (European Commission 2008: 11). However, gender mainstreaming policies have been slow to take hold within all areas, highlighting one of its main criticisms. Although gender mainstreaming calls for the inclusion of women at all stages of the policy process, the literature often ignores who would be better at promoting women’s issues. Therefore, if women are unable to achieve representation within the system, a discussion of how women overcome this is needed. We turn now to the literature on civil society and its relationship to female representation in Kazakhstan.

### *Civil Society*

“Civil Society” is a concept often identified by its characteristics but not easily defined in a way that includes all permutations. In 2010, the World Bank adopted a definition of “civil society” that reads:

The term civil society refers to the array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious, or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations and foundations (World Bank 2010).

Although it highlights possible contributing organizations, this definition overlooks the goal of civil society. Alexis de Tocqueville (1935) depicts civil society as a space for private entrepreneurship and civil affairs regulated only by the rule of law.

Against the notion of individualism, de Tocqueville introduced the idea of civil associations for promoting reciprocity and trust among citizens in a democratic polity. Michael Foley and Bob Edwards extend this notion, describing civil society as a “sphere of action that is independent and can engage in resistance to a tyrannical regime” (1996:2). Olivier Roy (2005) counters, however, that civil society cannot be universally applied when discussing democratization, insofar as it overlooks the cultural and historical context and the needs of the society to be effective in providing a voice to its citizens, it must work within existing political institutions. Roy further claims that the models of democratization and civil society promoted by Western scholars are inappropriate for assessing Central Asia and Middle East developments; the concept is often seen by locals (for good or bad reasons) to embody an idealized, abstract model of modern western society. It is seen to have resulted from a historical process which took centuries to evolve but which is now presented as a ready-made, compulsory blue-print for reforms to be implemented in “oriental” societies in the span of one generation; there is often a suspicion that what lies behind it is a hidden agenda, ranging from political control, access to oil, or to religious ideology.

If the support for civil society is to develop at all, civil society has to help transform a tyrannical regime into a more democratic one. Experts like de Tocqueville (1935), Habermas (1989) and Putnam (2000) posit that civic associations and increased social capital through human interactions force governments to become more accountable to citizens by serving as a thermometer for the mood of citizens while ensuring that their needs and rights are being met. The connection between civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rests with the fact that NGOs are the driving force of

change because of their ability to organize communities, provide voice to the minority, and work closely with political institutions. Representing only one type of possible association, local, domestic, and international NGOs play an important role in empowering disadvantaged groups; they are not only crucial in the formation of civil society but also in the transformation of political institutions because of their ability to bridge the gap between both the public sphere and governmental organizations.

However, there is an overall concern regarding the ability of NGOs to produce real change as to whether these organizations might impede the democratization process. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (2005) claim that one technique activists employ is known as the *boomerang effect* which involves domestic activism seeking allies in the international arena, who have, in turn, the ability to exert influence on the host country to change its existing policies due to international pressure. The issue rests in whether change due to NGO influence is legitimate or whether their influence is superficial. Riker argues that NGOs in Indonesia were able to instigate democratic change through successfully lobbying to the international community. However, Indonesia ranks 110<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries on the Transparency International's Corruption Index (2011) due to corruption and illegitimate practices. This example emphasizes the need to critically examine the overall effectiveness of NGOs at producing institutional change.

Even beyond corruption, in post-Soviet countries where civil society is in its relative infancy, there is ongoing distrust affecting civil society. Elise Helen LoBue (2007) in her discussion on Kazakhstan highlights the Soviet ban on independent public activity outside the Communist Party control and the persisting desire for the state to provide social needs. Given the pre-1990 history of civil organizations, there is a public



apathy and “legacy of cynicism” surrounding contemporary civic organizations in Kazakhstan (Riker 2002).

Furthermore, President Nazarbayev has implemented institutional constraints, in effect limiting the type of civic organizations allowed to develop in Kazakhstan. With the 2005 Law on National Security, criminal and civil charges will be brought against any individual who participates in any informal organizations or protests not sanctioned by the Kazakhstan government, inherently cutting organizations that are seeking change off at their proverbial knees and limiting any type of democratic reform. Government restrictions on NGO functions in Kazakhstan, intended to maintain authoritarian control, are combined with a lack of public activism, rooted in the Soviet legacy of suspicion towards independent associations. Consequently, organizations promoting female rights are hindered in their efforts to promote democratic reforms or societal change. Instead, NGOs and civil society in Kazakhstan are mere shells of their international counterparts.

### *Conclusion*

This review of the literature sets out to accomplish three distinct goals. First, it introduces the reader to the two competing frameworks tested in this research: historical institutionalism and social constructivism. The strength of historical institutionalism is that it provides the reader with the understanding that past decisions or institutional dynamics constrain present and future institutional designs. Momentous change occurs at critical junctures when the stability of the institution is in flux; it is at these moments when an institution has the ability to break from its path. However, often more than not, even these “new” paths are still constrained or influenced by prior institutional

developments. In short, historical institutionalism allows us to study what role institutions play in structuring behavior. However, historical institutionalism often forgets about the need for ideas and the extent to which ideas evolve, and so do institutions. Some historical institutionalists (North 2006; Lewis and Steinmo 2007) are beginning to view institutional change as an evolutionary process instead of fixed set of paths that are pre-determined and fixed. Social Constructivism, however, fully embraces the importance of ideas and argues that behavior and norms of a society are interpreted (or constructed) rather than the result of simple causal connectedness. Unlike historical institutionalism which situates individuals and society as prisoners of structural forces beyond their control, social constructivism aims “ to understand the worlds of meaning that people generate through interaction in order to understand how social actors define, construct and act towards the ‘realities’ that constitute their everyday worlds” (Clapham 2009: 4). Through these interactions, the construction of gender, ethnicity, and religion and the norms associated with these constructs take shape. Although social constructivism accounts for the importance of history with the acknowledgement that ideas change over time as interactions change, social constructivism does not clearly link the causality constraints that past institutional dynamics can impose on current institutions. In that sense, each framework picks up where the other left off.

This chapter also provides an overview of the research subject, female political participation, and how the previous literature fails to account for all dimensions (formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic) of representation, specifically within post-Soviet Central Asian republics. Finally, this chapter offers a glimpse into whether the role of

civil society, in countries where civil society is still in its beginnings, can induce institutional changes and lower barriers to excluded groups such as women.

The next chapter outlines the methodological approach utilized to examine the influences blocking women from gaining equal representation. Chapter Three begins by introducing the overall research problem and hypotheses tested. It then turns to a brief discussion of qualitative methods and the importance a qualitative model carries in fully developing a contextual understanding as to what barriers have hindered women's access to political institutions in Kazakhstan. After reviewing the qualitative method utilized, Chapter Three concludes with addressing ethical concerns raised in the pursuit of this research.

## **Chapter Three:**

### **Methodology: Testing a Complex Phenomena**

#### *Introduction*

As the previous chapters demonstrate, there is much uncertainty over what factors influence women's access to political institutions. Historical institutionalism and social constructivism debate as to whether material or cultural forces influence female representation. This chapter seeks to examine not only whether internal or external, cultural or material forces impede women from gaining access to governmental institutions in Kazakhstan but also suggests that a qualitative method approach provide the best framework for observing this complex phenomena.

#### *Research Design and Rationale of Methodology*

This analysis takes the form of a qualitative research study. Instead of quantitative research methods which attempt to develop generalizable or universal laws through static reality (or numbers), qualitative research methods understand that reality is contextual and that universal laws often miss the specifics. Qualitative studies allow us to gain a perspective from the people involved, often overlooked.

Further reasons for utilizing a qualitative approach versus a quantitative approach is that it allows researchers to determine how individuals construct ideas and their own relationship to institutions. This type of research lends itself to explaining how and why a specific event occurred. Consequently, conducting qualitative research allows us to explore what decisions or events necessitated the event or phenomena being studied.

In this case, a qualitative study combining personal interviews with elite women and university students and content analysis of official documents, media reports, and journal articles allows me to explore why women in Kazakhstan continue to lag behind their male counterparts in regards to political representation and to discover how a combination of historical events and cultural identity have contributed.

### *Qualitative Exploratory Questions*

Since this qualitative analysis examines factors hindering female representation using a bottom-up approach, the process of identifying individual influences and their interplay with one another (i.e., cultural norms and historical institutional development) involves drawing inferences from the interviews and verifying these observed themes with subsequent interviews. Therefore, conjecture as to whether a hypothesized factor is statistically significant in influencing women's access to political institutions is inappropriate for this section. Instead thematic questions about the supposed barriers were addressed to the interviewees. Some of the exploratory questions regarding women's access to political institutions are found in the table below.

**Table 3.1 Qualitative Exploratory Research Questions**

<b>Research Questions</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. What rules exist in regards to running for political office?</li><li>2. How are women viewed within society?</li><li>3. Do women feel represented by already females within Parliament?</li><li>4. What barriers did women historical confront under the Soviet Union?</li><li>5. What barriers do women experience when actively seeking full representation?</li><li>6. What policy arenas are have women found the most success? Most resistance?</li><li>7. To what effect do patriarchal norms influence women's desire/ability to run for office?</li></ol>

### *Sampling/Population Details*

Initially, the goal of the research was to conduct interviews with elected female officials, gender experts, political party leaders, academics, and a large focus group of young women located in Almaty, Kazakhstan. This multi-level approach was meant to detect a) whether intersectionality of religion, ethnicity, and gender increased the likelihood of certain sectors of the female population being represented; and c) common problems or influences women experienced when trying to gain access to political institutions.

However, limited access to political leaders and time constraints required me to focus my interviews on women in Almaty. Almaty serves as the NGO capital of Central Asia and is the former capital of Kazakhstan. Having secured an affiliation with KIMEP University, my research focused on interviewing three distinct groups: academics at KIMEP University, staff members of international and local NGOs, and a focus group consisting of four students (two female and two male) majoring in international relations at KIMEP University. This field research was dependent on the “snow ball effect” (i.e., one interviewee introducing me to potential organizations/individuals) due to cultural norms of excluding outsiders who might ask potentially personal questions. Due to my affiliation to KIMEP University, I was granted access to the political science faculty. However, due to scheduling conflicts I was only able to interview five faculty members who all consented to my naming them within my research at the start of the interview. It was through my interview with one of the professors that I gained access to students enrolled in the Politics of International Affairs Course. Students were allowed to volunteer to be a part of a focus group during of their class periods. Out of ten students,

four volunteered. I separated them into male and female focus groups to allow students to speak freely about their feelings towards female political participation and to increase the validity of their answers. Also, beyond basic descriptive characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity), I do not name the students to protect their privacy.

As for my interviews with staff members of NGOs, I sent emails and phone calls to various organizations. Out of these, I was able to interview five non-governmental organizations. Out of these, I was able to interview the staff of five non-governmental organizations (three local and two international). Out of these organizations, only one requested to not be identified by the organization's name. The director allowed me to use her name, but for the protection of the organization and the interviewee, I coded the organization as Women's Entrepreneurship and removed all identifying characteristics beyond a basic description of their goals and target audience.

I chose this sample of the population because these individuals represent the middle and upper class segment of society and are the most well-informed regarding female political participation in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, if female and male interviewees believe that women are disenchanted with the political process in Kazakhstan due to internal and external influences, one can assume that this feeling trickles down to the lower classes of society. However, I acknowledge that without interviewing rural elites that there is a probable skew regards to symbolic representation since political elites are going to want to maintain some levels of democratization in order to continue to receive aid and funding from NGOs. Based on readings and primary resources, political elites often set up their own NGOs or align with NGOs in order to receive funding. By exploiting NGOs, the political elites have the ability to increase

private gain by “intercept[ing] development aid to run programs that in another era might have managed by a governmental agency” (Gros 2011:214-215). Thereby, the implication of my sample size largely consisting of NGO staff could potentially conflate the overall results. It is important to reiterate that this analysis is preliminary research meant to stimulate further studies. It offers a snapshot of the barriers women face in Kazakhstan.

### *Instrumentation*

Following a self-designed rubric (See Appendix A), the interviews conducted were semi-structured in order to allow those being interviewed to express themselves in their own words and to allow for follow-up questions. The rubric found in Appendix A represents the questions meant to ask in my initial study. Due to circumstances already described, many of these questions went unasked due to the population of the sample. However, my work included human observation and detailed note taking (many of the interviewees did not want to be audio or video recorded); each interview with the staff from the NGOs and the faculty at KIMEP University lasted approximately sixty to ninety minutes and was located at a place of their choice. Those who are affiliated with KIMEP University were interviewed on KIMEP’s campus, while NGO interviews were conducted at their offices, homes, or at local coffee shops. Although a questionnaire was used, a majority of interviews expanded beyond the questionnaire (i.e., from generalizable themes to concrete details and normative evaluations). This flexibility in interview structure allowed me to ask questions that had arisen in previous interviews to see if there were any overall connections. I was required to use an interpreter found by a local connection through the university only once since a majority of the interviews were



conducted in English. It is difficult to control for translation when the interviewees did not want to be audio or video recorded. To ensure that no external forces (the government) pressured my assistant to translate the conversation in ways that would skew the actual results, I found my translator through an American graduate student attending KIMEP University with whom I had the opportunity to interact on several occasions. This helps reduce some of the bias that could be present.

### *Data Analysis*

For analyses within the case study, I apply historical institutionalism and social constructivism to the four dimensions of representation as presented by Hanna Pitkin (1967). I look specifically at historical institutional dynamics and the role of cultural identity to see how these influence current gender relations in regards to formal, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. The interviews provide a contextual narrative for the merging of these theoretical frameworks in understanding the complex phenomena of female representation in Kazakhstan.

### *Overcoming Qualitative Inexactness*

Several concerns arise when conducting interviews based upon snowball sampling. The first issue that presents itself is community bias. Community bias infers that those respondents interviewed first exert the most influence on the results because they are the ones who recommend further interviews with individuals or organizations with which they are associated (Van Meter 1990). This can lead to important members of the population being omitted from the sample. If not controlled for, these first individuals may skew the findings and provide inaccurate profiles of the phenomena being observed.

Another potential problem is “wrong” anchoring.” Not only must I account for whether or not the first respondents distort the picture, but I must also account for whether or not the sample reflects the target population. In other words, are the issues affecting the sample groups actually affecting women in gender or is it localized to those within the sample?

Although bias and wrong anchoring are inevitable at some level, these issues can be minimized by: a) increasing the sample size; b) by relying on a variety of sources; and c) reaching isolated members of the community (Liam 2014). Since I was only able to interview a sample of elite women in Almaty, I try to overcome this bias by interviewing three distinct groups (NGO personnel, academics and students) providing a variety of sources. Even with this small sample size, by interviewing a variety of groups I found two important findings regarding female representation in Kazakhstan.

### *Ethical Concerns*

It is important to address the potential ethical concerns when conducting such research, especially the need to protect the identities of those wishing to remain anonymous in their interviews. My IRB approval number for conducting interviews with individuals in Kazakhstan is 1039875. Also, each individual interviewed as a part of this research was first asked if she or he would allow for their identities to be associated with their responses. All verbally acknowledged that they would allow the comments collected from these interviews to be used in my study. Only one organization refused to be identified but allowed the interview to be conducted and the information received to be coded as local non-governmental organization associated with female entrepreneurship.

This organization also allowed me to identify its staff members by name within my research. However, I made the decision to withhold any individual names this organization allowed as an added measure of anonymity.

### *Merging Analysis*

Since this research blends historical institutionalism and social constructivism into one conceptual framework, the final chapter merges historical institutionalism as it relates to formal and descriptive representation with social constructivism as it related to substantive and symbolic female representation in Kazakhstan. By analyzing where these two frameworks produce similar results, differ completely, or enhance a better contextual understanding of female representation, I will accomplish the two main goals of this research. First, I determine what factors are hindering female political participation in Kazakhstan. Second, the results from the overall analysis allow for an examination of whether either of these two competing frameworks alone provides explanatory power on the current situation of female representation in Kazakhstan or whether a merging of the two is necessary to accomplish this.

### *Summary*

This chapter provided an overview as to the approach used to gather information on factors influencing female political representation in Kazakhstan. By conducting a qualitative study which utilized on-the-ground interviews with local elites, I provide a contextual analysis for female representation in Kazakhstan, albeit preliminary, on the overall development of female representation. Having discussed the rationale behind this methodological approach, the research questions, the instruments use to gather the data

and the limitations present, the next chapter presents a substantive analysis of historical institutionalism and its interplay with two types of female representation in Kazakhstan.

## **Chapter Four:**

### **Break with the Past or Follow in its Footsteps: Historical**

#### **Institutionalism in Kazakhstan**

##### *Re-Introduction of Historical Institutionalism in Kazakhstan*

Historical Institutionalism involves looking at historic causality (Page 2006), examining how institutions have developed certain patterns and configurations based upon institutional configurations which, in turn, shape decisions about future political institutions. Commonly used for country-level comparisons, historical institutionalism seeks to answer how and why countries that were once formally similarly situated vary in regards to subsequent institutional design or policy adoption.

These types of questions lead to understanding the path-dependent behavior of institutions and decision makers and the variation that occurs. According to Capoccia and Keleman (2007:431), dynamic institutional variation occurs after “relatively long periods of path-dependent stability, where dramatic change can occur when there is a brief phase of influx.” These influxes, or critical junctures, set national leaders and their institutional arrangements on paths are difficult to alter. In other words, during these critical junctures more choices open to decision makers, and there is likelihood that these choices will have much more of a momentous impact, resulting in the disparity between institutional configurations between countries.

Kazakhstan had two opportunities to break with its past, in 1917 when it succumbed to the Soviet Union and in 1991 when it declared its independence. This

study seeks to understand the shifts in level of representation in Kazakhstan by first exploring its historical institutional legacy as an autonomous republic of the Soviet Union and the path that the Republic of Kazakhstan chose at its second critical juncture, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This chapter then turns to representation and seeks to understand how Kazakhstan's decision to break from its Soviet past not only diminished female representation but also reduces women's roles in society in the public sphere.

This chapter begins by briefly reviewing Kazakhstan's historic and current institutional dynamics. I utilize interviews with elite women and university students, and combining information from documents, journal articles, and media sources. The next section analyzes how female representation in Kazakhstan has been transformed, as a result of departing from its previous path. I then examine the consequence of both diverging and maintaining certain characteristics of its former institutional framework. The final section provides an assessment of the applicability of historical institutionalism to understanding female political representation, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. I present an alternative theory to fill in the gaps left unanswered under the historical institutionalist framework.

### *Historical Kazakhstan: Pre-Soviet and Soviet Era*

In search of a Kazakh identity and clear a break from its historic past as of 1991, Kazakhstani leaders have often promoted the idea of the return to a traditional identity. However, this Kazakh history is one full of folklore; written documents detailing historic institutions prior to Soviet rule are limited. Historically, Kazakhstan was populated by

nomadic tribes with no history. In place of biographical accounts, genealogies, customs, rule of law traveled down by oral tradition (Mullerson 2014). This is pertinent because the traditions often associated with nomadic people of Kazakhstan have been malleable to appease the wants and desires of those in power.

The lack of written history also allowed for the permeation of Russian dominance in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century after Russian tsars invaded Central Asia, implementing policies such as the removal of all previous Kazakh history in order to ensure state control over a multi-ethnic population. This continuous removal of ethnic Kazakh identity elements continued when Kazakhstan became an autonomous republic within the Soviet Union.


In order to understand Kazakhstan's desire to break from its Soviet past, a brief review of Soviet political and economic institutions is necessary. Five of the most easily identifiable characteristics of governmental institutions operating within the Soviet Union that has trickled down to its republics, including the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, were 1) one-party dominant structure (Central Communist Party) that paralleled state structures; with 2) the fact that the final approval lies in the central of the structure at all levels with final approval remaining with the *Politburo*. 3) Democratic centralism allowed members of the party to "debate" policy, but once a decision had been reached all members were expected to uphold the decision; 4) the policies of *nomenklatura* that guaranteed all important posts were filled by loyal party members. This led to the homogenization of policies across the entire Soviet Union. Parallel party and government structures appeared at local, city, oblast, republic, and all-union levels. The head of the party was simultaneously the office holder heading the equivalent state positions, and 5)

administrative federalism promoting policies which are “national in form, socialist in content.”

Under a modified parliamentary system, the “representative” component of the government in the Soviet Union consisted of two houses: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The Soviet of the Union was comprised of 750 deputies who were elected from equally populated districts, similar in form (but not function) to our House of Representatives. The Soviet of Nationalities, however, consisted of 750 deputies representing ethnic entities across all of the Soviet Union. Although the legislative bodies were meant to have the highest legal authority, they functioned as mere puppets of the Presidium, comprised of top party leaders.



**Figure 4.1 Nationalities Breakdown**



With the advent of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in 1986, Gorbachev revamped this to create the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. The People’s Congress elected the members of the Supreme Soviet to serve as a direct link between the party and the state. Within the Supreme Soviet, which held 542 members elected for 5 year terms, was another bicameral body: the Council of the Union. However, even with this legislative restructuring, the Presidium remained dominant and ruled during recesses of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium of 39 Soviet members not only held legislative powers but also exercised judicial powers; they could both void laws and grant clemency and pardons.

Most directly related to Kazakhstan was the creation of the Soviet Nationalities. The Soviet of Nationalities guaranteed representation of all Republics, electing 32 from each republic of the Soviet Union, eleven deputies from each autonomous republic, five from each autonomous oblast, and one from each national district. The function of the Soviet of Nationalities was to represent both national and non-ethnic Russians like. However, after 1937, the Soviet of Nationalities was reduced to a largely symbolic body, dealing solely with issues of national identity (Martin 2001). Meant to grant “equal voice” in policy formation, the Soviet of Nationalities held no real power (CIA World Fact book 1989).

Within the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, the Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Council served as both the legislative branch and the judicial branch. However, like the Supreme Soviet in the USSR, the KSSR Presidium maintained complete control. Two bodies comprised the Supreme Soviet: the Council of Ministers, which served two year terms; the Council of Nationalities, which was composed of 32 members of various major ethnic groups, not limited to Kazakhs, Russians, Germans, etc. However, major positions of power were consistently held by loyal Russians and eventually by “Russified” Kazakhs who followed the party line (*nominklatura*). Unchallenged party loyalty dated back to 1929 when all Kazakh leaders were removed from local and regional government positions and replaced with Soviet patriots. Furthermore, Stalin’s Purges during the 1930’s made Kazakhstan’s nomadic cultural heritage all but obsolete. Once nomadic in function, the majority of all arable lands were used to develop large state-run farms (Kort 2004). Also during this time, a large influx of Russians centered the KSSR not only to seek employment on these farms but also to occupy and control

positions in the “national” Communist Party. Therefore, ethnic Kazakhs not only lost their culture but also modes of economic survival upon which they had long depended.

In the 1980s, riots in Kazakhstan began to increase following the removal of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, first ethnic Kazakh to hold the position of the First Secretary General, on the grounds of corruption; he was replaced by an ethnic Russian. Eventually, the ethnic Russian was also removed and replaced by none other than Nursultan Nazarbayev. A clear party loyalist, Nazarbayev had joined the Communist Party in 1962. Working his way up the party ranks, he eventually became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (equivalent to Prime Minister) and was even briefly considered as a candidate for the post of second in command to Mikhail Gorbachev (McCauley 2014).

*Kazakhstani Institutions Today: Chance for a Second “Break” with Past*

The key in understanding political and governmental institutions in Kazakhstan is that the government has become synonymous with President Nursultan Nazarbayev and vice versa. Nazarbayev is the state, and the state is Nazarbayev. All assertions that the Republic of Kazakhstan represents a democratic society with open institutions are erroneous. Having maintained his control as the leader of Kazakhstan since he was named First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1989, Nazarbayev was elected as the newly independent Republic’s first president in December 1991. Since then, Nazarbayev has continued his “elected” reign over the country; elections foster the illusion democracy, in what is, in fact, a system surrounded by authoritarian rules, controlled by one man and one political party – Nur Otan. Ironically similar to its Soviet counterpart, Kazakhstan has again become a mono-centric

state with all levels of administration controlled by the central government and President Nazarbayev at its head.

Although the Kazakh Constitution states that a president may only serve for two consecutive five-year terms, these term limits do not apply to President Nazarbayev hinting at the reversal of democratization that has taken place within Kazakhstan since 1991. In the November 2011 elections, Nazarbayev won with 95.5% of the votes, but the elections were quickly condemned by international observers. The OSCE released a statement that the “Reforms necessary for holding democratic elections have yet to materialize” (BBC 2011). Furthermore, Nazarbayev himself admits to a lack of democratization, having declared in a Washington Post article that achieving “prosperity before democracy” is the key to Kazakhstan’s immediate future (BBC 2011). Ranked 70<sup>th</sup> out of the 187<sup>th</sup> on the Gender Equality Index and ranked “very high” on the Human Development Index, Kazakhstan holds a score of 5.5 for overall freedom, political rights and civil freedoms, (based on a scale of 1 to 7, 7 being the worst) and a political freedom score of 6 (Freedom House 2014).

Further evidence of the authoritarian chokehold Nazarbayev maintains on Kazakhstani institutions and society is found within the political structure. Although the national government has three distinct branches, the president exercises direct influence over both the legislative branch and judicial branch. The legislative branch contains two chambers: the Senate (upper) and *Majilis* (lower). The Senate is composed of 47 deputies, with fifteen of its members being appointed by the president. The remaining 32 deputies represent the sixteen oblasts (regions) and the major cities of Almaty and Astana. Elections are held every three years, for six year terms. The *Majilis* has 105

deputies with 98 seats, elected by party lists through proportional representation, while the remaining seven seats are elected through single member district voting (Kazakhstan Constitution 2014). Nazarbayev also has the power to appoint and dismiss not only the Prime Minister but also the Chairs of both chambers.

As to the judicial branch, the President appoints three out of seven members of the Constitutional Council, including the chairperson of the Council. The other four members are appointed by the chairperson of the Senate and the chairperson of the *Majilis*. The Supreme Court consists of 44 members appointed by the president and approved by the Senate. The Constitution (1995) also accords President Nazarbayev the authority to dissolve the branches as his discretion, as well as to nullify any laws sanctioned by the other two branches (UN 2004).

In short, President Nazarbayev maintains control by appointing loyal individuals not only to the legislative branch but also to the judicial branch. Although the Senate chairperson and *Majilis* chairperson each appoint members to the Constitutional Council, these appointments have to secure presidential approval, insofar as the president has the authority to dismiss either chairperson. Even at the local level, regional heads (*akimats*) are appointed at the discretion of president and must fully back the national government's agenda (thus Nazarbayev's agenda). So even if women were appointed, they would have little room for independent gender-actions.

Simultaneously, President Nazarbayev also wields control over political institutions as the head of the only enduring political party in Kazakhstan: the Nur Otan. His concurrent role as the head of state and of the nation and as leader of the predominant

mono-party system, allows Nazarbayev to operate as the head gatekeeper for access to governmental institutions. Even though a 2007 campaign reform allowed the registration of at least one other political party, any party recognized is required to remain loyal to President Nazarbayev, because it is illegal for any party opposed to the government to form. Following the 2011 elections, two parties (Ak Zolt and the Communist People's Party) received eight and seven seats in the *Majilis*, respectively (Carnegie Endowment 2012). However, these parties are seen more as an extension of the Nur Otan rather than as separate entities. Like the old Soviet system, gaining positions within the political party and government institutions rests on a form of clientelism, because party lists are closed. Party gatekeepers dictate who can be nominated and what rank they should hold on the party lists. Clientelism represents a form of political patronage whereby material goods (bribes) are exchanged for political support. Nazarbayev's power is reinforced by unrestricted corruption controlling government and shaping election processes as a whole, all of which began with the unchecked power granted to Nazarbayev in 1991.

These structures and the interwoven connections between governmental institutions and political parties eerily resemble parts of Kazakhstan's Soviet past. First, President Nazarbayev was the First Secretary of the Communist Party to head the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. This automatically shapes the type of exclusionary power Nazarbayev hoped to maintain. Furthermore, the one-party dominant system mandating complete and unquestioned loyalty to the existing government mirrors the Soviet past, in which the only legal party was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Like their Soviet predecessors, party structures of the Nur Otan parallel state structures of the Republic of Kazakhstan; ultimate authority and approval lies with central structure (or

person) of the party. In this case, the central structure of the party and the state are one and the same: Nazarbayev.

As a recruited member of the Soviet *nomenklatura*, which served as an extension of the Politburo, Nazarbayev continued the client-patron relations into the newly form independent Kazakhstan that had originally allowed him to move up the ranks. Under both past and present *nomenklatura* policies, client-patron relations not only allowed for career advancement of up and coming party members, but also enforced widespread support of the patron's policies. The newly formed state bureaucracy transitioned into the role of the *nomenklatura* which surrounded itself around Nazarbayev and his political party. For example, in 1990, all parliamentary deputies appointed were on these *nomenklatura* lists (Olcott 2010). Emrich-Bakenova (2009) describes how recent civil service reforms introduced by President Nazarbayev promoting rational-legal authority have actually strengthened patronage and increase partisan politization.

Persistence of spoil systems, “open” and “partisan” politization through all the years of civil service development is not surprising, given the limited capacity of the law to regulate practice, thus allowing managers essentially to choose their own personnel. The new proposed model of elite corps of civil service, and the notion that it is a norm for a lower ranking administrative civil servant to aspire to be a politician, is an indication that indeed the political and administrative worlds are essentially indistinguishable (2009: 739-740).

Furthermore, the *nomenklatura* became an apparatus for promoting national interests throughout Kazakh society.

The connection to its Soviet past also influences the level of seen among Kazakh citizens. The total imbalance of power between the executive and legislative branches directly shapes the nature and the extent of representation within a parliamentary body,

specifically in regard to female political representation. In some respects, Nazarbayev and subsequent institutions felt the need to break from the Soviet past in order to promote a unified Kazakh nation. As a result of this, where women were once included (even if only symbolically), they were immediately pushed to the periphery and eliminated from the conversation. Compounding this break with the Soviet past is the exclusion of certain sects of the population once granted “equality.” This has led to the formation of informal institutions and the development of civil society as excluded groups seek to gain some level of representation, even if it is not formally accorded by governmental institutions. Where the Communist Party once held claim over political discourse, now civic organizations seek to fill the vacuum left in the aftermath.

#### *How the Past Shapes Female Political Representation Today*

This section seeks to accomplish two tasks. First, it attempts to link variables highlighted under historical institutionalism with patterns of female representation in Kazakhstan witnessed under both Soviet rule and since independence. Employing two out of four dimensions of representation developed by Hanna Pitkin’s (1967), I argue that historical institutionalism does provide some explanatory power for understanding the transformation of female representation in Kazakhstan in regard to formal, descriptive, and symbolic representation. To support this argument, I utilize interviews I conducted with elite women and students in Almaty, Kazakhstan from August 2013 to September 2013. Before discussing Hanna Pitkin’s dimensions of representation, I provide a detailed synopsis of those women and organizations interviewed. It is important to clarify that these interviews were limited to a very small sample; as a result they only provide a brief glimpse at the current status of women who lack access to governmental institutions. This



should be an indication of overall feelings of disenfranchisement among women in Kazakhstan. Table 4.1 demonstrates the overall findings on what ways or how Kazakhstan has broken from its Soviet legacy.

**Table 4.1 Representation in the Soviet Union and in Kazakhstan**

Representation	Soviet Union	Kazakhstan
Formal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gender Quotas</li> <li>- Party-State System</li> <li>- Zhenotdel</li> <li>- Russification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Removal of Mechanisms</li> <li>- “Hidden” Party State System</li> <li>- Kazakhization</li> <li>- Civil Society</li> </ul>
Descriptive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- High levels of representation (30%)</li> <li>- Low Level Positions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rarely hitting 15% until 2006</li> <li>- Familial Ties to Party Leaders</li> </ul>
Substantive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Equal under Law</li> <li>- Healthcare</li> <li>- Employment</li> <li>- Childcare</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Equal Under Law</li> <li>- Lack of implementation</li> <li>- Increased discrimination</li> </ul>
Symbolic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Soviet Woman</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nazarbayev as “Father”</li> </ul>

Having secured an affiliation with KIMEP University, I focused on interviewing three distinct groups: gender experts and academics, staff members of international and local NGOs, and a “focus” group of four students (two female and two male) majoring in international affairs and political science at KIMEP University. Unfortunately, my access to political leaders was restricted, especially to members of Parliament leaders, because of the government’s suspicion of foreigners and the limited amount of time I was

permitted to remain in country. My research depended on the “snow ball effect,” i.e., one interviewee introducing the researcher to potential organization/individual (Van Meter 1990). One consequence of this method is that important members of the target population might have been excluded from the sample, such as working women, rural women, etc., skewing the overall generalizability of my results. Therefore, I must acknowledge the probability that issues or factors influencing female representation may be limited to those within my sample.

In regard to their characteristics and affiliations, I interviewed members of four NGOs ranging from local to international in their structures and missions. These organizations included the SOROS Foundation/Open Society Foundations; the Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia (EFCA), and the Women’s League with Creative Initiative. Although the Center for Gender Studies is registered as an NGO in Kazakhstan, its mission and purpose align it more with those of an expert group. The fourth organization, focusing women’s entrepreneurship in Almaty, requested anonymity. I have labeled this organization Women’s Entrepreneurship (WE) and removed all identifying characteristics, as requested by the staff. The WE director did, however, allow me to cite her as an anonymous source for the purpose of this investigation. Below, I categorize each organization by its name, year founded, location focus, and policy domain.

**Table 4.2 Non-Governmental Organizations**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Year Founded</b>	<b>Location Focus</b>	<b>Policy Domain</b>
SOROS Foundation	1979	International	Human Rights
Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia	2004	Regional	Economic Development, Democracy Building, Human Rights
Women's League for Creative Initiative	2011	Country	Human Rights, Gender, Family
*Women's Entrepreneurship	2007	Local	Women's Economic Development

The SOROS Foundation and the EFCA do not focus solely on women's political participation or women-specific policies, but encompass human rights that also include women as their target audience. The SOROS Foundation focuses on "build[ing] vibrant and tolerant societies whose governments are accountable and open to the participation of all people" (Open Society 2014). This implicitly includes female representation, and it therefore was deemed appropriate to include in this sample. The "Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia's mission is to mobilize public and private resources to help citizens participate in building their future by strengthening their communities and improving their civic and economic wellbeing" (EFCA 2014). Although the organization does not name women's advocacy as one of its policy domains, several of its projects focus solely on women's issues. One such project is the "Equal before the Law" program which provides legal consultation to vulnerable groups, including women. The other

organizations focus solely on the promotion of women’s activism either within Central Asia or locally in Kazakhstan.

The next subgroup of interviews involves one gender expert from the Center for Gender Studies and political science/international relations professors at KIMEP University in Almaty. Within the department I interviewed five faculty members but focused on the three female professors. These interviews lasted for periods of thirty to ninety minutes. While each professor’s focus varies across discipline, all are considered experts on the historical and current institutional dynamics in Kazakhstan. In Table 4.3, I list the names of the individuals interviewed, their nationality, and organizational affiliation.

**Table 4.3 Female Interviewees**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Gulnara Dadabayeva	Kazakh	KIMEP University
Aigul Adibayeva	Kazakh, Tartar, Korean	KIMEP University
Svetlana Shakirova	Russian	Center for Gender Studies
Janel Bayastanova	Kazakh	Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia
Jessica Howard	American	Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia
Assiya Khairullina	Kazakh	Women’s Leadership for Creative Initiative
*Women’s Entrepreneurship	Russian	*Women’s Entrepreneurship

The final group serves as an example of the positive influence of the snowball effect. Under the direction of one of Professor Gulnara Dadabayeva, I conducted a small focus group, comprised of two female and two male students from her international politics course. These students may bias the results because not only did they volunteer, suggesting they are more likely to hold strong opinions on the role of women in politics; but they are more likely to hold strong opinions on the role of women in politics; but they are more likely to hold strong opinions on the role of women in politics; but these students also represents the views of potential future decision makers in Kazakhstan.

It is also important to acknowledge the inherent bias of interviewing female NGO staffers. These women are an extension of political elites and are employed by NGOs that have more of international flavor. Furthermore, these women are in a position to reflect the ideas of their given NGOs, potentially distorting the overall picture of women in Kazakhstan. However, these interviews still are valuable tools to gain additional insight on women's access to political institutions.

Returning to the connection between historical institutionalism and representation theory, I re-introduce Hanna Pitkin's four forms of representation: formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic. I reiterate that although these types of representation are analytically separate each, "bleeds" into the other, often causing some academics confusion when it comes to depicting which type of representation is lacking or present. Formal representation refers to the rules, norms, and procedures present in determining how representative are selected. Formal representation can include forms of political institutions, nomination processes, candidate selection, or voting systems. Descriptive representation revolves around the numeric representation of "compositional similarity

between representatives and the represented” (Pitkin 1967:10-11). Descriptive representation is all about numbers and the proportion of certain populations achieving political representation within governmental institutions.

Often seen as an extension of descriptive representation, symbolic representation is the ability of a symbol’s power to “evoke feelings or attitude” (Pitkin 1967:97). Symbolic representation reflects on whether the presence of the symbol affects voter or citizen perceptions as compared to the symbol not being there. Often symbols (in this case, the Chamber of Nationalities and presence of gender quotas) provide legitimacy to current and past political institutions. Finally, substantive representation entails the degree of overlap between the wishes of the represented and actions of the representatives. Under substantive representation, citizens are not only represented through formal procedures and numerical representation; policy formulation and implementation actually reflect their concerns and the needs of the representatives.

Connecting historical institutionalism and certain forms of representation is not a stretch. Historical institutionalism maintains that current institutional developments are the result of historical patterns that the path followed or “breaks with the past” from earlier constructions of key institutions. This includes representation. The want to continue to break from this trajectory is only possible there was at least a minimal level of representation. The collapse of the Soviet Union serves as the critical juncture which shaped further patterns of representation.

This study examines the historical patterns of gender and ethnic representation found within Kazakhstan while it was still seen as an autonomous Republic of the Soviet

Union. It then analyzes how this historical pattern influenced the current dimensions of female political representation in Kazakhstan. Although I am mostly looking at female political representation, as discussed in the next chapter, I must also account for ethnic and minority representation because many of the changes in formal, descriptive, and symbolic representation are closely intertwined with the social construction of gender and ethnic identity.

### *REPRESENTATION IN USSR*

Formally, or rather legally, women in the Soviet Union were considered equal to their male counterparts. In the formation of the USSR, it was the Bolsheviks' aim to emancipate women from the privacy of their homes and to exploit their paid labor in building socialism that would eventually lead to complete equality between men and women. Substantive policies such as banning polygamy (Rasnake et. Al 2000) and the Red Yurt campaign, which promoted female literacy, healthcare, and vocational training in rural Kazakhstan (Michaels 1998), were immediately adopted. The idea was to promote the "New Soviet Woman," as compared to the uncivilized, uneducated "baba" (backward woman). Women were guaranteed employment, healthcare, childcare, maternity leave that would solidify their place within the work force (LoBue 2007).

The Soviets mandated gender quotas and the creation of the *Zhenotdel* (the Women's Department of the Central Communist Secretariat) in 1919, along with their regional version (*zhenotdely*). Among the working class and peasantry, women developed political consciousness that merged into political participation within the Communist Party. However, even with formal representation and increased descriptive representation

promising them certain substantive and “inalienable” rights such as healthcare, employment, education, etc., the new Soviet Woman as an equal to her male practice, they became totally dependent on the male dominated state to protect their equality. Gulnara Dadabeyeva,<sup>1</sup> Professor at KIMEP University, holds that although women have more “freedom” under the current regime, women had more “rights” allotted to them during the Soviet times in the form of childcare and maternity leave. Single mothers were given resources to survive.

Although women were considered equal, they still received less pay for the same or similar jobs. Women had access to employment, but their employment opportunities were limited to lower ranking positions. Women were also dissuaded from pursuing technical specialties while receiving an education because these positions were seen as “male” positions. Finally, although women benefited politically from organizations such as the *Zhenotdel* and from the adoption for gender quotas, guaranteeing a certain level of political representation; women were still not part of the major decision making process (LoBue 2007). Furthermore, their “forced emancipation” created a double bind for these women as both workers and mothers. This dichotomy stressing equality in the public sphere but stereotypical gender roles within the home left women trapped between modernity and tradition in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian Republics. Women were caught between Soviet state expectations and their traditional, patriarchal heritage.




## *REPRESENTATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN*

Following independence, those remaining in power pursued an alternate in forming new institutions. This alternate path adopted both features of its pre-Soviet and Soviet past, suggesting that although superficially the Republic of Kazakhstan sought to break from its Soviet chains, it, in fact, still adhered to a lot of the same qualities and rules of its predecessor. This combination of “out with the old and in with the new” negatively affected female representation. This includes implementation of Kazakhization policies, the presence of the Soviet legacy in regards to a centralized government controlled by one political party, and the replacement of formal mechanisms of female representation with the creation of a civil society. Discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the historical implementation of Russification policies that ultimately tried to assimilate ethnic minorities (including Kazakh) under one national Russian identity and introduction of women as equal to men precipitated the implementation of Kazakhization policies. The Kazakhization policies served as a break from its Soviet past by systemically advocating for the supremacy of a unified Kazakh identity and the elimination of any symbols associated with the Soviet identity. This included the removal of formal mechanisms or representation that had previously been guaranteed to women in the Soviet regime. With the removal of gender quotas (both a formal mechanism and symbolic gesture of female representation), women’s descriptive representation initially decreased. However, Graph 4.1 illustrates that between 2006 to 2012, the percentage of women in Parliament more than doubled.

Despite governmental constraints, there is a dramatic increase in descriptive representation. This increase in descriptive representation is associated to the changes in

party lists. In 2006, the Nur Otan it opened its “closed” party list features. Although the Nur Otan has continued to table the proposal for gender quotas (IGPN 2010), it has opened party lists to include more women as potential candidates. Yet, even with an increase in descriptive representation, loyalty to Nazarbayev and the Nur Otan remains a requirement of all elected officials. Yet, while women may be subjected to party control, there may be positive long term implications associated to including more women, at least descriptively, in the political process.

**Graph 4.1 Women in Kazakhstan Parliament, 1996-2012 (Source: IPU 2014)**



Beyond the percentage of women in Parliament, formal structures like the *Zhenotdel* found in the Soviet Union that had served to secure women’s voice while conforming to party norms within the national government were dissolved upon independence. This removal of female organizations from the state apparatus highlights the second break from their Soviet past that Kazakh elites tried to execute. Under the Soviet regime, civil society had not existed because no “sphere of formal organization in

society was sufficiently independent of control by the part-state regime to be self-governing” (Evans et al. 2006:32). Instead all political or “civic” organizations were under the control of the party-state with no real autonomy.

However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the onset of Kazakh independence, civic organizations began to appear in Kazakhstan and the surrounding region. These civic organizations, predominantly in the shape of non-governmental organizations, possessed several goals, the most important of which was to force governments to become more accountable to its citizens and to ensure that their needs and rights are being met and upheld. At the initial stage of Kazakhstan’s independence, international non-governmental organizations filled the vacuum left behind by the Soviet regime. In other words, these organizations were meant to stimulate civil society by providing public goods and services to the community when the government failed to meet or satisfy the needs of its citizens.

The government’s failure to provide equal representation led women to seek representation within these organizations. With the immediate removal of formal mechanisms upon independence and the negative memories women associated with formal political institutions, civil society became inundated with women. Svetlana Shakirova,<sup>ii</sup> Director of the Center for Gender Studies, argues that Kazakhstan has a vibrant civil society with over 80 percent of all positions held by women. Yet, the influence of civil society in a) influencing governmental change and b) ensuring some level of representation is questionable. Assiya Khairuulina<sup>iii</sup> paints an even bleaker picture: “Civil Society organizations are not wealthy which is why women are more likely to hold positions here rather than men. It is made mostly up of volunteers and there

is no stable funding.” Thus, even though civil society organizations are meant to provide some levels of formal and descriptive representation and equality for women, women still remain unequal to men, dependent on them for financial security.

Some problems the NGOs face in the democratization process include reinforcing corruption by local elites. An increased reliance on NGOs to permanently provide public goods and services, resulting in the reduction of the public-sector responsibility triggered a brain drain of public-sector employees to the NGO sector. Another dilemma, seen within female civic organizations, includes the oversaturation of NGOs not only within one country but also within a single area of expertise such as women’s issues. This oversaturation of NGOS not only has led to competition over limited funds but also to a serious lack of coordination among organizations, and a “muddying” over the overall democratization process.

Women’s needs organizations are the only apparent movement working to ensure that some level formal and substantive representation is taking place (LoBue 2007). However, these organizations are characterizes as signifying an “opportunity constrained by reality” (Gottlick 1999). Although NGO staffs are dominated by females, NGOs focusing on women’s issues only constitute 13% of all registered organizations within Kazakhstan. However, many of these organizations are non-functioning or, worse, contradicting the very goals they seek to attain, such as reduction in bride-knapping and domestic violence.

One requirement of civil society is that it remains autonomous, separate from governmental influence. Although civic organizations can work with governmental

institutions to accomplish their goals, autonomy of these organizations must be guaranteed. In discussing female non-governmental organizations, Aigul Adibayeva<sup>iv</sup> explains that there is a gap between NGOs and their political goals: “NGOs are not effective and those that are, are usually part of government sponsored initiatives which are counter intuitive to NGOs. Thus they [NGOs] become dependent on government aid rather than remain independent and become more pro-government, especially if a new law is introduced. However, NGOs in Kazakhstan are not effective in promoting democratic value. They try hard, but the environment is not conducive.” In other words, NGOs are constraint by the government, limiting their overall effectiveness and ability to exist.

The members of the SOROS Foundation further highlight this lack of voice among NGOs. Identified as GONGAs (Governmental-Non-Governmental Associations), these organizations portray themselves as “non-governmental” organizations yet depend on state support for their survival. However, by co-opting with the government to maintain funding, these organizations are required to follow the party line and have no real voice. “If you get money, you either have to be neutral or follow the political line.”<sup>v</sup> This cooperation could potentially reduce the trust of average citizens in their activities.

Out of the non-governmental organization staff interviewed, three NGOs were independent of government funding, while the other two received some state backing. The League with Creative Initiative receives limited funding and in-kind services like administrative and technical support. It is an established organization with over 25 volunteers who focuses on women’s issues such as domestic violence and bride-knapping. The Women’s Entrepreneurship organization has only two staff members, and

focuses on providing middle class women the tools for opening businesses within their homes to provide financial support to their family while maintaining their traditional roles within the household.

Compared to the three other organizations, these two organizations were hesitant to say anything about whether they felt that receiving governmental aid reduced their overall legitimacy within civil society sector. The Women's Entrepreneurship is highly dependent on governmental assistance which has provided commercials, direct mailings, and bill boards to promote its agenda. The Women's League with Creative Initiative often works in connection with the government to present programs on the reduction of bride-knapping and related women's issues. Although these organizations provide services to women not provided by the state, these organizations would not directly assess current government dynamics and its leadership. Instead, they focused on social issues such as domestic violence.

However, my discussion partners at the SOROS Foundation and the Center of Gender Studies were quick to criticize both institutional structures and those non-governmental organizations that had been co-opted. One example cited by Svetlana Shakirova is the Women's Business Association in Kazakhstan (WBA). Considered the strongest among the female-needs organizations, whose sole mission is the advancement of women, the WBA aligned itself with the Nur Otan political party because it receives in-kind support, blurring the lines between civil society and the state.

However, GONGAs are becoming the norm among civic organizations in Kazakhstan, especially since officials have introduced legislation banning foreign aid

organizations from donating to local NGOs. If passed, this would eliminate a majority of international NGOs like the SOROS Foundation, USAID, and the UNDP. It would moreover render most local NGOs directly dependent on the government. Furthermore, even with Nazarbayev's claim to promote the advancement of women, Section 4 of Article 5 of the Kazakhstan Constitution calls for the abolition of any public association that engages in "incitement of social, racial, national, religions, or tribal discords, collectively cutting NGOs off at their knees. This leads to the question whether Kazakhstan has truly broken from its past, or if it is reverting back to its old Soviet ways by eliminating core prerequisites for democratization and the need for a functioning civil society. By co-opting non-governmental organizations, these organizations serve more as conductors of the party line than promoters of institutional change. However, under the Soviet regime, women at least were guaranteed some level of representation.

#### *Conclusion: Historical Institutionalism and Female Representation*

This chapter sought to determine how past developments and institutional continue dynamics to shape current institutional structures in regards to female representation. Through the lens of historical institutionalism, I find that Kazakhstan has had difficulty fully breaking from its Soviet legacy and that it exhibits contradictory behavior, both eliminating formal Soviet mechanisms like gender quotas yet allowing the creation of informal institutions like non-governmental organizations to operate in Kazakh society under the constraints of authoritarian regime. Furthermore, the constraints have negatively affected female representation not only by eliminating formal mechanisms and reducing their levels of descriptive representation buy also by limiting the outlets women can informally represent their issues. However, as Graph 4.1 indicates,

legislative changes have increased the number of women in parliament and that may change further dimensions of representation in the future.

Although historical institutionalism provides a framework for understanding how certain factors have limited female representation, HI often ignores where preferences originate and the relationship between ideas and institutions. Historical institutionalism often depicts actors as hostage to structures and ignores the environment and interaction between individuals or groups that caused these structures to develop. Yet, some changes have occurred within this aspect of governmental institutions. In order to fully appreciate female representation in Kazakhstan, we also must understand how women are situated within this culture. Furthermore, due to the complex ethnic relationship between Russians and Kazakhs, we must also understand how the interaction between these groups developed governmental structures and their effect on female representation. The next chapter operationalizes social constructivism in hopes of developing complete understanding as to circumstances have reduced female representation in Kazakhstan.



## **Chapter Five:**

### **Social Constructivism: The Role of Identity in Kazakhstan**

#### *Introduction*

As stated throughout, this investigation seeks to bridge the gap between historical institutionalism and social constructivism by coupling both with the four modes of representation shaping female political participation in Kazakhstan. As the last chapter demonstrated, historical institutionalism serves as a useful framework for understanding a country's structural and political development over time, and the ways in which a country's efforts to break from its "path" leads to certain results regarding women's access to governmental institutions, as well as to certain responses to a real or perceived lack of access. However, historical institutionalism does not fully take into consideration the role of cultural norms in the development of government institutions. Social constructivism fills this void accounting for the causal role of "ideas" in formulating institutional development, specifically in regard to gender representation. In this case, social constructivism helps resolve the question as to why certain sectors of Kazakh society (ethnic Kazakh men) are granted full representation compared to others, and whether or not those population groups granted some level of representation feel adequately represented, for examples, among women.

This chapter begins by briefly re-introducing the readers to social constructivism and its relationship to gender and ethnicity. It then examines how old and new cultural norms within Soviet society influenced policy adoption in regard to gender and ethnicity. The fourth section then applies social constructivism to Soviet "Russification" policies, which I then link to Hanna Pitkin's (1967) dimensions of representation. In the fifth

section, I reflect on the ways in which ideas and efforts to forge a new national identity shaped who is allowed representation in Kazakhstan after independence was realized in 1991. In this section, I not only consider Kazakhization policies as they pertain to formal and descriptive representation but also utilize interviews with elite Kazakh and Russian women and university students. This helps to pinpoint not only the type of representation women enjoy (or lack thereof) in Kazakhstan and, more importantly, how women feel about the level and types of representation. These interviews offer a snapshot of female political representation. Due to the authoritarian nature of the Kazakhstani government and politics, compounded with native suspicion towards foreigners, there is no real way to know how representative these interviewees are of the larger population. However, it is a start. The final section concludes by summarizing how social constructivism allows for a deeper understanding of the dynamics behind female representation in Kazakhstan, and it begins to bridge the theoretical gap between historical institutionalism and social constructivism in regard to representation politics.

#### *Social Constructivism: Have and Have Not*

At the heart of social constructivism lies the argument that ideas concerning identity and interactions with others, and not material forces per se, influence institutional dynamics. Based less on essentialism, which argues that group characteristics are fixed (not accounting for in-group variance), social constructivism follows the relationship between ways in which an individual sees herself within a community and whether the community, in turn sees and treats the individual as a full member.

Especially important for this study is the construction of national identity as it pertains to ethnic, gender, and religious subgroups in Kazakhstan. Karen Cerulo (1997:90) explains how the construction of national identities provides insights into “ways in which actors, particularly elites, create, manipulate, or dismantle the identities of nations, citizenships, allies, and enemies.” She argues further that “public policymakers typically socially construct target populations in positive and negative terms and distribute benefits and burdens so as to reflect and perpetuate these constructions” (Ingram, et al 2007:90). Individuals and groups are considered insiders or outsiders and the rights afforded to both groups result from changing dynamics.

#### *Soviet Legacy and the “National Question”*

One of Stalin’s most quoted phrases in regard to ethnic nationalities in the Soviet Union was the idea of the “proletariat [Soviet] in content, national in form.” Stalin understood that the way to converge and fuse the 150 ethnic groups within the Soviet Union would be through appeasing minority groups that strove to remain separate from the Soviet Union. This convergence would eventually lead to a Soviet identity under one common “proletariat” language.

Initially, “proletariat in content, national in form” allowed active participation and leadership by individual nationalities as long as they conformed to the Communist Socialist project. In other words, these ethnic groups were allowed to remain semi-autonomous and to maintain their cultural heritage as long as these behaviors conformed to the Communist Party’s social and economic policies. Eventually, maintaining cultural

identity under the parameters set by the Communist Party inherently would weaken this traditional identity, leading to a one unified “Soviet” nationality.

Stalin, who equated national identity with languages, proposed a three-step process for the eventual national unification. First, formerly oppressed languages would be allowed to flourish, creating a multicultural society constrained only by party policy. Second came the introduction of a common language for managing economic and political structures. In other words, Russian became the dominant language in all public and economic institutions. The third and final step involved the adoption of a one universal language. As a result of this process, nationality differences would die away, and leaving in their place a common language used by all (Grenoble 2003). Instead of allowing this process to occur naturally, assimilation (Russification) policies were adopted not only to hasten the construction of this national identity but to further promote the Russian identity as superseding all others.

*Representation: Russification Policies and the “Woman”*

In her pivotal book, *Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Powers*: Bhavna Dave (2007) draws a connection between previous Russification and current Kazakhization policies. Under Russification, the Soviets believed that no nation can be great with the loss of its language (Zanca 2010). Russification was the formal and informal policy adopted to convert those claiming a non-ethnic Russian identity into a Russian one. As stated earlier, Stalin believed that national identity and language were interconnected. Although language requirements had been introduced under the Tsarist regime at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was not until the “Purges” of the 1930’s that Russification policies

gained popularity among the Communist Party officials because Stalin used the Purges to pack the party with those completely loyal to himself. Russification policies were seen as a quick way to change one's ethnic non-Russian identity to a Russian one.

Theodore Weeks (2010) breaks down Russification policies into three categories: "Administrative Russification," "Cultural Russification" and "Sovietization."

Administrative Russification refers to the increasing centralization seen within and among political institutions. In the Soviet Union, party members were allowed to partake in discussion, but once a decision was made at the higher levels it had to be followed without question. Cultural Russification was the policy for assimilating non-ethnics. Finally, Sovietization encompassed both administrative and cultural Russification because Sovietization was a form of modernization drawing on industrialization, urbanization, increased state intervention, adoption of universal education, and the establishment of a welfare state. This process served as a tool for encouraging non-ethnics to assimilate by promising them economic and political success through the creation of a Soviet identity. This "new" Soviet Union would be educated, scientific, and speak fluent Russian. Furthermore, assimilation demanded that women be treated as equals in the quest to build a socialist society.

The fictional construction of the "New Soviet Union" featured an educated and independent woman, free from domestic concerns to take her role in the paid labor force. Replacing the "baba" (backward) woman associated with rural Russians and ethnic minorities meant that in her place would stand a proud, loyal worker ready to promote a unified Soviet identity. Yet construction of this fictional identity was not without criticism.

**Image 5.1 *The Worker and the Collective Farm Woman***



Source: Encyclopedia Britannica 2014

The *Worker and the Collective Farm Woman* monument created by Vera Mukhina in 1937 serves as the epitome of the ideal behind the construction of the “New Soviet Woman.” On the surface, the woman is standing equal to her male counterpart, holding up the sickle symbolizing the peasants, while the man holds up the hammer, referencing the workers or proletariat. However, this symbol of equality also depicts the inequality still present within the Soviet political structure as discussed in Chapter Four. The symbols of the two lower classes are still gendered with women as subservient. The proletariat is represented by the male and the peasantry by the female, inherently promoting gender inequality.

Women were faced with a double bind. They were encouraged to enter the paid labor force and maintain the superficial appearance of equality to men, but they also had to return home and take their place as wives and mothers. Even with the entrance into the

paid labor force in lower ranking positions with lower wages, women remained dependent not just on men, but also on the masculine institution of the state.

*Kazakhization and Backlash to the Soviet Past: Pitkin's Representation and Gender Politics*

When the Soviet republics gained independence following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, a resurgence of identity politics, an increasing emphasis on ethnicity, pushed women out of governmental institutions.

...Two particular outcomes of the Soviet legacy of gender equality impact and the development initiatives in important ways: decline of women's status after Kazakhstan's independence and an overvaluation of gender equality in the Soviet Union (LoBue 2007:24)

Following Kazakhstan's declaration of independence, rights that had been afforded women based solely on their identity as women disappeared. Healthcare, economic status, quotas, etc., all rights to which women had become accustomed were lost to the rise of nationalism and the changing status of citizenship in Kazakhstan. Constituting a form of backlash to decades of Russification programs, newly independent Kazakh elites began institutionalizing "Kazakhization" policies. This is the "process of the ascendance of Kazakhs as a national group at the expense of other national groups, mainly Russians" (Matuszkiewicz 2010). Michel Huysseune (2006:2) argues that this "emergence of cultural and ethnic minorities is to be understood as a reaction against policies of cultural homogenization of nation-states." In other words, the nationalism that took root and is intensifying in Kazakhstan does not come as a surprise because

nationalism most likely occurs in previously occupied or colonized states in which the citizens were forced to assimilate to the dominant or controlling cultures.

In the *Concepts of National Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan Up to 2015*, the government explicitly identifies several central areas in which it seeks to institutionalize Kazakh as not only as a superior ethnicity but to define being Kazakh as both an ethnicity and nationality. This document explicitly prioritizes the values of the Kazakh people as compared to other nationalities. Furthermore, Kazakhstan is to be regarded as mono-ethnic state. To encourage this paradigm, there is to be a limit on foreign television channels and the Kazakh language will eventually shift from its Soviet-style Cyrillic script to a Latin Script (Shakirova 2012) which curiously has no tie to ancient Kazakh culture.

The main thrust of Kazakhization policies takes the form of language requirements. Kazakh remains the official state language and, as a result, many state and public positions, not limited to elected positions, require fluent knowledge of the state language (Law on Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Article 23). Because of this requirement, the number of Kazakh-language schools has increased, just as the number of Russian-language schools has decreased. The evaluation of the Kazakh language is also seen across the media landscape where quotas exist for the number of Kazakh-language broadcast (Law of the Languages of Kazakhstan, July 11, 1997, No.151-1).

As a result of this “swapping” of state languages, there has been a rise in national consciousness among the Kazakh people, leading to an increase in the proportion of Kazakhs occupying the public sphere. However, the negative consequences perhaps



outweigh the positive revival of ethnic nationalism. In other words, these policies have come at a great cost to those are not Kazakh men. With regard to Pitkin's forms of representation, Kazakhization policies implemented based on this very limited construction of identity, has led to substantial shift in citizenship rights. The resurgence of ethno-nationalism and the implementation of Kazakhization policies has perpetuated and intensified male superiority and the power of Kazakh men, at the expense of their female and Russian counterparts.

The shift in political systems from a communist regime to a "developing democracy" with strong authoritarian components has flipped the definition of who is considered an insider, outsider, who winds up somewhere in between. Returning to Pitkin, the formal transformation of the definition of representation included the much discussed language requirements and its effect on citizenship requirements. National law now limits not only who has access to public officer but also to all levels and types of employment in the Kazakhstani government. One result was the mass emigration of Russians from Kazakhstan. According to the 1988 census, Kazakhs comprised of 39.7 percent of the population while Russians were 37.8 percent. By 2011, the Kazakh population had increased to 63.1 percent, compared to 23.7 percent among Russians. The requirement that all public-sector employees speak fluent Kazakhs means that only five percent of these positions are currently held by non-Kazakhs (Panfilova 2014). This paints an overall picture of disparity between Kazakhs and non-ethnic Kazakhs solely on the basis of ethnicity and nationality.

Women have also felt the backlash of the rise in ethnic nationalism in Kazakhstan. The first, most visible indicator of the reconstruction of a dominant male

identity has been the removal of gender quotas from the national Parliament. Seen as a symbol of Soviet imperialism, gender quotas were eliminated upon independence leading to a decrease in the percentage of women in both the Senate and the *Majilis*. Prior to the Soviet collapse, 30 percent of all seats in parliament had been for women in the KSSR. Until 2012, women had rarely occupied more than three percent of the Senate seats and 17 percent of all seats in the *Majilis* (IPU 2014). The removal of formal mechanisms meant to include women into the decision making process also led to a decline in substantive policies that were adopted and implemented to increase female political participation.

Under the Soviet regime, women had been guaranteed education, divorce and property rights, they had enjoyed relatively high levels of literacy and were afforded paid maternity leave and childcare. After independence, women's status as equal partners was displaced by the symbol of a unified, ethnic male named Nursultan Nazarbayev. One result of the elimination of Russian social policies was the reduction of state responsibility for social services which directly erodes the status of women. Janel Bayastanova<sup>vi</sup> of the Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia contends that the decentralization led to "local mayors hav[ing] no budget for women's concerns because of the corruption and the trickle-down effect it causes." As result, gender discrimination indirectly increased. For example, in 1988, women earned only 75.8 percent of men's salaries. In 2001, this reduced to 58.4 percent (LoBue 2007:88). There are no law suits against wage discrimination. According to Assiya Khairuulina,<sup>vii</sup> League of Creative Initiative, "Laws aren't working to protect. They are not developed and in detail. Equality here is defined broadly."

Across the board, the women I interviewed believed that gender issues are not being addressed by the government in Kazakhstan. During my interviews with 14 female academics and NGO members, three main policy concerns arose: retirement age, bride-knapping, and violence against women.

On June 21, 2013, President Nazarbayev signed pension reform that would raise women's retirement from 58 to 63 (Volshin 2013). The logic of this change is that it would align female and male pension age (thus offering "equality" for all); women are still losers in this case because they are less likely to be hired or retained than their male counterparts past the age of 58, thus increasing unemployment and reducing their eventual pension benefits. Although women constitute nearly 70 percent of those receiving a pension in Kazakhstan, their pensions, on average are 30 percent less than those of males due to lower salaries and unpaid maternity leave (LoBue 2007). This creates a double bind: women receive lower wages and have a harder time remaining employed after a certain age, thereby increasing their dependency on husbands and male family members for survival.

Aigul Adibayeva<sup>viii</sup>, Professor at KIMEP University, highlighted this policy's negative impact on women in Kazakhstan.

For example: the increase in retirement age. It is anti-woman on how it affects poorer women, invalid women who find it impossible to work at that age. Also, before the law was implemented, women always found jobs and were unofficially forced to retirement when they reached a certain age. Now there is a labor problem because young can't find jobs and now

can't retire forcing a double bind. The indirect effect of this is that women are becoming very dependent on husbands and families.

The member of the Women's Entrepreneurship<sup>ix</sup> supports the claim that women are disadvantaged by this policy adoption because "no one wants to hire elderly women."

Substantively, laws against domestic violence and bride-knapping also have been lacking. According to the Law on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women (2010), men and women are equal, in theory. But in practice another story emerges. Assiya Khairuulina (Women's League with Creative Initiative), reported that seven to ten percent of marriages in Kazakhstan are forced marriages (bride-knapping) were women are pushed into marriage between the ages of 14 to 18 by their captors.<sup>x</sup>

Cynthia Werner discussed why bride-knapping has gone relatively unchecked in Kazakhstan under post-Soviet institutions and laws:

The rise of non-consensual bride-knapping relates to the changing nature of state-society relations in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods. In particular, this trend is attributed to the transition from a socialist state-where women's rights were protected and economic security was provided – to a post socialist state where the following three factors are present: (1) Popular support for and state promotion of Kazakh nationalism has encouraged the restoration of "traditional" gender roles. (2) an increasing perception that the legal system is corrupt has ensure that young men are confident that they can get away with this crime (2013).

This return to cultural traditions and the return of the traditional roles of men as the heads of households have also increased the levels of domestic violence. Svetlana Shakirova<sup>xi</sup> observes that although there are laws on the books, implementation has had many problems. “There is no good mechanism to make a safe environment. Most property is owned by men because they have the resources’ so the police and the courts see him as the property owner. The Original Criminal Code which outlines rights afforded to victims of domestic violence remains inadequate.

First, only since 2006 have authorities reported consistent statistics on the levels of domestic violence in Kazakhstan (Stop Violence Against Women 2010). In 2005, 71 percent of women reported being a victim of domestic violence at some point in their lives. Out of 71 percent, only 26 percent reported to a crisis center (LoBue 2007). In 2006, out of 10,000 domestic violence reports filed with the police, only 4,700 of these resulted in penalties in the form of monetary fines (Stop Violence Against Women 2010). The problem lies within the belief that the private sphere where domestic violence occurs is seen as a family matter. One female university student<sup>xii</sup> reported that it was commonplace for her father to beat her and that she had had no recourse against these beatings.

Not only are men not accorded criminal punishment for their abuses, but the sham of monetary fines leaves women at risk for future attacks, since the abuser remains in the home. The victim often remains dependent on her male attacker for financial survival. In 2006, there were twenty-two NGOs that addressed domestic violence, but only four of those twenty-two offered any form of shelter for women from their attackers (Stop Violence Against Women 2010).

Jessica Howard<sup>xiii</sup> of the Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia further expounds: “Many people, even in the NGO world, simply don’t recognize that there gender-related issues in Kazakhstan. More than once I’ve tried to initiate a gender-focused project only to have my own colleagues tell me that there’s no reason here, because there aren’t any problems...”

These cultural constructions of women as subservient to male family members also translated women not entering the public sphere and running for political office after independence in 1991. Symbolic representation intertwines with descriptive representation in identifying the type of women elected to political office. The next question is whether or not female citizens feel represented by these women politicians. With the initial decrease in women holding political office, from the earlier mandates 30% to barely 14 percent from 1991 to 2006, only women with influential male family members were elected to political office. The most notable female official with familial ties is Dariga Nazarbayeva, daughter of President Nazarbayev. She serves as both the deputy speaker of the *Majilis* and as deputy director of the Nur Otan political party (Gizitdinov 2014).

Professor Aigul Adibayeva<sup>xiv</sup> of KIMEP University argues that although Dariga Nazarbayeva sometimes promotes women’s issues, gender interests are rarely pushed because they lack profitability (financial backing) associated with women’s issues. In other words, there is no strategic purpose for politicians to pursue women’s issues. Shakirova<sup>xv</sup> as well as the members of the SOROS Foundation<sup>xvi</sup> agree that those women who are elected serve as pawns to the Nur Otan. Even when female officials cherry-pick women and children’s issues to address, these women have no real voice. Having to toe

the party line, the lack of voice and inability to promote women's issues as women see fit may lead to many to characterize women in Parliament as lacking legitimacy.

A majority of the women interviewed described females elected to political office as the wives, lovers, and daughters of prominent men within Kazakh society. The director of the Women's Entrepreneurship organization refused to comment on women elected to political office, probably because her organization receives the majority of its funding from the state. Adibayeva<sup>xvii</sup> provided the example of the large number of female television reporters who were once mistresses to prominent male officials; they subsequently gained access to the political arena through this connection. Yet, Assiya Khairuulina<sup>xviii</sup> contends that any female presence in Parliament is important for symbolic reasons: "Yes, women are influential, but will follow party lines. Women are seen as less corrupt because they are seen as honest." Therefore, even when women in elected positions are seen to lack legitimacy, they are still viewed or perceived as less corrupt than their male counterparts.

Why are only mistresses and women with familial ties running for political office? If women feel that they are not adequately represented, why are they themselves not running for office or pressuring the current administration to adopt formal mechanisms to increase female representation? First, many women reject quotas because the symbol of the quota is associated with the Soviet Union. Secondly, politics itself is seen as a male domain and associated with corruption (Einhorn 1993; Siklova 1997; Snitow 1998). Thirdly, cultural norms pressure women from entering the public sphere.

It is important to remember the dichotomy between the idealized “Soviet Woman” and the “new” Kazakh national identity. One of the key departures from Kazakhstan’s past with the Soviet Union was the deliberate return to traditional norms and cultural values. Although the last chapter discussed the removal of formal mechanisms promoting gender equality, leading women to resort to informal conduits such as non-governmental organizations, the state’s desire to reinstate cultural and traditional norms also restructured gender roles within Kazakhstan.

LoBue (2007) suggests that there are three ways in which a woman can gain access to the political arena in Kazakhstan: a) by securing support from the Nur Otan, b) by way of presidential appointment or by c) running independently. However, a woman receiving a presidential appointment would indicate automatic support from and for the Nur Otan, because the president is the head of the only functioning political party. Furthermore, given the limited resources allotted to women and their increased dependence on male partners, the likelihood of women gaining access without the support from men is minimal.

During one interview, Adibayeva described how one female friend unsuccessfully campaigned for political office. Due to her lack of personal income, she was forced to borrow money from her husband in order to finance her campaign. Because she did not secure a political position with her husband’s resources, she was ultimately shamed by her community because she lost while using her husband’s money. This highlights the underlying belief that the political arena should be male dominated.



A further reconstruction of gender roles is seen in the return to the ideal of women as mothers and as the property of the home. The Women's Entrepreneurship member<sup>xix</sup> argued that women tend not to run for political office because they are distancing themselves from the government in favor of focusing on their families. This notion of family and the home as one of the few parameters allotted to women was reinforced by comments from two male students<sup>xx</sup> (one ethnically Kazakh and the other Arab, respectively). Both indicated that the role of a woman was to first be a good wife and mother. Although the Kazakh male student was comfortable in allowing his wife to pursue employment as long as the family structure did not suffer, the male Arab student contended that women could pursue employment before having children, but they should remain at home once children were born. When asked if women should be allowed to run for political office, the Arab student declared that "women aren't good politicians because they psychologically aren't constructed the same as men. Men think in perspective, they have foresight. Women only see in the present situation."

Highlight cultural norms, Svetlana Shakirova (2012:2-3) depicts how traditional roles unduly burden women, forcing them to remain in the household. Not only are women expected to be good mothers, but all domestic roles that take precedence over other activities. Going so far as to maintain separation between male and female gender roles, many traditional Kazakh men will completely abstain from household labor. Promotion of the complete separation of male and female roles influences women's interest in campaigning for political office. Gulnara Dadabayeva<sup>xxi</sup> observed that a majority of her female students were enrolled not only to receive an education but also to find desirable husbands. Although husbands want their wives' responsibilities take

precedence in the household, they also want their wives to be educated so that they may instruct their children (LoBue 2007). As LoBue contends, women in Kazakhstan are over educated and underemployed. I argue that women have become housewives with an education.

The push for women to return to traditional gender roles, no longer serving as symbols of political equality in favor of a universalized Kazakh identity leads to the question as to whether any political role models exist to make women feel as if they are represented on at least some level. Ironically, the symbol (in this case, person) most associated with the rise of ethnic nationalism and often seen as the opposite of democratic reform has also served as a form of stability to women by guaranteeing at least some level of female representation. This symbol is none other than President Nazarbayev, himself.

**Image 5.2 President Nursultan Nazarbayev**



Source: Associated Press

Often called the Papa or the Father of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has secured his image as the “balancer” between factions (Orange 2011), maintaining relative peace in Kazakhstan through the use of authoritarian tactics under the guise of democratic

representation. This father figure image provides comfort even to women who claim to have limited rights under Nazarbayev, arguing that at least under his regime they have some rights instead of none. Aigul Adibayeva<sup>xxii</sup> observes that “although considered a dictator, without him at the helm, instability would have occurred and when he steps down there is a fear that the advancements that have been made will fall to the waste side. Furthermore, “Nazarbayev is seen as very pragmatic and promotes neutral policies. There is a fear of if he leaves, traditional values will return and hurt the status of women. His stability affects the role of women.” This indicates that even though there has been a return to traditional values, these values have been held at bay somewhat by the presence of Nazarbayev.

There are several reasons why Nazarbayev stands as the sole champion of women’s rights in Kazakhstan. Beyond signing onto the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1998), in 2005, Nazarbayev ratified the Strategy on Gender Equality in Kazakhstan for 2006-2010, promoting gender inequality in social and political institutions (Zhantaykyzy 2013). In a 2013 speech, he stated “I instructed the government, together with the President Administration, the National Committee on the Family and Women, the leadership of the Nur Otan political party to develop a concrete action plan by 2016 to promote women’s participation in the sphere of decision-making” (Zhantaykyzy 2013:A8). However, skeptics claim that these words have very little power until they are sanctioned as a legal act.

*Female Identity Equates to Lack of Representation*

The once liberating symbol of women as equal to men dissipated in Kazakhstan as a result of a reconstruction of Kazakh identity and nationalism, as a form of backlash against Soviet assimilation policies. This “newly” formed identity based on a folkloric past not only legitimized Kazakh as the supreme ethnicity and nationality in Kazakhstan, but further subjugated women by removing many rights they had secured under the Soviet Union.

By removing the formal and symbolic mechanism of gender quotas because of its association with the Soviet Union, women’s numerical representation saw an initial decrease from the time of 30 percent mandated quota. Furthermore, the return to traditional norms, epitomized by these Kazakhization policies, also led to the increase of formal and informal discrimination stemming from national policies. Rooted in the changes in pension age requirements, tolerance of bride-knapping and domestic violence, women in Kazakhstan now enjoy fewer substantive rights than their male counterparts. Not only is there a disconnect between conventions mandating equal treatment of men and women, laws meant to protect (See Appendix B) the well-being of women in general, and implementation of policies, there has been a cultural shift mandating that women’s issues should be regulated in the privacy of the homes and not within the public sphere. As a result, domestic violence remains decriminalized and bride-knapping of young women remains high. Furthermore, women who have been elected to political office are not perceived as legitimate; they are there to serve at the whims of the Nur Otan. The one person that provides at least some comfort to women and guarantees women a minimal level of representation is President Nazarbayev. I argue that Nazarbayev as a champion of women’s rights should remain suspect since women’s representation remains limited.

*Conclusion: Social Constructivism and Female Representation*

In Kazakhstan, the reconstruction of ethnic identity inherently reversed and positions accorded to not only ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians but also transformed the role of women within Kazakhstani political and economic institutions. With the return of traditional values and the paradigm shift in ethnic supremacy, governmental institutions that allocated superficial “descriptive” equality to women in all dimensions of representation, substantive representation in the form of policies promoting women’s issues has been completely relegated to the sidelines in favor of more pro-ethno nationalist policies. One consequence of this has been the reinstatement of discriminatory policies towards women and an increase in domestic violence and occurrences of bride-knapping. The construction of gender identity has moreover transformed symbolic representation. Not only have women been cast aside as symbols of equality and modernization, the state has this symbol with a patriarchal male, seen as the protector of his citizens.

Social constructivism inherently privileges agency and the role of ideas over structures. In so doing, it overlooks that material constraints can curb an individual’s capacity to form ideas. The strength of social constructivism is that it supports the belief that culture matters, and the ways in which constructs categories such as gender, ethnicity, and nationality and their relationship to one another influence how structures and norms develop. Government structures are a reflection of the institutionalization of the interactions of these socially constructed categories.

If social constructivism favors agency but overlooks structural constraints and historical institutionalism limits the role of agency in order to concentrate on formal structures, each independently lacks the overall explanatory value to fully grasp how female representation has decreased, formally, substantively and symbolically. I was unable to fully explore the idea of symbolic representation because of the fact I could only interview women belonging to NGOs. Because I could not get a larger sample of women, it is hard to assess whether their feelings of representation truly reflect the female population. Because of this limitation, it is further difficult to conclude that social constructivism is a good lens for exploration. Additionally, I was unable to detect the role of religion on the political views of the women across the state. A representative sample of women in Kazakhstan certainly might challenge the notions of the women. At this point, these findings provide more of an insight into female representation in Kazakhstan.

The next chapter begins by returning to type of female representation in Kazakhstan while utilizing historical institutionalism and social constructivism. It then provides a discussion as to the ways in which these two frameworks into one can provide a much more substantive analysis of female representation. It then addresses the limitations and offers recommendations for future research. Finally, this study concludes by discussing potential consequences of re-traditionalizing the roles of women in Kazakhstan.

## Chapter Six: Conclusion

### *Reviewing the Issue*

This study hoped to accomplish two goals. First, it sought to understand what dynamics have led to the current levels of female representation in Kazakhstan under the frameworks of historical institutionalism and social constructivism. The second and loftier objective was to test the effectiveness of historical institutionalism and social constructivism in considering various dimensions of female representation. Although each framework provides explanatory power in determining how female representation has been transformed, each framework lacks what the other employs. Instead, to understand current institutional dynamics and their effect on female representation fully, historical institutionalism and social constructivism must learn to co-exist in a co-evolutionary process, as discussed by Sven Steinmo (2008).

This chapter begins by first reviewing how historical institutionalism and social constructivism individually allowed us to grasp the effect of a country's historical legacy and transformation of identity politics on female representation in Kazakhstan. It then turns to a more theoretical discussion, exploring whether a co-evolutionary process combining both constructivist and material forces in the form of path dependency and the role of ideas can produce a more nuanced account of current institutional dynamics not only in Kazakhstan but in other "forgotten" Central Asian Republics. This final section of this chapter provides recommendations for further research and concludes.

*Historical Institutionalism and Social Constructivism: So What about Women in Kazakhstan?*

Employing historical institutionalism and social constructivism as theoretical frameworks in which to observe various dimensions of representation as categorized by Hanna Pitkin (1967), while I observed that the overall female representation in Kazakhstan is a far cry from the democratizing practices the Kazakhstani government claims to uphold, progress has been made in the area of descriptive representation. Despite this finding, however, women in Kazakhstan had achieved higher levels of representation in all four dimensions: formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic while under Soviet rule than under the current regime headed by President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Historical institutionalism allowed for an overall analysis on how the people of Kazakhstan face at least two critical junctures in which they might have broken the chains of their past: the first in 1917, when Kazakhstan became an autonomous republic, and again in 1991 when Kazakhstan declared its independence. The current path before Kazakhstan involves a mixture of both its nomadic Kazakh heritage and the Soviet regime from which it tried to liberate itself. In regard to traditional values that prevailed prior to Soviet occupation, national leaders introduced Kazakhization policies after 1991 in hopes of rendering Kazakh identity supreme as compared to its subservient titular nationality status under ethnic Russians. Presented in terms of social constructivism, these Kazakhization policies entail a blend of both a break from path dependent behavior, and the renewed construction of identity based solely on nationality and race.



A further break from its Soviet past in favor of a return to patriarchal norms is seen in the relationship between representation and women. Under the Soviet Union, women were granted formal equality vis-à-vis their male counterparts, even if only superficially. Formally, political institutions mandated a 30 percent quota to encourage female political participation. This quota also ensured an increased level of descriptive representation among women in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Furthermore, women also had a formal political organization within the Communist Party, the *Zhenotdel*, which allowed women to promote gender-friendly issues such as universal healthcare, paid maternity leave, child care, etc. within the party framework. Women under the Soviet regime were at least guaranteed some level of formal representation. However, the extent of this representation was misleading. Women may have had formal access to political institutions, but they were still seen as a subservient to men often receiving lower pay, holding less skilled positions of the labor market, and facing exclusion from the overall decision-making processes.

Following independence, the elites from Kazakhstan broke away from this path of advancing female equality, essentially removing formal mechanisms that had guaranteed at least a superficial level of representation. The elimination of gender quotas and the dissolution of the *Zhenotdel*, because of its association with the Soviet Union, led to an initially sharp decrease in the percentage of women found in Parliament. Instead of finding security within the political structure of the Communist party, women were forced to engage outside of the formal political arena; they began to develop new institutions to ensure at least some form of representation.

Another significant break from its institutional past centered on the creation of civil society and civil associations. Under the Soviet regime, independent civic associations had been banned; all social and political discussions had to take place within the constraints of the Communist Party. In other words, civil society did not exist in the Soviet Union. However, with independence, civil society began to form to help fill a void. For women, these new civic organizations and non-governmental associations provided all dimensions of representation outside the existing governmental institutions. Formally, these organizations are structured as to be woman friendly; descriptively, they are dominated by women: over 80 percent of all positions within these organizations held by females, including the leadership positions. Substantively, these organizations often serve as the sole arena in which women's issues can be addressed beyond just speeches on International Women's Day. Finally, non-governmental organizations present themselves as a symbol of transparency and lack of corruption, as compared to the male-dominated political institutions in Kazakhstan. Yet, women are well aware that civil society in Kazakhstan is in its relative infancy and that the forms of representation granted to them within these "new" institutions are limited, since these organizations are required to be respondent to formal political institutions. While women appear to have better representation in non-governmental organizations, inroads are being made within Parliament with the recent increase of descriptive representation.

This circles back to whether Kazakhstan has truly broke from its past or whether these newly created institutions are simply cosmetic, covering up old scars that still remain. One of the most obvious developments that demonstrates Kazakhstan's inability to break from its historical path lies with Nazarbayev and the political system itself. A

hold-over from the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev was a party loyalist until independence at which point he transitioned from serving as the appointed First Secretary General to a “democratically” elected President. I would be remiss to assume that following independence Nazarbayev would have shed his cloak of imperialism and transformed himself into a real promoter of democratic values. Further relics of Kazakhstan’s Soviet past are found in the interconnectedness between the dominant party Nur Otan and the state. Although the Nur Otan does not completely parallel the state as seen in its predecessor, the intertwining of state and the Nur Otan is very apparent. First, Nazarbayev resides as head of both. Secondly, Constitutional amendments dictate that no political parties are allowed to oppose the current administration. Finally, admission to political institutions requires active support from key party gatekeepers.

There are also signs that Kazakhstan may be reverting even farther back to its Soviet past: newly introduced legislation that if adopted would ban non-governmental organizations from receiving foreign aid, the limiting their right to organize; the Constitution also bans any public association “geared to forcible change in the constitution” (Kazakhstan Constitution Section 4, Article 5). Where once civic organizations hoped to stimulate change, civic organizations will potentially be forced to co-opt themselves to follow the state and ultimately party lines, as seen in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the new informal institutional roles of civil society may be diminishing as Kazakhstan returns to its “Soviet” historical roots.

Even through historical institutionalism helps to establish clear causality as to how Kazakhstan’s inconsistent break from the past has come at the expense of gender representation, there are other dynamics that must be addressed to further contextualize

what is taking place in Kazakhstan. The discord seen between female representation and emphasis is on ethnic nationality can only be fully understood if one includes an analysis on how the construction of identity has been transformed in Kazakhstan, leading to a clear decline in female representation.

Under the new regime, ethnic Kazakh identity has been exalted over Russian predominance. Under the guise of Kazakhization policies and a return to the original cultural heritage, the ethnic Kazakh male has been reevaluated not only the decision maker in the privacy of his home but also within the public sphere pushed ethnic Russians to the periphery at the same time this shift has removed rights previously accorded to women. In other words, the construction of gender and ethnicity, as well as the norms associated with both has been reversed as well.

As discussed under historical institutionalism, reverting back to pre-Soviet cultural norms has led to the elimination of formal mechanisms and the percentage of women in Parliament in Kazakhstan. More importantly, the reconstruction of gender roles has negatively affected substantive representation in Kazakhstan leading to an increase in direct and indirect discrimination against women. According to examples provided by the women interviewed, policies regarding women are rarely addressed because many of the matters are seen as domestic, to be decided by the husband, not the state. Because of this, domestic violence and the number of younger girls forced into unwanted marriages have increased. The disparity between men and women's economic standing has widened considerably, causing women to rely further on their husbands for economic survival.

Social constructivism allows us to acknowledge further the ways in which the Kazakh national identity has also eliminated women as the symbol of progress and freedom. Where women once served as the Soviet identity, epitomizing strength, education, hard work, and equality, there now stands the picture of a patriarchal father meant to provide stability and security to his children, including women. Furthermore, elected women are not perceived as legitimate representatives among their female constituents, they often symbolize a continuation of corruption and familial ties, instead of promoting feelings of trust and expectation of representation.

Social constructivists posit that institutional arrangements are based upon how society understands how the world works, less on material forces, and more on evolution of ideas through interaction. The interaction between Kazakhs and Russians has transformed history over time, leading to the development of reconstructed gender roles, inherently removed from the advances women had made towards achieving equality between 1917 and 1991. Institutions changed as the idea of national identity was redefined and evolved. However, social constructivists face the problem of not explaining how discourse rises and falls.

Historical institutionalism is often associated with materialism and that paths are dependent on increasing returns. In other words, institutions constrain the choices that decision makers undertake to enhance national material interests. At the same time, institutional trajectories can be altered when a critical juncture or choice point, allowing a different alternative, presents itself (Mahoney 2001). Critical junctures emphasize the role of agency and the actor's ability to shape an outcome more than normal circumstances would permit. In this case, the critical juncture was the collapse of the

Soviet Union. The choice left to Nazarbayev and the Kazakh elite was how to ensure that a) they remained in power and b) that ensured the stability of Kazakhstan. Power and stability lie at the center of their material interests. Hence, the reason that institutional development comprised of a blend of Soviet political structures (centralized figure head surrounded by one political) and ethnic nationalism to unite Kazakhstan under one banner.

However, the need for an ethnic-nationalist platform would have been irrelevant had not there been the idea of Soviet unity and identity which transformed Kazakhstan's social and political structures at the expense of ethnic Kazakh and minority groups for 70 years. The idea of including gender equality into this Soviet identity influenced institutional structures to mandate gender inclusiveness. Thus the interaction of ideas of gender inclusiveness and ethnic assimilation framed the structures not only in the Soviet Union but also in modern day Kazakhstan. As ideas of nationality and gender change and interactions vary, institutions change to reflect this.

Several evolutionary and constructivist institutionalists try to overcome the deficiency often associated with historical institutionalism with the strengths of social constructivism: the inability to fully address the relationship between ideas, preferences and institutions (See Lewis and Steinmo 2012). Historical institutionalists argue that structures influence preferences, but that these institutions do not answer where these preferences or ideas come from. North (2008) expands on this evolutionary approach by explaining how preferences evolve from humans learning from another, as seen in the development of culture. Lewis and Steinmo (2012) further this by arguing that institutions are the space for agent variation where new ideas and strategies form and

thereby impact the existing institutions. Evolutionary and constructivist institutionalists are beginning to see the process of ideational change (agency variation) and historical change (structure) as interactive; they still have not made the leap of fully blending social construction and historical institutionalism under one paradigm.

Although it could be argued that interaction between idea transformation (social constructivism) and structural path dependent behavior (historical institutionalism) are cyclical, I had hoped to argue that these cannot be separated into two dichotomous approaches, completely independent mechanisms influencing each other. However, the limitations of this study prevented me from fully examining this question.

#### *Limitations and Recommendations*

The most glaring limitation of this study pertains to constraints on my field research. It is open to question whether or not I captured generally shared perceptions and interests on whether women are really disenfranchised in regard to representation. Due to time constraints and the suspicion towards foreigners in Kazakhstan, my interviews were limited to a small number of elite/middle-class women and an even smaller number of university students. By interviewing only one small segment of the female population, I encountered issues of reliability. Although I attempted triangulation, that is to increase the reliability of my findings by interviewing different groups of elite and middle-class women (academics, non-governmental organizations and students), I was not able to carry out my original research agenda, which would have included discussions with many more elected officials, and with rural, economically disadvantaged women. However, I argue that the perceived lack of representation felt by these elite women inevitably

trickles down to all women in Kazakhstan; perhaps it is even more pronounced among poor and rural segments of the female population.

I offer three recommendations for continuing this type of research. The first recommendation would involve increasing the sample size to include rural and working class women. By increasing the sample size, one could conduct a more in-depth analysis on female representation in Kazakhstan. This, of course, would require changes in Kazakhstan visa policies, especially towards United States citizens. The next suggestion would be to expand the study of female representation to include other Central Asian republics. By examining female representation in nearby countries, we could determine whether this phenomenon is unique to Kazakhstan whether it extends to other post-Soviet republics. However, even this comparison will be difficult due to the limited availability of data on employment, domestic violence, and other standard indicators of women's socio-economic status. The final suggestion for this enhanced research agenda would be to include a mixed methodology that would combine quantitative and qualitative analysis that would statistically test not only factors that have hindered female political representation in all post-Soviet regimes but also provide a contextual analysis as to how certain barriers have developed within each country and their total impact on various forms of representation.

### *Conclusion*

This analysis began by exploring shifts in the levels of representation in Kazakhstan and the main factors influencing these levels. Unfortunately, female representation as it stands currently is less significant now than under the Soviet regime.



Although Kazakhstan claims to be in the process of “democratizing,” which should require policies that ensure equal participation among all sectors of the society, there is little evidence of this in Kazakhstan. Instead, Kazakhstan has engaged in contradictory behavior: it seeks to break from its historical past by introducing new institutions to fill the void left with the collapse of the Soviet Union, only to limit the ability of these organizations to reach their full potential. Furthermore, the interaction between the construction of gender and ethnic nationalism leaves few opportunities for women to engage in political discourse or to enhance the prospects for transforming institutions in order to gain more political equality. This leads me to wonder if women facing strong cultural and structural barriers will ever be able to overcome gender inequality and discrimination under the current regime. Or is socialism, as seen in the Soviet Union, the best that these women could have hoped for gaining voice?

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## APPENDIX A

### Interview Questions

Name:

Date:

Location:

Age:

Position:

Years of Experience:

Religious Affiliation:

Ethnicity:

Permission: Before we start, would you mind if I quote you directly in my dissertation or would you prefer to remain anonymous?

Part 1: Recollections of the way things “used to be

1. Based on your experiences or conversations with other women who were active back then, what were the two or three biggest problems women used to face?
2. What were the two or three rights that you think women appreciated under the old system?
3. Prior to independence, did you or any women close to you hold political positions? If so, which ones?

Part 2: Changes in women’s problems and rights since 1991

1. What do you think the 2 or 3 biggest problems facing women now?
2. Are there different problems confronting various age groups, ethnic or religious minorities?
3. In your judgment, what positive changes in women’s status have come about, especially over the last 10 years?

4. Since the removal of gender quotas from national policies, have women found it harder to gain access to political institutions?
5. When running for office, do women have a harder time gaining party nominations compared to their male counterparts?

Part 3: Personal Experiences regarding women's rights and participation in politics

1. Did you or any women close to you hold political positions prior to independence? If so, which ones?
2. How does your party approach "women's issues?" Committees? Elections? Mainstreaming?
3. Have any of your immediate family members been elected to political office? If yes, which family member and position?
4. How does your political party approach ethnic issues?
5. Who gets nominated and how within your political party?
6. What elements (party support, money, family connections) are needed to be considered a legitimate candidate for political office?
7. Does your own party have a form of quota? Do you support the idea of gender quotas? Why? Why Not?
8. What committees are female politicians more likely to serve on?
9. What two or three factors contributed or hindered your desire to run for political office?
10. What barriers do women face when expanding a female-based agenda?
11. What examples can you provide of how female representatives represent their female electorate?
12. What policy arenas are more women needed?
13. What do you think are the main obstacles or incentives of forms of assistance that make it easy/hard for women to be adequately represented within the legislature?
14. Based on your experience, what policy arenas have women found most success? Least success? Examples?

#### Part 4: Role of Outside Organizations

1. How often does your organization interact with government institutions? Do you receive contributions? Expertise? Do you offer these for in-kind donations?
2. At what level do governmental institutions collaborate with NGOs on gender policies?
3. What role should non-governmental organizations play when promoting women's access to political institutions?

#### Part 5: If you were in charge for a day

1. What are the 2 or 3 biggest stumbling blocks for women being able to participation in the decision making process?
2. What are the 2 or 3 most important changes you would like to see? How likely are these changes? Do you see differences among ethnicity or age groups?
3. Do you think that women's presence in parliament really does make a difference? How?
4. Have you personally promoted any policies that you think would increase the role of women within governmental institutions and civil society?

## **APPENDIX B**

### **Highlighted Excerpts from Kazakhstan's Constitution**

#### **Article 5**

3. Formation and functioning of public associations pursuing the goals or actions directed toward a violent change of the constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the Republic, undermining the security of the state, inciting social, racial, national, religious, class and tribal enmity, as well as formation of unauthorized paramilitary units shall be prohibited.

#### **Article 7**

1. The state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be the Kazak language.

#### **Article 13**

I. Everyone shall have the right to be recognized as subject of the law and protect his rights and freedoms with all means not contradicting the law including self-defense.

2. Everyone shall have the right to judicial defense of his rights and freedoms.

3. Everyone shall have the right to qualified legal assistance. In cases stipulated by law, legal assistance shall be provided free of charge.

#### **Article 14**

1. Everyone shall be equal before the law and court.

2. No one shall be subject to any discrimination for reasons of origin, social, property status, occupation, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude towards religion, convictions, place of residence or any other circumstances.

#### **Article 20**

2. Propaganda of or agitation for the forcible change of the constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the Republic, undermining of state security, and advocating war, social, racial, national, religious, class and clannish superiority as well as the cult of cruelty and violence shall not be allowed.

## **Article 32**

Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall have the right to peacefully and without arms assemble, hold meetings, rallies and demonstrations, street processions and pickets. The use of this right may be restricted by law in the interests of state security, public order, and protection of health, rights and freedoms of other persons.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>i</sup> Gulnara Dadabayeva, personal interview, August 30, 2013, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>ii</sup> Svetlana Shakirova, personal interview, September 3, 2013, personal home of the interviewee, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>iii</sup> Assiya Khairuulina, personal interview, September 4, 2013, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>iv</sup> Aigul Adibayeva, personal interview, September 3, 2013 KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>v</sup> SOROS Foundation member, personal interview, September 8, 2013, Local Office, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>vi</sup> Janel Bayastanova, personal interview, September 10, 2013, Street Bar, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>vii</sup> Assiya Khairuulina, personal interview, September 4, 2013, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>viii</sup> Aigul Adibayeva, personal interview, September 3, 2013 KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>ix</sup> Women's Entrepreneurship. September 14, 2013, local coffee house, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>x</sup> Assiya Khairuulina, personal interview, September 4, 2013, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xi</sup> Svetlana Shakirova, personal interview, September 3, 2013, personal home of the interviewee, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xii</sup> Female University Student Interviewee, September 12, 2013, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xiii</sup> Jessica Howard, personal email correspondence, September 3, 2013.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Aigul Adibayeva, personal interview, September 3, 2013 KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xv</sup> Svetlana Shakirova, personal interview, September 3, 2013, personal home of the interviewee, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xvi</sup> SOROS Foundation member, personal interview, September 8, 2013, Local Office, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Aigul Adibayeva, personal interview, September 3, 2013 KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Assiya Khairuulina, personal interview, September 4, 2013, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xix</sup> Women's Entrepreneurship, September 14, 2013, local coffee house, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xxxx</sup> Male students, September 12, 2013, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xxi</sup> Gulnara Dadabayeva, personal interview, August 30, 2013, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- <sup>xxii</sup> Aigul Adibayeva, personal interview, September 3, 2013 KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.